GRAD
U
413
.A66
C75
2003
trategic Studies Institute S
RECONSTRUCTING IRAQ:
nsights, Challenges, and Missions
or Military Forces in a Post-Conflict
cenario
Conrad C. Crane
V. Andrew Terrill
undrats
Fut
U.S. Army War College


RECONSTRUCTING IRAQ: INSIGHTS,
CHALLENGES, AND MISSIONS FOR MILITARY
FORCES IN A POST-CONFLICT SCENARIO
Conrad C. Crane
W. Andrew Terrill
February 2003


u
413
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
C25
Dr. Conrad Crane was in charge of an Army War College faculty
team that included Dr. W. Andrew Terrill, Colonel George Oliver,
Colonel Stephen Kidder, Colonel Tom McShane, LTC Mike Esper, and
Professor William Kiehl. Colonel Robert McClure of DCS, G-3
coordinated support from the Army Staff. Interim reports were
prepared and presented to a joint and interagency workshop conducted
by Dr. Crane and Dr. Terrill in December. Outside attendees were from
the Department of Defense, the State Department, the Joint Staff, the
Army Staff, National Defense University, Joint Forces Command,
AUSA RAMP, and SAIC. Especially notable were contributions from
Dr. John Finney, RADM(ret) John Siglar, Colonel Paul Hughes, Colonel
(retired) Scott Feil, Mr. Joseph (Barry) Hughes, LTC Guy Sands-Pingot,
and Ms. Sarah E. Peter.
NOTICES
The views expressed in this report are those of the authors and do
not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Department of
the Army, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government. This
report is cleared for public release; distribution is unlimited.
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FAX (717) 245-3820, or be e-mail at Rita.Rummel@carlisle.army.mil
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ISBN 1-58487-112-1


SUMMARY
M
During the latter half of the 20th century, U.S. military
leaders and planners focused heavily on winning wars, and
not so much on the peacekeeping or nation-building that
comes afterwards. But national objectives can often be
accomplished only after the fighting has ceased. With the
winds of war swirling around Iraq, it is time to begin
planning for the post-conflict reconstruction of that state.
This monograph presents some historical insights from past
occupations and peace operations, provides some additional
analysis of the unique requirements involved in remaking
Iraq, and, most importantly, develops a detailed list of
potential tasks to help contemporary military commanders
plan for post-conflict operations there.
Most analysts and commentators focus on World War II
for insights about occupying states and replacing regimes.
Clearly, the American experience with occupations after
major wars provides valuable insights about the importance
of long and detailed planning for such missions, and about
just how difficult demilitarization and democratization can
be, even under the best of conditions. The world has changed
a great deal since 1945, however. The experiences of the
1990s are generally more relevant to shape post-conflict
operations in Iraq. They reveal past inadequacies in Army
planning and preparation, and the difficulties in finding
competent and resourced civilian agencies to assume
responsibilities from the military. Recent experiences also
show that even when the Army plans and performs well in a
post-crisis environment, as it did in Haiti, strategic success
is not guaranteed. That state quickly reverted back to chaos
when military forces left.
Iraq presents far from ideal conditions for achieving
strategic goals. Saddam Hussein is the culmination of a
violent political culture that is rooted in a tortured history.
Ethnic, tribal, and religious schisms could produce civil war


RECONSTRUCTING IRAQ: CHALLENGES AND
MISSIONS FOR MILITARY FORCES IN A
POST-CONFLICT SCENARIO
CONCLUSIONS:
• To be successful, an occupation such as that contem-
plated after any hostilities in Iraq requires much detailed
interagency planning, many forces, multi-year military
commitment, and a national commitment to nation-
building.
• Recent American experiences with post-conflict
operations have generally featured poor planning,
problems with relevant military force structure, and
difficulties with a handover from military to civilian
responsibility.
• To conduct their share of the essential tasks that must
be accomplished to reconstruct an Iraqi state, military
forces will be severely taxed in military police, civil
affairs, engineer, and transportation units, in addition to
possible severe security difficulties.
• The administration of an Iraqi occupation will be
complicated by deep religious, ethnic, and tribal
differences which dominate Iraqi society.
• U.S. forces may have to manage and adjudicate
conflicts among Iraqis that they can barely comprehend.
• An exit strategy will require the establishment of
political stability, which will be difficult to achieve given
Iraq's fragmented population, weak political institu-
tions, and propensity for rule by violence.
INTRODUCTION
By the time Germany surrendered in May 1945, detailed
Allied planning for the occupation of that nation had been
ongoing for 2 years. All staff sections at Supreme


