area handbook series Iraq a country study . .. . HE 11 ? ... hNI171 re M CUDA 2. 11. "I V2 .:25 TY OF Befir al Milf JORDAN 1 AAN 3 SAUDI ARABIA Boundary representation not necessarily authoritative 39 42 Figure 5. Topography and Drainage gives way to mountains ranging from 1,000 to nearly 4,000 meters near the Iranian and Turkish borders. Except for a few valleys, the mountain area proper is suitable only for grazing in the foothills 72 The Society and Its Environment Caspian Sea . 45 48 51 5 Lake Urmia - International boundary National capital Great 2 Marsh (e actin Pinam o Khazzan Darbandikhan Nahr al Uzaymer 25 50 25 100 Kilometers 50 100 Miles T o Diyala HbbTRAN Baghde 33 Shatt al Gharra Euphrates Al Qurnah Hawr al Hammar Ber * Shatt al Arab * 30 Al Faw KUWAIT Persian Gulf XIRAQ- SAUDI ARABIA ; NEUTRAL ZONE .. and steppes; adequate soil and rainfall, however, make cultivation possible. Here, too, are the great oil fields near Mosul and Kirkuk. The northeast is the homeland of most Iraqi Kurds. 73 Iraq: A Country Study The alluvial plain begins north of Baghdad and extends to the Persian Gulf. Here the Tigris and the Euphrates rivers lie above the level of the plain in many places, and the whole area is a delta interlaced by the channels of the two rivers and by irrigation canals. Intermittent lakes, fed by the rivers in flood, also characterize southeastern Iraq. A fairly large area (15,000 square kilometers) just above the confluence of the two rivers at Al Qurnah and extending east of the Tigris beyond the Iranian border is marsh- land, known as Hawr al Hammar, the result of centuries of flood- ing and inadequate drainage. Much of it is permanent marsh, but some parts dry out in early winter, and other parts become marsh- land only in years of great flood. Because the waters of the Tigris and the Euphrates above their confluence are heavily silt laden, irrigation and fairly frequent flood- ing deposit large quantities of silty loam in much of the delta area. Windborne silt also contributes to the total deposit of sediments. It has been estimated that the delta plains are built up at the rate of nearly twenty centimeters in a century. In some areas, major floods lead to the deposit in temporary lakes of as much as thirty centimeters of mud. The Tigris and the Euphrates also carry large quantities of salts. These, too, are spread on the land by flooding and by sometimes excessive irrigation. A high water table and poor surface and sub- surface drainage tend to concentrate the salts near the surface of the soil. In general, the salinity of the soil increases from Baghdad south to the Persian Gulf, a condition which severely limits produc- tivity in the region south of Al Amarah. The high degree of salinity is reflected in the large lake in central Iraq, southwest of Bagh- dad, known as Bahr al Milh (Sea of Salt). There are two other major lakes in the country to the north of Bahr al Milh, Buhayrat ath Tharthar and Buhayrat al Habbaniyah. The Euphrates originates in Turkey, is augmented by the Nahr al Khabur (or Khabur River) in Syria, and enters Iraq in the north- west. Here it is fed only by the wadis of the western desert during the winter rains. It then winds through a gorge, which varies from two to sixteen kilometers in width, until it flows out onto the plain at Ar Ramadi. Beyond there the Euphrates continues to the Hin- diyah Barrage, which was constructed in 1914 to divert the river into the Hindiyah Channel (the present-day Shatt al Hillah had been the main channel of the Euphrates before 1914). Below Al Kifl, the river follows two channels to As Samawah, where it reap- pears as a single channel to join the Tigris at Al Qurnah. The Tigris also rises in Turkey, but it is significantly augmented by several rivers in Iraq, the most important of which are the 74 The Society and Its Environment Khabur, the Great Zab, the Little Zab, and the Uzaym, all of which join the Tigris above Baghdad, and the Diyala, which joins it about thirty-six kilometers below the city. At the Kut Barrage much of the water is diverted into the Shatt al Gharraf, which was once the main channel of the Tigris. Water from the Tigris thus enters the Euphrates through the Shatt al Gharraf well above the confluence of the two main channels at Al Qurnah. Both the Tigris and the Euphrates break into a number of channels in the marshland area, and the flow of the rivers is substantially reduced by the time they come together at Al Qurnah. Moreover, the swamps act as silt traps, and the Shatt al Arab is relatively silt free as it flows south. Below Basra, however, the Karun River enters the Shatt al Arab from Iran, carrying large quantities of silt that present a continuous dredging problem in maintaining a clear chan- nel to enable ocean-going vessels to reach the port at Basra. This problem has been superseded by a greater obstacle to river traffic, however, namely the presence of several sunken hulks that have been rusting in the Shatt al Arab since early in the war. The waters of the Tigris and Euphrates are essential to the life of the country, but they may also threaten it. The rivers are at their lowest level in September and in October and are at flood in March, April, and May, when they may carry forty times as much water as at low mark. Moreover, one season's flood may be ten or more times as great as another's. In 1954, for example, Baghdad was seriously threatened, and dikes protecting it were nearly topped by the flooding Tigris. Since Syria built a dam on the Euphrates, the flow of water has been considerably diminished, and flooding was no longer a problem in the mid-1980s. In 1988 Turkey was also constructing a dam on the Euphrates that would further restrict the water flow. Until the mid-twentieth century, most efforts to control the waters were primarily concerned with irrigation. Some attention was given to problems of flood control and drainage before the July 14 Revo- lution in 1958, but development plans in the 1960s and the 1970s were increasingly devoted to these matters, as well as to irrigation projects on the upper reaches of the Tigris and the Euphrates and the tributaries of the Tigris in the northeast. During the war, government officials stressed to foreign visitors that, with the con- clusion of a peace settlement, problems of irrigation and flooding would receive top priority from the government. Settlement Patterns In the rural areas of the alluvial plain and in the lower Diyala region, settlement almost invariably clusters near the rivers, 75 The Society and Its Environment maintain life in the fastness of these overgrown, desolate areas while hiding out from the authorities. These deserters in many instances have formed into large gangs that raid the marsh communities. For this reason, many of the marsh dwellers have abandoned their villages. The war has also affected settlement patterns in the northern Kurdish areas. There, the persistence of a stubborn rebellion by Kurdish guerrillas has goaded the government into applying steadily escalating violence against the local communities. Starting in 1984, the government launched a scorched-earth campaign to drive a wedge between the villagers and the guerrillas in the remote areas of two provinces of Kurdistan in which Kurdish guerrillas were active. In the process, whole villages were torched and subsequently bulldozed, which resulted in the Kurds' flocking into the regional centers of Irbil and As Sulaymaniyah. Also as a military precau- tion, the government has cleared a broad strip of territory in the Kurdish region along the Iranian border of all its inhabitants, hop- ing in this way to interdict the movement of Kurdish guerrillas back and forth between Iran and Iraq. The majority of Kurdish villages, however, remained intact in early 1988. In the arid areas of Iraq to the west and to the south, cities and large towns are almost invariably situated on watercourses, usually on the major rivers or their larger tributaries. In the south, this dependence has had its disadvantages. Until the recent develop- ment of flood control, Baghdad and other cities were subject to the threat of inundation. The dikes needed for protection, moreover, have effectively prevented the expansion of the urban areas in some directions. The growth of Baghdad, for example, was restricted by dikes on its eastern edge. The diversion of water to the Milhat ath Tharthar and the construction of a canal transferring water from the Tigris north of Baghdad to the Diyala River have facili- tated both the irrigation of land outside the limits of the dikes and the expansion of settlement. Climate Roughly 90 percent of the annual rainfall occurs between Novem- ber and April, most of it in the winter months from December through March. The remaining six months, particularly the hot- test ones of June, July, and August, are dry. Except in the north and in the northeast, mean annual rainfall ranges between ten and seventeen centimeters. Data available from stations in the foothills and in the steppes south and southwest of the mountains suggest that there is mean annual rainfall of between thirty-two and fifty-seven centimeters for that area. Rainfall in the Iraq: A Country Study mountains is more abundant and may reach 100 centimeters a year in some places, but the terrain precludes extensive cultivation. Cul- tivation on nonirrigated land is limited essentially to the moun- tain valleys, foothills, and steppes, which have thirty or more centimeters of rainfall annually. Even in this zone, however, only one crop a year can be grown, and shortages of rain have often led to crop failures. Mean minimum temperatures in the winter range from near freezing (just before dawn) in the northern and northeastern foothills and the western desert to 2°C-3°C and 4°C-5°C in the alluvial plains of southern Iraq. They rise to a mean maximum of about 15.5°C in the western desert and in the northeast and of 16.6°C in the south. In the summer mean minimum temperatures range from about 22.2°C to about 29°C and rise to maximums between roughly 37.7°C and 43.3°C. Temperatures sometimes fall below freezing, and they have fallen as low as –14.4°C at Ar Rutbah in the western desert. They are more likely, however, to go over 46°C in the summer months, and several stations have records of more than 48°C. The summer months are marked by two kinds of wind. The southerly and southeasterly sharqi, a dry, dusty wind with occa- sional gusts of eighty kilometers an hour, occurs from April to early June and again from late September through November. It may last for only a day at the beginning and at the end of the season but for several days at other times. This wind is often accompa- nied by violent duststorms that may rise to heights of several thou- sand meters and that may close airports for brief periods. From mid-June to mid-September, the prevailing wind, called the shamal, is from the north and northwest. It is a steady wind, absent only occasionally during this period. The very dry air brought by this shamal permits intensive heating of the land surface by the sun, but the breeze has some cooling effect. The combination of rain shortage and extreme heat makes much of Iraq a desert. Because of very high rates of evaporation, soil and plants rapidly lose the little moisture obtained from the rain, and vegetation could not survive without extensive irrigation. Some areas, however, although arid, do have natural vegetation in con- trast to the desert. For example, in the Zagros Mountains in north- eastern Iraq there is permanent vegetation, such as oak trees, and date palms are found in the south. Population Although a census occurred in late 1987, only overall popula- tion totals and some estimates were available in early 1988. The 78 The Society and Its Environment latest detailed census information was that from the 1977 census. The total population increased from 12,029,000 in 1977 to 16,278,000 in 1987, an increase of 35.3 percent. The population has fluctuated considerably over the region's long history. Between the eighth century and the twelfth century A.D., Iraq-particularly Baghdad—was the flourishing center of a bur- geoning Arab civilization. At the height of the region's prosperity it may have supported a population much larger than the present society. (Some estimates range as high as 15 to 29 million people.) Decline came swiftly in the late thirteenth century, however, when Mongol conquerors massacred the populace, destroyed the cities, and ravaged the countryside. The elaborate irrigation system that had made possible agricultural production capable of supporting a large population was left in ruins. A pattern of alternating neglect and oppression characterized the Ottoman rule that began in the sixteenth century, and for hundreds of years the three wilayat (sing., wilayah, province) of Baghdad. Al Basrah, and Mosul - which the British joined to form Iraq in the aftermath of World War I-remained underpopulated backward outposts of the Ottoman Empire. In the mid-1800s, the area had fewer than 1.3 million inhabitants. When Iraq became independent in 1932, the departing British officials estimated the population at about 3.5 million. The first census was carried out in 1947; it showed a population of approxi- mately 4.8 million. The 1957 census gave a population figure of about 6.3 million, and the 1965 census returned a count of slightly above 8 million. The October 1977 census gave the annual rate of population growth as 3.2 percent. According to the October 1987 census, the annual population growth rate was 3.1 percent, which placed Iraq among those countries with high population growth rates (2.8 to 3.5 percent per year). In common with many developing coun- tries, Iraq's population was young; in 1987 approximately 57 per- cent of the population was under the age of twenty. The government has never sought to implement a birth control program, a policy reinforced by the war in order to offset losses in the fighting and to mitigate the threat from Iran, the population of which is roughly three times that of Iraq (see fig. 6). In 1977 about 64 percent of the population was listed as living in urban areas; this was a marked change from 1965, when only 44 percent resided in urban centers. In the 1987 government esti- mates, the urban population was given as 70 percent. The increase resulted in large measure from the migrations to the cities after the start of the war. The partial destruction of Basra by Iranian 79 Iraq: A Country Study AGE-GROUP MALES FEMALES 80 and over 75-79 70-74 65-69 60-64 55-59 50-54 45-49 40-44 35-39 30-34 25-29 20-24 15-19 10-14 5-9 0-4 1.5 750 750 1.5 POPULATION IN THOUSANDS Figure 6. Estimated Population Distribution by Age and Sex, 1987 artillery barrages has had a particularly devastating effect; by 1988, according to some well informed accounts, almost half the residents of the city—its population formerly estimated at 800,000—had fled. At the same time, approximately 95,000 persons were identified in the 1977 census as nomadic or seminomadic beduins; the apparent increase from the 57,000 listed in the 1957 census prob- ably reflects either an improved counting procedure or a change in classification. Overall, nomads and seminomads constituted less than 1 percent of the population, whereas in 1867 they had been estimated at about 500,000 or 35 percent of the population (see table 2, Appendix). The population remains unevenly distributed. In 1987 the Bagh- dad Governorate had a population density of about 745 persons per square kilometer; the Babylon Governorate, of 211 persons per square kilometer; and the Al Muthanna Governorate, of only 6.1 persons per square kilometer. In general the major cities are located on the nation's rivers, and the bulk of the rural population lives in the areas that are cultivated with water taken from the rivers (see table 3, Appendix). People Although the data are not absolutely reliable, the government 80 The Society and Its Environment Tonment estimates that 76 percent of the people are Arab; 19 percent are Kurds; while Turkomans, Assyrians, Armenians, and other rela- tively small groups make up the rest. All but a small percentage adhere to Islam. The Islamic component is split into two main sects, Sunni and Shia; the Shias are in the majority by far. Officially the government sets the number of Shias at 55 percent. In the 1980s, knowledgeable observers began to question this figure, regarding it as low. Because the government does not encourage birth con- trol and the Shias, the least affluent in society, have traditionally had the highest birthrate, a more reasonable estimate of their num- bers would seem to be between 60 and 65 percent. All but a few of the estimated 3,088,000 Kurds are Sunni, and thus the Sunni Arabs—who historically have been the dominant religious and eth- nic group-constitute a decided minority of only about 13 percent vis-à-vis the Shia majority (see fig. 7). Almost all Iraqis speak at least some Arabic, the mother tongue for the Arab majority. Arabic, one of the more widely spoken lan- guages in the world, is the mother tongue claimed in 1988 by over 177 million people from Morocco to the Arabian Sea. One of the Semitic languages, it is related to Aramaic, Phoenician, Syriac, Hebrew, various Ethiopic languages, and the Akkadian of ancient Babylonia and Assyria. Throughout the Arab world, the language exists in three forms: the Classical Arabic of the Quran; the literary language developed from the classical and referred to as Modern Standard Arabic, which has virtually the same structure wherever used; and the spoken lan- guage, which in Iraq is Iraqi Arabic. Educated Arabs tend to be bilingual-in Modern Standard Arabic and in their own dialect of spoken Arabic. Even uneducated Arabic speakers, who in Iraq constitute about 60 percent of the population, can comprehend the meaning of something said in Modern Standard Arabic, although they are unable to speak it. Classical Arabic, apart from Quranic texts, is known chiefly to scholarly specialists. Most of the words of Arabic's rich and extensive vocabulary are variations of triconsonantal roots, each of which has a basic mean- ing. The sounds of Arabic are also rich and varied; they include some made in the throat and back of the larynx which do not occur in the major Indo-European languages. Structurally there are important differences between Modern Standard Arabic and spoken Arabic, such as the behavior of the verb: the voice and the tense of the verb are indicated by different internal changes in the two forms. In general the grammar of spoken Arabic is simpler than that of Modern Standard Arabic, having dropped many noun declensions and different forms of the relative pronoun for the 81 Iraq: A Country Study TURKEY Lake Urmia Boundary representotion not necessarily authoritative 0 0 50 100 kilometers 50 100 Miles 50 MOSU Sinjar Sulaymaniyah SYRIA Manda IRAN Baghdad Ramadi JORDAN Karbala all Amarah SAUDI ARABIA An Najaf Tigris River Euphrates River An 11 Nasiriyah MAJORITY GROUPS Sunni Arab Sunni Kurd Shia Arab Sunni Arab and Sunni Kurd Sunni Arab and Shia Arab Basrd IRAQ- SAUDI ARABIA NEUTRAL ZONE MINORITY GROUPS Yazidi t Christian Turkoman SA Persian O KUWAIT Gulf Figure 7. Ethnic and Religious Distribution, 1988 different genders. Some dialects of spoken Arabic do not use spe- cial feminine forms of plural verbs. Dialects of spoken Arabic vary greatly throughout the Arab world. Most Iraqis speak one common to Syria, Lebanon, and parts of Jordan and—as is true of people speaking other dialects—they proudly regard theirs as the best. Although they converse in Iraqi Arabic, there is general agreement that Modern Standard Arabic, the written language, is superior to the spoken form. Arabs gener- ally believe that the speech of the beduins resembles the pure clas- sical form most closely and that the dialects used by the settled villagers and townspeople are unfortunate corruptions. Kurds Kurds represent by far the largest non-Arab ethnic minority, numbering about 3.1 million in 1987. They are the overwhelming 82 The Society and Its Environment majority in the governorates of As Sulaymaniyah, Irbil, and Dahuk. Although the government hotly denies it, the Kurds are almost cer- tainly also a majority in the region around Kirkuk, Traq's richest oil-producing area. Kurds are settled as far south as Khanaqin. Ranging across northern Iraq, the Kurds are part of the larger Kurdish population (probably numbering close to 16 million) that inhabits the wide arc from eastern Turkey and the northwestern part of Syria through Soviet Azarbaijan and Iraq to the northwest of the Zagros Mountains in Iran. Although the largest numbers (variously estimated at between 3 and 10 million) live in Turkey, they are most active politically in Iraq. The Kurds inhabit the highlands and mountain valleys, and tradi- tionally they have been organized on a tribal basis. In the past, it was correct to distinguish the various communities of Kurds according to their tribal affiliation. To a large extent this was still true in the 1980s; tribes like the Herkki, the Sorchi, and the Zibari have maintained a powerful cohesion. Increasingly, however, groups of Kurds organized along political lines have grown up alongside the tribal units. Hence, the most northern and north- eastern areas of Iraq are heavily infiltrated by elements of the so-called Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP-see The Emergence of Saddam Hasayn, 1968-79, ch. 1). The area surrounding Kirkuk and extending south to Khanaqin is the preserve of the Faili Kurds, who, unlike the majority of Kurds, are Shias. Many of the Faili Kurds belong to the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK). The far northwestern region of Iraq around Sinjar is spotted with enclaves claimed by the Iraqi Communist Party (ICP), and the majority of its cadres are composed of Kurds. Once mainly nomadic or seminomadic, Kurdish society was characterized by a combination of urban centers, villages, and pastoral tribes, from at least the Ottoman period. Historical sources indicate that, from the eighteenth century onward, Kurds in Iraq were mainly peasants engaged in agriculture and arboriculture. By the nineteenth century, about 20 percent of Iraqi Kurds lived in historic Kurdish cities such as Kirkuk, As Sulaymaniyah, and Irbil. The migration to the cities, particularly of the young intel- ligentsia, helped develop Kurdish nationalism. Since the early 1960s, the urban Kurdish areas have grown rapidly. Kurdish migration—in addition to being part of the general trend of urban migration-was prompted by the escalating armed conflict with the central authorities in Baghdad, the destruction of villages and land by widespread bombing, and such natural disasters as a severe drought in the 1958 to 1961 period. In addi- tion to destroying traditional resources, the severe fighting has 83 Iraq: A Country Study hindered the development of education, health, and other ser- vices. The historic enmity between the Kurds and the central Arab government has contributed to the tenacious survival of Kurdish culture. The Kurds' most distinguishing characteristic, and the one that binds them to one another, is their language. There are several Kurdish dialects, of which Kirmanji (also seen as Karamanji) tends to be the standard written form as well as the language spoken by the northern group of Kurds (Kurdi or Sorani is spoken by the central group of Kurds.) Kurdish is not a mere dialect of Farsi or Persian, as many Iranian nationalists maintain, but one of the three major Iranian languages. The other two are Persian and Pashto (the Pathan language of eastern Afghanistan and parts of West Pakistan). It is not a variant of the Semitic or Turkic tongues but a separate language, part of the Indo-European family. The Kurds have been locked in an unremittingly violent strug- gle with the central government in Baghdad almost since the found- ing of the Iraqi republic in 1958 (see Internal Developments and Security, ch. 5). It appeared in the early 1970s that the dissident Kurds—under the generalship of the legendary leader Mullah Mustafa Barzani-might actually carve out an independent Kurd- ish area in northern Iraq. In 1975, however, the shah of Iran- the Kurds' principal patron-withdrew his support of the Kurds as part of the Algiers Agreement between Tehran and Baghdad, leading to a sharp decline in the Kurdish movement. The signing bf the Algiers Agreement caused a breakaway faction to emerge from the KDP, led by Masud Barzani, the son of Mullah Mustafa Barzani. The faction that left the KDP in opposition to the agree- ment formed the PUK under Jalal Talabani. The PUK continued to engage in low-level guerrilla activity against the central govern- ment in the period from 1975 to 1980. The war between Iraq and Iran that broke out in 1980 afforded the PUK and other Iraqi Kurd- ish groups the opportunity to intensify their opposition to the government. The future of the Kurds in Iraq is uncertain because of the war. In 1983 the KDP spearheaded an Iranian thrust into northern Iraq, and later its cadres fanned out across the border area adjacent to Turkey where they established a string of bases. Meanwhile, Talabani’s PUK has maintained a fighting presence in the Kirkuk region, despite ruthless attempts by the central government to dis- lodge them. Thus, as of early 1988, most of the northern areas of Iraq-outside the major cities—were under the control of the guer- rillas. On the one hand, if the present government in Iraq survives the war—which in early 1988 seemed likely—it is almost certain 84 wo A Kurd from Salah ad Din Courtesy Mokhless Al-Hariri to punish those Kurds who collaborated with the Iranians. On the other hand, a number of large and powerful Kurdish tribes as well as many prominent Kurds from nontribal families have continued to support the central government throughout the war, fighting against their fellow Kurds. These loyal Kurds will expect to be rewarded for their allegiance once the war ends. Other Minorities The Yazidis are of Kurdish stock but are distinguished by their unique religious fusion of elements of paganism, Zoroastrianism, Christianity, and Islam. They live in small and isolated groups, mostly in the Sinjar Mountains west of Mosul. They are impover- ished cultivators and herdsmen, who have a strictly graded religiopolitical hierarchy and who tend to maintain a more closed community than other ethnic or religious groups. Historically, they have been subject to sharp persecution because of their heretical beliefs and practices. The Turkomans, who are believed to constitute somewhat less than 2 percent of the population, are village dwellers in the north- east, along the border between the Kurdish and Arab regions. A number of Turkomans live in the city of Irbil. The Turkomans, who speak a Turkish dialect, have preserved their language, but they are no longer tribally organized. Most are Sunnis who were brought in by the Ottomans to repel tribal raids. These early 85 Iraq: A Country Study Turkomans were settled at the entrances of the valleys that gave access to the Kurdish areas. This historic pacification role has led to strained relations with the Kurds. By 1986 the Turkomans num- bered somewhere around 222,000, and they were being rapidly assimilated into the general population. The Assyrians are considered to be the third largest ethnic minority in Iraq. Although official Iraqi statistics do not refer to them as an ethnic group, they are believed to represent about 133,000 persons, or less than 1 percent of the population. Descen- dants of ancient Mesopotamian peoples, they speak Aramaic. The Assyrians live mainly in the major cities and in the rural areas of northeastern Iraq, where they tend to be professionals and business- men or independent farmers. They are Christians, belonging to one of four churches: the Chaldean (Uniate), the Nestorian, the Jacobite or Syrian Orthodox, and the Syrian Catholic. There is also a small number of Armenians. Religious Life Although members of the ruling Baath (Arab Socialist Resur- rection) Party generally are ideologically committed to secularism, about 95 percent of Iraqis äre Muslim, and Islam is the officially recognized state religion. Islam came to the region with the victory of the Muslim armies, under Caliph Umar, over the Sassanids, in A.D. 637 at the battle of Al Qadisiyah. The majority of inhabit- ants, including the Kurds, soon became Muslim, although small communities of Christians and Jews remained intact in the area of present-day Iraq. Iraq has been the scene of many important events in the early history of Islam, including the schism over the rightful successor to the Prophet Muhammad. Islam Islam is a system of religious beliefs and an all-encompassing way of life. Muslims believe that God (Allah) revealed to the Prophet Muhammad the rules governing society and the proper conduct of society's members. It is incumbent on the individual, therefore, to live in a manner prescribed by the revealed law and incumbent on the community to build the perfect human society on earth according to holy injunctions. Islam recognizes no distinctions between church and state. The distinction between religious and secular law is a recent development that reflects the more pro- nounced role of the state in society, and Western economic and cultural penetration. The impact of religion on daily life in Muslim countries is far greater than that found in the West since the Mid- dle Ages. 86 The Society and Its Environment The Ottoman Empire organized society around the concept of the millet, or autonomous religious community. The non-Muslim “People of the Book” (Christians and Jews) owed taxes to the government; in return they were permitted to govern themselves according to their own religious law in matters that did not con- cern Muslims. The religious communities were thus able to preserve a large measure of identity and autonomy. The Iraqi Baath Party has been a proponent of secularism. This attitude has been maintained despite the fact that the majority of Iraqis are deeply religious. At the same time, the Baathists have not hesitated to exploit religion as a mobilizing agent, and from the first months of the war with Iran, prominent Baathists have made a public show of attending religious observances. Iraq's Presi- dent Saddam Husayn is depicted in prayer in posters displayed throughout the country. Moreover, the Baath has provided large sums of money to refurbish important mosques; this has proved a useful tactic in encouraging support from the Shias. Islam came to Iraq by way of the Arabian Peninsula, where in A.D. 610, Muhammad-a merchant of the Hashimite branch of the ruling Quraysh tribe in the Arabian town of Mecca-began to preach the first of a series of revelations granted him by God through the angel Gabriel. A fervent monotheist, Muhammad denounced the polytheism of his fellow Meccans. Because the town's economy was based in part on a thriving pilgrimage business to the shrine called the Kaaba and to numerous other pagan religious sites in the area, his censure earned him the enmity of the town's leaders. In 622 he and a group of followers accepted an invitation to settle in the town of Yathrib, later known as Medina (the city), because it was the center of Muhammad's activities. The move, or hijra (see Glossary), known in the West as the hegira, marks the beginning of the Islamic era and of Islam as a force in history; the Muslim calendar begins in 622. In Medina, Muhammad con- tinued to preach, and he eventually defeated his detractors in bat- tle. He consolidated the temporal and the spiritual leadership in his person before his death in 632. After Muhammad's death, his followers compiled those of his words regarded as coming directly from God into the Quran, the holy scriptures of Islam. Others of his sayings and teachings, recalled by those who had known him, became the hadith (see Glossary). The precedent of Muhammad's personal behavior is called the sunna. Together they form a com- prehensive guide to the spiritual, ethical, and social life of the orthodox Sunni Muslim. The duties of Muslims form the five pillars of Islam, which set forth the acts necessary to demonstrate and reinforce the faith. These 87 Great Mosque in the Shia holy city of An Najaf Courtesy Matson Collection prophets beginning with Abraham and including Moses and Jesus, was chosen by God to present His message to humanity; and there is a general resurrection on the last, or judgment, day. During his lifetime, Muhammad held both spiritual and tem- poral leadership of the Muslim community. Religious and secular law merged, and all Muslims have traditionally been subject to sharia, or religious law. A comprehensive legal system, sharia developed gradually through the first four centuries of Islam, primarily through the accretion of interpretations and precedents set by various judges and scholars. During the tenth century, legal opinion began to harden into authoritative rulings, and the figura- tive bab al ijtihad (gate of interpretation) closed. Thereafter, rather than encouraging flexibility, Islamic law emphasized maintenance of the status quo. After Muhammad's death, the leaders of the Muslim commu- nity consensually chose Abu Bakr, the Prophet's father-in-law and one of his earliest followers, to succeed him. At that time some per- sons favored Ali ibn Abu Talib, Muhammad's cousin and the hus- band of his daughter Fatima, but Ali and his supporters (the Shiat Ali, or party of Ali) eventually recognized the community's choice. The next two caliphs (successors)—Umar, who succeeded in 634, and Uthman, who took power in 644-enjoyed the recognition of the entire community. When Ali finally succeeded to the caliphate 89 Iraq: A Country Study in 656, Muawiyah, governor of Syria, rebelled in the name of his murdered kinsman Uthman. After the ensuing civil war, Ali moved his capital to Iraq, where he was murdered shortly thereafter. Ali's death ended the last of the so-called four orthodox caliphates and the period in which the entire community of Islam recognized a single caliph. Muawiyah proclaimed himself caliph from Damas- cus. The Shiat Ali refused to recognize him or his line, the Umay- yad caliphs, and withdrew in the great schism to establish the dissident sect, known as the Shias, who supported the claims of Ali's line to the caliphate based on descent from the Prophet. The larger faction, the Sunnis, adhered to the position that the caliph must be elected, and over the centuries they have represented them- selves as the orthodox branch. Sunnis Originally political, the differences between Sunni and Shia interpretations rapidly took on theological and metaphysical over- tones. In principle, a Sunni approaches God directly: there is no clerical hierarchy. Some duly appointed religious figures, however, exert considerable social and political power. Imams usually are men of importance in their communities, but they need not have any formal training; among the beduins, for example, any tribal member may lead communal prayers. Committees of socially prominent worshipers usually administer mosque-owned land and gifts. In Iraq, as in many other Arab countries, the administra- tion of waqfs (religious endowments) has come under the influ- ence of the state. Qadis (judges) and imams are appointed by the government. The Muslim year has two religious festivals-Id al Adha, a sacri- ficial festival on the tenth of Dhu al Hijjah, the twelfth, or pil- grimage, month; and Id al Fitr, the festival of breaking the fast, which celebrates the end of Ramadan on the first of Shawwal, the tenth month. To Sunnis these are the most important festivals of the year. Each lasts three or four days, during which people put on their best clothes and visit, congratulate, and bestow gifts on each other. In addition, cemeteries are visited. Id al Fitr is celebrated more joyfully, as it marks the end of the hardships of Ramadan. Celebrations also take place, although less extensively, on the Prophet's birthday, which falls on the twelfth of Rabi al Awwal, the third month, and on the first of Muharram, the beginning of the new year. With regard to legal matters, Sunni Islam has four orthodox schools that give different weight in legal opinions to prescriptions in the Quran, to the hadith or sayings of the Prophet Muhammad, 90 Iraq: A Country Study Among Shias the term imam traditionally has been used only for Ali and his eleven descendants. None of the twelve Imams, with the exception of Ali, ever ruled an Islamic government. During their lifetimes, their followers hoped that they would assume the rulership of the Islamic community, a rule that was believed to have been wrongfully usurped. Because the Sunni caliphs were cognizant of this hope, the Imams generally were persecuted under the Umay- yad and Abbasid dynasties. Therefore, the Imams tried to be as unobtrusive as possible and to live as far as was reasonable from the successive capitals of the Islamic empire. During the eighth century, the Caliph Al Mamun, son and suc- cessor to Harun ar Rashid, was favorably disposed toward the descendants of Ali and their followers. He invited Imam Reza, the Eighth Imam (765-816), to come from Medina (in the Arabian Peninsula) to his court at Marv (Mary in the present-day Soviet Union). While Reza was residing at Marv, Al Mamun designated him as his successor in an apparent effort to avoid conflict among Muslims. Reza's sister Fatima journeyed from Medina to be with her brother, but took ill and died at Qom, in present-day Iran. A major shrine developed around her tomb and over the centuries Qom has become a major Shia pilgrimage and theological center. Al Mamun took Reza on his military campaign to retake Bagh- dad from political rivals. On this trip, Reza died unexpectedly in Khorasan. Reza was the only Imam to reside in, or die in, what in now Iran. A major shrine, and eventually the city of Mashhad, grew up around his tomb, which has become the most important pilgrimage center in Iran. Several important theological schools are located in Mashhad, associated with the shrine of the Eighth Imam. Reza's sudden death was a shock to his followers, many of whom believed that Al Mamun, out of jealousy for Reza's increasing popularity, had had the Imam poisoned. Al Mamun's suspected treachery against Imam Reza and his family tended to reinforce a feeling already prevalent among his followers that the Sunni rul- ers were untrustworthy. The Twelfth Imam is believed to have been only five years old when the Imamate descended upon him in 874 at the death of his father. Because his followers feared he might be assassinated, the Twelfth Imam was hidden from public view and was seen only by a few of his closest deputies. Sunnis claim that he never existed, or that he died while still a child. Shias believe that the Twelfth Imam never died, but disappeared from earth in about 939. Since that time, the greater occultation of the Twelfth Imam has been in force, which will last until God commands the Twelfth Imam 92 WWW The Haidar Khana Mosque, Baghdad Courtesy Matson Collection Close-up of the minaret of the Haidar Khana Mosque, Baghdad Courtesy Matson Collection 93 Iraq: A Country Study to manifest himself on earth again as the Mahdi or Messiah. Shias believe that during the occultation of the Twelfth Imam, he is spiritually present-some believe that he is materially present as well—and he is besought to reappear in various invocations and prayers. His name is mentioned in wedding invitations, and his birthday is one of the most jubilant of all Shia religious observances. The Shia doctrine of the Imamate was not fully elaborated until the tenth century. Other dogmas were developed still later. A characteristic of Shia Islam is the continual exposition and reinter- retation of doctrine. A further belief of Shia Muslims concerns divine justice and the individual's responsibility for his acts, which are judged by a just God. This contrasts with the Sunni view that God's creation of man allows minimal possibility for the exercise of free will. A significant practice of Shia Islam is that of visiting the shrines of Imams both in Iraq and in Iran. These include the tomb of Imam Ali in An Najaf and that of his son Imam Husayn in Karbala, because both are considered major Shia martyrs. Before the 1980 Iran Iraq War, tens of thousands went each year. The Iranians have made it a central aim of their war effort to wrest these holy cities from the Iraqis. Other principal pilgrimage sites in Iraq are the tombs of the Seventh Imam and the Ninth Imam at Kazimayn near Baghdad and in Iran, respectively, the tomb of the Eighth Imam in Mashhad and that of his sister in Qom. Such pilgrimages originated in part from the difficulty and the expense of making the hajj to Mecca in the early days. In commemoration of the martyrdom of Husayn, killed near Karbala in A.D. 680 during a battle with troops supporting the Umayyad caliph, there are processions in the Shia towns and vil- lages of southern Iraq on the tenth of Muharram (Ashura), the anniversary of his death. Ritual mourning (taaziya) is performed by groups of five to twenty men each. Contributions are solicited in the community to pay transportation for a local group to go to Karbala for taaziya celebrations forty days after Ashura. There is great rivalry among groups from different places for the best per- formance of the passion plays. In the villages, religious readings occur throughout Ramadan and Muharram. The men may gather in the mudhif (tribal guest- house), the suq (market), or a private house. Women meet in homes. The readings are led either by a mumin (a man trained in a religious school in An Najaf), or by a mullah who has apprenticed with an older specialist. It is considered the duty of shaykhs (see Glossary), elders, prosperous merchants, and the like to sponsor these read- ings, or qirayas. Under the monarchy these public manifestations 94 The Society and Its Environment were discouraged, as they emphasized grievances against the Sunnis. Two distinctive and frequently misunderstood Shia practices are mutah, temporary marriage, and taqiyah, religious dissimulation. Mutah is a fixed-term contract that is subject to renewal. Practiced by the first community of Muslims at Medina, it was banned by the second caliph. Mutah differs from permanent marriage in that it does not require divorce to terminate it. It can be for a period as short as an evening or as long as a lifetime. The offspring of such an arrangement are the legitimate heirs of the man. Taqiyah, condemned by the Sunnis as cowardly and irreligious, is the hiding or disavowal of one's religion or its practices in order to escape the danger of death from those opposed to the faith. Persecution of Shia Imams during the Umayyad and Abbasid caliphates reinforced the need for taqiyah. Shia practice differs from that of Sunnis concerning both divorce and inheritance in that it is more favorable to women. The reason for this reputedly is the high esteem in which Fatima, the wife of Ali and the daughter of the Prophet, was held. Like Sunni Islam, Shia Islam has developed several sects. The most important of these is the Twelver or Ithna-Ashari sect, which predominates not only in Iraq but in the Shia world generally. Broadly speaking, the Twelvers are considered political quietists as opposed to the Zaydis, who favor political activism, and the Ismailis, who are identified with esoteric and gnostic religious doc- trines. Within Twelver Shia Islam there are two major legal schools, the Usuli and the Akhbari. Akhbaris constitute a very small group and are found primarily around Basra and in southern Iraq as well as around Khorramshahr in Iran. The dominant Usuli school is more liberal in its legal outlook; it allows greater use of interpreta- tion (ijtihad) in reaching legal decisions; and it considers that one must obey a mujtahid (learned interpreter of the law) as well as an Imam. Sunni-Shia Relations in Iraq Until the 1980s, the dominant view of contemporary political analysts held that Iraq was badly split along sectarian lines. The claim was that the Sunnis-although a minority-ran Iraq and sub- jected the majority Shias to systematic discrimination. According to the prevailing belief, the Shias would drive the Sunnis from power, if once afforded an opportunity to do so. There was some basis to this notion. For many years Iraq was ruled by and large by Arab Sunnis who tended to come from a restricted area around Baghdad, Mosul, and Ar Rutbah-the 95 Iraq: A Country Study so-called Golden Triangle. In the 1980s, not only was President Saddam Husayn a Sunni, but he was the vice chairman of the rul- ing Baath Party. One of the two deputy prime ministers and the defense minister were also Sunnis. In addition, the top posts in the security services have usually been held by Sunnis, and most of the army's corps commanders have been Sunnis. It is also true that the most depressed region of the country is the south, where the bulk of the Shias reside. Nonetheless, the theory of sectarian strife was undercut by the behavior of Iraq's Shia community during Iran's 1982 counter- invasion and the fighting thereafter. Although about three-quarters of the lower ranks of the army was composed of Shias, as of early 1988 no general insurrection of Iraqi Shias had occurred. - Even in periods of major setbacks for the Iraqi army—such as he Al Faw debacle in 1986—the Shias have continued to defend their nation and the Baath regime staunchly. They have done so despite intense propaganda barrages mounted by the Iranians, call- ing on them to join the Islamic revolution. It appears, then, that, however