Strategic Studies Institute SSI
S
THE UNITED STATES AND IRAQ'S SHIITE
CLERGY: PARTNERS OR ADVERSARIES?
W. Andrew Terrill
D
Prudeus A
ature
U.S. Army War College


THE UNITED STATES AND IRAQ'S SHI'ITE CLERGY:
PARTNERS OR ADVERSARIES?
W. Andrew Terrill
February 2004


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DS
The views expressed in this report are those of the author and do not
necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, the
Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government. This report is cleared for public
release; distribution is unlimited.
T49
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2004
The author states: I would like to thank Ms. Sarah E. Peter, Dr. Larry Goodson,
Dr. Steven Metz, Dr. Conrad Crane, Lieutenant Colonel Thomas N. Baker, U.S.A.R.,
Dr. Jeffrey Record, and Captain David M. Burke, USAF, for useful comments on
earlier drafts of this work. My friend, Dr. Sami G. Hajjar, also provided his wise
insight and suggestions. My thanks also go to Colonel Brian Kerns, USAF, Defense
Attache in the United Arab Emirates, and Major James Overstreet, Assistant Air
Attaché in Amman, Jordan, in 2003. Both of these fine officers gave a great deal
of their time to help me with my research while I was in the Middle East. I also
thank Bart Gatrell, who served as my very able research assistant on this project.
All mistakes associated with this work are, of course, my own.
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Rita.Rummel@carlisle.army.mil
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ISBN 1-58487-153-9
ii


SUMMARY
Clerics are one of the most important forces guiding and directing
Iraqi Shi'ite public opinion. Many of Iraq's secular leaders were
sullied by their collaboration with the Saddam Hussein regime or
colonged absence from Iraq, and thus do not
have the potential power of the religious establishment to mobilize
popular opinion. Moreover, many Shi'ite clerics are emerging as
important spokesmen for their communities. Iraqi Shi'ites have
been denied power proportionate with the size of their community
since Iraq was established in 1920 and are determined not to be
disenfranchised again. Their actions toward the United States are
often calibrated with this goal in mind.
All of Iraq's major Shi'ite clerics are critical of the U.S. military
presence. Some are deeply critical and may choose to support
anti-coalition violence should the U.S. forces remain in Iraq for an
extended period of time. Those who do cooperate with the U.S.
presence usually are careful to explain to their followers that they do
so reluctantly and only in recognition of overwhelming U.S. power.
The leading Shi'ite clerics in Iraq at this time are Grand Ayatollah
‘Ali Sistani and his four colleagues who control the Najaf Haw
Shi'ite religious seminary and center of religious scholarship. The
Hawza clerics have had a tradition of staying distant from politics,
but this tradition now seems to be eroding. Sistani publicly treats the
U.S. presence as illegitimate, but also engages in tacit cooperation
with U.S. authorities. His continued cooperation with the United
States will be vital for U.S. forces now in Iraq, but his patience is not
assured.
A potentially important leader seeking to compete with the Hawza
is the young and militant Muqtada al Sadr, a junior cleric whose
father was Iraq's most senior cleric in 1999 when he was murdered
by Saddam's agents. Sadr is backed by the deeply radical and anti-
Semitic Grand Ayatollah Kazem Ha'eri, an Iraqi exile in Iran and a
believer in a variety of hateful conspiracy theories about the United
States. Sadr hopes to develop a strong following among the young
and impoverished dwellers in Shi'ite slums.


THE UNITED STATES AND IRAQ'S SHI’ITE CLERGY:
PARTNERS OR ADVERSARIES?
Every day, we receive dozens of requests from Iraqis asking us to issue
a fatwa against the Americans, and we say no. But this “no” will not last
forever.
Spokesman for Grand Ayatollah Sistani
If Sistani calls for a holy war, it will happen.
Ayatollah ‘Ali al Wahid?
No to America. No to the Devil.
Chant at Muqtada al Sadr rally3
Introduction.
When the U.S.-led military forces took control of Iraq in early
2003, they assumed control of a country with a short but extremely
complex religious, ethnic, and social history. As the future of post-
Saddam Iraq unfolds, the attitudes and behavior of the Shi'ite
Muslim Arabs are emerging as critical factors for Iraq's future. This
community, traumatized by years of Iraqi government brutality,
forms 60-65 percent of the Iraqi population. Currently, the majority
of its members appear determined not to return to their former
status as an oppressed majority ruled by minority Sunni leaders.
At the time of this writing, U.S. military forces in Iraq are facing
serious ongoing casualties in their confrontation with predominantly
Sunni Muslim Arabs, some of whom are supporters of the previous
regime. The Shi'ites, in contrast, while showing strong signs of
impatience with the U.S. military presence, have not yet joined in
the guerrilla war at any significant level. So long as they continue
to remain outside of the fighting, the United States may have a
reasonable chance of succeeding in the rehabilitation of Iraq. The
Iraqi situation will, however, become vastly more complex should
Shi'ite leaders call upon their followers to resist the U.S. military
presence.


