__ ISRAELI ATTACK ON IRAQI NUCLEAR FACILITIES »BUHR STORAGE'* of Mich. 3- B 1,123,224 -/23 ]98l HEARINGS Reference before: the SUBCOMMITTEES ON INTERNATIONAL SECUEITY AND SCIENTIFIC AFFAIRS ON EUROPE AND THE MIDDLE EAST AND ON INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC POLICY AND TRADE OF THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES NINETY-SEVENTH CONGEESS FIRST SESSION JUNE 17 AND 25, 1981 Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs ijINIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN LIBRARIES NOV 19 WW DEPOSITED BY THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE g1.844 o WASHINGTON: 1981 COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS CLEMENT J. ZABLOCKI, Wisconsin, Chairman L. H. FOUNTAIN, North Carolina WILLIAM S. BROOMFIELD, Michigan DANTE B. FASCELL, Florida EDWARD J. DERWINSKI, Illinios BENJAMIN S. ROSENTHAL, New York v PAUL FINDLEY, Illinois LEE H. HAMILTON, Indiana LARRY WINN, Jr., Kansas JONATHAN B. BINGHAM, New York BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, New York GUS YATRON, Pennsylvania ROBERT J. LAGOMARSINO, California STEPHEN J. SOLARZ, New York WILLIAM F. GOODLING, Pennsylvania DON BONKER, Washington JOEL PRITCHARD, Washington GERRY E. STUDDS, Massachusetts MILLICENT FENWICK, New Jersey ANDY IRELAND, Florida ROBERT K. DORNAN, California DAN MICA, Florida JIM LEACH, Iowa MICHAEL D. BARNES, Maryland ARLEN ERDAHL, Minnesota HOWARD WOLPE, Michigan TOBY ROTH, Wisconsin GEO. W. CROCKETT, Jr., Michigan OLYMPIA J. SNOWE, Maine BOB SHAMANSKY, Ohio JOHN LeBOUTILLIER, New York SAM GEJDENSON, Connecticut HENRY J. HYDE, Illinois MERVYN M. DYMALLY, California DENNIS E. ECKART, Ohio TOM LANTOS, California DAVID R. BOWEN, Mississippi John J. Brady, Jr., Chief of Staff Josephine Weber, Staff Assistant Roxanne Perugino, Staff Assistant Anne Markward, Staff Assistant Subcommittee on International Security and Scientific Affairs CLEMENT J. ZABLOCKI, Wisconsin, Chairman L. H. FOUNTAIN, North Carolina WILLIAM S. BROOMFIELD, Michigan DANTE B. FASCELL, Florida LARRY WINN, Jr., Kansas LEE H. HAMILTON, Indiana JOHN LeBOUTILLIER, New York JONATHAN B. BINGHAM, New York EDWARD J. DERWINSKI, Illinois Ivo J. Spalatin, Subcommittee Staff Director William H. Fite, Minority Staff Consultant Toni J. Grant, Subcommittee Staff Associate Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East LEE H. HAMILTON, Indiana, Chairman L. H. FOUNTAIN, North Carolina PAUL FINDLEY, Illinois BENJAMIN S. ROSENTHAL, New York MILLICENT FENWICK, New Jersey BOB SHAMANSKY, Ohio TOBY ROTH, Wisconsin TOM LANTOS, California OLYMPIA J. SNOWE, Maine Michael H. Van Dusen, Subcommittee Staff Director Alison Brenner, Minority Staff Consultant Ronald L. Soriano, Subcommittee Staff Associate David Paul Barton, Subcommittee Staff Associate Subcommittee on International Economic Policy and Trade JONATHAN B. BINGHAM, New York, Chairman DENNIS E. ECKART, Ohio ROBERT J. LAGOMARSINO, California DON BONKER, Washington ARLEN ERDAHL, Minnesota HOWARD WOLPE, Michigan BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, New York BOB SHAMANSKY, Ohio MILLICENT FENWICK, New Jersey R. Roger Majak, Subcommittee Staff Director Tabor E. Dunman, Jr., Minority Staff Consultant Paula B. Reynolds, Subcommittee Staff Associate Carol Pace Rovner, Subcommittee Staff Associate (II) IV Page Statement by the Department of State on public hangings in Baghdad's main square 36 Statement by the Department of State concerning statement by Ezer Weiz- man last year regarding consultation with the United States prior to pre- emptive or other military action 36 Text of report made by Mr. Richter to U.S. representative of IAEA 58 Text of administration comments on IAEA safeguards as they relate to Iraq.... 59 APPENDIXES 1. Letter dated June 26, 1981, to Representative Lee H. Hamilton from Representative Benjamin S. Rosenthal concerning the 1949 Armistice Agreement 85 2. Congressional Research Service report dated June 18, 1981, entitled "How Long Would it Take for Iraq To Obtain a Nuclear Explosive After its Research Began Operation? 88 3. Congressional Research Service report dated June 18, 1981, entitled "Possi- ble Contamination of Baghdad From Bombing of the Iraqi Reactor" 91 4. Letter dated August 7, 1981, from Thomas Graham, Jr., General Counsel, U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, responding to Representa- tive Hamilton's question regarding U.S. Government efforts to strengthen IAEA safeguards 96 5. Letter and statement dated June 16, 1981, from the American Israel Public Affairs Committee 102 6. Memorandum dated August 6, 1981, from American Law Division, Congres- sional Research Service on "Aggression and Self-Defense Under Interna- tional Law" Ill ISRAELI ATTACK ON IRAQI NUCLEAR FACILITIES The Israeli Action and United States Policy WEDNESDAY, JUNE 17, 1981 House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign Af- fairs, Subcommittees on International Security and Scientific Affairs, and on Europe and the Middle East, Washington, D.C. The subcommittees met at 10:23 a.m., in room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Clement J. Zablocki (chairman of the Subcommittee on International Security and Scientific Affairs) pre- siding. Chairman Zablocki. The subcommittees will please come to order. On June 7, 1981, the Government of Israel announced that it had carried out an attack against the Osirak nuclear facility located near Baghdad, Iraq. The executive branch subsequently condemned the Israeli attack, noting "the unprecedented character of which cannot but seriously add to the already tense situation in the area." In accordance with the relevant statutes, Secretary of State Haig sent a letter to Congress on June 10, indicating on behalf of the President that Israeli Air Force units taking part in the attack were reportedly equipped with U.S.-supplied F-15 and F-16 aircraft and "that a substantial violation of the 1952 agreement may have occurred." The Department of State is currently conducting a review of this incident in order to determine whether a violation of our laws and agreements with Israel has occurred. In the meantime, the Presi- dent has directed the temporary suspension of the shipment of four F-16 aircraft scheduled for delivery to Israel last week. The Government of Israel contends that its action was necessary for its self-defense because the reactor was intended to produce atomic bombs and would become operational very soon. The Gov- ernment of Iraq has claimed that its nuclear program is for peace- ful purposes and has vowed to continue this program in spite of the Israeli attack. Surrounding the incident have been a number of contentious allegations. Several unconfirmed and incomplete reports also per- sist. Given the significance of this incident to U.S. national security and peace in the Mideast, it is essential that the true and complete facts be established. (1) To that end, the Subcommittees on International Security and Scientific Affairs and on Europe and the Middle East are holding this hearing. As noted by the Department of State, the Israeli action will seriously affect the already tense situation in the Mideast. Accord- ingly, this hearing will also attempt to examine and evaluate what some of those foreign policy implications of the Israeli action may be. For instance, does the Israeli attack represent a dangerous precedent with respect to resolving nuclear proliferation disputes? In that same connection, does not the incident underscore the urgent need for the Reagan administration to promptly articulate an effective nuclear nonproliferation policy? In addition, has the attack placed into question U.S. Persian Gulf strategy by shifting Arab attention away from the Soviet Union and toward Israel as the major threat to peace and stability in the Middle East? There are other serious questions relative to the impact of the incident on Mideast peace. For example, did it possibly undermine Egyptian President Anwar Sadat and adversely affect the prospects for further progress on the Camp David accords? And, has the attack made a peaceful settlement of the missile crisis in Lebanon even more difficult? Before we hear from the representatives of the executive branch, I understand my colleague and chairman of the Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East, Mr. Hamilton, has a statement. The Chair now recognizes Mr. Hamilton. Mr. Hamilton. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I endorse your comments. I believe this to be an important inquiry. I look forward to the testimony from the Department of State. I want to express the view that I hope as much of that testimony as possible can be made public. I realize the State Department is studying the matter, and that parts of the issue should be discussed in closed session, but I think we can all agree that the issues raised by the recent Israeli attack on the nuclear facility south of Bagh- dad has important aspects to it which should be put on the public record. There are a number of suspicions and inaccuracies that have arisen around the incident, and I think it is important that the administration now come forward, in public, and state precisely what U.S. policies are toward Israel and what the ramifications of this raid are for our interests in the Middle East. We have already had two extended secret briefings in the last 10 days. The President has spoken publicly on this issue on two or three occasions. All kinds of articles are now coming out, and it would seem to me to be far preferable to get the public record straight than to have distortions that might come out of a secret session. I would hope the administration would do everything they can today to be as public and forthcoming as they can, and to follow that up with continued public hearings. Our witnesses today are the Honorable—I take it Mr. McFarlane is not present. That same day, Secretary Haig sent you his letter pursuant to section 3(C)(2) of the Arms Export Control Act, indicating that a substantial violation of the 1952 agreement may have occurred. The Secretary indicated we were conducting a review of this entire matter, which is the subject of our session today. Neither our condemnation nor the suspension of delivery of the four aircraft implied that we had reached any determination on the legal ques- tions under the Arms Export Control Act that were raised by Israel's action. We have not made such a determination under the act. MUTUAL DEFENSE ASSISTANCE AGREEMENT The Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement with Israel includes Israel's assurance that weapons acquired from the United States will be used solely to maintain its internal security, its legitimate self-defense or to permit it to participate in the defense of the area of which it is a part, or in United Nations collective security arrangements and measures. It also provides that Israel will not undertake any act of aggression against any other state. ISRAEL JUSTIFICATION Israel contends that its action against Iraq was necessary for its legitimate self-defense because the Iraqi reactor was intended to produce the required weapons grade material to produce atomic bombs. Israel notes that there has been a state of war between the two countries and has further contended that Iraq had made clear its intention to produce such a weapon for use against Israel. Israel indicated its belief that the reactor would become operational very soon, and that once it became operational, an attack would have been impossible because it could not be carried out without expos- ing the inhabitants of Baghdad to massive lethal radioactive fall- out. NONPROLIFERATION TREATY AND IAEA CONTROLS Iraq denies that its nuclear program has any application other than the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. It points out that it has ratified the nonproliferation treaty and notes that Israel has not, and that Iraq's reactor and supply of enriched uranium were sub- ject to International Atomic Energy Agency controls. Iraq further points out that its facilities were inspected in January 1981, by the IAEA, that no violations were found, and that all enriched urani- um supplied to Iraq was accounted for. Iraq considers Israel's action as unprovoked aggression. We have long been concerned about nuclear proliferation. We were concerned about the Iraqi nuclear program because of the sensitivity of the region, and because it would eventually give Iraq the capability to build an atomic weapon. We have shared these concerns in the past with appropriate governments and made clear our view that global adherence to and respect for safeguards is essential. While the NPT and IAEA safeguards regime, which was operative in Iraq, obviously did not allay the fears of Israel in this situation, the regime is still critical to any effective nonprolifera- tion effort. While we can all agree that we should seek to strength- en existing safeguards, without even today's safeguard, the kind of suspicion and mistrust that contributed to Israel's act would be more widespread in the world. We have condemned the Israeli attack and cannot but be dismayed by the damage which has been done to the search for peace in the Middle East. At the same time, I must candidly say that Iraq, which refuses even to recognise the legitimacy of Israel, has not played a constructive role in the Mideast peace process. U.S. CONSULTATIONS ON PROPER RESPONSE Since the attack, we have been engaged in consultations with Israel and with other appropriate governments. These consulta- tions are continuing. This is not a matter that can be dismissed lightly, and our judgments on the response warranted must be made only after the most careful consideration and consultation. We are not prepared today to make any judgments on the merits of the various arguments or decide on an appropriate response. We do believe that the Israelis had not exhausted all the diplomatic options available for alleviating their concerns. On the other hand, as the President said at his press conference yesterday: One has to recognize that Israel had reason for concern in view of the past history of Iraq, which has never signed a cease-fire or recognized Israel as a nation, has never joined in any peace effort for that. I would emphasize, Mr. Chairman, that this issue at its core is political rather than legal. We therefore should insure that our efforts are devoted to achieving a political resolution of the ten- sions and instabilities which plague the region. We continue to believe that force is not the answer to the problems of the Middle East. The Middle East will only find tranquillity through negotiat- ed solutions in Lebanon between Iraq and Iran, and between Israel and its neighbors. The issues before us today only accentuate the urgent need for all of us to redouble our efforts to achieve peace throughout the region. Mr. Chairman, as we continue our review, we will keep the committee informed so that it may pursue further its consideration of the issues involved. I thank you for your attention, and I wel- come any questions which you or the members of the subcommit- tees may wish to pose. INTELLIGENCE SHARING AND DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS Chairman Zablocki. Thank you, Ambassador Stoessel. You have stated in your testimony that we believe Israel had not exhausted all diplomatic efforts. Could you specify what could have been done on the part of Israel, the United States, or other countries, in preventing the action Israel has taken, apparently in desperation? For example, it has been alleged that the U.S. intelligence coop- eration with Israel was a factor in Israel's decision. Has such intelligence been shared? Did our intelligence tell the Israelis that we did not feel the Osirak reactor was presently being used to make bombs? Mr. Stoessel. First, with regard to intelligence information or exchanges, I think that would be better handled in closed session or through written response, which we would be glad to provide to you. Chairman Zablocki. The committee will welcome such a detailed response to that question for the purposes of the record. Mr. Stoessel. We will be glad to provide that. * With regard to diplomatic efforts, I think it is clear that we and other countries have been concerned for some time with the Iraqi nuclear program. We have held discussions with supplier nations involved, with France and with Italy, concerning their supply of technology and material to Iraq for purposes of its nuclear pro- gram. Our feeling is that the exchanges which we had of that kind had not been exhausted, that there could have been further efforts undertaken in continuation of that effort, but that that was pre- empted by the Israeli action. DETERMINATION PURSUANT TO AECA Chairman Zablocki. Mr. Ambassador, when is the earliest the committee can expect a judgment or determination by the execu- tive branch as to whether or not the Israeli attack is a substantial violation of our laws and agreements? Mr. Stoessel. Mr. Chairman, I would be unable now to fix a timeframe for that. We are working urgently on our review. As I mentioned, the issues are very complex. We do not want to be rushing into a decision, and, therefore, I would not be in a position now to provide a date firm for completion of that process. Chairman Zablocki. You could, nevertheless, speculate on the earliest or the latest date. A week, 2 weeks, 10 days? Mr. Stoessel. I would not be able to specify a date in that regard, Mr. Chairman. Chairman Zablocki. Could you share with the committee what key factors you are evaluating in order to make the determination with respect to a violation of the AECA, which will be coming at some uncertain date in the future? Mr. Stoessel. I think we are looking at all aspects of the situa- tion which have a bearing on the action which Israel took—the concerns voiced by Israel with regard to the Iraqi program, the validity of those concerns, and, on the other hand, the position of Iraq, taking into account many of the factors which I have men- tioned in my statement. discussions on use of U.S. equipment Chairman Zablocki. Mr. Ambassador, apparently there have been discussions with the Israelis as we were fully concerned as well about the ultimate intent of the Iraqi nuclear reactor. In discussing this reactor with the Israelis, have we at any time cautioned the Israelis that if they were to engage in a military strike against the reactor and if they used its military equipment for such a strike they should bear in mind the provisions we have in our statutes as to offensive use of our military equipment? 'The response to this question was provided in a classified form and is retained in committee files. Mr. Stoessel. Mr. Chairman, we have on frequent occasions discussed with Israel the question of the use of equipment provided by the United States for legitimate self-defense purposes of Israel. I would like to add a statement here with regard to the legal aspects of this matter, that the legal question does not involve compliance by Israel with any U.S. law. Rather, it involves the application and interpretation of an international agreement in force between Israel and the United States. The existence of that agreement is a condition of the President's authority under U.S. law to sell de- fense articles to Israel. However, U.S. laws are not, themselves, binding on other sovereign nations. That is just a clarification of the legal approach. Chairman Zablocki. As I understand the agreements with Israel there were not any exceptions to the U.S. law? Mr. Stoessel. No. Chairman Zablocki. Then why would these provisions not be binding if our military equipment under our law is limited to defensive purposes. I am concerned that any recipient country could interpret the law to their own purposes rather than to abide by its provisions. Mr. Stoessel. I would like to call on Mr. Michel, of our legal division, to respond to that, Mr. Chairman. STATEMENT OF JAMES H. MICHEL, DEPUTY LEGAL ADVISER, DEPARTMENT OF STATE Mr. Michel. Mr. Chairman, the point is not as to the content or the nature of the assurances given by Israel to the United States which are those assurances that our law requires the executive branch to obtain from any foreign country as a condition of the executive's authority to sell military equipment to that country. The technical point, though, is that the law that Congress passes binds the executive and requires the executive to obtain those assurances. The assurances, themselves, are contained in an inter- national agreement entered into between the United States and the foreign country, and so the legal obligation of the foreign country derives from the international agreement to which it is a party—not from a law passed by Congress that is automatically binding on that foreign country without the intervention of that international agreement. It is really just a technical legal point. POSSIBLE VIOLATION OF STATUTE Chairman Zablocki. I would like the interpretation of the legal department on the following. If it is determined that the statute has been violated, is it incumbent upon the executive branch to discontinue all military assistance to that country? Mr. Michel. The statute binds the executive to obtain those assurances in an agreement, which the executive has done. The agreement is binding on the foreign country. If there arises a question as to whether there has been a substantial violation of the agreement that implements the law, then the executive must report to Congress, as was done in this case. The possibility of a determination of ineligibility is provided for in the statute but is not required. This was changed in 1976 from the previous law, which had required a determination in all cases. DEFINITION OF HOT REACTOR Mr. Hamilton. The Israelis there say the facility would be hot starting in July 1981. If so, what do we mean by the word "hot," and what are the implications of it? STATEMENT OF JOHN P. BORIGHT, ACTING DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR NUCLEAR ENERGY AND ENERGY TECHNOL- OGY, BUREAU OF OCEANS AND INTERNATIONAL ENVIRON- MENTAL AND SCIENTIFIC AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF STATE Mr. Boright. Hot means the reactor is actually producing a substantial amount of power. When it produces power, that power is produced by fission. The fission produces radioactive waste within the fuel elements. The reactor is hot both in terms of producing power which is taken out in the cooling water, and the fuel, which itself is hot. Mr. Hamilton. If you bomb a hot reactor, does that mean you let loose a lot of radiation? Mr. Boright. You did ask the question about when it would go hot? Mr. Hamilton. Right. I am coming back to that. I haven't forgot- ten that. Let's get both of them. When was it going to go hot? Mr. Boright. We don't know exactly, Mr. Chairman. It was not yet hot. We, I think, assumed it would go hot sometime later this year. Mr. Hamilton. If you bomb a hot reactor, does that release a lot of radiation? Mr. Boright. The answer to that, Mr. Chairman, would depend very much on the type of bombing. In fact, I don't believe we yet understand the details of what was physically done to this reactor by this particular bombing. That is a very complicated technical question, Mr. Chairman. I think we would probably want to com- pose a detailed technical answer to that. [The information follows:] The answer to this question depends on a specific set of assumptions, but the executive branch analysis is generally consistent with conclusions reached in Pre- liminary Draft CRS Reports of June 17 entitled "Possible Contamination of Baghdad from Bombing the Iraqi Reactor" and "How Long Would it Take for Iraq to Obtain a Nuclear Explosive after its Reactor Began Operation?" RAMIFICATIONS OF RAID Mr. Hamilton. Mr. Stoessel, I am interested in some of the ramifications of this raid for the United States. Your statement indicates what Israel thought and what Iraq thought about it, and the fact that we condemned it. Just what kinds of ramifications flow now from this? What happens to the United States in the Arab world, for example? What kind of reaction have we had? What does it mean with regard to the Soviet Union in the area? What happens to the administration's so-called strategic consensus as a result of this raid, where we tried to persuade Middle East States that the Soviet Union was the greatest threat to the Middle East? What happens to Mr. Sadat, who the papers say has been badly embarrassed as a result of all this? What happens to the whole question of arms in the area? 10 I just see all kinds of problems flowing from this raid, and I would like for you to comment specifically on some of the things I have mentioned—how this raid impacts on American foreign policy in the Middle East—Mr. Habib's mission as well. Mr. Stoessel. Mr. Chairman, I think you have touched on a number of our concerns in this area. I believe the raid does compli- cate our efforts to promote the peace process in the area, in a general sense; that is, to promote a reconciliation between Israel and its Arab neighbors. Clearly the action which the Israelis have taken has aroused animosity on the part of the Arab countries toward Israel; has heightened tension in that regard. The Israeli planes flew over the territory of Jordan and Saudi Arabia without any kind of advance notification. This has caused an adverse reaction on the part of those countries. The position of Mr. Sadat, as you mentioned, has certainly been complicated, to say the least. He met with Mr. Begin some 3 days before the raid and was not told about it, and has felt, as a result, very embarrassed and exposed, vis-a-vis his Arab colleagues. We are also concerned about the immediate problem involving the situation in Lebanon and the progress of Mr. Habib's mission. He is continuing his efforts. He is in the area, has been able to talk to the independent parties in Lebanon and in Saudi Arabia and in Damascus, but all of them have made clear that the Israeli action has cast a shadow over his efforts to seek a solution of the situation in Lebanon. Mr. Hamilton. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Chairman Zablocki. Mr. Broomfield. Mr. Broomfield. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. U.S. POSITION IN U.N. Mr. Stoessel, what can you tell us about the U.S. position at the U.N. right now? I understand the U.N. Security Council will be making a final decision very shortly. Have we taken a position on what we are going to do on the condemnation of Israel? Mr. Stoessel. Well, Mr. Congressman, the situation, as you indi- cate, is fluid at the moment. No official resolution has been tabled as yet in the U.N. Security Council debate. The discussions, the presentations of position, are still going on. I expect that our repre- sentative, Ambassador Kirkpatrick, will make a statement this morning as to our general position with regard to the situation. I would expect that later today or tomorrow there will begin a consideration of resolutions as to what decision the Security Coun- cil may reach on that, and we will have to wait and see what the shape of these resolutions is before we take a position. IRAQI RELATIONS WITH OTHER COUNTRIES Mr. Broomfield. Following up Mr. Hamilton's question, what impact do you believe the Baghdad incident will now have upon Iraqi-Soviet relations? Mr. Stoessel. That is, I think, hard to be precise about. There were indications that Iraq in the past year or so had been pulling away somewhat from the Soviet connection. This is another aspect of the situation in the area, following the Israeli raid, where the 11 Soviet Union may have more opportunities now to expand its influ- ence, and I would suspect that they would wish to try and strength- en again ties with Iraq. Mr. Broomfield. Mr. Ambassador, is it accurate to say Iraq was using French and Italian dependence on Iraqi oil supplies as a method of blackmailing Rome and Paris into supplying it with nuclear technology that would permit Iraq to develop a nuclear weapon option? Mr. Stoessel. No; I could not associate myself with that or characterize the French and Italian actions as resulting from that situation. Mr. Broomfield. What degree of intelligence-sharing has oc- curred between the United States and France with regard to the Iraqi nuclear program? Mr. Stoessel. We would prefer to submit that in written form.1 FUTURE U.S. ARMS SALES TO MIDDLE EAST Mr. Broomfield. What do you believe to be the long-term impli- cation of the Baghdad incident as far as future arms sales in the region are concerned and, in particular, the possible sale of AWACS to Saudi Arabia? Mr. Stoessel. Mr. Congressman, on the question of arms sales in the future, I believe that this incident will heighten concern about the use of equipment and will demand from us and from other arms-supplying nations greater attention to the potential use of such equipment. With regard to the sale of AWACS, I do not see that this raid has altered the situation fundamentally. I think the interest of the Saudi Arabians in acquiring such equipment for their defense needs remains, and perhaps has even been intensified. SUSPENSION OF F-16 SHIPMENT Mr. Broomfield. I would like to ask a final question. The Presi- dent has directed the suspension of the immediate shipment of four F-16 fighter aircraft scheduled for delivery to Israel this past week. Has any U.S. military equipment been delivered to Israel since June 7? How long is the suspension of the four F-16's expected to last, and in the interim will other U.S. military equipment be delivered on schedule to Israel? Mr. Stoessel. Mr. Congressman, I would like to provide that answer for the record on arms deliveries. There may have been some items in the pipeline. I am not aware of the details. We will provide that to you. [The information follows:] U.S. Military Items in Pipeline to Israel The U.S. Military supply pipeline to Israel continues except for the temporary suspension of F-16s. Since June 7 the following items have been shipped to Israel: Item: Quantity M109A1B 155 howitzers 11 Mortar carriers M125A2 28 'The response to this question was provided in a classified form and is retained in committee files. 