important sectarian affiliation may have been in the past, in the latter 1980s nationalism was the basic determinant of loyalty. In the case of Iraq's Shias, it should be noted that they are Arabs, not Persians, and that they have been the traditional enemies of the Persians for centuries. The Iraqi government has skillfully exploited this age-old enmity in its propaganda, publicizing the war as part of the ancient struggle between the Arab and Persian empires. For example, Baathist pub- licists regularly called the war a modern day “Al Qadisiyah.” Al Qadisiyah was the battle in 637 in which the Arabs defeated the pagan hosts of Persia, enabling Islam to spread to the East. The real tension in Iraq in the latter 1980s was between the majority of the population, including Sunnis as well as Shias, for whom religious belief and practice were significant values, and the secular Baathists, rather than between Sunnis and Shias. Although the Shias were underrepresented in government posts in the period of the monarchy, they made substantial progress in the education, business, and legal fields. Their advancement in other areas, such as the opposition parties, was such that in the years from 1952 to 1963, before the Baath Party came to power, Shias held the majority of party leadership posts. Observers believed that in the late 1980s Shias were represented at all levels of the party roughly in propor- tion to government estimates of their numbers in the population. For example, of the eight top Iraqi leaders who in early 1988 sat with Saddam Husayn on the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC)— Iraq's highest governing body-three were Arab Shias 96 Iraq: A Country Study nomadic people of Iraqi society. This prolonged process of seden- tarization was disrupted by the dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire during and after World War I, but it resumed with renewed intensity in the British mandate period, when the political struc- ture of independent Iraq was formed (see World War I and the British Mandate, ch. 1). This threefold transformation of rural society-pastoral to agricultural, subsistence to commercial, tribal- communal to landlord-peasant-was accompanied by important shifts in urban society as well. There was a general increase in the number of market towns and in the size of their populations, but the destruction of handicraft industries, especially in Baghdad, by the import of cheap manufactured goods from the West, led to an absolute decline in the population of urban centers. It also indelibly stamped the subsequent urban growth with a mercantile and bureaucratic-administrative character that is still a strong feature of Iraqi society. Thus, the general history of Iraqi population dynamics in the modern era can be described as a period extending from the mid- dle of the nineteenth century to World War II, characterized chiefly by urbanization, with a steady and growing movement of people from the rural (especially southern) region to the urban (especially y central) region. Furthermore, the basic trends of the 1980s are rooted in the particularly exploitive character of agricultural prac- tices in regard to both the land itself and the people who work it. Declining productivity of the land, stemming from the failure to develop drainage along the irrigation facilities and from the wretched condition of the producers, has resulted in a potentially harmful demographic trajectory—the depopulation of the coun- tryside—that in the late 1980s continued to thwart government efforts to reverse the decades-long pattern of declining productivity in the agricultural sector. The accelerated urbanization process since World War II is starkly illustrated in the shrinking proportion of the population liv- ing in rural areas: 61 percent in 1947, decreasing to 56 percent in 1965, then 36 percent in 1977, and an estimated 29.5 percent in 1987; concurrently, between 1977 and 1987, the urban popula- tion rose from 7,646,054 to an estimated 11,483,000. The rural exodus has been most severe in Al Basrah and Al Qadisiyah gover- norates. The proportion of rural to urban population was lowest in the governorates of Al Basrah (37 percent in 1965, and 12 per- cent in 1987) and Baghdad (48 percent in 1965 and 7 percent in 1987). It was highest in Dhi Qar Governorate where it averaged 49 percent in 1987, followed closely by Al Muthanna and Diyala governorates, each with a rural population of 48 percent of total 1 98 Christian church, Baghdad Courtesy Ronald L. Kuipers population. Between 1957 and 1987, the population of Baghdad and Al Basrah governorates grew by 73 percent and 41 percent respectively. During the same years, the city of Baghdad grew by 87 percent, and the city of Basra grew by 64 percent. Because of the war, the growth of Al Basrah Governorate has been reversed while that of Baghdad Governorate has accelerated alarmingly to the 1987 census figure for urban Baghdad of 3,600,000. Iranian forces have mounted an offensive each year of the war since 1980, except for early 1988, seeking to capture Basra and the adjoining area and subjecting the city to regular bombard- ment. As a result, large numbers of the population have fled north- ward from Basra and other southern areas, and many have entered Baghdad, which was already experiencing overcrowding. The government has attempted to deal with this situation by moving war refugees out of the capital and resettling them in other smaller cities in the south, out of the range of the fighting. Rural Society Rural Iraq contains aspects of the largely tribal mode of social organization that prevailed over the centuries and still survived in the 1980s—particularly in the more isolated rural areas, such as the rugged tableland of the northwest and the marshes of the south. The tribal mode probably originated in the unstable social condi- tions that resulted from the protracted decline of the Abbasid 99 Iraq: A Country Study Caliphate (A.D. 750-1258) and the subsequent cycles of invasion and devastation. In the absence of a strong central authority and of the urban society of a great civilization, society developed into smaller units under conditions that placed increasing stress on prowess, deci- siveness, and mobility. Under these conditions, the tribal shaykhs emerged as a warrior class, and this development facilitated the ascendancy of the fighter-nomad over the cultivator. The gradual sedentarization that began in the mid-nineteenth century brought with it an erosion of the power of shaykhs and a disintegration of the tribal system. Under the British mandate, and the monarchy that was its creation, a reversal took place. Despite the continued decline of the tribe as a viable and organic social entity, the enfeebled power of the shaykhs was restored and was enhanced by the British. This was done to develop a local rul- ing class that could maintain security in the countryside and could otherwise head off political challenges to British access to Iraq's mineral and agricultural resources and Britain's paramount role in the Persian Gulf shaykhdoms (see World War I and the British Mandate, ch. 1). Specifically, through the implementation of land registration, the traditional pattern of communal cultivation and pasturage-with mutual rights and duties between shaykhs and tribesmen—was superseded in some tribal areas by the institution of private property and by the shaykhs' expropriation of tribal lands as private estates. The status of the tribesmen was in many instances reduced drastically, to that of sharecroppers and laborers. The additional ascription of judicial and police powers to the shaykh and to his retinue left the tribesmen-cum-peasants as virtual serfs, continuously in debt and in servitude to the shaykh turned land- lord and master. The social basis for the shaykhs' power had been transformed from military valor and moral rectitude to the pos- session of wealth as embodied in vast landholdings and in a claim to the greater share of the peasants' production. This change was the social dimension of the transformation from a subsistence, pastoral economy to an agricultural economy linked to the world market. It was, of course, an immensely complicated process, and conditions varied in different parts of the country. The main impact was in the southern half—the riverine economy, more than in the sparsely populated, rain-fed northern area. A more elaborate analysis of this process would have to look specifically at the differences between Kurdish and Arab shaykhs, between political and religious leadership functions, between Sunni and Shia shaykhs, and between nomadic and riverine shaykhs, all within their ecological settings. In general the biggest estates developed 100 The Society and Its Environment nians in areas restored to cultivation through dam construction and by pump irrigation after World War I. The most autocratic exam- ples of shaykhly power were in the rice-growing region near Al Amarah, where the need for organized and supervised labor and the rigorous requirements of rice cultivation generated the most oppressive conditions. The role of the tribe as the chief politico-military unit was already well eroded by the time the monarchy was overthrown in July 1958. The role of some tribal shaykhs had been abolished by the central government. The tribal system survived longest in the mid- Euphrates area, where many tribesmen had managed to register small plots in their own names and had not become mere tenants of the shaykh. In such settings, an interesting amalgam developed of the traditional customs of the tribes and the more modern prac- tices of the civil servants sent to rural regions by the central government—both influenced by the expanded government edu- cation system. For example, the government engineer responsible for the water distribution system, although technically not a major administrator, in practice became the leading figure in rural areas. He would set forth requirements for the cleaning and the main- tenance of the canals (see Agriculture, ch. 3), and the tribal shaykh would see to it that the necessary manpower was provided. This service, in the minds of tribesmen, replaced the old customary obligation of military service that they owed to the shaykh and was not unduly onerous. It could readily be combined with work on their own grazing or producing lands, and it benefited the tribe as a whole. The government administrators usually avoided becoming involved in legal disputes that might result from water rights, leaving the disputes to be settled by the shaykh in accor- dance with traditional tribal practices. Thus, despite occasional ten- sions in such government-tribe relationships, the power of the central government gradually expanded into regions where Bagh- dad's influence had previously been slight or absent. Despite the erosion of the historic functions of tribal organiza- tion, the prolonged absence of alternative social links has helped to preserve the tribal character of individual and group relations. The complexity of these relations is impressive. Even in the southern, irrigated part of the country there are notable differences between the tribes along the Tigris, subject to Iranian influences, and those of the Euphrates, whose historic links are with the Arab beduin tribes of the desert. Since virtually no ethnographic studies on the Tigris peoples existed in the late 1980s, the following is based chiefly on research in the Euphrates region. 101 Iraq: A Country Study The tribe represents a concentric social system linked to the clas- sical nomadic structure but modified by the sedentary environment and limited territory characteristic of the modern era. The primary unit within the tribe is the named agnatic lineage several genera- tions deep to which each member belongs. This kinship unit shares responsibilities in feuds and in war; it restricts and controls mar- riage within itself; and it jointly occupies a specified share of tribal land. The requirements of mutual assistance preclude any signifi- cant economic differentiation, and authority is shared among the older men. The primary family unit rests within the clan, com- posed of two or more lineage groups related by descent or adop- tion. The clans are units of solidarity in disputes with other clans in the tribe, although there may be intense feuding among the line- age groups within the clan. The clan also represents a shared ter- ritorial interest, because the land belonging to the component lineage groups customarily is adjacent. A clan, nevertheless, can switch its allegiance from its ancestral tribal unit to a stronger, ascen- dant tribe. Several clans united under a single shaykh form a tribe (ashira). This traditionally has been the dominant politico-military unit although, because of unsettled conditions, tribes frequently band together in confederations under a paramount shaykh. The degree of hierarchy and of centralization operative in a given tribe seems to correlate with the length of time it has been sedentary: the Bani Isad, for example, which has been settled for several centuries, is much more centralized than the Ash Shabana, which has been sedentary only since the end of the nineteenth century. In the south, only the small hamlets scattered throughout the cultivated area are inhabited solely by tribesmen. The most widely spread social unit is the village, and most villages have resident tradesmen (ahl as suq-people of the market) and government employees. The lines between these village dwellers and the tribes- people, at least until just before the war, were quite distinct, although the degree varied from place to place. As the provision of education, health, and other social services to the generally impoverished rural areas increases, the number and the social influence of these nontribal people increase. Representatives of the central government take over roles previously filled by the shaykh or by his representatives. The government school competes with the religious school. The role of the merchants as middlemen- buyers of the peasants' produce and providers of seeds and imple- ments as well as of food and clothing—has not yet been superseded in most areas by government-sponsored cooperatives and exten- sion agencies. Increasingly in the 1980s, government employees 102 The Society and Its Environment were of local or at least rural origin, whereas in the 1950s they usually were Baghdadis who had no kinship ties in the region, who wore Western clothing, and who viewed their assignments as exile and as punishment. In part, the administrators initially provoked the mutual antagonism that later flourished between them and the peasants, particularly as Sunni officials were often assigned to Shia villages. The merchants, however, were from the some region-if not from the same village-and were usually the sons of merchants. Despite some commercial developments in rural areas, in the late 1980s the economic base was still agriculture and, to a lesser but increasing extent, animal husbandry. Failure to resolve the tech- nical problem of irrigation drainage contributed to declining rural productivity, however, and accentuated the economic as well as the political role of the central government. The growth of villages into towns-and whatever other signs of recent prosperity there were-should be viewed, therefore, more as the result of greater government presence than as locally developed economic viability. The increased number of government representatives and employees added to the market for local produce and, more impor- tant, promoted the diffusion of state revenues into impoverished rural areas through infrastructure and service projects. Much remained to be done to supply utilities to rural inhabitants; just before the war, the government announced a campaign to provide such essentials as electricity and clean water to the villages, most of which still lacked these (see Electricity, ch. 3). The government has followed through on several of these projects—particularly in the south-despite the hardships caused by the war. The regime apparently felt the need to reward the southerners, who had suffered inordinately in the struggle. Impact of Agrarian Reform One of the most significant achievements of the fundamentally urban-based revolutionary regime of Abd al Karim Qasim (1958– 63) was the proclamation and partial implementation of a radical agrarian reform program. The scope of the program and the drastic shortage of an administrative cadre to implement it, coupled with political struggles within the Qasim regime and its successor regimes, limited the immediate impact of the program to the expropriation stage. The largest estates were easily confiscated, but distribution lagged owing to administrative problems and to the wasted, saline character of much of the land expropriated; moreover, landlords could choose the best of the lands to keep for themselves. The impact of the reforms on the lives of the rural masses can only be surmised on the basis of uncertain official statistics and 103 Iraq: A Country Study of rare observations and reports by outsiders, such as officials of the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization. The development of cooperatives, especially their capacity as market- ing agents, was one of the most obvious failures of the program, although there were isolated instances of success. In some of these instances, traditional elders were mobilized to serve as coopera- tive directors, and former sirkals, clan leaders who functioned as foremen for the shaykhs, could bring a working knowledge of local irrigation needs and practices to the cooperative. The continued impoverishment of the rural masses was evident, however, in the tremendous migration that continued, through the 1960s, 1970s, and into the 1980s, from rural to urban areas. Accord- ing to the Ministry of Planning, the average rate of internal migration from the countryside increased from 19,600 a year in the mid-1950s to 40,000 a year in the 1958 to 1962 period. A study of 110 villages in the Nineveh and Babylon governorates concluded that depressed rural conditions and other variables-rather than job opportunities in the modern sector-accounted for most of the migration. There was little doubt that this massive migration and land reform reduced the number of landless peasants. The most recent compre- hensive tenurial statistics available before the war broke out-the Agricultural Census of 1971—put the total farmland (probably meaning cultivable land, rather than land under cultivation) at more than 5.7 million hectares, of which more than 98.2 percent was privately owned. About 30 percent of this had been distributed under the agrarian reform. The average size of the holdings was about 9.7 hectares, but 60 percent of the holdings were smaller than 7.5 hectares, which accounted for less than 14 percent of the total area. At the other end of the scale, 0.2 percent of the holdings were 250 hectares or larger, which amounted to more than 14 per- cent of the total. Fifty-two percent of the total was owner-operated, 41 percent was farmed under rental agreements, 4.8 percent was worked by squatters, and only 0.6 percent was sharecropped. The status of the remaining 1.6 percent was uncertain. On the basis of limited statistics released by the government in 1985, the amount of land distributed since the inception of the reform program totaled 2,271,250 hectares (see Land Tenure and Agrarian Reform, ch. 3). Political instability throughout the 1960s hindered the implemen- tation of the agrarian reform program, but after seizing power in 1968 the Baath regime made a considerable effort to reactivate it. Law No. 117 (1970) further limited the maximum size of hold- ings, eliminated compensation to the landowner, and abolished pay- ments by beneficiaries, thus acknowledging the extremity of peasant indebtedness and poverty. 104 The Society and Its Environment The reform created a large number of small holdings. Given the experience of similar efforts in other countries, foreign observers have surmised that a new stratification has emerged in the coun- tryside, characterized by the rise of middle-level peasants who, either directly or through their leadership in the cooperatives, control much of the agricultural machinery and its use. Membership in the ruling Baath Party is an additional means of securing access to, and control over, such resources. Prior to the war, the party seemed to have few roots in the countryside, but, after the ascent of Saddam Husayn to the presidency in 1979, a determined effort was made to build bridges between the party cadre in the capital and in the provinces. It is noteworthy that practically all party offi- cials promoted to the second echelon of leadership at the 1982 party congress had distinguished themselves by mobilizing party support in the provinces. Even before the war, migration created serious labor shortages. In the 1980s, as the war has driven whole communities to seek refuge in the capital, this shortage has been exacerbated. The government has attempted to compensate for this shortage by importing turnkey projects with foreign professionals. In the Kurd- ish areas of the north, however-and to a degree in the southern region infested by deserters—the safety of foreign personnel has been difficult to guarantee; therefore, many projects have had to be temporarily abandoned. Another government strategy for cop- ing with the labor shortage caused by the war has been to import Egyptian workers. It has been estimated that as many as 1.5 mil- lion Egyptians have found employment in Iraq since the war began. Urban Society Iraq's society just before the outbreak of the war was undergoing profound and rapid social change that had a definite urban focus. The city has historically played an important economic and politi- cal role in the life of Middle Eastern societies, and this was cer- tainly true in the territory that is present-day Iraq. Trade and commerce, handicrafts and small manufactures, and administra- tive and cultural activities have traditionally been central to the economy and to the society, notwithstanding the overwhelmingly rural character of most of the population. In the modern era, as the country, and particularly its commercial and administrative sectors, witnessed a growing involvement with the world market, the growth of a few urban centers, notably Baghdad and Basra, has been astounding. The war, however, has altered this pattern of growth remarkably—in the case of Baghdad accelerating it, and in the case of Basra shrinking it considerably. 105 w A cafe in Baghdad Courtesy Mokhless Al-Hariri These slums became a special target of Qasim's government. Efforts were directed at improving the housing and living condi- tions of the sarifah dwellers. Between 1961 and 1963, many of these settlements were eliminated, and their inhabitants were moved to two large housing projects on the edge of the city-Madinat ath Thawra and An Nur. Schools and markets were also built, and sanitary services were provided. In time, however, Madinat ath Thawra and An Nur, too, became dilapidated, and just before the war Saddam Husayn ordered Madinat ath Thawra rebuilt as Sad- dam City. This new area of low houses and wide streets has radi- cally improved the life-styles of the residents, the overwhelming majority of whom were Shias who had migrated from the south. Another striking feature of the initial waves of migration to Bagh- dad and to other urban centers is that the migrants have tended to stay, bringing with them whole families. The majority of migrants were peasant cultivators, but shopkeepers, petty traders, and small craftsmen came as well. Contacts with their points of rural origin were not totally severed, and return visits were fairly common, but reverse migration was extremely rare. At least initially, there was a pronounced tendency for migrants from the same village to relo- cate in clusters to ease the difficulties of transition and to maintain traditional patterns of mutual assistance. Whether this pattern has continued into the war years is not known, but it seems likely. A 107 Iraq: A Country Study number of observers have reported neighborhoods in the capital that have been formed on the basis of village or even tribal origin. An instance of the abrupt population shifts-although in the reverse direction-was that of the Iraqi Jews. The establishment of the state of Israel led to the mass exodus of this community in 1950, to be replaced by Shia merchants and traders, many of whom were descendants of Iranian immigrants from the heavily Shia popu- lated areas of the south. The urban social structure has evolved gradually over the years. In prerevolutionary Iraq it was dominated by a well-defined rul- ing class that was concentrated in Baghdad. This was an internally cohesive group, distinguished from the rest of the population by its considerable wealth and political power. The economic base of this class was landed wealth, but during the decades of the British mandate and of the monarchy, as landlords acquired commercial interests and merchants and government officials acquired real estate, a considerable intertwining of families and interests occurred. The result was that the Iraqi ruling class could not be easily sepa- rated into constituent parts: the largest commercial trading houses were controlled by families owning vast estates; the landowners were mostly tribal shaykhs but included many urban notables, government ministers, and civil servants. Moreover, the landown- ing class controlled the parliament, which tended to function in the most narrowly conceived interest of these landlords. There was a small but growing middle class in the 1950s and the 1960s that included a traditional core of merchants, shopkeep- ers, craftsmen, professionals, and government officials, their num- bers augmented increasingly by graduates from the school system. During the monarchy education had been the only area that was relatively independent of British advisers, and thus it was expanded as a conspicuous manifestation of government response to popu- lar demand. It was completely oriented toward preparing people for white-collar, middle-class occupations. Within this middle class, and closely connected to the commercial sector, was a small indus- trial bourgeoisie whose interests were not completely identical with those of the more traditional sector. Iraq's class structure at midcentury was characterized by great instability. In addition to the profound changes occurring in the countryside, there were the economic and social disruptions caused by the shortages and the spiraling inflation brought on by World War II. A few people made fortunes, but for most there was depri- vation and, as a consequence, there was great social unrest. Long- time Western observers compared the situation of the urban masses unfavorably with conditions in the last years of Ottoman rule. 108 The Society and Its Environment The trend of urban growth, which had begun in the days imme- diately preceding the revolution, took off in the mid-1970s, when the effects of the sharp increases in the world price of oil began to be felt. Oil revenues poured into the cities, where they were invested in construction and in real estate speculation. The dis- satisfied peasantry then found even more cause to move to the cities because jobs—mainly in construction-were available, and even part-time, unskilled labor was an improvement over conditions in the countryside. As for the elite, the oil boom of the 1970s brought greater diver- sification of wealth, some of which went to those attached to the land, and some to those involved in the regime, in commerce, and, increasingly, in manufacturing. The working class grew, but it was largely fragmented. Only a relatively small number were employed in businesses with ten or more workers, including those in the ser- vice sector. Between the elite and the working masses was the lower middle class of petite bourgeoisie. This traditional component con- sisted of the thousands of employees of small handicraft shops, which made up a huge part of the so-called manufacturing sector, and the even more numerous owners of one-man stores. The newer and more rapidly expanding part of this class consisted of profes- sionals and semiprofessionals who were employed in the service and public sectors, including the officer corps, and the thousands of students looking for jobs. This class became particularly signifi- cant in the 1980s because former members of it have become the nation's elite. Perhaps the most important aspect of the growth of the public sector was the expansion of education facilities, which put pressure on the regime to find white-collar jobs for graduates in the noncommodity sectors. Stratification and Social Classes The prerevolutionary political system, with its parliament of land- lords and hand-picked government supporters, was increasingly incompatible with the changing social reality that accompanied growing urban-based economic activity fueled by oil revenues. The faction of the elite investing in manufacturing, the petite bour- geoisie, and the working classes pressured the state to represent their interests. As the armed forces came to reflect this shift in the balance of social forces, radical political change became inevitable. The social origins and the political inclinations of the Free Officers (see Glossary) who carried out the 1958 overthrow of the monar- chy as well as the various ideological parties that supported and succeeded them clearly reflect the middle-class character of the Iraqi revolution. Both the agrarian reform program and the protracted 109 Iraq: A Country Study campaign against the foreign oil monopoly were aimed at restruc- turing political and eonomic power in favor of the urban-based mid- dle and lower classes. The political struggle between the self-styled radicals and the moderates in the 1960s chiefly concerned the role of the state and of the public sector in the economy: the radicals promoted a larger role for the state, and the moderates wanted to restrict it to the provision of basic services and of physical infra- structure. There was a shift in the distribution of income after 1958 at the expense of the large landowners and the businessmen and in favor of the salaried middle class and, to a lesser degree, the wage earn- ers and small farmers. The Baath Party, in power since July 1968, represented the lower stratum of the middle class, the sons of small shopkeepers and of petty officials, and the graduates of training schools, law schools, and military academies. In the 1980s, the rul- ing class tended to be composed of high- and middle-echelon bureaucrats who either had risen through the ranks of the party or who had been coopted into the party because of their technical competence, i.e., technocrats. The elite also consisted of army officers, whose wartime loyalty the government has striven to retain by dispensing material rewards and gifts. The government's practice of lavishing rewards on the military has also affected the lower classes. Martyrs' benefits under the Baath have been extremely generous. Thus, the families of youths killed in battle could expect to receive at least an automobile and more likely a generous pension for life. Family and Society Kinship groups are the fundamental social units, regulating many activities that in Westernized societies are the functions of politi- cal, economic, religious, or neighborhood groups. Rights and obligations center on the extended family and on the lineage. The family remains the primary focus of loyalty; and it is in its con- text, rather than in the broader one of corporate loyalties defined by sectarian, ethnic, or economic considerations, that the majority of Iraqis find the common denominators of their everyday lives. A mutually protective attitude among relatives is taken as a mat- ter of course. Relatives tend to be preferred as business partners because they are believed to be more reliable than people over whom one does not have the hold of kinship ties. Deeply ingrained family loyalty also manifests itself at higher levels of business and public life. The characteristic form of family organization involves a large group of kinsmen who are related to one another through descent and marriage, that is, an extended family usually consisting of three 110 Public transportation in Baghdad Courtesy Mokhless Al-Hariri generations. The members of such an extended family may all live together, which is the more traditional pattern, or they may reside in separate nuclear families, but still share the values and func- tions of an extended family, such as depending upon one another and deferring to the older generations. As Iraqi society has become increasingly urbanized, however, the tendency toward nuclear family social organization, as opposed to mere nuclear family resi- dence, has become more prevalent. The status of an individual is traditionally determined by the position of his or her family in society and the individual's position within that group. The family transmits the values and the standards of behavior of the society to its members, and it holds them responsible for each other's con- duct. It traditionally determines occupations and selects marriage partners. Kinsmen also cooperate in economic endeavors, such as farming or trade, and ownership of land and other assets frequently is vested in the group as a whole. The sharpest degree of diver- gence from these patterns occurs among educated, urban Iraqis, an ever-increasing proportion of the society. Until 1959, family life was subject only to the regulation of reli- gious law and of tradition. All Muslims were brought under a sin- gle body of family law for the first time in 1959 with the enactment of a secular law on personal status, based on sharia, statutes from other Islamic countries, and legal precedents established in Iraqi 111 Iraq: A Country Study courts; a brief amendment of the law was enacted in 1963. The law spells out provisions governing the right to contract marriage, the nature of the contract, the economic rights of the partners, divorce and child custody, as well as bequests and inheritance. The basic structural unit of the family consists of a senior cou- ple, their sons, the sons' wives and children, and unmarried daugh- ters. Other dependent relatives may also be attached to the group. The senior male is the head of the family; he manages its proper- ties and has the final voice in decisions. Kinsmen are organized into still larger groups. The next level of organization is the line- age, composed of all persons, male and female, who trace their descent from a common ancestor. The number of generations by which this ancestor is removed from the oldest living one varies; a depth of four to six generations is usual. Individuals or whole families of other descent sometimes attach themselves to a particular lineage in an arrangement of mutual advantage, becoming recognized after several generations as full members of the lineage on equal terms with those born into it. In small villages, most people are likely to belong to the same lineage; in larger ones, two or more lineages may be represented, but lin- eage ties are tempered by economic cooperation, by intermarriage, and by the authority of the village leadership or elders. Among nontribal Iraqis, kinship organization and traditions of common descent do not go beyond the lineage. Awareness of distant ties is keen among recent migrants to the cities and among the rural population. In rural areas, new households are not usually set up until many years after the initial recognition of a marriage. In general, the wife moves in with her husband's parents, where the young cou- ple remains for some time. Often this arrangement is maintained until the death of the father. Even when the father dies, the brothers sometimes stay together, forming joint family households that include themselves, their wives, and their children. The actual number of persons who make up the household is determined by the family's economic circumstances, its pattern of living, and its mode of habitation. In an agricultural setting, as long as ownership of land and other possessions is vested in the family as a whole, the possibilities for a young man's being able to set up an independent household are limited. In urban centers, on the other hand, young men can avail themselves of wage-earning employment. Authority within the family is determined by seniority and by gender. The father, in theory, has absolute authority over the activi- ties of the members of the household, both within the confines of 112 The Society and Its Environment the house and outside it. He decides what education his children will receive, what occupations his sons will enter, and, usually in consultation with his wife, whom his children will marry. These authority patterns also have been greatly weakened in the urban environment and by the shift of more and more responsibilities from the family to larger social institutions, such as the schools. An even greater change in the traditional pattern of male domi- nance has been brought about by the war. Because Iraq is numeri- cally a much smaller nation than Iran, it has experienced considerable difficulty in maintaining an adequate defense on the battlefront. In order to field a sufficient force, it has had to draw down the available labor pool on the home front, and, to compen- sate for this, it has mobilized women. In the mid-1980s, observers reported that in many ministries the overwhelming proportion of employees were women. Foreign contractors have encountered women supervisors on huge construction projects, women doctors in the hospitals, and even women performing law enforcement roles. This emancipation-extraordinary for an Arab country-was sanc- tioned by the government, which issued a significant amount of propaganda publicizing the role of women in helping to win the war. The government further maintained that after the war women would be encouraged to retain their newfound work roles; this was doubtful, however, because in the same breath the government declared its determination to increase the birthrate. The Muslim majority has traditionally regarded marriage as primarily a civil contract between two families, arranged by par- ents after negotiations that may be prolonged and conducted by an intermediary. The arrangement of a marriage is a family mat- ter in which the needs and the position of the corporate kin group are primary considerations. Prospective partners are often known to each other, and they frequently come from the same village and the same kin group. Among educated urban dwellers, the tradi- tional pattern of contracting marriage is giving way to a pattern in which the young people make their own choices, but parents must still approve. With regard to marriage and to divorce, the 1959 Law of Per- sonal Status, amended in 1963, liberalized various provisions that affected the status of women; in practice, however, the Iraqi judiciary up until the revolution tended to be conservative in applying the provisions of the law. Specifically, Iraqi law required that divorce proceedings be initiated in a court of law, but the hus- band still had the controlling role in dissolving the marriage. A man who wanted to marry a second wife was required first to get approval from the court. Provision was also made for the custody 113 olo o SEPSPBESPACE P09.89 S UR SHRI Tertas University of Baghdad Courtesy Mokhless Al-Hariri 115 Iraq: A Country Study The second level, also of six years, consisted of an intermediate- secondary level and an intermediate-preparatory level, each of three years. Graduates of these schools could enroll in a vocational school, in one of the teacher training schools or institutes, or in one of the various colleges, universities, or technical institutes. The number of students enrolled in primary and in secondary schools was highest in the central region and lowest in the north, although the enrollment in the northern schools was only slightly lower than that in the southern. Before the war, the government had made considerable gains in lessening the extreme concentra- tion of primary and of secondary educational facilities in the main cities, notably Baghdad. Vocational education, which had been notoriously inadequate in Iraq, received considerable official atten- tion in the 1980s. The number of students in technical fields has increased more than 300 percent since 1976–77, to more than 120,090 in the academic year 1985-86. The Baath regime also seemed to have made progress since the late 1960s in reducing regional disparities, although these were far from being eliminated and no doubt were more severe than statis- tics would suggest. Baghdad, for example, was the home of most education facilities above the secondary level; it was the site not only of the University of Baghdad, which in the academic year 1985-86 (the most recent year for which statistics were available in early 1988) had 44,307 students, but also of the Foundation of Technical Institutes with 34,858 students, the University of Al Mustansiriyah with 14,886 students, and the University of Tech- nology with 7,378 students. The University of Basra, the Univer- sity of Mosul, and the University of Salah ad Din in Irbil, taken together, enrolled 28 percent of all students in higher education in the academic year 1985-86. The number of students seeking to pursue higher education in the 1980s increased dramatically. Accordingly, in the mid-1980s the government made plans to expand the University of Salah ad Din. In addition, in January 1988, the government created four more public universities, at Tikrit in the central area, at Al Kufah and at Al Qadisiyah in the south, and at Al Anbar in the west. Details of these universities were not known. The outbreak of the war posed a difficult dilemma for the govern- ment regarding education. Despite the shortage of wartime man- power, the regime was unwilling to tap the pool of available university students, arguing that these young people were Iraq's hope for the future. As of early 1988, therefore, the government routinely exempted students from military service until gradua- tion, a policy it has adhered to rigorously. This policy, however, 116 The Society and Its Environment has probably caused resentment among the poorer classes and among those forced to serve multiple tours at the front because of continuing manpower shortages. Health In the 1980s, almost all medical facilities continued to be con- trolled by the government, and most physicians were Ministry of Health officials. Curative and preventive medical services in government-controlled hospitals and dispensaries as well as the ser- vices of government physicians were free of charge. The ministry included the directorates of health, preventive medicine, medical supplies, rural health services, and medical services. The inspec- tor general of health, under the ministry, was charged with the enforcement of health laws and regulations. Private medical prac- tice and private hospitals and clinics were subject to government supervision. In each province, Ministry of Health functions were carried out by a chief medical officer who, before the war, frequently had a private practice to supplement his government salary. Provin- cial medical officers were occupied mainly with administrative duties in hospitals, clinics, and dispensaries. The work of medical officers in the rural areas before the war was seriously curtailed by lack of transportation. One of the most serious problems facing the Ministry of Health in the prewar period was its shortage of trained personnel. The shortage was accentuated by the fact that most medical personnel tended to be concentrated in the major cities, such as Baghdad and Basra. Physicians trained at government expense were required to spend four years in the public health service, but they strongly resisted appointments to posts outside the cities and made every effort to return to Baghdad. In 1985, the latest year for which detailed statistics were avail- able in early 1988, Baghdad Governorate, which had about 24 per- cent of the population, had just over 36 percent of the country's hospital beds, 18 percent of the government clinics, and 31 per- cent of the paramedical personnel. The increasing number of clinics in the provinces brought some rudimentary health care within reach of the rural population. At the same time, given the unsettled con- ditions in the Kurdish areas, it was likely that health care in the northern provinces had deteriorated since the start of the war (see table 5, Appendix). Published information concerning sanitation and endemic diseases was scanty. Reportedly, in the mid-1980s Iraq had a high incidence of trachoma, influenza, measles, whooping cough, and tuberculosis; it had, however, made substantial progress in 117 Iraq: A Country Study sin villas ollution controlling malaria. Prior to the war, poor sanitation and polluted water sources were principal factors in the spread of disease. A large percentage of the population lived in villages and in towns that were along irrigation canals and along rivers polluted with human and animal wastes. These waterways, together with the stagnant pools of water that sometimes constituted the village reservoir, were the major sources of drinking water and of water for bathing, laun- dering, and washing food. The periodic flooding of rivers contami- nated water supplies and spread waterborne diseases. The Tigris and Euphrates rivers and their tributaries serve as water sources for Baghdad and for some of the major provincial towns. Irbil and As Sulaymaniyah, located in the northern moun- tains, have adequate supplies of spring water. In Basra, Mosul, and Kirkuk the water is stored in elevated tanks and is chemically treated before distribution. In Baghdad, the water is filtered, chlo- rinated, and piped into homes or into communal fountains located throughout the city. In the smaller towns, however, the water supply is unprotected and is only rarely tested for potability. Welfare Iraq, with its socialist economy, pays considerable attention to welfare. This regard for social benefits has been increased by the war. No statistics were available in early 1988 by which to judge the scope of benefits paid by the government to its servicemen and to their families. Nonetheless, journalistic reports indicated that martyrs' benefits—for the families of war dead-and subsidies for young men who volunteer for service tended to be extremely gener- ous. A family that had lost a son in the fighting could expect to be subsidized for life; in addition, it was likely to receive loans from the state bank on easy terms and gifts of real estate. Minimal information was available in early 1988 concerning social welfare coverage. The most recent published data was that for 1985, when the government gave a figure of 703,776 workers. In addition, pensions were paid to retirees and to disabled persons, and compensation was given to workers for maternity and for sick leave. Observers anticipated that once the war with Iran ended, the government would devote greater attention to improving health and social welfare services. Although a number of first rate military analyses of Iraq and of the war have appeared since 1980, there has been little useful research on social change. Much of the information that would make 118 The Society and Its Environment up such studies has been withheld by the government because of wartime censorship, and in some cases material that has been made available appears to be untrustworthy. A number of classics, there- fore, continue to be required reading for those interested in the society of Iraq. Wilfred Thesiger's The Marsh Arabs graphically depicts life among the southern Shias in the mid-and late 1950s. Robert Fernea's Shaykh and Effendi describes social conditions in the central Euphrates valley and Elizabeth Fernea's Guests of the Sheik deals with the role of women particularly. A classic historical treatment of the Kurdish question is found in Edmund Ghareeb's The Kurdish Question in Iraq. The latest work on the subject is The Kurds: An Unstable Element in the Gulf by Stephen Pelletiere. For an excellent treatment of the Baathist elite see The Old Social Classes and the Revolutionary Movements of Iraq by Hanna Batatu. Also on the same topic is Iraq, Eastern Flank of the Arab World by Christine Helms. For the best all-around treatment of Iraq in the recent period, see Phebe Marr's The Modern History of Iraq. (For further information and complete citations, see Bibliography.) 