GRAD
DS
79
.T47
2003
trategic Studies Institute SSI
S
NATIONALISM, SECTARIANISM, AND
HE FUTURE OF THE U.S. PRESENCE
N POST-SADDAM IRAQ
W. Andrew Terrill
furt
U.S. Army War College


NATIONALISM, SECTARIANISM, AND THE FUTURE
OF THE U.S. PRESENCE IN POST-SADDAM IRAQ
W. Andrew Terrill
July 2003


"GROU
*****
7
The views expressed in this report are those of the author and do not
necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, the
| Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government. This report is cleared for public
release; distribution is unlimited.
147
*****
w3
The author would like to thank Dr. Conrad Crane, Dr. Larry Goodson, Dr.
Sami Hajjar, Dr. Steven Metz, and U.S. Air Force Captain David M. Burke for
valuable comments on earlier drafts of this monograph. He would also like to
thank Bart Gatrell for his energetic support as his research assistant. All mistakes
in this work naturally are the fault of the author.
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ISBN 1-58487-129-6


in both the 1948-49 and 1967 Arab-Israeli wars under non-Baath
ernments. It also participated in the 1973 War as a result of the
efforts of Saddam Hussein.44
Some Iraqis also appear concerned that the U.S. military presence
in their country will continue in some form for the indefinite future.
The argument that Westerners can manage an Arab state better than
the native inhabitants is an old colonialist one, and can be taken as
such now no matter how true or how well-intentioned statements
made by U.S. leaders are.45 The UK may also be distrusted in Iraq
due to the colonial legacy. The analogy of the Palestinians keeps
surfacing among Iraqis seeking to underscore their worries about a
long-term U.S. occupation.
The presence of foreign bases in Iraq previously has been a
particularly sensitive matter and the prospects of new basing
agreements can be expected to cause resentment among Iraqi
nationalists. In the 1950s until the 1980s, Western bases in the Middle
East were often described as being placed there to defend the region
against Soviet aggression such as occurred with the invasion of
Afghanistan in 1979. Despite this impressive external threat, many
Arabs assumed that the primary function of such military outposts
was to dominate the Middle East and suppress indigenous threats to
Western interests. The end of the Cold War and the disintegration of
the Soviet Union removed an important justification for a Western
presence in the area. The defeat of Saddam Hussein, a proven
aggressor against Kuwait, removes a further justification. Iraqis
correspondingly will be a difficult audience to convince that long
term postwar U.S. bases in Iraq will be necessary, especially since the
majority of the Arab World will inevitably oppose such an option.
Conservative Muslims have additional reasons for opposing a
continued Western presence in Iraq. Many believe that the West is the
source of cultural pollution that can undermine the fabric of a moral
society. In other contexts this has been called “cultural imperialism"
or "West-toxification." In particular, some Muslims worry about
what they view as Western permissiveness.
the widespread availability of narcotics, atheism, pornography,
nightclubs, youth rebellion, sexual promiscuity, and other perceived
Western vices. The longer the United States stays in Iraq, the more


the regime. Conversely, a number of Shi'ite leaders were openly
murdered by the Baath regime or disappeared under suspicious
circumstances when they appeared too independent, or perhaps
too capable of establishing a mass following. A few were publicly
executed for openly supporting the Khomeini regime in Iran.60
Competition for power among clerics also rapidly materialized
as the postwar situation unfolded. Occasionally, the followers of
leading clerics sought to suggest that they were more anti-American
than their rivals, apparently viewing this as a key asset in appealing
to the Shi'ite masses.61 Anti-Americanism was sometimes apparent
at some of the Shi'ite rituals where politics and religion can easily
become intertwined. Some marchers to Karbala, for example, were
seen to be chanting or carrying signs calling for “Death to America."62
The number of such signs was limited in the immediate postwar era
and some were even written in Farsi, in a less than subtle indication
of Iranian influence.63
The Najaf-based Hawza al Ilmiya (circle of scholars), which is
formally headed by Grand Ayatollah al Sistani, emerged as a key
voice of the Shi'ite clerical establishment in the postwar era. This
organization is led by senior and hence older clerics such as the
73-year-old Sistani. Almost immediately after the war, mosques
throughout the mostly Shi'ite south and the Shi'ite areas of Baghdad
declared their allegiance to the Hawza.64 However, it is not clear
if they were declaring their allegiance to Sistani and his senior
colleagues, clerical rule, or simply acknowledging their willingness
to receive guidance from the Shi'ite leadership in Najaf without
getting involved in the power struggles there.
Opposing Sistani for control of the religious establishment is the
Sadr movement (sometimes called the Sadr-2 movement), led by
Sayyid Muatada al Sadr, the son of Grand Ayatollah Muhammad
Sadiq al Sadr. Grand Ayatollah al Sadr was murdered by Saddam's
agents in February 1999 after his speeches became increasingly
popular and showed some independence from government
censorship.65 Several of his older sons were murdered as well in
the incident. The courage of Grand Ayatollah al Sadr, along with
his martyrdom and that of his sons, has conferred considerable
legitimacy on Muatada al Sadr, his surviving son. While Muatada
21


