B 836,298 DA Pam Nr. 550-31 DS 70.6 .165 1969 ARBA HANDBOOK MARCH 1968 NGAN.SG MICHIG IBRARIE DIVERS NOAHL THLY DEPOSITED BY THE UNITEO AJES DE BADICA I Area hand book series I AREA HANDBOOK for IRAO Co-Authors Harvey H. Smith Nancy W. Al-Any Donald W. Bernier Frederica M. Bunge William Giloane Irving Kaplan Rinn-Sup Shinn Suzanne Teleki Research and writing were completed on May 31, 1968 Published March 1969 For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office Washington, D.C. 20402—Price $3.50 bobl _SO I goot so DEPOSITED BY THE ONITED STATES OF AMERIC FOREWORD This volume is one of a series of handbooks prepared by Foreign Area Studies (FAS) of The American University, designed to be useful to military and other personnel who need a convenient com- pilation of basic facts about the social, economic, political and military institutions and practices of various countries. The em- phasis is on objective description of the nation's present society and the kinds of possible or probable changes that might be ex- pected in the future. The handbook seeks to present as full and as balanced an integrated exposition as limitations on space and re- search time permit. It was compiled from information available in openly published material. Extensive bibliographies are provided to permit recourse to other published sources for more detailed information. There has been no attempt to express any specific point of view or to make policy recommendations. The contents of the handbook represent the work of the authors and FAS and do not represent the official view of the United States Government. An effort has been made to make the handbook as comprehen- sive as possible. It can be expected, however, that the material, interpretations and conclusions are subject to modification in the light of new information and developments. Such corrections, ad- ditions and suggestions for factual, interpretive or other change as readers may have will be welcomed for use in future revisions. Comments may be addressed to The Director Foreign Area Studies The Amercan University 5010 Wisconsin Avenue, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20016 PREFACE The modern Iraqi state, located on the centers of an ancient civilization, has been sovereign and independent since 1932 and exposed to modern technology for only half a century. Because of the continuing ferment in the Middle East, however, it plays an increasingly important role in world affairs. Great internal changes have taken place, particularly since the 14 July Revolution of 1958. Within the past decade, they have affected political, economic and other aspects of the country's in- ternal and external situations. An attempt has been made in this study to indicate the extent and impact of these changes as well as the trends in significant areas. No fieldwork has been possible, but consultants and all the available materials have been used in an effort to analyze the dominant sociological, political and economic aspects of a society in transition and to identify the patterns of thought and behavior of its members. In the interpretive treatment of Iraq's national life, many ques- tions posed could not be answered. It is hoped, however, that where parts of the picture are missing, the analysis provided will give a valuable insight into the various aspects of cultural develop- ments and into contemporary problems confronting the govern- ment and the people. Special recognition is accorded to Dr. Erich W. Bethmann, Di- rector of Research and Publications, American Friends of the Middle East, for his wholehearted cooperation and extraordinary efforts expended in searching for bibliographic material. Likewise, appreciation is extended to The Middle East Institute, Wash- ington, D. C., for making valuable source materials available. Grateful acknowledgment is also due many persons within and outside the United States Government, who gave their time and special knowledge to provide data and objective criticism of pre- liminary chapter drafts. Particular appreciation is extended to the staff of the Military Assistance Institute of the American Insti- tutes for Research, for their liberal cooperation in providing the use of facilities and important source materials, as well as for their assistance in many part of this study. An area of difficulty encountered in preparation of the study was the variety of transliteration systems used by different sources; inconsistencies often occurred within a single source. An effort has been made to establish a common, simple system which will allow the general reader to understand the Arabic word and approximate its pronunciation. Symbols and diacritical marks, un- common in English usage, have been avoided. The spelling of Arabic words and names has followed the transliteration system of Webster's Third New International Dictionary (unabridged), in most instances. Conventional spelling, however, has been used for well-known personal and some place names. Following usage in the Statistical Abstract, 1965, published by the Iraqi Ministry of Plan- ning in 1966, articles are omitted from the names of administra- tive divisions and cities. A Glossary is included as an appendix for the reader's conven- ience. Terms in the Glossary are not in every case defined explic- itly in the text. The place names used are, wherever possible, those established for Iraq by the Board on Geographic Names, United States Department of Interior, in June 1957. COUNTRY SUMMARY 1. COUNTRY: Republic of Iraq, historically known as Mesopo- tamia. Overrun by numerous invaders, was a part of the Ottoman Empire at the outbreak of World War I. Became a British Man- date territory after the war and achieved independence in 1932. Ruled by Hashimite kings until the Revolution of 1958 established the Republic. 2. GOVERNMENT: The Interim Constitution of 1964 as amended provides for independent executive, legislative and judicial branches, but overall authority in all government functions is ac- tually exercised by the President and the Council of Ministers. A permanent Constitution is planned. 3. POPULATION: About 9.0 million and predominantly Moslem; annual growth rate approximately 3.3 percent; density averaged about 52 persons per square mile in 1968. About 70 percent live under essentially rural conditions. Roughly three-fourths of the people think of themselves as Arabs, and many more speak Arabic. Between 15 and 20 percent are Kurds, the largest minority group. Smaller minorities include Turkomans, Persians and Lurs. Emi- gration is relatively low and principally to neighboring Kuwait, because of work in the oil industry. 4. SIZE: About 170,000 square miles; only access to sea is through the 30-mile coastline on the Persian Gulf. 5. TOPOGRAPHY: Four main areas: the mountainous highlands in the north and northeast with peaks rising to 12,229 feet; the dry, rolling uplands between the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers northwest of Baghdad; the fertile, alluvial flood plains of the Ti- gris and Euphrates extending from just north of Baghdad south- eastward to the Persian Gulf; the vast desert south and west of the Euphrates. 6. LANGUAGES: Official state language is Arabic. Most widely spoken minority language is Kurdish. English is the most com- monly used European language. 7. RELIGION: Official religion is Islam; the two dominant sects, vii Sunni and Shia, are almost equal and make up over 95 percent of the population. Other religions represented include: Christianity, Judaism, Mandeanism, Yezidism and various small Islamic sects. 8. EDUCATION: Literacy rate is about 20 percent. In 1967 more than 1.2 million students were enrolled in educational institutions at all levels. In 1965 over 5,000 Iraqi students attended foreign universities. 9. HEALTH: Accurate statistics lacking. Chief causes of debility and death: malaria, dysentery, tuberculosis, eye infections, para- sitic diseases of the intestinal tract and of the skin, typhus and venereal diseases. Under Five-Year Economic Plan 1965–69, 5 major and 8 smaller hospitals, 3 chest-disease hospitals and 800 rural health centers to be constructed. 10. CLIMATE: Combination of rain shortage and extreme heat makes much of the country a desert. Ninety percent of rainfall occurs in winter; summer months are intensely hot and dry. 11. JUSTICE: Ultimate supervisory power rests in the Ministry of Justice. Three-level court system: Courts of First Instance; Courts of Appeal; and Court of Cessation. Jury system not used. 12. ADMINISTRATIVE DIVISIONS: Provinces (14), districts (75), subdistricts (180), towns and villages; all supervised cen- trally from Baghdad. Under normal conditions army contingents are grouped into 3 regional areas: northern, central and southern. 13. ECONOMY: Predominantly agricultural. Heavily dependent on royalties and taxes from production and sale of petroleum by foreign concessionary companies. Annual rate of growth (1953– 68) about 6 percent. 14. INDUSTRY: Minor except for petroleum, but expanding along with general economy. Contribution to gross national product esti- mated at between 11 and 12 percent in 1964–67. Largely small- scale; dependent on raw material imports ; limited to oil refining, food processing and production of simple consumer goods and building materials. 15. LABOR: Working-age population estimated at about 4.5 mil- lion in 1968. Roughly 75 percent in farming, fishing and herding; remaining 25 percent in nonagricultural employment in 1964 di- vided into services, 8 percent; industry, 6 percent; trade, 3 per- cent; unspecified, 8 percent. 16. EXPORTS: Petroleum of paramount importance; in 1966 yielded 80 percent of foreign exchange earnings and 66 percent of government revenue. Nonoil exports, primarily agricultural viii and mostly dates, fluctuate widely and account for only 8 percent of total. 17. IMPORTS: Until 1964, well over 50 percent consumer goods, almost half of which were food products. Capital goods, of growing importance after 1964, included boilers and engines, machinery, electrical and transportation equipment, timber and paper. 18. FINANCE: Currency. Strong enough to withstand devalua- tion of pound sterling in 1967. Backed by gold, foreign exchange and government securities. Unit is dinar, divided into 1,000 fils; equals United States $2.80. Banks. Nationalized since 1964, under control of Central Bank of Iraq. Fiscal regime. Persistent deficit financing since 1958. 19. COMMUNICATIONS: All public information media govern- ment controlled. Radio. Principal news medium; stations, 14; re- ceiving sets, approximately 1.1 million, many in public places with loudspeakers. 20. RAILROADS: Government-owned and limited to two lines: one, a standard gauge, running from the Persian Gulf at Umm Qasr to the northwestern border and linking directly, via the Syrian and Turkish systems, to Europe; the other, a narrow-gauge line, from Irbil in the northeast through Baghdad and south to Basra near the Persian Gulf coast. 21. ROADS: Limited, but improving under government plans. 22. PORTS: Only port accommodating oceangoing vessels is Basra on the Shatt al Arab, 80 miles from Persian Gulf. Umm Qasr near Kuwait border being developed as second port for oceangoing traffic. 23. AIRFIELDS: Two international airports, Baghdad and Basra. New major facility under construction in Baghdad. Two main civil airports are at Mosul and Kirkuk. 24. AIRLINES: Government-owned Iraqi Airways; conducts in- ternational and domestic flights. 25. INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS: Mutual defense pact with the United Arab Republic and Jordan; bilateral treaty of friendship with Turkey. 26. AID PROGRAMS: Soviet Union has provided loans and tech- nical assistance for industrial development as well as military aid for modernization of the armed forces. 27. INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS: An original member of the United Nations; supports its principles and in 1968 was par- ticipating in at least 13 of its Specialized Agencies. 28. THE ARMED FORCES: Total strength approximately 80,000; Army (75,000), Navy (1,000), Air Force (4,000). The Mobile Force, a full-time paramilitary group of 5,000 under con- trol of the Minister of the Interior, supports armed forces in emer- gencies. Conscription: 2-year period. Budget: over 25 percent of total government expenditures. IRAQ TABLE OF CONTENTS FOREWORD ------------ PREFACE ---- -------------- COUNTRY SUMMARY ---- SECTION I. SOCIAL Chapter 1. General Character of the Society 2. Physical Environment Major Geographical Divisions—Climate-The River System - Resources - Transporta- tion-Settlement Patterns 8. Historical Setting ------- Ancient History-Arab Conquest and the Com- ing of Islam—The Abbasside Caliphate (750– 1258)—The Ottoman Period (1534–1918)-The Twentieth Century – Independence - World War II and the Postwar Iraq-The 1958 Revolution and End of the Monarchy—The Arif Government 4. Population --- Composition_Dynamics 6. Ethnic Groups and Languages ---- Arabs — Kurds — Turkomans — Persians and Lurs—Non-Moslems—Language 6. Social Structure - Society in the Mid-Twentieth Century (1918– 58)—The Years Since the 1958 Revolution 7. Family ------ Structure Family and Society 8. Living Conditions - Standards of Living—Traditional Welfare Government Welfare Efforts—Private Welfare Organizations Public Health 9. Education Background—The School System-Education and Society Page 131 145 Chapter 10. Artistic and Intellectual Expression Intellectual Expression—The Oral and Literary Tradition—The Performing Arts—The Visual Arts 11. Religion ----- Islam - Religious Minorities — Popular Reli- gion-Intercommunal Relations—Religion and Social Change 12. Social Values ---- Islamic Values-Tribal Arab Values—Urban Values-Shared Concepts—Dynamics 161 SECTION II. POLITICAL 175 189 203 Chapter 13. The Governmental System ------ Constitutional Development—The Interim Con- stitution of 1964—The Central Government- Provincial and Local Government—Civil Serv- ice—The Electoral System 14. Political Dynamics Political Trends-Political Awareness and Par- ticipation Political Elements—Political Rami- fications of Religious and Ethnic Factors Political Organizations 15. Foreign Relations ---- Determinants-Relations with the Arab League and Arab Nations—Relations with Non-Arab Nations—Relations with Western Nations- Relations with Communist Nations—Relations with International Organizations-Mechanics of Foreign Relations 16. Public Information Government and Freedom of the Press—In- formation Media During the 1960's—Informal Communications Channels—Government Infor- mation Programs—Foreign Government Infor- mation Programs 17. Political Values and Attitudes ----- Self-Image of Iraq-Arab Socialism-Atti- tudes and Expectations-National Symbols 221 237 243 SECTION III. ECONOMIC Chapter 18. Character and Structure of the Economy ------ Background-The Economy Since 1963—Devel- opment Planning 19. Agriculture ---- Control of Land Resources—Land, Crops and Growing Season-Livestock-Fishing—Forests and Forestry 251 Page 269 279 301 309 Chapter 20. Industry Industrial Development Policy – Investment and Construction Program-Current Status of Industry 21. Labor --------------- The Labor Force-Employment Patterns Working Conditions-Labor Relations During the 1960's 22. Domestic Trade ------ Direction and Composition—The Trading Com- munity-Trade Practices Transportation 23. Foreign Economic Relations --- Structure of Foreign TradeTrade Policy- Balance of Payments Foreign Aid—The Arab Common Market 24. Public Finance -- The Budgetary Process—The Budget—Tax- ation 25. Banking and Currency ------ Banking Institutions—Currency SECTION IV. NATIONAL SECURITY Chapter 26. The Armed Forces ------ Background-Attitudes Toward Military Serv- ice-Mission and Organization-Foreign Influ- enceEconomic Impact-Training-Logistics -Rank and Pay-Uniforms and Rations Awards and Decorations--Military Justice 27. Public Order and Safety ------- Background—The Police System-Legal Sys- tem—The Penal System-Crimes and Punish- ment 321 331 339 351 BIBLIOGRAPHIES 363 GLOSSARY --------- 383 INDEX 387 List of Illustrations Figure i 2 3 4 Position of Iraq in Southwest Asia The Terrain and River System of Iraq ------ The Transportation System of Iraq -------- Geographic Distribution of Ethnic and Religious Communities in Iraq The Governmental Structure of Iraq, 1968 ---- Provinces of Iraq ------ ------------ 5 6 List of Tables Table Page 17 1 2 3 4 5 ------------- Mean Annual Rainfall for Nine Stations in Iraq ------ Mean Maximum and Mean Minimum Temperatures, January and July, for Nine Stations in Iraq -- Population of Iraq by Age Group, 1957 ------ Population, Growth Rates and Density of Iraq in 1965 -- Dialect Distribution in the Mesopotamian Dialect Area of Iraq, 1968 - The Broadcasting Service of the Iraqi Republic in Baghdad (Idha 'At Al-Jumhuriyah Al-Iraqiyah fi Baghdad) -- Production of Selected Commodities by Nationalized Industries in Iraq, 1965–67 The Consolidated Budget of Iraq for Fiscal Years 1960–61 Through 1964–65 Iraqi Army Ranks and Insignia, 1967 ---------- 6 229 7 274 8 324 9 348 XV SECTION I. SOCIAL CHAPTER 1 GENERAL CHARACTER OF THE SOCIETY The modern state of Iraq developed from three Ottoman Turkish provinces, Basrah, Baghdad and Mosul, which were de- tached from the defeated Ottoman empire at the end of World War I. After almost 400 years of Turkish rule, the area was awarded to Great Britain in 1920 under a League of Nations mandate. While typical unsettled postwar conditions prevailed, a growing spirit of nationalism matured rapidly and, with British support, members of the prominent Hashimite family from Arabia established a monarchy in 1921 with Faisal I on the throne. Four years later, he signed the country's first constitution. The monarchy assumed in- creasing administrative responsibilities and took full control of the government after the British Mandate terminated in 1932. At the same time. Iraq was immediately admitted to the League of Na- tions as an independent and sovereign state. Residual treaty ar- rangements with Great Britain, however, called for a close rela- tionship between the two countries and for consultations on all foreign policy matters (see ch. 3, Historical Setting). Hashimite rule ended abruptly on July 14, 1958, when revolu- tionary forces led by the army seized control of the country after killing King Faisal II, his prime minister, Nuri as Said, and other monarchical leaders. The new government, headed by Brigadier Abdul Karim Qasim, set up the Republic of Iraq, quickly adopted a provisional constitution and announced a policy calling for unity with the Arab world but emphasizing Iraq's separate national in- terests. Factions soon developed and Pan-Arab sentiments mounted, but Qasim remained in power until he, in turn, was overthrown and assassinated in February 1963, during a coup by the Iraqi wing of the Arab Socialist Renaissance Party, commonly known as the Baath Party, which was dedicated to the Pan- Arab movement with emphasis on equality among Arab nations. Political acrimony intensified, and only 9 months later the new government was replaced by another group which established a Pan-Arab nationist policy. This government favored ties with the United Arab Republic but stressed the advancement of internal solidarity and development as a prerequisite for any unity with the United Arab Republic (see ch. 14, Political Dynamics). The provisional constitution of 1958 was superseded in May 1964 by the Interim Constitution. Governmental leaders asserted that it would remain in effect during the transition period, which would end with the promulgation of a permanent constitution. By mid-1968, after repeated extensions of this temporary period, a permanent constitution had not been promulgated, but major pre- paratory measures for parliamentary elections had been an- nounced (see ch. 14, Political Dynamics). The country's geography and ecology give form and substance to the most permanently distinguishing features of the society. Situ- ated at the head of the Persian Gulf, this region for centuries has served as an area of contention between peoples living in Turkish territory to the north and those living in Persian-speaking lands to the east. Three geographic characteristics stand out distinctively. In the north and northeast the Zagros Mountains, rather sparsely cov- ered with deciduous trees and scattered shrubs, are extensions of eastern Turkey's Taurus Range, and their summits rise to approx. imately 6,500 feet above sea level. To the east, they join western Iran's Zagros Mountains with barren peaks rising from 7,000 to 12,229 feet above sea level (see ch. 2, Physical Environment). In the center and southeast are the fertile, densely populated alluvial plains adjoining the sluggish lower courses of the south- eastward-flowing Tigris and Euphrates Rivers. In the area be- tween the rivers northwest of Baghdad these plains merge with the drier, higher and more undulating terrain. Southeast of Baghdad, the rivers meander through a broad flat delta character- ized by a network of ditches, irrigation canals, distributaries, ex- tensive marsh lands and numerous shallow lakes. In many places, their stream beds, being higher than the surrounding flood plains, must be contained by levees. High-water periods extend from March through June and low-water periods from July through October. The rivers finally merge to form the Shatt al Arab which continues southeastward about 100 miles to the Persian Gulf. In the south and west are expansive, barren and almost uninhab- ited sandy and rocky deserts which blend indistinctly with sim- ilar wastes in neighboring Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Syria. This region is almost featureless except for scattered sand dunes and boulder areas. During the infrequent rains, intermittent streams in channels called wadis, flow eastward toward the Eu- phrates, but most of them eventually disappear into the ground. The flood plains of the two major rivers comprise about 25 percent of the country's total area of approximately 170,000 square miles. The plains contain roughly 75 percent of Iraq's popu- lation, in mid-1968 estimated at approximately 9 million. This region is often referred to as the site of the Garden of Eden. More than two-thirds of the people living there work on the land which, with irrigation and drainage systems, constitutes the country's prime agricultural area. These two important rivers provide great benefits but cause serious problems. Spring floods, if unchecked, destroy productive acreage, bring starvation and spread diseases. Flood control measures necessitate effective central planning, fi- nancing and administration. Baghdad, the nation's capital and largest city as well as its cultural, educational, commercial and political center, is on the Tigris in the heart of this region. Basra, on the Shatt al Arab below the confluence of the Tigris and Euphrates and about 60 miles upstream from the Persian Gulf (called Arab Gulf by Iraqis) is the second largest city and the country's main sea- port. Mosul, also on the Tigris but in the north some 70 miles before it crosses the Turkish border, is the third largest city and an important industrial and agricultural center. Although the country has been a sovereign state for less than four decades, the land within its present boundaries has witnessed a succession of civilizations and empires over five millennia. This factor has contributed to the varied linguistic and religious char- acteristics of the Iraqis. Archaeological evidence such as paintings, sculpture and skeletal remains indicates, however, that the phys- ical appearance of the population seems to have remained essen- tially unchanged over the past centuries. The Sumerians, Babylonians and Assyrians in ancient times were followed by the Islamic and Arab civilizations centered around Baghdad. By the end of the Middle Ages, when the Ot- toman Turks arrived, the people had been successively under Per- sian, Greek, Roman and Mongol rule (see ch. 3, Historical Set- ting). During this early period, the area, named Mesopotamia by the Greeks, was particularly important because it is the eastern por- tion of the Fertile Crescent, which extends in a semicircle from the shores of the Mediterranean around the northern and eastern sides of the Syrian Desert to the Persian Gulf. It includes the headwa- ters of the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers in southeastern Turkey. Within this region occurred many of the struggles and migrations involving some of the earliest known peoples. It provided fa- vorable routes for trade caravans and nomads, as well as for con- quering and defeated armies. As they passed through, these groups left indelible marks on the indigenous people. Iraqi society gradually developed into a wide variety of separate communities, based mainly on ethnic or religious distinctions. Lan- guage is not a major barrier to interregional communications. Most adults in virtually all groups either speak or understand Arabic, the official state language. Each group, nevertheless, re- gards itself as distinctly different from the others in one or more significant respects (see ch. 5, Ethnic Groups and Languages). The common tendencies among groups to emphasize their own peculiar characteristics hamper governmental efforts to develop a spirit of national unity. The policy of not focusing attention on statistics regarding ethnic origin or religious faiths, assists the authorities in their efforts to play down intergroup rivalries and differences. Prominent among the unifying influences is the Islamic religion, professed by at least 90 percent of the population, including a great majority of the Arabs and sizable segments of other ethnic groups. The effects of the Moslem-Arab conquest, which brought Islam to the country in the seventh century, were permanent and profound. The Syriac (also called Aramaic) dialect, spoken by the pre-Islamic inhabitants of the area, was gradually replaced by the related Arabic language of religion and government. Islam still prevails and continues to influence strongly the minds and actions of the people. Small groups of Christians and Jews survived the conquest, and traces remain of still older religions associated with the civilizations of earlier inhabitants of the region (see ch. 5, Ethnic Groups and Languages; ch. 11, Religion). After the Prophet Mohammed died in 632, factional conflicts arising from bitter disputes over his rightful successor and the correct policy to be adopted in choosing a successor, led to a deep-seated schism of Islam, not only in Iraq but throughout the Moslem world. Some of the disputes involved bloody clashes between opposing groups in the Euphrates valley. One faction favored Ali, Moham- med's cousin and son-in-law, as successor. Those holding to this viewpoint became known as Shiites. Another faction developed around Mu'awiyah and the forces of his son, Yazid, who were descendants of the Prophet's clan in Mecca; they were called Umayyads and eventually were known as Sunnites. Conflict be- tween the two factions resulted in the establishment of the Umayyad dynasty of Islam in Damascus and later, the Abbasside caliphate in Baghdad. It also led to a permanent division of the Islamic community between the Sunnites and the followers of Ali, the Shiites (see ch. 11, Religion). The effects of this ancient struggle still strongly influence the attitudes of modern Iraqis. The population is divided almost equally between these two main branches of Islam, with the Shiites holding a slight numerical advantage. The schism continues to be reflected in political and economic rivalries. The Shiites remain generally concentrated in the marshy delta area south of Baghdad. The Sunnites, favored by the Ottoman rulers, originally included most of the wealthier and more influential elements of the population; these heritages, in general, have been transmitted to their descendants. Islam, through its Sharia (law—see Glossary), regulates many affairs of its adherents in a detailed manner, embodying much that is left to custom and individual conscience in Christian countries. The status of this code is recognized by the Iraqi Government. People, therefore, are very much aware of their religious affiliation. This is particularly true of the Shiites, who are advised and guided by an expansive system of religious teachers known as mujtahids (specialist in Islamic law). Religious teachers and de- scendants of the Prophet are held in great respect and, as a result, frequently acquire considerable political and economic power. The non-Moslem population comprises a very small minority. In the absence of official statistics regarding the relative strengths of various groups, any figures offered are merely estimates by qualified observers. Christians, constituting by far the largest non-Moslem group, include various branches of faith, such as Orthodox or Eastern church, Catholic church, Uniate churches and sundry representations from Protestant churches. Altogether, the Christians make up no more than 6 or 7 percent of the population. The adherents of several other non-Moslem religions live in widely scattered localities. Their lack of strength and leadership precludes significant influence on national society. This category includes a few thousand Iraqi Jews, most of whom live in the Baghdad area; the Mandeans, pre-Christian gnostics, who dwell along the rivers and among the marshes of the southeastern delta region; and the Yezidis, regarded by some Iraqis as devil wor- shipers, who live mainly west of Mosul in the northern highlands. Ethnically, more than three-fourths of the people are Arabs. The largest national minority, the Kurds, comprising at least 15 percent of the population, live in the northern mountains con- tiguous to other Kurds in Syria, Turkey and Iran. Considered by some historians to be descendants of the ancient Medes, they speak various dialects of Kurdish, their native language. Most of them, however, can speak Arabic, but efforts to elevate Kurdish to the status of a national language has been a subject of dispute with the central authorities (see ch. 14, Political Dynamics). They are commonly regarded as hardy mountaineers, many of whom are still tribally organized. The majority are settled grain farmers or seminomadic crop raisers and stockbreeders. Individualistic in dress and independent in spirit, they are traditionally resistant to national government regulations. Occasional forceful efforts against them to reestablish control have resulted in disquieting truces (see ch. 5, Ethnic Groups and Languages; ch. 27, Public Order and Safety.) All together, the smaller ethnic minorities total less than 10 percent of the people of Iraq. Noteworthy among these are the Turkomans. Descendants of the pre-Ottoman Turkish infiltration into the country beginning in the tenth century, they are clustered in small farming villages among the Kurds and along the old trade route south from eastern Turkey, through Mosul, Irbil and Kirkuk to Baghdad. Most of them speak Arabic. Some became Ottoman officials and were regarded by the Kurds as intruders. Tensions between the Turkomans and the Kurds have resulted in clashes creating problems for public order and safety forces. On occasions of disputes between Iraqi Arabs and Kurds, the Turko- mans generally have stood aside, seeking to avoid involvement and favoring a peaceful solution to the issue. The Lurs are Persian-speaking tribal people living mostly in villages and towns along the Iranian border, where they work more often as laborers than as farmers. Many are porters of heavy loads in Baghdad and Basra. They are racially akin to the Kurds and have not been a politically active group. Within the national society, but not yet fully assimilated by it, are two ethnically Arab groups, the Bedouins and the marsh dwellers, each group having its own peculiar social distinctiveness based primarily on its mode of subsistence originating in the ecology of its living area. The Bedouins, related to nomads in the great Arabian desert, live and move in the wide wastes of the south and west. Organized in large tribes and confederations, their social structure differs markedly from that of other groups. In- creasing efforts have been made, with some success, to settle them in cultivable areas under government control. In contrast, the marsh dwellers, also tribally organized, live sedentarily among the swamps in the delta area between the lower Tigris and Euphrates. The region's general inaccessibility hampers the functioning of government supervisory and control agencies. Literate Iraqis, both rural and urban, regardless of their ethnic, religious or regional differences, have, on the whole, a strong sense of Iraqi nationality. Despite this consciousness of nationality, cer- tain factors tend to retard the development of a spirit of common- ality among the various groups. The government's chief concern in this respect is the threat posed by the bare subsistence level of living in many areas and by the prevalence of illiteracy, particu- larly throughout the countryside. Lack of land communications, except in the few main arteries, is a significant factor in the slow progress of improvement efforts made by governments under the monarchy as well as the Republic (see ch. 8, Living Conditions; ch. 9, Education). Under the monarchy, changes favoring the landlords were accel- erated in the nineteenth century land-tenure system. The gap be- tween the rich and the poor widened. The Development Board, an autonomous body established in 1950, proved to be the main cata- lyst in the monarchy's planned exploitation of the country's im- mense potential wealth. The Board devoted increased government revenues, especially from expanding oil resources, to major con- struction projects, principally irrigation works and communica- tions. The beneficial effects of these undertakings, however, were not immediate, nor did they reach the majority of the people. Despite a shift in emphasis to small-scale projects, discontent arose in some areas where it was observed that the growth in material prosperity was shared mainly by government supporters, landlords and entrepreneurs (see ch. 19, Agriculture). By 1955 more attention had begun to be paid to local develop- ment measures and less to industrialization. The Agrarian Reform Law, promulgated by the newly established Republic in 1958, was an important initial step forward in distribution of land to the landless tenants as well as to small holders. It also provided for the formation of rural cooperatives to facilitate the purchase of seeds and equipment, the marketing of crops and the securing of financial assistance. Progress had been slow, mainly because of administrative problems arising in the process of setting up ap- propriate organizations and the assignment of responsibilities to persons untrained to cope with them. In industry, the dominant factor is the production and refining of crude oil by foreign companies operating under long-term concessions. Royalties and taxes from these companies in 1966 provided the government with about 80 percent of its foreign exchange earnings and roughly 65 percent of its total revenues. After the Revolution of 1958, successive governments acted to reduce the extent of foreign control over the production and re- fining processes as well as over the exploration and exploitation of new fields. Since most of the oil fields are located considerable distances inland, an extensive system of pipelines has been devel- oped for transportation to port facilities on the Persian Gulf and across to Syria to outlets on the Mediterranean. Most knowl. edgeable Iraqis assert that the oil resources belong to Iraq and that the people should benefit from their own control and utiliza- tion (see ch. 20, Industry). Consistent with the policy of government control over industry, the Detailed Economic Plan 1961-62 to 1965–66 and the Five-Year Economic Plan 1965–69 cover industry, agriculture, transport, communications and social services. After the Qasim government was overthrown in 1963, greater emphasis on socialism was ac- companied by nationalization of the largest private industrial firms and the reorganization of many others into joint stock com- panies. Control of most nationalized activities was placed in the High Council for Public Organization and its four subsidiary groups, responsible for industry, banks, commerce and insurance. By 1968 the number of private industries had increased somewhat, but progress in overall production was slow, mainly because of shortages of skilled labor, capital and imported raw materials after the Middle East conflict in 1967 (see ch. 18, Character and Structure of the Economy). Most political power since the Revolution of 1958 has been placed primarily in the chief executive of the Republic. Prime Minister Qasim exercised this power through the National Council of Revo- lutionary Command until February 1963, when his government was overthrown by the Baath Party coup led by Brigadier Ahmad Hassan Bakr. During the next 9 months political power was in the hands of the Baath Party, which drew its support mainly from a group of military officers. After the Party organization became weakened by factional disputes over the method of achieving Arab unity, President Arif, who sympathized with the Party's pro- Nasser elements, brought about a coup in November 1963. He established a non-Baathist government and banned all political parties. Since that time, the President of the Republic has wielded political powers through the Council of Ministers serving as the Cabinet (see ch. 14, Political Dynamics). The military officers' corps, together with a number of civil servants with military support, has continued to wield strong political influence. This group, aside from being the most cohesive in the country, is the most adept and experienced in carrying on government organizational functions. Since dissolution of the party system in 1963, all political ac- tivity has been channeled through the Arab Socialist Union, a government-controlled organization established in 1964 as an outlet for political expression between the people and the central authorities. The Union also serves as an instrument for conveying the government's viewpoints on political policies and developments to the people. The government's principal political goals, as indicated by var- ious statements of its leaders in 1968, were to achieve a spirit of national unity, to promote Arab socialism as sanctioned by the precepts of Islam, to attain the political and economic union of all Arab states and to maintain a policy of nonalignment in the East- West controversy. The Kurdish problem presents the gravest threat to national stability and to attainment of the national unity goal. Armed clashes, beginning in mid-1961, formally ended in June 1966 with the government's announcement of a cease-fire accompanied by a 12-point conciliation program. Principal fea- tures of this program included decentralization of the Kurdish provinces, recognition of the Kurdish language, surrender of arms by the Kurds and reconstruction of the devastated places. Occa- sional reports of incidents, however, indicate that tensions still exist in the area. The Kurds, in general, desire autonomy within the Iraqi state. Some desire this autonomy at once, while others, more moderate, appear hopeful that it will be granted eventually. Foreign policy efforts, under the monarchy as well as under the Republic, have been directed mainly toward advancing the coun- try's role in world affairs, as a member of the Arab bloc of nations. Interest in international problems expanded notably after Iraq became a founding member of the United Nations in 1945. Active participation in at least 13 of its 16 Specialized Agencies has provided Iraq an acquaintanceship with the viewpoints of other nations on affairs influencing Iraq's international position. Under the Republic, various governments have consistently followed a foreign policy of nonalignment, particularly with non-Arab coun- tries (see ch. 15, Foreign Relations). The Western orientation prevailing under the monarchy was illustrated, for example, by the Baghdad Pact signed in 1955 with Great Britain, Turkey, Iran and Pakistan to control the spread of communism in the Middle East. After the Republic was established in 1958, this orientation shifted to one favoring cooperation with Communist nations but rejecting foreign domination of any kind. Within a year, Iraq withdrew from the Pact which had been under repeated attacks by some domestic politicians, the Soviet Union and by Gamal Abdel Nasser of the United Arab Republic. Arab nationalism and nonalignment have become major fea- tures in foreign policy. Arab nationalism, in general, does not imply a governmental superstructure or the supremacy of any particular country. It appears to be regarded as the natural expression of a common bond emphasizing the unity of interests, including origin, culture, language and history of all Arab peoples. Christians and other minorities in these predominantly Moslem countries are not excluded from the bond. Reference to religious brotherhood in this form of nationalism tend to be accepted by most Iraqi Moslems who seem confident of the unity and ultimate superiority of Islam. Discussions on the subject of Arab unity evoke varied inter- pretations regarding methods of attainment and Iraq's position in relation to other Arab countries within the proposed concept. The government also pursues the unity policy through the Arab League, established in 1945, and in which Iraq plays a leading role among the seven founding members. By 1968 the League included 13 Arab states extending from Iraq and Saudi Arabia on the east to Morocco on the west. Decisions of the League's Council are seldom unanimous except on resolutions against Israel and on de- nunciations of “Western imperialism." The strong influence of the Arab-Israeli controversy on foreign policy has been evidenced since the creation of Israel in 1948. After the armed conflict of June 1967, Iraq broke relations with the United States and the United Kingdom, asserting that these two countries had assisted Israel in its military effort. Likewise, an oil embargo was placed against these two countries and West Germany. Foreign firms said to have provided Israel with arma- ment or related material were subject to economic boycott. Foreign aid has been received in the form of loans and technical assistance needed for capital and for carrying out the projects outlined in the economic development and modernization pro- grams. Most of this assistance, since the Revolution of 1958, has come from the Soviet Union and several East European countries. Trade agreements have been concluded with some 30 nations. Along with Kuwait, Jordan, Syria and the United Arab Republic, Iraq is a member of an Arab Common Market established in 1965, but by mid-1968 its operation was not yet in evidence (see ch. 23, Foreign Economic Relations). In 1968 government leaders, pressing forward with the modern- ization programs, particularly the Five-Year Economic Plan 1965–69, were encountering problems arising from lack of skilled manpower as well as a widespread resistance to changes from traditions and age-old customs. Special efforts were being made to build up a desire for cooperation among all segments of society, irrespective of ethnic, religious, regional or other influences. The younger generation appeared to be the most dynamic in accepting and adapting to changing conditions. The forces of sectarianism seemed to be weakening, except in the more remote areas and inaccessible areas. Government leaders recognized that a major basic requirement is education, essential 10 for developing technical skills and managerial competence. Em- phasis is being placed on inculcating in all people the idea that internal unity builds naticnal prestige which in turn promotes progress and enhances individual dignity and prestige. CHAPTER 2 PHYSICAL ENVIRONMENT Most of the country is hot, dry and level. Only in the foothills of the mountains on the northern and northeastern borders can crops be cultivated without extensive irrigation. In the central and southern regions (the Mesopotamia of the early Greeks and later Europeans), cultivation and the development of relatively dense populations, including cities, are made possible by the waters of the Euphrates and Tigris Rivers and the tributaries of the latter. In the desert areas of the west and southwest, only pastoral nomads can subsist. Except for the mountains in the north (extensions of Turkey's Taurus mountain chain) and in the northeast (extensions of the Zagros mountain system of western Iran), the country's borders with its neighbors are not marked by significant physical features (see figs. 1 and 2). In the west and south Iraq's desert areas merge almost imperceptibly with those of Syria, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. Pastoral nomads cross these borders regularly, and the jointly administered Neutral Zone between Iraq and Saudi Arabia is meant to facilitate the movement of these people and to provide them with water as they cross the borders. There are no perma- nent residents in the Zone. Despite the large tracts of desert on either side of Iraq's borders with its western neighbors, the generally stony surface permits vehicular traffic even on the unpaved sections of the route between Baghdad and Damascus. Movement to the northwest is possible on the railroad that runs from Baghdad through northeastern Syria and Turkey. Until early 1968 most paved highways to the west and northwest tended to stop at, or short of, the border, but proposals to extend them were under consideration. 40 4 48 Khazir TURKEY Ayn Zalah Eski Mosul Mosul Euphrates Zab) Khabur Little Kirkuk Butmah SYRIA o Derbendi Khan IRAN River Samarra Usam Diyala Khanaqin THARTHAR Hadithah Naft Khaneh Hit Euphrates Ramadi BAGHDAD Rutbah Ever Shatt al Hillah River Kuts Habbaniyah ABU DIBBIS Shatte JORDAN! Hillah Kif Diwaniyah it al Gharra Amarah Karum Samawah Nasiriyah Qurnah Намтар Shaft al Amb Basra Zubayr 30 SAUDI ARABIA Persian KUWAIT 200 MILES 200 MILES Gulf NEUTRAL ZONE SCALE NEUTRAL ZONE 40 44 48 Figure 2. The Terrain and River System of Iraq. The country's only access to the sea is through the Persian Gulf, on which is its 30-mile coastline. The Shatt al Arab (River of the Arabs), formed by the confluence of the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers about 40 miles above Basra, flows to the Gulf and permits access to the port of that city. The location of the country's single outlet to the sea and the difficulties of access over land across deserts from the west tended, before the development of the Suez Canal in the mid-nineteenth century, to orient Iraq to the east, especially to India and to what was then Persia. Because of the construction of the Suez Canal, the development of port facilities at Basra and, later, the rise of air travel, Iraq's direct economic and political relations with the West grew in importance. Baghdad has become one of the major links in air routes from Europe and North Africa to the Middle East and to southern and eastern Asia. The lower Shatt al Arab flows along the border between Iran and southeasternmost Iraq, but the river is entirely within Iraq. Unlike most international river boundaries, this one is not drawn to follow the lowest points in the river channel (thalweg line) but 14 along the low water line on the Iranian side, and Iraq controls all navigation on the river. Iran's objection to this has led to disputes from time to time, the latest in the mid-1960's (see ch. 15, Foreign Relations). MAJOR GEOGRAPHICAL DIVISIONS Topographically, the country may be divided into four main zones: the desert in the west and southwest; the rolling upland, much of it very dry, between the upper Tigris and Euphrates Rivers; the highlands in the north and northeast; and the alluvial plain through which the lower Tigris and Euphrates flow (see fig. 2). The greater part of the population lives on or near the plain (see ch. 4, Population). The desert zone, including most of the area lying west and southwest of the Euphrates River, is a part of the Syrian Desert, which covers sections of Syria, Jordan and Saudi Arabia. The region, sparsely inhabited by pastoral nomads, consists of a wide, stony plain interspersed with rare sandy stretches. A widely ramified pattern of wadis—watercourses which are dry most of the year—run from the borders to the Euphrates. Some are over 200 miles long and carry brief but torrential floods during the winter rains. Wells provide some water for the nomads who cross the desert and for workers who maintain the oil pipeline paral- leling the Wadi Hawran, which runs from near the Jordanian border to the Euphrates. The upland between the Tigris north of Samarra and the Eu- phrates north of Hit is known as Al Jazirah (the island). It forms a part of a larger area that extends westward into Syria between the two rivers and into Turkey. Water in the area flows in deeply cut valleys, and irrigation is much more difficult than it is in the lower plain. Much of this zone may be classified as desert. The northeastern highlands begin just southwest of a line drawn from Mosul to Kirkuk and extend to the borders with Syria and Iran. High ground, separated by broad, undulating steppes, gives way to mountains ranging from 3,000 to more than 12,000 feet near Iranian and Turkish borders. Except for a few valleys, the mountain area proper is suitable only for grazing. In the foothills and steppes, however, adequate soil and rainfall make cultivation possible (see ch. 19, Agriculture). Here, too, are the great oilfields near Mosul and Kirkuk (see ch. 20, Industry). The northeast is the homeland of most Iraqi Kurds (see ch. 5, Ethnic Groups and Languages). The alluvial plain begins north of Baghdad and extends to the Persian Gulf. Here the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers lie above the quate drainarshland, theng east of the confluenca'y large level of the plain in many places, and the whole area (roughly 45,000 square miles) is a delta interlaced by the channels of the two rivers and by irrigation canals. Intermittent lakes, fed by the rivers in flood, also characterize southeastern Iraq. A fairly large area (roughly 6,000 square miles) just above the confluence of the two rivers at Qurnah and extending east of the Tigris beyond the Iranian border is marshland, the result of centuries of flooding and inadequate drainage. Much of it is a permanent marsh, but some parts dry out in the early winter, and other parts become marshland only in years of great flood (see fig. 2). Because the waters of the Tigris and Euphrates above their confluence are heavily silt laden, irrigation and fairly frequent flooding deposit large quantities of silty loam in much of the delta area. Windborne silt contributes to the total deposit of sediments. It has been estimated that the delta plains are built up at the rate of nearly 8 inches a century. In some areas major floods lead to the deposit, in temporary lakes, of as much as 12 inches of mud. The Tigris and Euphrates also carry large quantities of salts. These, too, are spread on the land by sometimes excessive irriga- tion and flooding. A high water table and poor surface and subsur- face drainage tend to concentrate the salts near the surface of the soil. In general, the salinity of the soil increases from Baghdad south to the Gulf and severely limits productivity in the region south of Amarah. CLIMATE Roughly 90 percent of the annual rainfall occurs in the 6 months beginning in November and lasting through April, most of it in the winter months from December through March. The remaining 6 months, particularly the hottest ones of June, July and August, are dry. Except in the north and northeast, mean annual rainfall ranges between 4 and 7 inches. Data available from stations in the foot- hills and steppes south and southwest of the mountains suggest mean annual rainfall between 13 and 15 inches for that area (see table 1). Rainfall in the mountains is more abundant and may reach 40 inches a year in some places, but the terrain precludes extensive cultivation. Cultivation on nonirrigated land is limited essentially to the mountain valleys, foothills and steppes, which have 12 or more inches of rainfall annually. Even in this zone, however, only one crop a year can be grown, and a shortage of rain has led to crop failure (see ch. 19, Agriculture). Mean minimum temperatures in the winter range from near freezing (just before dawn), in the northern and northeastern 16 foothills and the western desert, to the upper 30°8 F. and lower 40°s F, in the alluvial plains of southern Iraq. They rise to a mean maximum in the middle 50's F. (western desert and northeast) and lower 60°s F. (in the south). In the summer, mean minimum temperatures range from the lower 70°8 F. to the lower 80°s F. and rise to a mean maximum roughly between 100° and 110° F. (see table 2). Temperatures sometimes fall below freezing and have fallen as low as 6° F. at Rutbah in the western desert. They are more likely, however, to go over 115° F. in the summer months (particu- larly July and August), and several stations have records of 120° F. or more. Table 1. Mean Annual Rainfall for Nine Stations in Iraq* Station Rainfall (in inches) Baghdad ---- Basra Diwaniyah Nasiriyah Hayy ------ Rutbah ---- Khanaqin Kirkuk ---- coco e gioi 13.8 15.0 Mosul ------ 14.7 • Mean annual rainfall is based on data collected over a period of 25 to 42 years, and figures are rounded to the nearest tenth. Source: Adapted from Republic of Iraq, Ministry of Planning, Statistical Abstract, 1965, p. 23. Table 2. Mean Maximum and Mean Minimum Temperatures, January and July, for Nine Stations in Iraq* January Mean Mean Minimum Maximum July Mean Mean Minimum Maximum Station 110 Baghdad ------ Basra - Diwaniyah Nasiriyah Hayy ------ Rutbah Khanaqin Kirkuk Mosul 105 109 109 110 102 111 109 110 * Mean temperature data are based on material collected over periods of 17 to 38 years. Source: Adapted from Republic of Iraq, Ministry of Planning, Statistical Abstract, 1965, pp. 18-22. 17 The summer months are marked by two types of wind phe- nomena. The southern and southeasterly sirocco (in Iraq, sharqi), a dry, dusty wind with occasional gusts to 50 miles an hour, occurs from April to early June and again from late September through November. It may last for a day at the beginning and end of the season but for several days at other times. These winds are often accompanied by violent duststorms which may rise to heights of several thousand feet and close airports for brief pe- riods. From mid-June to mid-September, the prevailing wind, called the shamal, is from the north and northwest. It is a steady wind, absent only occasionally during this period. The very dry air brought by this wind permits intensive sun heating of the land surface, but the breeze has some cooling effect. The combination of rain shortage and extreme heat makes much of Iraq a desert. Because of very high rates of evaporation, soil and plants rapidly lose the little moisture obtained from rain, and vegetation could not survive without extensive irrigation. THE RIVER SYSTEM The Euphrates originates in Turkey, is augmented by the Khabur River in Syria and enters Iraq in the northwest. Here it is fed only by the wadis of the western desert during the winter rains. It then winds through a gorge varying from 1 to 10 miles in width until it flows out on the plain at Ramadi and continues to the Hindiyah Barrage, constructed in 1914. There the river was di- verted into the Hindiyah Channel. What is now the Shatt al Hillah had served as the main channel of the Euphrates before that time. Below Kifl, the river follows two channels to Samawah where it reappears as a single channel to join the Tigris at Qurnah. The Tigris also rises in Turkey but is significantly augmented by several rivers in Iraq, the most important of which are the Khabur, the Great Zab, the Little Zab and the Uzaym, all of which join the Tigris above Baghdad, and the Diyala, which joins it about 20 miles below the city. At the Kut Barrage much of the water is diverted into the Shatt al Gharraf which had once been the main channel of the Tigris. Water from the Tigris thus enters the Euphrates through the Shatt al Gharraf well above the con- fluence of the two main channels at Qurnah (see fig. 2). Both the Tigris and the Euphrates break into a number of chan- nels in the marshland area, and the flow of the rivers is substan- tially reduced by the time they come together at Qurnah. More- over, the swamps act as silt traps, and the Shatt al Arab is relatively silt-free as it flows south. Below Basra, however, the Karun River enters the Shatt al Arab from Iran, carrying large 18 quantities of silt which presents a continuous dredging problem in maintaining a channel for oceangoing vessels to reach the port at Basra. The waters of the Tigris and Euphrates are essential to the life of the country, but they may also threaten it. The rivers are at their lowest level in September and October and at flood in March, April and May when they may carry 40 times as much water as at low mark. Moreover, one season's flood may be 10 or more times as great as that in another year. In 1954, for example, Baghdad was seriously threatened, and dikes protecting it were nearly topped by the flooding Tigris. Until the mid-twentieth century, most efforts to control waters were concerned primarily with irrigation. Some attention was given to problems of flood control and drainage before the 1958 Revolution, but development plans in the middle and late 1960's were increasingly devoted to these matters, as well as to irrigation projects on the upper reaches of the Tigris and Euphrates and on the tributaries of the Tigris in the northeast. Extensive water storage projects, associated with flood control undertakings, are expected to make possible more effective irriga- tion, since water for irrigation has not always been available at the appropriate time in the agricultural cycle (see ch. 19, Agricul- ture). Water stored in flood season can be released later (in the dry summer) when it is needed. In the mid-1960's for the first time, extensive water control projects, including dams and canals, were proposed and, to a lim- ited extent, executed in the upper Tigris and Euphrates and on the Diyala, Uzaym and Little Zab Rivers. These are meant to provide opportunities for cultivation in the arid zones (Jazirah) and to permit the cultivation of more than one crop a year in areas such as the northeast, which had relied entirely on rainfall. In the desert zone (west and southwest) where irrigation is not possible, an extensive well-digging program was completed in the early 1960's. In the late 1960's, deep wells were being dug in Mawsil, Irbil and Kirkuk Provinces. The river system has not been a significant source of power. Although a few of the dams already completed and a few in pros- pect in 1968 were considered as actual or potential sources of power, oil and natural gas provide the fuels for most of the elec- tricity-producing installations in the country (see ch. 20, In- dustry). Two major flood control and water shortage facilities were es- sentially completed before 1958 but were undergoing modification in the mid-1960's; at Ramadi a dam permits the diversion of water 19 from the Euphrates to Lake Habbaniyah, and a regulator governs flow from the lake to the river downstream. At Samarra on the Tigris, a dam and regulator permit the diversion of water to the great Tharthar depression. Other depressions, quite dry except during the rainy season, provide for water storage in the future. On the Euphrates, a major water control and irrigation project (probably to be located near Hadithah where the oil pipeline from Kirkuk crosses the river on its way west) has been delayed. Iraq and Syria have contemplated major dams on the Euphrates since the early 1960's, but negotiations between the two countries have been inconclusive, and no significant steps had been taken on the Iraqi dam by the end of 1967. The 1968 spring floods on the Euphrates—the worst in years— apparently led the government to consider moving ahead rapidly on a dam. The project had been broached in the early 1960's, but technical difficulties had blocked early implementation. The dam will be part of a system meant to provide irrigation for a large arid zone in the Jazirah, to balance the flow of the Tigris to the dam at Samarra and to furnish hydroelectric power. Elsewhere, progress has been faster. A major dam at Derbendi Khan on the upper Diyala was completed in 1959, and the Dokan Dam on the Little Zab was also completed. These and other proj- ects on the northeastern tributaries of the Tigris are expected to contribute substantially to increased agricultural productivity in this part of the country (see ch. 19, Agriculture). In the delta area (the alluvial plain) of southern Iraq, proposed projects and some already underway in the middle and late 1960's were directed to water control and drainage. New dams were being planned or built; an older one, such as the Hindiyah Barrage, was being reconstructed. RESOURCES The country's only significant and exploited resource is oil. In the 1960's the most productive field was at Kirkuk. Smaller fields near Kirkuk are those at Bay Hasan and Jambur. Substantial amounts of crude oil were being produced at Rumaila and Zubayr in the southeast, and lesser quantities in fields at Ayn Zalah and Butmah, northwest of Mosul. A still smaller producer is at Naft Khaneh, south of Khanaqin on the Iranian border. Most of the production is exported as crude oil, but refineries process some of it for domestic use, and in the mid-1960's the government was planning the development of a petrochemical industry (see ch. 20, Industry; ch. 23, Foreign Economic Relations). Natural gas is also produced at the Kirkuk field. Some is used 20 domestically for thermal power stations, and gas oil is exported to Syria. In 1967 arrangements were being made for the export of natural gas to Turkey (see ch. 20, Industry; ch. 23, Foreign Eco- nomic Relations). Except for salt, exploited for domestic use, there was no impor- tant production of other minerals in early 1968. Gypsum and low- grade coal have been known to exist for some time, and a geolog- ical survey underway in the mid-1960's had located ceramic clay, phosphates, sulfur, iron and copper and glass sands. Further ex- ploration and exploitation were expected in the late 1960's but had not yet begun in early 1968 (see ch. 20, Industry). TRANSPORTATION With the exception of the road leading west from Baghdad across the Syrian Desert to Jordan and Syria, most roads and railroads follow the large rivers from southeast to northwest or lead from Baghdad to the oilfields of Kirkuk and to other north- eastern centers. For all routes Baghdad is the center because of its location and its political, cultural and commercial importance (see fig. 3). Despite their importance in other respects, Iraq's rivers are not significant traffic arteries. Small craft move in the Tigris and Euphrates between Baghdad and Basra, carrying local trade goods, and the Madans, people of marshes of the southwest, rely heavily on reed canoes, but roads and railroads are much more significant for the movement of people and goods (see ch. 22, Domestic Trade). In the middle and late 1960's government plans heavily empha- sized the development of ports, airports and the road and railroad system. Little attention was paid to river transportation. Until the mid-1960's the railroad system consisted of a standard (broad) gauge line from the northwestern border with Syria (the transfer point, Tall Kushik, was in Syrian territory) to Baghdad, and a meter (narrow) gauge line running from Irbil in the north- east through Kirkuk to Baghdad and south to Basra. A short branch line ran from Jalula on the Baghdad-Kirkuk section to Khanaqin. The standard gauge road is directly linked via Syrian and Turkish systems, to Europe. In the mid-1960's the extension of the standard-gauge line from Baghdad to Basra and on to Umm Qasr, roughly paralleling the existing meter-gauge railroad, was formally completed. Because of technical difficulties, however, the extension was not able to carry heavily loaded, high-speed traffic which continued to run on the meter-gauge line. New stations and other buildings have been constructed and new rolling-stock acquired. Technical and financial aid were supplied by the Soviet Union and most of the new equip- 40 48 TURKEY Zakhu Amadiyah Rawanduz Sinjar Mosul Irbil Sulaymaniyah IRAN SYRIA Legend Bai di Tikrit Samarra Khanagin Euphrates - Baqubah HB BAGHDAD Ramadi AN - Major Highways - Paved Secondary Roads - Paved -- Selected Dirt Roads Major Highways – Under Construction ++++++ Railroads + Major Civil Airports International Airports Rutbah Karbala JORDAN! Najaf Diwaniyah Amarah Euphrates Nasiriyah Basra Zubay 30 SAUDI ARABIA Safwand Umm Qasr KUWAIT Persian NEUTRAL ZONE KUWAIT Gulf NEITRAL ZONE 40 48 Figure 3. The Transportation System of Iraq. ment by other East European countries (see ch. 23, Foreign Economic Relations). In the late 1960's there were plans for small but important extensions of the railroad system and for the reconstruction of existing sections. By the end of 1967 a spur had been built from the new standard-gauge main line just above Basra to Umm Qasr, where new port facilities were being constructed. Also proposed was a link between Karbala, served by a spur on the Baghdad- Basra line, and Samawah, on the main line to the southeast. Such a link would provide rail service to a densely settled area on the west bank of the Euphrates (the main line runs east of the river) and would also furnish rail access to Najaf, holy city of the Shiites (see ch. 11, Religion). In 1968, work was underway on the existing standard-gauge line from Baghdad to the Syrian border. The reconstruction and extension of the road system have been underway since the early 1960's, and much had been accomplished by early 1968. Nevertheless, unpaved roads still link some admin- istrative centers, and much of the desert is served only by caravan tracks (see fig. 3). New or reconstructed roads generally follow older unpaved or otherwise inadequate roads linking towns in the alluvial plain or running from Baghdad to the north and northeast. A new road has been proposed, however, to replace the present inadequate one from Ramadi through Hadithah to the Syrian border following the southeast bank of the Euphrates. The main east-west artery from Baghdad through Rutbah to the Jordanian border is regarded as an inadequate route to Damascus, and it has been suggested that a branch be built, departing from a point west of Rutbah and moving northwest to the Syrian border. Most communities in the Tigris-Euphrates plain are located at or near rivers or major canals, and the rivers themselves some- times flow in several channels. Road construction, therefore, often requires extensive bridge building, sometimes several bridges for short stretches of road. The major international airport is at Baghdad; another is at Basra. A new airport of major dimensions was under construction at Baghdad in early 1968. There are civil airports at Mosul and Kirkuk. In 1966 a new airport at Mosul, primarily for military pur- poses, but accessible also to civil aircraft, was proposed. In early 1968 there was no information on the status of that project. At one time the Iraq Petroleum Company maintained a number of landing fields, but in early 1968 the only important one still func- tioning was located at Kirkuk. In 1968 the major seaport was at Basra, on the Shatt al Arab, roughly 80 miles from the Persian Gulf. The port was already 23 capable of handling oceangoing vessels, but important facilities were being added in the late 1960's. Umm Qasr, near the western end of the short coastline, was also being developed in 1968 and was expected to be able to handle oceangoing traffic when com- pleted. Faw, about 6 miles from the Persian Gulf on the Shatt al Arab, is at the end of a pipeline from Zubayr, the center of the southeastern oilfields. From Faw an underwater pipeline extends to Khoral Amaya, a platform offshore which serves as a loading point for large tankers. SETTLEMENT PATTERNS Although roughly 44 percent of the people live in urban areas as officially defined (all administrative centers, regardless of size and available facilities are urban), it is probable that as much as 70 percent of the population live under essentially rural conditions (see ch. 4, Population). In the rural areas of the alluvial plain and in the lower Diyala region, settlement almost invariably clusters near the rivers, streams and irrigation canals. The bases of the relationship be- tween watercourse and settlement have been summarized by Robert McCormick Adams, Director of the Oriental Institute at the University of Chicago. He notes that the levees laid down by streams and canals provide advantages for both settlement and agriculture. Surface water drains more easily on the levee back- slope, and the coarse soils of the levees are easier to cultivate and permit better subsurface drainage. The height of the levees gives some protection against floods and the frosts that often affect low- lying areas and may kill winter crops. Above all, those living or cultivating on the crest of a levee have easy access to water for irrigation and household use in a dry, hot country. Although isolated homesteads occur occasionally, most rural communities are nucleated settlements rather than dispersed farm- steads: the farmer leaves his village to cultivate the fields outside it. This pattern holds for farming communities in the Kurdish highlands of the northeast as well as for those in the alluvial plain. The size of the settlement varies, generally with the volume of water available for household use and with the amount of land accessible to village dwellers. Sometimes, particularly in the lower Tigris and Euphrates Valleys, soil salinity is responsible for a rather restricted area of arable land and limits the size of the community dependent on it, but salinity usually results in large unsettled and uncultivated stretches between towns or villages. Fragmentary information suggests that most farmers in the alluvial plain tend to live in villages of over 100 persons even in larger towns, and substantial numbers of urban dwellers, except, perhaps, those within the municipal limits, actually are farmers. In the lower Diyala, on the other hand, villages are often smaller, but even here, a substantial proportion of the persons residing in the provincial center, Baqubah, are employed in agriculture. The marsh dwellers (Madans) of the south usually live in small clusters of two or three houses kept above water by rushes which are constantly being replenished. Such clusters are often close to- gether, but access from one to another is possible only by canoe. Here and there, a few natural islands permit a slightly larger cluster. Some of these people are primarily buffalo herders and lead a seminomadic life. In the winter, when the waters are at low point, they build fairly large, temporary villages. In the summer they move with their herds out of the marshes to the riverbanks. Cities and large towns in this arid country are almost invariably situated on watercourses, usually on the major rivers or their larger tributaries. In the south this dependence has had its disad- vantages. Until the recent development of flood control, Baghdad and other cities were subject to the threat of inundation. More- over, the dikes needed to protect them effectively prevented the expansion of the urban areas in some directions. The growth of Baghdad, for example, was restricted by dikes on its eastern edge. The diversion of water to the Tharthar depression and the con- struction of a canal transferring water from the Tigris north of Baghdad to the Diyala River have permitted the irrigation of land outside the limits of the dikes and the expansion of settlement. The way of life of the Bedouin herders of the south and west does not permit permanent settlements. Generally the focal point of their annual movement is a city, usually Baghdad. Some groups move up from the south in sniall units to gather in Baghdad in the dry season. Others move to Baghdad from the west. In the rainy season (winter and early spring) they disperse to the desert, again in small units. Before and since the 1958 Revolution, there have been efforts to settle the nomads and to convert them, at least in part, into cultivators. There is little reliable information on the success of these efforts (see ch. 6, Social Structure; ch. 19, Agri- culture). CHAPTER 3 HISTORICAL SETTING Iraq, a republic since the coup d'etat of 1958 which ended the reign of King Faisal II, became a sovereign, independent state in 1932. The history of the land and its people, however, dates back almost 5,000 years to the time when the fertile area between the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers was known as Mesopotamia (meaning between rivers) and its inhabitants then called Sumerians, prob- ably because the delta region of the two rivers was then called Sumer. Until World War I, the country was generally known in the West as Mesopotamia. Geographically, the Mesopotamian region has been open to incur- sions from all sides. The deserts to the south and west harbored mounted nomads, and the passes to the north and east provided entry corridors from those directions. Numerous foreign con- querors came and went, each contributing to the physical mixture and cultural diversity of the area. The most significant historical and cultural change occurred in the seventh century, when the Arab conquest brought Islam to the land, overlaying and reworking all that had gone before. It almost completely obliterated any conscious memory among the people of their ancient ways. The Arabs brought not only a new set of rulers but also their language, religion and certain patterns of living which have characterized the country ever since. The conquerors also gave the country its modern name, “Iraq,” mean- ing basically “to sweat” or “to take root." Despite the destruction wrought by the Mongols in the thir- teenth century and the stultifying centuries of Turkish rule that followed, the past has continued to express itself in subtle details of social life and outlook which still distinguish the Arabized Iraqi majority on the Mesopotamian plain from Arab populations else where in the Middle East. There are aspects of community life in Iraq and a characteristic approach to the problems of government, technology and economic organization which in degree or kind set off the country from its neighbors, with whom the majority of its people share common Moslem traditions and faith as well as Arabic speech. 27 Iraq identifies itself as a bearer of the Arab tradition because of its 13 centuries of participation in the Moslem Arab world. For most Iraqis not the grandeur of ancient Sumer or Babylon, but the magnificence of the medieval Abbasside dynasty (750–1258) represents the zenith of the country's past achieve- ment and nurtures an historical awareness that greatness is pos- sible again in a revived and united Arab world. This outlook, more Pan-Arab than nationalist in its implications, is being modified toward a more specific sense of Iraqi identity in the course of the country's experience as an independent nation while under the influence of the government's efforts to stress Iraq's inheritance of ancient civilization. For the great majority of the people, Iraq's recent past is seen as a struggle for national freedom—first against the Ottomans (Turks), later against the British, and finally against "Western imperialism" and what is regarded as its creature, Israel (see ch. religious affiliation of the viewer, but for the most part the people 15, Foreign Relations). The native heroes vary with the ethnic and share the common dislike of all non-Arabs. History thus becomes an active factor in the contemporary Iraqi scene and an instru- ment available to political contenders. The anti-Western senti- ments aroused during and since the British Mandate worked to the disadvantage of the Hashemite monarchy (1921-58) and its sup- porters seeking to maintain an alignment with the West. Since the overthrow of the kingdom in the coup of 1958, nonalignment in world affairs, though erratic, has become an important concern of successive governments. ANCIENT HISTORY Sumer, Akkad, Babylon and Assyria Almost 3,000 years before Christ, Sumerian kings, who were contemporary with the Pharaohs of the earliest Egyptian dynas- ties (3100–2270 B.C.), developed what is often called “the first civilization.” It is not certain where they came from nor when they entered the area. It is clear, however, that they were preceded by numerous other peoples who had contributed to the social and political complexity of the region. The Sumerians lived under a federation of city-states, devised the oldest form of writing based on pictorial as well as phonetic signs, used copper for tools and weapons, made highly polished painted pottery and developed elaborate irrigation and water-con- trol systems. So important were these irrigation works to survival and prosperity that even in wartime contestants took pains to avoid their destruction. 28 The Sumerian dynasties ended probably about 2800 B.C. when they were conquered by the Akkadians under Sargon, the founder of the Akkadian kingdom. A Semitic people from the west and northwest, the Akkadians had entered in numbers sufficient to give their name to the territory surrounding what is now Baghdad. Despite their worship of the sun, they treated the agrarian reli- gions of the conquered places with respect, and placing their earth- gods into a kind of pantheon protected by a new and larger polit- ical order. The Akkadians and the Sumerians, in effect, combined their forces, and Sargon's military movements and exploits were extended to the Mediterranean and into Asia Minor. After Sargon's death the empire slowly fell before the on- slaughts of tribesmen from the north. Power was revived briefly with its center in the city of Erech (modern Warka) and later in that of Ur (now Makayyar), but it was, in turn, gradually weak- ened by the attack of Elamites, Semitic-speaking people from Elam in what is now the southwestern part of Iran. The Sumerian-Akkadians were finally subjugated by the Se- mitic-speaking Amorites, probably from Syria. By 2000 B.C. the Amorites established a new state with its capital at Babylon on the southern Euphrates. Babylonian authority was extended over southern Mesopotamia by Hammurabi (c.1955–13 B.C.), the sixth of his line of Amoritic rulers. One of the great kings of antiquity, Hammurabi is remembered not only as a conqueror but also as a lawgiver. The code of laws he collected dealt with land tenure, rent, the position of women, marriage, divorce, inheritance, func- tions of money, contracts, control of public order, administration of justice, wages and labor conditions. Around 1600 B.C. the Kassites, a people speaking Elamitic (one of a group of languages related to modern Georgian) overthrew the Babylonian dynasty and ruled the region until about 1150 B.C. The Kassite domination was supplanted by the Assyrians, a race of warriors from the north containing a mixture of Semites with non-Semitic tribes. The Assyrians were renowned not only for their military innovations and ruthless proficiency in war but also for their contributions in the spheres of administration, architec- ture, sculpture and literature. One of the Assyrian rulers of note was Tiglath-Pileser III (745–27 B.C.), who developed an important political idea—the maintenance of a permanent military force or standing army under the control of a permanent bureaucracy. He raised the As- syrian empire, with its capital at Nineveh on the Tigris opposite present-day Mosul, to its pinnacle of power (even Egypt was re- quired to recognize Assyrian supremacy), but the system he inau- gurated eventually alienated subject peoples, who were driven to 29 hatred and desperation by the severity of Assyrian methods. Revolt followed revolt; Egypt and Syria were lost; eventually, in 612 B.C. Scythians from the north destroyed Nineveh, and As- syrian power became a historic memory. Iraq's present-day Nesto- rian Christian minority calls itself Assyrian and claims ethnic descent from the peoples of this ancient empire (see ch. 11, Reli- gion). Babylon rose again as the center of a Neo-Babylonian empire, also called the Chaldean empire (605–539 B.C.). Favored by its geographical position, Babylon, after being rebuilt as one of the greatest cities of its day, became a center of trade and arts, but this glory also passed when it fell to the Persians under Cyrus the Great (c.550–30 B.C.), the founder of the Archaemenian empire (c.550–331 B.C.). Persian and Greek Intrusions Mesopotamia, so long a seat of Semitic power, then came under an Indo-European-speaking people. It remained a province of the Archaemenain empire for nearly 150 years until subjugated by Alexander the Great around 331 B.C. Upon his death at Babylon in 323 B.C., the Greek power began to decline in the hands of his successors. Seleucus, one of Alexander's generals, became ruler of Mesopotamia and Persia, then known as the kingdom of the Seleu- cide, which had its power center at Seleucia on the Tigris south of modern Baghdad. Although his successors continued to spread Hellenistic civilization, by 200 B.C. the Seleucid power had shrunk to the confines of Mesopotamia and Syria. The Seleucids were challenged by new powers to the north, the Parthian Persians who were by then in control of all Persia, and increasingly by the rapidly rising new power in the west, the Romans. Subduing Mesopotamia in 138 B.C., the Parthians there- after had to contest with the Romans for supremacy over the region for nearly 800 years, until the coming of the Arabs. The Parthians were pushed aside in A.D. 224 by a new Persian power, the Sassanian empire (about A.D. 224–641), which in its hostility to the Romans and to Christianity, their favorite religion, gradu- ally revived Zoroastrianism, the dominant religion in Persia since the sixth century B.C. As a result, the Sassanian efforts to con- solidate power were aided by the power Zoroastrian priests, but by the mid-seventh century inconclusive struggles between Sas- sanids and the Romans left both of them exhausted and vulnerable (see ch. 11, Religion). ARAB CONQUEST AND THE COMING OF ISLAM The process of detaching Iraq from the declining Sassanian 30 637 Mesoneraders but she second. power began during the brief reign of Abu Bakr (632–34), first caliph (spiritual and temporal ruler) and successor to Mohammed (570–632), founder of Islam (see ch. 11, Religion). The many Arabs, mostly Christian, who were living under the Persian rule in lower Mesopotamia, at first supported their Persian masters against the Moslem invaders but slowly transferred their alle- giance. By 637 Mesopotamia was completely subjugated by the second caliph, Omar (634-44), in a decisive battle at Al Qadisiyah (sometimes called Kadisiya), a locality on the Euphrates south of Baghdad. The religion and, only somewhat more slowly, the lan- guage of the victors were accepted by the majority of the popula- tion, which since has been Moslem and counted itself Arab. The Iraqis, whose culture was more advanced than that of the victors themselves, however, did not passively accept the culture brought by the newcomers. Rather, Iraqi culture predominated so thoroughly that the Moslem Arab golden age that followed was centered in Iraq, not in the Arabian Peninsula, and it was the Moslem Arabs rather than the old population of Mesopotamia that may be said to have been culturally absorbed. As the Islamic empire grew, the center of power shifted from Arabia northward to Syria and Iraq. In this process new divisions and conflicts were added to traditional Arab intertribal and inter- factional strife; longstanding regional conflicts reasserted them- selves in the new empire. From the beginning, Moslem Arab egali- tarianism before Allah or God was perpetuated, but neither then nor since has the Arab ideal of political union among all Arabic- speaking peoples become a lasting reality. Down to the present time the world has witnessed a continual alternation in the Arab world between movements toward unity and countermovements toward schism (see ch. 14, Political Dynamics; ch. 15, Foreign Relations). After the stabilization of Moslem power in the territories which included present-day Iraq, Iran, Syria and Egypt, the problem of the succession to the caliphate became pressing. In 657 Ali, the fourth caliph (656–61), with his center of power in Iraq, was murdered by his adversaries. Ali's son, Hasan, though proclaimed caliph, had to abdicate in the face of superior forces advancing under Mu'awiyah, who became the first of the Umayyad caliphs (661–750) ruling from Damascus in Syria. The last trace of armed resistance to the new Umayyad dynasty was eliminated in 680 when Ali's second son, Husain, was killed in a battle. Meanwhile, in opposition to the Umayyad dynasty, supporters of Ali and his descendants founded a political organization called the Shi'at Ali, or “the party (partisans) of Ali.” Centered in Iraq, this movement drew its initial members almost exclusively from 31 among the Arabs involved in the succession struggles but gradu- ally gained support from large numbers of disaffected Moslem converts in Iraq and Persia who had been treated as second-class Moslems by the Arab aristocracy in Damascus. The early political conflicts soon hardened into the first major religious schism in the Moslem world—the rival Shia and Sunni branches. Both Ali and Husain became Syria martyrs; Najaf, Ali's burial place some 90 miles south of Baghdad, and Karbala, 55 miles southwest of Bagh- dad, where Husain died, became holy places of pilgrimage as important to the Shiites as Mecca is to the Sunnites (see ch. 11, Religion). The Moslem empire achieved its greatest political expansion under the Umayyads. From southern France, where it existed only fleetingly, its domains included the Iberian Peninsula, the whole of North Africa, including Egypt, the Mediterranean islands, the Arabian Peninsula and the Fertile Crescent to the north, of Asia Minor. Persia's with its boundaries pushed eastward to the Amu Darya, Afghanistan, temporary possessions in India and the westernmost portion of China. Umayyad power waned in the early eighth century because of the age-old Arab difficulties of feud and schism within the ruling aristocracy. The dynasty was also being challenged by the dissi- dent Shiites and other sectarian forces which questioned the legitimacy of the Umayyad caliphate. In 750 it was supplanted by the Abbasside rebels, Arab Sunnites who were most active in Persia but also had the support of Iraqi Shiites. THE ABBASSIDE CALIPHATE (750–1258) The Abbassides claimed their descent from al-Abbas (566–652), an uncle of Mohammed and, despite Shiite opposition, they as- serted themselves as legitimate heirs of the Prophet. Under the Abbasides, Baghdad became the center of power where Arab and Persian cultures mingled to produce a blaze of philosophical, scientific and literary glory remembered throughout the Arab world and by Iraqis in particular as the pinnacle of the Islamic past. A cosmopolitan center of the medieval world, Baghdad had the advantages of an adequate water supply, river communications and freedom from malaria. Although it was built entirely with the needs of political administration in mind, its population grew rap- idly as it gained importance as a social, political and trade center, and by 800 it had become the second largest city in the Mediterra- nean world, next only to Constantinople (now Istanbul). The greatest caliphs of the period combined outstanding admin- istrative and intellectual capacities with unrelenting cruelty. Their 32 ruthlessness is less significant as a personal trait than as evidence of the substitution, perhaps under Persian influence, of the caliph as absolute autocrat for the traditional Arab notion by the leader chosen by a council of his peers and answerable solely to the council. The Abbasside cultural renaissance roughly spanned the reigns of the first seven rulers of the dynasty (750–842). Of the seven, three achieved lasting fame: Mansur (754–75), Harun al Rashid (786–806) and Mamun (813–33). These sovereigns had in common great administrative and political ability, both of which were vital in keeping under control the factional strife. The situation in Iraq with its Sunni dynasty and large Shia population was especially volatile, and it required all the guile and sternness of the Abbassides to stay in power. The Abbasside caliphs had to contend with continual Shia revolts in Iraq, Persia and Arabia. The Abbasside caliphate did not end abruptly but fell into a long decline under the stresses of regional, ethnic and religious dif- ferences. In areas under a relatively weak control, local forces revolted and gained autonomy as early as 756 when Spain broke away. Morocco followed in 788, Tunisia in 800 and Egypt in 868. The Abbasside decay was prompted by the Sunni-Shia split which had weakened the effectiveness of Islam as a single unifying force and as a sanction for a single political authority. Although the intermingling of various linguistic and cultural groups contributed greatly to the enrichment of Islamic civiliza- tion, it was also a source of tensions. Not only was there the cleavage between the Arabs and Persians, but the growing promi- nence of the Turks in military and political affairs gave cause for discontent and rivalry in court. The Turks came as a stream of slaves brought in year by year to man the caliphs' imperial guard and fill the ranks of the regular military forces as mercenaries. Excelling in combat, Turkish officers rose rapidly to high positions and began to replace the Arabs around the seat of power. This trend was quickened after the rule of Caliph Mutasim (833– 42) whose mother was a Turkish slave. By the tenth century the Turkish commanders—no longer checked by their Persian rivals in court—were able to bring the caliphs under their effective control. Consequently, the political power of the caliphate was separated from its religious functions—functions which had here- tofore been combined in the person of the caliph. There was no disposition, however, to dispense with the office of the caliphate, since the sanction of the incumbent continued to be important as a symbol for legitimizing claims to authority. Thus, even the stronghanded Persian Buwayhid family of the Shia branch which ruled Iraq for a century (945–1055), retained the caliph as a shadowy symbol of spiritual authority. Until termi- 33 nated in Iraq by the Mongols in 1258, the Abbasside caliphs con- tinued to be treated with deference but only as nominal sovereigns. After 1258 the Abbassides fled to Cairo, where they continued to exercise, under Egyptian protection, the spiritual authority of the caliphate. The highpoints of the Moslem renaissance in Iraq occurred during the reign of Harun al Rashid, marked by its material splendor, that of his son Mamun, which saw the greatest intellec- tual advances. In Mamun's time some of the greatest Islamic poetry was written. Under his successors, impressive advances were also made in mathematics, physics, astronomy and geog- raphy. Historical and religious scholarship also prospered, and the compilation and further creation of Arabian tales began. In addi- tion, the Abbasside caliphs sought to preserve the unity of Islamic thought by encouraging the use of Arabic as the common medium of expression for all peoples in the empire (see ch. 10, Artistic and Intellectual Expression). At the top of the Abbasside society was the caliph, the head of a treocratic state. He was assisted by the vizier, often the power behind the throne. Under them were a number of ministers and senior military officers presiding over a salaried bureaucracy and standing army. Learned men were highly honored in and outside the court for their literary pursuits. Artists, merchants, farmers, herdsmen and slaves comprised the remainder of social groups, but there were relatively few rigid social barriers among them. Slavery existed, but little stigma was attached to it. In the first half of the thirteenth century the Mongols had reached the lower edges of what is now Soviet Russia in Europe. In 1256 under Hulagu, a grandson of Genghis Khan (1162–1227), the Mongols sacked Baghdad. The material and artistic production of centuries was swept away. Iraq itself was laid waste, a tragedy from which the country recovered only in the twentieth century; the canal system, upon which the prosperity of the land depended, fell into ruin. The Mongol overlords yielded to the Islamic culture of their subject peoples, but their rule remained alien to the end. Another wave of Mongols under Tamerlane (1369–1405) further ravaged Baghdad in 1393, but he was no more successful than his predecessors in stabilizing the vast Mongol empire. New local dy- nasties and additional Mongol groups rose to power in quick succession. In Iraq, political chaos, economic depression and social disinte- gration immediately followed the Mongolian invasions. Baghdad, so long a center of trade, rapidly lost its commercial importance. A major preoccupation of the governmental authorities had been to keep the peace in order to maintain the agricultural production the peacpation of the pidly lost its 34 essential to the whole economy. As central controls weakened, no- madic tribes encroached on the settled areas. The first outside force to take advantage of these conditions was Ismail Shah (1502-24), the founder of the Persian Safawid dynasty (1502–1794) and self-proclaimed leader of all Shiites. In 1509 he conquered Iraq and in doing so came into conflict with the Ottomans (Turks) of the Sunni order, who had their capital at Istanbul. Persian rule ended in 1534 when Baghdad was captured by Suleiman the Magnificent (1520–66). Earlier in 1517 the Otto- mans had taken Cairo, ending the last of the Abbasside caliphs, and thereafter Ottoman sultans claimed the title of caliph. Istanbul became the center of Islam, and Iraq was left to decay. Except for an interlude of Persian Safawid control in the seven- teenth century(1623–38), Iraq remained under Ottoman rule until 1918. THE OTTOMAN PERIOD (1534–1918) Divided into the three provinces (vilayet) of Baghdad, Mosul and Basrah, Iraq was administered by appointed governors (pasha) answerable directly to the sultan-caliph in Istanbul. As the eastern frontier outpost of the empire, it was subjected to recurrent forays by Shiite Persian powers and by tribes in Kurdi- stan (see Glossary) as well as by the rebellious local chieftains of the predominantly Shia southern Iraq. A tenuous peace was main- tained with the intractable tribes largely by leaving them alone. For more than a century, beginning in the early eighteenth cen- tury, the waning Ottoman sultan-caliphate could exercise its au- thority minimally by confirming as governors the strongest among the local chieftains in Iraq. Not until around 1830 did the Otto- mans reassert absolute power under the strong leadership of Sultan Mahmud II (1808–39). From 1831 until World War I the Ottoman rulers sought spo- radically to modernize their administration, frequently with the help of European advisers, largely to revive national powers in face of various expansionist threats from Russia and Europe. The Ottoman sultans, gradually enforcing their right to appoint admin- istrators and station troops, turned their attention to many semi- independent pashas. Finally they tried to extend government to the heretofore autonomous tribes, including those in Kurdistan. By selling land to the local rulers and encouraging them to accept government positions, it was hoped that the nomadic tribes could be forced to settle and to accept the government's right to tax and to conscript. Considerable unrest followed these efforts. The greatest and the most progressive of the governors of Baghdad, Midhat Pasha (1869–72), introduced a series of par- tially successful reform measures to set Iraq on a course of mod- 35 ernization. Within 3 years he initiated a system of land-registra- tion, improved communications and reformed the legal and admin- istrative systems. In addition, he started a newspaper, built a hos- pital and a technical school and opened a savings bank. For a time it seemed that the country might acquire importance in terms of its own internal developments rather than merely as an important link on the East-West line of communication and as a focal point of foreign competition. Externally, the decline of Ottoman rule after the eighteenth century coincided with the rise of European seapower and the worldwide competition among European powers for commercial benefits and for spheres of influence. The impact of this rivalry was not fully felt in Iraq, however, until after 1899 when Germany obtained from Turkey a concession to build a railway from Konya (a province in southwest Turkey) to Baghdad; in 1902 Germany was granted another right to build a line from Baghdad to Basra, an outlet to the Persian Gulf. The British feared that this scheme of the rising and potentially hostile German power would interfere with their vital lines of communication to India via Persia and Afghanistan, menacing British oil interests in Persia and ultimately India itself. Russia reacted also with hostility because of its southward expanionist urge for warm water ports and related strategic gains. Although it was in rivalry with Great Britain over Persia, Russia was disinclined to be bellicose toward either the British or the Ger- mans as a consequence of its humiliating defeat in the Russo- Japanese War of 1904–05; the result was a compromise settle- ment known as the Anglo-Russian Agreement of 1907, directed in part against Germany. Also under the pact, Persia—the root of the Anglo-Russian conflict-was divided into northern and south- ern spheres of influence separated by a buffer belt. In addition, Russia yielded to Great Britain's special position in Afghanistan and in the Persian Gulf. After the 1907 entente the Germans and the British became the primary contenders for influence in Iraq. Because of the British obstruction, for example, German plans to make Kuwait the terminus of the Berlin-Baghdad-Basra railway were abandoned in June 1914. On another occasion the British combined with the Sheik of Kuwait, King Ibn Saud, of Arabia, and a semi-independ- ent local Iraqi ruling group to prevent a reassertion of the pro- German Ottoman power in the lower delta area around Basra. THE TWENTIETH CENTURY World War I In November 1914 the Ottoman empire, allied with Germany, 36 was at war with Great Britain, Russia and France. The British dispatched an expeditionary force from India to Basra to protect their oil interests in adjacent Iran. The first major British ad- vance under General Charles Townshend was stopped in 1915 be- low Baghdad at Kut on the Tigris by Turkish troops under the command of a German general, and the Anglo-Indian forces were captured. Aroused, the British decided upon a major engagement in Iraq; by March 1917 new forces led by General Stanley Maude seized Baghdad. In November 1918 the British ended the Ottoman rule in Iraq by occupying the remainder of the country to the Anatolian highlands north of Mosul, where Arabic speech is re- placed by Turkish speech (see ch. 5, Ethnic Groups and Lan- guages). Upon capturing Baghdad, Maude proclaimed that Great Brit- ain intended to return to Iraq some control of its own affairs, stressing that this step would pave the way for ending the sub- jection to alien rulers which the country had known since the Mongol conquest. The proclamation was in keeping with the en- couragement the British had given to Arab nationalists, such as Jafar al Askari, Nuri as Said and Jamil al Midfai, who sought emancipation from Ottoman rule. Although these nationalists had supported the Allied powers in expectation of the defeat of the Ottoman regime, the local population for the most part had shown only minimal interest in the struggle against the Turks. During the war the course of events in Iraq was influenced greatly by the Hashimite family (descendants of the Prophet Mo- hammed) of Husein ibn Ali, Sharif of Mecca. Aspiring to the establishment of an independent Arab kingdom, Husein in October 1915 had secured Great Britain's conditional assurances of sup- port for his cause in return for Arab support against Turkey. Refusing to rally to the Ottoman Sultan-Caliph's call for a holy war against the Allies, Husein in June 1916 led the revolt of the Arabs, marching northward in conjunction with the British into Transjordan (Jordan), Palestine and Syria. Anticipating the fulfillment of Allied pledges, Husein's son, Prince Faisal, then head of a new Arab regime set up in Damas- cus with British support, and later to become modern Iraq's first king, arrived in Paris in 1919 as chief spokesman of the Arab cause. Much to his disappoinment, Faisal found Allied powers less than enthusiastic about Arab independence and contemplating the notion of a mandate for the ex-Ottoman territories. The British Mandate The fate of Iraq and other Arab territories was formally de- cided in April 1920 at San Remo, Italy, where a conference of Allied Powers placed Iraq and Palestine under the British Man- date and Syria under French Mandate. Faisal, who had been pro- claimed King of Syria by a Syrian national congress in Damascus in March 1920, was ejected from Syria by the French in July 1920; the British then invited him to London as a token of their regard. In Iraq the British occupation authorities found themselves con- fronted with a myriad of conflicting local demands and divisive forces. Townsmen and villagers desired restraints against tribal incursions. The tribal sheiks, on the other hand, wanted the gov- ernment to confirm their titles to tribal territories and to give them new land as well. Merchants demanded more effective legal procedures, courts and laws protecting their activities and inter- ests. Municipal authorities appealed for defined powers and grants-in-aid from an effective central government, in addition to the establishment of public welfare and educational facilities. Landlords pressed for grants of land, for the building of canals, railways and roads, and for the provision of tested seeds and live- stock. In religious circles Shiites and Sunnites continued to dis- trust each other. The most troublesome issue confronting the British was the growing evidence of Iraqi nationalist discontent. Arab and Iraqi nationalism, directed initially against the Turks in the beginning of the twentieth century, became increasingly anti-European after World War I. In July 1920 an anti-British revolt broke out in southern Iraq among many tribes which had for centuries jeal- ously guarded their political autonomy. The insurrection spread over one-third of the countryside which had been already aroused by the efficient British tax collection methods. For 3 months the country was in a state of anarchy; order was restored only with difficulty by British forces which had to call upon reinforcements from India. This episode, known to Iraqis as the national war of liberation, gave dramatic evidence of Arab dissatisfaction with foreign rule. Nevertheless, at no time did the revolt show coordination or general direction; throughout, many outstanding local sheiks and urban figures remained aloof from the insurrection; the Iraqi police and security forces were notably loyal to the British authorities. The British military authorities accepted the revolt as an object lesson. Civil disturbances had cost much loss of life and inordi- nately large sums of money, prompting the British people to demand the reduction of commitments in Iraq. In October 1920 the military regime was replaced by a provisional Arab government to be assisted by British advisers and answerable to the supreme 38 authority of the High Commissioner for Iraq, Sir Percy Cox. The new administration was to serve as a channel of communication between the British and the restive population, to give opportunity for Iraqi leaders to come forward and to prepare the way for eventual self-government. After a canvass of various influential personalities for the official chief of state, the British persuaded Prince Faisal, the deposed king of Syria, to ascend the throne. Prince Faisal of the Hashimite family traced his descent from Mohammed, and his ancestors had held political authority around the holy cities of Arabia. Hence he was endowed with traditional Arab standards of political legitimacy which he could invoke to install himself as the monarch of Iraq. Moreover, his achievements as a leader in the Arab emancipation movement made him an acceptable candidate to many Iraqis who were deeply concerned with the development of a national government, especially to the former Iraqi officers in the Ottoman army who had supported the 1916 revolt against the Turks. His candidacy, however, was spon. sored by the British to repay Hashimite assistance in World War I and to assure future cooperation between Iraq and Great Britain. A referendum of Iraqi notables, tribal chiefs and townsmen pro- duced an almost unanimous return favoring the selection of Faisal. On August 23, 1921, he was proclaimed king of Iraq. The British sought to cope with the growing nationalist de- mands for immediate and outright independence by concluding a compromise treaty with Iraq in October 1922. Intended to soften the Mandate relationship, the treaty gave Iraq limited control in the spheres of both foreign and domestic affairs but retained Brit- ain's ultimate mandatory power. Attempts to modify the 1922 treaty followed in 1923, 1926 and 1927; as a result, the British in December 1927 pledged to conditionally support Iraq's admission to the League of Nations in 1932. A notable step toward independence was the British decision in September 1929 to terminate the Mandate, support uncondition- ally the admission of Iraq into the League and to open negotia- tions with the Iraqi Government toward a treaty of alliance defining future relations between the two countries. This move was precipitated by the coming to power of the Labor Party in London. This change of regime was paralleled by the emergence of a liberal nationalist government in Baghdad under Nuri as Said, who the British authorities believed was capable of leading the country to self-rule. A new pact called the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty was signed in June 1930, providing for the establishment of a “close alliance" and for "full and frank consultation between them in all matters of foreign policy” and mutual assistance in case of war. Iraq granted to the British use of air bases at Basra and at Habbaniyah and the right to move troops across the country. To be of 25 years duration, the treaty was to come into force upon Iraq's admission to the League of Nations. INDEPENDENCE Iraq became a sovereign, independent state on October 3, 1932, when it was admitted to the League. The British Mandate was automatically terminated. The independent government possessed adequate financial means to cope with many of its internal prob- lems because of its growing oil revenues; oil had been discovered at Naft Khaneh (about 90 miles northeast of Baghdad) in 1923 and at Kirkuk in 1927. By 1930 oil products were being exported. Among the problems confronting the government were the deep-seated Shia-Sunni conflicts. The Sunnites, favored by the Turks during Ottoman rule, had had more administrative experi- ence than their adversaries. The Shiites, at the time constituting 50 percent or more of the population and being very conscious of the presence in Iraq of so many Shia holy places, began to fear the possibility of complete Sunni domination in the government. On the other hand, some of the old-fashioned Sunnites felt that Faisal's 1916 revolt against the Ottoman Sultan-Caliph had been an impious act and were indisposed to give full support to the new monarch. In addition, many non-Arab groups, such as the Jews and Kurds, resented the accession of an Arab dynasty. Another source of concern to the new kingdom related to people living in the Mosul region in the north, the restless Kurds who were noted for their fierce spirit of independence and separatism. An ancient mountain tribe of obscure origin, they were converted to Islam after the Arab conquest of the seventh century. Most of them subsequently became Sunnites, supported the Sunni Ottoman rulers in return for a measure of local autonomy and remained loyal to Turkey during World War I. In recognition of their strong longing for independence, the Allies and Turkey in August 1920 conditionally agreed to the establishment of "an independent Kurdish State," known as Kurdistan, to be carved out of the pre- dominantly Kurdish areas bordering on Iraq, Turkey and Iran. Because of altered political conditions in Turkey under Mustafa Kemal Pasha, however, this scheme failed to materialize, and the Kurds resorted to a series of anti-Kemal revolts in Turkey. In Iraq the Kurdish opposition to British encroachments upon their traditional autonomy erupted into anti-British and anti-Iraqi revolts in 1922–24. Their hostility increased after 1925 when the League of Nations awarded Mosul, to which Turkey laid claim, to Iraq; despite their traditional suspicion of all outsiders, many of 40 the Kurds in the Mosul region appeared to have favored Turkish rather than Iraqi rule. These problems were compounded by the death of King Faisal I in September 1933. His departure meant the loss of the main stabilizing personality in politics and the one figure with sufficient prestige to draw the politicians together around a concept of na- tional interest and to balance nationalist and British pressures within the framework of the Anglo-Iraqi alliance. His son and successor, Ghazi, was a strong Arab nationalist, but he was inex- perienced and unable to control the increasing factionalism stem- ming from tribal and communal tensions and the clamor of voices against Great Britain's dominant influence in Iraqi affairs. The years during which no stability was provided by royal au- thority were also years of increased desire for an effective role of government in promoting national welfare. Very important was the growing demand during the 1930's for general reform, in- cluding measures in the spheres of land improvement and distribu- tion, roadbuilding, irrigation, commerce, industry, public health and communications. Some politicians, seeking to capitalize on these demands and to lead the growing intelligentsia, responded with liberal and social democratic slogans and programs, while others looked to the emerging authoritarian governments in Europe as models for Iraqi development along vaguely fascist or Communist lines. In this situation the military began to inject itself into the political scene. The first military involvement occurred in October 1936 when a coup d'etat was executed by an alliance of the army, representing idealistic nationalism, and by a reformist political group, known as the Ahali (People) which advocated socialism and democracy. The incumbent government of Prime Minister General Yasin al- Hashimi was forced from office, and King Ghazi, a helpless by- stander, was put in a position of having to sanction a regime coming to power by unconstitutional means. In the course of the coup, Minister of Defense General Jafar al Askari, a highly re- garded older statesman, a leading pro-British figure and founder of the Iraqi army, was assassinated. Through the technique of the coup, various arm leaders deposed and installed a series of regimes in the course of the next 5 years, and a new process for making and unmaking governments became institutionalized. Another consequence of the coup was to split various politicians and generals eventually into two rival blocs, headed respectively by the pro-British Nuri as Said and the pro- German Rashid Ali al Gailani. After King Ghazi's death in 1939, the crown passed to his 4-year-old son, Faisal II, and the royal authority devolved upon the Regent, Abdul Illah, who was the young King's uncle and crown prince. WORLD WAR II AND THE POSTWAR IRAQ When World War II broke out in September 1939, Prime Min- ister Nuri as Said severed diplomatic relations with Germany under the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of 1930. Rashid Ali al Gailani was ostensibly neutral, but his sympathies lay with the Germans. By March 1940, when he replaced Nuri as Said as prime minister (March 1940-January 1941), he had gradually gathered the sup- port of Anglophobes in general as well as ultranationalists im- pressed by fascist ideology. Despite the opposition of the British and of Nuri as Said and the regent, he sought to maintain friendly contacts with the Axis powers. He further antagonized the British by returning to power in April 1941 through a coup and by at- tempting to modify the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty terms of 1930 gov. erning wartime conditions. The British retaliated by landing forces at Basra in late April 1941, and they justified their action under the 1930 pact. Many Iraqis, still in the flush of their recently won independence, re- garded the move as an attempt to restore British rule. They rallied to the support of the Iraqi army, which received a token amount of aid from the Axis. By late May, however, the uprising had been suppressed, and Rashid Ali and his associates had fled the country. Succeeding governments cooperated with the Allies. In January 1943, Iraq declared war on the Axis under the 1930 pact. In March 1945 Iraq became a founding member of the Arab League (Iraq, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Syria and Yemen) which was designed to promote "cooperation in economic, cultural, social, and other matters" in a loose framework of Arab unity. It also joined the United Nations in December 1945. Although the country opposed the creation of Israel in 1948, its external orientation was strongly pro-Western in postwar years. In April 1954 the nation accepted United States military assist- ance, and in January 1955 the government of Prime Minister Nuri as Said suspended diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union. In addition, in February 1955 Iraq signed a mutual defense treaty with Turkey (better known as the Baghdad Pact) to which Great Britain, Pakistan and Iran acceded during the year. Iraq's pro- Western policy culminated in the formation of the Arab Federa- tion (Iraq and Jordan) on February 14, 1958, as a counterweight to the avowed neutralist but anti-Western United Arab Republic (Egypt and Syria) that had been formed earlier on February 1, 1958. Internally, a prominent feature of postwar politics was the con- tinued dominance of men whose names had appeared regularly on Cabinet lists after the 1930's. Chief among them was Nuri as Said 42 who had sought to maintain stable government often through firm measures. He favored alignment with Great Britain and the West and attempted to modernize the country gradually by the judicious investment of rapidly increasing oil revenues. Though not always prime minister, he was consistently recognized as the ultimate arbiter in the affairs of state and, together with Crown Prince Abdul Illah, personified the government. Men who entered political life after 1946, however, found Nuri as Said and the crown prince out of sympathy with their liberal, reformist sentiments. Prince Abdul Illah's regency was terminated on May 2, 1953, when King Faisal II mounted the throne at the age of 18. In the postwar years the governing elite sought to accommodate growing liberal ferment for social and economic progress in part by permitting the revival of party activities that had been sus- pended during the war years, but the elder statesmen were not prepared to make any substantive concessions. Believing that par- ties were dominated largely by irresponsible opportunists, Prime Minister Nuri as Said banned all parties in September 1954. Antigovernment sentiments continued to grow as Iraq aligned itself with the West through the Baghdad Pact and as Pan-Arab nationalism became a stronger rallying ground for many in Iraq who were aspiring to their country's closer ties with Arab neigh- bors and to Iraq's greater role in world affairs through nonalign- ment. This trend was accelerated after the British and French armed intervention against Egypt in October-November 1956. At home the oil revenues, widely publicized by the government as the means by which the country would become prosperous, appeared to many to enrich only the already affluent officials and landlords. To these criticisms were added the new resentments caused by the firm tactics employed by the government against many opposition politicians who were denied access to power by controlled elections or in many cases branded as subversives and deported. THE 1958 REVOLUTION AND END OF THE MONARCHY The kingdom of the Hashimite family was overthrown on July 14, 1958, in a swift coup executed by a group of army officers under Brigadier Abdul Karim Qasim and Colonel Abdul Salam Arif. According to later statements by Qasim, he had planned such a move for many years. The coup, or “revolution" as the Iraqis have called it since, met virtually no armed opposition. King Faisal II and Crown Prince Abdul Illah as well as other members of the royal family were executed. The following day Nuri as Said was also killed after attempting to escape disguised as a veiled woman. The proclamation of the revolution brought crowds of people into the Baghdad streets cheering the deaths of two "strong men," 43 Nuri as Said and Abdul Illah. The young King's death appears to have been regretted for he was regarded as a helpless bystander in the intrigues of Iraqi politics, but he was not mourned. In the ensuing mob demonstrations against the old order, the British Embassy was severely damaged by hysterical crowds. The leaders of the new regime, who declared their nation a republic, envisioned an Iraq reformed, egalitarian, democratic, united in spirit with the Arab world and committed to a foreign policy of nonalignment. Qasim declared his determination to resist all foreign ideologies—“Communist, American, British, or Fascist.” Amnesty was declared for political prisoners, and exiled opponents of the old regime were invited to return home, but the government dealt severely with more than 100 leading supporters of the ousted regime. In September 1958 an agrarian reform law was pro- claimed, and in March 1959 Iraq announced its withdrawal from the Baghdad Pact. The Qasim government was troubled, however, by divisive ri- valry within its ranks and by serious internal threats to its own survival. Many people inside and outside the government became disillusioned with Qasim's inability to consolidate authority and bring about any improvement in either political life or material prosperity. The first open split came 2 months after the Revolution when Deputy Prime Minister Arif's policies favoring closer ties with the United Arab Republic prompted Prime Min- ister Qasim first to dismiss and then to arrest him, setting off a propaganda war between the two nations. In December 1958, an unsuccessful anti-Qasim plot, rumored to have been organized with foreign assistance, caused further political tension. Colonel Arif himself was brought to trial on charges of endangering na- tional security. Although condemned to death in January 1959, he was pardoned in December 1962. Stability was affected also by frictions between the nationalists, and the surging Communists. Tolerated by the regime apparently as a counterweight against the powerful Pan-Arab and pro-Nasser groups, the Communist Party of Iraq rapidly gained influence after 1958 by infiltrating nearly all social and political organiza- tions, including government agencies. Aroused, a military contin- gent in Mosul revolted in March 1959 against the allegedly pro- Communist Qasim government but was quickly suppressed. There- after, the Communists who had a hand in subduing the military uprising became increasingly assertive and violent, causing Prime Minister Qasim eventually to restrict their activities. Meanwhile opposition from the pro-Nasser group continued unabated as indi- cated by an assassination attempt in October 1959 on Qasim's life during which he was shot and wounded. 