12 Item: Quantity Ambulance 84 HAWK missiles 153 175mm rounds 25,000 MARK 84 bombs 1,000 TOW missiles 847 Other items due in the fourth quarter of 1981 include: Item: Quantity F-15 aircraft 5 M60-A3 tanks 49 M113 armored personnel carrier 135 M88A1 recovery vehicles 25 81mm mortar rds .- 71,000 175mm rds 40,000 Sidewinder missiles AIM-9 30O TOW missiles 916 The total financial value of U.S. military supplies in the pipeline is extremely difficult to calculate at any given moment. Such variables as transportation and handling changes, purchase lead-time versus delivery time, and follow-on support costs make day-to-day accounting all but impossible. Last year, however, Israel received $2.185 billion in U.S. assistance, and under current plans it will continue to receive at least $2 billion per year. The adminsitration is continuing its study of the implications of the June 7 attack; no decision has been taken regarding the duration of the F-16 suspension. Mr. Stoessel. As to a decision on lifting the suspension, I think it is premature for me to comment on that. This is a question which remains under review. Mr. Broomfield. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chairman Zablocki. Mr. Solarz. Mr. Solarz. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. PURPOSE OF IRAQI PROGRAM Mr. Stoessel, I have to say that I am amazed and appalled at your unwillingness to characterize the purpose of the Iraqi nuclear program as being one designed to provide them with the capacity to manufacture nuclear weapons in view of what we have heard from so many other people associated with the administration over the course of the last week. What do you think was the Iraqi purpose in going forward with this program? Was it to give them the capacity to replace oil as a source of energy in their country? Mr. Stoessel. Mr. Congressman, I cannot comment on their in- tentions. As I have indicated, we have had concerns clearly about the Iraqi nuclear program and what their intentions might have been, and I think it is fair to say if they had continued on the course outlined, they would have had the option to produce nuclear weapons. Mr. Solarz. What do you think was the purpose? You have said that we cannot give a definitive answer to that question, but in the world in which we live, we often have to answer questions without being definitively certain as to whether we are right or wrong. Surely we have made an assessment of this. I have been hearing over and over again from all sorts of people in this town in the last week that in our view, while we might not be able to reach this conclusion with absolute total certainty, that it appeared to us as if, in fact, the purpose of this program was to enable Iraq to be in a position to manufacture nuclear weapons. 14 Mr. Solarz. Let me ask you a few questions which maybe you can answer easily. IRAQ 3 INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS Mr. Stoessel, is it true that unlike Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, and even Syria, Iraq never signed the armistice agreement with Israel after the war in 1949. and that it is, therefore, still technically in a state of war with Israel? Mr. Stoessel. Yes, that is true. There are other states in the same situation in the whole area. Mr. Solarz Is it also true that Iraq has never recognized Israels right to exist? Mr. Stoessel. That is true. Mr. Solabz. Is it also true that we consider Iraq to be a country which supports international terrorism? Mr. Stoessel. Yes. Mr. Solarz. Is it also true that Iraq, within the last year, in contravention of its treaty commitments to Iran, invaded that country? Mr. Stoessel. Yes, that is true. Mr. Solarz So, if all of this is true, then is it fair to say that Israel does face a potential threat from Iraq, which is still in a state of war against it, which refuses to recognize its right to exist, which supports international terrorism and which, itself, was in- volved in a brutal, unprovoked and massive invasion of a neighbor- ing country within the last year? Mr, Stoessel. Yes; that is true, Mr. Congressman. However, I would say at the same time that the method chosen by the Israelis to react; that is, the bombing, is not something which we could condone. Mr. Solarz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chairman Zablockr. I might say to my colleagues I am trying to balance the number of members on both sides instead of the 2 to 12. Mr. Findley. Mr. Findley. Mr. Secretary, my favorite constituent, Abraham Lincoln, had timely thoughts for the ages, and one of them was that we, even we, here, hold the power and bear the responsibility. I think those are words we ought to reflect on as we contemplate the U.S. role in the Israeli attack against Iraq. We are not silent partners here. We have a very unique relationship with Israel. U.8. WARNINGS TO ISRAEL It is my belief that had we given timely warnings to the Israelis, this attack would not have occurred. As evidence to support that argument, I would remind those listening that in 1979 the Carter administration laid down the law privately with the State of Israel. According to Assistant Secretary of State Harold Saunders, who was quoted just a couple of days ago to this effect, Carter told the Israelis he would go to Congress and demand enforcement of the law. The result was that the attacks decreased in frequency and intensity. 16 it must occur in the case of the Syrian missile site in Lebanon or we could risk a Mideast war. Mr. Stoessel. Mr. Congressman, I take your point there. I think it is a good point. I would simply note we have condemned the Israeli action, and we have suggested in writing that their action may have been in violation of the agreement. I think our position has been made quite clear. I agree for the future it is very impor- tant. Mr. Findley. I want to say I congratulate the administration for its reaction to the event of the attack. The condemnation was proper; it was timely. The suspension of shipment was proper and timely, and I think you are wise to withhold a final decision until all the facts are in. But events move swiftly, and I would hope that the administration at this late date would see fit to challenge the Israelis on the use of U.S.-supplied equipment at the missile sites. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chairman Zablocki. The hour has arrived when Ambassador Stoessel has to leave. We will continue the hearing with the rest of the witnesses, and I understand the Counsel of the Department of State, the Honor- able Robert McFarlane, will be coming in eventually. Is he here? Mr. Fairbanks. Mr. Chairman, I have been informed that due to his activities on other matters at the State Department, he will not be able to come, but we have the Acting Legal Adviser of the State Department here. Chairman Zablocki. Thank you very much, Ambassador Stoes- sel. [Whereupon, at 11 a.m., the subcommittees recessed, and recon- vened at 11:10 a.m. the same day.] Chairman Zablocki. The Chair will now recognize Mr. Tom Lantos of California. Mr. Lantos. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. STATEMENT OF HON. NICHOLAS A. VELIOTES, ASSISTANT SEC- RETARY, BUREAU OF NEAR EASTERN AND SOUTH ASIAN AF- FAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF STATE IRAQI POSITION ON 1948 ARMISTICE AGREEMENT Mr. Veliotes. Ambassador Stoessel asked that I address again the issue raised by Congressman Solarz on the Iraqi position in 1948 because it is very complicated and he asked I clarify it to the extent we can. We have a letter dated February 13, 1949, in reply to a request from the President of the Security Council.1 Let me read it. It clarifies the issue in the best manner I have ever seen. Sir: In reply to the message from Dr. Ralph 'Bunche, United Nations Acting Mediator, addressed to my government under cover of your letter dated January 31, 1949, regarding the establishment of an armistice in Palestine, I have the honor to inform you that the terms of armistice will be agreed upon by the Arab States neighbors of Palestine; namely, Egypt, Trans-Jordan, Syria and Lebanon will be regarded as acceptable to my government. This is signed by the Iraqi Minister of Foreign Affairs. 1 See letter from Representative Rosenthal concerning 1949 armistice agreement in appendix 17 Chairman Zablocki. Thank you very much. president's statement Mr. Lantos. Mr. Secretary, I have several questions. The first one relates to the statement of the President of the United States yesterday. Since occasionally I detect some divergence between Presidential statements and State Department policies, I would like to ask you for the record whether the State Department is in full accord with President Reagan's statement of yesterday, which I wish to quote: "Israel has reason for concern in view of the past history of Iraq, which has never signed a cease fire or recognized Israel as a nation." Do you agree with this statement? Mr. Veliotes. Mr. Congressman, for the record obviously the State Department in general and me in particular, we both agree with policies and policy statements of the President of the United States, including this one. Mr. Lantos. I am pleased to get that on the record because I don't always have the same impression. I would like to ask a second question with regard to the Presi- dent's statement: It is very difficult for me to envision Israel as being a threat to its neighbors. It is a nation that from the very beginning has lived under the threat from its neighbors. Would you agree with that for the State Department? Mr. Veliotes. Of course. Mr. Lantos. I am pleased to note that, Mr. Secretary. Now, let me open another issue which has not yet been explored. IRANIAN ATTACK ON IRAQI NUCLEAR REACTOR Am I correct in assuming that the Air Force of Iran attacked the same nuclear reactor some months ago? Mr. Veliotes. I believe that has been confirmed. It was Septem- ber. Mr. Lantos. Was that action condemned by our Government? Mr. Veliotes. Not that action in itself. Mr. Lantos. That action was condemned to the best of your knowledge by the Government of the United Kingdon? Mr. Veliotes. No. Mr. Lantos. To the best of your knowledge was that action condemned by the Government of France? Mr. Veliotes. No. Mr. Lantos. Did that action precipitate a meeting of the United Nations Security Council? Mr. Veliotes. Not that action itself, no, but the conflict did. Mr. Lantos. Did the attempt by the Iranian Air Force to bomb the same nuclear facility result in a Security Council meeting at the United Nations? Mr. Veliotes. No. Not the act itself. Mr. Lantos. Do you detect a double standard in all of these lacks of parallels? Mr. Veliotes. I think it is best to look at the context of the Iranian attack on the Iraqi reactor. They were fighting a war 18 which the United Nations, the Islamic Conference, the Non- Aligned Movement, and even those of us who had very little influ- ence in either capital, were seeking to end. In that context you had a lot of international concern, sir, about the conflict itself. This concern was not manifested by a specific major international initiative, over any aspect of the hostilities and, as you know, the oil facilities in both countries were damaged. Mr. Lantos. I am fully aware of the damage to the oil facilities. The point I am attempting to pursue—Mr. Secretary—is that the attack by the Israeli Air Force on an Iraqi nuclear facility has created an international cause celebre, has brought about a con- demnation by this Government, by the Governments of the United Kingdom, France, many others, and a special Security Council meeting. A parallel attack in intent, although not in success by the Air Force of Iran created none of these developments. Am I accurate in this statement? Mr. Veliotes. You are correct. Mr. Lantos. If I am correct, I would like to find out why in your view this double standard is being applied? Mr. Veliotes. I wouldn't characterize it as such, Mr. Lantos. I understand the point you are making. I believe in the context of the Iran-Iraq conflict Mr. Lantos. Let me help you, Mr. Secretary, because I don't think I am getting a straight answer. There was tragically a successful attempt at assassinating Presi- dent Kennedy and there was fortunately an unsuccessful attempt at assassinating President Reagan. Do you think that the intent of the assassin needs to be handled with a degree of evenhandedness, even though the success of the two episodes differed in degree? Mr. Veliotes. In the context of what you have described about the reported assassination attempt, I would agree with you. Mr. Lantos. Well, it seems to me that what we are dealing with basically is the bombing of a nuclear facility. That is why the issue is at the center of the stage. There ought to be some recognition of the fact by the State Department, publicly, that in fact a similar attack was undertaken several months ago and there was to the best of my knowledge total silence by our State Department, the other governments I indicated, and by the United Nations. If I may move to my second issue, Mr. Chairman. Chairman Zablocki. The time of the gentleman has expired, but proceed with your question. CONCERNS ABOUT IRAQI REACTOR Mr. Lantos. On the 24th of March, Mr. Secretary, on the floor of the House of Representatives, in part, I had the following to say: The radical and unstable regime in Iraq has begun an alarming escalation of atomic weapons development. Some of our European allies, France, Italy and Portugal, supply essential hard- ware and technology to Iraq without stringent controls on their use. I call on the administration to take immediate and effective action to remind our European friends to stop their ill-conceived propagation of nuclear weapons. 19 Were you aware of this statement on the floor of the House of Representatives when it was made on the 24th of March? Mr. Veliotes. Yes, sir. Mr. Lantos. What, if any reaction, was forthcoming from the administration, since I never received any reaction to my request to this administration to take immediate and effective action. This was 2% months before the Israeli strike. Mr. Veliotes. I would only repeat what Ambassador Stoessel said earlier. We, of course, had our concerns about the Iraqi reactor which we had made publicly as well as privately in our discussions with certain of our friends. Beyond that I would like to submit for the written record the details of these exchanges.1 Mr. Lantos. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chairman Zablocki. Mr. Gilman. Mr. Gilman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to address the entire panel. U.S. EFFORTS TO LIMIT NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION Did not our Government undertake a substantial number of efforts to try to convince the Iraqis to stop pursuing a nuclear capability over a lengthy period of time? Mr. Veliotes. I think my answer would have to be in the context of my previous statement. Mr. Gilman. Can't we have a yes or no answer? Did we ever take any initiatives to try to convince the Iraqis, the French, the Italians, to stop developing a nuclear capability in Iraq? Mr. Veliotes. We have had discussions. I really cannot go beyond that in this session. Mr. Gilman. Are you saying then that question has to be an- swered privately or confidentially? Mr. Veliotes. Yes, sir, and I would prefer to submit it in writing. Mr. Gilman. Mr. Chairman, I think since this issue is so impor- tant and since we are attempting to delve into these matters, can't we go into a closed session if the administration officials feel there are some security concerns about the responses? I think it is important that our committee delve into these very pertinent issues. Obtaining answers in writing 2 or 3 weeks from now, whatever the time is, and circulating them through the committee is not going to accomplish what we are seeking to do. That will be of little help as we try to get to the importance of how the adminis- tration perceives this problem and how the facts have been arrived at in trying to make a proper analysis of what should be done at this point. Accordingly, Mr. Chairman, I would move we go into closed session. Chairman Zablocki. Would the gentleman from New York yield? Mr. Gilman. Pleased to. 'The response to this question was provided in a classified form and is retained in committee files. 20 Chairman Zablocki. Before we began these hearings, there was a discussion on going into closed session. We had two options. Either to have as much of the meeting in open session or to immediately after the formal statement of Ambassador Stoessel to proceed in executive session. It was the decision of the Chair and the chairman of the Subcom- mittee on Europe and the Middle East and other members who were present at the time, that we would proceed in open session and have any sensitive questions submitted for the record. We were assured that the answers would be forthright and re- sponded to in a very reasonable period of time. Mr. Veliotes. Mr. Chairman, we could give you a quicker re- sponse. I take the point of Mr. Gilman. Obviously I won't call it our usual response, but a time-consum- ing response would not be appropriate and we could make every effort to give you an expeditious written reply, if that would be satisfactory. Chairman Zablocki. I might say to the gentleman from New York, we do not have a quorum at the present time to go into an executive session. Mr. Gilman. If that be the case, I would have to withdraw my request. Mr. Veliotes, I would hope you could provide us with an answer.1 Chairman Zablocki. Would you agree that we appealed to the Governments of France and Italy to go slow in their supply of nuclear materials and technical assistance to Iraq? Mr. Veliotes. I wouldn't characterize it as appeals, but we did have discussions. Mr. Gilman. Was the basis of that discussion because we had some concern about the direction in which that project was head- ing? Mr. Veliotes. Well, of course. Mr. Gilman. Thank you. Mr. Veliotes. About the potential directions. Mr. Gilman. Based upon the information we have and based upon our discussions with the other government, I would assume then that we perceive that there was some possibility that this project could be used for the development of nuclear weaponry, is that correct? Mr. Veliotes. Yes; it was a potential possibility over a period of time. REPORTS ON ARAB INTENTIONS TO DEVELOP NUCLEAR WEAPONS Mr. Gilman. Based upon some of the statements that had been made by the Iraqi leadership and some of the other Arab Govern- ments, there was an indication, was there not, that at some future time both the Iraqi government and some of the Arab Govern- ments hoped to develop nuclear weaponry, is that correct? Were there statements to indicate that by any of the leaders of the Iraqi Government? 'The response to this question was provided in a classified form and is retained in committee files. 21 Mr. Veliotes. Mr. Gilman, we have had a number of alleged statements brought to our attention which have not been verified. Mr. Gilman. Did you have an opportunity to verify any of those statements? Mr. Veliotes. None that have been brought to our attention has been verified. Mr. Gilman. Could you comment on the accuracy of this state- ment from the International Herald Tribune of June 27, 1980 by Naim Haddad, a senior member of Iraq's ruling Revolutionary Command Council who stated at a meeting of the Arab League in 1977, "The Arabs must get an atom bomb. The Arab countries should possess whatever is necessary to defend themselves." Now this is a senior member of Iraq's ruling Revolutionary Com- mand Council. Mr. Veliotes. I can't comment on it, sir, because I haven't seen it. I don't know whether it is authentic or not. Mr. Gilman. Ambassador Spiers is the Intelligence Chief in the State Department. Is that correct, Mr. Spiers? Has that report ever been brought to your attention? STATEMENT OF HON. RONALD I. SPIERS, DIRECTOR, BUREAU OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH, DEPARTMENT OF STATE Mr. Spiers. Mr. Gilman, I don't recognize the report you cite. Generally we have tried to track down every statement ascribed to the Arabs that have been cited in the press in recent weeks and so far we have failed to verify any of them. Mr. Gilman. Could I ask you to comment on the veracity or accuracy of that report when you provide us with the additional information? [The information follows:] An article in the June 27, 1980 issue of the International Herald Tribune reports that Naim Haddad, a senior member of Iraq's ruling Revolutionary Command Council, said the following at an Arab League meeting in 1977: "The Arabs must get an atom bomb. The Arab countries should possess whatever is necessary to defend themselves." We have been unable to locate an original text of the alleged remarks by Naim Haddad and, therefore, are unable to determine whether the article accurately reflects his actual remarks. We would note, however, that the statement as quoted appears to be hortatory and general in nature rather than specifically descriptive of Iraq's own nuclear program. As we have indicated, the question of ultimate intent is difficult to judge, but official Iraqi statements have uniformly ascribed peaceful purposes to Iraq's nuclear activities to date, and we doubt that an Iraqi official would deviate from this position in a forum such as the meeting in question. Mr. Gilman. Could I ask you to comment on Iraqi Ambassador Haidir's report, an envoy to Brazil upon the occasion of the signing of a nuclear cooperation agreement in 1979, "If our enemy, Israel, is close to building an atomic bomb, or already has one, what prevents us from developing this same capacity?" Was that report brought to your attention? Mr. Spiers. I don't recognize it. Mr. Gilman. You haven't seen that report. Is any other member of the panel familiar with that report? Mr. Boright? Mr. Boright. No. Mr. Gilman. Again I would ask you to comment on the accuracy of that report when you respond to us. 23 TIMEFRAME FOR NUCLEAR WEAPONS DEVELOPMENT Secretary Veliotes—and I might also refer this to Mr. Boright—a number of us have been very anxious to get technical information about the nuclear situation, the situation which would prevail if the reactor were hit at a later date, the timeframe involved in producing weaponry there, if that is the intent or was the intent of the Iraqis. In conversations with the Department of Energy, they have indi- cated that they could not provide timely documentation of informa- tion along those lines to us. I certainly hope that you are utilizing all the available resources of the executive branch and I hope at an appropriate time you may be able to present some of this informa- tion to us. In light of the fact that we do not have access to those executive branch resources, we have called upon an extremely competent source available to us here on Capitol Hill, the Congressional Re- search Service of the Library of Congress, and I have just received a preliminary draft of two reports addressing those subjects. They are not for attribution to individuals but they can be re- ferred to and identified as preliminary drafts which should be in print and available to the public later this afternoon or tomorrow. One of them, of course, addressing the subject of the timeframe involved in the production of a nuclear weapon, should such be the intent of the Iraqis, indicates that the facility there might be able to produce 1 kilogram a year of plutonium with somewhere be- tween 5 and 15 kilograms needed to produce a nuclear weapon.i Other sources have indicated that this same kind of timeframe was involved, somewhere from 5 to 10 to 15 years. With the exception of excluding all the international inspectors and excluding the French, which would immediately announce to the world that they had the intention of producing a weapon, which would present a completely different picture for the Israelis, that information I think is very important and I hope we can have as much as possible on that subject as soon as possible. POSSIBLE NUCLEAR CONTAMINATION OF BAGHDAD Another report is addressed to the possible contamination of Baghdad from the bombing of the reactor.2 This is a point ad- dressed by Mr. Hamilton earlier in questions, inquiring about what would happen if the reactor were hit after it became ' hot," that is, after it became activated and operational. Under those circumstances that would result in maximum expo- sure—that is to say, if the core were hit directly from above and if the energy released by the bomb would vaporize the core instead of spark it into pieces and if the bomb released enough heat to lift the vapor to an altitude where it would condense and fall out and if the wind was moving toward Baghdad and was strong enough to carry the cloud over the city before all of the condensed particles fall out, and if half of the fission products present are lifted into i See Congressional Research Service report of June 18, 1981, entitled "How Long Would it Take for Iraq to Obtain a Nuclear Explosive After its Research Reactor Began Operating?" in appendix 2 on page 88. s See Congressional Research Service report of June 18, 1981, entitled "Possible Contamina- tion of Baghdad from Bombing of the Iraqi Reactor," in appendix 3 on page 91. 24 the clouds, and if half the cloud's contents fall uniformly over the city, in other words, all of those conditions which are described in this report as extremely unlikely, would be fulfilled to the maxi- mum degree—if all of those conditions were present, then the report concludes that a citizen of Baghdad would have to be ex- posed for 62 million hours in order to receive a lethal dose. The conclusion of the report is—unless the Israelis chose to use a nuclear weapon themselves for the attack upon Iraq, that it is most unlikely that an attack with conventional bombs upon the reactor when operating would have caused lethal exposures to radioactiv- ity in Baghdad. I have noted in one of the local newspapers that there is a long list of claims that Prime Minister Begin has made about the raid which turned out to be erroneous. Mr. Veliotes, would you say if this report I have just given you is accurate, then the assumption of Prime Minister Begin that he must make the attack now for fear of jeopardizing the lives of hundreds of thousands of citizens of Baghdad, should also be added to that list of erroneous statements which he has made? Mr. Veliotes. Mr. Bowen, if you make that report available to us, we will be able to comment on it. I personally am not able to address this issue. Mr. Bowen. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. That report should be available later today or tomorrow and I think it will shed consider- able light upon the subject of the question of the justifiability of an attack at this time as opposed to waiting and going through a longer process of peaceful exploration of methods of resolving the problem which has developed. I think that process of exploration, of course, includes an admin- istration in France with a different perspective and a number of other options that would lie open to the Iraqis and the Israelis during the period of several years, which would be necessary before a weapon might be produced. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. Chairman Zablocki. Mr. Lagomarsino. By the way, Mr. Veliotes, when you receive that report, you will supply your answer on it for the record? Mr. Veliotes. Yes, Mr. Chairman. [The information follows:] The answer to this question depends on a specific set of assumptions, but the Executive Branch analysis is generally consistent with conclusions reached in Pre- liminary Draft CRS Reports of June 17 entitled "Possible Contamination of Baghdad from Bombing the Iraqi Reactor" and "How Long Would It Take for Iraq To Obtain a Nuclear Explosive After Its Reactor Began Operation?" Mr. Lagomarsino. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Regardless of the report Mr. Bowen has been talking about and regardless of what your official review and analysis will provide as to how accurate that report might be, isn't it beyond argument, really, that to bomb a nonoperative nuclear reactor would cause less threat of nuclear radiation release than one that is operation- al? Can there be any doubt about that? Mr. Veliotes. There is no question in my mind, but I would ask others to address it. 25 Mr. Boright. That is certainly true, assuming that the irradiated fuel is still in the reactor. So the answer is basically yes. STATEMENTS ON IRAQ'S NUCLEAR CAPABILITY Mr. Lagomarsino. Now, Ambassador Spiers, I am somewhat con- fused by your statement—and you have made it several times— that you are not able to verify some of the statements that have been reported from other sources as to what Iraq officials had to say about the use of their nuclear capability. Now, some of the things that have been quoted have apparently appeared—they appeared or they didn't appear—in the Iraqi press and I would assume that our interest section in Iraq would clip those out if they appeared. I am at somewhat of a loss to understand why we don't know whether they were made or not. I agree it would be one thing to differentiate between a report in the press quoting the President of Iraq or some other official and you are saying, "We don't know whether he in fact said it," that is obviously a much more difficult thing but can we confirm the reports actually appeared in the press? Mr. Spiers. The two reports Mr. Gilman mentioned, the Iraqi Ambassador in Brazil and the other one, have never been brought to my attention. Every time something like this has been brought to my atten- tion, we have tried to track it down. The first was the Israelis' ascription to President Hussein of the statement. We immediately went to our interest section in Bagh- dad and our embassy in Tel Aviv and were told that as far as they could tell no such statements were made. The Israelis then told us that this was perhaps in error and pointed to a newspaper article. We have tried to track down that newspaper article which car- ries the same burden as what was ascribed to Saddam Hussein and have not been able to verify that such an article appeared. We will continue to try to track down any such statements, although I would like to repeat what I said earlier, that generally the public statements of the Arab leaders have stressed their peaceful pur- poses and also what I added to that is, in my judgment that is to be expected. INITIATION OF IRAQI PROGRAM Mr. Lagomarsino. When did the Iraqi Government start on its nuclear program.? Mr. Spiers. The program was started with Soviet assistance in the late fifties and early sixties. As you know, there is a Soviet- built research reactor, a 2- or 5-megawatt reactor. The program was expanded in 1975, 1976, and 1978, I believe, with the contracts that the Iraqis reached with the Italians and the French as a result of which there were two French-built research reactors, one of which was the Osirak, which was totally destroyed, and then some laboratory facilities built by the Italians, which were not touched in the raid. 26 STATUS OF ISRAELI-IRAQI RELATIONS Mr. Lagomarsino. In the view of the State Department—per- haps you answered this earlier; if you did, I didn't hear it—in our Government's view, are the States of Israel and Iraq still in a state of war? Mr. Michel. Yes, sir. Both countries, I believe, characterize the state of relations between them as being a state of war. I wouldn't want to imply too much by that answer though the fact of a state of hostilities has been asserted in the past in some cases as a basis for attacks on Israel and I wouldn't want to suggest that that existence of a state of war is in itself something that causes or justifies particular legal results Mr. Lagomarsino. I was just interested in the legal situation. On September 30 I understand there was a raid on the same reactor, or a bombing attempt. Are you aware of allegations that that raid may indeed have been conducted by Israelis using F-4 airplanes? Mr. Veliotes. Yes, that was common in the Middle East at the time. One of the rumors. Mr. Lagomarsino. Have we any information on that? Mr. Spiers. We have no evidece to support that contention. Mr. Lagomarsino. Thank you. Chairman Zablocki. Mr. Bingham. Mr. Bingham. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. First, I would just like to make a comment, particularly in reference to the report of the CRS, that my friend from Mississippi has brought out. It seems to me quite clear that while the critics of Israel are now arguing that the danger to Baghdad, if the reactor was bombed while operational, was not so great, if Israel had waited until that reactor was hot and had then bombed it, those same critics would have increased the decibels of their criticism by about tenfold, for the heartlessness of Israel in bombing a live, hot reactor. I think that is something we should bear in mind. I am sorry that Ambassador Stoessel left because it seemed to me he was raising questions about some of the background of this situation which are absolutely unnecessary questions. consequences of raid I just don't understand the timidity of his answers. Let me ask you, Mr. Veliotes, this question: Would you say Israel was quite aware before they undertook this raid that it would have adverse and unwelcome political reactions and raise questions as far as their relations with the United States are concerned? Mr. Veliotes. Presumably, but I can't Mr. Bingham. There is no question in your mind Mr. Veliotes. I can't answer that question because they never came to us and said "We are contemplating that." Mr. Bingham. Come on now. You know there is no question that they would have recognized that they were going to pay a price if they did this. Right? Mr. Veliotes. I can't give you a yes or no answer, sir. 27 I assume there was an assumption that this would not be wel- come. Mr. Bingham. Boy, the State Department is really outdoing itself. Do you think the attack was a prelude to general offensive action, as the Arab propagandists aver? Mr. Veliotes. I think the Israelis undertook the raid for the purposes the Israelis say they undertook the raid. Mr. Bingham. They said they did it in self-defense. Mr. Veliotes. I am sure this is the Israeli position. Mr. Bingham. That is helpful. I think the perception of the Israelis with regard to this matter is a very important factor in the total picture. EVALUATION OF IRAQI INTENTIONS Now, with respect to our view of what the Iraqis were up to, I know from my extensive considerations with the preceding admin- istration that the United States was very concerned about what Iraq was doing, that it was making diplomatic efforts to see that they didn't proceed down the road to a nuclear capability and that they were basing this on the conclusion that what Iraq was doing with its nuclear facilities made sense only in terms of preparations for developing nuclear capability. Now, does the new administration have a different appreciation of what the Iraqis were up to than the Carter administration? Mr. Veliotes. Any detailed comments on this would have to be submitted in writing, but Mr. Bingham. I think the question can be answered yes or no. Mr. Veliotes. It can't because you make the assumption that the previous administration made a definitive judgment; that the pur- pose of the Iraqi nuclear program was to build nuclear weapons. Mr. Bingham. No, sir, that is not what I said. Mr. Veliotes. I am sorry. That is the way I understood it. Mr. Bingham. That they were deeply concerned about what Iraq was doing and were trying in every way they knew to slow down this activity or prevent it, based on the fact that the nuclear facilities didn't make sense in terms of a nuclear program other than that designed to produce weapons. I know that that was the way the previous administration was thinking and I am simply asking you if this administration has reached a different conclusion? Mr. Veliotes. No, sir. I must have misunderstood your previous formulation. This administration shares the concern of the previous adminis- tration about the potential for the future of the Iraqi nuclear program. PLANT'S ABILITY TO PRODUCE PLUTONIUM Mr. Bingham. That leads to my question which has to do with the statement which I gather you haven't seen in today's Post that the Director General of the IAEA is quoted as saying that the Iraqi plant would not be able to make nuclear weapons. 29 POSSIBLE CONTAMINATION I would like to ask you something too, Mr. Boright, if I may, concerning the hot or radioactive aspect of the facility. Questions have been asked concerning Baghdad, which as I un- derstand it, was some 35 miles away from the nuclear reactor itself. Mr. Spiers. Twelve kilometers. Mrs. Fenwick. The newspaper said 35 miles. I noted in the photographs furnished us there were a great many houses around the circumference of the plant itself with, presum- ably, people living in them. Is that true? Just to the north, if the photograph was taken from the south, you could see a group of little houses. Mr. Spiers. I think the group of houses you are referring to are associated with the installation, itself. Mrs. Fenwick. Occupied by human beings, in any event. Mr. Spiers. It is not housing. Mrs. Fenwick. They are occupied by human beings; they are homes. Mr. Spiers. I think not during the time that the raid took place. Mrs. Fenwick. You know the thing I must say—I would like to follow on Congressman Lagomarsino's—I cannot understand how it is that our State Department or our agencies of Government know every single peaceful statement, and none of the statements sug- gest anything other than a very peaceful and loving attitude toward the state of Israel. If you have been able to examine the reports, how is this? I just don't understand it. Congressman Lago- marsino has an excellent point with which I would like to associate myself, but there are more serious questions. Mr. Spiers. Since that statement might be directed at me, I think what we were looking for is statements that clarified the intention to produce a nuclear weapon and to use this weapon against Israel—not general statements of hostility toward Israel, which I don't think you would have too much trouble finding oceans of. Mrs. Fenwick. When in one speech there is the mention of nuclear energy, in a speech given on Brazil, or mentioned in the official editorial in an official newspaper in Baghdad, certainly it would seem to me they might be noticeable. The discrepancy in information is evident. That is what worries me. FRENCH SUPPLYING ENRICHED URANIUM I would like to ask something: Did France continue to supply enriched uranium after the inspectors were denied entrance to Iraq? Mr. Veliotes. That was after the war started. Mrs. Fenwick. As I understand it, at some point Iraq said to the IAEA inspectors: You cannot come here. Now, did France continue to supply enriched uranium after that refusal? Mr. Boright. Mrs. Fenwick, there was a delay—at the first part of the war between Iraq and Iran—in IAEA inspections. In fact, delay is not accurate. Nothing had been scheduled during that time. The question arose as to when to schedule the next one. After ki-M4 o-ki—:t r 30 some exchanges, one was scheduled and did take place. In that interim, no fuel was supplied, to our knowledge. Mrs. Fenwick. Subsequently, after the inspections again took place, was more scheduled? Mr. Boright. No; there has only been one fuel delivery so far. Mrs. Fenwick. When was that? Mr. Boright. The middle of last year. Something like that. Mrs. Fenwick. Something like July or August 1980? Mr. Boright. Something like that. Mrs. Fenwick. The refusal came in the autumn? Mr. Boright. Again, refusal is not quite accurate. Mrs. Fenwick. Well, whatever it was. Mr. Boright. Yes. Mrs. Fenwick. And nothing has been delivered since? Mr. Boright. That is correct. Mrs. Fenwick. And nothing is planned? Mr. Boright. The reactor, when it is under power does need more than one refueling a year, and so certainly something was planned, after the reactor goes into operation. In response to an earlier question relating to when the reactor would go hot, I said that would be later this year. Presumably the next fuel supply would also have been later this year. Mrs. Fenwick. It would have required that second fuel supply in order to become hot? Mr. Boright. No. Mrs. Fenwick. It could have become hot without that fuel supply? Mr. Boright. Yes. Mrs. Fenwick. And we have been given time schedules for that between July and September, that it might become hot. And your contention is that had a nonnuclear bomb been dropped on that facility, after it became hot, it would not endanger any lives in the area. Is that correct? Mr. Boright. No; not at all. I didn't answer that question at all, as I recall. I said it was a very complicated question which we would answer in writing, not in this case, because of any secrecy or sensitivity, but because, as Congressman Bowen laid out, one has to make a whole set of assumptions. Mrs. Fenwick. Thank you. I understand. We are told that Israel appealed, or if you don't like the word "appealed," approached, France, Italy, and the Netherlands asking them to abstain from the development of this nuclear facility in Iraq. The newspapers also said that the Netherlands had agreed. Did we take part in that? Did we support that appeal, or ap- proach, or whatever word you want to use? Did we join with Israel in that appeal or approach? Mr. Veliotes. Mrs. Fenwick, we are going to have to submit that information. [The information follows:] The U.S. did not make any joint appeal with Israel to supplier countries over their nuclear cooperation with Iraq. However the U.S. expressed its concerns on a bilateral basis in discussion with France and Italy, including about how best to limit the potential risks of proliferation associated with the facilities. Since we are aware of no significant nuclear supply to Iraq from the Netherlands, the U.S. has not had comparable consultations with the Dutch. 31 LIMITATIONS ON ENRICHED URANIUM SUPPLIES Mrs. Fenwick. Could I ask you, are we making any plans at all for some kind of an international agreement among those nations which are able to supply enriched uranium so that we would have an operating agreed-upon procedure? Denial of entry perhaps could prohibit furnishing any more uranium. Are we planning any kind of an international agreement on this proliferation danger? Mr. Boright. We have for several years been talking extensively with other suppliers. Certainly those discussions have related to the general proposition that supply would cease if there were a substantial violation of any of the agreements covering that supply, so we feel that that agreement is already in place. Mrs. Fenwick. In place? Mr. Boright. Yes; and we can provide you the formulation of that. [The information follows:] The United States has worked with other supplier nations to define appropriate safeguards and conditions for the supply of nuclear equipment, technology, and material (including enriched uranium). We will continue to include discussion of the need for special caution (e.g. non-supply of sensitive items) with regard to areas of tension such as the Middle East. Mrs. Fenwick. Now wait a minute. Mr. Boright. Substantial violation. Mrs. Fenwick. That is the trouble with the word "substantial." We run into it all the time with the legislation here. We use that mistaken word. I think with even the suspicion of a violation, there should be suspension. When you say substantial, who is going to say what is substantial? We cannot expect nations threatened by other nations to sit by and watch the progress that may result in their own destruction unless we have the international family of nations ready to move, to intercede, in some peaceful and negotiated and agreed-upon way. Otherwise, it is a world without law and order. It is like having somebody with a noose around your neck and a policeman at the end of the block who doesn't listen. We must to have a system that can be called up to operate so that nations are not tempted to such extremes. I hope we are going to move, if we haven't already. I couldn't be more disappointed, because it just isn't working. There is nuclear proliferation around the world. I don't want to say what we have here—some of this has been in closed session—but nation after nation are heading toward atom bombs, and we apparently are not able to stop them. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chairman Zablocki. Mr. Dornan. STATEMENTS IN IRAQI PAPERS Mr. Veliotes. Mr. Chairman, several members have referred to newspaper articles in Iraqi papers that purported to express the view authoritatively that the Iraqis were building atom bombs through their reactor. There has been some annoyance that we have been unable to find these articles. I would like to clarify it. Each such article that has been brought to our attention, we have found did not exist. 32 Now, I am not referring to the two that Mr. Gilman has just mentioned to us. They are new, and we are waiting to receive them. But as far as the so-called editorial in the official Baati, paper, we have devoted a lot of time and effort to trying to find these things. They are not there in the paper on the day that the suggestion has been made that they were there. We haven't just let this drop. I just wanted that to be clear for the record. Mrs. Fenwick. Have you ever seen any others? Mr. Veliotes. Personally, no. I am not saying they don't exist, mind you. But on these specific items that have been brought to our attention through the press or otherwise, we have expended a considerable amount of effort in trying to verify whether or not they exist. Chairman Zablocki. Mr. Dornan. Mr. Dornan. One more question on this point. I just made a note to my staff to hold up my mail responding to—negative and posi- tive mail—the Israeli raid on the reactor, because I am quoting in those letters from some of these articles that I have made the mistake of taking out of the columns of well-known columnists on both sides of the issue, from the Post, the Star, and the Los Ange- les Times; so, please may I make a request to have you inform my offices if you find any substantiation of these quotes, particularly the often-quoted October 4 editorial. Mr. Veliotes. It doesn't exist. Mr. Dornan. Yesterday, in closed session—and I don't believe this was part of that required part of the session that remained executive and closed—someone from one of our intelligence agen- cies had a translation and an analysis of the October 4 editorial. So I am really confused on this point. Mr. Veliotes. There is an October 4 editorial. Mr. Dornan. It is the quotes from that. Mr. Veliotes. The question is, what did it say? We have been unable to find in that editorial the quotes that were attributed to it. Mr. Dornan. I understand that point. INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENTS OF IRAQ NUCLEAR WEAPON CAPABILITY Now, my question is one of intelligence in nature. Did our intelli- gence services make an assessment, as late as February 1981, of the nuclear weapon capability of the Osirak reactor? Could I start by addressing this to Mr. Nosenzo? Mr. Nosenzo. Mr. Dornan, I believe we had best answer that as a written, classified response. Mr. Dornan. Then in the interest of a written answer, let me add that I have been informed, as have many of us on the commit- tee, that the intelligence community did make such an assess- ment—a very clear assessment, I might add—regarding whether Iraq was attempting to build nuclear weapons, and that this was based on intelligence up through October 1980, and that it was updated specifically on February 26, 1981. In the written responses, I would like to see direct reference to that February 26, 1981, 33 intelligence analysis and have it included in the classified record of this hearing.x Mr. Dornan. I would just like to make a statement and yield back my time. This key to determining whether the small nation of Israel was acting in self-defense, is to determine if their closest friends in the free world, particularly those friends that have the greatest intelli- gence capacity—and I don't think any nation surpasses our intelli- gence capacity—came to a firm conclusion that Iraq was driving for nuclear weapons capability. Then all of the other arguments— about hot or cold cells about whether the Israelis should have acted before or after the upcoming election—becomes less significant. Some political decisions are patriotic in nature. In other words, if Mr. Begin decided that a new government would not move as effectively as he felt necessary for the survival of his nation, then the decision to act would have been a moral and patriotic political decision. I think everything hinges on whether or not this other small poor nation, Iraq, with an unstable political past and a leader who came to power through murder and assassination and imprisonment, and human rights violations, was driving for nu- clear weapons capability,, and thereby exacerbating tensions in the area; I believe the Israelis, while meeting with our intelligence community here in a philosophical way—and I don't think this is classified or should be classified—have said that they will always, where their natural survival is at stake, base their decisions on a worst-case analysis. That happens to be a philosophy that I think this country has long been without, and it is one of the reasons that I vigorously campaigned for a new administration. A worst-case analysis is the analysis you must use when the survival of your nation is at stake. I yield back the balance of my time. Chairman Zablocki. Mr. Roth. Mr. Roth. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Ambassador Spiers, can you think of what other countries in the Middle East are as advanced in the nuclear field as the Iraqis were before the June 7 raid? Mr. Spiers. Other than Israel? Mr. Roth. Other than Israel. Mr. Spiers. None. RAID AS ACT OF SELF-DEFENSE Mr. Roth. A number of people have said that they can come to the logical conclusion that Israel may have acted in its legitimate self-defense. Do we feel that it was legitimate self-defense, the June 7 strike? Mr. Veliotes. This is a legal determination we are in the process of reviewing. We have made no conclusion at this point. Mr. Roth. It has been 10 days since the strike, and I would think we should make some sort of conclusion, because if we do extend the definition of self-defense this broadly, what is going to happen when other countries make strikes like this? iThe response to this question was provided in a classified form and is retained in committee files. 36 Mr. Veliotes. I know there were executions. I can't from memory, sir Mr. Lantos. Would you submit for the record whether, in fact, there were public hangings undertaken by Iraq on the main square of Baghdad? Mr. Veliotes. Yes, sir. [The information follows:] There have been no public hangings in Baghdad's main square since January 1969 when fourteen Iraqis accused of spying for Israel were hanged. We are not aware of any susequent public hangings. Mr. Lantos. How would you characterize the human rights record of the Iraqi regime? Mr. Veliotes. It is a dictatorship. Mr. Lantos. How would you characterize its relationship to in- ternational terrorism? Mr. Veliotes. I think we have cited Mr. Lantos. I am sorry. Mr. Veliotes. We have listed the Iraqi Government as one of those governments which support international terrorism. Mr. Lantos. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chairman Zablocki. Are there any further questions? Mr. Findley. Mr. Chairman, could I ask one additional question? Chairman Zablocki. The gentleman from Illinois, Mr. Findley, is recognized. ISRAELI CONSULTATION WITH UNITED STATES Mr. Findley. Mr. Secretary, a couple of years ago when Ezer Weizman was Defense Minister of Israel, in a dialog with this committee, he gave us assurances that before any preemptive strike would be undertaken by the State of Israel, that his govern- ment would consult with the U.S. Government. He made it very plain that this would not give the United States a veto over the decision, but that consultation would occur in advance of the event. Can you tell us if that policy has become an established one between the two governments? Mr. Veliotes. Mr. Findley, certainly there was no consultation between our two governments before this event. I want to make that very clear. Mr. Findley. Did the Ezer Weizman statement lead to a consul- tation framework? Mr. Veliotes. I would say—I would like to think about this, and I would like to submit the answer for the record. Mr. Findley. If you would place in the record examples of prior consultation in regard to strikes that might be considered preemp- tive from our standpoint, I would appreciate it. [The information follows:] Ezer Weizman publicly disclaimed reports of any undertaking on his part that Israel would consult with the United States before taking preemptive or other military action. The Government of Israel has not consulted with the United States in advance of any military action. Mr. Lantos. Would the gentleman yield for a moment? Mr. Findley. Surely. 37 Mr. Lantos. From the point of view of the State Department, would it have been preferable, to have had prior consultation, since under the circumstances clearly we would not have been in a position to claim, as we now do, that we knew nothing about this attack? Mr. Veliotes. We are not in the business of having prior consul- tations with anyone on preemptive strikes, anywhere. Mr. Lantos. I understand that. Nevertheless, would you say it would have been more helpful to have had notification, or does the State Department find it more helpful to be able to say its hands are clean? Mr. Veliotes. These are extremely difficult questions. Mr. Lantos. I understand that. Mr. Veliotes. Anything I say will be certainly misinterpreted. We would prefer such events not occur Mr. Lantos. That is not my question, Mr. Secretary. Mr. Veliotes. I would like to complete my answer, sir. Mr. Lantos. I have to insist that you answer the question. Mr. Findley. Mr. Chairman, in view of the fact that I have the time, I would like to have Mr. Veliotes' answer. Mr. Veliotes. I am not quite sure which question I am answer- ing at this point. Chairman Zablocki. Take your choice. U.S. KNOWLEDGE OF ISRAELI INTENTIONS Mr. Findley. Mr. Secretary, I know it is difficult to answer the question as to whether our Government would have liked to have known in advance of the Israeli intention, but surely you would not want to leave the impression that we would not have welcomed an opportunity to make a case against that preemptive strike. Surely you wouldn't want to leave that impression. Mr. Veliotes. Put in those terms; sure. Mr. Lantos. May I ask my question now, Mr. Chairman? Chairman Zablocki. Does the gentleman from Illinois yield? Mr. Findley. I do. Mr. Lantos. Thank you. I thank my colleague and friend. Assuming that we had been advised in advance of this intention, and assuming we had attempted to dissuade the Israelis from taking the action, and assuming we would have failed in that attempt, and they would have proceeded anyway, would we be in a better position, having been notified, or are we now in a better position not having been notified? Mr. Veliotes. The reformulation of your question gives me all the problems that your original question gave, sir. I can only state that we would, of course, strongly prefer that such things not happen. Mr. Lantos. We all agree with that. Mr. Findley. Mr. Secretary, you heard, I am sure, my comments earlier today. I would hope that in that circumstance, we would have laid down the law and made it very plain to Israel that such an attack would jeopardize the bilateral military-supply relation- ship. Given that notice, I am sure the Israeli attack would not have occurred. 