14
affairs personnel or engineers for the rebuilding effort.
Personnel deficiencies were exacerbated by slow and
disorganized Reserve call-ups relying on volunteers.
Political-military interagency cooperation was also poor, as
many agencies were excluded from DoD planning and the
embassy was severely understaffed. 12
Senior commanders admitted afterwards that they had
done poorly in planning for post-conflict operations and
hoped the Army would remedy that situation in the future. 13
Despite these deficiencies, the U.S. Military Support Group,
activated in January 1990 to support the growth of
independent Panamanian institutions, was able to be
deactivated just 1 year later in a much more stable country;
though whether it or Panamanian leaders deserved most
credit for this success was unclear to observers. 14
Haiti. Like Panama, this was another SSC in response to
a long-festering crisis. It began with the military overthrow
of President Jean-Bertrande Aristide by Lieutenant
General Raoul Cedras in September 1991. On April 1, 1993,
the JCS sent the first alert order to CINCUSACOM to begin
planning for contingency operations in Haiti. Planning for
active intervention intensified in October of that year after
armed protesters in Port Au Prince turned away a ship
loaded with UN peacekeepers. During the next year,
international pressure on the military leaders of Haiti
increased, and was intensified even further by obvious
American preparations for an invasion. The decision of the
Haitian government in September 1994 to return President
Aristide to power was to a large extent taken because they
knew Army helicopters and 10th Mountain Division
soldiers aboard the USS Eisenhower, along with elements of
the 82nd Airborne Division deployed from Fort Bragg, were
heading for Haiti.15 In fact, General Cedras did not begin to
negotiate seriously with the American diplomatic
delegation until he had confirmed that the 82d Airborne
contingent was in the air. The overwhelming force deployed
in the initial occupation and the soldiers' professional and
disciplined conduct and appearance in continuing


Current American operations in the Balkans again
reveal how force and mission requirements change during
the post-conflict phase. Eighteen months after the signing
of the agreement between NATO and the Yugoslav Army
over Kosovo, U.S. Army troops there were still engaged in
"peacekeeping with an iron fist.” They were primarily
focused on establishing a safe and secure environment
under the rule of law, with patrols backed by armored
vehicles and detention centers to control troublemakers.
The UN-NATO justice system has been heavily criticized,
and a Judge Advocate General Legal Assessment Team
found the UN mission in Kosovo so severely short of
facilities and personnel to establish the rule of law that it
recommended teams of 15 Army lawyers be rotated through
the country to reinforce the UN effort. Additionally, the
resentment of impatient Kosovars has grown against a UN
presence that seems to be making little progress toward a
transition to local control.32
Efforts in Bosnia are more advanced, and the
environment more secure and peaceful. Deployed Army
task forces have become lighter with every rotation, and
have moved from immediate security concerns towards
enhancing long-term stability. By late 1997 it became
apparent to the Stabilization Force (SFOR) that a large
disparity existed between the ability of military forces to
achieve their initially assigned tasks of the General
Framework Agreement for Peace (GFAP) and that of their
less-capable civilian counterparts to meet their own
implementation requirements. SFOR realized it could not
disengage with such a large “GFAP Gap” remaining, and
expanded its mission to “assist international organizations
to set the conditions for civilian implementation of the
GFAPin order to transition the area of operations to a stable
environment.” U.S. military leaders on the scene recognized
they were moving into the area of nation-building, but saw
no alternative if SFOR was ever going to be able to withdraw
or significantly reduce its commitment without risking the
peace.33