44 The regime sought to accelerate economic development and to push agrarian reform, but it was frustrated by chaos resulting from the Kurdish rebellion which broke out in September 1961 and by bureaucratic delays and mismanagement. Growing disenchant- ment with Qasim's “personal dictatorship" and mounting Pan- Arab sentiments culminated in the overthrow of the regime on February 8, 1963. Qasim was executed on the following day. The coup was carried out by members of the Arab Socialist Re- naissance Party (Hizb al Baath al Arabi al Ishtiraki), better known as Baathists, who were aided by their supporters and sym- pathizers within the armed forces (see ch. 14, Political Dynamics). A National Council of Revolutionary Command (also known as the National Revolutionary Command) was established as the highest policymaking body. Brigadier Ahmad Hassan Bakr, a Baathist leader, became Prime Minister, and Colonel Arif was elevated to the nominal position of President. Within the Party, however, in- ternal dissension quickly arose between those favoring the pro- Nasser line and those opting for a pro-Syrian policy. THE ARIF GOVERNMENT The Baathist regime was ousted on November 18, 1963, in a military coup directed by Arif, who was known to have sympa- thized with the pro-Nasser group. A new National Council of Rev- olutionary Command was established, a nonparty regime which placed its important powers in the hands of Arif, who became president. Externally, the new government sought friendly rela- tions with all nations, notably with Nasser's Egypt. During 1964 steps were taken to hasten integration of military, economic, social, cultural and information policies of Iraq and Egypt by forming in May a Joint Presidency Council and by establishing in December a Unified Political Command; the latter organization was designed to expedite ultimate constitutional union between the two states. Internally, an uncertain cease-fire was arranged in February 1964 with the Kurds. The Interim Constitution was proclaimed in May 1964, declaring the Republic to be a “democratic, socialist state, deriving the principles of its democracy and socialism from the Arab heritage and the spirit of Islam.” The fundamental law, still in force in 1968, stressed Arab unity and declared Islam as “the religion of the state” (see ch. 13, The Governmental System). On the economic front the government announced in January 1965 the Five-Year Economic Plan 1965–69 with a goal of doubling national income in 9 years. In April 1966 Major General Abdul Rahman Mohammad Arif succeeded his brother, the late president who had been killed in an air crash earlier in the month. 45 CHAPTER 4 POPULATION According to the census of 1965, the total population of the country was 8,261,527. This figure included some 40,000 Iraqis living abroad as well as an unspecified number of nomads who, in the earlier censuses of 1947 and 1957, had been reported sep- arately from the rest of the population. Despite many difficulties encountered by the census takers, especially the presence of a nomad population and the mistrust of some respondents, the re- sults of the 1965 census, on the whole, appeared to be fairly accu- rate. Figures relating specifically to the northern provinces, how- ever, were unreliable because of unsettled political conditions in that area when the information was being collected (see ch. 14, Political Dynamics). Population estimates for the years following the census were not wholly dependable. The reported annual growth rate of 3.3 percent in 1963 was high by Asian standards, and the latest official esti- mate of total population—8.3 million for July 1966-indicated a rate of only about 1.5 percent annually. Nevertheless, it could be assumed that by mid-1968 the Iraqi population numbered at least 8.6 million and probably more nearly approached 9 million. The population has fluctuated considerably over the country's long history. Between the eighth and the thirteenth centuries, Iraq was a flourishing center of Arab civilization, and at the height of its prosperity it may have supported a larger population than it has today. Some estimates were as high as 15 million. Decline came swiftly, however, after 1285 when Mongol conquerors rav- aged the country and left its elaborate irrigation system in ruins. The pattern continued under the Turkish rule which began in the sixteenth century, and for hundreds of years Iraq remained an underpopulated backwater outpost of the Ottoman Empire. In the mid-nineteenth century it had fewer than 1.5 million inhabitants. At the end of World War I, however, a new era began in which economic development and the greater availability of modern med- ical care contributed to a spurt of population growth. By 1947, The summer months are marked by two types of i nomena. The southern and southeasterly sirocco (in Iray, a dry, dusty wind with occasional gusts to 50 miles an ho from April to early June and again from late Septembe November. It may last for a day at the beginning a' the season but for several days at other times. These often accompanied by violent duststorms which ma heights of several thousand feet and close airports for riods. From mid-June to mid-September, the preva called the shamal, is from the north and northwest. It wind, absent only occasionally during this period. The brought by this wind permits intensive sun heating surface, but the breeze has some cooling effect. The combination of rain shortage and extreme heat r of Iraq a desert. Because of very high rates of evap and plants rapidly lose the little moisture obtained from vegetation could not survive without extensive irrigati THE RIVER SYSTEM 1 The Euphrateg originates in Turkey, is augme. Khabur River in Syria and enters Iraq in the northwe fed only by the wadia of the western desert during raine, I then winds through a gorge varying from It with lilililit faire out on the plain at Ramadi and cor Hindali Baruro, monstructed in 1914. There the Infort into the timirah (hannel. What is now the She hi m the main channel of the Euphrates be Hiltill the permi s (wi channels to Sama" ly i ng that meet this in the Tigris et Qur... I'm thithin liko su 'Theer kit is signincan WAT Wat therefore the he. Wer - -- rted to port of in Eco- , impor- înd low- 1 geolog- mic clay, rther ex- 's but had MI i Baghdad roads and orthwest or other north- r because of 1 importance rivers are not he Tigris and ng local trade southwest, rely are much more ods (see ch. 22, ins heavily empha- le road and railroad nsportation. nsisted of a standard border with Syria (the territory) to Baghdad, 5 from Irbil in the north- south to Basra. A short Baghdad-Kirkuk section to is directly linked via Syrian of the standard-gauge line from im Qasr, roughly paralleling the was formally completed. Because er, the extension was not able to eed traffic which continued to run on ations and other buildings have been stock acquired. Technical and financial viet Union and most of the new equip- 21 from the Euphrates to Lake Habbaniyah, and a regulator governs flow from the lake to the river downstream. At Samarra on the Tigris, a dam and regulator permit the diversion of water to the great Tharthar depression. Other depressions, quite dry except during the rainy season, provide for water storage in the future. On the Euphrates, a major water control and irrigation project (probably to be located near Hadithah where the oil pipeline from Kirkuk crosses the river on its way west) has been delayed. Iraq and Syria have contemplated major dams on the Euphrates since the early 1960's, but negotiations between the two countries have been inconclusive, and no significant steps had been taken on the Iraqi dam by the end of 1967. The 1968 spring floods on the Euphrates—the worst in years, apparently led the government to consider moving ahead rapidly on a dam. The project had been broached in the early 1960's, but technical difficulties had blocked early implementation. The dam will be part of a system meant to provide irrigation for a large arid zone in the Jazirah, to balance the flow of the Tigris to the dam at Samarra and to furnish hydroelectric power. Elsewhere, progress has been faster. A major dam at Derbendi Khan on the upper Diyala was completed in 1959, and the Dokan Dam on the Little Zab was also completed. These and other proj- ects on the northeastern tributaries of the Tigris are expected to contribute substantially to increased agricultural productivity in this part of the country (see ch. 19, Agriculture). In the delta area (the alluvial plain) of southern Iraq, proposed projects and some already underway in the middle and late 1960's were directed to water control and drainage. New dams were being planned or built; an older one, such as the Hindiyah Barrage, was being reconstructed. RESOURCES The country's only significant and exploited resource is oil. In the 1960's the most productive field was at Kirkuk. Smaller fields near Kirkuk are those at Bay Hasan and Jambur. Substantial amounts of crude oil were being produced at Rumaila and Zubayr in the southeast, and lesser quantities in fields at Ayn Zalah and Butmah, northwest of Mosul. A still smaller producer is at Naft Khaneh, south of Khanaqin on the Iranian border. Most of the production is exported as crude oil, but refineries process some of it for domestic use, and in the mid-1960's the government was planning the development of a petrochemical industry (see ch. 20, Industry; ch. 23, Foreign Economic Relations). Natural gas is also produced at the Kirkuk field. Some is used 20 domestically for thermal power stations, and gas oil is exported to Syria. In 1967 arrangements were being made for the export of natural gas to Turkey (see ch. 20, Industry; ch. 23, Foreign Eco- nomic Relations). Except for salt, exploited for domestic use, there was no impor- tant production of other minerals in early 1968. Gypsum and low- grade coal have been known to exist for some time, and a geolog- ical survey underway in the mid-1960's had located ceramic clay, phosphates, sulfur, iron and copper and glass sands. Further ex- ploration and exploitation were expected in the late 1960's but had not yet begun in early 1968 (see ch. 20, Industry). TRANSPORTATION With the exception of the road leading west from Baghdad across the Syrian Desert to Jordan and Syria, most roads and railroads follow the large rivers from southeast to northwest or lead from Baghdad to the oilfields of Kirkuk and to other north- eastern centers. For all routes Baghdad is the center because of its location and its political, cultural and commercial importance (see fig. 3). Despite their importance in other respects, Iraq's rivers are not significant traffic arteries. Small craft move in the Tigris and Euphrates between Baghdad and Basra, carrying local trade goods, and the Madans, people of marshes of the southwest, rely heavily on reed canoes, but roads and railroads are much more significant for the movement of people and goods (see ch. 22, Domestic Trade). In the middle and late 1960's government plans heavily empha- sized the development of ports, airports and the road and railroad system. Little attention was paid to river transportation. Until the mid-1960's the railroad system consisted of a standard (broad) gauge line from the northwestern border with Syria (the transfer point, Tall Kushik, was in Syrian territory) to Baghdad, and a meter (narrow) gauge line running from Irbil in the north- east through Kirkuk to Baghdad and south to Basra. A short branch line ran from Jalula on the Baghdad-Kirkuk section to Khanaqin. The standard gauge road is directly linked via Syrian and Turkish systems, to Europe. In the mid-1960's the extension of the standard-gauge line from Baghdad to Basra and on to Umm Qasr, roughly paralleling the existing meter-gauge railroad, was formally completed. Because of technical difficulties, however, the extension was not able to carry heavily loaded, high-speed traffic which continued to run on the meter-gauge line. New stations and other buildings have been constructed and new rolling-stock acquired. Technical and financial aid were supplied by the Soviet Union and most of the new equip- 21 40 48 TURKEY Zakhu Amadiyah Rawanduz Sinjar Mosul tabil Sulaymaniyah IRAN ht SYRIA Legend Bai Tikrit Samarra Khanagin Baqubah Euphrates BAGHDAD Ramadi Major Highways - Paved Secondary Roads - Paved ----Selected Dirt Roads ... Major Highways - Under Construction Hit Railroads + Major Civil Airports International Airports Rutbah Karbala JORDAN! Hillah Najat Diwaniyah Amarali "- Euphrates Nasiriyah Basra Zubay Satwan Umm Qasr 30 SAUDI ARABIA Faw KUWAIT Persian NEUTRAL ZONE KUWAIT Guulj NEUTRAL ZONE 40 44 48 Figure 3. The Transportation System of Iraq. ment by other East European countries (see ch. 23, Foreign Economic Relations). In the late 1960's there were plans for small but important extensions of the railroad system and for the reconstruction of existing sections. By the end of 1967 a spur had been built from the new standard-gauge main line just above Basra to Umm Qasr, where new port facilities were being constructed. Also proposed was a link between Karbala, served by a spur on the Baghdad- Basra line, and Samawah, on the main line to the southeast. Such a link would provide rail service to a densely settled area on the west bank of the Euphrates (the main line runs east of the river) and would also furnish rail access to Najaf, holy city of the Shiites (see ch. 11, Religion). In 1968, work was underway on the existing standard-gauge line from Baghdad to the Syrian border. The reconstruction and extension of the road system have been underway since the early 1960's, and much had been accomplished by early 1968. Nevertheless, unpaved roads still link some admin- istrative centers, and much of the desert is served only by caravan tracks (see fig. 3). New or reconstructed roads generally follow older unpaved or otherwise inadequate roads linking towns in the alluvial plain or running from Baghdad to the north and northeast. A new road has been proposed, however, to replace the present inadequate one from Ramadi through Hadithah to the Syrian border following the southeast bank of the Euphrates. The main east-west artery from Baghdad through Rutbah to the Jordanian border is regarded as an inadequate route to Damascus, and it has been suggested that a branch be built, departing from a point west of Rutbah and moving northwest to the Syrian border. Most communities in the Tigris-Euphrates plain are located at or near rivers or major canals, and the rivers themselves some- times flow in several channels. Road construction, therefore, often requires extensive bridge building, sometimes several bridges for short stretches of road. The major international airport is at Baghdad; another is at Basra. A new airport of major dimensions was under construction at Baghdad in early 1968. There are civil airports at Mosul and Kirkuk. In 1966 a new airport at Mosul, primarily for military pur- poses, but accessible also to civil aircraft, was proposed. In early 1968 there was no information on the status of that project. At one time the Iraq Petroleum Company maintained a number of landing fields, but in early 1968 the only important one still func- tioning was located at Kirkuk. In 1968 the major seaport was at Basra, on the Shatt al Arab, roughly 80 miles from the Persian Gulf. The port was already 23 we capable of handling oceangoing vessels, but important facilities were being added in the late 1960's. Umm Qasr, near the western end of the short coastline, was also being developed in 1968 and was expected to be able to handle oceangoing traffic when com- pleted. Faw, about 6 miles from the Persian Gulf on the Shatt al Arab, is at the end of a pipeline from Zubayr, the center of the southeastern oilfields. From Faw an underwater pipeline extends to Khoral Amaya, a platform offshore which serves as a loading point for large tankers. SETTLEMENT PATTERNS Although roughly 44 percent of the people live in urban areas as officially defined (all administrative centers, regardless of size and available facilities are urban), it is probable that as much as 70 percent of the population live under essentially rural conditions (see ch. 4, Population). In the rural areas of the alluvial plain and in the lower Diyala region, settlement almost invariably clusters near the rivers, streams and irrigation canals. The bases of the relationship be- tween watercourse and settlement have been summarized by Robert McCormick Adams, Director of the Oriental Institute at the University of Chicago. He notes that the levees laid down by streams and canals provide advantages for both settlement and agriculture. Surface water drains more easily on the levee back- slope, and the coarse soils of the levees are easier to cultivate and permit better subsurface drainage. The height of the levees gives some protection against floods and the frosts that often affect low- lying areas and may kill winter crops. Above all, those living or cultivating on the crest of a levee have easy access to water for irrigation and household use in a dry, hot country. Although isolated homesteads occur occasionally, most rural communities are nucleated settlements rather than dispersed farm- steads: the farmer leaves his village to cultivate the fields outside it. This pattern holds for farming communities in the Kurdish highlands of the northeast as well as for those in the alluvial plain. The size of the settlement varies, generally with the volume of water available for household use and with the amount of land accessible to village dwellers. Sometimes, particularly in the lower Tigris and Euphrates Valleys, soil salinity is responsible for a rather restricted area of arable land and limits the size of the community dependent on it, but salinity usually results in large unsettled and uncultivated stretches between towns or villages. Fragmentary information suggests that most farmers in the alluvial plain tend to live in villages of over 100 persons even in 24 larger towns, and substantial numbers of urban dwellers, except, perhaps, those within the municipal limits, actually are farmers. In the lower Diyala, on the other hand, villages are often smaller, but even here, a substantial proportion of the persons residing in the provincial center, Baqubah, are employed in agriculture. The marsh dwellers (Madans) of the south usually live in small clusters of two or three houses kept above water by rushes which are constantly being replenished. Such clusters are often close to- gether, but access from one to another is possible only by canoe. Here and there, a few natural islands permit a slightly larger cluster. Some of these people are primarily buffalo herders and lead a seminomadic life. In the winter, when the waters are at low point, they build fairly large, temporary villages. In the summer they move with their herds out of the marshes to the riverbanks. Cities and large towns in this arid country are almost invariably situated on watercourses, usually on the major rivers or their larger tributaries. In the south this dependence has had its disad- vantages. Until the recent development of flood control, Baghdad and other cities were subject to the threat of inundation. More- over, the dikes needed to protect them effectively prevented the expansion of the urban areas in some directions. The growth of Baghdad, for example, was restricted by dikes on its eastern edge. The diversion of water to the Tharthar depression and the con- struction of a canal transferring water from the Tigris north of Baghdad to the Diyala River have permitted the irrigation of land outside the limits of the dikes and the expansion of settlement. The way of life of the Bedouin herders of the south and west does not permit permanent settlements. Generally the focal point of their annual movement is a city, usually Baghdad. Some groups move up from the south in sniall units to gather in Baghdad in the dry season. Others move to Baghdad from the west. In the rainy season (winter and early spring) they disperse to the desert, again in small units. Before and since the 1958 Revolution, there have been efforts to settle the nomads and to convert them, at least in part, into cultivators. There is little reliable information on the success of these efforts (see ch. 6, Social Structure; ch. 19, Agri- culture). 25 CHAPTER 3 HISTORICAL SETTING Iraq, a republic since the coup d'etat of 1958 which ended the reign of King Faisal II, became a sovereign, independent state in 1932. The history of the land and its people, however, dates back almost 5,000 years to the time when the fertile area between the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers was known as Mesopotamia (meaning between rivers) and its inhabitants then called Sumerians, prob- ably because the delta region of the two rivers was then called Sumer. Until World War I, the country was generally known in the West as Mesopotamia. Geographically, the Mesopotamian region has been open to incur- sions from all sides. The deserts to the south and west harbored mounted nomads, and the passes to the north and east provided entry corridors from those directions. Numerous foreign con- querors came and went, each contributing to the physical mixture and cultural diversity of the area. The most significant historical and cultural change occurred in the seventh century, when the Arab conquest brought Islam to the land, overlaying and reworking all that had gone before. It almost completely obliterated any conscious memory among the people of their ancient ways. The Arabs brought not only a new set of rulers but also their language, religion and certain patterns of living which have characterized the country ever since. The conquerors also gave the country its modern name, "Iraq,” mean- ing basically “to sweat” or “to take root." Despite the destruction wrought by the Mongols in the thir- teenth century and the stultifying centuries of Turkish rule that followed, the past has continued to express itself in subtle details of social life and outlook which still distinguish the Arabized Iraqi majority on the Mesopotamian plain from Arab populations else. where in the Middle East. There are aspects of community life in Iraq and a characteristic approach to the problems of government, technology and economic organization which in degree or kind set off the country from its neighbors, with whom the majority of its people share common Moslem traditions and faith as well as Arabic speech. Iraq identifies itself as a bearer of the Arab tradition because of its 13 centuries of participation in the Moslem Arab world. For most Iraqis not the grandeur of ancient Sumer or Babylon, but the magnificence of the medieval Abbasside dynasty (750—1258) represents the zenith of the country's past achieve- ment and nurtures an historical awareness that greatness is pos- sible again in a revived and united Arab world. This outlook, more Pan-Arab than nationalist in its implications, is being modified toward a more specific sense of Iraqi identity in the course of the country's experience as an independent nation while under the influence of the government's efforts to stress Iraq's inheritance of ancient civilization. For the great majority of the people, Iraq's recent past is seen as a struggle for national freedom—first against the Ottomans (Turks), later against the British, and finally against "Western imperialism" and what is regarded as its creature, Israel (see ch. religious affiliation of the viewer, but for the most part the people 15, Foreign Relations). The native heroes vary with the ethnic and share the common dislike of all non-Arabs. History thus becomes an active factor in the contemporary Iraqi scene and an instru- ment available to political contenders. The anti-Western senti- ments aroused during and since the British Mandate worked to the disadvantage of the Hashemite monarchy (1921–58) and its sup- porters seeking to maintain an alignment with the West. Since the overthrow of the kingdom in the coup of 1958, nonalignment in world affairs, though erratic, has become an important concern of successive governments. ANCIENT HISTORY Sumer, Akkad, Babylon and Assyria Almost 3,000 years before Christ, Sumerian kings, who were contemporary with the Pharaohs of the earliest Egyptian dynas- ties (3100–2270 B.C.), developed what is often called “the first civilization.” It is not certain where they came from nor when they entered the area. It is clear, however, that they were preceded by numerous other peoples who had contributed to the social and political complexity of the region. The Sumerians lived under a federation of city-states, devised the oldest form of writing based on pictorial as well as phonetic signs, used copper for tools and weapons, made highly polished painted pottery and developed elaborate irrigation and water-con- trol systems. So important were these irrigation works to survival and prosperity that even in wartime contestants took pains to avoid their destruction. 28 The Sumerian dynasties ended probably about 2800 B.C. when they were conquered by the Akkadians under Sargon, the founder of the Akkadian kingdom. A Semitic people from the west and northwest, the Akkadians had entered in numbers sufficient to give their name to the territory surrounding what is now Baghdad. Despite their worship of the sun, they treated the agrarian reli- gions of the conquered places with respect, and placing their earth- gods into a kind of pantheon protected by a new and larger polit- ical order. The Akkadians and the Sumerians, in effect, combined their forces, and Sargon's military movements and exploits were extended to the Mediterranean and into Asia Minor. After Sargon's death the empire slowly fell before the on- slaughts of tribesmen from the north. Power was revived briefly with its center in the city of Erech (modern Warka) and later in that of Ur (now Makayyar), but it was, in turn, gradually weak- ened by the attack of Elamites, Semitic-speaking people from Elam in what is now the southwestern part of Iran. The Sumerian-Akkadians were finally subjugated by the Se- mitic-speaking Amorites, probably from Syria. By 2000 B.C. the Amorites established a new state with its capital at Babylon on the southern Euphrates. Babylonian authority was extended over southern Mesopotamia by Hammurabi (c.1955–13 B.C.), the sixth of his line of Amoritic rulers. One of the great kings of antiquity, Hammurabi is remembered not only as a conqueror but also as a lawgiver. The code of laws he collected dealt with land tenure, rent, the position of women, marriage, divorce, inheritance, func- tions of money, contracts, control of public order, administration of justice, wages and labor conditions. Around 1600 B.C. the Kassites, a people speaking Elamitic (one of a group of languages related to modern Georgian) overthrew the Babylonian dynasty and ruled the region until about 1150 B.C. The Kassite domination was supplanted by the Assyrians, a race of warriors from the north containing a mixture of Semites with non-Semitic tribes. The Assyrians were renowned not only for their military innovations and ruthless proficiency in war but also for their contributions in the spheres of administration, architec- ture, sculpture and literature. One of the Assyrian rulers of note was Tiglath-Pileser III (745–27 B.C.), who developed an important political idea—the maintenance of a permanent military force or standing army under the control of a permanent bureaucracy. He raised the As- syrian empire, with its capital at Nineveh on the Tigris opposite present-day Mosul, to its pinnacle of power (even Egypt was re- quired to recognize Assyrian supremacy), but the system he inau- gurated eventually alienated subject peoples, who were driven to hatred and desperation by the severity of Assyrian methods. Revolt followed revolt; Egypt and Syria were lost; eventually, in 612 B.C. Scythians from the north destroyed Nineveh, and As- syrian power became a historic memory. Iraq's present-day Nesto- rian Christian minority calls itself Assyrian and claims ethnic descent from the peoples of this ancient empire (see ch. 11, Reli- gion). Babylon rose again as the center of a Neo-Babylonian empire, also called the Chaldean empire (605–539 B.C.). Favored by its geographical position, Babylon, after being rebuilt as one of the greatest cities of its day, became a center of trade and arts, but this glory also passed when it fell to the Persians under Cyrus the Great (c.550–30 B.C.), the founder of the Archaemenian empire (c.550–331 B.C.). Persian and Greek Intrusions Mesopotamia, so long a seat of Semitic power, then came under an Indo-European-speaking people. It remained a province of the Archaemenain empire for nearly 150 years until subjugated by Alexander the Great around 331 B.C. Upon his death at Babylon in 323 B.C., the Greek power began to decline in the hands of his successors. Seleucus, one of Alexander's generals, became ruler of Mesopotamia and Persia, then known as the kingdom of the Seleu- cide, which had its power center at Seleucia on the Tigris south of modern Baghdad. Although his successors continued to spread Hellenistic civilization, by 200 B.C. the Seleucid power had shrunk to the confines of Mesopotamia and Syria. The Seleucids were challenged by new powers to the north, the Parthian Persians who were by then in control of all Persia, and increasingly by the rapidly rising new power in the west, the Romans. Subduing Mesopotamia in 138 B.C., the Parthians there- after had to contest with the Romans for supremacy over the region for nearly 800 years, until the coming of the Arabs. The Parthians were pushed aside in A.D. 224 by a new Persian power, the Sassanian empire (about A.D. 224–641), which in its hostility to the Romans and to Christianity, their favorite religion, gradu- ally revived Zoroastrianism, the dominant religion in Persia since the sixth century B.C. As a result, the Sassanian efforts to con- solidate power were aided by the power Zoroastrian priests, but by the mid-seventh century inconclusive struggles between Sas- sanids and the Romans left both of them exhausted and vulnerable (see ch. 11, Religion). ARAB CONQUEST AND THE COMING OF ISLAM The process of detaching Iraq from the declining Sassanian 30 power began during the brief reign of Abu Bakr (632–34), first caliph (spiritual and temporal ruler) and successor to Mohammed (570–632), founder of Islam (see ch. 11, Religion). The many Arabs, mostly Christian, who were living under the Persian rule in lower Mesopotamia, at first supported their Persian masters against the Moslem invaders but slowly transferred their alle- giance. By 637 Mesopotamia was completely subjugated by the second caliph, Omar (634–44), in a decisive battle at Al Qadisiyah (sometimes called Kadisiya), a locality on the Euphrates south of Baghdad. The religion and, only somewhat more slowly, the lan- guage of the victors were accepted by the majority of the popula- tion, which since has been Moslem and counted itself Arab. The Iraqis, whose culture was more advanced than that of the victors themselves, however, did not passively accept the culture brought by the newcomers. Rather, Iraqi culture predominated so thoroughly that the Moslem Arab golden age that followed was centered in Iraq, not in the Arabian Peninsula, and it was the Moslem Arabs rather than the old population of Mesopotamia that may be said to have been culturally absorbed. As the Islamic empire grew, the center of power shifted from Arabia northward to Syria and Iraq. In this process new divisions and conflicts were added to traditional Arab intertribal and inter- factional strife; longstanding regional conflicts reasserted them- selves in the new empire. From the beginning, Moslem Arab egali- tarianism before Allah or God was perpetuated, but neither then nor since has the Arab ideal of political union among all Arabic- speaking peoples become a lasting reality. Down to the present time the world has witnessed a continual alternation in the Arab world between movements toward unity and countermovements toward schism (see ch. 14, Political Dynamics; ch. 15, Foreign Relations). After the stabilization of Moslem power in the territories which included present-day Iraq, Iran, Syria and Egypt, the problem of the succession to the caliphate became pressing. In 657 Ali, the fourth caliph (656-61), with his center of power in Iraq, was murdered by his adversaries. Ali's son, Hasan, though proclaimed caliph, had to abdicate in the face of superior forces advancing under Mu'awiyah, who became the first of the Umayyad caliphs (661-750) ruling from Damascus in Syria. The last trace of armed resistance to the new Umayyad dynasty was eliminated in 680 when Ali's second son, Husain, was killed in a battle. Meanwhile, in opposition to the Umayyad dynasty, supporters of Ali and his descendants founded a political organization called the Shi'at Ali, or “the party (partisans) of Ali.” Centered in Iraq, this movement drew its initial members almost exclusively from among the Arabs involved in the succession struggles but gradu- ally gained support from large numbers of disaffected Moslem converts in Iraq and Persia who had been treated as second-class Moslems by the Arab aristocracy in Damascus. The early political conflicts soon hardened into the first major religious schism in the Moslem world—the rival Shia and Sunni branches. Both Ali and Husain became Syria martyrs; Najaf, Ali's burial place some 90 miles south of Baghdad, and Karbala, 55 miles southwest of Bagh- dad, where Husain died, became holy places of pilgrimage as important to the Shiites as Mecca is to the Sunnites (see ch. 11, Religion). The Moslem empire achieved its greatest political expansion under the Umayyads. From southern France, where it existed only fleetingly, its domains included the Iberian Peninsula, the whole of North Africa, including Egypt, the Mediterranean islands, the Arabian Peninsula and the Fertile Crescent to the north, of Asia Minor. Persia's with its boundaries pushed eastward to the Amu Darya, Afghanistan, temporary possessions in India and the westernmost portion of China. Umayyad power waned in the early eighth century because of the age-old Arab difficulties of feud and schism within the ruling aristocracy. The dynasty was also being challenged by the dissi. dent Shiites and other sectarian forces which questioned the legitimacy of the Umayyad caliphate. In 750 it was supplanted by the Abbasside rebels, Arab Sunnites who were most active in Persia but also had the support of Iraqi Shiites. THE ABBASSIDE CALIPHATE (750–1258) The Abbassides claimed their descent from al-Abbas (566–652), an uncle of Mohammed and, despite Shiite opposition, they as- serted themselves as legitimate heirs of the Prophet. Under the Abbasides, Baghdad became the center of power where Arab and Persian cultures mingled to produce a blaze of philosophical, scientific and literary glory remembered throughout the Arab world and by Iraqis in particular as the pinnacle of the Islamic past. A cosmopolitan center of the medieval world, Baghdad had the advantages of an adequate water supply, river communications and freedom from malaria. Although it was built entirely with the needs of political administration in mind, its population grew rap- idly as it gained importance as a social, political and trade center, and by 800 it had become the second largest city in the Mediterra- nean world, next only to Constantinople (now Istanbul). The greatest caliphs of the period combined outstanding admin- istrative and intellectual capacities with unrelenting cruelty. Their 32 ruthlessness is less significant as a personal trait than as evidence of the substitution, perhaps under Persian influence, of the caliph as absolute autocrat for the traditional Arab notion by the leader chosen by a council of his peers and answerable solely to the council. The Abbasside cultural renaissance roughly spanned the reigns of the first seven rulers of the dynasty (750–842). Of the seven, three achieved lasting fame: Mansur (754–75), Harun al Rashid (786–806) and Mamun (813–33). These sovereigns had in common great administrative and political ability, both of which were vital in keeping under control the factional strife. The situation in Iraq with its Sunni dynasty and large Shia population was especially volatile, and it required all the guile and sternness of the Abbassides to stay in power. The Abbasside caliphs had to contend with continual Shia revolts in Iraq, Persia and Arabia. The Abbasside caliphate did not end abruptly but fell into a long decline under the stresses of regional, ethnic and religious dif- ferences. In areas under a relatively weak control, local forces revolted and gained autonomy as early as 756 when Spain broke away. Morocco followed in 788, Tunisia in 800 and Egypt in 868. The Abbasside decay was prompted by the Sunni-Shia split which had weakened the effectiveness of Islam as a single unifying force and as a sanction for a single political authority. Although the intermingling of various linguistic and cultural groups contributed greatly to the enrichment of Islamic civiliza- tion, it was also a source of tensions. Not only was there the cleavage between the Arabs and Persians, but the growing promi- nence of the Turks in military and political affairs gave cause for discontent and rivalry in court. The Turks came as a stream of slaves brought in year by year to man the caliphs' imperial guard and fill the ranks of the regular military forces as mercenaries. Excelling in combat, Turkish officers rose rapidly to high positions and began to replace the Arabs around the seat of power. This trend was quickened after the rule of Caliph Mutasim (833– 42) whose mother was a Turkish slave. By the tenth century the Turkish commanders—no longer checked by their Persian rivals in court—were able to bring the caliphs under their effective control. Consequently, the political power of the caliphate was separated from its religious functions—functions which had here- tofore been combined in the person of the caliph. There was no disposition, however, to dispense with the office of the caliphate, since the sanction of the incumbent continued to be important as a symbol for legitimizing claims to authority. Thus, even the stronghanded Persian Buwayhid family of the Shia branch which ruled Iraq for a century (945–1055), retained the caliph as a shadowy symbol of spiritual authority. Until termi- 33 essential to the whole economy. As central controls weakened, no- madic tribes encroached on the settled areas. The first outside force to take advantage of these conditions was Ismail Shah (1502-24), the founder of the Persian Safawid dynasty (1502–1794) and self-proclaimed leader of all Shiites. In 1509 he conquered Iraq and in doing so came into conflict with the Ottomans (Turks) of the Sunni order, who had their capital at Istanbul. Persian rule ended in 1534 when Baghdad was captured by Suleiman the Magnificent (1520–66). Earlier in 1517 the Otto- mans had taken Cairo, ending the last of the Abbasside caliphs, and thereafter Ottoman sultans claimed the title of caliph. Istanbul became the center of Islam, and Iraq was left to decay. Except for an interlude of Persian Safawid control in the seven- teenth century(1623–38), Iraq remained under Ottoman rule until 1918. THE OTTOMAN PERIOD (1534–1918) Divided into the three provinces (vilayet) of Baghdad, Mosul and Basrah, Iraq was administered by appointed governors (pasha) answerable directly to the sultan-caliph in Istanbul. As the eastern frontier outpost of the empire, it was subjected to recurrent forays by Shiite Persian powers and by tribes in Kurdi- stan (see Glossary) as well as by the rebellious local chieftains of the predominantly Shia southern Iraq. A tenuous peace was main- tained with the intractable tribes largely by leaving them alone. For more than a century, beginning in the early eighteenth cen- tury, the waning Ottoman sultan-caliphate could exercise its au- thority minimally by confirming as governors the strongest among the local chieftains in Iraq. Not until around 1830 did the Otto- mans reassert absolute power under the strong leadership of Sultan Mahmud II (1808–39). From 1831 until World War I the Ottoman rulers sought spo- radically to modernize their administration, frequently with the help of European advisers, largely to revive national powers in face of various expansionist threats from Russia and Europe. The Ottoman sultans, gradually enforcing their right to appoint admin- istrators and station troops, turned their attention to many semi- independent pashas. Finally they tried to extend government to the heretofore autonomous tribes, including those in Kurdistan. By selling land to the local rulers and encouraging them to accept government positions, it was hoped that the nomadic tribes could be forced to settle and to accept the government's right to tax and to conscript. Considerable unrest followed these efforts. The greatest and the most progressive of the governors of Baghdad, Midhat Pasha (1869–72), introduced a series of par- tially successful reform measures to set Iraq on a course of mod- 35 ernization. Within 3 years he initiated a system of land-registra- tion, improved communications and reformed the legal and admin- istrative systems. In addition, he started a newspaper, built a hos- pital and a technical school and opened a savings bank. For a time it seemed that the country might acquire importance in terms of its own internal developments rather than merely as an important link on the East-West line of communication and as a focal point of foreign competition. Externally, the decline of Ottoman rule after the eighteenth century coincided with the rise of European seapower and the worldwide competition among European powers for commercial benefits and for spheres of influence. The impact of this rivalry was not fully felt in Iraq, however, until after 1899 when Germany obtained from Turkey a concession to build a railway from Konya (a province in southwest Turkey) to Baghdad; in 1902 Germany was granted another right to build a line from Baghdad to Basra, an outlet to the Persian Gulf. The British feared that this scheme of the rising and potentially hostile German power would interfere with their vital lines of communication to India via Persia and Afghanistan, menacing British oil interests in Persia and ultimately India itself. Russia reacted also with hostility because of its southward expanionist urge for warm water ports and related strategic gains. Although it was in rivalry with Great Britain over Persia, Russia was disinclined to be bellicose toward either the British or the Ger- mans as a consequence of its humiliating defeat in the Russo- Japanese War of 1904–05; the result was a compromise settle- ment known as the Anglo-Russian Agreement of 1907, directed in part against Germany. Also under the pact, Persia—the root of the Anglo-Russian conflict-was divided into northern and south- ern spheres of influence separated by a buffer belt. In addition, Russia yielded to Great Britain's special position in Afghanistan and in the Persian Gulf. After the 1907 entente the Germans and the British became the primary contenders for influence in Iraq. Because of the British obstruction, for example, German plans to make Kuwait the terminus of the Berlin-Baghdad-Basra railway were abandoned in June 1914. On another occasion the British combined with the Sheik of Kuwait, King Ibn Saud, of Arabia, and a semi-independ- ent local Iraqi ruling group to prevent a reassertion of the pro- German Ottoman power in the lower delta area around Basra. THE TWENTIETH CENTURY World War I In November 1914 the Ottoman empire, allied with Germany, 36 was at war with Great Britain, Russia and France. The British dispatched an expeditionary force from India to Basra to protect their oil interests in adjacent Iran. The first major British ad- vance under General Charles Townshend was stopped in 1915 be- low Baghdad at Kut on the Tigris by Turkish troops under the command of a German general, and the Anglo-Indian forces were captured. Aroused, the British decided upon a major engagement in Iraq; by March 1917 new forces led by General Stanley Maude seized Baghdad. In November 1918 the British ended the Ottoman rule in Iraq by occupying the remainder of the country to the Anatolian highlands north of Mosul, where Arabic speech is re- placed by Turkish speech (see ch. 5, Ethnic Groups and Lan- guages). Upon capturing Baghdad, Maude proclaimed that Great Brit- ain intended to return to Iraq some control of its own affairs, stressing that this step would pave the way for ending the sub- jection to alien rulers which the country had known since the Mongol conquest. The proclamation was in keeping with the en- couragement the British had given to Arab nationalists, such as Jafar al Askari, Nuri as Said and Jamil al Midfai, who sought emancipation from Ottoman rule. Although these nationalists had supported the Allied powers in expectation of the defeat of the Ottoman regime, the local population for the most part had shown only minimal interest in the struggle against the Turks. During the war the course of events in Iraq was influenced greatly by the Hashimite family (descendants of the Prophet Mo- hammed) of Husein ibn Ali, Sharif of Mecca. Aspiring to the establishment of an independent Arab kingdom, Husein in October 1915 had secured Great Britain's conditional assurances of sup- port for his cause in return for Arab support against Turkey. Refusing to rally to the Ottoman Sultan-Caliph's call for a holy war against the Allies, Husein in June 1916 led the revolt of the Arabs, marching northward in conjunction with the British into Transjordan (Jordan), Palestine and Syria. Anticipating the fulfillment of Allied pledges, Husein's son, Prince Faisal, then head of a new Arab regime set up in Damas- cus with British support, and later to become modern Iraq's first king, arrived in Paris in 1919 as chief spokesman of the Arab cause. Much to his disappoinment, Faisal found Allied powers less than enthusiastic about Arab independence and contemplating the notion of a mandate for the ex-Ottoman territories. The British Mandate The fate of Iraq and other Arab territories was formally de- cided in April 1920 at San Remo, Italy, where a conference of Alhed Powers placed Iraq and Palestine nder the British Man- date and Syria under French Mandate. Faisal, bo had been pro- claimed King of Syria by a Syrian national congress in Damascus in March 1920, was ejected from Syria by the French in July 1920; the British then invited him to London as a token of their regard. In Iraq the British occupation authorities found themselves con- fronted with a myriad of conflicting local demands and divisive forces. Townsmen and villagers desired restraints against tribal incursions. The tribal sheiks, on the other hand, wanted the gov- ernment to confirm their titles to tribal territories and to give them new land as well. Merchants demanded more effective legal procedures, courts and laws protecting their activities and inter- ests. Municipal authorities appealed for defined powers and grants-in-aid from an effective central government, in addition to the establishment of public welfare and educational facilities. Landlords pressed for grants of land, for the building of canals, railways and roads, and for the provision of tested seeds and live- stock. In religious circles Shiites and Sunnites continued to dis- trust each other. The most troublesome issue confronting the British was the growing evidence of Iraqi nationalist discontent. Arab and Iraqi nationalism, directed initially against the Turks in the beginning of the twentieth century, became increasingly anti-European after World War I. In July 1920 an anti-British revolt broke out in southern Iraq among many tribes which had for centuries jeal- ously guarded their political autonomy. The insurrection spread over one-third of the countryside which had been already aroused by the efficient British tax collection methods. For 3 months the country was in a state of anarchy; order was restored only with difficulty by British forces which had to call upon reinforcements from India. This episode, known to Iraqis as the national war of liberation, gave dramatic evidence of Arab dissatisfaction with foreign rule. Nevertheless, at no time did the revolt show coordination or general direction; throughout, many outstanding local sheiks and urban figures remained aloof from the insurrection; the Iraqi police and security forces were notably loyal to the British authorities. The British military authorities accepted the revolt as an object lesson. Civil disturbances had cost much loss of life and inordi- nately large sums of money, prompting the British people to demand the reduction of commitments in Iraq. In October 1920 the military regime was replaced by a provisional Arab government to be assisted by British advisers and answerable to the supreme 38 authority of the High Commissioner for Iraq, Sir Percy Cox. The new administration was to serve as a channel of communication between the British and the restive population, to give opportunity for Iraqi leaders to come forward and to prepare the way for eventual self-government. After a canvass of various influential personalities for the official chief of state, the British persuaded Prince Faisal, the deposed king of Syria, to ascend the throne. Prince Faisal of the Hashimite family traced his descent from Mohammed, and his ancestors had held political authority around the holy cities of Arabia. Hence he was endowed with traditional Arab standards of political legitimacy which he could invoke to install himself as the monarch of Iraq. Moreover, his achievements as a leader in the Arab emancipation movement made him an acceptable candidate to many Iraqis who were deeply concerned with the development of a national government, especially to the former Iraqi officers in the Ottoman army who had supported the 1916 revolt against the Turks. His candidacy, however, was spon. sored by the British to repay Hashimite assistance in World War I and to assure future cooperation between Iraq and Great Britain. A referendum of Iraqi notables, tribal chiefs and townsmen pro- duced an almost unanimous return favoring the selection of Faisal. On August 23, 1921, he was proclaimed king of Iraq. The British sought to cope with the growing nationalist de- mands for immediate and outright independence by concluding a compromise treaty with Iraq in October 1922. Intended to soften the Mandate relationship, the treaty gave Iraq limited control in the spheres of both foreign and domestic affairs but retained Brit- ain's ultimate mandatory power. Attempts to modify the 1922 treaty followed in 1923, 1926 and 1927; as a result, the British in December 1927 pledged to conditionally support Iraq's admission to the League of Nations in 1932. A notable step toward independence was the British decision in September 1929 to terminate the Mandate, support uncondition- ally the admission of Iraq into the League and to open negotia- tions with the Iraqi Government toward a treaty of alliance defining future relations between the two countries. This move was precipitated by the coming to power of the Labor Party in London. This change of regime was paralleled by the emergence of a liberal nationalist government in Baghdad under Nuri as Said, who the British authorities believed was capable of leading the country to self-rule. A new pact called the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty was signed in June 1930, providing for the establishment of a "close alliance” and for "full and frank consultation between them in all matters of foreign policy” and mutual assistance in case of war. Iraq granted 39 to the British use of air bases at Basra and at Habbaniyah and the right to move troops across the country. To be of 25 years duration, the treaty was to come into force upon Iraq's admission to the League of Nations. INDEPENDENCE Iraq became a sovereign, independent state on October 3, 1932, when it was admitted to the League. The British Mandate was automatically terminated. The independent government possessed adequate financial means to cope with many of its internal prob- lems because of its growing oil revenues; oil had been discovered at Naft Khaneh (about 90 miles northeast of Baghdad) in 1923 and at Kirkuk in 1927. By 1930 oil products were being exported. Among the problems confronting the government were the deep-seated Shia-Sunni conflicts. The Sunnites, favored by the Turks during Ottoman rule, had had more administrative experi- ence than their adversaries. The Shiites, at the time constituting 50 percent or more of the population and being very conscious of the presence in Iraq of so many Shia holy places, began to fear the possibility of complete Sunni domination in the government. On the other hand, some of the old-fashioned Sunnites felt that Faisal's 1916 revolt against the Ottoman Sultan-Caliph had been an impious act and were indisposed to give full support to the new monarch. In addition, many non-Arab groups, such as the Jews and Kurds, resented the accession of an Arab dynasty. Another source of concern to the new kingdom related to people living in the Mosul region in the north, the restless Kurds who were noted for their fierce spirit of independence and separatism. An ancient mountain tribe of obscure origin, they were converted to Islam after the Arab conquest of the seventh century. Most of them subsequently became Sunnites, supported the Sunni Ottoman rulers in return for a measure of local autonomy and remained loyal to Turkey during World War I. In recognition of their strong longing for independence, the Allies and Turkey in August 1920 conditionally agreed to the establishment of "an independent Kurdish State,” known as Kurdistan, to be carved out of the pre- dominantly Kurdish areas bordering on Iraq, Turkey and Iran. Because of altered political conditions in Turkey under Mustafa Kemal Pasha, however, this scheme failed to materialize, and the Kurds resorted to a series of anti-Kemal revolts in Turkey. In Iraq the Kurdish opposition to British encroachments upon their traditional autonomy erupted into anti-British and anti-Iraqi revolts in 1922–24. Their hostility increased after 1925 when the League of Nations awarded Mosul, to which Turkey laid claim, to Iraq; despite their traditional suspicion of all outsiders, many of 40 the Kurds in the Mosul region appeared to have favored Turkish rather than Iraqi rule. These problems were compounded by the death of King Faisal I in September 1933. His departure meant the loss of the main stabilizing personality in politics and the one figure with sufficient prestige to draw the politicians together around a concept of na- tional interest and to balance nationalist and British pressures within the framework of the Anglo-Iraqi alliance. His son and successor, Ghazi, was a strong Arab nationalist, but he was inex- perienced and unable to control the increasing factionalism stem- ming from tribal and communal tensions and the clamor of voices against Great Britain's dominant influence in Iraqi affairs. The years during which no stability was provided by royal au- thority were also years of increased desire for an effective role of government in promoting national welfare. Very important was the growing demand during the 1930's for general reform, in- cluding measures in the spheres of land improvement and distribu- tion, roadbuilding, irrigation, commerce, industry, public health and communications. Some politicians, seeking to capitalize on these demands and to lead the growing intelligentsia, responded with liberal and social democratic slogans and programs, while others looked to the emerging authoritarian governments in Europe as models for Iraqi development along vaguely fascist or Communist lines. In this situation the military began to inject itself into the political scene. The first military involvement occurred in October 1936 when a coup d'etat was executed by an alliance of the army, representing idealistic nationalism, and by a reformist political group, known as the Ahali (People) which advocated socialism and democracy. The incumbent government of Prime Minister General Yasin al- Hashimi was forced from office, and King Ghazi, a helpless by- stander, was put in a position of having to sanction a regime coming to power by unconstitutional means. In the course of the coup, Minister of Defense General Jafar al Askari, a highly re- garded older statesman, a leading pro-British figure and founder of the Iraqi army, was assassinated. Through the technique of the coup, various arm leaders deposed and installed a series of regimes in the course of the next 5 years, and a new process for making and unmaking governments became institutionalized. Another consequence of the coup was to split various politicians and generals eventually into two rival blocs, headed respectively by the pro-British Nuri as Said and the pro- German Rashid Ali al Gailani. After King Ghazi's death in 1939, the crown passed to his 4-year-old son, Faisal II, and the royal authority devolved upon the Regent, Abdul Illah, who was the young King's uncle and crown prince. WORLD WAR II AND THE POSTWAR IRAQ When World War II broke out in September 1939, Prime Min- ister Nuri as Said severed diplomatic relations with Germany under the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of 1930. Rashid Ali al Gailani was ostensibly neutral, but his sympathies lay with the Germans. By March 1940, when he replaced Nuri as Said as prime minister (March 1940-January 1941), he had gradually gathered the sup- port of Anglophobes in general as well as ultranationalists im- pressed by fascist ideology. Despite the opposition of the British and of Nuri as Said and the regent, he sought to maintain friendly contacts with the Axis powers. He further antagonized the British by returning to power in April 1941 through a coup and by at- tempting to modify the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty terms of 1930 gov- erning wartime conditions. The British retaliated by landing forces at Basra in late April 1941, and they justified their action under the 1930 pact. Many Iraqis, still in the flush of their recently won independence, re- garded the move as an attempt to restore British rule. They rallied to the support of the Iraqi army, which received a token amount of aid from the Axis. By late May, however, the uprising had been suppressed, and Rashid Ali and his associates had fled the country. Succeeding governments cooperated with the Allies. In January 1943, Iraq declared war on the Axis under the 1930 pact. In March 1945 Iraq became a founding member of the Arab League (Iraq, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Syria and Yemen) which was designed to promote "cooperation in economic, cultural, social, and other matters” in a loose framework of Arab unity. It also joined the United Nations in December 1945. Although the country opposed the creation of Israel in 1948, its external orientation was strongly pro-Western in postwar years. In April 1954 the nation accepted United States military assist- ance, and in January 1955 the government of Prime Minister Nuri as Said suspended diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union. In addition, in February 1955 Iraq signed a mutual defense treaty with Turkey (better known as the Baghdad Pact) to which Great Britain, Pakistan and Iran acceded during the year. Iraq's pro- Western policy culminated in the formation of the Arab Federa- tion (Iraq and Jordan) on February 14, 1958, as a counterweight to the avowed neutralist but anti-Western United Arab Republic (Egypt and Syria) that had been formed earlier on February 1, 1958. Internally, a prominent feature of postwar politics was the con- tinued dominance of men whose names had appeared regularly on Cabinet lists after the 1930's. Chief among them was Nuri as Said 42 who had sought to maintain stable government often through firm measures. He favored alignment with Great Britain and the West and attempted to modernize the country gradually by the judicious investment of rapidly increasing oil revenues. Though not always prime minister, he was consistently recognized as the ultimate arbiter in the affairs of state and, together with Crown Prince Abdul Illah, personified the government. Men who entered political life after 1946, however, found Nuri as Said and the crown prince out of sympathy with their liberal, reformist sentiments. Prince Abdul Illah's regency was terminated on May 2, 1953, when King Faisal II mounted the throne at the age of 18. In the postwar years the governing elite sought to accommodate growing liberal ferment for social and economic progress in part by permitting the revival of party activities that had been sus- pended during the war years, but the elder statesmen were not prepared to make any substantive concessions. Believing that par- ties were dominated largely by irresponsible opportunists, Prime Minister Nuri as Said banned all parties in September 1954. Antigovernment sentiments continued to grow as Iraq aligned itself with the West through the Baghdad Pact and as Pan-Arab nationalism became a stronger rallying ground for many in Iraq who were aspiring to their country's closer ties with Arab neigh- bors and to Iraq's greater role in world affairs through nonalign- ment. This trend was accelerated after the British and French armed intervention against Egypt in October-November 1956. At home the oil revenues, widely publicized by the government as the means by which the country would become prosperous, appeared to many to enrich only the already affluent officials and landlords. To these criticisms were added the new resentments caused by the firm tactics employed by the government against many opposition politicians who were denied access to power by controlled elections or in many cases branded as subversives and deported. THE 1958 REVOLUTION AND END OF THE MONARCHY The kingdom of the Hashimite family was overthrown on July 14, 1958, in a swift coup executed by a group of army officers under Brigadier Abdul Karim Qasim and Colonel Abdul Salam Arif. According to later statements by Qasim, he had planned such a move for many years. The coup, or “revolution" as the Iraqis have called it since, met virtually no armed opposition. King Faisal II and Crown Prince Abdul Illah as well as other members of the royal family were executed. The following day Nuri as Said was also killed after attempting to escape disguised as a veiled woman. The proclamation of the revolution brought crowds of people into the Baghdad streets cheering the deaths of two "strong men,” 43 Nuri as Said and Abdul Illah. The young King's death appears to have been regretted for he was regarded as a helpless bystander in the intrigues of Iraqi politics, but he was not mourned. In the ensuing mob demonstrations against the old order, the British Embassy was severely damaged by hysterical crowds. The leaders of the new regime, who declared their nation a republic, envisioned an Iraq reformed, egalitarian, democratic, united in spirit with the Arab world and committed to a foreign policy of nonalignment. Qasim declared his determination to resist all foreign ideologies—“Communist, American, British, or Fascist.” Amnesty was declared for political prisoners, and exiled opponents of the old regime were invited to return home, but the government dealt severely with more than 100 leading supporters of the ousted regime. In September 1958 an agrarian reform law was pro- claimed, and in March 1959 Iraq announced its withdrawal from the Baghdad Pact. The Qasim government was troubled, however, by divisive ri- valry within its ranks and by serious internal threats to its own survival. Many people inside and outside the government became disillusioned with Qasim's inability to consolidate authority and bring about any improvement in either political life or material prosperity. The first open split came 2 months after the Revolution when Deputy Prime Minister Arif's policies favoring closer ties with the United Arab Republic prompted Prime Min- ister Qasim first to dismiss and then to arrest him, setting off a propaganda war between the two nations. In December 1958, an unsuccessful anti-Qasim plot, rumored to have been organized with foreign assistance, caused further political tension. Colonel Arif himself was brought to trial on charges of endangering na- tional security. Although condemned to death in January 1959, he was pardoned in December 1962. Stability was affected also by frictions between the nationalists, and the surging Communists. Tolerated by the regime apparently as a counterweight against the powerful Pan-Arab and pro-Nasser groups, the Communist Party of Iraq rapidly gained influence after 1958 by infiltrating nearly all social and political organiza- tions, including government agencies. Aroused, a military contin- gent in Mosul revolted in March 1959 against the allegedly pro- Communist Qasim government but was quickly suppressed. There- after, the Communists who had a hand in subduing the military uprising became increasingly assertive and violent, causing Prime Minister Qasim eventually to restrict their activities. Meanwhile opposition from the pro-Nasser group continued unabated as indi- cated by an assassination attempt in October 1959 on Qasim's life during which he was shot and wounded. 44 The regime sought to accelerate economic development and to push agrarian reform, but it was frustrated by chaos resulting from the Kurdish rebellion which broke out in September 1961 and by bureaucratic delays and mismanagement. Growing disenchant- ment with Qasim's "personal dictatorship” and mounting Pan- Arab sentiments culminated in the overthrow of the regime on February 8, 1963. Qasim was executed on the following day. The coup was carried out by members of the Arab Socialist Re- naissance Party (Hizb al Baath al Arabi al Ishtiraki), better known as Baathists, who were aided by their supporters and sym- pathizers within the armed forces (see ch. 14, Political Dynamics). A National Council of Revolutionary Command (also known as the National Revolutionary Command) was established as the highest policymaking body. Brigadier Ahmad Hassan Bakr, a Baathist leader, became Prime Minister, and Colonel Arif was elevated to the nominal position of President. Within the Party, however, in- ternal dissension quickly arose between those favoring the pro- Nasser line and those opting for a pro-Syrian policy. THE ARIF GOVERNMENT The Baathist regime was ousted on November 18, 1963, in a military coup directed by Arif, who was known to have sympa- thized with the pro-Nasser group. A new National Council of Rev- olutionary Command was established, a nonparty regime which placed its important powers in the hands of Arif, who became president. Externally, the new government sought friendly rela- tions with all nations, notably with Nasser's Egypt. During 1964 steps were taken to hasten integration of military, economic, social, cultural and information policies of Iraq and Egypt by forming in May a Joint Presidency Council and by establishing in December a Unified Political Command; the latter organization was designed to expedite ultimate constitutional union between the two states. Internally, an uncertain cease-fire was arranged in February 1964 with the Kurds. The Interim Constitution was proclaimed in May 1964, declaring the Republic to be a “democratic, socialist state, deriving the principles of its democracy and socialism from the Arab heritage and the spirit of Islam." The fundamental law, still in force in 1968, stressed Arab unity and declared Islam as “the religion of the state” (see ch. 13, The Governmental System). On the economic front the government announced in January 1965 the Five-Year Economic Plan 1965-69 with a goal of doubling national income in 9 years. In April 1966 Major General Abdul Rahman Mohammad Arif succeeded his brother, the late president who had been killed in an air crash earlier in the month. CHAPTER 4 POPULATION According to the census of 1965, the total population of the country was 8,261,527. This figure included some 40,000 Iraqis living abroad as well as an unspecified number of nomads who, in the earlier censuses of 1947 and 1957, had been reported sep- arately from the rest of the population. Despite many difficulties encountered by the census takers, especially the presence of a nomad population and the mistrust of some respondents, the re- sults of the 1965 census, on the whole, appeared to be fairly accu- rate. Figures relating specifically to the northern provinces, how- ever, were unreliable because of unsettled political conditions in that area when the information was being collected (see ch. 14, Political Dynamics). Population estimates for the years following the census were not wholly dependable. The reported annual growth rate of 3.3 percent in 1963 was high by Asian standards, and the latest official esti- mate of total population—8.3 million for July 1966-indicated a rate of only about 1.5 percent annually. Nevertheless, it could be assumed that by mid-1968 the Iraqi population numbered at least 8.6 million and probably more nearly approached 9 million. The population has fluctuated considerably over the country's long history. Between the eighth and the thirteenth centuries, Iraq was a flourishing center of Arab civilization, and at the height of its prosperity it may have supported a larger population than it has today. Some estimates were as high as 15 million. Decline came swiftly, however, after 1285 when Mongol conquerors rav- aged the country and left its elaborate irrigation system in ruins. The pattern continued under the Turkish rule which began in the sixteenth century, and for hundreds of years Iraq remained an underpopulated backwater outpost of the Ottoman Empire. In the mid-nineteenth century it had fewer than 1.5 million inhabitants. At the end of World War I, however, a new era began in which economic development and the greater availability of modern med- ical care contributed to a spurt of population growth. By 1947, when the first general census was taken, the reported population was 4,816,185, and by 1957 it had climbed to 6,339,960. COMPOSITION The 1965 census reported a total of 4,205,201 males and 4,056,326 females or almost 149,000 more males than females. Some females may not have been reported, since Iraq is a male-or- iented society and the subject of wives is regarded as a private matter. In urban areas, according to the census, there was an excess of men over women, possibly because there were more men than women among the large numbers or urban migrants. The age breakdown of the 1965 census figures were not available in early 1968. It could be assumed that much the same ratios prevailed as were reported in the 1957 census (see table 3). There was a good possibility, however, that by 1965 the proportion of the population classified in the lower age categories had increased, since a trend in this direction had been indicated in the previous decade. According to the 1957 figures, 44.8 percent of the popula- tion was under 15 years of age; 49.9 percent was between 15 and 65 years of age; and only 5.3 percent was over 65. Table 3. Population of Iraq by Age Group, 1957 Age Group Total Percent of Total Less than 1 year 14 3.3 16.0 15.2 10.3 5-9 ----- 10–14 15-19 20-24 25-29 30-34 35–39 40-44 45-49 50-54 55-59 60–64 Over 65 Total 208,475 1,015,332 963,782 654,334 499,924 395,678 448,469 401,404 299,762 316,191 223,691 236,553 201,998 139,073 335,294 -- 6,339,960 is is so one in iso 5.3 100.0 Source: Adapted from Demographic Yearbook, 1966, pp. 156, 157. Two major language groups can be distinguished within the population: an Arabic-speaking majority found mainly in central and southern Iraq; and a Kurdish-speaking minority concentrated in the northern highlands. The two have no feeling of affinity for 48 there were none. The 1965 census defined the nomadic population as being made up of those persons who have no specific boundaries of land to live on and who remain outside the scope of the main economic sectors. This may account for their disappearance from the tabulations, since efforts to get the nomads to settle perma- nently on the land have been a feature of national development throughout the modern period. Little reliable information is avail- able, however, regarding the results achieved. In mid-1968 the country was divided into 14 provinces, 75 dis- tricts and over 250 subdistricts (see ch. 13, The Governmental System). Population density in 1965 averaged 48 persons per square mile for the country as a whole, but the provinces varied substantially in this respect (see table 4). In comparison, Iran, four times larger in size than Iraq, had an average density of 41 per square mile. Saudi Arabia, about five times larger than Iraq, but comprised almost entirely of desert area, averaged only 5 per square mile. Table 4. Population, Growth Rates and Density of Iraq in 1965* Percent Increase of Total Population Over 1957 Density per Square Mile 1965 Province Population 88 113 66 276 Mawsil Sulaymaniyah Irbil Kirkuk ---- Diyala Ramadi Baghdad Kut ------- Hilla Karbala Diwaniyah - Nasiriyah Amarah ---- Basrah IRAQ - 954,157 408,220 360,285 462,027 400,049 319,289 2,124,323 335,495 448,023 339,692 548,830 346,663 500,033 673,623 --- 8,220,709* 168 • Excluding some 40,000 Iraqis living abroad. Source: Adapted from Iraq, Statistical Abstract, 1965, pp. 39–50. The country's desert areas, like those of Saudi Arabia, were also sparsely inhabited, their populations consisting principally of no- madic herdsmen. Accordingly, of the three Iraqi provinces whose boundaries were extended in the 1960's to include former desert administration areas, two, Ramadi and Diwaniyah, with densities of 6 and 17 persons per square miles respectively, showed lower 50 population concentrations than the other provinces. The third province, Mawsil, included Mosul, the third largest city in the country, which raised the average for the entire province to 49 persons per square mile. At the other end of the scale, Baghdad Province, including Baghdad and its metropolitan area, had the highest population density—276 persons per square mile. An examination of density figures for districts and subdistricts shows that the population clusters in areas where the water supply and fertility of the soil are adequate for cultivation. It also points out the great variation in density within certain provinces. Diyala Province, for example, has some subdistricts where the density is 2 persons per square mile, others with 250 persons per square mile. There appears, at least in this province, to be a significant correla- tion between population density and land tenure. Areas where tenant farmers predominate have lower densities than those where independent farmers are a majority, because these can manage to exist on less land than the tenants, as they do not have to turn over a major share of the crop to the owner. The area of maximum population concentration lies in the center of the country and extends north and south of Baghdad along the Diyala, Tigris and Euphrates Rivers. It continues roughly in the northeast from Miqdadiya and Baqubah in Diyala Province southwestward to Baghdad, and to Fallujah on the Eu- phrates, 40 miles west of Baghdad, in Ramadi Province, then south- ward about 100 miles to the Diwaniyah area. Outlying pockets of dense settlement are found to the north of Baghdad, including the towns of Mosul, Kirkuk and Khurmal (near the border with Iran, about 35 miles southeast of Sulaymaniyah). Dense settlements southeast of Baghdad include the towns of Nasiriyah, Amarah and Basra and their environs. The distribution of villages within this general area has been influenced over the centuries by changes in the productivity of the land. In central and southern Iraq, entire villages have been relocated when surrounding fields were ruined by salination of the soil, by silting of the canals or by floods. In 1965 the country had six cities with populations of more than 80,000. The largest of these was Baghdad, the capital, a modern cosmopolitan urban center with 1,745,328 inhabitants. Others were Basra (313,327), about 50 miles from the Persian Gulf in the extreme southeast; Najaf (128,096), and Hillah (84,717), some 75 and 50 miles south of Baghdad, respectively; Kirkuk (167,413), in the north; and Mosul (253,311), in the far north on the Tigris River. The figures did not include those persons living on the pe- ripheries of these cities who earned their livelihood as agrilcul- turalists and whose environment was essentially rural. 51 DYNAMICS Birth and death statistics are commonly based on fragmentary information. According to the best estimates, the birth rate in 1964 was approximately 20.0 per 1,000; the death rate, 4.2 per 1,000; and the infant mortality was placed at 19.3 per 1,000. Whatever the infant mortality actually was, it would be expected to decline in the next decade, along with the overall mortality rate, as health services were steadily expanding. The urban population, especially that of Baghdad, has soared during the past two decades. This growth has been chiefly a product of unfavorable conditions that foster a low standard of living in rural areas. The land tenure system which was in effect before the 1958 Revolution left much of the cultivable land, espe- cially in the south, in the hands of tribal leaders, who rented small holdings to members of their tribe, often for a large part of the total crop. Tenants working small holdings, moreover, had other problems, including poor methods of cultivation, lack of water for irrigation and an inadequate system of agricultural credit. Other forces giving impetus to urban migration included the greater availability of schools and health services in the cities and the promise, even in an urban slum, of an easier life than in the countryside. The population of Baghdad and its environs grew from 1,056,604 in 1957 to 1,745,328 in 1965. Baghdad Province showed the highest rate of growth of the country's 14 provinces, a 63 percent increase between 1957 and 1965 (see table 4). Much of this increase was caused by the arrival of migrants from the rural areas, principally from the four southern provinces and Kut in the center. Of these, the vast majority traced their origins to some part of Amarah Province. In Baghdad the migrants usually found employment as unskilled workers, although a few became peddlers, policemen, soldiers, domestics, night watchmen or gardeners. They tended to concentrate in certain parts of the city, many of which consisted predominantly of so-called sarifah dwellings, temporary one-room structures constructed of reed matting. Next to Baghdad Province, Karbala Province has shown the Highest rate of growth (57 percent between 1957 and 1965); Su- karmanivah, Mawsil, Irbil and Basra followed. The apparent mouth of the northern provinces may reflect errors in collecting son compiling data because of the unsettled conditions in the area. may be caused by the growth of a few large towns; Kirkuk, *tuse environs lie several oilfields, one of which is the country's me pductive; and Mosul, near which are several smaller fields, Some oilfields are situated in the area of Basra, which is also the principal port of foreign trade. Emigration to foreign countries is a relatively unimportant aspect of population dynamics. As reported in the 1965 census, there were 40,818 Iraqis living outside the country. Of these, ap- proximately 30,000 were in neighboring Kuwait, which was drawing many Iraqi young men to work in its oil industry. 53 CHAPTER 5 ETHNIC GROUPS AND LANGUAGES Iraq is predominantly an Arab country whose people are more than 90 percent Moslem. The Moslem majority, however, is marked by an ancient split between the Shiites and Sunnites. Shia Moslems outnumber Sunni Moslems, but the Sunnites have, histor- ically, been the most powerful. Communities in Iraqi society have been defined, by themselves and by others, in terms of ethnicity, with language playing a major part, and in terms of religion. In some cases, religious and ethnic distinctions coincide. For example, the small group called Assyrians who speak a dialect of Aramaic are Nestorian Chris- tians. In most cases, however, ethnic boundaries divide groups of the same or similar religious affiliation, or religious differences separate one section of an ethnic group from another. For ex- ample, Kurds share Sunni Islam with many Arabs and with mem- bers of other, smaller ethnic groups. The Arab majority, on the other hand, includes Shia and Sunni Moslems and several small Christian groups. From the point of view of language alone even the Jewish community speaks Arabic as a mother tongue. In the mid-twentieth century, particularly since the 1958 Revo- lution, Iraq has formally stressed national citizenship in its In- terim Constitution of 1964, but ethnic and religious communities persisted in 1968, and attitudes rooted in old conflicts had not yet disappeared. Community formation and persistence have been supported by geographic localization of some groups, for example, that of the Kurds in the northeastern highlands or the Yezidi communities in the north and northwest. They have also been rein- forced by the clear and continuing separation of different groups in specific quarters of the cities, which was just beginning to break down in the 1960's. Moreover, ethnic and religious differ- ences have often been associated with occupational specialization. In addition, Islam, under Ottoman Turks and Arabs, stressed the rootedness of law in religion, particularly the law governing fam- ily relationships, inheritance and related matters. Hence, most 55 religious communities were given jurisdiction over their own members with respect to significant legal relationships. With some modifications this practice persisted in 1968 (see ch. 13, The Governmental System). Roughly three-fourths of the people think of themselves as Arabs, despite varied origins and significant differences in reli- gion and other aspects of culture. The deepest division within the Arab majority lies between Sunni and Shia Moslems. The com- mon language and common Islamic faith provide a bond in certain contexts, but not in all. The Kurds constitute the only other large ethnic group; other distinctive ethnic communities include Iranians, Turkomans, Armenians, Assyrians and Lurs. Some groups whose native tongue is either Arabic or Kurdish are, nevertheless, clearly distinguished in many aspects of their cul- ture from Arabs or Kurds; Iraqi Jews, for example, are Arabic- speakers, and Yezidis speak a dialect of Kurdish. Not only did Islam, Christianity and Judaism emerge in the Middle East, but some of the early controversies in both Islam and Christianity took place in the same area. Many of the sects that arose in those early years have small communities of adherents in Iraq and adjacent countries. Other religions, such as Mandeanism, had their origins in the Middle East before or just after the begin- ning of the Christian era, and their remnants exist in the mid- twentieth century as tiny islands in a Moslem sea (see ch. 11, Religion). Accurate statistics on the size of ethnic and religious communi- ties are not available, and estimates vary widely. For example, estimates of the proportion of Kurds in the population range from under 15 percent to more than 25 percent. ARABS Iraq is the only Arab country in which Shiites form a substan- tial majority of the Arabic speakers and, probably, a narrow ma- jority of the total population. They constitute from two-thirds to three-fourths of the Arabs. With the addition of small numbers from non-Arabic speaking groups, such as Iranians, some Turko- mans and others, the Shiites comprise from 52 percent to 55 per- cent of the total population. Iraq, unlike Syria and Lebanon, has relatively few Christian Arabs, although a number of groups are represented in the country. The division between Sunni and Shia Islam had its origins in the first half of the seventh century in a dispute over succession to the leadership of Islam shortly after the Prophet Mohammed's death. Differences in belief, practice and the organization of the religious community developed, and the relationship between 56 the two segments of the greater Islamic community has been marked by varying degrees of hostility (see ch. 11, Religion). Within the Arab majority the division between Shia and Sunni Moslems is associated with other differences in culture, in eco- nomic pursuits and in political participation and power. Thus, although most Iraqi Arabs are Shiites, Sunnite participation in governments in this area has been more extensive. The Sunni Abbasside caliphate had its seat in Baghdad from the eighth to the middle of the thirteenth centuries. After several centuries of war and Mongol rule, the Sunni Ottoman Turks ruled Mesopo- tamia until World War I, and they were succeeded by the Hash- imite dynasty, also Sunnite. Since the Revolution of 1958 most of the leading figures in the government of the Republic have been Sunnites. Under the Ottoman Turks the law of family relationships and inheritance was administered by religious courts and councils for each religious group. In principle, however, the Ottomans did not extend this right to the community whose members they consid- ered simply as heterodox Moslems. The Shiites acquired the rights held by other religious communities under the British Mandate (1920), and the Constitution makes it clear that they may have their cases heard in religious (sharia) courts presided over by Shia judges (qadis) (see ch. 13, The Governmental System). Un- derlying the relations between the two communities are the an- cient grievances connected with the conflict over succession to the caliphate (see ch. 3, Historical Setting). Memories of the conflict are annually reinforced, in the Shiite community, by reenacting some of the events of 1,300 years ago (see ch. 11, Religion). The Shiites have been generally more conservative and less open to modern influences and developments than the Sunnites. Arab nationalism, which stresses cultural and linguistic rather than re- ligious elements, has had little effect on Shia Arabs. Most of them, although conscious and proud of their Arab heritage, are also strongly aware of their religious affinity for non-Arab Shiites, many of whom live in adjacent Iran, officially a Shia state (see ch. 14, Political Dynamics). Shiites Most Shia Arabs are farmers who live in the alluvial plain of southern Iraq; some are semisedentary sheepherders and goat- herders living in the same area. The marsh dwellers living near the confluence of the Tigris and Euphrates are also Shiites (see fig. 4). Some Shia Arabs, particularly in the Diyala River region east of Baghdad, are merchants, and still others work in the lower echelons of government service. Shiites have occasionally achieved 57 40 48 TURKEY Mosul Sinjar Irbil ile Zab Euphrates Little Kirkuk Sulaymaniyah IRAN SYRIA Ricer Samarra DOR I Mandali Kazimiyah BAGHDAD Legend: Shia Arab Sunni Arab Mixed Shia and Sunni Arob Sunni Kurd Mixed Sunni Arab and Sunni Kurd_V Turkomans (Sunni and Shia). Yezidi Persian (Shia) Lur (Shia) Christians Jews Mandeans Rutbah River Karbala JORDAN! 01 + Euphrates Najat Amarah MI River Nasiriyah Basra SAUDI ARABIA KUWAIT Persian Gull 100 200 MILES 50100200 NEUTRAL ZONE SCALE NEUTRAL ZONE 48 Figure 4. Geographic Distribution of Ethnic and Religious Communities in Iraq. 58 Cabinet status, and one, Fadil Jamali, was prime minister for a time in 1953 and 1954. Under the monarchy, Shiites were often tenant farmers, fre- quently on the land held by Sunnites. As cultivators of the alluvial plain, Shia farmers have often suffered from floods, and many, particularly in Amarah Province, have felt impelled to leave the land because of its salinity and move to Baghdad where, until the construction of low-cost housing was begun in the mid-1960's, they lived in reed huts on the edge of the city (see ch. 4, Population; ch. 8, Living Conditions). These rural migrants to Baghdad come with little or no literacy and few, if any, urban skills, so that they formed, in the middle 1960's, a largely unemployed or intermit- tently employed group of Shia affiliation in a Sunni-dominated city. In the rural areas of southern Iraq, the Republic inherited a number of problems affecting the Shia farmer which were grad- ually being dealt with in the middle and late 1960's. The situation of the Shia agriculturist has been relieved by significant flood-con- trol measures and other continuing agricultural projects on the lower Euphrates and Tigris Rivers. Land reforms and reallocation policies, important to the rural Shiite, were also being imple- mented by the government (see ch. 2, Physical Environment; ch. 19, Agriculture). Proportionately fewer Shiites than Sunnites are literate, and even fewer have received education at the secondary and higher levels (see ch. 9, Education). Some of the variation may be attrib- uted to differences in value and religious orientation; some to specific historical circumstances. Traditional scholarships, as in law, played a greater role among the Sunni Moslems than among the Shiites who relied more heavily on the religious au- thority of their leaders than on the results of scholarship as guides to proper practice (see ch. 11, Religion). The intellectual ferment that began in the eighteenth century under Ottoman rule and took a turn to the secular in the late nine- teenth and early twentieth centuries affected Sunni Arabs, in communication with the larger Arab world, more than it did the Shiites. Finally, a far greater proportion of the Shia population than the Sunni has been rural, and Shia Moslems, therefore, have had little access to educational facilities. Sunnites The Arabs found along the rivers above Fallujah and Baghdad, on the plain south of Mosul, and the tributaries of the Tigris up to the Kurdish foothills are overwhelmingly Sunni (see fig. 4). Many are farmers and among them are included almost all of the true 59 nomads, Bedouins or camel herders, of the western desert. There are Sunnites in southern Iraq as well, particularly in Basra and some of the other larger towns. Before the implementation of land reform and in 1968 to some extent, many of the big landowners in the south were Sunnites. The literacy rate has been higher among the Sunnites than among the Shiites, and they have played a greater role in the government, as occupants of high political office and in the bu- reaucracy. The economic activities of Sunni Arabs, however, range from the bottom to the top of the occupational scale. Other Arab Groups Two Arab groups have ways of life substantially different from those of ordinary rural or urban Arabs. The first of these consists of the true nomads (Bedouins), largely Sunni, but independent of the settled Sunni community. In the 1947 census they were esti- mated at 250,000 and in that of 1957, at roughly 69,000. They were not separately counted in 1965. Over the centuries many groups of Bedouin origin have become sedentary cultivators and contributed to the ordinary rural population of Iraq, but until the early 1960's, at least, large numbers retained a way of life based on camel herding, involving regular movement each year between the desert and the rivers of southern and western Iraq and, for some tribes in the Jazirah, between the upper Tigris and Euphrates. The Bedouins regard their way of life superior to that of culti- vators or urban dwellers, and they have usually managed to main- tain a substantial degree of independence under governments in the area. In modern Iraq, however, their nomadism and independ- ence are considered by the government as both disruptive and unproductive, and efforts have been made to have them settle down. No information was available in 1968 about the success of these efforts. The marsh dwellers (marsh Arabs) are adapted to life in the marshes, permanent and temporary, of the lower Tigris and Eu- phrates delta above Basra. Other Arabs often apply the term "Madan” (yokel) to them, a name not used by the marsh dwellers themselves except to refer to those devoted exclusively to buffalo herding. Like most of the other rural people of southern Iraq, the marsh dwellers are Shiites, but other Shiites consider their Shi- ism to be distorted (see ch. 11, Religion). Some observers believe that the core of the group consists of descendents of ancient, pre- Arab populations. Along the Euphrates, however, their number have been augmented for many hundreds of years by Bedouins 60 who have influenced the social organization of the marsh dwellers but have themselves adapted to their way of life. In the east, among the Tigris marsh dwellers, there is some evidence of Per- sian influence. Estimates of the total number of marsh dwellers are unreliable, partly because the vast majority of them, who are primarily agriculturists, with a few cattle, are not usually clearly distinguished from other Shiite farmers in lower Iraq. In the early 1950's an Iraqi who made a close study of them estimated their number between 300,000 and 400,000, including the very distinctive buffalo herders, roughly 25,000, and about an equal number of reed gatherers and matweavers, who also practice a little agriculture. KURDS Kurds constitute between 15 and 20 percent of the population. With the exception of a few Shiites and several very small sects, Shabaks and Sarliyahs, most Kurds are Sunni Moslems, but their religious practice and organization differs in some respects from those of Iraq's Sunni Arabs (se ch. 11, Religion). Their homeland is in the mountains, foothills and higher plains of the north and northeast, an area contiguous with the Kurdish zones of Turkey and Iran and very close to the much smaller Kurdish area in northeasternmost Syria (see fig. 4). An increasing number of Kurds have moved to the cities, not only Mosul, Kirkuk, Sulayma- niyah and others in their own religion, but also to Baghdad. The Iraqi Kurds and those of Iran make up the southern sections of a Kurdish population that stretches north into Turkey and the Soviet Caucasus Mountains. Their total number is probably be- tween 5 million and 8 million. The largest single group lives in Turkey, but the approximately equal Iraqi and Iranian Kurdish populations are not far behind at roughly 1.5 million to 2 million each. Much smaller groups live in Syria and in the Soviet Union. Three groups of Iraqi Kurds are distinguished, and each is com- posed of a number of different tribes. The Badinan, an extension of the Turkish Kurds, live in villages ranging from the Syrian border to the Great Zab River and speak a northern dialect. The Suran live between the Great and Little Zab Rivers, and the Baban live between the Little Zab and the Diyala Rivers. Both speak a southern dialect. Each of these groups contains seminomadic herdsmen, freehold and tenant farmers and agricultural laborers. Although the Kurds have a tradition of nomadism, the majority have been settled agriculturalists or semisedentary herdsmen for some time. The latter generally restrict their movements to seasonal migrations between the lower and higher slopes of their mountain homeland. Until the second half of the nineteenth century, Iraqi Kurds formed a part of a larger Kurdish area-a vassal state of the Ottoman sultan. In the beginning of the twentieth century some of the Kurds educated in Turkey and Europe began to think in terms of Kurdish nationalism, but their interest was not shared by the traditional Kurdish rulers or the ordinary tribesman (see ch. 6, Social Structure). After World War I, and particularly after World War II, Kurdish nationalism became a more significant movement, in part as a reaction to Arab nationalism (and in Turkey, as a reaction to efforts to transform Kurds into Turks) and in part because more and more Kurds, including sons of Kurdish rulers, were educated in and influenced by the West. In Iraq and elsewhere Kurdish nationalism has led to brief pe- riods of Kurdish unity in opposition to dominate Arab govern- ments, but intertribal rivalries and conflicts between modern and traditional Kurds mark the relations of Kurdish leaders. They tend, however, to agree that Kurds ought not to become Arabs and that some of the wealth of the Kurdish highlands, including especially some of the income from the Kirkuk oilfields, ought to be used for the benefit of the Kurds. Iraqi Kurds make no claims for independ- ence, nor have they shown sustained interest in a Kurdistan (see Glossary) carved out of Iraq, Turkey, Iran and perhaps some other countries. Although the details of the Kurdish position have varied, general emphasis has been placed on substantial Kurdish autonomy within Iraq (see ch. 14, Political Dynamics). The Shabaks and Sarliyahs speak Kurdish dialects but are dis- tinguished from the main body of Kurds by their religious beliefs and observances. All of these groups consider themselves Islamic, but there seems to be a good deal of secrecy in their rites and little real information concerning their religion. TURKOMANS The Turkomans are village and town dwellers centered largely in the northeast, but there are communities in Tall Afar and Mosul (see fig. 4). They are related to the Turks but came to the area before the establishment of Ottoman rule in the fifteenth century. They have been estimated at between 1.5 and 2.5 percent of the population and are probably closer to the latter. A substantial majority are Sunni Moslems, but nearly a third are Shiites. Although they have had cultural ties with Turkey and a strong ethnic consciousness, there has been no significant movement for political ties. They participated in Iraqi governments, a few at 62 high levels, but more as members of the bureaucracy. Their rela- tions with Kurds have sometimes been strained, for the Turko- mans acted as peacekeepers in the northern highlands on behalf of the Ottoman empire in the nineteenth century, and Kurds have felt them to be intruders in Kurdish territory. PERSIANS AND LURS In some population estimates, the Persians and Lurs are lumped together, largely because both are Shiite and most Lurs live in Iran and often speak Persian although they have their own ver- nacular. The Lurs are a tribal people, and their role in Iraq is substantially different from that of ethnic Persians. Some estimates of the total number of Iranians place them at 2.5 to 3 percent of the population. Lurs alone may constitute from 0.5 to 1 percent of all Iraqis; Persians may be a somewhat larger group—from 1.5 percent to 2 percent. Most Lurs are concentrated in east Iraq, south of the Kurdish highlands, chiefly in and around Mandali, but there are others in towns and villages on the Tigris River and the Gharraf Canal, (south from Kut), and a number are to be found in Baghdad and Basra. In Iraq they are often village and town laborers, and many of them act as heavy porters in the larger cities. Kurdish nationalists have sometimes claimed the Iraqi and Iranian Lurs as "Fayliya” Kurds, but the Lurs do not seem to have accepted this designation and regard themselves as a separate people. True Persians tend to be merchants and religious figures. Some of the most important Shia holy places, Najaf and Karbala, are located in southern Iraq, west of the Euphrates and at Kazimiyah and Samarra north of Baghdad. Persian Shiites, particularly those engaged in religious occupations, either visit these places for long periods or remain there permanently. Persian merchants have always been active in southern Iraq, and many have been long settled there. NON-MOSLEMS Of the 6 to 8 percent of the people who are non-Moslems, most are Christians, divided into a number of groups, all but a few of whom have an ancient lineage in the area. Other than Christians the non-Moslems include the Yezidis, Mandeans and Jews. Christians Estimates for the total proportion of Christians range from just under 3 percent to more than 4 percent of the population. The latter may be more accurate. Political and theological disputes in the first centuries of the Christian era led to the formation of a number of groups which continued to exist in substantial isolation from later developments in Western churches. From the fifteenth century on, however, some of these became affiliated again with the Roman Catholic Church although they retained many of their own liturgical lan- guages (Syriac) (see ch. 11, Religion). The largest single group of Christians, perhaps 2 percent of the population, consists of members of the Chaldean Catholic Church. Historically, this community is linked to the Nestorian Church (Church of the East) now represented in Iraq only by a small group of people called Assyrians. The Chaldeans broke away from the Nestorians in the sixteenth century to return to the Roman Catholic Church as uniate Catholics (see ch. 11, Religion). Al- though some Chaldeans may use Syriac as a vernacular, most of them, unlike Assyrians, speak Arabic and seem to accept a status as Christian Arabs. The center of the Chaldean community is in the Mosul area, either in the city itself or in smaller communities north of it. A number of them, however, have settled in Baghdad. There are now very few Assyrians in Iraq. They have had a long history of conflict with their Moslem neighbors (Kurds, Arabs and Turks), and after the end of the British Mandate in 1932, they sought to obtain autonomy within the Iraqi state. At that time their titular leader, the Mar Shimun, was expelled by the Iraqi Government, and a number of Assyrians went to live in Syria. Some, however, remained in Iraq. There are small villages in the northeastern highlands where they have lived since the time of the Mongol invasions; others live near Baghdad and some near Kirkuk. Assyrians served in the Iraqi Levies, the British-con- trolled territorial force, during the Mandate period, and some stayed with the Iraqi Army when the Levies were disbanded after World War II. Those who remain villagers retain Syriac as their vernacular and cling to their Nestorian beliefs and rites (see ch. 11, Religion). The Syrian Church (Jacobites) were also detached from the main body of the Catholic Church by the sixth century. Like the Chaldeans they retain Syriac as a liturgical language but speak Arabic as a vernacular and consider themselves Arabs. Perhaps 10,000 to 15,000 live in and near Mosul, and many are grain mer- chants. A branch of the Syrian Church became, like the Chaldeans, uniate affiliates of the Roman Catholic Church in the seventeenth Century. Like the Jacobites, most members of the uniate Syrian Church live in the Mosul area, but there are a fairly large group 64 in Baghdad. They are largely urban and engaged in trade. Some estimates put their numbers at more than 100,000, at least 1 per- cent of the total population, but there is no accurate information. The Armenians, whose estimated numbers are as low as 4,000 and as high as 15,000, are relatively recent arrivals in Iraq. Most of the older generation entered the country from the Anatolian uplands following the Turkish violence against them there in 1915. Most Armenians live in the larger cities, particularly Baghdad and Basra, where they are professionals and artisans. In the Kirkuk area they serve as mechanics in the oilfields. Although many Armenians speak Arabic because their work requires it, they retain Armenian as their home language and as a liturgical language in the two churches to which they belong. Most are members of the Apostolic or Gregorian Church, but a few belong to the Armenian Catholic Church, a small group which became uniate affiliates of the Roman Catholic Church in the eighteenth century. Yezidis The term Yezidi is used by other Iraqis for a Kurdish-speaking group which calls itself Dasnayi. Their religion has pre-Islamic roots and has been influenced by several of the religious currents of the pre-Christian and pre-Islamic periods (see ch. 11, Religion). Unlike other religious communities they had no separate legal status under the Ottoman regime, and they have been largely set apart from the mainstream of Iraqi life. There are roughly 30,000 Yezidis in the country, most of them settled farmers living in the Sinjar district west of Mosul. Others live in the Shaykhan area north of Mosul where their neighbors are Christian and Kurdish farmers. The community has a strictly graded religious-political hierarchy headed by an emir (see Glos- sary), and they tend to maintain an even more closed community than that of other ethnic or religious groups in Iraq (see ch. 11, Religion). Mandeans The Mandeans (Sabeans or, to Arabs, Subba) are largely urban dwellers scattered among the towns along the rivers south of Baghdad. Their largest communities are in Baghdad and the towns bordering the marshes of southern Iraq. Altogether there are per- haps 4,000 to 5,000 of them. The Mandeans have a reputation as silversmiths, and many are boat builders, performing this service for the marsh dwellers. Their religion stresses the importance of immersion and regular ablutions, and they make a point of living near running water. 