If the majority of Shi'ites are currently not clear U.S. supporters,
neither have they yet chosen to take up arms against U.S. forces in
significant numbers. Consequently, a strong effort must be extended
to win their cooperation and avoid pressing them into becoming
enemies, while still seeking good relations with Iraq's non-Shi'ite
citizens. If the Shi'ite Arabs of Iraq do rise in significant numbers to
oppose the U.S. presence, the result will be a radicalizing experience
for them and increasing casualties for the U.S. armed forces. Any
Iraqi political system emerging from such a crucible can be expected
to be hostile to the United States and potentially destabilizing for the
region. Correspondingly, U.S. sacrifices of blood and treasure made
during and after the invasion of Iraq will have yielded few, if any,
tangible results.
Under these circumstances, it is important to consider the current
and emerging leadership of Iraq's Shi'ite community. Much of the
current leadership can be found among religious leaders. Although
these individuals and their organizations may yet be displaced by
more secular elites, they are the most powerful forces in the Shi'ite
community at present. The Shi'ite community's religious hierarchy,
current leaders, possible strategies, and future aspirations, therefore,
deserve serious consideration by U.S. policymakers and military
leaders.
The Iraqi Shi'ites: Beliefs and Practices.
To understand Iraq's current political and sociological situation,
one must consider Islamic beliefs as practiced by the Iraqi Shi'ites.
It is also important to discuss briefly the history of Iraq's Shi'ite
community. Iraqi Shi'ites are a diverse group, comprising both
religious and secular elements. A wide degree of differing opinion
exists on the proper role of the clergy in politics within Iraq, as well as
in the wider global Shi'ite community. The idea that decent people,
and especially clerics, stay far away from government has a strong
tradition in Shi'ite Islam, although this concept has been greatly
weakened in the last 30 years with the rise of activist clerics in Iran
and Lebanon. The quietist view also conflicts with many mainstrea
Islamic views which consider religion and politics inseparable.


and worldview. All practicing Muslims view Muhammad as the
world's most perfect man and look to his example, even in the
routine details of daily life, to help guide them in their own actions.
Shi'ites, however, also look to the life and example of 'Ali, the
Prophet Muhammad's son-in-law and the fourth Caliph, as a source
of inspiration, especially for dealing with injustice, victimization,
and suffering.
Moreover, suffering and victimization were a fundamental part
of ‘Ali's life. After prevailing in a long struggle to become Caliph,
‘Ali was murdered with a poisoned dagger because his support from
the lower classes frightened numerous members of the Islamic elite.
‘Ali's son, Hussein ibn `Ali, then took up his father's struggle and
was killed in 680 during a hopelessly unequal battle on the plains
of Karbala after refusing to subordinate himself and pay tribute to
Mu'awiya, the rival Caliph in Damascus. Hussein was subsequently
lionized by Shi'ites as the ultimate example of noble martyrdom,
while his more compromising brother, Hassan, is often treated with
embarrassed silence in Shi'ite religious texts.
The Shi'ite focus on their own lamentations, victimization,
suffering, and martyrdom is often described as the “Karbala
complex,” referring to the death of Hussein ibn Ali. This outlook
remains striking in a contemporary context, and numerous scholars
of Islam refer to Karbala as the core of Shi'ite history.10 Karbala
has also been described as providing the Shi'ites with a proclivity
towards defeatism as well as a belief that government is often
(perhaps usually) corrupt and oppressive. In Iraq, this view was
strongly reinforced by Saddam's years of misrule.
Shi'ite religious leadership, and especially that of the Twelvers
such as the Iraqis, also is quite different from that found in Sunni
Islam. The Shi'ite hierarchy is organized in a complex pyramid
structure unheard of in Sunni Islam. Consequently, the guidance
offered by senior clerics is vital. According to Shi'ite doctrine,
believers are bound by the fatwas (or religious declarations) of the
clerics they choose to follow so long as those clerics are alive. The
high rank of a cleric and the size of his following often are key
guideposts for predicting the seriousness which will greet any fatwas
that he chooses to issue.