As the nature of the stability operations and support
operations in Bosnia evolved, so did the requirements of the
peacekeeping force. It needed fewer combat troops and more
engineers, military police, and civil affairs personnel.
Intelligence requirements changed and expanded.
After-action reports highlighted many shortfalls in the
Balkans force structure and peacekeeping policies, many of
them common to previous SSCs. Army lawyers again proved
adept at “thinking outside traditional fiscal rules and
applications" to support operational requirements.34 The
roles of military policemen expanded to include performing
as maneuver battalion task forces and working with
international law enforcement agencies.35 Difficulties with
tactical MPs trying to perform law and order missions
reappeared.36
There were problems again with shortages and recall
procedures for Reserve Components engineer, military
intelligence, and civil affairs augmentation.37 The massive
engineering requirements for Operations JOINT
ENDEAVOR and JOINT GUARD especially highlighted
branch deficiencies with command and control,
construction unit allocations, and bridging.38 A split-based
logistics system trying to meet requirements in the Balkans
and back in the Central Region of Europe required
considerable augmentation, but still strained combat
support and combat service support assets considerably.39
Liaison officers were in great demand, not just as Joint
Commission Observers with the Entity Armed Forces, but
also to coordinate with the myriad non-governmental
organizations and other civilian agencies.40 There were
shortages of linguists throughout the theater, which
especially exacerbated problems with intelligence. Military
intelligence doctrine was completely inadequate for
supporting peace operations, and understaffed intelligence
units had to adapt as best they could for the complex
"multi-service, multi-agency, and multi-national” situation
further complicated by a host of treaty requirements.41
10


shooting stops. “Transition Operations” is probably a better
term, and they will be conducted simultaneously with
combat. Appropriate planning must be completed before the
conflict begins, so military forces are prepared to begin
immediately accomplishing transition tasks in newly-
controlled areas. All soldiers will need to accept duties that
are typically considered in the purview of CA detachments.
There will not be enough CA troops to go around, and
immediate needs will have to be met by whomever is on the
scene. Even in the midst of combat, leaders and their
soldiers must keep in mind the long-term goals of peace and
stability, and conduct themselves accordingly.44
In the Philippines, both military and civilian officials
recognized that the best agent for local pacification was the
military leader on the spot. Considerable decentralization
was required for a situation where village attitudes and
characteristics varied widely. Officers had great discretion
and were not closely supervised, though they also had clear
directives from higher headquarters providing guidelines.
The requirement for local familiarity meant that soldiers
could not be rotated quickly. In village societies personal
relationships are important, and take considerable time
and effort to establish. The Army had to accept some decline
in the combat efficiency of its units in order to keep them in
lengthy occupation duties. Troops had to be aware of the
cultures they were in, and not try to force American values.
Knowledge of the Koran and local customs were important
for everyone. Even John J. Pershing could spend hours
talking to local imams about religion. This does not lessen
the requirement to achieve the right balance of force and
restraint, but the long-term consequences must be
considered for every action. General Leonard Wood's
predilection for punitive forays in response to even minor
incidents like theft did cow many Moro chiefs, but he also
undermined many alliances and relationships pain-
stakingly established by local commanders. Instead of
quieting small disturbances, Wood's expeditions often
created larger problems by driving pacified or neutral
12


Addressing the Tribal Factor.
The Sunni, Shi'ite, and Kurdish populations of Iraq are
further subdivided by affiliation with hundreds of tribes
scattered throughout the country. While previous Iraqi
governments have viewed tribes as suspicious alternative
sources of authority, Saddam has increasingly come to view
them as forming important fault lines upon which to
splinter and further factionalize potential sources of oppo-
sition within larger ethnic and religious communities. 80
Additionally, Sunni tribes have been key recruiting grounds
for the officer corps of the Iraqi military. Thus, Saddam is
ignoring Baath ideology which proclaims tribes backward
and an obstacle to modernization, in order to use the tribal
system as a bulwark of his own power. Saddam has even
called the Baath party“the tribe encompassing all tribes."81
Saddam's retribalization of Iraq began in the late 1980s
and has progressed sufficiently enough to cause townsmen,
several generations removed from the countryside, to
"rediscover their tribal identities and affiliations. Some of
these same people have sought out a tribal sheikh to ask
permission to affiliate with his tribe in cases where their
own lineage has become unclear. This is done to seek the
protection and support of the tribe and improve chances for
individual advancement. 82
Tribalism also appears to have strengthened in the
Kurdish areas during Saddam Hussein's presidency as a
result of central government policies dating back for
decades. During the Iran Iraq War, Kurdish conscripts
were exceptionally prone to desertion at the earliest
opportunity, leading Baghdad to switch to a tribal strategy
to manage the Kurds and address the manpower drain. In a
move away from the conscription of individual Kurds, the
Iraqi government paid the leaders of Kurdish tribal militias
to perform various security duties useful to the war effort.
Tribalism was strengthened accordingly.
30