65 Mandeans have claimed to be Christian, “Christians of St. John," but this claim seems to have been made largely in order to gain status in Arab eyes as “people of the book," who retained certain legal and religious rights (see ch. 11, Religion). Their scriptures and other documents suggest that they are pre-Chris- tian and that they were regularly in doctrinal and sometimes in political conflict with early Christians. Jews Estimates of the number of Jews still in Iraq in 1968 range from 2,000 to 7,000. The 1947 census figure for Jews was 118,000, but they were unofficially estimated at 150,000, more than 2 per- cent of the population at the time. Most lived in the Baghdad area, but there were many in Mosul and Basra. The bulk of them left in the early 1950's, others after 1956. Earlier they were engaged in commerce, banking, moneylending, medicine and law, but the occu- pational, economic and social situation of the remaining Jews is not clear. LANGUAGE Arabic is the official language of the state and the mother tongue of more than three-fourths of the people. Many members of minority groups, especially the younger males, also use Arabic, often among themselves as well as in their relations with Arabic- speakers. Kurdish, the native tongue of 15 to 20 percent of the population, is the most widely-spoken minority language. Ac- cording to an agreement signed in 1966, it has an official status equal to that of Arabic. Smaller groups of people, in no case more than 2 percent and usually less than 1 percent of the population, speak other lan- guages. The European language most commonly used by the edu- cated segments of the population is English which, with Arabic, is employed in the universities and in scientific and technical publica- tions. Aramaic dialects were, until the coming of Arabic, the most widely spoken tongues in the area stretching from the Mediterra- nean coast to Iran and the Persian Gulf. Arabic became the prin- cipal language of Iraq only after Arabs from the south invaded the country in the seventh century A.D. as the bearers of the then new religion of Islam. As the indigenous population was converted, Arabic supplanted Aramaic. Kurdish, an Indo-European language, related to but in many ways different from Persian, is spoken by the main body of Kurds and by the Shabaks and Sarliyahs. The Yezidis use Kurdish as their vernacular, but Arabic is their religious language. Of the three Kurdish dialects, Kurdi is spoken by the Suran and Baban Kurds living between the Great Zab and Diyala Rivers. These, together, comprise the bulk of the Kurdish population. The Ban- dinan Kurds who live west of the Great Zab River speak the Kermanji dialect as do the Yezidis. Members of the small Kakai sect speak a dialect called macho-macho (or Gorani). Aramaic, in the form of a dialect called Syriac, is regularly spoken only by the inhabitants of a few isolated Assyrian villages, but is the liturgical language of Chaldean Catholics, Syrian Cath- olics and Jacobites and may sometimes be used in ordinary speech by the more isolated of these groups or by their older members. An Aramaic dialect is the sacred language of the Mandeans. Until the tenth century, when it gave way to Arabic, Aramaic was the ver- nacular of the large Jewish community. Each of the smaller ethnic groups speaks its own vernacular; Turkmanic, Lur, Persian and Armenian are the most important. All but Turkmanic are Indo-European languages. Turkmanic is related to Turkish and, like it, is one of the Turkic group of the Altaic language family. Many of these people are urban dwellers or are actively engaged in trade and other activities where they regularly have business with Arabs and have, therefore, learned to speak and often to read some Arabic. Throughout the Arabic-speaking world the language exists in three forms. The first form is the classical Arabic of the Koran; the second is a literary language developed from the classical and referred to as Modern Standard Arabic; and the third consists of local spoken dialects. Classical Arabic was a synthesis of some of the spoken dialects of seventh century Hejaz (the northwestern region of the Arabian Peninsula in which Islam emerged) and of the language of the pre-Islamic poets. It became standardized as the language of the Koran, believed to be the exact language of God's revelations to Mohammed, but as Arabic spread from the Atlantic to the Arabian Sea among largely illiterate populations, local variants developed. These are largely defined in regional terms, but there are sometimes dialect differences between no- madic or seminomadic and sedentary peoples in the same region and between different sections of the population in the same city or town. Modern Standard Arabic, the present form of the written language, developed gradually from classical Arabic. With the in- troduction of printing techniques into areas of the Ottoman empire during the last years of the eighteenth century, newspa- pers and books began to spread the written language beyond the 67 narrow range of the academic and religious community, until it has become standardized throughout the Arabic-speaking world as the language of literature, scholarly discourse, official pronounce- ment and intellectual discussion. Modern Standard Arabic differs from the classical in the omis- sion of certain syntactical features and in the inclusion of a range of new terms which permits scholars, scientists and technicians to deal with phenomena not within the experience of the people among whom classical Arabic was developed. Generally, new scientific terms are introduced into Arabic by individuals who wish to refer to something for which there is no unambiguous Arabic translation. Sometimes an English (or other European) word, printed in Latin characters, is used, followed by an Arabic transliteration. Sometimes a writer may suggest that an Arabic word or phrase be considered as a translation of a technical term. In either case, if the term meets with general approval it gradually works its way into the written language as a standard word. Modern Standard Arabic is commonly spoken in political de- bates, public speeches and university lectures. Classical Arabic is used for effect in speeches in which quotations from the Koran or classical poetry and allusions to early Arab heroes and the glories of Arabic civilization are the basic devices of rhetoric. As a spoken language, Modern Standard Arabic is effected to some extent by the sound and sometimes the usage of local dialects. Most educated Arabs speak Arabic at several levels: the local dialect and a rela- tively dialect-free Standard Arabic are the two extremes. Varying mixtures of the two will be used depending upon the situation and audience. Since Modern Standard Arabic is not the language of everyday speech, most people first encountered it on the radio and in the schools. Similarly the older literary form, classical Arabic, is studied in classes on the Koran, in Moslem schools and in classes on Arabic literature and grammar in higher schools. Real pro- ficiency in classical Arabic, however, is reserved to some scholars and students of religion. Most Arabic-speaking Iraqis speak one of the dialects of the Mesopotamian dialect area, a region stretching along and between the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers from the Persian Gulf to the Anatolian uplands in Turkey. According to the linguistic scholar, Haim Blanc, two large groups of dialects (designated as the gelet group and the qeltu group) are spoken in this area by different groups of people (see table 5). That the gelet group of dialects is spoken by nonsedentary Arabs throughout the Mesopotamian dialect area, but by sedentary Mos- 68 lems in southern Iraq only, suggests that these dialects are used primarily by the Bedouins of this area and that the sedentary Moslems of southern Iraq, but not other sedentary people, have been heavily influenced by the former. The dialect distinction be- Table 5. Dialect Distribution in the Mesopotamiam Dialect Area of Iraq, 1968 Dialect Groups Qeltu Area Gelet Southern Iraq ------------Moslem: sedentary Non-MOSIECI and nonsedentary Northern Iraq -----------Moslem: nonsedentary Jews): sedentary Moslem: sedentary Non-Moslem: sedentary Source: Adapted from Haim Blanc, Communal Dialects in Baghdad, p. 6. tween sedentary Moslems and non-Moslems in southern Iraq ap- parently did not exist during the Abbasside caliphate (750–1258). The recurrent conquests of the area by Mongols and related peo- ples led to a shattering of older urban populations, and many sedentary Arabs returned to a nomadic, tribal way of life. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries when the towns of southern Iraq began to grow again, many of the new settlers were Bedouins of northern Arabic origin. Their dialect, therefore, had a substan- tial impact on the speech of sedentary Moslems of that region, but little or none on the language of the non-Moslems or of the seden- tary Arabic-speakers of northern Iraq. In southern Iraq there are also clear differences between the dialects (although both are of the celtu group) spoken by the Christians and the now remnant Jews. There seems to be no such systematic difference in Mosul or elsewhere in Iraq. The Christian dialect of southern Iraq closely resembles the Arabic spoken by all sedentary communities in Mosul, which may be a function of the migration of substantial numbers of Christians from Mosul to Baghdad. Generally, the members of non-Arabic-speaking communities who learn and use Arabic adopt the Arabic dialect of the majority group among whom they live. Armenians in Baghdad and the Mandeans of Nasiriyah Province, for example, speak the gelet dialect of the Moslem Arabs. CHAPTER 6 SOCIAL STRUCTURE In 1968 most Iraqis shared a sense of common identity as Mos- lems and Arabs, but structurally the society was remarkably seg- mented. It included numerous ethnic, religious and tribal commu- nities, whose existence as separate entities long predated the be- ginning of the Republic in 1958; community members in many cases participated only marginally in national life. Still other social cleavages developed from the manner in which people grouped themselves in terms of kinship, occupation, neighborhood and way of life. Despite this heterogeneity, society in its broadest outlines con- formed to the generalized social pattern found throughout the Middle East. Major adaptations to the environment over a long period of time have produced three types of social organization. These are the nomadic communities of the pastoral peoples, the village societies of cultivators settled in the more fertile and well- watered areas and the urban centers of commerce and govern- ment. Each type has its own system of social stratification. Pride in one's own group and a feeling of moral superiority over those who pursued a different way of life colored the relations between these three fundamental divisions. There were, of course, wide areas of interdependence, especially in relation to production and distribution of consumer goods. In each of these three types of community-nomadic, village and urban—are units of social organization identifiable as line- ages. The lineage, the continuation of social organization above the extended family, consists of a group of people who trace their actual line of descent from'a common ancestor through a determi- nate number of generations. Beyond the lineages are clans, whose members claim descent from a common ancestor but make no attempt to establish the links through an actual line of descent. A system of clans and lineages of varying sizes and depths together forms the basis for the tribe. In the Iraqi context, a tribe may be formally defined as an aggregate of persons claiming descent from a common ancestor, who have some degree of residential unity, and who recognize the political leadership of one of their members. The authority of this tribal leader supplements, and in some cases supersedes, that of appointed government officials. Tribal organization is of greater significance among the nomads than among the settled population, but in Iraq it has persisted to an unusual degree among the sedentary population as well. Ac- cording to the estimate of an official of the United Nations Educa- tional, Scientific and Cultural Organization, more than 45 percent of settled village farmers were still tribally organized in the late 1950's. More recent information indicates, however, that among a large number of settled tribal groups, the tribe no longer has any functional importance economic, jural or political. Leaders of the 1958 Revolution had envisioned a change in the basic structure of Iraqi society, but in mid-1968 much of the tradi- tional social system that had existed at mid-century remained intact. The society was still basically divided into urban, village and nomad communities, although there were proportionately fewer villagers because of urban migration, and fewer nomads because of settlement programs. The traditional ruling elite had lost its political power, and members of the old urban class were no longer the pace setters for the entire society. Nonetheless, despite the implementation of a land reform program, many of them appeared to have retained at least part of their wealth. Meanwhile, living standards of the rural villagers, whose material position was to have been improved by this program, seemed much the same as before 1958. The major social change of the decade was felt within the urban middle class, with its military core, whose political power and status were rising. SOCIETY IN THE MID-TWENTIETH CENTURY (1918–58) Between 1918 and 1958, a period during which Iraq achieved independence and a greater role in world affairs, some important changes took place in the social order. In particular, access to power and prestige became freer than it was in the traditionally authoritarian and highly stratified system. In general, however, the major outlines of society remained more or less as they had been for centuries, with nomad camps, villages and towns contin- uing to define vastly different ways of life. Rural Patterns The rural population in 1957 numbered approximately 3.8 mil- lion persons, or 60 percent of the population. Typically, these rural inhabitants, whether Arab or members of the large Kurdish mi- nority, lived in villages, earned their living from agriculture and 72 regarded themselves as members of some tribe. The nomadic mi- nority was small, and its size was further diminishing because of official efforts to establish its members permanently on the land. The 1957 census gave the nomadic population as 68,000. Nomads Nomadic societies included several pastoral peoples differing in their ethnic and cultural traditions and to some extent in their type of nomadism. In the rugged mountains of the northeast, for example, true nomads of Kurdish origin belonging to one of the tribes of the Jaf federation lived in tent camps throughout the year. In the vast swamps along the lower Tigris and Euphrates Rivers, some tribes, such as the Suaid, were seminomads but mi- grated annually in search of grazing land for their water buffaloes. Bedouin tribesmen of Arab descent, comprising the great majority of nomads, moved with their camels and cattle across the country's desert areas, especially those of the southern provinces. True nomads such as the Bedouin tribes were habitually on the move for about 9 months of the year, traveling by day or night. With their large herds of camels and a few other animals, they followed a fairly fixed annual cycle, eventually returning to their starting point where they lingered briefly to dispose of surplus animals or to collect provisions. Their migratory routes were determined by the need of access to water and pasture for the herds. Each group had lands and water sources which it claimed as its own and stood ready to defend by force of arms. They usually traveled in rather small bands, of 20 or 30 tents. In contrast to true nomads, seminomads typically remained in permanent settlements at least part of the year, many of them doing some farming or maintaining some date-palm groves as well. Their paths of migration were usually vertical rather than hori- zontal, taking them from the plain in winter to mountain areas in summer. All Bedouins and many Kurdish nomads were tribally orga- nized. In the communities characterized by tribal organization, every individual belonged to a particular tribe, and his identity derived from membership in that tribe rather than from an asso- ciation with a specific place, village or town. This distinguishing criterion was retained even when, as happened with increasing frequency in the first half of the twentieth century, the nomads settled down and became sedentary villagers. The purely nomadic Bedouin tribes were divided into roughly five tribal groups, most of which had branches in neighboring Syria and Saudi Arabia. The largest of these by far was the Shammar confederation. Others, concentrated for the most part 73 west of the Euphrates, were the Sinjara, the Zawba, the Abda and the Anza. Tribal organization was based on the kinship system, with the extended family as its nucleus. Patterns of tribal organization and terminology used in connection with it varied not only between Kurds and Arabs, but among Arab groups as well. The Bedouins followed a complex system involving six levels of organization. In this case the tribe (qabilah) was divided into two or more subtribes ('ashirah). The subtribes, in turn, were divided into smaller subsegments (firqah); these, in turn, into still smaller units (fakhdh); and these, in turn, into lineages (hamulah). Lineages were made up of two or more related extended families. All members of the same tribe claimed descent from a single male ancestor. In some instances this forebear was a mythical figure. Family groups living together in the same household were commonly called beyt. Among Bedouins in Iraq, even the largest and most complex groups usually had only four levels extended family, lineage, sub- tribe and tribe. Next to the extended family, the lineage was the group with which the individual identified himself most closely and which functioned as a unit in grazing its flocks and in camping and protecting its members. Attached to certain in- fluential lineages might be found clients who served, for example, as armed retainers in turn for claiming the protection of that lineage. Within the lineage every individual had a core group (khamsah-literally, five). A man's core group ideally embraced all his patrilineal relatives within five steps of kinship relation- ship to him. They comprised his vengeance group—the persons on whom he could depend or who could depend on him when vengeance was demanded. Governmental pressures were breaking down the vengeance concept, but traditionally, if a tribesman was murdered, his relatives within his core group were required to avenge his death, and all members of the murderer's core group were regarded as legitimate targets for reprisal. Leadership among nomadic and seminomadic Arab tribes was vested in the heads of successively larger kinship aggregates. Every competent male could count on eventually becoming head of his own extended family. As a rule, among the extended families, comprising a lineage, one family had the hereditary right to lead- ership of the lineage. One of that family's senior males—not neces- sarily the most senior—was the head of the lineage. The headship of the next higher group in the tribe was similarly sanctioned and so on up to the leadership of the tribe or a confederation of tribes. In this hierarchy each leader exercised authority on the level to 74 which family and personal ability brought him. The traditional title of all these chieftains was sheik; the head of a tribal confed- eration was the permanent sheik. Within the tribe individual status depended on several circum- stances; among them was nearness of relationship to the common ancestor of the group. Those persons considered to be of highest descent; that is, those with the closest degree of relationship by direct patrilineal descent to the common ancestor, comprised an elite group. Standing within the group was also based on personal wealth and on approximation of traditional standards of conduct. In general, age was respected, and a man was subordinate to his elders and equal to persons of his own generation. The Kurds followed their own system of tribal organization. Among the Jaf, for example, with a powerful federeration of tribes and being wholly nomadic until well into the twentieth century, the largest unit of political organization was the confederacy l'ashirah). The tribal confederacy was made up of numerous tribes (tira), the primary political and landowning groups. Tribes were, in turn, divided into tent camps (khel), roughly equivalent to lineage segments but held together by economic as well as lineage ties. Each tent camp was made up of a number of house- holds. The tribal confederacy was ruled by a Beg, or Pasha; every tribe by a raiz, whose position was hereditary. The raiz was also the head of his own tent camp. Other tent camps were informally led by a headman subject to the raiz. Villagers With most of its people living in rural areas, Iraq, like other countries of the Middle East, was a land of villages, almost en- tirely agricultural. Crops and methods of cultivation differed from region to region, however, as did patterns of social organization. Many of the villages were inhabited by descendants of formerly nomadic tribesmen, separated from their forebears by only a few generations. In some villages, both Arab and Kurdish, the inhab- itants were still tribally organized, and the tribe retained most or all of its traditional functions. Among much of the sedentary rural population, however, probably a majority, tribal relation- ships no longer retained any political or economic significance. The distribution of power and prestige in these villages was rooted instead in patronage and landlord-tenant relationships. Regional variations in village social organization were attribut- able to a number of circumstances, among which the pattern of land tenure was especially important. Most of the cultivated land belonged to large estates, owned by Arab tribal sheiks, aghas (Kurdish chieftains) or city landlords. Only about 15 percent of 75 the land was worked by small independent farmers, found mainly in the central and northern provinces (see ch. 19, Agriculture). Rents paid by tenants to the landlords were high, sometimes 50 percent of the crop, but in return for this advantage the tribal sheiks and the aghas were expected to provide agricultural credit and advice and to assist in arranging marriages, judging disputes and protecting the interests of their people with the government. They were also expected to maintain a guest house wherein they dispensed lavish hospitality. · In one Shiite, Moslem village in southern Iraq, said to be repre- sentative of many rural communities in that region, five social classes were recognized. In ascending order of prestige these were the Subba (Mandeans), a religious minority; families of slave origin; commoner clans and lineages and their heads; members of the clan which had formerly ruled the villages; and the so-called holy men. All inhabitants of the village regarded themselves as members of a single tribe. The village had been subject to the authoritarian rule of the noble clan of that tribe for four centu- ries, until 1924, when the central government had intervened and abolished the sheikdom. The former sheik had taken up residence in Baghdad, but a few members of his clan remained in the village. The holy men claimed descent from the Prophet Mohammed and, when pious and devout, were highly respected by other villagers. They and their families were attached to one of the clans of the tribe, but they were actually unrelated to other villagers and tended to marry within their own group. The few remaining rep- resentatives of the former ruling clan were accorded a certain superficial respect by their fellows, but they were losing standing rapidly, and some had become absorbed in occupations which even ordinary villagers disdained. Ranking below the level of the more common clans and lineages and their heads, the descendants of slaves were more or less accepted as ordinary tribesmen, but there was no intermarriage with other villagers. The Subba, however, being non-Moslems, were regarded as religiously impure. Status within this system was ascribed at birth, and there was no mobility between its different levels. Mobility concerned only be- tween the upper and lower segments of the commoner clan and lineage group, that is, between those who comprised its leadership and the ordinary people. The leaders were appointed clan and lineage heads and other men noted in the community for their good conduct and knowledge of tribal customs and law. They were usually economically better off than the ordinary members of this group. Economic resources in themselves, however, were no criteria of social standing nor was there any special correlation between occupation and social class. 76 Living in the villages but only participating in a minimal way in village life were the representatives of the government in Baghdad. The large villages usually had a mudir, the subdistrict administrative officer who served as the government's administra- tive liaison with the village authority and who usually supervised one or more teachers, policeman and health workers and a regis- trar of deeds. These outsiders were dressed in uniforms of Western clothing and were often regarded with suspicion by the villagers and rarely entered fully into the life of the village or intermarried with the local population. Such social contacts as these outsiders maintained were usually with landlords with whom, educationally and economically, they were likely to have something in common. At times they also would be of a different religious or ethnic group from the villagers. Urban Patterns Urban society has played a leading role in the cultural achieve- ments of Moslem Arab civilization from the beginning. Islam itself emerged in an urban setting: the Prophet Mohammed was born in Mecca, one of the major cities of his time, and his early followers were drawn from its population. The great heights subsequently attained by Islamic culture rested mainly on the collective accom- plishments of theologians, scholars, poets and architects who lived and worked in the towns. The city of Baghdad, under the Abbas- side Caliph Harun al Rashid (A.D. 786–809), represented the pin- nacle of Islamic cultural achievement. In the mid-twentieth century the urban segment of Iraqi society was once again a dominant force in national life. According to the 1957 census, nearly 40 percent (2.5 million) of the total population of 6.3 million was urban. Three-fourths of a million (nearly one- third) of these urban inhabitants, moreover, were clustered in Baghdad. The next largest city, Mosul, in the Kurdish region, had fewer than 179,000 people. Baghdad was a rapidly growing and changing metropolis, the seat of government and the center of trade and communications. It drew its wealth and population from, and made decisions for the entire nation. Concentrated principally in Baghdad, the urban upper class was distinguished from the rest of the population mainly by its polit- ical power and its considerable wealth based largely on land. In terms of the economic resources of its members, the range of their activities, the character of their private lives and their position on the national scene, the upper class formed a clearly recognizable and internally cohesive group. It was comprised of the royal family, ministers and former ministers, urbanized tribal sheiks, the wealthiest landlords and senior civil servants and military officers. Nearly all were Sunni Moslems. Aristocratic families prided themselves on the nobility and purity of their bloodlines and the degree to which the behavior of their members upheld the ideals derived from their tribal heritage honor, courage, gener- osity and hospitality. British, Germans, Americans and other Westerners were freely admitted to upper class society but in practice tended to keep mainly to themselves. Most of the upper class lived in Ottoman-style villas with exten- sive gardens, situated in exclusive residential areas of Baghdad. This conformed to traditional settlement patterns reflecting segre- gation of religious and occupational groups and a tendency for members of one lineage to congregate in certain quarters of the city. The usual domestic living arrangement was a three-genera- tion extended family household. Emphasis was on privacy, and upper class women confined themselves mainly to their homes where they received their peers in regularly scheduled receptions. Beginning in the late nineteenth century upper class young men were given university educations at home or abroad. Modern edu- cation for carefully chaperoned upper class young women was a post-World War I development. At mid-century the urban middle class was far less cohesive than the upper class and was experiencing rapid internal change. Broadly speaking it could be divided into two sectors-traditional and emergent. The core of the traditional sector was comprised of propertied persons whose economic interests lay chiefly in com- merce and real estate, mainly successful merchants and small busi- nessmen. Impinging on this group were various religious and edu- cational specialists as well as artisans and tradesmen who shared their ideals and interests but were less prosperous. The emergent sector, by contrast, was chiefly made up of salaried military officers and civilian administrators, politicians and technical experts, all of whom were nontraditional in outlook, Included with this sector, but comprising its lower strata, were those persons who resembled the salaried group in every respect except that, with too few white-collar jobs to go around, they were unemployed. The chief resource of the traditional sector of the middle class was its productive private property, whereas that of the emergent sector was its influence on, or ability to manipulate, the machinery of state in its own behalf. Most Iraqis linked middle class status with a white collar occu- pation, which required at least a secondary school certificate. Manual labor was generally regarded as degrading and was com- monly associated with lower class status. A serious unemployment problem existed in the late 1950's at the executive, managerial and 78 administrative levels and among sales and clerical personnel. Of some 10,000 Iraqis who earned university degrees between 1950 and 1955, for example, fewer than 15 percent found positions in government or business. Many persons who could qualify for white-collar positions but could find no openings remained unem. ployed rather than accept work which would lower them in the esteem of their peers. There was a high degree of correspondence between religious and occupation groups. Sunni Arabs, for example, predominated among salaried civil servants. Religious minorities tended to fill socially assigned roles in the economy. The great proportion of Christians and Jews, for example, were merchants and artisans, and they were among the oldest inhabitants of Baghdad. The ba- zaars (suqs), where they engaged in their trade, formed a core area in the inner city. Later arrivals had to establish themselves on the periphery of the already-settled area. Like the middle class, the lower class grew rapidly in the late Hashimite period, its numbers augmented by an influx of rural peasants. Because of few economic resources and little or no edu- cation, these persons were drawn to the cities by the hope of employment in industry and by the lure of modern medical and social services. Beginning in the late 1940's increased oil income produced new employment opportunities for some unskilled workers. These openings were rapidly filled, however, and later arrivals, finding no jobs, were compelled to subsist on occasional employment and begging. For shelter they erected temporary structures on vacant lots, usually adjacent to permanent dwellings from which they drew their electricity and water. Established residents referred to them as the sarifah dwellers, after the reed matting which they combined with mud to build their temporary homes. Not all members of the urban lower class were living under such difficult conditions as the sarifah people. Many were gain- fully employed as semiskilled or unskilled workers in oilfields, in auto repair and small machine shops or as porters, deliverymen and domestic servants. A substantial proportion of lower class dwellings had electricity and water, and some had inside plumb- ing. Some public housing for workers had been constructed in various sections of Baghdad. tions of Baghdador workers had he had inside plu THE YEARS SINCE THE 1958 REVOLUTION The government headed by Brigadier, later Major, General Abdul Karim Qasim, which rose to power after a military coup on July 14, 1958, put into force a number of programs intended to reorganize the basic structure of Iraqi society. One of the primary tools of change in the economic sphere was the Agrarian Reform Law of September 30, 1958. Its principal goal was the redistribu- tion of cultivable land held in large tracts. This program was continued, with only minor modifications, after the overthrow of the Qasim government. Another instru- ment of social change was the nationalization of all private and foreign banks and insurance companies as well as of 30 industrial and business firms announced by the government of President Abdul Salam Arif in mid-1964. Workers in the nationalized com- panies were, henceforth, to receive a share of their profits. Confiscation of large landholdings in excess of maximum limits set by the Agrarian Reform Law had been largely accomplished by September 1963, at which time 85 percent of holdings subject to expropriation had been taken over by the government. Neverthe- less, the former large landlords have retained much of their eco- nomic strength. At least some have received partial or full com- pensation for their confiscated holdings. They have kept their most productive fields, and many have sought to offset their land loss by increasing their capital investment so as to produce higher yields per acre. Funds have been made available to them by the Agricul- tural Bank for the purchase of agricultural machinery. Finally, agricultural income is exempt from taxation under the prevailing income tax system. In mid-1968 salaried civilian and technical persons and military officers, most of whom were from middle class backgrounds, occu- pied a prominent position on the national scene. Along with a more direct influence on the conduct of national political affairs than they had exercised before 1958, members of this group had also gained certain material benefits. For example, about 120 housing projects had been built in Baghdad since 1958, of which the ma- jority were for middle-class government employees. By mid-1965, 90 of these projects had had allocated to them government-owned (or confiscated) land on which they planned to build. Of the funds allocated for expenditure under the Detailed Economic Plan 1961-62 to 1965–66, 25 percent was budgeted for building and housing. By mid-1968 the government had provided public housing for many of the sarifah dwellers in Baghdad. Several large projects have been opened or expanded for this sizable segment of the lower class population, said to number some 250,000 persons. Other members of the urban lower class, many of them also recent immigrants and still fully identified with their larger kinship group and points of origin, are concentrated, still by family, else- where in the city. As in the past, the inhabitants of any given 80 quarter tend to concentrate on a number of particular occupations. Given common occupations, religious adherence and kinship ties, these neighborhoods are generally set off from each other; jeal- ousies, hatreds and blood feuds between different lineages and neighborhoods continue to be a prominent feature of urban life. In the rural areas, meanwhile, the social and economic goals of agrarian reform are experiencing slow fulfillment. Confiscation of large landholdings is farther along than either redistribution or assistance programs for newly independent farmers. Nonetheless, tens of thousands of formerly landless families have been settled on small holdings that they work independently, either with per- manent tenure or on a leaseholding arrangement with the govern- ment. CHAPTER 7 FAMILY Family ties are far reaching and pervasive. In Iraq, as in other parts of the Middle East, the characteristic form of family organi- zation involves a large group of kinsmen related to one another through descent or marriage. The prevailing type of domestic unit is an extended family consisting of three generations—grandpar- ents, their sons, sons' wives and children—all living in one house- hold or adjacent households. Sometimes a nuclear family—a hus- band, his wife and their unmarried children—may break away and form an independent domestic unit. Because of economic pressures and the influence of Western individualistic values, the nuclear household has become fairly prevalent in Baghdad and other urban centers. Polygyny, though declining, is still practiced by a small minority of the people so that in either type of household an adult male may have more than one wife, each with children of her own. The status of an individual is generally determined by the posi- tion of his family in society and his own position within that group, rather than by his personal achievements. The family transmits values and standards of behavior of the society to its members, and holds them responsible for each other's conduct and to varying degrees for the punishment of those who do wrong. It determines the occupations and selects the marriage partners of its young people. Often, too, it comprises an economic unit, with kinsmen cooperating in farming or other pursuits, and with own- ership of land and other assets vested in the group as a whole. Because nearly all Iraqis are Moslem and bound by Islamic reli- gious law, different segments of the society show a great deal of uniformity in customs governing family affairs. Slight variations occur in such matters as segregation of the sexes and the negotia- tion of the marriage contract, but the same basic elements appear among Arabs and Kurds, urban dwellers, villagers and nomadic herdsmen, tribal and nontribal people. Although non-Moslems reject certain features of Moslem family life, such as polygyny, not sanctioned by their own faiths, they too share the same broad patterns. The sharpest degree of divergence occurs among the edu- cated urban Iraqis, many of whom are moving away from certain traditional family customs. Family life until recently was subject to regulation only ac- cording to religious law and tradition. The regulations differed not only between Moslems and non-Moslems but also within the Is- lamic community itself. Shia Moslems, for example, upheld the principle of muťa (literally, enjoyment), a contractual marriage of limited duration, whereas this practice was strictly forbidden under Sunni law. Minor variations differentiated family life among the followers of the two schools of law to which Iraqi Sunnites adhered. All Moslems were brought under a single body of family law for the first time in 1959 with the enactment of a secular law on personal status. First drawn up in 1947, this law was strongly opposed by the Shiites who managed to prevent it from being passed until after the 1958 Revolution. Known as the Law for Per- sonal Status of 1959, it was based on the Shariat (Moslem reli- gious law), statutes from other Islamic countries and legal prece- dents established in Iraqi courts. A brief amendment to the Law was enacted in 1963. The law and its amendment spell out provisions governing the rights of particular persons to contract marriage, the nature of the contract itself, economic rights of the partners, divorce and child custody, bequests and inheritance. Plural marriage is per- mitted to males, for example, only provided that the husband is able to obtain the permission of the court, that he has the financial means to treat all wives equally and that there is some lawful benefit involved. The Law for Personal Status is not applicable to non-Moslems, whose affairs are regulated by secular courts (see ch. 13, The Governmental System). The promulgation of this law in 1959 and its amendment in 1963 occurred at a time when the Islamic countries of the Middle East were confronted with modernization. Ideas, industrial production and power generated outside the Islamic world were having a strong impact on all aspects of the society, including family rela- tionships and the position of women. Some observers saw indica- tions of the growing disintegration of the extended family, as its members dispersed in search of industrial employment or partici- pated in government resettlement schemes which took them far from their place of birth. To what degree bonds between extended family members were weakening in Iraq in 1968 could not be reliably ascertained. It was likely, however, that physical prox- imity has considerable bearing on the strength of the ties between 84 kinsmen, since the ties of a family to its relatives in a distant part of the country tended to become weak in comparison with those to relatives close at hand. STRUCTURE The composition of family units is determined according to the principle of patrilineal descent. Both men and women trace their ancestry through a single line of male forebears. In a patrilineal society a man's connection with his father's family is more impor- tant than his connection with his mother's family, but in the Iraqi pattern not to the exclusion of significant ties with the maternal line. In any case, because of cousin marriage, the two lines of descent may be interwoven. Genealogical relationships can be ex- tremely complex. Kin Group Organization The basic structural unit of the family system is a three-gen- eration extended family consisting of a senior couple, their sons, married and unmarried, the sons' wives and their children. Other dependent relatives, such as an unmarried sister of the eldest male, may also be attached to the group. The senior male is the head of the family, manages its properties and has the final voice in all decisions. The extended family is traditional in the country and has been widely accepted as the ideal. Beyond the extended family, kinsmen are organized into still larger groups. Among most segments of the population the next level of organization is the lineage, which is composed of all per- sons, male and female, who trace their descent from a common male ancestor. The number of generations by which this ancestor is removed from the oldest living one varies; a depth of four to six generations is usual. Individuals or whole families of other descent sometimes attach themselves to a particular lineage in an arrangement of mutual advantage, becoming recognized after several generations as full members of the lineage on equal terms with those born into it. In small villages everyone is likely to belong to the same lineage, but in larger villages there may be two or more lineages. In such places rivalry between lineages is common but it is tempered by economic cooperation, intermarriage and the political authority of the village headman and elders. Among nontribal Iraqis, kinship organization and traditions of common descent do not go beyond the lineage. In tribal society, however, organization is carried beyond the lineage to the level of the clan, which is the political and territorial subdivision of the tribe. All the members of a clan are ideologically united by their 85 assumed descent from a common ancestor, but, as is true with lineages, with individuals or even with entire families, assimila- tion of outsiders can occur. Whereas awareness of distant kin ties has weakened among long-settled groups in the larger urban centers, it is still keen among recent immigrants to the cities and among the rural popu- lation. Many villagers and Bedouins can recite the names of every relative in both the paternal and maternal lines for six generations beyond the oldest living family members. Among the tribes, noble clans maintain elaborate genealogies, through which they claim descent from early rulers. Residence Patterns Among the rural population new households are not usually set up until many years after the initial recognition of a marriage. In general, the wife moves in with the parents of her new husband, where the young couple remains for a long period of time. Often this arrangement is maintained until the children of the third generation reach marriageable age, or until the death of the father. Even when the father dies, the brothers sometimes stay together, forming joint family households, comprised of them- selves, their wives and their children. The typical household is thus one made up of three generations of kinsmen all sheltered under one roof or in adjacent quarters. Among the marsh Arabs this may mean living as an extended family group on the same island. The physical crowding and forced coexistence tend to foster tensions, sometimes leading to the breakup of the extended family and permanent separation. When a serious dispute arises between father and son, the young couple may separate itself from the family group. The actual number of persons who comprise the household is determined by the family's economic circumstances, pattern of living and mode of habitation. In an agricultural society, as long as ownership of land and other possessions is vested in the family as a whole, the possibilities for a young man to set up an inde- pendent household are limited. In urban centers, on the other hand, young men can avail themselves of opportunities for wage- earning employment. Middle Eastern observers commonly allege that in the cities there is a trend away from the extended family and toward a greater emphasis on the nuclear household as the principal operative unit. In the case of Iraq, however, there are no reliable statistics to substantiate this assertion. up. 86 FAMILY AND SOCIETY Kinship groups are the fundamental social units, regulating many activities that in other societies are the functions of polit- ical, economic, religious or neighborhood groups. Rights and obli- gations center on the extended family and the lineage. The In- terim Constitution of 1964 declares that the family shall be the basic unit of society, whose principles are religion, morals and patriotism. The family is the primary focus of loyalty, and it is in this context rather than the broader one of corporate loyalties defined by sectarian, ethnic or economic considerations that the majority of Iraqis find the common denominators of their everyday lives. A mutually protective attitude among relatives is taken as a matter of course; kinsmen are expected to render one another special favors. Relatives tend to be preferred as business partners since they are likely to be more reliable than persons over whom one does not have the hold of kinship ties. On higher levels, deeply ingrained family loyalty manifests itself in business and public life. Authority Authority within the family is determined by seniority and sex. Among Moslems and Christians alike, the father, in theory, has absolute authority over the activities of the members of the house- hold, both within the confines of the house and outside. He decides what education his children will receive, what occupations his sons will enter and, usually in consultation with his wife, whom his children will marry. In practice, a wife may exert a considerable influence in the family depending upon the personalities involved, and in the case of the wife of the village headman, this influence may affect the entire community. Moreover, the wife in her later role of mother- in-law exerts significant authority and influence over her sons' wives and children. Respect for masculine authority and seniority is carefully in- grained in children. Much attention is paid to the formal deference owed to the father and elder brothers, and in rural families, sons -even after marriage—are expected to obey their fathers. A son may accompany his father to work in the field or to deliberations of the village council, but he should remain in the background and listen quietly to his elders. Within this general pattern a fairly wide range of variation can be observed. Among the marsh Arabs, a wife, both in theory and in fact, has little influence in family matters. She has scant authority over her children and is allowed no opinions regarding the management of family finances. By contrast, in towns and cities the opinions of wives and grown children of Westernized middle class families tend to carry increased weight in family affairs. Status of Men and Women In Iraqi society, as in other Moslem societies of the Middle East, the position of men in society is superior to that of women. Ine- quality of the sexes is fixed in customs and traditions to which the majority of the population remains attached. Great respect is given to men, especially to older men. Correspondingly, although all children are valued, male children are especially valued as the embodiment of the ideals of the culture. This does not necessarily mean that women are downtrodden, only that the pattern of the relationship between the sexes is mutual respect for a strict divi- sion between the worlds of men and women. The status of women is more nearly equal that of men in some segments of the population than in others. In general, the possibili- ties for movement and the degree of freedom are greatest for the women of educated and middle income groups in an urban environ- ment. Daughters of Westernized families in Baghdad, for instance, are given university educations, and a few can avail themselves of relatively rare job opportunities. Since World War II women who hold professional jobs in the large cities have gone without both the abaya (a voluminous and concealing black outergarment) and the veil. Nonetheless, sexual segregation still persists even among this sector of the population to a degree said by a number of observers of Arab society to be greater than that in Beirut or Cairo. Among the crowds in restaurants, cafes and bazaars, women comprise a minority; some restaurants have special sections where women, escorted by men, can seek relative privacy. Women's social life apparently still continues to revolve around activities in the home. Their participation in national affairs is minimal, but the Elec- tion Law of 1967 gave them the right to vote. A study of Kurdish women's life in Sulaymaniyah Province in- dicated that urban women of the lower income groups lived a highly secluded life and considered it obligatory, when in public, to wear both a veil and an abaya. In the confines of their own vil- lages, rural women of all types went without these garments. The wife of the sheik, however, always wore them on trips to town; moreover, routinely she was more careful about maintaining seclu- sion than were the ordinary women of the village, who found it impractical. Their daily activities took them to the village well, its 88 duty to take revenge against both her and her husband. A Kurdish girl may refuse to marry her parents' choice of a partner for her but not without greatly insulting them, so that this seldom hap- pens. Among educated urbanites the traditional method of con- tracting marriages apparently is giving way toward a pattern in which the young persons make their own choices. Parents, how- ever, still must approve. Marriages contracted within the extended family are preferred, and those between the children of brothers are still regarded as ideal. Such marriages are favored for a number of reasons. A girl married to the son of her father's brother remains in the same extended family as her parents. Thus, conflicts of loyalty are less likely to arise, and both sets of parents are more likely to be satisfied that the match is socially suitable since the young couple are of the same descent. Moreover, the bride's father acquires the support of a son-in-law who already has a close relationship with him as his nephew; and finally, if a girl gets an inheritance, it remains in the family. In return for these advantages and in the interests of family solidarity there is a reduced bride-price for intralineage marriage. The bride-price for extra-lineage marriages is high; the father who seeks financial advantage by marrying his daughter outside the lineage must face severe criticism or outright opposition from his brothers. Among the educated urbanites much less emphasis is placed on the desirability of finding a partner within the lineage. The rights of Moslems to marry non-Moslems are governed by provisions of the Koran, which are upheld in Iraqi secular law. Thus, Article 17 of the Law for Personal Status of 1959 gives a Moslem man the right to marry a non-Moslem woman provided that she is a believer in a revealed religion—that is, Judaism or Christianity. The Moslem women is less free, however, as she may not marry a non-Moslem. Marriage between members of the Sun- nite and Shiite branches of Islam, although not forbidden either by law or by tradition, is generally disapproved and avoided. Polygyny in Islam is regulated by tradition and Koranic pre- scription. A Sunnite is allowed a maximum of four wives, and he is enjoined to treat them equally and to provide each with a separate domicile. He must also pay the bride-price for each and support the children. In the modern period several Moslem countries have en- acted legislation prohibiting plural marriage; in Iraq marriage with more than one wife is permitted. In accordance with the Law for Personal Status a man may not take another wife without the express permission of a judge of the religious court. In any case, economic circumstances rule out the possibility of plural marriage for most men. 90 Only the relatively well-to-do are able to support a sec- ond family, and it has been estimated by some students of Iraqi society that fewer than 10 percent of the Iraqis have more than one wife. Polygyny is most prevalent among small land- owners, to whom plural marriage is a symbol of wealth and status. It is becoming increasingly unusual in cities and towns and tends to be deprecated by educated groups. Marriage formalities, which provide an occasion for reaffir- mation of kinship ties, vary somewhat from region to region. In the villages and in conservative urban circles two ceremonies pre- cede a Moslem marriage; the engagement (khutbah) and the signing of the contract (katb al kitab). For the engagement a few relatives and friends are invited to the bride's house, where the parents of the couple announce the forthcoming marriage. Held sometime later, the ceremony of signing the contract is attended by a judge of a religious court and a large gathering of friends; neither bride nor bridegroom need be present. The marriage is not a religious event, but a contract freely reached by the parties involved and this agreement, whether documented or not, must be made public. Among the Kurds a village wedding involves a festive breakfast followed by dancing, lasting the better part of a day. Men and women congregate separately at the bridegroom's house for the festivities; the men fetch the bride from her home while the women wait to greet her as she arrives in the bridal conveyance. Certain differences mark the ceremonies in an urban setting. For example, the bride does not arrive for the festivities until late afternoon and is escorted by women rather than by the men, who have been spending the day in the company of the bridegroom. A week later a festive meal is shared by the men of the two families. Divorce is usually effected through repudiation of the wife by the husband. Repudiation has many forms, and depending on the manner in which it is done, it is considered either revocable or definite. In the first case, the marriage is not automatically dis- solved, and the repudiation can be withdrawn; in the second, the conjugal community is dissolved. Among the most common forms of repudiation is the so-called triple repudiation, whereby a hus- band pronounces the traditional formula, “I divorce you,” three times. The formula is supposed to be repeated during three succes- sive states of purity from menstruation of his wife, but it has become customary to do it in one declaration. Another common form of repudiation is by the oath of the husband to abstain from marital intercourse for 4 months; if the oath is upheld, the repu- diation becomes definite. Under certain circumstances, a wife may obtain a divorce by repudiating her husband, but this rarely hap- 91 pens. Marriages can also be ended by a decision of a judge of the religious court, acting either on his own initiative or at the request of one of the spouses. Dissatisfaction with traditional forms of divorce has been in- creasing in recent years, and among Westernized townspeople uni- lateral divorces are becoming less common. In any case, divorce is not as common as might be expected. A man divorcing his wife without good cause incurs censure and loss of honor, and he must pay her the amount of the pride-price reserved in the marriage contract for this contingency; the problems of contracting another marriage are themselves a deterrent. Under Moslem law the children of divorced parents belong to the father, but they gener- ally remain with the mother until the age of 7, in the case of boys, and 9, in the case of girls. Child Rearing Economic motivation and considerations of prestige and family strength all contribute to the traditional high value placed on large families. The greater the number of children, especially sons, the greater the prestige of the father and, through him, that of the family as a whole. Among the lower income group, children are regarded as economic assets, the cost of their maintenance is small, and they begin to contribute to the family income at an early age. The subordinate position of the daughter-in-law in the household of her husband's family provides an additional motive for having many offspring, since the young wife, unless she is from a more important family than her husband, gains prestige and position only with the birth of children. A childless woman, often said to be cursed by God, is regarded with commiseration mixed with contempt. Failure to bear children may result in di- vorce or in the husband's taking a second wife. The birth of a child is a matter for celebration, especially if the baby is a boy. Boys are especially welcome since they are the carriers of the family tradition, and their economic contribution in an agricultural society is greater than that of girls. Babies are breast fed, and weaning generally takes place at about 2 years of age. Between the ages of 3 and 6, children are allowed consider- able freedom and learn by imitating older brothers and sisters, but in later childhood they begin to be trained for their adult roles. Strong emphasis is placed on teaching the child to conform to the patterns laid down by his elders and to be a loyal and obedient member of the family group. The paramount importance of family solidarity is stressed, and the child learns that his wants are to be 92 subordinated to the interests of the family, through which his own interests will best be served. The concept of honor and personal dignity is stressed in the disciplining of children; the disgrace attaching to improper behavior, to interrupting one's elders, for example, is made plain to the child, who from an early age learns to associate propriety with conformity. In early life children have more and closer contacts with their mothers than with their fathers, who tend in public, at least, to avoid expressions of affection toward their offspring. Later the responsibility for the upbringing of a boy passes into the hands of his spiritual guardian-his father or a close relative on his fa- ther's side, who prepares him for adulthood. During the same years a girl is trained by her mother for her eventual role in her husband's household. The child passes quickly from adolescence into maturity. Upon reaching puberty there is a separation of the sexes; girls are ex- cluded from male society except that of their own close kin. Daughters maintain only a distant and respectful relationship with their fathers. Great emphasis is put on premarital chasity in women, and a young girl is watched carefully so that she may not be the cause of damage to family honor. This is one reason for their early marriage, which usually is arranged at about 15 or 16 years of age for girls in villages and in nomadic groups. Boys have greater freedom than girls during adolescence and, at that time, begin to be drawn into the company of their fathers and the world of men. Young married couples leave the bridegroom's parental house- hold only in unusual circunstances, such as the result of a serious quarrel between father and son. The young wife is supposed to relinquish her loyalty to her own father and brothers and identify herself completely with the family of her husband. In practice, however, the wife retains ties and contacts with her own lineage, and in the event of a marital dispute can return to her father's house. Property and Inheritance For Moslems, property holding and inheritance are governed by detailed regulations set forth in the Koran, the traditions of the Prophet Mohammed and other rulings based on these sources. In general, important property holdings are passed down within the lineage from father to son, from one male paternal kinsman to another. Women have certain property rights and own such things as jewelry and other movable wealth, but land and livestock are usually owned by men and administered for the collective welfare of the kin group. Ordinarily a married man owns no land while his 93 surviving aw for Pestate are father lives; on the father's death assets may be divided or held as common property by the surviving sons. An amendment in 1963 to the Law for Personal Status of 1959 establishes the principle that shares of an estate are to be distrib- uted to surviving family members in accordance with a fixed table. For example, sons inherit equally, and each son receives twice as much as a daughter. Wives usually inherit one-eighth of the hus- band's property, but are entitled to one-fourth if there are no children to share the legacy. It is likely, however, that in practice the formula is not followed; in many cases wives and daughters probably get less than the amount to which they are entitled or nothing at all. CHAPTER 8 LIVING CONDITIONS The general standard of living in 1968 was modest, and in some rural areas just on the level of subsistence. Most Iraqis regard privation and hardship as divinely willed and, therefore, to be accepted with equanimity. Such beliefs, rooted in Islamic tradition, also account for the indifference of many villages toward initiating or accepting changes designed to improve their material surround- ings. Modern social and political ideologies that gained prominence after the Revolution of 1958 have begun to change traditional attitudes, especially among urban groups which have begun to look to the government as a source of public welfare. In the rural areas, where for many centuries contact with government officials was synonymous with tax collection and military conscription, govern- ment welfare activities are still viewed with some reserve. The effects of poor sanitation and of limited water and electrical supplies are felt both in the countryside and in the cities. In rural areas flood control and irrigation projects initiated since the 1920's have helped increase crop yields, but inadequate roads and the lack of transportation and communication isolate some commu- nities from the services that would otherwise be available from provincial authorities. Major cities and the provincial towns have a number of characteristics in common. City life has greater com- plexity, however, and tends to magnify the difference between the prosperous and those living on a subsistence level even though all benefit from the easier access to schools and medical facilities. Traditionally, the family or larger kinship group was the pri- mary welfare agent. The burden of public welfare was supported by a system of recognized rights and obligations not only between kinsmen but also between landlord and tenant farmer, and em- ployer and worker as well. Differences in wealth and privilege in the community at large were mutually understood and accepted as part of the natural order of things, but the wealthy were expected to assist the poor. Absentee landlordism, urbanization and popula- tion growth, in addition to the beginnings of industrialization and the increase of wage labor, have all tended to break down the small-group pattern and the highly personalized system of rela- 95 tionships through which the society formerly secured the welfare of its members. The family, in particular, has become less able to function as the self-sufficient economic unit it was in the past. The combined earn- ings of the members of a peasant family that has moved to the city usually exceed its previous income, but as wageworkers the indi- vidual members no longer constitute a single, close-knit economic unit and thus lack the relative security they had known on the land. The single individual who leaves for the city can no longer rely on his family for security in times of economic difficulty unless a relative has moved there before him. Nor can the rural family depend on contributions from one of its members who has succeeded in the city, because his earnings are generally too unreli- able and too small for him to be able to bear his share of family responsibility for those remaining on the land. Governmental initiative in welfare, mostly in the form of public works projects, began in the 1920's. During the 1950's labor and social security legislation was enacted, and projects to expand the school system were started, in addition to small-scale rural im- provement and public health schemes. Since 1960, housing and the improvement of municipal services have been the favored areas of government welfare spending. Special efforts also have been directed at improving the housing and living conditions of the sarifah (reed hut) dwellers and the rural migrants who have set- tled in increasing numbers on the outskirts of Baghdad and other major cities in search of urban employment. The continued con- cern of the government with public welfare is reflected in the budget of the Five-Year Economic Plan 1965–69, which allocated the second largest item of its total expenditures to housing, public health and educational projects. In 1967 almost 36 percent of the state budget was allocated for social and educational services. Debilitating diseases, notably parasitic infections, are wide- spread and are a major cause of low productivity in agriculture and industry. Most of these are traceable to polluted drinking water and to the lack of sanitation and personal hygiene. Smallpox and cholera have been brought under control by vaccinations, and the incidence of malaria has been reduced by spraying. Major improvements in the general level of health, however, remain de- pendent on the large-scale introduction of clean water sources and sewage systems. Medical facilities and the number of trained personnel are inadequate. Physicians, numbering somewhat more than 1,400, practice mainly in Baghdad and its vicinity. Curative and preventive services are free, but the majority of hospitals are located in Baghdad and in the provincial capitals, and people in 96 the countryside often have no access to rural clinics because of the lack of transportation. STANDARDS OF LIVING With rare exceptions rural Iraqis subsist only on the barest necessities. Famines are infrequent, but when crop failures occur many rural families suffer from hunger. Since agricultural tech- niques are largely inefficient, villagers must work hard to maintain even minimal standards of living. Tenant farmers consume a large portion of their share of the crop as food. A small cash income, obtained from the sale of dates or sesame crops or from wage- earning expeditions to the nearest town, is used to purchase sugar, tea, tobacco and clothing. Additional material aspirations rarely extend beyond the possession of footwear and perhaps a watch. A transistor radio confers special prestige upon its owner, but only the more affluent villagers are able to afford one. In general, how- ever, cash incomes are insufficient to cover the basic needs of the rural family, and many villagers are deeply in debt. Medical and recreational facilities and schools are scarce. Public life is centered around the mosque, in the guesthouses of wealthier inhabitants and, in the larger villages, in the coffeehouse. The marsh dwellers, living in the south between the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers, derive cash incomes by weaving reed mats sup- plemented by the cultivation of summer crops, cattle breeding, temporary urban jobs, fishing and occasional hunting of wild fowl. Although the economic activities of the marsh dwellers are more varied than those of most villagers, indebtedness among them is frequent. Tribal nomads live as frugally as village cultivators. Living con- ditions in this sector of the population vary, ranging from the minimal standards of groups who eke out an existence with a few sheep and seasonal wage labor to the relative comfort and suf- ficiency of certain camel-raising tribes whose members in some cases also derive income from agricultural holdings. Urban dwellers may not have to work so hard for food, shelter and clothing, but only a few of them are able to buy luxuries or to save money. To those who can afford more than the basic necessi- ties, however, cities offer a certain variety in consumer goods. Whenever possible, urban Iraqis prefer to spend surplus cash on imported items used to decorate the home, personal ornaments (especially jewelry), cosmetics, food supplements and transistor radios. Urbanities also benefit by the proximity of schools and med- ical clinics. Recreational facilities are more varied than in the countryside, although in the cities, as in the villages, visiting the 97 coffeehouse remains a favorite diversion, especially among the older residents. Mud bricks, fired bricks, and mud and reed are used most com- monly for house construction in the countryside as well as in the towns and cities. Although these materials are readily available, the dwellings made of them deteriorate quickly and provide little protection against dampness, floods and cold. Wooden beams for roofs and supporting frames are expensive, and poor families find it difficult to obtain them. In the northern part of the country, however, wood as well as natural stone are extensively used in construction. The common fuels are dung cake and twigs, ade- quate for cooking but not for heating. In the towns and cities small kerosene stoves are used; gas heat is available in some of the modern buildings in Baghdad and Basra. Because locally produced textiles cover only about 40 percent of domestic needs, cotton and wool supplies must be imported and are consequently expensive. Second-hand Western style garments are also available in the bazaars of small towns and in the cities. The acquisition of adequate clothing places a strain on many low and middle income budgets; in the rural areas dairy products and woven reed mats are often bartered for clothing. The estimated annual average per capita income rose from 66.9 dinars in 1963 to 69.1 dinars in 1965 (1 dinar equals US$2.80— see Glossary). The data upon which these estimates are based in- clude a few personal incomes of considerable size, but the great majority of earnings are barely above subsistence level. Since the late 1950's a potential bridge between income levels has begun to appear with the emergence of white-collar workers and profes- sional people who constitute a developing middle income group. The consumption patterns of this group and of clerks, artisans and small shopkeepers are threatened by the rising cost of living. De- spite official attempts to curb the increase in prices, the cost of food and of essential consumer goods in Baghdad rose from 104 points in 1961 to about 118 points in 1966. During the first quarter of 1967, however, the prices of consumer goods remained rela- tively steady, although that year's harvest was poor. Statistics are lacking regarding the allocation of expenditures in the aver- age urban dweller's budget. Data published during the late 1950's indicate that nearly two-thirds of urban incomes was spent on food, rent and essential clothing. Because luxury items are im- ported and therefore expensive, middle-income groups feel price rises more than do the urban poor whose small incomes are spent on local items and therefore have a broader purchasing power. 98 Housing Rural The majority of Iraqis live in villages, most of which are lo- cated along rivers or canals. The dwellings are built in clusters forming irregular patterns and connected to each other by narrow passageways. Sometimes there is a rudimentary network of narrow, tortuous streets which may end in blind alleys. The larger villages have a plaza in the center where the mosque, the cof- feehouse and the shops are located. The common type of rural house is a rectangular hut, built of mud brick, roofed with reeds or twigs or covered with a mud dome. Most of these dwellings are low, and except for a narrow entrance have no apertures. A single room accommodates the family. Animals are kept in a small, rectangular walled courtyard in rear of the hut, although they sometimes share the living quar- ters with the family. Some villagers build their houses of a cement made of straw and mud and, when wooden beams are available, use them to support the roof. The dirt floors are covered with pressed wool or with mats. Furniture is lacking except for one or more wooden chests used for storage. Household possessions may include a few wool comforters, aluminum cooking pans and crockery teapots. Working tools, notably pitchforks and scythes, are mostly handmade. Bedouins live in square-topped black tents, made of goat's or camel's hair. In the marshes between the lower Tigris and Euphrates Rivers, villages are built in the center of a shallow lagoon, surrounded by reed beds. Consisting of a few hundred dwellings, each village appears to be a small island. The individual dwellings are built on a sodden platform made of bundles of rushes and surrounded by a low reed fence. New layers of rushes are added as the platform level subsides. Five or more parallel ribs, made of bundles of reeds, constitute the framework of the dwelling. The ribs are made of tightly bound bundles of reeds which are set into the ground op- posite each other. Their tips are then pulled together to form arches which are covered with a treble or quadruple thickness of overlapping reed mats. The interiors of the marsh dwellers' houses are divided by a platform made of bundles of reeds, which sep- arate the family quarter from the reception area where the head of the household entertains his male companions. During floods, when water seeps into the dwelling, the platform is used by the family as a temporary refuge. The family quarters are used for cooking and for storing household possessions, such as cooking pots, earthenware pitchers, mortars and pestles, fishing equipment and grain reserves. Wealthy villagers maintain guesthouses, in ad- 99 dition to family dwellings. A spacious, barrel-vaulted structure about 20 feet wide and 18 feet high, the guesthouse is built with an odd number of vaulted arches made of reed bundles. Heavy, ta- pered columns support the facade, which is ornamented with lat- tice work. In the northern mountain regions inhabited by the Kurds, the rectangular houses are built of burnt brick or of stone, with flat clay roofs supported by poplar trunks. In the villages near the Iranian border the walls of houses are made of stone, with short, wooden beams placed horizontally between the stones. The win- dows, rectangular or arched, may have wooden shutters or they may be covered by a lattice of flat wooden shavings. At least one of the walls is thick enough to allow for the construction of a recess where household goods are stored. Houses on hillsides are some- times built entirely of natural stone. They have two stories to the front and one to the back. A central living room located on the upper floor leads onto the terrace which forms the roof of the stable located on the lower level. During the summer months the terrace is the main living area and is also used for sleeping. Furni- ture is scarce, even in the homes of relatively prosperous villagers. Most households, however, have a number of rugs, mattresses and pillows and some chests for storage. Urban In the provincial towns living conditions differ little from those of the villages. Narrow, winding unpaved streets are lined with fired brick or mud brick buildings, although in the northern areas these buildings may be made of wood and stone. Schools, hospitals, or government buildings are located in the newer sections, which have been built around the old towns. In the newer, more spacious quarters of the major cities, the homes of prosperous families are flat-roofed, rectangular, villa-like buildings, surrounded by gardens and hidden behind high brick walls. A hall and rooms reserved for male guests of the host are in the front part of the house; the family quarters are in the back. The floors of the rooms and of the courtyard are of tile. Most of these homes have piped water and electricity, and they include small kitchens with oil stoves and cooking pits, a bathroom which doubles as a laundry room, and sanitary facilities. A smaller, one- or two-storied building is located in a corner of the garden. This building is generally rented out to persons unrelated to the family, although traditionally it was used to accommodate overnight visi- tors or guests. In the older sections of town, typical dwellings along the narrow, twisting muddy alleys are one- or two-storied rectangular, flat-roofed mud-brick or burnt-brick structures. They are built in 100 one corner or along one or more sides of a mud-walled rectangular courtyard. The upper story of the house usually has a wooden gallery, with latticed screens projecting onto the streets. The size of the house and of the courtyard, the amount of decorative detail and the number of rooms depend on the wealth of the owner, Al] dwellings, however, represent a separate unit, with blank walls facing the street although they may be adjacent to one or more similar units. The rooms on the upper story are usually used as sleeping quarters although, during summer months, the family sleeps on the flat roof which is surrounded by a low wall to ensure privacy. Modern adaptations of these traditional dwellings, found in the new suburbs of the cities, are inhabited mostly by government workers, middle income white-collar groups and army officers. In this type, the house faces the street although its windows open onto the courtyard behind it. Few Iraqis, even prosperous ones, possess much furniture. Home furnishings may include simple sofas, smoking tables, cup- boards, chests and rugs. Clothes are kept in bundles and stored in cupboards. Western furniture, notably bedroom suites, has become popular with middle income families in the towns and cities. Since the 1940's, Baghdad and the major cities have experienced housing problems and the proliferation of substandard accommo- dations. A growing number of rural migrants in search of employ- ment have flocked to the cities, especially to Baghdad, establishing themselves in sarifah huts, which they set up on vacant lots, tap- ping the regular water and electricity supplies of the permanent residents. In response to public protest against their presence in the residential sections, sarifah dwellers were moved in 1963 by government authorities to the eastern outskirts of the capital. Their influx, however, has continued, and in the mid-1960's their numbers were estimated at about 500,000. The sarifah huts have a single room of about 27 square meters where an average of six persons live, cook and sleep. The muddy roads along which the huts are built often turn into quagmires. Lacking sufficient water, sewage disposal and sanitary facilities, the sarifah settlement represents a major health hazard to its inhabitants and to those of the adjacent urban community. Dependent for their livelihood on earnings from casual jobs, the sarifah dwellers' living standard barely differs from that in the rural areas. Their occasional earnings, however, provide them with more cash than they were able to earn as village cultivators. Since 1963, the sarifah dwellers' difficulties have been compounded by the lack of transportation into the center of Baghdad where the casual jobs are found. 101 Clothing Traditionally, the style of garments and the fabrics of which they were made were important indicators of a person's social status, tribal and ethnic affiliations, and wealth. With the growing influence of Western clothing, however, the importance of tradi- tional garments has diminished. Since the 1950's, many people in the countryside as well as in the cities have adopted Western clothing, which they often wear in combination with traditional garments. The basic garment of rural men is a long dishdasha (loose shirt) with long sleeves. It is made of plain or striped cotton and may be worn loose or belted. A long, sleeveless wool cloak is worn over the dishdasha in cool weather. Western-type suit jackets often replace the cloak. The style of headgear varies, but the one most commonly worn is the kaffiyah, a large, rectangular kerchief held in place by a piece of cloth which is wrapped around the head or secured by a rope-like band (agal). In the countryside the tarbush, a pillbox- like hat made of red or maroon felt, is worn mostly by religious dignitaries, but in the cities it is rarely part of the regular male attire. Women also wear the dishdasha, with either long or short sleeves, sometimes made of patterned fabric. Young women gener- ally wear a short version of the garment, sometimes belted to resemble Western clothing. Older women in the cities wear a floor-length, loosely cut black dress. A distinctive female outer garment is the abaya, a long black shroud which conceals the entire figure but not the face. It is worn by nearly all women, rural and urban alike, except for business and professional women. Most women wear some headgear, but face veils have become rare except in small provincial towns. A black, shoulder-length silk scarf wrapped around the head and draped under the chin is worn by middle-aged and older women. A white rectangular scarf made of thin cotton or silk, loosely draped over the head, is preferred by girls and young women. During the 1960's, however, many women of all ages have replaced traditional headgear with triangular col- ored silk scarves tied under the chin. Kurdish men wear a suit costume of bag-shaped, loose trousers with a shirt or jacket open in the front and fitted with a low collar. The shirt is tucked into a long, broad sash, wound several times around the waist. In cool weather a waistcoat is worn under the jacket and above the shirt, or the jacket is replaced by a lined vest which is closed in front with buttons. Western jackets also are 102 often worn over the shirt. The headgear consists of a cap cro- cheted of cotton yarn, with a turban wound around it. The main outer garment of Kurdish women is a floor-length, long-sleeved gown usually made of flower-patterned cotton in bright colors, preferably crimson, green and red. Long trousers gathered with a drawstring around the ankles, and a knee-length chemise are worn underneath. A quilted, ankle-length coatlike gar- ment made of brocade is worn over the gown in cold weather. As headgear, married women in the countryside wear a small, black skullcap with slightly sloping sides and a turban wrapped around it. The top and sides of the skullcap may be decorated with coins, jewelry or amulets. Unmarried women wear a thin, white or col- ored veil which hangs loosely over the head. In the cities and small towns Kurdish women also wear the abaya over their long, col- orful gowns. Many younger women have adapted Western-style skirts and blouses. Both men and women in the countryside wear slippers or clogs, but many of them go barefoot. Kurds wear cloth shoes with thick soles made of folded strips of cloth. Western-type leather shoes, imported from Czechoslovakia, have become popular especially in the cities. In many households one or two pairs of slippers are shared by the entire family. Footwear is always removed when entering a mosque or when walking on carpets. TRADITIONAL WELFARE Traditionally, the family extended economic assistance and pro- tection to kinsmen in need who, in turn, were bound to them in a network of mutual obligations. This system of welfare, common in the Middle East, has continued to operate, although less and less adequately since the 1950's. The Islamic commandment to give alms conveyed a concept of the broad responsibility of the good Moslem within the community of the faithful. In accepting ine- qualities of talent and wealth as manifestations of divine will, Moslems also insisted on the obligation of the wealthy to assist the poor. Almsgiving, which represents the direct application of the religious ideal, was originally viewed not as a gratuitous gener- osity but as the duty of the donor and the right of the recipient. It has also furnished some precedent for modern tax systems and public welfare schemes. During the 1960's almsgiving has become purely voluntary, but for devout Moslems it has remained a moral obligation. Waqfs (religious, charitable or family foundations) represent another form of traditional welfare. They were established for a variety of secular and religious purposes but have typically taken 103 the form of endowments of land left by the donor in perpetuity to his descendants or to a religious beneficiary. During the 1960's they have continued to exercise their welfare functions, and the proceeds accrued from the lease of their properties are used for charitable purposes (see ch. 11, Religion; ch. 19, Agriculture). The concept of mutual obligations within the family is a duty legally recognized and enforced according to property relation- ships and mutual financial obligations defined by religious law. A wealthy or income-earning relative must support another relative who is poor or unable to earn a living. A large family becomes "social security" for the aged. The eldest male within the family group, both in the village and in conservative urban households, receives the family income, including that earned by married sons, and disburses it for the benefit of the group. These long-estab- lished forms of assistance have not been eclipsed by government welfare programs, but they have not sufficed to meet the problems of poverty under the changing conditions of the 1960's. GOVERNMENT WELFARE EFFORTS The authorities have tended to concentrate their welfare efforts in the urban areas, population growth has been rapid, and rising prices have often threatened urban living standards. The Development Board, an autonomous government agency established in 1950 to promote a more efficient use of the country's economic and human resources, undertook a number of welfare projects or assisted the ministries and municipalities in initiating them. Since 1958, the Board's functions have been taken over by the Ministry of Municipalities and Public Works, the Ministry of the Interior, and the Educational and Social Development Planning Board. Housing and municipal development have been given high priority. In the suburbs of Baghdad low-cost dwellings equipped with kitchens and running water have been built to accommodate government employees and army personnel. During the 1960's such housing projects have been expanded to include a growing number of skilled laborers and clerks. Tenants pay a small monthly sum for rent and eventually acquire title to the house. Low-cost home- ownership is also available to workers and employees of the Iraq Petroleum Company (IPC) (see ch. 21, Labor). To improve the housing of sarifah dwellers, the government has allocated plots equipped with drinking water and sanitary facili- ties in the outskirts of Baghdad. It has also supplied construction materials and encouraged the settlers to build their own simple housing. In some sarifah settlements the government erected brick cubicles with small back yards and opened a few schools and med- ical clinics. 104 In response to the growth of the industrial and the govern- mental labor force, Labor Law No. 1 was enacted in 1958 and has remained in force during the late 1960's. The new, more compre- hensive Social Security Law No. 140 was promulgated in October 1965, replacing similar legislation adopted in 1956. The new law provides for sickness, disability and maternity benefits, and for pension payments to retired workers (see ch. 21, Labor). Other government welfare projects in the cities included street construction, installation of sewage disposal facilities and the pro- vision of pure drinking water. Several modern office buildings and monuments also have been erected in the central section of the capital. The rural population has received far fewer benefits than urban dwellers from such projects, and the absence of amenities in the countryside has tended to encourage the continued migra- tion to the cities. One major rural improvement project was begun in Diyala Province during the 1950's. Needy villagers were allotted small farms of which they acquired ownership within 10 years. Small-scale cottage industries were organized to provide sources of cash income for the settlers. Educational, health and vocational training facilities were established in conjunction with the proj- ect, which was designed to serve as a model for similar rural wel- fare efforts in other areas. To integrate primary schools into the rural improvement effort, a special center was opened in Abu Ghuraib, about 20 miles west of Baghdad, where rural primary school teachers were offered courses in modern agricultural techniques, hygiene, sanitation and community welfare. Other rural development projects have been planned by the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs, but infor- mation regarding the progress of these projects in 1968 was lacking (see ch. 9, Education). On obstacle to rural improvements has been the reluctance of the country's few trained welfare officials to move into the coun- tryside. Although the government has made efforts to enlist active village participation in community development and to coordinate welfare activities, rural communities have remained dependent on the initiative of the government. At the same time the lack of transportation and communication has made contact with central authorities difficult. PRIVATE WELFARE ORGANIZATIONS A number of philanthropic and charitable organizations dedi- cated to social welfare operated during the 1960's. Notable among these are the Red Crescent Society (the Moslem equivalent of the Red Cross), the Child Welfare Society and the Women's Temper- 105 ance and Social Welfare Society. These organizations have distin- guished themselves in lending assistance to the needy in times of natural disasters or public emergencies. They have also helped to operate literacy centers and have supported public health pro- grams. In addition to private welfare organizations of this type, several professional societies have been organized by middle income groups to render assistance to their own members and to promote general social reform. Governmental efforts to improve public housing have been sup- plemented by similar efforts on the part of private organizations. Cooperative associations have been formed by professional socie- ties and trade unions to help their members build houses on lots which have been purchased from the government at low cost. PUBLIC HEALTH Nutrition Nutritional deficiency diseases caused by inadequate intake of vitamins, proteins and minerals are prevalent, and because of poor nutrition many villagers have low resistance to disease. The long nursing of babies by undernourished mothers and the practice of withholding solid foods until the child is 2 years old is a major cause of debility among mothers and children. The staple food of most villagers is wheat, eaten in the form of leavened breads and baked in flat, round or oval loaves. Rice is an important element in the diet. For variety, onions and dates are eaten with the bread. Meat, fish, milk and eggs are almost entirely missing from the diet. Such foods are served only on special feast days, and poor villagers are unable to obtain them without going into debt. People living in the marshes between the lower Tigris and Euphrates Rivers eat three meals daily consisting of millet, bread and tea, with occasional additions of fish, rice and dairy products, mainly yogurt. The wealthier among them regularly eat rice, fish, yogurt, game and occasionally beef or lamb. In comparison, the diet of the Kurds is more varied. Their bread is a paper-thin, circular pancake prepared from wheat flour. It is crisp when fresh baked, but later changes to a leathery consist- ency. Yogurt made of ewe's, goat's or cow's milk is eaten with bread as a morning meal, sometimes with sliced cucumbers. Butter is eaten as a food supplement, used for cooking or sold on the market in a clarified state. Buttermilk mixed with water is consumed as a refreshment between meals. Tea, sweetened with large amounts of sugar, is the main beverage. 106 The morning meal of prosperous Kurds consists of tea, curd and, occasionally, eggs fried in large amounts of butter. Rice, steamed and served with a thick tomato sauce, vegetables and a few pieces of meat (mutton or fowl) are eaten at noon or at the evening meal, which is usually served at 6 o'clock. Boiled crushed wheat grains are sometimes substituted for rice. Thinly sliced cucumbers and a variety of vegetables, including eggplants, lentils and beans, are served with the main course. Fresh fruits, including plums, apricots, figs and grapes, are served after the meal. The main staple of prosperous city dwellers is rice, boiled or fried. It is served with vegetables, mainly eggplant, which is stuffed with the rice, ground meats and spices. Grape leaves are sometimes wrapped around a mixture of boiled rice and onions, or ground meat. The preferred meat is lamb, cooked as a stew with various vegetables and seasoned with garlic or curry. The main course is accompanied by a green salad and is followed by fruit, or dessert made of thin layers of pastry, filled with ground nuts, honey and stewed fruit. Yogurt with water is taken as a refresh- ment between meals. Tea with large amounts of sugar is consumed after each meal. Bread is the basis of all meals among the urban poor. It is eaten with vegetables, mostly lentils and beans, and is varied with occa- sional servings of meat and poultry. Dates, eaten with meals or as a snack, are important staples of the diet. Sanitation Poor sanitation and polluted water sources are principal factors in the spread of disease. A large percentage of the population lives in villages and towns which have been built along irrigation canals and rivers polluted with human and animal wastes. These water- ways, along with the stagnant pools of water which constitute the village reservoir, are the major sources of drinking water and of water for bathing, laundering and washing of food. Some of the major rivers, notably the broad, shallow Shatt al Arab, create favorable breeding conditions for malaria-carrying mosquitoes and parasites spreading waterborne diseases. The periodic flooding of rivers contaminates water supplies and spreads waterborne dis- eases, including typhoid fever. The Tigris and Euphrates Rivers and their tributaries serve as water sources for Baghdad and some of the major provincial towns. Irbil and Sulaymaniyah, located in the northern mountains, have adequate supplies of spring water. In Basra, Mosul and Kirkuk the water is stored in elevated tanks and chemically 107 treated before distribution. In Baghdad the water is filtered, chlo- rinated and piped into homes or to communal fountains located throughout the city. In the smaller towns, however, the water supply is unprotected and rarely tested for potability. In 1967 water supply projects were underway in several provincial towns, and a water treatment plant in Samarra, on the Tigris about 70 miles northwest of Baghdad, was nearing completion. Except in Baghdad and in some sections of the larger cities, sewage and sanitary facilities in urban settlements are nonexis- tent or inadequate. The major portion of a project to improve the sewer system of the capital, including the construction of a main sewer, pumping station and treatment plant, was nearing comple- tion in 1967. In the smaller towns the narrow streets are strewn with dirt, rubbish and garbage. Dust clouds the air in the summer. In villages facilities for the disposal of garbage normally consist of ditches running along rows of houses. Septic tanks and latrines are used in Baghdad and the major cities. Pits dug near the houses or on the banks of irrigation canals serve as latrines in the vil- lages. Many diseases are spread through the unsanitary handling of food. Legal provisions exist regarding the sanitary standards of various foods sold, including meat and milk. The enforcement of these provisions, as well as of others relating to supervision by health inspectors of markets, foodshops and restaurants, is hin- dered because of the shortage of trained officials. Rules of personal hygiene are unknown to the great majority of the population. Although Islamic teachings prescribe daily ritual ablutions, most people comply with the rule only in the form of token gestures, often using polluted water. Soap is available only to city dwellers; villagers use a cake of slippery, soap-like mud (geel) for the same purpose. Disease Accurate vital and health statistics are lacking. Available data reflecting birth and death rates are based on incomplete reg- isters and cover only the population of urban centers. In rural areas births and deaths are rarely reported. Admission records of hospitals provide a random sampling of hospitalized cases of dis- eases and causes of death. The infant death rate was estimated at 23.7 per 1,000 live births in 1965, a figure probably representing a fraction of the actual rate because of the lack of medical care in rural areas. During the same year a Soviet source estimated the average life expectancy of Iraqis to be 30 years. During the mid-1960's the chief causes of debility and death 108 were parasitic diseases involving the intestinal tract and the skin, malaria, tuberculosis, eye infections, dysentery, typhus and vene- real diseases. The effects of many of these afflictions, if not fatal, are to sap the strength and alertness of the population and tot lower its labor productivity. Lack of sanitation, poor personal and food hygiene and polluted drinking water are chiefly responsible for the spread of parasitic diseases. The yearly movement of thou- sands of pilgrims to shrines increases the danger of epidemics of infectious diseases. Intestinal ailments are a chief cause of mor- tality among infants. Nutritional deficiency diseases and anemia are frequent underlying causes of debility. Vaccination campaigns begun during the 1950's have reduced the incidence of formerly dreaded epidemics of smallpox, plague and cholera, but govern- ment vaccination teams still have difficulty in reaching the Bed- ouin population. Ancylostomiasis, an infestation of the intestinal tract by the hookworm, is widespread. The parasite thrives mainly in open drains and in untreated sewers. According to estimates by health experts, 20 percent of the population in the northern provinces and 40 percent in the south were afflicted by the disease during the early 1960's. Schistosomiasis or bilharziasis, a parasitic ailment affecting the liver and causing extensive debility, is highly endemic. Spread by a snail which breeds in marshes and in polluted stagnant waters, the disease is most prevalent in the irrigated areas of the south, no- tably in the provinces of Baghdad, Kut, Basra, Diwaniyah, Kar- bala, Amarah and Hillah. Persons wading in stagnant pools are most susceptible to the disease since the disease-carrying organism is picked up through the skin of the foot. Although clinical treatment of schistosomiasis is difficult, it can be prevented by wearing shoes and by the chemical spraying of canals and pools of water. Moreover, the host snail fails to thrive in water flowing at a rate of as much as 3 miles an hour or in ditches and canals which are periodically drained. During the early 1960's health authorities launched a schistosomiasis control program which included the building of specially designed irri- gation canals and ditches and of drainage works to prevent water- logging. In general, however, the extension of irrigation systems, during the same period, has tended to promote the spread of the disease (see ch. 19, Agriculture). Malaria is most prevalent in the north but has been spreading in the south with the expansion of irrigation facilities. Highly ma- larial areas include the banks of the Shatt al Arab River and the lower Euphrates, the valleys of the Kurdish mountains, the north- eastern provinces and the lower Diyala basin. Spread by the 109 malaria-carrying Plasmodium vivax mosquito, malaria killed more than 50,000 persons each year during the 1950's. The inci- dence of the disease has since decreased as a result of chemical sprayings of malarious areas, carried out with the assistance of the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF). Nevertheless, malaria has remained one of the major endemic diseases and a chief cause of death, especially among infants. Tuberculosis, mainly the pulmonary type, is a major public health problem. Nutritional deficiencies, crowded living quarters and dust help to spread tuberculosis, but because the disease is considered shameful, it is often concealed, making its detection and prevention difficult. A national campaign to control tubercu- losis through vaccinations and chest X-rays was begun in 1952 with assistance of the World Health Organization (WHO). These preventive services, however, were available only to a limited seg- ment of the urban population. According to reports by health experts in 1962, the incidence of pulmonary hydatid disease, a cystic ailment affecting the tissues of the lung, ranked next to that of tuberculosis. Endemic in the region between the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers, the disease is spread by parasites infesting sheep. Trachoma, a fly-borne eye infection, is highly endemic and rep- resents a major cause of blindness. Eye clinics operate in govern- ment hospitals, and the government has also provided fixed and mobile eye clinics. These facilities, however, are not accessible to all afflicted persons, and the disease has continued to spread. Venereal diseases are widespread, and persons known to transmit them are not subject to legal action. Because the diseases are considered shameful, only a fraction of persons afflicted report for treatment. No stigma is attached, on the other hand, to bejel, a nonvenereal form of syphilis (similar to yaws) which is wide- spread among infants especially in the Bedouin tribes. Control measures have been carried out by health authorities, and the disease has declined in the northern provinces. The population suffers from numerous other diseases. Typhoid and dysentery are widespread and occur in epidemic proportions mainly during the summer months, from July to October. Diphtheria, measles, whooping cough, rheumatic fever and pneu- monia take a heavy toll among children. Tetanus often results from the common practice of packing an infant's umbilical cord with manure as a healing measure. Complications in childbirth are a common cause of death, particularly among Bedouin women. Circulatory disorders and degenerative diseases of old age are not widespread although ailments of this type occur among the wealthy and longer lived. 110 Medical Facilities and Personnel charge. Medicices. The Almost all medical facilities are controlled by the government, and most physicians are Ministry of Health officials. Curative and preventive services in the government-controlled hospitals and dis- pensaries and the services of government physicians are free of charge. In 1964, the Ministry included Directorates of Health, Pre- ventive Medicine, Medical Supplies, Rural Health Services and Medical Services. The inspector general of health, under the min- istry, is in charge of the enforcement of health laws and regula- tions. The military, the police, the port authorities and the oil companies have independent medical services, but they cooperate closely with the Ministry of Health. Private medical practice and private hospitals and clinics are subject to government supervi- sion. In each province the Ministry of Health functions are carried out by a chief medical officer who also has his own private practice to supplement his government salary. Provincial medical officers are preoccupied mainly with the administrative duties in hospitals, clinics and dispensaries, which have been increasing even in the smaller towns. Their work in the rural areas is seri. ously curtailed by lack of transportation. One of the most serious problems facing the Ministry of Health is its shortage of trained personnel. According to the latest data, the number of physicians in 1964 totaled 1,436, or 1 physician per approximately 5,500 persons. During the same year there were 1,041 fully trained nurses, 1,442 health aides, 650 midwives, 229 laboratory assistants and 528 pharmacists. The shortage is accen- tuated by the fact that most medical personnel are concentrated in the major cities, such as Baghdad and Basra. Physicians trained at government expense must spend 4 years in the public health service, but they strongly resist appointments to posts outside the cities, and make every effort to remain in Baghdad. Recognizing that the lack of amenities in the countryside is a main reason for the preference for an urban medical practice, the government during the 1960's started to furnish homes to physicians who prac- ticed in rural area. Training in medicine and in the paramedical professions is given at Baghdad University and its branches at Basra and Mosul. The University also has a College of Pharmacology. In 1965 the total number of medical graduates was 177. A medical degree re- quires the completion of a 6-year course. Pharmacists, health officials and medical assistants are trained in 5 years, nurses and midwives in 3 years. Medical courses during the mid-1950's were oriented mainly 111 toward the training of specialists and toward medical practices requiring modern equipment. Since then, more emphasis has been placed on the theory and practice of preventive and simple cura- tive medicine, urgently needed in the rural areas. In 1964 the country had 131 hospitals with some 14,000 beds. About one-third of the hospitals were located in Baghdad and its vicinity; the rest operated in the provincial towns and were in general inaccessible to villagers and to the nomadic population. Of the hospitals, 87 offered general care; the rest were specialized institutions for the treatment of tuberculosis, children's diseases, trachoma and mental illness. One institution in Amarah cared for lepers and five were maternity hospitals. Modern facilities are available at Republic Hospital in Baghdad, the teaching institution of Baghdad University Medical College. Another 1,000-bed hospital and medical center to be operated by the Medical College were under construction in 1966. Provincial hospitals, however, often lack equipment, and their services are seriously handicapped by the lack of trained staff (see ch. 9, Edu- cation). More than 400 dispensaries operate in the rural areas. They are staffed by medical assistants and offer simple curative care and administer vaccinations. Some of these are mobile facilities, lo- cated on river barges; muleback teams visit some of the remote villages. The dispensaries include special units to treat trachoma, tuberculosis and bejel. Although their services are sought by an increasing number of villagers, they are rarely visited by provin- cial medical officers. Modern and relatively high-standard medical services are avail- able to the country's approximately 11,000 oil workers. The IPC and its affiliates maintain six hospitals located in Kirkuk, Basra and Faw. Some 35 dispensaries are scattered throughout the IPC's area of operation; drilling sites are visited by mobile dispensaries. The services are extended to the workers' families and, in remote areas where government health facilities are not available, also to the neighboring villages (see ch. 21, Labor). Governmental efforts to expand health facilities within the Five-Year Economic Plan 1965–69 include plans for the construc- tion of 5 major hospitals with 200 beds each, 8 smaller hospitals, 4 chest disease hospitals and some 800 rural health centers. The 5 major hospitals are to be built in Karkh and Kadhimain (both in the suburbs of Baghdad) and in Amarah, Basra and Sulayma- niyah. The chest disease hospitals are to be located in Mosul, Nasi- riyah, Kirkuk and Amarah. The government also plans to open an institution for the training of paramedical personnel and a public health laboratory in Baghdad. 