119 Chapter 3. The Economy 10 2.40 10 EDE K. j....: ...::;- .:. Watermelons for sale in the marketplace Iraq: A Country Study US$226 billion. This figure was disaggregated into US$120.8 bil- lion in gross domestic product (GDP-see Glossary) lost in the oil sector, US$64 billion GDP lost in the nonoil sector, US$33 billion lost in destroyed matériel, and US$8.2 billion lost in damage to non-oil sector fixed capital investment. Included in the lost GDP was US$65.5 in lost oil revenues and US$43.4 billion in unreal- ized fixed capital investment. As the 1980s progressed, the Iran-Iraq conflict evolved into a protracted war of attrition, in which Iran threatened to overwhelm Iraq by sheer economic weight and manpower. Although Iraq implemented some cost-cutting measures, the government feared that an austerity plan would threaten its stability, so it turned to outside sources to finance the war. Iraq's Persian Gulf neighbors assumed a larger share of the economic burden of the war, but as the price of oil skidded in the mid-1980s, this regional support of Iraq diminished. For the first time, Iraq turned to Western credi- tors to finance its deficit spending. Iraq's leadership calculated cor- rectly that foreign lenders, both government and private, would be willing to provide loans and trade credit to preserve their access to the Iraqi economy, which would emerge as a major market and an oil supplier after the war. But the sustained slump in oil prices made foreign creditors more skeptical of Iraq's long-term economic prospects, and some lenders apparently concluded that providing more loans to Iraq amounted to throwing good money after bad. Some creditors were also wary of Iraq's postwar prospects because of Iranian demands for tens of billions of dollars in reparations as the price for any peace settlement. Although Iraq would probably pay only a fraction of the reparations demanded (and that, most likely, with the help of other Persian Gulf countries), a large set- tlement would nonetheless delay Iraq's postwar economic recovery. In 1988, as the war entered its eighth year and Iraq's debt topped US$50 billion, the government was implementing comprehensive economic reforms it had announced in 1987. Iraq's new economic policy was designed to reverse twenty years of socialism by relin- quishing considerable state control over the economy to the pri- vate sector. It was not immediately clear if this move would result in a fundamental and enduring restructuring of Iraq's economy, or if it was merely a stopgap measure to boost productivity, to cut costs, to tap private sector savings, and to reassure Western creditors. Growth and Structure of the Economy In the 1960s, investment in industry accounted for almost one- quarter of the development budget, about twice the amount spent 124 The Economy under the monarchy in the 1950s. After the 1968 Baath revolu- tion, the share allocated to industrial development grew to about 30 percent of development spending. With the advent of the Iran- Iraq War, however, this share decreased to about 18 percent. Devel- opment expenditure on agriculture fell from about 40 percent under the prerevolutionary regime to about 20 percent under the Baath regime in the early 1970s. By 1982, investment in agriculture was down to 10 percent of the development budget. Total Iraqi GDP, as well as sectoral contribution to GDP, could only be estimated in the 1980s. On the eve of the Iran-Iraq War, the petroleum sector dominated the economy, accounting for two- thirds of GDP. The outbreak of war curtailed oil production, and by 1983 petroleum contributed only one-third of GDP. The non- petroleum sector of the economy also shrank, and, as a consequence, total real GDP dropped about 15 percent per year from 1981 to 1983. To a lesser extent, nominal GDP also shrank, from about US$20 billion to US$18 billion, an indication of high wartime infla- tion. The decline in GDP was reversed between 1984 and 1986, when oil production grew at about 24 percent per year as the government secured outlets and resumed exports. But over the same period, the nonpetroleum sector of the economy continued to con- tract by about 6 percent per year, offsetting gains from increased oil production. In 1986, the petroleum sector revived to the extent that it contributed about 33.5 percent of GDP, while the nonpetro- leum sector, including services, manufacturing, and agriculture, accounted for the remainder. Business services, the largest com- ponent of nonpetroleum GDP, amounted to about 23 percent of GDP. Agriculture accounted for about 7.5 percent of GDP, min- ing and manufacturing for slightly less than 7 percent, construc- tion for almost 12 percent, transportation and communications for about 4.5 percent, and utilities for between 1 and 2 percent. The total estimated GDP for 1986 was equivalent to US$35 billion. Projections based on economic trends indicated that total GDP would grow about 6 percent annually over the five-year period from 1987 to 1991. In fact, however, 1987 GDP was estimated at a 1.7 percent real growth rate. The petroleum sector would continue to grow, although at a slower rate of about 8 percent per year, and it would account for more than half of GDP. The nonpetroleum sector was expected to resume modest growth in 1987. Construc- tion would be the fastest growing sector, at about 7 percent per year. Agriculture would grow only marginally, and therefore its share of overall GDP would decline from 1986 levels. Other non- petroleum sectors would grow at a rate of between 3 and 4 percent per year and, because these projected growth rates were smaller 125 Iraq: A Country Study than the overall GDP growth rate, would likewise decline as a per- centage of total GDP. In early 1988, Iraq's total external liabilities were difficult to determine accurately because the Iraqi government did not pub- lish official information on its debt. Moreover, Iraqi debt was divided into a number of overlapping categories according to the type of lender, the terms of disbursement or servicing, and the dis- position of the funds. For example, some loans were combined with aid grants in mixed credits, and some loans were authorized but never disbursed. And, in a process of constant negotiation with its creditors, Iraq had deferred payment by rescheduling loans. Finally, some loans were partially repaid with oil in counter-trade and barter agreements. Nevertheless, experts estimated that Iraqi debt in 1986 totaled between US$50 billion and US$80 billion. Of this total, Iraq owed about US$30 billion to Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the other Gulf states. Most of this amount was derived from crude oil sales on Iraq's behalf. Iraq promised to provide reim- bursement in oil after the war, but the Gulf states were expected to waive repayment. A second important category of debt was that owed to official export credit agencies. The authoritative Wharton Econometric Forecasting Associates estimated in 1986 that Iraqi debt guaranteed by export credit agencies totalled US$9.3 billion, of which US$1.6 billion was short-term debt and US$7.7 billion was medium-term debt. In the category of private sector debts, Iraq owed up to US$7 billion to private companies that had not secured the trade credit they extended to Iraq with their government export credit agen- cies. The firms that were owed the most were based in Turkey, in the Republic of Korea (South Korea), and in India, which lacked access to official export credit guarantees. European companies were also owed large amounts. By the late 1980s, Iraq had placed a pri- ority on settling these private sector debts. In addition, Iraq owed an estimated US$6.8 billion to commercial banks as of mid-1986, although much of this sum was guaranteed by government export credit agencies. In the realm of government debts, Iraq had accrued considera- ble debts to Western governments for its purchases of military matériel. Iraq owed France more than US$1.35 billion for weapons, which it was repaying by permitting Elf-Aquitaine and Compagnie Française des Pétroles-Total (CFP)-two oil companies affiliated with the French government—to lift 80,000 barrels of oil per day from the Dortyol terminal near Iskenderun, Turkey. Finally, Iraq owed money to the Soviet Union and to East European nations. 126 The Economy Iraq's debt to the Soviet Union was estimated at US$5 billion in 1987. The Role of Government Following the Baath Party's accession to power in 1968, the gov- ernment began using central planning to manage the national econ- omy. The government separated its expenditures into three categories: an annual expenditure budget for government opera- tions, an annual investment budget to achieve the goals of the five- year plans, and an annual import budget. Economic planning was regarded as a state prerogative, and thus economic plans were con- sidered state secrets. The government rarely published budget or planning information, although information on specific projects, on total investment goals, and on productivity was occasionally released. Extremely high revenues from oil exports in the 1970s made budgeting and development planning almost irrelevant in Iraq. The responsibility of the state was not so much to allocate scarce resources as to distribute the wealth, and economic planning was concerned more with social welfare and subsidization than with economic efficiency. One consistent and very costly development goal was to reduce the economy's dependence on a single extrac- tive commodity-oil-and, in particular, to foster heavy industry. Despite this objective, in 1978 the government began an attempt to rationalize the non-oil sector. The process of cost-cutting and streamlining entailed putting a ceiling on subsidization by mak- ing state-run industries and commercial operations semiautono- mous. The expenditures of such public entities were not aggregated into the governmental expenditure budget. Instead, state-run com- panies were given their own budgets in an attempt to make them more efficient. Because Iraqi economic development planning was predicated on massive expenditure, the onset of the Iran-Iraq War in 1980 brought central planning to an impasse. Despite an effort to main- tain the momentum of its earlier development spending, the govern- ment was forced to revert to ad hoc planning as it adjusted to limited resources and to deficit spending. Economic planning became not just a perceived national security issue, but a real one, as the govern- ment devoted its attention and managerial resources to obtaining credits. The Fourth Five-Year Plan (1981-85) was suspended, and as of early 1988, the Fifth Five-Year Plan (1986-90) had not been formulated. In early 1987, President Saddam Husayn abruptly reversed the course of Iraq's economic policy, deviating sharply from the 127 Iraq: A Country Study socialist economic ideology that the government had propounded since the 1968 Baath revolution. Saddam Hussayn advocated a more open, if not free, market, and he launched a program of exten- sive reform. Because the liberalization was aimed primarily at deal- ing with the nation's mounting and increasingly unmanageable war debt, Saddam Husayn's motivation was more strategic than eco- nomic. He had four related goals—to conserve money by cutting the costs of direct and of indirect government subsidies, to tap pri- vate sector savings and to stem capital outflow by offering credi- ble investment opportunities to Iraqi citizens, to reduce the balance of payments deficit by fostering import substitution and by promot- ing exports, and to use the reforms to convince Western commer- cial creditors to continue making loans to Iraq. The reform process began with Revolutionary Command Coun- cil (RCC) Decree Number 652, which in May 1987 abolished Iraq's labor law. This law had institutionalized the differences among white-collar, blue-collar, and peasant workers. Under the law, every adult had been guaranteed lifetime employment, but workers had almost no freedom to choose or to change their jobs or places of employment, and they had little upward mobility. One result was that labor costs in Iraq accounted for 20 percent to 40 percent of output, compared to about 10 percent in similar industries in non- socialist economies. Nonproductive administrative staff accounted for up to half the personnel in state-run enterprises, a much higher proportion than in private sector companies in other countries. The government immediately laid off thousands of white-collar work- ers, most of whom were foreign nationals. Thousands of other white- collar civil servants were given factory jobs. Previously, all state blue-collar workers had belonged to government-sponsored trade unions, while unions for private sector employees were prohibited. After the labor law was abolished, the situation was reversed. Government workers could no longer be union members, whereas private sector employees were authorized to establish and to join their own unions. To compensate state blue-collar workers for their lost job security, Saddam Husayn established an incentive plan that permitted state-enterprise managers to award up to 30 percent of the value of any increase in productivity to workers. Decree Number 652 aroused resentment and controversy among government bureaucrats, many of whom were stalwart Baath Party members, not only because it contradicted party ideology, but also because it imperiled their jobs. Feeling compelled to justify his new economic thinking and to reconcile it to Baathist ideology, Saddam Husayn wrote a long article in Ath Thawrah, the major government- run newspaper, criticizing the labor law for perpetuating a caste 128 Fertilizer plant in Basra Courtesy Embassy of Iraq, Washington Cement factory in Basra Courtesy Embassy of Iraq, Washington and class system that prevented people from being rewarded accord- ing to merit and from using their capacities fully. Perhaps writing with intentional irony, Saddam Husayn stated that unless people were rewarded for producing more, some might start to regard the capitalist system as superior because it permitted the growth of wealth and the improvement of workers' lives. In June 1987, Saddam Husayn went further in attacking the bureaucratic red tape that entangled the nation's economy. In a speech to provincial governors, he said, “From now on the state should not embark on uneconomic activity. Any activity, in any field, which is supposed to have an economic return and does not make such a return, must be ignored. All officials must pay as much attention to economic affairs as political ideology.” To implement this policy, Saddam Husayn announced a move toward privatization of government-owned enterprises. Several mechanisms were devised to turn state enterprises over to the pri- vate sector. Some state companies were leased on long terms, others were sold outright to investors, and others went public with stock offerings. Among the state enterprises sold to the public were bus 129 Iraq: A Country Study companies serving the provinces, about 95 percent of the nation's network of gas stations, thousands of agricultural and animal hus- bandry enterprises, state department stores, and factories. In many instances, to improve productivity the government turned stock over to company employees. The most significant instance of privatization occurred in August 1987, when Saddam Husayn announced a decree to abolish the State Enterprise for Iraqi Airways by early 1988. Two new ven- tures were to be established instead: the Iraqi Aviation Company, to operate commercially as the national airline, and the National Company for Aviation Services, to provide aircraft and airport ser- vices. Stock was to be sold to the public, and the government was to retain a minority share of the new companies through the General Federation of Iraqi Chambers of Commerce and Industry. In a further move consistent with the trend toward privatiza- tion, the RCC announced in November 1987 that the government would offer new inducements for foreign companies to operate in Iraq by loosening direct investment restrictions. Details of the new proposal were not specified, but it was expected to entail modifi- cation of Resolution Number 1646 of the RCC, enacted in Novem- ber 1980, which forbade foreign capital participation in private sector companies. Changes in the long-standing government policy of preventing foreign ownership of state institutions might also occur. According to the new regulations, all foreign firms engaged in development projects would also be exempt from paying taxes and duties, and foreign nationals who were employees of these com- panies would pay no income tax. At the same time, Saddam Husayn announced that development projects would no longer be paid for on credit. The new legislation indicated that Iraq was encounter- ing difficulty paying for or obtaining credits for turnkey projects and was therefore willing to permit foreign companies to retain partial ownership of the installations that they built. Previously, Iraq had rejected exchanging debt for equity in this manner as an infringement on its sovereignty. Banking and Finance When Iraq was part of the Ottoman Empire, a number of European currencies circulated alongside the Turkish pound. With the establishment of the British mandate after World War I, Iraq was incorporated into the Indian monetary system, which was operated by the British, and the rupee became the principal cur- rency in circulation. In 1931, the Iraq Currency Board was estab- lished in London for note issue and maintenance of reserves for the new Iraqi dinar (ID—for value of the dinar-see Glossary). 130 Iraq: A Country Study while acting on behalf of the government as an intermediary in securing loans from private foreign banks. With deposits of more than US$17 billion in 1983, the Rafidayn was reportedly the largest commercial bank in the Arab world. It managed to maintain a rela- tively sound commercial reputation for the five years of the war, and in 1985 its total assets stood at about ID10.4 billion and its total deposits, at more than ID9.5 billion-both figures having tripled since the Iran Iraq War began in 1980. This huge increase in deposits was attributed to increased saving by the public because of the scarcity of consumer products. Profits of ID290 million in 1985 represented an increase of nearly 50 percent over 1980 levels. By 1985 the Rafidayn had established 215 branches in Iraq, 104 of which were in Baghdad; according to the Iraqi government, it also had seven branches abroad. In 1986, however, the bank started to delay payment of letters of credit owed to foreign exporters, and its failure to make installment payments on a syndicated loan of 500 million Eurodollars forced rescheduling of the debt payments. In 1987, with the exception of the Baghdad office of a Yugoslav bank, the Rafidayn was Iraq's only commercial bank. In this same year, the government ordered the Rafidayn Bank to double its capi- tal to ID100 million. This increase was to enable the bank to improve and to extend its commercial services, so that it could tap the public for the increased deposits that would enable the bank to offer more loans. To the extent that new loans could bolster the emerging private sector, the move appeared consistent with other government efforts to make state-run operations more fiscally efficient. The other three banks in Iraq were so-called special banks that provided short- to long-term credit in their respective markets. Since its establishment in 1936, the Agricultural Bank had grown to forty- five branches, of which four were in Baghdad. In 1981, its capital stood at ID150 million and its loans totaled ID175 million. The Agricultural Bank had also started a project whose objective was to encourage rural citizens to establish savings accounts. Mean- while, the Industrial Bank had grown to nine branches and offered loans both to private and to public sector industrial and manufac- turing companies. The Real Estate Bank was composed of twenty- five branches and provided loans for construction of housing and tourist facilities. The Iraq Life Insurance Company, the Iraq Reinsurance Company, and the National Life Insurance Company conducted the nation's insurance business. Post offices maintained savings accounts for small depositors. 132 The Economy The Oil Sector Developments Through World War II Natural seepage aroused an early interest in Iraq's oil poten- tial. After the discovery of oil at Baku (in what is now the Soviet Union, on the west side of the Caspian Sea) in the 1870s, foreign groups began seeking concessions for exploration in Iran and in the area of the Ottoman Empire that became Iraq after World War I. The Anglo-Persian Oil Company (later renamed the Anglo- Iranian Oil Company and still later British Petroleum) was granted a concession in Iran and discovered oil in 1908. Shortly before World War I, the British government purchased majority owner- ship of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company. The discovery of oil in Iran stimulated greater interest in potential Iraqi oil resources, and financial groups from several major nations engaged in protracted negotiations and in considerable intrigue with the Ottoman Empire in order to obtain concessions to explore for oil in Mosul and in Kirkuk, two locations in what later was north- central Iraq. Although a few concessions were granted prior to World War I, little surveying or exploration was done. The Turkish Petroleum Company In 1912, several rival groups banded together to establish the Turkish Petroleum Company (TPC), which would seek a conces- sion to explore for Iraqi oil. The original purpose of the TPC was to eliminate rivalry among the partners and to outflank American concession seekers. The TPC's guiding hand was Calouste Gul- benkian, who had been hired by British banking interests because of his knowledge and his ability to influence the decisions of the Turkish government. His 5 percent holdings in TPC reputedly made him the richest individual in the world for many years, and were the source of his nickname, “Mr. Five Percent.” Establishment of the TPC did not eliminate the rivalry among the shareholders representing various national interests. Britain had a long-standing strategic interest in Mesopotamia because of its loca- tion in relation to Britain's military and commercial routes to India. The British government's decision before World War I to convert its naval fleet from coal to oil increased the importance of the area. By 1914, the British-government-controlled Anglo-Persian Oil Com- pany had bought 50 percent of the shares of TPC and was exerting pressure on the Turkish government to grant the Anglo-Persian Oil Company a concession, but World War I delayed negotiations. World War I demonstrated to the major powers the importance of securing their own sources of oil. The British-French San Remo 133 Iraq: A Country Study Conference of 1920 provided for permanent British control of any company established to develop Mesopotamian oil, but allocated Iraqi interests 20 percent if they chose to invest. France claimed the German shares of TPC that had been seized as enemy property and formed the CFP to hold the French shares in TPC. The Italian and United States governments protested their exclusion. After prolonged and sharp diplomatic exchanges, American oil compa- nies were permitted to buy into TPC, although negotiations were not completed until 1928. Although Iraq became a British mandate in 1920, that did not guarantee TPC an exclusive concession. Using the promise of a concession from the prewar Turkish government, TPC began nego- tiating for one in 1921. A major point of contention was Iraq's 20 percent share of any oil development company, a condition stipu- lated at the San Remo Conference. By the early 1920s, TPC con- sisted almost entirely of oil companies that did not want Iraq's representation or its interference in the management of TPC. They successfully resisted Iraqi efforts to participate despite pressure by the British government to accept Iraqi shareholders. A concession was granted to TPC in March 1925. Many Iraqis felt cheated from the beginning of the concession. Its term was for seventy-five years, and it covered twenty-four plots selected by TPC. The Iraqi government was to receive royalties at a flat fee per ton to be paid in English pounds sterling, but with a gold clause to guard against devaluation of the pound. Royalty payments were linked to oil company profits, but this clause became effective only after twenty years. The Iraqi government had the right to tax TPC at the same rate levied on other industrial concerns. TPC was to build a refinery to meet Iraq's domestic needs and a pipeline for the export of crude oil. The Iraqi government had the right to lease other plots for oil exploration and development, and TPC was not excluded from bidding on these additional plots. TPC began exploratory drilling after the concession was rati- fied by the Iraqi government. Oil was discovered just north of Kir- kuk on October 15, 1927. Many tons of oil were spilled before the gushing well was brought under control. This indication of a large, valuable field soon proved well-founded. The discovery of oil hastened negotiations over the composition and the functions of TPC. The shareholders signed a formal agree- ment in July 1928. The Anglo-Persian Oil Company, the Dutch Shell Group, the CFP, and the Near East Development Corpora- tion (which represented the interests of five large American oil com- panies) each held 23.7 percent of the shares, and Gulbenkian the remaining, but nonvoting, 5 percent. TPC was organized as a 134 The Economy nonprofit company registered in Britain that produced crude oil for a fee for its parent companies, based on their shares. TPC was limited to refining and marketing for Iraq's internal needs to prevent any competition with the parent companies. The Anglo-Persian Oil Company was awarded a 10 percent royalty on the oil produced, as compensation for its reduced share in TPC. A major obstacle facing United States firms had been a clause in the 1914 reorganization of the TPC that stipulated that any oil activity in the Ottoman Empire by any shareholder would be shared by all partners. Gulbenkian had insisted on the clause so that the oil companies could not circumvent his interests by establishing other companies without him. This arrangement, continued in the 1928 reorganization, came to be known as the Red Line Agree- ment because the TPC partners were forbidden to act indepen- dently within the boundaries of the now-defunct Ottoman Empire. This “red line” effectively precluded the United States and other TPC partners from concession hunting and from oil development in much of the Persian Gulf region until after World War II. In 1929 the TPC was renamed the Iraq Petroleum Company (IPC). IPC represented oil companies that had diverse and some- times conflicting interests. The Anglo-Persian Oil Company and Standard Oil of New Jersey (also known as Esso and subsequently known as Exxon), for example, had access to major sources of crude oil outside Iraq, and they therefore wished to hold the Iraqi con- cessions in reserve. CFP and other companies, in contrast, pushed for rapid development of Iraqi oil to augment their short crude oil supplies. IPC's parent companies delayed development of the Iraqi fields, and IPC's concession expired because the companies failed to meet certain performance requirements, such as the construction of pipe- lines and of shipping terminals. IPC's concession was renegotiated in 1931. The new contract gave IPC a seventy-year concession on an enlarged 83,200-square-kilometer area, all east of the Tigris River. In return, however, the Iraqi government demanded and received additional payments and loans as well as the promise that IPC would complete two oil pipelines to the Mediterranean by 1935. Iraqi politicians remained suspicious of IPC's motives. Many Iraqis believed that IPC was deliberately withholding Iraqi crude from the market to boost the price of the parent companies' oil produced elsewhere. In 1932 Iraq granted a seventy-five-year con- cession to the British Oil Development Company (BODC), created by a group of Italian and British interests, to 120,000 square kilo- meters west of the Tigris River. The terms were more favorable to the Iraqi government than those of earlier agreements. BODC 135 Iraq: A Country Study financing was insufficient, however, and the company was bought out by IPC in 1941 and was renamed the Mosul Petroleum Com- pany (MPC). IPC shareholders asserted their monopoly position again when they won the concession rights to southern Iraq and in 1938 founded the Basrah Petroleum Company (BPC) as their wholly owned subsidiary to develop the region. Transport remained the main obstacle to the efficient export of Iraqi oil. When France joined IPC after World War I, it wanted the Iraqi pipeline to transit its mandate in Syria to a coastal terminal at Tripoli, Lebanon. The Iraqis and the British preferred a terminal at Haifa, in Palestine. In 1934, a pipeline was completed from the Kirkuk fields to Al Hadithah, where it divided, one branch going to Tripoli (the Tripoli branch was closed by Syria—which supported Iran-in 1982 after the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq War in 1980) and the other to Haifa (the Haifa line was closed in 1948). In 1938, nine years after the discovery of oil, Iraq began to export oil in significant quantities. Iraqi production averaged 4 million tons per year until World War II, when restricted shipping in the Mediter- ranean forced production down sharply (see fig. 8). Post-World War II Through the 1970s With the end of World War II, IPC and its affiliates undertook repair and development of facilities in Iraq as rapidly as financing and materials became available. Exploration and drilling were pressed, particularly in the Basra and the Mosul areas, to meet con- cession terms. Although considered a priority, the elimination of transport constraints was set back when a larger second, nearly completed pipeline to Haifa was abandoned in 1948 as a result of the first Arab-Israeli war. Use of the existing Haifa line was also discontinued. In 1951, however, commercial exports by the BPC of good quality crude began via a new pipeline to Al Faw, on the Persian Gulf. Exports were boosted further with the completion in 1952 of a thirty-inch pipeline linking the Kirkuk fields to the Syrian port of Baniyas, which had a throughput capacity of 13 million tons per year. In that year, production from Basra and Mosul approached 2.5 million tons while the Kirkuk fields increased production to more than 15 million tons. In the space of a year (1951-52), total Iraqi oil production had doubled to almost 20 million tons. Iraqi officials still harbored ambitions, dating back to the 1920 San Remo Conference, to take control of their nation's oil resources. The elimination of transportation bottlenecks and the subsequent rapid growth of exports encouraged Iraqi assertiveness. IPC's costly, irretrievable investments in Iraq's oil infrastructure gave the govern- ment even greater leverage. 136 The Economy One particularly sore point among the Iraqis concerned IPC's contractual obligation to meet Iraq's domestic requirements for gasoline and other petroleum products. An IPC subsidiary oper- ated a small refinery and distribution company based near Kirkuk that supplied two-thirds of Iraq's needs. But IPC imported the remaining third from a large refinery in Abadan, Iran. Iraq con- sidered this arrangement politically imprudent, a judgment that was vindicated when, in the early 1950s, Iranian production was cut during that country's oil industry nationalization crisis. In 1951 the Iraqi government took over, with compensation, the small Kirkuk refinery and hired a United States contractor to build a refinery near Baghdad. This represented Iraq's first concrete step toward taking control of the oil industry. In 1952 Iraq followed the examples of Venezuela and of Saudi Arabia by demanding and receiving a 50 percent tax on all oil com- pany profits made in the country. The tax more than doubled Iraqi profits per ton on exported oil. The 1958 Iraqi revolution had little effect at first on the govern- ment's attitude toward IPC. The government needed the oil reve- nues generated by IPC; moreover, Iran's experience when it nationalized its oil industry was a vivid reminder to the Iraqis of the power the oil companies still wielded. In 1959 and in 1960, surpluses led the international oil companies to reduce the posted price for Middle Eastern oil unilaterally, which reduced govern- ment revenues significantly. IPC's policy of exploiting and develop- ing only .5 percent of the total concessions it held in Iraq and of holding the remainder in reserve also reduced Iraqi revenues. Perhaps in response to the general situation, Iraq convened a meet- ing in Baghdad of the major oil-producing nations, which resulted in the September 1960 formation of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). In December 1961, the Iraqi govern- ment enacted Law No. 80, which resulted in the expropriation of all of the IPC group's concession area that was not in production. The expropriation locked the government and the oil companies in a controversy that was not resolved for more than a decade. The companies had two paramount objectives in seeking to mitigate the law's effect. One was to regain control of the concession to the North Rumaylah field in southern Iraq, which was expected to be a major source of oil. In particular, the companies did not want competitors to gain access to it. The companies' second major objec- tive was to limit the impact of Iraq's actions on IPC concession agreements in other oil-exporting nations. In February 1964, the government established the state-owned Iraq National Oil Company (INOC) to develop the concession areas 137 Iraq: A Country Study 39 TURKEY To Dortyol 36 Mosul SYRIA Baiji To Baniyas (closed) Al Hadithan 33 Tor Haifa (closed) JORDAN SAUDI ARABIA Boundary representation not necessarily authoritative 39 42 Figure 8. Petroleum Industry, 1988 taken over from IPC. INOC was eventually granted exclusive rights by law to develop Iraq's oil reserves; granting concessions to other oil companies was forbidden, although INOC could permit IPC 138 Iraq: A Country Study more important, to export and to market it. IPC therefore remained the arbiter of existing, if not potential, Iraqi oil production. Iraq's disillusionment with newly formed OPEC began just after the enactment of Law 80. Iraq applied pressure on OPEC to adopt a unified negotiating stance vis-à-vis the oil companies. Instead, OPEC members negotiated separately. This allowed the oil com- panies to extract concessions that permitted them to switch produc- tion away from Iraq and therefore to pressure Iraq with the prospect of lower oil revenues. Iraq's relationship with IPC was further aggravated in 1966 when Syria raised transit fees on the pipeline that carried two-thirds of Iraqi oil to port and demanded retro- active payments from IPC. When IPC refused to pay, Syria closed the pipeline for several months, an action that cost the Iraqi govern- ment much revenue. The eight-year shutdown of the Suez Canal that followed the June 1967 Arab-Israeli War increased the importance of Mediter- ranean oil producers because of their proximity to European mar- kets. In 1970 Libya took advantage of this situation to win higher prices for its oil. Iraq, which was in the unusual position of exporting oil through both the Gulf and the Mediterranean, demanded that it be paid for its oil at the Libyan price. IPC countered that Iraqi oil, because of its higher sulfur content, was inferior to Libyan oil. Meanwhile, exports of Iraqi oil via the Mediterranean began to decline, which IPC attributed to falling tanker rates that made Gulf oil more competitive. Iraq, however, interpreted the declining exports as pressure from the oil companies. In general, Iraq believed that IPC was intentionally undercharging customers for oil it sold on behalf of Iraq and was cutting back Iraqi production to force Iraq to restore the nationalized concession areas. In response, Iraq attempted to make INOC a viable substitute for IPC. The INOC chairman of the board was given cabinet rank and greater authority, but INOC's activities were hampered by lack of experience and expertise. Iraq, therefore, sought assistance from countries consid- ered immune to potential IPC sanctions and to retaliation. In 1967 INOC concluded a service agreement with Entreprise des Recherches et des Activités Pétrolières (ERAP)—a company owned by the French government-covering exploration and development of a large segment of southern Iraq, including offshore areas. Some foreign observers doubted that the terms of the arrangement were more favorable than IPC's terms, but more important from Iraq's point of view, the ERAP agreement left control in Iraqi hands. By 1976 ERAP started pumping the oil it had discovered, at which point INOC took over operation of the fields and began deliver- ing the oil to ERAP. 140 The Economy In 1967 INOC tapped the Soviet Union for assistance in develop- ing the North Rumaylah field. The Soviet Union provided more than US$500 million worth of tied aid for drilling rigs, pumps, pipe- lines, a deep-water port on the Persian Gulf, tankers, and a large contingent of technicians. In 1972, the North Rumaylah field started production and produced nearly 4 million tons of crude. In the same period, Iraq obtained aid from French, Italian, Japanese, Indian, and Brazilian oil companies under service con- tracts modeled on the 1967 ERAP agreement. The service con- tracts, which Iraq did not regard as concessions, allowed the foreign oil companies to explore and to develop areas in exchange for bear- ing the full costs and the risks of development. If oil were discovered, the companies would turn their operations over to INOC, which would sell them the oil at a discounted rate. Iraq's increasing ability to manage its petroleum resources finally induced IPC to negotiate. In 1972 IPC promised to increase its production in Iraq and to raise the price it paid for Iraqi oil to the Libyan level. In return, IPC sought compensation for its lost con- cession areas. Iraq rejected this offer and, on June 1, 1972, nation- alized IPC's remaining holdings in Iraq, the original Kirkuk fields. A state-owned company, the Iraqi Company for Oil Operations (ICOO), was established to take over IPC facilities. BPC was allowed to continue its operations. In February 1973, Iraq and IPC settled their claims and coun- terclaims. IPC acknowledged Iraq's right to nationalize and agreed to pay the equivalent of nearly US$350 million to Iraq as compen- sation for revenue lost to Iraq over the years when IPC was selling Iraqi oil. In return, the government agreed to provide to IPC, free of charge, 15 million tons of Kirkuk crude, valued at the time at over US$300 million, in final settlement of IPC claims. Some observers believed that IPC had received a liberal settlement. The October 1973 Arab-Israeli War impelled the Iraqis to take complete control of their oil resources, and Iraq became one of the strongest proponents of an Arab oil boycott of Israel's supporters. Although Iraq was subsequently criticized by other Arab countries for not adhering to the agreed-upon production cutbacks, Iraq nationalized United States and Dutch interests in BPC. By 1975 all remaining foreign interests were nationalized. Fifty-three years after the humiliating San Remo agreement, Iraq had finally gained complete sovereignty over its most valuable natural resource. Throughout the mid- to late-1970s, increases in the price of oil caused Iraqi oil revenues to skyrocket even as production fluctu- ated. Iraq funneled much of this revenue into expanding the oil industry infrastructure. Refinery capacity was doubled, and in 1977 141 Iraq: A Country Study When Jalabi was appointed Iraq's oil minister in March 1987, he instituted a new round of reorganizations in the petroleum sec- tor. The Ministry of Oil assimilated INOC, thus consolidating management of Iraq's oil production and distribution. The NPO absorbed the CPO. This organization, along with SOOP, was to be granted corporate status in an effort to make it more efficient. Jalabi was also concerned about the proper handling of Iraq's large hydrocarbon reserves. Although estimates of Iraqi hydrocarbon reserves in the late 1980s varied considerably, by all accounts they were immense. In 1984, Iraq claimed proven reserves of 65 bil- lion barrels plus 49 billion barrels of “semi-proven’’reserves. In November 1987, Iraq's state-owned Oil Exploration Company cal- culated official reserves at 72 billion barrels, but the company's director, Hashim al Kharasan, stated that this figure would be revised upward to 100 billion barrels in the near future. In late 1987, oil minister Jalabi said that Iraqi reserves were “100 billion barrels definite, and 40 billion barrels probable,” which would con- stitute 140 years of production at the 1987 rate. Western petroleum geologists, although somewhat more conservative in their estimates, generally concurred with Iraq's assessment; some said that Iraq had the greatest potential for new discoveries of all Middle Eastern Countries. Besides petroleum, Iraq had estimated natural gas reserves of nearly 850 billion cubic meters, almost all of which was associated with oil. For this reason, most natural gas was flared off at oil wells. Of the estimated 7 million cubic meters of natural gas produced in 1987, an estimated 5 million cubic meters were flared. Iraq's Fifth Five-Year Plan of 1986-90 included projects to exploit this heretofore wasted asset. The war did not impede Iraqi investment in the oil sector. On the contrary, it spurred rapid development. The government announced in 1987 that, during the previous 10 years, 67 oil-related infrastructure projects costing US$2.85 billion had been completed and that another 19 projects costing US$2.75 billion were under way. One Iraqi priority was to exploit natural gas reserves. Because natural gas is more difficult to process and to market than petro- leum, the Ministry of Oil in late 1987 called for the substitution of natural gas for oil in domestic consumption, a move that could free more oil for export. Therefore, it became a key goal to convey natural gas from oil fields to industrial areas, where the gas could then be used. In 1987 the Soviet Union's Tsevetmetpromexport (TSMPE) was construct- ing a main artery for such a system, the strategic trans-Iraq dry gas pipeline