Any post-Saddam government will thus be faced with
the requirement to operate within a highly tribalized
society, even if the new government seeks to transform and
modernize such a society over the long term. Moreover, in
any post-Saddam government a new President might be
quick to turn to his own family and tribal supporters to help
remain in power. Once Saddam is ousted, the successor
government will probably seek to reestablish ties to a
myriad of tribal leaders, many of whom are now either
actually or nominally loyal to Saddam. This could be an
exceptionally difficult task.
Other Sources of Potential Iraqi Fragmentation.
Beyond ethnic, tribal, and religious cleavages, other
differences among Iraqis may also aggravate political
fragmentation. One potentially problematic difference is
between exiles and non-exiles. Iraqi citizens who have
suffered under Saddam could well resent Iraqis coming
from outside the country following a war and claiming a
disproportionate amount of power. Some returning exiles
may also be more readily viewed as the tools of foreign
powers such as the United States, Iran, and perhaps
Turkey. Some might even be seen as friends of Israel.
It is doubtful that the Iraqi population would welcome
the leadership of the various exile groups after Saddam's
defeat. Many Iraqis are reported as hostile to the external
Iraqi opposition groups despite the fact that a post-Saddam
power struggle has yet to take place. According to former
CIA analyst Judith Yaphe, “[Iraqi exile leader Ahmad)
Chalabi and the INC [Iraqi National Congress) are known
quantities and extremely unpopular in Iraq.983
Another potential cleavage is between civilian and
military opposition to Saddam Hussein. Some former Iraqi
officers seem like attractive alternatives to Saddam, and
various U.S. Government officials are reported in the press
as favoring the possibility of an ex-Iraqi general replacing
Saddam.84 The accession of a moderate general may
31


with Iran, circumstances forced him to shift to a total war
economy by 1981. If the United States assumes control of
Iraq, it will therefore assume control of a badly battered
economy.
Upon ousting Saddam, the United States will then have
responsibility for providing some level of comfort and
subsistence to Iraq's impoverished population. Based on
the people's current plight, these tasks will be exceptionally
challenging. Moreover, regional or international public
opinion will have little tolerance for a lethargic aid program
under which people starve while waiting for relevant
bureaucracies to work out their problems. Any incidents of
suffering, neglect, or U.S. indifference can be expected to
come to the prompt attention of the regional and
international media.
Some of the economic burden of rebuilding the country
may be borne by reliance on the Iraqi oil industry. It is
doubtful, however, that oil wealth will pay for all of Iraq's
reconstruction needs, even if the oil infrastructure survives
the war relatively intact. Estimates of the cost of rebuilding
range from $30 to $100 billion and do not include the cost of
occupation troops.92 Such troops will be maintained as a
separate expense from that of reconstruction and are not
expected to be maintained through Iraqi revenues.
Moreover, Iraq also has an exceptionally heavy burden of
debt, the management of which was one of Saddam's major
reasons for invading Kuwait in 1990. On the plus side, Iraq
does have a well-educated population that could participate
in reconstruction efforts.
It is not clear what the condition of the Iraqi oil industry
will be in the aftermath of war with a U.S.-led coalition. If
Saddam perceives his regime as crumbling, he could order
the destruction of the wells just as he did with the Kuwaiti
oil wells in 1991.93 While the destruction of Kuwaiti wells
may have had some military utility in obscuring ground
targets from allied aircraft, Saddam's primary motive for
this action was probably revenge. Should his regime face
40