112 Popular Beliefs and Practices Like other Middle Eastern peoples, Iraqis have traditionally re- garded illness as a manifestation of divine will or as the work of evil spirits. Suffering from illness and injury is endured as an inevitable and normal condition of life rather than as a temporary suspension of good health. In the towns traditional views are yielding to the spread of modern medical practices, but they still persist among the poor in general and are strongest in the relative isolation of the villages and tribes. Villagers rarely seek medical treatment while they are still able to follow a regular daily work routine. Because hospitals are regarded as places of suffering and death, they are entered only as a last resort, and many rural patients are beyond help when admitted; when incapacitated by illness, villagers usually go to a local "holy man” known for his wisdom and piety, or they turn to bonesetters. Many of the treatments and potions dispensed by tra- ditional practitioners are harmful and sometimes cause death; others are only palliatives. Manipulative techniques of bonesetters and of the village midwives, however, have often been found to be efficacious. Belief in the curative and prophylactic qualities of charms and amulets is nearly universal. They are supposed to ward off malevo- lent spirits and offer protection against the “evil eye,” believed to be the principal causes of disease. Their most frequent form is a portion of the Koran written on a long strip of paper by a holy man and worn in a small leather case around the neck. Many of the amulets and charms are blue, a color believed to be dreaded by the devil. Special curative powers are ascribed to mud and dust gathered from holy places. Mud is caked and applied over wounds; the dust scraped from the mud cakes is mixed with water and taken for internal ailments. Cauterization is widely used by traditional practitioners to heal aching spots, tumors and sprains, and to stop hemorrhages. A burning rag is used for the process to make small circular or cross-shaped scars on the site of the affliction. The meat of roast hedgehogs is eaten to cure children's diseases and ailments accompanying pregnancy. Typhoid and malaria are treated with various herb teas. Water pipes, sometimes containing medicinal herbs, are smoked by those afflicted by syphilis. To cure measles the patient is wrapped in a loose red gown. Persons bitten by snakes are treated with human or snake saliva mixed with sugar. One of the areas in which traditional ways have remained par- ticularly strong is that of childbirth. The midwife is regarded as 113 the only proper and expert attendant in this crisis. Unseen dangers are believed to threaten both mother and child at this time and to surround the infant during its first years of life. The mother is pampered and protected by all sorts of charms to ward off spirits. The young baby is thought to be vulnerable to the influence of both good and evil spirits, and so is protected by bright blue amulets to repel the "evil eye.” As a measure of concealment, the child may be kept dirty and disheveled, its face covered with flies; sometimes, a boy is dressed as a girl to trick the "evil eye.” Despite some progress in bringing modern health services to rural areas, villagers tend to regard Western medicine with re- serve and suspicion. The results of antibiotic injections in curing bejel and other dreaded diseases have impressed many, and the demand for such curative services has become notable. Neverthe- less, the principles of preventive medicine, including the need for vaccinations, have remained alien to most of the rural population. Persons living in the cities, especially those with education beyond the primary grades, usually go to a medical doctor in the case of a serious illness and also recognize the importance of vaccinations. When modern medical practices are accepted they are often used in conjunction with traditional practices by city dwellers and vil. lagers alike. 114 CHAPTER 9 EDUCATION The government was making persistent efforts in 1968 to extend educational services throughout the country. Progress was re- tarded, however, by financial limitations, a rudimentary transpor- tation network and the shortage of trained personnel. Despite these handicaps, the authorities by 1967 had succeeded in estab- lishing a limited network of schools offering primary, secondary, vocational and higher education to more than 1.2 million students in that year. Between 1958 and 1967 educational services were provided for a growing proportion of the population. Enrollment in primary schools increased from 430,308 to 957,800 and the number of sec- ondary students more than tripled. Literacy centers were impor- tant adjuncts to the overall educational efforts, but in 1967 less than one-fifth of the population could read and write. Primary education is compulsory and free, according to the law, for children between 7 and 12 years of age. In 1967 Ministry of Education estimates indicated, however, that only about half of the children in that age group attended primary schools. Enroll- ment of all school-age children in primary schools has been as- signed a high priority in educational planning, and the govern- ment envisages full implementation of compulsory education for boys by 1970 and for girls by 1975. The growth of educational facilities benefited urban rather than rural areas. In the provinces school construction has proceeded at a much slower pace because materials, labor and local funds were scarce. Statistics published in 1953–54 showed that 60 percent of the primary schools were located in towns, although more than 70 percent of the people lived in rural areas. Official statements in 1965 indicated that the same maldistribution persists (see ch. 4, Population). Despite the shortage of educational facilities in some areas, the rate of school construction exceeded the rate of economic develop- ment. During the 1960's many graduates of secondary schools and of Baghdad University were unable to find jobs. Some filled posi- 115 tions where their qualifications could not be utilized (see ch. 21, Labor; ch. 6, Social Structure). Official efforts to promote education have led to a general em- phasis on its value for both men and women. Religious and social attitudes disapproving of education for women are beginning to change, notably in the urban centers. In villages, however, such attitudes still tend to lower the proportion of girls enrolled in coeducational primary schools. Secondary education became avail- able to women only during the 1930's, and in 1967 women's sec- ondary schools accounted for only a small percentage of school facilities on that level. During the mid-1960's the number of girls in secondary schools was considerably smaller than that of boys although, in general, female enrollment in proportion to that of boys increased more rapidly on all school levels (see ch. 6, Social Structure). Education is provided by the government through a centrally organized three-level school system-primary, intermediate-sec- ondary and preparatory-secondary. Baghdad University is autono- mous, but its president closely cooperates with a representative of the Ministry of Education. Private schools, operating mainly on the secondary level, are also under close government supervision. Western influence is notable in both the structural organization of the system and in the curricula. Subjects taught in the primary and secondary schools are mostly academic. Many of the students, especially in rural areas, find it difficult to grasp these subjects which are not related to practical tasks. Islamic religious in- fleuences, formerly dominant in the school system, have decreased. Traditional religious instruction, however, survives in the rural mosque schools, which provide the only formal education in areas where public schools are lacking. The Five-Year Economic Plan 1965–69 reflects the government's continued efforts to expand educational facilities. Of the Plan's total expenditure of 830 million dinars (1 dinar equals US$2.80— see Glossary), more than 110 million are allocated to educational projects. Priorities in dispensing the funds are assigned to the construction of 7,900 primary-school classrooms and to teacher training. In addition, 435 secondary-school classrooms and 14 vo- cational training schools are to be built by 1969. Education officials are also planning an extensive revision of the primary and sec- ondary curricula with a view to introducing vocational subjects. Official statements during the 1960's repeatedly stressed the im- portance of education in providing the country with personnel trained in skills and possessing administrative qualifications to implement economic development plans. In his Ministerial Pro- gram of July 1967, Prime Minister Taher Yahya called for the 116 expansion of scientific and vocational education to meet the needs of industry and agriculture. Progress in this direction, however, tends to be slow because of the highly academic curricula, the insistence of most persons on being prepared for work in white- collar positions and the widespread negative attitudes toward oc- cupations involving manual labor and outdoor work, including some fields of engineering. Government initiative in the field of education has been affirmed by the Interim Constitution of 1964. Article 33 calls on the government to “pay special attention to the physical, mental and moral growth of youth.” Accordingly, education has been officially made an important instrument in developing feelings of national identity and awareness of the Arab cultural heritage. Prime Minister Yahya's Ministerial Program of July 1967 called for educational efforts to help raise “a generation believing in God and country," and urged teachers to foster consciousness of Arab cultural and religious values. BACKGROUND Mosque schools (kuttabs) provided the only education available in most parts of the country until about the mid-nineteenth cen- tury, when the first secular public schools were established under Turkish rule. Extremely limited in scope, this public school system did not displace the kuttabs operating in nearly every village. The language of instruction was Turkish, and both the school system and its teachers were unpopular. Manual instruction, main- ly in carpentry, was given to orphan boys in government work- shops that combined the functions of orphanages and training institutions. Higher education, available only to a small minority, dealt largely with Islamic theology and with the mastery of classical Arabic. After 1941 the language of instruction in public schools was changed to Arabic, and Arabic-speaking secular teachers were recruited and trained for the first time. As a result of the establishment of the British Mandate in 1920, the public primary school system gradually expanded under British supervision. The first secondary schools (for boys) were opened during the 1920's in the major cities. The curricula of the primary and secondary schools were similar to those in Great Britain. When Iraq attained independence in 1932, there were about 300 primary schools and 15 secondary schools, located mostly in the towns. The government financed the higher educa- tion of a few outstanding students at universities in Egypt, Syria, Europe and the United States. In 1950 school construction and various other aspects of educa- 117 tional planning were placed under the jurisdiction of the Develop- ment Board, an autonomous government agency established to promote more efficient use of the country's economic and human resources. Sums allocated to education in the state budget were substantially increased. Within a major school-construction pro- gram under the auspices of the Board, more than 700 schools were built between 1950 and 1958. As new facilities became available, enrollment levels rose, and by 1958 nearly 43 percent of the school-age children were enrolled in the primary grades, as com- pared with 20 percent in 1947. THE SCHOOL SYSTEM The majority of schools are owned and operated by the govern- ment. In government schools, tuition is free on all academic levels. The government also pays the full or partial cost of board, lodging and medical care in teacher-training institutions, secondary schools, vocational schools and at Baghdad University. Private schools, functioning mainly on the secondary level, enrolled about 24 percent of the secondary-school students in 1965. Many of these schools operated under the auspices of foreign groups or were maintained by Christian religious denominations. Only some 2.7 percent of primary-school children attended private schools during the same year. Most of the private primary schools are operated by Moslem religious and fraternal organizations. According to the Public Ed- ucation Law of 1940, private primary schools for Iraqi children may be operated only by Iraqi citizens. An exception has been made in the case of Iranian schools maintained by Iranians in Baghdad, Basra, Karbala and Najaf for the benefit of children of Iranian merchants who have long resided in these cities. The curricula of private schools must conform with that of gov- ernment schools, and the textbooks must meet government speci- fications. The terminal certificates of private schools are officially acceptable only if students pass an examination administered by a government school official. In both government and private schools, each year of the pri- mary and secondary level ends in an examination entitling the student to admission to the next grade. These examinations are of overriding importance in assessing the student's academic standing and in determining his admissibility to higher academic levels. The difficulty of the examination contributes substantially to the rate of attrition in the primary and secondary grades. The language of instruction in the primary and secondary schools is Arabic. Although the Local Language Law promulgated 118 in 1931 specifies that primary instruction in areas where the ma- jority of the population speak Kurdish or Turkish is to be offered in the local language, this provision is not always enforced. In the private secondary schools, literature, history, geography and civics must be taught in Arabic, by teachers appointed by the Ministry of Education. Other subjects may be taught in a foreign language during the last two academic years (see ch. 5, Ethnic Groups and Languages). The government school system is handicapped by a chronic shortage of physical facilities. Despite the allocation in 1966 of 800,000 dinars for the construction of school buildings, the number of classrooms was still inadequate, and many school buildings were in need of repair. In about 20 percent of the school buildings, classes had to be taught in several shifts. The use of rented facili- ties is widespread, although such facilities are not equipped for classroom use. In government schools the academic year, beginning in early September and lasting until the middle of June, is divided into two semesters. Classes are held 6 days a week, for an average of 5 hours daily. A 10-day vacation is given between semesters. Private schools follow a similar schedule. Administration and Finance According to Article 33 of the Interim Constitution of 1964, education is the right “of all Iraqis, guaranteed by the State through the construction and expansion of different types of schools, universities and cultural and educational institutes.” Ar- ticle 34 provides for state supervision of education and directs that “education affairs shall be organized by law.” Governmental leadership and supervision are exercised through the Ministry of Education, headed in 1968 by Taha al Hajj Ilyas. The Ministry, in addition to coordinating the school system, drafts and implements policies relating to curricula, teacher training and long-term planning. It also recruits and promotes teachers and administers examinations. Some functions pertaining to the phys- ical expansion of educational facilities are under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of the Interior and of the Ministry of Municipali- ties and Public Works. The Council on Social and Educational Development is a consultative body for the Ministry of Education and the Council of Ministers. Within the Ministry of Education, each major department is headed by a director general. There are eight major departments: General Education, Research, Inspection, Vocational Education, Administration, Cultural Relations, Kurdish Studies and Physical 119 Education. The Department of General Education, one of the Ministry's largest, supervises primary and secondary schools (both public and private), training institutions for primary school teachers and literacy schools. The Research Department is in charge of curricula planning, textbook publication and educational statistics; it also controls public libraries throughout the country. Inspection Department officials inspect public and private schools for compliance with regulations governing curricula and administrative procedures; they also report to the Ministry on standards of instruction, finan- cial needs and general progress. Although the Ministry of Education organization provides for a highly centralized administration of the educational system, some operational and supervisory functions have been delegated to local authorities. The country is divided into 15 educational districts, each headed by a provincial director of education who supervises all public and private schools in his area and is directly responsible to the Ministry of Education. Provincial governors have been re- sponsible, since 1951, for local school-building projects. Construc- tion costs as well as costs for equipment and supplies are financed by provincial authorities, although supplemental grants are made by the central government. During the 1960's budget allocations for educational develop- ment rose consistently. In 1966 the education budget totaled some 44 million dinars, over 24 percent of the total state budget for that year. Of the total sum allocated for education 10.2 million dinars were granted to the Ministry of Education and 28 million dinars to provincial authorities to supplement local school construction. Baghdad University received 5.8 million dinars for expansion of its facilities. In 1967 almost 36 percent of the annual state budget was allocated in educational nad social services, compared to about 18 percent in 1958. Primary Education Primary education was available in 1966 to 957,211 students enrolled in more than 4,000 schools offering 6-year courses. Girls accounted for about 29 percent of the primary school students. The government officially favors coeducation on the primary level. The number of coeducational schools increased from 425 in 1956 to more than 1,700 in 1965, but in most towns there were some primary schools for girls only. Virtually all rural primary schools, however, are coeducational. In at least some of these schools, traditional attitudes toward female education have tended to keep the number of girl students low. Because of a general shortage of classrooms and the lack of 120 schools and of transportation facilities in the countryside, compul- sory education is fully enforced only in certain areas designated by the Ministry of Education on the basis of available facilities. Where primary schools are lacking, the only education available to school-age children is offered by the traditional mosque schools. These teach recitation and memorization of the Koran and, occa- sionally, the fundamentals of reading and writing. Children who have attended these schools may enter the lower grades of the government primary schools after passing an examination. Attrition rates in the primary grades are high, especially in the rural areas. Figures for 1968 are lacking, but a primary school survey conducted in the four southern provinces of Nasiriyah, Amarah, Basra and Diwaniyah in 1962–63 indicated that of 40,314 students enrolled in the primary grades, more than 30 per- cent dropped out before the end of the academic year. Although the government pays for tuition and school supplies, the minimum needs of the primary school student constitute an excessive financial burden for most rural families. Moreover, children become economically useful at an early age, and parents cannot afford to forgo their help at home. Many rural children leave school after completing only two or three grades and soon thereafter lose the basic literacy skills they have acquired. Among students reaching grade 6, the attrition rate is further increased by the terminal examination which many are unable to pass (see ch. 19, Agriculture). In 1966 the curricula of primary schools included religion, Arabic language and penmanship (with special emphasis on clas- sical, written Arabic), arithmetic, hygiene, geography, history, morals and civics, drawing and manual arts, singing and physical education. English-language instruction is added in grades 5 and 6. Rural children find many of the subjects difficult to grasp and to relate to their lives because of the primarily academic orientation of the curriculum. Moreover, the emphasis in primary instruction on rote learning, group recitation and rigid classroom discipline has tended to discourage students with the material at hand. In some of the urban schools teaching methods are more flexible. Plans have been under way since 1960 to introduce agricultural and other vocational subjects into rural curricula and more prac- tical subjects into the curricula of primary schools in general. The lack of appropriately trained teachers, however, has made the im- plementation of these plans difficult. The schooling of Bedouin children represents a serious problem to education officials. According to the latest estimates, the Bed- ouin population numbered about 70,000 in 1957, but the propor- 121 tion of school-age children in this group was not known. During the late 1960's, a few mobile schools were organized, but in 1968, data about their operations were lacking (see ch. 4, Population). Secondary Education Academic Enrollment in government and private secondary schools in 1966 totaled 214,378. Secondary education, unlike that on the pri- mary level, is not coeducational. Of the 424 schools operating in 1965, about 35 percent were for girls, who accounted for a little more than one-fourth of the total enrollment. Secondary schooling is divided into grades similar to those in the United States. The intermediate grades are 7 through 9, and the preparatory grades are 10 and 11. In compliance with the decision made in a conference of Arab Ministers of Education, held in Baghdad in February 1964, the Ministry of Education plans to expand the secondary level to 6 years, adding a third year (grade 12) to the preparatory-secondary phase. According to official plans the change was to be effective by September 1968, at which time secondary students entering grade 10 were to enroll for a 3-year rather than a 2-year program. Information about the implementation of the change, however, is lacking. The curriculum in 1967 for the secondary-intermediate level in- cluded religion, Arabic, English, history, geography, civics and ethics, geometry, drawing, physical education and home arts (for girls). General science is offered in grade 7, arithmetic in grades 7 and 8 and algebra in grades 8 and 9. Chemistry and biology are added in grade 8, hygiene and physics in grade 9. Students in the secondary-preparatory grades (10 and 11) may choose between enrollment in a science or in a literary section of the curriculum. Completion of the science section qualifies a stu- dent for admission into the science, engineering and medical colleges, and the literary section qualifies one for admission into the liberal arts colleges of Baghdad University. The curricula in both sections include religion, Arabic, English, history, drawing and physical education; child care and home arts are added for girls. In the science section, biology, chemistry and physics are of- fered in both years; trigonometry is added in grade 10 and geometry in grade 11. In the literary section, general mathematics and geography are offered throughout the 2 years in addition to the subjects of the general curriculum. General science is added in grade 10, and economics in grade 11. The Ministry of Education plans some changes in the curriculum after extending the second- ary-preparatory level to 3 years. The general curriculum is to be 122 given during the first year (grade 10), after which the students may elect to follow the academic program of the science or literary section during the last 2 years (grades 11 and 12). Examinations are given at the end of both the intermediate-sec- ondary and the preparatory-secondary grades. These examinations are difficult and contribute substantially to the high attrition rates prevailing at the secondary level. The terminal examination for the preparatory-secondary grades, called the baccalaureate, is ad- ministered in June. This examination qualifies students for admis- sion to Baghdad University and is regarded as the decisive point in a student's academic career. Usually only about 30 percent of the students pass when they first take the baccalaureate. Those who fail in one or more subjects may repeat the examination in September, at which time about another 20 percent pass. As a rule, therefore, only about half of the students who have completed the full secondary school level succeed in passing the baccalaureate. Attrition rates caused by failure to pass the examination terminating the intermediate- secondary level are nearly as drastic. The government plans to expand the scope of secondary educa- tion, but officials have stated that such expansion must be preceded by an adaptation of the predominantly humanistic and academic curricula to the country's need for people trained in technical and intermediate-level managerial skills. They have also expressed con- cern over attrition rates because of examinations which diminish the upper-grade pool of available, trainable manpower. In addition to the government-operated institutions, there are 111 private secondary schools. The oldest one among these is the American School for Boys in Basra, founded by the Dutch Re- formed Mission during the early 1900's. The same Mission later founded the American School for Boys in Baghdad. The Baghdad College for Boys was founded by American Jesuit priests in 1932. It has modern classroom and laboratory facilities and offers spe- cial programs in science and commerce. Noted for its high aca- demic standards, the College graduates approximately 90 students a year. The Baghdad High School for Girls was organized by the United Mission, a group comprising several Protestant denomi- nations from the United States. Its graduating class numbers about 30 each year. The Mission also operated the intermediate- secondary school for boys in Basra. Among Iraqi private schools on the secondary level, the Shamash Secondary School in Baghdad is noted for high scholastic and disciplinary standards. Vocational In 1966 vocational education was offered to about 7,000 students 123 in 45 institutions. Some of the institutions offer 6-year vocational training courses; others give 3-year courses for nurses and health workers; still others specialize in 2-year commercial courses; and one provides a 3-year course to train police officers. The institutions giving 6-year vocational training courses in- clude schools specializing in industrial and technical skills, agricul- ture and home economics. Students wishing to enroll must have completed 6 years of primary education. During the first 3 years, the curriculum in all of these schools generally follows that of in- termediate-secondary schools. Subjects related to vocational specialization are taught during the last 3 years. In the industrial schools these subjects include welding, foundry work and mechanical, electrical and radio en- gineering. In the agricultural schools the specialized subjects are farm management, soil chemistry, animal husbandry and irriga- tion methods. In home economics schools the last 3 years are devoted mainly to child education, hygiene, nutrition, sewing, crafts, music and secretarial subjects. Commercial schools operate on the secondary-preparatory level and offer courses in bookkeeping, accountancy, business adminis- tration, law and commercial mathematics. Graduates may enter commercial employment, or they may be admitted to the third year of the College of Commerce at Baghdad University. The schools for nurses and health workers require graduation from the intermediate level (grade 9) of secondary school. The school for police officers, administered by the Ministry of the Inte- rior, has the same entrance requirement. Enrollment in vocational schools is relatively low because of the generally low regard for manual labor. Commercial schools are more popular since their graduates qualify for the much-coveted white-collar office positions. During the early 1960's, however, the number of such positions was limited, and many graduates could not be placed in jobs for which they were trained (see ch. 21, Labor). Adult Education Adult education is offered in literacy schools and fundamental education centers. Night schools offering instruction in primary subjects operate in the major cities. The majority of persons at- tending these schools are men who plan to enter employment. In 1965 there were 145 literacy centers with an enrollment of 8,421. Of this total only 1,294 (roughly 15 percent) were women. Eve- ning schools in 1965 numbered 163, providing instruction for 36,338 persons, about 10 percent of whom were women. 124 Fundamental education centers-a total of 27 with more than 3,000 persons enrolled in 1962—are generally located near the provincial capitals; their jurisdiction extends over several of the surrounding villages. The centers offer instruction in reading, writing and basic arithmetic as well as in agricultural and other vocational subjects such as health care and sanitation techniques. The principal center, also a training school for fundamental educa- tion teachers, is at Abu Ghuraib, about 20 miles west of Baghdad. The center in Diyala Province operates a small model farm. Teacher Training Teacher training is provided in the secondary schools and on the university level. Institutions for training primary school teachers offer 3-year courses to graduates of the intermediate-secondary schools (grade 9). Graduates of the preparatory-secondary level (grade 11) complete the course in 2 years. The curriculum includes methodology, child psychology, social science subjects and lan- guages. Teachers for the intermediate and the preparatory levels of sec- ondary schools are trained at Baghdad University's two colleges of education, in Baghdad and Basra. The Women's College of Baghdad University also trains secondary school teachers. In addi- tion, persons holding bachelors' degrees from any of the other colleges of Baghdad University are qualified to teach in secondary schools. The Institute of Fine Arts in Baghdad trains teachers of art, music and drama for primary, intermediate-secondary and preparatory-secondary schools. Staffed by the country's leading artists, the Institute is noted for its training program in painting and sculpture. Those applying for admission to the 3-year program offered by the Institute must be graduates of the intermediate-sec- ondary school level (grade 9). Schools for training primary teachers had an enrollment in 1966 of 5,563 persons, a 17-percent decline from the previous year. The Ministry of Education reported in 1966, however, that though there was no overall shortage of primary school teachers, the pu- pil-teacher ratio varied widely from one area to another. In some rural areas the teacher shortage was acute since many persons refuse to accept teaching positions in places far removed from the cities. During the same year the Ministry of Education noted a severe shortage of teachers on the secondary level, especially in vocational schools. Official measures to remedy the shortage in- cluded appointing primary school teachers to secondary schools, increasing the teaching load of some secondary school teachers and employing foreign teachers—mostly from Europe-on contract. 125 The Five-Year Economic Plan 1965–69 envisages the training of some 10,000 primary and secondary teachers during the Plan period. School teachers are subject to civil service regulations in mat- ters of appointment, dismissal, discipline and retirement; their salaries are regulated by separate law, with a supplement paid to those employed in remote provinces. Higher Education Higher Education is offered at Baghdad University and its branches at Mosul and Basra, at the University College, at the Higher Technical Institute and at Al Hikma University, all located in Baghdad. Other institutions of higher learning are the College of Religion and Philosophy in Najaf and the College of Commerce in Basra. The Institute of Fine Arts in Baghdad also has an ad- vanced studies program. Unlike other schools and educational institutions directly subor- dinated to the Ministry of Education, Baghdad University is au- tonomous and is responsible only to the Council of Ministers. The University is governed by the University Council and by the Aca- demic Council. The former is headed by the president of the uni- versity and includes the dean of colleges, four faculty representa- tives and a representative of the Ministry of Education. In prac- tice, major decisions affecting university affairs are reached on the basis of agreement between the university president and the repre- sentative of the Ministry of Education. The Academic Council, composed of heads of the various academic departments, deals with curricula, faculty appointments, admission standards and ex- amination procedures. Founded in 1956, by 1966 Baghdad University had a main campus in Baghdad and branches in Mosul and Basra. The Baghdad campus included 15 colleges, 5 higher institutes and 4 vocational institutes. They occupied separate facilities in some 48 buildings scattered throughout the northern section of the capital. Both the College of Agriculture and the College of Veterinary Medicine are located 10 miles west of Baghdad. Five colleges and one vocational institute operate in Mosul, and another five colleges are in Basra. According to plans in 1966, the Basra and Mosul branches were to become independent universities when their aca- demic programs were fully developed. A new campus for Baghdad University designed by Walter Gro- pius, an architect from the United States, was in the early stages of construction in 1966. Located in the southern sector of 126 Baghdad, the new campus will provide space for about half of the colleges and will accommodate some 30,000 students. Another major project envisages the construction of a Medical City to house the College of Medicine, the College of Nursing and the College of Dentistry. A 1,000-bed hospital will be the largest building in Medical City (see ch. 8, Living Conditions). The courses offered by the various colleges and institutes of Baghdad University and by its branches at Mosul and Basra in- clude agronomy and forestry, arts, commerce, dentistry, eco- nomics, political science, education, engineering, Islamic law and culture, secular law, medicine, nursing, pharmacology, natural sci- ences, industrial engineering, languages, physical education, public administration, technology, medical technology and secretarial studies. Largely because of their scattered locations, the colleges and institutes operate independently and often duplicate academic departments and services. Since 1963, measures have been under way to unify and centralize the academic program through the creation of major departments or faculties which are to consolidate the academic programs in the fields represented by the various colleges. By 1965 the departments of science and of humanities had been established and offered coordinated programs of study on the undergraduate and graduate levels. Enrollment at Baghdad University in 1966 totaled approxi- mately 21,500, including about 2,300 women. The colleges are co- educational except for the College of Women and the College of Nursing. The College of Physical Education is reserved for men. By 1965 the largest enrollments were in the colleges of educa- tion, law and art. Of a total of 1,923 students who graduated in 1964, 1,075 received degrees in education, languages, commerce and art. An academic 4-year program leads to the bachelor of arts or the bachelor of science degree. In the college of medicine the course of studies is 6 years, and in the colleges of pharmacology, dentistry and veterinary medicine, 5 years. To earn a degree in specialized fields, students must follow a prescribed course with no elective subjects. The faculty in 1966 totaled 1,128, including 178 foreign profes- sors and lecturers. Most of the foreign faculty members taught science, agriculture, languages and medical subjects. These courses are frequently taught in a foreign language, mostly English. The majority of other courses are taught bilingually, in Arabic and English. English is introduced early in the secondary school cur- riculum, but many students find it difficult to follow university- level instruction in that language. 127 Al Hikma University was founded in 1956 under the auspices of the Jesuit religious order of the United States. In 1966 the univer- sity offered academic programs leading to degrees in business ad- ministration, civil engineering and the liberal arts. It is coeduca- tional, and the language of instruction is English. The Ford Foun- dation, the Gulbenkian Foundation and the Catholic Near East Welfare Association helped to build and equip five classroom build- ings as well as to provide modern laboratory facilities and a 35,000 volume library. Enrollment in 1965 totaled 483, and the faculty numbered 33 full-time and 28 part-time priests, mostly Jesuit. The University College is affiliated with Baghdad University. Organized in 1964, it offers university-level evening courses to accommodate the growing number of employed persons in Baghdad who wish to acquire a college degree. More than 2,000 students were enrolled in 1965. The cirriculum included courses in mathematics, physics, education, Arabic, law, political science, ac- counting, business management, economics and languages. The College of Commerce in Basra is privately sponsored by the Basra branch of the Iraqi Economists Society. Like the University College, it is affiliated with Baghdad University and offers a 4-year course leading to degrees in commerce, accounting and business administration. The Higher Technical Institute in Baghdad was organized in 1960 by the government, with assistance from the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization. It has a 5-year program leading to bachelor of science degrees in electrical, me- chanical, structural and automotive engineering. The first grad- uating class in 1965 numbered 28; total enrollment in 1966 was 319. Students attending foreign universities in 1965 totaled 5,457. Of this total, the government provided full financial support to 1,324 and partial support to 870. Others received help from private foundations and international organizations. The largest number of students attended universities in Great Britain, the Soviet Union, Lebanon, the United States, West Germany and the United Arab Republic. The majority of the government-aided students were preparing for degrees in engineering, science and medicine; upon returning to Iraq, they must work in positions assigned to them by the government for a period of time equaling that devoted to their study abroad. EDUCATION AND SOCIETY Respect for learning and knowledge among Iraqis is rooted in the Islamic religious heritage. The Koran is regarded as a source 128 of knowledge and inspiration, and its teachings exert a powerful influence. The prestige attached to religious learning is reflected in the strong pressure put upon even the poorest villager or urban dweller to see to it that his son acquires at least some formal knowledge of the Koran. Great value is also placed on facility in verbal expression. Eloquence and the ability to quote from the Koran or to marshal proverbs in arguments are still the marks of an educated man. In learned circles, the correct usage of the many shades of meaning in the Arabic language and the use of allegoric forms of speech bring great intellectual prestige (see ch. 10, Ar- tistic and Intellectual Expression). Because of these traditions, some Iraqis, notably those in the rural areas, remain unconvinced of the value of modern education, with its stress on factual and quantitative knowledge. Education is equated with knowledge in matters of religion, wisdom and right- eousness which presuppose conformity with traditional ways and values believed to be pleasing to God. Innovations, which are inva- riably introduced by education, are therefore regarded as a threat to God-ordained ways. In those instances when villagers accept education, it must be linked to immediate, tangible benefits, such as laborsaving devices and health care. During the 1960's such benefits usually accrued from community improvement projects rather than from school curricula. Religious and ethnic factors affect the value placed on education. The Shiites tend to be less literate than the Sunnites; many Shiites are apprehensive about the influence of the more educated Sunni group. The Kurds have been consistent in demanding education for their children. A growing number of Kurds, mostly sons of tribal leaders, have been trained in science, law and government (some of them in schools abroad) to occupy positions of leadership upon their return. Secular schools are regarded unfavorably by members of the Yezidi religious minority. Some of their religious beliefs prohibit the education of children, and their taboos against the pronuncia- tion of certain sounds and words render virtually all forms of instruction difficult (see ch. 11, Religion). To urban groups, education is of considerable importance as a path to economic gains and social mobility. Some have accepted the application of learning to practical life although they continue to look with disfavor upon manual work. Those who have received technical training tend to regard themselves as supervisors, no longer obliged to work with their hands. Science is equated with knowledge, and such tangible objects as airplanes, modern weapons and irrigation works are respected as evidence of intellec- 129 tual and moral achievement rather than as the result of technical labor. White-collar jobs carry much prestige, and keen competition for them has resulted in a scarcity of office positions. Still more pres- tige is attached to the position of a government official. Even a low-ranking position in this category represents the ultimate career achievement for many members of the middle class. University degrees, especially from foreign universities, carry great prestige; serving as passports to the professions and govern- ment positions, degrees often compensate for humble origins in an individual's efforts to gain social recognition. The study of law is favored since knowledge of legal matters is regarded as useful in business affairs and in politics. Students are conscious of themselves as a distinct and important group. They are fully aware that in a largely illiterate population the educated persons wield influence disproportionate to their numbers. At both the secondary and the university levels they tend to engage in political activities and to make their influence felt through strikes and demonstrations that disrupt discipline and often cause suspension of classes (see ch. 14, Political Dynamics). Besides bringing improved living standards and greater social mobility to many, education has also served as a channel for new ideas and scientific information leading to a reexamination of tra- ditional values and social practices. Those who have completed primary and secondary schooling and have subsequently obtained urban employment often find themselves questioning the values and practices which governed their families and to which they were expected to conform. Study abroad has helped to fill the need for professional per- sonnel, but young men returning from foreign countries experi- ence difficulty in adjusting to living conditions in their country. Many are discouraged from entering professional positions at home as they see little chance of achieving the material gains they have witnessed abroad. 130 CHAPTER 10 ARTISTIC AND INTELLECTUAL EXPRESSION The country's contributions to the artistic and intellectual achievements of the Middle East represent one of the most signif- icant elements in its long history. Throughout its pre-Islamic era, the Tigris-Euphrates region witnessed the rise and decline of great civilizations. Their accomplishments included magnificent architecture, irrigation systems, sculpture and metalwork. Excava- tions at ancient Sumerian, Babylonian and Assyrian sites have uncovered vast collections of clay tablets and books containing writings on history, philosophy, religion, law, mathematics and chemistry. The advent of Islam in the seventh century stimulated a new outpouring of cultural activity which flourished under the Abbas- side caliphate (750–1258). Baghdad came to rival Constantinople as a seat of learning and art. Scholars from other flourishing centers of civilization gathered there, intermingling Greek, Indian, Persian and Judaic thought and talent. In time, these diverse ele- ments were submerged and transformed into an all-embracing Is- lamic synthesis in which a monotheistic religion defined man's place and duties in a supernatural order and constituted the in- spiration and guide in art, scholarship and the ordinary affairs of daily life. This golden age represents to Iraqis the climax of their country's past achievements, and it serves them as an inspiration and a goal for efforts to revive past greatness within a unified and prosperous nation. Iraqis are less conscious of the contributions of the pre-Islamic past although government statements and publica- tions emphasize the country's heritage of ancient civilizations (see ch. 3, Historical Setting). Turkish rule from the sixteenth century to 1918 and subsequent British domination inhibited creative activity and precipitated an era of political and social stagnation from which the country emerged only during the 1930's. Since that time, increasing con- tact with the West has modified the traditionally religious orienta- tion of scholarship and the arts and introduced modern styles in literature and in the visual arts. Natural science and technological 131 subjects have been incorporated into school curricula, but in the 1960's the country's few experts in these fields were foreign trained (see ch. 9, Education). During the 1960's the reinterpretation of modern social and political theories in the light of Islamic religious and Arab cultural values dominated intellectual discussion. Within this framework, scholars and writers sought to define Iraq's role in the process of Arab unification and political rejuvenation. Young intellectuals were involved in the search for a national identity, specifically Iraqi, within the Islamic-Arabic context. An awareness of domestic social issues, sharpened by the Revolution of 1958, was reflected in the modern works of sculptors and painters. Because of the modest scope of publishing activities and the close government surveillance of the press during the 1960's, issues reflecting current intellectual trends rarely appear in printed form. Such issues are generally aired in spirited discus- sions among a relatively small urban group of scholars and pro- fessionals, including journalists, whose views, although not ex- pressed through formal channels, determine the tenor of educated public opinion (see ch. 16, Public Information). Poetry is regarded as the highest form of art and is loved by all Iraqis Poetry recitals are a favorite form of diversion in the cities as well as in the countryside. Interest in the modern changes in arts, literature and scholarship is limited to educated urban groups. This trend tends to reinforce the cultural dominance of cities, among which Baghdad is foremost. The flow of new cultural influences from the cities to the villages tends to be slow and, when changes reach the countryside, they are little understood and are frequently regarded with apathy. Ethnic and religious differences account for diversity in cultural expression within the country. The Kurds, some of whom have shown promise in literary and scholarly work, have a distinct language and ethnic lore to which they have clung tenaciously for many generations. Demands voiced by Kurdish leaders for the recognition of Kurdish intellectual traditions were part of the Kurdish autonomy efforts during the 1950's and 1960's, Authoriza- tion was requested for extensive publishing activities in Kurdish and for the establishment of a separate Kurdish college in Bagh- dad, but by mid-1968 no information had been announced regard- ing the granting of these demands. The schism between Shia and Sunni Moslems is another reflection of indigenous cultural differ- ences (see ch. 5, Ethnic Groups and Languages; ch. 11, Religion) The government's cultural policies during the 1960's focused on the extension of the educational system. Official speeches stressed 132 the role of schools in fostering the Arabic-Islamic heritage, and government officials called for the intensification of cultural and educational exchange programs with the countries of the Arab League (see ch. 15, Foreign Relations). Government initiative in cultural activities is exercised through the Ministry of Culture and Guidance and through the Ministry of Education. The latter is responsible for the administration of research facilities, libraries and cultural relations with other countries. A Supreme Council on Research is subordinated directly to the Council of Ministers. INTELLECTUAL EXPRESSION The importance assigned to intellectual activity was long ago reflected in the saying attributed to the Prophet Mohammed : "Seek knowledge though it be in China.” Under the Abbasside caliphs scholars engaged in the translation of Greek and other foreign works and also wrote original treatises on philosophy and science. The foundations for algebra, astronomy and alchemy were laid, and the system of Arabic numerals became a tool for mathe- maticians the world over. During the early years of the Abbasside dynasty, the country came under strong Persian influences which contributed new con- cepts useful to the exposition of religious and philosophical ideas. Persian questioning of the values and forms brought to them by the Arabs supported indirectly the existing atmosphere of intellec- tual freedom and inquiry in Baghdad. The tenth century Iraqi theologian Ash'ari, who died in 935, encouraged the use of the dialectic in religious argument. Syrian and Coptic Christian scholars helped to introduce Greek logic and metaphysics into Iraqi philosophy, although the Greek concept of man's ability to participate in a perfect, universal knowledge through the syste- matic use of mind was never fully assimilated. Although the cen- tral motif of Islamic intellectual life in Iraq was always Arabic, the Semitic-Persian-Greek combination contributed greatly to the elaboration of the theories upon which Islam as a religion and as a body politic came to be based. Greek concepts and terminology also contributed to the clari- fication of Sufism, or Moslem mysticism, which until that time had been confined to an orthodox vocabulary in its attempts to describe essentially intuitive religious experience. The practice of Sufism in its various forms gradually became embellished with and systema- tized under external influence—Indian, Christian, Greek and Per- sian. It spread to Basra and Baghdad and, in time, came to connote the entire body of Moslem mysticism (see ch. 11, Religion). Generally, the ultimate goal of the Sufi is to draw near to God 133 in a mystical union through prayer or through a defined series of steps. Such ecstasy is considered possible because of the defini- tion, “the existence of created things is nothing but the very essence of the existence of the Creator," and since man preexists as an idea in the mind of God, it is inversely possible that the soul can again unite with God. This doctrine had important effects on the Moslem community in which it merged and on the intellectual life of that community. Aside from the positive influence of such great thinkers as al Ghazali (1059–1111) and Ibn Sina (980–1037), who were adher- ents of mysticism, these Sufi convictions presented a real challenge to the dogma of orthodox Islam. Sufism constituted a rebellion of the individual conscience against the rigidly defined collective practices and preoccupation with public behavior that character- ized the orthodox. Furthermore, Sufis had a generally uninterested view of politics, and the spread of Sufism coincided with the weak- ening of Islam as a political force. In spite of the adverse response of orthodox theologians, the Sunnites never wholly rejected Sufism and even incorporated some of its more moderate beliefs. After the thirteenth century the speculative trend in theology and philosophy gradually gave way to a hardening dogmatism in religion; the Greek influence in science and philosophy disap- peared. Bound within the limits of a rigid and pervasive religious code, intellectual expression was thereafter characterized by emo- tion rather than reason; its language became connotative rather than denotative, and the intellect served to embroider rather than test the verities laid down by religion. Overshadowed by the preoccupation with law and theology, the earlier interest in natural sciences diminished; mathematics, physics and biology came to be considered foreign fields. Medicine reverted to folk remedies until its revival in 1872 with the con- struction of a hospital in Baghdad. The intellectual climate of Islam languished for nearly 600 years until its exposure to the modern West. The process of change set in motion by Western contact in the nineteenth century was met by the unwillingness of the traditionalists to compete with or to adapt the new trends in scholarship and art. As late as the turn of the twentieth century, formal intellectual activity was confined to a small number of scholars who owned their libraries and concerned themselves with the writing of their family chronicles. Sunni Moslems regarded religious law and theology as the most legitimate field of study. Among the Shiites, whose intellectual life was confined to the traditional schools of the holy cities, religious scholarship was considered almost equivalent to virtue. Even among literate groups there was 134 little comprehension of Western thought, which was greatly influencing thinking in some other parts of the Middle East, no- tably in Egypt and Turkey. Intellectual ferment leading to attempts at reconciling Western scientific and social thought with Islamic traditions began in con- junction with the gradual political and economic changes set in motion after the attainment of independence in 1932. The publica- tion of books and other printed matter increased, and new fields of study were introduced at Baghdad University. Poetry, a tradition- ally favorite form of art, became a vehicle for the expression of new currents of thought. The Institute of Fine Arts, established by the government in 1941, offered instruction in modern styles of sculpture and painting and in Western music. The curriculum of Baghdad University Medical College was revised to meet stand- ards of modern medical practices. Foundations for cultural and social studies were created in conjunction with the University to help secure recognition in the Arab world for distinctively Iraqi values and intellectual contributions. THE ORAL AND LITERARY TRADITION Poetry, formal prose and speech have long been esteemed as the highest of the arts in Iraq as well as elsewhere in the Arab Middle East. In this tradition, language was more than a means of com- munication; its skillful use was an end in itself. Where logic failed, the apt employment of a quotation from the Koran, a proverb or a fragment of verse might succeed. Each element of a literary product was regarded as an individual experience. A line in a poem need have no evident relation with the whole, and sometimes even the words themselves seemed to lose all but aesthetic signifi- cance. Within the limits of conventionally approved subject matter, the appreciation of sheer rhetoric transcended any concern for internal coherence and logic as these canons have come to be applied in Western literature. The old poetry, recited or sung, is still popular in Iraq, and the storyteller still draws an audience on feast days and festive occasions. Set content and formal style in the tradition models of poetry had long resisted change. Nevertheless, it was in literature that the beginnings of a new creative effort were first manifested during the early twentieth century. The new directions which were still being pursued during the 1960's have involved changes in both style and content. Whereas philosophy and rhetoric, religion and history, biography and geography dominated the literary scene a century ago, politics and foreign affairs, social and economic sub- jects have become the prominent interests since the 1930's. 135 The press, a medium borrowed from the West, has become a major vehicle of literary expression and linguistic reform. To gether with textbooks published since the 1930's for the teaching of social and natural sciences in secondary schools and at Baghdad University, the press has played a prominent role in the modi- fication of classical Arabic to meet modern needs (see ch. 16, Public Information). Poetry Early Iraqi poetry shows strong pre-Islamic influences in its use of old Bedouin themes. With the advent of Islam, and the town- centered culture under the Abbasside caliphs, a poetry developed which reflected the urban preoccupations of the court. Persia con- tributed the romantic and heroic epic and a poetry which per- mitted full elaboration of mystical themes. Later, with the decline of Abbasside power, poets again began to glorify the Bedouin ideals of simplicity, courage and independence. The peasant culti- vator, looked down upon by townsmen and nomad alike, was never regarded as a suitable subject for poetic treatment. Sufism also had a profound influence on Iraqi poetic achieve- ment, stimulating poetry written for the express purpose of in- citing a state of ecstasy in the listener; though monotonous in its use of repetitive allegories and expressions, its essential elements were soon absorbed into the body of Islamic poetry as a whole. In the twentieth century, however, this kind of poetry has been in- creasingly rejected by modern Moslems, and the number of pro- fessed Sufi poets in Iraq in the 1960's is small. Poetry produced around the turn of the twentieth century was still traditional in form and spirit. The typical diwan, or collection of odes, of that time was devoted to involved puzzles in verse, commemorative poems for wedding ceremonies and poems in praise of the Prophet Mohammed and religious leaders, the gover- nors and their associates. The works of such famous nineteenth century poets as Abd al Baqi al Umari and Abd al Ghaffar al Akhras and of their younger contemporaries, Haidar al Hilli and Mohammed Said al Habbubi, all fall within this tradition. The intellectual and political crisis of the first quarter of the twentieth century was reflected in the emergence of a new ap- proach, associated with two of Iraq's greatest modern poets, ar Rasafi (1875–1945) and az Zahawi (1863–1936). The movement they initiated is characterized by the shift from an almost exclu- sive preoccupation with style to the use of language to inform. Social and political topics replaced the idealized Bedouin themes; modern Arabic was employed, and new poetic forms made their appearance. This trend has been continued by a number of 136 younger poets. The attention of these contemporary poets has shifted from the doings of a small group of literati to those of the ordinary people to whom they dedicate their work. Ar Rasafi, of Kurdish descent, is still read with great admira- tion in Iraq, and his poems have been included in school texts. His language, although far removed from the colloquial, is clear of the ornate style which prevailed in the classical period. Knowledge of Turkish enabled him to read the works of European thinkers, and he was the first poet in Iraq to come to grips with the social problems of his age. Az Zahawi has been called the “philosopher of the poets." Viewing scientific progress as the outstanding phenomenon of modern times and employing it as a major theme in his poetry, he appears to be more of an intellectual philosopher than a poet. Like ar Rasafi, he was sensitive to the social and political evils of his day, but he went beyond ar Rasafi in the quest for simplicity of style and language. Az Zahawi was especially noted for his poems in support of the emancipation of women and for his efforts to popularize science. His poetry, however, gained general apprecia- tion only after the country attained independence in 1932. During and immediately after World War I, the idea of Iraqi nationalism and the revival of the Arab cultural heritage inspired a new group of poets. Many poems featured highlights of Iraqi his- tory and praised national independence, although the public under- standing of these themes was limited. Al Shabibi, Al Hindawi and Al Radi were the representative poets of this group. During World War II and thereafter, poetry in Iraq entered another phase. Traditional literary styles had only limited appeal for the younger writers and poets. Much of the poetry of this period reflected the influence of the content and style of Western literature which reached educated groups mainly through Egypt and Lebanon. Objection and dissent became major keynotes. The traditionally approved Qasidah (which was written according to rigid rules, including the use throughout a poem of a single rhyme sound and one of several approved meters) was critically rejected, although no new forms were accepted to take its place. Al Jawa- rihi is the outstanding representative of modern poetry in Iraq, and he is also regarded as one of the most prominent contempo- rary poets in the Arab world. Other well-known members of the new group of poets were Nazik al Malaikah, a woman; Buland al Haidari, a Kurd; and Abd al Wahab al Bayati. During the 1960's poetry continued to be held in the highest esteem by all levels of society in Iraq. It is a popular art, and its enjoyment is limited neither by education nor by sex. Compara- 137 tively little of it is written, and there is no sharp distinction be- tween "folk” and “classical” poetry. All Iraqis may feel moved, on occasion, to compose poems or a verse on current topics. Village poets recite both traditional and modern poetry. The ideals of the Revolution of 1958, Iraqi national identity and Arab solidarity, are favored themes of poets of national stature as well as those for whom poetry is only an avocation. Prose During the twentieth century nearly every author of Arabic prose employed the traditional pattern of rhymed prose, or saj. History, biography, theology, philosophy and other branches of knowledge were written in this manner, as were stories and tales called maqamaat. Prose literature in the form of novels, short stories and essays has been borrowed relatively recently from the West and reached the country mainly through Egypt, which had come into contact with these forms during earlier centuries. The lack of publishers, the size of the literate public and the tendency of intellectuals to be drawn into politics rather than liter- ature have tended to delay the development of creative prose writing. Since the 1950's, however, creative prose has assumed a more prominent place, although poetry has remained the favored literary form. Newspapers played an important role in the devel- opment of modern Arabic prose. Many newspaper editors, in- cluding Rafail Butti and Fahmi Al Muddaris, are prominent writers (see ch. 16, Public Information). The works of Mahmud Ahmad as Sayyid and of his greater successor, Dhu Nun Ayyub, show the influence of Western novels and short stories. Anwar Shaul specializes in the colloquial short story. Abdul Majid Lutfi is noted for his simple but forceful style exhibited in several collections of short stories dealing with the life of the poor and with human nature. Dhu Nun Ayyub is gener- ally regarded as the country's most outstanding writer; next in importance is Abd al Malik Nuri. THE PERFORMING ARTS Theater Despite the Greek influence early in Iraqi history (from about 323–200 B.C.), the theater has been unknown in Iraq, except for the Shia passion plays commemorating the death of Husain, son of Ali and grandson of the Prophet Mohammed. This religious per- formance, reminiscent of the morality plays of Europe's Middle Ages, has set a pattern which varies slightly in dialogue and cos- 138 tume depending upon the region and the wealth of the particular Shia community (see ch. 3, Historical Setting; ch. 11, Religion). Dramatic forms are generally alien to traditional Arabic litera- ture. This is indicated not only by the virtual absence of theatrical development but also by the concentration, in verse and prose works, on memorable lines and decorative details rather than on a structure of ideas. This characteristic is closely related to the rhe- torical tradition, which is essential to the classical form of the Arabic language itself and which does not lend itself to stage productions. Storytellers, however, unknowingly make use of drama as they portray the characters and events of their stories with great realism. The shadow play, which makes use of themes of well-known folk tales, also contains expressive forms. In the plays the shadows of puppets are projected on a white screen while they act out well-known stories. The plots generally involve heroic characters engaged in contest and aided or hindered by spirits. Arabic plays written in Egypt are known in Iraq, but the country has no prominent playwrights. There are few professional actors, and no regularly established legitimate theater. Plays written locally show structural characteristics which make staging difficult. Unlike the novel and other prose forms, their content has not been deeply influenced by foreign material; most draw their subject matter from Arab history and literature, although some have been concerned with social and political problems. In these beginning stages Iraqi drama has tended to be serious in tone, and only recently have comedies, such as those of Yusif al Ani, been accepted on the stage. Some of the modern writers have also found Radio Baghdad a medium for expression. There is a Cinema and Stage Administration in Baghdad which produces plays. Dramatic training is offered at the Institute of Fine Arts at Baghdad. Some theater criticisim appears in the newspapers. Be- cause of the few performances presented in the country, however, such criticism is devoted mainly to encouraging public interest in the theater. Music A tradition of folk music enters intimately into the life of the people. Despite the ban on music in Moslem religious services, song has penetrated in the chanted recitations from the Koran in the mosque and in the call to prayer. Music is also inextricably meshed with poetry in Iraq; it provides a vehicle for a style of verse which closely resembles Western lyrical poetry centering mainly of the theme of unrequited love. 139 Unlike Western music, most of which is composed according to fairly explicit formal rules, Arabic music is based on a modal framework within which the performer is free to improvise. In the absence of a system of musical notation, the musician or singer learns his art by ear and transmits it through his performances. The performance represents a canonical interplay between the singer and the instruments in which the instruments render an embellished version of the basic melody. A good singer is judged by the ability to express by vocal variations the emotions conveyed by the text. The most commonly used instruments in classical Arabic music included the 'ud, a plucked string instrument with 9 to 11 strings; the kemanja, a bowed instrument comparable to the violin; the qanuun, another plucked string instrument resembling a three-octave dulcimer played with wooden mallets; and the nay, a flutelike instrument. Like other aspects of Iraqi art, music has come to include Western forms. In urban circles appreciation of Western music is growing, encouraged by radio and television. Since the 1940's, stu- dents have been sent abroad to study music, and performers have been trained in traditional and Western instruments at the Insti- tute of Fine Arts. The Iraqi Symphony Orchestra was established in 1941. Dance Iraq shares with other Middle Eastern countries a number of traditional folk dances, which are performed during holidays and feast days. Various ethnic groups have traditional dances which are performed for the entertainment of guests. The belly dance, some versions of which are familiar to Westerners from perform- ances in urban nightclubs, is frequently performed at weddings by professional entertainers. On these occasions guests often bring their own dancers. Western social dancing is offensive to the Arab concept of feminine honor and is generally confined to clubs and cabarets. THE VISUAL ARTS Architecture The country has numerous archaeological monuments and relics dating back to the Sumerian and Babylonian empires (3100–1600 B.C.). The government has preserved and restored many of these for the benefit of scholars and visitors. Iraqis, however, have little sense of affinity with these monuments of the past, which they regard as remnants of the Jahiliyah period (pre-Islamic age of ignorance). The ruins of the Persian city of Ctesiphon are located 140 20 miles south of Baghdad. One wing of the royal palace has been preserved, including a large vaulted arch believed to be one of the world's largest spans of unreinforced brickwork. Ruins of the ter- raced or “hanging" gardens, a noted architectural accomplish- ment of the Babylonian period, are about 60 miles southwest of Baghdad. On the same site is a massive animal statue, known as the Lion of Babylon. The traditional architecture, which has flourished in Iraq since the seventh century, comprised elements of Roman, Greek and Byzantine styles. Building proportions were monumental; win- dows were small; and extensive use was made of pillars, domes and colonnades with pointed arches. This style reached its climax during the Abbasside caliphate, but its techniques and decorative methods have been preserved and adapted to modern needs. A noted characteristic of Islamic architecture is the use of poly- chrome faience mosaic to face the exterior walls of mosques, pal- aces and tombs. The principal elements in the patterns are curving stems, leaves and blossoms in countless pieces of small, carefully cut and fitted segments of glazed tile. Deep blue, turquoise and purple predominate, accented by deep green and bright yellow or black and white. Each cut piece is rubbed down with a rasp until the edges and sides are smooth and even and taper from the glazed surface to a ridge or point in the back. These fragments are placed face down in the outlines drawn on a plaster bed. When a section is complete, it is covered with a thick coat of plaster, which settles into the gaps left by the taper of the units. The units are so close that the plaster barely shows on the surface. The size of each section is determined by convenience in handling, and care has to be taken in assembling and joining these sections when they are raised to a vertical position on the wall. Workmanship is so skilled, however, that it is impossible to tell from the finished work where the division occurs, and the panel appears to be painted on the wall. Slight irregularities in the bed on which the pattern is assembled result in slight modu- lations in the surface of the finished work and, as the tiles used are brilliantly glazed, these differences in angle make spots that gleam and sparkle in the bright sunlight. The Mongol raids of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries and devastation during the Turkish occupation beginning in the six- teenth century swept away most of the architectural monuments of the Abbasside period. Of the few surviving representative buildings in Baghdad, the most notable are the minaret of the Suq el Ghazel mosque, a brick structure decorated with geometric de- signs; the Khan Marjan caravansary, which has accommodated the Islamic Museum in recent years, and the Mustanzariyah, 141 another caravansary built during the thirteenth century. Mus- tanzariyah, a rectangular hall with small cupolas resting on parallel arches, was converted into a customs building in 1823. The Abbasside Palace, noted for its vaulted colonnades and tile decor, is surrounded by a large garden decorated with fountains. Tile mosaic decoration has been lavishly used on the Qadhimain mosque, located about 4 miles north of Baghdad. The mosque has four minarets, two covered with gilded copper plaques, and a spa- cious interior which has been richly furnished with carpets, carv- ings and mirrors. Other outstanding examples of traditional Is- lamic architecture are the mosques of Najaf and Karbala, the latter a well-known shrine. The Friday Mosque at Samarra, built during Abbasside rule, has a spiral-shaped tower (ziggurat), a structure widely used in ancient Mesopotamia. Mosques built in modern times are in the traditional style. Public buildings erected since the 1950's, however, represent a fusion of traditional Islamic and modern architecture. For ex- ample, gracefully proportioned colonnades and marble tile floors were utilized in Baghdad's new Parliament Building. Completed just after the Revolution of 1958, it is used to accommodate meet- ings of Cabinet ministers. Painting and Sculpture Scholars disagree on the extent to which the development of certain forms of the visual arts were inhibited by the proscriptions in Islamic law against the portrayal of human and animal figures. Certainly the Islamic prohibition was preceded by earlier notions of magical attributes attracting to living forms. In any even, with the coming of Islam in the seventh century, certain media of ar- tistic expression hitherto used were disqualified; others were em- phasized. Nonrepresentational ornamental motifs gained promi- nence within the framework of a distinctive decorative style known as arabesque. Characterized by floral and geometric design, this abstract and elaborate style was especially highly developed in the southern portions of Iraq and in Baghdad. The ornamental use of calligraphy was also widespread. Relics of the pre-Islamic past and of the Abbasside period are preserved in several museums located in Baghdad. The Islamic Museum and the Iraqi Museum are noted for archaeological relics and decorative objects from the thirteenth and fourteenth centu- ries. The New Museum, located on the east bank of the Tigris River, is surrounded by a garden where some of the archaeological relics are exhibited. Ancient Arab weapons are shown in the War 142 Museum; samples of the country's fauna, flora and mineral re- sources may be seen in the Natural History Museum. The Ar- chaeological Museum in Mosul has an extensive collection of ob- jects dating back to the Assyrian period. In modern times visual arts in Iraq have been strongly affected by Western influences. Whereas the traditional art forms found their highest expression in tile mosaics, calligraphy and mosque architecture, modern forms of painting and sculpture have made their appearance, notably since 1958. Favored themes of many painters and sculptors are based on political and sociological ideals of the Revolution, although works portraying family groups and rural scenes have also gained prominence. One of the country's most renowned modern artists was Jawad Salim (1920–61), a painter and sculptor. After studying in Europe he taught at the Institute of Fine Arts and helped found the Friends of Art, the country's first modern art group. Salim's works reflect Babylonian and Sumerian themes as well as Islamic and Western traditions. Among his best-known works is a frieze of bronze figures portraying the Revolution of 1958. Khalid al Rhehal is noted for his sculpture of a mother and child in one of Baghdad's public gardens. Another frieze by Abdul Rahman al Gahailani decorates the modernistic building of the Central Bank of Iraq. The monument to the Unknown Soldier, a simple, sweeping arch located in a major public square in Baghdad, is the work of Ra'uf Chadirchi. Among the painters, Abd al Kadir ar Rassah (1872–1951) is remembered as the "father of modern art in Iraq." His romantic landscapes enlivened with small figures reflected Turkish in- fluence. The paintings of Faiq Hassan, head of the Department of Painting of the Institute of Fine Arts, depict rural scenes and customs, although many of his works feature abstract themes. Sayid Mahmud Sabri is another noted modern painter whose works have been exhibited in Baghdad. 143 Arabic, Islam means "submission to the Will of God,” and believers call themselves Moslems. Origins Islam was founded by the Prophet Mohammed at Mecca in Arabia. He was born there about 570 of a poor family belonging to one of the most powerful tribes of the city. Mecca, at that time, was an important religious and commercial center ruled by an oligarchy of tribes interested in maintaining its power and the income it derived from commerce and from the pilgrims who vis- ited its shrine. Except for other trading cities in western Arabia, the Arabian Peninsula was inhabited by nomadic warring tribes. There were small groups of Christians and Jews in Arabia, but most Arabians were polytheists. Mohammed was orphaned while still a small child and was brought up by his grandfather and later by his father's brother, Abu Talib. As a young man he differed from other citizens of Mecca only in his refusal to accept the gods of the local religion. At age 25 he married his employer, a wealthy middle-aged widow named Khadija. One daughter of this marriage, Fatimah, survived to leave descendants. As he approached middle age, Mohammed became a respected member of his community, with a reputation for justice and honesty. Mohammed used to go to a cave in the mountains near Mecca to meditate. When he was 40 years old, he had there the first of a series of visions of the archangel Gabriel, which were the source of the Koran (Qur'an), the Islamic scripture. Among the first be- lievers in his message were his wife and Abu Talib's son, Ali. In the manner of the old Hebrew prophets, Mohammed began preaching the unity of God and the necessity for a return to upright living. As the number of converts increased, the Meccan oligarchy became concerned about the threat to the structure of society and to the revenues received from the pilgrimage. Persecution of the Moslems became severe, and in 622 they fled some 250 miles northward to Medina, a rival city of Mecca. This exodus, called the Hegira, marks a turning point in Islamic history and is the base date for the Islamic calendar. After the Hegira Mohammed became the head of state as well as Prophet. The small community of Moslems in Medina continued to gain converts and, by means of treaties and military conquests, gained control of the Arabian Peninsula. When Mohammed died in 632, the problem of choosing his suc- cessor as head of state arose, because he left no sons or any indica- tion as to his choice of successor. Factions developed; some fa. 146 vored Ali, Mohammed's cousin and son-in-law, the husband of Fa- timah, and others supported various close friends of Mohammed. Abu Bakr, an older man than Ali and a member of the old Meccan aristocracy, eventually was chosen. The Party of Ali (shi'at 'Ali) was discontented. After Abu Bakr's death, two other older men served as caliphs (from khalifah, literally successor) in succession. Eventually Ali had his turn, but he was assassinated within 5 years. The civil war intensified. Both Mu'awiyah (a distant kinsman of the Prophet) and Hasan, and later Husain, both sons of Ali, claimed to be caliph. Hasan abdicated; Husain and his followers tried to gain assistance in Iraq but were surrounded and massa- cred at Karbala in 680. The forces of Mu'awiyah's son Yazid pre- vailed, and the rule of the Umayyads (descendants of Mohammed's clan in Mecca) was established. The Party of Ali had reason for being discontented also over the failure of Ali and his sons to gain power. The Umayyads tended to treat Moslems of Persian, and other non-Arab, descent as second- class citizens. Discontent of these non-Arabs was an important factor in the 750 overthrow of the Umayyads by the Abbassides who claimed descent from al-Abbas, a brother of Mohammed's father. After the final defeat of the forces of Husain at Karbala, the Party of Ali remained a dissident group within Islam. Although the original cause for the split between them and the majority of Moslems was polticial, involving disagreements over who was to succeed Mohammed and what was to be the principle of succession, it was not long before theological, legal and ritual differences in- tensified the political division. Members of the Party of Ali became known as Shiites. Fol- lowers of the Umayyads, and later the Abbassides, became known as Sunnites, because they claimed to follow the tradition (sunnah) of the Prophet Mohammed. Although the Shiites also have a tradition, they accept only those parts of it transmitted through Ali and his descendents. Divisions Of the perhaps 400 million Moslems in the world, 30 million are Shiites. The Shiites are divided into three major groups and also a number of sects. In Iraq all of the Shiites belong to the Ithna 'Ashari group and form about half of the Moslem population (see ch. 5, Ethnic Groups and Languages). Certain of the Shiite sec- tarian offshoots also find adherents in Iraq, but they are only a small and isolated minority. The Shiites believe that Ali should have been the head of state 147 after the death of Mohammed because of his close relationship to the Prophet and because of his possession of religious knowl- edge which they believe had been entrusted to him by Mohammed. Because of their nobility of descent and their possession of this esoteric religious knowledge, Ali's descendants are believed to have exclusive right to leadership. The Shiites call these leaders Imams and regard them as spiritual as well as temporal rulers. Beginning with Ali, the Iraqi Shiites recognize 12 Imams, the last of whom disappeared as a small child in the ninth century; they believe that he is divine and immortal and will reappear on the Day of Judgment. Because of their belief in the special qualities of the Imams, the Shiites have tended to hold themselves above the Sunnites. Because of their dependence upon the authority of the Imams and their agents on earth, the mujtahids (specialists in Islamic law), the Shiites in Iraq have tended to place less emphasis upon education and, hence, are disporportionately represented in the country's educated classes. Every year on 10 Muharram (first month of the Islamic year) the Shia community reenacts the massacre of Husain at Karbala and mourns for the family of Ali. This annual commemoration, together with the less-advantaged position of the Shia community in Iraq, has served to reinforce a Shia sense of separation and exclusiveness. Iraqi Sunnites have always regarded the Shiites as an integral part of the Moslem community; under Ottoman rule, they had no separate legal status. The Iraqi Government is aware of Shia feelings of exclusivness and is giving them a greater share in national life. Beliefs and Characteristics Moslems view Islam as a conclusive manifestation of Judaism and Christianity. Mohammed is regarded as the last in a series of prophets which includes Moses and Jesus. Moslem beliefs and practices have much in common with those of Christianity and Judaism, and the Koran contains a good deal of Biblical material. The Moslem creed (shahadah) states: "There is no god but God, and Mohammed is the messenger of God.” As Mohammed was the messenger of God, his message is accepted, but he is not regarded as divine. Moslems make no prayers to Mohammed. The creed is recited in the call to prayer and in the daily prayers; this recital is one of the requirements for Moslems. Five duties, known as the Five Pillars, are required by Moslems: the recital of the creed, the performance of the five daily prayers, the giving of alms, the fast of the month of Ramadan and the 148 pilgrimage to Mecca (Al Hajj). Since Islam does not require an individual to do more than he can accomplish, persons in certain circumstances are exempt from fasting and prayer, and the pil- grimage is required only if one is able to make the journey. All one needs to do to become a Moslem is to recite and believe the creed; this belief and recital require concomitant action, but the statement is the essence. Ritual practices and duties are equally simple to comprehend. The basic simplicity of Islam has not precluded the development of an elaborate structure of reli- gious law and theology, but this development has been remote from the average Moslem. Islamic theory views the nature of man as neither perfect nor depraved. Human beings are expected only to do the best they can. Each person is responsible for the sins of no other person other than himself. Thus, no one can inherit sin from his ancestors, nor can one person atone for another. Moslems characterize Islam as a practical religion for its view of the nature of man, for its stress on the avoidance of extremes and for its stress on duties as opposed to rights. This pragmatic character finds place in the law where, for example, a person is permitted to carry out business transactions while on the pil- grimage to Mecca, so that the required journey is not too great a financial hardship. Neither asceticism nor sensuality is con- doned. The life of Mohammed, which was simple but ordinary, is held up as a model, and the hadiths (savings and deeds of the Prophet) contain a wealth of material on this subject. Law and Society The social life of Moslems is based on local customs and on the Islamic canon law, called the Sharia, which in turn is based on the Koran, and the sunnah, including the hadiths and other Islamic traditions. Pre-Islamic Arabian custom, and Byzantine, Persian and, to a certain extent, other local customs have also contributed to the Sharia. From these various sources, Islamic legal scholars of the Middle Ages developed the Sharia. Sunni legal thought evolved into four legal schools, of which the Hanafi and Shafe'i have been predominant in Iraq; the Ithna ’Ashari Shiites also developed their own legal school. These schools differ in the emphasis placed on the various sources of the Sharia and the rational processes applied to the sources, and not in the- ology. The resultant legal differences concern what are now minor differences in matters of ritual, personal status, inheritance and certain other matters of more theoretical than practical signifi- cance. Since the Middle Ages, Sunni scholars have agreed on a modus 149 vivendi between their four schools, considering all equally valid. Although the country's Shiites (Ithna 'Asharis) belong to a sep- arate sect, their legal thought has developed in a very similar fashion to that of the Sunnites. Until the Law for Personal Status of 1959, and its amendment in 1963, Iraq had no statute on personal status and inheritance. Instead, as had been the practice since the Middle Ages, religious judges (qadis) decided upon cases, and certain experts on religious law (muftis) rendered legal opinions. Although the government appointed these officials, their activities were not regulated by status (see ch. 13, The Governmental System). The chief significance of the 1959 statute is that it unites all Moslems under a single law, without regard to sect or legal school; various provisions of the law were drawn from Shia or from Sunni law, depending on which was thought to be more progressive. The government sought to bring the Shiites into the fold with the Sunnites. The Law for Personal Status is very general and, in some points, unclear; judges must still rely upon the accumulated juris- prudence and legal decisions. As of 1968 the law had not yet unified the country's Moslems, but the trend was established. As a further attempt at unity, the government now runs the Sharia schools and expects that the new generation of Islamic legal spe- cialists will be more unified than its predecessor. Criminal law, civil law and regulations concerning economic affairs and administrative practices have been part of the Sharia in theory, but in practice Islamic rulers and their officials have always tended to administer these matters as they saw fit. Conse- quently, religious conservatism has never been a barrier to the modernization of law in these fields. Islamic law, as it exists in modern Iraq, covers personal rela- tions, including ethics and ritual matters. As a part of the Judeo- Christian tradition, Islam recognizes more or less the same sins and virtues as Christianity and Judaism. Ritual matters, includ- ing dietary restrictions, are closer to Jewish than to Christian practice. Islamic law classifies human actions into five categories: forbidden, reprehensible, neutral, recommended and required. For example, pork and alcohol are forbidden; certain forms of divorce are reprehensible; traveling by air is neutral; extra prayers are recommended; and the Five Pillars are required. In the history of Islam there has never been a separation of church and state. The community of believers was coextensive with the state in theory; in practice, this was not always true, especially after the decline of the Abbasside empire and the spread of Islam into east Asia and Africa. In Islamic theory, the laws of 150 the state are supposed to be the laws as developed by religious specialists, and it has been the duty of the government to follow those laws; the government, however, has been in charge of ap- pointing religious specialists. Although theory and practice have not always coincided, the modern Iraqi accepts the role of the government in appointing religious specialists, regulating reli- gious foundations, training religious specialists and giving reli- gious instruction in public schools. The government exempts non- Moslems from specifically Moslem affairs. One feature of life in Iraq, as in other Moslem countries, is the separation of the lives of males and females. This separation not only has Islamic origins, but also historical origins. Women have had a restricted life outside the home and fewer opportunities for education. Public life has been considered more appropriate for men. As a result, formal religion has tended to become a more or less masculine province, and popular religion, including magic, a feminine sphere. Women, however, have always performed their religious duties privately, and the men often believe in the magic they claim to scorn (see ch. 12, Social Values). Holidays and Rituals Moslems observe two major holidays and four lesser ones, as well as a month of fasting. The Islamic religious calendar is based on a year of 12 lunar months, but an intercalary month is not added to make up a solar year, so that each year all of the holidays come 2 weeks earlier than in the preceding year. The old Arabian calendar had used an intercalary month, but in Islam the month was removed so that Moslem holidays could not become associated with pagan holidays as happened in Christianity. The major holidays are Fast-Breaking Feast ('Id al Fitr) and Feast of Sacrifice ('Id al Adha). Fast-Breaking Feast falls on 1 Shawwal, at the end of the month of fasting, Ramadan. Feast of Sacrifice comes 70 days later, on 10 Dhu al Hijjah. During this feast Moslems sacrifice a sheep in commemoration of the ram which Abraham sacrificed in place of his son Isaac, and also in commemoration of the sheep being sacrificed by the pilgrims at Mecca on this day (see ch. 21, Labor). Both of these holidays last for 4 days and are celebrated by feasting, the wearing of new clothes and by giving to charity. Special sweets are appropriate to these holidays, and children ride ferris wheels erected in the streets. These feasts are also marked by special services in the mosques. The four lesser holidays fall on 1 Muharram, 10 Muharram, 12 Rabi' al Awwal and 27 Rajab. Muharram is the first month of the Islamic calendar, and its first day is the Moslem New Year (Yawm 151 Ra's as Sanah al Hajriyah). Shiites on this day begin the mourning for the martyr, Husain, and his family who were killed at Karbala. The mourning for Husain culminates on 10 Muharram ('Ashurah) and is marked by processions of mourners, the recital of poems and performance of pageants telling the story of the martyrdom. The Sunnites, on 10 Muharram, observe a fast which is said to commemorate the expulsion of Adam and Eve from the Garden of Eden; it is the same day as the Jewish Yom Kippur. On 12 Rabi' la Awwal, the holiday called Birthday of the Prophet (Mawlid an Nabi) commemorates Mohammed's birthday. Poems are recited in his honor on this occasion. The evening of 27 Rajab, known as the Night of the Ascension (Lailat al Mi'raj), com- memorates a vision which Mohammed had of Heaven and Hell. Poems telling the story of the vision are recited. The fast during the month of Ramadan is one of the require- ments of Islam. The fast is held in thankfulness for the revelation of the Koran, which was first given during this month; while fasting, adults who are able must abstain from food, drink and sexual relations during the hours of daylight. Ramadan is consid- ered a joyous occasion, and at night, people feast and celebrate. Daily routine is upset; those who can sleep during the day to minimize the rigors of the fast and spend most of the night in celebration and visiting with friends. The mosques are open at night for special prayer services and the recital of the Koran. The Pilgrimage to Mecca, al Hajj, is one of the requirements for Moslems who are able to go. Although the journey by motor vehicle or airplane is not as rigorous as in the past, its expense is still beyond the means of most Iraqis. Persons who have made the pilgrimage are highly respected, not only because of their piety, but also because only those of means can afford to go. The pil- grimage must be made during the first 10 days of Dhu al Hijjah (literally, month of the Pilgrimage). The ceremonies at Mecca center around a small stone building believed to have been built by Abraham and Ishmael, and other sites connected with Abraham, Ishmael or Hagar. Beside fulfilling a religious duty, the pilgrim to Mecca has a chance to meet pilgrims from many countries and to renew his connection with the entire Islamic community. Because of the expense of the journey to Mecca and because of their belief in the special qualities of the family of Ali, Iraqi Shiites often prefer to make a pilgrimage to Karbaba and Najaf (Ali's capital city and site of his tomb). Although this pilgrimage, which does not have to be made in any particular season, is not a religious requirement, Shiites believe it greatly increases a per- son's religious merit. They also believe that to be buried in or near these places improves one's status in the life to come. 152 has never received official sanction from either Sunnite or Shiite leaders and has often been suppressed, it has appealed to people because of its more emotional and personal approach to religion. In Iraq the appeal of Sufism is no longer great, and Sufis are to be found only among the poor and politically disadvantaged. Informal religious functionaries include such members of Sufi orders as darwishes (dervishes), shaikhs and sayyids. Darwishes are generally members of Sufi orders who try to earn a living in rural districts by begging, performing magical feats and dis- pensing magical charms. Shaikh is a term for any leader, but in the religious context it refers to the leader of a Sufi group. A sayyid, also called sharif, is anyone descended from the Prophet Mohammed. Their nobility of descent is supposed to give them special sanctity, but sayyids are to be found in all social levels and in all occupations, and they are not revered, unless they live a pious and religious life. Many of them become formal religious specialists, where their noble descent is of benefit, or else shaikhs of Sufi orders. Among the tribes, they may be called upon to settle feuds. Often, like darwishes, they try to capitalize on their descent by going about the countryside selling charms and telling fortunes. The institution of waqf (plural, awqaf) is unique to Moslem countries. A waqf is a charitable foundation usually consisting of real property; proceeds from the property are used for purposes of charity and to build and maintain mosques. At one time, a considerable amount of land in Iraq was held under waqf tenure and, since it could not be alienated, development and land distribu- tion were delayed. In 1924, under the British Mandate, a Ministry of Awqaf was created to administer awqaf and to regulate their tenure. In 1964 the Ministry was changed to a Bureau under the prime minister. As modern social welfare institutions and the gov- ernmental control of land tenure increased, the institution of waqf declined. In 1968 the Bureau administered the awqaf remaining in Iraq; it is mainly concerned with building and maintaining mosques and religious schools and with appointing religious func- tionaries. RELIGIOUS MINORITIES Approximately 6 to 8 percent of the population is non-Islamic. In this minority are included the many Christian churches, the Jews, Mandeans, Yezidis and a few members of small and obscure sects. These minorities all antedate the coming of Islam to Iraq, and some are of considerable antiquity. Since the advent of Islam, they have survived as small, cohesive and exclusive groups amidst the Moslem majority. These groups are losing some of their iso- lation and are taking a more active part in Iraqi society. 154 Christianity Christians in Iraq are divided into three general groups-the Orthodox or Eastern churches, the Roman Catholic and Uniate churches and the Protestant churches. The Eastern churches in- clude the Greek Orthodox, Syrian Orthodox (sometimes called Ja- cobites), Armenian Orthodox (also known as the Apostolic or Gre- gorian Church) and the Nestorian Assyrian Church. The Catholic churches include the Roman Catholic Church and four Uniate churches comprised of the Chaldean, Syrian, Armenian and Greek Catholic churches. The Protestant churches have several small representations, such as the Anglican Church, Seventh-day Adven- tists, Lutheran Church and the Evangelical and Reformed Church. Despite their position as a religious minority, the Christians have traditionally attached greater importance to their differences than to their common Christianity (see ch. 5, Ethnic Groups and Lan- guages). In 330, when the seat of the Roman Empire was transferred from Rome to Constantinople, the Bishop of Rome, who had been equal with the other bishops of the church, claimed supremacy over all Christians in matters of faith and morals. The Orthodox churches never accepted the supremacy cf Rome. In general, the Eastern churches observe the same sacraments as the Catholic Church and follow the Apostolic Succession. Their rituals are somewhat different from those in the West, and clergy are permitted to marry. Many fasts are observed, and Lent is followed more rigorously than it has been in the West since the Middle Ages. They have numerous monasteries and shrines, espe- cially in northern Iraq. There are not many native Protestants in Iraq. An Anglican mission in the north has had some success in converting Armenian Gregorians to Anglicanism, and many Nestorians have been con- verted to Protestantism by missionaries from the United States. In general, missionaries have had their greatest success in converting Iraqis who were already Christians. Christmas and Easter are the major Christian holidays. Christmas is celebrated for 3 days. People wear new clothes, give their children money and spend their time visiting and feasting. Mass is celebrated just before dawn on Christmas and is followed by a feast. Easter, celebrated later than in the West, also lasts for 3 days and is marked by feasting, visiting and attending Mass. Judaisn The Jewish community in Iraq goes back to the Babylonian captivity of the sixth century B.C. When Cyrus allowed the Jews 155 to return to Palestine, many chose to remain in Babylon, which had become their home. Some of their descendants live in Iraq, but most chose to migrate to Israel or to the United States in the 1950's. Most Iraqi Jews were Orthodox (see ch. 5, Ethnic Groups and Languages). Mandeans The Mandeans, a sect of considerable antiquity, are also called Sabeans or “Christians of St. John.” Although they are not Chris- tians, they maintain a special relationship with St. John the Bap- tist. Mandean beliefs are drawn from Jewish, ancient Persian, Babylonian, Christian and Gnostic sources. They possess a scrip- ture written in ancient Syriac and, therefore, are often classified by Moslems as People of the Book. Yezidis The Yezidis are believed by their neighbors to be devil wor- shipers; they believe him to be a source of good as well as evil. The origins of the Yezidi sect are obscure, but their beliefs contain elements from ancient Persian, Christian and Islamic beliefs. The Yezidis have been regarded as polytheists by the Moslems and, hence, beyond the protection of the law. Beliefs and practices re- semble elements of popular religion adhered to by other Iraqis. Despite their reputation as devil worshipers, their lives are sober and quiet. The name Yezidi may be derived from Yazid, the son of Umayyad caliph, Mu'awiyah; they call themselves Dasnayi. The Yezidis maintain a shrine at the tomb of their chief saint, Shaikh 'Adi, on Jabal Sinjar, a mountain about 70 miles west of Mosul, to which they make a yearly pilgrimage. The shrine is named for their chief saint. The chief object of Yezidi adoration is Malik Tawwus (the Peacock Angel), who represents the devil and is symbolized by a bronze peacock. Images of the peacock are carried to Yezidi communities by the clergy. Yezidis observe certain food taboos and avoid speaking any words reminiscent of satan (shaitan) which creates a problem in trying to educate them. Other Sects There is a small number of adherents to a variety of sects de- rived from Shia Islam or from Sufi orders; most of these people live in remote parts of the northern mountains. The sects, called Shabaks, Sarliyahs, Kakais, 'Ali ilahis (Ali is God) and Ahl al Haqq (People of the Truth) are, for the most part, secret. Some of their beliefs and practices resemble those of the nearby Yezidis. Their adoration for the family of Ali, derived from Shiite sources, 156 may be carried to the point of deification of Ali, as in the case of the 'Ali ilahis. Sufi practices are evident in their rites. There are a few Baha'is, mostly of Persian origin, living in Baghdad. This syncretistic religion originated in Persia and is based in part on Shia sources. POPULAR RELIGION In addition to the beliefs and practices of the religion they pro- fess, most Iraqis adhere to religious elements which can be derived only marginally from their formal religion. These elements are of considerable antiquity and are similar to beliefs and practices found elsewhere in the Middle East, as well as in Europe and North Africa, and are shared by Iraqis of all religions. Much of the practice of these elements is left to women, but men may also believe in them. Some of the rituals are viewed with skepticism but may be tried in the hope of gaining some desired result. A number of various supernatural spirits are believed to exist. For example, there are the jinn, who inhabit the dark wells, public baths and trees, the qarinah (an individual's double), familiar spirits, and other creatures living in water and strange places. For the most part, these spirits are considered to be evil, although some of them may perform good deeds. To protect against spirits a number of charms and amulets are worn; the additional precau- tion of not mentioning them when they might be listening is also taken. The Evil Eye is also feared. It is not a spirit, but a projec- tion, often unconscious, of evil and envious forces; a person may not be aware of having it. Blue-eyed persons are especially feared. To protect against the Evil Eye, charms and amulets are worn. Small boys may be dressed as girls, and the appearance and clean- liness of children may be neglected, so as not to attract the atten- tion of the Evil Eye. If one desires to praise an infant, one should say “Ma sha'Allah" (whatever God wills) to avert the danger of the Evil Eye. The charms used to avert evil include certain precious stones, iron, anything blue in color, ancient gold coins, and certain de- signs, such as the triangle, pentangle, and the figure of a hand. The number seven is also potent. Certain verses from the Koran are believed to afford protection from evil; these may be inscribed on paper and wrapped in silk, or engraved on small images of the Koran. Wandering sayyids are the chief source of these charms. Magic is sometimes used, either to promote fertility in women, to retain the affections of husbands, or to work evil on cowives or other disliked persons. 157 Brides, newborn infants and new mothers are believed to be both dangerous and vulnerable to harm. Contact with death is defiling. Sudden fright and strong smells are dangerous and some persons consider members of other sects unclean. Various rites may be performed to avert these kinds of harm. Occasionally aid may be sought from members of other sects for magical pur- poses; Moslems may visit Christian shrines and vice versa. One aspect of popular religion which receives very little support from Islamic religious officials is the adoration of saints and the visiting of their tombs for the purposes of magical cures. A saint is a person, often a sayyid or Sufi, who was renowned for his piety. The saint is not prayed to, but his tomb and relics, such as clothing, are believed to possess a kind of sanctity and power called barakah. Often the sites of saints' tombs are in reality very ancient holy places having nothing to do with Islam. Persons seeking cures at these places go to touch or kiss the tomb and carry away some earth from the grounds. When the cure is effected, they hang small flags on the trees growing near the tomb. Both cures and attempts to prevent disease may be more mag- ical than rational. Varieties of imitative and sympathetic magic may be performed; for example, a yellow medicine may be given for jaundice, or the touch of a mother of sons may be used for infertility. Certain designs may be tatooed or cauterized on the skin (see ch. 8, Living Conditions). INTERCOMMUNAL RELATIONS On the whole, relations among the various religious groups in Iraq have been marked by tolerance. In Islamic theory Jews, Christians, Sabeans (Mandeans) and sometimes Zoroastrians were considered People of the Book (Ahl al Kitab), because they possessed a revealed scripture. People of the Book were to be protected (Ahl adh Dhimma) and were permitted considerable communal autonomy as long as they remained loyal citizens of the state. Feelings of toleration have been increased by the tendency for each group to have an economic specialty and to live in a sep- arate quarter of a city or in a particular part of the country. Members of various religious groups have tended to cooperate in certain matters of religion, particularly popular religion. They all acknowledge certain holy places, such as the shrine of Jonah (Nabi Yunis) near Mosul, and may carry out rites in common at such places. RELIGION AND SOCIAL CHANGE The relationship between traditional religious beliefs, practices and loyalties and the process of social change is complex. On the 158 one hand, certain beliefs are disappearing with the advent of modern medicine and education but, on the other hand, religion (in particular, Islam), is strengthened by the rise of modern Arab nationalism and its recognition of Islam as part of the national cultural heritage. Conservative religious functionaries oppose change, but as the structure of society changes they have less voice in regulating change. As modern medicine and education spread into rural areas and the lot of the peasants improves, popular religion and magic are regarded with increasing skepticism. The government is spon- soring a program of religious education in the public schools, which places more stress on moral behavior and understanding of religion and less on the memorization of religious texts. Since the Revolution of 1958, outward observance of religion has acquired a connection with patriotism. Modern Arab nation- alism is secular, in that it rests not on common religion but on common culture, history, traditions and language. Christian Arabs living in Greater Palestine were among the early proponents of Arab nationalism (see ch. 12, Social Values). Many Iraqis believe that religion must become merely a personal matter in order for rapid social change to take place; most, how- ever, do not go so far. Despite announced adherence to the Sharia, modern legislation, except in the realm of personal status, is based on nonreligious considerations and Western models. Although the Interim Constitution of 1964 states that Islam is the fundamental basis for the constitution and is the state re- ligion, the Constitution itself has no obvious connection with Islam, and it guarantees freedom of belief and practice of religion and equality of opportunity to all Iraqis (see ch. 13, The Govern- mental System). The Islamic tradition is strongest in the laws concerning per- sonal status, which apply only to Moslems, in other fields of law, Islamic tradition was only one of several sources. The application of laws from entirely non-Islamic sources is still colored by the traditions of the Iraqi people. 