39 come this August, there will be the anniversary of 7 years that the occupation has continued. So one doesn't have any problem in clearly seeing the prima facie case of a violation in the Turkish invasion. SELF-DEFENSE What I think the public and all of us have a problem with is the extension of self-defense doctrines. Is there some new legal ground we are breaking, and in trying to develop that, I have asked myself certain hypothetical questions. For example, supposing President Sadat knew that Colonel Qaddafi had six atomic bombs, and he had every reason to believe they would be delivered in terms of their execution against six major cities in Egypt. Would he have the right under existing law, in terms of self-defense, to take those bombs out? I have asked myself that question. I don't necessarily have to ask you, because I don't know that you have even formulat- ed an answer. Mr. Michel. I haven't formulated an answer to your hypothetical question, sir. Mr. Rosenthal. What would you think about that? Mr. Michel. Let me try to back away from that just a little bit, if I may, and make two points. First of all, the limits of the right of self-defense are not easy at all to define. In any particular case, this would depend on the character and the immediacy of the threat to which a state is responding. Mr. Rosenthal. Are you reading something? Mr. Michel. I jotted down some notes. Mr. Rosenthal. What are you reading from? Mr. Michel. From notes. Mr. Rosenthal. I mean, your own notes? Mr. Michel. Yes, sir. Mr. Rosenthal. I am interested to know whether there is some international treatise like Lauderbach, or something like that. Mr. Michel. I can provide you with some materials Mr. Rosenthal. Could you tell me the basis of your notes? Mr. Michel. Reading over a period of many years in internation- al law. Mr. Rosenthal. But in preparation for this meeting, did you use one particular treatise? Mr. Michel. No, sir. Mr. Rosenthal. I have been reviewing them, myself, and I am just looking for some help. In terms of self-defense one has to take himself from Washington crossing the Delaware to the period of atomic warfare, and it keeps enlarging, and 1981 may well be a new extension of what is either self-defense or anticipatory self-defense. When one gets over the initial shock and the fact that you wouldn't want to hire Begin as your lawyer to represent you in a particular proceeding, then one thinks of the serious purpose of trying to define the doctrine we are going to be bound by. Mr. Michel. Two points again on that: One is the difficulty of making that judgment as to what is reasonable in the exercise by a state of the most profound judgment as to what its national secu- rity requires. Under the U.N. Charter, there is reserved to each 40 state the inherent right to exercise self-defense. Now, that right is limited by international law, which permits only a proportionate use of force against an immediate military threat to a nation, and discerning in particular cases whether the force was proportional, whether the threat was urgent and immediate, is a very difficult process turning on the facts of each case. Mr. Rosenthal. So that one cannot make a judgment in this case until one has complete understanding and presumed verification of the allegation the Israelis make for the reason for their proceed- ing? Mr. Michel. I would like to know a lot more than I know now. Mr. Rosenthal. Then how can the Secretary of State say there may have been a substantial violation? Mr. Michel. Because there has been no ongoing state of active hostilities, and this facility is some considerable distance from Israel Mr. Rosenthal. What facility? I didn't even mention a facility. What facility? Mr. Michel. You are saying in this particular case the question was— Mr. Rosenthal. How could the Secretary have made even a preliminary judgment that there may have been a violation with- out fully understanding what the Israeli perception of the threat was? Mr. Michel. The alternative would be to say there was no seri- ous question here and it was obviously an act of self-defense, and therefore there was no need to inform the Congress of the question. Mr. Rosenthal. I wouldn't say that at all. I would say, We are looking into the matter, and as soon as we have a full and com- plete understanding of all the facts and circumstances, we will report to you, the Congress." LEGAL REQUIREMENTS Mr. Michel. The second point I wanted to make, sir, is that Congress changed the law in 1976 Mr. Rosenthal. I am very much aware of that. Mr. Michel. It changed the law from that which had been on the books in 1974. The present law calls for a report to the Congress whenever a substantial violation "may have occurred." We have tried to construe that Mr. Rosenthal. How do you know whether a violation occurred? Mr. Michel. That is just it. The old law required a determination and didn't require a report. The new law requires a report and doesn't require a determination. Mr. Rosenthal. I know both of those very well, having lived through them on 12 different votes in the House. Mr. Michel. We thought that the Congress would expect to receive a report from the Secretary of State in these circumstances. Mr. Rosenthal. But the Secretary of State should be very rea- sonable and deliberate and prudent in making quick and early judgments. Mr. Michel. He did not express a conclusion in his letter as to whether any violation had or had not occurred, and he indicated at the conclusion of his letter, "We will, of course, inform the Con- 41 gress of the outcome of our discussions with the Government of Israel and our deliberations on the response warranted." Mr. Rosenthal. My time expired a long time ago. Before you go any further in this matter, you will fully and completely and comprehensively review all of the facts and circumstances as they exist in the Middle East and not in a law library at the United Nations? Mr. Michel. We will not likely make a quick judgment, if a judgment is made in this case. Mr. Rosenthal. Nobody may make a judgment. Mr. Michel. That is possible. Mr. Rosenthal. History may make a judgment. Mr. Michel. Yes. Mr. Rosenthal. Going back to my example of Sadat finding out Qaddafi has six bombs and Qaddafi intends to drop them on Egyp- tian cities, what is Sadat's responsibility to his people? Mr. Michel. I really don't think I can answer hypotheticals. As I said earlier, the reasonableness of the judgment must be evaluated in the particular facts and circumstances of each case after a very close look at those facts and circumstances. Mr. Rosenthal. Did you take a close look at the facts and circumstances before you sent the preliminary letter up? Mr. Michel. The judgment wasn t made in this case. All we have said is that a substantial violation may have occurred, not that one has occurred. Mr. Rosenthal. You keep telling me what the letter says, not what went into the thinking process before the letter was sent. Mr. Michel. The judgment was it raised sufficient question to warrant sending a report to Congress, and no more than that. We thought Congress would want to be informed. Chairman Zablocki. When I was much younger, I wanted to be an attorney. I am not so sure now. Mr. Markey? Mr. Markey.i Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I thank you for the opportunity of being a guest here today. ADMINISTRATION POSITION ON NONPROLIFERATION I think the central question here is not the response of the U.S. Government to the Israeli raid. I think the central question is not whether or not Mr. Begin has used this for his own political gain. I think the question here is what the U.S. reaction is going to be to the nonproliferation message that has been sent by the Israeli attack upon the Iraqi reactor. Yesterday, President Reagan was asked: What would you think the proper role of the United States is in preventing the spread of nuclear weapons and nuclear weapons technology? That is the question. That is the question, Mr. President. What are you going to do about the spread of nuclear weapons? Not vertical proliferation, not the proliferation of weapons be- tween the United States and the Soviet Union in stockpiling of weapons, but rather horizontal proliferation, as country after coun- try after country gets nuclear technology. Horizontal proliferation i Hon. Edward J. Markey, a Representative in Congress from the State of New York. 42 is a hundred times more dangerous than vertical nuclear prolifera- tion but it receives only a fraction of the attention that the Soviet- United States arms race does. The President's response: Well, our position is, and it is unqualified, that we are opposed to the proliferation of nuclear weapons, and will do everything in our power to prevent it. I don't believe, however, we should carry over into the development of a nuclear power for peaceful purposes. The point here is can nuclear power be used for peaceful pur- poses? The point that has been made by Begin, by the Israelis, is that an electrical generating plant, a nuclear generating plant like Seabrook or Three Mile Island, or Pilgrim, or any of the other nuclear plants in America, placed in the hands of Third World countries, is a bomb factory, that has an incidental unofficial side benefit to the country, of electricity. The question I have is whether or not the United States is going to reevaluate completely its export policy of nuclear powerplants around this world. Do you accept the fact that nuclear powerplants are bomb factories, that Seabrooks and Three Mile Islands can be used to construct atomic weapons, that Mr. Boright's testimony of whether it be low-enriched uranium, whether it be high, whether it be plutonium, it can all be used to construct atomic weapons. It is the most serious question of the 1980's. What is the response of President Reagan and your administration to the question of limit- ing or blocking permanently any further exports of nuclear tech- nology, of nuclear powerplants around the world. Do you have a position on that yet? Mr. Veliotes. The nonproliferation policy of this administration is still under review. Mr. Markey. So you have not yet made a determination that nuclear powerplants are bomb factories? Mr. Veliotes. We have the policy under review. Mr. Markey. You haven't made a decision? DANGERS OF NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION Earlier in your testimony, you say you don't know yet whether Iraq was intending to use the reactor to produce a bomb. You don't know whether political oil blackmail was being used on France and Italy to get this technology. It seems to me you don't know a lot. It seems to me the real issue here is the nonproliferation issue; with all due respect for the short-term Israeli sale of the F-16's and the effect that it has upon the Lebanese situation, that the real ques- tion is, the question for the 1980's, is whether or not the President of the United States can step back from his mind-set to believe that peaceful nuclear power does not exist. Can we say to the Westinghouses and the General Electrics and Bechtels and Stone and Websters that business-as-usual has ended, that we are going to call on the French, West Germans, Japanese, Belgians, and Italians and all these other countries selling nuclear powerplants around the world, that we are going to call a SALT III treaty—not to talk about vertical proliferation, but horizontal pro- liferation, the much more dangerous spread of nuclear weapons technology. Do you think it is time for us to do that? ISRAELI ATTACK ON IRAQI NUCLEAR FACILITIES The Role of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in the Iraqi Nuclear Program THURSDAY, JUNE 25, 1981 House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign Af- fairs, Subcommittees on International Security and Scientific Affairs, on Europe and the Middle East, and on International Economic Policy and Trade, Washington, D.C. The subcommittees met at 11 a.m. in room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Clement J. Zablocki (chairman of the Subcom- mittee on International Security and Scientific Affairs) presiding. Chairman Zablocki. The subcommittees will please come to order. This morning the Subcommittees on International Security and Scientific Affairs, on Europe and the Middle East, and on Interna- tional Economic Policy and Trade will examine the role of the International Atomic Energy Agency—IAEA—in the Iraqi nuclear program. Last week, the subcommittees heard testimony from representa- tives of the executive branch on the Israeli attack on Iraq's nuclear facilities. It is our hope that the witnesses at today's hearing will be able to shed some light on issues such as the nature of Iraq's nuclear program, IAEA safeguard methods, the French role in Iraq's nu- clear program, the IAEA's ability to deal with clandestine nuclear activities, and possible improvements of IAEA safeguard procedures. As a' consequence of the Israeli attack on the Iraqi nuclear facility a great deal of attention has been focused on the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and the IAEA safeguard regime. It is clear that improvements should be made to strengthen the current safe- guards regime and to gain more support from all nations for that regime. However, the NPT and the IAEA safeguards regime have their shortcomings. They are both critical to any effective efforts to pursue the goals of nuclear nonproliferation. Testifying before us today will be Mr. Roger Richter, former inspector, International Atomic Energy Agency; Dr. Albert Carne- sale, professor of public policy, John F. Kennedy School of Govern- ment, Harvard University; Dr. Carnesale is a former U.S. repre- sentative to the Technical Coordinating Committee of the Interna- ls) 46 tional Nuclear'Fuel Cycle Evaluation—INFCE; and Dr. Frank S. Houck. acting chief. Nuclear Safeguards and Technology Division, Nonproliferation Bureau. U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. I understand that only Mr. Richter has a prepared statement which the subcommittees look forward to receiving. In addition to Mr. Richter's prepared statement, we look forward to the wit- nesses* testimony. Dr. Carnesale. I understand you, too, have a statement. Before we begin. I understand that my colleague and chairman of the Subcommittee on International Economic Policy and Trade, Mr. Bingham, has a statement. Mr. Bingham. Mr. Bingham. Thank you. Mr. Chairman. I think you summarized very well the purposes of this hearing which will be the first of several to explore this very important subject. I would just like to make a couple of comments in welcoming the witnesses. I do feel that we should express appreciation for Mr. Richter's willingness to appear before the committee. He made a substantial personal sacrifice to share his very sincere concerns about the Iraqi nuclear program. I am glad to note from his testi- mony that he—although we know of his criticism of the IAEA inspection system and its weaknesses—is a believer in the organi- zation and in the need to strengthen it. It is also a pleasure to welcome Dr. Carnesale. We were hoping at one time that he was going to be chairman of the NRC, and we look forward to his comments on where we go from here in terms of strengthening our nonproliferation regime in the world. He cer- tainly is very well equipped to comment on that. We also welcome Dr. Houck, who is one of the experts from ACDA on the safeguards question. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chairman Zablocki. Does the chairman of the Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East care to comment? Mr. Hamilton. I have no statement, Mr. Chairman. Thank you very much. Chairman Zablocki. Mr. Findley. Mr. Findley. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am glad that this hearing has been scheduled. I am glad that Mr. Richter is available to give us testimony. I have made my own position on the Israeli raid clear. I think it was a provocative act and very destabilizing in the Middle East. But that in no way lessens my own concern about the Iraqi nuclear program. It is clear to me that Iraq was working on a nuclear program that would give it an option to build nuclear weapons. It is therefore imperative that the United States and other nu- clear supplier states cooperate more fully and more effectively than they have in the past to stem the flow of dangerous nuclear materials to any nation—not just Iraq, but to any nation. I look forward to the President's announcement on a nuclear nonproliferation policy which I hope will be forthcoming quite soon. Today, I hope to learn from Mr. Richter and the other witnesses how the IAEA safeguards system might be strengthened in order to 47 better preclude nuclear proliferation which remains a very danger- ous element in the international arena. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chairman Zablocki. Dr. Carnesale, please proceed. STATEMENT OF ALBERT CARNESALE, PH. D., PROFESSOR OF PUBLIC POLICY, JOHN F. KENNEDY SCHOOL OF GOVERN- MENT, HARVARD UNIVERSITY Mr. Carnesale. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate this opportunity to appear before this committee to express my views on the implications for nuclear nonproliferation of the Israeli attack of June 7 on the Iraqi nuclear facilities. Let me introduce myself briefly. As you know, my name is Albert Carnesale, and I am a professor of public policy at the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University. I am a rare animal in that I am a professor of public policy, but my Ph. D. is in nuclear engineering. My teaching, research, and consulting activities focus on nuclear energy policies and nuclear weapons policies. I served on the U.S. Delegation to SALT I and more recently, as was mentioned, as the United States member of the Technical Coordinating Committee of the International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation—INFCE. KEY QUESTIONS ON THE ATTACK Consideration of the Israeli raid on the Iraqi nuclear facilities in my mind raises five key questions: First, what were Iraq's intentions with regard to the production of nuclear weapons? Second, what were Iraq's capabilities with regard to the produc- tion of nuclear weapons? Third, would the current nonproliferation regime, based largely upon the NPT and IAEA safeguards, have been adequate to deter or to detect use of the Osirak reactor in an Iraqi nuclear weapons program? Fourth, was Israel "justified" in attacking the Iraqi facilities? Fifth, what should be done to strengthen the nonproliferation regime? I do not pretend to have answers to all of these questions, but I believe they provide a useful framework for my remarks. Let me turn to the first question. Iraq's intentions What were Iraq's intentions with regard to the production of nuclear weapons? The answer, of course, is "I do not know." Nei- ther does anyone else other than the Iraqi leadership and perhaps not even they. But I can understand why Israel would assume the worst of Iraqi intentions. Intentions can change quickly and they are affected by changes in capabilities. Israel had too much at stake to assume that Iraq's intentions were benign and would have remained so. The Israeli focus had to be on Iraq's capabilities instead, and so should ours. 48 Iraq's capabilities Second, what were Iraq's capabilities with regard to the produc- tion of nuclear weapons? While experts can debate ad nauseam about the precise capabilities of the Osirak reactor and the facul- ties associated with it, there appears now to be a consensus on the following two basic points: (a) Osirak was to be fueled with highly enriched uranium, and there appear to be credible scenarios in which the amount of highly enriched uranium onsite could have been sufficient to pro- duce a few nuclear weapons; and (b) Osirak could have been used to produce plutonium, perhaps enough to manufacture as many as a few bombs per year. Such production would have required a continuing supply of highly en- riched uranium, which Iraq cannot produce by itself and for which Iraq would have had to rely upon France. ADEQUACY OF NPT AND IAEA SAFEGUARDS The third question: Would the current nonproliferation regime, based largely upon the NPT and IAEA safeguards, have been ade- quate to deter or detect use of the Osirak reactor in an Iraqi nuclear weapons program? No knowledgeable and objective person could answer this ques- tion with a simple "yes" or "no." For example, to determine wheth- er IAEA safeguards would detect a violation, one would have to make assumptions about the nature of the violation, the skills and the luck of the violators; the details of the safeguards arrange- ments, and the skills and the luck of the IAEA personnel. At best, an objective expert might be able to make an informed estimate of the probability that a given diversion scenario would be detected. As to whether or not that estimated probability of detec- tion would be sufficient to deter the potential violator only the potential violator knows. The question of "How much is enough for deterrence?" is familiar to Americans in the context of strategic weapons, and in that context we have seen the extent to which so- called experts can disagree. This discussion is intended not to evade the issue of the adequacy of the international nonproliferation regime, but only to place that issue in perspective. My personal view is that it is unlikely that Iraq could successfully have concealed either a diversion of bomb quantities of highly enriched uranium, or the production and sepa- ration of bomb quantities of plutonium. In other words, I judge it to be unlikely that such programs of diversion conducted by the Iraqis could have been concealed successfully from the IAEA, the French technicians at the Osirak site, and the intelligence services of Israel and other interested parties. Just how unlikely an undetected diversion would have been would have depended strongly on the so-called "subsidiary arrange- ments" for safeguarding the facilities, which were under negotia- tion between the IAEA and Iraq. But to say that successful diversion would have been unlikely, or for that matter even very unlikely, is not to say that it would have been impossible. The distinction is important and should be kept in mind. 51 majority of nations take such covenants seriously. Would we prefer that these 111 countries be freed of those commitments? I think not. Most of the power reactors and research facilities around the world are of types which can be adequately safeguarded under the current arrangements. Most of the power reactors in operation are light water reactors, and neither the fuel that goes into them nor the spent fuel that is discharged can be used directly in weapons. These reactors, each of which produces about 250 kilograms of plutonium annually, can be safeguarded very effectively. Without safeguards applied to them, the risks of proliferation would be multiplied manyfold. The real problem lies with the so-called sensitive materials, highly enriched uranium and separated plutonium, and with facili- ties in which these materials are present in significant quantities. Fortunately, neither highly enriched uranium nor separated pluto- nium is now needed for the production of nuclear power. Highly enriched uranium has some economic and operational advantages as a fuel for research reactors, but in my opinion the proliferation costs rarely fail to outweigh those benefits. Plutonium is essential to the breeder fuel cycle, and its presence in large quantities will have to be dealt with if and when breeders become widespread. To meet these challenges, we must strive to minimize the avail- ability of highly enriched uranium and plutonium, and we must continue to improve safeguards. Inspections of sensitive facilities must be far more frequent than at nonsensitive ones, perhaps even continuous, and the quality of surveillance must be much higher than it is now. The current nonproliferation regime is far from perfect, but it is far, far better than no regime at all. While the recent event in Iraq properly focused our attention on the deficiencies of IAEA safe- guards, we must not lose sight of the strengths and the potential for improvement in the system. If the current nonproliferation regime really were without value—which I doubt anyone here really believes—then: Why should nations adhere to the NPT? Why should nations submit to international inspections? Why should nations forego the use of highly enriched uranium? Why should nations forego the use of plutonium? Why should nations forego the acquisition of nuclear weapons? Clearly, there is much of value in the current regime. Let us take care not to throw out the baby with the bathwater. Our nonproliferation objectives should have our highest priority. The long-term future of our Nation and of the world will be shaped by our ability to meet these goals. Indeed, unless we are successful, we may have no long-term future. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chairman Zablocki. Thank you, Dr. Carnesale. Mr. Richter? STATEMENT OF ROGER RICHTER, FORMER INSPECTOR, INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY Mr. Richter. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is both an honor and privilege for me to appear before the committee. It is my intention to present my views regarding the 52 adequacy of the International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards system and how this system relates to the controversy surrounding the Iraqi nuclear program. As the only American inspector in the section responsible for the safeguarding of nuclear facilities in Iraq, Israel, Pakistan, and India among other countries, I believe I have had a unique oppor- tunity to gain an insight into the quality and effectiveness of the IAEA safeguards in a region of the world that is very much the focus of our government's efforts to contain proliferation. The present heightened interest and concern on the part of the American people and the world community toward the effective- ness of the IAEA nuclear safeguards and nonproliferation efforts offers perhaps the best opportunity ever to identify deficiencies which exist in the system and to work toward resolving these deficiencies. NEED TO STRENGTHEN IAEA A principal objective of my testimony, Mr. Chairman, is to identi- fy IAEA deficiencies and to strengthen what I believe to be the crucial mission of this most important international agency. The other principal objective is to explain why I believe that the Iraqi nuclear program was organized for the purpose of developing a capability to produce nuclear weapons over the next several years. By way of discussing these two subjects and their relation to .one another, I thought it could best be accomplished by explaining them from the perspective of an IAEA safeguards inspector who is charged with the responsibility of safeguarding the Osirak reactor. witness' background But first by way of background, Mr. Chairman, I want to inform the committee of my relevant experience in the field of nuclear engineering. I hold a B.S. in metallurgical engineering and a master of science in nuclear engineering from the Polytechnical Institute of New York and the University of Maryland. The latter degree was attained under the auspices of the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission select intern program. I have been employed by the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, the Energy Research Develop- ment Administration, and the Department of Energy from June 1968 until February 1978. During this time I was involved in nearly all aspects of the technology associated with nuclear fuel engineering, reactor irradiations and nuclear waste disposal. While working for the Atomic Energy Commission, I have served as project engineer for the national program to develop advanced fuel for breeder reactors, as a site representative at the General Electric Breeder Reactor Headquarters in Sunnyvale, Calif., and the Westinghouse Nuclear Component Manufacturing Facility also in Sunnyvale. I would also like to state that throughout my career I have been very pro-nuclear and continue to remain so. 53 On the basis of these relevant experiences, I was offered a posi- tion as a nuclear safeguards inspector with the IAEA in February 1978. At the IAEA I initially served as an inspector in the Euratom section. I was a principal inspector at the nuclear fuel reprocessing facility in West Germany and at the fuel fabrication facilities in both West Germany and Italy. I subsequently replaced the lone American inspector in the south and southeast section when he returned to the United States. I have been an active inspector in the south and southeast sec- tion for the past 2 years, until my resignation on June 26 of this year. In this capacity I have inspected small research reactors in Australia, Greece, Indonesia, Israel, the Philippines, Turkey, and Yugoslavia. I have had considerable inspection experience with the heavy water power reactors, the RAPPS 1 and 2 in Kota, India, and the General Electric supplied light water reactors in Tarpur, India, and at the nuclear fuel fabrication complex in Hyderabad, India. I was recently involved in the final negotiations on behalf of the IAEA with the Government of India on the safeguard approach to the Prefre nuclear fuel reprocessing facility, located at the Tarapur site. I was to have been a key inspector in the implementation of the forthcoming inspections at the Prefre reprocessing plant later this year. I had in fact been offered, and I recently accepted, a 5- year extension of my present contract with the IAEA. ROLE OF A NUCLEAR SAFEGUARDS INSPECTOR Now, I ask the members of the committee to imagine for the moment that each of you is a nuclear safeguards inspector who will shortly be going to Iraq to conduct an inspection. To begin with, you have to imagine yourself as being a national of the Soviet Union or another Eastern bloc country, or possibly also a French- man. Since 1976, all inspections performed in Iraq have been conduct- ed by Soviet and Hungarian nationals. Recently, a French national was granted approval by Iraq to be an inspector, but he has not been to Iraq to make an inspection as of yet. This is a reflection of the fact that countries have the right to veto inspectors from whatever countries they choose; a right which they regularly exer- cise. As an accepted inspector, you must keep in mind that any ad- verse conclusions you might reach as a result of your inspections would have to take into account your country's sensitivity to how this information might affect relations with Iraq. THE INSPECTION PROCESS In preparing for the inspection you must first give the Govern- ment of Iraq several weeks' notice of your planned inspection and obtain a visa. They may agree with the date or could, as has recently been the case, suggest you postpone or change your plans to a more suitable date. Naturally, not wanting to create unnecessary friction, you will agree. You are now ready to go about the business of preparing ferae: .TJaiauce will not ^■■rimc could fii ong * Irac 'IKFor - w V> t inspector you a** of plutoniinr Qank reactor. Ev< a the first few veaxscf < fci t*»i_ ■ because in spite of having ugrwd thv NW' . facilities in the nuclear nwloi a»mt« - I . , . . of the purview of the IAEA a* long M It »i HUl "-" I that they contained either plutoniuni or umnmm ".. ' il "W' During these years when the plutontum itocKpIl* I* Iraq could master the techniaues of lnl)i nut int: IfM plttl "" '"" figurations required for a nuclear wea|w>ri NUMBER Of YEARLY IN*Wii'." Equally disturbing to joa m m imp**/* m It* ider the present —pr*fittfd agww— ****** '*+ '•' under Iraq, you will be spaced at ap: can be emptied days, you as az to verify lie reactor." si - 54 E yourself for the inspection. First, you should become familiar with the design information Iraq has provided to the IAEA. You note that this design information is limited to describing the reactor, its operating characteristics such as power and flux, a description of the type and number of fuel elements, and of the irradiation ports. The hot cells provided by Italy for examination and processing of irradiated nuclear specimens for possible plutoni- um separation are not included in the information provided by Iraq. Nor is the radiochemistry laboratory, pilot reprocessing facili- ty or the fuel fabrication line included in the design information available to the IAEA. These facilities are not under safeguards and as long as Iraq maintains that it is not processing plutonium or fabricating urani- um fuel in these facilities, they will remain outside of safeguards. This may be disturbing to you as IAEA inspector. Nevertheless, ou are aware that as a signatory of NPT only facilities which Iraq as declared to the IAEA as containing either thorium, natural or depleted uranium in metal or oxide form, or plutonium are subject to your examination. However, natural uranium in the form of U308, which is commonly known as yellowcake, is not subject to safeguards, despite its potential for easy conversion to target speci- mens for plutonium production. LIMITATION ON INSPECTIONS You are not entitled even to look at the other facilities if Iraq has not adhered to its obligation under NPT, to report to the IAEA that material subject to safeguards is located in these facilities. You are aware that the role of the inspector is limited to verify- ing only material declared by Iraq or France. You have no authori- ty to look for undeclared material. Your job is to verify that the declared material accountancy balance is correct. The IAEA does not look for clandestine operations. The IAEA in effect conducts an accounting operation. The amount and level of enrichment of the reactor fuel elements is indicated on your computer printout. But you notice that 100 tons of uranium in the form of U308 yellowcake is not on the list. This is not an oversight but is a reflection of the fact that even though Portugal reported the shipment to the IAEA it is only a formality. The 200,000 pounds of U308 are not subject to safe- guards. Had this uranium been in a slightly reduced form such as UO2, it would have been under safeguards. But this loophole could enable Iraq to do as it pleases with the U308. And so long as it does not report that the U308 has been converted into a material that is in the safeguarded category, you have no right to inquire of its whereabouts. You are disturbed by this because you realize that in the other Italian-supplied fuel processing equipment which is not under safe- guards, Iraq possesses the capability to convert in a rather simple fashion the U308 to UO2 or even better, to uranium metal. This could then be made into uranium targets which when bom- barded by neutrons in the reactor core or blanket would be partial- ly converted to plutonium. The targets could then be disassembled and reprocessed in the unsafeguarded hot cells and pilot reprocess- ing facility, and the plutonium recovered. 55 Since the U308 is not under safeguards, the material accountan- cy balance will not show that material has been withdrawn. The plutonium could therefore be accumulated without IAEA aware- ness. So long as Iraq does not live up to its obligation to admit to irradiating UO2 or uranium metal in the reactor, you as an inspec- tor have no recourse but to limit your inspection to the declared inventory. As an inspector you have become aware that as much as 17 to 24 kilograms of plutonium could be produced each year with the Osirak reactor. Even if only one-third of this amount was produced in the first few years of operation of the reactor through the use of the attendant processing facilities, Iraq could acquire a stockpile of plutonium sufficient to make several atomic bombs. This is because in spite of having signed the NPT, the most sensitive facilities in the nuclear reactor complex could remain outside of the purview of the IAEA as long as Iraq did not declare that they contained either plutonium or uranium metal, or oxide. During these years when the plutonium stockpile is growing, Iraq could master the techniques of fabricating the plutonium con- figurations required for a nuclear weapon. NUMBER OF YEARLY INSPECTIONS Equally disturbing to you as an inspector is the realization that under the present negotiated agreement between the IAEA and Iraq, you will be limited to only three inspections per year, usually spaced at approximately 4-month intervals. Since the entire reactor can be emptied of the clandestine uranium target specimens within days, you as an inspector face the fact that by the time you arrive to verify the declared inventory of fuel elements which power the reactor, all evidence of illicit irradiations could be covered up. NO TV OR PHOTOGRAPHIC SURVEILLANCE Furthermore, under the present safeguard approach for material test reactors such as Osirak, no use of TV or photographic surveil- lance is made. Such surveillance could possibly provide an indica- tion of accelerated withdrawal of specimens from the reactor prior to an inspection. While it is recognized that such surveillance alone would not prevent clandestine plutonium production in the reactor, it could serve to reduce the ease by which the present laissez-faire ap- proach to safeguarding large-scale material test reactors allows for optimized production of plutonium-239, which has a low plutonium- 240 content. Such low plutonium-240 fuel is ideal for nuclear bomb construction, particularly for a country whose bomb-making capa- bilities are in the early stage of development. In contrast to material test reactors in light water nuclear power reactors it is comparatively very difficult to divert any of the plutonium generated during operation, and the high fuel exposure times lead to a buildup of the undesirable plutonium-240 isotope. This significantly increases the level of sophistication necessary to produce a useful bomb from light water power reactors and also greatly increases the difficulty of reprocessing the fuel for plutoni- um recovery. 57 Thus far, this has been the easiest part of the inspection. The most difficult part lies ahead. FINDINGS REPORTED TO IAEA You will now return to Vienna and report that your inspection disclosed no discrepancies between the operator's records and that of the agency. You will report that you verified the unirradiated fuel with your stabilized assay meter and that you verified the irradiated fuel in the core by counting the elements and by virtue of seeing the reactor in operation. The difficult part of the job is that you must prepare yourself mentally to ignore the many signs that may indicate the presence of clandestine activities going on in the facilities adjacent to the reactor, facilities which you were not permitted to inspect unless the host country has informed you that fuel elements from the reactor were transferred there. You will now complete a standard report, filling in the blanks; you will try to forget that you have just been party to a very misleading process. It is partially the result of such feeling that I was prompted a year ago to write a report of my concerns about Osirak to the Department of State U.S. mission to the IAEA. IMPROVING IAEA The U.S. mission representative indicated that he shared my concern and that he had forwarded my report to ACDA. He further indicated that the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency was well aware of most of what I had reported and that an effort was being made to improve the IAEA approach to safeguards in Iraq. But as the most recent IAEA internal documents regarding these discussions show, there remains a very strong resistance to upgrad- ing safeguards in the large-scale research reactors, which consti- tute the most dangerous threat to nuclear nonproliferation. The time is now at hand to act. No better time is likely to exist in the future for improving the IAEA safeguard system. There is no other viable substitute for the IAEA. It is a very necessary agency with perhaps the most important job of all inter- national agencies. It employs highly competent, motivated and sin- cere people, nearly all of whom share the same ideals and goals with respect to nuclear nonproliferation. But the IAEA has been hampered by narrowly focused rights to conduct inspections bestowed by the member states. These rights need to be broadened and the IAEA must be enabled to conduct more comprehensive and better quality inspections. Each member state should ask itself whether its security and the collective secu- rity of the world community will be better served by improving the confidence and respect for the IAEA, or whether unbridled prolif- eration and short-term commercial advantages should take prece- dence. Thank you. 59 tors under the presently constituted safeguards arrangements. Perhaps the most disturbing implication of the Iraqi nuclear program is that the NPT agreement has had the effect of assisting Iraq in acquiring the nuclear technology and nuclear material for its program by absolving the cooperating nations of their moral respon- sibility by shifting it to the IAEA. These cooperating nations have thwarted concert- ed international criticism of their actions by pointing to Iraq's signing of NPT, while turning away from the numerous, obvious and compelling evidence which leads to the conclusion that Iraq is embarked on a nuclear weapons program. Mr. Richter. Just as a point of clarification, this is just one part of the report that was submitted to ACDA. This is just a statement from that report. That is why I will limit myself to reading that statement. Chairman Zablocki. It is not a complete report. Mr. Richter. No, it is just an excerpt from that report. Chairman Zablocki. Does the excerpt that you have in your statement misrepresent the situation because it is not the complete report? Does the report contain other observations and assessments that may have been of value to the committee? Mr. Richter. It is those observations that I am concerned about having made part of the public record. This observation, the ex- cerpt from that report, I would be happy to read. It does not cause me any grief. Chairman Zablocki. It is not necessary to read it, we will have it, include it. Mr. Richter. All right. Chairman Zablocki. Mr. Houck, do you have a prepared state- ment or a statement to make? STATEMENT OF FRANK S. HOUCK, PH. D., ACTING CHIEF, NU- CLEAR SAFEGUARDS AND TECHNOLOGY DIVISION, NONPRO- LIFERATION BUREAU, U.S. ARMS CONTROL AND DISARM- AMENT AGENCY Mr. Houck. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I do not have a state- ment to read at this time. I do, however, have administration comments on the subject of IAEA safeguards as they relate to Iraq that I would like to provide for inclusion in the record of these hearings. Chairman Zablocki. Without objection so ordered. [The information follows:] 1. Mr. Richter, in his testimony, makes two basic assertions: First, that Iraq has embarked on a nuclear weapons program; and second, that the safeguards system of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) would not detect that program. 2. In making his assertions that Iraq has embarked on a nuclear weapons pro- gram, Mr. Richter presents no specific facts to support his claim except to refer to the existence of facilities and nuclear materials in Iraq. 3. The Administration is separately providing answers to the question as to whether Iraq was engaged in a nuclear weapons program. From our perspective Mr. Richter's testimony sheds no additional specific light on this question. 4. Mr. Richter makes a number of comments concerning various aspects of the IAEA safeguards system as it relates to Iraq. His main points are examined in the following paragraphs. (a) He states that as much as 24 kilograms of plutonium could be produced each year in the Osirak reactor through irradiation of uranium. There is agreement (although not on this particular number) that significant amounts of plutonium theoretically could be produced annually in this type of reactor if natural or depleted uranium were introduced into the core or as a blanket. An essential condition, which Mr. Richter's testimony does not mention, to achieving such a capability is an uninterrupted supply (sufficient for frequent refuelings) of highly enriched uranium fuel, fuel which Iraq can not now produce and for the foreseeable 60 future will not be able to produce. In our view, France, as the supplier of this fuel, would not provide quantities of fuel beyond that actually needed for the Osirak research program, a program which was to have been conducted jointly by Iraq and France. (b) Mr. Richter implies in his prepared testimony that the IAEA does not ac- knowledge that clandestine plutonium production is a problem to be dealt with at material test reactors of this type. This does not coincide with our understanding. The IAEA has in the past recognized this to be a potential risk for various types of reactors, including some large research reactors, and has developed and implement- ed certain inspection measures for dealing with this risk. In our view, the internal IAEA documents referred to by Mr. Richter indicate that the IAEA is addressing this risk for material test reactors. (c) Mr. Richter describes in his testimony the nature of inspection activities that have been carried out to date at the Osirak reactor. While we are not in a position to comment on the details of his description, it is our understanding that the main features in his description, i.e., counting, identification, and measurement with portable assay equipment of the highly enriched uranium (HEU) fuel assemblies, are indeed correct. We share his view that these are adequate activities for the HEU fuel itself. We also share his view that these activities are not sufficient for dealing with the diversion possibility of clandestine plutonium production at an operating reactor of this type. Where we disagree with Mr. Richter's testimony is in his implications that the IAEA clearly would not have carried out the necessary additional inspection activities after the reactor had commenced operations. We understand that the IAEA has been proceeding first to define the magnitude and nature of the potential problems, which would have to be faced once the reactor went critical, and then to identify and assess alternative inspection procedures for dealing with these problems. The use of surveillance cameras, mentioned as a desirable procedure by Mr. Richter, is one of several procedures being considered by the IAEA. We understand that the IAEA is considering measures beyond camera surveillance in its safeguards approach to detecting plutonium production at these reactors. The internal IAEA documents referred to by Mr. Richter suggest IAEA resistance to taking the necessary steps. We have been advised by the IAEA that the IAEA was in fact at the time developing plans for the necessary additional inspection activities and for including them in the facility attachment for the facility. (d) A general implication of Mr. Richter's testimony is that the entire scope of IAEA safeguards in Iraq would have been no different in the future than in the past and that what was done in the past was inadequate. From our perspective this testimony fails to recognize the essential facts that the amount of HEU present was less than a significant quantity, that the reactor had not been in operation, and that, therefore, there was no produced plutonium to reprocess. It is, of course, only conjecture on Mr. Richter's part that Iraq would not have put under IAEA safe- guards the hot cells and fuel processing facilities at the time that nuclear material was to be introduced into these facilities. Had Iraq failed to do so, it would have been in violation of the NPT. (e) The testimony also implies that the safeguards system is inherently deficient, i.e., the legal basis of the safeguards system needs to be changed. While further rights for the IAEA might be envisaged, their existing rights are extensive and constitute the basis for an effective system. Under NPT safeguards agreements, states have an obligation to report to the IAEA all nuclear material in all peaceful nuclear activities. Mr. Richter stresses that inspectors can not go everywhere they wish to look for unreported material. It has long been recognized that it is not reasonable for IAEA inspectors to roam across a country looking for unreported nuclear materials and undeclared facilities. Rather, the approach that has been taken, which we believe is the only feasible approach, is for the IAEA to conduct inspection activities sufficient for ensuring that all reported nuclear material is adequately accounted for and that all nuclear material introduced into certain facilities under safeguards, such as reactors, will be known to the IAEA independ- ent of the reporting by the state. This is in fact what the IAEA was proceeding to do. We believe that safeguards have to be conducted on this basis, rather than on the basis of searching for suspected or conjectured activities. In addition, we must reiterate that all NPT safeguards agreements give the IAEA the right and obligation to ensure that safeguards will be applied on all nuclear material in all peaceful nuclear activities in the states concerned. We believe the IAEA Secretariat would have a clear basis for bringing the issue to the IAEA Board of Governors if it had any grounds for believing that an NPT party was not fulfulling its obligations. 61 Unfortunately, we believe, the testimony includes incorrect implications of other inadequacies in the formal basis for safeguards, for example, that the inspection effort allowed by the safeguards agreement is only three inspections a year. This is not correct. The Iraq safeguards agreement, like all other NPT safeguards agree- ments, allows up to 50 man-days of inspections per year, including some unan- nounced inspections, for each of the two research reactors provided by France (Isis and Osirak). The IAEA has the right to conduct additional ad hoc inspections of receipts of HEU fuel from abroad and, if all of this is not sufficient, additional special inspections. In short, we believe that the rights of the IAEA are adequate. The facility attachment for each facility would include an estimate of the actual amount of inspection effort that the IAEA considered would be needed at the facility. This could be well below the above amount, but would be subject to adjustments if needed. It is certainly true that the IAEA has manpower limitations which have reduced implemented inspection levels below that desirable. The IAEA is working to remedy this and we are supporting them in this effort. (f) It is true that inspectors are individually accepted by inspected states. While there are certainly differences in the experience and training of individual inspec- tors, we generally believe that the IAEA inspectors are sufficiently motivated and geographically mixed that any collusion with inspected states is extremely unlikely. While this right of states to accept or not accept individual inspectors has been important in gaining acceptance of safeguards, there are also provisions in the safegards agreements to guard against excessive use of this right. (g) In his description of IAEA inspections, Mr. Richter does usefully bring out one important point which has not received much focus. This is the difficult nature of the job of being an IAEA inspector. The inspectors, who are generally technical people and not diplomats, are in the forefront of a unique international experience in going into nuclear facilities in a country to verify that the country is telling the truth about its nuclear activities. The IAEA and its inspectors need the continued technical, financial, and political support of the United States and other like-minded countries. We hope that these hearings will help to reinforce and strengthen that support. 5. These comments have been shown to the IAEA, and the IAEA has advised us that our descriptions of the IAEA plans, procedures, and implementation measures are correct. Mr. Houck. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chairman Zablocki. The Chair wishes to advise that we will follow the procedure where I will recognize the chairmen of the three subcommittees first, then the ranking Republican members and the other members by seniority. POSSIBILITY OF DETECTION At this point I am a bit confused because Dr. Carnesale said that even though there are shortcomings in the IAEA process of inspec- tion and certainly you have, Mr. Richter, gone into detail how those shortcomings are obvious, nevertheless, Dr. Carnesale said if I remember or understood his assessment correctly, for Iraq to transfer or to produce a bomb without detection would be pretty difficult; that although the IAEA inspection has some shortcom- ings, nevertheless such diversion could be detected. In your testimony, Mr. Richter, it almost seems undetectable. So, I am a little confused and therefore I invite Dr. Carnesale's further comments on the IAEA inspection process. Mr. Carnesale. The precise word I used, I believe, was that it was "unlikely" that it could be done without detection. I also said without detection not only by the IAEA, but also by the French technicians and by various intelligence services. One has to look at the overall picture. If you are operating a reactor to produce plutonium, particularly great quantities, you operate it differently than you would other- wise. You also have to handle large quantities of material. K1-K4* O—Kl 5 63 your visa, then the Embassy is informed of your coming there. They have to give you that visa and it usually takes about a week for them to process it. We also try to make it a practice to give them advance notice of our coming there. We cannot just show up in many of these coun- tries. Chairman Zablocki. Well, then the inspector is as much at fault as the country that does not allow surprise visits, if the inspector takes it upon himself to always give advance notice of an inspec- tion. Why would that decision be made on the part of the inspec- tor? Mr. Richter. The inspector is not the one who makes the deci- sion; it is the system that forces that decision upon him. Chairman Zablocki. If you get a 6-month visa you do not neces- sarily have to go the first or the second month. You can make it a surprise inspection during the period of the validity of your visa. Why was this practice not employed? Mr. Richter. Mr. Chairman, one thing we should have as IAEA inspectors, we should have the right to go to a country. We should have a special visa that allows us to go there without getting separate ones each time. In many countries you have to get a separate visa each time. Chairman Zablocki. But even if you get a separate visa, you do not get a visa for a month, do you, or for a certain month? If you request a visa, say, on June 24 for a period in the second half of 1981, you could go there on July 1 if you get the visa within a week or two, or in August, October, September, when you choose. Mr. Richter. We have a practice in the IAEA of giving a country at least 2 weeks' notice before our arrival. We have to prepare the paper to process it through, that says we are going. Chairman Zablocki. Well, in my opinion, that practice should be discontinued. Mr. Richter. I agree. There are many practices that can be improved, and that is what I hope to elicit as a result of these hearings. I think there are many things that can be done to im- prove the agency, yes. Mr. Zablocki. This is certainly of greatest concern and deepest interest on the part of the committee and those of us who are sincerely interested in nonproliferation. If the IAEA realized the risk and the security considerations involved, they would agree that every country should cooperate with the inspectors on the importance of surprise inspections. I believe this will be a matter of review and study on the part of this committee. Mr. Richter. Mr. Chairman, may I ask a question of Dr. Carne- sale concerning his answer to you? Chairman Zablocki. Well, it is highly irregular. Mr. Richter. Sorry. Chairman Zablocki. If Dr. Carnesale is willing to receive your question, the Chair without objection will depart from his normal, and usual, and well-organized procedure. You may proceed. [Laugh- ter.] Mr. Richter. I am very new to this, and I apologize. 