religion. Moreover, the predispositions and concerns of the
Iraqis, not the values of their occupiers, will need to be
addressed to build a viable new society. Any culturally-
based efforts by the United States to assume away
differences between Americans and Iraqis can only doom
the effort for social rebuilding.
The possibility of the United States winning the war and
losing the peace in Iraq is real and serious. Rehabilitating
Iraq will consequently be an important challenge that
threatens to consume huge amounts of resources without
guaranteed results. The effort also threatens to be a long
and painful process, but merely “toughing it out” is not a
solution. The longer the occupation continues, the greater
the potential that it will disrupt society rather than
rehabilitate it. Thus, important and complex goals must be
accomplished as quickly as possible. However, a withdrawal
from Iraq under the wrong circumstances could leave it an
unstable failed state, serving as a haven for terrorism and a
center of regional insecurity or danger to its neighbors. The
premature departure of U.S. troops could also result in civil
war.
Successfully executing the postwar occupation of Iraq is
consequently every bit as important as winning the war.
Preparing for the postwar rehabilitation of the Iraqi
political system will probably be more difficult and complex
than planning for combat. Massive resources need to be
focused on this effort well before the first shot is fired.
Thinking about the war now and the occupation later is not
an acceptable solution. Without an overwhelming effort to
prepare for occupation, the United States may find itself in a
radically different world over the next few years, a world in
which the threat of Saddam Hussein seems like a pale
shadow of new problems of America's own making.
PART III: A MISSION MATRIX FOR IRAQ
While insisting upon the firm adherence to the course
delineated by existing Allied policy and directive, it is my
42


2A-C
CMF
2B-1
CMF, AID, NED, DOS, AID, NED, DOS, UNDP, UNDP, Iraqi Inst
AID, NED, DOS, IO, CMF Same as above UNDP, Iraqi Inst
AID, NED, DOS, IO, CMF Same as above UNDP, Iraqi Inst
AID, NED, DOS, IO, CMF Same as above UNDP, Iraqi Inst
CMF, DOJ
Iraqi Institutions
CMF
CMF, DOS
CMF, DOS
2C-1
2D-1
2E-E
3A-E
3B-E
3C-E
Category 2 - Public Administration
Establish and Assist Regional and
Local Governments
E&A National Legislative System
E&A National Executive Office
E&A Ministries
Preserve & Improve Public Records System
Category 3 - Legal
Operate Criminal Court System
Operate Civil Court System
Establish and Operate System to
Enact & Publicize Laws
Operate Judicial Administrative System
Support & Conduct War Crimes Tribunals
Provide Legal Education
Protect Human Rights
Category 4 - Public Finance
Stabilize Currency
Maintain & Operate Govt Finance System
(Revenues & Distribution)
Establish Private Financial Institutions
CMF, Iraqi courts AID, AOUSC, DOJ, AL, Iraqi Previous + DoS/F
CMF, Iraqi courts AID, AOUSC, DOJ, AL, Iraqi Previous + DOSIF
CMF AID, DOJ, AOUSC, AL Previous + DoS/F
AL, Iraqi
AL, Iraqi
AL, Iraqi
3D-E
3E-E
3F-
3G-1
CMF, Iraqi courts AID, AOUSC, DOJ, AL, Iraqi Previous + DoS/F
CMF CMF, DOJ, DOS/S/WCI CMF&ICC or Tribunal
AID, USED, AL, NGO AID, USED, AL, NGO
CMF
DOS, AID, CMF, NGO DOS, AID, ICM, NGO
AL, UNDP, ICM, Iraqi
Iraqi Institutions
AL, Iraqi
ICM, NGO
4A-E
4B-1
CMF, Trsy
CMF. Trsy
Trsy, AID
Trsy, AID
Trsy, AID, WB, IMF
Trsy, AID, WB, IMF
WB, IMF, Iraqi
WB, IMF, Iraqi
4C-1
Trsy, AID
Trsy, AID, WB, IMF
WB, IMF, Iraqi
59