159 CHAPTER 12 SOCIAL VALUES Underlying most social practices is a fairly well-integrated system of social values originating mainly in the tribal Arab and Islamic traditions. To a lesser extent, some values find their source in the minority ethnic traditions and in the mainly urban tradi- tions, both of which can be traced back to the earliest days of civilization in Mesopotamia. For the most part, these different traditions, after centuries of mutual associations, form a cohesive whole, but there are some conflicts between the values of nomadic Arabs and those of sedentary people. Likewise, there are dif- ferences between these same trial Arab values and those of Islam. The Islamic and pre-Islamic traditions are similar in many respects. The knowledge of Western values has increased, but they have not had much impact on the Iraqi system. Islamic ideals differ from tribal Arab customs. In Islam, distinc- tions on the basis of descent group membership are to be replaced by Islamic distinctions based on piety, and tribal loyalties by the larger Islamic community of believers. Although it shares a core of values with the Islamic tradition, the tribal Arab tradition places emphasis on lineage principles and loyalties, as well as on concepts of honor, and in its customary law the tradition violates many principles of Islamic law. The urban Arab tradition does not follow some of the Islamic and tribal values concerning commerce and use of wealth. Mainly, the Kurdish traditions of both nomadic and sedentary ways of life are similar to those of the Arabs. Despite the dif- ferences in beliefs, rituals and law, the minorities have traditions similar to the Arab and Islamic traditions; since these minorities are sedentary urban or rural people, the traditions are closer to the Islamic and sedentary Arab than to the tribal Arab or Kurd- ish value systems (see ch. 5, Ethnic Groups and Languages; ch. 11, Religion). Western values have become known through the European pene- tration during the British Mandate (1930-32), through students who have studied abroad and, particularly, through those persons 161 exposed to new knowledge acquired in connection with moderniza- tion processes. In general, the values foreign to traditional Iraqis are those which replace loyalty to ethnic-religious community or lineage group with loyalty to the state and which stress an in- creased civic feeling. Western values also place more emphasis on achieved as opposed to ascribed status and on the office as opposed to the man holding it, although these concepts do have a certain place in the traditional Iraqi value system. ISLAMIC VALUES Islam, as one of the major world religions, has no connection with any particular racial, ethnic or descent group. Although Islam is historically connected with Arabs, most Moslems are not Arabs. People of all origins are equal before God in Islam. The Koran says that, “The best of you is he who excels in piety.” The Islamic egalitarian ethnic sets a value upon treating all alike without regard to distinctions of wealth, lineage or occupation; the criterion of distinction among persons should be their adher- ence to Islamic belief and practice. For the most part, this standard is followed. Men and women of piety and religious learning are revered. Men pray together in the mosque without regard to rank. But most important is the impact of Islamic egalitarianism in a stratified society. Whereas an ac- ceptance of the social order does not stem from Islamic teaching, most Iraqis tend to accept the social order, with its ranks and distinctions, as given. Although there are differences among men, the difference between man and God is such that the difference among men become insignificant. Consequently, in daily social in- tercourse the elaborate and formal system of manners bridges the gap between Islamic egalitarianism and the stratification of so- ciety (see ch. 6, Social Structure). Islamic standards of behavior uphold fairness and decency in conduct and reject dishonesty, cheating, stealing and sexual laxity. The intent of any action is considered as important as the action itself; one can deceive other people, but not God or oneself. Ideally, one is supposed to follow the same standards in dealing with non- Moslems as with Moslems, although many do not adhere to this ideal. Supernatural sanctions stand behind the Islamic standards but, in addition, the Sharia (the body of Islamic law) invokes secular penalties; in many instances these no longer stand, either because of modern legislation or because of tribal custom, which in many cases is contrary to Islamic law. The ideal relationship between the sexes is of paramount im- portance in the Islamic tradition. Chastity outside of marriage is the rule, and modesty is enjoined. Social interaction between 162 the sexes is supposed to be marked by decorum and modesty and kept to a minimum. Stress is placed on kindness and love in the relationship between husband and wife. The extent to which ideals are practiced varies. Kindness and charity are commanded as the outstanding features in Islamic life. Charity, institutionalized as one of the Five Pillars of Islam, is taken to heart as a means for helping those less fortunate. TRIBAL ARAB VALUES Values among tribal Arabs, whether sedentary or nomadic, center around the social structure. Group membership is based on patrilineal descent and the predominant idiom of social interac- tion is kinship. Residence is usually in terms of patrilineal group- ings. Economic cooperation and political leadership occur in the context of patrilineal kinsmen. Individuals or social groups wish- ing to become part of a preexisting kinship group, usually on the 'ashirah (subtribe or confederacy) or fakhdh (smaller unit of the subtribe) level, do so on the basis of fictitious kinship or adoption (see ch. 6, Social Structure). In the course of time, the fictitious kinship becomes reality. In addition, the kinship idiom often tends to reflect existing territorial and social realities rather than actual genealogical structure. Tribal Arabs judge descent groups by their adherence to certain traditional values. The reputation of a descent group is believed to be handed down through genealogical lines; nevertheless, a group can lose its reputation. A good reputation is usually associated with wealth and political power, although a respectable family may be poor and a wealthy family may be of low repute if it does not adhere to traditional values. This same wealthy family, how- ever, by its adherence to traditional standards, may over a period of generations acquire a good reputation, and the poor family, as long as it adheres to the social values, will not lose its good name. The key concept in the tribal value system is honor (sharaf). Honor resides in the group and in individuals as members of the group; individuals maintain group honor by their adherence to traditional values—doing good and avoiding the shameful. The honorable man is pious, following the dictates of his religion in- sofar as he is familiar with them, respects women and protects their chastity, is courageous, strong, virile, generous and dis- dainful of wealth, proud, wise and clever. He must be dignified in behavior and respectful and polite to others. He must be loyal to his descent group and be ready to defend it. Women are expected to adhere to the same values as men, except for the masculine virtues of strength, virility and courage. They 163 are expected to serve and obey men. Even after marriage a woman remains a member of her father's descent group and should remain loyal to it. This may create a conflict in loyalty for a woman married out of her descent group, for in time she becomes attached to her husband's group with which she is living, and the two groups may come into conflict. Many of the virtues of the ideal man center around the idea of a warrior—a man who is brave and skillful in war, but doesn't soil his hands with mundane business. Thus, most domestic and some outdoor work—such as herding, preparing food, or bringing goods to the market falls upon women and children. Even when tribesmen farm, as they often must, they dislike farming; grain raising is disliked the least, but vegetable raising, fishing, selling of milk products and dealing in commerce or handicrafts are gen- erally viewed with disdain. Even nontribal peasants and townsmen of the professional classes share this ideal. The peasants tend to dislike farming, and do not feel at all attached to the land they farm; if they could, they too would prefer to be regarded as noble warriors and gen- erous hosts. Among the urban professionals the attitude is mani- fested in a preference for clerical jobs and a dislike of manual work of any kind. The tribesman, as well as being a noble warrior, should be a generous host. Tribal leaders, and other tribesmen who can afford it, keep regular guesthouses where they entertain fellow tribesmen and strangers; even less formal entertaining is expected to be generous. The honor of the descent group lies in its generosity, and one of the worst things that can be said about a man is that he is stingy. Although generosity and the warrior virtues are highly valued, the most important reservoir of the descent group's honor is its women. The honor of women, or more particularly their sexual purity, is called 'irdh; they must be most careful to maintain it, but the burden of protecting feminine honor lies on the men of the descent group, and upon them the shame of dishonor if their kins- women transgress the rules. For the tribesmen, honor is held dearer than life itself. Lesser kinds of shame, called 'aib, reflect only upon the indi- vidual and not upon his descent group. Deviations of this sort, such as evincing too great a concern with money or engaging in a despised occupation, are generally punished by social ostracism and loss of any hope for social recognition. Nontribal Iraqis, whether rural or urban, also share in these concepts of honor and shame and are most careful to protect their womenfolk and maintain their honor. The word 'aib is used to 164 admonish children, although it tends to become nothing more than a linguistic habit of speech. URBAN VALUES Urban Iraqis in some respects have a set of values different from that of rural Iraqis. Chief among these is a greater interest in commerce and a consequent higher value placed on wealth; for this, the rural Iraqi scorns the urban Iraqi as he would the towns- man's weaker concern with family matters. Because the urban environment, with its orderly social life, orderly government and availability of public utilities and a larger food supply, is more congenial to the practice of religion, the townsman places a higher value on adherence to the values and practices of religion. Although the rural Iraqi believes that the urban Iraqi has no honor and neglects his family, the townsman still has a greater respect for family connections, whereas the rural elaboration of family structure is reduced to the household and bilateral kindred. City dwellers maintain ties with relatives in other cities, prefer to enter into business arrangements with relatives and prefer them for mates; family honor is equally dear to them. As the urban Iraqi has traditionally made his living by trade, he is interested in maintaining fair practices and standards of com- merce, although he is not above making a “sharp" deal. Islamic legal scholars have devoted much attention to standards of com- merce, especially to the law of contracts; like the tribal Iraqi, the townsman places great importance on keeping his word. SHARED CONCEPTS Respect Respect is an important concept in the understanding of Iraqi behavior. When a woman covers her head in the presence of her father, when a child kisses his grandfather's hand, when a man pays no attention to his wife in public, the reason is always re- spect. Deference is paid to persons who are older, of a senior generation or male. Somewhat less deference is paid to strangers. Women, because of the tradition of chivalry, are respected. The man ignores his wife in public so as not to draw attention to her; if he noticed her, the others, not knowing her relationship to him, since the relationship between man and wife is considered private, might think her a women of low repute. Out of respect, wives and children defer to the authority of men, at least ideally. As children, especially boys, grow older, they become less subject to paternal authority, although ties of 165 affection still lead them to accede to much of it. Married couples maintain a public facade of patriarchal authority, but the extent to which this is privately realized varies; often the woman is of considerable power in the home, less often overtly, but more often as a “power behind the throne.” More often patriarchal authority is the reality. Individual and Society Precisely because of their concern with honor, the Iraqis are at the same time both conformists and individualists. A man's honor is his own and his descent group's, but he maintains his honor by conformity to tradition. Men belong to various social groups but they remain individuals and find it hard to cooperate in many endeavors. As long as self-expression is possible, conformity and submission to authority are tolerated. The ideal warrior-host of tribal tradition has great scope for self-expression, within the framework of the social structure and the norms of social life. The Position of Women A concept similar to the European notion of chivalry after the Middle Ages illuminates the seeming paradox of the position of women in the Arab world. On the one hand, the confinement of women to the home, the wearing of loose, concealing clothing and face veils, and their jural disabilities have made their position seem very low, but on the other hand, Arab men claim they honor, cherish and protect women. The Arab concept of chivalry places women in high esteem; they are often idealized. Along with the tendency to idealize women goes a tendency to set them on pedestals, to remove them, at least conceptually, from the world of practical affairs. Because of the increase of wealth in Arab society during the early Islamic period, women in wealthy households tended to become luxury items, and to separate them from servants and working-class women, they were increasingly secluded and veiled. The upper-class pattern became a model for other classes to follow as much as they could, although nomadic, village and working-class women, out of eco- nomic necessity, have generally had more exposure to public life. Secluded women, until the penetration of Western ideas during the latter part of the nineteenth century, valued the restrictions put upon them because they indicated that the women were honored, cherished and protected. Islamic standards of behavior enjoin modesty upon both sexes. Modesty is usually taken to include the wearing of unrevealing clothing and a separation in social life of persons of the opposite 166 sex, except close relatives or spouses; this separation is reinforced by the sexual division of labor. Iraqis have a strong desire for privacy; family matters are not for the public eye or ear. Given the additional desire to keep women out of the public eye and given the function of gossip as a mechanism of social control, privacy is strongly desirable; in a small-scale society, such as a village, tribal camp or city neighbor- hood, where everyone knows everyone else, privacy becomes an essential. The conduct of life became separated into two spheres, the public and the private, the male and the female. Other oppositions were attached to this fundamental duality, such as active versus passive, honor versus taboo, and religion versus magic, although these were not explicitly verbalized. Fatalism Iraqis tend to accept events with an attitude of detachment and acceptance, generally called fatalism. This attitude has its roots in the environment and economic conditions, and to a certain ex- tent in religion. A person who has suffered some misfortune will often say, "It is from God," or "It is my portion (fate).”. Iraqi peasants and nomads have lived a life of adversity for many centuries, beset by scarcity of food and water, plagues of disease and insects and by governments seeking only taxes and army conscripts. Try as he might there was often not very much a man could do to control what happened to him in a seemingly capricious world. Even city dwellers were often unable to exert control over many things that happened to them. The level of technology was such that man's best efforts were often to no avail. Under such conditions, a certain amount of fatalism is to be ex- pected. A farmer, for example, could farm his land using the best techniques he knew, perform magic over it and pray for a suc- cessful crop, but if a drought or a plague of locusts came, there seemed nothing to do but adopt the cherished posture of dignity and ascribe his misfortune to fate. Characteristically, Iraqis did not passively accept anything that happened to them; the fatalism was merely a psychological last resort, a reassurance that people had done their best, that the disaster was not their fault. Fatalism in Islam is an abstract philosophical concept. In the Koran things and events are attributed to God, the First Mover, but on the other hand, man creates his own fate by his own choice and his own actions. They way was thus opened in Islam, as it was in Christianity, for the long debate over free will versus predesti- nation, and it was solved in much the same way. Man remains 167 responsible for his own actions, but God is recognized as the ulti- mate source of all. In modern Iraq improvements in technology have increased man's ability to control his environment and the government has become more responsive to law and to public opinion and more interested in public welfare. Modern education has been instru- mental in spreading the idea of man's ability to at least partly control his environment. All of these factors are contributing to the decrease in the fatalism of the average Iraqi; the philosophical concept remains for intellectuals. Thrift Tribal Iraqis place a high value on generosity and hospitality; feasts and entertainment are expected to be lavish; and a good man is not supposed to appear concerned with money. Nontribal Iraqis also adhere to these standards. Nevertheless, although it is not explicitly verbalized, a high value is placed on thriftiness, espe- cially in women, who are in charge of managing the household. In housekeeping every economy possible is made, and furnishings are apt to be sparse. This economy may be necessary, for when a guest appears, no expense is spared, no matter how marginal the income of the household or the number of members it supports. DYNAMICS Manners and Qualities of Social Interaction In many social situations, one must be dignified, formal and kind. Considerable attention is paid to comfort of others; requests may be assented to, even if there is no intention of fulfilling them unpleasant things are not mentioned; and nothing is said to dis- parage the reputation of the listener. Events often take a leisurely pace; men will sit in the guesthouse or guestroom for long periods of time, saying little except polite phrases. People, especially older ones, who are in a position of respect, move slowly and in a dig- nified manner. Most consider it unseemly to be concerned about time and to hurry. In social interaction it is important to consider the feelings of others and maintain an atmosphere of pleasantness; it is con- sidered important to be charming and adaptable to any social situation. Sincerity is a highly valued quality; Iraqis appreciate one who is sincere, genuine and simple in his reactions with other people. Iraqis prefer personal to impersonal relations. They prefer to do business with people they know; therefore, they frequently do business with relatives. Upon first meeting a stranger, they are 168 likely to ask many personal, but not private, questions so that they might get to know that person. Commercial transactions are con- ducted in a personal manner; Iraqis enjoy bargaining over prices, just for the fun of the interaction and the chance to display their wit. Despite the bureaucratic structure of government, Iraqis prefer to rely on personal contacts in an informal way. Both tribal leaders and landlords maintain personal relations with their fol- lowers; tribal leaders cannot maintain their leadership if they do not follow this norm. In any situation of office holding, the quality of the person holding the office is considered more important than the mere status of office holding. Thus, the concept of hereditary kingship or any kind of hereditary leadership was never strong in Iraq. Weak leaders were never respected, no matter what office they held, and political leaders are still respected more for their personal qualities and accomplishments than for the offices they hold. Reciprocity in social relations is usually not verbalized, but nonetheless expected. Hosts keep mental notes on hospitality and expect the returned hospitality to be more or less equivalent; if they feel their hospitality was not reciprocated, they feel some- what slighted. Sometimes favors are made with an expection of return. Enculturation and Social Control A great deal of misbehavior is tolerated from small children, but when they reach the age of reason they are expected to act with propriety. A child will be taught to sit still and be quiet in the presence of his elders; he will be told to kiss his grandfather's hand; he learns to bring things and serve people. He hears the doings of other people discussed and commented on, favorably or otherwise. If he receives schooling, either modern or traditional, he receives additional explicit instruction in social values. As the child approaches adolescence, his presence in adult circles is more tolerated, and when he becomes an adult, he begins to participate in the discussions of behavior and values. Social values are reinforced and maintained by social interac- tion; gossip, praise, manifestations of respect, and occasionally severe negative sanctions maintain the continuity of belief and behavior. In a small-scale, closely knit society, such as that in which most Iraqis find themselves, the chief object of interest and conversation is other people. In such a society, an individual's self-image is that image which is presented to him by others. He cannot afford to neglect public opinion for fear of losing the re- spect of others and, thus, his own self-respect. Under such condi- 169 tions, gossip cannot fail to exert a powerful influence in social control. A man or woman who conforms to what is expected of him gains the respect of others and becomes known as rajul khair (good man) or mart khrairah (good woman). For the most part, desire for the good will of others is sufficient to ensure adherence to the values of the social group, and the possibility of more vi- olent sanctions ensures that practically all conform. The violent sanctions are rarely resorted to, for it is often possible for a de- viant individual to seek an alternative social role or to leave the society; a family may also wish to avoid a public scandal. Supernatural sanctions also serve to maintain adherence to the social values promulgated by religion. All of Iraq's religions have value systems attached; there is little variation among them. The prospect of eternal damnation or eternal bliss, at least for those who believe, is effective in maintaining Iraqi value systems. Communication of Values In addition to ordinary talk and the instruction of children, values are communicated and maintained by folktales, proverbs, poetry and other oral teaching. The tribal warrior virtues are glorified in the tribal hawzas (rallies in which poems in praise of the descent group are composed and recited in chorus), and the traditional poetry which goes back to the Jahiliyah period (pre-Is- lamic age of ignorance). In the folktales the hero is frequently a brave warrior, but the villain is never brave or honorable. In folktales, and to a certain extent, proverbs, cleverness and especially verbal cleverness, is rewarded and praised; frequently, the hero or heroine wins by some trick over his adversary. Clever- ness is not one of the more explicit values, but its appreciation is visible in Arab society. The proverbs offer pithy comments on behavior and morals. The ill fate of deviants is upheld, and the good is praised. Often the proverb is connected with a folktale, to which it is added as a moral. Grammatical and semantic usage and common phrases as well as value connotations also function in the communication and maintenance of social values. For example, the same word husn means both beauty and good, and qubh means both evil and ugly; in Islamic law the words husn and qubh are used to judge the morality of actions. Grammatical categories also tend to stress the masculine; the hero, representing good, is always good looking, and the villian is ugly. Iraqis use the expression, "he has a good face" to mean that a person has a good character; they also say that shame "blackens a man's face.” Since they use the symbol 170 "face" to mean character, the expressions "blackening" and "whit- ening” of “face" then refer to the quality of a person's character or his actions. Sociolinguistic Behavior Iraqis express respect relations in their use of forms of address and reference. Politeness is expected, but they still use different terms which indicate whether the person addressed is on a plane equal or lower or on a higher plane than the speaker. For example, a young man may address his father's brother by the kin term, but his cousin by his name. Three components, age, sex, and generation, enter into the re- spect situation, as well as distinctions between distance and fami- liarity. In a situation of social distance, an older man will be addressed as Mister, but in a situation of greater familiarity the term for a father's brother will be extended to him. An uncle younger than oneself will be addressed by his first name in all but the most formal of situations. Older women receive the same respect as older men. Etiquette, especially in formal situations, requires the use of elaborate formulas of politeness. These formulas maintain the desired atmosphere of dignity and, in a tribal context, may serve to mitigate expressions of conflict. Young people, especially those with modern education, tend to be less elaborate in their use of polite formulas. Behavior Concerning Clothing Style of clothing and the mode of wearing it indicate attitudes of respect and shame. Islamic standards of modesty, as well as the exigencies of the Iraqi climate, have dictated a style of clothing which loosely conceals nearly the whole body. The introduction of Western-style clothing has only slightly changed the general ap- pearance (see ch. 2, Living Conditions). Considerations of shame require people, especially women, to dress modestly, particularly around persons of the opposite sex. Women must be especially careful not to attract the attention of men. If a woman attracts the attention of men and is talked about, shame falls upon her descent group. To a certain extent, usage of respect contradicts that of shame. The environment, where one is and whom one is encountering, shape behavior. A woman may wear her abaya, a voluminous and concealing black outergarment, carelessly while making purchases from a shopkeeper, but she may be very careful to conceal all but her face when visiting her uncle or an older brother; she has more 171 respect for her brother or uncle than she has for the shopkeeper. A woman may not wear the veil in her village but will put it on when she visits a provincial town. The townswoman may wear her veil in the main streets of town but will raise it when she reaches the side streets. Even women who habitually wear Western clothing will cover their heads in situations where respect is indicated. The notion of what constitutes modesty in dress is opposite to that found in the West. Bare limbs are considered more daring than low necklines; the bare head is considered disrespectful in many situations. Because the traditional style of clothing did not make much distinction between sleeping and street attire, Iraqis still do not consider it bad form to wear pajamas or nightgowns during the day and even in the street. The governing concept is how well one is covered; they do not make the Western connection between sleeping attire and boudoir. Group Identification and Intergroup Behavior Language, as one of the criteria for ethnicity, forms an impor- tant part of an individual's social identity (see ch. 5, Ethnic Groups and Languages). The Arabic language, and to a lesser extent the Kurdish, is a primary focus in modern nationalism. Arabic, moreover, is the language of the Koran and the liturgical language of Islam; it has for centuries formed a bond among all Moslems, so that it is valued by all Moslems, Arabs and non-Arabs. Arabs have an almost mystical attitude toward their language. The two major dialects and their local subdivisions tend to set Iraqis into groups. Traditionally, other distinctions were inten- sified by dialectic differences (see ch. 5, Ethnic Groups and Lan- guages). Religion is not only a source of ethics and norms for social behavior and the focus for rituals and beliefs in the supernatural, it is, like language, one of the criteria of ethnicity. Sectarian affiliation is a major part of a person's social identity. Above and beyond an individual's personal beliefs (or lack thereof), his sec- tarian affiliation, irrevocable except for rare cases of conversion, colors if it does not determine, his social relations in most con- texts. For tribal Arabs and Kurds, patrilineal descent determines membership in descent groups, but even nontribal Iraqis identify themselves with family groups larger than the nuclear family. Tribal Iraqis belong to various inclusive levels of descent groups (see ch. 6, Social Structure). Nontribal Iraqis acknowledge the household (bayt) and bilateral kindred variously called ahl or usrah. An individual identifies himself with his descent group and 172 is identified with it; he takes pride in its honor and is involved in its shame. The factors of religion, language and descent group both com- pete and work together in setting an individual's part in a given social situation. Religion and language have no necessary connec- tion, but the members of an individual's descent group are almost always members of the same religious and linguistic group. Which factor is uppermost in the identification of the individual depends upon the situation. If the situation is linguistic, then the individual is Arab, Kurd or Turkoman; if it is religious, he is a Moslem or Christian, or Shiite or Sunnite, or Chaldean or Armenian; in a situation of descent groups, family affiliation takes precedence over the accompanying religious and linguistic affiliations. The individual may be identified with several different social groups, but the one that is foremost in his mind, and in the minds of others, depends on the social context. Members of outgroups are regarded with some suspicion by tra- ditionally oriented Iraqis. This suspicion, intensified by the tradi- tional separation of various ethnic and social groups, is created and maintained by the notion that the outsider is "fair game”; he is not necessarily subject to the same rules of conduct applicable to members of one's own group. On the other hand, the tribal concept of honor demands that any guest, or even any visitor, be treated hospitably and fairly; nontribal Iraqis also hold this concept, al- though it is not so formally developed. In addition, standards of good manners and religious ethics also mitigate the notion of "fair game." The notion of "fair game” is at its strongest in the field of commerce, where the norm is let the buyer beware; the other party to a transaction is expected to be able (and he usually is able) to take care of himself. Conflict and Change Built into the Iraqi system of values is a certain amount of conflict. Concepts of respect come into conflict with the emphasis on achieved qualities or even among themselves; a man will not have much respect for an uncle younger than himself, and it is feelings of kindness rather than respect which make him show deference to an older person of meager accomplishments. Respect behavior may be inconsistent with canons of modesty. Affection may conflict with duty. But the greatest area of conflict lies between the tribal tradi- tions and the tradition of Islam. For example, Islam enjoins chas- tity on both sexes, whereas the tribal tradition is somewhat more lenient toward masculine transgressions; the sanctions for devia- 173 tion also differ. Islam requires fairness and decency toward all persons, but the tribal tradition makes distinction between dif- ferent social contexts, and between kinsmen and nonkinsmen. Tribal, as well as urban, traditions distinguish between persons on bases such as lineage, wealth, and heroic prowess, while Islam recognizes only degrees of piety. Areas of conflict and instability within a value system may lead to changes in values; in Iraq, the impact of the West has also contributed to the process of change. During the Mandate Period and the early years of independence, Europeans introduced new forms of government and education to Iraq. Even before the Man- date, the beginnings of anti-Turkish feeling started the process of supplanting ethnic and religious loyalties by nationalism. In time, the creation of the state of Iraq began a process of national identification (see ch. 14, Political Dynamics). Modern education began to change the attitude toward nature and the fate of man, and widened the outlook of many beyond their ethnic, religious, and lineal group memberships. European criticism of many aspects of family life caused many Iraqis to examine closely their social values. European ways were held up as models, and although may Iraqis scorned them, many began to feel doubt. Incipient industrialization and the migration of country people to the cities have had profound consequences on Iraqi values. Fac- tory work generally involves manual labor, attention to time, an atmosphere free of intergroup rivalries and a more impersonal way of conducting business. Iraqis who have entered into indus- trial situations have found it necessary to adjust. Movement into the cities has tended to weaken the emphasis placed on family ties. Often the immigrant leaves his family, and the housing in cities is rarely adequate for large family groups. The relatively impersonal environment of the city makes it possible for a person to be incon- spicuous; he becomes less susceptible to group pressures for con- formity, and more interested in commerce. Iraq in the 1960's is in transition. Although most of the tradi- tional values remain strong, many educated young people have new values and the critical attitude of reformers. Although some would remake Iraqi society, most would be content to hasten the already quickened process of change in social values. 174 SECTION II. POLITICAL CHAPTER 13 THE GOVERNMENTAL SYSTEM The governmental system, as functioning in early 1968, was set up under the Interim Constitution of 1964, as amended. It was headed by President Abdul Rahman Mohammad Arif, in office since April 1966. The system was unitary in nature with the cen- tral government in Baghdad controlling important powers for the formulation, implementation and coordination of all national poli- cies. A three-tier structure of provincial, district and subdistrict administrations carried out governmental programs at the local level. The source of national sovereignty or the basis of governing authority was not specifically indicated in the fundamental law. Theoretically the government was divided into executive, legisla- tive and judicial functions, but the executive establishment con- trolled by the president and the Council of Ministers exercised legislative power under a constitutional provision permitting this dual function for a 3-year transitional period (1964–67) or until the promulgation of a permanent constitution. The executive branch exercises a measure of control over the judiciary through the Ministry of Justice. The principles and practices of the govern- ment reflected both Western and traditional influences. Before 1958 the system resembled that of the British parliamentary gov- ernment under a constitutional monarchy, but since the 1958 Revo- lution the Iraqi rulers have opted for a political form stressing the primacy of presidential and executive powers. Successive govern- ment leaders have expressed the view that various internal and external needs required a strong central government. Traditional influences have been most pronounced in the operation of the judi- ciary which retains separate courts for various religious communi- ties. The administrative function of the government is performed by a corps of permanent civil service officials and employees, re- cruited normally on the basis of merit through examinations. Both 175 central and local government officials are subject to the provisions of the Civil Service Law of 1960. The principle of representation through direct, secret elections is affirmed in the 1964 Constitution, and the electoral law promul- gated in February 1967 permitted adult women to vote and run for elective office for the first time in the country's modern history. CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT The constitutional system is the outgrowth of relatively recent contact with the West. The evolution of constitutionalism was aided by two major factors. One was long experience with inef- fective and harsh Ottoman rule, which predisposed many of the Iraqi elite to accept a new political structure that placed formal restraints on the exercise of state powers. The other was that Great Britain, which was granted a Mandate in 1920, intended eventually to withdraw from the country after an adequate consti- tutional framework of Anglo-Iraqi cooperation had been developed (see ch. 3, Historical Setting). British public opinion would not support any long-range involve- ment in Iraq, since the British position became increasingly un- popular there. In 1921 the British drafted the text of a consti- tution, which after necessary modifications was approved and signed by King Faisal I in March 1925. Known as the Organic Law of 1925, it remained in effect until the overthrow of the monarchy in July 1958. The Organic Law established a constitutional monarchy within a unitary state and provided for a system of checks and balances. In theory, the Council of Ministers of the executive establishment was accountable to a bicameral parliament, but the legslature was seldom able to control or successfully challenge a policy desired by the executive branch. Royal authority was no longer absolute under the constitution, but in recognition of the need for a strong executive, the king was given substantial decisionmaking power. He could issue decrees when parliament was not in session and dismiss the prime min- isters “if the public interest renders it necessary.” The relationship between the king and the Council of Ministers was such that one or the other might prove the stronger, depending on the personali- ties involved and the events taking place. For example, during his lifetime the preeminence of King Faisal I (1921–33) was never challenged, but after his death the Council of Ministers, controlled by the prime minister, dominated the national scene. Before the achievement of independence in 1932, the majority of the people knew little if anything about the constitution, and among the few who were politically conscious, many were more 176 concerned with terminating the Mandate and gaining independ- ence than with issues concerning the form of a government. After 1932, however, many Iraqis both inside and outside the govern- ment began to realize the advantages of constitutionalism. Those in ruling positions sought to preserve the existing consti- tutional order, which they believed would assure their continued incumbency. On the other hand, aspirants to power and those who were on the periphery of the ruling system tended to suspect that the constitutional system was being circumvented in various ways by the governing group and, hence, demanded strict observance of the letter and spirit of the Organic Law. After the 1958 Revolution the regime abrogated the Organic Law and almost immediately promulgated a provisional constitu- tion with the explanation that it would remain in force “during the transitional period until such time as a permanent constitution is adopted" (see ch. 3, Historical Setting). The provisional consti- tution provided for a republican form of government in which the Council of Ministers would enact laws on its own authority. Although legislation technically required the approval of a three-member Council of Sovereignty which functioned as the col- lective "head of state,” this approval was only a formality. The constitution guaranteed the independence of the judiciary. Basic civic rights, including freedom of thought and expression, the in- violability of the home and the protection of private property, were to be safeguarded within limits to be set by law. Landholding was to be regulated by law. In addition, the provisional constitution declared Iraq to be a part of the “Arab Nation," a provision implying the intention of cooperation with other Arab states in the manner which had been impossible while the old regime was aligned with Great Britain and the West (see ch. 15, Foreign Relations). It also proclaimed Islam as the state religion and noted that “Arabs and Kurds are considered partners in this nation. ..." The 1958 provisional constitution was designed primarily to au- thorize Prime Minister Abdul Karim Qasim and his Cabinet to mobilize the full resources of government to maintain public order and to implement the reforms considered necessary during the transitional period. Prime Minister Qasim's reformist goals pre- supposed that the government should assume a strong guiding role in economic and social life, but despite his expressed hope to write a permanent constitution in 1960, political conflict within the gov- erning group and accompanying instability prevented his regime from initiating any effective action at that time. 177 PRESIDENT Republican Council National Defense Council PARLIAMENT COUNCIL OF MINISTERS Prime Minister JUDICIARY Ministers Judicial Council General Service Board Court of Cassation Court of Cassation for State Security MINISTRIES Planning Defense Justice Figure 5. The Governmental Structure of Iraq, 1968. Courts of Appeals Foreign Affairs Industry Agriculture and Agrarian Reform 1 State Security Courts Union Affairs Not formed yet; legislative power is exercised provisionally by the Council of Ministers. Oil and Minerals Courts of Sessions Municipalities and Public Works Culture and Guidance Economy Self-governing, but mayors are appointed by and responsible to the Minister of the Interior. Reconstruction of the North Youth Welfare Health Communications Education Labor and Social Affairs LEGEND: The Interior Finance ad hoc body command =====► appeal coordination Municipalities 2 (baladiyah) Province (liwa) District (qada) Subdistrict (nahiyah) Courts of First Instance: Unlimited Limited Peace Courts Magistrate Courts Religious Courts 178 THE INTERIM CONSTITUTION OF 1964 The provisional constitution of 1958 was superseded in May 1964 by a new fundamental law. Drafted by the government of President Abdul Salam Arif, the Interim Constitution of 1964 was to remain in force during a transitional period of 3 years from May 1964 or until the promulgation of a permanent constitution. In mid-1968 the provisional version was still in effect. The Constitution proclaims the Republic of Iraq to be "a demo- cratic, socialist state, deriving the principles of its democracy and socialism from the Arab heritage and the spirit of Islam.” It de scribes Islam, the state religion, as "the fundamental basis” of the Constitution. It also states that the Iraqi people constitute “a part of the Arab Nation" and expresses the hope for ultimate Arab unity to be achieved initially through a “union with the United Arab Republic" (see ch. 15, Foreign Relations). The Constitution directs the state to steer the national economy within the framework of a comprehensive plan based on collabora- tion between the private and public sectors. Natural resources are declared as the property of the state, and landholding to be limited by law "in a way that shall not give rise to feudalism." The rights and duties of the citizens are defined and apply equally to all regardless of race, origin, language or religion. The “national rights of the Kurds” are affirmed within the context of "a broth- erly national unity.” Other principles guaranteed are the freedom of residence, trial through the due process of law, prohibition of torture, rights to education and provisions for various social secu- rity benefits. THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT Under the terms of the 1964 Constitution, as amended in De- cember 1964, in March, September and November 1965, and in May 1968, the government in theory consisted of three separate, independent branches: executive, legislative and judicial. In early 1968 the constitutional provisions relating to the separation of powers were yet to be fully implemented, and the legislative power of the state was being exercised by the Council of Ministers. The Presidency and the Council of Ministers The president, who is chosen from those who have rendered "great service to the nation," must be born of Iraqi parents, must be at least 40 years of age and must enjoy political and civil rights. He appoints and removes, at his own discretion, the prime minister and members of his Cabinet, who constitute the Council of Ministers (see fig. 5). 179 The Constitution prescribes that "the present President” shall remain in office during the 3-year transitional period (1964–67) or until a new chief executive is elected under the terms of a perma- nent constitution. It also states that he shall not be held respon- sible "for actions of his post, except in cases of violation of the Constitution or high treason." Charges of misconduct may be brought against him only by the Council of Ministers upon a deci- sion by a two-thirds majority of the Cabinet members. In April 1967 the government announced an indefinite extension of President Arif's term of office, and in the following month, when the transitional period was to end, the validity of the 1964 Constitution was extended for a year; in 1968 its validity was extended indefinitely. The president represents the ultimate executive authority, which he exercises either directly or through his Council of Minis- ters. He may proclaim a state of emergency, and, “in case of actual or probable" threat to national security and tranquility of the Republic, he may issue decrees with the nominal consent of the Council of Ministers. He approves and ratifies international treaties and agreements. All foreign diplomatic envoys to Iraq are accredited to him. As commander in chief of the armed forces, the president heads the National Defense Council which formulates defense policy and, in addition, declares war and makes peace after the Council of Ministers and the National Defense Council give consent (see ch. 26, The Armed Forces). During the absence of the president on official visits in foreign countries, or when he is unable to carry out his duties for any reason, the president appoints a three-member Republican Council, sometimes called the Presidential Council, to act on his behalf. The members are chosen from among the Cabinet minis. ters or the National Defense Council, or from both. Upon vacancy of the presidency for any reason, the Council of Ministers and the National Defense Council may jointly elect a successor by a vote of two-thirds majority of the total members involved within 1 week from the vacancy date. Below the presidential level, the responsibility for the formula- tion, implementation and coordination of executive policies and programs rests in the Council of Ministers. Chaired by the prime minister, the Council supervises the activities of all government departments, including local units. Its deliberations are secret, and decisions are made by a simple majority. The Council members are regarded as having resigned collectively when the prime min- ister resigns or is dismissed by the president. The Council has the additional duty of enacting laws during the 180 so-called transitional period. The executive functions of govern- ment were represented in 1968 by the following ministries : De- fense; Foreign Affairs; Union Affairs (for the integration of gov- ernment policies and for constitutional merger with the other Arab nations); Culture and Guidance (for information and propa- ganda); the Interior (for local administration and for internal security); Justice; Planning; Finance; Agriculture and Agrarian Reform; Economy (commercial affairs); Industry; Oil and Min- erals; Education; Labor and Social Affairs; Health ; Municipali- ties and Public Works; Youth Welfare; Communications; and Re- construction of the North (for the rehabilitation and development of the northern region) (see fig. 5). Directed by a presidential appointee, each ministry consists of a number of directorates general headed by directors general; each directorate general is subdivided into sections. Below the under secretary (deputy minister), also a presidential appointee, various departmental units are staffed by a corps of permanent civil serv- ice officers. The Judiciary The judicial system is based partly on the French model as first introduced during Ottoman rule and modified since then and based partly on religious traditions, Islamic and others. In Iraq the pre- dominant schools of Islamic jurisprudence are Hanafite among the Sunni Arabs, Shafiite among the Sunni Kurds, and Jafari among the Shiites. The Christians and Jews apply their own re- ligious laws (see ch. 11, Religion; ch. 27, Public Order and Safety). The judiciary is supervised jointly by a Judicial Council and the minister of justice; in actual practice the ultimate supervisory power rests in the minister of justice. Headed by the president of the Court of Cassation, which is the highest tribunal of the land, the Judicial Council considers matters relating to qualifications, appointment, performance and promotion of secular as well as religious judges (qadis). In addition to disciplinary matters, the Council may make recommendations to the minister of justice on measures designed to improve the operation of the judicial system. As constituted under the Judicial Power Law of April 1963, the judiciary in 1968 consisted of three types of courts: civil, religious and special. The tribal courts, formerly an integral part of the judiciary, were abolished in 1968 by the government of Prime Minister Qasim. His government regarded the tribal system of justice as outmoded and a convenient means by which tribal loyalties and controls were perpetuated beyond their usefulness. The tribal system also came under attack because persons with 181 only remote tribal connections tended to exploit them as a means of escaping regular judicial processes whenever these processes did not seem advantageous. The Civil Courts The jurisdiction of civil courts extends to all civil, commercial and criminal cases as well as to suits brought against or for the government. Exception is made for certain categories of cases which are under the authority of religious courts. For civil and commercial matters the courts of first instance and the peace courts assume original jurisdiction. The courts of first instance are of two kinds: those with limited competence covering suits which involve less than 500 dinars (1 dinar equals US$2.80 - see Glossary); and those with unlimited jurisdiction which in- volve more than 500 dinars. Each court is presided over by a single judge. In 1967 there were 14 unlimited courts of first instance, one at each provincial capital, and 44 limited courts established at each provincial center as well as in important district and subdistrict centers. Peace courts, each with a single judge, normally operate wher- ever there is a court of first instance. They try cases involving not more than 100 dinars; they also handle cases involving water rights, the partitioning of common property and evictions, regard- less of the sum involved. The judge of a court of first instance may hear cases in the peace court when there is no judge in the latter body. In criminal cases, magistrate or penal courts have original but limited jurisdiction. They are established in each court of first instance, whose judge also normally presides as penal judge. Crim- inal cases of a more serious nature are brought before a court of sessions, located in each of Iraq's five judicial districts (Baghdad, Basra, Hilla, Kirkuk and Mosul). The courts of sessions also per- form appellate functions in criminal cases adjudged by lower courts. A court of sessions consists of three judges and is presided over by the president of the court of appeal in the same judicial district. The Minister of Justice may establish more than one court of session in any district (see ch. 27, Public Order and Safety). Appeals from the courts of first instance in civil and commercial matters are submitted to the courts of appeals, of which there were five in 1968, each composed of a president and up to three vice presidents. Additional members may be appointed when needed, usually from among the judges of unlimited courts of first instance within the area of the appellate court. The Court of Cassation sitting in Baghdad is the court of last recourse for civil, criminal and personal status cases. It consists of 182 a president, a number of vice presidents, not less than 15 perma- nent members and a number of deputized judges, reporting judges and religious judges as may be necessary. The court is divided into four benches: general; civil and commercial; criminal; and personal status. Disputes involving court jurisdiction, conflicting judgments issued by the Court of Cassation and sentences of death must be heard by the general bench. The personal status bench hears appeals from those judgments issued by the religious courts. For crimes committed by public officials, such as Cabinet ministers and members of the courts of appeal, the Court of Cassation as- sumes original jurisdiction. The Religious Courts Cases affecting the personal status of Moslems, either Shia or Sunni, and disputes arising from administration of the waqfs (pious or religious endowment) are dealt with in the religious (shariat) courts (see ch. 11, Religion). Established wherever there is a court of first instance, the religious courts apply the Islamic religious law appropriate to the Sunnite or Shiite tradition. A Moslem judge (gadi) of the court of first instance presides over the religious court if no separate Moslem judge has been ap- pointed. He is a member of the sect to which the majority of the inhabitants belong in the district to which he is appointed. The personal status of Christians, Jews and other sects (such as the Mandeans) is dealt with by the spiritual councils (or com- munal councils) of the separate communities. These councils ad- minister justice according to the common law of the appropriate communities (see ch. 11, Religion; ch. 5, Ethnic Groups and Lan- guages). The Special Courts A system of state security courts was established under the National Security Law No. 4 of 1965 to replace the military courts which had been set up in August 1958. In late 1965 there were two state security courts operating, one in Baghdad and the other in Kirkuk. In addition, there was the Court of Cassation for State Security (also called Supreme State Security Court) to review appellate cases. The state security courts try cases involving offenses against the internal or external security of the nation during a period of "emergency" (see ch. 27, Public Order and Safety). Sentences in- volving the death penalty or life imprisonment are automatically referred to the Court of Cassation for State Security, which con- sists of five judges—two military and three civilian. The civilian judges are from the Court of Cassation on the civil side; the senior 183 judge holds the presidency of the Court of Cassation for State Security. Judgments concerning the military personnel are han- dled by the Supreme Military Court of Appeals (see ch. 26, The Armed Forces). PROVINCIAL AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT The country was divided in 1968 into 14 provinces (liwas), each governed by a governor (mutasarrif) (see fig. 6). The Governor appointed by and responsible to the Minister of the Interior, is the chief agent of the central government to whom all other public officials in the province are subordinate. He controls the police, and may, in cases of serious internal disorders, call for military assist- ance. The Governor is assisted by a General Provincial Council which consists of appointed officials. Under the Liwa Administration 40 TURKEY Mosul Irbil Mawsil Sulaymaniyah Euphrates SYRIA IRAN Kirkuk River Baghdad 34 Diyala Baqubah BAGHDAD. Ramadi . kut JORDAN! o Hillah Karbala! Amarah Pirata Nasiriyah Diwaniyah River Basr Basrab 30 SAUDI ARABIA 200 MILES KUWAIT Persian Guds 0 50 100 *NEUTRAL ZONE NEUTRAL SCALE NEUTRAL ZONE 48 Figure 6. Provinces of Iraq. 184 Law of 1945 as amended in March 1959, the Council is formed by senior provincial officials, ministerial representatives of the cen- tral government assigned to the province or those ministerial officials who maintain functional relationships with the province, and by mayors representing the municipalities which seat provin- cial headquarters. Each province is divided into a number of districts (qadas), administered by a deputy governor or district officer (qaimmqam) who acts on behalf of the Provincial Governor and represents local interests in the district before higher authority. There are 3 to 10 districts in each province. The districts totaled about 75 in late 1965. Each district is subdivided into a number of subdistricts (nahi- yahs), the lowest level of territorial administration. There were more than 180 subdistricts in late 1965. Each subdistrict is headed by a subdistrict officer (mudir) who supervises one or more teachers, policemen, dispensary officers and a registrar of title deeds. His responsibilities have increased as government has ex- panded its functions. Although once responsible mainly for public order, census taking and taxation when possible, he has become the major means by which the government can introduce various innovations to local communities. In carrying out his functions the subdistrict officer will work with the local notables, the sheiks, the more important landholders and the mukhtar, who by virtue of wealth, age or wisdom is recog- nized as the leading man of a small village (qarya) or a quarter of a city (mahalla). A major city or town (madina or balad) is administered under a municipal authority presided over by a mayor (rais al baladiyah), who is appointed by and responsible to the Minister of the Inte- rior. In late 1965 municipalities were divided into five classes: superior (Basra, Mosul and Kirkuk), first (11), second (12), third (47) and fourth (158). The classification is based on the size of revenues collected by the respective municipal authorities. Unlike the territorial units, municipalities are empowered to levy their own taxes, though the budget must be approved by the provincial governors concerned. Baghdad, as the national capital, enjoys special status. It was administered under the Municipality of the Capital (Amanat al Asimah), sometimes called the Directorate of the Capital. Its mayor is called Guardian of the Capital (Amin al Asimah). CIVIL SERVICE The civil service system, as constituted under the Civil Service Law and the Cadre Law, both promulgated in 1962, covers 185 “officials and employees” in government departments and semigov- ernment bodies. Members of the armed forces are excluded from this system and are regulated by separate laws (see ch. 26, The Armed Forces). Members of the foreign service corps, although subject to the regular Civil Service Law, are governed by an addi- tional statute (see ch. 15, Foreign Relations). According to the latest data available, there was in 1964 a total of 279,430 civil servants, including 24,758 women. The civil ser- vants are of two categories: "officials” who hold one of the nine grades in government departments, and “employees” in various semigovernment bodies who are directly supervised by ministries. In 1964 there were 159,667 “officials" and 119,763 "employees.” In some instances, various government departments also included "employees," whereas semigovernment bodies had “officials.” The Ministry of the Interior, which controls the internal security forces, had by far the largest single component of civil service officials with 59,006, followed by the Ministry of Education with 58,320. To be appointed, a civil service officer must have been an Iraqi national for at least 5 years and must be at least 18 years of age and of good reputation and health. College graduates with a bach- elor of arts degree normally start at the sixth grade level. The civil service system is administered by a General Service Board whose president and four members are appointed by the of Finance. Appointed for a term of 3 years, the Board members are accountable to the Council of Ministers. The supervisory Council of Ministers, based on the recommendation of the Minister authority over the system is shared by the Board and the Minister of Finance, who has additional responsibility to fix the quota of civil servants for each ministry, to transfer officials from one ministry to the other and to conduct investigations into charges of misconduct. Routine matters concerning recruitment, appoint- ment, promotion and discipline are handled by the General Service Board. Civil servants are recruited on the basis of competitive examinations sponsored by the Board. THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM The Interim Constitution of 1964 states that election to office is a “right of Iraqis in accordance with Law" and that individual participation in public life is “a national duty.” It also contains provisions for direct election of parliamentary deputies through "public secret elections." There is no specific reference to univer- sal adult suffrage. The Constitution also provides that principles of election and electoral procedures are to be defined by a law to 186 be promulgated not later than 6 months before the “transitional period” terminates. In February 1967 the government issued an electoral law and announced the intention of holding elections before May 1967, but by early 1968 these measures were yet to be implemented. Nevertheless, Iraqi experience with Western-inspired electoral laws and elections began as early as 1924, when members of the first constituent assembly were chosen. The country, however, had no elections after the 1958 Revolution. Before that time the elec- toral system, as constituted under the Electoral Law of 1946 and as amended by an electoral decree of December 1952, was based on the principle of partial adult suffrage. Only male adults over 20 years of age were permitted to vote. Each deputy to the lower chamber of parliament was chosen, after 1953, directly, each re- presenting an average of 20,000 registered male voters. Before 1952 deputies had been selected through a two-stage system of indirect elections. 187 of bringing about unity with the UAR. They have considered this unity necessary for their country's progress, for enhancing their nation's role in the world and for increasing its economic inde- pendence by reducing the role of foreign oil interests (see ch. 15, Foreign Economic Relations). The government regarded the few popular demands for resump- tion of partisan politics as a less serious source of political insta- bility than the demands of the Kurdish tribes for autonomy of their areas in the north. Kurdish leaders, regardless of differences on the means of achieving self-determination, emphasized that their position was not Communist-inspired and that they were not secessionists. POLITICAL TRENDS The July 1958 Revolution accelerated new political trends, such as the rise of a new generation of leaders, special emphasis on socialism as a guiding principle of the state, a shift to nonaligned foreign relations and intensified measures for national integration and economic development. The Revolution was largely a revolt of one generation against another. The small group that had brought independence to the country maintained power until 1958, claiming its authority by virtue of its age and the wealth and aristocratic lineage of its members. Although Pan-Arab in outlook, they emphasized Iraqi national interest and aligned themselves with the West through the Baghdad Pact (see ch. 15, Foreign Relations). They believed that the management of state affairs was the function of an en- lightened, paternalistic elite. Increasing oil revenues permitted them to engage in a moderate-scale economic development pro- gram which promised much for the future betterment of the country as a whole but did little to solve basic social problems (see ch. 3, Historical Setting; ch. 19, Agriculture). The post-1958 leaders were younger, relatively suspicious of the West, more self-conscious about the country's Arab and Islamic identity and more inclined to accept the notion of Pan-Arab unity. Before the Revolution they had sought to limit royal authority, to amend the electoral laws to permit popular participation and to make the government more responsive to popular demand. Their origins were mainly in the educated stratum of the cities and larger towns, and their occupations were diverse, ranging from unemployed secondary school graduates and junior civil servants to successful doctors, lawyers, engineers, journalists and even some senior officials in the army and the civil service. Nearly all old-regime politicians were debarred from partici- 190 pating in public affairs. Those officials whose continuance in office was regarded as detrimental to the public interest were suspended. Because of the shortage of trained personnel, however, some of the disqualified men were subsequently reinstated, but emphasis on political reliability remained a major criterion. The Qasim sup- porters were eliminated in February 1963 when the Pan-Arabist, Arab Socialist Renaissance Party, better known as the Baath Party seized power by a coup. The Baathist regime was in turn ousted in November 1963. Before 1958 reformist zeal had been most intense among young activists, of whom many were in political opposition. A gradualist socialism, different from Communist revolutionary doctrine, gained a wide following among them, stimulated in part by the emerging socialist trends in the neighboring Arab states. As a first step toward socialist reform, the Qasim regime in Sep- tember 1958 enacted the Agrarian Reform Law, and in April 1961 a new land-tax law was published to bring about a more equitable distribution of wealth by lessening the tax burden on low-income groups. These reform measures remained unaffected despite changes in political leadership. The Interim Constitution of 1964, still operative in 1968, reaffirms the principle of socialism justified in terms of Arab her- itage and the spirit of Islam (see ch. 13, The Governmental System; ch. 17, Political Values and Attitudes). In a partial effort to ensure social justice and to eliminate what it termed exploita- tion, the government in July 1964 issued nationalization laws (see ch. 18, Character and Structure of the Economy). The quest for Iraqi identity and progress in the Arab and Is- lamic context has been evident in the Government's closer align- ment with the neutralist Arab states, such as the UAR and Syria, and in the avowed policy of noninvolvement in the East-West con- frontation. Especially since November 1963, when President Abdul Salam Arif came to power, the government has sought to establish closer political, military, cultural and economic ties with the UAR. In 1968 the goal of an eventual constitutional union with the UAR continued to be a cornerstone of national policy (see ch. 15, For- eign Relations). · The issue of national solidarity has been a focal point of politics for every regime since the overthrow of the monarchy. The Qasim regime abolished the tribal system of justice because of its latent role in perpetuating parochial loyalties and tribal controls. Both the Qasim and the Baathist regimes attempted to reconcile and integrate various political tendencies through the bureaucracy and a multi-party system. Since November 1963, the government has 191 relied primarily on the bureaucracy, supplemented by the Arab Socialist Union. In establishing the Union in July 1964, the gov- ernment, with the intention of replacing the conventional party system banned November 1963, asserted that partisanship, sec- tarianism and political blocs were harmful, at least during the transitional phase of nation-building. POLITICAL AWARENESS AND PARTICIPATION Abdul Rahman Mohammad Arif became president in April 1966 when his brother, President Abdul Salam Arif, died in an air accident. He was, in 1968, advised and assisted by a group of Cabinet ministers, most of whom came from the civil service and the army. The government's strongest support came from the mili- tary establishment. The stability of the political system depended largely on President Arif's ability to moderate and reconcile the ambitions of influential figures; there were frequent changes in the Cabinet. A small group of men made the important decisions at the highest levels; in the local communities and tribal settings a rela- tively small number of men and important families wielded in- fluence. Politics centered in personalities and was the concern mainly of educated city people. The government's intention has been to encourage active po- pular interest in public affairs and to broaden the scope of partici- pation. The president has often expressed the desire to terminate the transition period and to permit general elections as soon as domestic and external conditions warranted. An important step to broaden the base of politics was the extension of suffrage to women under the new Election Law promulgated in February 1967. This law also gave women the right to run for elective office. Another measure was a constitutional amendment passed in May 1968, indicating that a national assembly would be convened no later than May 1970. The level of political awareness rose gradually after 1958 be- cause of the increasing governmental efforts to satisfy the basic needs of the people. Indications in the mid-1960's were that polit- ical awareness was more or less directly related to one's distance from the cities and the main roads. City people were, on the whole, more conscious of national affairs than were country people. Prac- tical issues were more important than political ideologies. In rural areas consciousness of governmental efforts increased at least in part because of the land reform measures and related promises of social justice. Expansion of educational and developmental pro- grams were welcomed uniformly throughout the country, but es- 192 pecially by the Shiites because such programs could open the way for greater civil service opportunities and economic benefits for themselves. The people in and near the country's oil producing areas appeared more interested than others in the government's efforts to end foreign oil concessions (see ch. 15, Foreign Rela- tions, ch. 23, Foreign Economic Relations). POLITICAL ELEMENTS Since the country's independence in 1932, the army has been the principal support of political authority and a basic stabilizing force. Often it has been less an agency of government than itself the center of government authority and decisionmaking. Rules have tended to be closely associated with the army, often as its leaders. Since the 1930's military coups or threats of coups have become familiar means of changing political leadership (see ch. 3, Historical Setting; ch. 26. The Armed Forces). An army career has traditionally been viewed as a desirable stepping stone to government position, especially by those who were dissatisfied with, or who had no access to, civilian avenues of rising to public office. Most of the officer group appeared, in the mid-1960's, willing to support any government that adhered to the ideal of Arab unity, pursued the policy of nonalignment and could maintain national integrity, There were indications, however, that they were not unanimous in their view of Arab unity; some were inclined to emphasize the importance of self-reliance while others sought to promote national interests by collaborating with other Arab nations. Along with the army, the civil service continued to be an impor- tant stabilizing force and the most important form of employment for the educated. Members of the civil service, although forbidden to engage in partisan politics, were encouraged to join the Arab Socialist Union in private capacity. Most of them appeared un- willing to identify themselves exclusively with any particular pol- itical leadership or organization apparently because they believed that shifts in power relationships at the highest levels could result in personnel changes in the subordinate levels of bureaucracy. Landlords and tribal sheiks, most of whom were also big land- lords, were potent sources of monarchical power, but their ability to sway national leaders was weakened by the 1958 Revolution and the ensuing land reform program. In many parts of the country the land redistribution measure further accelerated the already diminishing economic basis of the traditional system of communal welfare, under which landlords and tribal sheiks were expected to aid the needy villagers and tribesmen (see ch. 8, Living Condi- 193 tions). This process of weakening was aided in part also by the Government's detribalization policy and in part by the emergence of the government as the effective alternate provider of material benefits. Nevertheless, tribal chiefs and big landlords continued to command respect from the people in their own areas, because the traditional way of life persisted essentially unbroken. The entrepreneurial freedom enjoyed by business leaders under the monarchy was restricted after 1958, because of increasing gov- ernmental efforts to expand the scope of the state-controlled sector in the national economy (see ch. 18, Character and Structure of the Economy). Business leaders made their demands known to government officials formally through the Chamber of Commerce of Baghdad. Most of them, however, relied on direct individual contacts. The religious leaders, Sunni as well as Shia, had closer contact with the people than did any political group. Because government leaders often attempt to convey their political messages to the people in the Islamic context, they refrained from antagonizing the religious leaders, who could potentially influence the attitudes of the people toward the government through their networks of communal relationships. Strongly anti-Communist, regardless of sectarian differences, the religious leaders in January 1960 formed an organization called the Iraqi Islamic Party, through which they protested against the prevalence of Communist influence in the Qasim government and pressed for stronger governmental recog- nition of spiritual values. The party was so outspoken in its at- tacks on the government that Prime Minister Qasim banned it in 1961. In 1968 there was no overt indication of any friction be- tween the religious order and the government. Students and members of the professions, such as lawyers, jour- nalists, engineers, doctors and teachers, were keenly interested in public affairs. Mostly urban-centered, many of them were aware of their traditional role as the leaders of reformist movements. Few disagreed with the commitment to Arab socialist, Pan-Arabism and nonalignment, but some occasionally voiced the hope that the government would provide more opportunities for broader popular participation by relaxing control of the press, encouraging repre- sentation through electoral process, and permitting the resumption of competitive party activities. Students and members of the professions expressed their voices in campus debates, individual contacts with government leaders, public statements through in- formally distributed leaflets, statements in the press or participa- tion in occasional street demonstrations. Publicly, the workers and peasants after 1958 received fa- vorable mention as continuers of the spirit of the 1958 Revolution. 194 Government leaders continued to affirm their intention to improve the working people's living conditions and to permit their partici- pation in the political process. There were few overt indications of discontent among the workers and peasants. By 1968 indications were that the government wished to broaden the working people's political horizons through an extensive publicity campaign and to put into practice the reforms it advocated. POLITICAL RAMIFICATIONS OF RELIGIOUS AND ETHNIC FACTORS Religious Identification Religious identity is politically significant. The Sunni and Shia Moslems are approximately equal in number, but a Shia complaint heard in the past, although far less in the 1960's, was that Shiites were not given positions of power in proportion to their numbers and that the predominantly Sunni political leadership was not sen- sitive to Shia aspirations (see ch. 4, Ethnic Groups and Lan- guages; ch. 11, Religion). Before World War I, under the rule of the Turkish Sunnites, an Iraqi Sunni elite enjoyed a favored position over the Shiites. During the period of the British Mandate (1920–32) and with the coming of independence, the political and economic dominance of the Sunnites was preserved. After the Arab-Israeli conflict in 1948, however, government leaders attempted to enhance national unity by emphasizing communal harmony. As a result, in the eco- nomic domain, for example, the Shiites improved their position by moving into the gap left by the departure of the Jews after 1948, thus gaining control of a sizable proportion of the country's trade and business. The gradual narrowing of distance between the two Moslem communities was aided in part by the growth of secular education. The secular as well as religious authority of the mujtahids (speci- alists in Islamic law) was weakened; especially in the middle Eu- phrates region around the holy cities of Najaf and Karbala, they had been disposed to take adamant stands against the Sunnites. The tight, theocratically organized Shia community with its own religious leaders, traditions and holy places began to loosen slowly as an increasing number of its members turned to secular educa- tion as the means of attaining worldly success (see ch. 11, Reli- gion). The Kurdish Question The Kurds, estimated to number more than a million, have a traditional passion for being left alone by outsiders. This led to at 195 least two major military clashes with the central government in the 1960's. Since June 1966, when Kurdish rebels agreed to cease their activities in return for substantial government concessions for autonomy, the Kurdish issue has been officially considered closed. By mid-1968 neither side had implemented the terms of the 1966 agreement, however, and the tensions continued. The traditional Kurdish dream of autonomy was stimulated in 1918 when President Woodrow Wilson recognized the right of self-determination for all the non-Turkish nationalities of the defeated Ottoman empire, and in 1920 the Turks as well as the Allied powers conditionally endorsed the idea of an independent Kurdish state. Again in World War II the autonomy theme was carried in German propaganda, which promised help in creating a Kurdish national state. By 1945, however, it was difficult to arouse Kurdish confidence in any verbal promise of independence. In 1946 many Kurdish leaders, headed by Mulla Mustafa Barzani revolted against the Iraqi Government to dramatize their cause. Failing in this, Bar- zani and others fled to the Soviet Union, which had been sympa- thetic to their aims and had long encouraged both Iraqi and Ira- nian Kurds to establish separate states. Iraqi Kurds are concentrated largely in the four northern prov- inces of Mosul, Irbil, Kirkuk and Sulaymaniyah (see ch. 5 Ethnic Groups and Languages). The problem of governing the Kurdish areas continues to be complicated because Kurdish social organiza- tion outside the towns is largely tribal. Kinship ties and a pattern of communal loyalties interpose between the central authorities and the Kurdish villager or nomad who gives his allegience, though declining in the mid-1960's, not to a distant and non- Kurdish government in Baghdad but to his sheik or landlord. In 1968 politically conscious Kurds continued to charge that their areas were receiving less than their share of attention in govern- mental provisions for social services, education, irrigation projects and roadbuilding. The Kurds, in general, welcomed the 1958 Revolution because, though never cordial to Arab domination in any form, they hoped that it would lead to an era of Arab-Kurdish partnership as as- sured by the provisional constitution of July 1958. This prospect was brightened in 1959 when the Qasim government allowed the Kurdish leader Barzani and his followers to return from exile in the Soviet Union; they were given a hero's welcome in Baghdad as well as by people in the north. Soon, however, the Kurds com- plained that the central government was unwilling to recognize their demands for autonomy. In September 1961 a widespread Kurdish rebellion broke out in 196 the north. After Qasim's fall in February 1963, fighting stopped briefly because of the pledge by the new Baath Party government to make substantial concessions, but armed clashes dragged on in- conclusively until May 1966, when the two sides began to negotiate for peaceful settlement. On June 29, 1966, Prime Minister Abdul Rahman Bazzaz announced that Barzani had agreed to accept the government's peace terms. The 1966 agreement provided for statutory recognition of Kurdish nationality; elevation of Kurdish to the status of an official language, along with Arabic; establishment of self-govern- ment for Kurdish districts; use of Kurds for most local adminis- trative positions in the Kurdish areas; holding elections as prom- ised in the Interim Constitution of 1964; and representation of Kurds in the Cabinet, Parliament, Judiciary and in all govern- mental departments in proportion to their numbers. It also pro- vided recognition of Kurdish rights to form their own political organizations and publish their own newspapers; a general am- nesty for all Kurdish participants in the northern incidents; rein- statement in their former posts of all Kurds who had either de- serted from the army and the police force or been dismissed from civil service positions; reconstruction and rehabilitation of the Kurdish areas under a specially created ministry; and the govern- ment's intention to compensate, within limits, various Kurdish vic- tims of the northern incidents. The initial, generally favorable Kurdish reaction did not last long, partly because of the government's cautious approach to the agreement and partly because of the intensification of intra- Kurdish factional activities. Barzani's leadership, based upon the support of conservative tribal sheiks, was being challenged in- creasingly by a group of younger, militant dissidents led by Jalal Talabani, Ibrahim Ahmad and Hilmi Ali Sherif. The dissidents pressed not only for immediate fulfillment of the 1966 agreement but also for extensive social reforms in the Kurdish areas. The Kurdish Democratic Party, the political arm of the autonomy movement and headed for the most part by Barzani since its es- tablishment in 1959, appeared no longer able to represent the Kurdish community as it had earlier. Talabani, until mid-1964 a key figure within the party, led his own organization called Barati Party, formed apparently sometime in early 1966. POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS In 1968 the only officially approved political organization was the Arab Socialist Union, headed by President Arif. A number of party organizations, however, continued to exist, to the extent that 197 their partisans and leaders maintained allegiance to their princi- ples. Political parties appeared shortly after World War I, organized mainly to advance the ambitions of political personalities. None of them had any popular support, and their fortunes shifted ac- cording to the rise and fall of their leaders. After World War II several parties of reformist, antigovernmental and anti-Western orientations became vocally active but were banned in September 1954 on the grounds that they had resorted to violence and street rioting during the elections of that year. After the Revolution of 1958, their legal status was not changed, but they were allowed full freedom in practice, and finally in January 1960, party activi- ties were legalized by the Qasim government. Arab Socialist Union President Abdul Salam Arif, on July 14, 1964, announced the formation of the Arab Socialist Union—Iraqi Region (as it is officially called in Iraq), and declared it to be the only political organization in the country. He stated that the charter of the body was similar to that of the Arab Socialist Union in the UAR, estab- lished earlier in 1962. His stated intention was to absorb all ex- isting political parties into the Union so that various shades of political thinking would be represented. On the same day, such little-known organizations as the Arab Nationalist Movement, the Arab Socialist Party, the Socialist Union Movement and the Dem- ocratic Social Unionists announced their dissolution and incorpo- ration into the Union. The government urged "all the working forces," including civil servants, to join the Union, which by February 1965 had claimed the membership of 70,000, but none of the major parties which had existed until November 1963 had joined. In late 1965 the gov- ernment initiated a campaign which denounced conventional par- ties as opportunistic and divisive, and as harmful sources of "false statements and rumors," and which sought to enlist the support of the "nationalists and progressives.” Official efforts to reinvigorate the Union and to establish a na- tional front of various political organizations and groups were intensified after the Arab-Israeli conflict in June 1967. Minister of Culture and Guidance Malik Duhan al Hasan in November 1967 was quoted as having blamed the “leaders of political thinking and opinion” for their refusal to “sit together for a flexible dialogue." The minister also stated that the government's decision to seek the cooperation of various leaders “in their personal capacity” without reference to their institutional affiliations was opposed by them for fear of losing "privileges and identities." 198 Nevertheless, the government announced in January 1968 that the country's leaders tentatively agreed on the general principles under which the Union would be reorganized. The guidelines were stated as the need for internal solidarity as the prerequisite for Arab unity; no monopoly of national or Pan-Arab political activi- ties by any single group or class; reorganization based on the wishes of the entire people, and rejection of atheist materialism and respect for personal freedom within the limits of public in- terest. The guidelines also called for elimination of discrimination; rejection of racism and supranationalism; rejection of any appeals for secession or subversive activities; emanation of all political activities from the people; and support of the republican form of government. Other Organizations Under the Qasim regime various political parties, manifesting diverse tendencies, competed for popular support. They were banned in November 1963, but the principles which they espoused remained in varying degrees of intensity. The most conservative organization was the Independence Party (Hizb al Istiqlal) led by Mohammad Mahdi Kubbah. Its member- ship consisted mainly of extreme nationalists of authoritarian outlook who had supported or sympathized with the anti-British Rashid Ali coup in 1941 (see ch. 3, Historical Setting). Suspicious of foreign influence and moderately reformist, this party opposed the West and the Soviet Union alike, but supported an alignment with the Arab bloc. The Arab Socialist Renaissance Party (al Baath al Arabi al Ishtiraki), commonly called the Baath Party, pursued the goals of Arab socialism and Pan-Arab unity. Established first in Syria in 1943, the Party gained a limited following among students and intellectuals in Iraq after 1949 because of its platform stressing egalitarian socialism and planned economic development. After Gamal Abdel Nasser seized power in Egypt, the Baathists in Iraq, as in Syria, gradually accepted the preeminence of Nasser as the spokesman of Arab nationalism and as the leader under whom unity might be achieved. In 1954 the Iraqi Baath Party received recognition from Damascus as a Regional Party. Almost immediately after the 1958 Revolution, the Baath Party called for Iraq to join or federate with the UAR. Beginning in December 1959, when an alleged anti-Qasim and pro-Nasser con- spiracy was uncovered, a number of Cabinet ministers, senior officials and military officers having Baathist connections were dis- missed. Nevertheless, in February 1963, the Baathists overthrew 199 the Qasim regime and established the first party-controlled gov- ernment in the country's history. The Baath leadership soon came to be dominated by anti-Nas- serites, who favored the principle of collective leadership in any scheme of Pan-Arabism, and hence opposed President Nasser's allegedly unitary leadership. The government moved progressively closer to the ruling Baathists in Syria, who had also opposed Pres- ident Nasser's leadership (see ch. 15, Foreign Relations). De- nounced as deviationist because of their alleged departure from the course of Arab unity, the Baathist regime was ousted in No- vember 1963 by Abdul Salam Arif. Leading Baathists exiled themselves in Syria, where they have continued their activities. The National Democratic Party (Al Hizb al Watani ad Di- muqrati) drew its support form the younger and better-educated people of the cities and larger towns. A loose collection of indi- vidual reformers, who shared general beliefs in socialism, demo- cratic government and nonalignment in foreign affairs, the party briefly became the nucleus of Qasim's civilian support early in 1959. Of all the parties in the country, it appeared to be least interested in Pan-Arabism. After the death in early 1968 of its leader, Kamil Chadirchi, the best known civilian politician in the country, the party was led by Mohammad Hadid. The Communist Party of Iraq, founded in 1934, was not recog- nized legally until February 1960. Shortly after July 1958, it took advantage of the new political climate to reconstruct its front organizations. Tolerated by the Qasim regime as a tactical coun- terweight to the Baath Party, the Communists infiltrated trade unions, peasant associations, and other groups ostensibly repre- senting occupational or professional interests but used primarily to bring pressure on the government. The Communists professed to be friends of many non-Commu- nist patriots who had previously been accused of various political offenses, and thus gained credit for their vigorous opposition ac- tivities under the monarchy. They also excelled in organizational work at the popular level, attracting a number of malcontents and disaffected people. By early 1959, despite apparent lack of internal cohesion and discipline, the Party had become an influential polit- ical organization, challenged only by the Baath Party. Under strong Soviet influence, the Party's growth was rapid and widespread, and in March 1959 an anti-Communist, anti- Qasim military mutiny broke out in Mosul. Aided in part by the Communists, the government forces suppressed it quickly. The Communists then demanded Cabinet positions for themselves and sought to collaborate with other parties and the Kurds. They also 200 attempted to seize power in some provincial centers, notably at Kirkuk in mid-July 1959. The "bloody massacre of Kirkuk," as it became known among the Iraqis, led to the weakening of the Party's influence. Prime Minister Qasim began to restrict the Party's activities; in January 1960, when the Communists, having split into two factions, ap- plied for legal recognition as two separate parties, the government approved the smaller of the two headed by Daud Sayigh, rejecting the larger one led by Abdulla Bustani and Abdul Qadir Ismail. By February 1968 the Communists, confronted with what they described as "complex organizational and ideological problems," decided to discontinue indefinitely their clandestine radio, “Voice of the Iraqi People.” There were also indications that they were split into pro-Soviet and pro-Chinese factions, of which the latter appeared to be in the minority. 201 CHAPTER 15 FOREIGN RELATIONS Ever since the Hashimite monarchy was overthrown in July 1958, the government has endeavored to enhance its role in world affairs by pursuing a policy of nonalignment or "positive neu- trality.” Initially this policy manifested itself in a rapid shift from the pre-1958 Western orientation toward one favoring the Com- munist nations, and the Soviet Union in particular. Beginning in 1960, however, Baghdad changed its position to one more conso- nant with its avowed intention of charting a prudent middle course between the East and the West. As a result the initial policy of excluding Western influence from the country was moderated; Iraq did not cut itself off from Western economic, technical and military assistance. After the Arab-Israeli armed conflict of June 1967, diplomatic relations with the United States and Great Britain were severed, but there was little disposition on the part of Baghdad to abandon its nonalign- ment posture. By the mid-1960's Iraq had not only become the third largest recipient of Soviet aid in the Arab world, after the United Arab Republic (UAR) and Algeria, but had also continued to receive aid from Western nations. Although the Soviet Union was the principal supplier of arms and equipment, it continued to receive some military materiel from Great Britain. Indications in April 1968 were that France had decided, as it had agreed during Pres- ident Abdul Rahman Arif's visit to Paris 2 months earlier, to supply Iraq with a number of jet fighter-bombers within 2 years. The post-1958 reorientation has been evident also in Baghdad's closer ties with other Arab nations. As in many Arab states, the Iraqis are not unanimous in their view of how the long-cherished ideal of Arab solidarity can be achieved, but they agree for the most part that their progress and future are intimately tied in with those of fellow Arab countries. The government, with var- ying emphasis, has therefore sought to increase economic, polit- ical, cultural and military cooperation with the others, especially with the UAR. Since November 1963, when President Abdul Salam Arif seized power from those who had advocated closer 203 ties with Syria to the exclusion of the UAR, the Baghdad and Cairo governments have attempted to step up cooperation in var. ious fields, with the result that domestic and external policies were related to changing events in the UAR. Except for nonalignment and commitment to the goal of Arab unity, the more or less commonly shared Arab hostility toward Israel has also affected Baghdad's external ties. For many years the government has shown a tendency to base its relations with foreign governments on their attitudes and policies for or against the Arab bloc. Oil has been another principal determinant of foreign relations. Baghdad has used the oil factor selectively either to retaliate against a foreign nation or to reward it in various circumstances affecting Iraqi self-interest. Beginning in 1961, when the govern- ment promulgated a law to “recover" over 99 percent of foreign oil concession areas, efforts to "liberate Iraqi oil rights from foreign monopolies" intensified. Since then, there have been signs of in- creased tension between Baghdad and foreign oil companies oper- ating in the country. The Iraqis have favorable views of other Arab peoples and gov- ernments. Dislike of Israel appeared fairly widespread except among limited numbers of dissident Kurds. Apart from the fre- quent anti-Western and anti-imperialist declamations heard in Baghdad, popular attitudes toward the peoples and governments of Western nations could not be meaningfully determined on a country-to-country basis. The inclination, both inside and outside official circles, to distrust non-Arab peoples was manifest in occa- sional criticism directed also toward the Communist nations and in frequent public pronouncements that Iraqi "socialism" is not to be confused with that preached by Marx and Lenin. DETERMINANTS The conduct of the country's foreign relations is determined largely be considerations affecting Israel, nonalignment, the ideal of Arab unity and foreign oil concessions in the country. Iraq has not recognized Israel as a sovereign state, regarding it as a creation of "Western imperialism" most inimical to Arab interests, and has maintained that any support given to Israel would be considered an unfriendly act against Iraq in particular and the Arab peoples in general. This factor predisposes the country to carry on its relations with other countries based on whether they are for or against Iraq on the Israeli issue. For most Iraqis the distinction between anti-Israel and anti- Western sentiments is often blurred. They regard Israel as the spearhead of renewed Western colonialism and readily point to the 204 Israeli military operations in the Sinai peninsula in October-Nov- ember 1956 and the concurrent British-French military interven- tion in Egypt as proof that the Western powers and Israel share the mutuality of anti-Arab interests in the Middle East. In November 1956, in a show of avowed Arab solidarity against Israel, Iraq dispatched a contingent of troops to Jordan at the latter's request and later, upon the outbreak of the Arab-Israeli conflict on June 5, 1967, the government declared war on Israel and again ordered troops into Jordan. In early 1968 Iraq continued to station troops in Jordan under the terms of a mutual defense pact which it had signed with both the UAR and Jordan on June 4, 1967 (see ch. 26, The Armed Forces). Other instances of anti-Israel reactions included Iraq's sever- ance of official ties with West Germany in May 1965 after Bonn had established diplomatic relations with Israel. Similarly, upon the outbreak of hostilities involving Israel and its Arab neighbors in June 1967, Iraq imposed an embargo on oil shipment to the United States and Great Britain and broke off diplomatic relations with these countries allegedly because the two Western powers had aided Israel militarily. Since the Revolution of July 1958, nonalignment has become a cornerstone of Iraqi foreign relations. This shift from the previous alignment with the West through the anti-Communist Baghdad Pact resulted from the reconstitution of the country's internal power structure after a group of young intensely nationalistic military officers under Brigadier Abdul Karim Qasim ousted the Western-oriented leadership group of Nuri as Said (see ch. 3, His- torical Setting). The new group condemned the foreign policy of the ousted regime as "a part of the imperialist design elaborated abroad” and, in March 1959, withdrew Iraq from the Baghdad Pact (see ch. 26, The Armed Forces). Through nonalignment or "positive neutrality," Prime Minister Qasim sought to reduce Western influence, to establish national identity independent of foreign powers and to steer his country closer toward other neutralist Arab states. In these efforts, which won the full support of the Soviet Union, Qasim turned to Moscow for economic and military aid. Iraq's drift toward the Communist nations was slowed, however, by Qasim's apparent realization that prudence called for the avoidance of an overly one-sided reliance on the Soviet Union. Fidelity to the ideal of Arab solidarity or Pan-Arabism is no less important than the anti-Israel and anti-imperialist declamations. Fostered by the awareness that all Arab peoples share a common heritage of culture, language and religion, the desire for inter- 205 Arab unity was prompted at first by anti-Ottoman sentiments fo- mented in the first decade of the twentieth century. Anti-Western feelings aroused in the wake of British and French ascendancy in the Middle East during the post-World War I years further inten- sified the sense of a common Arab future (see ch. 17, Political Values and Attitudes). Arab nations are not unanimous in their interpretation of the manner in which unity can be attained. Although professing the importance of closer ties with others, the pre-1958 Iraqi mon- archy, for example, aspired to incorporate Syria and Jordan into an Iraqi-sponsored union; Egypt questioned Iraq's motive and op- posed such a scheme. The concept of unity itself was at times exploited by an Arab nation to denounce a fellow nation as a betrayer of common Arab interests. Such criticism was leveled against pre-1958 Iraq by Egypt and Syria. Although the Revolution of 1958 aroused hopes in the country for effective inter-Arab cooperation, progress in this direction was slow, in part because of political differences between Iraq and Egypt. It was not until after the coup of November 1963 that steps were initiated toward the ultimate goal of achieving complete Arab unity, beginning with a hoped-for “union in stages" with the UAR (see ch. 14, Political Dynamics). Oil is the most important tool for diplomatic leverage at the country's disposal. Most of the oil is produced and marketed, how- ever, most importantly by a consortium of foreign firms called the Iraq Petroleum Company (IPC) in which British, French, Dutch and American companies hold varying shares of concessions (see ch. 28, Foreign Economic Relations). The IPC concession, which originally covered the whole of Iraqi territory and which was valid from 1925 for a period of 75 years, has been frequently attacked by nationalists and Communists alike as one of the means by which foreign prerogatives are perpe- tuated. After Qasim came to power, and especially since August 1960, Iraq has demanded higher royalties and taxes from the IPC and has also sought to limit the company's concession areas. In August 1967, 2 months after the Middle East crisis, the gov- ernment proclaimed a new set of oil policies under Law No. 97 of 1967. The Law appropriated over 99 percent of the IPC concession territories, a measure first initiated in July 1961. It also stipulated that no part of the “recovered” areas should be open to any “concession or similar arrangements” except on a contractual basis (see ch. 23, Foreign Economic Relations). After September 1967, the government reviewed a number of foreign offers to develop oil resources. In November 1967 it signed 206 an agreement with the French government-owned oil consortium called the Company for Petroleum Research and Operations (En- treprise de Recherches at d'Activités Pétrolières—ERAP). Put into effect in March 1968, this accord permitted the ERAP to explore, drill and market oil in central and southern Iraq. The French firm was excluded, however, from the northern Rumaila oilfields (southwest of Basra) which were then a subject of sep- arate negotiation between the Iraq National Oil Company and the French Petroleum Company (Compagnie Française des Pétroles —(CFP), a semigovernment-controlled French oil concern. Iraqis have welcomed the ERAP arrangement “as a great victory” in their struggle for ending foreign monopolies. In December 1967 the government agreed tentatively to a Soviet proposal to supply technical assistance and equipment for oil ex- ploration. In April 1968, however, it rejected a number of foreign proposals to develop the northern Rumaila field and declared that these proposals had fallen short of the expected benefits occurring from Iraqi exploitation. Among those rejected was an offer from France. The new oil policy was protested by the IPC. The govern- ment stood firm, however, and in February 1968 Minister of Oil and Minerals Abdul as-Sattar Ali al-Husayn declared that his gov- ernment's "silent war" with “foreign oil monopolies” was just beginning. President Arif had earlier announced that his country was fully prepared to face all the consequences of his new oil policy. RELATIONS WITH THE ARAB LEAGUE AND ARAB NATIONS In addition to its bilateral relations with other Arab states, the government conducts diplomacy with them multilaterally through a regional organization formally called the League of Arab States, but more commonly known as the Arab League. The Arab League The movement to cultivate cordial relations with other Arab states began almost immediately after the country won its inde- pendence in 1932. For the proponents of Pan-Arab unity, the ulti- mate goal was to link Iraq in a type of loose federation with other Arab nations. Iraq began by signing treaties of cooperation and alliances with Saudi Arabia and Yemen in 1936 and later with Jordan in 1946. The most significant move, however, was the establishment, in March 1945, of the Arab League in which Iraq played a leading role. By 1968 in addition to the seven founding members, including 207 Iraq, Egypt, Lebanon, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Syria and Yemen, the League included Algeria, Kuwait, Libya, Morocco, South Yemen, Sudan and Tunisia. The permanent seat of the League's secretariat is located in Cairo. Its highest policymaking body, called the Council, is com- posed of ministerial representatives from member nations. The Council's unanimous decisions, rarely achieved with the exception of anti-Israeli questions, are binding on all members, but the acceptance of majority decisions is voluntary. The League's pact provides for cooperation in political, eco- nomic, legal, cultural, press and information, administrative and financial, social, and Palestine affairs. It also recognizes the prin- ciple of collective security against aggression on any member state. Specific measures for collective defense cannot be initiated, however, unless unanimously agreed on by the League Council. To implement ihis principle, an agreement on Joint Defense and Eco- nomic Cooperation, also known as the Arab Collective Security Pact, was signed on June 17, 1950, by Egypt, Lebanon, Syria, Saudi Arabia and Yemen; by Iraq on February 2, 1951; and by Jordan on February 16, 1952 (see ch. 26, The Armed Forces). The League was favorably received in almost all Iraqi political circles where it was regarded as a step toward further Arab soli- darity. Its achievements, however, fell short of initial expectations with the notable exception of arriving at more or less common agreement regarding anti-Israel policies. With varying degrees of success Iraq and others have acted in concert to deny political and economic aid to Israel. Otherwise, the League members more often found themselves unable to transcend mutual suspicion and dif- ferences. In nonpolitical fields, however, some measures of cooperation have been accomplished. Under the League's Cultural Treaty signed in November 1946, Iraq and others have sought to improve the quality of education and to standardize educational systems through a series of cultural exchange programs with other nations (see ch. 9, Education). In addition, Iraq along with Jordan, Kuwait and Syria signed in August 1964 an agreement designed to create an Arab Common Market by no later than 1975 (see ch. 23, Foreign Economic Relations). The United Arab Republic The largely cultural rivalry between Iraq and Egypt has shifted in recent decades to the political sphere as the two nations maneu- vered, especially after World War II, for leadership in the Arab world. After the mid-1950's the two nations became involved in the 208 intensified East-West rivalry in the Middle East. In February 1955 Iraq aligned itself with the West through a mutual defense pact it concluded with Turkey, already a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. In the ensuing month Egypt formed a coun- teralliance with Syria and Saudi Arabia and, at the same time, proceeded to move closer to the Soviet Union. By February 1958, despite their continued affirmation of the goal of Arab unity, Iraq and Egypt had remained wider apart than ever; Egypt joined Syria to form the UAR, and Iraq reacted by establishing a rival federation with Jordan (see ch. 3, Historical Setting). The adoption of a nonalignment policy by the "revolutionary' government of Prime Minister Qasim was welcomed by the UAR, and it led to the conclusion of a mutual defense pact in the same month between Iraq and the UAR. Under the pact they pledged to collaborate was one bloc” in repulsing any attack on either country, in coordinating their foreign policies and in promoting economic and cultural cooperation. Little came out of this agreement be- cause of mutual distrust, and their relations deteriorated after Syria seceded from the UAR in September 1961. The Cairo gov- ernment accused Iraq of having aided and abetted the secession. The ouster of the Qasim regime by a coup in February 1963 brought a brief respite and resulted in a tripartite accord in April 1963 among Iraq, the UAR and Syria, in which they pledged to establish a new federation to be known also as the United Arab Republic and to adopt a new flag designed to symbolize the three nation unity (see ch. 17, Political Values and Attitudes). This scheme was almost immediately thwarted because of the rise to power in both Iraq and Syria of anti-Nasser elements (see ch. 14, Political Dynamics). A coup in Baghdad in November 1963 by a group favorably disposed toward President Gamal Abdel Nasser of the UAR led to a series of measures designed to improve relations. Notable among these was the conclusion on May 26, 1964, of an agreement estab- lishng a Joint Presidency Council and making Cairo its permanent seat. The purpose of the Council was to explore ways and means of achieving unity; to plan and coordinate military, economic, social, cultural and information policies; and to foster the development of popularly rooted organizations as the prime instruments of the unity movement. In addition to creating a number of appropriate study committees, this agreement also provided that "any aggres- sion or threat of aggression directed against either country,” would be considered an attack on the other (see ch. 23, Foreign Economic Relations; ch. 26, the Armed Forces). As a followup measure, in December 1964 the two nations set up a Unified Political Command as their “highest political authority" 209 with powers to take "all practical steps to achieve constitutional union” within 2 years and to supervise the implementation of all governmental policies. Unity proved elusive, although the two na- tions continued to reaffirm the ultimate objective of achieving one- ness. By 1968 it was evident that both countries recognized the difficulties stemming from what Iraqi Prime Minister Abdul Rahman Bazzaz (September 1965–August 1966) called “differ- ing circumstances" between the two nations. Syria Iraq has always shown keen interest in promoting friendly rela- tions with Syria, since in addition to the commonality of Arab ties, nearly 70 percent of Iraqi oil is piped across Syria to the Mediter- ranean ports of Baniyas and Tripoli (see ch. 23, Foreign Economic Relations). In the 1940's Iraq supported the idea of the Greater Syrian State to be composed of Syria, Lebanon, Palestine and Trans- jordan (modern Jordan). The plan was proposed initially in 1944 by King Abdullah of Transjordan. The modified version of the scheme, known as the Fertile Crescent Plan, would have incorpo- rated Syria and Transjordan into a union under Iraq's Hashimite monarchy. It was, however, opposed by Egypt, the rival claimant to Arab leadership. Many Syrian leaders, encouraged by Egypt and identifying their own future with an independent Syria, op- posed such projects, while others, especially young radicals and some moderates, supported the idea but would not endorse the Hashimite dynastic ambitions. Relations with Syria during the 1955–58 period were strained because of divergent postures toward Egypt and the East-West conflict, but improved rapidly after Qasim seized power in July 1958. In November 1959 and again in January 1960 he publicly expressed the longstanding Iraqi aspiration of uniting with Syria, then a part of the UAR. In September 1961 Iraq welcomed Syria's secession from the UAR. Iraq and Syria agreed on a number of measures designed to strengthen their cultural and economic cooperation. In June 1962 Prime Minister Qasim declared that the frontiers between the two countries would “disappear shortly ... for we are one people and one country.” Syria announced in February 1963 its readiness to federate with Iraq. Seizure of power by groups of Pan-Arab unionists, including members of the Arab Socialist Renaissance Party (commonly called the Baathists) both in Iraq and Syria, in February and March 1963 respectively, enhanced the prospect of closer ties 210 among Iraq, Syria and the UAR. The result was the agreement by the three countries in April 1963 on a tripartite federation. In- fluential Baathists in Iraq and Syria and President Nasser of the UAR were divided on their interpretations of the unity agreement. Iraq and Syria continued their cooperative efforts in economic as well as military matters (see ch. 26, the Armed Forces). The situation was reversed in November 1963 when the Baa- thist-controlled government in Baghdad was overthrown by a coup. The new leadership headed by President Abdul Salam Arif denounced as "deviationists" Iraqi Baathists, who thereupon sought sanctuary in Syria and from there waged an anti-Arif campaign (see ch. 14, Political Dynamics). By 1968, however, much of the earlier mutual recrimination had subsided, although relations were not particularly warm. Others Relations with other Arab nations, Kuwait and Jordan in parti- cular, were cordial in 1968. Iraq was involved in a major crisis with Kuwait in June 1961 when Great Britain terminated its pro- tectorate over oil-rich Kuwait and recognized its independence. Almost immediately Prime Minister Qasim laid claim to Kuwait as an integral part of Iraq, alleging that it was part of the Province of Basrah in the former Ottoman empire, and that the British protectorate, established in 1899, had been illegally imposed. The dispute also strained Iraqi relations with other Arab na- tions which, backed by the UAH, admitted Kuwait, to the Arab League as a sovereign member. Iraq was critical of Great Britain which, under an agreement providing for British protection against foreign aggression, helped Kuwait at its request. Iraq severed dip- lomatic relations briefly with Japan, Iran, Lebanon, the United States and Tunisia on the ground that they had recognized Kuwait. The ouster of the Qasim regime in February 1963 opened the way for reconciliation, and in October 1963 Iraq formally recog- nized Kuwait's independence. This was followed by a series of bilateral measures designed to facilitate economic cooperation and, in January 1968, the two nations agreed to settle their differences on border demarcation by appointing a joint study group (see ch. 23, Foreign Economic Relations). Relations with Jordan had been intimate before the Iraqi Revo- lution of 1958 because of dynastic ties between the two Hashimite monarchies in both nations. In 1947 they signed a mutual defense pact, and in February 1958 they also formed an ill-fated federa- tion to counter the Soviet-backed UAR. When Qasim seized power 211 in July 1958, Jordan withheld recognition, but anti-UAR orienta- tions both in Jordan and in Qasim's Iraq brought them closer. In October 1960 Jordan recognized the Qasim government and com- munication links, suspended in July 1958, were restored in the same month. On the eve of the Arab-Israeli armed conflict in June 1967, Iraq joined the Jordanian-UAR defense pact which bound the signatories to “use all means at their disposal, including the use of armed forces” to repel an attack on any of them (see ch. 26, The Armed Forces). RELATIONS WITH NON-ARAB NATIONS Turkey Iraqi efforts to cultivate close ties with Turkey were manifested, before 1958, in three separate treaties of alliance. In July 1937, together with Turkey, Afghanistan and Iran, Iraq signed a pact at Saadabad, Iran, in which each pledged noninterference in the in- ternal affairs of the others and nonaggression on any member state. The pact remained largely on paper, and efforts to revive it in 1946 were unsuccessful. In March 1946 Iraq and Turkey con- cluded a bilateral treaty of friendship. In February 1955 the concern for defense against aggression, from the Soviet Union in particular, brought Iraq and Turkey together in a Pact of Mutual Cooperation, the nucleus of which was to be known as the Baghdad Pact. Their relations cooled after 1958 partly because of Iraq's adoption of a neutralist posture and its withdrawal from the Baghdad Pact, and partly because of the Kurdish rebellion in northern Iraq. Iraq accused Turkey of har- boring Kurdish "outlaws,” and Turkey countercharged that Iraqi planes bombed a Turkish border village in the course of anti- Kurdish operations (see ch. 14, Political Dynamics; ch. 26, The Armed Forces). After Iraq's announced readiness in July 1965 to compensate for the losses and damages sustained in the earlier Iraqi raid on the Turkish border settlement, the two nations normalized their ties, beginning with the conclusion of a trade agreement in August 1965. In July 1966, Iraq reaffirmed its support of Turkey over the Cyprus question, and in February 1967 President Arif paid a state visit to Turkey. In July 1967 Iraq agreed on a plan to export natural gas to Turkey (see ch. 23, Foreign Economic Relations). Iran Iraq and Iran, allied through the Baghdad Pact, maintained friendly relations until late 1959, when their relations deteriorated 212 for several years thereafter. By 1968 however, despite some unre- solved differences, their relations were generally warm. Relations deteriorated after November 1959 when Iran ques- tioned the validity of the 1937 agreement between the two coun- tries concerning their common frontier. Under this agreement, Iraq obtained sovereignty over that 100-mile Shatt al-Arab which divides the two nations before emptying into the Persian Gulf. This settlement gave Iraq the exclusive navigational rights up to the low-water line on the Iranian bank, rather than to the mid- stream point of the river. Excepted were the anchorage areas at the Iranian ports of Abadan, Khorramshahr and Khosrowabad, about 10 miles below Abadan, where the borderline is moved to the center of the river (see ch. 2, Physical Environment). In December 1959 Prime Minister Qasim reacted by nullifying the 1937 agreement and claimed Iraqi sovereignty over the an- chorage areas. In the ensuing month Iran also invalidated the agreement and counterclaimed Iranian sovereignty over the cen- ter-of-navigation line in the river. Mounting border tensions and other mutual recriminations led to the stoppage of all Iranian shipping on the Shatt al-Arab in early 1961, but by April the two nations had agreed to settle their differences by negotiations. This led to the establishment in January 1966 of a joint border com- mittee. Related to the border dispute is the issue of conflicting claims to territorial waters in the Persian Gulf. In early 1963 Iran opened its coastal offshore areas to international oil exploration bids. Iraq protested the action on the ground that it would infringe on its territorial waters, the limit of which, as proclaimed in November 1958, was 12 nautical miles. In August 1963 the two nations agreed in principle on “joint exploitation" of the disputed areas. In the mid-1960's the two nations quarreled because of some Kurds who occasionally crossed into Iranian territory to escape their pursuers. In December 1965, for instance, Iran charged that Iraqi planes had attacked its border villages while pursuing Kurdish insurgents; Iraq denied the charges. The next month Iraq alleged that Iran was providing sanctuary to Kurdish forces and accused it of supplying them with arms and equipment. Iran denied both accusations. As the Kurdish insurgency in Iraq sub- sided by mid-June 1966, however, this issue gradually receded into the background. RELATIONS WITH WESTERN NATIONS The United States Before World War II, Iraqi relations with the United States 213 were maintained mainly through private channels, although the two nations had established diplomatic ties in 1932. American edu- cators, archaeologists, businessmen and doctors on assignments in Iraq in various capacities were highly regarded in that country. In postwar years this reputation suffered indirectly because of Amer- ican support for the creation and growth of Israel. Iraqi and American concern over the Soviet threat in the Middle East, however, drew the two nations closer in the early 1950's. In April 1954 Iraq accepted United States military assistance and in February 1955 joined the Baghdad Pact. The United States ac- tively supported the Pact, although it did not formally adhere to this treaty after 1957 except for membership in some of its com- mittees (see ch. 26, The Armed Forces). In August 1959 the Baghdad Pact, minus Iraq, was renamed the Central Treaty Or- ganization. Iraq withdrew from the Baghdad Pact in March 1959 and 2 months later terminated the military assistance agreement it had signed with the United States in 1954. In doing so it disassociated itself from the Eisenhower Doctrine which the United States had proclaimed early in 1957 to extend economic and military assist- ance to any Middle East nation seeking protection from armed aggression by "any country controlled by international commu- nism.” The United States responded to the Iraqi situation with relative equanimity, respecting Prime Minister Qasim's policy of nonalign- ment. The two nations concluded a cultural cooperation agreement and a Food for Peace Agreement in January 1961 and August 1963 respectively. In addition, the United States Export-Import Bank granted a loan of $5.3 million in 1965 to Iraq, and the govern- ments signed an Agricultural Commodities Agreement in De- cember 1966. On a nongovernmental level, Iraq and the Ford Foundation in October 1966 signed an agreement in which the Foundation pledged to provide technical assistance in educational, scientific and developmental fields (see ch. 9, Education; ch. 23, Foreign Economic Relations). Almost immediately after the outbreak of the Arab-Israeli conflict in June 1967, Iraq severed diplomatic relations with the United States, suspended oil shipments destined for the United States, refused to permit American aircraft to overfly Iraq and announced a boycott of American goods. This action was taken after the UAR alleged that United States as well as British air- craft intervened on the Israeli side. In mid-1968 diplomatic rela- tions remained suspended, and Iraqi interests in the United States were represented by India. 