64 Chairman Zablocki. All right, please pose your question. We may be just as interested. CONVERSION RATIO Mr. Richter. He had mentioned a conversion of a ratio of 1,000 to 1, going from uranium to plutonium. I do not know what the exact numbers are, offhand that sounds very high to me. There was a study that was done on behalf of ACDA for the agency for the Osirak reactor. In that study it made it fairly reasonable that they could produce fairly large amounts of pluto- nium, turning over the core every 5 weeks. Although I cannot see in the study exactly the amount of uranium that was to be irradi- ated, I have the feeling it was much less than 1,000 to 1. Mr. Carnesale. I have the feeling you are wrong. Chairman Zablocki. I did not hear you. Mr. Carnesale. I said, I have the feeling he is wrong. Chairman Zablocki. You have the feeling he is wrong. Do you have the same feeling, Mr. Richter? [Laughter.] Mr. Richter. My feeling is that he is probably right. [Laughter.] Chairman Zablocki. Well, that was an easy question. Mr. Richter. A point of clarification. Chairman Zablocki. Mr. Hamilton. Mr. Hamilton. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. ASSESSMENT OF IAEA PROCEDURES I guess I want to get first from Mr. Houck and Dr. Carnesale an overall impression of Mr. Richter's testimony. He is really very strong, it seems to me, in his condemnation of IAEA procedures. He calls the IAEA procedures a very misleading process. He says that the safeguards are totally incapable of detecting the produc- tion of plutonium in large-size material test reactors under present- ly constituted safeguards arrangements. I have the sense, Mr. Richter, you just do not have any confi- dence at all in these procedures of the IAEA. Dr. Houck and Dr. Carnesale, do you share his deep distrust of those procedures? Would you describe them as very misleading and totally incapable of detecting the production of plutonium? Mr. Houck. Thank you. sir. I would like to comment on that. Mr. Hamilton. Would you speak right into that microphone. Mr. Hoixk. Regarding Dr. Carnesale's answer to the previous question with respect to detection of plutonium production. I would share generally his comments and observations there. One can argue at length with respect to the numbers involved in production of plutonium. I think, based on what I have heard, that the numbers quoted by Dr. Carnesale are roughly correct. There would be very Large quantities of uranium in the order of tons— that would have to be involved in such a program. With respect to your question, sir. I think one of the important things that we would like to say about the comments of Mr. Rich- ter is the need to make a clear distinction between what the IAEA has done in the past at this reactor and what they would do in the future. I think Mr. Richter would agree that what they have done 66 Mr. Richter. That statement by itself is not clear. Mr. Hamilton. It is pretty clear to me. Mr. Richter. As an engineer to me it is not clear. What I think the facility, the entire complex would have given them would be the capability to produce plutonium which subsequently could be made into a bomb. Mr. Hamilton. Is it your judgment on the basis of your under- standing that Iraq was pursuing a nuclear weapons capability? Mr. Richter. I think that once the reactor had started up they would have been in a position to produce plutonium and subse- quently make a nuclear weapon. Mr. Hamilton. But you do not make any judgment as to whether or not they were doing that. Mr. Richter. They could not have been doing it because the reactor was not in operation. Until the reactor was in operation all they had was material that conceivably could have been diverted, but I do not believe that would have been the way. Mr. Hamilton. So, then, was the reactor designed to produce atomic bombs? Mr. Richter. The reactor had the capability to produce plutoni- um, which subsequently, in conjunction with the other facilities in the complex, could have been used to make nuclear weapons. Mr. Hamilton. I guess my time is expired, I see the red light, Mr. Chairman. So, I will wait until you come back to me. Thank you. Chairman Zablocki. Mr. Findley. Mr. Findley. I yield to the gentleman from Indiana. Mr. Hamilton. No, I have a number of other questions. I thank you. SURPRISE INSPECTION Mr. Findley. I have an interest in Mr. Richter's statement about the inadequacy of the inspection process, and I would like to clarify my own understanding of what he said. Is it IAEA policy to avoid surprise inspections? Mr. Richter. I think one has to look at the record of how many surprise inspections have been made. I am not aware of any. There may have been some, but I am not aware of any. Mr. Findley. Then, it is the practice of IAEA to avoid surprise inspections? Mr. Richter. I would say the record would indicate that. Mr. Findley. Would you other gentleman accept that as being a correct statement? Mr. Houck. Yes, sir, if I could just add one point, and that is, whereas the system provides the right, I understand that the agency does not as a practice exercise that right. I think it is important in addressing this question, however, to understand whether the agency is attempting to develop a system that is based for its effectiveness on catching someone by surprise, or whether they are developing a system whose effectiveness is based on inspection activities that are effective, even though the operator and the state know you are coming. The agency's approach is to develop a system that is not depend- ent on catching someone by surprise. Now, these surprise inspec- 67 tions may in principle have some deterrent value but, as Mr. Richter points out, in practice it is very difficult to really carry out a surprise inspection. Mr. Findley. That was my next question, how important is the element of surprise in the inspection process? Dr. Carnesale, would you answer that question? Mr. Carnesale. In the scenario that Mr. Richter is concerned about, namely the long-term production of plutonium, surprise in- spections certainly would be helpful. I think we have to be careful here not to get any of us in the position of saying that safeguards are now adequate to do the job or that they do not have to be improved. All of us would agree that safeguards have to be improved. If there is any risk that diversion scenarios might be successful, the world gains if we reduce that risk. We may differ among us on just what the risk is, but none of us are saying, "It is low enough, you do not have to bother to do anything." SCOPE OF INSPECTIONS LIMITED Mr. Findley. I am inclined to wonder whether the element of surprise is even the most important shortcoming of IAEA safe- guards, especially after reading a memo from the IAEA dated March 10 in which it says that, "Agency safeguards have primarily been applied to the inventory of nuclear material declared by the state." Does that mean that inspection is limited only to materials which are declared by the host state? Mr. Carnesale. The answer to the question is, yes. Let me give you a simple example that would show how a surprise inspection would be valuable. Suppose it were a reactor of this type which is essentially a swimming pool—a large pool containing transparent water—in fact, more transparent than most of the water we come in contact with because it is highly purified. If the inspector goes in and he is only entitled to count the materials which are reported but there is a lot of other material there, he knows something is wrong. While there may not be a blank on his form that says, "I saw a lot of stuff that I was not supposed to see," he is expected to report an anomaly such as that. So, a surprise inspection certainly could be valuable, despite the limitation you described. Mr. Findley. Mr. Houck, would you accept this as a correct statement that Iraq prior to the bombing was embarked upon a nuclear program which eventually would give it the weapons option? Mr. Houck. The information that we have, sir, is that they had acquired the kinds of facilities of a small scale in which they could develop and learn the technology associated with a complete fuel cycle that would include the technology for producing plutonium. That technology in the future, with perhaps these facilities but perhaps also with other larger future facilities, could have been used to produce such material. Mr. Findley. Thank you. Chairman Zablocki. Mr. Bingham. Mr. Bingham. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 69 an extensive program of doing as much as we can in many areas to improve the system. That work clearly has to continue. Mr. Bingham. I am glad to have you clarify that. REACTOR WAS INTENDED FOR DEVELOPING WEAPONS With respect to what Chairman Hamilton raised with regard to the statement made by Mr. Begin, I just think it is worth noting for the record—and I have the text of an Israeli press conference— that Mr. Begin did not say that the reactor was designed for developing weapons; he said it was intended for developing weap- ons. It seems to me there is a very significant difference between the two. I think what he was saying was that in the judgment of the Israeli Government it was part of a complex of facilities that was intended for the development of a weapons capability. That is just about consistent with what you said in your report to the U.S. mission at the IAEA. You said, "The available information points to an aggressive, coordinated program by Iraq to develop a nuclear weapons capability during the next 5 years." I do not think you have told us, Mr. Richter, really on what basis you drew that conclusion because that is quite different from point- ing out the inadequacies of the inspection procedures as you see them. Would you give us in summary form the basis for the conclusion that I have just quoted? Mr. Richter. Yes. There is a very long background behind it. I wrote that a year ago and nothing in the past year has caused me to change my mind. This is the basis for that conclusion. Some of the factors that enter into that I would prefer not to put on the record, but there are many others that I think are self- supporting. Among those you had a situation where a country which was at a fairly low level of industrial development was purchasing a facili- ty that really had only two possible uses if you were looking at the kind of facility that one would use, either as a materials irradia- tion test facility, or as a facility for doing fairly sophisticated physics experiments. At the same time, it was a facility that could also be used for generating relatively large amounts of plutonium and would, under the way we do safeguards; they have the ability to get away with that. Then there was the matter of 200,000 pounds of uranium yellow- cake which they had purchased. I could not imagine why so much yellowcake and for what reason. There was no explanation for it. But I could imagine what could be done with that yellowcake. Then there was the matter of the very sophisticated hot cells that they had and the pilot reprocessing plant, and the fuel fabrica- tion line—$50 million worth of very, very sophisticated equipment which could be added onto and expanded to give them a larger throughput capability. PLUTONIUM PRODUCTION ABILITY When you look at the fact that they had all of the elements in place to enable them to take plutonium, generated in uranium, 70 which they could put through their fuel fab line to convert into a material which would serve as a target specimen and then extract that plutonium. Coupled with my knowledge of how ineffective we were in safeguarding those particular reactors, I became concerned that they in fact did have a program which was geared to plutoni- um production. It was the very extensive circumstantial evidence, coupled with some other factors which I do not feel I should put on the record at this time. Chairman Zablocki. Mr. Lagomarsino. Mr. Lagomarsino. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. POSSIBILITY OF PLUTONIUM DIVERSION I would like all of you to comment on this. IAEA Director Gener- al Ecklund stated last week that: "Plutonium diversion in Iraq was not feasible and would have been detected by the Osirak Reactor IAEA." However, I understand it has been reported in a special study conducted for the IAEA earlier this year and a subsequent group of nine IAEA senior technical specialists both concluded that plutoni- um diversion in Iraq was possible. Could you speculate what might explain the divergence of views, Doctor? Mr. Carnesale. As I tried to indicate in my testimony, of course it is possible. It should never have been stated categorically that it would have been detected. It depends on the amount, it depends on all of the things we talked about. No absolute statement like that can be correct. It is certainly conceivable that some amount could have been diverted without detection. We might argue about how much, and with what likelihood, and over what time scale? They just avoided all of the tough questions. Mr. Lagomarsino. Mr. Houck? Mr. Houck. Thank you. I think it is very difficult for me to say what was precisely in Dr. Ecklund's mind when he made that statement, but there are certain considerations that would be rele- vant. First of all, there is the point that Dr. Carnesale has made, that to produce plutonium requires a continuing and for this type of reactor probably an unusually large supply of HEU fuel. If you do not have that, you cannot produce plutonium. The question is whether they would have had that, and in the quantities needed for a plutonium production program; that is, whether the French would have provided it. Our view is that the French would not have provided quantities of HEU that would have exceeded the needs of the research pro- gram. The second consideration is whether he meant it was impossible to do this, or whether he meant it was impossible to do this without being detected. Technically, if you have the fuel we see it as possible to do. Whether it would be detectable is another matter. The technology for safeguards exists, which the agency could use, that would have made it in our view detectable. Thank you. 71 IMPROVEMENTS IN IAEA INSPECTION PROCEDURES Mr. Lagomarsino. What you have just said seems to be the central core here. Mr. Richter is saying—and as I understand your position you are not necessarily disagreeing with him—that up until this period, at any rate, IAEA inspection procedures, or at least inspection practices, have not been all that great. He is saying that they should be improved. You are saying that they will be improved. Is that really what we are saying, all of us here? Not that Mr. Richter is saying there will be, but you are saying there will be. Mr. Houck. Essentially, that is what we are saying. I would like just to clarify one thing. I did not mean to imply that they were inadequate in the past. They were adequate in the past for a situation which was not a very difficult situation to safeguard. There was only a limited amount of fuel and the reactor was not operating. So, they were adequate for that circumstance. But let me make it clear, they would not have been adequate if the, circumstances had changed. I think that is the point where additional procedures would be needed. Our view is that the agency was endeavering to employ those additional procedures. overcoming inspection constraints Mr. Lagomarsino. Now, Mr. Richter, you say on page 7 you were disturbed by this—speaking about this hypothetical inspector—you were disturbed by this because you realize that in the other Italian- supplied fuel-processing equipment which is not under safeguards, Iraq possesses the capability, and so on. Why is the Italian equipment not under safeguards? Mr. Richter. Well, that is part of the whole reason for my concern. I kept expressing my concern to the people in my section. While they agreed that the concern was justified they also said: "This is what NPT allows us to do and we have to do the best we can within the framework of this treaty." It is beyond our scope as simple inspectors to do more than what we are allowed to do by a treaty which has been signed by over 100 nations. It is such an overwhelming obstacle that everybody re- signed themselves to live within the system and do the best possi- ble job we can. In explaining this a little bit further so you can understand why I became concerned and why I was frustrated with the limitations placed upon us, I would like to refer to you some statements made by this group which was asked to review the quality of safeguards at a material test reactor, and in particular it had the Osirak in mind when it did this analysis. This is the result of the review, the conclusions: It was felt that extending safeguards for this purpose- Meaning extra inspections at an MTR, upgraded surveillance capabilities, just to try to do a better quality inspection that we had contemplated at that time doing there— It was felt that extending safeguards for this purpose represents a fundamental change in the current scope of agency responsibility. In the absence of an authorized 72 position on this matter, the participants were of the view that it was very unlikely that some member states would accept the inspection activities necessary. That is the bottom line of my concern, that we were not getting anywhere. I also knew from personal discussions with my section head that it was very unlikely we were going to be able to do better in Iraq than what we had been doing at the time, even though we knew we needed to do more. It was very clear we had to do more, but he personally felt frustrated that there was only so much he could do because of these other constraints. That is the crux of the issue. I think all three of us agree that more needed to be done. The difference in our perceptions is whether it would have been done. Mr. Lagomarsino. Thank you. Chairman Zablocki. Mr. Shamansky. Mr. Shamansky. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. SUSPECTED OR CONJECTURED ACTIVITIES Mr. Houck, we have been given administration comments on the written testimony of Mr. Richter. The comments are June 24. On page 4 of those comments, toward the bottom it says: "We believe that safeguards have to be conducted on this basis"—that is the system that they are now using checking the amounts—"rather than on the basis of searching for suspected or conjectured activi- ties." I am a layman, but when I heard that the IAEA makes an inspection, to me an inspection means you go in and look for something. This attitude on the part of the Department seems to be so diffident it approaches paralysis. Why is that the only basis on which to go because the signatories do not want a real inspection? On something as vital as this, are we really satisfied—and Mr. Richter, I think all your testimony verifies this—we are so careful not to go beyond this unbelievably circumscribed area that you do not really have an inspection. When we need confidence, why not go in and look and search for suspected or conjectured activities? Mr. Houck. Let me clarify so there is no misunderstanding as to what we meant on this point. The point we were making here is that we believe an effective system of safeguards—and we understand this is the approach that the agency also takes—is to insure that they can account adequate- ly for all material that is reported to them. That is the first step but clearly not the only step. That, in fact, represents most of their work. They have large quantities of material reported to them. States, as far as we know, do report all material to them, and that is in fact the bulk of their work, but not the only part of their work. At certain types of facilities—and we would include reactors, at least certain types of reactors in that category—it is also essential that the safeguards activities and procedures at those facilities be such that if unreported material is introduced into that facility, the inspectors have the capability to detect it. Now, we did not mean that to be excluded. Clearly, that is a necessary part of the system. What we were referring to is the notion of going into other facilities which the inspectors may see, 73 or they may suspect, or they may have no knowledge of, as a means for detecting the processing of material. Mr. Shamansky. Why not? Commonsense forces me to say, why not go in? Mr. Houck. The point that we were trying to make is that the most efficient way of doing it is to deal with those facilities where you are carrying out safeguards and to insure that any material that goes into those facilities is detected. Then, if material is taken from this safeguarded facility elsewhere, you know about it already and you can account for it, rather than trying to find that other facility. Now, the problem is that in some circumstances you may know of the facility. Mr. Shamansky. You may what? Mr. Houck. You may know or suspect of some other facility that is not covered by safeguards. What we were saying is that it did not seem practical or even feasible to us to base safeguards on hoping that you know where such unreported facilities are, and therefore you can go look at them. We felt it was essential to base the system on catching material, if you will, where you were in- specting. I think in this particular circumstance where you have this case that there is a facility which is not currently being inspected, it would probably have provided more assurance to other countries if the IAEA had gone into that facility. Whether they would have gone into that facility in the future is something one cannot say. Clearly, if nuclear material was to be introduced into that facility it should have been under safeguards. Mr. Shamansky. Well, Mr. Houck, I would like to comment that conceptually I have trouble with your explanation about the most "efficient is to." That is not inconsistent. It may be efficient to do something for the ease or convenience of something, but we are seeking here an assurance to the world and maybe mere efficiency is not the sole criterion. CLANDESTINE FACILITIES Mr. Houck. If I can just clarify that further. If a state were to embark on a, if you will, clandestine nuclear weapons program and were to build a separate set of facilities, maybe unknown to any- body or maybe suspected; and the weapons program was carried out entirely in that—if you will—clandestine set of facilities, that is by all agreement outside of the scope of the current safeguards system. The system was set up not to deal with that situation at all. It was left to the national intelligence means of the member states of the NPT to deal with that kind of situation. Mr. Shamansky. Well, clearly, Mr. Houck, we are dealing with a situation where the IAEA comes in and yet cannot go beyond the little area that it is in and not where the hot cells are. I do not want the either/or with these tremendous alternatives. Dr. Carnesale, do you want to say something? Mr. Carnesale. The NPT and IAEA safeguards are intended to deal with the problem of diversion of civilian nuclear materials, that they not be misused. 74 So, the practices of accounting and bookkeeping, verifying that "the stuff is still here," takes care of that problem. The IAEA is not an intelligence agency. Mr. Shamansky. I understand. Mr. Carnesale. The IAEA is not set up to deal with the clandes- tine problem. Now, one might say: "Can we not extend it a little bit so it can do a little bit of that?" You quickly come across cases where such actions would be unacceptable, probably even to us. Where do you draw the line? Suppose there is a Soviet inspector in the United States who says he has strong reason to believe that there is a materials testing reactor in this funny-looking building in Langley, Va. He wants to go in and look and we say, "I am sorry, no." Some people say: "Let s limit such practices only to non-weapons states." Well, nonweapons states have security interests, too. They do not want intelligence agents in their country, and neither do we. That is the problem. Mr. Shamansky. Dr. Carnesale, I can agree with that. The diffi- culty I am having is that these so-called inspections from the IAEA are cited for assurances in an area at which they are clearly inadequate to provide assurances for. That is the problem that I am having. Mr. Carnesale. I am not sure I understand. Is your problem that we cannot assure against diversion of declared civilian material because the hot cell happened to be at the site instead of 5 miles away? Mr. Shamansky. I am saying that we get these political judg- ments, as with the administration conclusions, based on these very restricted procedures. I do not think that these restricted proce- dures can support the broad conclusions that they are cited as evidence of. That is what we are talking about. If you say these are the rules, fine. But then do not cite them for something else. Mr. Chairman, my time is up. Thank you. Chairman Zablocki. Mrs. Fenwick. The time of the gentleman was prolonged because we did not want to deduct the time for the changing of the tape from his time for questions. Mrs. Fenwick. Of course not. IAEA powers It seems to me that we have a problem with IAEA. They have powers that they do not exercise, according to the testimony here this morning. We are fooling the world. If the Agency has powers that it now, through delicacy, or tact, prefers not to exercise, we had better get another agency or another director, or another system, or something more honest. The state of the world is such that people insist on straight answers, in my opinion. They really want to know what is going on. It would be better to come right out and say: "We cannot control it." We have 111 nations, I believe you said. Who are the key coun- tries here? Obviously, those which have the uranium and can supply it. Those surely are the more responsible and we ought to 75 be able to work with them in some system by which we simply could shut off the valve. But that depends on an agency that is willing to do it. We hear about safeguards, how it is that yellowcake can be transferred, U308. Why is that not under the jurisdiction of the Agency, too? In the last analysis, in other words, what I wish the agency would do is get tough and serious so that the world will understand that we have a group that really is prepared to do what they pretend to be doing. We have so many groups in this Nation of ours, and in the world generally, which pretend to be doing some- thing that they are not doing at all. SYSTEM OF CHOOSING INSPECTORS Maybe the real problem is the ability of the nations to choose which inspectors they will accept. I wonder very much when I hear that three Soviet, or two Soviet and one Hungarian, have been able to go and inspect. They are open to pressure from their govern- ments. We know that, even in the United Nations, Soviet citizens turn out to be KGB officials in positions in the United Nations itself. How do we know that these inspectors can really inspect? They are not free the way our people are to stand up and say: "We will not obey." They have families back home. The system does not seem to be set up to take into account human nature, and the problems of those who are engaged in it. We have a fallible system if nations can choose any inspector they want. Maybe they all ought to be Scandinavians or Swiss, who seem to be able to move around freely—or Canadians. Maybe we should not have people who are under the dictates of their nation. Something is wrong here, Dr. Carnesale. It is not operating, in my opinion, properly at all. I do not know how we could justify it to the public that we continue to accept this kind of halfhearted arrangement. That is almost what I mind more than anything else that it is halfhearted. It is the feeling that we do not have a vigorous and concerned agency. Who is the director? Do not tell me because I do not want to say anything about a personality. But we need someone prayerful, somebody who, like Lincoln, will seek to do the right as God gives him to know the right when we are dealing with something as terrible as atomic energy. I do not see that in evidence anywhere. The hope that they may improve, Mr. Houck, has been very helpful. In describing that what was true in the past would not be adequate for the future you give us hope. We have come to a different stage. What is it, Mr. Houck, that makes you feel that what was perhaps adequate once is no longer? Mr. Houck. The point I was making there was that the situation was expected to change in Iraq, that the reactor was expected to start operating. At that point there would have been a need for additional procedures. Mrs. Fenwick. Well, that is more confusing than ever. I am talking about a system. You are talking about a specific case, right? 