all aid going to the population, thus establishing an ironclad grip on
power. Such an approach, while intolerable from a U.S. standpoint,
may appear more reasonable to the Iraqi population because of the
activities of Christian missionaries in that country, some of whom
are believed to seek to convert Muslims to Christianity.75 These
organizations have been in Iraq since the end of the war, giving
out food and medicine.76 In Islam apostasy is an unpardonable sin
punishable by death. While it is extremely doubtful that converted
Muslims would be executed, they nevertheless would become
pariahs within their own society.
It is also possible that the radical Shi'ite clergy would seek
power by constitutional means and then dismantle the democratic
process to set themselves up in power permanently. This type of
approach has been dramatically referred to as “one person, one
vote, one time.”77 Currently, the press is reporting that many Iraqi
clerics oppose clerical rule, but these statements need to be placed
in context. The Iranian concept of Velayat-e Faqih (Guardianship of
the Jurist) has been denounced by the Iraqi religious establishment
during Saddam's reign because failure to do so would have placed
them in danger of severe regime punishment, including execution.
Clerical rule may gain a new appeal in the post-Saddam era,
although the Iranian model is also filled with failures and problems
that could cause Iraqi religious leaders to reconsider any effort to
seize formal power.
The Sunnis and the Kurds in Post-Saddam Iraq.
Shi’ite power appears to be on the rise in Iraq, increasing the
possibility of a new Iraqi nationalism with a Shi'ite face. Sunni Arabs
and Kurds correspondingly are watching these developments with
great interest. Thus far, most Sunnis seem to be adopting a wait-
and-see attitude. Despite possible changes in the distribution of
power, Iraqi Sunnis have little choice but to accept social change and
perhaps search out new ways to dominate the emerging political
entity. Additionally, Sunni groups are establishing neighborhood
militias as rapidly as possible as a hedge against future problems.78
They can also be expected to pay considerable attention to the
24


out a tribal sheikh to ask permission to affiliate with his tribe in
cases where their own lineage has become unclear. This is done to
seek the protection and support of the tribe and improve chances for
individual advancement.89
Tribalism also seems to have strengthened in the Kurdish areas
during Saddam's presidency as a result of central government
policies. During the Iran Iraq War, Kurdish conscripts were
exceptionally prone to desertion at the earliest opportunity, leading
Baghdad to switch to a tribal strategy to manage the Kurds and
address the manpower drain. In a move away from the conscription
of individual Kurds, the Iraqi government paid the leaders of
Kurdish tribal militias to perform various security duties useful to
the war effort. Tribalism was strengthened accordingly.
U.S. forces in Iraq are thus faced with the requirement to operate
within a highly tribalized society. This situation can create a number
of problems. Recently, tribal feuds have been reported as becoming
more evident, and, in at least one case, the identification of regime
collaborators was complicated by denunciations based on tribal
disputes.90 Additionally, tribalism may strengthen anti-Americanism
by reinforcing a chauvinistic form of Iraqi nationalism, while
simultaneously making Iraq more difficult to govern due to tribal
fragmentation. Also, where possible, tribal leaders may attempt
to lure the United States into supporting them in their various
disputes. On the positive side, tribal leaders may be useful contacts
with whom to deal. Some important tribal leaders, especially in the
Kurdish areas, have already indicated a strong interest in establishing
good relations with U.S. authorities, whom they view as a source of
patronage. 91 They might also serve as something of a counterweight
to radical members of the clergy.
Iraqi Nationalism and Iranian Involvement in Postwar Iraq.
The Iranians watched the 2003 war with tremendous apprehen-
sion, but also with a strong interest in the opportunities that might
be available to influence the post-Saddam era. In the aftermath of the
Afghanistan and Iraq wars, Iran has found itself increasingly encircled
by U.S. allies or potential client states. A friendly government in
28