214 Great Britain Iraqi foreign relations in recent decades were for the most part concerned with Great Britain, which exercised mandate powers between 1920 and 1932. Only gradually after World War II, as British influence declined in the Middle East, did relations with Great Britain cease to be the determinant of all Iraqi foreign relations (see ch. 3, Historical Setting). Until Iraq's formal withdrawal from the Baghdad Pact in March 1959, the two nations had allied themselves initially through the 1930 treaty of alliance and later through the Baghdad Pact (see ch. 26, The Armed Forces). Despite Iraq's option for nonalign- ment and withdrawal in June 1959 from the sterling area, rela- tions between Baghdad and London were not overly strained except for a brief interregnum in 1961 when Great Britain backed Kuwait in the dispute with Iraq (see ch. 24, Public Finance). Although no longer militarily allied, beginning in early 1963 Iraq received some military items from Great Britain, apparently to lessen its excessive dependence on the Soviet Union for military assistance (see ch. 26, The Armed Forces). Diplomatic relations, severed after the Arab-Israeli conflict in June 1967, were resumed in May 1968. France Relations with France, strained until mid-1962, improved steadily thereafter, and by 1968 their ties were cordial. French military intervention in Egypt in late 1956 was resented in Iraq, and Baghdad reacted promptly by breaking off diplomatic rela- tions with Paris. Anti-French sentiments were reflected also in Iraq's support of the Algerian rebels fighting for independence from France; this trend was evident especially after Qasim came to power in 1958. It was not until January 1963 that the two nations agreed to resume diplomatic relations. After 1963 Iraq appeared receptive to France's interest in aiding Iraqi economic development. Numerous French economic delegations have been received in Baghdad, and the severance of Iraqi ties with leading Western nations in mid-1967 did not affect France, which maintained a pro-Arab posture on the Middle East conflict of 1967. In September 1967, a trade agreement was signed between the two nations, and 2 months later a French govern- ment-owned oil firm signed an oil prospecting agreement with Iraq. This contract was ratified by the Iraqi Cabinet in February 1968 and put into effect the following month. Shortly after the February agreement, President Arif visited France to confer with President Charles de Gaulle on economic, political and military 215 matters. In their joint communique they pledged “close coopera- tion in several fields.” Based on this understanding, France, in April 1968, agreed to deliver 54 Mirage jet aircraft to Baghdad within 2 years. A French bid, along with other foreign offers, to contribute to the development of the northern Rumaila oilfield, however, was rejected by Iraq in April 1968. RELATIONS WITH COMMUNIST NATIONS In 1968 Iraq maintained diplomatic relations with all Commu- nist nations which, with rare exceptions, supported Baghdad's anti-Israel and “anti-imperialist” postures. Basic to the govern- ment's politics toward these nations was the principle of peaceful coexistence and the readiness to accept foreign aid from any country as long as strings were not attached. Iraq has emphasized that its own "socialism” derives from the Arab heritage rather than from Marxism-Leninism (see ch. 17, Political Values and Attitudes). than from M. Socialism” derives fromarnea. Iraq has emphasized Soviet Union Until 1958, relations between Iraq and the Soviet Union were not the warmest. Long suspicious that the Russians were intent on acquiring influence and a foothold in the Persian Gulf region, Iraq was not predisposed to regard the Soviet Union as a friendly power. It broke off diplomatic relations with Moscow in January 1955 when the Soviet Government criticized the proposed Iraqi- Turkish mutual defense pact of February 1944. After 1958 Iraq's efforts to assert its independence of Western influence were welcomed by the Soviet Union, which was also seeking, for different reasons, to undermine the Western position in the Middle East. The Soviet Government was among the first to recognize the Qasim regime, which moved quickly to restore diplo- matic ties with Moscow and to establish them also with other Communist nations. By the end of 1958, the Soviet Union was supplying Baghdad with arms (see ch. 26, The Armed Forces). On formal state levels, this rapprochement was accompanied by many agreements, beginning with a pact signed in October 1958 for trade, technical assistance, and scientific and cultural coopera- tion (see ch. 23, Foreign Economic Relations). On the party level, however, Moscow was often critical of Bagh- dad's increasingly hostile posture toward Iraqi Communists. The tone of Soviet criticism heightened, especially after the February 1963 coup, which resulted, among other things, in intensified anti- Communist measures. The Soviet Government retaliated by sus- pending arms shipments, alleging that it could not remain in- 216 different to the manner in which its military aid was used, osten- sibly, against the Kurdish insurgents (see ch. 14, Political Dy- namics; ch. 26, The Armed Forces). In mid-1963 relations be- tween the two nations deteriorated further because of Soviet alle- gations before the United Nations that Iraq had been engaged in "genocide” and in "large-scale military operations” against the Kurds. For its part, Iraq complained before the Security Council that the Soviet Government was interfering in its internal affairs by aiding the Kurds. The anti-Communist posture in Baghdad notwithstanding, the Soviet Government pursued a pragmatic policy of befriending Iraq, presumably to retain and enhance its influence over the Iraqi Army, which is equipped largely with Soviet arms (see ch. 26, The Armed Forces). Iraq itself appeared eager to see a continued Soviet role in its foreign relations as a counterbalance against the West. In August 1966 the two nations reaffirmed their readiness to develop commercial ties, and at that time Soviet leaders also em- phasized their intention to strengthen the Iraqi defense potential. Upon the outbreak of the Middle East crisis in June 1967, the Soviet Union publicly sided with the Arab bloc, undoubtedly to capitalize on anti-Israel sentiments in most Arab nations. To reassure the Arabs of his government's continued support for them, Soviet President Nikolai V. Podgorny visited Baghdad in early July, after conferring with leaders in the UAR and Syria. In December 1967 Iraq and the Soviet Union initialed a letter of intent by which Moscow promised to provide technical assistance and equipment needed for prospecting and extracting oil in se- lected parts of Iraq-a major Soviet breakthrough in gaining access to Iraqi oil heretofore controlled almost exclusively by the West (see ch. 23, Foreign Economic Relations). Communist China Iraqi relations with Communist China date from July 1958 when the Communist regime promptly recognized Qasim's govern- ent and lavished praises on the so-called “new heroes of Baby- lonia”; until then Iraq had maintained diplomatic ties with the Republic of China or Taiwan. Communist China followed by con- cluding a series of agreements for cultural and economic coopera- tions and even attempted, though only for symbolic reasons, to increase Iraq's military potential by sending in May 1959 and in March 1960 a token quantity of arms (see ch. 16, Public Informa- tion; ch. 23, Foreign Economic Relations; ch. 26, The Armed Forces). Relations with Communist China were warmest in the first year 217 of the Qasim regime during which members of Chinese cultural and other assorted missions descended on Iraq by the hundreds. The year was marked, coincidentally, by the rise and fall of the Iraqi Communist Party (see ch. 14, Political Dynamics). Iraq's warmth toward the Communist regime cooled, however, after the Kirkuk uprisings of July 1959 in which Iraqi Communists played a leading part and certain Chinese Communists were suspected by the Iraqi authorities of being implicated. Shortly after this in- cident the Chinese Communist Ambassador to Iraq was asked by Prime Minister Qasim to "shorten” his stay in Baghdad. Relations between the two nations worsened further after July 1, 1961, when Communist China-unlike the Soviet Union—recog- nized Kuwait over which Iraq had claimed sovereignty a week earlier. Nevertheless, trade relations continued unaffected and, in fact, by 1962 Communist China had become the largest consumer of Iraqi dates (see ch. 23, Foreign Economic Relations). Qasim's ouster in February 1963 led to a gradual improvement of overall relations, but Communist China's role in Iraqi foreign affairs in 1968 continued to be of marginal significance because of its limited economic and military capacity as an aid-dispensing nation. RELATIONS WITH INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS Iraq has shown an active interest in the activities of interna- tional organizations. It became a member of the League of Nations in 1932 and took part in a number of international conferences. In 1936 Iraq endorsed sanctions against Italy in its dispute with Ethiopia. In its general policies and with the exception of its anti- Israeli commitment, Iraq has accepted the principles of interna- tional cooperation as well as those of collective security. It also has shown regard for international law and treaties and has preferred to use peaceful methods of resolving differences with other na- tions. Participating in the United Nations Conference held in San Francisco in 1945, Iraq became one of the original members of the United Nations and has actively taken part in the organization's activities. Although its delegates dissented from the West's stand on the Israeli question in the United Nations, until mid-1958 Iraq almost always stood with the Western powers on other issues. In 1950 it was the first Arab state to support the United Nations Security Council resolution of June 27, asking all nations to aid the Republic of Korea against North Korean armed attack; in July 1950 it complied with the United Nations recommendation to with- hold arms and other supplies to Communist China and North Korea. 218 In 1968 Iraq held membership in the International Atomic Energy Agency; International Labor Organization; Food and Ag- riculture Organization; United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization; World Health Organization; Interna- tional Bank for Reconstruction and Development; International Finance Corporation; International Development Association; In- ternational Monetary Fund; International Civil Aviation Organi- zation; Universal Postal Union; International Telecommunication Union; and World Meteorological Organization. MECHANICS OF FOREIGN RELATIONS In the formulation of policy and the conduct of external rela- tions, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs plays an important, but by no means exclusive, role. The ultimate responsibility for the con- trol of foreign affairs rests in the President of the Republic. The Ministry of Union Affairs, established in July 1963 initially to implement the tripartite unity accord of April 1963 signed by Iraq, the UAR and Syria, also plays a significant part especially in matters dealing with functional cooperation with other Arab na- tions (see ch. 23, Foreign Economic Relations). Auxiliary func- tions are performed also by the Ministry of Economy which deals with foreign trade and by the Ministry of Oil and Minerals. In the overall process of foreign relations, the executive dominance in 1968 was not significantly questioned by any political organiza- tions, most of which were unable to exert influence because of their proscribed status (see ch. 14, Political Dynamics). Members of the career foreign service corps enjoy high social prestige. For the most part, they are recruited on a merit basis. Emphasis on merit has been evident especially since the end of the Hashimite monarchy in July 1958; the government in 1960 could assert that "for the first time in history, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs welcomed all qualified individuals regardless of any other considerations." To be eligible, foreign service applicants must be Iraqi nationals of sound political and moral standing, must be fluent in either English or French or in both, and must pass examinations given by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as well as by the General Serv- ice Board (see ch. 13, The Governmental System). According to laws, regular foreign service officers may not marry with any na- tional other than an Iraqi or a national of other Arab countries descending from Arab parents; prior written permission of the Minister of Foreign Affairs is mandatory for marriage. 219 CHAPTER 16 PUBLIC INFORMATION In 1968 modern communications media other than radio existed only on a small scale and reached only the urban population di- rectly. The dissemination of news still took place mostly by word of mouth even though the news items may have originated in one of the formal communications media. Among the formal media radio was of the greatest importance in transmitting information. Estimates by informed observers sug- gested that some 6 million persons were reached by the radio in 1967. Many of the receiving sets were in public places. Moreover, news items heard over the radio were passed on by word of mouth to persons who were not within the reach of sets or loudspeakers. There was great popular interest in television, but because of technical limitations in relay, transmission signals in 1968 were effective only in the Baghdad area. In the capital city, however, many sets were in public view. Motion picture shows were a favorite form of recreation in urban centers, but their use as information media was limited. In Baghdad and in the major cities, film theaters were well attended, but film-showing facilities were not available for most of the rural population. The circulation of newspapers and the ability of the public to read them were limited, but news publications had con- siderable political impact on some groups, such as intellectuals, students and government officials. When newspapers reached remote rural areas they were read aloud to illiterates, and single copies were passed around many times. Freedom of the press was guaranteed, in principle, by the Or- ganic Law of 1925 (also known as the Constitution of 1925) and reaffirmed in the Interim Constitution of 1964. During the 1960's, however, the content of newspapers was regulated under the terms of the Press Law of April 1964 and also by informal advice from the Ministry of Culture and Guidance. Some criticism of minor points of policy was tolerated, but censorship measures were in- voked if criticism was directed at the government itself. Full gov- 221 ernment control over the press was established by Law No. 155 of December 3, 1967, which created the Organization of Press and Printing under the Ministry of Culture and Guidance. The Law placed the Organization in charge of issuing five dailies and abol- ished all existing privately owned newspapers. The government also controlled all other public information media. Radio and television were instruments for the dissemina- tion of official views. In a major policy statement in the summer of 1967, Prime Minister Tahir Yahya spoke of the need “to de- velop an information apparatus . . . that will build solid citizens who believe in their country . . . and in the goals of the Revolu- tion of 1958." The government owned and operated the only do- mestic broadcasting service, Radio Baghdad, and the national television network. The Iraqi News Agency was another chan- nel of officially endorsed information. The principal themes in government information media in 1967 and 1968 were those of national unity, with special emphasis on brotherhood with the Kurdish minority, domestic oil policies de- signed to develop the country's oil resources by Iraqi national agencies and the reduction of the size of foreign concessions. The need to safeguard the Arab character of the Persian Gulf and the importance of Arab unity and solidarity in the conflict with Israel were also stressed in broadcasts and press statements. The technical facilities of communications media have been improved during the 1960's. The Five-Year Economic Plan 1965–69 allocated 8.6 million dinars (1 dinar equals US$2.80—see Glossary) for the development of public information facilities, in- cluding the establishment of broadcasting aid television centers in the provincial districts. West Germany lent extensive technical assistance in implementing plans to improve the television net- work. Before 1967 information from non-Communist countries reached Iraq largely through publications, radio and film programs of the United States Information Service (USIS). Since the severance of diplomatic relations with the United States in June 1967, informa- tion from the United States has been available to the Iraqi people only through the Voice of America (VOA) broadcasts. West Ger- many, however, maintains an active information program, and the Arabic-language broadcasts of the British Broadcasting Corpora- tion reach many listeners. Communist information and propaganda were disseminated through broadcasts originating mainly from the Soviet Union and from East European nations. Visits of delegations from these countries supplemented the Communist information effort. 222 GOVERNMENT AND FREEDOM OF THE PRESS The earliest predecessors of the press were official and semi- official newspapers published during the latter half of the nine- teenth century under Turkish rule. Printed in Arabic and Turkish, they carried laws, official statements, announcements and news items. During the early 1900's more than 50 newspapers were published in Baghdad and in other major cities. Most of them featured commercial news and announcements. A few also carried stories and editorials expressing nationalist and anti-Turkish sen- timents. The number of nationalist newspapers increased, but by 1914 most of them had been banned by the Turkish authorities. Under the monarchy which existed during the British Mandate in 1920, newspapers were subject to licensing, although freedom of the press was guaranteed by the Organic Law of 1925. Some news- papers, including Al-Istiqlal (Independence) and Al-Furat (Euphrates), were critical of the Mandate and demanded its end. Jaridat al-Fallah (Peasant Gazette) and Lisan al 'Arab (Lan- guage of the Arabs) represented the government's point of view. The attainment of independence in 1932 gave rise to a new group of newspapers operating as personal organs of politicians, each of whom sponsored his own following of journalists. When politicians fell from office their newspapers tended to be replaced by others which, in turn, were supported by new leaders. Nationalist sentiment in the press arose again during the 1940's in connection with negotiations preceding the Treaty of Ports- mouth (1948), which regulated matters of mutual defense between Iraq and Great Britain. The newspapers Al Jihad (Crusade) and Al-Yaqda (Vigilance) led the press campaign against the Treaty. A press law promulgated in 1950 provided for formal censorship. Until 1952, however, it was rarely invoked; consequently, various opposition newspapers thrived on attacks on government policies (see ch. 15, Foreign Relations). The number of newspapers was sharply reduced after the gov- ernmental crisis of 1952 which had stemmed from political pres- sure for election law reforms and had eventually resulted in riots in Baghdad. A new censorship law prohibited "irresponsible criti- cism” of the government under threat of suspension. The effect of this law was not only to eliminate press comment unfavorable to the government but also to make editors extremely cautious in expressing views on the government's domestic and foreign poli- cies. The return of Nuri as Said as prime minister in 1954 brought about the dissolution of all political parties and the suspension of party press organs. Eighteen newspapers were closed, and the rest 223 had to observe strict rules delimiting topics which could be sub- jected to press criticism. Newspapers were not to comment ad- versely on the Baghdad Pact of 1955 or to attack powers with which Iraq had friendly relations. They were permitted, however, to criticize United States policy toward Israel, French policies in Algeria and the Soviet Union. Many journalists resented these restrictions and spread their discontent to other politically articulate elements in the commu- nity. After the involvement of Great Britian, France and Israel in the Suez Canal crisis of 1956, the newspapers published a con- siderable amount of anti-Western material (see ch. 15, Foreign Relations). Censorship was lifted, and freedom of the press was proclaimed after the Revolution of 1958. A number of stridently left-wing newspapers appeared including Ittihad ash Sha'ab (The People's Unity), the press organ of the Communist Party of Iraq. Other pro-Communist newspapers included Sawt al-Ahrar (Voice of Freedom), Ar Ra'i alamm (Public Opinion) and Al-Insaniya (Hu- manity). Ath Thawrah (The Revolution) represented a leftist but anti-Communist political viewpoint. The moderate socialist Al Ahali (The People) and the pro-government Al Akhbar (The News) had the largest circulations. Despite official emphasis on freedom of the press the govern- ment expected the newspapers to support its policies. The minister of guidance and broadcasting stated that freedom of the press was not to be regarded as a license to promote discord or to vilify the government. The press was advised to support "Arab solidarity," publicize the success of the 1958 Revolution and offer “construc- tive criticism." Between 1958 and 1959 the rise of Communist elements in poli- tics was reflected in the press. Many of the pro-Communist news- papers were tolerated, and those representing opposite political views hesitated to challenge them. Noting the general unrest created by Communist political activities (including an uprising in Kirkuk in June 1959) and disturbed by severe attacks against government policies in the pro-Communist newspapers, Prime Minister Abdul Karim Qasim blamed the press for creating confu- sion and disrupting national unity. Communist influence in the government was curbed, and in June 1959 the Press Association Law was promulgated. It provided that all qualified journalists must become members of the government-sponsored Press Asso- ciation (also called Journalists' Association). The Law reaffirmed freedom of the press but stipulated that enemies of the country would be denied press licenses, that fabricated news would be 224 banned and that only true news would be published (see ch. 14, Political Dynamics). INFORMATION MEDIA DURING THE 1960's In the 1960's the Ministry of Culture and Guidance was the principal government agency regulating public information media. Its main function was to draft information policies for the press, radio and television. The Ministry also enforced censorship regula- tions when applicable and screened imported foreign publications. In 1967 the Ministry's major departments were the Directorate General for Radio and Television, the Iraq News Agency, the Di. rectorate General for Planning and Projects and the Department of Summer Resorts and Tourism. In 1968 the Ministry was given the additional responsibility of supervising the Press and Printing Organization, a government publishing agency established under Law No. 155 of 1967. The Press The major legislation regulating the press during the early 1960's was Press Law No. 53 promulgated in April 1964. Ac- cording to its provisions, publications criticizing government poli- cies or containing obscenities could be censored. Newspapers pub- lishing “whatever constitutes a danger to the Republic and the internal and external security of the State" could have their li- censes revoked. Altogether, 21 paragraphs of the Law were de- voted to the definition of items subject to censorship. The Minister of Culture and Guidance could warn offending editors and impose fines and jail sentences without recourse to the judiciary. In case of a serious offense he may revoke the newspaper's publishing license. Editors, however, could appeal any revocation decision to the Council of Ministers. Additional measures to control the press and other information media were contained in the National Security Law of 1965, which defined the conditions under which a state of emergency could be declared in any district or in the entire country. The Law provided that in such circumstances the Prime Minister was authorized to censor newspapers, magazines, books, films and sound tapes be- fore publication or release or to confiscate them if their contents might disturb public security or spread "fear and the spirit of dissension among the citizens. ..." The degree of enforcement of the press laws depended on the extent of political activity and governmental continuity. Criticism involving minor aspects of policy associated with a particular gov- ernment official was generally tolerated as long as such criticism 225 did not directly affect the government itself. If official guidelines were needed in addition to those contained in the press laws, these guidelines were usually provided through informal channels from the Ministry of Culture and Guidance, notably through telephone conversations between newspaper editors and Ministry personnel. Experienced journalists, however, generally knew the limits within which editiorial opinions could be expressed. Law No. 155 of 1967, promulgated on December 3, 1967, pro- vided for the abolition of existing privately owned political news- papers and periodicals and called for establishment of the Press and Printing Organization under the supervision of the Ministry of Culture and Guidance. According to the Law the purpose of the Organization is to publish and print political newspapers, periodi- cals and other publications for domestic as well as foreign distri- bution. Moreover, the Law stipulated that governmental ap- proval, in the future, would be required for the publication of private newspapers. Official comments accompanying the publica- tion of the Law stressed the need of the Iraqi press to "be guided on sound national lines,” especially in view of “the current battle the Arab nation is waging against imperialism, Zionism and reaction. ..." The Press and Printing Organization is administered by a Board of Directors whose members are appointed by the govern- ment. They include the chief editors of newspapers published by the Organization, a representative of the Ministry of Culture and Guidance, the head of the Department of Journalism at Baghdad University and representatives from the journalists' and printers' unions. The Law also provides for the appointment to the Board of five part-time members representing "writers, thinkers and ex- perts." Decisions of the Board are subject to approval by the Minister of Culture and Guidance. During the early 1960's an average of about 16 daily newspa- pers were published, all in Baghdad. The most important was Al Jumhuriya (The Republic), generally regarded as the govern- ment's spokesman. Ath Thawra al Arabiya (The Arab Revolution) was an organ of the Arab Socialist Union. Politically independent and privately owned dailies included the English-language Baghdad News and a Kurdish-Arabic-language newspaper, At Ta 'akhi (Brotherhood), published by a group of Kurdish intellec- tuals. In addition, several weeklies were published in the capital. Weeklies were also published in Mosul, Sulaymaniyah, Samarra, Hillah, Najaf, Nasiriyah and Basra. Because newsprint was often in short supply, most newspapers were limited to eight pages. Arab political news and editorial com- ment were prominently featured, usually on the first page. Trans- 226 lations of political and economic articles from the foreign press were carried on the second page. Page three was often devoted to items of interest to women and youth. Local news, sports news and stories continued from other pages occupied the rest of the newspaper. According to estimates of Iraqi editors, approximately one-fourth to one-third of their space was used for advertise- ments, many of which were placed by the government and by government-owned firms. Editorial staffs of the dailies generally ranged from 4 to 20 persons, and mechanical employees, between 10 and 25. Reporters and editors were graduates of secondary schools. Some had 1 or 2 years of university education, but only a few held degrees. News- paper publishers and editors frequently were short of qualified personnel, and they welcomed the founding of a Department of Journalism at Baghdad University in 1964. About 15 periodicals, such as magazines and reviews, were pub- lished in Baghdad during the mid-1960's. Some represented polit- ical views, but the majority catered to special interests, including literature, arts and languages. The circulation of the periodicals was small, and, as in the case of newspapers, many were short- lived. After the promulgation of Law No. 155 of 1967, all privately owned dailies ceased publication. Subsequently, five dailies were published under the control of the Press and Printing Organiza- tion. These were Ath Thawra, Al Jumhuriya (both published before the enactment of the Law) and three new dailies, Al Masa' (Evening), Al Muwatin (The Citizen) and the English-language Baghdad Observer, which replaced the Baghdad News. Senior officials of the Ministry of Culture and Guidance were appointed as editors to all of the new dailies except Al Masa'. Early in 1968 several owners of newspapers published before December 3, 1967 applied to the Ministry of Culture and Guidance for the renewal of their publishing licenses, but their requests were disapproved. After some delay a license to renew publication was granted to the privately owned Kurdish-Arabic-language newspaper At Ta'akhi and its first issue appeared on February 17, 1968. In early March 1968 Al Masa' ceased publication. It was replaced by Ash Shab (The People), also published by the Press and Printing Organization. News Agencies The government-owned Iraqi News Agency was founded in 1959. It is headed by a board of directors which includes repre- sentatives from the Ministry of Culture and Guidance, the Min- 227 within earshot, and news heard on the radio is carried by word of mouth to remote parts of the country. Moreover, each private set serves not only its owner but his neighbor since the refusal to share one's radio with others is regarded as an act of inhospitality. Table 6. The Broadcasting Service of the Iraqi Republic in Baghdad (Idha 'At Al-Jumhuriyah Al-Iraqiyah fi Baghdad)* Locality Power (in kilowatts) Freqeuncy (in kilocycles) Salman Pak 300 100 100 100 100 50 50 and 100 100 200 100 100 20 760 3235 3940 6095 6155 7210 7240 9555 11785 15400 Abu Ghurayb 908 6030 7180 1308 Baghdad - • All the radio stations are owned and operated by the Iraqi Government. The building of a 1,200-kilowatt mediumwave transmitter in Basra and of a 240-kilowatt mediumwave transmitted in Mosul was in progress in 1967. A mediumwave transmitter also will be built in Kirkuk. Source: Adapted from World Radio-TV Handbook, 1967. In 1967 Radio Baghdad and its affiliated stations broadcasted a total of about 210 hours a week in Arabic. The weekly broad- casting time for Kurdish and Turkoman languages was 91 hours. Arabic-language newscasts based on government reports and Iraqi News Agency dispatches could be heard 10 times a day. The ma- jor portion of the programs was devoted to recorded broadcasts of mainly vocal music. Religious broadcasts were frequent espe- cially during Ramadan and other Islamic holidays. Readings of poetry and lectures on cultural and political subjects were promi- nent features of radio programs. Television Iraq inaugurated the first television station into the Arab world in 1957. In 1967 the government-controlled television facility oper- ated two 5-kilowatt transmitters in Baghdad. Additional facilities were being built in Mosul, Kirkuk and Basra. The Mosul station was inaugurated in February 1968. The station has a transmitting 229 power of 140 kilowatts and is designed to serve the provinces of Mawsil and Irbil. Estimates on the number of television sets in the country in 1966 varied between 125,000 and 240,000. The majority of the sets are in Baghdad and its vicinity. Individual ownership of sets is limited. Many sets are on view in public places, however, and the estimated television audience in 1966 was about 1 million. Domestic manufacturing of sets began on a small scale in 1962. The government channel televised a total of 8 hours a day in 1966. Live programs included public service telecasts, news, com- mentary, drama and music. Children's programs and an educa- tional series were also featured. Most programs, however, con- sisted of video-taped telecasts from various sources. Some docu- mentaries and brief newscasts were produced domestically under the auspices of the Ministry of Culture and Guidance. Documenta- ries and feature-type programs from other Middle Eastern coun- tries (notably the United Arab Republic), The Soviet Union and some Western countries are extensively used. Before the severance of diplomatic relations between the United States and Iraq in June 1967, television comedy series from the United States were fre- quently shown on the Baghdad television channel. Films According to the latest available information there were be- tween 86 and 100 cinemas in the country during the mid-1960's. Some of these were open-air installations operating only in the summer. The large majority of the indoor showings were in Bagh- dad; the others were located in Basra, Mosul and Kirkuk. Second to the coffeehouses, films were the most popular form of recrea- tion. The average weekly attendance in 1964 was estimated at more than 500,000. Depending on location and equipment, the price of admission ranged from 40 to 80 fils (approximately US 11 to 22 cents). Attendance of the rural population was limited because of the cost of tickets and the distance to film theaters. The country's only domestic film producer is the Cinema and Theater Administration Service operating under the Ministry of Culture and Guidance. The Service produces three to five full- length feature films annually, dealing mostly with historical and romantic subjects. Newsreels and documentaries are also pro- duced. The newsreel output, about five prints per week, is shown in the Baghdad film theaters and then circulated to theaters in the provincial towns. Documentary films are also shown by private organizations and schools, but these showings are limited mostly to Baghdad. 230 appeal in the country as a whole, are very persuasive among Is- lamic religious leaders. Loudspeakers appeal to the rural popula- tion. Newssheets are effective with students. Information communicated through the government-controlled media is sometimes received with reserve by certain ethnic and religious groups. The Kurds, for example, are wary of statements originating with the Arabic-speaking government. The Shiite reli- gious majority is apprehensive of the influence of the Sunnites on the official media. Government officials, aware of the effectiveness of word-of- mouth communication, often publicize government policies through speeches. Many public speeches are made on religious hol- idays and on days of national celebrations which are attended by large crowds. Speeches have special appeal when interspersed with emotional and humorous elements. Islamic religious leaders re- spond to explanation by analogy. Citations of poetry are highly effective with educated groups. Broadcasts for foreign audiences by Radio Baghdad in 1967 included news and commentary in English, German and French, from 1930 to 2200 hours Greenwich Mean Time daily on 6030 and 6095 kilocycles. Programs in Urdu, in Persian (Farsi) and in Turkish were beamed to other countries of the Middle East and to South Asia. The Urdu program was broadcast from 1730 to 1800 hours on 6030 and 9635 kilocycles; the Farsi program, from 1800 to 1845 hours on 3240 and 6030 kilocycles; and the Turkish pro- gram, from 1845 to 1930 hours on 3240 and 6030 kilocycles, all Greenwich Mean Time. Illustrated pamphlets, maps and guidebooks, intended for pro- spective visitors and for readers in foreign countries, were pub- lished by the Department of Summer Resorts and Tourism in the Ministry of Culture and Guidance. Iraq, A Guidebook, published in 1961, contains sections on history and art, transportation, public services and information on major cities and on local customs. During the early 1960's some cultural magazines were also pub- lished in foreign languages. FOREIGN GOVERNMENT INFORMATION PROGRAMS Before June 1967 the United States operated one of the major information programs in the country. The United States Informa- tion Service (USIS) in Baghdad distributed cultural and general interest periodicals, published every 2 months, including Life in America and the American Intellectual Review and a number of topical pamphlets. Educational and documentary films were shown under USIS auspices in Baghdad and in the provinces. Some of 233 these films were also shown on television. Film shows were held at the USIS English Teaching Center and the USIS Library in Baghdad for special groups, such as teachers, students, govern- ment officials, army officers and commercial leaders. The USIS Library in Baghdad served numerous readers, notably university students. The English Teaching Center offered language courses and also was the site of various cultural programs, including mu- sical presentations held under the USIS auspices. The United States information activities were discontinued after the severance of diplomatic relations in June 1967, but Voice of America (VOA) radio programs in Arabic, beamed on medium- wave from Rhodes, and other VOA shortwave broadcasts may still be heard. Information programs from the United Arab Republic stressed the theme of solidarity among Arab nations. In 1967 Cairo's Voice of the Arabs program was broadcast daily from 0300 hours to midnight Greenwich Mean Time on 620, 1178, 7050, 9460, 9495, 9550 and 11745 kilocycles. A Kurdish-language program was also broadcast at 1645 hours Greenwich Mean Time on 11655 kilocy- cles. The British Institute in Baghdad maintains a library, offers English-language courses, arranges study programs in Great Britain for Iraqi students and assists them in obtaining scholar- ships. The Arabic Service of the British Broadcasting Corporation may be heard from 0345 to 0545 hours and from 1100 to 2100 Greenwich Mean Time on 11, 13, 16, 19, 25 and 31 meter bands. The Overseas Service of the French Radiodiffusion-Télévision Française broadcasts in Arabic to the Middle East from 1130 to 1215 hours on 17740 and 21620 kilocycles. West Germany's information programs have expanded since 1966. German cultural representatives presented several major events during that year. Information from West Germany also reaches the Iraqi public through technical assistance personnel from that country. Communist information activity was intense during the 1960's. Affirmation of Soviet support of the Arab cause against Israel was a prominent theme of the Soviet information and propaganda reaching the Arab countries. The portion directed specifically at Iraq especially noted the efforts of the Kurdish minority to gain autonomy (see ch. 15, Foreign Relations). In 1967 the combined time of broadcasting in Arabic by the Soviet Union and by the East European Communist countries totaled 266 hours and 35 minutes weekly. Arabic broadcasts of Radio Peking totaled 14 hours a week. The Soviet illustrated fort- nightly Al Anba' as-Sufiyatiya (Soviet News) was published in 234 Baghdad, where documentary films on a variety of subjects were regularly shown at the Soviet Cultural Center. A documentary film from Communist China entitled “The Great Victory of Mao Tse-tung's Thought” was shown on the Baghdad television chan- nel. The clandestine communications media of the Communist Party of Iraq reinforced the Soviet support of Kurdish autonomy efforts. Appeals to the Kurdish "national revolutionary movement” were prominent in the broadcasts of the Communist clandestine radio station, Voice of the Iraqi People. On February 26, 1968, the sta- tion stopped broadcasting "until an unknown date.” In the final broadcast the commentator stated the “the Iraqi people have re- gained their strength" since the station first started broadcasting in 1963, that “the Kurdish people are flying the flag of their liberation movement ..." and that the role of the station will be taken over by the Communist Party of Iraq. The Arabic-lan- guage clandestine press organ of the Communist Party of Iraq, Tariq ash Sha'ab (Road of the People), and the Kurdish-language weekly Rezaye Kurdistan (Kurdistan's Satisfaction), issued by the Kurdish branch of the Communist Party of Iraq, were also available to the public. Cultural exchange agreements were in effect between Iraq and the Soviet Union, the Communist countries of Eastern Europe and Mongolia, North Korea and North Vietnam. The Soviet Union and the East European Communist countries also arranged exhibitions and participated in the International Trade Fair of 1967 in Baghdad. During 1967 the country was visited by 38 delegations repre- senting government officials, professional, commercial, scientific and cultural personnel from the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. Iraq responded with 47 comparable delegations to these countries. Friendship societies were maintained by Bulgaria, Czechoslo- vakia, Communist China and other Communist countries during the 1960's to promote travel, disseminate cultural information and offer language courses. These societies were abolished by government order in 1966. The order, however, did not affect the cultural centers of the Soviet Union and of Czechoslovakia, which engaged in similar activities and were active in 1967. 235 CHAPTER 17 POLITICAL VALUES AND ATTITUDES Since the Revolution of 1958, successive governments have sought to restore what they considered to be native Iraqi values, in terms of which they have also justified their official actions. In these efforts they have described the old order as one dominated by Western imperialists, which unjustly permitted discrimination against minorities, restricted political freedom and tolerated tri- balism and the concentration of wealth into the hands of a few. In addition, especially since February 1963 when the Arab Son cialist Renaissance Party came to power, government leaders have given prominent publicity to a non-Marxist ideal of Arab so- cialism, which has as its objectives the achievement of increased production, equitable distribution of wealth and social justice (see ch. 14, Political Dynamics; ch. 18, Character and Structure of the Economy). Governments since 1958 have strongly emphasized that their efforts to create a new political order are entirely consonant with Islamic teachings which enjoin rulers to be pious, just, tolerant and firm, but beneficent (see ch. 11, Religion). The spirit of Islam has also been invoked to enhance the concepts of individual dignity and morality, to popularize the notion of the brotherhood of Arabs and the nation and to raise the Iraqi people and their nation to a position of eminence in the world. SELF-IMAGE OF IRAQ The key word in the thought of Iraqis, as well as other Arabs, is ummah, meaning community or nation; since it is related to the word for mother, a notion of kinship is implied in its use. Al- though the word has a social connotation when used alone, it usually appears in the expression al ummah al Arabiyyah (the Arab nation). There are people who belong and those who do not. As defined by the Moslem Arabs in Iraq, the Christian Arabs are part of the ummah. The indigenous Jews, until the growth of the animosities caused by the establishment of Israel, were on the borderline of the ummah. The placement of the other minorities as 237 made by the dominant Arabs varies with time, place and the back- ground of the Arab making the assignment. Those non-Arabic- speaking minorities, except the Kurds, are generally rejected. The Yezidis and the Assyrians, in spite of their long residence in the country, remain essentially outsiders because of their religious and ethnic differences (see ch. 5, Ethnic Groups and Languages). The Shia Arabs, in spite of their sectarian differences from the predominant Sunni Arabs, are part of the ummah, and they place strong emphasis not only upon their Arabism but also on their membership in the ummah. The ummah includes peoples drawn together first by language, then by religion and finally by residence or birth in a particular place. In addition, ummah, as used in the Koran, carries the sense of a group figuring in the divine plan of salvation, a community identified by a singular destiny. The con- cept of the mass, in a more specific and political sense, is expressed by sha’ab. Iraqis often refer to their country as al bilad al Iraqiyyah (Iraqi towns), and, in connoting an aggregation of settled places, the term reveals the essentially local orientation of Iraqi social life. Whatever his awareness of the larger entities of which he may be a part, the average Iraqi thinks of himself, first of all, as coming from a certain town or locality, such as Baghdad, Basra, Najaf or Mosul. There is implied a hierarchy of loyalties in which the Bagh- dadi, for example, may proceed from loyalty to his home city to loyalty to the country, to a larger Arab world and, for some, to a still larger world of Islam. Another word of importance is watan, originating from a root meaning “to settle in a place” but referring in this usage to the land on which the people are settled. To the more educated, the land unit is at the same time a political unit based on common language and culture. For those who are primarily Iraqi in their loyalties, the expression is al Watan al Iraqi (the Iraqi land); for others, larger concepts may be involved to include the land upon which all Arabs are settled, al Watan al Arabi (the Arab land). As used in the Iraqi Nationality Law promulgated in May 1963, the concept of "Arab Nation” refers to "the territory between the Atlantic Ocean and the Arab Gulf [Persian Gulf] where Arabic is the language of the majority of the inhabitants.” No single Arabic word seems clearly to denote the modern Western concept of nation in itself, meaning people and land. Either watan or ummah may be used as a rough synonym of nation. They are constantly used by Iraqi Arabs, but only among the educated does watan, for example, begin to acquire a political connotation paral- leling the Western notion of nation. 238 ARAB SOCIALISM Since the overthrow of the monarchy in 1958, government leaders have consistently upheld the ideals of social justice, social progress and equitable distribution of national resources to benefit everyone. Collectively, these ideals have come to be known as Arab socialism, a term used initially in the United Arab Republic (UAR) beginning in mid-1961. When President Abdul Salam Arif became the head of government in November 1963, an extensive campaign was undertaken to popularize the concept of Arab so- cialism. Leaders have explained this concept largely in Islamic terms, maintaining that many of the egalitarian principles found in the present century, such as land reform, rejection of exploita- tion and social welfare, had already been manifest in the days of the Prophet Mohammed and of his immediate successors. In Nov- ember 1965, for example, President Arif declared that “Islam alone is the absolute justice” and that “we do not need to import principles from abroad." Prime Minister Abdul Rahman Bazzaz, in November 1965, stated that "socialism which we know and advocate is a name applied to the social aspect of Arab nationalism that aims at raising the standard of low income groups.” According to him there are no essential differences between the Iraqi version of socialism, which he also defined as prudent socialism, and that practiced in the UAR. Government leaders have emphasized that their socialism would not be Marxist-Leninist, that it would not create any new class to replace an old one and that no single group or class would preempt the country's political activities. They have also stated that, unlike communism, it actively encour- ages individual initiative and ambition, aims at cooperation be- tween private and public sectors and protects the people's freedom to believe in religious and spiritual doctrines. The government has also regarded the notion of Arab socialism as a new motivating ideology for youth. In February 1965, for example, President Arif told a gathering of teachers that they must bring up "a revolutionary generation” of youth which believes in the ideal of Arab unity and which eschews partisan bickerings and regards all foreign ideas as suspect. Apart from the school system, the principal organizational instrument for spreading so- cialist ideals has been the Arab Socialist Union—Iraqi Region, an officially sponsored political organization established in July 1964 which, in 1968, was being reorganized to improve its political po- tentialities (see ch. 14, Political Dynamics). ATTITUDES AND EXPECTATIONS Modern secular influences and developments are affecting the 239 popular attitudes and expectations toward national institutions and politics. The pattern of change has been, however, neither uniform nor consistent throughout the country. In 1968 there were few overt indications of any massive popular discontent with the government, which would erupt into major political unrest. An exception was the continued Kurdish agitation for immediate au- tonomy for their areas in the north (see ch. 14, Political Dy- namics). The principal determinant of popular attitudes toward the cen- tral authorities in the mid-1960's was the degree of governmental effectiveness to satisfy popular demands and aspirations. Both rural and urban peoples were concerned less with sympathetic appreciation of the difficulties involved and the time required to implement official policies than with the immediately apparent benefits. President Abdul Rahman Mohammad Arif's government in 1968 continued to exhort the virtues of patience and sacrifice and asked the people to be understanding and tolerant. The extension of communication facilities, including roads and radio broadcasting, is bringing increasing numbers of people to an awareness of national government as an institution which has a purpose and reality apart from the individuals who make it up. Government leaders, especially since 1958, have sought to demon- strate the beneficent existence of national government by ex- panding secular education, by enlarging economic opportunities and by narrowing social and economic disparities. As a result, the number of villagers who had been cut off from outside stimuli has been diminishing. The civil service, military conscription and various secular in- fluences have caused individuals to modify their parochial loyalties and to make them increasingly aware of the nation and the gov- ernment. Nevertheless, in many parts of the country the people continue to follow the old habits in which respect for authority was based not on the content or legitimacy of the orders issued but on the personal influence of the individuals issuing or conveying the orders. An awareness of the government has been accompanied by the rising level of expectations. More persons throughout society are demanding more schools for their children, more and better med- ical facilities close by their homes, more income and other benefits, such as improved water supplies and better housing. The expecta- tion of progress varies according to places and individuals. On the whole, rural residents are more inclined than townsmen to expect that progress is possible only by the activities of a benev- olent government. Moreover, feeling that they alone were unable to achieve the goal of self-help because of various limitations, they 240 expected the government to provide them with much-needed social services. In contrast, the townsmen, especially the educated, shared the view that given more opportunities they could effectively participate in the political process and influence the course of government in their favor (see ch. 14, Political Dy- namics). NATIONAL SYMBOLS The national flag used in 1968 was adopted in April 1963 to symbolize the country's fidelity to the concept of Arab unity. It derives from an agreement in April 1963 by Iraq, the UAR and Syria to establish a new, three-nation federation (see ch. 15, For- eign Relations). The flag has three equal horizontal stripes, red at the top, white in the center and black at the bottom, with three green stars on the white stripe, indicating the tripartite character of the proposed federation. This unity scheme failed to mate- rialize, but the ideal of Arab union continues to be upheld in Iraq. The national emblem is symbolized by an Arab eagle, identical to that used in the UAR's emblem and seal. Officially adopted in June 1965, the Arab eagle is taken from the standard said to have been borne by Saladin, Moslem hero of the Crusades. It stands on a base on which is written, in Kufi (highly decorative Arabic script), “Republic of Iraq.” A shield is engraved on its breast, with the red, white and black stripes running vertically and the green stars placed vertically on the center white stripe. The Islamic character of the nation is emphasized through a number of official holidays celebrated in the country. Of the 10 national days designated by law in March 1963, for example, all but 4 were religious, including the weekly day of rest which falls on Friday (see ch. 11, Religion). The four secular holidays in- cluded Army Day, January 6, established under the monarchy to commemorate the founding of the army in 1921 and to stress the key role of the military establishment in society; Revolution Day, February 8, to celebrate the Baathist takeover on that day in 1963; Worker's Day, May 1; and Republic Day, July 14, to mark the birth of the Republic of Iraq. After President Abdul Salam Arif ousted the Baathist regime on November 18, 1963, the new government added it own Revolution Day, November 18. 241 SECTION III. ECONOMIC CHAPTER 18 CHARACTER AND STRUCTURE OF THE ECONOMY In mid-1968 the economy, despite some problems, had con- siderable potential for development. Oil was the principal source of wealth, and large revenues accrued from the operations of for- eign concessionary companies in the national territory. These revenues not only provided the government with the major share of the funds for current expenditures but also made possible the undertaking of broad plans for long-term economic development. Besides oil, the country also had substantial unused, or only par- tially exploited, resources in arable land with adequate water for irrigation. Nevertheless, the oil revenues, together with the second major source of funds in the forms of indirect taxation, did not provide sufficient capital for the government's needs. Consequently, throughout the decade 1958–68, it had been necessary to resort to deficit financing (see ch. 24, Public Finance). Agriculture and the production and export of crude oil were the dominant economic activities. Agriculture provided employment for roughly 75 percent of the working population. Its contribution to gross national product varied considerably from year to year, mainly because of differences in crop yields reflecting weather conditions. In 1963, for example, a year of inadequate rainfall, it accounted for only 15 percent of gross national product, whereas in 1966 its contribution was estimated at 25 percent. The oil sec- tor employed a comparatively small number of persons, but it ac- counted for an estimated 25 to 30 percent of gross national product, for more than 60 percent of the government's revenue and for about 80 percent of its foreign exchange receipts. Since the overthrow of the monarchy in 1958, there has been a general trend toward state regulation of, and participation in, economic activities. Whereas the economy before 1958 was mainly in private hands, by the mid-1960's nearly all sectors were subject either to government ownership or to extensive government con- trol. This changing situation was brought about by successive gov- 243 powerful and wealthy urban segments of the population. This high-income group manifested little concern in making funda- mental changes which could lead to greater productivity or a higher standard of living for the rural majority. Western interests became involved on a large scale with the profitable utilization of oil resources beginning with the late years of the British Mandate (1920–32). Apart from oil, however, the industrial sector played a minor role in the economy of the country. Iraqi businessmen lacked both the financial means and the technological resources to develop manufactured goods for the for- eign market, and they found the domestic market highly re- stricted. Woolen textiles and cigarettes were the only products manufactured in large-scale plants. Government sponsorship of industrial development, except in the oil sector, began after World War II with the establishment of an Industrial Bank in 1946 and a Development Board in 1950. These two agencies were instrumental in fostering the beginning of a modest expansion of industry, including the manufacture of cement, cotton textiles, distillery and tannery products and vegetable oils. Private capital was also invested in the construction and building materials industries. On the whole, however, progress was limited, and few new areas of employment outside agriculture were opened to the country's rapidly growing labor force. Attempts to accelerate economic development under the Qasim government, from July 1958 to February 1963, had limited results, mainly because of political instability. The Kurdish uprising, after 1961, disorganized development efforts, and in general economic activity was at a low ebb. The public sector suffered from the effects of disputes, differing advice and weaknesses in the decision- making process. The private sector was hampered not only by political uncertainties, but by the limitations on foreign owner- ship, the size of the domestic market for industrial goods and a shortage of credit facilities. Official figures showed that the annual growth rate of the economy as a whole was a moderate 6.4 percent during the decade ending in 1963. During the same period, there were marked dif- ferences in the growth rates of particular sectors of the economy, reflecting the expansion of the industrial sector and fluctuations in agricultural production. Growth rates by sectors were: agricul- ture, zero; mining and quarrying, including crude oil extraction, 8.4 percent; manufacturing, including oil refining, 11.5 percent; construction, 2.4 percent; water and electricity, 16.7 percent; transport, communication and storage, 6.0 percent; public admin- istration and defense, 10.5 percent; and other services, 6.9 percent. 245 THE ECONOMY SINCE 1963 Figures on gross national product and rates of economic growth since 1963 are tenuous, and firm conclusions cannot be drawn from them. Moreover, the effect of fluctuations in agricultural produc- tion, so heavily reflective of climatic conditions, made for signif- icant variations in estimated growth rates from year to year. Major changes in the economy since the establishment of the Republic in July 1958, and especially since the end of the Baathist regime in November 1963, reflected the increasing emphasis of successive governments on the role of the public sector in economic development. In mid-1968 supervision of the country's economic activity was an integral part of the government's policy. Agrarian Reform An Agrarian Reform Law, involving the expropriation of be- tween 7 and 8 million dunams (1 dunam equals 0.618 acre) of land held in large estates and its redistribution to landless peasants, has been in effect since September 1958. Until the mid-1960's the proc- ess of confiscation had proceeded slowly but, according to the official figures released by the Arif government, 7 million dunams had been expropriated by the end of 1964. Redistribution was being handled less effectively; by the same year little more than 2 million dunams had been parceled out to new owners. A portion of the remainder was being leased by the government to tenants (see ch. 19, Agriculture). In mid-1968 problems arising out of the implementation of the land reform program were creating difficulty in the agricultural sector. Management, credit and marketing services, most of which had formerly been supplied by the landlords, were scarce or nonex- istent. The Agrarian Reform Law had called for the formation of cooperatives to take over these functions, but the establishment of such groups had lagged, and of those which had been organized, few were operating effectively. Stagnation in agriculture produc- tion also reflected the fact that adverse weather conditions had often reduced crop yields. The sharp decline in wheat, barley, dates and cotton crops in 1963, for example, could be largely as- cribed to inadequate rainfall. Government concern over this situation was evident with re- spect to both current planning and long-term development proj- ects. The Five-Year Plan 1965–69 included a wide variety of plans for irrigation and drainage works, crop storage facilities, model farms and the expansions of credit. In addition, the govern- ment organized various study groups and made important struc- tural changes in the agencies and ministries responsible for agri- 246 By mid-1964, the government had taken over the largest indus- trial and commercial firms as well as all banks and insurance companies and placed them under the supervision of a newly es- tablished state-controlled economic organization. Various diffi- culties led to subsequent reorganization and, in late 1967, control of activities in the nationalized sector was vested mainly in the High Council for Public Organizations and its four subsidiary groups. There were: the Public Organization for Industry, at- tached to the Ministry of Industry; the Public Organization of Banks, attached to the Ministry of Finance; and the Public Organizations for Commerce and for Insurance, both of which were attached to the Ministry of Economy. A fifth public organiza- tion, concerned with agriculture and livestock, had been formed during the year, but information regarding its relation to the High Council was unclear (see ch. 20, Industry). In other sectors of the economy, the prominence of the govern- ment's role varied. Domestic trade was still left largely to private enterprise, but the government retained broad powers to control imports and exports and had a monopoly over the distribution of certain commodities. Furthermore, private trade was hampered by restricted bank credit. Public authorities were responsible for the maintenance of a network of highways and secondary roads and for the operation of ports, national railroads and airways. DEVELOPMENT PLANNING Long-term economic planning received some attention in the decade before the Revolution of 1958. A Development Board was established in 1950, and a Ministry of Development was organized in 1953. Two 6-year plans drawn up during the period emphasized flood control and irrigation, transport and industry, mining and power. In general, however, progress was slow; efforts were un- coordinated; and spending did not keep pace with goals. Economic development planning under the Qasim government suffered from the political instability of the period and from the Kurdish rebellion. As a result, the economy stagnated, and planned projects rarely progressed beyond initial stages. The Detailed Eco- nomic Plan 1961–62 to 1965–66 called for total expenditures amounting to 566 million dinars (1 dinar equals US$2.80), using revenues derived from oil and from domestic and foreign loans. The plan, however, was not fulfilled and, in time, was merged with a new Five-Year Economic Plan 1965–69, introduced by the gov- ernment of Abdul Rahman Arif. The total allocation under this plan was set at 668 million dinars. This was to be distributed over the various sectors as follows: agriculture, receiving 26 percent of 248 the total; industry and electricity, 28 percent; transport and com- munications, 16 percent; building and housing, 21 percent; de- fense, 5.2 percent; and miscellaneous, 3.8 percent. The miscella- neous included allocations of slightly less than 4 percent for repay- ment of foreign loans and less than 1 percent for economic plan- ning and followup. The principal source of funds was to be oil revenues, 50 percent of which were allocated for long-tern, devel- opment projects. Published figures, however, indicated a wide disparity between the rate of actual expenditures under both plans as compared with original targets. Limiting factors contributing to this discrepancy included the country's dependence on foreign experts for techno- logical advice and knowledge; a shortage of administrators with managerial capabilities; and a lack of detailed planning projec- tions and coordination of effort in relation to long-term goals (see ch. 24, Public Finance). 249 and stability to the rural areas under the shelter of Agrarian Reform, and the elapse of a sufficient period of good administration and direction of government sys- tems concerned with agricultural questions. It was not clear in 1968 how soon the government's heightened awareness of the problems of agriculture would lead to significant action. Of Iraq's approximate 172,000 square miles, between 15 and 18 percent was agricultural land in the late 1960's. Under the prac- tices applied up to 1968 roughly half of this lies fallow in any year. Irrigation schemes completed and projected in the middle and late 1960's may increase arable land a little, and drainage projects should decrease the amount of land that becomes unproductive because of salinity, but the proportion of Iraq's total land area devoted to agriculture is not likely to exceed 20 to 22 percent. Most of the country's vast desert areas are and will continue to be suitable only for seasonal grazing (see ch. 2, Physical Environ- ment). Cultivation occurs in two areas—the northern and northeastern rain-fed zone and the irrigated zone of the Tigris-Euphrates plain in central and southern Iraq (see ch. 2, Physical Environment). Roughly half the country's arable land lies in each zone. Irrigation projects completed, under construction and proposed on the upper Tigris and its tributaries have made and will make possible the cultivation of two crops a year. Unlike Egypt, Iraq is not over- populated in relation to its land resources. The extension of arable land by irrigation and drainage projects—completed, under construction and proposed—and more effective use of existing arable land should be adequate to the country's needs in the twen- tieth century. Wheat and barley are the principal staple crops, and the largest quantity of agricultural land is devoted to them. In good years barley may be an important export crop; in bad years wheat must be imported. Rice is cultivated, but demand usually exceeds the domestic supply. Iraq produces some of the world's best dates, and they are the steadiest export crop, but quantity and quality vary. Other tree crops and vegetables are also cultivated. Oilseeds, partic- ularly sesame, are produced as are beets and, in the late 1960's, some cane for sugar. Tobacco and, to a lesser extent, cotton are the chief nonfood crops. Livestock, herded as part of a mixed farming operation or by nomadic and seminomadic peoples, contributes to the livelihood of many Iraqis and provides from a fifth to a third of the value of agricultural exports. Sheep make up nearly two-thirds of the live- stock, but goats and cattle are also important. Poultry received 252 little attention until the mid-1960's although domestic fowl, par- ticularly chickens, are common. In 1968 a project was underway to improve the quantity and quality of both meat and eggs. Although a small number of people in the lower Tigris and Euphrates valley fish for a living, and others do so occasionally, in the mid-1960's, there has been little attention paid either to in- creasing the production of fish or to improving their distribution. Only in the northern and northeastern provinces are there nat- ural forests or areas with potential for forestry. Forestry has been given some attention since the 1958 Revolution, but political instability and armed conflict in the Kurdish highlands have impeded extensive activity (see ch. 3, Historical Setting; ch. 27, Public Order and Safety). CONTROL OF LAND RESOURCES The rights in land held by the state, groups and individuals have developed through 12 centuries. Some of the concepts of land tenure introduced in the seventh century by Moslem conquerors are still in use, but they have been modified by the Ottomans, the monarchy and the Republic. The first modern effort to consolidate the law and practice of centuries was undertaken in 1858 by the Ottoman rulers of the area. At that time, however, only a small proportion of the land was regularly under cultivation, even in the northern and central zones. In the south, tribal groups cultivated sporadically and relied heavily on herding, and Ottoman law had no effect. Under the monarchy significant changes in the law and a begin- ning of settlement and registration of title were made with the intent of rationalizing the system of land tenure. Much of the land under cultivation in the mid-1960's came to be so during the mon- archy, but the practical effect of the laws enacted in that period was to put much of it under the control of a very few persons. In the mid-1950's the great majority of those engaged in farming were either sharecroppers or agricultural laborers, and the divi- sion of the harvest between the landowners and managers on the one hand, and those who worked the land on the other, was consid- ered inequitable even by many officials in the prerevolutionary government. The Agrarian Reform Law of 1958 marked the beginning of efforts under the Republic to make significant changes in the dis- tribution of land and to alter the status and income of those who continued to work land held by others. The process of reform has been slow and halting. Iraqis in and out of government have ac- knowledged that errors have been made, but the principle of land 253 reform is generally accepted. In 1968 the problem was seen as one of securing efficient and equitable administration. Tenure and Distribution Before the 1958 Revolution The Ottoman Land Code of 1858 recognized five categories of land: miri, mulk, waqf, matruka and mawat. Miri was the most important category of agricultural land. The absolute ownership (raquba) of miri land resided in the state, but individuals held a heritable usufructuary right (tasarruf), usually in the form of a lease. Both the absolute ownership and the right of usufruct in mulk land were held by the individual. There has never been very much mulk land, and most of it was located in towns. Mawat land consisted of desert or unreclaimed land. It was owned by the state, but an individual who cultivated it over a period of years acquired a usufructuary right in it, and the plot became miri land. Matruka (literally, "leftover") land was that reserved for a public purpose and included roads, rivers, marketplaces and the like. All of the categories recognized by the Land Code had a basis in Islamic law and usage, but waqf land was a peculiarly Islamic category. It was land permanently given as an endowment for a religious or charitable purpose. Under the Ottoman empire and until it was rescinded during the monarchy, a special provision permitted an individual to make a religious endowment but to postpone handing it over until the family and its heirs had died. Men with large holdings used this form of waqf to safeguard their property against the demands of the state and the fragmentation that normally takes place under the Islamic law of inheritance. The Land Code of 1858 was not applied in southern Iraq where most of the land was held in tribal tenure until the 1920's or later. Elsewhere the systematic surveying and registration necessary for the effective application of the Code were carried out only in a limited fashion until the period between World War I and World War II. Under tribal tenure each tribe held a large tract of land, the tribal dirah, consisting of cultivated and uncultivated land. Tech- nically, the members of the tribe were tenants-at-will on state- owned land. Small portions of tribal land were held by specific persons and regularly tilled, but ordinary tribesmen rarely culti- vated a plot for long periods and held no rights in specific pieces of land. A member of the tribe was entitled to cultivate a plot when he chose to till the land instead of, or in addition to, herding sheep. Usually contiguous land was cultivated by members of the same clan, and its head (sirkal) supervised operations requiring com- munal effort, such as clearing of the land, canal digging and 254 maintenance. The sirkal also collected the portion of the crop due the office of the sheik. The incumbent, in turn, had certain political and social functions and obligations (see ch. 6, Social Structure). This tribal system began to break down in the early decades of the twentieth century as developments in irrigation encouraged more permanent settlement, and markets for Iraqi grain ex- panded. The tribal sheiks began to consider grain chiefly as ex- portable commodities rather than primarily as obligations paid by their followers to support the performance of their political and social duties. The major impact on the tribal system occurred after 1932. Before that time, neither those who had invested or wished to invest in capital improvements nor the ordinary cultivator had much legal security. In the south, particularly, the sheiks who had installed water pumps wanted to obtain secure title to the land served by the pumps. The fellahin (peasants) on the other hand, wanted to retain the rights developed by long usage. In 1929 a British adviser, called in by the Iraqi Government, recommended solutions for the settlement of title to land that would have taken carefully into account the customary rights of sheiks and fellahin, but his recommendations could not be imple- mented in the political climate of the time and in the absence of an efficient and impartial civil service. In 1932 the Land Settlement Law, largely ignoring the adviser's recommendation, empowered the government to settle title to land and specified registration procedures. Beginning in 1933 British officials supervised a proc- ess-of-title settlement that resulted, particularly in the south, in the alienation of most tribal land to the sheiks. Here and there, where some smallholders already existed, members of a tribe re- ceived shares in the land and registered title to it. It seems that the stronger the effective authority of the government in any locality, the smaller the proportion of the tribal land allotted to the sheik. In the 1930's settlement of title applied largely to pump-irri- gated lands. In the 1940's land irrigated by flow was offered for sale by the government, and much of it was acquired by large landholders, usually sheiks. In the north, where the land was largely rain fed, and the Ottoman Land Code had been applied to some extent, fairly large areas of land had been acquired by vil- lage headmen in their own names. In other cases, land near the towns, particularly Mosul, had come into the hands of merchants, and the men who had worked the land under customary tenure became agricultural laborers or sharecroppers. The Land Settlement Law of 1932 also formally redefined the categories of land. Mulk, matruka and waqf lands retained their status, but these constituted a very small proportion of agricul- 255 tural lands. Miri land was formally divided into three categories -tapu, lazma and miri sirf. Tapu land corresponded to land reg- istered according to the Ottoman Land Code. Lazma was an old customary form given legal status. Lazma tenure could be granted an individual who could prove usufruct of the land for 15 years. Although both these types were formally included in the miri category, they were, for practical purposes, equivalent to mulk land: they could be inherited, sold or mortgaged. After 1932 most agricultural land was held in tapu and lazma tenures. There were, initially, two minor distinctions between them: the transfer of lazma land had to be approved by the Tapu Department of the Ministry of Justice, and the holders of lazma land had to pay, until 1939, a higher tax than holders of tapu land. The approval of transfer of lazma land was meant to prevent the alienation of land to persons who were not members of the tribe that had settled and cultivated it. In effect, however, few ordinary tribesmen acquired lazma land, most of which was acquired by the owners of irrigation pumps who were, with few exceptions, either sheiks or members of their families. The third category of miri land was miri sirf-government land, which included both uncultivated land and agricultural land to which title had not been settled. Much of the latter was in fact under the control of sheiks who paid a small tax on it and who gained from it the full landlord's share of the harvest. The shares of landowner and sharecropper varied from one region to another and with the type of cultivation and water supply. On flow-irrigated land in the south, the owner received three-fifths of the harvest if he did not provide seed and two- thirds if he did. On pump-irrigated land he received five-sevenths. On date-palm land, the landlord's share was even higher, but there much of the labor was provided by agricultural workers who were not attached to the land and who were often sharecroppers else- where. The landholder's share was also sometimes higher on dou- ble-cropped land, but there higher production meant a higher income for the cultivator. On the other hand, where output was low and the landlord's share high, as in the rice-producing prov- ince of Amarah, the sharecopper's income was quite small. This, together with increasing soil salinity, led to substantial migration from the province in the 1950's; whole families left for the towns, particularly Baghdad (see ch. 4, Population). In the northern provinces the share customarily taken by the landlord ranged from as little as one-sixteenth to one-eighth or one-fourth on rain-fed land to as much as one-half on pump-irri- gated land. The difference in shares between north and south was, in good part, caused by differences in the labor supply: the north 256 is more sparsely populated than the south. In southern Iraq, despite migration to the cities, many who remained on the land were underemployed. A law of 1933 provided that a sharecropper could not leave the land if he was indebted to the landholder. Because of the high proportion of the crop taken by the landlord and his agents and the fact that a sharecropper could rarely borrow from anyone but the landlord, this law effectively bound most of them to the land. Those who left could do so only by taking their entire families and going to the cities. In the early 1950's the government, responding to criticism of the situation, undertook to increase the shares of those working the land and to distribute miri sirf land to landless fellahin, to men retiring from the army, police and civil service, and to graduates of agricultural and religious schools. Neither of these efforts was effective. A law of 1952 that set the landlord's maximum share at 50 percent of the harvest proved to be inapplicable in the north where it was often less than that and unenforced in the south where it was much more. A provision of the law forbidding the landlord to request special contributions from his sharecroppers had some effect in the north, but little in the south. The law of 1951 governing the distribution of miri sirf lands had the effect of putting more land in the hands of a few large owners, although some small holdings were established. According to the agricultural census of 1958–59—after more than 20 years of title settlement and land distribution under the law of 1932 and subsequent legislation more than two-thirds of the cultivated land was concentrated in 2 percent of all holdings, a little more than one-fourth of the land in about 12 percent of the holdings and well under a tenth of the land in roughly 86 percent of all holdings. The largest holdings consisted of cultivated land of at least 1,000 dunams (1 dunam equals 0.618 acres; meshara is frequently used by Iraqis instead of the Turkish derivative dunam). The smallest holding consisted of land less than 100 dunams. The very largest holdings, 0.3 percent of the total, com- prised 18.5 percent of the cultivated land in parcels of 20,000 dunams or more. The number of holdings recorded in the agricultural census of 1958–59 does not precisely reflect the number of holders, some of whom held more than one parcel of land. Nevertheless, the number of holdings—168,346_indicates something of the kinds and num- bers of holders. The landowners were of three kinds: the few owners of very large estates, often tribal sheiks but, in the north especially, some merchants; a somewhat larger group of holders of middle-sized parcels; and a much larger group of smallholders. 257 the details and administration of the Law, all agreed that its general goals were desirable and practicable and that a substantial redistribution of rights in land was one of the major ways of achieving them. The Law set a maximum of 1,000 dunams of irrigated land and twice that for unirrigated holdings. Land beyond these limits was to be confiscated within 5 years. Confiscated and miri sirf land was to be distributed to landless or land-poor cultivators in holdings ranging from 30 to 60 dunams of irrigated land and 60 to 120 dunams of unirrigated land. Compensation was to be paid to those from whom land and capital investments, such as pumps, were taken. Those who received land were expected to pay for it over an extended period. The Law also specified the shares to be retained by those who continued to work the land of others and allocated specific propor- tions of the harvest to other factors of production. A landholder who supplied pumps and managerial and other services (for ex- ample, crop protection) could receive as much as 40 percent of the harvest in contrast to the more than 70 percent before the Agrarian Reform Law. Sharecroppers received 40 percent of the harvest for their seed and labor in pump-irrigated land and 50 percent in flow-irrigated and rain-fed land. These proportions were raised to 43 percent and 53 percent in 1963. It is probable that where larger shares had gone to the sharecropper in some northern areas, this continued to be the case, but specific informa- tion is not available. The Higher Committee for Agrarian Reform was autrorized to make changes in the proportions allocated to landholders, sharecroppers, agricultural laborers and other factors of production. The Agrarian Reform Law also specified that cooperatives for new owners were to be formed and were to market crops, supply seed and equipment, and organize the maintenance of local irriga- tion and drainage canals. Loans from the Agricultural Bank were to be made through the cooperatives (see ch. 25, Banking and Currency). The administration of agrarian reform was allocated to two ministries. In general, the tasks of confiscating land, managing it pending distribution and allotting it to landless fellahin were given to the Ministry for Agrarian Reform. The tasks connected with organizing and improving the processes of production and marketing were allotted to the Ministry of Agriculture. Ultimate authority for the stages and processes of land reallocation lay with the Higher Committee for Agrarian Reform, headed in 1958 by Prime Minister Qasim. Even after the overthrow of Qasim in 259 1963, the two ministries continued to share control over agricul- tural matters, and the difficulties of coordinating their activities contributed to the problems of agricultural production until they were combined in a single Ministry of Agriculture and Agrarian Reform in early 1968. Official and unofficial sources agree that, until the middle 1960's, the process of confiscation was slow and the process of redistribu- tion even slower. The 1958 Law specified that the processes of land reform were to be completed within 5 years. By 1963 the law was amended to extend the period to 10 years. Estimates of the quantity of land subject to expropriation vary, but the lowest estimate was between 7 and 8 million dunams. An additional 5 million dunams of miri sirf land was also to be dis- tributed to land-poor of landless fellahin. According to official figures, 7 million dunams had been expropriated by the end of 1964, more than 5 years after the Law had been published, but only a little more than 2 million dunams had been distributed. By mid-1966 the quantity of distributed land had not yet reached 3 million dunams. Unofficial and fragmentary accounts for 1967 and early 1968 indicated that the process of redistribution had not then accelerated. Much of the expropriated land and a good deal of the miri sirf land that was to be distributed to smallholders was still in govern- ment hands but leased to fellahin. In 1965, the last year for which detailed figures were available, 4.5 million dunams of state land and 2.8 million dunams of expropriated land were cultivated by leaseholders. Because of the slow process of distribution, it is likely that roughly similar amounts were cultivated on lease in early 1968. The formation of effective cooperatives also went very slowly. These were to perform many of the functions previously carried out by owners and managers, such as furnishing seed, fertilizer and agricultural machinery and arranging irrigation, in addition to handling government credit. In the middle 1960's between 300 and 400 cooperatives had been formally organized and registered, but it is not clear how many of them actually functioned. The problems of agrarian reform in the first 7 or 8 years may be attributed to the slowness of distribution of land and to the failure of the government to provide adequate organizational, technical and financial support to those who had become smallholders or leaseholders on miri sirf or expropriated land. In the early years, the slowness of distribution had its sources in political instability and in conflict among various political groups over ends and means. Perhaps equally important were the cumbersomeness of 260 the processes of expropriation and distribution and the lack of enough people qualified to distribute the large quantities of land confiscated and to provide the managerial and technical services required. The cooperatives which could have furnished some of these services and could also have acted as channels for financial assistance were not formed or, when formed, did not function. LAND, CROPS AND GROWING SEASONS According to the agricultural census of 1958–59 less than 20 percent of the country's area was included in farmholdings. Of the roughly 32 million dunams so included, more than 93 percent, nearly 30 million dunams, consisted of acreage in annual (field) crops, perennial crops and fallow land. Woodlots, perennial forage, building plots and the like constituted the rest. More than 53 per- cent (roughly 15 million dunams) of the land subject to cultivation was planted in field crops; more than 44 percent lay fallow; and between 2 and 3 percent was devoted to orchards, date palm groves and vineyards. In the late 1950's and early 1960's about 48 percent of the arable land was irrigated, chiefly in central and southern Iraq, and 52 percent was rain fed. Some land in the northern rain-fed area was irrigated as well, and the construction of barrages and dams on the tributaries of the Tigris has increased the irrigated acreage in that region. On the other hand, some cultivated land in the center and south is not irrigated. In 1968, as in 1958, it continued to be standard practice to leave roughly half the cropland fallow. In the north the practice helped to restore soil fertility and to store moisture. In the south, because the process of irrigation raises the water table, a residue of salt is left in the soil, and the custom of leaving the land idle every other year slows the process of salinization. Land may also be left fallow simply because there is not enough water to irrigate it. The increasing number of irrigation facilities in the north and the use of fertilizers or crop rotation may, in time, permit regular use of more of the cultivable land there. In the south the con- struction of drainage facilities, in most instances barely begun, may eventually lessen the need to keep the land idle. Fallowing, however, is likely to continue for some time. Most cropland is planted and harvested only once a year, but some of it, usually planted in vegetables, is double cropped. Be- cause many Iraqi farmers have some livestock, land lying fallow or recently harvested provides pasturage for sheep, goats, cattle and, occasionally, camels. 261 Crop Types Iraqis recognize two classes of annual crops: winter (shitwi) and summer (saifi). Winter crops are planted, the seed usually sown by hand, in the fall and harvested in the spring. These rely heavily on winter rains, supplemented in the south by light irriga- tion. Adequate rains in March are particularly important for a good winter crop, but excessive rainfall has occasionally resulted in wheat rust and fungus. Summer crops are sown in the spring and depend almost entirely on irrigation. One of the major problems for both winter and summer crops requiring irrigation is that the period of maximum flow of the Tigris and Euphrates occurs in the spring, often too late for the winter crops and too early for the summer ones. For the areas depending on flow rather than pump irrigation, probably more than half, there is sometimes a shortage of water when it would be more useful. The increasing use of pumps and the storage of water at flood periods for later use have improved the situation, but the volume of water in the major rivers varies so greatly during the year and from year to year that adequate supply remains a problem. The major winter crops are wheat and barley. Flax raised for linseed is also fairly important, and lentils, broadbeans, chick-peas and vetch are grown. Usually a little more than half the cultivated land in any winter growing season is planted in wheat, a little less than half in barley and about 1 percent in other crops. Between 40 and 45 percent of the country's wheat-producing acreage lies in Mawsil Province, which produces 40 percent or more of the total wheat crop. Kirkuk and Irbil Provinces in the north, the central provinces of Baghdad and Diyala and Diwa- niyah in the south also grow a good deal of wheat, and a little is cultivated in almost every province. Much of the wheat acreage in Mawsil and the other northern provinces has been opened up since 1950 in the plains where there is relatively little rainfall, often less than 12 inches annually. On the one hand, the terrain permits extensive mechanization of agriculture, more characteristic of this region than of most others; on the other hand, rain is sparse and uncertain, and much of the fluctuation in wheat production may be attributed to the location of a substantial proportion of the coun- try's wheat acreage in this zone of marginal rainfall. Barley has been widely cultivated in Iraq for a longer time than wheat, and it is grown in both rain-fed and irrigated zones. Al- though there is considerable fluctuation in the barley crop from year to year, it tends to do better than wheat, in the south because it is more tolerant of saline soils, in the north because barley requires less water. 262 Although winter legumes are allotted much less acreage than that devoted to cereals, they form an important part of the diet of much of the population. The most important legume is the broad- bean, grown largely in the irrigated areas. Some of it is picked in the winter and early spring as a vegetable, but most of it is har- vested later as a dry bean. Lentils and chick-peas are grown chiefly in the northern areas, and chickling vetch, less important, in the north and in the central irrigated zone. The major summer crop is rice, grown chiefly in the southern provinces of Diwaniyah, Amarah and Nasiriyah and in the central province of Hillah. Rice is much in demand, but its cost limits consumption to a small portion of the population. Less important summer grains are millet, sorghum (giant mil- let) and corn. Millet is cultivated in the north and in the central irrigated zone, sorghum in the irrigated areas of central and southern Iraq and corn in the same areas. The chief summer legumes are green gram, grown chiefly in the central irrigated zone, and cowpeas, grown more sparsely, in most areas. Sesame is also cultivated in many parts of the country. A summer crop of increasing importance is sugar beets. Uniti 1959–60, all of the sugar consumed was imported. In that year a small quantity of sugar beets was grown near Mosul to supply the sugar factory in that city. The supply of sugar beets has expanded steadily. In 1965 the cultivation of surgarcane was undertaken near Amarah, and sugar-processing facilities were begun nearby. By 1966, 325 dunams had been planted in cane, and a larger area was prepared for expansion. It may be some time, however, before the country produces enough sugar beets and cane to supply its domestic needs. A wide variety of vegetables is grown, and they are often double cropped. Most of them are raised in truck gardens around towns, although there is some transfer from one region to urban centers in another. The most extensively planted vegetables are melons (including watermelon), onions, tomatoes, cucumbers, eggplant and okra, all grown in the summer. Less important summer vegetables are potatoes and squash. Carrots, beets, artichokes, cab- bages, cress, cauliflower, lettuce and radishes are winter vegeta- bles. Iraq is the world's leading producer of dates, and they are the country's most important fruit. Production fluctuates widely from year to year, but annual consumption remains stable at about 50,000 tons. In an average year, roughly one-third of the crop is locally consumed, and about two-thirds are exported. The bulk of the dates grown for export-Hallawi, Khadrawi and Sayir varie- 263 ties—are cultivated in Basrah Province along the canals of the Shatt al Arab. Nasiriyah and Amarah Provinces sometimes pro- vide a small portion of the export crop. The Zahdi date is also exported but is less desirable, and a large number of domestically consumed varieties are grown in Diwaniyah and several central provinces, such as Hillah, Karbala, Baghdad and Diyala. The Iraqi climate of long, hot summers provides an excellent environment for dates. Moreover, date palms can flourish in saline soil, and they can survive floods or produce with limited irrigation. Much of the irrigation in the Basrah date-growing area is accom- plished by tidal movement of the Shatt Al Arab. A substantial amount of labor is required for date production. The female palm must be pollinated by hand in April; some picking of half-ripened fruit is done in August; and fully ripened fruit is harvested in September and later. A variety of other fruits and some nuts, chiefly walnuts and almonds, is produced. Vineyards are concentrated in the Kurdish area, principally in Sulaymaniyah and Irbil Provinces, but some grapes are grown near Baghdad under irrigation. Other fruits and nuts are grown in many places, but the major areas are the Diyala Valley and the mountain slopes in the north. Pomegranates, oranges and apples are the other chief fruits, but lemons, peaches, pears, plums and other fruits are also grown. The two nonfood crops of any importance are cotton and to- bacco. Most tobacco is produced in Sulaymaniyah Province, where it is the chief cash crop; some is cultivated in Irbil, and much smaller amounts in Mawsil and Kirkuk Provinces. A strong, dark tobacco, called tumbak, used in water pipes, is produced in Kar- bala and Hillah Provinces on the middle Euphrates. Cotton is grown in the irrigated zone of central Iraq and in the northern provinces of Mawsil and Sulaymaniyah. The area de- voted to its production has ranged from under 100,000 to 225,000 dunams, and the output has fluctuated in the same way. There are indications that more of it is being grown in the relatively stable conditions of the middle and late 1960's and in response to the opening of textile plants in the country. Crop Production In the years since World War II, the chief factors affecting crop production have been the opening up of new land and developing mechanization, particularly in some of the new areas; the inef- ficient implementation of the Agrarian Reform Law; and political instability. Beyond these factors, features of the physical environ- ment, some of which are partially controllable, sporadically cause wide fluctuations in production. The most important is the availa- 264 14.6 million animals, excluding fowl, in the country; by 1960 esti- mates put the number at more than 17 million. In 1965 the number was reduced to 15.5 million, but that figure excluded a large number of animals, particularly goats, sheep and mules which were not counted in the northern (Kurdish) districts. A little less than two-thirds of the livestock are sheep. There are three breeds, all of the fat-tailed variety. Although sheep are raised in substantial numbers in almost every province, Mawsil in the north, Diwaniyah, Amarah and Nasiriyah Provinces in the south are the major centers. Sheep provide milk as well as meat, fat and wool. All of these products but wool are consumed largely within the country; wool is regularly exported. Roughly 15 to 20 percent of all livestock consists of goats. They may be found everywhere but are raised mainly in the mountain not. In addition to the ordinary black, short-haired goats, an Angora variety with fine, long hair is bred in the mountains. Goats have been kept chiefly for milk and meat, but there has been an increasing demand for their skins. Cattle constitute about 10 percent of all Iraqi livestock. Major centers are Diwaniyah, Nasiriyah and Amarah Provinces, al- though there are a good number in Sulaymaniyah in the northeast. Some thousands are kept in a mixed farming operation. Iraqi cattle, of several varieties, are not very good milk producers, but they are tough and resist local diseases. European types have been introduced for breeding purposes to increase the milk supply, but they probably could not survive as pure breeds in this area. Al- though Iraqi cattle are not significant sources of milk, their hides are valuable, and they are occasionally used as draft animals. Some water buffalo are kept in all provinces, but they are raised chiefly in the marshlands of the southern provinces. The Madan, a segment of the people called Marsh Arabs or Marsh Dwellers, rely on buffalo herding exclusively for their livelihood, and other marsh dwellers keep some buffalo (see ch. 5, Ethnic Groups and Languages). Water buffalo provide milk, fuel and hides and are used as draft animals. Although some camels are found in the settled areas, most are kept in the desert zone. Only a few nomadic or seminomadic tribes rely exclusively on the camel to supply their needs, although camel meat and milk are consumed. Most camel herders also raise sheep or goats and use the camel largely as a transport animal. As a result of the increasing use of motor transportation, the number of camels has declined. 