running northward from An Nasiriyah. In 1986 work 144 Iraq: A Country Study jump in state oil revenues, stimulated industrial growth. Manufac- turing output increased 10 percent annually in the 1950s. Industrial development slowed after the overthrow of the monar- chy during the 1958 revolution. The socialist rhetoric and the land reform measures frightened private investors, and capital began leaving the country. Although the regime led by Abd al Karim Qasim excepted industry from the nationalization imposed on the agricultural and the petroleum sectors, in July 1964 a new govern- ment decreed nationalization of the twenty-seven largest privately owned industrial firms. The government reorganized other large companies, put a low limit on individual shareholdings, allocated 25 percent of corporate profits to workers, and instituted worker participation in management. A series of decrees relegated the pri- vate sector to a minor role and provoked an exodus of managers and administrators, accompanied by capital flight. The govern- ment was incapable of filling the vacuum it had created, either in terms of money or of trained manpower, and industrial develop- ment slowed to about 6 percent per year in the 1960s. After the 1968 Baath revolution, the government gave a higher priority to industrial development. By 1978 the government had revamped the public industrial sector by organizing ten semi- independent state organizations for major industry subsectors, such as spinning and weaving, chemicals, and engineering. Factory managers were given some autonomy, and an effort was made to hold them responsible for meeting goals. Despite Iraq's attempt to rationalize and reorganize the public sector, state organizations remained overstaffed because social legislation made it nearly impos- sible to lay off or to transfer workers and bureaucratization made the organizations top-heavy with unproductive management. The government acknowledged that unused capacity, overstocking of inventories, and lost production time, because of shortages or dis- ruptions of supply, continued to plague the industrial sector. The government attempted to strengthen public sector industry by pouring money into it. According to official figures, annual investment in the nonpetroleum industrial sector rose from ID39.5 million in 1968 to ID752.5 million in 1985. As a consequence, industrial output rose; the government put the total value of Iraq's industrial output in 1984 at almost ID2 billion, up from about ID300 million in 1968 and up more than 50 percent from the start of the Iran Iraq War. The total value of industrial input in 1984 was ID981 million, so value added was in excess of 100 percent. Productivity relative to investment, however, remained low. Because of revenues from oil exports, the government believed it could afford to pursue an ambitious and expensive policy of 146 Students learning foundry (tool and dye) skills at a technical instruction center Courtesy United Nations import substitution industrialization that would move the economy away from dependence on oil exports to obtain foreign exchange. In the early 1970s, Iraq made capital investments in large-scale industrial facilities such as steel plants. Many of the facilities were purchased from foreign contractors and builders on a turnkey basis. But Iraq neglected development of the next stage in the industrial process, the transformation of processed raw materials into inter- mediate products, such as construction girders, iron pipes, and steel parts. These bottlenecks in turn hampered the development of more sophisticated industries, such as machinery manufacture. Plant con- struction also outpaced infrastructure development. Many plants, for example, were inadequately linked by road or rail to outlets. Excess capacity remained a problem, as the large industrial plants continued to strain the economy's ability to absorb new goods. In an attempt to overcome these problems, Iraq imported the finished products and materials it required, defeating the purpose of its import substitution industrialization strategy and making the large extractive industries somewhat redundant. Imports of various basic commodities, such as plastics and chemicals, doubled and tripled in the 1970s. Most imports were consumed rather than used as intermediate components in industry; when imports were used as industrial inputs, value added tended to be low. Concurrently, 147 Iraq: A Country Study tariffs and other trade barriers erected to protect domestic infant industry from foreign competition impeded the importation of cer- tain vital materials, particularly spare parts and machinery. The growth of small-scale industries in the private sector and the rise in the standard of living in general were inhibited by such restric- tions. Subsidized by oil revenues, the industrialization strategy yielded growth, but only at great cost. In the late 1980s, the cumulative fiscal effects of the war with Iran forced Iraq to reverse priorities and to focus on the export side of the trade equation. Although the government previously had attempted to diversify the economy in order to minimize dependence on natural resources, it was now forced to concentrate on generating export income from extractive industry, in which it had a comparative advantage, rather than on producing more sophisticated manufactured goods. At the same time, in conjunc- tion with its gradual move toward privatization, the government ceded greater responsibility to the private sector for the manufac- ture of light consumer items as import substitutes. In 1983 legisla- tion exempted the private sector from customs duties and from excise taxes on imported spare parts and on machinery needed to build factories. The private sector was also given tax exemptions for capital investment and for research and development spend- ing. Finally, the replacement of sole proprietorships by joint stock companies was encouraged as a means of tapping more private investment. In a 1987 reorganization, the Ministry of Light Indus- tries was renamed the Ministry of Industry, and the Ministry of Industry and Minerals was renamed the Ministry of Heavy Indus- try. New ministers were appointed and were charged with improv- ing both the the quality and quantity of industrial output; large parts of the state bureaucracy that had controlled industry were abolished. According to official Iraqi figures, the total industrial labor force in 1984 consisted of about 170,000 workers. State-operated facto- ries employed slightly more than 80 percent of these workers, while 13 percent worked in the private sector. The remaining 7 percent worked in the mixed economy, which consisted of factories oper- ated jointly by the state—which held a major share of the com- mon stock and the private sector. Men constituted 87 percent of the industrial work force. According to the Iraqi government, in 1984 there were 782 industrial establishments, ranging in size from small workshops employing 30 workers to large factories with more than 1,000 employees. Of these, 67 percent were privately owned. The private sector owned two-thirds of the factories, but employed only 13 percent of the industrial labor force. Privately owned 148 The Economy industrial establishments were, therefore, relatively numerous, but they were also relatively small and more capital-intensive. Only three privately owned factories employed more than 250 workers; the great majority employed fewer than 100 people each. Private- sector plant ownership tended to be dispersed throughout indus- try and was not concentrated in any special trade, with the excep- tion of the production of metal items such as tools and utensils. Although the private sector accounted for 40 percent of produc- tion in this area, the metal items sector itself constituted no more than a cottage industry. Figures published by the Iraqi Federation of Industries claimed that the private sector dominated the con- struction industry if measurement were based not on the number of employees or on the value of output, but on the amount of capi- tal investment. In 1981, such private-sector capital investment in the construction industry was 57 percent of total investment. By this alternative measurement, private sector involvement in the tex- tile and the food processing industries was above average. In con- trast, about forty-six state-owned factories employed more than 1,000 workers apiece, and several industrial sectors, such as min- ing and steel production, were entirely state dominated. In 1984 Iraq's top industry, as measured by the number of employees, was the nonmetallic mineral industry, which employed 18 percent of industrial workers and accounted for 14 percent of the value of total industrial output. The nonmetallic mineral indus- try was based primarily on extracting and processing sulfur and phosphate rock, although manufacturing of construction materi- als, such as glass and brick, was also included in this category. Production of sulfur and of sulfuric acid was a priority because much of the output was exported; phosphates were likewise important because they were used in fertilizer production. Mining of sulfur began at Mishraq, near Mosul, in 1972; production capacity was 1.25 million tons per year by 1988. With the help of Japan, Iraq in the late 1980s was augmenting the Mishraq sulfur works with the intent of boosting sulfur exports 30 percent from their 1987 level of 500,000 tons per year and of increasing exports of sulfuric acid by 10,000 tons annually. Iraq was also attempting to increase the rate of sulfur recovery from oil from its 1987 level of 90 per- cent (see fig. 9). Phosphate rock reserves were located mainly in the Akashat area northwest of Baghdad and were estimated in 1987 at 5.5 billion tons-enough to meet local needs for centuries. A fertilizer plant at Al Qaim, linked by rail to the Akashat mine, started produc- tion in 1984; it was soon converting 3.4 million tons of phosphate per year into fertilizer. As the Al Qaim operation came onstream, 149 Iraq: A Country Study TURKEY Dahuk Mosul -36 SYRIA Tikrit Al Qaim Zu schrates shoor LAI Fallujah -33 JORDAN SAUDI ARABIA Boundary representation not necessarily authoritative 39 42 Figure 9. Economic Activity, 1988 Iraq became self-sufficient in fertilizer, and three-quarters of the plant's output was exported. Iranian attacks on Iraqi fertilizer plants in the Basra area, however, cut Iraq's surplus. In 1986 Iraq obtained 150 The Economy Caspian Sea Lake Urmia Irbil -..-.. International boundary Light industry National capital 1 Steel mill > Electric power w ell Textile mill Fertilizer plant Dates Food processing S Sulfur P Phosphate Principal agricultural areas Little Cement Kirkuk As Sulaymaniyah Kifri 0 o 25 50 25 100 Kilometers 50 90 100 Miles n Diyala IRAN (Baghdad 33 Tigris Al Kur Ad Diwaniyah An Najaf ΑΙ Amarah phrates As Samawah An Nasiriyah Fr Basra FI Az Zubayr 30 Al Faw KUWAIT Persian Gulf 45 IRAQ- SAUDI ARABIA 48 NEUTRAL ZONE LI a US$10 million loan from the Islamic Development Bank to import urea fertilizer, and in 1987 Iraq continued to import fertilizer as an emergency measure. Meanwhile, additional fertilizer plants were 151 The Economy cars and 25,000 trucks per year, but the project's US$5 billion cost led to indefinite delays. By the late 1980s, Iraq had had some success in establishing light industries to produce items such as spark plugs, batteries, locks, and household appliances. The electronics industry, concentrated in Baghdad, had grown to account for about 6 percent of output with the help of Thompson-CSF (that is, Compagnie sans fil) of France and the Soviet Union. Other more advanced industries just starting to develop in Iraq in the late 1980s were pharmaceuticals and plastics. Agriculture Since the beginning of recorded time, agriculture has been the primary economic activity of the people of Iraq. In 1976, agricul- ture contributed about 8 percent of Iraq's total GDP, and it employed more than half the total labor force. In 1986, despite a ten-year Iraqi investment in agricultural development that totaled more than US$4 billion, the sector still accounted for only 7.5 per- cent of total GDP, a figure that was predicted to decline. In 1986 agriculture continued to employ a significant portion-about 30 percent-of Iraq's total labor force. Part of the reason the agri- cultural share of GDP remained small was that the sector was over- whelmed by expansion of the oil sector, which boosted total GDP. Large year-to-year fluctuations in Iraqi harvests, caused by varia- bility in the amount of rainfall, made estimates of average produc- tion problematic, but statistics indicated that the production levels for key grain crops remained approximately stable from the 1960s through the 1980s, with yield increasing while total cultivated area declined. Increasing Iraqi food imports were indicative of agricul- tural stagnation. In the late 1950s, Iraq was self-sufficient in agricul- tural production, but in the 1960s it imported about 15 percent of its food supplies, and by the 1970s it imported about 33 percent of its food. By the early 1980s, food imports accounted for about 15 percent of total imports, and in 1984, according to Iraqi statis- tics, food imports comprised about 22 percent of total imports. Many experts expressed the opinion that Iraq had the potential for substantial agricultural growth, but restrictions on water sup- plies, caused by Syrian and Turkish dam building on the Tigris and Euphrates rivers, might limit this expansion. Water Resources Iraq has more water than most Middle Eastern nations, which led to the establishment of one of the world's earliest and most advanced civilizations. Strong, centralized governments-a 153 Irrigation canal south of Baghdad Courtesy Ronald L. Kuipers '80s. verge of completion in 1988. Furthermore, a Chinese-Brazilian joint venture was constructing a US$2 billion dam on the Great Zab River, a Tigris tributary in northeastern Iraq. Additional dams were planned for Badush and Fathah, both on the Tigris. In Hindiyah on the Euphrates and in Ash Shinafiyah on the Euphrates, Chinese contractors were building a series of barrages. Geographic factors contributed to Iraq's water problems. Like all rivers, the Tigris and the Euphrates carry large amounts of silt downstream. This silt is deposited in river channels, in canals, and on the flood plains. In Iraq, the soil has a high saline content. As the water table rises through flooding or through irrigation, salt rises into the topsoil, rendering agricultural land sterile. In addi- tion, the alluvial silt is highly saline. Drainage thus becomes very important; however, Iraq's terrain is very flat. Baghdad, for example, although 550 kilometers from the Persian Gulf, is only 34 meters above sea level. This slight gradient makes the plains susceptible to flooding and, although it facilitates irrigation, it also hampers drainage. The flat terrain also provides relatively few sites for dams. Most important, Iraq lies downstream from both Syria and Turkey on the Euphrates River and downstream from Tur- key on the Tigris River. In the early 1970s, both Syria and Tur- key completed large dams on the Euphrates and filled vast reservoirs. Iraqi officials protested the sharp decrease in the river's 155 Iraq: A Country Study because several hundred thousand hectares of government land were included in the distribution. The situation in the countryside became chaotic because the government lacked the personnel, funds, and expertise to supply credit, seed, pumps, and marketing services—functions that had previously been performed by landlords. Landlords tended to cut their production, and even the best-intentioned landlords found it difficult to act as they had before the land reform because of hostil- ity on all sides. Moreover, the farmers had little interest in coopera- tives and joined them slowly and unwillingly. Rural-to-urban migration increased as agricultural production stagnated, and a prolonged drought coincided with these upheavals. Agricultural production fell steeply in the 1960s and never recovered fully. In the 1970s, agrarian reform was carried further. Legislation in 1970 reduced the maximum size of holdings to between 10 and 150 hectares of irrigated land (depending on the type of land and crop) and to between 250 and 500 hectares of nonirrigated land. Holdings above the maximum were expropriated with compensa- tion only for actual improvements such as buildings, pumps, and trees. The government also reserved the right of eminent domain in regard to lowering the holding ceiling and to dispossessing new or old landholders for a variety of reasons. In 1975 an additional reform law was enacted to break up the large estates of Kurdish tribal landowners. Additional expropriations such as these exacer- bated the government's land management problems. Although Iraq claimed to have distributed nearly 2 million hectares by the late 1970s, independent observers regarded this figure as greatly exag- gerated. The government continued to hold a large proportion of arable land, which, because it was not distributed, often lay fallow. Rural flight increased, and by the late 1970s, farm labor shortages had become so acute that Egyptian farmers were being invited into the country. The original purpose of the land reform had been to break up the large estates and to establish many small owner-operated farms, but fragmentation of the farms made extensive mechanization and economies of scale difficult to achieve, despite the expansion of the cooperative system. Therefore, in the 1970s, the government turned to collectivization as a solution. By 1981 Iraq had established twenty- eight collective state farms that employed 1,346 people and culti- vated about 180,000 hectares. In the 1980s, however, the govern- ment expressed disappointment at the slow pace of agricultural development, conceding that collectivized state farms were not profitable. In 1983 the government enacted a new law encourag- ing both local and foreign Arab companies or individuals to lease 158 The Economy larger plots of land from the government. By 1984, more than 1,000 leases had been granted. As a further incentive to productivity, the government instituted a profit-sharing plan at state collective farms. By 1987, the wheel appeared to have turned full circle when the government announced plans to reprivatize agriculture by leas- ing or selling state farms to the private sector. Cropping and Livestock Most farming in Iraq entails planting and harvesting a single crop per year. In the rain-fed areas the winter crop, primarily grain, is planted in the fall and harvested in the spring. In the irrigated areas of central and southern Iraq, summer crops predominate. A little multiple cropping, usually of vegetables, exists where irri- gation water is available over more than a single season. Even with some double or triple cropping, the intensity of culti- vation is usually on the order of 50 percent because of the practice of leaving about half the arable land fallow each year. In the rain-fed region, land is left fallow so that it can accumulate moisture. The fertility of fallow land is also increased by plowing under weeds and other plant material that grow during the fallow period. On irrigated land, fallow periods also contribute some humus to the soil. Grain, primarily wheat and barley, was Iraq's most important crop. Cereal production increased almost 80 percent between 1975 and 1985, notwithstanding wide variations in the harvest from year to year as the amount and the timing of rainfall strongly affected both the area planted and the harvest. Between 1980 and 1985, the area under wheat cultivation increased steadily for a cumula- tive growth of 30 percent, to about 1,566,500 hectares. In 1985, the most recent year for which statistics were available in 1988, Iraq harvested a bumper crop of 1.4 million tons of wheat. In 1984, a drought year, Iraq harvested less than half the planted area for a yield of between 250,000 and 471,000 tons, according to foreign and Iraqi sources respectively. The north and central rain-fed areas were the principal wheat producers (see table 7, Appendix). Barley requires less water than wheat does, and it is more toler- ant of salinity in the soil. For these reasons, Iraq started to substi- tute barley production for wheat production in the 1970s, particularly in southern regions troubled by soil salinity. Between 1980 and 1985, the total area under barley cultivation grew 44 per- cent, and by 1985 barley and wheat production were virtually equal in terms both of area cultivated and of total yield. Rice, grown in paddies, was Iraq's third most important crop as measured by cultivated area, which in 1985 amounted to 24,500 hectares. The area under cultivation, however, did not grow appreciably between 159 Iraq: A Country Study 1980 and 1985; 1985 production totaled almost 150,000 tons. Iraq also produced maize, millet, and oil seeds in smaller quantities. A number of other crops were grown, but acreage and produc- tion were limited. With the exception of tobacco, of which Iraq produced 17,000 tons on 16,500 hectares in 1985, cash crop produc- tion declined steeply in the 1980s. Probably because of domestic competition from synthetic imports and a declining export mar- ket, production of cotton was only 7,200 tons in 1985, compared with 26,000 tons in 1977. Production of sugar beets was halted com- pletely in 1983, and sugarcane production declined by more than half between 1980 and 1985. Iraq may have cut back on production of sugar beets and sugar- cane because of an intention to produce sugar from dates. Dates, of which Iraq produces eight distinct varieties, have long been a staple of the local diet. The most abundant date groves were found along the Shatt al Arab. In the early 1960s, more than 30 million date palms existed. In the mid-1970s, the Iraqi government esti- mated that the number of date palms had declined to about 22 mil- lion, at which time production of dates amounted to 578,000 tons. The devastation of the Shatt al Arab area during the Iran-Iraq War hastened the destruction of date palm groves, and in 1985 the government estimated the number of date palms at fewer than 13 million. Date production in 1987 dropped to 220,000 tons. The government-managed Iraqi Date Administration, however, planned to increase production in an attempt to boost export revenue. In 1987 about 150,000 tons, or 68 percent of the harvest, was exported, primarily to Western Europe, Japan, India, and other Arab coun- tries. The Iraqi Date Administration also devised plans to construct large facilities to extract sugar, alcohol, vinegar, and concentrated protein meal from dates. Iraq produced a variety of other fruits as well, including melons, grapes, apples, apricots, and citrus. Production of such fruits increased almost 30 percent between 1975 and 1985. Vegetable production also increased, particularly near urban centers, where a comparatively sophisticated marketing system had been developed. Vegetable gardening usually employed relatively modern techniques, including the use of chemical fertilizers and pesticides. Tomatoes were the most important crop, with produc- tion amounting to more than 600,000 tons in 1985. Other vegeta- bles produced in significant quantity were beans, eggplant, okra, cucumbers, and onions. Overall vegetable production increased almost 90 percent between 1975 and 1985, even though the produc- tion of legumes dropped about 25 percent over the same period. 160 Date palms along the Tigris River near Baghdad Courtesy Matson Collection 161 Iraq: A Country Study Crop production accounted for about two-thirds of value added in the agricultural sector in the late 1980s, and the raising of livestock contributed about one-third. In the past, a substantial part of the rural population had been nomadic, moving animals between seasonal grazing areas. Sheep and goats were the most important livestock, supplying meat, wool, milk, skins, and hair. A 1978 government survey, which represented the most recent official data available as of early 1988, estimated the sheep population at 9.7mil- lion and the goat population at 2.1 million. Sheep and goats were tended primarily by nomadic and seminomadic groups. The 1978 survey estimated the number of cattle at 1.7 million, the number of water buffalo at 170,000, the number of horses at 53,000, and the number of camels at 70,000. In the 1970s, the government started to emphasize livestock and fish production, in an effort to add protein to the national diet. But 1985's red meat production (about 93,000 tons) and milk production (375,000 tons) were, respectively, about 24 and 23 per- cent less than the in 1975 totals, although other figures indicated that total livestock production remained stable between 1976 and 1985. In the mid-1980s, however, British, West German, and Hun- garian companies were given contracts to establish poultry farms. At the same time, the government expanded aquaculture and deep- sea fishing. Total production of processed chicken and fish almost doubled, to about 20,000 tons apiece, from 1981 to 1985, while egg production increased substantially, to more than 1 billion per year. The government planned to construct a US$160 million deep- sea fishing facility in Basra and predicted that, within 10 years, freshwater fishing would supply up to 100,000 tons of fish. Iraq nevertheless continued to import substantial quantities of frozen poultry, meat, and fish to meet local needs for protein. Transportation Transportation was one of the Iraqi economy's most active sec- tors in the late 1980s; it was allocated a large share of the domestic development budget because it was important to the government for several reasons. Logistics became a crucial factor in Iraq's con- duct of the Iran Iraq War. The government also recognized that transportation bottlenecks limited industrial development more than any other factor. Finally, the government believed that an expanded transportation system played an important political role by promot- ing regional integration and by heightening the central govern- ment's presence in the more remote provinces. For these reasons, the government embarked on an ambitious plan to upgrade and to extend road, rail, air, and river transport simultaneously. Iraq's 162 The Economy main transportation axis ran roughly northwest to southeast from Mosul via Kirkuk to Baghdad, and then south to Basra and the Gulf. In the 1980s, efforts were underway to link Baghdad more closely with the Euphrates River basin to the west (see fig. 10). Roads The total length of Iraq's network of paved roads almost dou- bled between 1979 and 1985, to 22,397 kilometers, augmented by an additional 7,800 kilometers of unpaved secondary and feeder roads. In 1987 Iraq's major road project was a 1,000-kilometer- long segment of a six-lane international express highway that would eventually link the Persian Gulf states with the Mediterranean. In Iraq, the road would stretch from the Jordanian border through Ar Rutbah to Tulayah near An Najaf, then to the southern Iraqi town of Ash Shaykh ash Shuyukh, and finally to the Kuwaiti border at Safwan. Construction was under way in the late 1980s. Plans were also being made for another highway, which would link Bagh- dad with the Turkish border via Kirkuk and Mosul. There was progress as well on a program to build 10,000 kilometers of rural roads. Railroads Iraq possessed two separate railroads at independence, one stan- dard gauge and one meter gauge. The standard gauge line ran north from Baghdad through Mosul to the Syrian border and to an even- tual connection with the Turkish railroad system, and the meter gauge line ran south from Baghdad to Basra. Because the two sys- tems were incompatible, until the 1960s cargo had to be transloaded at Baghdad to be transported between the two halves of the coun- try. The Soviet Union helped extend the standard gauge system to Basra, and by 1977 fully 1,129 kilometers of Iraq's 1,589 kilo- meters of railroad were standard gauge. By 1985 the total length of railroad lines had been extended to 2,029 kilometers, of which 1,496 kilometers were standard gauge. In 1985 the railroads were being traveled by 440 standard-gauge locomotives that moved 1.25 billion tons of freight per kilometer. A 252-kilometer line linking Kirkuk and Al Hadithah was completed by contractors from the Republic of Korea (South Korea) in 1987 after five years of work. Built at a cost of US$855 million, the line was designed to carry more than 1 million passengers and more than 3 million tons of freight annually. The system included maintenance and control centers and more than thirty bridges crossing the Tigris and Euphrates rivers. By the end of the century, Iraq planned to triple the line's passenger capacity and to double its freight capacity. 163 Iraq: A Country Study 39 TURKEY Dahuk Mosul -36 21gr 15 SYRIA Baiji X ΑΙΣ Qaim Al Hadithah Ar Rutbah 33 JORDAN SAUDI ARABIA Boundary representation not necessarily authoritative 39 42 Figure 10. Transportation System, 1988 A 550-kilometer line, built by a Brazilian company and extending from Baghdad to Qusaybah on the Syrian border, was also opened in the same year. In 1987 Indian contractors were finishing work 164 The Economy Caspian Sea 45 Lake Urmia th International boundary National capital Major road Standard-gauge railroad Meter gauge railroad Major airport Portebas Irbil As Sulaymaniyah Kirkuk o o 25 50 25 100 Kilometers 50 100 Miles Khanaqin IRAN Baghdad 33 Al Kut Ad Diwaniyah $1.1577 AI Amarah An Najat) "phrates As Samawah SA An Nasiriyah Basra Az Zubayret Umm Qasr 30- Al Faw KUWAIT Persian Gulf 45 45 -IRAQ- SAUDI ARABIA NEUTRAL ZONE 48 on a line between Al Musayyib and Samarra. Iraqi plans also called for replacing the entire stretch of railroad between Mosul and Basra with modern, high-speed track, feeding all lines entering Baghdad 165 Iraq: A Country Study into a 112-kilometer loop around the city, and improving bridges, freight terminals, and passenger stations. In addition, Iraq has con- ducted intermittent negotiations over the years with Turkey, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia concerning the establishment of rail links to complete a continuous Europe-Persian Gulf railroad route. Ports At independence, Iraq had little port capacity, a fact that reflected the low level of foreign trade and the country's traditional over- land orientation toward Syria and Turkey rather than toward the Gulf. Since then, the Gulf port of Basra has been expanded many times, and a newer port was built at Umm Qasr to relieve pres- sure on Basra. Oil terminals were located at Khawr al Amayah, and Mina al Bakr, Al Faw, and a port was built in tandem with an industrial center at Khawr az Zubayr. Because Iraq's access to the Gulf was an Iranian target in the Iran-Iraq War, port activities were curtailed severely in the 1980s. Before shipping can be resumed after the war, the Shatt al Arab will have to be cleared of explosives and wreckage, which will take years. Despite long-standing government interest in developing the Tigris and the Euphrates rivers into major arteries for inland trans- port, little had been accomplished by the late 1980s, primarily because of the massive scale of such a project. Dredging and the establishment of navigation channels had been completed on several stretches of the Tigris south of Baghdad, and in 1987 a river freight route using barges was opened between Baghdad and Al Amarah. Iraq investigated the possibility of opening the entire Tigris River between Mosul and Baghdad, as well as the feasibility of opening a stretch of the Euphrates between Al Hadithah and Al Qurnah, but lack of funds precluded further action. Airports In 1988 Iraq had two international airports, one at Baghdad and one at Basra. In 1979 a French consortium was awarded a US$900 million contract to build a new international airport at Baghdad. By 1987 the facility was partially completed and in use. The Basra airport was also being upgraded with an extended 4,000-meter run- way and other facilities at a cost in excess of US$400 million. A third international airport was planned for Mosul. The State Enterprise for Iraqi Airways was the sole domestic airline in operation in 1988. The company was established in 1945 by Iraqi State Railways. In 1987, the airline's fleet included thirty- five Soviet-built Antonov and Ilyushin cargo planes and fourteen Boeing passenger jets, as well as smaller commuter aircraft and 166 The Economy VIP jets. The airline provided service throughout the Mediterra- nean, the Middle East, and Europe, as well as to Brazil and to the Far East. In 1987 Saddam Husayn announced a decree to privatize Iraqi Airways. Two new ventures were to be established instead: the Iraqi Aviation Company to operate commercially as the national airline, and the National Company for Aviation Ser- vices to provide aircraft and airport services. Stock would be sold to the public, and the government would retain a minority share. Telecommunications In 1988 Iraq had a good telecommunications network of radio communication stations, radio relay links, and coaxial cables. Iraqi radio and television stations came under the government's Iraqi Broadcasting and Television Establishment, which was responsi- ble to the Ministry of Culture and Information. The domestic ser- vice had one FM and nine AM stations with two program networks. The domestic service broadcast mainly in Arabic, but also in Kurd- ish, Turkoman, and Assyrian from Kirkuk. The short wave for- eign service broadcast in Arabic, Azeri Turkish, English, French, German, Hebrew, Kurdish, Persian, Russian, Spanish, and Urdu. Television stations were located in the major cities, and they car- ried two program networks. In 1988 Iraq had approximately 972,000 television sets; the system was connected to both the Atlantic Ocean and Indian Ocean systems of the International Telecommunications Satellite Organization (INTELSAT) as well as to one Soviet Intersputnik satellite station. It also had coaxial cable and radio relays linking it to Jordan, Kuwait, Syria, and Tur- key. Iraq had an estimated 632,000 telephones in 1988. Electricity Iraqi electric power consumption increased by a factor of four- teen in the twenty-year period between 1968 and 1988, and in the late 1980s it was expected to double every four to five years. On- going rural electrification contributed to increased demand; about 7,000 villages throughout the nation were provided electricity in the same twenty-year period. The destruction in 1980 of power- generating facilities near the Iran-Iraq border interrupted only tem- porarily the rapid growth in production and consumption. In 1981 the government awarded US$2 billion in contracts to foreign con- struction companies that were building hydroelectric and thermal generating plants as well as transmission facilities. By 1983 the production and consumption of electricity had recovered to the prewar levels of 15.6 billion kwh (kilowatt hours) and 11.7 billion kwh, respectively. As previously commissioned projects continued 167 Iraq: A Country Study to come onstream, Iraq's generating capacity was expected to exceed 6,000 megawatts by 1986. In December 1987, following the com- pletion of power lines designed to carry 400 million kwh of power to Turkey, Iraq became the first country in the Middle East to export electric power. Iraq was expected to earn US$15 million annually from this arrangement. Long-range plans entailed export- ing an additional 3 billion kwh to Turkey and eventually provid- ing Kuwait with electricity. Iraq's plans to develop a nuclear generating capacity were set back by Israel's June 1981 bombing of the Osiraq (Osiris-Iraq) reactor, then under construction (see The Search for Nuclear Tech- nology, ch. 5). In 1988 French, Italian, and Soviet technicians were exploring the feasibility of rebuilding the reactor at a different site. Saudi Arabia had promised to provide financing, and Brazil and Portugal reportedly had agreed to supply uranium. Foreign Trade The pattern of Iraqi foreign trade in the 1980s was shaped primar- ily by the Iran-Iraq War, its resulting deficit and debt problems, and developments in the petroleum sector. Iranian attacks on petroleum industry infrastructure reduced oil exports sharply and Iraq incurred a trade deficit of more than US$10 billion in 1981. The pattern continued in 1982 as the value of Iraqi imports peaked at approximately US$23.5 billion, while exports reached a nadir of US$11.6 billion, leading to a record trade deficit. In 1983, however, imports were cut roughly by half. Figures for Iraq's imports and exports from 1984 onward vary widely and cannot be considered authoritative. Despite the partial recovery of Iraqi oil exports in 1986, exports were valued at only about US$7.5 bil- lion because of the plunge in world oil prices (see Oil in the 1980s, this ch.). In 1987 imports were expected to rise to about US$10 billion. Export revenues were also expected to rise, as Iraq com- pensated for low oil prices with a higher volume of oil exports (see table 8, Appendix). Iraq had counted heavily on solving its twin debt and deficit problems by reestablishing and eventually by augmenting its oil export capacity. But increases in volume were insufficient to off- set lower prices, and because demand remained low, expanded oil exports served only to glut the market and further drive down the price of oil. The depressed price of oil and the low prices of other raw materials that Iraq exported, coupled with higher prices for the goods it imported, trapped the nation in the classic dilemma of declining terms of trade. Although Iraq was cutting the volume of its imports and was increasing the volume of its exports, the 168 The Economy KON SON relative values of imports and exports had shifted fundamentally. More than 95 percent of Iraq's exports were raw materials, primar- ily petroleum. Foodstuffs accounted for most additional exports. Conversely, nearly half of Iraq's imports were capital goods and consumer durables. According to Iraqi statistics, 34.4 percent of 1984 imports were capital goods, 30 percent were raw materials, 22.4 percent were foodstuffs, and 12.5 percent were consumer items. Iraq's declining imports resulted not so much from belt-tightening or from import substitution, as from the increasing reluctance of trading partners to extend credit. Despite its socialist orientation, Iraq had long traded most heavily with Western Europe. Initially, Iraq's debt accumulation worked in its favor by creating a hostage effect. Western creditors, both governments and private compa- nies, continued to supply Iraq in an effort to sustain the country until it could repay them. Additionally, the debt helped to secure outlets for Iraqi petroleum in a tight international market through barter agreements in which oil was exchanged for a reduction in debt. In 1987, however, as some West European companies pre- pared to cut their losses and to withdraw from the Iraqi market, and as others curtailed sales by limiting credits, other countries were poised to fill the vacuum by offering goods and services on concessional terms. Companies from Brazil, South Korea, India, Yugoslavia, and Turkey, backed by their governments' export credit guarantees, were winning an increasing share of the Iraqi market. In 1987 the Soviet Union and East European nations were also offering goods and services on highly concessional terms. Even- tually, Iraq's exports might also be diverted from the West toward its new trading partners. Iraq continued to seek Western imports when it could afford them. In 1987 Iraq was forced to ration imports for which pay- ment was due in cash, although nonessential imports were pur- chased if the seller offered credit. Imports contributing to the war effort had top priority. Imports of spare parts and of management services for the maintenance of large industrial projects were also deemed vital, as Iraq sought to stave off the extremely high costs it would incur if facilities were shut down, mothballed, and then reopened in the future. Consumer goods were given lowest priority. In 1985 Iraq purchased 14.4 percent of its total imports from Japan. Iraq bought an array of Japanese products, ranging from transport equipment, machinery, and electrical appliances to basic materials such as iron and steel, textiles, and rubber goods. In 1987, as Iraqi debt to Japan mounted to US$3 billion, the government of Japan curtailed the export insurance it had offered Japanese 169 Iraq: A Country Study companies doing business with Iraq; nevertheless, Japanese com- panies continued to trade with Iraq. Iraq bought 9.2 percent of its imports from West Germany. Neighboring Turkey provided the third largest source of Iraqi imports, accounting for 8.2 percent of the total. Italy and France each accounted for about 7.5 percent, followed by Brazil with 7 percent and Britain with 6.3 percent. Kuwait was Iraq's most important Arab trading partner, contribut- ing 4.2 percent of Iraq's imports (see table 9, Appendix). In 1985 Brazil was the main destination of Iraqi exports, account- ing for 17.7 percent of the total. France was second with 13 percent, followed by Italy with 11 percent, Spain with 10.7 percent, Turkey and Yugoslavia with about 8 percent each, Japan with about 6 percent, and the United States with 4.7 percent. In April 1987, the government attempted to streamline the trade bureaucracy by eliminating five state trading companies that dealt in various commodities. Although the state trading companies had been established in the 1970s to foster increased domestic produc- tion, they had evolved into importing organizations. In view of this orientation, their operations were incorporated into the Ministry of Trade. Three Ministry of Trade departments, which had admin- istered trade with socialist, with African, and with Arab nations, were abolished. The responsibilities of these disbanded organiza- tions were centralized in a new Ministry of Trade department named the General Establishment for Import and Export. The Ministry of Trade implemented a national import policy by allocating portions of a total budget among imports according to priority. The import budget varied from year to year, depend- ing on export earnings and on the amount in loans that had been secured from foreign creditors. The government's underlying inten- tion was gradually to replace imported manufactured products with domestic manufactured products and then to increase export sales. In the mid-1980s, however, the government recognized that increased domestic production required the import of intermedi- ate goods. In 1987 state companies were permitted for the first time to use private agents or middlemen to facilitate limited imports of necessary goods. The private sector, which had long been accorded a quota of total imports, was also deregulated to a limited extent. In 1985 the quota was increased to 7.5 percent of total imports, and the govern- ment gave consideration to increasing that percentage further. All imports by the private sector had previously been subject to govern- ment licensing. In 1985, Law No. 60 for Major Development Projects exempted the private sector from the obligation to obtain licenses to import basic construction materials that would be used 170 The Economy in major development projects. In an attempt to increase remit- tances from Iraqis abroad, the government also gave special import licenses to nonresident Iraqis, if the value of the imports was invested in Iraq and was not transferred outside the country. In 1987 the rules concerning private sector imports were liber- alized further when private sector manufacturers were granted spe- cial licenses that permitted them to import raw materials, spare parts, packaging, machinery, and equipment necessary for plant modernization and for expansion. In some cases no ceiling was placed on such imports, while in other cases imports were limited to 50 percent of the value of the export earnings that the manufac- turer generated. Such imports were not subject to quotas or to for- eign exchange restrictions. Moreover, the government announced that it would make no inquiry into the companies' sources of financ- ing. In a remarkably candid statement in a June 1987 speech, Sad- dam Husayn promised that citizens would not be asked where they had acquired their money, and he admitted that the private sector had not imported any goods because of its fear of prosecution by the security services for foreign exchange violations. While the government permitted more imports by the private sector, it nevertheless continued to promote exports at the same time. Starting in 1969 it maintained an Export Subsidy Fund, which underwrote the cost of eligible nonpetroleum exports by up to 25 percent. The Export Subsidy Fund was financed with a tax of .5 percent levied on imports of capital goods and .75 percent levied on imports of consumer goods. Most imports were also charged both duty and a customs surcharge that varied from item to item. Export licenses were granted freely both to public and to private sector firms with only a few exceptions. The Board of Regulation of Trade had the authority to prohibit the export of any commodity when domestic supplies fell short of demand, and the control over export of certain items was reserved for the General Organization of Exports. The degree to which government economic policies would be liberalized in the late 1980s remained to be seen. The government had taken several steps in that direction but state con- trols continued to play a major role in the economy in 1988. Both primary and secondary source information on the Iraqi economy tends to be scant and dated. The government of Iraq has regarded data on national economic performance as a state secret, particularly since the start of the Iran-Iraq War in 1980. The government does not publish a budget, although it releases 171 Iraq: A Country Study a yearbook, the Annual Abstract of Statistics, which contains some economic figures. The Iran-Iraq War has also diverted scholarly attention from economic issues. One exception is Phebe Marr's The Modern History of Iraq, which contains a chapter titled “Eco- nomic and Social Changes under the Revolutionary Regime.” The most detailed and authoritative periodic reports on the Iraqi econ- omy are produced by the Wharton Econometric Forecasting Associates in their semiannual Middle East Economic Outlook. The Economist Intelligence Unit's Country Report: Iraq, a quarterly, con- tains much useful information and analysis. Another good source of up-to-date information is the Middle East Economic Digest. (For further information and complete citations, see Bibliography.) 