although some state that military operations against U.S. forces may
become necessary if the United States seeks to act in an imperial
manner. Fatih Kashif al Ghita, a Hawza representative, summarized
the situation by stating, “I hope that the occupation troops will
not compel Iraqis who welcomed them to resort to violence. The
Americans can avoid such an eventuality if they demonstrate an
understanding of the political, social, economic, and even religious
realities in Iraq."97
It should also be noted that there have been some serious
incidents with the Shi'ites that could have escalated but fortunately
did not. In An Numaniyah, U.S. Marines briefly arrested Shi'ite cleric
Said Habib at his house and were almost immediately surrounded
by a hostile crowd just beyond Habib's courtyard. As the crowd
grew and some among them appeared to be armed, the Marines
aimed their weapons at the Iraqis. At this point, the potential for a
tragic incident seemed high, but tensions quickly defused when a
Marine intelligence team, and its Iraqi-American civilian translator
arrived and convinced the Marines to remove tape from the cleric's
wrists and mouth. It was then established that Sheikh Habib has
been falsely accused by a tainted source. Later, when the cleric and
his supporters were released, he accepted the explanation that the
entire episode had been a mistake, and helped to calm the crowd.98
At the point where weapons were trained on the crowd, the panic or
indiscipline of only one Marine could have caused the situation to
degenerate into carnage.
Should the current situation in Iraq ever reach the point where
hostile crowds and nervous troops meet on a regular basis, it is
uncertain that events will go as well as they did in An Numaniyah.
If such encounters do recur with less successful outcomes, it is likely
that resistance to the U.S. presence could increase substantially
It is also likely that various clerics would issue fatwas calling for
resistance to the U.S. presence, perhaps by force of arms.
Moreover, the nucleus for anti-Western organizations already
exists. Shi'ite organizations such as al Dawa that waged an
underground struggle against Saddam during the years of tyranny
are both extreme and predisposed to violence. No other form of
Shi'ite organization (say a collection of moderates or reformers)
32


would have challenged Saddam through terrorism by force of
arms. Only hard core militants had the strength to endure Saddam's
brutality and continue to fight.
The greatest danger of confrontation is that it might provoke an
intensification of terrorism or even a full scale insurgency. Should
a large element of Iraqi society become mobilized against the U.S.
presence, this could become an exceptionally serious problem.
Most Iraqi males have previously served in the military or militia,
are familiar with small arms, and have some basic military skills.
Moreover, Iraq, even under Saddam, has been an exceptionally well-
armed society. In keeping with Arab concepts of manhood, many
adult males had firearms of some sort, although these weapons
had to be registered with the Iraqi government, and the misuse of
them was severely punished. Also, in the aftermath of the 2003 war,
many Republican Guard, Army, and militia arsenals were looted
placing even larger numbers of weapons into Iraqi society. Looting
and crime that followed the U.S. seizure of Baghdad naturally led a
number of individuals to purchase weapons from the black market
for self-defense.
Conclusion: Implications for U.S. Troops Remaining in Iraq.
Nationalist emotion seems to flourish when challenged or
when an external power presents a threat of some kind. Palestinian
nationalism developed rapidly and became angry in response to
Zionism. Kurdish nationalism developed in response to Turkish,
Iraqi, and other attempts to eradicate it. The danger of a new Iraqi
Arab nationalism defining itself as an anti-U.S. force is real, but it
may still be possible to minimize this phenomenon.
Iraqi nationalism is currently in the process of redefining itself
for a post-Saddam world. The chances of this nationalism being
anti-Western and anti-U.S. seem serious. With Saddam's defeat,
the choice for Iraqis is no longer between his brutality and foreign
rule. The choice may appear to them to be between direct or indirect
foreign rule and rule by indigenous elites, most probably the clergy.
While Shi'ite clerics were among the bitterest enemies of the Saddam
regime, this bitterness has not translated into love of the United
33


States or a high level of toleration for U.S. influence in Iraq. With this
in mind, the author provides the following policy guidelines and
recommendations.
1. The United States needs to be continually searching for areas of
agreement with the nonextremist clergy while recognizing issues and
activities upon which collaboration is not possible. It is natural and
useful for the United States to encourage secular and liberal trends
in Iraq. Yet, if the United States attempts to circumvent the religious
Shi'ites, there is a risk that we will appear to be denying the clerics
their due. It is interesting that the Shi'ite clergy was able to maintain
itself as a source of at least some authority throughout the Saddam
Hussein years. If Saddam, with his unlimited capacity for brutality,
had to coexist with it, then it is unrealistic to think that U.S. power
can eliminate clerical influence in politics. Moreover, the United
States, as a non-Muslim power, will be at a severe disadvantage in
attempting to explain actions that the Shi'ite clergy label as hostile
to Islam. Rather, the United States may have to show its concerns
for Iraqi citizens with strong aid programs. These programs may be
coordinated with the clergy but never ceded to their control.
2. The United States should continue to support a strong information
campaign directed at the Iraqi citizenry. Views that the United States
seeks to wipe out or Americanize Islam are widespread in the Arab
World and need to be refuted by both an information campaign
the conduct of U.S. troops. It has already been noted that some Iraqis
are concerned about U.S. forces bringing vice, bad morals, alcohol,
and sexually transmitted diseases into the country. All possible effort
should be made to refute the stereotype of U.S. troops as a threat to
Muslim morals. It might even be useful for U.S. troops not to eat or
drink water too publicly during Ramadan as a gesture of solidarity.
Any U.S. military collaboration with Christian proselytizing risks a
severe backlash.
ust. Ýã ã ŠE
3. The United States should maintain and expand efforts to challenge
Iranian activities in the area while continuing to point out the differences
between Iraqi and Iranian interests. Respecting Islam does not require
34