266 The Arabian horse may have originated in Mesopotamia. Al- though the original strain has been mixed with other breeds, pedi- greed Arabian racehorses have been bred in Iraq for export and local use. Racing was prohibited after the 1958 Revolution, and the confiscation of large estates seems to have diminished the number of horses in the country. Some larger animals are still used for draft. There are probably half a million or more donkeys. One breed, small, wiry and dark, is used as a pack animal; another, larger and white or gray, is used for riding. Mules are bred chiefly in the northern mountains where they are used for plowing, travel and as pack animals. Poultry is found on almost all farms, but ordinary farmers give it little attention. A government experimental station at Abu Ghu- raib, about 20 miles west of Baghdad, was reported as having some success in the middle and late 1960's in its efforts to improve egg production. FISHING Although many Iraqis occasionally fish their local streams, only a few, most of them marsh dwellers, rely heavily on fish as a source of food or as an item of trade. A rather large quantity of river fish and some of the sea varieties, chiefly shad, are sold in Baghdad. Naisiriyah Province, where many full-time fishermen live, is the next most important market for fish. FORESTS AND FORESTRY There are roughly 2,500 square miles of highland forest of vary- ing density, most of it in the northern provinces of Mawsil, Irbil and Sulaymaniyah. There are, in addition, about 100 square miles of riverain forests scattered throughout the plain. Much of the highland timber is oak, but there is some walnut and poplar. The highland forests were exploited for firewood and charcoal until 1955 when the government forbade tree-cutting. The government encourages tree-planting, and there are a number of tree-planting projects in some of the central and southern provinces as well as in the northern ones. 267 CHAPTER 20 INDUSTRY Modern industrial activity is confined very largely to the pro- duction of crude oil by foreign companies under a long-term con- cession (see ch. 23, Foreign Economic Relations). Apart from pe troleum, available mineral resources are only minimally exploited. Domestic industry, predominantly small-scale and heavily de- pendent upon imported raw materials, is limited to refining of domestic oil, food processing and the production of a simple con- sumer goods and building materials. Intensified government spon- sorship of industrial development outside the oil sector since 1950 was just beginning to show significant results in mid-1968, with the completion or near-completion of several large publicly owned plants for the production of sulphur, machinery and textiles. Industrial development has consistently fallen short of govern- ment plans. A major reason for this lag has been not a dearth of investment funds, but an inadequate managerial capability to translate ambitious goals into physical reality. Of equal impor- tance have been chronic political instability in the country and limitations placed upon private initiative by a government policy which included nationalization of the largest private firms. Other contributing factors include a lack of qualified technical personnel and skilled labor, the small size of the domestic market and uncer- tainty of export prospects for output above domestic needs. In 1967 domestic industrial production was able to cover about 80 percent of the demand for beverages, tobacco, shoes, furniture and petroleum products. At the same time, domestic output could cover only about 40 percent of the demand for textiles, lumber, paper and plastics. Cement was the only industrial product to have attained an output volume sufficient to allow significant exports. INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT POLICY Government Promotion of Industry Industrial development through public and private means has been considered imperative for the country's progress by succes- 269 sive governments since 1929, when the Law for the Encourage- ment of Industries was enacted. Expanded in 1950 and again in 1961 and 1964 this law, since known as the Industrial Promotion Law, grants exemption from customs duties on imported indus trial equipment, raw materials and supplies, as well as remission of income and stamp taxes for a period of several years. In 1946 the Industrial Bank was created to provide capital and technical assistance to new industries, and in 1950 a newly estab- lished Development Board began to promote petroleum refining, cement production and the manufacture of cotton textiles. Succes- sors of this board were subsequently charged with the formulation of 5-year economic development plans, including plans for the ex- pansion of industry. Protection of domestic industries was pro- vided through the customs tariff and through outright prohibition of the importation of competing products. The stimulus provided by these laws, however, was weakened by restrictions placed upon private firms seeking to avail themselves of their liberal provisions. These restrictions related to minimum size of business, foreign capital participation and the employment of foreign personnel. To be eligible for the benefits of the Indus- trial Promotion Law under regulations effective in 1967 and ap- parently still in force in mid-1968, a business must have invest- ment in machinery and equipment, excluding the powerplant, of not less than 3,000 dinars (1 dinar equals US$2.80—see Glossary), have at least 60 percent of the share capital in possession of Iraqi or Arab nationals and employ only Iraqi or Arab labor, except for technicians not available locally. Effectiveness of the incentive measures was further reduced by ambiguity about the applica- bility of the tariff law's provisions to private enterprise, insuf- ficient capitalization of the Industrial Bank and its failure to pro- vide adequate technical assistance, as well as administrative confu- sion and delays. A limitation imposed in 1964 on the repatriation of profits by foreign investors in industrial companies discouraged the entry of foreign capital. Nationalization of Industry The revolutionary Qasim government which came to power in 1958 continued the permissive economic policies instituted by the monarchy (see ch. 3, Historical Setting). The overthrow of this government in 1963, however, was followed by increased emphasis on socialism, which culminated the following year in nationaliza- tion of the 27 largest private industrial firms. At the same time, all remaining private firms capitalized at 70,000 dinars or more were required by law to reorganize within 1 year into joint stock com- panies, with a limit of 10,000 dinars on individual ownership of 270 shares at par value. Failure to comply resulted in liquidation of the business. In the atmosphere of uncertainty created by nationalization, shareholders who had to divest themselves of a portion of their stocks had difficulty in finding new investors. To avoid wide- spread business closures the time span allowed for conversion was extended for an additional year. The central economic control organization created by the nation- alization decree, including its industrial branch, soon alienated private business by its hostile attitude and excessive interference, and also antagonized various ministries and government agencies through encroachment upon their prerogatives. An attenuation of the nationalization policy, accompanied by a reorganization of the economic administration, was therefore announced by a new gov- ernment in November 1965. The new policy, which declared socialism to be a means for greater production and just distribution rather than an end in itself, sought to encourage the revival of private enterprise by authorizing the establishment of companies with a capital of up to 250,000 dinars and to attract foreign capital through provision of investment guarantees. It also promised to develop the mixed in- dustry sector, promoted by the industrial Bank, in which public and private resources would be joined to undertake various indus- trial projects, particularly of a type not included in the 5-year plan. Some of the mixed enterprises envisaged by the bank in 1965 were intended to manufacture bicycles, automobile batteries, pressed fiber board, aluminum sheets and plates and electric fans. Still another government, installed in August 1966, called for fruitful cooperation between the public and the private sectors. Yet it also relegated private capital to small-or medium-sized in- dustrial undertakings in the food products and consumer goods field, reserving for public enterprise exclusively such important branches of production as petroleum refining, cement, asbestos, jute, sugar, fats and oils, spinning and weaving and cigarettes. It promised improved financing for medium-sized businesses in the mixed sector through the Industrial Bank and gave renewed assur- ance of guarantees for foreign capital. Nevertheless, as of mid- 1968, no important mixed-sector enterprise had been identified, and little foreign capital was invested in industry. Private enter- prise remained confined to the smaller establishments. INVESTMENT AND CONSTRUCTION PROGRAM Five-Year Plans The industrial development program for the 9 fiscal years of 271 April 1, 1961 to March 30, 1970, as outlined in the overlapping Detailed Economic Plan 1961-62 to 1965–66 and the Five-Year Economic Plan 1965–69, envisaged over 55 industrial and electric power projects with a total estimated cost of some 337 million dinars. Building construction plans for the same period, including public facilities and housing, called for a program of slightly under 382 million dinars. Selection of specific projects under the earlier plan took into account existing private industrial plants and their potential ex- pansion. The formally stated aim was to complement private in- dustry rather than to compete with it. Consideration was given to private capital participation in the planned projects through mi- nority share ownership and loans. The Five-Year Plan postulated close cooperation between the public and the private sectors based on a clear definition of their respective areas of competence, but it limited private investment in industry, including electric power and water, to only 5 million out of a total of 215 million dinars. By contrast, the private sector was expected to contribute 141 million dinars to building construc- tion, or over 53 percent of the total planned allocation. Foreign exchange requirements for industrial and power proj- ects were estimated at the equivalent of 147 million dinars, or 72 percent of total cost. Exchange needs for building construction were much more modest—the equivalent of 69 million dinars, or only 25 percent of cost. Investment and Construction Over the years execution of the industrial investment and con- struction program proceeded at a much slower pace than contem- plated by the development plans. Availability of funds, though below original expectations, was not a limiting factor. It was, rather, the total dependence of the program upon foreign per- sonnel and material resources that posed difficult problems of choice among competing project proposals to government officials inadequately equipped to make quick decisions. The periodic need for adjustment of plans to realistic possibilities, with its attendant weighing and selection of alternatives, inevitably caused further delays, as did also the requirement for approval of every contract detail by the Development Board. During the 5 fiscal years 1961–65, public investment in industry amounted to 56.4 million dinars, or somewhat less than 37 percent of the planned expenditure. This amount was equivalent to one third of the sum spent on education and less than one-fifth of the outlays for defense. For the same period the government's overall 272 development budget showed a surplus of receipts over expendi- tures amounting to over 46 million dinars. Roughly 35 million dinars of the public industrial investment of 56.4 million came from the proceeds of a Soviet technical coopera- tion loan, with the balance of some 21 million provided out of government funds. The government contribution to industrial de velopment thus amounted to just about 2 percent of the total budg- etary receipts for the period. New private investment in industry since 1963 has been min- imal and confined to small-scale enterprise. Some disinvestment actually took place through reimbursement of foreign and domestic owners of nationalized firms. A substantial flight of pri- vate capital, on the order of 75 million dinars, took place in the years 1962–66, an amount roughly 40 percent greater than public investment in industry. Almost without exception, plant construction has fallen substan- tially behind schedule, and a number of plants contemplated in 1961 have not emerged from the planning state. On the eve of the Middle East conflict in 1967, four plants were nearing completion. Only one of these four projects, the rayon factory at Hindiyah, about 50 miles south of Baghdad, was fairly close to schedule. Of the remaining three projects, the sulfur extraction plant at Kirkuk was to have been completed in 1967; the knitting and hosiery mill at Kut, in 1964; and the Baghdad electrical equipment factory, in 1963. Several other plants, in various stages of construction at the time, had been scheduled for completion before 1967. Yet in that year the building of a pulp and paper mill at Basra, which was to have begun operation in 1966, was just beginning, and contracts were awarded but not yet signed for the Basra fertilizer plant, which was to have been completed in 1965. Prospects for an early completion of the industrial construction program are dim. Reduced government revenues and increased defense expenditures since mid-1967 resulted in an indefinite post- ponement of projects on which construction had not yet started. In the light of their past experience and in the face of the worsened international atmosphere, neither domestic nor foreign investors have thus far stepped into the breach. CURRENT STATUS OF INDUSTRY Organization Overall policies and programs in the industrial field are deter- mined by the State Industrial Organization which is directly re- sponsible to the Minister of Industry. The organization also super- 273 vises the public sector industrial enterprises, particularly with regard to investment. Managements of the individual corporations subject to the direction of the State Industrial Organization enjoy broad decisionmaking powers, including, in most cases, the setting of prices for their products. In some instances, for example in the cement industry, sales prices are established by the government. Industrial Establishments and Employment In the first quarter of 1966, the latest date for which acceptable information is available, "large-scale” industry consisted of 1,446 establishments employing 10 or more workers each, with a total employment of slightly over 73,000 and a wage outlay for the quarter of more than 5 million dinars. During the same quarter the public sector comprised 276 of these establishments with 44,332 workers and a wage bill on the order of 3.7 million dinars. Total sales proceeds for the public sector were reported as 21.6 million dinars. The private sector was represented by 1,170 firms with 28,784 employees and a wage bill of about 1.5 million dinars. The average public enterprise was about six times larger than the average private enterprise in terms of the number of workers employed, about 161 against 25; average annual wages of workers in public industry were about 60 percent higher than wages in the private sector. In addition to these “large” firms, there was a much greater number of small industrial shops employing fewer than 10 workers each. In 1964 these small family enterprises numbered about 20,800 units. They provided employment to some 45,600 per- sons, including over 24,100 owners and members of their families as well as some 21,500 paid, hired workers. Industry was heavily concentrated in the areas of Baghdad, Basra and Mosul. Over half of the "large” establishments with up to 70 percent of the workers were located in Baghdad, and some 20 percent more were clustered in Basra and Mosul. Concentration of small business was somewhat less pronounced, almost one-third were located in Baghdad and nearly one-fifth in Mosul and Basra. The retaining “large” and small business firms were scattered in small numbers throughout the other 11 provinces. Effects of Nationalization Comparison of the 1966 data on “large” establishments with similar data for 1964 throws some light on the restructuring of industry following nationalization in mid-1964. The full impact of this government measure was greater than is indicated by the following figures, because the base data for 1964 already reflect some of the effects of nationalization. 274 Contribution to National Product The contribution of industry to the gross national product had been variously reported as 11 or 12 percent in the years 1964 to 1967, exclusive of petroleum extraction, which contributed 40 per- cent during the same period. A widely cited study of national product and income for the years 1953–63 by a governor of the Central Bank of Iraq placed this contribution in 1963 at 0.3 per- cent for mining and quarrying other than petroleum extraction, 11.4 percent for manufacturing, including oil refining, 3.6 percent for construction and 1.0 percent for electric power and water. 277 The most important factor regulating the individual's choice of work is the influence of his family and tribe, generally the source of significant economic security. Moreover, the individual's under- standing of his own best interest has been developed in the con- text of a traditional and closely knit family life. Occupations are passed from father to son through apprenticeship and observation, and certain trades have become related to certain lineages. In rural areas the head of a village, the landlord or the sheik may determine the relation of the individual to new kinds of em- ployment, particularly in the nomadic or tribal communities in which group interests take precedence over those of the individual. Since family, tribal or ethnic ties rather than occupation deter- mine a person's social situation, many of those who severed these ties because of migration to the cities found themselves without the support of the family or tribe left behind (see ch. 6, Social Structure; ch. 12, Social Values). In the Interim Constitution of 1964 employment is recognized as “the right of all Iraqis as well as ... the duty and honor of all able-bodied citizens." The need to expand the scope of nonagricul- tural employment and to unemployment is recognized in the Five-Year Economic Plan 1965–69 (see ch. 20, Industry). The Labor Law of 1958 regulates working conditions and pro- vides a general guide to industrial relations but covers only certain categories of workers and is enforced only in a few large enter- prises. A Social Security Law, promulgated in 1965, offers sickness accident and pension benefits. Like the Labor Law, however, it fails to cover large segments of the working population. The program of Prime Minister Lieutenant General Tahir Yahya, announced in July 1967, pledged extension of the scope of social services to include all workers and the expansion of social security benefits. The government has also attempted to stabilize wage levels and to keep them commensurate with the cost of living. Between 1957 and 1968, however, it was not always able to bridge the discrepancy between wages and the prices of essential commodities. The oil companies paid higher wages than other in- dustrial enterprises. Oil workers also received such benefits as low-cost housing, medical care and free transportation. Employer-employee relations and the organization of labor are for the most part still based on concepts sanctioned by centuries of practice. Kinship ties and the personal obligations between em- ployer and worker are of major significance in the family and in craft shops which constitute the great majority of the manufac- turing establishments. In other nonagricultural occupations the position of the worker often depends on the sponsorship or pa- 280 indicated in reference to areas of employment that these percent- ages were broken down as follows: men working in cities, 22.7 percent; and in rural areas, 41.8 percent; women working in cities, 6.1 percent; and in rural areas, 29.4 percent. In 1968 similar ratios probably prevailed between the two sexes and between the respective age groups. Certain tasks, such as the carrying of water, the collection of fuel, the care of poultry and household duties, are exclusively women's work. In the villages the seclusion of women gives way before the need to share the work with men. In the provincial towns traditional factors still operate among all groups, except the intellectuals and the very poor, with the result that fewer women are found working. In the three largest cities an increasing number of women have sought and found employment during the early 1960's as clerks, storekeepers and factory workers. Nevertheless, according to an estimate by labor experts made in 1962, not more than about 50,000 women worked full or part-time, mostly in agriculture, light industry, including tobacco-processing and textile factories, retail shops and in the service industries. A survey of some 1,197 large industrial establishments in 1964 showed that of a total of 72,846 workers employed, only 7,232 were women. The employment of children is more common. They begin work at an early age, often as apprentices in small enterprises or work- shops. They are regarded as economic assets in agriculture, and in certain industries in which higher production results largely from an increase in the number of workers. Although employment under 12 years of age is prohibited by law, and attendance of primary schools is compulsory, the labor force is in fact swelled by a large number of children. Mobility One of the most striking aspects of the labor force is its mo- bility. The continuing process of tribal movement has brought in- stability to the rural farming population, and most of those en- gaged in agriculture have not as yet developed a strong attach- ment to the land. Entire villages often shift location in response to irrigation needs or salination of the soil. Many workers migrate while searching for seasonal jobs, notably date picking in the southern part of the country and tobacco leaf gathering in the north. More significant, however, is the growing number of persons migrating from the rural areas to the large cities in search of work, especially since 1958. Baghdad and Basra are the main tar- gets of the migrants, most of whom come from provinces along the 282 demand that the members of his tribe be employed on the stretch of road in his territory, and each time this occurs the contractors are forced to hire and train a new force. Oil companies operating in the country have found that not only must they draw on immedi- ately surrounding villages and tribes for labor but they eventually must also hire workers from particular communities for particular jobs. Thus, nearly all truckdrivers come from one village, diggers from another, greasers from still another. Ethnic and Religious Characteristics Some occupations have long been associated with particular ethnic and religious groups. Although the gap between Sunnites and Shiites is gradually closing, the urban Sunnite is generally better educated than his Shiite counterpart. The Sunni have tradi- tionally held the higher-level managerial positions and have, there- fore, developed a higher degree of administrative ability. Many Shiites, have replaced numerous Jews, who, once dominant in commerce, left after 1948. Members of the Yezidi religious sect, living in the mountain villages of northern Iraq, engage only in agriculture. Members of Christian communities, because of their generally higher educa- tional level acquired in missionary schools, are usually clerks and other white collar workers, government officials, professional men, technicians, mechanics and leaders in the service industries. A few are wealthy merchants. From the Chaldean Christian communities of the Baghdad and Basra areas are drawn the raftsmen, firemen and deckmen on river boats (see ch. 11, Religion). The Kurds have shown more aptitude for acquiring mechanical skills than other Iraqis. Many of them are drivers and mechanics in the oil industry. Often they are policemen or soldiers. In the south many work as porters renowned for their great strength. The Mandeans (also called Sabeans) prefer occupations located near fresh water, such as boatbuilding. They are also known for their skill as silversmiths and makers of jewelry (see ch. 5, Ethnic Groups and Languages). Among some of the numerically small ethnic groups living in the marsh areas of the south, and unrelated to the predominant Madan, are people practicing certain occupations and marrying only within the same occupational group. A family of weavers lives in nearly all of the larger villages in this area. Most have migrated from the Kurdish highlands in the north and east. They are known for their skill and their characteristic looms, and in- termarry only with weavers from other villages. The Hassavi, living on the banks of the Tigris in the environs of 284 Baghdad, are vegetable farmers. Because of their occupation they are discriminated against by Arabs and Madan alike and virtually never marry outside their group. Another distinct occupational group in the Tigris-Euphrates marsh area is that of the Berbera fishermen. Their name connotes a way of living and method of fishing rather than ethnic origins of which little is known. Like the weavers and the vegetable farmers, the Berbera marry only within their group. Their fishing expedi- tions sometimes last for several months and follow a specific plan of operations. The fishermen work in groups of four to eight, under the close direction of a leader, and are remunerated ac- cording to skill and ability. In addition to fishing, the Berbera engage in netmaking and boatbuilding (see ch. 5, Ethnic Groups and Languages). Skills and Training The scarcity of skilled workers on all levels is critical. Iraqi workers are amenable to training and capable of acquiring manual skills, but the basic concepts of efficiency and productivity are generally alien to them. Many, for example, have difficulty under- standing the necessity of machine maintenance and repair. Break- down of equipment is usually regarded as a manifestation of divine will, and workers are hesitant to remedy it. The lack of skills, widespread debilitating diseases and illiteracy among workers adversely affect the level of productivity in all economic sectors. Most Iraqis are reluctant to take vocational instruction or to enroll in vocational schools since such training leads to manual labor, which carries no prestige and is unattractive to most. Grad- uates of vocational schools and even of short-term training courses prefer and expect white-collar supervisory or managerial appoint- ments. The prestige attached to such positions is as much an incen- tive to the trainee as the hope for higher income, and usually the two coincide. Urban artisans are a potential source of skilled labor. Generally familiar with some technical procedures, and often able to read and write, they are more capable of acquiring new skills. Moreover, among this group, the learning of technical skills is viewed as an avenue to nonmanual occupations. In 1964 a survey of industrial establishments employing 10 workers or more showed that about 55 percent of the workers were skilled or semiskilled. In the oil industry the percentage of skilled and semiskilled workers was slightly higher, or 68 percent. Only some 47 percent of the workers possessed skills in water and electrical work. In the government-owned construction firms 28.9 285 percent of the workers were skilled or semiskilled; in the private construction sector the proportion was 17.7 percent. Only a minute portion of female workers was skilled or semi- skilled. According to a survey of skills among different categories of workers in large industrial establishments and oil companies in 1964, male skilled and semiskilled workers, numbered 39,219 as compared to 2,620 skilled and semiskilled females. Among admin- istrative workers the camparable figures were 6,963 and 310, and, among technicians, 1,190 and 18. Because there is no skilled labor surplus on which to draw, industries and development projects hire unskilled workers and train them. The oil companies, some of the government ministries and the armed forces maintain their own training programs, but their contribution to the skilled labor reserve, though important, remains small. The Iraqi Petroleum Company maintains an Industrial Training Center at Kirkuk. Trainees must be graduates of primary schools and are trained in skills applicable specifically in oil company oper- ations. The courses, given in full-time or evening classes, include a 5-year apprentice course, skill improvement training for skilled and semiskilled workers, a 2-year artisan trainee course and a 9-month commercial training course for office clerks. Courses in English, commerce and technical subjects are available to qualified personnel. In addition, company workers receive on-the-job in- struction. Between 1960 and 1966 a total of 6,097 workers and employees were trained under the auspices of the Iraqi, Mosul and Basra petroleum companies; of this total, 455 persons were trained abroad. Supervisory training is given to senior technical and clerical employees. Some of the senior employees are sent overseas for training in industrial techniques, including instrumentation, com- puter programming and advanced engineering practices related to oil operations. Frequently, on-the-job training offered by compa- nies and government agencies increases the personnel turnover. After graduating from the training course, many workers leave to enter business on their own or transfer to employers offering higher wages. Because of the shortage of trained workers the government and private employers have relied extensively on foreign skilled techni- cians, experts and advisers. Since 1958, however, an intensive policy of limiting personnel to Iraqis in government and industry has sharply reduced the number of foreign workers and em- ployees. In 1966 only 11 percent of the personnel employed by the Iraqi Petroleum Company and its affiliates (the Basra Petroleum 286 Company and the Mosul Petroleum Company) were foreigners, as compared to 46 percent in 1960. A breakdown of the figures re- flecting the percentage of foreign workers for 1966 showed that 423 of a total of 483 specialists and administrators at the Iraqi Petroleum Company were Iraqis. Ninety-one percent of a total of 3,333 employees of the Basra Petroleum Company were Iraqi. None of the Mosul Petroleum Company's 896 workers and em- ployees were foreigners. To increase the supply of skilled workers the government has made major provisions for vocational training within The Five- Year Economic Plan 1965–1969; it has authorized the spending of more than 2.5 million dinars (1 dinar equals US$2.80—see Glos- sary) for the establishment of vocational training institutions. Of the projected sum, 900,000 dinars were to be spent during 1968–69 (see ch. 9, Education). EMPLOYMENT PATTERNS Agricultural Occupations Rural occupations, engaging more than 3 million persons in 1968, show a range from pure desert nomadism to fully settled agriculture. To some extent this range corresponds to an occupa- tional hierarchy in which the camel-herding nomads regard them- selves superior to cultivators and artisans; the wheat and barley raising farmers in turn look down on the vegetable growers living on the outskirts of the cities. Completely nomadic life has tended to decline since the late 1950's as irrigation pushed into the lands of nomadic herdsmen and as the market for the products of animal husbandry narrowed. An exception can be made, however, for the Kurdish herding tribes, and to a lesser extent, the Arab herding tribes, as their occupation is unlikely to feel competition from agriculture and as their products find a ready market. Peasant farmers form by far the largest occupational group. Most of the peasants do not own the land they till. They either work the land of their sheik or, as a detribalized and floating labor force in areas surrounding the cities and large towns, may hire themselves to landowners through contractors, settle on the land and remain as tenants. Some distinction, revealed in the percentage of the crop which the farmer receives, is made between sharecroppers, who are per- haps more literate or have family ties with the landlord, and the lowly agricultural wage laborers. This group-ignorant, impover- ished and without incentive—forms the majority of the people who work on the land. Small proprietors are few and are limited largely to Kurdish areas and to the new land settlements where 287 the settler himself, forced by law to live on his land yet eager to elevate his position by avoiding manual labor, can afford to hire laborers, often poorer relatives. There are few trained, wage. earning agricultural workers, a situation which prevents the mechanization of agriculture. In the village, underemployment is common largely because of the seasonal nature of agricultural work; the fellah works very hard during the labor shortages of the harvesting and planting seasons but remains idle during the rest of the year. There are few alternative sources of employment. Few villages have well-devel- oped handicraft industries which might employ the cultivator in the off-season. Although materials may be locally available, there is little or no home manufacture even of household necessities. The marsh dwellers provide an exception, since in addition to fishing and the raising of buffalo they also weave reed mats, which they sell to merchants in nearby towns. As the land becomes unproductive and the fellah becomes dis- contented, he has little choice but to move to the city where oppor- tunities are greater. In the southern provinces the fellah's migra- tion has caused some shortages in agricultural labor. In a few areas there was an attempt to modernize agricultural techniques through mechanization in order to offset the loss of labor. The introduction of even the simplest mechanical implements, how- ever, such as the scythe and cradle, is unlikely to occur in areas where the landowner is as ignorant as the fellah or where, unsure of the future, he is unwilling to invest in his land (see ch. 19, Agriculture). Nonagricultural Occupations The cities and large towns are the centers of commerce, of gov- ernment administration and of the manufacturing and service in- dustries. The new occupational opportunities that have developed since World War II as a result of industrial expansion and of economic development in general have been confined mainly to urban centers. Because of the rapid population growth in the three major cities-Baghdad, Mosul and Basra—there has been a growing demand for labor in these centers, particularly in services of all kinds. Many of the casual workers in the cities and towns are drawn from the fellahin and from displaced traditional craftsmen and artisans. Completely unskilled migrants from the countryside can initially command only unproductive part-time jobs, such as port- ering or rough manual work, which they alternate with begging and hawking. Their illiteracy and lack of skills bar them from all 288 but the lowest social and economic positions. Because of the pros- pect of even a slight chance of self-improvement in the cities as compared with the hopelessness of rural life and since the low wages they can earn seem to them a fortune, these migrants from the countryside refuse to return to their villages. Industrial Workers In 1964 approximately 148,300 wage earners were employed in industry, construction, oil production and public utilities. The manufacturing industry employed 80,072 workers; 47,198 persons worked in construction; 11,076 in oil installations; and 9,993 in water and electricity works. The state railroad system employed about 18,000 persons; over 100,000 were engaged in service occu- pations. More than 60 percent of industrial workers were em- ployed in Baghdad and its environs. The government is the prin- cipal industrial employer; since the nationalization of industrial enterprises in 1964, it hires more than half of the industrial labor force. Establishments with 10 or more workers employ most of the full-time wage earners, although the number of such enterprises is small. In 1964 there was only one industrial manufacturing estab- lishment-a garment factory built with Soviet aid-employing more than 1,000 workers. Several others, however, are envisaged under The Five-Year Economic Plan 1965–1969. These include an agricultural machinery plant employing 3,400 and an electrical engineering plant with a prospective staff of 1,800 workers. In 1961 machinery maintenance and repair plants hired some 10,000 workers; in 1963, 16,000 workers were employed in date pressing and packing plants, but mainly worked only from Sep- tember through November. Cotton, wool and silk plants engaged 7,700; footwear and tannery works, 2,420 during the same year. According to the 1964 industrial survey, 20,799 small industrial establishments employed 45,567 persons, but more than half were unpaid owners. Industrial workers occupy a relatively new and generally undefined place in society. Their homes are in the urban centers, and many of them have only recently come from the country. A new and small group, perhaps conscious of their low social status, attempts to reconstruct patterns of living similar to those of their original homes. Generally, their outlook and attitudes have not changed because of their new occupation, but this may be less true of workers in the oil industry. The difficulty of adjusting to disciplined factory life encourages the workers to move frequently, especially within areas containing 289 and to wear a business suit are highly desirable objectives. Com- pletion of secondary school training qualifies a person for most of the civil service posts, but those who have had such education generally refuse to accept posts in rural district offices where the need for administrative personnel is greatest. On the professional level, the most recent need is for medical personnel and teachers. Available data reveals an acute shortage in these and other professional fields. In 1964 there were 1,470 physicians, 247 dentists, 700 midwives and 653 pharmacists. The great majority of doctors and dentists practiced in Baghdad and its vicinity. Primary and secondary teachers during the same year numbered 36,787. In 1965, 3,239 engineers and 1,407 lawyers were registered (see ch. 9, Education; ch. 8, Living Conditions). WORKING CONDITIONS Most labor legislation is contained in the Labor Law No. 1 of July 1958 and its amendments. Many worker's benefits, however, including provisions for workmen's compensation, are regulated by Social Security Law No. 140 of October 1965, which replaced the Social Security Act of 1956. The Labor Law of 1958, which as still applicable in early 1968, regulates hours of work, holiday periods and the conditions for overtime work. It also establishes rules for hiring, dismissal and disciplinary actions. Government workers are covered by a separate civil service pension plan. The Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs, headed by Abdul al- Karim Hani in early 1968, is chiefly responsible for the adminis- tration of the Labor Law. It includes the Directorate General of Labor, the Inspectorate General and the Wage Board. The Direc- torate General of Labor controls trade union activities, supervises the National Employment Service, gathers labor statistics and ar- bitrates disputes between labor and management. The Inspec- torate General enforces the labor laws and deals with child labor matters. The Wage Board regulates wage scales and wages. Under the direct jurisdiction of the Ministry, field offices operate in the provinces, but they are seriously understaffed. Several other min- istries, including the Ministry of Health and the Ministry of Plan- ning, have corollary responsibilities. The drafting of a new, more extensive labor law has been progress since March 1963. Labor Law No. 1 covers less than 20 percent of the working population. Groups not covered by its provisions include agricul- tural workers, domestic and other servants and members of the employer's family, seasonal and occasional workers, pieceworkers working at home and employees in nonmechanized industrial es- tablishments hiring fewer than five persons. Article 21, which pro- 291 hibits the employment of children under 12 years of age, is fre- quently violated, but Article 134, restricting the employment of foreigners, has been strictly enforced. The shortage of officials trained in labor affairs makes inspec- tion of working conditions possible only in the larger urban facto- ries. In many family workshops and artisan establishments which have escaped government inspection, child labor and nightwork are common, and long hours are the rule. Health standards and sanitary conditions are especially poor, except in the modern factories. The Labor Law states, however, that the government may issue regulations for the establishment of workers' restaurants, recreational facilities and first-aid stations. Extensive employee services have been provided on a voluntary basis by oil companies. Workers of the Iraqi Petroleum Company and its affiliates re- ceive free outpatient treatment at the Company's dispensaries and free care in its hospitals. The Company frequently extends its medical services to the workers' families. The Home Ownership Scheme, started by the Company in 1957, had by 1966 built 1,817 low-cost houses for workers in Kirkuk, Baghdad and Hadithah. Its affiliates, the Basra Petroleum Company and the Mosul Petro- leum Company, built 630 and 83 workers' homes, respectively. The Company also furnishes subsidized meals for bachelor workers and employees, and free transportation is provided where public vehicles are not available. Workers in remote job sites are paid for the time spent traveling to and from the job, in addition to re- ceiving free transportation. Other services include gymnasium and sport facilities, children's playgrounds, recreational centers and film performances at nom- inal fees. A few of the domestic employers provide similar services on a smaller scale. Since the early 1960's the practice of volun- tarily granting services and benefits to workers, commensurate with the firm's financial ability, has gradually gained acceptance among industrial employers. Hiring and Dismissal Hiring is done largely by means of personal or family contacts or through labor contractors, often the heads of a village or tribe. Family or personal contacts also govern the selection of manage- rial or administrative personnel. The recruitment of unskilled workers within a locality is rarely difficult. Word quickly spreads that an industry needs workers, and applicants appear rapidly. Skilled workers are more difficult to find. They are recruited mainly through newspaper advertisement, through trade unions and through personal contacts. 292 According to law, workers must have an identity book and a discharge certificate to present to the prospective employer. The identity book contains medical data and occupational information. The discharge certificate must be furnished free of charge by the employer, showing that the worker has given statutory notice before leaving his job. The certificate also contains data on wages paid and type of work done. According to law, no worker may be hired without presenting a discharge certificate. In practice, how- ever, few workers possess either document. Physical examinations are given only by a few of the large government-owned industries and by the oil companies. Since 1958, employers have been required to obtain permission from the Directorate General of Labor for every foreigner em- ployed, offering proof that no Iraqi applicants are available pos- sessing equal skills and that the employment of the foreigner is in the national interest. Work permits issued to foreigners are valid for 2 to 3 years, and employers must pledge to train Iraqi workers to replace each foreigner on the payroll. The number of foreigners may not exceed 10 percent of the number of Iraqis employed in any one establishment. According to the Labor Law the minimum period of notice before termination is 7 days for workers and 1 month for white- collar employees. The law also provides that wages may be paid for the stipulated period instead of dismissal notice and that workers who fail to give notice before leaving a job forfeit half of the pay to which they are entitled under this provision. Workers who are given notice of dismissal are entitled to severance pay at the rate of 1 week's full wages for every year of uninterrupted employment after 2 years. After 5 years of continuous employ- ment the rate equals 2 weeks full wages for every year. Workers found guilty of criminal acts, endangering his and his fellow worker's life, tampering with safety devices, being under the in- fluence of drugs while at work, disclosing trade secrets or being absent for 15 consecutive days without valid reason, may be dis- missed without notice and forfeit their severance pay. In accordance with Law No. 55 of 1963, an amendment to the Labor Law of 1958, employers wishing to terminate the services of any worker must first obtain approval from a Workers Termina- tion and Discharge Committee to be set up in each district. De- signed specifically to protect trade union members from arbitrary dismissal, the Law stipulates that the Committee may not approve the employer's request for dismissal if the reason for such a re- quest is found to be the workers membership or activity in a trade union. 293 Hours of Work and Holidays The Labor Law provides for an 8-hour working day and a 48- hour week. During the month of Ramadan (the month of fasting) the workday is reduced by 1 hour. Overtime is limited to 2 hours in any day and 10 hours in any workweek. In practice, the hours of work vary in different enterprises. The government maintains a 35-hour week, and oil company workers have a 42-hour week. Friday is the weekly day of rest for all workers, although, ac- cording to law, the minister of labor and social affairs may assign another rest-day in certain occupations, notably in hospital, en- tertainment and food-serving establishments, and hotels. Workers and employees accrue paid annual leave at the rate of 1 day for each month of consecutive employment. Leave may be accumulated, although not more than half a year's leave may be carried over from a given year. Additional leave benefits are granted by the oil companies, including a round trip railroad fare to Baghdad for workers in the Kirkuk areas and transportation to a railroad center for those who work in remote areas. In addition to paid annual leave, workers have a number of paid holidays. Some of these are fixed according to the Western cal- endar: January 6 (Army Day), March 21 (Spring Day), March 24 (Freedom Day), May 1 (Labor Day), July 14 (Revolution Day) and December 13 (Safety and Rejoicing Day). Others follow the shifting Islamic calendar: 1 Muharram (Moslem New Year), 10 Muharram (Shia Holy Day), 12 Rabi'al Awwal (The Prophet's Birthday), 1–3 Shawwal (End of Ramadan) and 10–13 Dhu al Hijjah (Feast of Sacrifice). Christian employees are granted leave on Christmas Day, New Year's Day and Easter (see Ch. 17, Political Values and Attitudes). Wage and Benefits Minimum wages are determined for every industry and occupa- tion by the Wage Board which has been established in accordance with the Labor Law. The differential between wages for skilled and semiskilled workers is considerable. Semiskilled workers in 1963 earned between 450 fils and 1,000 fils (1,000 fils equal 1 dinar -see Glossary) a day as compared to a daily wage of about 2,800 fils for skilled workers; office workers earned an average minimum monthly salary of 30 dinars. The average employer tends to pay wages close to the pre- scribed minimum level, but many pay substandard rates. Women customarily receive less pay than men, and, according to the Labor Law, children may be paid two-thirds of the basic minimum wage. Wage scales, therefore, tend to be lowest in industries 294 In agriculture wages are often paid in kind, as a percentage of the crop; these wages are usually higher in the north and lower in the south. Generally the agricultural laborer's average earnings derived from the sale of his crop barely provide for survival (see ch. 19, Agriculture). Workers covered by the Labor Law of 1958 earn paid sick leave at the rate of 4 days for every month of uninterrupted employ- ment for non-work-connected diseases or injuries. According to the Labor Law, the employer's obligation to grant this leave is limited to 9 weeks in a 12-month period. In practice, oil companies permit their workers to use all of their leave in case of a long illness and continue to carry them on leave without pay. Six weeks of paid maternity leave are granted to women workers; women on maternity leave may not be given notice of dismissal. The Social Security Law No. 140, promulgated on October 10. 1965, covers a wide range of workers' insurance needs. It su- perseded the Social Security Act of 1956 and those portions of the Labor Law of 1958 and its amendments, which pertained to com- pensation for work-connected injuries. The new law offered three types of benefits: sickness, work-con- nected injuries and pensions. It has been implemented by the Social Security Institution, an administratively and financially au- tonomous body established on January 10, 1965. At the head of the Social Security Institution is a board representing workers and employers. The board's activities include the drafting of rules gov- erning the administration of the Social Security Law, drafting and approving budget estimates and making decisions relating to the investment of funds. The Institution is financed by contributions from the insured workers, employers and the government. Ac- cording to law, the rates of contributions must be related to wage categories, and the workers' share of the contribution must not exceed half of the employers' share. Benefits for work-connected sickness or injury are paid for a maximum of 13 weeks in any continuous period of incapacity. In exceptional cases this period may be extended to 26 weeks. The benefits, however, are not payable for periods covered by sick leave. Maternity benefits are paid for a period of 12 weeks starting 6 weeks before and ending 6 weeks after confinement. Sickness and maternity benefits are paid at the same rates, based on wage categories. Persons under 60 years of age are entitled to disability pension for the duration of disability. At the age of 60 an old-age pension becomes payable, or the rate of the disability pension is raised to the old-age pension rate. 296 Men aged 60 and women aged 55 are eligible for old-age pen- sions. As with other benefits, the fixed monthly rates correspond to wage categories. In 1964 the lowest category received a monthly pension of 3 dinars and 500 fils, and the highest, 18 dinars. Old-age grants in small amonts are paid those workers who failed to sat- isfy the contributions specified by the Law. A survivors' pension is paid if the deceased was eligible for a disability or old-age pension. Persons insured under the Law are eligible for medical care, including hospitalization and drugs, if the injury or illness is work-connected. Arrangements for medical care are made with the Ministry of Health by the Social Security Institution. Benefits for work-connected sickness or injuries are paid weekly until the inca- pacity is ended or a disablement pension is awarded. Such pen- sions are paid for more than 40 percent disability; persons suf- fering a lesser degree of disability are entitled to a gratuity. A survivor's benefit is paid if the work-connected injury or illness results in death. The daily rates for employment-injury benefits in 1964 ranged from 180 fils to 1 dinar and 230 fils. For total disable- ment, the monthly rates varied from 5 dinars and 400 fils to 36 dinars and 900 fils. LABOR RELATIONS DURING THE 1960's Employer-Employee Relations The growth of industries has begun to alter the traditional pat- tern of labor relations. The larger, modern enterprises must employ managers, technicians and clerical workers. The country has only just begun to train Iraqis for these positions which in the past were manned by foreigners. The Workers' Education Insti- tute, established by Law No. 162 in 1964, represents a major official effort in the field of industrial management training. Its aim is to educate intermediate-level managerial personnel, as well as workers and trade union leaders. Apart from practical instruc- tion, indoctrination is to be given special emphasis. Workers are to be acquainted with the principles of Arab nationalism and so- cialism, the history and background of the Arab labor movement and the role of workers in national production. Workers education centers are to operate under the jurisdiction of the Institute in every industrial town, and study camps will be organized in rural areas. Courses for general workers and employees include labor law, trade unionism, collective bargaining, principles of produc- tion and social security. Prospective intermediate-level managerial personnel are offered courses in industrial administration, business law, supervision, trade union leadership and labor relations. The courses for both 297 but the scope of labor organization during the monarchy was min- imal. Since the July 1958 revolution, however, the government has encouraged the formation of trade unions in accordance with Chapter XI of the Labor Law of 1958, which granted workers and employers the right to form organizations for the protection of their interests (see ch. 14, Political Dynamics). After the 1958 revolution trade unions proliferated and by 1961 had a combined membership of 775,000 workers. The great ma- jority of the unions were organized by craft and were joined together in one national union. Some industrywide unions operate in regions where the corresponding industrial plants are located. Despite the liberal attitude of postrevolutionary governments toward labor organizations, several provisions for the stringent official control of trade unions have been incorporated in the Labor Law of 1958 and its amendments. Applications to form unions and requests to merge must be obtained from the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs, and reversals of the Ministry's decisions must be sought from the Council of Ministers. The latter is entitled to dissolve any trade union if proof is furnished that it has violated the Labor Law of 1958 or any of its amendments or is pursuing activities not specified by the union's rules. In cases of national emergency, which may be countrywide or limited to various dis- tricts, Law No. 4 of 1965 provides for the dissolution of organiza- tions, including trade unions, which disturb public order and secu- rity (see ch. 14, Political Dynamics). According to Iraqi press reports, Communist organizers made serious efforts to gain control of the labor movement after 1958. Communist influence was strong in both major labor federations, the General Federation of Trade Unions and the General Federa- tion of Peasant Societies, as well as in the local industrial and rural unions. Concerned about the use of labor unions by some of their leaders as channels for the propagation of alien ideologies, the government took action several times against both the Gen- eral Federation of Trade Unions and the General Federation of Peasant Societies. Challenged by the government as well as by labor unionists themselves, Communist ascendancy has diminished since 1960. Unions have since continued to operate, though under relatively close government surveillance. After the February 1963 coup which overthrew the government of Prime Minister Abdul Karim Qasim, the structural organiza- tion of the General Federation of Trade Unions was modified and its name changed to Iraqi Confederation of Trade Unions, al- though its former name has also remained in use. Since 1964, the Iraqi Confederation of Trade Unions has included 19 member 299 unions, strongest of which are the oil workers, railroad workers and port workers. Mechanics and agricultural workers are also among its affiliates. An Iraqi Confederation of Trade Unions congress is called every year; in the interim, the Confederation is run by a Central Committee which convenes every 3 months. The Central Committee elects an executive committee which is in charge of the Confederation's current operations. The Confedera- tion also publishes a newspaper, Saut al-Ummal (Voice of the Workers). Since 1964, the Iraqi Confederation of Trade Unions has been a member of, and in close communication with, the Con- federation of Arab Trade Unions. In 1967 the Iraqi Confederation of Trade Unions joined the Communist-affiliated World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU). It also is a member of the Interna- tional Labor Organization (ILO). The membership of the Iraqi Confederation of Trade Unions in 1968 was small compared to that of 1961, when labor union ac- tivity was as its height and workers were kept in continual fer- ment by the exhortation of their leaders. The majority of the workers have remained unfamiliar with union activity and apa- thetic to this new form of organization. Many labor union leaders are inexperienced in questions affecting labor welfare and are without accountability to the largely passive rank and file of workers. Strikes or lockouts are legal, but before work stoppage 10 days' notice must be given to the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs and to the employer. Official measures, however, designed to im- prove workers' welfare and the introduction of profit-sharing plans have tended to reduce the number of work stoppages. Employers' Associations The Labor Law of 1958 requires the owners of establishments who employ more than 20 workers to form associations to deal in matters concerning trade unions or workers' welfare. With the approval of the minister of labor and social affairs, 10 employers or more engaged in similar fields of industry or commerce may form special associations. The main employers organizations are the Iraqi Federation of Industries and the Baghdad Chamber of Commerce. The latter is the major representative of merchants in the private sector of the economy. Information regarding the ac- tivities of these associations is lacking. The Iraqi Federation of Industries reportedly has been inclined occasionally to settle labor disputes without official interference. 300 Baghdad exerts strong influence in the national business life. Mosul, the second most important distribution point and a major wholesale center, serves Mawsil Province and the desert to the west and receives the agricultural produce of the northern part of the country. Kirkuk supplements Mosul as an agricultural distri- bution center in the north and is the commercial hub of the moun- tain provinces of Kirkuk, Sulaymaniyah and Irbil. Basra, also an important commercial center, serves Amarah, Basrah and Nasi- riyah Provinces in the south. Most large department stores of the Western-type are located in Baghdad; a few are found in Mosul, Basra and Kirkuk. These stores, some of which offer delivery service, have been built in the newer sections of the cities. Catering to the Westernized tastes and the income of a relatively prosperous minority, they carry a wide range of goods imported from the West and from Communist countries. Although Baghdad dominates wholesale trade and has more retail shops than any other city in the country, retail activity in general is less centralized than wholesale trade. Retail goods move through many channels, such as the few large department stores, smaller stores catering to the middle class in imported goods, ba- zaars, small town markets, cooperative stores, peddlers covering established routes and traveling merchants visiting villages and tribes. A significant number of retail businesses are family enterprises, specializing in a single or related group of commodities. These small dealers, operating in a highly saturated market served by hundreds of competitors, depend for their livelihood on a limited volume of sales with a high margin of profit. It is difficult for such a dealer to increase his minute portion of the market; advertising is hardly feasible because the goods rarely carry a known brand name, and the customer must see the commodity with his own eyes and examine it carefully before he will purchase it. The bazaar is a characteristic commercial institution. Situated in the older districts of the larger towns and cities, it is usually divided into sections dealing in particular goods, such as food- stuffs, clothing, metalware and leather goods. Its organization and the activities of its merchants exhibit a number of differences ac- cording to the function and perishability of the many goods offered. The center of the bazaar is usually devoted to daily neces- sities for which there is a steady demand; it is most active in the morning. The peripheral areas cater more to special wants and to the luxury trade. The old bazaar of Baghdad consists of rows of small stores, tents and stalls which are crowded together on 303 for sale in the modern commercial sector of Baghdad, for example, or the price of a meal in a restaurant was fairly well established. In every large town numerous small retail shops of all types pat- terned after those in western Europe charged fixed prices based on competitive market factors. Bargaining, however, is still a major method for establishing exchange values in rural areas and has some importance in cities as well. It involves direct negotiations between a vendor, who first proposes his highest price, and a customer, who has made an active survey of the goods available. A man or woman bargaining for foodstuffs in the marketplace usually buys daily the exact quantities needed and has as much knowledge of the market as the shopkkeeper. He or she makes a counter offer and eventually a mutually satisfactory price is agreed upon. In one village, said to be representative of many in the southern part of the country, barter was once the sole method of exchange in the local marketplace, but as trade with outlying communities developed, a currency began to be used as well as barter, according to the convenience of the shopkeeper. Local agricultural produce, buffalo and cattle dung, dairy products and reed mats comprised a significant part of the local trade in the market. With money earned from the sale of these items, villagers bought sugar, tea, tobacco, clothing, safety razors, pencils and other imported com- modities from the local shopkeepers. The local shopkeepers bought from wholesalers either in Basra, over 50 miles distant, or from a smaller town, which was closer but where prices were higher. Goods for sale in the village were transported there by boat or truck. Middlemen were active in the village, collecting locally woven reed mats for distribution in other parts of the country and, in good years, buying that portion of the cereal crop which was in excess of local needs. They worked either independently, arranging shipment to outside wholesalers themselves, or on commission from the big trading firms in Basra. A largely urban feature influencing trade practice is the con- sumer cooperative, in existence since World War II. With a limited membership of about 1,300 persons in 1965, the cooperatives had only a slight impact on domestic trade at the national level, but individuals belonging to them enjoyed a slight price advantage in buying household goods, groceries and clothing in comparison with the open market. Three other types are also in existence: housing, production and agricultural cooperatives. The housing coopera- tives, numbering 40 in 1965 with some 6,500 members, are in- tended to make better housing available to their members, offering 305 either finished dwellings or land on which to build them at lower prices than nonmembers could procure them. The single produc- tion cooperative in existence in 1965 was located in Baghdad and had fewer than 20 members. The most numerous type is the agricultural cooperative, of which there were said to have been close to 100 existing in 1965. Later estimates of their number were still higher, but what pro- portion of these were functioning effectively was unclear. In the south these cooperatives, in 1965, were mainly providing seed, some fertilizer and a small amount of credit but no significant marketing services. In the north, besides these services, some coop- eratives also engaged in marketing activities. TRANSPORTATION Historically, the caravan was the principal means for moving agricultural produce between widely separated towns. Supple- menting this traffic on shorter hauls were small boats and barges which plied the navigable portions of the river system and canals. Along the caravan and water routes, towns grew up. Their major functions were to provide fuel for rivercraft and rest stops for caravans and river boats and to serve as collection and distribu- tion centers for surrounding areas. In the outlying districts no madic tribes sometimes looted caravans and river traffic. Transport facilities are concentrated in the populated and culti- vated eastern part of the country from Mosul in the north to Basra in the south. The main axis of traffic is oriented northwest to southeast paralleling the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers. Down this line come grain and other produce from the north for domestic consumption and export. In the opposite direction move agricul- tural products of the south, locally produced manufactured goods and machinery, equipment and foodstuffs imported through ports on the Persian Gulf. Transportation facilities kept pace with the expansion of trade after World War II, and in the early 1950's the existing system was adequate to serve the needs of the country at the time. Rail- ways, run by the government, were the principal means of trans- porting goods. The port of Basra, managed by an autonomous public agency, was easily able to handle all the traffic through it. Road transport, on the other hand, was only moderately developed and had not assumed great importance because most roads were unsurfaced and impassable during heavy rains and the annual floods. Transport development plans of the 1960's focused on the problem of standardizing the gauges of railroad lines and of mod- 306 ernizing and increasing the rolling stock. Attention was also given to expansion of port and airport facilities and to the establishment of an up-to-date network of hard-surfaced and feeder roads. The main transport centers were Baghdad, Mosul and Basra, located on Shatt al Arab, 6 miles upstream from the Persian Gulf. Until 1964 goods which moved by rail from Mosul to Basra had to be reloaded in Baghdad because the same rolling stock could not be used on the broad (standard) gauge line to Mosul and the narrow (meter) gauge line to Basra. A broad gauge line to Basra was constructed in the mid-1960's with Soviet assistance. By mid- 1968, however, certain construction and operational problems had not been solved, and the line was able to carry only a small part of the total goods moving to and from the south (see ch. 2, Physical Environment). The combined shipments of all the railroad lines, which included a narrow gauge section from Baghdad north to Irbil, amounted in 1963–64 to 2.5 million tons of freight and 2.2 million passengers. By 1965 the country had 4,500 miles of major motor roads, including 1,250 miles of hard-surface roads, and many road- building projects were underway. Port facilities were being ex- panded, and shipping moved in or out of Basra increased from 1.5 million tons in 1963 to 1.8 million tons in 1965. The relative unim- portance of inland water traffic was reflected in the fact that in the same year only 177,000 tons of goods were moved on waterways within the country. 307 CHAPTER 23 FOREIGN ECONOMIC RELATIONS Foreign trade is of paramount importance to the country's economy. Exports and customs duties constitute the major source of revenue for the government's current operations and economic development projects, while imports supply the growing needs for capital and consumption goods. This trade is composed of two distinct sectors: the surplus-producing crude oil sector dominated by foreign oil companies (the Iraqi Petroleum Company [IPC] and its affiliated Mosul Petroleum Company and Basra Petroleum Company) and the chronically deficit sector, which includes all other commodities, controlled by the government. The degree of dependence upon oil exports is illustrated by the fact that in 1966 the government's income of almost 141 million dinars (1 dinar equals US$2.80—see Glossary) in oil royalties and taxes accounted for about four-fifths of the country's foreign ex- change earnings, two-thirds of total government revenue and one- fifth of the gross national product. In the same year, commodity trade other than oil had a deficit of approximately 152 million dinars. Since the Revolution of 1958, successive governments have acted to establish firmer controls over foreign trade as a means of de- riving greater revenue from it and of improving the domestic allocation of scarce resources. This policy led to protracted dis- putes with the oil companies which have been costly in terms of production. The policy also resulted in a progressive extension of state trading in commodities other than oil at the expense of the private sector. Efforts to promote non-oil exports through trade agreements and inter-Arab economic arrangements have not been markedly successful. Iraq is not a member of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) but participates in the work of the United Nations Committee on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). STRUCTURE OF FOREIGN TRADE Except for occasional trade interruptions related to interna- 309 tional disputes, changes in the domestic political situation and in international relations since 1957 have had only a minor effect on the trade pattern, although the volume and, with it, government revenue were at times significantly affected. Only in non-oil trade was there some change in direction after the overthrow of the Hashimite monarchy in 1958, when the United Kingdom ceased to be Iraq's major customer. Establishment of trade ties with the Communist countries since 1958 provided some additional supply sources for expanding imports but did not significantly alter ex- isting trade relations. Exports Total exports grew steadily between 1958 and 1966, increasing by two-thirds from approximately 200 million to slightly more than 335 million dinars. Of these totals, crude oil accounted for 92 percent, or about 186 million dinars in 1958 and 307 million in 1966, while exports of commodities other than oil amounted to only 14 million and 23 million dinars, respectively. Reexports were minor, and transit trade was insignificant. A preponderant share of total trade throughout this period was with the non-Communist world. In 1966 trade with Communist countries, including Eastern Europe, Communist China and Cuba, amounted only to little over 1 percent of exports and barely 19 percent of imports. During this 9-year period, Western Europe continued to absorb the major portion of oil exports and actually increased its share of growing shipments from 56 to 65 percent, or from 120 million to 200 million dinars. Apart from Europe, only Japan is known to have bought Iraqi oil in substantial and increasing quantities, ranging from 8 million dinars in 1958 to 22 million in 1966. Small amounts were shipped to the United States, Lebanon and Aden. About 20 percent of the total oil shipments in both years were sent to destinations not specified in official statistics. Crude Oil Because oil exports are highly important for the national economy, a rapid expansion of this trade has been one of the government's major goals. Its realization, however, has been ham- pered not only by competitive developments in world markets, but also by government policy and by political instability in the area. Relations with the oil companies have been controlled by conces- sions granted between 1925 and 1938, as modified by an agreement of 1952. Under the 1952 agreement the government receives 50 percent of the companies' oil profits. In addition, it is entitled to receive, as part of its share, 12.5 percent of the net production 310 freight on board at seaboard terminal. To increase its share of the revenues and to establish greater control over the country's major resource, the government has engaged in lengthy disputes and negotiations with the oil companies over various issues, such as calculation of production costs and profits, oil pricing, marketing fees, cargo dues and the relinquishment of undeveloped areas. The disputes were aggravated by unilateral government abroga- tion of the original concessions through enactment of a law in 1961 which left to the oil companies less than 0.5 percent of the conces- sioned area. As a result, oil production and exports stagnated in 1961 and 1962 and failed to reach their potential level in subse- quent years. In 1963 an interim agreement was reached on cargo dues. In 1964 the government organized a domestic company, the Iraq Na- tional Oil Company, for the exploration and exploitation of the oil areas removed from the IPC concession. This company, however, remained inactive because of a lack of financial, technical and managerial resources. An agreement covering the disputed issues and including an increase to 57 percent in the government's share of profits was finally initialed in 1965, but it failed to receive the government's formal ratification. Over the years resolution of the issues has been complicated by political instability and changes in regime. On November 23, 1967, the Iraq National Oil Company, which was reorganized in October 1966 and reestablished in September 1967, entered into an agency contract with the French Company for Petroleum Research and Operations (Enterprise de Re- cherches et d'Activités Pétrolières—ERAP) for the exploration and eventual exploitation of an area of 4,170 square miles in the provinces of Kut, Diwaniyah, Amarah, Nasiriyah and Basrah (all south of Baghdad) and of an additional 1,080 square miles in the Persian Gulf. Work on this contract, scheduled to begin in June 1968, was reported to have actually started in March. Negotiations with a French quasi-national concern, French Pe- troleum Company (Compaignie Française des Pétroles), for an agreement covering the rich North Rumaila field in southern Iraq near the border with Kuwait, were broken off in April 1968 when the government decided to undertake the development of this field directly through the Iraq National Oil Company. Bids by IPC, by Italy's National Hydrocarbon Organization (Ente Nationale Idro- carbure), Spain's Hispanoil and a consortium of Japanese firms were also rejected. There were indications, however, that Iraq would call upon Soviet technical and financial aid for this project on a consultant basis without granting a normal concession. At the 31] same time, pressure on the IPC for a greater government share of oil profits continued. Practical results from these new arrangements in the form of increased oil exports are necessarily some years distant. In the meantime, the IPC and its affiliates no longer have an incentive to make the additional investments needed for increasing production in their remaining fields to their reputed annual capacity of over 100 million metric tons. Nearly all exploration ceased in 1961, and imports of oil equipment by the companies slumped drastically from an annual average of 14.5 million dinars in 1959–61 to 1.2 million in 1962–66. These developments must necessarily have an adverse effect on the government's oil revenues. Other Commodities Commodity exports other than oil consisted almost entirely of agricultural focd products and raw materials, primarily dates, barley, raw wool, hides and skins. In recent years export of cement has become increasingly important. The direction of trade in these commodities has shifted since 1958. The share of Western Europe in this trade declined drastically, from 48 percent to not quite 10 percent in 1966—a volume of just over 2 million dinars. The major cause of this decline was a progressive curtailment of imports by the United Kingdom. Non-oil exports are now directed primarily to neighboring Arab countries, which received 30 percent of total shipments in 1958 and 49 percent in 1966. The balance is exported in small amounts to various destinations, chiefly Communist China, India, the United States and Ceylon. The Soviet Union, like Communist China, began importing from Iraq only after the Revolution of 1958, but its volume remained small, averaging less than 0.9 mil- lion dinars per year, with a maximum of 2.0 million in 1963. Shipments to Communist China grew steadily to a level of 2.4 million dinars in 1966. Before 1965 over 80 percent of the volume of non-oil exports was of agricultural origin, and from 41 to 68 percent of the total was accounted for by only two products—dates and barley. Be- cause of the narrow range of products, subject to the vagaries of weather and to international price and quality competition, the annual export volume fluctuated widely, and difficulty was at times experienced in finding outlets for available export supplies. Even though the situation improved somewhat during recent years, with cement exports increasing from 1.9 million dinars in 1963 to 3.4 million in 1966, any significant upswing in the non-oil export sector must await the solution of the country's agricultural organi- zation and production problems (see ch. 19, Agriculture). 312 Imports Except for recessions in 1958–59 and 1963, attributable to domestic political upheavals, the annual volume of merchandise imports during the decade ending in 1966 rose steadily from 112 million to 175 million dinars (see ch. 14, Political Dynamics). These imports originated in some 70 countries, but half of the total shipments came from only 3 countries in 1957 and 7 in 1966. The United Kingdom, the United States and Germany continued to be the major suppliers. Although the volume of their combined ship- ments rose by 10 percent over the period, their share in the ex- panded trade declined from 50 percent in 1957 to 35 percent in 1966. The slack was taken up by increased shipments from Japan, Ceylon, the Soviet Union and Italy, in that decreasing order. Other important suppliers in 1966, with volumes ranging from 7.6 mil- lion to 3.7 million dinars, were Communist China, Belgium, Sweden, France and Lebanon. As in the case of exports, the composition of imports reflected a relatively low stage of development of the domestic economy and a slow progress toward industrialization. From the Revolution of 1958 through 1964, imports of consumer goods outweighed capital goods imports, at times by as much as 50 percent. Although the economy is largely agricultural, food accounted for 40 to 50 percent of the consumer imports, the bulk of which consisted of tea, sugar, fruits and vegetables. Cereals became im- portant after years of poor domestic harvests, particularly in 1960–61 and again in 1964 (see ch. 18, Agriculture). The principal nondurable consumer goods included cotton and synthetic piece goods, pharmaceutical products, soap and deter- gents. Clothing, including secondhand goods, and shoes also ar- rived in significant quantities. About half of the durable consumer goods consisted of automobiles and electrical household appliances, followed in order of importance by radio and television sets, ovens, stoves, glassware and carpets. The chief producers' goods included boilers and engines, miscel- laneous machinery, electrical and transportation equipment, steel, timber, paper and cardboard. A pronounced change toward capi- tal goods after 1964 reflected a greater determination on the part of the government to devote a larger share of resources to eco- nomic development, in preference to increasing consumption. Effects of the 1967 Middle East Conflict Iraq's foreign trade revenue, vitally important to the govern- ment, suffered from the political instability of the Middle East 313 area. A large part of the exported oil flows to the Mediterranean through pipelines across Syria. The balance of the oil and all other cargo moving to the West must pass through the Suez Canal. Any developments interfering with the operation of these facilities have immediate and adverse repercussions on trade. Substantial losses in oil exports were sustained after the Suez Canal crisis of 1956. Oil flow through the Syrian pipelines was interrupted from mid-December 1966 until March 1967, with a loss of some 10 million tons in production, because of a dispute between the Syrian Government and the IPC over transit and other charges. The 6-day Middle East conflict in June 1967 and its political aftermath dealt a much more severe blow to trade. The full impact of that development was not yet known by mid-1968, but partial trade data and corrective economic measures taken by the govern- ment point to severe losses in export revenues and shortages of essential commodities. Oil revenue declined by 20 million dinars, or 14 percent from the previous year's level, and imports from the four major suppliers fell by 40 percent. TRADE POLICY Regulation of foreign trade is an integral part of the govern- ment's economic program. Trade policy is designed to protect domestic industry, provide commodities considered essential to the economy, limit imports of less essential items, control prices and increase the participation of Iraqi nationals in the country's trade. Broad powers to control imports and exports are vested in the State Organization for Trade, an agency attached to the Ministry of Economy. A system of closely coordinated quantitative restrictions and a tariff schedule, supplemented by state trading, are used to achieve the policy objectives. All imports are subject to quota allocations and individual licensing on the basis of essentiality and estimated market demand. In licensing imports no distinction is made re- garding currency areas. Capital goods and raw materials for the country's economic development, along with basic foodstuffs and other essential consumer goods, are subjected to minimal re- straints and are either exempt from import duty or carry low duty rates. In order to reduce the market demand, the tariff policy supple- ments the quota system through the assessment of higher duty rates on less essential goods. Higher duties also serve to protect domestic industries producing less than the country's require- ments. Imports of goods produced locally in sufficient quantities to 314 meet domestic needs generally are prohibited. Seventy items were on the prohibited list in 1966. A list is also maintained of countries with which trade is banned either wholly or in part, mainly for political reasons. Changes in this list are made from time to time in line with shifts in interna- tional relations. After the Middle East conflict in 1967, the import system was made even more restrictive through a reduction of the import program and administrative delays in granting licenses. The brunt of this reduction was borne by private dealers trading in consumer goods. State Trading State trading plays a significant and growing role in the coun- try's economy. Aside from such functions as handling imports and exports of government agencies or factories, state trading is used to assure the availability of certain basic items and to curb price manipulation. After nationalization of the economy in 1964 and several subsequent reorganizations, the state foreign trade estab- lishment in 1967 consisted of six companies under the State Or- ganization for Trade and one company under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Health. These companies had a monopoly of cer- tain imports and shared the balance of the trade with private im- porters. Their share of the total import allocations increased from about one-third in 1963 to two-thirds in 1966. Each of the various companies under the State Organization for Trade in 1967 specialized in specific imports. The General Automo- bile Company had a monopoly on imports of automobiles and of spare parts produced by automobile manufacturers. The African- Iraqi Trading Company imported tires and tubes. The Government Purchasing Board had a monopoly on importing sugar, tea and olive oil and was also a substantial importer of other food products and manufactured items. The Cement Marketing Bureau and Con- struction Materials Company was a monopoly exporter and im- porter of cement and an authorized importer of other construction materials. The General Agricultural Chemicals and Machinery Company, chartered in October 1966, imported fertilizers and pesticides and shared with private trade the importation of sprayers, dusters and similar equipment. Iraq Stores (Orosdi-Back) was a nationalized department store in Baghdad, with branches in Basra and Kirkuk, importing canned milk, baby foods and other canned products. The General Establishment for Drugs, attached to the Ministry of Health, was the primary importer of pharmaceutical items. 315 Domestic distribution of imported commodities is affected through a combination of privately owned and state company retail outlets (see ch. 22, Domestic Trade). Exchange Controls Allocation of exchange for imports is based on the annual import program which establishes individual allotments for import- ers as well as for specific commodity groups within an overall limit. Before 1967 allocations were generally adequate, with in- creased preference for capital goods after 1964, but they tended to restrict the importation of luxury items. Most exchange transac- tions take place at the official rate based on par value. Exchange purchased for travel purposes, however, is taxed at a rate of 8 percent for the first 500 dinars and 12 percent for amounts above that figure. Exception is made for students and in certain other cases. Payments for all invisibles require permission, but exchange is usually granted for costs connected with exports and for travel, educational and medical costs abroad. Specific limits are set on allowable funds for travel, depending upon age. Amounts above the basic allowance must be approved by the Central Bank of Iraq (see ch. 25, Banking and Currency). Receipts of exchange from exports and invisible transactions must be surrendered to a licensed dealer. Foreign travelers may bring in any amount of exchange and take out the unused balance but must declare the amounts to Iraqi customs. Capital may be freely imported and repatriated by nonresidents provided that it is deposited with a licensed dealer. Capital trans- fers by residents, regardless of nationality, must have the ap- proval of the exchange authorities. Transfer of profits from foreign investment is subject to certain limits depending upon the nature of the business. Trade Agreements To promote its export sales, primarily of dates, Iraq has entered into trade agreements with some 30 countries. These agreements generally provide for mutual most-favored-nation treatment with regard to both trade and shipping. Privileges and advantages ac- corded to border trade and to special trade zones of either party or arising from actual or potential participation in customs unions or free trade zones are usually excepted, as are also concessions to domestic fishing and coastal trade. The treaties call upon the contracting parties to facilitate all commercial transactions, to respect each other's trade embargoes involving third countries and to provide certificates of origin in 316 certain cases. They usually specify payment in agreed upon con- vertible currency, list the commodities to be traded and sometimes prescribe the annual volume of trade flow in each direction. In January 1955 Iraq ratified the Inter-Arab Trade and Transit Agreement which exempts certain agricultural items from cus- toms duty and provides a 25 percent reduction from prevailing tariffs for various industrial goods. Preferential agreements are also in effect with the United Arab Republic (UAR) and Jordan, which provide for customs reductions of from 50 to 100 percent on a large list of agricultural and manufactured items. Barter agreements were concluded in 1964 and 1965 with Bul- garia, Czechoslovakia, Ceylon, East Germany and France, under which over 50,000 tons of dates were exchanged for food items and industrial products. Trade agreements with Communist countries, except for Communist China, generally date back to 1959. Other agreements are of more recent origin. The Iraqi Chamber of Com- merce urged the government in March 1968 to find additional mar- kets abroad for surplus agricultural commodities. Bilateral payment agreements are also maintained with the UAR, Yugoslavia and Communist China. Yugoslavia and Com- munist China allow settlement of trade balances in Iraqi dinars up to a maximum of 250,000 and 500,000 dinars, respectively. BALANCE OF PAYMENTS The balance of payments has had large trade deficits, with ex- ports other than oil equivalent to about 15 percent of imports. The deficits have been largely, but not completely, offset by revenues from the IPC oil concession. In the years 1964–66 the overall pay- ments position showed deficits ranging from 3.1 to 19.6 million dinars, according to the official statement of the Central Bank. A substantial deficit must also have been incurred in 1967 because of the 20 million dinar decline in oil revenue in the aftermath of the Middle East conflict. The invisible items primarily reflect payments for services, such as freight and insurance charges and repatriation of investment income by the oil companies. The capital account shows substantial transfers of private capital abroad and a reduced availability of long-term loans since 1963, when Iraq received an interest-free loan of 30 million dinars from Kuwait. The long- and medium-term government foreign indebtedness at the end of 1966 amounted to 73.2 million dinars, including the 1963 loan from Kuwait and also 35.4 million dinars outstanding on the loan obtained from the Soviet Union under a technical coopera- 317 THE ARAB COMMON MARKET To improve inter-Arab commercial relations, an Arab Common Market embracing Iraq, the UAR, Syria, Jordan and Kuwait was created in January 1965. Its specific aims, as officially announced, include freedom of movement for individuals and capital, free ex- change of commodities and technical skills and experience, freedom of transit by land, sea and air and guarantees for indi- vidual property and inheritance rights. Its trade provisions cover farm and livestock products, domestic raw materials and manufac- tured items, at least 40 percent of the cost of which is attributable to processing in the exporting member country. The Common Market Agreement calls for most-favored-nation treatment by the partners and equality in the treatment of im- ported and domestic goods; it prohibits reexports without consent by the country of origin and the imposition of export duties. As an interim measure, it established a freeze on all existing customs duties, taxes and other charges applicable to import-export trans- actions. Settlement of payments is to be in accord with existing bilateral agreements and, in their absence, in United States dol- lars, pounds sterling or any other agreed upon currency, until such time as an Arab Payments Union or an Arab Monetary Fund is established. In October 1966 the Iraqi Higher Supply Committee, an organi- zation under the Ministry of Economics responsible for the assur- ance of adequate food supplies, approved a draft notification to the effect that the Common Market had become a reality. The Com- mittee recommended liberalization of export and import restric- tions on a list of agricultural, livestock and manufactured prod- ucts. Available evidence indicates that by May 1968 the Arab Common Market had not yet emerged from the discussion stage. 319 CHAPTER 24 PUBLIC FINANCE The essential features of the fiscal regime have been its heavy reliance on revenue from the petroleum sector and on indirect taxation, steadily rising current expenses, a lag in public invest- ment and persistent deficit financing. The annual deficits have been covered through domestic bank borrowing and foreign loans, with a consequent expansion of the money supply and a mild price inflation. A tightening of fiscal management is hampered by a lack of effective budgetary controls, the government's policy of increasing public services and a progressive growth of military expenditures. The latest announced budget for fiscal year 1968–69 (April 1 through March 31) again anticipates a substantial deficit, despite new emergency measures to raise personal income taxes and cus- toms duties. THE BUDGETARY PROCESS Under the provisions of Articles 44 and 69 of the Interim Con- stitution of 1964, national budgets are prepared by the Ministry of Finance with the approval of the Council of Ministers and are enacted into law following ratification by the President of the Republic. In the absence of a legislative body, budgets are not subject to legislative review. A special control commission for the review of treasury operations, authorized by Section 70 of the Constitution, had not been established by 1967, and evidence of its creation after that date was not conclusive. The national budget also provides for the financing of all pro- vincial and local needs through allocations to various ministries. No budgets are prepared by public authorities below the national level. Government finances are managed through a set of five budgets. The Ordinary Budget, the largest and most comprehensive of the five, provides for the current administrative needs of government ministries, the payment of pensions and the servicing of the for- eign debt. The Economic Plan Budget relates exclusively to the 321 Table 8. The Consolidated Budget of Iraq for Fiscal Year: 1960–61 Through 1964–65; (in millions of dinars) 1960-61 1961-62 Fiscal Years 1962–63 Total 5 Years Annual Average 1963-64 1964-65 95.0 9.4 33.5 116.2 9.2 37.3 99.0 11.7 36.2 114.4 12.7 34.6 129.6 15.0 41.2 554.2 58.0 182.8 110.8 11.6 36.5 18.8 16.5 10.2 3.0 151.1 13.6 3.5 179.8 19.7 5.4 172.0 20.1 5.7 187.5 5.2 209.8 82.4 22.8 900.2 4.6 180.0 44.1 24.5 49.3 32.4 REVENUES Oil income -- Direct taxes: ----- Indirect taxes“ ----- Profits of government agencies and enterprise ---- Other income ------ Total revenues EXPENDITURES Ordinary budget National defense and security ------ Education ---- Health Pensions and other benefits -- Others Total Ordinary ------ Economic plan budget -- Agriculture Industry Transport and communications --- Construction and social services ---- Ministry of Defense - Total Economic Plan ----- Total Expenditures -------- DEFICIT - 6.2 7.5 45.1 29.0 6.8 7.3 31.1 119.3 61.3 33.3 7.1 9.8 38.2 149.7 67.8 34.7 7.4 10.7 57.5 178.1 267.6 153.9 35.0 43.0 190.8 690.3 53.5 30.8 7.0 8.6 38.2 138.1 6.9 8.3 32.6 31.4 114.3 128.9 9.7 10.8 5.7 7.9 18.1 7.1 6.3 10.3 15.8 26.4 14.1 4.5 9.5 18.3 10.1 11.1 53.5 203.2 15.7 6.7 16.5 18.9 14.6 17.6 30.2 38.0 49.1 75.0 99.4 28.7 • 293.2 983.5 83.3 7.6 9.8 15.0 19.9 5.7 • 58.6 196.7 16.7 74.3 • 45.5 159.8 8.7 61.1 180.4 58.8 187.7 15.7 252.4 42.6 324 1 Fiscal year in April 1 to March 31. (a) The table represents a consolidated summary of the Ordinary and the Economic Plan Budgets. It reflects fairly adequately the operations of the entire public financial sector, because the net results of the activities covered by the three subsidiary budgets are created through the two major budgets. (b) To conform with accepted American accounting practice, loan proceeds and interbudgetary transfers have been eliminated from revenue, and additions to capital reserves, from expenses. For convenience in presentation, some very small amounts earmarked for foreign debt service in the Economic Plan Budget have been consolidated with similar items in the Ordinary Budget. For these reasons some of the figures in the table vary from data shown in official Iraqi publications. : 1 dinar equals US$2.80 (see Glossary). 3 Income, inheritance, real estate, agricultural land and stamp taxes. • Customs duties and excise taxes. 5 Operating expenses of various ministries and small sums for foreign debt service. The large increase in 1964, which applies to financial and economic affairs not officially explained. * Includes 3 million dinars unidentified "other" expenses or 0.6 million dinars annual average. Source: Adapted from Central Bank of Iraq, Central Bank of Iraq Quarterly Reports, January-March 1966, April-June 1967 and July-September 1967; and Abbas Alnasrawi, Financing Economic Development in Iraq, 1967, p. 50. 325 The public debt, on March 31, 1965, amounted to over 121 mil- lion dinars, exclusive of a small amount in securities held by pri- vate individuals. By June 30, 1967, it had risen to almost 232 million dinars, an increase of about 110 million dinars. Nearly 92 million dinars of this was drawn from the banking system; for- eign loans provided the balance of nearly 19 million dinars. The continuing rise of the public debt and the method used to finance it induced an expansion of the money supply from less than 120 million dinars in March 1960 to over 135 million dinars 5 years later and to nearly 162 million dinars in June 1967. The pressure of the growing money supply on resources was reflected in an increase from 1960 to 1967 of almost 17 percent in wholesale prices and of over 19 percent in the cost of living in Baghdad. Revenues The most important source of government revenue is the income derived from royalties and taxes on the production and sale of petroleum by foreign companies. This income rose from about 95 million dinars in 1960 to almost 141 million dinars in 1966, but it declined to slightly more than 119 million dinars in 1967 as a result of the Middle East conflict and the temporary closure of the pipelines to the Eastern Mediterranean earlier in the year. Over the last decade it accounted for 60 percent or more of total govern- ment revenue. From 1927, when oil royalties were first received, until 1950, this income was treated as a budgetary surplus to be used for financing various capital projects. In 1950 the law which created the Development Board directed that all the revenues from oil be credited to the Board's account with the Central Bank of Iraq (see ch. 20, Industry). The inability of the Board to use all the funds assigned to it and the continually rising ordinary expenses of gov. ernment brought about a reallocation of oil revenue in 1952, whereby 30 percent of the proceeds was allocated to the Ordinary Budget. For the same reasons, a further reapportionment of the oil income, which divided it equally between the Ordinary Budget and the Economic Plan Budget, was enacted into law in 1960. This division, however, has remained unenforced, since subsequent budgets have continued to divert a portion of the capital develop- ment funds to current expenditures. The second major source of revenue is indirect taxation in the forms of customs duties and excise taxes. This source has regularly contributed about 20 percent of total government income, in a ratio of 2 to 1 in favor of customs duties. Next in importance are 326 profits from the government's economic enterprises, which con- tribute some 9 percent. Direct taxes, including the income and inheritance taxes, real estate tax, agricultural land tax and stamp tax, are of least significance and yield barely 6.5 percent of gov- ernment revenue. Continued reliance on revenues from oil and customs and the lack of a firm domestic tax base constitute a weakness of fiscal policy, considering the vulnerability of the two major income sources to international developments beyond the government's control. This fact was amply demonstrated in 1956, 1966 and 1967 (see ch. 23, Foreign Economic Relations). Expenditures Outlays for national defense, including the police, constitute the largest single item of budgetary expenditure. During the 5 fiscal years of 1960–61 through 1964–65, these outlays increased by about 50 percent (from 44.1 million dinars to 67.8 million dinars) and accounted for nearly 39.0 percent of Ordinary Budget expend- itures. In addition, over 22 percent of the development outlays for the last 2 years of this period (nearly 29 million dinars) were devoted to "productive projects" of the Ministry of Defense. The large allocations for defense were an outcome of military operations in the Kurdish area, which were suspended in mid-1966 (see ch. 14, Political Dynamics; ch. 15, Foreign Relations), A further substantial rise in military expenditures after the 1967 Middle East conflict was indicated in a government release on the occasion of the adoption of the 1968–69 budget and by the major airplane purchase from France concluded in February 1968. Expenditures on education rank second in importance among the Ordinary Budget items. They increased by about one-third to 32.4 million dinars between 1960–61 and 1962–63, then leveled off to reach 34.7 million dinars in 1964. For the 5-year period as a whole, these outlays amounted to almost 154 million dinars, or more than 22 percent of total Ordinary Budget expenditures. Health and pensions accounted for an average of some 16 million dinars per year; administrative expenses of the various ministries absorbed about 37 million dinars. Expenditures of the Economic Plan Budget fluctuated between 1960 and 1963, averaging less than 55 million dinars per year, then rose steeply to 74.4 million dinars in 1964. During the same period, allocations among the economic sectors changed signi- ficantly; the share of agriculture declined from almost 24 to only 9 percent of the total. Allocations for industry tripled, and those for transport and communications more than doubled. Total develop- 327 month on amounts under 18 dinars to 18 percent per month on payments of 240 dinars or more. This law also provided for an additional graduated income tax ranging from 1 percent on tax- able annual income of less than 500 dinars to 13 percent of taxable annual income over 11,000 dinars. Progressive rates on business income favor industrial concerns and, above a certain income level, corporations over unincorpo- rated firms. Large public-sector enterprises, particularly in the in- dustrial field, thus enjoy a significant advantage. Tax rates for all firms start at 10 percent for the first 1,000 dinars of net income. They range up to 45 percent on amounts over 13,000 dinars for industrial corporations and 60 percent on amounts above 10,000 dinars for nonindustrial unincorporated firms. Dividend distribu- tions are deductible from taxable corporation income and are not taxed as personal income. Taxation of farm income was abolished in 1961 and was re- placed by a tax on irrigated agricultural land; rates ranged from 5 to 15 percent depending on the method of irrigation. Exemptions from this tax, however, are so extensive that the yield has never reached 1 million dinars per year. Enacted to raise farm income and stimulate production, this measure has also benefited wealthy large landowners. There is no evidence to indicate that any significant portion of their tax savings has been invested in agriculture. This fact may be ex- plained by the uncertainties of the domestic political situation and the land reform program (see ch. 14, Political Dynamics; ch. 19, Agriculture). A real estate tax on urban property is assessed at a flat rate of 10 percent of the rental value. For owner-occupied property, ex- emption based on its appraised rental value is so high that it absolves the majority of homeowners from payment of this tax. Its annual yield has been a little over 2 million dinars. A stamp tax is levied in connection with a wide variety of per- sonal, business and legal transactions evidenced by formal docu- ments. It has yielded about 1.2 million dinars per year. Information on the effectiveness of tax collection has not been published. Widespread tax evasion, however, is indicated both by an official statement that improvement of collection through reform of the collection machinery would lead to a considerable increase in revenue and by a recurrent budget revenue item called “fines resulting from defying bookkeeping regulations." althy Lificant nis facrical sit 329 CHAPTER 25 BANKING AND CURRENCY Marked changes in the banking and monetary system have taken place since the Revolution of 1958. Aiming at complete mon- etary independence, the revolutionary government left the ster- ling area in June 1959. Under the label of Arab socialism, the banks were nationalized in July 1964 with the stated goal of wid- ening the range of banking facilities. By the end of 1967 it was still unclear to what extent the supply of credit had been affected by nationalization. Throughout its more than 35 years of existence the Iraqi dinar (see Glossary) has been a remarkably stable cur- rency; so stable, in fact, that the dinar continued to maintain its exchange value of US$2.80 when the pound sterling was devalued in November 1967. The significant increase in the money supply after 1964 has reflected almost entirely a commensurate rise in government borrowing from the banking system. Most Iraqis are not familiar with a modern banking system and make no use of banking facilities. Transfers by check occur rarely outside the modern business community. Both banknotes and coins are in general use, and confidence in the domestic currency seems fairly well established. The subsistence standard of most of the population leaves them little or no margin for saving, and modest increases in income are quickly spent on consumption goods rather than saved. Among those who do accumulate cash surpluses, saving often takes the form of hoarding precious metals and bank- notes, rather than of bank deposits. Among professionals and in the business community there is an opportunity for saving. These groups prefer to invest in farmland and urban real estate, which carries great prestige, and in com- merce, which yields high, immediate returns. Wealthy individuals and banks also prefer to invest in foreign institutions and busi- ness. Industry and agriculture have, therefore, been starved for capital. In an effort to overcome this shortage, the government established special public credit institutions in these fields. These institutions greatly expanded their activities after the Revolution of 1958. Post-revolutionary governments attempted to go further than the monarchy, especially in channeling credit to the country- 331 Demand deposits more than doubled between 1952 and 1960, but subsequent growth has been minimal, and their level has fluctuated between 31.0 and 37.5 million dinars. Time and savings deposits rose from a little over 2 million dinars in 1952 to over 40 million in 1967. There has been a sizable expansion in credit, almost entirely limited to the cities and towns. The rate of increase in the distribu- tion of agricultural loans has been accelerated, but the availability of credit for the entire agricultural population remains seriously inadequate. The Central Bank of Iraq The Central Bank of Iraq discharges the central banking re- sponsibilities of the government, including the issue and manage- ment of the national currency and control over the banking system and foreign exchange transactions. The bank keeps the accounts of the government and handles government and semigovernment loans of all kinds. Central Bank supervision of the banking system is based on a law of 1950, revised in 1956. This law required banks to keep the equivalent of 15 percent of their time and demand deposits as a reserve with the Central Bank. In July 1954 the reserve require- ment was raised to 20 percent; 15 percent of the reserves was to be kept with the Central Bank—10 percent as cash deposits and another 5 percent in the form of government bonds and treasury bills. The remaining 5 percent of reserves could be retained by the banks in cash. For the 8 months of September 1964 through April 1965, the requirement concerning bonds and treasury bills was waived, thus temporarily reducing the reserve requirement to only 15 percent. Under Law No. 100 of 1964, the authority of the Central Bank over the banking system was greatly enhanced, and in 1966 its authorized capital was increased from 15 million to 25 million dinars. Other Government-Founded Banks Apart from the Central Bank of Iraq, six state-organized banks are functioning in the country; five of these are specialized institu- tions created to fill specific long-term credit needs not otherwise met by the banking system. They include the Industrial Bank, Agricultural Bank, Real Estate Bank, Cooperative Bank and Mort- gage Bank. The sixth-the Rafidain Bank-is a commercial bank, originally established in 1941 to act as banker to the government. In mid-1959 several of these banks were reorganized, and jurisdic- tion over them was transferred from the Ministry of Finance to 333 mortgages on their properties into loans at a more reasonable rate. In addition to taking over old high-interest loans at 5 percent, it has encouraged individual building activities by loans up to a max- imum of 4,000 dinars, secured by mortgages not exceeding 60 per- cent of the value of the property for not longer than 8 years. It also builds houses, on its own account, for sale or rent to persons with limited incomes. Originally the capital of the Real Estate Bank was set at 1 million dinars, advanced by the Ministry of Finance without interest; in 1952 this amount was raised to 2 million dinars and, in 1963, to 29 million dinars. In the 1960's the bank has pursued an active lending policy. In 1967 it had 16 branches with 42.5 million dinars in outstanding loans. The Mortgage Bank, for movable properties, with a paid-up capital of 1 million dinars, was established in 1951 to provide small loans to government employees, officials, pensioners and others against security. It also receives loans and deposits. In 1963 the bank began actively increasing the number of loans and raised interest payments on deposits to 4.5 percent in order to attract funds. Its outstanding loans in mid-1967 totaled 6.6 million dinars. The Cooperative Bank, founded in 1956, grants loans to coopera- tive societies, principally for the construction of housing. In 1967 it had a capital of 10 million and oustanding loans of 3.5 million dinars. The Rafidain Bank handles government accounts, including oil revenues. It is also the largest commercial bank in Iraq and ex- tends credit facilities to wholesale and retail merchants at the going rate of interest and operating at a profit. In 1967 it pos- sessed 6.4 million dinars of paid-up capital as well as sizable assets. It had 18 branches in Iraq, 1 in Lebanon, 2 in Syria and 1 in Jordan. Information on its operations is not published. The Nationalized Commercial Banks Nationalization of private banks in 1964 left deposits unaf- fected. The capital shares of the banks were converted into 15- year transferable government bonds, paying 3 percent interest. In August 1964, an amalgamation of the 10 nationalized banks into only 4 institutions was announced. The Bank of Baghdad, pre- viously a privately owned Iraqi bank, was to be joined with the Iraqi branch of the Jordanian Arab Bank as the Bank of Baghdad. The Credit Bank of Iraq, previously the Ottoman Bank, and the Federal Bank of Lebanon were to be amalgamated as the Credit Bank of Iraq. The Iraqi branches of the British Bank of the Middle East and the National Bank of Pakistan, along with the Commercial Bank of Iraq, were to become the Commercial Bank of 335 Iraq. The Iraqi branches of the Eastern Bank (British), the United Bank of Iraq (Lebanese) and the Rashid Bank were to be joined as the Bank of Rashid. As a result of a lag in official re- porting little is known of their operations. CURRENCY The currency unit of the country is the Iraqi dinar, equal to 2.48828 grams of fine gold and broken down into 1,000 fils. At the time of its creation in 1931, the dinar was equivalent to 1 British pound sterling, then valued at $4.86. Since 1949, the value of the dinar has been $2.80. In 1949 the issue of currency was taken over by the National Bank of Iraq from the former Iraqi Currency Board. The bank was required to maintain a 100 percent reserve against out- standing domestic currency, a minimum of 70 percent in the form of gold and foreign currencies and a maximum of 30 percent in government securities. Until 1955 the National Bank possessed no gold reserve of its own and only limited amounts of foreign exchange other than sterling. Like the other members of the sterling area, Iraq was under an obligation to surrender its gold and dollar earnings to the common pool, on which, in turn, it could draw according to its needs. But the Natiɔnal Bank obtained the consent of the United Kingdom to maintain a modest working balance in American dol- lars, not exceeding the equivalent of 2 million dinars ($5.6 mil- lion). During 1955, at the annual talks of the Anglo-Iraqi Econom- ic-Financial Committee, it was agreed that this working balance be increased by the equivalent of 1.5 million dinars and that gold be purchased to the equivalent of 5 million dinars in order to diversify the Iraqi currency cover. The dissolution of the National Bank and the creation of the Central Bank of Iraq in 1956 entailed no substantial change in the mechanism of currency issue. After the Revolution of 1958 existing currency was gradually replaced by banknotes bearing the seal of the Republic, and new denominations of coins were issued. Current notes are in denomi- nations of 1/4, 1/2, 1, 5 and 10 dinars, and coins are in amounts of 1, 5, 10, 25, 50 and 100 fils. Withdrawal from the sterling area in June 1959 constituted a major policy change, symbolizing the break with the past regime. It did not affect the country's monetary standing, since Iraq's sterling balances had gradually been converted to gold and non- sterling currencies. After the withdrawal the Iraqi dinar con- tinued to exchange at par with the pound sterling. 