172 Bas relief of a warrior from Nimrud, ca. end of the eighth century B.C. THE POLITICAL SYSTEM in 1988 was in what was officially characterized as a “transitional” phase. This description meant that the current method of rule by decree, which had been in effect since 1968, would continue until the goal of a socialist, democratic republic with Islam as the state religion was attained. The end of the transition period was to be marked by the formal enactment of a permanent constitution. The timing and the specific circum- stances that would terminate the transitional stage had not been specified as of early 1988. The country remained under the regime of the Baath (Arab Socialist Resurrection) Party, which had seized power through a coup d'état in July 1968. The legality of government institutions and actions was based on the Provisional Constitution of July 16, 1970, which embodied the basic principles of the Baath Party- Arab unity, freedom, and socialism. These principles were in turn rooted in the pan-Arab aspirations of the party, aspirations sanc- tified through identification with the historic right and destiny of all Arabs to unite under the single leadership of the Arab Nation.” The most powerful decision-making body in Iraq, the ten- member Revolutionary Command Council (RCC), which func- tioned as the top executive and legislative organ of the state, was for all practical purposes an arm of the Baath Party. All members of the RCC were also members of the party's Regional Command, or state apparatus. President Saddam Husayn was both the chair- man of the RCC and the secretary general of the Baath's Region- al Command. He was generally recognized as the most powerful political figure in the country. From its earliest days, the Baath Party was beset by personality clashes and by factional infighting. These problems were a primary cause of the failure of the first Baath attempt to govern Iraq in 1963. After the Baath returned to power in 1968, intraparty fissures were generally held in check, albeit not eliminated, by President Ahmad Hasan al Bakr. When Saddam Husayn succeeded to the presidency in 1979, he also commanded the loyalty of the major elements of the Baath. Saddam Husayn and other Baath leaders have always regarded the ability to balance endemic intraparty tensions—such as those between military and civilian elements and among personalities across boundaries of specialization-as the key to success in Bagh- dad. Above all, they perceived harmony in the military-civilian 175 Iraq: A Country Study coalition as pivotal. Although the Baath had begun recruiting within the Iraqi military as early as 1958, and within ten years military members constituted the backbone of the party's power, civilian Baath leaders maintained overall control of the party. Iraqi politics under the Baath regime were generally geared toward mobilizing support for the regime. Loyal opposition had no place, and it was not recognized as legitimate. The party lead- ers believed competitive politics ill-suited to Iraq, at least during the indefinite transitional period. They condemned partisan politi- cal activity, which they insisted had had damaging consequences on national unity and integration. The Baath also invoked Iraq's unhappy legacy of ethnic and regional cleavages as justification for harsh curbs on political rights. In 1988, twenty years after the Baath had come to power, it still was not possible to assess popular attitudes toward Saddam Husayn, toward the Baath Party, toward political institutions, or toward political issues because there had been insufficient field research in the country. Even though elections for a National Assembly had been held in 1980 and again in 1984, these had been carefully con- trolled by the government, and genuinely free elections had not been held for more than thirty years. Politicians or groups opposed to the principles of the 1968 Baath Revolution of July 17 to 30 were not permitted to operate openly. Those who aspired to be politi- cally active had few choices: they could join the highly selective Baath Party, remain dormant, go underground or into exile, or join the Baath-sponsored Progressive National Front (PNF). The PNF, which came into existence in 1974, was based on a national action charter that called for collaboration between the Baath and each of the other parties considered to be both progressive and nationalist. The PNF served as the only risk-free, non-Baath forum for political participation, although even this channel was denied to those whose loyalties to the regime were suspect. The Baath Party's objectives in establishing the front were to provide the semblance of broad popular support for the government as well as to provide the facade of alliance among the Baath and other par- ties. The Baath, however, held a dominant position within the front and therefore assumed sole responsibility for carrying out the decisions of the front's executive commission, which was composed of the Baath's most important members and sympathizers. In early 1988, the war with Iran continued to preoccupy Sad- dam Husayn and his associates. Approximately 75,000 Iraqis had been killed in the war, and about 250,000 had been wounded; more than 50,000 Iraqis were being held as prisoners of war in Iran. Property damage was estimated in the tens of billions of dollars; 176 Government and Politics destruction was especially severe in the southern part of the coun- try (see Introduction). Constitutional Framework The Provisional Constitution of July 16, 1970, upon which Iraq's governmental system was based in 1988, proclaims Iraq to be “a sovereign people's democratic republic” dedicated to the ultimate realization of a single Arab state and to the establishment of a socialist system. Islam is declared to be the state religion, but free- dom of religion and of religious practices is guaranteed. Iraq is said to be formed of two principal nationalities, Arab and Kurd. A March 1974 amendment to the Constitution provides for autonomy for the Kurds in the region where they constitute a majority of the population. In this Autonomous Region (see Glossary) both Arabic and Kurdish are designated as official languages for administra- tive and educational purposes. The Constitution also prescribes, however, that the “national rights” of the Kurds as well as the "legitimate rights of all minorities are to be exercised only within the framework of Iraqi unity, and the document stipulates that no part of Iraq can be relinquished. The Constitution sets forth two basic aims, the establishment of a socialist system based on “scientific and revolutionary princi- ples,” and pan-Arab economic unity. The state is given an active role in “planning, directing, and guiding'' the economy. National resources and the principal means of production are defined as “the property of the people” to be exploited by the state directly in accordance with the requirements of the general planning of the national economy.” The Constitution describes public properties and the properties of the public sector as inviolable. The Constitution classifies the ownership of property as “a social function that shall be exercised within the limits of society's aims and the state's programs in accordance with the provisions of the law””; nevertheless, the Constitution also guarantees private owner- ship and individual economic freedom “within the limits of the law, provided that individual ownership will not contradict or be detrimental to general economic planning.” The Constitution stipu- lates that private property may not be expropriated except for the public interest and then only with just compensation. The size of private agricultural land holdings is to be defined by law, and the excess is to be regarded as the property of the people. The Consti- tution also bars foreign ownership of real estate, although individu- als may be granted a legal exemption from this prohibition. Articles 19 through 36 of the Constitution spell out fundamen- tal rights and duties in detail. The right to fair trial through due 177 Iraq: A Country Study process, the inviolability of person and of residence, the privacy of correspondence, and the freedom to travel are guaranteed to all citizens. The Constitution also assures citizens of their right to religious freedom; to the freedom of speech, of publication, and of assembly; and to the freedom to form political parties, trade unions, and professional societies. The Constitution directs the state to eliminate illiteracy and to ensure the right of citizens to free edu- cation from elementary school through the university level. Accord- ing to Article 28, the aims of education include instilling opposition to “the doctrines of capitalism, exploitation, reaction, Zionism, and colonialism” in order to ensure the achievement of the Baathist goals of Arab unity, freedom, and socialism. The Constitution also requires the state to provide every citizen with employment and with free medical care. The Constitution defines the powers and the functions of the different government institutions. These include the RCC, the National Assembly, the presidency, the Council of Ministers, or cabinet, and the judiciary (see fig. 11). According to Article 37, the RCC “is the supreme body in the State.” Article 43 assigns to the RCC, by a vote of two-thirds of its members, authority to promulgate laws and regulations, to deal with national security, to declare war and conclude peace, and to approve the government's budget. Article 38 stipulates that all newly elected members of the RCC must be members of the Baath Party Regional Command. The Constitution also provides for an appointed Council of Ministers that has responsibility for carrying out the executive decisions of the RCC. The chief executive of the RCC is the president, who serves as the commander in chief of the armed forces and as the head of both the government and the state. The powers of the president, according to the Constitution, include appointing, promoting, and dismissing personnel of the judiciary, civil service, and military. The president also has responsibility for preparing and approving the budget. The first president, Ahmad Hasan al Bakr, was in office from 1968 to 1979, when he resigned and was succeeded by Sad- dam Husayn. Articles 47 through 56 of the Constitution provide for an elected National Assembly, but its powers are to be defined by the RCC. Elections for the Assembly took place for the first time in June 1980. Subsequent National assembly elections were held in October 1984. The Constitution can be amended only by a two-thirds majority vote of the RCC. Although the 1970 Constitution is officially desig- nated as provisional, it is to remain in force until a permanent con- stitution is promulgated. 178 Government and Politics Government The Constitution provides for a governmental system that, in appearance, is divided into three mutually checking branches, the executive, the legislative, and the judicial. In practice, neither the legislature nor the judiciary has been independent of the executive. The Revolutionary Command Council In 1988 the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) continued to be the top decision-making body of the state. The RCC was first formed in July 1968, and since then it has exercised both executive and legislative powers. The chairman of the RCC is the president of the republic. The number of RCC members has varied over time; in 1988 there were ten members. According to the Constitution, the RCC is the supreme organ of the state, charged with the mission of carrying out the popular will by removing from power the reactionary, the dictatorial, and the corrupt elements of society and by returning power to the peo- ple. The RCC elects its chairman, who serves concurrently as presi- dent of the republic, by a two-thirds majority vote. In case of the chairman's official absence or incapacitation, his constitutional pow- ers are to be exercised by the vice-chairman, who also is elected by the RCC from among its members. Thus the vice-chairman (in 1988 Izzat Ibrahim, who had served since 1979) is first in line of succession. The members of the RCC, including both the chairman and the vice-chairman, are answerable only to the RCC itself, which may dismiss any of its members by a two-thirds majority vote and may also charge and send to trial for wrongdoing any member of the council, any deputy to the president, or any cabinet minister. Since 1977 the Baath Party has regarded all members of the Baath Party Regional Command as members of the RCC. The interlocking leadership structure of the RCC and the Regional Command has served to emphasize the party's dominance in governmental affairs. The RCC's constitutional powers are wide ranging. It may perform legislative functions, both in collaboration with, and inde- pendently of, the National Assembly; approve government recom- mendations concerning national defense and internal security; declare war, order general mobilization, conclude peace, and ratify treaties and international agreements; approve the state's general budget; lay down the rules for impeachment of its members and set up the special court to try those impeached; authorize the chair- man or the vice-chairman to exercise some of the council's powers except for legislative ones; and provide the internal regulations and 179 Iraq: A Country Study Since 1980 the National Assembly generally has held two ses- sions per year in accordance with Article 48 of the Constitution. The first session is held in April and May, and the second session in November and December. During the few weeks each year that the National Assembly is in session, it carries out its legislative duties in tandem with the RCC. The assembly's primary function is to ratify or reject draft legislation proposed by the RCC. In addition, it has limited authority to enact laws proposed by a minimum of one-fourth of its membership, to ratify the government's budget and international treaties, and to debate domestic and international policy. It also has authority to supervise state agencies and to ques- tion cabinet ministers. Although the assembly has served as a forum for limited public discussion of issues, its actual powers were restricted and ultimate decision-making authority pertaining to legislation continued to reside with the RCC in 1988. The President and the Council of Ministers The president is the chief executive authority of the country. He may exercise authority directly or through the Council of Ministers, the cabinet. He must be a native-born Iraqi. The Constitution does not stipulate the president's term of office, nor does it provide for his successor. President Bakr served for eleven years before retir- ing for health reasons in 1979. He was succeeded by Saddam Husayn, the former vice-chairman of the RCC, who continued to hold the office of president in early 1988. The position of vice-chairman, rather than the office of vice- president, appeared to be the second most powerful political one. The vice-presidency appeared to be a largely ceremonial post, and the vice-president seemed to be appointed or dismissed solely at the discretion of the president. In 1988 the vice-president was Taha Muhy ad Din Maruf, who was first appointed by Bakr in 1974, and was subsequently kept in office by Saddam Husayn. The vice- chairman of the RCC, who would presumably succeed Saddam Husayn, was Izzat Ibrahim. The Council of Ministers is the presidential executive arm. Presidential policies are discussed and translated into specific pro- grams through the council. The council's activities are closely moni- tored by the diwan, or secretariat of the presidency. The head of the diwan is a cabinet-rank official, and his assistants and support staff are special appointees. The members of the diwan are not sub- ject to the regulations of the Public Service Council, the body which supervises all civil service matters. Cabinet sessions are convened and presided over by the presi- dent. Some senior members of the RCC are represented on the 182 President Saddam Husayn Courtesy Embassy of Iraq, Washington 183 Iraq: A Country Study cabinet. By convention, about one-third of the cabinet positions may be reserved for members of the Baath Party. In early 1988, the cabinet consisted of forty-one members including president Sad- dam Husayn and vice-president Maruf. Ministerial portfolios included those for agriculture and agrarian reform, communica- tions, culture and arts, defense, education, finance, foreign affairs, health, higher education and scientific research, industry and min- erals, information, interior, irrigation, justice, labor and social affairs, oil, planning, public works and housing, religious trusts, trade, and transport. Additionally, there were seven ministers of state and seven presidential advisers with ministerial status. Of the cabinet members, the president and the minister of defense, the minister of foreign affairs, the minister of interior, and the minister of trade were also members of the powerful RCC. The Judiciary Although the Constitution guarantees an independent judiciary, it contains no provisions for the organization of courts. Conse- quently, the legal system has been formed on the basis of laws promulgated by the RCC. In early 1988 the judicial system con- sisted of courts that had jurisdiction over civil, criminal, adminis- trative, religious and other matters. The courts were under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Justice, and all judges were appointed by the president. The secular courts continued to function partly on the basis of the French model, first introduced prior to 1918 when Iraq was under Ottoman rule and subsequently modified, and partly on Islamic law. The three dominant schools of Islamic jurisprudence were the Hanafi among the Sunni Arabs, the Shafii among the Sunni Kurds (see Glossary), and the Jafari among Shia Arabs. The Christian and Jewish minorities had their own reli- gious courts for the adjudication of personal status issues, such as marriage, divorce, and inheritance. For judicial administration, the country was divided into five appellate districts centered, respectively, in Baghdad, Basra, Al Hillah (Babylon), Kirkuk, and Mosul. Major civil and commer- cial cases were referred to the courts of first instance, which were of two kinds: 18 courts of first instance with unlimited powers, and 150 courts of first instance with limited powers. The former were established in the capitals of the eighteen governorates (provinces); the latter, all of which were single-judge courts, were located in the district and subdistrict centers, and in the governorate capitals (see fig. 1). Six peace courts, two in Baghdad and one in each of the other four judicial district centers, handled minor litigation. 184 Iraq: A Country Study responsibility of subdistrict officers (mudara; sing., mudir). Mayors headed cities and towns. Municipalities were divided into several categories depending upon the size of local revenues. Baghdad, the national capital, had special administrative status. The mayor of Baghdad and the mayors of other cities were presidential appointees. In 1971 President Bakr promulgated the National Action Charter, a broad statement of Baath Party political, economic, social, and foreign policy objectives. This document called for the formation of popular councils in all administrative subdivisions. These councils were to be given the right to supervise, to inspect, and to criticize the work of the government. The first councils were appointed in 1973 in accordance with a law promulgated by the RCC. As late as 1988, however, there was insufficient empirical research available to determine whether the popular councils were autonomous forums for the channeling of grievances or were merely Baath Party-dominated institutions used to encourage active popu- lar support of, and involvement in, government-initiated activities. Kurdish Autonomy Three governorates in the north-Dahuk, Irbil, and As Sulay- maniyah-constitute Iraqi Kurdistan, a region that historically has had a majority population of Kurds. Ever since Iraq became independent in 1932, the Kurds have demanded some form of self- rule in the Kurdish areas. There were clashes between Kurdish antigovernment guerrillas and army units throughout most of the 1960s. When the Baath Party came to power in July 1968, the prin- cipal Kurdish leaders distrusted its intentions and soon launched a major revolt (see The Emergence of Saddam Husayn, 1968-79, ch. 1). In March 1970, the government and the Kurds reached an agreement, to be implemented within four years, for the crea- tion of an Autonomous Region consisting of the three Kurdish governorates and other adjacent districts that have been determined by census to have a Kurdish majority. Although the RCC issued decrees in 1974 and in 1975 that provided for the administration of the Autonomous Region, these were not acceptable to all Kurd- ish leaders and a major war ensued. The Kurds were eventually crushed, but guerrilla activities continued in parts of Kurdistan. In early 1988, antigovernment Kurds controlled several hundred square kilometers of Irbil and As Sulaymaniyah governorates adjacent to the Iranian frontier. In early 1988, the Autonomous Region was governed accord- ing to the stipulations of the 1970 Autonomy Agreement. It had a twelve-member Executive Council that wielded both legislative and executive powers and a Legislative Assembly that advised the 186 Government and Politics council. The chairman of the Executive Council was appointed by President Saddam Husayn and held cabinet rank; the other mem- bers of the council were chosen from among the deputies to the popularly elected Legislative Assembly. The Legislative Assembly consisted of fifty members elected for three-year terms from among candidates approved by the central government. The Legislative Assembly chose its own officers, includ- ing its cabinet-rank chairman, a deputy chairman, and a secretary. It had authority to ratify laws proposed by the Executive Council and limited powers to enact legislation relating to the development of “culture and nationalist customs of the Kurds” as well as other matters of strictly local scope. The Legislative Assembly could ques- tion the members of the Executive Council concerning the latter's administrative, economic, educational, social, and other varied responsibilities; it could also withhold a vote of confidence from one or more of the Executive Council members. Both the assembly and the council were located in the city of Irbil, the administrative center of Irbil Governorate. Officials of these two bodies were either Kurds or persons well-versed in the Kurdish language," and Kurdish was used for all official communications at the local level. The first Legis- lative Assembly elections were held in September 1980, and the second elections took place in August 1986. Despite the Autonomous Region's governmental institutions, genuine self-rule did not exist in Kurdistan in 1988. The central government in Baghdad continued to exercise tight control by reserving to itself the power to make all decisions in matters per- taining to justice, to police, to internal security, and the adminis- tration of the frontier areas. The Baath Party, through the minister of state for regional autonomy and other ministerial representa- tives operating in the region, continued to supervise activities of all governing bodies in the region. The minister of justice and a special oversight body set up by the Court of Cassation reviewed all local enactments and administrative decisions, and they coun- termanded any local decrees that were deemed contrary to the “con- stitution, laws, or regulations” of the central government. The central government's superior authority has been most dramati- cally evident in the frontier areas, where government security units have forcibly evacuated Kurdish villagers to distant lowlands (see The Kurds, ch. 2). Politics The Baath Party In early 1988, the Baath Party continued to stress parallelism 187 Iraq: A Country Study focused on “regional” (qutri) and “national” (qawmi) goals, fol- lowing the Baath doctrine that the territorially and politically divided Arab countries were merely “regions” of a collective entity called “The Arab Nation.” Hence the Baath movement in one country was considered merely an aspect of, or a phase leading to, “a uni- fied democratic socialist Arab nation.” That nation, when it materi- alized, would be under a single, unified Arab national leadership. Theoretically, therefore, success or failure at the regional level would have a corresponding effect on the movement toward that Arab nation. Moreover, the critical test of legitimacy for any Baath regime would necessarily be whether or not the regime's policies and actions were compatible with the basic aims of the revolution-aims epitomized in the principles of “unity, freedom, and socialism.” The Baath Party in Iraq, like its counterparts in other Arab regions (states), derived from the official founding congress in Damascus in 1947. This conclave of pan-Arab intellectuals was inspired by the ideas of two Syrians, Michel Aflaq and Salah ad Din al Bitar, who are generally regarded as the fathers of the Baath movement. Several Iraqis, including Abd ar Rahman ad Damin and Abd al Khaliq al Khudayri, attended this congress and became members of the party. Upon their return to Baghdad, they formed the Iraqi branch of the Baath. Damin became the first secretary general of the Iraqi Baath. From its early years, the Iraqi Baath recruited converts from a small number of college and high school students, intellectuals, and professionals—virtually all of whom were urban Sunni Arabs. A number of Baath high school members entered the Military Col- lege, where they influenced several classmates to join the party. Important military officers who became Baath members in the early 1950s included Ahmad Hasan al Bakr, Salih Mahdi Ammash, and Abd Allah Sultan, all of whom figured prominently in Iraqi politi- cal affairs in later years. During the 1950s, the Baath was a clandestine party, and its members were subject to arrest if their identities were discovered. The Baath Party joined with other opposition parties to form the underground United National Front and participated in the activi- ties that led to the 1958 revolution. The Baathists hoped that the new, republican government would favor pan-Arab causes, espe- cially a union with Egypt, but instead the regime was dominated by non-Baathist military officers who did not support Arab unity or other Baath principles. Some younger members of the party, including Saddam Husayn, became convinced that Iraqi leader Abd al Karim Qasim had to be removed, and they plotted his assassi- nation. The October 1959 attempt on Qasim's life, however, was 188 D 190 DAN WA Tahrir Square, Baghdad, showing the Monument of Liberty Courtesy United Nations 191 Iraq: A Country Study statements called for abandonment of traditional ways in favor of a new life-style fashioned on the principles of patriotism, national loyalty, collectivism, participation, selflessness, love of labor, and civic responsibility. These “socialist principles and practices” would be instilled by the party's own example, through the state educa- tional system, and through youth and other popular organizations. The Baath particularly emphasized “military training” for youth; such training was considered essential for creating “new men in the new society” and for defending the republic from the hostile forces of Zionism, imperialism, anti-Arab chauvinism (e.g., from Iran), rightists, opportunists, and reactionaries (see Paramilitary Forces; Internal Security, ch. 5). The Baath's major goal since 1968 has been to socialize the economy. By the late 1980s, the party had succeeded in socializ- ing a significant part of the national economy (see The Role of Government, ch. 3), including agriculture, commerce, industry, and oil. Programs to collectivize agriculture were reversed in 1981, but government investment in industrial production remained important in the late 1980s. Large-scale industries such as iron, steel, and petrochemicals were fully owned and managed by the government, as were many medium-sized factories that manufac- tured textiles, processed food, and turned out construction materials. The Baath's efforts to create a unified Arab nation have been more problematic. The party has not abandoned its goal of Arab unity. This goal, however, has become a long-term ideal rather than a short-term objective. President Saddam Husayn proclaimed the new view in 1982 by stating that Baathists now “believe that Arab unity must not take place through the elimination of the local and national characteristics of any Arab country. ... but must be achieved through common fraternal opinion.” In practice this meant that the Iraqi Baath Party had accepted unity of purpose among Arab leaders, rather than unification of Arab countries, as more important for the present. As of early 1988, the Baath Party claimed about 10 percent of the population, a total of 1.5 million supporters and sympathizers; of this total, full party members, or cadres, were estimated at only 30,000, or 0.2 percent. The cadres were the nucleus of party orga- nization, and they functioned as leaders, motivators, teachers, administrators, and watchdogs. Generally, party recruitment proce- dures emphasized selectivity rather than quantity, and those who desired to join the party had to pass successfully through several apprentice-like stages before being accepted into full membership. The Baath's elitist approach derived from the principle that the 192 Government and Politics party's effectiveness could only be measured by its demonstrable ability to mobilize and to lead the people, and not by “size, num- ber, or form.” Participation in the party was virtually a requisite for social mobility. The basic organizational unit of the Baath was the party cell or circle (halaqah). Composed of between three and seven members, cells functioned at the neighborhood or the village level, where mem- bers met to discuss and to carry out party directives. A minimum of two and a maximum of seven cells formed a party division (firqah). Divisions operated in urban quarters, larger villages, offices, fac- tories, schools, and other organizations. Division units were spread throughout the bureaucracy and the military, where they functioned as the ears and eyes of the party. Two to five divisions formed a section (shabah). A section operated at the level of a large city quarter, a town, or a rural district. Above the section was the branch (fira), which was composed of at least two sections and which oper- ated at the provincial level. There were twenty-one Baath Party branches in Iraq, one in each of the eighteen provinces and three in Baghdad. The union of all the branches formed the party's con- gress, which elected the Regional Command. The Regional Command was both the core of party leadership and the top decision-making body. It had nine members, who were elected for five-year terms at regional congresses of the party. Its secretary general (also called the regional secretary) was the party's leader, and its deputy secretary general was second in rank and power within the party hierarchy. The members of the command theoretically were responsible to the Regional Congress that, as a rule, was to convene annually to debate and to approve the party's policies and programs; actually, the members were chosen by Saddam Husayn and other senior party leaders to be “elected” by the Regional Congress, a formality seen as essential to the legiti- mation of party leadership Above the Regional Command was the National Command of the Baath Party, the highest policy-making and coordinating council for the Baath movement throughout the Arab world. The National Command consisted of representatives from all regional commands and was responsible to the National Congress, which convened peri- odically. It was vested with broad powers to guide, to coordinate, and to supervise the general direction of the movement, especially with respect to relationships among the regional Baath parties and with the outside world. These powers were to be exercised through a national secretariat that would direct policy-formulating bureaus. In reality, the National Command did not oversee the Baath movement as a whole in 1988 because there continued to be no 193 Iraq: A Country Study single command. In 1966 a major schism within the Baath move- ment had resulted in the creation of two rival National Commands, one based in Damascus and the other in Baghdad. Both commands claim to be the legitimate authority for the Baath, but since 1966 they have been mutually antagonistic. Michel Aflaq, one of the original cofounders of the Baath Party, was the secretary general of the Baghdad-based National Command, and Saddam Husayn was the vice-chairman. In practice, the Syrian Regional Command, under Hafiz al Assad, controlled the Damascus-based National Command of the Baath Party, while the Iraqi Regional Command controlled the Baghdad-based National Command. Theoretically, the Iraqi Regional Command made decisions about Baath Party policy based on consensus. In practice, all deci- sions were made by the party's secretary general, Saddam Husayn, who since 1979 had also been chairman of the RCC and president of the republic. He worked closely with a small group of support- ers, especially members of the Talfah family from the town of Tikrit (see The Emergence of Saddam Husayn, 1968–79, ch. 1); he also dealt ruthlessly with suspected opposition to his rule from within the party. In 1979 several high-ranking Baathists were tried and were executed for allegedly planning a coup; other prominent party members were forcibly retired in 1982. Saddam Husayn's detrac- tors accused him of monopolizing power and of promoting a cult of personality. The Politics of Alliance: The Progressive National Front In 1988 Iraq was no nearer to the goal of democracy than it had been when the Baath came to power in 1968. The establishment of “popular democracy” as a national objective remained essen- tially unfulfilled. Political activities were restricted to those defined by the Baath regime. The party, however, recognized that not all citizens would become party members, and it sought to provide a controlled forum for non-Baathist political participation. It created the Progressive National Front (PNF) in 1974 to ally the Baath with other political parties that were considered to be progressive. As a basis for this cooperation President Bakr had proclaimed the National Action Charter in 1971. In presenting the charter for pub- lic discussion, the Baath had invited “all national and progressive forces and elements” to work for the objective of a “democratic, revolutionary, and unitary” Iraq by participating in the “broadest coalition among all the national, patriotic, and progressive forces.” The Iraqi Communist Party (ICP) was one of the important political groups that the Baathists wanted involved in the PNF. Dis- cussions between the Baath and the ICP took place periodically 194 Government and Politics over three years before the latter was induced to join the PNF in 1974. For Baath leaders, the PNF was a means of containing poten- tial opposition to their policies on the part of the ICP. Although the ICP was too small to pose a serious armed challenge to the Baath, it was regarded as a major ideological rival. The ICP's roots were as deep as those of the Baath, because the former party had been formed by Iraqi Marxists in the 1930s. Like the Baath, the ICP was an elitist party that advocated socialist programs to benefit the masses and that appealed primarily to intellectuals. Despite these similarities, there had been a long history of antagonism between the two parties. Baathists tended to suspect the communists of ulti- mate loyalty to a foreign power, the Soviet Union, rather than to the Arab nation, even though the Baathists themselves regarded the Soviet Union as a friendly and progressive state after 1968. In return for participation in the PNF, the ICP was permitted to nominate its own members for some minor cabinet posts and to carry on political and propaganda activities openly. The ICP had to agree, however, not to recruit among the armed forces and to accept Baath domination of the RCC. The ICP also recognized the Baath Party's “privileged”' or leading role in the PNF: of the sixteen-member High Council that was formed to direct the PNF, eight positions were reserved for the Baath, five for other progres- sive parties, and only three for the communists. The ICP also agreed not to undertake any activities that would contravene the letter or spirit of the National Action Charter. The ICP may have hoped that the PNF would gradually evolve into a genuine power-sharing arrangement. If so, these expecta- tions were not realized. The Baath members of the High Council dominated the PNF, while the party retained a firm grip over government decision making. By 1975, friction had developed between the ICP and the Baath. During the next two years, at least twenty individual ICP members were arrested, tried, and sentenced to prison for allegedly attempting to organize communist cells within the army in contravention of the specific ban on such activities. The April 1978 Marxist coup d'état in Afghanistan seemed to serve as a catalyst for a wholesale assault on the ICP. Convicted com- munists were retried, and twenty-one of them were executed; there were virulent attacks on the ICP in the Baathist press; and scores of party members and sympathizers were arrested. The ICP com- plained, to no apparent avail, that communists were being purged from government jobs, arrested, and tortured in prisons. By April 1979, those principal ICP leaders who had not been arrested had either fled the country or had gone underground. In 1980 the ICP formally withdrew from the PNF and announced the formation 195 Government and Politics The unanticipated and swift termination of KDP-central govern- ment hostilities in March 1975 resulted in more factional splits from the party. One breakaway group, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) under the leadership of Jalal Talabani, was committed to continuing the armed struggle for Kurdish autonomy. Until 1985, however, most of the PUK's skirmishes were with fellow Kurdish fighters of the KDP, and Talabani himself held intermittent negotia- tions with Baathist representatives about joining the PNF. Other KDP splinter groups agreed to cooperate with the central govern- ment. In order to accommodate them, and in recognition of the fact that no single political party represented the Kurds, two addi- tional seats, bringing the total to eighteen, were created in the PNF. Thus, the number of Kurdish representatives increased from three to five. The composition of the PNF changed again in 1980, fol- lowing the withdrawal of the three ICP members; the number of Kurds remained constant. In 1975 the Baath invited two independent progressive groups to nominate one representative each for the unreserved seats on the PNF. These seats went to the leaders of the Independent Democrats and the Progressive Nationalists. Neither of these groups was a formally organized political party, but rather each was an informal association of non-Baathist politicians who had been active before 1968. These groups had demonstrated to the satisfaction of the Baath Party that their members had renounced the former “reactionary’’ ideas of the various prerevolutionary parties to which they had belonged. In 1988 the Baath Party continued to hold the position that the PNF was indispensable as long as the Arab revolutionary move- ment faced dangers in Iraq and in other parts of the Arab homeland. The Baath insisted that its policy of combining its “leading role" within the front and a cooperative relationship based on “mutual respect and confidence”' among itself and the front's members was correct and that, in fact, this was a major accomplishment of its rule. Nevertheless, the PNF was not an independent political insti- tution. Although it served as a forum in which policy could be dis- cussed, the Baath actually controlled the PNF by monopolizing executive positions, by holding half of the total seats, and by requir- ing that all PNF decisions must be by unanimous vote. Political Opposition Although the Baath in 1988 permitted the existence of several non-Baathist political parties, it did not tolerate political opposi- tion to its policies. An effective security police apparatus had forced underground those groups opposed to the Baath (see Internal 197 Iraq: A Country Study Security, ch. 5). Other opposition groups operated in exile in Europe, Iran, and Syria. These included the ICP, the KDP, the PUK, a Baath splinter that supported the Damascus-based National Command, and several Islamic parties. Although various opposi- tion parties periodically succeeded in carrying out acts of violence against regime targets, especially in Kurdistan, for the most part their activities within Iraq did not seriously challenge the Baath regime. The opposition to the Baath historically has been fragmented, and efforts to form alliances—such as the ICP's November 1980 initiative to create a Democratic and Patriotic Front of Kurdish and Arab secular parties—foundered over ideological divisions. Per- sonality clashes and feuds also prevented the various Kurdish and Arab secular parties from cooperating. In addition, many of the opposition parties seemed to have a weak internal base of popular support because of the prevailing perception that they had collabo- rated with enemies of Iraq at a time when the country was engaged in war with Iran. The religious opposition to the Baath was primarily concentrated among the devout Shia population. The most important opposi- tion party was Ad Dawah al Islamiyah (the Islamic Call), popu- larly known as Ad Dawah, which originally had been established by Shia clergy in the early 1960s. After the Baath came to power in 1968, Ad Dawah opposed the regime's secular policies, and consequently many prominent clergy associated with the party, as well as some who had no connections to Ad Dawah, were per- secuted. In 1979, apparently to contain any radicalization of the Iraqi Shia clergy like that which had occurred in Iran, the regime arrested and subsequently executed Ayatollah Sayyid Muhammad Baqir as Sadr, the country's most respected Shia leader. Sadr's precise relationship to Ad Dawah was not established, but his death precipitated widespread, violent demonstrations and acts of sabotage. Ad Dawah was banned in 1980, and membership in the organization was made a capital offense. After the war with Iran had begun, Ad Dawah and other Shia political groups reorganized in exile in Europe and in Iran. In late 1982, the Iranian authorities encouraged the Iraqi Shia parties to unite under one umbrella group known as the Supreme Assembly for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SAIRI). Headquar- tered in Tehran, SAIRI was under the chairmanship of Muham- mad Baqir al Hakim, a prominent clergyman whose father had been the leading ayatollah of Iraq in the 1960s. SAIRI's aim was to promote the cause of Islamic revolution in Iraq by overthrow- ing the Baathist regime. To further that objective, in 1983 SAIRI 198 Government and Politics established a government-in-exile. SAIRI's activities brought harsh reprisals against members of the extended Hakim family still liv- ing in Iraq but were generally ineffective in undermining the politi- cal controls of the Baath. Another opposition element included in SAIRI was the Organization of Islamic Action, headed by Iraqi- born Muhammad Taqi al Mudarrissi. Mass Media In early 1988, all radio and television broadcasting in Iraq was controlled by the government. Radio Iraq had both domestic and foreign services. The domestic service broadcast in Arabic, Kurd- ish, Syriac, and Turkoman; the foreign service, in English, French, German, Russian, Swahili, Turkish, and Urdu. Two radio sta- tions based in Baghdad broadcast all day, and they could be picked up by the overwhelming majority of the estimated 2.5 million radio receivers in the country. There were also separate radio stations with programs in Kurdish and Persian. Baghdad Television was the main government television station. It broadcast over two channels throughout the day. Government- owned commercial television stations also broadcast from Basra, Kirkuk, Mosul, and nineteen other