22. al-Khalil, p. 130.
23. In the West, Ruhollah Khomeini is almost universally known as Ayatollah
Khomeini. Nevertheless, by the time he returned from exile to Tehran in February
1979, Khomeini was already a Grand Ayatollah, the highest title usually available
to Shi'ite clerics. Additionally, his most loyal followers refer to him by the more
exalted title of Imam Khomeini due to his “unique” role in Shi'ite history. See
introduction by Hamid Algar in Imam Khomeini, Islam and Revolution, Berkeley,
California: Mizan Press, 1981.
24. Sandra Mackey, The Iranians: Persia, Islam and the Soul of a Nation, New
York: Dutton, 1996 p. 317.
25. Karsh and Rautsi, pp. 167-168.
26. Amatzia Baram, “Broken Promises," pp. 48.
27. The Office of the Coalition Provisional Authority (OCPA) formerly
the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA) has been
coordinating strong efforts by human rights groups on the issue of mass graves.
Initial OCPA/ORHA reporting suggests that the estimates for the number of
people killed in 1991 may have to be expanded far beyond 60,000. Cited in ORHA,
Situation Report, 1800Z, May 12, 2003. Please note that reports issued prior to the
name change will be cited as ORHA throughout this monograph.
28. See British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), “Full Text of Ben Interview
with Saddam,” February 4, 2003, internet.
29. Andrew Koch, “Did Washington Underestimate Iraqi Resolve?" Jane's
Defense Weekly, April 2, 2003, p. 2.
30. Liz Sly,“ Angered by War, Iraqis Returning Home,” Chicago Tribune, March
25, 2003, p. 1; and “A Bus Ride to Martyrdom,” The Economist, April 5, 2003, p. 29.
31. Jailan Zayan, “Fedayeen's Code: Protect Hussein and Quell Unrest,” Los
Angeles Times, March 25, 2003, p. 1.
32. Agency France-Presse, “Arab Volunteers Join Iraqis to Defend Capital,"
Washington Times, April 7, 2003, p. 14.
33. In interviews with a U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute
team, Iraqi prisoners of war repeatedly stated that they did not wish to fight for
Saddam Hussein's longevity in power. For example, Republican Guard Sergeant
Ahmed al Samarl, interviewed by Dr. Steven Metz, Colonel Edward Filiberiti, and


Colonel Steven Kidder, Umm Qasr, Iraq, April 25, 2003.
34. Juan O. Tamayo, “Non-Iraqis Fought Fiercely, May Find New Kind of
Battle,” Miami Herald, April 22, 2003, internet.
35. “We Betrayed the Volunteers in Iraq” Beirut, Daily Star, May 5, 2003,
internet; and E. A. Torriero, “Arab Fighters Bitter of Iraqis' Quick Collapse,"
Chicago Tribune, May 7, 2003, internet.
36. “Ferment of Freedom, Fear and Fantasy,” The Economist, April 26, 2003, p.
38.
37. BBC, “Baghdad Treasures ‘mostly intact," June 7, 2003, internet.
38. “The Shi'ite Clergy Steps into the Gap,” Middle East International, May 2,
2003, p. 4.
39. Yaroslav Trofimov and Farnez Fasshi, “Shiites Blame U.S. for Missing
Cleric," Wall Street Journal, April 22, 2003, internet.
40. I am indebted to Dr. Sami Hajjar of the U.S. Army College team traveling
to Iraq in April/May 2003 for pointing out to me the widespread currency of this
conspiracy theory at that time.
41. For an exploration of these issues see Kanan Makiya, Republic of Fear,
Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1998, especially chapter
42. Hassouna, pp. 91-140.
43. See Baghdad Republic of Iraq Television in Arabic "Saddam Husayn on
US-Israeli ‘Alliance, 'Martyrdom Operations,” April 15, 2002, as cited by U.S.
Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), April 15, 2002, internet.
44. W. Andrew Terrill, “Iraq's Role in the 1973 Arab-Israeli War," Small Wars
& Insurgencies, Vol. 11, No. 3, Winter 2000, pp. 1-20.
45. Laura J. Winter and Thomas M. DeFrank, “Tough Troops to Calm City,"
New York Daily News, June 4, 2003, internet; and Azadeh Moaveni, “Thousand of
Ex-Soldiers in Iraq Demand to be paid," Los Angeles Times, June 3, 2003, internet.
46. “Three Weeks on, Many in Baghdad feel angry, hopeless,” Jordan Times,
May 1, 2003, internet.
47. For background on the development of Najaf and Karbala, see Yitzhak
40