76 What is more important, perhaps, is the system. Any time that any nation moves with its reactors from one stage to another one might think that another system would be appropriate, or that further safeguards would be necessary. YELLOWCAKE Why is yellowcake not among the safeguarded materials? Mr. Houck. The queston of yellowcake was a subject of long discussion in formulating the ground rules of the system. Essential- ly the view adopted was to exclude uranium in mines and in ore; you had to start somewhere. Mrs. Fenwick. Do you think that was wise to leave out yellow- cake? Mr. Houck. The decision was made to start with material that could be used in the nuclear fuel cycle. Mrs. Fenwick. Do you think it was wise to leave out yellowcake? Mr. Houck. I think one can argue both ways. I think subjecting yellowcake to safeguards would increase slightly the scope of safe- guards and increase slightly the possibility of detecting misuse. It would do so, however, at the expense of diverting inspection re- sources away from more sensitive material. I think that is basically the problem. Mrs. Fenwick. Thank you. Chairman Zablocki. Mr. Hamilton. Mr. Hamilton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. IMPROVING SAFEGUARDS SYSTEM I am wondering how you go about the business of trying to improve the IAEA safeguards. It seems to me that Mr. Richter in his statement does point out some things that are terribly deficient in that process. I am sure all of us are disturbed by the fact that the country can choose its own inspectors, for example. It would seem to me that surprise visits would be of considerable value. The frequency of inspections ought to be stepped up. The right to review all facilities in the area would seem to me to be a worth- while safeguard and making some kind of a public record of the inspection. I do not know whether these things are feasible or not, I do not know what kinds of problems you run into when you promote these ideas. But is there anybody in the U.S. Government now looking into this question of safeguards, identifying those safeguards that we think need to be strengthened and improved, and then pushing them forward in the right fora for action? Or are we just going to let this thing drag along? The basic problem that everybody has addressed themselves to up here is, we really do not have confidence in the system. As long as you do not have confidence in the system you have a pretty serious problem, it seems to me. How can we correct that? Mr. Houck. Mr. Hamilton, if I may, there are within the Govern- ment interagency groups which do in fact deal with the subject of how to try to continue the process of improving safeguards. I think the essential points, relevant to this effort, are that the basic formal structure of the safeguard system does provide for ' 77 very extensive rights on the part of the system to carry out safe- guards, and that those rights are sufficiently extensive that they do provide a basis for effective safeguards. Now, I would not want to suggest that there are not and cannot be ways of improving this system, the basic, formal structure of the system. But the view that we have taken is that there is sufficient room for improving the system within its existing framework and that the existing features should be further utilized rather than altering the basic system. A case in point is simply the matter of numbers of inspectors and how much inspection effort can they carry out. Our view is that the agreements generally provide for sufficient effort but the re- sources do not provide for doing as much as should be done. Mr. Hamilton. I guess what I want is assurance that someone in the administration is analyzing this in detail and is recommending a number of very specific suggestions for improvements of the safeguards, and that we are pursuing a course in the appropriate councils to strengthen these safeguards. Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask that they respond to that question in writing. Chairman Zablocki. Without objection, the response will be made part of the record.1 Mr. Hamilton. I understand while I was out of the room there was some question about one of the quotations I had made. I will yield to Mr. Bingham, I think we have that straightened out at this point. ISRAEL STATEMENT ON CAPABILITY OF REACTOR Mr. Bingham. Yes; I thank the gentleman for yielding. I should have known that the gentleman would have the correct reference. He was quoting from a statement by the Government of Israel dated June 8, 1981, which does say that the reactor was "designed to produce atomic bombs." I was looking at Mr. Begin's press conference in which he said it was intended for developing nuclear weapons. Certainly, to say the Osirak reactor was designed to produce atomic bombs, if taken literally, is not a correct statement. I do not know what the Hebrew was from which this was translated, but I cannot conceive that the Israel Government had any idea that the reactor itself would be capable of fabricating actual weapons. But I do want to state for the record that Chairman Hamilton was quoting directly from an official Israel Government document. PRESENCE OF FRENCH TECHNICIANS I would just like to pursue a little bit the question which we have not discussed in detail, about the significance of the presence of the French technicians to the question of whether clandestine produc- tion of plutonium would have been detected. Was your statement that you felt it was likely that such clandestine production would be detected, Dr. Carnesale? Was that based to a very considerable extent on the presence of the French technicians, as distinct from the IAEA inspections? 1 See appendix 4 for response by ACDA. 78 Mr. Carnesale. No, Mr. Bingham. It was certainly one of the factors. I have tried to explain how it is an overall impression of the difficulties involved and how it has to go without a hitch. Certainly, the presence of the French makes it far more difficult than it would be otherwise. I did not think of it in the context of, if one removed the French, would I still use the word "unlikely." I suspect that I would, but I have not thought of it in that context. Mr. Bingham. In this particular case the French technicians were absent from the site for a period of time after the bombing by Iran, is that not correct? Do you know, either of you? Mr. Carnesale. I think all of us know only from press reports. That is what was reported. Mr. Bingham. Was that action taken by the Government of Iraq, or was that action taken by the French authorities? Do you know? Mr. Carnesale. I do not know. Mr. Bingham. Do you know, Mr. Richter? Mr. Richter. No; I do not. Mr. Bingham. I think it should be pointed out that there was no guarantee that the French would continue to remain there. Perhaps I should ask you, Mr. Richter, whether in your view so long as the French remained there it would have been possible for these clandestine operations to proceed without detection by the French. Mr. Richter. I only learned of the secret pact a few days ago, and my testimony was really limited to the IAEA and whether the IAEA could detect a diversion. I do not know what kind of French technicians would be there, I do not know whether they would be circumscribed to certain areas that have to do with the French project and would not be allowed to visit, for example, the Italian side of the house. I do not know whether the French would be there 24 hours a day, I think that is very important. In the IAEA we talk about continuous inspection. People have the impression that means we are there 24 hours a day at, for example, a plutonium reprocessing plant. But we are not. We are there continuously, but not around the clock. In this particular kind of facility it depends on whether these French people would be there around the clock. So, without know- ing the particulars of what arrangements they have made with the French, I cannot say. However, I would like to refer to a comment which appeared in the Energy Daily of Friday, June 19. It was a report prepared, apparently, for President Mitterrand. It is a 34-page report on the Iraqi reactor program. In it, it concluded essentially that, "Interna- tional Atomic Energy Agency safeguards were largely ineffective to prevent Iraqi diversion of nuclear materials," and that Osirak could produce from 5 to 10 kilograms of plutonium per year. I think that is a very key point and it may explain why the French were so concerned about having their own people there because they recognize that the IAEA was not capable of doing the job. Mr. Bingham. Thank you. 79 Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chairman Zablocki. Mr. Shamansky, do you have anything fur- ther? Mr. Shamansky. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I really have just one final concern with respect to the choice by Iraq and France. One, to have an agreement to retain French inspectors to 1989, I believe it is; and yet not make it public? If the object was to allay a concern for the world that may in that sense deter an attack, why keep it secret? Do you have any thoughts on that? Mr. Carnesale. I do not think their intention was to allay the concerns of the world. I think France's concern was to allay the concern of France that their facility might possibly be misused and they would be to blame. Iraq's intention in keeping it secret was to preserve the impres- sion that no special arrangements were being made for them that might possibly indicate that they could not be trusted. I do not know either motive, but both of those motives sound pretty sensible to me. Mr. Shamansky. In other words, apparently as just reported by Mr. Richter, there was some rational basis for concern. Mr. Carnesale. Of course, whenever you have a nuclear facility there is some rational basis for concern. There is ambiguity in these facilities, and we have always been talking about likelihoods and amounts. There was certainly a basis for concern for Israel, for the French, and for everybody else. Now, the real question is, How strong should that concern be, and what could you have done to alleviate it? Mr. Shamansky. I will take one more question, if I may. Are you satisfied with the current state of inspections to allay the world's fears? Mr. Carnesale. No. Mr. Shamansky. Thank you. Chairman Zablocki. Let me just say before I ask my final ques- tion that your responses on a very technical issue have been under- standable even to the chairman, a layman, and they are very helpful. I think this meeting was very helpful. statement of Iraq's president husayn Looking toward the future, not only as far as improving IAEA's inspections, but as to Iraq's intentions, I would like to read Iraq's President Saddam Husayn statement who was quoted yesterday as saying that: Regardless of Iraq's intentions and capabilities at present and in the future, any country in the world which seeks peace and security respects peoples and does not wish those peoples to fall under the oppression of external foreign forces, should assist the Arabs in one way or another to obtain the nuclear bomb in order to confront Israel's existing bombs. What do you make of this statement in view of Iraq's clear commitment as an NPT party to forgo any nuclear weapons op- tions, Doctor? Mr. Carnesale. This statement was made shortly after Israel, a non-NPT party, known to have a nuclear program, bombed Iraq's 80 nuclear facility, with Iraq being a party to the NPT and having its facility under international safeguards. That Saddam Husayn might react with a statement like that is not very surprising, and I think it tells you little about the motiva- tions prior to the attack. I do not want to paint too rosy a picture. I believe that Iraq intended to get as close as they could to the weapons option. I believe many states are trying to do that. But that is quite differ- ent from saying that I know that their intention was—as soon as they could with this facility—to violate all of their international agreements to produce bombs as fast as they could, and to take the risk of being detected. That, I find unlikely. That they wanted a weapons option, I find that likely. Chairman Zablocki. Do the others wish to comment, Mr. Houck? Mr. Houck. I am afraid I cannot add anything to what Dr. Carnesale said on that. Chairman Zablocki. Mr. Richter? Mr. Richter. The" only difference of view that I have, I believe the evidence was more compelling than the other two gentlemen do in terms of the timeframe that we are looking at, and the motiva- tions and the intent behind their program. JANUARY 1981 IAEA INSPECTION Chairman Zablocki. We were advised in the earlier hearings that there was an inspection of IAEA in January of this year. Do you know who were the inspectors? Mr. Richter. It was a Ukrainian and a Hungarian. It was strict- ly limited to counting the fuel to make sure that the fuel was still there. Chairman Zablocki. Was the IAEA satisfied that there was no diversion or intent of diversion? Mr. Richter. I think the important point to keep in mind is that until that reactor was operating, there was no question that the IAEA could do an adequate job of ascertaining that the fuel was still in place because it is simply a question of going one, two, three, four, five, six, seven, and that is it. That was the essence of the inspection. I hope it is clear. Once the reactor operated you had a totally different problem because then you were concerned with, what could they do with their reactor? What could they do with those hot cells? But up until this period the inspections were necessarily and justifiably simple. osirak plant inspections Chairman Zablocki. Then you would agree with Mr. Houck that the inspections so far on the Osirak nuclear plant were at this point adequate, but when it became operative, then, of course it would have been a new ball game and you would have had to have other inspections than were involved in the past. Mr. Richter. Mr. Chairman, the reason I disagree with Mr. Houck is that I was intimately involved in how those negotiations were proceeding for the new arrangements when the reactor was to go critical. 81 I was aware that we were not going to be able to upgrade the inspections beyond three times a year. I was aware that Iraq wanted us to treat them the same way we treat Japan and Ger- many, which means that we go to that facility as often as we go to the same kind of reactor in Japan and Germany. I also knew that the Agency had a dilemma because they could not very well appear to be prejudiced against Iraq, despite the fact that the apparent motivations are much stronger in the case of Iraq vis-a-vis Germany and Japan. So, they were wrestling with this dilemma of: Well, we know Japan and Germany will not accept a very upgraded system of inspections at their material test reactors. On the other hand we know that we have to do more in Iraq because it is clearly unacceptable going there once every four months. They basically were at an impasse. PROJECTED INSPECTIONS Chairman Zablocki. Could you supply for the record, since ap- parently there were discussions in IAEA, the planned inspections or hopeful inspections in Iraq so that we get a clearer picture? You say you were aware of these. There must have been some discus- sions. Mr. Richter. Yes. Chairman Zablocki. There must have been some decisions, even. Mr. Richter. Yes. Chairman Zablocki. Could you supply those for the record? Mr. Richter. The difficulty is, that is contained in what is called the Draft Facility Attachment. That document is confidential. I did not take a copy of that document with me, but within that docu- ment it talks about the approach that we would take to that facility. Unfortunately, the approach that they were going to take is the same approach we were going to use in the Philippines, Indonesia, Thailand, and some of the other countries, Turkey, Greece, where they have tiny, tiny little research reactors. I was very upset that we were going to treat this incredibly dangerous facility the same way we were treating these very, very small research reactors. That, essentially, is the reason why I am here because of the fact that I felt we were not being serious about safeguarding that facility. That we were going to adopt an ap- proach which ignored the very real dangers that that reactor and those attendant facilities presented for proliferation. FREQUENCY OF INSPECTIONS Chairman Zablocki. But you are saying that as far as IAEA is concerned, regardless of whatever country, there are limits to the inspections of the research reactors. Is there any country which presently has a reactor similar to the Osirak reactor where there is a more effective inspection regime in operation? Mr. Richter. Well, in a material test reactor we are entitled to go 50 man-days a year. That implies two people, 1 or 2 days per person. So, if you divide 50 by 2, that tells you that you can go as 82 often as 24 times a year if you went 1 day for the inspection, or 12 times a year if you went 2 days. We do not come close to doing that anywhere else. To the best of my knowledge we do not inspect material test reactors more than three times a year. There may be an exception where we do it more than three times. But we are basically limited to that amount of inspections. Chairman Zablocki. This points out another shortcoming. Mr. Richter. We are not fully utilizing what is available to us. But the problem that the Agency has is getting Japan and Ger- many to accept a much more rigorous safeguards approach to their facilities which they feel is unjustified since they are clearly not involved in a clandestine plutonium production program. They do not want to have the burden of frequent IAEA inspec- tions and all the extra problems that causes for them when they in their mind know they are not going to do anything. Then the Agency is faced with the dilemma of forcing Iraq to be treated in a different manner than they are treating other countries with the same facilities. That is the essence of the dilemma that they are facing. I sympa- thize with that dilemma, it is a very difficult one to resolve. Chairman Zablocki. Well, in my opinion countries that have no intention whatsoever of pursuing nuclear weapons—as you cite Germany and Japan—they should not object to additional inspec- tions and thereby make it possible for inspections of facilities that are being utilized for purposes other than for military purposes. Mr. Richter. That would certainly be the enlightened view, and I would subscribe to that. But they are not, apparently, ready to accept that. Chairman Zablocki. Well, as a result of the world's concern because of the bombing of the Osirak reactor, I would hope there would be a change of opinions and views on the part of those two countries. Mr. Richter. Perhaps now there will be. Chairman Zablocki. Are there any further questions? Mr. Bingham. LIGHT WATER REACTORS Mr. Bingham. I have just a couple more questions. Mr. Richter would you agree with Dr. Carnesale's statement earlier that where you are talking about light water reactors or pressurized water reactors for the production of power, you have a very different situation in terms of the danger of weapons capabili- ty development, and that the inspection procedures are not bad as far as those reactors are concerned? Mr. Richter. Yes, I would most definitely agree with that. I think the whole concept of diversion in a light water reactor is many, many, many times more difficult than doing it in this partic- ular material test research reactor, when you consider the amount of time that is required during a refueling if you were going to do anything with the fuel as it comes out of the reactor itself before going to the spent fuel pool. Also, if you look at the surveillance system that we have at the spent fuel pools. And also the fact that it is quite a bit more If Iraq had equipment capable of processing the irradiated uranium to quickly recover this contained plutoniut; if the design and engineering of the explosive device had already been done and was successful; if all parts of the device had been -made and put together except for the plutonium; and if the unusual operation of the reactor could go unobserved, then some months after a full year of operation, Iraq might have enough plutonium for one sophisticated device. Assuming several months to fabricate the plutonium into already designed shapes, then Iraq in theory might have had one sophisticated device within two years. Note, if it is assumed Iraq could not design a sophisticated device, then perhaps more than two or more years of reactor opera- tion would have been needed plus several months for reprocessing and fabrication of plutonium into previously designed shapes. On the whole then, if the above series of assumptions turned out to be favorable, which seems unlikely, the reactor might have produced enough plutonium for a sophisticated device in about a year, or for a simpler device more than two years. Whether Iraq also could have completed development and engineering for a nuclear explosive within this time appears debatable, particularly if reliability and predictability in operation of the device were major design criteria. A different set of suppositions begins with possible diversion by Iraq of replacement fresh nuclear fuel for the reactor. In theory, siezure of two fresh cores each containing 12 to 15 kilograms of highly enriched uraniua would provide enough weapons grade material for one nuclear explosive. If the detailed design and engineering of the expletive had been complete and the device was already assembled except for its nuclear charge, then the time from diversion to completion of a device would be to extract the uranium from the APPENDIX 3 Congressional Research Service Report Dated June 18, 1981, "Possible Contamination of Baghdad From Bombing of the Iraqi Reactor" Would bombing the Iraqi research reactor after it had gone into operation have exposed the population of Baghdad to radiation? This question has been frequently put to the Congressional Research Service. The potential exposure of the people of Baghdad to radioactivity if the Iraq research reactor had been bombed after it began operation would have depended upon the amount of radioactive materials in the reactor, how much of it might be released, in what form, and the weather conditions. The radioactivity in the reactor would consist of fission products in the core and in any blanket of natural uranium around the core. The radioactive inventory would be least just after a partial change of fuel for the reactor and greatest just before a scheduled fuel change. At that time, the reactor could contain about 2.4 kg of fission products in its core 1/ and a much smaller amount in the blanket. 2/ 1/ Operation of this type reactor requires about 1/3 of the fuel to be changed every three weeks. Just before a fuel change, one third of the fuel would have 30Z burnup, one third 202 and one third 10X. If the core contains 15 kg of highly enriched uranium, then the amount of U-235 fissioned in the core would be 15 kg /-il . — . — I , 15 kg i-iAl * 2.4 kg, which would give rise to \ 3 * 3 + 3J (3) that quantity of fission products. 2/ The amount of fission products in normal uranium present in the reactor would depend upon its quantity and how long it had been exposed to neutrons in the reactor. The source of the fission products would fissioned U-235, which is only 0.7 percent of the uranium. So most of the fission products would be in the highly enriched uranium of the core. If one excess neutron is available from each two fissions in the fuel and if all of these are absorbed in the natural uranium either to produce plutonium in U-238 or fission in U-235, then for every kilogram of fission products produced in the core, 0.5 kg of plutonium would be produced in the natural uranium and about 3 grams of additional fission products. Oil 92 For radioactivity to reach Baghdad, the core and blanket would have to be vaporized, the vapors escape from the building and be lifted by heat energy of the bomb to altitude, and then drift towards Baghdad, with the vapors condensing into particles which would begin to fall out under the path of the cloud. To get some idea of how much radioactivity might reach Baghdad, it is assumed that: 1. The core is hit directly from above. 2. The energy released by the bomb would vaporize the core instead of simply smashing it into pieces. 3. The bomb would release enough heat to lift the radioactive vapor to altitude where it would begin to condense and fall out. 4. The wind is toward Baghdad and is moving fast enough to carry the cloud over the city before all of the condensed particles fall out. 5. Half of the fission products present are lifted into the cloud, i.e. 1.2 kg. 6. Half of the cloud's contents fall uniformly over the city, i.e. 600 grams. 7. The area of the city is 78 million square meters (i.e. 10 km in diameter). Using these assumptions, and without regard to their probability, the contamination of Baghdad could be 600 grams 7.7 x 10~" grams of 78 x 10° m2" fission products per square meter. The short term effect upon the people of Baghdad would depend upon the radioactivity of fission products. The intensity and nature of this radiation would change continually during the hours after the release of fission products into the envrionment, which prevents simple analysis. For purposes of analogy, one can estimate what the exposure would be if the contaminant was radium instead of fission products, for both radium and fission products are strong emitters of gamma radiation which would be the principle source of potential 93 injury. Taking, for purpose of illustration, the radiation from a gran of radium to be roughly equivalent to that from a gram of fission products, which is a substantial simplification, then the contamination of Baghdad from about 8 micrograms of fission products per square meter could be thought of as approximated by about 8 micrograms of radium per square meter. Since the radioactivity of 1 microgram of radium is 1 microcurie, such contamination would be about 8 microcuries per square meter. To cause an exposure lethal for half of those exposed, a person would have to receive a whole body exposure of 500 roentgens. A microcurie of radium causes an exposure of 1 microroentgen per hour at a distance of 1 meter from a source. So a contamination equivalent to about 8 microcuries of radium per sq. meter would cause an exposure of about 8 microroentgens per hour. At this level, a person would have to be exposed for many million hours to receive a potentially lethal dose. Such a level of contamination would be detectable by sensitive instruments, but would not cause a plausible source of lethal exposure. A longer term risk which is the subject of continuing controversy would be the long term effect of ingesting small amounts of the fallout with possible appearances of cancer in some of those exposed many years later. The earlier assumptions made in this analysis need some comment. Assumption 1 - The bomb hit. The probability of a direct hit on the core is small. Assumption 2 - The effects. A near miss could damage the reactor, perhaps break open the pool and cause a loss of cooling water, or jam the reactor controls so that it could not shut down. Either case could present a risk of local contamination if the fuel overheated and ruptured. However, most of the escaping radioactivity would be radioactive gases, iodine and xenon, which would be released comparatively slowly and present no noticeable radiological risk to Baghdad. If the reactor core were broken apart, there would be radioactive debris at the site which could be dangerous until collected and moved to safe containment. 