locations for an average of six hours a day. A Kurdish-language television station aired programs for eight hours each day. There were an estimated 750,000 pri- vately owned television sets in the country in 1986, the latest year for which such statistics were available. In 1988 there were six national daily newspapers, all of which were published in Baghdad. One of these papers, the Baghdad Observer, was published in English; it had an estimated circulation of 220,000. Another daily, Al Iraq, with a circulation of abut 30,000, was published in Kurdish. The largest of the four Arabic-language dailies was Al Jumhuriya, which had a circulation of approximately 220,000. Ath Thawra, with a circulation of about 22,000, was the official organ of the Baath Party. There were also seven weekly papers, all published in Baghdad. The government's Iraqi News Agency (INA) distributed news to the foreign press based in, or passing through, Iraq. Although Article 26 of the Provisional Constitution guarantees freedom of opinion and publication “within the limits of the law,” newspapers, books, and other publications were subject to censor- ship. The Ministry of Guidance monitored published material to ensure that all writing was “in line with the nationalist and pro- gressive line of the revolution.” The Ministry of Culture and Information's National House for Publishing and Distributing 199 Iraq: A Country Study Advertising had the sole authority to import and to distribute all foreign newspapers, magazines, and periodicals. Foreign Policy Iraq's relations with other countries and with international orga- nizations are supervised by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In 1988 the minister of foreign affairs was Tariq Aziz, who had served in that post since 1983. Aziz was a member of the RCC and an influential leader of the Baath Party. Before becoming minister of foreign affairs, he had been director of the party's foreign affairs bureau. Aziz, Saddam Husayn, and the other members of the RCC formulated foreign policy, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs bureaucracy implemented RCC directives. The Baath maintained control over the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and over all Iraqi diplo- matic missions outside the country through its party cells that oper- ated throughout the ministry and in all embassies abroad. In 1988 Iraq's main foreign policy issue was the war with Iran. This war had begun in September 1980, when Saddam Husayn sent Iraqi forces across the Shatt al Arab into southwestern Iran (see Iran Iraq Conflict, ch. 1). Although the reasons for Saddam Husayn's decision to invade Iran were complicated, the leaders of the Baath Party had long resented Iranian hegemony in the Per- sian Gulf region and had especially resented the perceived Iranian interference in Iraq's internal affairs both before and after the 1979 Islamic Revolution. They may have thought that the revolution- ary turmoil in Tehran would enable Iraq to achieve a quick victory. Their objectives were to halt any potential foreign assistance to the Shias and to the Kurdish opponents of the regime and to end Ira- nian domination of the area. The Baathists believed a weakened Iran would be incapable of posing a security threat and could not undermine Iraq's efforts to exercise the regional influence that had been blocked by non-Arab Iran since the mid-1960s. Although the Iraqis failed to obtain the expected easy victory, the war initially went well for them. By early 1982, however, the Iraqi occupation forces were on the defensive and were being forced to retreat from some of their forward lines. In June 1982, Saddam Husayn ordered most of the Iraqi units to withdraw from Iranian territory; after that time, the Baathist government tried to obtain a cease-fire based on a return of all armed personnel to the international borders that prevailed as of September 21, 1979. Iran did not accept Iraq's offer to negotiate an end to the war. Similarly, it rejected a July 1982 United Nations (UN) Security Council resolution calling for an immediate cease-fire. Subse- quently, Iranian forces invaded Iraq by crossing the Shatt al Arab 200 meer BRRR O D DO DO CLOROD PER WAPI DEN BOON Khalafa Street, Baghdad Courtesy Ronald L. Kuipers Rashid Hotel, Baghdad Courtesy Ronald L. Kuipers 201 Iraq: A Country Study in the south and by capturing some mountain passes in the north. To discourage Iran's offensive, the Iraqi air force initiated bomb- ing raids over several Iranian cities and towns. The air raids brought Iranian retaliation, which included the aerial bombing of Bagh- dad. Although Iraq eventually pushed back and contained the Ira- nian advances, it was not able to force Iranian troops completely out of Iraqi territory. The perceived threat to Iraq in the summer of 1982 thus was serious enough to force Saddam Husayn to request the Non-Aligned Movement to change the venue of its scheduled September meeting from Baghdad to India; nevertheless, since the fall of 1982, the ground conflict had generally been a stalemated war of attrition-although Iran made small but demoralizing ter- ritorial advances as a result of its massive offensives in the reed marshes north of Basra in 1984 and in 1985, in Al Faw Peninsula in early 1986, and in the outskirts of Basra during January and February 1987. In addition, as of early 1988 the government had lost control of several mountainous districts in Kurdistan where, since 1983, dissident Kurds have cooperated militarily with Iran. Saddam Husayn's government has maintained consistently since the summer of 1982 that Iraq wants a negotiated end to the war based upon the status quo ante. Iran's stated conditions for ceas- ing hostilities, namely the removal of Saddam Husayn and the Baath from power, however, have been unacceptable. The main objective of the regime became the extrication of the country from the war with as little additional damage as possible. To further this goal, Iraq has used various diplomatic, economic, and military strategies; none of these had been successful in bringing about a cease-fire as of early 1988 (see Introduction). Although the war was a heavy burden on Iraq politically, eco- nomically, and socially, the most profound consequence of the war's prolongation was its impact on the patterns of Iraq's foreign rela- tions. Whereas trends toward a moderation of the Baath Party's ideological approach to foreign affairs were evident before 1980, the war helped to accelerate these trends. Two of the most dra- matic changes were in Iraq's relationships with the Soviet Union and with the United States. During the course of the war Iraq moved away from the close friendship with the Soviet Union that had persisted throughout the 1970s, and it initiated a rapproche- ment with the United States. Iraq also sought to ally itself with Kuwait and with Saudi Arabia, two neighboring countries with which there had been considerable friction during much of the 1970s. The alignment with these countries was accompanied by a more moderate Iraqi approach to other Arab countries, such as Egypt and Jordan, which previously Iraq had perceived as hostile. 202 Government and Politics The Soviet Union When the Baath Party came to power in 1968, relations between Iraq and the West were strained. The Baathists believed that most Western countries, and particularly the United States, opposed the goal of Arab unity. The Baathists viewed the 1948 partition of Pales- tine and the creation of Israel as evidence of an imperialist plot to keep the Arabs divided. Refusal to recognize Israel and support for the reestablishment of Palestine consequently became central tenets of Baath ideology. The party based Iraq's relations with other countries on those countries' attitudes toward the Palestinian issue. The Soviet Union, which had supported the Arabs during the June 1967 Arab-Israeli War and again during the October 1973 Arab- Israeli War, was regarded as having an acceptable position on the Palestine issue. Thus, the Baath cultivated relations with Moscow to counter the perceived hostility of the United States. In 1972 the Baathist regime signed a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with the Soviet Union. Article 1 stated that the treaty's objective was to develop broad cooperation between Iraq and the Soviet Union in economic, trade, scientific, technical, and other fields on the basis of “respect for sovereignty, territorial integrity and non-interference in one another's internal affairs.” Under the treaty, Iraq obtained extensive technical assistance and military equipment from the Soviet Union. Despite the importance that both the Bakr and the Saddam Husayn governments attached to the relationship with the Soviet Union, they were reluctant to have Iraq become too closely entan- gled with the Soviet Union or with its sphere of influence. Ideo- logically, the Baath Party espoused nonalignment vis-à-vis the superpower rivalry, and the party perceived Iraq as being part of the Non-Aligned Movement. Indeed, as early as 1974, the more pragmatic elements in the party advocated broadening relations with the West to counterbalance those with the East and to ensure that Iraq maintained a genuine nonaligned status. The dramatic increase in oil revenues following the December 1973 quadrupling of prices by the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) provided the government with the financial resources to expand economic relations with numerous private and public enter- prises in Western Europe, Japan, and the United States. Iraq also was able to diversify its source of weapons by purchasing arms from France. The major impetus for Iraq's retreat from its close relationship with the Soviet Union was not economic, despite Iraq's increas- ing commercial ties with the West, but political. Iraqis were shocked 203 Iraq: A Country Study Concern about the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran and about the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan prompted Iraq to reexamine seriously the nature of its relationship with the United States. This process led to a gradual warming of relations between the two coun- tries. In 1981 Iraq and the United States engaged in low-level, offi- cial talks on matters of mutual interest such as trade and regional security. The following year the United States extended credits to Iraq for the purchase of American agricultural commodities, the first time this had been done since 1967. More significant, in 1983 the Baathist government hosted a United States special Middle East envoy, the highest-ranking American official to visit Baghdad in more than sixteen years. In 1984, when the United States inaugu- rated “Operation Staunch” to halt shipment of arms to Iran by third countries, no similar embargo was attempted against Iraq because Saddam Husayn's government had expressed its desire to negotiate an end to the war. All of these initiatives prepared the ground for Iraq and the United States to reestablish diplomatic relations in November 1984. In early 1988, Iraq's relations with the United States were gener- ally cordial. The relationship had been strained at the end of 1986 when it was revealed that the United States had secretly sold arms to Iran during 1985 and 1986, and a crisis occurred in May 1987 when an Iraqi pilot bombed an American naval ship in the Persian Gulf, a ship he mistakenly thought to be involved in Iran-related commerce. Nevertheless, the two countries had weathered these problems by mid-1987. Although lingering suspicions about the United States remained, Iraq welcomed greater, even if indirect, American diplomatic and military pressure in trying to end the war with Iran. For the most part, the government of Saddam Husayn believed the United States supported its position that the war was being prolonged only because of Iranian intransigence. The Persian Gulf Countries Iraq's closest relations in 1988 were with the countries of the Arabian Peninsula, especially Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. This was a reversal of the pattern of relations that had persisted in the 1970s. The original Baathist view of the Arabian Peninsula shaykhdoms was that they were regimes that had been set up by the imperialist powers to serve their own interests. This attitude was reinforced in the period between 1968 and 1971, when Britain was preparing the countries of Bahrain, Oman, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) for complete independence. Iraq wished to have an influence on the governments that would come to power, and it provided clandestine assistance to various groups opposed to the 206 Government and Politics pro-British rulers. Iraqi support of dissident movements was par- ticularly evident in Oman, where an organized guerrilla force was fighting the government from the late 1960s to the mid-1970s. The Baathist perception of Iran's role in the Persian Gulf was an important factor in Iraqi views of the Arabian Peninsula states. In 1969 Iran, which was then providing aid to dissident Iraqi Kurds, unilaterally abrogated a 1937 treaty that had established the Shatt al Arab boundary along the low water on the Iranian shore; in 1971 Iran forcibly occupied three small islands in the lower gulf near the approaches to the Strait of Hormuz; and by 1972 Iran was again giving assistance to antigovernment Kurds. As Iraq became increasingly concerned about Iranian policies, it tried to enlist the cooperation of the Arab monarchies in an effort to keep the Persian Gulf independent of Iranian influence. Iraq believed it was possi- ble to collaborate with the Arab kings and shaykhs because the latter had proven their Arab nationalism by participating in the 1973 oil boycott against the Western countries supporting Israel. Despite Iraq's new friendliness, the rulers in countries like Kuwait and Saudi Arabia did not easily forget their suspicions of Iraqi radicalism. Nevertheless, political discussions were initiated, and progress was made toward resolving disputes over borders, over oil pricing policy, and over support for subversion. By the time the Islamic Revolution occurred in Iran in 1979, Iraq had succeeded in establishing generally correct relations with the Arab states of the Persian Gulf. The war with Iran served as a catalyst to develop these relations even further. Although the Gulf states proclaimed their neutrality in the war, in practice they gave Iraq crucial financial support. The unexpected prolongation of the war and the closing of Iraqi ports early in the war had produced a severe economic crunch by the beginning of 1981. In response, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE all provided loans to help replace revenues that Iraq had lost because of the decline of its oil exports. Saudi Arabia and Kuwait were particularly gener- ous, providing an estimated US$50 billion in interest-free loans up through 1987. In addition, a major portion of Iraq's nonmili- tary imports were shipped to Kuwaiti harbors, then transported overland to Iraq. Saudi Arabia also agreed to provide to Iraqi con- tract customers part of its own oil from the Neutral Zone, juris- diction over which it shared with Iraq; it was understood that Iraq would repay this oil “loan” after the war had ended. Iraq and Other Arab Countries The war with Iran changed the Baathist perception of what con- stituted the principal threat to Arab unity. Prior to 1980, the Baath 207 Iraq: A Country Study leaders had identified Zionism as the main danger to Arab nation- alism. After the war had begun, Iranian nationalism was perceived as the primary force threatening the Arabs. Under the pressures of war, Iraq became reconciled with Egypt and moderated its once- uncompromising stance on Israel. This reconciliation was ironic, because Iraq had taken the lead in 1978 and in 1979 in ostracizing Egypt for recognizing Israel and for signing a separate peace treaty with the latter state. The war with Iran helped to transform Egypt from an excoriated traitor into a much-appreciated ally. Factories in Egypt produced munitions and spare parts for the Iraqi army, and Egyptian workers filled some of the labor shortages created by the mobilization of so many Iraqi men. As early as 1984, Iraq publicly called for Egypt's readmission into pan-Arab councils, and in 1987 Iraq was one of the countries leading the effort to have Egypt readmitted to the Arab League. The Baath also abandoned its former hostility to countries such as Jordan, Morocco, and the Yemen Arab Republic (North Yemen). On a smaller scale than Egypt, Jordan provided Iraq with tanks and with laborers, and it served as a transshipment point for goods intended for Iraq. The most ideologically significant consequence of the war was the evolution of Baathist views on the issue of Palestine. Prior to 1980, Iraq had opposed any negotiations that might lead to the creation of a Palestinian state on the Israeli-occupied West Bank and in the Gaza Strip on the ground that these territories constituted only part of historic Palestine. Accordingly, Iraq supported the most extreme Palestinian guerrilla groups, the so-called “rejectionist” factions, and was hostile toward the mainstream Palestine Libera- tion Organization (PLO). Thus, Iraq provided financial and mili- tary aid to such forces as George Habash's Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), the Palestine Liberation Front, and the Arab Liberation Front. The latter group had actually been founded by the Baath in 1969. In addition, Iraq was widely believed to have links to various Palestinian terrorist groups such as the “Spe- cial Operations Branch” of the PFLP, Black June, the Arab Orga- nization of the 15th May, and the Abu Nidal Organization. Beginning in 1980, Iraq gradually retreated from its long-held position that there could never be any recognition of Israel. In 1983 Baath leaders accepted the de facto partition of pre-1948 Palestine by stating publicly that there could be negotiations with Israel for a peaceful resolution of the Arab-Israeli dispute. Consequently, Iraq cut its ties to the extremist Palestinian factions, including that of Abu Nidal, who was expelled from the country in November; he subsequently established new headquarters in Syria. Iraq shifted 208 Government and Politics its support to the mainstream Palestinian groups that advocated negotiations for a Palestinian state. Yasir Arafat's Al Fatah organi- zation was permitted to reopen an office in Baghdad. Arafat, whose proposed assassination for alleged treason against the Palestinians had been clandestinely supported by Iraq in the late 1970s, was even invited to visit the country. This shift represented a fundamen- tal revolution in the thinking of the Iraqi Baath. In effect, by 1986 the Baath Party was saying that the Palestinians had to determine for themselves the nature of their relationship with Israel. Iraq's most bitter foreign relationship was with the rival Baath government in Syria. Although there were periods of amity between the two governments—such as the one immediately after the October 1973 Arab-Israeli War and the one in October 1978, when Iraq and Syria both opposed Egypt's plans for a separate peace with Israel—the governments generally were hostile to one another. Relations began to deteriorate once again at the end of 1980 fol- lowing the outbreak of the war with Iran. Syria criticized Iraq for diverting Arab attention from the real enemy (Israel) and for attack- ing a regime (Iran) supportive of the Arab cause. Relations wors- ened throughout 1981 as each country accused the other of assisting antiregime political groups. In April 1982, Syria closed its borders with Iraq and cut off the flow of Iraqi oil through the pipeline that traversed Syrian territory to ports on the Mediterranean Sea. The cessation of Iraqi oil exports via this pipeline was a severe economic blow; Iraq interpreted the move as a confirmation of Syria's de facto alliance with Iran in the war. The hostility between Iraq and Syria has been a source of con- cern to the other Arab states. King Hussein of Jordan, in particu- lar, tried to reconcile the Iraqi and Syrian leaders. Although his efforts to mediate a meeting between Saddam Husayn and Syrian president Hafiz al Assad were finally realized in early 1987, these private discussions did not lead to substantive progress in resolv- ing the issues that divided the two countries. Intense diplomatic efforts by Jordan and by Saudi Arabia also resulted in the atten- dance of both presidents, Husayn and Assad, at the Arab League summit in Amman in November 1987. The Iraqis were irritated, however, that Syria used its influence to prevent the conference from adopting sanctions against Iran. The animosities that have divided the rival Iraqi and Syrian factions of the Baath appeared to be as firmly rooted as ever in early 1988. Relations with Other Countries In 1988 Iraq maintained cordial relations with Turkey, its non-Arab neighbor to the north. Turkey served as an important 209 The golden helmet of Maskalam-dug, king of Ur, ca. 2450 B.C. SOCIAL UPHEAVALS HAVE PLAYED a major role in Iraq's perception of its national security. Internal political instability, cou- pled with recurrent revolts by the Kurdish minority, mobilized the energies of successive regimes to crush opposition forces and to restore order. During the mid- and late 1970s, however, the Baath (Arab Socialist Resurrection) Party leaders succeeded in establishing a revolutionary government, which temporarily subdued the Kurd- ish revolt in northern Iraq and, using repressive measures, con- solidated its power. The higher prices of petroleum following the October 1973 Arab- Israeli War, and the Arab oil embargo, resulted in an accumula- tion of wealth that enabled Iraq to expand its armed forces in an attempt to match, in strength as well as in strategic importance, the capacity of its neighbor, Iran. Having signed a border treaty with Tehran in 1975, Baghdad assumed that its search for military parity would not result in conflict, in particular because the two states enjoyed economic prosperity; however, regional events, ranging from the Soviet Union's expulsion from Egypt in 1972 to Egypt's even- tual expulsion from the League of Arab States (Arab League) in 1979, following the signing of the separate Israeli-Egyptian Peace Treaty, strengthened Baghdad's resolve to make a bid for regional leadership. Armed with modern weapons and with sophisticated equipment from the Soviet Union and France, Iraq gained a sense of invincibility and, when the opportunity arose, implemented its resolve. Threatened by the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran and by its potential influence on Iraq's majority Shia (see Glossary) popu- lation, Iraq attacked Iran on September 22, 1980. For most of the 1980s, Iraq has been preoccupied with that war. In contrast to the first forty years of Iraqi independence, when the military participated in several coups, the Iraqi armed forces demon- strated growing professionalism in the 1980s by limiting their direct role in the country's political life. The armed forces' loyalty has also been assured by the Baath Party, however, which-after con- ducting purges against the military during the 1970s—continued to maintain a close eye on every aspect of military life and national security in the late 1980s. National Security Concerns Like most developing states, but perhaps to a greater extent because of internal schisms, Iraq was plagued with insecurity and 215 Iraq: A Country Study with political instability after independence in 1932. When Brit- ain and France redrew boundaries throughout the Middle East fol- lowing the dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire after World War I, the region that eventually became Iraq (under the Sykes- Picot Agreement) included a wide variety of ethnic and religious groups with little sense of national unity (see World War I and the British Mandate, ch. 1). The absence of nation-building ele- ments encouraged various sectors of Iraqi society to oppose the establishment of central authority, often for personal and ideolog- ical reasons. Consequently, clandestine activities against the state's budding political and military institutions threatened Iraq's politi- cal leaders. Insecurity arising from domestic opposition to the state was compounded by Iraq's long-standing isolation from neighboring countries because of ideological rivalries, ethnic and religious differ- ences, and competition for influence in the Persian Gulf. The Iraqi political agenda was further burdened in the late 1970s by the newly inherited Arab leadership role that came with Egypt's isolation in the wake of the Camp David Accords and the ensuing separate Israeli-Egyptian Peace Treaty. The Baath Party that ruled Iraq in early 1988 came to power in July 1968 determined to restore order to a country where politi- cal turmoil was the norm (see The Emergence of Saddam Husayn, 1968-79, ch. 1). Despite several coup attempts during the inter- vening twenty years, notably in 1970 and in 1973, the Baath suc- cessfully ended the political turbulence of the 1950s and the 1960s. Yet, this level of stability was achieved only through harsh methods imposed by an increasingly disciplined, if intolerant, party. Anti- state conspirators, including fellow Baathists, were rushed into exile, were kept under house arrest, or were executed. Actual or alleged coup attempts were forcefully put down and were followed by sys- tematic purges of the bureaucracy and the armed forces; moreover, the party's vigilance on internal security was supported by a thorough indoctrination program to gain and to maintain formerly uncertain loyalties, both within the armed forces and in the civilian population. Baathist success in maintaining internal security resulted partly from its 1975 limited victory against the Kurds (see People, ch. 2; Internal Security, this ch.). The Iraqi-Iranian border agreement of March 1975, subsequently formalized in the Baghdad Treaty in June 1975, resolved a number of disputes between the two states. Its provisions ended Iranian support for Iraqi Kurds, whose strug- gles for autonomy had troubled Iraqi governments since 1932. Bolstered by this limited success, Baghdad adopted a variety of measures in the succeeding decade in order to emerge from its 216 Iraq: A Country Study in 1978 active-duty military personnel numbered fewer than 200,000, and the military was equipped with some of the most sophisticated weaponry of the Soviet military arsenal, by 1987 the quality of offensive weapons had improved dramatically, and the number of men under arms had increased almost fourfold (see table 10, Appendix). Army equipment inventories increased significantly during the mid-1980s. Whereas in 1977 the army possessed approximately 2,400 tanks, including several hundred T-62 models, in 1987 the International Institute for Strategic Studies estimated that Iraq deployed about 4,500 tanks, including advanced versions of the T-72. Other army equipment included about 4,000 armored vehicles, more than 3,000 towed and self-propelled artillery pieces, a number of FROG-7 and Scud-B surface-to-surface missiles with a range of up to 300 kilometers, and an array of approximately 4,000 (some self-propelled) antiaircraft guns. The vast majority of the army's equipment inventory was of Soviet manufacture, although French and Brazilian equipment in particular continued to be acquired in Iraq's ongoing attempt to diversify its sources of armaments (see table 11, Appendix). This mammoth arsenal gave Iraq a clear-cut advantage over Iran in 1987. Iraq had an advantage of more than four to one in tanks (4,500 to 1,000); four to one in armored vehicles (4,000 to 1,000); and two to one in artil- lery and antiaircraft pieces (7,330 to 3,000). Despite this quantitative and qualitative superiority, the Iraqi army by the end of 1987 had not risked its strength in a final and decisive battle to win the war. Headquartered in Basra, the 5,000-man navy was the smallest branch of the armed forces in early 1988, and, in contrast to the Iranian navy, had played virtually no role in the war. Iraq's second naval facility at Umm Qasr took on added importance after 1980, in particular because the Shatt al Arab waterway, which leads into Basra, was the scene of extensive fighting. It was at Umm Qasr that most of the Iraqi navy's active vessels were based in early 1988. Between 1977 and 1987, Iraq purchased from the Soviet Union eight fast-attack OSA-class patrol boats—each equipped with Styx surface-to-surface missiles (SSMs). In late 1986, Iraq obtained from Italy four Lupo class frigates, and six Wadi Assad class corvettes equipped with Otomat-2 SSMs. Although the four frigates and the six corvettes was held in Italy under an embargo imposed by the Italian government, these purchases signaled Iraq's intention to upgrade its naval power. Observers speculated that the end of the war with Iran could be followed by a rapid expansion of the Iraqi navy, which could exercise its influence in northern Persian Gulf waters (see table 12, Appendix). 218 National Security In 1987 the Iraqi air force consisted of 40,000 men, of whom about 10,000 were attached to its subordinate Air Defense Com- mand. The air force was headquartered in Baghdad, and major bases were located at Basra, H-3 (site of a pump station on the oil pipeline in western Iraq), Kirkuk, Mosul, Rashid, and Ash Shuaybah. Iraq's more than 500 combat aircraft were formed into two bomber squadrons, eleven fighter-ground attack squadrons, five interceptor squadrons, and one counterinsurgency squadron of 10 to 30 aircraft each. Support aircraft included two transport squadrons. As many as ten helicopter squadrons were also opera- tional, although these formed the Army Air Corps. The Air Defense Command piloted the MiG-25, MiG-21, and various Mirage inter- ceptors and manned Iraq's considerable inventory of surface-to- air missiles (SAMs). The equipment of the air force and the army's air corps, like that of the other services, was primarily of Soviet manufacture. After 1980, however, in an effort to diversify its sources of advanced armaments, Iraq turned to France for Mirage fighters and for attack helicopters. Between 1982 and 1987, Iraq received or ordered a vari- ety of equipment from France, including more than 100 Mirage F-1s, about 100 Gazelle, Super-Frelon, and Alouette helicopters, and a variety of air-to-surface and air-to-air missiles, including Exocets. Other attack helicopters purchased included the Soviet Hind equipped with AT-2 Swatter, and BO-105s equipped with AS-11 antitank guided weapons. In addition, Iraq bought seventy F-7 (Chinese version of the MiG-21) fighters, assembled in Egypt. Thus Iraq's overall airpower was considerable (see table 13, Appendix). Although Iraq expanded its arms inventory, its war efforts may have been hindered by poor military judgment and by lack of resolve. Saddam Husayn was the country's head of state and pre- mier as well as the chairman of both the RCC and the Baath Party; moreover, in 1984 he assumed the rank of field marshal and appointed himself commander in chief of the Iraqi armed forces. Iraqi propaganda statements claimed that Saddam Husayn had “developed new military ideas and theories of global importance," but few Western military analysts gave credence to such claims. Since 1980 General Adnan Khairallah, who served as both deputy commander in chief of the armed forces and minister of defense, was the highest officer in the military chain of command. In 1987 he also assumed the position of deputy prime minister. His multi- ple roles reflected the predominance of the army in the organiza- tional structure of the armed forces. Sattar Ahmad Jassin was appointed secretary general of defense and adjutant of the armed forces in 1985. General Abd al Jabar Shanshal assumed the position 219 Iraq: A Country Study of chief of the armed forces general staff in 1984. Frequent changes at the general staff level indicated to foreign observers that Iraq's military failures were primarily the result of poor leadership and an overly rigid command structure. Defective leadership was evi- dent in the lack of clear orders and in the poor responses by the army in the occupation of Susangerd. In October 1980, armored units twice advanced and withdrew from the city, and later in the same operation, the army abandoned strategic positions near Dezful. Rigid control of junior officers and of noncommissioned officers (NCOs) frustrated their initiative and may have been the reason for the high casualty figures in the infantry, where initia- tive and spontaneity in decision making can be of paramount impor- tance. The command structure reportedly was even more inflexible and slow in the People's Army detachments, where political com- manders routinely made military decisions. Manpower and Training Historically, under Turkish rule, Iraqi conscripts were often transported to distant locations within the vast Ottoman Empire, and they were not allowed to return home for many years. During the early years of independence, conditions of service were nearly as onerous: pay was irregular, troops were misused, and retention beyond the compulsory period remained a common practice. Throughout modern history, the majority of conscripts have ful- filled much of their service obligation in the rugged mountains of northern Iraq, where conditions were Spartan at best and were often very dangerous. Although conditions improved markedly during the 1970s, and conscription was no longer as widely resented as it had been for more than a century, there were still draft dodgers, and they were routinely court-martialed and executed in public. In the past, deferments and exemptions from conscription were usually granted generously. Until 1958 exemptions could be bought. In 1988 deferments were still available to full-time students, to hard- ship cases, and to those with brothers serving in the military. The increase in manpower needs created by the rapid growth of the army after 1973 and the war with Iran after 1980 resulted in a tight- ening of previously liberal exemption policies, however. In 1987 observers estimated that a total of 3 million Iraqi males, aged eigh- teen to forty-five, were fit for military service. An additional 2 mil- lion Iraqi females in the same age group were potentially available for military service. Males were liable to conscription until the age of forty-five. In 1980 the two-year compulsory period of service was extended without specific time limitations, to support the war effort; many 220 National Security trained technicians started serving as long as five years. A man could also volunteer—for a two-year term that could be extended by periods of two years—as an alternative to conscription or for additional service at any time between ages eighteen and forty-three. After two years of compulsory active service, both conscripts and volunteers were obliged to spend eighteen years in a reserve unit. These reserve units received intensive training during the mid-1980s because many reservists were called up to fill manpower shortages caused by the Iran-Iraq War and to relieve temporarily those on active duty. Although women were not conscripted, under a law passed in 1977 they could be commissioned as officers if they held a health- related university degree, and they could be appointed as warrant officers or NCOs in army medical institutes if they were qualified nurses. The vast majority of women in the armed forces held administrative or medical-related positions, but an increasing num- ber of women performed in combat functions after 1981. Women were serving in combat roles both in the air force and in the Air Defense Command in 1987. This integration of women into the military reflected the shortage of trained males. Most army officers came from the Military College in Baghdad, which was founded in 1924. Candidates for the college were physi- cally qualified, secondary-school graduates of Iraqi nationality, who had demonstrated political loyalty. Cadets were divided into two groups, combatant (combat arms) and administrative (technology and administration). They studied common subjects during the first two years, and they specialized according to their group designa- tion in the final year. On graduation cadets received commissions as second lieutenants in the regular army. Some were granted higher ranks because of voluntary service on the war front. Another source of army officers was the Reserve College founded in 1952. This school enrolled two classes annually, one for those who held professional degrees, such as medicine and pharmacy, and one for secondary-school graduates. During the 1970s, approxi- mately 2,000 reserve officers were graduated each year; those with professional degrees were commissioned as second lieutenants, and those without a college education were appointed as warrant officers. The army also maintained a system of service schools for training in combat arms as well as in technical and administrative services. Most of those schools, located in or near Baghdad, have conducted additional courses for both officers and NCOs since 1980. Since 1928 the army has also maintained a two-year staff college to train selected officers in all services for command and staff positions. 221 National Security In 1975 Baghdad adopted a comprehensive Military Service and Pension Law that established pay scales, allowances, benefits, and retirement pay designed to attract officers and enlisted men from the civilian sector. A second lieutenant was authorized ID65 (ID or Iraqi dinar-for value of dinar, see Glossary) a month as base pay, with an increase of ID20 for each higher rank. Moreover, an adjustable cost-of-living allowance was established, as was a family allowance amounting to a 5 percent increase in salary for each dependent. Service allowances were also granted to those with spe- cial skills or duties. Retirement pay was commensurate with rank and with civilian retirement benefits, and indemnities were estab- lished for the families of soldiers disabled or killed in action. After the military defeats of 1982, the entire chain of command suffered low morale. On several occasions, signs of mutiny in oppo- sition to the war emerged. According to unverified Iraqi dissident reports, the number of deserters reached 100,000, and in central and in southern Iraq, they formed armed groups that were opposed to the regime. Many soldiers refused to fight in Kurdistan, and many more joined the armed Kurdish resistance movement. Military Justice System Both political offenders and ordinary criminal offenders in the armed forces were tried in the military courts, but Iraq's military courts had no jurisdiction over civilians accused of security-related crimes. Such cases were reviewed by revolutionary courts. Mili- tary tribunals were held in camera and were often summary in nature. Although little information was available in early 1988, observers believed that the system of military justice differed little from the system in operation at the time of the 1968 Baath Revo- lution. At that time a permanent military court of at least five mem- bers was usually established at each division headquarters and wherever large concentrations of nondivision troops were stationed. In addition, emergency military courts could be set up in combat areas to expedite the trial of offenders there. Such courts usually consisted of three members, a president with the rank of lieutenant colonel and two members with the rank of major or above. The highest court was the Military Court of Cassation, which sat in Baghdad. It was appointed by the minister of defense and was composed of a president with the rank of brigadier general or above and two members with the rank of colonel or above. Appeals from the sentences of lower military courts were heard in the Mili- tary Court of Cassation; it also conducted trials of the first instance of senior officers. 223 Iraq: A Country Study A number of changes were introduced into the Penal Code of the Popular Army since 1980. Law No. 32 of 1982, for example, made several offenses by service personnel punishable by death. In its 1985 report, Amnesty International noted that RCC Reso- lution No. 1370 reaffirmed the death penalty for various offenses. These included fleeing or defaulting from military service, con- spiring against the state, espionage, and joining the Ad Dawah al Islamiyah (the Islamic Call), commonly referred to as Ad Dawah. Uniforms and Rank Insignia In the late 1980s, Iraqi uniforms consisted of service and field attire for both summer and winter and a dress uniform and mess jacket for officers. The winter service dress uniform, of olive drab wool, consisted of a single-breasted coat having patch pockets with flaps, a khaki shirt and tie, and trousers that were usually cuffless. The summer uniform was similar but was made of light tan mate- rial. The winter field uniform consisted of an olive drab shirt, wool trousers, and a waist-length jacket. The summer field uniform was identical in style but was made of lighter material. Both field uni- forms included a web belt, a beret or helmet, and high-top shoes. Commissioned officers' rank insignia were identical for the army and for the air force except that shoulder boards were olive drab for the army and were blue for the air force. Naval officer rank insignia consisted of gold stripes worn on the lower sleeve. Army and air force enlisted personnel wore stripes on the sleeve to desig- nate rank, while the top noncommissioned officer rank, sergeant major and chief master sergeant, respectively, consisted of a gold bar on top of the shoulders (see fig. 12 and fig. 13). Paramilitary Forces In 1987 the People's Army (Al Jaysh ash Shaabi-also cited as the Popular Army or People's Militia), standing at an estimated 650,000, approached the regular armed forces' manpower strength. Officially, it was the Iraqi Baath Party Militia and included a spe- cial youth section. Formed in 1970, the People's Army grew rapidly, and by 1977 it was estimated to have 50,000 active members. Sub- sequently, a phenomenal growth, giving the militia extensive inter- nal security functions, occurred. Whereas its original purpose was to give the Baath Party an active role in every town and village, the People's Army in 1981 began its most ambitious task to date, the support of the regular armed forces. The official functions of the People's Army were to act as back- up to the regular armed forces in times of war and to safeguard revolutionary achievements, to promote mass consciousness, to 224 Iraq: A Country Study IRAQI RANK MULAZIM MULAZIM AWWAL NAQIB RAID MUQADDAM AQID AMID LIWA FARIQ FARIQ AWWAL MUSHIR ARMY U.S. RANK TITLES | 2D LIEUTENANT 1ST LIEUTENANT CAPTAIN MAJOR LIEUTENANT COLONEL COLONEL BRIGADIER GENERAL MAJOR GENERAL LIEUTENANT GENERAL GENERAL GENERAL OF THE ARMY IRAQI RANK MULAZIM MULAZIM AWWAL NAQIB RAID MUQADDAM AQID AMID LIWA FARIQ FARIQ AWWAL MUSHIR AIR FORCE XX U.S. RANK TITLES 2D LIEUTENANT 1ST LIEUTENANT CAPTAIN MAJOR LIEUTENANT COLONEL COLONEL BRIGADIER GENERAL MAJOR GENERAL LIEUTENANT GENERAL GENERAL GENERAL OF THE AIR FORCE IRAQI RANK MULAZIM MULAZIM AWWAL NAQIB RAID MUQADDAM AQID AMID LIWA FARIQ FARIQ AWWAL MUSHIR NAVY U.S. RANK TITLES ENSIGN LIEUTENANT JUNIOR GRADE LIEUTENANT LIEUTENANT COMMANDER COMMANDER CAPTAIN COMMODORE ADMIRAL REAR ADMIRAL VICE ADMIRAL ADMIRAL FLEET ADMIRAL Figure 12. Officer Ranks and Insignia, 1987 National Security IRAQI RANK IRAQI RANK JUNDI JUNDI AWWAL NAIB ARIF NAIB ARIF ARIF RAIS URAFA RAIS URAFA NAIB DABIT NAIB DABIT ARMY NO INSIGNIA U.S. RANK TITLES BASIC PRIVATE PRIVATE/PRIVATE 1ST CLASS CORPORAL SERGEANT STAFF SERGEANTI SERGEANT 1ST CLASS SERGEANT MAJOR IRAQI RANK JUNDI JUNDI AWWAL NAIB ARIF ARIF RAIS URAFA NAIB DABIT AIR FORCE NO INSIGNIA U.S. RANK TITLES AIRMAN BASIC AIRMAN/AIRMAN 1ST CLASS SERGEANT STAFF SERGEANT TECHNICAL SERGEANTI MASTER SERGEANT CHIEF MASTER SERGEANT IRAQI RANK JUNDI JUNDI AWWAL NAIB ARIF ARIF RAIS URAFA NAIB DABIT NAVY NO INSIGNIA INSIGNIA NOT KNOWN INSIGNIA NOT KNOWN INSIGNIA NOT KNOWN INSIGNIA NOT KNOWN INSIGNIA NOT KNOWN U.S. RANK TITLES SEAMAN RECRUIT SEAMAN APPRENTICE/SEAMAN PETTY OFFICER 3D CLASS PETTY OFFICER 2D CLASS | PETTY OFFICER 1ST CLASSI CHIEF PETTY OFFICER MASTER CHIEF PETTY OFFICER Figure 13. Enlisted Ranks and Insignia, 1987 Ñ Iraq: A Country Study Foreign Military Ties Military Ties Prior to the Iran-Iraq War Iraq's armed forces were heavily dependent on foreign military assistance after the fall of the Ottoman Empire at the end of World War I. In 1921 British Mandate authorities undertook the train- ing of Iraqi soldiers who had served under the Ottomans. The Brit- ish reorganized the former Ottoman units into a force designed to uphold internal law and order and to serve British interests by putting down frequent tribal revolts. Until 1958 British officers guided the development of the armed forces, and British influence was reflected in the organization, training, and equipment of the Iraqi military. Senior Iraqi officers regularly were sent to Britain or to India to receive advanced training. Iraq's generally Western- oriented military posture throughout this period culminated in the 1955 Baghdad Pact. The revolution of July 14, 1958, and the coming to power of Abd al Karim Qasim completely altered Iraq's military orienta- tion. Disagreement with the British (and with the Western world's) stance vis-à-vis Israel and growing pan-Arab sentiment led Qasim to abrogate the Baghdad Pact and to turn to the Soviet Union for arms. Since 1959 the Soviet Union has been Iraq's chief arms sup- plier and its most essential foreign military tie. In April 1972, the two states signed a fifteen-year Treaty of Friendship and Coopera- tion in which Iraq and the Soviet Union agreed to “continue to develop cooperation in the strengthening of the defense capabili- ties of each.” By no means, however, was Iraq a “satellite" of the Soviet Union. Baghdad consistently insisted on its independence in policy making, and on a number of key issues, including the Arab-Israeli conflict, Syria's role in Lebanon, and the Nonaligned Movement, the two states held opposing views. Furthermore, Iraq's Baathist ideology remained fundamentally antithetical to communism. As a further sign of its staunch independence, Iraq insisted on its free- dom to purchase weapons from Western sources, and in 1980 it demonstrated its intention to diversify its source of armaments. Although France and Britain both had sold some arms to Iraq dur- ing the 1966 to 1968 regime of Abd ar Rahman Arif, between 1974 and 1980 Iraq increased its purchases from France by acquiring helicopters, antitank missiles, and high performance Mirage jet fighters. Despite these expressions of Iraqi independence, both mutual interests and practical necessity dictated the Iraqi air forces's reliance 228 Iraq: A Country Study provided extensive military assistance to Iraq and, at the same time, continued its efforts to gain leverage on Iran. In early 1987, Moscow delivered a squadron of twenty-four MiG-29 Fulcrums to Bagh- dad. Considered the most advanced fighter in the Soviet arsenal, the MiG-29 previously had been provided only to Syria and India. The decision to export the MiG-29 to Iraq also assured Iraq a more advantageous payment schedule than any offered by the West and it reflected Soviet support for one of its traditional allies in the Mid- dle East. Caught in a financial crisis, Baghdad welcomed the low- interest loans Moscow extended for this equipment. Although the Soviets might not receive payments for several years, the sale of military hardware remained a critical source of revenue for them, and they have tried to retain Iraq as a customer. In May 1987, for example, the Soviets provided Iraq with better financial terms in a successful effort to prevent Iraq from buying sixty French Mirage 2000 fighters for an estimated US$3 billion. An additional US$3 billion in sales of helicopters and radar equip- ment may also have been denied to the French, although it was not possible to determine whether the Soviets agreed to fulfill both requirements. In early 1988, Iraq owed the Soviet Union between US$8 billion and US$10 billion in military debts alone. Arms from France France became a major military supplier to Iraq after 1975 as the two countries improved their political relations. In order to obtain petroleum imports from the Middle East and strengthen its traditional ties with Arab and Muslim countries, France wanted a politico-military bridge between Paris and Baghdad. Between 1977 and 1987, France contracted to sell a total of 133 Mirage F-1 fighters to Iraq. The first transfer occurred in 1978, when France supplied eighteen Mirage F-1 interceptors and thirty helicopters, and even agreed to an Iraqi share in the production of the Mirage 2000 in a US$2 billion arms deal. In 1983 another twenty-nine Mirage F-1s were exported to Baghdad. And in an unprecedented move, France “loaned” Iraq five Super-Etendard attack aircraft, equipped with Exocet AM39 air-to-surface missiles, from its own naval inventory. The Super-Etendards were used extensively in the 1984 tanker war before being replaced by several F-1s. The final batch of twenty-nine F-1s was ordered in Septem- ber 1985 at a cost of more than US$500 million, a part of which was paid in crude oil. In 1987 the Paris-based Le Monde estimated that, between 1981 and 1985, the value of French arms transfers to Iraq was US$5.1 billion, which represented 40 percent of total French arms exports. 