336 When the pound sterling was devalued in November 1967, the Iraqi financial position was strong enough to maintain the ex- change value of the dinar at $2.80. Holdings of the Central Bank as of September 30, 1967 amounted to 33.5 million dinars in gold and 89.3 million dinars in foreign exchange. A special committee was established to safeguard Iraqi Government deposits in coun- tries affected by the devaluation of the pound sterling. Under the monarchy the money supply expanded from almost 44 million dinars in 1952 to slightly over 98 million dinars in 1958. This increase did not have a pronounced inflationary effect for a number of reasons: budgetary surpluses, an increase in savings and adequate supplies of goods resulting partly from a liberal import policy. Simultaneously with a growing money supply, prices followed a downward trend; the cost-of-living index de- creased from 115 in 1952 to 101 in 1955 (based on an index of 100 in 1953), and by 1958 it had risen to only 108. During the first year of the postrevolutionary government the money supply increased markedly, rising to 110 million dinars by the end of 1959. After slight decreases in 1960 and 1961, the money supply resumed its rapid rise, reaching 160 million dinars in September 1967. Government deficit spending has been primar- ily responsible for this increase. Although the general cost of living did not advance during the first year and a half following the 1958 Revolution, the annual infusions of large sums into the monetary stream eventually caused a rise of 22 percent in the cost of living between 1958 and the end of 1967. 337 lished as an army air arm with five light aircraft obtained from the British. This small force increased in the next few years to several squadrons, most of whose equipment was also British. A small sea force was created shortly before 1940, also as an integral compo- nent of the army. The limited mission and short Iraqi coastline in the Persian Gulf have restricted the development of the navy. The Iraqi Armed Forces have never been involved in a major war. Their principal combat experience has been obtained in ac- tions against the British in May 1941 and participation in the Arab-Israel conflicts of 1948, 1956 and 1967. The major action against British forces centered around Habbaniyah airbase, near Baghdad, and was short-lived. After only 29 days had elapsed, an armistice was signed and order restored (see ch. 3, Historical Setting). When the British Mandate over Palestine ended in May 1948, Arab forces intervened against the emerging state of Israel. More than 12,000 Iraqi troops were involved in this first campaign out- side the country, and the prestige of the army was enhanced at home, despite failure to attain the overall Arab objective. Experi- ences gained in this campaign were of considerable value in later reorganization changes undertaken to improve the army's mo- bility. Iraqi forces saw only limited action in the Arab-Israeli conflict in October-November 1956. Upon initiation of hostilities, Iraqi troops were sent to Jordan in anticipation of possible expansion of operations into that area. These forces were engaged primarily in patrol and defensive duties and in December of 1956 returned to Iraq. Substantial Iraqi air and ground forces were involved in the third Arab-Israeli crisis of June 1967, mainly in Jordan and Syria. The 6-day period of operations was characterized by intensive initial Israeli air action, and all Arab forces including those of Iraq sustained appreciable losses. Since the beginning of the cease-fire, the government of Iraq has continued to maintain a force of 12,000 to 15,000 men in Jordan, mainly to support Jorda- nian forces. ATTITUDES TOWARD MILITARY SERVICE Iraqi Arabs are not militaristic people, and their history does not include any prolonged periods of armed struggle for national independence. Although many bore arms in various tribal revolts against foreign occupying powers, Arab nationalism in its modern sense had not yet appeared to spur any large-scale challenge to the many years of Turkish rule. The development of a spirit of nation- alism has been slow because of social, ethnic, religious and kinship 341 vessels were older types acquired from the Soviet Union after 1958. FOREIGN INFLUENCE From their beginning in 1921 until the emergence of the Repub- lic in 1958, the armed forces were under British influence. During that period British officers organized and equipped the Iraqi Army, and British sources supplied most of its equipment. In addition, selected senior Iraqi military officers were sent to England or India, where they received advanced training in British military doctrine and techniques. Since the 1958 Revolution, Soviet influence has supplanted that of the British. After signing an initial loan agreement in March 1959, the Soviet Union provided large shipments of modern arms and equipment. This armament included naval craft, a variety of aircraft, air defense missiles, artillery and both light and medium tanks. As a result of this assistance, the Iraqi Armed Forces have undergone extensive modernization and improvement. In the late 1960's Iraq attempted to broaden its military aid program and to counteract somewhat its heavy dependence on Soviet support. In the fall of 1967 the government was attempting to diversify its general armament inventory by the acquisition of French armored gun carriers, tanks, mortars and Mirage jet fighter aircraft. Despite the acceptance of foreign aid, Iraq has declared itself to be following a course of independent "revolutionary” socialism, aligned only by religious and "fraternal" bonds with other nations of the Arab world. In keeping with this national policy the country has entered into, or attempted to revive, various international agreements, such as the Unified Arab Command established in 1964. Most of these agreements were aimed at unifying the Arab military potential to achieve Arab aims in the Middle East (see ch. 15, Foreign Relations). ECONOMIC IMPACT Manpower Recruitment and conscription for national military service have long been matters of serious concern for the government. Under Turkish rule conscription was probably the most resented institu- tion imposed on the Iraqi people. Troops were misused, pay was irregular, bribery to avoid callup was permitted, conditions of service were disagreeable and retention beyond the normal com- pulsory period was a common practice. Consequently, opposition to military duty became ingrained and persisted long after Turkish 344 and specialize according to their group designated in the final year. Upon graduation cadets receive commissions as second lieu- tenants in the regular army. A second source of army officers is the Reserve College, founded in 1952. This school enrolls two classes annually, one for holders of professional degrees, such as medicine and pharmacy, and one for secondary school graduates. Approximately 2,000 reserve officers are graduated each year, and those with professional degrees are commissioned second lieutenants; those without a college educa- tion are appointed warrant officers. In addition to the Military and Reserve Colleges, the army main- tains service schools for the combat arms as well as the technical and administrative services. Most of these schools are located in or close to Baghdad and conduct courses for both commissioned and noncommissioned officers. The army also maintains a Staff College for the training of selected army and air force officers for high command and staff positions. Founded in 1928, it is located at Rustamiyah, a suburb in southwestern Baghdad, and offers a 2-year course of study. The course is patterned after the standard curriculum followed at the British Staff College at Camberly, England, adjusted as neces- sary to fit Iraqi requirements. The Air Force Flying College and Shuaiba airbase near Basra is the source of officer personnel with specialist ratings. It was founded in 1950 and replaced an earlier aviation school which had been established in 1933. In addition to the flight training courses, it conducts courses for the training of technical specialists and flight crews. LOGISTICS The armed forces logistic system is not highly developed. As a result of the lack of a heavy industry to supply the major arma- ment needed to maintain its modern forces, almost all such items are provided from outside sources. Since 1958 the Soviet Union has been Iraq's principal military supplier of aircraft, heavy weapons and equipment, spare parts and ammunition. Responsibility for the procurement, storage and distribution of all military items is concentrated in the higher staff elements, but little is known concerning the responsibilities of various elements within the system. The principal port of entry for foreign supplies is Basra, and apparently a regulated flow if materiel moves from there to Baghdad, the hub of the transportation system and the major military base area. 347 RANK AND PAY The rank structures of the three services have developed from those employed by the comparable components of the British forces (see table 9). Variations have been introduced over the years in both the rank and insignia systems, primarily to highlight national and Arab features. The latest of these modifications took place in mid-1967 when the crown previously used in designating Table 9. Iraqi Army Ranks and Insignia, 1967 Title Western Equivalent Zaim ----------- Mushir --------- Field Marshal ----- Crossed sabers within olive wreath, Arab eagle toward center Muhib General Crossed sabers, two stars, Arab eagle Fariq ---- Lieutenant General Crossed sabers, one star, Arab eagle Liwa- ----Major General ---- Crossed sabers, Arab eagle ------Brigadier General -- Three stars forming triangle, Arab eagle Aquid Colonel Two stars in line, Arab eagle Muqaddam ---- Lieutenant Colonel One star, Arab eagle Rais Awwal ---- Major Arab eagle Rais ----------- Captain Three stars Mulazim Awwal First Lieutenant -- Two stars Mulazim Thani - Second Lieutenant - One star Naib Dabit ----- Warrant Officer ---- Arab eagle on upper sleeve Rais Urafa Widha Regimental Sergeant Major ---------- Arab eagle on lower sleeve Rais Urafa Widha Company Sergeant Four slanting stripes on upper Major ---------- sleeve Rais Urafa ----- Company Quarter Three slanting stripes, sur- master Sergeant - mounted by Arab eagle Arif Sergeant --------- Three slanting stripes Naib Arif ------ Corporal Two slanting stripes Jundi Awwal --- Lance Corporal ---- One slanting stripe Jundi Private • Insignia for officer ranks are worn on shoulder straps; noncommissioned officer stripes are black. Branches of service for grade of warrant officer and below are shown by distinetive emblems, colored cap piping and collar patches, Air Force officers wear identical insignia with flight wings added to outer edge of shoulder strap. Equivalent Air Force officer grades are Marshal of the Air Force, Air Chief Marshal, Air Marshal, Air Vice Marshal, Air Commodore, Group Captain, Wing Commander, Squadron Leader, Flight Lieutenant, Flying Officer and Pilot Officer. Naval officers wear identical insignia for equivalent officer grades of Admiral of the Fleet, Admiral, Vice Admiral and Rear Admiral. A Commodore wears one broad stripe; a Captain, four stripes; a Commander, three stripes; a Lieutenant Commander, two and one-half stripes; a Lieutenant, two stripes; a sub-Lieutenant, one stripe ; and a commissioned Warrant Officer, a single fouled anchor. 248 the rank of certain officer grades was replaced by the Arab eagle, similar in design to that used to indicate ranks in the armed forces of the United Arab Republic. Before 1966, all officers were required to serve for 4 years in a grade before becoming eligible for promotion to the next higher grade. On July 24, 1966, a new law permitted the president of the Republic to grant up to 3 years constructive credit to any officer for distinguished service. In early 1968 no information was avail- able to indicate either the extent to which the provisions of this law has been applied in selections for promotions or its effect of the morale of the officer corps. Promotion of enlisted men was based on the recommendation of superior officers, written proficiency examinations and completion of the necessary time in grade. The period of time required to be spent in each grade before advancement was: private, 1 year; lance corporal, 11/2 years; corporal, 2 years; sergeant, 24/2 years; sergeant major, 4 years; and warrant officer, 3 years. There were eight classes of warrant officer, and consecutive advancement for each class required the same 3-year period to be spent in each class. After World War II a cost-of-living allowance was set up for all ranks. In the fall of 1964 a comprehensive system of allowances was established for travel, living abroad and official entertain- ment. Pay and allowances are said to compare favorably in the context of the Iraqi standard of living. UNIFORMS AND RATIONS Iraqi uniforms are similar in style to those of the British Army. They consist of service and field uniforms for both summer and winter and a dress uniform and a mess jacket for officers. The winter service dress uniform of olive-drab wool consists of a single-breasted coat with turned-down collar and patch pockets with squared flaps. Khaki shirts and ties are worn, and trousers are usually without cuffs. The British-type garrison cap is worn, usually with colored piping to denote the branch of service. Mounted officers wear breeches and boots, or cloth leg wraps, and officers assigned to armored units wear berets. The summer dress uniform is similar in style to the winter uniforms but is made of light tan gabardine or cotton twill. The winter field uniform is the British-style olive-drab wool battle dress with waist length jacket and a high collar, which is worn open. The summer field uniform is identical in cut but made of lighter material. Both field uniforms include a web belt; beret, or British-type helmet; short leggings and ankle-high, sturdy- soled shoes. 349 Rations generally are provided according to the type of duty performed. The basic ration is that served in garrison, and all others are obtained by adding to or subtracting from it. Breakfast and the noon meal are fairly light; the principal meal is served in the evening. AWARDS AND DECORATIONS The government and the high command of the armed forces recognize the beneficial morale effect of giving recognition for con- spicuous bravery or outstanding service. In general, liberal use is made of decorations and awards to members of the armed forces, and medals are worn with pride on all appropriate occasions. In early 1968 the order of precedence among all Iraqi decora- tions was not known. The highest award of the government, how- ever, was the Decoration of the Republic, established on May 24, 1959. It may also be presented to foreigners in appreciation of their exceptional services to the nation. The Rafidain Military Medal, also established on May 24, 1959, is awarded in three grades to both military personnel and civilians. It is similarly conferred for outstanding services to the nation and may be pre- sented to foreigners. On August 14, 1967, President Abdul Rahman Mohammad Arif presented this medal to President Josip Broz Tito of Yugoslavia during a visit to Baghdad. The Bravery Medal also came into being on May 24, 1959 and is presented to both military and civilians for outstanding bravery during military operations or in time of war. The General Service Medal, created at the same time, is conferred on military personnel or civilians who actively participate in military operations and who, as a result of their service, receive particular commendation from the Minister of Defense. The May 1941 Operations Medal and the Palestine 1948-1949 Campaign Medal are presented to all Iraqi citizens who rendered active military service during the period May 2–30, 1941, and the first Palestine campaign, respectively. Both of these medals also date from May 24, 1959. The 14 July Revolution Medal (1958), the Fourteenth Ramadan (8 February 1963) and the 18 November 1963 Revolution Medal, are similarly presented to those Iraqi citi- zens who were in military service or who participated in any of these three revolutions. The Medal of the Suppression of the Re- bellion in the North is similarly awarded to military and civilians who actively participated in the operations against the Kurds in the northern provinces. MILITARY JUSTICE The military penal code, as amended, is the basis of the court- 350 CHAPTER 27 PUBLIC ORDER AND SAFETY In early 1968 the state of law and order and the role played by the internal security forces, the national police, in maintaining national stability, were only sketchily known. The 1958 Revolution and the ensuing changes in governments and political alignments, brought about by coups or countercoups, created conditions of ten- sion and unrest, which had an adverse influence on the internal security situation, particularly during the 1959–66 period when armed force was employed on at least four occasions in attempts to overthrow the government. Two of these attempts were successful (see ch. 14, Political Dynamics). The situation was further aggravated by many political and economic problems which also adversely affected internal security. For example, discontent arose from President Abdul Salam Arif's abrogation, on January 6, 1965, of martial law which had been in force since the Revolution of 1958. Moreover, there was strong opposition to the abolition, on January 26, 1965, of the extraordi- nary rights granted to the president, authorizing him to exercise all powers of the National Council of Revolutionary Command (also known as the National Revolutionary Command) formed after the coup of November 1963. Meanwhile, tensions persisted because of slow action on economic reform measures, particularly the delays in distribution of expropriated land to peasants, as promised by government leaders soon after the Revolution of 1958 (see ch. 14, Political Dynamics; ch. 19, Agriculture). A considerable portion of the army continued to be tied down by the lack of a permanent solution to the Kurdish rebellion in the northern provinces. The endemic Kurdish struggle for autonomy remained unsettled and continued to demand much of the govern- ment's attention and resources. Despite the cease-fire brought about by the June 1966 truce, there had been occasional clashes, and relations with the Kurds remained strained. Statistics on crime are generally not available, but homicide probably ranks highest among the serious crimes. Indications are that the lesser crimes of smuggling, pickpocketing, robbery and 353 theft rank high in incidence. Smuggling is increased by the clandestine efforts of proscribed political parties and the needs of the Kurdish insurgents for arms, weapons and food. BACKGROUND Shortly after the outbreak of Anglo-Turkish hostilities in 1914 during World War I, British Indian forces secured the southern- most Iraq province of Basrah and set up a British military admin- istration for the area. As part of this governing body, a police force, modeled along British-Indian lines, was established. This force, largely native and containing British advisers, was the fore- runner of other police units which the British established as they progressively occupied the entire country. Upon assumption of the Mandate over Iraq in 1920, the British proceeded to improve local governmental institutions. Under the provisional national government established by the British Mili- tary Administration in November of that year, a Ministry of the Interior was created, and the police were placed under its jurisdic- tion (see ch. 3, Historical Setting). Also placed under the Ministry of the Interior were the Iraqi Levies, local units which had been formed in 1915 to assist in policing the country. These Levies continued to serve as a separate internal security force but dwin- dled in number and ultimately were disbanded in 1955. The police, with considerable British assistance, continued to improve after Iraq became an independent state in 1932. They had increased in strength from about 3,000 men in the mid-1920's to nearly 8,000 men at the end of the Mandate. Specialized units and activities were developed. In the early 1930's a Mobile Force was created with an initial strength of about 250 men, equipped along military lines and used as a backup force to reinforce other police elements engaged in quelling serious disorders. The police steadily increased in effectiveness and efficiency over the next two decades. British advice and assistance continued until after World War II, and by that time a penal system had been established, and an acceptable level of justice and security prevailed. In the late 1950's the total strength of the police forces had reached substantially more than 25,000, and although there was no information available as to their authorized strength in early 1968, that figure probably had not been greatly exceeded. Meanwhile, the Mobile Force increased rapidly to a strength of approximately 5,000 men, and no official information in the late 1960's became available to indicate any further change. 354 Kirkuk) during the early 1960's, the Mobile Force was partially reorganized, and special forces-type (commando) units were added to its organization. More modern equipment and armament were provided, and plans were made to place the Force on equal terms with the army with respect to pay and retirement privileges. LEGAL SYSTEM The legal system has a history of Western, religious and tribal influences, all of which found expression in one or more types of courts. In mid-1968 criminal prosecution, however, was limited to the criminal, Western-prototype courts which formed the main structure of the judiciary. Religious courts (sharia) were limited to handling matters relating to personal status, such as marriage, divorce and inheritance. Tribal courts operated until 1958 and were active both in the criminal and civil field. Although super- vised by the Ministry of Justice as were the other courts, the revolutionary government of General Abdul Karim Qasim abol- ished tribal courts as being discriminatory and outmoded (see ch. 13, The Governmental System). Criminal Code The Criminal Code in effect in early 1968 was based on the Baghdad Penal Code, formulated by the British military in 1918 to replace the Ottoman Codes used by the Turks. Although it drew heavily on Ottoman law, which, in turn, was based largely on the French legal tradition, the Baghdad Code included certain amend- ments and additions adapted from the Egyptian Penal Code. These modifications were designed to bring the Western-inspired law more into conformity with Islamic law and Middle Eastern cus- toms. In August 1958 a new law for trying officials of the old regime was added to the Baghdad Penal Code and the criminal procedure. This provided for the trial of any person who had held government office, had been a member of parliament or commissioned to per- form a public service and had been charged with conspiracy or corruption. The validity of the new legislation was made retroac- tive to September 1, 1939. Under the monarchy(1921–58), the administration of justice among the nomads followed the policy, inaugurated under the Mandate, of giving official sanction to tribal customary law. A separate code, the Tribal Criminal and Civil Disputes Regulation, governed criminal procedure in tribal areas. In cases involving conflicts between Western-derived law of the country at large and local custom, particularly crimes of violence arising from matters 357 of honor and vengeance, the state was usually lenient in its prose- cution. One of the first acts of the new republic after its establish- ment in 1958 was to abolish the tribal legal systems and make the Baghdad Penal Code applicable to the whole country. The de- finitions of crimes and the penalties prescribed therein became uniform throughout the nation, and the judicial powers of the tribal chiefs over large segments of the population officially ended. Criminal Courts The criminal court system consists of courts of first instance (including magistrate courts), courts of sessions, courts of appeal and the Court of Cassation. The system, in the main, follows the French pattern as first introduced during the rule of the Ottoman Turks and revised several times since then. Courts of first instance are located in each province and also in certain districts and subdistricts. Wherever there are courts of first instance, there are magistrate or penal courts which are pre- sided over by the first instance court judge. Magistrate courts have limited jurisdiction and handle the great majority of lesser crim- inal cases involving petty offenses. They can impose fines and im- prisonment according to the provisions of the Criminal Code. Courts of sessions, located in each of the five judicial districts (Baghdad, Basra, Hillah, Kirkuk and Mosul), exercise unlimited or general original jurisdiction in criminal cases and intermediate appellate jurisdiction in cases adjudged by courts of first in- stance. The courts are presided over by a president or a vice presi- dent assisted by three judges. The president of a court of sessions is also president of the court of appeals in the same district. In case of need all judges of courts of first instance may be members of a court of sessions in the same judicial district. The Court of Cassation, sitting in Baghdad, is the court of highest recourse for both civil and criminal cases. It consists of a president, a number of vice presidents and not less than 15 perma- nent members. It is divided into four benches, criminal, civil, gen- eral and personal status (religious court matters). There may be more than one of each of such benches, and each is constituted of not less than three judges except in cases of crimes involving the death penalty, when the criminal bench is composed of five judges. All original judgments of a court of sessions must be submitted for review and confirmation to the Court of Cassation, which may confirm, reduce, remit or suspend sentences of lower courts or may refuse to confirm the findings of a lower court and order a retrial. They jury system is not used in criminal procedure. All phases of investigation and trial are, in general, the responsibility of the 358 public prosecutors and magistrates; in some localities police officers may be used as public prosecutors if the need arises. All judges are appointed by executive decree, and the organization of the judiciary is regulated by law. The administrative supervision of the courts and judges is the responsibility of the Ministry of Justice and is carried out by inspectors appointed for the purpose. Although the supervisory system is intended to be impartial and objective, it nevertheless carries the inherent danger of imparting indirect influence over the judiciary through the pressure of adul- terated reports (see ch. 13, The Governmental System). State Security Courts In August 1958 the State Council of the Republic established a system of military courts, including a Supreme Military Tribunal for the trial and punishment of certain crimes against the state committed during periods of martial law. These courts operated in most of the larger population centers during the 1958–65 period of martial law and became an important adjunct to the judicial system. They tried important personages, including high govern- ment officials and revolt leaders charged with serious crimes, such as conspiring against the security of the Republic, causing deaths during street demonstrations or by torture during investigations. Depending on the gravity of the offense, sentences varied from several years imprisonment to death. When martial law was re- pealed, this auxiliary system of justice was revamped in February 1965 into a system of state security courts, similarly staffed and also charged with hearing cases involving offenses against the ex- ternal or internal security of the state during periods of emer- gency (see ch. 13, The Governmental System). A state security court consists of five members appointed by the Prime Minister with the approval of the Council of Ministers. Three members are army officers of at least lieutenant colonel rank, the senior of whom acts as president; the remaining two members are civilian judges. Crimes within the jurisdiction of the courts are investigated under the supervision of judges appointed for the purpose, and when so indicated, public prosecutors present the cases for trial. The accused has the right to select his own counsel for defense, but if unable to do so, the court appoints a lawyer to defend him. In addition to the state security courts, whose number may vary according to need under a particular declared emergency, a special Court of Cassation for State Security (sometimes called Supreme State Security Court) is provided for. This court also consists of five members, but three of them are civilian judges from the Court 359 of Cassation, the senior of whom holds the presidency. The re- maining two members are army officers of the rank of colonel or above. Sentences passed by the state security courts normally are car- ried out promptly. Appeals to the Court of Cassation for State Security can be made on all sentences and must be presented within 20 days after pronouncement; those involving capital pun- ishment or penal servitude for life are automatically referred to the higher courts, and such sentences also must be approved ulti- mately by the president before being carried out. THE PENAL SYSTEM Prisons and jails are the responsibility of the director general of prisons under the minister of labor and social affairs. Official pub- lications make no clear distinction between prisons and jails; the terms apparently are used indiscriminately. Major jails are lo- cated at Baghdad and Mosul (in the north) and at Basra and Hillah (in the south). There are centers of detention, commonly called jails, within the provinces to the north of Baghdad at Kirkuk and Baqubah, to the west of Ramadi, and in the south at Amarah and Nasiriyah. The Ministry of Planning reported in 1966 that jails at Sulaymaniyah in the north and at Kut in the south were closed in early 1965, and the prisoners were trans- ferred to other detention centers. Camps for the detention of polit- ical prisoners are maintained and administered separately from the formal prison system. Female prisoners, too, are segregated and are kept only at certain of the major prison centers. Prisoners are usually divided into those who are serving court sentences, those awaiting trial and political detainees. Each group is treated differently, and ordinarily convicted prisoners are held separately from all other categories. Juvenile offenders are incar- cerated in the reformatory at Baghdad, and limited government efforts are made to rehabilitate these juvenile delinquents to good citizenship. A primary school for both boys and girls is operated at the site, and vocational training programs are pursued by all in- mates. Political prisoners and those who are awaiting trial are not forced to work and are granted certain other privileges. Convicted prisoners are employed in elementary prison industries or on labor projects and are entitled to receive compensation. Information is lacking as to whether social reforms or other rehabilitation pro- grams have been instituted in the prison system at large. CRIMES AND PUNISHMENT Statistics on crime as well as incidence of crime are the respon- 360 sibility of the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs, but very few are published by the state-controlled press. The indications from scattered press reports are that traffic offenses, smuggling, pocket picking, robbery and theft rank high in incidence. Because of the revenge tradition, homicide probably ranks highest among the ser- ious crimes, particularly in the tribal areas. Many crimes of vio- lence, including homicide, undoubtedly derive from the strict Moslem and tribal rules regarding behavior toward women. Much stealing and thievery, by both professionals and nonprofessionals, probably go unreported because of the confusion and congestion in the market centers and crowded bazaars. Smuggling and Black Marketing Coping with smugglers and black marketeers requires the re- sources of a considerable portion of the various internal security forces, who cooperate in attempting to control these illegal activi- ties. The allure of large and quick financial gain has attracted many individuals into smuggling and black marketing which over the years have remained on a sizable scale and have represented an appreciable loss of national revenue. The specialized units of the civil police use a large portion of their time and personnel in apprehending smugglers, in the sur- veillance of routes and border crossing points and in investigating individuals and rings suspected of corruption in connection with this illicit business. Proscribed political parties, particularly the Communists and Baathists, support organized smuggling rings to supply their clandestine efforts throughout the country. Also, the Kurdish insurgent forces are heavily supplied by arms, weapons and food smuggled to them across Iraq's borders. A great variety of contraband items are involved in this un- lawful trade, one of the most important being narcotics in several of its various forms. In recognition of this situation Iraq in 1964 joined nine other Arab states in forming the Arab International Organization for Social Defense, designed primarily to promote mutual cooperation in combating illegal production, use and traffic in narcotics. Informaton regarding the success of this joint ven- ture is meager. Other articles often seized by the authorities in- clude firearms, clothing, watches and transistor radios. The moun- tainous and desert country, barren and sparsely settled for long stretches along the frontier, is ideal for smuggling operations and adds materially to the difficulties of detection and capture. 361 Hansen, Henny Harald. The Kurdish Woman's Life. (National- museets Skrifter Etnografisk Roekke, VII.) Copenhagen: Na- tionalmuseets, 1961. Hitti, Philip K. A Short History of the Near East. Princeton: Van Nostrand, 1966. Izzeddin, Nejla. The Arab World: Past, Present and Future. Chicago: Regnery, 1953. Kinnane, Dirk. The Kurds and Kurdistan. London: Oxford Uni- versity Press, 1964. Kirk, George E. Contemporary Arab Politics: A Concise History. New York: Praeger, 1961. Langley, Kathleen M. The Industrialization of Iraq. (Harvard Middle Eastern Monograph Series, V.) Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1967. Lenczowski, George. “Iraq: Seven Years of Revolution,” Current History, XLIX, May 1965, 281–289. Peristiany, Jean G. (ed.). Honour and Shame: The Values of Mediterranean Society. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1965. Quint, Malcolm. “The Idea of Progress in an Iraqi Village,” Middle East Journal, XII, Fall 1958, 369-384. Salim, S. M. Marsh Dwellers of the Middle Euphrates Delta. (London School of Economics, Monographs on Social Anthro- pology, No. 23.) London: Athalone Press, 1962. Stewart, Desmond, and Haycock, John. New Babylon: A Portrait of Iraq. London: Collins, 1956. Vernier, Bernard. L'Irak d'aujourd'hui. Paris : Librarie Armand Colin, 1963. Warriner, Doreen. Land Reform and Development in the Middle East: A Study of Egypt, Syria and Iraq. London: Oxford Uni- versity Press for the Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1962. OTHER SOURCES USED Abu Jaber, Kamel S. The Arab Ba'th Socialist Party: History Ideology, and Organization. Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1966. Adams, Doris Goodrich. Iraq's People and Resources. (University of California Publications in Economics, XVIII.) Berkeley: Uni- versity of California Press, 1958. Ali, Abudllah Yusuf. The Holy Qur'an: Text, Translation and Commentary. Washington: American International Printing, 1946. Alitovskiy, S.N. et al. Agrarnya Problem v Irake (Agrarian Changes in the Republic of Iraq, 1958–1965). (Trans. from Russian.) Moscow: Nauka Publishing House, 1966. 364 Alitovskiy, S. N. Sovremennyy Irak (Contemporary Iraq).(Trans. from Russian.) Moscow: USSR Academy of Science, Institute of Asian Peoples, 1965. Al-Madfai, Kahtan A. J. “Baghdad.” Pages 39-63 in Morroe Berger (ed.), The New Metropolis in the Arab World. New Delhi: Allied Publishers, 1963. Al-Toma, Salih Jawel. “The Teaching of Classical Arabic to Speakers of the Colloquial in Iraq: A Study of the Problem of Linguistic Duality and Its Impact on Language Education.” Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation. Harvard University, 1957. The American Assembly. The United States and the Middle East. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1964. The American University of Beirut. Political Studies and Public Administration Department. Chronology of Arab Politics, III. Beirut: 1965. Anderson, J.N.D. “Changes in the Law of Personal Status in Iraq,” International and Comparative Law Quarterly, XII, 1963, 1026_1031. . “A Draft Code of Personal Law for Iraq,” Bulletin of the London School of Oriental and African Studies, XV, 1953, 43–60. - Islamic Law in the Modern World. New York: New York University Press, 1959. -. “A Law of Personal Status for Iraq,” International and Comparative Law Quarterly, IX, 1960, 542-563. Antonius, George. The Arab Awakening: The Story of the Arab Nationalist Movement. New York: Capricorn Books, 1946. Arab Information Center. Education in the Arab States. (Infor- mation Paper No. 25, I-XIII.) New York: AIC, 1966. Arberry, Arthur J. (ed.). Arabic Poetry. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1965. - Revelation and Reason in Islam. London: Allen and Un- win, 1957. Arfa, Hassan. The Kurds: An Historical and Political Study. London: Oxford University Press, 1966. Arnold, Thomas. Painting in Islam. New York: Dover, 1928. “Art in Iraq,” Economist, CCVI, No. 6235 February 23, 1963, 688. Azzam, 'Abd-al-Rahman. The Eternal Message of Muhammad. New York: New American Library of World Literature, 1964. Baali, Fuad. Relation of the People to the Land in Southern Iraq. (University of Florida Monographs, Social Sciences, No. 31.) Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1956. - "Social Factors in Iraqi Rural-Urban Migration," Ameri- can Journal of Economic and Sociological Research, XXV, Octo- ber 1966, 359-364. 365 Baer, Gabriel. Population and Society in the Arab East. New York: Praeger, 1964. Berger, Morroe (ed.). The New Metropolis in the Arab World. New Delhi: Allied Publishers, 1963. Blanc, Haim. "Iraqi Dialect Studies.” Pages 48–53 in Harvey Sobelman (ed.), Arabic Dialect Studies. Washington: Center for Applied Linguistics, Middle East Institute, 1962. Bottero, Jean; Cassin, Elena; and Vercoutter, Jean (eds.). The Near East: The Early Civilization. (Trans., R.F. Tannenbaum.) New York: Delacorte Press, 1967. Boulanger, Robert. The Middle East: Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, Iraq and Iran. (Hachette World Guides.) Paris: Hachette, 1966. Bullard, Sir Reader (ed.). The Middle East: A Political and Eco- nomic Survey. (3d ed.) London: Oxford University Press, 1958. Campbell, Charles Grimshaw. From Town and Tribe. London: Benn, 1952. -. Tales from the Arab Tribes. New York: Macmillan, 1950. - Told in the Market Place. London: Benn, 1954. Chambers, Carl. “Higher Education Students in Iraq: The 1966 Picture.” N.pl.: 1966 (unpublished manuscript not available for public distribution). Clarity, E. E.; Stowasser, Karl; and Wolfe, Ronald G. (eds.). A Dictionary of Iraqi Arabic: English-Arabic. (The Richard Slade Harrell Arabic Series, No. 6) Washington: Georgetown University Press, 1964. Coon, Carleton Stevens. Caravan. New York: Holt, 1951. Coulson, Noel James. A History of Islamic Law. (Islamic Surveys, No. 2.) Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1964. Coxill, H. Wakelin; Grubb, Kenneth; and Knapp, Kathleen A. (eds.). World Christian Handbook, 1968. Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1967. Cressey, George B. Crossroads: Land and Life in Southwest Asia. Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1960. Donaldson, Dwight M. The Shi'ite Religion. (Luzac's Oriental Religious Series, No. 6.) London: Luzac, 1933. Drower, Lady Ethel Stefana Stevens. "Arabs of the Hor al Ha- wiza.” In Henry Field (ed.), The Anthropology of Iraq. (An- thropolitical Series, XXX, No. 2, Pt. 1.) Chicago: Field Museum of Natural History, 1949. - By Tigris and Euphrates. London: Hurst and Blackett, 1923. - Folk Tales of Iraq. London: Oxford University Press, 1931. - The Mandeans of Iraq and Iran. Leiden: Brill, 1962. - "Mandean Polemic. “Bulletin of the London School of 366 Hilali, Abdul Razak. A Modern Guide to Iraq. (1st ed.) Baghdad: n.pub., 1957. Hourani, Albert. Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age, 1798–1939. London: Oxford University Press, 1962. - Minorities in the Arab World. London: Oxford University Press, 1947. Imari, A. J. “Pulmonary Hydatid Disease in Iraq,” American Journal of Tropical Medicine, XI, No. 4, July 1962. International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. The Economic Development of Iraq. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1952. International Yearbook of Education, XXVII, No. 286. Geneva: International Bureau of Education, 1965. Iraq: A Pictorial Record. Cologne-Deutz: Orient Mercur-Verlag, 1958. Iraq. Laws, Statutes, etc. Ministry of Culture and Guidance. “Law for Personal Status, No. 188 of 1959,” Weekly Gazette of the Republic of Iraq (Baghdad), 1960, 365–379. Law No. 87 of 1965: "The Five Years Economic Plan, 1965– 1969," Weekly Gazette of the Republic of Iraq (Baghdad), No. 48, December 1, 1965. Iraq. Ministry of Planning. Central Bureau of Statistics. Section of Research and Publicity. Statistical Abstract, 1962. Baghdad: Government Press, 1963. - Statistical Abstract, 1965. Baghdad: Government Press, 1966. Iraq. Summer Resort and Tourism Service. Iraq: A Guidebook. Baghdad: 1961. "Iraqi Population 8,261,527 in October 1965,” Baghdad News, January 14, 1966, 2. Jamali, Sarah Powell. Folk Tales from the City of the Golden . Domes. Beirut: Khayats, 1965. Jeffery, Arthur (ed.). Islam: Muhammad and His Religion. (The Library of Religion Series, No. 6.) New York: Liberal Arts Press, 1958. Jwaideh, Zuhair E. “The New Civil Code of Iraq,” George Wash- ington Law Review, XXII, 1953, 176–186. Kerr, Malcolm. The Arab Cold War, 1958–1967: A Study of Ideology in Politics. (2d ed.) London: Oxford University Press, 1967. Khadduri, Majid. Independent Iraq, 1932–1958: A Study in Iraqi Politics. (2d ed.) London: Oxford University Press, 1960. Khadduri, Majid and Liebesny, Herbert J. (eds.). Law in the Middle East, I. Washington: Middle East Institute, 1955. 368 Kirk, George E. A Short History of the Middle East: From the Rise of Islam to Modern Times. London: Methuen, 1952. Langley, Kathleen M. "Iraq: Some Aspects of the Economic Scene,” Middle East Journal, XVIII, Spring 1964, 180–188. Laqueur, Walter Z. Communism and Nationalism in the Middle East. New York: Praeger 1956. Laqueur, Walter Z. (ed.). The Middle East in Transition: Studies in Contemporary History. New York: Praeger, 1958. Lecref, Jean. “Poesie dialectical iraqqienne dans les millieux bagdadiens,” Arabica, IX, No. 3, 1962, 435–446. Lenczowski, George. The Middle East in World Affairs. (3d. ed.) Ithaca: Cornell University Press 1962. Levy, Reuben. The Social Structure of Islam. Cambridge: Cam- bridge University Press, 1957. Lewis, Bernard. The Arabs in History. London: Hutchinson's University Library, 1950. - The Middle East and the West. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1964. Liebesny, Herbert J. "Impact of Western Law in the Countries of the Middle East,” George Washington Law Review, XXII, 1953, 127–141. Longrigg, Stephen H. Iraq, 1900 to 1950: A Political, Social, and Economic History. London: Oxford University Press, 1956. Longrigg, Stephen H., and Stoakes, Frank. Iraq. London: Benn, 1958. Lovejoy, Bahija. The Land and People of Iraq. Philadelphia: Lip- pincott, 1964. Margueron, J. C. Mesopotamia. Cleveland: World Publishing, 1965. Monteil, Vincent. L'arabe moderne. (Etudes Arabes et Islamiques, III.) Paris: Librairie Klincksieck, 1960. Nolte, Richard H. (ed.). The Modern Middle East. New York: Atherton Press, 1963. Obermann, Julian. “Islamic Origins: A Study in Background and Foundations.” Pages 58–120 in Nabih Amin Faris (ed.), The Arab Heritage. New York: Russell and Russell, 1963. Parker, Orin D., and Parker, Garland G. Iraq: A Study of the Educational System of Iraq and Guide to the Academic Place- ment of Students from Iraq in United States Educational In- stitutions. Washington: American Friends of the Middle East, 1965. Peaslee, Amos J. Constitutions of Nations: Asia, Australia and Oceana, II. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1966. 369 Phillips, Doris G. “Rural to Urban Migration in Iraq,” Economic Development and Cultural Change, VII, No. 3, Pt. 2, April 1959, 405-421. Pickthall, Mohammed Marmaduke. The Meaning of the Glorious Koran. New York: New American Library, 1953. Pike, E. Royston (ed.). Encyclopedia of Religion and Religions. New York: Meridian Books, 1958. Polk, William R. The United States and the Arab World. Cam- bridge: Harvard University Press, 1965. Qubain, Fahim I. The Reconstruction of Iraq, 1950–1957. New York: Praeger, 1958. Raphaeli, Nimrod. “Agrarian Reform in Iraq: Some Political and Administrative Problems,” Journal of Administration Over- seas, V, April 1966, 102–111. "Report on the American Jewish Congress European Office: A Survey of Jews in Arab Countries, New York Times, January 29, 1968, 10. Rice, David Talbot. Islamic Art. New York: Praeger, 1965. Rosenthal, Erwin I. J. Political Thought in Medieval Islam. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1958. Roux, George. Ancient Iraq. Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1967. Schacht, Joseph. An Introduction to Islamic Law: Oxford, Claren- don Press, 1964. Schwantes, Siegfried J. A Short History of the Ancient Near East. Grand Rapids: Baker Book House, 1965. Simmons, John L. "Agricultural Development in Iraq; Planning and Management Failures,” Middle East Journal, XIX, Spring 1965, 129–141. Smeaton, Winifred. “Tattooing Among the Arabs of Iraq," American Anthropologist, XXXIX, 1937, 53–71. Stark, Freya. Baghdad Sketches. New York: Dutton, 1964. Statistical Yearbook, 1965. Paris: United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, 1966. Thesiger, Wilfred. The Marsh Arabs. New York: Dutton, 1964. Thesiger, Wilfred, and Gavin, Maxwell. "Marsh Dwellers of Southern Iraq,” National Geographic Magazine, CXIII, No. 2, February 1958, 204–239. Ungor, Beret Zeki. “Women in the Middle East and North Africa and Universal Suffrage,” Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, CCCLXXV, January 1968, 72–81. United Nations. Population and Vital Statistics Report. (Statisti- cal Papers, Series A, XIX, No. 4.) New York: 1967. United Nations. Statistical Office. Department of Economic and Social Affairs. Demographic Yearbook, 1966. New York: 1967. 370 United Nations. Statistical Office, Department of Economic and Social Affairs. Statistical Yearbook, 1966. New York: 1967. United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization. The Problems of the Arid Zone. (Proceedings of the Paris Symposium.) Paris: UNESCO, 1962. - World Survey of Education, IV: Higher Education. New York: UNESCO Publications Center, 1966. University of California at Los Angeles. Festival of Oriental Music and the Related Arts. Los Angeles: UCLA, 1960. Van Ess, Dorothy. Fatima and Her Sisters. New York: Day, 1961. Wallbank, T. Walter, and Taylor, Alastair M. Civilization: Past and Present, I. (4th ed.) Chicago: Scott, Foresman, 1960. Walter Reed Army Medical Center. Medical Information and In- telligence Agency. Health and Sanitary Data for Iraq. Wash- ington: April 1960. Wardy, Aly. A Study in the Society of Iraq. (Trans. from Arabic.) Baghdad: University of Baghdad, 1965. Wehr, Hans. A Dictionary of Modern Written Arabic. (Ed., J. Milton Cowan.) Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1966. Williams, John Alden (ed.). Islam. (Great Religions of Modern Man Series.) New York: George Braziller, 1962. Woodhead, D. R., and Beene, Wayne (eds.). A Dictionary of Iraqi Arabic: Arabic-English. (The Richard Slade Harrell Arabic Series, No. 10.) Washington: Georgetown University Press, 1967. World Health Organization. Third Report on the World Health Situation, 1961–1964. (No. 155.) Geneva: WHO, April 1967. Young, Elizabeth. "Cause and Effect: Iraqi Literature Today," Arab World, IV, No. 8, 1958. (Various issues of the Quarterly Economic Review (formerly Three-Monthly Economic Review—London], from February 1963 to December 1967, and Annual Supplements, 1963–67, were also used in the preparation of this section.) 371 Section II. Political RECOMMENDED FURTHER READING Among the sources consulted in the preparation of this section, the following are recommended as additional reading on the basis of quality and general availability. Abu Jaber, Kamel S. The Arab Ba'th Socialist Party: History, Ideology, and Organization. Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1966. The American University of Beirut Political Studies and Public Administration Department. Chronology of Arab Politics, I. Beirut: 1963. - Chronology of Arab Politics, II. Beirut: 1964. —. Chronology of Arab Politics, III. Beirut: 1965. Arfa, Hassan. The Kurds: A Historical and Political Study. London: Oxford University Press, 1966. Halpern, Manfred. The Politics of Social Change in the Middle East and North Africa. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963. Khadduri, Majid. Independent Iraq, 1932–1958: A Study in Iraqi Politics. (2d ed.) London: Oxford University Press, 1960. Kinnane, Dirk. The Kurds and Kurdistan. London: Oxford Uni- versity Press, 1964. Lenczowski, George. “Iraq: Seven Years of Revolution," Current History, XLIX, May 1965, 281-289. Naamani, Israel T. “The Kurdish Drive for Self-Determination," Middle East Journal, XX, Summer 1966, 279–295. Quint, Malcolm. “The Idea of Progress in an Iraqi Village,” Middle East Journal, XII, Fall 1958, 369-384. Wenner, Lettie M. "Arab-Kurdish Rivalries in Iraq,” Middle East Journal, XVII, Nos. 1 and 2, Winter and Spring, 1963, 68–82. OTHER SOURCES USED Abid, A. Al-Marayati. A Diplomatic History of Modern Iraq. New York: Speller, 1961. Alitovskiy, S. N. et al. Souvremannyy Irak (Contemporary Iraq). 373 (Trans. from Russian.) Moscow: USSR Academy of Science, Institute of Asian Peoples, 1966. The American Assembly. The United States and the Middle East. Englewood Cliffs : Prentice-Hall, 1964. Arab Information Center. Basic Documents of the League of Arab States. (Document Collections, No. 1.) New York: AIC, 1955. Carman, Ernest Day. Soviet Imperialism: Russia's Drive Toward World Domination. Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1950. Chejne, Anwar G. “The Use of History of Modern Arab Writers," Middle East Journal, XIV, Autumn 1960, 382_396. Dawn, C. Ernest. “The Rise of Arabism in Syria,” Middle East Journal, XVI, Spring 1962, 145–168. DeNovo, John A. American Interests and Policies in the Middle East, 1900–1939. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1963. Eagleton, William, Jr. The Kurdish Republic of 1946. New York: Oxford University Press, 1963. Edmonds, Cecil J. “The Kurdish War in Iraq: A Plan for Peace,” Royal Central Asian Journal, LIV, Pt. 1, February 1967, 10–23. Europa Publications. The Europa Yearbook, 1967: Africa, The Americas, Asia and Australasia, II. London: Europa, 1967. - The Middle East and North Africa, 1966–67. (13th ed.) London: 1966. Faris, Nabih Amin, and Husayn, Mohammed Tawfik. The Crescent in Crisis: An Interpretative Study of the Modern Arab World. Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 1955. Fisher, Carol A., and Krinsky, Fred. Middle East in Crisis: A Historical and Documentary Review. Syracuse: Syracuse Uni- versity Press, 1959. Fisher, Sydney N. (ed.). The Military in the Middle East: Prob- lems in Society and Government. Columbus: Ohio State Uni- versity Press, 1963. Gibney, Frank. The Khrushchev Pattern. New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1960. Glubb, John Bagot. Britain and the Arabs: A Study of Fifty Years, 1908–1958. London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1959. Goldman, Marshall I. Soviet Foreign Aid. New York: Praeger, 1967. Grassmuck, George. “The Electoral Process in Iraq, 1952-1958," Middle East Journal, XIV, Autumn 1960, 397-415. Harari, Maurice. Government and Politics of the Middle East. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1962. 374 Hinton, Harold C. Communist China in World Politics. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1966. Iraq. Embassy in London. Iraq: Official Statements of Policy on Internal Arab and Foreign Affairs. N.pl.: 1965. - The High Committee for the Celebration of the 14th July. The Iraqi Revolution in Its Fourth Year. Baghdad: 1962. Iraq. Laws, Statutes, etc. Ministry of Culture and Guidance. “Law No. 87 of 1965: The Five Years Economic Plan, 1965–1969,” Weekly Gazette of the Republic of Iraq (Baghdad), No. 48, December 1, 1965. Iraq. Ministry of Planning. Central Bureau of Statistics. Section of Research and Publicity. Statistical Abstract, 1965. Bagh- dad Government Press, 1966. Kaamani, Israel T. "The Kurdish Drive for Self-Determination,” Middle East Journal, XX, Summer 1966, 279–295. Kanovsky, E. “Arab Economic Unity,” Middle East Journal, XXI, Spring 1967, 213-235. Kerr, Malcolm. The Arab Cold War, 1958–1967: A Study of Ideology in Politics. (2d ed.) London: Oxford University Press, 1967. Kerr, Malcolm H. “The Emergence of a Socialist Ideology in Egypt,” Middle East Journal, XVI, Spring 1962, 127–144. Khadduri, Majid. “General Nuri's Flirtations with the Axis Powers,” Middle East Journal, XVI, Summer 1962, 328–336. Kirk, George E. Contemporary Arab Politics: A Concise History. New York: Praeger, 1961. Laqueur, Walter Z. Communism and Nationalism in the Middle East. New York: Praeger, 1956. Laqueur, Walter Z. (ed.). The Middle East in Transition: Studies in Contemporary History. New York: Praeger, 1958. Lenczowski, George. The Middle East in World Affairs. (3d ed.). Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1962. Lewis, Bernard. The Middle East and the West. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1964. Lindley, William R. “The Press of Baghdad and Iraq as Seen by an Outsider,” Journalism Quarterly, XXXXII, Summer 1965, 450-452. Longrigg, Stephen H. Iraq, 1900 to 1950: A Political, Social, and Economic History. London: Oxford University Press, 1956. - "Iraq's 'Claim to Kuwait,” Royal Central Asian Journal, XLVIII, Pts. 3 and 4, July-October 1961, 309, 310. Longrigg, Stephen H., and Stoakes, Frank. Iraq. London: Benn, 1958. 375 Baali, Fuad. “Relationships of Man to the Land in Iraq," Rural Sociology, XXXI, June 1966, 171–182. - "Social Factors in Iraqi Rural-Urban Migration," Amer- ican Journal of Economic and Sociological Research, XXV, October 1966, 359-364. Basrah and Mosul Petroleum Companies. Reviews for 1966. London: Iraq Petroleum Company, n.d. Beling, W. A. “Political Trends in Arab Labor,” Middle East Journal, XV, Winter 1961, 29–39. "Bilan des Transformations socialistes," Etudes Mensuelle Sur l'Economie et les Finances de la Syrie et des Pays Arabes, No. 94, October 1965, 84–86. Cressey, George B. Crossroads: Land and Life in Southeast Asia. Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1960. “Currency in Iraq,” International Financial News Survey, XIII, January 27, 1961, 22. Europa Publications. The Europa Yearbook, 1967: Africa, The Americas, Asia and Australasia, II. London: 1967. - The Middle East and North Africa, 1967–68. (14th ed.) London: 1967. Fernea, Robert A. “Irrigation and Social Organization Among the El Shabana: A Group of Tribal Cultivators in Southern Iraq.” Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation. University of Chicago, 1959. Finnie, D. "Recruitment and Training of Labor: The Middle East Oil Industry,” Middle East Journal, XII, Spring 1958, 127–143. “Fund Operations in April,” International Financial News Sur- vey, XVII, June 4, 1965, 200. “Fund Operations in August,” International Financial News Sur- vey, XVII, October 8, 1965, 380. Great Britain. Naval Intelligence Division. Iraq and the Persian Gulf. Oxford: 1944. Halpern, Manfred. The Politics of Social Change in the Middle East and North Africa. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963. Haseeb, K. “National Income of Iraq, 1962 and 1963.” (Lecture delivered to a Seminar on May 29, 1964.) Beirut: Economic Research Institute of the American University of Beirut, 1964. "Increases in Fund Quotas Approved,” International Financial News Survey, XVIII, February 25, 1966, 57. International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. The Economic Development of Iraq. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1952. 378 Iraq. Agricultural Bank of Iraq. The Agricultural Bank Law and the Banks' Regulation with Its Internal Regulation. Bagh- dad: 1962. Iraq. Central Bank of Iraq. Laws, Regulations and Ordinances. Baghdad: 1965. - Statistics and Research Department. Annual Report, 1962. Baghdad: 1962. - Annual Report, 1963. Baghdad: 1963. - Annual Report, 1964. Baghdad: 1964. - Annual Report, 1965. Baghdad: 1965. Irag. Laws, Statutes, etc. Ministry of Culture and Guidance. “Law No. 70 of 1961: Five-Year Detailed Economic Plan for 1961–62 to 1965– 66,” Weekly Gazette of the Republic of Iraq (Baghdad), No. 33, August 15, 1962. - "Law No. 87 of 1965: The Five Years Economic Plan, 1965–1969,” Weekly Gazette of the Republic of Iraq (Baghdad), No. 48, December 1, 1965. Iraq. Ministry of Planning. Central Bureau of Statistics. Section of Research and Publicity. Statistical Abstract, 1965. Baghdad: Government Press, 1966. "Iraq,” International Financial Statistics, XIV, December 1961, 160, 161; and February 1968, 172, 173. “Iraq Draws from Fund,” International Financial News Survey, XIX, June 2, 1967, 165. Langley, Kathleen M. The Industrialization of Iraq. (Harvard Middle Eastern Monograph Series, V.) Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1967. - "Iraq: Some Aspects of the Economic Scene," Middle East Journal, XVIII, Spring 1964, 180–188. “La Masse monetaire," Etudes Mensuelle Sur l'Economie et les Finances de la Syrie et des Pays Arabes, No. 94, October 1965, 95, 96. “Monnaie et Credit,” Etudes Mensuelle Sur l'Economie et les Finances de la Syrie et des Pays Arabes, No. 101, May 1966, 120-123. “Nationalization Measures in Iraq,” International Financial News Survey, XVI, No. 31, August 7, 1964, 256. "New Social Security Law in Iraq,” International Labor Review, XCI, June 1965, 521-523. Phillips, Doris G. “Rural to Urban Migration in Iraq," Economic Development and Cultural Change, VII, No. 3, Pt. 2, April 1959, 405–421. 379 Section IV. National Security RECOMMENDED FURTHER READING Among the sources consulted in the preparation of this section, the following are recommended as additional reading on the basis of quality and general availability. Kelidar, Abbas. “The Struggle for Arab Unity,” World Today, XXIII, No. 7, July 1967, 292–300. Kerr, Malcolm. The Arab Cold War, 1958–1967: A Study of Ideology in Politics. (2d ed.) London: Oxford University Press, 1967. Khadduri, Majid. Independent Iraq, 1932–1958: A Study in Iraqi Politics. (2d ed.) London: Oxford University Press, 1960. - "The Role of the Military in Iraqi Society.” Pages 41-51 in Sydney N. Fisher (ed.), The Military in the Middle East: Problems in Society and Government. Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1963. Lenczowski, George. The Middle East in World Affairs. (3d ed.) Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1962. Longrigg, Stephen H. Iraq, 1900 to 1950: A Political, Social and Economic History. London: Oxford University Press, 1956. Longrigg, Stephen H., and Stoakes, Frank. Iraq. London: Benn, 1958. Polk, William R. The United States and the Arab World. Cam- bridge: Harvard University Press, 1965. Vernier, Bernard. L'Irak d'aujourd'hui. Paris : Librairie Armand Colin, 1963. OTHER SOURCES USED Alitovskiy, S. N., et al. Sovremennyy Irak (Contemporary Iraq). (Trans. from Russian.) Moscow: USSR Academy of Science, Institute of Asian Peoples, 1966. Cramer, James. The World's Police. London: Cassell, 1964. “Decree Concerning the Reform School,” Al-Waqai al-Iraqiyyah (The Iraqi Gazette), Baghdad, October 23, 1962. [Translated by U.S. Department of Commerce, Office of Technical Services, 381 GLOSSARY abaya-A long black shroud worn by women; it conceals the entire figure but not the face. aga (also agha)-Kurdish tribal leader. agal-A rope-like band used to secure the kaffiyah, q.v. 'alim (plural 'ulama)—Literally, a learned man. Refers to Islamic scholars in general. amanah-Directorate. 'ashirah-A subtribe. 'Ashurah-A Shiite day of mourning which falls on 10 Muharram, q.v. asimah-Capital. In Iraq, Baghdad. awqaf-Moslem religious endowments. Singular is waqf. balad—Town, city, community or country. baladiyah-Municipality. bayt-A household (can also be used to mean a house). bilad—Plural of balad, q.v. dervish (also darvesh; darwesh; darwish)—Member of a Moslem religious fraternity of monks or mendicants noted for its form of devotional exercises which frequently include concerted bodily movements. Dhu al Hijjah-Twelfth month of the Islamic calendar. Month during which the Pilgrimage to Mecca takes place. dinar—The gold monetary unit of Iraq. Officially known as the Iraqi Dinar. It is divided into 1,000 fils. Official rate of exchange: 1 dinar equals US$2.80. One United States dollar equals 0.357 dinar. dishdasha-A long-sleeved ankle-length loose shirt worn by men or women. dunam—Unit of area: 0.618 acre. The Arabic word mishara (q.v.) is sometimes used. emir (also amir)~Prince. faqih–In Islam, a legal expert competent only in established jurisprudence. fakhdh-Small unit of a subtribe. fatwa-A legal opinion regarding Moslem religious law expressed by a mufti, q.v. as the United sencial rate of w 383 Fertile Crescent-Semicircle of fertile land, stretching from Pal- estine on the Mediterranean around the Syrian Desert north of Arabia to the Persian Gulf. fils-A minor coin in Iraq. First established in 1932 as the thousandth part of a dinar, q.v. hadiths—Deeds and sayings of the Prophet Mohammed which were reported by witnesses and handed down by tradition. One of the sources for the Sharia, q.v. Hajj (also Hadj; Haj)—The Pilgrimage to Mecca required of all Moslems able to go. hajji (also hadji; haji)—One who has made the Pilgrimage to Mecca; it is often used as a title of respect. Hanafi-An orthodox Sunni school of Moslem jurisprudence, pre- dominating in Turkey, India and Iraq. Hanafite—A follower of the Hanafi school, q.v. hawzah-A tribal gathering devoted to praise of descent groups. Hegira (also Hejira; Hijrah)—The exodus of Moslems from Mecca to Medina in A.D. 622. IBRD—International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, commonly known as the World Bank, a specialized agency of the United Nations. 'Id al Adha-A Moslem holiday, celebrating Hajj, q.v. 'Id al Fitr-A Moslem holiday, celebrating the end of Ramadan, imam—Moslem prayer leader. q.v. Imam-To the Shiites, one of 12 divinely appointed religious lead- ers of the family of Ali. IMF-International Monetary Fund, a specialized agency of the United Nations. IPC-Iraq Petroleum Company. kaffiyah-Male headgear consisting of a rectangular kerchief held in place by a piece of cloth or a rope-like band (agal). khatib—The man who delivers the sermon at the mosque during Friday congregational prayers. Kurdistan-A mountainous region in southeastern Turkey and partly in northern Iraq and northwestern Iran. Literal mean- ing: land of the Kurds. Lailat al Mi'raj-A Moslem holiday celebrating a vision which appeared to the Prophet Mohammed. liwa—Province. Mawlid an Nabi-A Moslem holiday celebrating the Prophet's Mohammed's birthday. miri sirf-Government land. mishara—Unit of area: 0.618 acre. The Turkish derived word dunam (q.v.) is sometimes used. mu'adhdhan—See muezzin. 384 INDEX crop, 258; reform, 44, 45, 79–80, 81, 191, 194, 246–47, 251, 253, 258; share of GNP, 243; sharecropping, 256–58, 259; wages, 295 Ahali (reformist political group) : 41 abaya (concealing garment) : 88, 171, 363 Abbas, al- (uncle of Prophet Mohammed): 32, 147 Abbasside period: 28, 32–35, 133, 147; museum, 142 Abdullah (King of Transjordan): 210 absenteeism: 290 Abu Ghuraib (town): broadcast- ing, 228; fundamental educa- tion center, 125 Adams, Robert McCormick, (Director, Oriental Institute, Univ. of Chicago): 24 address: forms of, 171 Aden: trade, 310 administration (see also civil serv- ice; government, local; prov- inces; subdistricts): personnel shortage, 279, 290 African-Iraqi Trading Company: 315 age: and status, 75 agencies, public: autonomous and semi-autonomous, finance, 322 aghas (Kurdish chieftains) : land ownership, 75; responsibilities, 76 agrarian reform. See agriculture: reform Agricultural Bank: 80, 259, 333, 334 Agricultural Commodities Agree- ment: 214 agriculture (see also cooperatives, agricultural: crops: irrigation: land): 251-67; background, 244– 45; credit, 260, 331, 333, 334; cultivation areas, 3, 252, 261- 64; employment, 49, 243, 287– 88; expenditures, 327; ex- ports, 252, 312; growth, deter- rents to, 251; laborers, landless workers, 61, 258; mechanization, 258, 262, 264, 288; position in the economy, 251; produc- tion, 246, 251-52, 264-65; productivity, 244, 258; rain- Ahmad, Ibrahim (Kurdish dissi- dent): 197 Air Force: 339, 340, 342, 343 Air Force College: 346 Air Force Flying College: 347 air routes : major, links with, 14 airbase, Shuaiba: 347 airports: 23; facilities, develop- ment, 307 Akhras, Abd al Ghaffar al (poet) : 136 Akkadians: 29 Al Hikma University, 126, 128 Al Jumhuriya (newspaper): 226, 227 Al Muwatin (newspaper): 227 Alexander the Great: 30 Ali (cousin of Prophet Moham- med): 4, 31, 32, 146, 147, 148, 157 Ali, Husein ibn (Sharif of Mecca): 37 Alwand River: 276 Amarah (province): crops, 263, 264; livestock, 266 Amarah (town): health facility, 112 American School for Boys (Baghdad and Basra): 123 Amorites: in historical back- ground, 29 Amtliche Deutsche Nachrichten (E. German news agency): 228 ancylostomiasis (hookworm): 109 Anglican Church: 155 Anglo-Iraqi Treaty (1930): 39, 42 Ani, Yusif al (playwright): 139 animals: number of, 265–66 animism: 113–14, 157 Apostolic (or Gregorian) Church: 65 | Arab Collective Security Pact: 208 387 children: behavior, 169; diseases, 110, 113; employed, 282; father's rights in divorce, 92; nutrition, 106; rearing, 92–93; social value, 88; tasks, 164; wages, 294 China, Communist: aid, military, 217; broadcast time in Arabic, 234; relations with, 217-18; TV film, 235; trade, 310, 312, 313; trade agreement, 317 Christians: Arab, attitudes toward, 237; as ethnic group, 55, 63- 65, 69; holidays and churches, 155; Nestorian, 55, 64; occu- pations, 284; population, 5; schools, 118; spiritual councils for administration of justice, 183 church-state relationship, 150 Cinema and State Administration: 139 Cinema and Theater Administration Service: 230 civic rights: 177 civil service: 175, 185–86; male- female ratio, 290; officials, number of, 290; as political element, 193; teachers under, 126; wages, 295; workers, number of, 186 climate: 16-18 clothing: 98, 101, 102–03; behavior concerning, 166, 171–72 coffeehouses: informal communi- cation centers, 232; public life centers, 97, 98, 99; radios, 228 College of Commerce (Basra): 126 College of Religion and Philosophy (Najaf): 126 commerce: employment, 290; inter- personal relationships, 168, 169, 173 Commercial Bank of Iraq: 335 commodities : exports, 312; gov- ernment regulation of supply and price, 304; imports, 313, 315 communications: expenditures, 327; factor in improvement and development, 7; informal channels, 232 Communist countries: broad- casts, 222; cultural exchange, 235; government attitude toward, 9; information activi- ties, 234-35; relations with, 216–18; trade, 310, 317 | Communist Party of Iraq: 44, 200, 218; clandestine communi- cations media, 235 Communists: information and propaganda dissemination, 222; and Kurdish issue, 217, 235; labor unions, activity in, 281, 299; political activity and power, 200–01; and the press, 224; radio broadcasting, 234, 235; support of smuggling rings, 361 Company for Petroleum Research and Operations (ERAP): 207 Confederation of Arab Trade Unions: 300 Constitution: citizen guarantees, 179; development, 176–77 Constitution, Interim (1964): 2, 45; Arab socialism, 191; Arab unity, 179; Armed Forces, 343; budget, 321; education, 117, 119; employment, 280; and family, 87; freedom of the press, 221; national citi- zenship, 55; principles, 179; religion, 159 construction: administrative and technical workers, 290; budget, Detailed Economic Plan, 80; industrial plant, 273, 276; share of GNP, 277 consumer goods: 71, 97, 98; im- ports, 313 Cooperative Bank: 333, 335 cooperatives: agricultural, 7, 2 46, 259, 260, 261, 305, 306; con- sumer, 305; housing, 106, 305; marketing, 306 cost of living: 98, 104, 326, 337; wage coordination, 295 cottage industries, 105 cotton: production, 252, 264 Council of Ministers: 8, 119, 126, 133, 175, 176, 177, 179, 180, 186, 225, 321, 359 Council on Social and Educational Development: 119 coups. See under politics Court of Cassation: 181, 182–83, 184, 358, 359 391 Court of Cassation for State Se- curity (Supreme State Security Court): 359, 360 courts: administrative supervision, 359; or appeal, 182; civil, 182-83; Court of Cassation, 181, 182–83, 184, 358, 359; criminal, 358-59; of first in- stance, 182, 358; labor, 298; magistrate or penal, 182; military, 351; peace, 182; religious (sharia), 57, 183, 357; of sessions, 358; special, 183–84; state security, 183, 359, 360; tribal, 181, 357 Cox, Sir Percy (High Commis- sioner for Iraq): 38 credit: agricultural, 260, 331, 333, 334; public institutions, 331–32 Credit Bank of Iraq: 335 crime: 353, 360–61 Criminal Code: 357–58 crops: (see also specific crop) : 262–64; cash, 97, 264; chief non-food, 252; growing areas and seasons, 261–64; pro- duction, 264–65; yields, 244 Ctesiphon (ruins of Persian city): 140 Cuba: trade, 310 currency: 336–37; stability, 331 customs duties: as revenue source, 309, 326 Cyrus the Great (founder, Archae- menian empire): 30, 155 Czechoslovakia: aid, economic, 318; barter agreement, 317; shoes from, 103 deserts: 2, 13, 15, 252; police, 356; population, 49, 50 Deutsche Presse Agentur (W. Germany news agency): 228 Development Board: 7, 104, 245, 248, 270, 326 development and improvement (see also Economic Plans): agri- culture, 246–47; attitudes to- ward, 240; deterrents to, 244, 245, 249; expenditures, 327; fund sources, 243; health, 109–12 passim; industry, 245, 247, 269-73; irrigation, 252; labor, 283, 287; oil, 206–07, 215, 216, 247; planning, 248– 49; public information facili- ties, 222, 228; welfare, 96, 104-05, 106 diet: 106–07, 263 Directorate of: Health, 111; Medical Supplies, 111; Preventive Medicine, 111; Rural Health and Medical Services, 111 Directorate General: Labor, 291, 293; Planning and Projects, 225; Radio and Television, 225 | diseases: 96, 108-10; and labor productivity, 279, 285; plant, 265; resistance to, 106; water- borne, 107 dishdasha (garment): 102, 103 | districts (qadas): 185 divorce: 91-92 Diyala (province): population density, 51; rural improvement project, 105 Diyala region: malaria, 109; settlement pattern, 24, 25; Shiites in, 57 Diyala River, 18, 19, 20, 61 Dokan Dam: 20 drainage: projects, 252, 261 dunan (land area unit): 259, 260 Dutch Reformed Mission: 123 dwellings: construction, 98, 99; marsh dwellers, 25, 99; sarifah, 79 dams: 19, 20, 261 dance: 140 Dasnayi. See Yezidis dates: export, 263, 312, 317; production, 252, 262–63, 265 Dawrah: refinery and power sta- tion, 276 death rate: 52; infant, 108 debt, public: 326, service, 317–18 democracy: 41, 44, 45, 179 Democratic Social Unionists: 198 dentists: number of, 291 department stores: 302, 303, 315 Department of Summer Resorts and Tourism, 225, 233 Derbendi Khan: dam, 20 East-West conflict: 9, 210 Eastern Bank (British): 335 Economic Plan (1961-62 to 1965–66): 8, 80; industry, 272, 318; total expenditures, 248 392 Economic Plan (1965–69): 8, 10; agriculture, 246, 251; alloca- tion and distribution of funds, 248–49; education, 116, 126; goal, 45; health services and facilities, 112; industry, 272; labor, 283; major objectives, 244; public information facil- ities, 222, 228; public welfare, 96; vocational training, 287 Economic Plans: actual expendi- tures, 249; source of funds, 249 economy: background, 244-45; bibliography, 381–84; charac- ter and structure, 243-49; growth rate, 245, 246; military impact, 344–47; potential for development, 243 education (see also schools, train- ing): 115–30; abroad, 117, 128, 130; administration and finance, 119-20; adult, 124– 25; under Arab League, 208; attitudes toward, 11, 116, 120, 122, 129–30, 148; attrition, 118, 121, 123; background, 117–18; budget, 116, 118, 20; coeducation, 20, 127, 128; compulsory, 115, 121; curric- ula, 116, 117, 120–27 passim; development and improvement, 115–27 passim; enrollment, 115, 118, 120, 122-28 passim; examinations, 118, 121, 123; expenditures, 327; facilities, 115–20 passim; female, 116, 120, 122, 124, 127; fundamental, 125; higher, 117, 126–28; of Kurds, 62; male-female pro- portion, 116; primary, 115, 117, 120–22; pulpil-teacher ratio, 125; secondary, 117, 122–24; Shiites, Sunnites com- pared, 59; and social mobility, 130; and social values, 174; and society, 128–30; univer- sity, 78; women, 88; workers, 297, 298 Educational and Social Development Planning Board: 104 egalitarianism: 162, 239 Egypt: movement for union with, 45; relations with, 206, 210 Eisenhower Doctrine: 214 | Elamites (people): in historical background, 29 elections: 2, 176, 187, 189, 192 electoral system: 186–87 electricity: in dwellings, 100; fuels for, 19 elite: life style, 78; tribal, 75 emblem, national: 241 employers associations: 300 employment: agriculture, 243; for- eigners, 279; industry, 274, 275, 289–90; levels, 283; offices, 283; opportunities cre- ated by oil, 79; patterns, 287-91; sex and age ratios, 281; unskilled and semiskilled, 79 engineers: 291 English (language): government broadcasts in, 233; language of instruction, 127, 128; teach- ing of, 121, 122, 127; usage, 66 estates: ownership, 75 ethnic groups (see also Arabs, Bedouins, Christians, Jews, Kurds, Lurs, Mandeans, marsh dwellers, Persians, Shiites, Sunnites, Turkomans, Yezi- dis): 55–66; geographic dis- tribution, 58 (fig. 4) Euphrates River: 2, 3, 5, 13-21 passim, 51, 59, 60, 73, 107, 109; major water control and irri. gation project, 20 Europe, Eastern: trade, 310 Europe, Western: trade, 310 Evangelical and Reformed Church: 155 expenditures: urban dweller, 98 expenditures, government: 327–28; defense, 327, 328; Economic Plans, 249; education, 116, 119, 120; (1960–61 through 1964–65), 324 (table 8) exports: 310-12; control, 248; dates, 263, 312, 317; oil, 309, 310; non-oil, 312 Faisal I (King of Iraq): 1, 37, 38, 40, 176 Faisal II (King of Iraq): 39, 43 family: 83–94; authority, 87–88, 165–66; basic unit, 85, 87; and changing social values, 174; 393 family-Continued focus of loyalty, 87; functions, 83; household pattern, 78; influence in individual's choice of work, 280; religious and secular law regulating, 83, 84, 90, 94; residence patterns, 86; rights and obligations, 87, 95, 103, 104; strength of ties, 84– 85, 86; structure, 85–86, 87; traditional welfare, 95, 96, 103, 104; and tribal organiza- tion, 74 faqih (legal expert, religious law): 153 farmers: 57, 59, 61, 65; independ- ent, proportion of, 75; land- less and casual workers, 255, 258, 260, 287, 288; settlement pattern, 49; Shiite, 57, 59, 61; social organization, 72; stan- dard of living, 97; Sunnite, 59. 60 farming: mixed operation, 266; sharecropping, 256–58, 287 farms: allotted to needy villagers, 105; holdings, 261; income tax, 329 Fatimah (daughter of Mohammed): 146, 147 Faw (town): hospital, 112 Federal Bank of Lebanon: 335 fellahin (landless cultivators): 255, 258, 288; distribution of land to, 257, 260 Fertile Crescent: 3, 32; Plan, 210 films: 221, 222, 230–31, 233–34 finance, public (see also budget, expenditures, revenues, taxes): 321-29 fiscal policy: weakness, 321, 327 fish and fishing: 253, 267, 285 Five Year Plans. See Economic Plans flag: 241 flood control: 3, 19-20 food: imports, 313; products, ex- ports, 312; sanitation, 108, 109; staples, 106, 107; taboos, 150, 156 Food and Agriculture Organization: 219 Ford Foundation: 128, 214 foreign aid: economic and techni- cal, 21, 205, 214, 216, 217, 273, 289, 317, 318; military, 203, 205, 214, 215, 216–17, 339, 344, 346, 347; police, 356; principal source, 10 foreign exchange: controls, 316; industry and power project requirements, 272; oil re- ceipts, 7, 243, 309 foreign policy: anti-Israel, 204, 205, 208; direction and major features, 9; influence of Arab- Israeli controversy, 10; non- alignment, 9, 194, 203, 205, 209 foreign relations: 203-19; Arab nations and League, 208–12; Communist nations, 216–18; determinants, 203, 204-07; in- ternational organizations, 218- 19; mechanics, 219; non-Arab nations, 212–13; Western na- tions, 213–16 foreign service corps: 186; status, 219 forests and forestry: 253, 267 France: aid, military, 344; airplane purchase from, 327; barter agreement, 317; broadcasts in Arabic, 234; influence on judi- cial system, 181; oil explora- tion and development, 207, 216, 275, 311; relations with, 215–16 French (language): government broadcasts in, 233 French Company for Petroleum Research and Operations (ERAP): 311 French Petroleum Company; 207, 311 Friday Mosque (Samarra): 142 Friends of Art: 143 fruits and nuts: 264 fuels: cooking and heating, 98; for electricity-producing installa- tions, 19 Gahailani, Abdul Rahman al (sculptor): 143 Gailani, Rashid Ali al (former Prime Minister): 41, 42, 199 gas, natural: 20-21; exports, 21, 212 394 Islam-Continued 173–74; as unifying influence, 4; view of nature of man, 149; waqf (land category), 254 Islamic Museum (Baghdad): 142 Ismail, Abdul Qadir (political leader): 201 Israel (see also Arab-Israeli con- Alict): armed forces action against, 341; attitude toward, 204, 208; “issue" as foreign relations determinant, 204- 05; policy regarding, 204, 205, 208; position on creation, 42 Jabal Sinjar (mountain shrine): 156 Jaf federation: 73, 75 Jahiliyah period: 140 Jamali, Fadil (former Prime Minister): 57 Jamayli, Abdul al-Majid al- (Cab- inet Minister): 281 Jabur: oilfield, 20 Japan: trade, 310, 313 Jawarihi, Al (poet): 137 Jazirah: camel herders, 60; irri- gation, 15; water control proj- ects, 19 Jesuits: schools founded by, 123, 128 Jews: attitude toward, 237; in domestic trade, 304; as ethnic group, 5, 66, 69; spiritual councils for administration of justice, 183 Jonas (Nabi Yunis): shrine, 158 Jordan: Armed Forces in, 341; relations with, 205-08 passim, 211-12, 318; trade agree- ment, 317 Jordanian Arab Bank: 335 Judaism: 155–56 judges (religious, qadis): 57, 150, 153, 181, 183 Judicial Council: 181 judicial districts: list of, 182 judiciary: 181-84 jury system: 358 justice: military, 350 Karbala (town): schools, 118; shrine, 32, 63, 142 Karbala (province): population growth rate, 52 Karkh (town): hospital, 112 Karun River: 18 Kassites (people): in historical background, 29 Khabur River: 18 Khadija (wife of Mohammed): 146 Khan Marjan caravansary (archi- tectural monument): 141 kings: Faisal I, 1, 37, 37, 40, 176; Faisal II, 39, 43; Ghazi, 41 kinship: basis of tribal organiza- tion, 74; organization, 85–86; rights and obligations, 87, 95, 103, 104; and social identity and behavior, 172–73; strength of ties, 84–85, 86; traditional welfare, 95, 103, 104, 193; traditions and modern labor relations, 280: and tribal values, 161, 163 Kirkuk (town): airport, 23; "bloody massacre of", 201, 218; broadcasting, 228, 229; ethnic groups, 59, 61, 64, 65; films, 230; gas, 20; hospitals, 112; oilfields, 20, 40, 62; population, 51; potable water, 107; sulfur extraction plant, 273; trade distribution cen- ter, 303 Koran: 135, 148, 152; instruc- tion in mosque schools, 121; marriage provisions, 90; mean- ing of ummah, 238; on prop- erty and inheritance, 93; social values, 162, 167; source of, 146; as source of knowl- edge, 128, 129 Kubbah, Mohammad Mahdi (po- litical leader): 199 Kurdish (language): 5, 56, 62; broadcasts in, 229, 235; Communist publications, 235; language of instruction, 119; official status, 66; proportion of native speakers, 49 | Kurdish Democratic Party: 197 Kadhimain (town): hospital, 112 kaffiyah (headgear): 102 398 -Continded zz.: private sector, 269– Im; production, 8, satie 7); profitsharing, protection, 270, 314; & SNP, 277; wages, vegers engaged in, 279 zity: 52 s e public: 221-35; cen- government programs, -: development, 222, 228; hec government programs, zice: 93–94, 150 rate General: 291 2 of Fine Arts : 125, 126, 6,139, 140, 143 De companies: nationaliza- 180, 301 tal expression: 133–35 ub Trade and Transit Ement: 316 nal Atomic Energy 7: 219 al Bank for Reconstruc- d Development: 219, 317 1 Civil Aviation Orga- 1: 219 I Development Asso- 219 Finance Corporation: Iraq National Oil Company: 207, 247, 275; organized, 311 Iraq Petroleum Company: 207, 309, 311, 312, 317; affiliated companies, 275; airfield, 23; curtailment of operations, 247; government appropriation of concession territories, 206; hospitals, 112; housing, 104, 290; Industrial Training Cen- ter, 286; labor benefits, 292; ratio, foreign and Iraqi per- sonnel, 286–87 Iraq Rate Administration: 265 Iraq Stores (Orosdi-Back): 315 Iraqi Chamber of Commerce: 317 Iraqi Confederation of Trade Unions : 281, 299, 300 Iraqi Federation of Industries: 300 Iraqi Islamic Party: 194 Iraqi Levies (British-controlled territorial force): 64, 340, 354 Iraqi Museum: 142; Library, 231 Iraqi News Agency: 222, 225, 227, 228, 232 irrigation: 3; areas, 15-20 passim, 263; ancient works, 28; and decline of nomadic life, 287; development, 244, 246, 252; major project on Euphrates, 20; proportion of land irri. gated, 261; pumps, 256, 262; redistribution of irrigated land, 259; and spread of digcase, 109; water supply for, 243, 202 Islam: attitude toward knowledge and learning, 128; calendar, 151; family, regulation of, 83–84, 90; fatalism, 167 68; Five Pillars, 148, 163; foun- dations, 145, 148; holidays, 151-53; holy places, 22; influ- ence on education, 116; influ- ence of other thought, 133; r. zence on society, 145; in- :99; 281 agri- otal, Labor Organiza- 300 [onetary Fund: elecommunication ade Fair (1967): ited, con- quan- opped, oldings, -58, 259; pries, 254; 81, 191, 60; re- J, 81, 244, ,76; re- 3-61; title pensation for con- .30; foreign, 3:5: guarantees 2.21: pri- e peeference, jund, 7, pulation rela- 2; relationship nization, 75; L1 23 kird- Joguiatica stitutions, 154; introduction of, 4, 27, 36–32. 131: law, 5,8% 84, 90, 143_51. 162, 181; off- cias, 33-34; origins, 14647; reiziers. to state. 150; schis 45, 32, 56, 115, 14647; sra er seets. 158-57; sveial V2Ies, 6. 162-13. 108, :0 399 Islam—Continued 173–74; as unifying influence, 4; view of nature of man, 149; waqf (land category), 254 Islamic Museum (Baghdad): 142 Ismail, Abdul Qadir (political leader): 201 Israel (see also Arab-Israeli con- flict): armed forces action against, 341; attitude toward, 204, 208; “issue” as foreign relations determinant, 204- 05; policy regarding, 204, 205, 208; position on creation, 42 Jabal Sinjar (mountain shrine): 156 Jaf federation: 73, 75 Jahiliyah period: 140 Jamali, Fadil (former Prime Minister) : 57 Jamayli, Abdul al-Majid al- (Cab- inet Minister): 281 Jabur: oilfield, 20 Japan: trade, 310, 313 Jawarihi, Al (poet): 137 Jazirah: camel herders, 60; irri- gation, 15; water control proj- ects, 19 Jesuits: schools founded by, 123, 128 Jews: attitude toward, 237; in domestic trade, 304; as ethnic group, 5, 66, 69; spiritual councils for administration of justice, 183 Jonas (Nabi Yunis): shrine, 158 Jordan: Armed Forces in, 341; relations with, 205–08 passim, 211–12, 318; trade agree- ment, 317 Jordanian Arab Bank: 335 Judaism: 155–56 judges (religious, qadis): 57, 150, 153, 181, 183 Judicial Council: 181 judicial districts: list of, 182 judiciary: 181-84 jury system: 358 justice: military, 350 Karbala (town): schools, 118; shrine, 32, 63, 142 Karbala (province): population growth rate, 52 Karkh (town): hospital, 112 Karun River: 18 Kassites (people): in historical background, 29 Khabur River: 18 Khadija (wife of Mohammed): 146 Khan Marjan caravansary (archi- tectural monument): 141 kings: Faisal I, 1, 37, 37, 40, 176; Faisal II, 39, 43; Ghazi, 41 kinship: basis of tribal organiza- tion, 74; organization, 85–86; rights and obligations, 87, 95, 103, 104; and social identity and behavior, 172–73; strength of ties, 84-85, 86; traditional welfare, 95, 103, 104, 193; traditions and modern labor relations, 280; and tribal values, 161, 163 Kirkuk (town): airport, 23; "bloody massacre of”, 201, 218; broadcasting, 228, 229; ethnic groups, 59, 61, 64, 65; films, 230; gas, 20; hospitals, 112; oilfields, 20, 40, 62; population, 51; potable water, 107; sulfur extraction plant, 273; trade distribution cen- ter, 303 Koran: 135, 148, 152; instruc- tion in mosque schools, 121; marriage provisions, 90; mean- ing of ummah, 238; on prop- erty and inheritance, 93; social values, 162, 167; source of, 146; as source of knowl- edge, 128, 129 Kubbah, Mohammad Mahdi (po- litical leader): 199 Kurdish (language): 5, 56, 62; broadcasts in, 229, 235; Communist publications, 235; language of instruction, 119; official status, 66; proportion of native speakers, 49 Kurdish Democratic Party: 197 Kadhimain (town): hospital, 112 kaffiyah (headgear): 102 398 Medical City (Baghdad Univer- sity): 127 medical personnel: 111, 112, 291 medical services and facilities: de- velopment, 112; mobile dis- pensaries, 112; for oil workers, 112 men: clothing, 102, 103; division of labor, 164; father authority, 87; ideal qualities, 163, 164-66, 168; marriage and divorce, 89–92; military service, 345; religious beliefs and practices, 151; status, 88–89; and tribal leadership, 74 Mesopotamia: 27, 29, 30, 31 Mesopotamian dialect area: 68, 69 (table 5) Middle East: broadcasts to, 233; conflict (see Arab-Israeli con- flict); TV programs, 230 Middle East News Agency (UAR): 228 Midfai, Jamil al (Arab nation- alist): 37 midwives: 111, 113, 291 migration: nomad patterns, 49, 73; for seasonal jobs, 282; to urban centers, 52, 101, 105, 256, 279, 282–83, 288 military, the. See Armed Forces Military College: 346, 347 Military Court of Cassation: 351 minerals: 21 mining and quarrying: share of GNP, 277 ministries: list of, 181 Ministry of: Agriculture and Agrar- ian Reform, 181, 260, 334; Culture and Guidance, 133, 181, 221-33 passim; Defense, 181, 228, 327, 340, 343, 345; De- velopment, 248; Economy, 181, 219, 248, 314, 319; Edu- cation, 115–26 passim; 133, 181, 186, 231, 232, 290; Fi- nance, 181, 248, 333, 335; Foreign Affairs, 181, 219, 228; Health, 110, 111, 181, 290, 291, 297, 302, 315; Industry, 181, 248, 273; Interior, 104, 119, 181, 184, 185, 186, 290, 354, 355; of Justice, 175, 181, 256, 357, 359; Labor and Social Affairs, 105, 181, 281, 291, 297–300 passim, 361; Munici- palities and Public Works: 104, 119, 181; Oil and Min- erals, 181, 219, 275; Planning, 181, 291; Reconstruction of the North, 181; Union Affairs, 181, 219 miri (land category): 254, 255, 256, 257, 259, 260 missionaries: 155 | Mobile Force (militarized police strike force): 339, 354, 355, 356–57 modernization (see also develop- ment and improvement): atti- tudes toward, 10, 57; and law governing family, property, and inheritance, 84; under Nuri as Said, 43; under Otto- man rule, 35-36; role of state, 189; welfare, 96 Mohammed (Islam Prophet): 4, 77, 93, 133, 136, 145, 148, 149, 152, 239; life of, 146–47 monarchy: end of, 43–45; estab- lished, 1, 40; political orien- tation, 9; problems confront- ing, 40–41, 43 money (see also currency): sup- ply, 326, 337 Mongols: 27, 34 Mortgage Bank: 333, 335 mosaic: 141, 142 Moslem empire: 32 Moslems: almsgiving, 103; atti- tudes toward change and im- provement, 95; beliefs and characteristics, 145, 148–49; creed, 148; five duties, 148; marriage, 89, 90; -non-Moslem behavior, 162; schools (see also under mosques), 118; Sufism, 133–34 mosques (see also shrines): 97, 99; architecture, 141, 142; prayers at, 153; schools, 116, 117, 121 Mosul (city): airport, 23; anti- Communist, anti-Qasim mili- tary mutiny, 200; broadcast- 401 Mosul (city)—Continued ing, 228, 229; ethnic groups, 61, 64, 66; films, 230; hospital, 112; industrial establishments, 274: location, 3; museum, 143; population, 51, 77; potable water, 107; shrine near, 158; trade and transportation cen- ter, 303, 307 Mosul Petroleum Company: 275, 309; labor benefits, 292 Mosul Public Library: 231 mountains: 2, 15 Mu'awiyah (Sunnite religious figure): 4, 31, 147 Muddaris, Fahmi Al (writer): 138 mudir (subdistrict officer): 77, 185 muftis (religious law experts) : 150. 153 mujtahids (religious law inter- preter): 5, 148, 153, 195 mulk (land category): 254, 255, 256 Municipality (or Directorate) of the Capital: 185 museums: 142-43 music: 139–40 Mustanzariyah (architectural monument): 141 mutasarrif (provincial governor): 184 Mutasim (Abbasside caliph): 33 National Employment Service: 283, 291 National Hydrocarbon Organiza- tion: 311 National Oil Company: 275 National Revolutionary Com- mand: 45, 353 nationalism: 1, 341-42; during British mandate, 38–39; and changing social values, 174; identification of religion with, 145, 159; importance of lan- guage, 56, 172; and literature, 137, 138; Pan-Arab, 43; secu- lar character, 159 nationalization: banks, 80, 248, 301, 331-35 passim; commerce and industry, 8, 80, 247-48, 270–71, 274–75, 276 (table 7), 301; compensation to owners, 259, 322; department store, 315; economic control organi- zation, central, 8, 271; insur- ance companies, 80, 301; laws issued, 191; and trade activ- ity, 301 nationhood: attitude of literate Iraqi, 6–7; deterrents to, 4, 6–7, 55; as focal point of politics, 191–92; greatest threat to stability, 9; lack of word denoting Western concept of nation, 238; self-image, 237– 39; symbols, 241; unifying factors, 4, 56 Natural History Museum: 142 Navy, Iraqi: 339, 342, 343 Nestorian Assyrian Church: 155 Nestorian Church (Church of the East) : 64 Netherlands: oil interest, 275 New China News Agency (NCNA, Communist China): 228 New Museum: 142 news agencies: 227–28; 229 newspapers: 221, 223–25; politi- cal, abolition of privately owned, 226; role in develop- ment of modern Arabic prose, 138; theater criticism, 139 nomads: 59, 60, 61; barter in vil- lage markets, 304; justice, 357; Naft Khaneh: oilfield, 40, 276 Najaf (city): library, 231, popu- lation, 51; regional distribu- tion center, 302; schools, 118; Shia holy place, 63; shrine, 32, 142 name of the country: meaning, 27 narcotics: 361 Nashrat Wikalat al Anba'al 'Iraqiyah (Bulletin of Iraqi News Agency), 228 Nasiriyah: hospital, 112 Nasser, Gamal Abdel (President, UAR): 9, 45, 199, 200, 209 National Bank of Iraq: 332, 336 National Bank of Pakistan: 335 National Council of Revolutionary Command: 8 National Defense Council: 180, 343 National Democratic Party: 200 402 Nomads—Continued migration pattern, 49, 73; population, 47, 49–50, 73; set- tlement efforts, 25, 50, 73, 81; social organization, 73–74; standard of living, 97 North Atlantic Treaty Organiza- tion: 209 Nuri, Abd al Malik (writer): 138 nurses: number of, 111 nutrition : 106–07; deficiency dis- eases, 109 300; international 218–19; welfare, 105–06 Orthodox (or Eastern) Church: 5, 155 Ottoman Bank: 335 Ottoman period: 28, 35–36; intel- lectual activity, 59; law, 57 oil: 243, 247–48; appropriation of IPC concession territories, 206; determinant of foreign rela- tions, 204, 205, 206–08; de- velopment, 206–07, 215, 216, 247; effect of Middle East conflict, 313–14; exploration, 207, 213, 275, 311-12; exports, 20, 244, 247, 309, 310; foreign aid, 207; foreign interests, limitation of, 190, 193, 204, 206; pipelines, 7, 15, 20, 24, 210, 247, 313, 326; principal resource, 20; production, 244, 247, 275; refining, 20, 275–76; reserves, 275; revenues, 7, 40, 43, 79, 243, 249, 309, 317, 326, 335; share of GNP, 243, 309; suspended shipments to U.S., 214 oil companies (see also Iraq Petroleum Company): em- ployer-employee relations, 298; foreign, 244, 247, 275, 309; government controlled, 310–12; labor recruitment, 284; per- sonnel training, 286 oil workers: employee-employer re- lations, 298; employment, 79; medical services and facilities, 112; skilled and unskilled, 285, 286; wages and benefits, 280 oilfields: 15, 20, 24, 79, 207, 216 oilseeds: 252, 263 Omar (second caliph): 31 organizations (see also political organizations, political par- ties): employer associations, Pact of Mutual Cooperation (Iraq and Turkey): 212 painting: 132, 142–43 Pan-Arab: groups, 44; movement, 1; outlook, 28, 43 parasitic diseases: 96, 107, 108, 109, 110 Parliament Building: 142 Party of Ali (shi'at 'Ali): 147 Pasha, Midhat (Ottoman gover- nor of Baghdad): 35 penal code: military, 350 penal system: 360 periodicals: political, abolition of privately owned, 226 Persia: in historical background, 33, 35 Persian (language): 63 Persian Gulf: 2, 3, 7, 14; conflict- ing claims to territorial wa- ters, 213; oil exploration, 311 Persians: as ethnic group, 6, 63; economic activity, 63; in his- torical background, 30; in- fuence, 133 petrochemical industry: 20 pharmacists: number of, 111, 291 physicians: number of, 96, 111, 291; training, 111, 112 pilgrimages, 148, 149, 152, 156 plain, alluvial: characteristics, 2, 15–16; cultivation area, 252; population, 49; settlement pat- tern, 24; Shiite farmers, 57, 59; water control and drain- age projects, 20 Podgorny, Nikolai V. (Soviet President): 217 poetry: 132, 135, 229, 233 police (see also Mobile Force): background, 354; camel- mounted desert, 356; civil, 355-56; system, 356–57 403 political organizations (see also Arab Socialist Union, political parties): 189, 197–201 political parties (see also Baath Party, Communist Party) : dissolution, 8, 192, 198, 223 politics: 189–201; Armed Forces, influence and power, 339; at- titudes, 239–41; awareness and participation, 176, 189, 192-93, 240; bibliography, 377–80; coups, 8, 29, 41, 43, 45, 189, 191, 193, 199, 209, 210–11, 353; elements, 189, 190, 193–95; ethnic factors, 195–97; gov- ernment's principal goals, 9; locus of power, 8, 77; middle class power, 78; movement for Iraq-Egypt union, 45; nationalist-Communist friction, 44; Pan-Arab faction, 44; pro-Syrian faction, 45; pro-UAR faction, 44; religious factors, 195; trends, 190-92; values, 237–39; world, policy, 28; WW II and postwar, 42-43 polygyny: 83, 84, 90-91 population: 47–53; by age group, 48 (table 3); area of maxi- mum concentration, 51; compo- sition, 48–51; density, 50 (table 4); dynamics, 52-53; growth rate, 47, 50 (table 4), 52; non-Moslem, 5; total, 47; urban, 77 ports and port facilities: 7, 14, 23–24; development plans, 307 poultry: 267 power: hydroelectric, 20; share of GNP, 277; sources, 19; total generating capacity, 276 prayers: at mosque, 153 presidency: 179–80, 219 press: 221, 225–27; Communist clandestine, 235; control, 194; freedom of, 221, 223–25; laws, 225, 226; pro-Communist, 224 Press Association: 224 Press and Printing Organization: 222, 225, 226, 227 prices: government regulation, 304-05 prisons and jails: 360 professionals: investment prefer- ences, 331; personnel short- ages, 291; as political element, 190, 194; savings, 331 property: rights and inheritance, 93–94, 150 Protestant churches: 155 I provinces : 184 (fig. 6); crops, 262–64; fishing, 267; forests, 267; government, 184–85; Kurdish concentration, 196; libraries, 231; livestock, 266; police, 355, 356; population, 50-51, 52 Provincial Governor: 185 public order and safety (see also courts; crime; Kurdish prob- lem; legal system; Mobile Force; penal system; police; Turkomans: -Kurd tensions): 353–61 | Public Organization for: Banks, Commerce, Industry, Insur- ance, 248 I publications: foreign, 225 punishment: 361; military, 351 Qadhimain mosque: 142 qadis (religious judges): 57, 150, 153, 181, 183 qaimmqam (district officer): 185 Qasim, Brig. Abdul Karim (former Prime Minister): 1. 8, 224 and agrarian reform, 79, 259; the coup and regime, 43–45; and courts, 357; and the economy, 244, 245, 247, 248; execution, 45; and foreign relations, 205, 206, 209–18 passim; and gov- ernmental system, 177, 181; and politics, 189–201 passim; and social structure change, 79 Radi, Al (poet): 137 radio: 222, 232; audience, 221, 228; broadcasts for foreign audiences, 233; Communist, 234, 235; ownership and con- trol, 228; receivers and transmitters, 228, 229 (table 404 Saladin (Moslem Crusades hero): 241 Salim, Jawad (painter and sculp- tor): 143 Salman Pak: broadcasting, 228 salt: 21 Samarra (town): mosque, 142; water treatment plant, 108 sanitation: 95, 96, 105, 107–08 Sargon (founder of Akkadian kingdom): 29 sarifah dwellers: 79–80, 96, 101, 104 Sassanian empire: 30 Saud, Ibn (King of Arabia): 36 Saudi Arabia : population density comparison, 50; relations with, 207 Saut al-Ummal (labor union news- paper): 300 savings: 331, 333 Sayigh, Daud (political leader): 201 Sayyid, Mahmud Ahmad (writer): 138 schistosomiasis control program: 109 schools: academic year, 119; attri- tion rate, 118, 121, 123; com- mercial, 124; construction, 115–20 passim; Iranian, 118; mobile, 122; mosque, 116, 117, 121; night, 124; private, 116, 118, 122, 123, 124; public system, 116, 118–19; role in fostering Arabic-Islamic heri- tage, 133; tuition and board 118; vocational 285 sculpture: 132, 143 security, national (see also Armed Forces, public order and safety): 339–61; bibliography, 385–86; State courts, 183–184 Seleucus (Greek General, king of Seleucide): 30 services: workers engaged in, 279 settlement: efforts, 25, 50, 73, 81; patterns, 24-25, 49 Seventh-day Adventists: 155 sewage and sanitary facilities. See sanitation Shabibi, Al (poet): 137 Shah, Ismail (founder Persian Safawid dynasty): 35 shamal (wind) : 18 Shamash Secondary School (Bagh- dad): 123 Shammar confederation: 73 sharecropping: 256-58, 259, 287 Sharia (Islamic law): 5, 83-84, 90, 149–50, 162, 181; courts, 57, 183, 357 Shatt al Arab (river): 2, 14, 23, 107, 109; date production along canals of, 264; dispute with Iran, 14–15, 213 Shatt al Gharaf (river): 18 Shaul, Anwar (writer): 138 sheep: 266 sheiks: land settlement, 255, 257– 258; political power, 193–94; and problem of recruiting and retaining workers, 283; and relationship of individual to new kinds of employment, 280; responsibilities, 76; and tribal land system, 255; and tribal organization 75–76 Sherif, Hilmi Ali (Kurdish dissi- dent): 197 Shia passion plays: 138 Shia-Sunni conflicts: 40, 56–57 Shia't Ali (political organization), 31-32 Shiites: attitude toward education, 129, 148; attitude toward gov- ernment information programs, 233; attitude toward modern- ization, 57; attitude toward monarchy, 40; beginning of the Islam schism, 32, 146–47; economic activities, 57, 59, 61, 284; as ethnic group, 4, 5, 55, 57, 58 (fig. 4), 59, 60, 62, 63; historical background, 32, 33; holidays, 148, 152; holy places, 63; literacy, 59, 60, 129; marriage, 84, 90; occupations associated with, 284; origin, 4, 147; part of the ummah, 238; and politics, 195; popu- lation, 56, 147; position in the society, 195; school of legal thought, 149; three major 406 Shiites—Continued groups, 147; village social organization, 76_77 Shimun, Mar (Assyrian titular leader): 64 shrines and monuments: 32, 40, 63, 109, 140, 141, 142, 143, 156, 158 Shuaiba airbase: 347 silversmiths: 65 Sina, Ibn (scholar): 134 sirocco (wind): 18 smuggling: 361 social security: 96, 105, 280, 296–97 Social Security Institution: 297 social structure: 71–81; corre- spondence between religion and occupation, 79; mobility, 76; reorganization programs, 79- 80; rural areas, 72–77; three types of organization, 71; urban areas, 77–79 socialism: 41, 45, 179, 344; Arab, 189, 191, 194, 199, 216, 237, 239; instruments for spread- ing, 329; Iraqi brand, 239; after Qasim overthrow, 8 Socialist Union Movement: 198 society: bibliography, 367–75; character of, 1-11; controls, 169–70; and education, 128– 30; and the family, 87–94; influence of Islam, 145; Is- lamic law and, 149–51; mobil- ity offered by military, 342; position of women, 164, 165, 166–67; religion and social change, 158–59; separation of lives of males and females, Kurdish issue, 217, 235; mili- tary influence, 344; oil explora- tion assistance, 207; rela- tions with, 42, 203, 205, 209, 216–17; students in, 128; TV programs, 230; trade, 313 Staff College (army and air force) : 347 stamp tax: 329 standard of living: 78, 244, 245 State Industrial Organization: 273, 274 State Organization of Trade: 302, 314, 315 status: determinants, 76, 280; and education, 130; and family, 83; industrial workers, 289; men, 88–89; military officers, 342, personal, law for, 84, 90, 94, 150; symbol, 91; tribal, 74– 75; in villages, 75–77; white collar work, 290; women, 88– 89 students: and politics, 189, 190, 194 subdistricts: 185 Suez Canal crisis (1956): effect on trade, 314 suffrage. See voting Sufism (Moslem mysticism): 133– 34, 136, 153–54 sugar: beets, 252, 263; cane, 252, 263; processing facilities, 263 Sulaymaniyah (province): crops, 264; hospital, planned, 112; study of Kurdish women's life, 88 Suleiman the Magnificent (Otto- man conqueror): 35 Sumerian empire: archaeological relics, 140 Sumerians: in historical back- ground, 27, 28–29 Sunnites: administrative ability, 284; economic activities, 59, 60; as ethnic group, 4, 5, 55, 58 (fig. 4), 59–60, 61, 62; in government, 57; historical background, 32, 33; literacy, 59, 60; origin, 4, 147; politi- cal dominance, 195; schools of 151 soils: salinity, 16, 24, 51, 59, 244, 252, 256, 261, 262, 264; silt- ing, 18-19, 51 Soviet Union: aid, economic and technical, 10, 21, 205, 207, 216, 217, 273, 289, 307, 311, 318, 323; aid, military, 203, 205, 216–17, 339, 344, 346, 347; broadcasts, 222; Cultural Cen- ter, 235; films, 231; informa- tion activities, 234–35; and 407 Sunnites—Continued legal thought, 149; -Shiite con- Alict, origin, 32, 146–47; -Shiites, marriage, 90 Supreme Council for Agricultural Planning: 247 Supreme Council on Research: 133 Supreme Military Court of Ap- peals: 184 Supreme Military Tribunal: 359 Supreme State Security Court: 183-84 Suq el Ghazel mosque: 141 surveys: geological, 21; primary school, 121 Sweden: trade, 313 symbols, national: 241 Syria: Euphrates dams, negotia- tions, 20; in historical back- ground, 29, 30, 31, 37; -IPC dispute over oil transit charges, 314; oil disputes, for- eign interests, 244, 247; pro- posed union, 191, 206, 209, 210; relations with, 204, 206, 208, 209, 210,211, 318; trade, 21 Syriac (language): 64, 67 Syrian Catholic Church: 155 Syrian Church (Jacobites) : 64, 155 Tiglath-Pileser III (Assyrian ruler): 29 Tigris River: 2, 3, 5, 13-21 passim, 51, 59, 60, 63, 73, 107 tires and tubes: 315 Tito, Josip Broz (President of Yugoslavia): 350 tobacco: production, 252, 264 topography: 2–3, 13, 14 (fig. 2), 15–16 tourism: publications, 233 Townshend, Gen. Charles (British officer): 37 trachoma: 110, 112 trade, domestic: 301-07; bargain- ing, 305; composition, 302–03; control, 248; direction, 302– 03; employment, 279, 290; family enterprises, 303; limit- ing factor, 302; middleman, 305; practices, 304–06; private sector, aftermath of nation- alization, 301; regional dis- tribution centers, 302; restric- tion on foreign ownership, 304; retail, 301, 303; share of GNP, 301; trading community, 304; tribal attitude toward, 304 trade, foreign: 309–19; agree- ments, 10, 316–17; countries banned, 315; direction, 310, 312; government controls, 309; policy, 314–17; regulation, 314; state trading, 315 trade unions. See labor unions traders: characteristic, 290 training: limiting factors, 279, 285; management and indus- trial relations, 281; medicine and paramedical professions, 111, 112; military, 340, 346– 47; on-the-job, 279, 286; supervisory, 286; teacher, 105, 116, 118, 125–26; vocational, 279, 285, 286, 287 transportation: 21, 22 (fig. 3), 23–24, 306–07; development plans, 306; expenditures, 327; facilities, 306; lack of, 95, 97, 101, 105, 111 Talbani, Jalal (Kurdish leader): 197 Talib, Abu (father of Ali): 146 Tamerlane (Mongol conqueror): 34 taxes: collection, 328, 329; cus- toms duties and excise as major revenue source, 326; policy, 328; real estate, 329; reform, 191 teachers: injunction to indoctri- nate, 239; number of, 291; shortage, 125; training, 105, 116, 118, 125–26 Telegrafnoe Agentsvo Sovietskovo Soyuza (TASS, Soviet Union news agency): 228 television: 221, 222; transmitters, sets, audience, 229, 230 temperature: 16, 17 (table 2) textile plants: 264 Tharthar depression: 20, 25 theater: 138–39 408 treaties and agreements: civil, 10. 39, 207, 208, 209, 212, 214, 215, 216, 235, 310–12, 316–17, 318, 319; military, 42, 205, 209, 211, 212, 344 tribes and confederations: 6, 38, 61, 63; courts, 181; definition, 71-72; historical background, 35; in- dividual characteristics, ideal, 78; influence in choice of occupation, 280; land tenure, 254; leadership, 74–75; legal system, 357; migration pat- terns, 73; organization 72–77, 85–86; political power of sheiks, 193–94; social values, 161, 163–65, 168, 170, 173, 174 tuberculosis: 108, 112; control cam- paign, 110 Turkey: relations with, 209, 212; trade, 21 Turkish (language): government broadcasts in, 233 Turkish period: Armed Forces, 339– 40; effect on artistic and intel- lectual expression, 131 Turkoman (language): broadcasts in, 229 Turkomans: as ethnic group, 6, 62–63; -Kurd tensions, 6; population, 62 Turks: historical background, 33 typhoid fever: 110, 114 208–10, 211, 318; trade agree- ment, 317; tripartite accord on federation (UAR, Syria, Iraq), 209, 211; Voice of the Arabs, 234 United Bank of Iraq (Lebanese) : 336 United Kingdom. See Great Britain United Mission: 123 United Nations: Children's Fund (UNICEF), 109; Committee on Trade and Development, 309; Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, 72; membership, 9, 42, 218; stand on issues confronting, 218 United States: aid, economic and technical, 214, 323; aid, mili- tary, 214; Commodity Credit Corporation, 317; English Teaching Center (USIS), 234; Export-Import Bank, 214, 317; films, 231; information pro- grams, 233-34; Information Service (USIS): 222, 233, 234; Library (USIS, Baghdad), 234; missionaries, 155; oil in- terest, 275; relations with, 203, 205, 211, 213–14; students in, 128; TV programs, 230; trade, 310, 312, 313; Voice of America, 222, 234 Universal Postal Union: 219 University College: 126, 128 urban centers: attitude toward edu- cation, 129; diet, 107; dwell- ings, 100–01; educational fa- cilities, 115; five classes, 185; government, 185; households, 86; individual's identification with his town, 238; kinship ties, 84–85, 86; location, 25; marriage arrangements and ceremonies, 90, 91; middle class, power and status, 72; migration to, 52, 101, 105, 256, 279, 282–83, 288; police, 355; political awareness and par- ticipation, 192, 240-41; politi- cal elements, 190, 194; population, 49, 52, 77; sanita- tion, 107–08; social structure, 77–79; social values, 165, 174; 'Umar (Caliph): 145 Umari, Abd al Baqi al (poet): 136 Umayyad dynasty: 31, 32 Umayyads. See sunnites Umm Qasr (port): port facilities, 23, 24; railroad to, 21 Ummah (community or nation): in and out groups, 237, 238 unemployment and underemploy- ment: 78, 279, 283, 288 Uniate churches: 5, 155 Unified Arab Command (military treaty): 344 United Arab Republic (UAR): 42, 44, 128; brand of socialism, 239; films, 231; goals of unity with, 189–90, 191, 199; infor- mation programs, 234; rela- tions with, 2, 203, 204, 205, 409 urban centers—Continued standard of living, 97–98; status of women, 88; trade, 302; and traditional family customs, 84, 91; welfare proj- ects, government, 104-05 Uzaym River: 18, 19 vaccination campaigns: 109 values, political: 237–39 values, social: 161-74; children, 88, 92; conflict and change, 173–74; education, 129, 130; Islamic, 161, 162–63, 166, 167, 173–74; reinforcement, 169– 70; social control 169–70; tribal, 78, 161, 163–65, 168, 173; urban, 165, 174 vegetables : 262, 263 venereal diseases: 108, 110 vengeance concept: 74 villages: attitude toward educa- tion and public schools, 117, 129; awareness of national government, 240; central gov- ernment administrative repre- sentative in, 77; dwellings, 99, 100; farms allotted to, 105; government, 185; headman, 85, 185, 280; health facilities and services, 112; lineage, 85; marsh dwellers, 99; popula- tion, 49, 51; size, 24–25; so- cial organization, 75–77; trade, 305; underemployment, 288 Voice of the Iraqi People: 235 voting: right to, 176, 187, 192; women, 192 water: control projects, 3, 19–20; in dwellings, 100, 104, 107; polluted, 96, 107, 108, 109; potable, 96, 105, 107; supply, 19, 20, 107, 262; treatment plant, 108 wealth: principal basis, 77; redis- tribution, 328; as social value, 165; symbol, 91 welfare: government efforts, 95, 96, 104-05; modernization proj- ects, 96; Moslem institution, 154; private organizations, 105–06; traditional, 95, 96, 103–04, 193 wells: digging program, 19 West: art and learning, influence, 131, 143; attitudes toward, 28, 190, 204; education, influence, 62, 116; furniture, influence, 101; governmental systems, influence, 175, 176; legal sys-. tem, influence, 357; literature, influence, 137, 138; medical practices, attitude toward, 114; music, influence, 140; oil in- terests, 245; policy of mon- archy toward, 42; relations with, 14, 213–16; religion, in- fluence on, 134; scientific and social thought, influence, 135; TV programs, 230; values, 161, 162, 174 wheat: as food, 106; production, 252, 262, 265 Wilson, Woodrow (former U.S. president): 196 winds: 18 women (see also marriage): child- birth, 110, 113–14; in civil service, 186; clothing, 102, 103; division of labor, 164, 282; divorce, 91–92; dress, behavior related to, 171; edu- cation, 78, 88, 116, 120, 122, 124, 127; employed, 281, 382, 290; employment, attitude to- ward, 281; ideal qualities, 163-65, 168; influence in family, 87; inheritance, 94; position and role in society, 84, 88–89, 151, 164, 165, 166– 67; property rights, 93; reli- Wadi Hawran: 15 Wage Board: 291, 295 wages: 280, 294–96; agriculture, 295; industrial, average an- nual, 295; private and public sector compared, 295 waqf (land category): 254, 255 waqfs (religious, charitable, or family foundations) : 103, 154, 183 War Museum: 142 watan (land on which people are settled): 238 410