94 Assumption 3 - Vaporisation. The reactor's fuel consists of * collection of plates each with 13 grams of highly enriched uranium in 220 grams of aluminum. The heat energy necessary to vaporize the 744 plates in the core would be large and seems unlikely to be available from a chemical explosive. Likewise, while a chemical bomb might throw debris into the air, it seems unlikely that it could provide enough heat to lift a. cloud to several tens of kilometers into the air. At lower altitudes, most of the radioactivity would fall to earth near the reactor. Assumption 4 - Wind and weather. On a purely random basis, the chances would not favor wind in the direction of the city with enough speed to carry the cloud. Assumption 5 - The amount of fission products lifted. An illustrative assumption. However, it seems unlikely that all of the vaporized material would be lifted and none thrown out at the surface. Assumption 6 - The amount reaching Baghdad. Again an illustrative assumption. The actual amount would better be estimated by the ratio of the area of the city to the total area receiving contamination. This would depend upon cloud height, precipitation — if any, wind speed, and possibility of wind shear, i.e. lower levels moving in different directions. While uniform fallout would be unlikely, variations would have little effect on the main point of this analysis. Assumption 7 - The area of the city. In the absence of specific information, the area was roughly estimated from a map of Iraq which indicates the city would fit within a circle of about 10 km diameter. While the question did not mention it, another group of people might be exposed to radiation as a result of attack on the operating reactor. This group would include the scientists, engineers, technicians and other workers at the reactor and the Iraq nuclear research center. The most likely result of a successful bombing which destroyed the reactor APPENDIX 4 Letter From U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Responding to Representative Hamilton's Question Regarding U.S. Government Efforts To Strengthen IAEA Safeguards General Counsel U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Washington,D.C., August 7, 1981 Hon. Clement J. Zablocki Chairman Committee on Foreign Affairs, U.S. House of Representatives Dear Mr. Chairman: On June 25, 1981, three subcommittees of the House Foreign Affairs Committee conducted joint hearings on the application of safeguards by the International Atomic Energy Agency in Iraq. During those hearings, Congressman Hamilton posed a question to the Administration witness. Dr. Frank Houck of ACDA, concerning U.S. government efforts to strengthen IAEA safeguards and a- response for the record is herewith enclosed. If you have any further questions concerning this matter, do not hesi-tate to contact me. Sincerely Enclosure: As stated. Thomas Graham, Jr. (96) 98 Energy (DOE), the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), and the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) was established for policy matters and overall coordination. The ISG establised two interagency working groups. One of these groups, chaired by ACDA and with representatives from DOS, DOE, and NRC, is responsible for regularly assessing the status of safeguards primarily on the basis of the" IAEA's annual Safeguards Implementation Report (SIR). This assessment systemmatically identifies safeguards problems, possible solutions, priorities, and actions that the United States might initiate to effect these solutions. The working group also assists in coordin- ating these actions. The second focus, in keeping with strong Congressional inter- est originally expressed in 1974, is the U.S. program of coordin- ated technical support of IAEA safeguards utilizing resources available in the United States.. The Program of Technical Assist- ance to IAEA Safeguards (POTAS) has been the main vehicle for this support and is coordinated and managed by an interagency working group chaired by DOE with representatives from DOS, NRC, and ACDA. This group meets regularly, maintains through DOE a project office which provides a full-time staff person in Vienna, and meets formally twice each year with IAEA management to review program progress, identify new program needs, establish priorities, and plan the future program. 99 The POTAS includes providing to the IAEA technical experts, training, safeguards system studies, and equipment for surveil- lance and for non-destructive measurement of nuclear material. In 1981, $5.1 million was allocated for POTAS and other technical support of IAEA safeguards. The same amount has been requested by FY-1982. Other D.S. efforts to improve safeguards, particularly when a large and long-term effort is required, involve ad hoc coordin- ating arrangements. An example is participation in the two-year Hexapartite Safeguards Project, initiated-by the United States in 1980, for improving safeguards for gas centrifuge enrichment plants. D.S. efforts to improve safeguards involve not only POTAS but also external research programs of ACDA, DOE and NRC, includ- ing substantial work by DOE national laboratories, and direct assistance to IAEA by safeguards experts on the staff of government agencies through advisory meetings and consultative arrangements. These collective efforts deal with the following main areas: (a) Increasing the availability of factual information on IAEA safeguards. (This is to enhance the ability to assess effec- tiveness and identify where improvements can be made. The United States was instrumental in encouraging the IAEA to produce the first SIR.) 101 demonstrated several major improvements for safeguards at reproces- sing plants.) (f) Training of inspectors. (An important part of the POTAS program is assistance in training IAEA inspectors.) (g) Cost-free experts. (The United States has safeguards expertise which the IAEA needs but is unable to provide for through its regular budget and staffing and which we have been providing (currently through 17 full-time experts) through POTAS). While substantial progress has been made, there is a contin- uing need for efforts to improve safeguards in all of these areas. These efforts are needed with respect both to the effectiveness and efficiency of safeguards now and in the future as well as to keep pace with increases in the magnitude and complexity of the safeguarding task as new, larger and more advanced nuclear facil- ities come under safeguards. ki-h44 O—si—7 APPENDIX 5 Letter and Statement From the American Israel Public Affairs Committee American Israel Public Affairs Committee Washington, D.C., June 16, 1981 The Honorable Clement J. Zablocki Chairman, Committee on Foreign Affairs House of Representatives Washington, D.C. 20515 Dear Hr. Chairman: In the context of your Committee's hearing on the Israeli - raid on Iraq's nuclear facilities, the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) wishes to state:' 1. the raid was an act of legitimate self-defense supportable under international law, and Article 51 of the U.N. Charter. 2. The Iraqi nuclear reactor would have been capable of producing nuclear weapons. 3. Safeguards on Iraq's reactor were Inadequate. 4. The Iraqi regime is committed to the destruction of the State of Israel by any and all means. 5. Israel has exhausted over three years all diplomatic means to prevent the supply of nuclear weapons capability .to Iraq. 1. SELF-DEFENSE: LEGALITY OF ISRAEL'S RAID Iraq has T>een in a state of war against Israel since Israel's establishment in 1948, when the Iraqi army Joined other Arab armies in an invasion of the new nation. Egypt, Lebanon, Syria and Jordan signed armistice agreements in 1948, but Iraq refused. Again in 1967 and 1973, Iraq joined the wars against Israel. Iraq refused to accept the 1967 cease-fire contained in UN Security Council Resolution 242 and the 1973 cease-fire contained in UN Security Council Resolution 338. On October 22, 1973, the 1raqi government proclaimed, "Iraq does not consider itself a party to any resolution, procedure or measure in armistice or cease-fire agreements or negotiations or peace with Israel, now or in the near future." (1021 105 Top level French nuclear experts have expressed concern over the reactor their country supplied to Iraq. Francis Perrin, the former High Commissioner for Atomic Energy and the President of the European Society of Atomic Energy, warned in August 1980 that "the nuclear cooperation treaty between France and Iraq could lead to the development of a nuclear weapon," according to the Tines of London. Two weeks ago, three officials of the French National Center for Scientific Research released a 32-page report which warned that "the high flux Osirak reactor, capable of significant and efficient radiation levels,is well suited for producing - plutonium with a potential for the production of explosives." 3. INADEQUATE SAFEGUARDS It is widely accepted in the scientific community that today's nuclear safeguards are incapable of detecting violations of nuclear guidelines and the secret developing of nuclear weapons. "Advanced technologies will outpace the safeguards systems needed to control them," warned the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) last year. The enforcement and detection powers of the International Atomic Energy Agency, SIPRI continued, are "exceedingly cumbersome... Action [by IAEA against any violator] is bound to be slow, leaving a violator the time needed to carry out his design." The political nature of the IAEA shor.ld also be noted. The Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) has been granted observer status to the Angen- cy. Writing in the Brookings Institution's Nonproliferation and O.S. Foreign Policy, Henry Rowen and Richard Brody warn that "under the present international rules, nations can possess nuclear explosive materials without violating... the MPT-IAEA safeguards." Fred Ikle, who now serves as undersecretary of defense, wrote in the for- ward to Plowshares into Swords that IAEA safeguards are woefully inadequate: "The agency made it easier for the exporters of nuclear technology in several countries to pretend that their practices were safe Never mind that highly enriched ura- ium was accumulating in large amounts in many countries, it was under agency 'safeguards.'" The current Newsweek and today's Washington Post reach a similar conclu- sion. "IAEA's authority and capabilities are limited," according to Newsweek. "Iraq offers a prime example of the weakness of IAEA inspections.... An IAEA spokesman ... admitted that no security cameras or seals were yet in place at the reactor Iraq's nuclear activities were openly suspicious. The Osirak reactor was theoretically only for research purposes — but Iraq twice refused a French offer to supply it with low-enriched uranium.... Iraq was also operating an Ital- ian-built 'hot cell' lab for extracting plutonium, and had arranged to buy large quantities of uranium from Brazil, Portugal and Niger — all without any invest- ment in a nuclear-energy program." The Washington Post, in a lead editorial entitled "Nuclear Safeguards or 107 Later that week, Hussein.ominously hinted how Iraq would defeat Israel. "The Arabs will triumph when the Arab nation's sons have rid themselves of scientific and technological backwardness and have taken advance positions that bridge or reduce the gap between those who have come from the most developed scientific world circles and gathered on Palestinian territories as usurpers on one hand, and the Arab nation on the other, which has suffered from the oppression, division and backwardness that accompanied the colonialist domination of the Arab nation during past decades.... We are certain that the day will come when the Arabs will triumph over the midget Zionist entity.... "We also treat occupied Palestine's territory as if it were Iraqi terri- tory. We are preparing ourselves for a role in protecting the security of the Arab countries against the greedy, the invaders and the imperialists. We are also preparing ourselves for a role in liberating the beloved land of Palestine." 5. ISRAEL'S RAID: THE LAST RESORT Israel's June 7 attack on Iraq's nuclear installation was not a sudden, ar- bitrary decision. It was the carefully-considered last resort available to Israel whose existence was threatened by Iraq's development of a nuclear weapons capability. As the following record indicates, Israel has long stated its objections to the Iraqi facility. But for a few exceptions, those objections fell on deaf ears. Since the first signs of nuclear cooperation between Iraq and European nations, Israel, enlisting the support of the United States, embarked on a campaign of pub- lic and secret diplomacy to alert the world community to the danger of the projects and to persuade those nations involved to end their support. Only after thoroughly exhausting those diplomatic channels without success and only after the new French government announced that there will be no changes in its Iraq policy did Israel resort to a military response. And even then it opted for a surgical raid, the loss of human life was minimized, and the possibility of nuclear contamination was averted. We offer a chronology of that diplomatic effort: * September 1976 Just months after the French-Iraqi nuclear agreement is published, the Paris correspondent for the Israeli paper Ha'aretz reports that Iraq is to receive enough enriched fuel to manufacture three nuclear devices by 1985. Israel launches an Intensive diplomatic campaign to try to convince France to renege on the agreement. (Miami Herald, July 23, 1980) * July 1978 The London Times reports on U.S. efforts to exert pressure on France to withhold a planned delivery of weapons-grade uranium to Iraq. Sources in- dicate that the "State Department, at the instigation of President Carter, has held talks with France, during which the United States expressed its 'grave concern' that the Iraqis could use the uranium to manufacture nuclear weapons." (Times, July 4, 1978) 108 * April - July 1979 Israel appeals to France to reconsider its agreement following the mysteri- ous destruction of reactor components awaiting shipment to Iraq at a French port. Yielding to diplomatic pressure, French Prime Minister Barre meets with Iraqi leaders to convince them to accept a newly-developed fuel known as "caramel" which would suite Iraq's reactor, but is not "bomb-grade" material. Iraq adamently refuses anything but the 93 percent enriched uranium. Under threats of an oil cut-off and cancellation of French arms purchases, France goes along with Iraq's demands. (Jerusalem Post, August 22, 1980; Sunday (London) Times, October 26, 1980) * February 1980 In response to reports of France's failure to persuade the Iraqis, Senator Frank Church, then Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, and Senator Jacob Javits, ranking minority member, send an expression of concern to President Carter. (Congressional Research Study, June 8, 1981) * March 1980 New York Times correspondent Richard Burt reports that Administration officials are "most concerned" about an Italian decision to permit Iraq to purchase a sensitive nuclear facility called a "hot cell," which would enable Iraq to extract plutonium from other nuclear substances. Burt notes that efforts by U.S. officials have "so far...not succeeded in per- suading Italy to reassess the project." (H.Y. Tiroes, March 18, 1980) * July 1980 Prime Minister Begin makes a speech on French Independence Day in which he accuses France of encouraging an extremely dangerous situation. (FBIS, July 14, 1980) In a television interview on the same day. Deputy Premier Yadin says that Israel would take measures against the nuclear program. (Jerusa- lem Post, August 22, 1980) Foreign Minister Yitzhak Shamir says he views with severity the sale of French uranium to Iraq. (FBIS, July 15, 1980) Transportation Minister Chaim Landau makes a statement to Voice of Israel that the supply of a nuclear reactor to Iraq is particularly serious and the French government does not realize the danger inherent in the move. (FBIS, July 15, 1980) The Knesset Foreign Affairs Committee suggests that a diplomatic and infor- mation offensive'be launched in Europe. Labor Party Chairman Shimon Perea - .. supports the idea and offers to make a special trip to Paris to discuss the matter with President Giscard. The committee issues the following state- ment: "When an extremist and aggressive regime such as Iraq's gets nuclear manufacturing potential Israel must regard the development as a threat to its existence. Israel will therefore have to make a sober assessment of its response." (Christian Science Monitor, August 18; FBIS, July 24, 1980) Associated Press reports on a U.S. announcement not to oppose the "contro- versial sale to Iraq." The report acknowledges that "Israel has protested strongly about the sale," in both France and the United States. (July 25, 1980) V 109 July 1980, continued- Yitzhak Shamir calls on the French charge d'affaires in Israel to voice hia government's protest that French nuclear aid to Iraq will reinforce its "aggressive designs against Israel." (Washington Post, July 30, 1980) Ronald Koven of the Washington Post reports that France has begun deliveries of fuel shipments of enriched uranium to Iraq despite the fact that "Israel has been mounting an increasingly insistent campaign to underscore the danger that Iraq could develop atomic weapons as a result of French actions" and that "Washington also has privately expressed its concern to France about the wisdom of shipping sensitive materials to unstable regimes..." (July 30, 1980) Israel restates its proposal to begin immediately direct negotiations with the Arab countries "at any time, in any place, and without preconditions" to establish a zone free of nuclear weapons in the Middle East. The proposal is rejected by Arab states. (FBIS, July 31, 1980) * August 1980 The Christian Science Monitor reports that "Israeli officials have begun hinting strongly at the possibility of direct action against Iraq to block the development of that country's nuclear capability." Deputy Defense Mini- ster Mordecai Zipori: "We will explore all legal and humane avenues. If pressure doesn't work, we'll have to consider other means." Director-General of the Prime Minister's Office Matti Shmuelevitz: "Israe1. could not wait until an Iraqi bomb falls on it." Ze'ev Schiff, Israel's leading military correspondent: "Israel must make every effort to block Arab [nuclear] development. This effort must be in the political area and other areas as well." (August 18, 1980) * February 1981 Nucleonics Week reports that Italy could face possible difficulties in obtaining U.S. nuclear exports because of U.S. concern that it is contribu- ting to Iraqi development of nuclear weapons. (Congressional Research Service Study, June 8, 1981) * March 1981 Representative Jonathan Bingham writes a letter to Secretary of State Haig asking him to consider ending American nuclear supply to France and Italy because their assistance to Iraq and Pakistan's nuclear programs presented a "clear and present danger'to the United States and indeed, Western security interests" in the region. (N.Y. Times. March 18, 1981) Senator Alan Cranston delivers a speech on the Senate floor in which he accuses Iraq of "blackmailing" oil-dependent Western European nations to acquire nuclear technology and fuel and embarking upon a "Manhattan Project- type approach" toward acquiring nuclear weapons. He further urges the Rea- gan Administration to exert pressure on France and Iraly to refrain from exporting their nuclear technology and to consider ending U.S. shipments 114 In broad outline, modern international legal principles condemn aggres- sion, sustain the right of self-defense, and, in appropriate circumstances, permit anticipatory self-defense. So much was true of customary internation- al law the requirements of which are largely codified in the United Nations Charter. The Charter requires its members to resolve disputes by peaceful means. Article 2(3) provides: All members shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security, and justice are not endangered. Paragraph 4 of the same article enjoins the membership from resort to aggression. It states: All members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or politi- cal independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations. That this provision did not affect in a restrictive way the right of self- defense accords both with contemporaneous understanding and explicit provi- sion of the Charter. Thus, in its Report on paragraph 4, Committee 1 to Com- mission I stated: "... The use of arms in legitimate self-defense remains admitted and unimpaired ...." quoted at Whiteman, 5 Digest of International Law 977 (1965). Article 51 of the Charter provides: Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defense shall be immediately reported to the Secur- ity Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and re- sponsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security. 125 The United Nations Charter not only condemns aggression but enjoins tbe membership to resolve disputes by peaceful means. At the same time, the principle of general customary law regarding the right of self-defense is acknowledged. Although opinions differ regarding the requirement of an "armed attack" for the lawful exercise of the right under Article 51 of the Charter, the weight of opinion and practice seems to be that the right may be claimed and used when there is reasonable cause to believe that the national existence is imperiled or proximately endangered by the implemen- tation of a known and dangerous cause of action. As such, the exercise of the right is not limited to responding to an armed attack, but also in responding to the use of force not constituting an armed attack. In other words, international law permits the exercise of self- defense not only in the face of actual attack but also against a threatened aggression when the danger is imminent. So much seems to have been accepted by the United States early on in connection with the Caroline controversy. While Secretary Webster's formulation expressed at that time is highly re- strictive insofar as the proper circumstance for its exercise, the formula- tion acknowledges cricumstances other than actual armed attack. The requirements imposed by customary international law upon the right of self-defense are those of necessity and proportionality. "... imminence of attack of such high* degree as to preclude effective resort by the intend- ed victim to non-violent modalities of response has always been regarded as sufficient justification ..." McDougal, "The Soviet,Cuban Quarantine and Self-Defense," 57 American Journal of International Law 597, 598 (1963). "... proportionality, ... stipulates that the responding use of the military instrument by the target state be limited in intensity and magnitude to what 126 is reasonably necessary promptly to secure the permissible objectives of Belf-defense under the established conditions of necessity." Ibid. The application of these principles to evaluate the Israeli actions of June 7 under international law requires answers to certain fundamental questions apparently not definitively resolved by knowledgeable experts at this time. Some of these questions were raised by John Norton Moore in his June 25, 1981 testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. The more immediate of these concerns include — * was it the intention of Iraq to develop nuclear weapons and use them against Israel in violation of the United Nations Charter? * what was the immediacy of the threat of attack against Israel or loss of the option to strike the reactor and mitigate this threat? * what diplomatic and other alternatives had been employed by Israel to end the threat and what diplomatic or other actions short of the air attack on the reactor remained as possibly effective means of preventing the threat? * How effective were the IAEA safeguards and supplemental French controls in preventing the multiple threats from diversion, crea- tion of plutonium from uncontrolled source U238, denunciation of the NPT treaty by Iraq as permitted on three months notice under Article 10 of the NFT Treaty, and training of Iraqi nationals in technology employable under a purely national program without IAEA safeguards? The answers to these and related questions, particularly question 2 re- lating to the immediacy of the threat posed by the Iraqi project, depend on assessments of the technical characteristics of the reactor installation and the effectiveness of constraints imposed by Iraq's acceptance of on-site in- spections under the nonproliferation treaty. See Israeli Raid Into Iraq, CRS Issue Brief Number IB 81103. Briefly, if the international law of self-defense provides some frame of reference for determination of the eligibility criterion for arms transfers 130 real growth" which is likely to put a restraint on the agency's expansion to provide adequate safeguards inspection of the uses of plutonium as a commercial fuel. Some specific comments follow: Page 1, par 1. The reply says the U.S. provides considerable support to the IAEA. It does not say whether the total support from the U.S. and other members is enough and whether the U.S. share is all that it could be. Page 2, top. The reply identifies several of the Agency's working group but describes only the group chaired by ACDA. What do the others do? Page 2, par. 2. The reply notes that an agency group chaired by ACDA regularly assesses safeguards based on the Vienna agency's annual Safeguards Implementation Report. The reply does not say what problems, what solution, or priorities are indicated in the most recent implementation report. Page 2, par. 3. The reply is optimistic about U.S. support for safeguards technology. It does not mention, however, that much of the technical assistance program orignated from Congressional interest. Nor does it mention that an appreciable research effort to improve safeguards technology is funded in the military program of DOE and that the House Arms Services Committee last March raised questions about the military program linkage with civil safeguards. Nor does the reply mention past OMB policy, which apparently has been continued under the Reagan administration, that U.S. funds for safeguards development can not be used to buy suppliers of the equipment thus developed. Page 3, par. 1. While the ACDA reply notes that 5.1 million was allocated in FY 1981, for technical support to safeguards and that the same amount has been requested for FY 1982, it does not say how far this funding will go to fill the IAEA needs. 132 UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN 3 9015 03905 6646 Page 5. last par. The reply points to substantial progress by noting a continued need for improved safeguards with respect to both effectiveness and efficiency. Such a general statement could apply to almost anything. It says nothing about specific goals and the means to attain them. A notable omission is comment on the tension within the agency between the developing countries on one hand who would prefer the agency to increase funding for technical assistance, and the U.S. which is much less concerned with the technical assistance than it is with safeguards. This tension can substantially affect the future support for IAEA development of safeguards technology. On the whole the reply gives a useful sketch of interagency coordination and says there is development and progress. It contains no specific suggestions to improve safeguards. Neither does it say much about U.S. participation in international bodies that work for improved safeguards. A reader would never learn from this reply what effect Israel's June attack on Iraq's research reactor has had upon the credibility of safeguards and of U.S. measures to offset the bad effect of that attack. O C THE UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN DATE DUE DEC l 9 2001