230 National Security France, however, was forced to reschedule payment on most of its loans to Iraq because of Iraq's hard-pressed wartime economy and did so willingly because of its longer range strategic interests. French president François Mitterand was quoted as saying that French assistance was really aimed at keeping Iraq from losing the war. Iraqi debts to France were estimated at US$3 billion in 1987. French military sales to Iraq were important for at least two rea- sons. First, they represented high-performance items. Iraq received attack helicopters, missiles, military vehicles, and artillery pieces from France. Iraq also bought more than 400 Exocet AM39 air- to-surface missiles and at least 200 AS30 laser-guided missiles between 1983 and 1986. Second, unlike most other suppliers, France adopted an independent and unambiguous arms sales policy toward Iraq. France did not tie French arms commitments to Bagh- dad's politico-military actions, and it openly traded with Iraq even when Iranian-inspired terrorists took French hostages in Lebanon. In late 1987, however, the French softened their Persian Gulf policy, and they consummated a deal with Tehran involving the exchange of hostages for detained diplomatic personnel. It was impossible in early 1988 to determine whether France would curtail its arms exports to Iraq in conjunction with this agreement. The Search for Nuclear Technology On June 7, 1981, Israeli air force planes flew over Jordanian, Saudi, and Iraqi airspace to attack and destroy an Iraqi nuclear facility near Baghdad. In a statement issued after the raid, the Israeli government stated that it had discovered from “sources of unques- tioned reliability’’ that Iraq was producing nuclear bombs at the Osiraq (acronym for Osiris-Iraq) plant, and, for this reason, Israel had initiated a preemptive strike. Baghdad, however, reiterated a previous statement that the French atomic reactor was designed for research and for the eventual production of electricity. The attack raised a number of questions of interpretation regard- ing international legal concepts. Those who approved of the raid argued that the Israelis had engaged in an act of legitimate self- defense justifiable under international law and under Article 51 of the charter of the United Nations (UN). Critics contended that the Israeli claims about Iraq's future capabilities were hasty and ill-considered and asserted that the idea of anticipatory self-defense was rejected by the community of states. In the midst of this con- troversy, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) came under fire from individuals and from governments who complained that the Vienna-based UN agency had failed to alert the world to developments at Osiraq. IAEA officials denied these charges and 231 Iraq: A Country Study reaffirmed their position on the Iraqi reactor, that is, that no weapons had been manufactured at Osiraq and that Iraqi officials had regularly cooperated with agency inspectors. They also pointed out that Iraq was a party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (informally called the Non-Proliferation Treaty or NPT) and that Baghdad had complied with all IAEA guide- lines. The Israeli nuclear facility at Dimona, it was pointed out, was not under IAEA safeguards, because Israel had not signed the NPT and had refused to open its facilities to UN inspections. After the raid, Baghdad announced that it planned to rebuild the destroyed facility. Although France agreed in principle to pro- vide technical assistance, no definitive timetable had been announced as of early 1988. The Iran-Iraq War Of the many conflicts in progress around the world in early 1988, the Iran-Iraq War was by far the bloodiest and the costliest. The Iran-Iraq War was multifaceted and included religious schisms, border disputes, and political differences. Conflicts contributing to the outbreak of hostilities ranged from centuries-old Sunni-versus- Shia (for Sunni-see Glossary) and Arab-versus-Persian religious and ethnic disputes to a personal animosity between Saddam Husayn and Ayatollah Khomeini. Above all, Iraq launched the war in an effort to consolidate its rising power in the Arab world and to replace Iran as the dominant Persian Gulf state. Phebe Marr, a noted analyst of Iraqi affairs, stated that “the war was more immediately the result of poor political judgement and miscalcu- lation on the part of Saddam Hussein,” and the decision to invade, taken at a moment of Iranian weakness, was Saddam's” (see The Iran Iraq Conflict, ch. 1). Iraq and Iran had engaged in border clashes for many years and had revived the dormant Shatt al Arab waterway dispute in 1979. Iraq claimed the 200-kilometer channel up to the Iranian shore as its territory, while Iran insisted that the thalweg-a line running down the middle of the waterway-negotiated last in 1975, was the official border. The Iraqis, especially the Baath leadership, regarded the 1975 treaty as merely a truce, not a definitive set- tlement. The Iraqis also perceived revolutionary Iran's Islamic agenda as threatening to their pan-Arabism. Khomeini, bitter over his expulsion from Iraq in 1977 after fifteen years in An Najaf, vowed to avenge Shia victims of Baathist repression. Baghdad became more confident, however, as it watched the once invincible Imperial Iranian Army disintegrate, as most of its highest ranking officers 232 National Security were executed. In Khuzestan (Arabistan to the Iraqis), Iraqi intel- ligence officers incited riots over labor disputes, and in the Kurd- ish region, a new rebellion caused the Khomeini government severe troubles. As the Baathists planned their military campaign, they had every reason to be confident. Not only did the Iranians lack cohesive leadership, but the Iranian armed forces, according to Iraqi intel- ligence estimates, also lacked spare parts for their American-made equipment. Baghdad, on the other hand, possessed fully equipped and trained forces. Morale was running high. Against Iran's armed forces, including the Pasdaran (Revolutionary Guard) troops, led by religious mullahs with little or no military experience, the Iraqis could muster twelve complete mechanized divisions, equipped with the latest Soviet matériel. In addition, the area across the Shatt al Arab posed no major obstacles, particularly for an army equipped with Soviet river-crossing equipment. Iraqi commanders correctly assumed that crossing sites on the Khardeh and Karun rivers were lightly defended against their mechanized armor divisions; moreover, Iraqi intelligence sources reported that Iranian forces in Khuzestan, which had formerly included two divisions distributed among Ahvaz, Dezful, and Abadan, now consisted of only a num- ber of ill-equipped battalion-sized formations. Tehran was further disadvantaged because the area was controlled by the Regional 1st Corps headquartered at Bakhtaran (formerly Kermanshah), whereas operational control was directed from the capital. In the year following the shah's overthrow, only a handful of company- sized tank units had been operative, and the rest of the armored equipment had been poorly maintained. For Iraqi planners, the only uncertainty was the fighting ability of the Iranian air force, equipped with some of the most sophisti- cated American-made aircraft. Despite the execution of key air force commanders and pilots, the Iranian air force had displayed its might during local riots and demonstrations. The air force was also active in the wake of the failed United States attempt to rescue Ameri- can hostages in April 1980. This show of force had impressed Iraqi decision makers to such an extent that they decided to launch a massive preemptive air strike on Iranian air bases in an effort similar to the one that Israel employed during the June 1967 Arab-Israeli War. Iraqi Offensives, 1980-82 On September 22, 1980, formations of Iraqi MiG-23s and MiG-21s attacked Iran's air bases at Mehrabad and Doshen- Tappen (both near Tehran), as well as Tabriz, Bakhtaran, 233 Iraq: A Country Study Ahvaz, Dezful, Urmia (sometimes cited as Urumiyeh), Hamadan, Sanandaj, and Abadan. Iranian defenses were caught by surprise, but the Iraqi raids failed because Iranian jets were protected in specially strengthened hangars and because bombs designed to destroy runways did not totally incapacitate Iran's very large air- fields. Within hours, Iranian F-4 Phantoms took off from the same bases, successfully attacked strategically important targets close to major Iraqi cities, and returned home with very few losses. Concurrently with its air attack, Iraq ordered six of its divisions across the border into Iran, where they drove as far as eight kilo- meters inland and occupied 1,000 square kilometers of Iranian ter- ritory. As a diversionary move, a mechanized division overwhelmed the border garrison at Qasr-e Shirin, while five armored and mechanized divisions invaded Khuzestan on two axes, one cross- ing over the Shatt al Arab near Basra, which led to the siege and eventual occupation of Khorramshahr, and the second heading for Susangerd, which had Ahvaz, the major military base in Khuzestan, as its objective. In addition, Dehloran and several other towns were targeted and were rapidly occupied to prevent reinforcement from Bakhtaran and from Tehran. By mid-October, a full division advanced through Khuzestan headed for Khorramshahr and Abadan and the strategic oil fields nearby (see fig. 14). Iraq's blitz-like assaults against scattered and demoralized Iranian forces led many observers to think that Baghdad would win the war within a matter of weeks. Indeed, Iraqi troops did capture the Shatt al Arab and did seize a forty-eight-kilometer-wide strip of Iranian territory. But Tehran rejected a settlement offer and held the line against the militarily superior Iraqi force. It refused to accept defeat, and slowly began a series of counteroffensives in January 1981. Iran stopped Iraqi forces on the Karun River and, with limited military stocks, unveiled its “human wave” assaults, which used thousands of Basij (Popular Mobilization Army or People's Army) volunteers. The recapture of Abadan, Iran's first major vic- tory, came in September 1981. Iraqi Retreats, 1982-84 In March 1982, Tehran launched its Operation Undeniable Vic- tory, which marked a major turning point, as Iran penetrated Iraq's “impenetrable” lines, split Iraq's forces, and forced the Iraqis to retreat. In late June 1982, Baghdad stated its willingness to negotiate a settlement of the war and to withdraw its forces from Iran. Iran refused, and in July 1982 Iran launched Operation Ramadan on Iraqi territory, near Basra. Tehran used Pasdaran forces and Basij volunteers in one of the biggest land battles since 1945. Ranging 234 National Security nefields and c eager but tanks. In in age from only nine to more than fifty, these eager but relatively untrained soldiers swept over minefields and fortifications to clear safe paths for the tanks. In doing so, the Iranians sustained an immense number of casualties, but they enabled Iran to recover some territory before the Iraqis could repulse the bulk of the invading forces. By the end of 1982, Iraq had been resupplied with new Soviet matériel, and the ground war entered a new phase. Iraq used newly acquired T-55 tanks and T-62 tanks, BM-21 Stalin Organ rocket launchers, and Mi-24 helicopter gunships to prepare a Soviet-type three-line defense, replete with obstacles, minefields, and fortified positions. The Combat Engineer Corps proved efficient in con- structing bridges across water obstacles, in laying minefields, and in preparing new defense lines and fortifications. In 1983 Iran launched three major, but unsuccessful, human- wave offensives, with huge losses, along the frontier. On Febru- ary 6, Tehran, using 200,000 “last reserve” Pasdaran troops, attacked along a 40-kilometer stretch near Al Amarah, about 200 kilometers southeast of Baghdad. Backed by air, armor, and artil- lery support, Iran's six-division thrust was strong enough to break through. In response, Baghdad used massive air attacks, with more than 200 sorties, many flown by attack helicopters. More than 6,000 Iranians were killed that day, while achieving only minute gains. In April 1983, the Mandali-Baghdad north-central sector witnessed fierce fighting, as repeated Iranian attacks were stopped by Iraqi mechanized and infantry divisions. Casualties were very high, and by the end of 1983, an estimated 120,000 Iranians and 60,000 Iraqis had been killed. Despite these losses, in 1983 Iran held a distinct advantage in the attempt to wage and eventually to win the war of attrition. The War of Attrition, 1984-87 Most foreign military analysts feel that neither Iraq nor Iran has used its modern equipment efficiently. Frequently, sophisticated matériel had been left unused, when a massive modern assault could have won the battle for either side. Tanks and armored vehicles were dug in and used as artillery pieces, instead of being maneu- vered to lead or to support an assault. William O. Staudenmaeir, a seasoned military analyst, reported that “the land-computing sights on the Iraqi tanks (were] seldom used. This lower[ed] the accuracy of the T-62 tanks to World War II standards.” In addi- tion, both sides frequently abandoned heavy equipment in the battle zone because they lacked the skilled technical personnel needed to carry out minor repairs. 235 Iraq: A Country Study TURKEY Caspian Sea Lake Urmia TEHRAN Qasr-e Shirin IRAN National capital -. International boundary IRAQI THRUSTS Mountain infantry Mechanized BAGHDAD ehran Deztul IRAQ Susangerd VAN Ahvaz Armor Limit of Iraqi advance O 50 100 150 Kilometers 10 50 100 150 Miles orramshahr Basra Abadan Iraq-Saudi Arabia Neutral Zone Shatı al Arab KUWAIT SAUDI ARABIA Persian Gulf Boundary representation not necessarily authoritative Figure 14. Initial Iraqi Attack on Iran, 1980 Analysts also assert that the two states' armies have shown little coordination and that some units in the field have been left to fight largely on their own. In this protracted war of attrition, soldiers and officers alike have failed to display initiative or professional expertise in combat. Difficult decisions, which should have had immediate attention, were referred by section commanders to the capitals for action. Except for the predictable bursts on important anniversaries, by the mid-1980s the war was stalemated. In early 1984, Iran had begun Operation Dawn V, which was meant to split the Iraqi 3rd Army Corps and 4th Army Corps near Basra. In early 1984, an estimated 500,000 Pasdaran and Basij forces, using shallow boats or on foot, moved to within a few kilo- meters of the strategic Basra-Baghdad waterway. Between Febru- ary 29 and March 1, in one of the largest battles of the war, the 236 National Security two armies clashed and inflicted more than 25,000 fatalities on each other. Without armored and air support of their own, the Iranians faced Iraqi tanks, mortars, and helicopter gunships. Within a few weeks, Tehran opened another front in the shallow lakes of the Hawizah Marshes, just east of Al Qurnah, in Iraq, near the con- fluence of the Tigris and Euphrates rivers. Iraqi forces, using Soviet- and French-made helicopter gunships, inflicted heavy casualties on the five Iranian brigades (15,000 men) in this Battle of Majnun. Lacking the equipment to open secure passages through Iraqi minefields, and having too few tanks, the Iranian command again resorted to the human-wave tactic. In March 1984, an East Euro- pean journalist claimed that he “saw tens of thousands of children, roped together in groups of about twenty to prevent the faint-hearted from deserting, make such an attack.” The Iranians made little, if any, progress despite these sacrifices. Perhaps as a result of this performance, Tehran, for the first time, used a regular army unit, the 92nd Armored Division, at the Battle of the Marshes a few weeks later. Within a four-week period between February and March 1984, the Iraqis reportedly killed 40,000 Iranians and lost 9,000 of their own men, but even this was deemed an unacceptable ratio, and in February the Iraqi command ordered the use of chemical weapons. Despite repeated Iraqi denials, between May 1981 and March 1984, Iran charged Iraq with forty uses of chemical weapons. The year 1984 closed with part of the Majnun Islands and a few pockets of Iraqi territory in Iranian hands. Casualties notwithstand- ing, Tehran had maintained its military posture, while Baghdad was reevaluating its overall strategy. The major development in 1985 was the increased targeting of population centers and industrial facilities by both combatants. In May Iraq began aircraft attacks, long-range artillery attacks, and surface-to-surface missile attacks on Tehran and on other major Iranian cities. Between August and November, Iraq raided Khark Island forty-four times in a futile attempt to destroy its installa- tions. Iran responded with its own air raids and missile attacks on Baghdad and other Iraqi towns. In addition, Tehran systematized its periodic stop-and-search operations, which were conducted to verify the cargo contents of ships in the Persian Gulf and to seize war matériel destined for Iraq. The only major ground offensive, involving an estimated 60,000 Iranian troops, occurred in March 1985 near Basra; once again, the assault proved inconclusive except for heavy casualties. In 1986, however, Iraq suffered a major loss in the southern region. On February 9, Iran launched a successful surprise amphibious assault 237 National Security responded by escalating its attacks on shipping serving Arab ports in the Gulf. As Kuwaiti vessels made up a large portion of the targets in these retaliatory raids, the Kuwaiti government sought protec- tion from the international community in the fall of 1986. The Soviet Union responded first, agreeing to charter several Soviet tankers to Kuwait in early 1987. Washington, which had been approached first by Kuwait and which had postponed its decision, eventually followed Moscow's lead. United States involvement was sealed by the May 17, 1987, Iraqi missile attack on the USS Stark, in which thirty-seven crew members were killed. Baghdad apologized and claimed that the attack was a mistake. Ironically, Washington used the Stark incident to blame Iran for escalating the war and sent its own ships to the Gulf to escort eleven Kuwaiti tankers that were “reflagged with the American flag and had American crews. Iran refrained from attacking the United States naval force directly, but it used various forms of harassment, including mines, hit-and-run attacks by small patrol boats, and periodic stop-and-search opera- tions. On several occasions, Tehran fired its Chinese-made Silk- worm missiles on Kuwait from Al Faw Peninsula. When Iranian forces hit the reflagged tanker Sea Isle City in October 1987, Wash- ington retaliated by destroying an oil platform in the Rostam field and by using the United States Navy's Sea, Air, and Land (SEAL) commandos to blow up a second one nearby. Within a few weeks of the Stark incident, Iraq resumed its raids on tankers but moved its attacks farther south, near the Strait of Hormuz. Washington played a central role in framing UN Secu- rity Council Resolution 598 on the Gulf war, passed unanimously on July 20; Western attempts to isolate Iran were frustrated, however, when Tehran rejected the resolution because it did not meet its requirement that Iraq should be punished for initiating the conflict. In early 1988, the Gulf was a crowded theater of operations. At least ten Western navies and eight regional navies were patrolling the area, the site of weekly incidents in which merchant vessels were crippled. The Arab Ship Repair Yard in Bahrain and its counter- part in Dubayy, United Arab Emirates (UAE), were unable to keep up with the repairs needed by the ships damaged in these attacks. Armed Forces and Society Status in National Life In modern Iraq, the armed forces have intervened in the politi- cal life of the state. Military interventions were concentrated in two periods, the first from 1936 to 1941, when there were seven 241 200 Iraqi units at Khorramshahr, Iran, October 1980 Courtesy Photri/Lehtikuva and in a vision of this historical mission, completed the emergence of the new army as a national force. During the 1970s, military officers unsuccessfully attempted to overthrow the Baathist regime, however, on at least two occasions. In January 1970, an attempted coup led by two retired officers, Major General Abd al Ghani ar Rawi and Colonel Salih Mahdi as Samarrai, was discovered and thwarted as the conspirators entered the Republican Palace. In June 1973, a plot by Nazim Kazzar, a Shia and the director of internal security, to assassinate President Ahmad Hasan al Bakr and Saddam Husayn was foiled. Kazzar, who resented both Sunni and Tikriti domination of the Baath Party, had taken a prominent part in organizing the mas- sacre of communists in the anarchy that followed the military's sei- zure of power in February 1963. He had acquired a reputation as a torturer, and the old palace that he had taken over as head- quarters was known as “Qasr an Nihayah," the “Palace of the End.” Few who entered ever came out, nor did their bodies receive public burial. When his coup plans failed, Kazzar fled toward the Iranian border. Before being apprehended, he killed the minister of defense, Hammad Shihab, who happened to be in the area inspecting border posts. Shortly afterward he was executed. Both coup attempts were followed by summary trials, executions, and purges of the armed forces. 243 National Security exceeding 50 percent of GNP by 1982. The 1986 military budget was estimated at US$11.58 billion. The war's staggering financial and economic costs have proved to be more severe than anticipated, and, because of them, most large-scale infrastructure development projects have been halted. In 1980 Iraqi revenues from oil exports amounted to US$20 bil- lion, which, when added to Iraq's estimated US$35 billion in for- eign exchange reserves, permitted the country to sustain rapid increases in military expenditures. By 1984, however, oil revenues were so low that Iraq sought loans from the Gulf Cooperation Coun- cil (GCC) states and from its foreign creditors. In 1986 annual oil revenues were estimated at US$5 to US$8 billion, whereas the war cost between US$600 million and US$1 billion per month. Mili- tary and financial experts estimated that by the end of 1987, Iraq had exhausted its US$35 billion reserves, and had incurred an additional US$40 to US$85 billion debt. Most of the money (US$30 to US$60 billion) came from GCC members, particularly Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, which, some experts believed, may not demand repayment. The Baathist regime adopted a strategy of “guns and butter,” trying to absorb the economic shock of the war without imposing undue hardships on the population. Through a subsidy program, the government continued to provide ample food and basic necessities to the population. The policy succeeded, but it also mortgaged the state's future. In early 1988, as the war dragged on and as military expenditures rose, it was difficult to ascertain whether this strategy could be sustained (see Introduction). The Impact of Casualties on the Armed Forces Casualty figures in the Iran-Iraq War could not be estimated accurately because neither belligerent permitted independent observers to assist in verifying records, and both belligerents rarely allowed foreign observers to visit combat areas. At the end of 1986, the most frequently cited estimate of casualties since September 1980 was about 1 million—350,000 dead and 650,000 wounded. According to this estimate, 250,000 Iranians and 100,000 Iraqis had been killed, while 500,000 Iranians and 150,000 Iraqis had been wounded. These estimates were probably conservative. Another reliable source claimed that the combined death toll was between 600,000 and 800,000. In 1987, the Iraqi minister of defense reported that as many as 1 million Iranians had been killed and almost 3 million had been wounded, but this was impossible to verify. During large offensives, reports indicated that casualty 245 Iraq: A Country Study figures ranged between 10,000 and 40,000, primarily because of Iran's “human wave”' tactics. The impact of this loss of life on both societies was immense as was that of the high number of prisoners of war (POWs). The Geneva-based International Com- mittee of the Red Cross estimated the number of POWs at nearly 50,000 Iraqis and 10,000 Iranians in early 1988. For Iraq, the most damaging social repercussion in 1988 was the knowledge that the toll in casualties would continue to increase. Drafting young men, and at times women, from school and from work became unpopular, and the loss of young life weakened the regime. This human drain also created shortages in the labor force. These shortages forced an integration of women into the work force, a move that further disrupted Iraq's traditional social environment. The war also forced cutbacks in Iraq's economic development, and it wiped out the relative prosperity of the late 1970s. Individuals were pressured to donate savings and gold holdings to the war ef- fort. Experts believed in 1988 that these hardships, endured from 1980 onward, would gradually erode what social cohesion and progress had been achieved over the previous decade, should the war continue for a few more years. Opposition to the war continued to grow. There were sporadic attempts on the lives of military officers, and especially on the lives of Saddam Husayn's relatives. As funerals in every neighborhood reminded the masses of the realities they faced, Iraqi morale con- tinued to diminish. Treatment of Veterans and Widows The regime, at least initially, provided substantial sums of money to the families of war “heroes.” Parents received, as a lump pay- ment, enough for a car, a piece of land, and a new house. In addi- tion, a victim's brother was assigned a monthly pension of ID500—which was equivalent in purchasing power to somewhat less than the same amount in US dollars in 1987—and his sister, in keeping with “Iraqi tradition,” received a pension of half that amount. A widow and surviving children also received monthly pensions, in addition to a guarantee of free university education for the children. The government reduced its benefits packages in 1985, especially after revenues declined. Survivors of a soldier killed in battle con- tinued to receive the equivalent of US$10,000, and veterans received monthly pensions equivalent to US$500, but women whose hus- bands and sons were away fighting found it increasingly difficult to make ends meet. 246 Iraqi soldiers at Qasr-e Shirin, Iran, June 1981 Courtesy Photri/Lehtikuva Internal Security Internal Developments and Security In maintaining internal security, the Baath regime focused on three main sources of opposition—the Kurds, living primarily near the borders of Iran and Turkey, the ICP and its splinter factions, and Shia revival movements not in sympathy with Baath social- ism. In dealing with these groups, the government tended either to provide them with benefits so as to coopt them into the regime, or to take repressive measures against them. The Kurdish Problem The Kurdish minority offered the most persistent and militarily effective security threat of Iraq's modern history (see People, ch. 2). Although the Kurds had traditionally opposed any central govern- ments in both Iran and Iraq, most Kurdish leaders initially saw the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran as a possible vehicle for promot- ing Kurdish aspirations toward self-government. The Iranian government's antiminority attitude, however, along with Iraq's attempts to support the Iranian Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP), dashed all hopes for a unified Kurdish independent state. The Iraqi and Iranian regimes each chose to support a Kurdish faction oppos- ing the other's government, and this intervention divided the Kurds 247 Iraq: A Country Study along “national” lines. As a result, during the 1980s Kurds in Iraq tended to hope for an Iranian victory in the Iran-Iraq War, while a number of Kurds in Iran thought that an Iraqi victory would best promote their own aspirations. Because most Kurds were Sunni Muslims, however, their enthusiasm for a Shia government in either country was somewhat limited. Following the outbreak of hostilities and the ensuing stalemate in the Iran Iraq War, Kurdish opponents of the Iraqi regime revived their armed struggle against Baghdad. In response to deportations, executions, and other atrocities allegedly perpetrated by the Baath, the Kurds seemed in the 1980s to have renewed their political con- sciousness, albeit in a very limited way. Differences between the brothers Masud and Idris Barzani, who led the KDP, and Jalal Talabani, leader of the Iraqi-supported Patriotic Union of Kur- distan (PUK), as well as the Kurdish leadership’s periodic shifts into progovernment and antigovernment alliances, benefited Bagh- dad, which could manipulate opposing factions. What the Iraqi government could not afford, however, was to risk the opening of a second hostile front in Kurdistan as long as it was bogged down in its war with Iran. Throughout the 1980s, therefore, Baghdad tolerated the growing strength of the Kurdish resistance, which, despite shortcomings in its leadership, continued its long struggle for independence. The Iraqi Communists and Baathist Iraq The Iraqi Communist Party (ICP) has seen its fortunes rise and fall repeatedly since its founding by Yusuf Salman Yusuf (known as Comrade Fahd, or the Leopard) in 1934. During the next fifty years, the party's fortunes fluctuated with the successes of particu- lar regimes in Baghdad. Although the ICP was legalized in 1937, and again in 1973, the Baath Party regularly suppressed it after 1963 and outlawed it altogether in 1985 (see Political Opposition, ch. 4). In general, Iraqis rejected communism as contrary to both Islam and Arab nationalism. Yet, the clandestine ICP survived under the repressive policies of the monarchy, which had determined that because of its widespread appeal, the dissemination of communist theory among the armed forces or the police could be punished with death or with penal servitude for life. This persecution under the Hashimite monarchy raised communists to a status near that of martyrs in the eyes of the antimonarchical postrevolutionary lead- ers plotting the 1958 uprising. Ironically, the ICP was able to use the army to promote its goals and to organize opposition to the monarchy. In August 1949, for example, one of the army units 248 Iraq: A Country Study In addition to relying more heavily on outside financial and moral support, the ICP initiated significant structural and ideological changes in the 1980s. Four Arab leaders (two Shias, two Sunnis) were dropped from the Politburo, and four Central Committee members were reportedly expelled from the party in 1984. Although the reasons for these changes were not clear, observers speculated at the time that party boss Aziz Muhammad and his Kurdish com- patriots had gained control of the ICP and that Kurdish interests therefore outweighed national interests. Muhammad's tenacity in supporting the armed struggle of Iraqi Kurds and in totally oppos- ing the Iran-Iraq War helped to bring about a split in the ICP leadership. His keynote address to the 1985 Fourth Party Congress analyzed in detail the course of the Iran Iraq War; he assigned par- tial responsibility for the war to Iran, but he blamed the Baath government in Baghdad for prolonging the conflict. In September 1986, the ICP declared the communists' fight against the Baath regime to be inextricably linked to the achievement of peace between Iraq and Iran. A 1986 joint statement of the Tudeh (the Tudeh Party being the leading Marxist party of Iran) and the ICP called for an end to the war and for establishment of “a just democratic peace with no annexations whatsoever, on the basis of respect for the two countries' state borders at the start of the war, each peo- ple's national sovereignty over its territory, and endorsing each people's right to determine the sociopolitical system they desire.” Reliable data on ICP membership were unavailable in early 1988. One 1984 estimate was 2,000 members, but other foreign sources indicated a considerably larger ICP membership. Because it was a clandestine party fighting for the overthrow of the Baathist regime, the ICP's true membership strength may never be known, espe- cially because it directed its organizational efforts through the Kurd- ish Democratic National Front (DNF). The ICP headquarters was partially destroyed in May 1984 following limited Turkish incur- sions to help Iraq protect its oil pipeline to and through Turkey and was apparently relocated in territories controlled by the DNF in 1988. Ideologically split and physically mauled, the ICP may have lost much of its strength, and it had no influence in the Peo- ple's Army, which remained in the hands of the Baath Party. Impact of the Iranian Revolution on Iraqi Shias In 1964 Ayatollah Khomeini was expelled from Iran to Turkey, and he was then granted asylum by Iraq (see The Iran-Iraq Con- flict, ch. 1). His theological erudition and idealism earned him a significant following in An Najaf, where ulama (religious leaders) and students from throughout the Shia world formed an important 250 National Security circle of learned men. The Baath socialist regime, however, with its secular, anticlerical stance, was never comfortable with Shia religious leaders and their followers. Relations between the Iraqi regime and the Shia clerics deterio- rated during the Imam Husayn celebrations in February 1977, when police interference in religious processions resulted in mas- sive antigovernment demonstrations in An Najaf and in Karbala. Several thousand participants were arrested, and eight Shia dig- nitaries, including five members of the clergy, were sentenced to death and were executed. In 1978, in an effort to quell the Shia unrest and to satisfy the shah's request, Baghdad expelled Ayatol- lah Khomeini, who sought refuge in France. In another attempt to minimize Shia dissent, the Iraqi govern- ment had deported to Iran 60,000 Shias of Iranian origin in 1974. In the months following the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran, the Iraqi government deported nearly 35,000 more ethnic Iranians. Deportations, the suppression of the Shia ulama, and the death under suspicious circumstances of Shia leader Imam Musa as Sadr all contributed to the deterioration of relations between Baathist Iraq and Islamic Iran. The ranking Shia religious leader, Sayyid Abu al Qasim al Khoi, refrained from either sanctioning or oppos- ing the Baath government, but the government feared Sadr because of his leadership qualities and because of his close association with Khomeini. Beginning in 1980, Iran actively promoted its own revolution- ary vision for Iraq. All anti-Iraqi Islamic organizations, including Ad Dawah al Islamiyah, commonly called Ad Dawah (see Politi- cal Opposition, ch. 4) and the Organization of Islamic Action were based in Tehran, where they came under the political, religious, and financial influence of the ruling clergy. To control rivalry and infighting among the different groups, Iran helped to set up the Supreme Assembly for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SAIRI) on November 17, 1982. It was headed by Iraqi cleric Hujjat al Islam Muhammad Baqir al Hakim. Establishing SAIRI was viewed as a step toward unifying the political and military work of all groups and as an attempt to unite them under a single command directly supervised by their Iranian counterparts. In return, SAIRI acknowl- edged the leadership of Khomeini as the supreme commander of the Islamic nation. Nevertheless, the majority of Iraqi Shias resisted Tehran's control and remained loyal to Iraq. Internal Security in the 1980s In addition to the regular armed forces, Iraq's state security sys- tem consisted of at least six organizations charged with a wide 251 Iraq: A Country Study variety of security functions. Little was publicly known about these paramilitary and police organizations, but their importance was undisputed. In addition to the People's Army, discussed above, internal security organizations consisted of the Security Troops (or Presidential Guard), the Border Guard, the Frontier Force, the regular civil police, and the Mukhabarat (or Department of General Intelligence). The Security Troops formed an elite group of 4,800 whose primary task was to protect the Baath leadership in Iraq. Their ranks were filled with the most loyal troops serving in the Iraqi armed forces, whose dedication to Baathism and to Saddam Husayn personally had been tested on numerous occasions. These troops faced considerable danger because the frequent assassination attempts on the president and on his close associates usually meant loss of life among bodyguards. Survivors were generously rewarded, however. The Frontier Guard and the Mobile Force accounted for an esti- mated 50,000 additional men within the security system. Unlike the People's Army, these forces consisted of full-time, professional men-at-arms. Frontier Guard personnel were stationed principally in northern Iraq along the borders with Iran, Turkey, and Syria to guard against smuggling and infiltrations. Before 1974 the Fron- tier Guard was under the control of local Kurds, but, after the defeat of the Kurdish revolt in 1975, it was administered by the central government. The Mobile Force was a strike force used to support the regular police in the event of major internal disorders. It was armed with infantry weapons, with artillery, and with armored vehicles, and it contained commando units trained to deal with guer- rilla activities. The regular civil police handled state security in addition to their routine duties of fighting crime, controlling traffic, and the like. After 1982, many of these routine functions were taken over by People's Army “volunteers” to free more able-bodied men for duty on the war front. The regular police were under the Ministry of Interior, and they were commanded by the director of police in Baghdad. There were thought to be several specialized components of the police, including forces assigned exclusively to traffic, to nar- cotics investigation, and to railroad security. The police operated at least two schools: the Police College for those with secondary degrees and the Police Preparatory School for those without second- ary education. Police officers held military ranks identical to those of the regular armed forces, and many were called to serve in the war with Iran. 252 Iraq: A Country Study also enforced by several laws-a 1970 trade regulation, for exam- ple, made both the selling of goods at prices other than those fixed by the state and the production of inferior products felonies. The government's free education program was enforced by a law mak- ing it a crime to refuse to participate. The more traditionally defined kinds of crime, including theft, forgery, bribery, the misappropriation of public funds, and murder, followed the pattern of most developing states. No adequate statisti- cal data for Iraq were available in 1987, however. Amnesty Inter- national reported in 1986 that degrading treatment of prisoners, arbitrary arrests, and denial of fair public trials were common. In 1985 and in 1986, several high-ranking officials, including the mayor of Baghdad, were tried for corruption, were found guilty, and were executed. Presumably, the purpose of these sentences was to make it clear that criminals would be punished, regardless of their status. Criminal Justice System The regular criminal justice system consisted of courts of first instance (including magistrate courts), courts of sessions, and the Court of Cassation. Major crimes against state security were tried in the revolutionary courts, which operated separately from the regular judicial system. In general this court system followed the French pattern as first introduced during the rule of the Ottoman Turks, although the system had undergone several modifications during the twentieth century. Juries were not used anywhere in the Iraqi criminal court system. Most petty crimes, or contraventions, which carried penalties of imprisonment from one day to three months or of fines up to ID30, were tried in local magistrate courts. These third-class courts, which were found in all local municipalities, were presided over by municipal council members or by other local administrative offi- cials. First- and second-class criminal matters, which corresponded to felonies and to misdemeanors, respectively, were tried within appropriate penal courts attached to civil courts of first instance, located in provincial capitals and in district and subdistrict centers. Misdemeanors were punishable by three months' to five years' imprisonment; felonies by five years' to life imprisonment or by the death penalty. One judge conducted the trials for criminal mat- ters at each of these courts of original jurisdiction. In 1986 the six courts of session continued to hold jurisdiction in the most serious criminal matters, and they acted as courts of appeal in relation to lower penal or magistrate courts. Four of these 254 National Security courts were identical to the civil courts of appeal; two were presided over by local judges from the courts of first instance. Three judges heard cases tried in the courts of session. The Court of Cassation was the state's highest court for crimi- nal matters. At least three judges were required to be present in its deliberations, and in cases punishable by death, five judges were required. The Court of Cassation also served as the highest court of appeals, and it confirmed, reduced, remitted, or suspended sen- tences from lower courts. It assumed original jurisdiction over crimes committed by judges or by high-ranking government officials. The revolutionary courts, composed of three judges, sat perma- nently in Baghdad to try crimes against the security of the state; these crimes were defined to include espionage, treason, smuggling, and trade in narcotics. Sessions were held in camera, and the right of defense reportedly was severely restricted. It was also believed that regular judicial procedures did not apply in these special courts, summary proceedings being common. On several occasions during the 1970s-after the attempted coups of 1970 and of 1973, after the 1977 riots in An Najaf and in Karbala, and after the 1979 conspiracy against the regime—the RCC decreed the establishment of special temporary tribunals to try large num- bers of security offenders en masse. Each of these trials was presided over by three or four high government officials who, not being bound by ordinary provisions of criminal law, rendered swift and harsh sentences. In 1970 fifty-two of an estimated ninety accused persons were convicted, and thirty-seven of these were executed during three days of proceedings. It was believed that about thirty- five had been sentenced to death and about twenty had been acquitted, during two days of trials in 1973. In a one-day trial in 1977, eight were sentenced to death, and fifteen were sentenced to life imprisonment; eighty-seven persons were believed to have been acquitted. Thirty-eight Iraqis were executed between May 24 and May 27, 1978. The majority of them were members of the armed forces, guilty of political activity inside the military. An additional twenty-one leading members of the party, including ministers, trade union leaders, and members of the RCC, were tried in camera and executed in 1979. In general, those sentenced to death were executed, either by hanging or by firing squad, immediately after the trials. Administered by the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs, the penal system was dominated by the central prison at Abu Ghurayb near Baghdad, which housed several thousand prisoners, and by three smaller branch prisons located in the governorates of Al 255 Iraq: A Country Study Basrah, Babylon, and Nineveh. Additional detention centers were located throughout the country. In early 1988, it was impossible to determine the full number of imprisonments in Iraq. Internal security was a matter of ongoing concern for Iraq in the late 1980s. The end of the war with Iran would presumably bring opportunities for liberalizing the security restrictions imposed by the Baathist regime. * * * English-language literature on the subject of Iraqi national secu- rity was scarce in 1988, largely because of the government's almost obsessive secrecy with respect to security affairs and because of the Iran-Iraq War. Frederick W. Axelgard's Iraq in Transition: A Politi- cal, Economic, and Strategic Perspective was the most comprehensive and up-to-date study of the subject in 1988. Majid Khadduri's Socialist Iraq, dealing with military and security affairs in the larger context of post-1968 political developments, continued to be indis- pensable. Mohammad A. Tarbush's The Role of the Military in Politics: A Case Study of Iraq to 1941, and Hanna Batatu's The Old Social Classes and the Revolutionary Movements of Iraq, provided invaluable back- ground information. The rapid growth, in both manpower and equipment, of Iraq's armed forces was best documented in the annual The Military Balance, published by the International Insti- tute for Strategic Studies. Accounts by Efraim Karsh in The Iran- Iraq War, and a series of articles by Anthony H. Cordesman, thoroughly discussed the Iran Iraq War. (For further information and complete citations, see Bibliography.) 256 Iraq: A Country Study Table 4. Teachers, Students, and Schools, School Years 1976-77 to 1985–86, Selected Years Number of Teachers Level Number of Students Total Students Number of Schools Level Female Male 276 Kindergarten 1976-77 1979-80 1982-83 1985-86 358 2,291 3,079 4,175 4,657 24,223 33,156 38,137 38,604 27,617 47,262 41,319 42,827 51,840 80,418 79,456 81,431 507 584 Primary 1976-77 1979-80 1982-83 1985-86 70,799 92,644 107,364 118,492 687,220 1,174,866 1,214,410 1,258,434 1,259,962 1,434,067 1,400,517 1,554,082 1,947,182 2,608,933 2,614,927 2,812,516 8,156 11,316 10,223 8,127 Secondary 1976-77 1979-80 1982-83 1985-86 19,471 28,002 32,556 35,051 164,442 271,112 334,897 371,214 387,600 626,588 636,930 660,346 552,042 897,700 971,827 1,031,560 1,319 1,774 1,977 2,238 n.a. 82 Vocational 1 1976-77 1979-80 1982-83 1985-86 1,906 3,928 4,733 6,405 n.a. n.a. 28,365 4,026 61,383 120,090 n.a. n.a. 88,838 n.a. 126 157 237 31,252 Teacher Training Schools 2 1977-78 666 1982-83 1,022 1985-86 209 12,685 15,936 3,355 4,652 10,255 2,928 17,337 26,191 6,283 Teacher Training Institutes 3 1977-78 241 1982-83 219 1985-86 1,202 3,233 3,286 16,820 3,019 3,197 11,083 6,252 6,483 27,903 University, College, or Technical Institutes 4 1976-77 1979-80 1982-83 1985-86 4,008 5,680 6,674 7,616 24,584 9,298 10,536 17,015 56,914 21,884 23,626 36,022 81,498 31,182 34,162 53,037 n.a.-not available. · Includes commercial, technical, and agricultural schools. ? A three-year course for those who had completed intermediate studies. 3 A two-year course for secondary school graduates. 4 Includes Iraqi, other Arab, and foreign faculty and students at University of Baghdad, University of Basra, Foundation of Technical Institutes, University of Mosul, University of Al Mustansiriyah, University of Salah ad Din, University of Technology, and the religious colleges affiliated with the University of Baghdad and the University of Al Mustansiriyah. Source: Based on information from Iraq, Ministry of Planning, Central Statistical Organi- zation, Annual Abstract of Statistics, 1985, Baghdad, n.d., 203-33. 260 Appendix Table 5. Medical Personnel and Facilities, 1985 Administrative Division Estimated Population in thousands) Hospital Beds Hospitals Doctors Paramedics 206 399 499 ..... Governorate Al Anbar ...... Al Basrah ..... Al Muthanna ... Al Qadisiyah .... An Najaf At Tamim Babylon Baghdad ... Dhi Qar ... Diyala ...... Karbala ..... Maysan ..... Nineveh ..... Salah ad Din . Wasit ......... ..... 818 872 313 561 723 593 1,109 2 3,845 2 918 900 456 500 1,507 2 724 460 523 1,562 307 435 581 488 623 4,535 825 2,212 499 749 1,355 869 859 10,006 1,102 836 488 956 2,223 775 590 163 207 146 203 2,145 160 148 118 126 498 125 600 454 287 546 1,011 403 506 137 124 Autonomous Region As Sulaymaniyah Dahuk .. Irbil ........... 943 293 743 1,187 490 1,684 630 344 848 124 196 17 196 TOTAL .......... 16,278 216 27,705 5,724 4,683 1 For 1987. 2 From October 17, 1987, census. 3 See Glossary. Source: Based on information from Iraq, Ministry of Planning, Central Statistical Organi- zation, Annual Abstract of Statistics, 1985, Baghdad, n.d., 192-96; and Joint Publi- cations Research Service, Daily Report: Near East and South Asia, October 20, 1987, 22 and October 21, 1987, 25. Table 6. Crude Oil Production and Oil Revenues, 1982-87 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 Production (in thousands of barrels per day) .. 972 922 1,203 1,437 1,746 2,076 Revenue (in millions of United States dollars) ......... $10,250* * Estimated. $9,650* $10,000* $11,900* $6,813* $11,300* Source: Based on information from Central Intelligence Agency, Directorate of Intelligence, Economic and Energy Indicators, June 3, 1988, 9, and The Middle East and North Africa, 1989, London: Europa, 1988, 475. 261 Iraq: A Country Study Table 7. Production and Area of Major Crops, Selected Years, 1981-85 Production in thousands of tons) Cultivated Area (in thousands of hectares) 13 Crop 1981 1983 1985 1981 1983 1985 Wheat 902 841 1,406 484.7 512.6 626.6 Barley ..... 925 835 1,331 419.5 556.6 579.5 Rice ...... 162 111 149 22.9 22.7 24.5 Cotton ..... 12 7. 4.5 5.5 4.3 Tobacco .... 12 17 4.8 5.8 6.6 Tomatoes ....... 425 439 612 16.4 14.9 19.1 Eggplant ........ 83 112 232 3.0 3.8 5.6 Watermelon ........... .. 491 583 75 17.1 18.8 21.9 Source: Based on information from Iraq, Ministry of Planning, Central Statistical Organi- zation, Annual Abstract of Statistics, 1985, Baghdad, n.d., 59-64. 14 Table 8. Principal Exports and Imports, 1984 Exports (in millions of Iraqi dinars *) Imports (in millions of Iraqi dinars *) Oil, gas and related products 7,028 Machinery, including aircraft 65,067 Foodstuffs 681 Manufactured goods 48,786 Raw materials (including fertilizers, cement) 287 Foodstuffs 43,828 Manufactured goods 241 Chemicals, pharmaceuticals, and explosives 17,225 Heating, medical equipment, furniture, and clothes 10,285 Other items Other items 36 TOTAL 8,273 *For value of the Iraqi dinar-see Glossary. 10,653 195,844 Source: Based on information from Iraq, Ministry of Planning, Central Statistical Organi- zation, Annual Abstract of Statistics, 1985, Baghdad, n.d., 164. 262 Appendix Table 9. Direction of Trade, 1985-86 (in percentages) Country 1985 1986 Exports Brazil Brazil .... Britain .... ............................... France .... ce ............................... Italy ............................... Japan ............................... Spain Turkey ............................. United States 1 States ......................... West Germany ... Yugoslavia ...... ........ 17.7 n.a. 13.0 11.0 6.0 10.7 n.a. 1.2 7.0 8.1 10.5 8.1 4.7 n.a. 8.0 n.a. 8.1 5.8 10.5 8.1 Imports Brazil ............................ Britain ... ............................... France France ............................... Italy ................................ ..... Japan .... Kuwait ..... ............................ Tur .............................. United States ...... West Germany ny ....... Yugoslavia ........................... 7.0 6.3 7.5 7.6 14.4 4.2 8.2 n.a. 9.2 n.a. 8.0 6.8 8.0 14.8 n.a. 9.0 5.7 8.0 4.5 n.a. n.a.- not available. Source: Based on information from the International Monetary Fund, Direction of Trade Statistics, cited in the Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Report: Iraq, No. 1, 1987, 2 and No. 1, 1988, 2. Table 10. Armed Forces Manpower, Selected Years, 1977–87 1977 1979 1981 1983 1985 1987 Armed Forces Army Navy Air Force Air Defense 160,000 190,000 210,000 1 475,000 1 3,000 4,000 4,250 1 4,250 1 15,000 18,000 28,000 1 28,000 1 10,000 10,000 10,000 1 10,000 1 188,000 222,000 252,250 · 517,250 1, 2 250,000 250,000 250,000 75,000 475,000 1 475,000 5,000 1 5,000 1 30,000 1 30,000 10,000 1 10,000 TOTAL 520,000 75,000 520,000 480,000 Reserves Paramilitary People's Army Security Forces Frontier Guard 50,000 4,800 75,000 250,000 3 250,000 4,800 4,800 4,800 - n.a. 450,000 4,800 650,000 4,800 n.a. n.a. n.a.-not available. Losses make estimates tentative. 2 In addition, 10,000 armed forces personnel from Egypt, Jordan, and Sudan served in Iraq. 3 75,000 of these mobilized. 263 Iraq: A Country Study Table 11. Major Army Equipment, 1987* TYPE DESIGNATION INVENTORY Armored fighting vehicles Heavy and medium tanks 2,790 1,500 T-54, T-55, T-62, T-72 T-59, T-69 II Chieftain Mark 3/5, M-60, M-47 M-77 150 60 PT-76 Light tanks TOTAL 100 4,600 Armored vehicles Mechanized infantry combat vehicles BMP 1,000 Reconnaissance vehicles BRDM-2, FUG-70, ERC-90, MOWAG Roland, EE-9 Cascavel, EE-3 Jararaca Armored personnel carriers BTR-50, BTR-60, BTR-152, OT-62, OT-64, VC-TH (with HOT antitank guided weapons), M-113A1, Panhard M-3, EE-11 Urutu TOTAL 4,000 Artillery guns 122mm: D-74; 130mm: M-46, Type 59-1; 155mm: GCT self-propelled. Guns/howitzers 152mm: M-1937; 155mm: G-5, GHN-45 Howitzers 105mm: M-56 pack; 122mm: D-30 towed, M-1938, M-1974 (281); 152mm: M-1943, M-1973 (283) self-propelled; 155mm: M-114/M-109 self-propelled TOTAL 3,000 Multiple rocket launchers n.a. Includes 122mm: BM-21 127mm: ASTROS II 132mm: BM-13, BM-16 60 n.a. TOTAL 200 Surface-to-surface missiles FROG-7 Scud-B TOTAL 81mm; 120mm; 160mm Mortars n.a. 264 Appendix Table 11.—Continued. TYPE DESIGNATION INVENTORY Antitank weapons Recoilless rifles 73mm: SPG-9 82mm: B-10 107mm n.a. Guns 100 n.a. Antitank guided weapons 85mm; 100mm towed; 105mm: JPz SK-105 self-propelled AT-3 Sagger (including BRDM-2) AT-4 Spigot (reported), SS-11, Milan, HOT n .a. n.a. Army Air Corps, armed helicopters Attack helicopters 50 Mil Mi24 Hind, with AT-2 Swatter SA-342 Gazelle (some with HOT) SA-321 Super Frelon (some with Exocet AM-38 ASM) SA-316B Alouette III, with AS-12 ASM BO-105, with AS-11 antitank guided weapons Hughes-530F Hughes-500D Hughes-300C 56 26 30 30 TOTAL 272 Transport helicopters Heavy Medium Light Mi-6 Hook Mi-8 Mi-4 SA-330 Puma 10 100 20 10 TOTAL 140 Air defense weapons Guns 23mm: ZSU-23-4 self-propelled; 37mm: M-1939 and twin; 57mm: includes ZSU-57-2 self-propelled; 85mm; 100mm; 130mm TOTAL 4,000 Surface-to-air missiles SA-2 SA-3, SA-6, SA-7, SA-9 Roland 120 150 60 TOTAL 300 n.a.-not available. * Equipment estimates are tentative because of wartime losses. Source: Based on information from International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance, 1987-1988. London, 1987, 100. 265 Iraq: A Country Study Table 12. Major Navy Equipment, 1987 Type and Description Inventory Frigates 4 Lupo class with 8 Otomat-2 SSM, 1 X 8 Albatros/Aspide SAM, 1 helicopter (held in Italy) 1 Yug (training vessel) Corvettes Assad class, all with 1 X 4 Albatros/Aspide SAMs: 2 with 2 Otomat-2 SSMs, 1 helicopter; 4 with 6 Otomat-2 SSMs; completed (all 6 held in Italy) Fast-attack craft (missiles) OSA class, each with 4 Styx SSMs (6 of model II, 2 of model I) Fast-attack craft (torpedoes) P-6 (may not be operable) Large patrol craft: SO-1 Coastal patrol craft: Zhuk (under 100 tons) Minesweepers 2 Soviet T-43 (ocean); 3 Yevgenya (ocean); and 3 Nestin (inshore/river) Amphibious 3 Polnocny (LSM ") 3 modern cargo (LST 2) Support ships 1 Stromboli class 2 Poluchat torpedo support; 1 Agnadeen tanker; and 1 Transport 1 Landing ship, medium. ? Landing ship tank. 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Zaher, U. “Political Developments in Iraq, 1963-1980.” Pages 30- 53 in Committee Against Repression and for Democratic Rights in Iraq (CARDRI), (ed.), Saddam's Iraq: Revolution or Reaction? London: Zed Books, 1986. 280 Iraq: A Country Study GDP (gross domestic product)—A value measure of the flow of domestic goods and services produced by an economy over a period of time, such as a year. Only output values of goods for final consumption and for intermediate production are assumed to be included in final prices. GDP is sometimes aggregated and shown at market prices, meaning that indirect taxes and subsidies are included; when these have been elimi- nated, the result is GDP at factor cost. The word gross indi- cates that deductions for depreciation of physical assets have not been made. GNP (gross national product)—GDP (9.v.) plus the net income or loss stemming from transactions with foreign countries. GNP is the broadest measurement of the output of goods and ser- vices by an economy. It can be calculated at market prices, which include indirect taxes and subsidies. Because indirect taxes and subsidies are only transfer payments, GNP is often calculated at factor cost, removing indirect taxes and subsidies. hadith— Tradition based on the precedent of Muhammad's non- divinely revealed words that serves as one of the sources of Islamic law (sharia). hijra-Literally to migrate, to sever relations, to leave one's tribe. Throughout the Muslim world hijra refers to the migration of Muhammad and his followers to Medina. In this sense the word has come into European languages as hegira, and it is usually, and somewhat misleadingly, translated as flight. ID-Iraqi dinar. See dinar. Imam-A word used in several senses. In general use and in lower case, it means the leader of congregational prayers; as such it implies no ordination or special spiritual powers beyond suffi- cient education to carry out this function. It is also used figura- tively by many Sunni (q.v.) Muslims to mean the leader of the Islamic community. Among Shias (q.v.) the word takes on many complex meanings; in general, it indicates that particular descendant of the House of Ali ibn Abu Talib, who is believed to have been God's designated repository of the spiritual authority inherent in that line. The identity of this individual and the means of ascertaining his identity have been major issues causing divisions among Shias. International Monetary Fund (IMF)- Established along with the World Bank in 1945, the IMF is a specialized agency affiliated with the United Nations and is responsible for stabilizing inter- national exchange rates and payments. The main business of the IMF is the provision of loans to its members (including industrialized and developing countries) when they experience 282 Glossary balance of payments difficulties. These loans frequently carry conditions that require substantial internal economic adjust- ments by the recipients, most of which are developing countries. Levant-Historically, the countries along the eastern shores of the Mediterranean. shaykh-Leader or chief. Word of Arabic origin used to mean either a political leader or a learned religious leader. Also used as an honorific. Shia, from Shiat Ali, the Party of Ali—A member of the smaller of the two great divisions of Islam. The Shias supported the claims of Ali and his line to presumptive right to the caliphate and to leadership of the Muslim community, and on this issue they divided from the Sunni (q.v.) in the great schism within Islam. Later schisms have produced further divisions among the Shias over the identity and the number of Imams (q.v.). Shias revere Twelve Imams, the last of whom is believed to be in hiding. Shiite-See Shia. Sunni (from sunna, orthodox)—A member of the larger of the two great divisions of Islam. The Sunnis supported the traditional method of election to the caliphate, and they accepted the Umayyad line that began with caliph Muawiyah in 661. On this issue they divided from the Shias (9.v.) in the great schism within Islam. 283 Index Abadan, 52, 137, 233, 234 Abbasid Dynasty, xxiii, 20, 21, 92, 99-100 Abbasid Empire, 4, 25-26, 99-100 Abbasids, 3, 20-21, 23 Abd al Abbas, 20 Abd al Hamid (sultan), 29 Abd al Ilah, 45-49 Abd Allah, 18 Abraham (prophet), 9 Abu Bakr, 15, 17, 89 Abu Ghurayb, 255 Abu Musa, 60 Abu Muslim, 20 Abu Nidal, 208 Abu Nidal Organization, 208 Abu Said (Bahadur the Brave), 25 Abu Timman, 44 Achaemenids, 12, 13 Adams, Robert McCormick, 76 Ad Dawah al Islamiyah (the Islamic Call), xxvi, 64-65, 198, 224, 251 Ad Dujayl, 244, 253 Administrative Court, 185 Adruh, 18 Afghanistan, 31 Aflaq, Michel, 53, 188, 194 Agade, 9 agrarian reform (see also land reform; rural society), 103-5, 157–59 Agricultural and Industrial Bank, 131 Agricultural Bank, 131, 132 Agricultural Census (1971), 104 . agriculture (see also agrarian reform; col- lectives; cooperatives; irrigation; land reform; migration; water control), xv- xvi, 76, 78, 153; expansion of, 156; grain crops of, 159-60; production in, 153, 156-60; rain-fed and irrigation crops, 159 Ahali government, 44 Ahvaz, 233, 234 aircraft, combat and support, xviii, 219 aircraft, commercial, 166-67 Air Defense Command, 219, 221 air force, xviii, 219, 233-34, 235 air force training college, 222 airports, xvii, 166-67 Aisha, 17 Akashat, 149 Akhbari school, 95 Akkad, 9 Akkadians, xxiii, 9 Akshak, 9 Al Ahd (the Covenant), 31 Al Amarah, 26, 74, 101, 166 Al Anbar, 116 Al Bakr University for Higher Military Studies, 222 Al Basrah, 20, 26, 98-99, 255-56 Alexander, 3 Alexander the Great, 12, 13, 14 Al Fatah, 209 Al Faw Peninsula, xxv, xxix, 202, 241 Al Faw terminal and port, xvi, 31, 136, 163, 238 Algeria as mediator, 70 Algiers Agreement (1975), xxiv, xxviii, 5, 61, 70, 84 Al Habbaniyah, 39 Al Hadithah, 136, 154, 163, 166 Al Hillah, 34 Al Hirah, 16 Ali ibn Muhammad, 23 Ali (imam), 94 Al Jamiya al Wataniya al Islamiya (The Muslim National League), 34 Al Jazirah, 71 Al Kifl, 74 Al Kufah, 18, 19, 20, 116 Al Kut, 31, 34 alluvial plain region, 74 Al Mamun (caliph), 21, 92 Al Mansur, 21 Al Musayyib, 152, 165 Al Muthanna Governorate, 80, 98 Al Qadisiyah, 16, 86, 96, 98, 116 Al Qadisiyah Dam, 154 Al Qaim, 149 Al Qurnah, 74, 75, 166, 237 Amin, 21 Amman, 63, 209 Ammash, Salih Mahdi, 188 Amnesty International, 224, 254 Amorites, 10 Amu Darya, 16 285 Iraq: A Country Study Anatolia, 26 Anayzah, 33 Anayzah tribal confederation, 26 Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, 133 Anglo-Iraqi Treaty (1922), 36-37, 38, 39 Anglo-Iraqi Treaty (1930), 39, 42-43, 46 Anglo-Persian Oil Company (see also Anglo-Iranian Oil Company; British Petroleum; Turkish Petroleum Com- pany (TPC)), 133, 134-35 Anglo-Turco-Iraqi treaty (1926), 38-39 An (god), 7 An Najaf, 19, 25, 31, 33, 34, 36, 63, 64, 69, 94, 163, 232, 250, 251, 255 An Nasiriyah, 31, 144 An Nur, 107 antiaircraft guns, 218 appliance industry, 153 Aqaba, 63 Arab civilization, 79 Arabia, 15 Arabian Gulf Academy for Naval Studies, 222 Arabian Peninsula, 26, 87, 206-7 Arabic language (see also classical Arabic; Iraqi Arabic; Modern Standard Arabic), xiv, 16, 81-82, 177 Arab-Israeli wars: 1948 war, 47-48, 136; June 1967 War, 57-58, 140, 203, 205; October 1973 War, 141, 203 Arab League (League of Arab States), 46, 52, 60, 205, 208, 209, 210, 215 Arab Legion, 46 Arab Liberation Front, 208, 229 “Arab Nation, The,” 188 Arab Organization of the 15th May, 208 Arab Revolt (1916), 32 Arab Revolutionary Movement, 57 Arabs, 14, 15, 50-52, 81 Arab Ship Repair Yard, 241 Arafat, Yasir, 209 Aramaeans, 14 Aramaic language, 13, 86 arid regions, 77 Arif, Abd ar Rahman, 54, 56-57, 228, 249 Arif, Abd as Salaam, 49, 50, 53-55, 56, 249 armed forces, 215, 217-27 Armenian language, xiv Armenians, xiv, 81, 86 armored vehicles, 218 arms, xviii; artillery pieces as, 218; production of, xxviii-xxix; purchases of, 203-4, 205, 229-30 army (see also Ideological Army (Al Jaysh al Aqidi)), xviii, 36, 52, 217; Iraqi Communist Party activity in, 248-49; morale problems of, 222-23; reserves of, 217 Ar Ramadi, 74 Ar Rutbah, 78, 95, 163 Arsacids, 14 Ash Shabana tribe, 102 Ash Shaykh ash Shuyukh, 163 Ash Shinafiyah, 155 Ash Shuaybah, 219 Ashur, 11 Ashurbanipal (king), 11 Ashurnasirpal, 11 Askari, Jafar al, 32, 37, 44 Assad, Hafiz al, 63, 194, 209 As Samawah, 74 As Samitah, 60 As Sulaymaniyah, xxiv, 77, 83, 106, 118 As Sulaymaniyah Governorate, xiv, 186 Assyria, 3, 10, 12 Assyrian Rebellion (1918), 41 Assyrians, xiv, xxiii, 11, 12, 33, 40, 41, 81, 86 atabegs, 24, 25 Atatürk, 38 Atatürk Dam reservoir, 156 Autonomous Region, xvii, 177, 186-87 Autonomy Agreement (1970), 186–87, 196 auto parts industry, 153 Axis countries, 45, 46 Azarbaijan, 25, 83 Aziz, Tariq, 64, 200, 204 Az Zubayr, 143 Baath (Arab Socialist Resurrection) Party (see also National Command: Baath Party; pan-Arab concepts; Regional Command: Baath Party; Revolution- ary Command Council (RCC)), 5, 50, 51, 53-54, 57, 61, 64, 87, 104-5, 110; altered perceptions of, 207-9; control of army by, 242-43; creation of, 188; economic focus of, 192; first govern- ment of (1963), 189; focus on domes- tic issues by, 189, 192; link to Revolutionary Command Council of, 179; militia of (People's Army), xxv, 286 Iraq: A Country Study Cox, Percy, 32, 33, 35, 37 CPO. See Central Petroleum Organiza- tion (CPO) credit. See debt, external Crete, 46 Creusot-Loire, 152 Ctesiphon, 16 cuneiform, xxiii, 6-7 currency (see also Iraqi dinar), xv, 130-31 current account, 123 Cyrus, 3, 12 Cyrus the Great, xxiii, 12 capital flight, 146 Caspian Sea, 23, 133 cement industry, 55, 152 Central Bank of Iraq, 131 Central Petroleum Organization (CPO), 142, 144 CFP. See Compagnie Française des Pétroles-Total Chaldeans, xxiii, 11 Chaldean (Uniate) church, 86 chemical industry, 152 chemical warfare, xxvi, 237, 238 China, 24 Chinggis (Genghis) Khan, 24-25 Christian Crusaders, 24 Christians, xiv, 15, 41, 86, 87; court sys- tem of, 184 cigarette industry, 152 classical Arabic, 81 Clayton, Gilbert, 39 climate, 77-78 Code of Hammurabi, xxiii, 10 collectives, xxv, 158-59 communism, 50, 51, 52 Conference on Disarmament (1986), 238 Compagnie Française des Pétroles-Total, 126, 134, 135 conscription/conscripts, xviii, 220-21, 244 Constituent Assembly (1924), 37 constitution (see also Provisional Consti- tution), 51; new, xxvi, xxx construction companies, foreign, 167, 168 construction industry, xv, 55 Cooperative Bank, 131 cooperatives, agricultural, 104, 157–58 corvettes, xviii, 218 cotton, 160 Council of Ministers, 178, 182, 184 coups d'état: in 1936, 44, 49; in 1941, 5, 45-46, 47, 48, 49; in 1958, 3, 5, 49, 109, 137, 146, 228; 1959 attempt, 51, 188-89; 1963 (February, November), 52-53, 54, 189, 243; 1965 attempt, 55; in 1968, 57, 146, 175, 189; 1970 at tempt, 243, 255; 1973 attempt, 59, 216, 255; 1982 attempt, 244 Court of Cassation, xvii, 185, 187, 254, 255 court system (see also Administrative Court; Court of Cassation; military courts; religious court system; Revolu- tionary Court), 184-85, 254–55; appel- late districts of, 184 Dahuk, xxiv, 41, 69, 83, 106 Dahuk Governorate, xiv, 186 Damascus, 11, 19, 20, 32, 194 dam construction, 153-55 Damin, Abd ar Rahman ad, 188 Darband, 154 Darius, 3 Darius the Great, 12 date industry, 160 Daud, Ibrahim ad, 27, 57 Daylam, 23 debt, external, xxviii, 126, 169, 230 debt, military, 230 Decree Number 652, 128 Dehloran, 234 Democratic National Front (DNF), Kur- dish, 250 Department of General Intelligence. See Mukhabarat desert conditions, 78 desert zone, 71 Dezful, 220, 233, 234 Dhi Qar Governorate, 98 diseases, xiv, 117-18 divisions, xviii, 217 divorce, 113 Diyala, 75 Diyala Governorate, 76, 98 Diyala River, 77 Dobbs, Henry, 37 Dortyol terminal, xvi, 126, 142 Doshen-Tappen, 233 drainage, 155 drought, 83 Dubayy, 241 due process of law, 177-78 Dukan, 154 Dulles, Allen, 52 Durah refinery, 145 288 Iraq: A Country Study government administration: decentralized nature of, 3-4; effect of rural-to-urban migration on, 4-5; local, 185-86 government role, 102-3; in economic planning, 127; in medical services and health care, 117 governorate administration, xvii, 185-87 Greater and Lesser Tunbs, 60 The Great Iraqi Revolution (Ath Thawra al Iraqiyya Kubra): 1920, 35 Great Zab River, 75, 155 Greek period, 14 gross domestic product (GDP), xv, 124, 125, 153 gross national product (GNP), 142 guerrillas: Kurdish, 52, 77, 84-85, 106, 196, 210, 215; Palestinian, 225, 229 Gulbenkian, Caloust, 133-35 Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), 245 Gulf of Aqaba, 143 Guti, 9 hijra (hegira), 87 Hindiyah Barrage, 74, 155 Hindiyah Channel, 74 Hit, 71 Hittites, 10 housing projects. See An Nur; Madinat ath Thawra: Saddam City Hulagu Khan, 25 Husayn, Barazan, 253 Husayn ibn Ali, 32 Husayn (imam), 19, 94 Hussein (king of Jordan), xxviii, 49, 63, 209 “hydraulic despotism,” 154 Habash, George, 208 Habbaniyah, 154 hadith, 87 Haifa, 48, 136 Hakim family, 199 Hakim, Muhammad Baqir al, 198, 251 Hakkari Mountains, 33 Halabjah, 60, 238 Hamadan, 2345 Hammadi, Saadun, 181 Hammurabi (king), 3, 10 Hanafi school of jurisprudence, 91, 184 Hanbali school, 91 Hanging Gardens of Babylon, xxiii, 11 Haras al Istiqlal (The Guardians of Inde- pendence), 34 Harun ar Rashid, 21, 92 Hasan, 18 Hashim, 20 Hashimi, Yasin al, 44 Hashimite (or Hashemite) monarchy, xxiii, 5, 49 Hawizah Marshes, 237 Hawr al Hammar, 74 health care, xiv, 117-18 helicopters, 228 Hellenization, 14 Herkki tribe, 83 highland region, northeast, 71, 73 Hijaz, 17 Ibn Yusuf ath Thaqafi al Aajjay, 20 Ibrahim, Izzat, xvii, 179, 182 ICOO. See Iraqi Company for Oil Oper- ations (ICOO) Ideological Army (Al Jaysh al Aqidi), 242-43 imam, 88 Imamate, 91-92, 94 imports, xvi, 147-48, 151, 168; of agricul- tural products, 162; of capital goods and durables, 169; with concessions, 1 69; of food, 153, 169; licenses for, 171 import substitution policy, 147-48, 170 independence (1932), 3, 40, 79, 216 Independent Democrats: Kurdish, 197 India, 10, 34 Indus River, 13 Industrial Bank, 131, 132 industrial development, 145-53 inflation, xxix, 48, 125 infrastructure development, 147, 162–67, 245 INOC. See Iraq National Oil Company (INOC) insurance industry, 55 internal security, 247-56 International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), 205, 231-32 International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), xxvii, 210, 246 International Labour Organisation (ILO), 210 International Monetary Fund (IMF), 210 International Telecommunications Satel- lite Organization (INTELSAT), 167 Intersputnik satellite station, 167 290 Index investment, 144; in agriculture, 125; by Government, 145-46; in industry, 124-25, 145; by private sector, 149 IPC. See Iraq Petroleum Company (IPC) Iran, 10, 25, 31, 33, 40, 44, 46, 52, 59-60, 64, 75, 83, 94, 133, 137; aid to Kurdish Democratic party by, 196, 247-48; border treaty (Baghdad Treaty) with (1975), 215, 216; border with Iraq, 70; early rulers of Iraq, 12-14; hegemony in Persian Gulf of, xv, 200; invasion by Iraqi troops: 1980, xv, 5-6, 200, 215; Iraq border with, 4; Iraqi perception of, 207; Islamic Revo- lution in, 62; military assistance from, 61; oil exploration with Iraq, 56 Iranian forces, 99 Iranians, 13-16 Iran-Iraq War (see also tanker war), xvi, xxiii, xxv, xxvi-xxvii, xxviii, 65, 69–70, 232-40; casualties' impact on armed forces, 245-46; cease-fire of, xxviii; cost for Iraq of, 123-24, 244-45; effect of, xxix-xxx, 127-30, 148, 160, 176–77, 207-8; effect on foreign relations of, 202; effect on foreign trade of, 168; as foreign policy issue, 202, 200; impor- tance of transportation for, 162; Iraq military in, 217-20; Kurdish sympathy with Iran in, 248; naval operations in, 240 Iraq Currency Board, 130-31 Iraqi Arabic, 81 Iraqi Arab Socialist Union, 54 Iraqi Aviation Company, 130 Iraqi Broadcasting and Television Estab- lishment, 167 Iraqi Communist Party (ICP), xvii, 47, 51, 53, 61, 83, 194-96, 198, 247, 248-50 Iraqi Company for Oil Operations (ICOO), 141, 142 Iraqi dinar, 130-31 Iraqi Federation of Industries, 149 Iraqi Red Crescent, 210 Iraqi-Soviet Joint Commission on Eco- nomic and Technical Cooperation, 145 Iraqi State Railways, 166 Iraq Levies, 41 Iraq Life Insurance Company, 132 Iraq National Oil Company (INOC), 50, 57, 137-42, 144 Iraq Petroleum Company (IPC) (see also Iraq National Oil Company (INOC)), 38, 50, 56-57, 135-42 Iraq Reinsurance Company, 132 Irbil, xxiv, 77, 83, 85, 106, 116, 118 Irbil Governorate, xiv, 186-87 iron and steel industry, 152 irrigation systems, xxiii, 3, 75, 77, 154 Islam (see also Shia Islam; Sunni Islam), x iv, xxiii, 15, 16, 19-20, 23, 81, 86; as state religion, 177; tenets of, 86-90 Islamic Call. See Ad Dawah al Islamiyah (the Islamic Call) Islamic Development Bank, 151 Islamic jurisprudence, 184 Islamic Republic of Iran, 64 Islamic Revolution (1979), 62, 63, 64, 206, 207, 215, 247, 251 Ismailis, 95 Ismail Shah, 26 Israel: aid to Kurdish Democratic Party by, 196; attitude of Baath Party toward, 203; Baath Party relations with, 208- 9; destruction of nuclear facility by, 231; military aid from, 61; state of, 69 Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty, 215, 216 Istanbul, 29 Italy, 134; Iraqi relations with, 204; trade with Iraq of, xvi, 170 Jacobite (Syrian Orthodox) church, 86 Jafari school of jurisprudence, 184 Jalabi, Isam Abd ar Rahim al, 143-44 Jalayirids, 25 Jamil al Midfai, 32 Jamiyat an Nahda al Islamiya (League of the Islamic Awakening), 33-34 Japan: economic assistance by, 149; Iraqi relations with, 204; trade with Iraq by, xvi, 169-70 Jasim, Latif Nayyif, 64 Jassin, Sattar Ahmad, 219 Jerusalem, 11 jet fighters, 228 Jews, xiv, 12, 48, 86, 87; court system of, 184; emigration of, 108 Joint Presidency Council, 54 joint stock companies, 148 Jordan, xviii, 18, 49, 57, 63, 71, 142, 143, 163; Iraqi relations with, xxviii, 202 Jubur, 32 Judah, 11 291 Iraq: A Country Study judicial system (see also court system; mili- tary courts), xvii, 184-85, 254 Jumailah tribe, 54, 55 June 1967 War. See Arab-Israeli wars 45, 50, 51-52, 54, 61, 73, 81, 189; Au- tonomous Region for, 177, 186, 196; concentration in Iraq of, 82-83; culture of, 84; guerrilla activity of, 52, 77, 84-85, 106, 196, 210, 215; language of, xiv, 56, 84, 177; military cooperation with Iran of, 202, 207; political parties of, 196-97; rebellion of, 56, 186, 196, 216, 222-23, 233; tribal affiliation of, 83 Kut Barrage, 75 Kuwait, xxv, 40, 52, 60, 143, 145, 163, 241, 245; border with Iraq, 70; eco- nomic assistance of, 207; Iraqi relations with, 202, 206-7; trade with Iraq by, 170 Kaaba, 87 Karbala, 19, 20, 25, 31, 32, 34, 36, 64, 69, 94, 251, 255 Karun River, 75, 233, 234 Kassites, 10 Kazzar, Nazim, 59, 243, 253 KDP. See Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP) Khabur River, 74, 75 Khairallah, Adnan, 219 Khan, 154 Khanaqin, xvi, 83 Kharajites, 18 Kharasan, Hashim al, 144 Khardeh River, 233 Khark Island, 237, 238 Khawr al Amayah, xxix Khawr al Amayah terminal, xvi, 142, 166 Khawr az Zubayr, xvi, 152, 163 Khoi, Sayyid Abu al Qasim al, 251 Khomeini, Ayatollah Sayyid Ruhollah Musavi, xxiv, 63, 64, 217, 232, 233, 250-51 Khorasan, 20, 21, 23-24 Khorramshahr, 95, 234 Khudari, Abd al Khaliq al, 188 Khuzestan, 52, 61, 233, 234 Khwarizm shahs, 24 Kinik group, 23 kinship groups, 110-12 Kirkuk, 51, 53, 61, 71, 73, 83, 84, 106, 118, 142, 163, 219; oil industry in, 133, 134, 136-37, 142 Kirmanji (Karamanji) language, 84 Kish, 9 Konya, 31 Korea, Republic of, 163 Kufah, 16 Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP), 60-62, 83, 84, 196, 198, 247; split in, 196-97 Kurdish Progressive Group, 196 Kurdish resistance, xxx, 5, 41, 62, 247-48 Kurdish Revolutionary Party, 196 Kurdistan, xvii, 26, 27, 33, 61, 77, 186-87, 196, 198, 202, 223, 225, 248, 249 Kurds, xiv, xxiv, 5, 26, 37–39, 40, 41, labor force: agriculture, xv, 153, 158; in- dustrial, xv, 148-49, 152 labor law, 128 . Lagash, 9 land ownership (see also expropriation of land), 177 land reform, xxiv, 4, 27, 29, 42, 46, 50, 104 land reform law (see also Lazmah land re- form (1932)), 42, 46, 156, 157 land tenure system, 156-57 languages, 84, 177; Arabic, xiv, 16, 81-82, 177; Aramaic, 13, 86; Arme- nian, xiv; Kurdish, xiv, 56, 84, 177; Persian, xiv, 16; Turkic, xiv, 69; Turk- ish, 30, 85 Larak Island, 238 Larsa, 9 Law Number 80 (see also oil industry), 137, 140 Law Number 60 for Major Development Projects, 170-71 Law of Personal Status (1959, 1963), 111-12, 113-14 Lazmah land reform (1932), 42, 46, 156 League of Nations, 5, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41 League of Nations Covenant, 32 leather industry, 152 Lebanon, 46, 48, 63, 136, 225, 228, 229 legal system, 184 Levant, 46 Libya, 140 licensing for foreign trade, 170-71 Little Zab River, 75 livestock, 162 292 Index local government. See governorate ad- ministration Long-Berenger Agreement (1919), 38 machinery industry, 152 Madain, 16 Madan (Marsh Arabs), 27, 76-77 Madinat ath Thawra, 107 Mahmud II, 27 Malek Shah, 24 Maliki school, 91 Mamluks, 23, 27 manufacturing, xv Marduk (god), 13 Marr, Phebe, 57, 232 marriage, 112, 113 Mar Shamun, 41 Maruf, Taha Muhy ad Din, xvii, 182, 184 Mashhad, 92, 94 Maude, Stanley, 31-32 Mecca, 15, 19, 26, 32, 35, 87 Medes, 11 medical facilities, xiv-xv, 117 Medina (see also Yathrib), 17, 35, 87 Mediterranean Sea, xvi, 10, 11, 136, 140, 142, 163 Mehrabad, 233 Mehran, 238 Merv, 20, 21, 24, 92 Mesopotamia, xxiii, 3, 6-7, 9-15, 65, 133-34 Midhat Pasha, 27, 29 migration, xxx, 4, 6, 83, 98-99, 104; to cities, 105-8, 158 Milhat ath Tharthar, 77 military assistance, 61, 228-30 military budget, xviii, 244-45 Military College, 188, 219, 244 Military Court of Cassation, 223 military courts, 223 military equipment (see also arms), xviii, 203, 218 military intervention, 241-42 Military Service and Pension Law, 223 Mina al Bakr terminal, xvi, xxix, 142, 166 mineral industry, nonmetallic, xv, 149-52 Ministry of Culture and Information, 167, 199-200 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 200 Ministry of Guidance, 199 Ministry of Health, 117 Ministry of Heavy Industry, 148 Ministry of Industry, 148 Ministry of Justice, xvii, 184 Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs, 255 Ministry of Oil, 142, 144 Ministry of Planning, 104 Ministry of Trade, 170 Mirza Muhammad Riza, 34 Mishraq, 149 missiles, 218, 219, 228 Mitterand, François, 231 Mobile Force, 252 Modern Standard Arabic, 81 monetary policy, 131 Mongol invasion, 24-25, 27, 79, 154 Mongols, xxiii Morocco, 21 Mortgage Bank, 131 Mosul, 24, 30, 31, 34, 40, 41, 51, 53, 71, 73, 85, 95, 106, 118, 149, 152, 154, 163, 165, 166, 219; oil industry in, 133, 136 Mosul Petroleum Company (MPC), 136 Mosul Province, 37-39 motor vehicle industry, 152-53 Muawiyah, 17, 18, 19, 89 Mubarak, Husni, xxviii Mudarrissi, Muhammad Taqi al, 199 Muhammad, Aziz, 250 Muhammad (prophet), xxiii, 15, 16, 17, 18, 32, 35, 86, 87-91 Muharram, 94 Mukhabarat, xviii, 252, 253 Muntafiq tribal confederation, 26 Murad IV, 26 Mustafa Kamal. See Atatürk Mutasim (caliph), 23 Naft-e Shah, 56 Naft Khaneh, 56 Najd, 26 Nasser, Gamal Abdul, 40, 49, 53, 54-55, 58 National Action Charter, 186, 189, 194, 195 National Assembly, xvii, 176, 178; organ- ization and function of, 181 National Bank of Iraq (see also Central Bank of Iraq), 131 National Command: Baath Party, 193-94 National Company for Aviation Services, 130 293 Iraq: A Country Study National Council of Revolutionary Com- mand (NCRC), 53, 54 National Defense Council, 56 National Guard, 54 nationalism, 5, 29, 33-36, 39, 42-47, 51, 52, 96; of Kurds, 83 nationalization, 55, 57, 131, 141, 146 National Life Insurance Company, 132 natural gas, xv; use, liquefaction and pipeline for, 144-45 navy, xviii, 218 Nayif, Abd ar Razzaq an, 55, 57 NCRC. See National Council of Revolu- tionary Command (NCRC) Near East Development Corporation, 134 Nebuchadnezzar (king), 11 Nestorian church, 86 Neutral Zone (Iraq-Saudi Arabia), xiv, 71, 143, 207 New Delhi, 210 newspapers, 199 Neyshabur, 24 Nineveh, 11, 69, 256 Nineveh Governorate, 104 Nizam al Mulk, 24 Non-Aligned Movement, 202, 203, 210, 228 Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), 205 Northern Petroleum Organization (NPO), 142, 144 North Rumaylah field, 137, 141, 145 NPO. See Northern Petroleum Organiza tion (NPO) OPEC. See Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) Operation Dawn V, 236 Operation Ramadan, 234 Operation Undeniable Victory, 234 opposition groups, 188 opposition (to Baath) organizations, 1 97-99 Organic Law, 37 Organization of Arab Petroleum Export- ing Countries, 210 Organization of Islamic Action, 199, 251 Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), 137-43, 203, 210 Osiraq nuclear reactor, 168, 204-5, 231 Ottoman Decentralization Party, 29 Ottoman Empire, 4, 29-31, 38, 45, 70, 79, 87, 98, 133, 135, 216, 220, 228 Ottoman Land Code (1858), 156 Ottoman Turks, xxiii, 3, 25-26, 27 Oxus River, 16, 23 officer corps, 109 Oghuz Turks, 23 oil companies, foreign, 140-41 Oil Exploration Company, 144 oil industry (see also natural gas), xv, xxix, 4, 38, 48, 50, 56, 133; drilling rights of, 71; effect of Iran-Iraq War on, 168; exports of, 142–43, 168; fields, 73, 137, 141, 145; hydrocarbon reserves of, 144; investment in, 144, 145; refining sec- tor of, 145; revenues of, 109, 123-25, 127, 137, 141-43, 146, 148, 203, 245; service agreements with oil companies, 140-41; terminals in Iraq for, 142; transportation for, 142 oil pipelines. See pipelines, oil Oman, 62, 206-7 Pachachi, Hamdi al, 46 Palestine, 11, 32, 136; partition of (1947), 47 Palestine Liberation Front, 208 Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), xxviii, 208 Palestine revolt (1936-39), 45 pan-Arab concepts, 44, 54, 58, 175, 228, 232; of economic unity, 177; “The Arab Nation," 188, 189, 192 paper industry, 152 paramilitary forces (see also Futuwah (Youth Vanguard)); People's Army, xviii, 217, 224-25 Paris Peace Conference (1919), 32 Parthians (or Arsacids), 14 Pasdaran (Iranian Revolutionary Guard), 233, 234-36 Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), 62, 83, 84, 197, 198, 248 patrol boats, 218 penal code (1969), 253 Penal Code of the Popular Army, 224 People's Army (Al Jaysh ash Shaabi) (see also Baath (Arab Socialist Resurrection Party)), xviii, xxv, xxvii, 217, 224, 250, 252 People's Democratic Republic of Yemen, 60, 62-63 People's Militia. See People's Army 294 Index PUK. See Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) purges, 58, 216, 242, 249 Qabus (sultan), 62 Qasim, Abd al Karim, 49, 50-53, 103, 188-89, 228 Qasim government, 107, 146, 249 Qasr-e Shirin, 65, 234 Qatar, xxv, 206, 207 Qom, 92, 94 Quraysh tribe, 15 Qusaybah, 164 People's Resistance Force, 50, 51 Pérez de Cuellar, Javier, xxvii, 238 Permanent Bureau of the Arab Jurists' Federation, xxvi Persia. See Iran Persian Empire, 12-13 Persian Gulf, xvi, xxviii, 10, 13, 27, 56, 61, 74, 135, 136, 140, 141, 155, 163, 200, 216, 237, 238 Persian language, xiv, 16 Pesh Merga, 60, 61 petrochemical industry, 152 petroleum sector. See oil industry Petroline, xvi Phoenicia, 11, 14 phosphate rock industry, 149 physicians, 117 pipelines, gas, 144 pipelines, oil, xvvi, xxix, 48, 56-57, 135, 136, 140, 142-43, 209, 210 plague, 27 police, xviii, 252 Police College, 252 Police Preparatory School, 252 Popular Army. See People's Army Popular Front for the Liberation of Pales- tine (PFLP), 208; Special Operations Branch, 208 Popular Front for the Liberation of the Occupied Arabian Gulf, 60 population, xiv, 78-80; growth in cities of, 105-9; redistribution of, 97-99 ports, xvi, 166 Portsmouth Treaty (1948), 47 presidency, 178 Presidential Guard Force, xviii, 217, 252 price controls, xxix, 254 prisoners of war, 246 private sector: imports of, 170; industries of, 145–46, 148-49 privatization, XXV, XXX, 42, 129-30, 148; of agriculture, 159; of airline, 167 Progressive National Front (PNF) (see also Baath (Arab Socialist Resurrection Party)), xvii, 176, 194-97, 249; High Council of, 195 Progressive Nationalists: Kurdish, 197 protection, 148 Provisional Constitution (1970), xvii, xxiv, 58, 59, 175, 181, 199; principles expressed in, 177-78 public health system, 117-18 Public Service Council, 182 radio: broadcasting, 199; transmission, 167 Radio Iraq, 199 Rafidayn Bank, 131-32 railroads, xvi, 163-66 rainfall, 77-78, 153, 154 Ramadan, 88, 94 Ramadan, Taha Yasin, 225 Ras al Khaymah, 60 Rashid, 219 Rashid Airbase, 222 Rashid Ali, 5, 45–46, 47, 48 Rawanduz, 61 Rawi, Abd al Ghani ar, 243 Razzaq, Arif Abd ar, 55 RCC. See Revolutionary Command Coun- cil (RCC) Real Estate Bank, 131, 132 reconstruction, xxix Red Line Agreement, 135 Red Sea, 143 refineries, 145 refugees, 61 Regional Command: Baath Party, xvii, 97, 193 Regional Congress, 193 religion, xiv, 7 religious court system, 184-85 Reserve College, 221 reserve units, military, 221 reservoirs, 154 Resolution 598, UN Security Council, xxvii Resolution 1646, of the RCC, 130 revenues: from export of electric power, 168; from oil export, 48, 50, 109, 123-25, 127, 137, 141-43, 146, 148, 168-69, 203, 245 295 Iraq: A Country Study relations with, 209-10; trade with Iraq of, xvi, 170 Turkic language, xiv Turkish language, 30 Turkish Petroleum Company (TPC) (see also Iraq Petroleum Company (IPC)), 38, 133-35 Turkomans, xiv, 51, 69, 81, 85-86 Turks, 23, 35 Tuwaitha, 204 Twelver or Ithna-Ashari sect, 95 Twentieth Brigade, 54 Tehran, 56, 234, 251 telecommunications system, 167 telephones, 167 television: broadcasting, 199; transmis- sion, 167 temperatures, 78 Temujin, 24 textile industry, xv, 152 thalweg, 60, 61, 70, 232 Thompson-CSF, 153 Tiglath-Pileser III (king), 11 Tigris (Dijlis) River, xiv, 3, 6, 10, 11, 14, 21, 26, 27, 30, 35, 71, 74, 75, 101, 118, 135, 153, 155, 166 Tigris-Euphrates confluence, xxiii, 74, 75, 237 Tigris-Euphrates river valley, 14 Tigris Valley, 11, 154 Tikrit, xxiv, 58, 59, 116, 194, 222, 244 Tikritis, 58, 59 tobacco industry, 55, 160 topography, xiv Townshend, Charles, 31 trade barriers, 148 trade deficit, 168 trade policy, 170 trade unions, 50, 51, 128 trading companies, 170 Trajan, 14 Transjordan, 32, 45, 46 Transoxiana, 23 transportation, 162–67 transport equipment industry, 152 Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with Soviet Union (1972), 203, 228 Treaty of Mohammara (1922), 70 Treaty of Sèvres (1920), 37-38 treaty setting Kuwait-Iraq border (1913), 70 treaty with Iran (1937), 70 tribal affiliation, 83 tribal revolts, 42 tribal society (see also shaykhs), 99-103 Tripoli, 48, 136 Tsevetmetpromexport (TSMPE), 144 Tudeh Party, 250 Tughril, 24 Tughril Beg, 23 Tulayah, 163 Tunisia, 21 Turkestan, 14, 24 Turkey, 4, 30, 31, 33, 38, 41, 44, 71, 74, 83, 126, 142, 153, 155-56, 163, 168; Ubayd Allah, 19 Umar (caliph), 16, 17, 18, 86, 89 Umar Khayyam, 24 Umayyad Dynasty, 19, 40, 90, 92 Umayyads, 20, 21 Umm Qasr, xvi, xxviii, 60, 166, 218 Unified Political Command, 54 uniforms and insignia, 224 United Arab Emirates (UAE), xxv, 60, 206, 207, 241 United Arab Republic (UAR), 54 United National Front, 188 United Nations (UN), xxvii, 46, 210; par- tition of Palestine by, 47; report on chemical weapon use, 238 United Nations (UN) Food and Agricul- ture Organization (FAO), 104 United Nations (UN) Security Council: cease-fire resolution for Iran-Iraq War, 200, 204; Resolution 598, xxvii United States: aid to Kurdish Democratic Party by, 196; Arms Control and Dis- armament Agency, 229; Central Intel- ligence Agency, 52; Department of Defense, 229; Department of State, xxviii; Iraqi relations with, xviii, 202, 205-6; military assistance from, 61; Navy SEAL commandos, 241; owner- ship in TPC of, 134; role in Iran-Iraq War, 241; trade with Iraq of, 170 University of Al Mustansiriyah, 116 University of Baghdad, 116 University of Basra, 116 University of Mosul, 116 University of Salah ad Din, 116 University of Technology, 116 university system, 116 upland regions, 71 Ur, 3, 9-10 298