potential of various senior clerics. Promotions traditionally have
been decided upon by the religious establishment, although in
Saddam's Iraq the last few appointments to grand ayatollah were
made by the government, which nevertheless was forced to choose
among a very few highly qualified candidates.14
The Shi'ite Clergy in Pre-Saddam Iraq.
Iraq was created out of territory taken from the Ottoman Empire
as a British class A mandate in the aftermath of World War 1.15 Like
many colonialist states, Britain sought a weak minority-based client
regime which would fear being overwhelmed by the remainder
of the population should the country achieve independence. The
choice of the Sunni Arabs as a junior partners in the administration
of Iraq was thus a natural one since they were clearly outnumbered
by Arab Shi'ites within the borders of the new state.
Nevertheless, the British decision to work with Sunni rather
than Shi'ite Arabs was partially forced upon them. Following World
War I, Iraq's Shi'ite clergy took angry exception to the concept of
the British mandate, and was prepared to resist it to an extent that
did not occur in the Sunni community. The preeminent Shi'ite cleric
Grand Ayatollah Mohammad Taqi Shirazi issued a fatwa that “none
but Muslims have a right to rule over Muslims."16 This declaration
was followed by a call to jihad against the British forces issued by
the Shi'ite clergy from the holy city of Karbala in southern Iraq.17
Initially, Iraqi irregulars did quite well against British forces, but the
tide turned after the Government of British India sent significant
numbers of reinforcements and supplies to Iraq. By February 1921,
the resistance had been broken, and British authority was restored to
the country, albeit with nearly 2000 British casualties, including 450
dead.18
Britain's suppression of Iraq's 1920 revolt easily was placed
within the Shi'ite psychological framework of unjust leaders taking
control of an honest, pious, but defeated, people. It also caused most
Shi'ites to retreat back into familiar patterns of submission that
continued throughout the British Mandate (1920-32). Moreover, in
the aftermath of the revolt, the British were unwilling to bring many


with Sadr's efforts to advance his own agenda. Ha'eri is, nevertheless,
a grand ayatollah in his 60s and may not be fully comfortable serving
as the tool of a 30-year-old cleric with student status, regardless of
the prominence of his family. There are thus constant rumors that
Ha'eri will be returning permanently to Iraq “soon." These rumors
have as yet come to nothing, but the threat looms for Muqtada.
Moreover, while Ha’eri is in Qom, the Iranians can be expected to
maintain influence over him and, by extension, the Sadr movement.
The Iranians, therefore, probably favor Ha'eri's continued presence
in their country.
Sadr, not surprisingly, also maintains significant links to Tehran,
but he is not under Iranian control. In June 2003, Sadr traveled to
Tehran and met with a number of senior leaders there including
Ayatollah ‘Ali Khamenei, Iran's Supreme Religious Guide, and ‘Ali
Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, Iran's former president and the head
of the Iranian government's powerful Council for the Discernm
of Expediency. Rafsanjani apparently had a role in attempting to
repair differences between Sadr and the Iranian-supported Supreme
Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI).69 SCIRI has been
especially close to the Tehran government for decades, but it has not
maintained good relations with the Sadr movement.
Early into the occupation, Sadr called for the boycott of U.S.-
ponsored institutions such as the transitional Governing Council
and the U.S.-supported Iraqi Media Network (IMN). He has urged
Iraqis to ignore the Council and to refer political and social issues
to the religious establishment for resolution.70 Sadr has also made a
strong effort to influence regional and international media outlets. He
and his supporters give a large number of interviews to numerous
regional media outlets. He also has sought news coverage for events
that underscore support for his activities. In mid-July, for example,
4,000 of his supporters staged an anti-American rally in Najaf.
This publicity-seeking strategy is not always well-received. Sadr's
continuing policy of busing in large numbers of loud and unruly
crowds of slum dwellers to listen to his sermons at the Kufa Mosque
near Najaf apparently has alienated a number of Najaf residents. 71
In August 2003, Sadr created a militia loyal to him, which he calls
the Imam al-Mahdi Army.72 At various times, Sadr has claimed that
20


In 1979 the Da'wa began a serious assassination campaign directed at
Ba'thist officials, and on April 1, 1980, they unsuccessfully attempted
to assassinate Deputy Prime Minister Tareq Aziz. On April 5, more
Da'wa terrorists attacked the funeral procession of security officials
who had died in the attack against Aziz. Saddam responded by
making membership in Da'wa a crime punishable by death and
executed hundreds of members. Sadr was arrested and on April 9
was executed.105 Repression against the Da'wa continued to be brutal
throughout the war and the party was further radicalized as a result
of this process. The Da'wa also has been accused of participation in
international terrorism in the 1980s, and may have been involved in
attacks against Americans in Kuwait and Lebanon.106 It was gravely
crippled by 1982, and the party that exists now may have little
continuity with the party of 1958-82.
Da'wa claims to have lost 77,000 members killed in its struggle
against Saddam.107 In recent years, a weakened Da'wa focused
heavily on assassinating members of the Saddam regime since
provoking an uprising or engaging in serious military strikes
remained beyond the group's capabilities. In this regard, Da'wa has
claimed responsibility for a December 12, 1996, attack on Saddam
Hussein's oldest son, Uday, in which he was severely wounded
and two of his companions were killed.108 Other individuals and
organizations attempted to take credit for this attack as well, and it
is difficult to discern the truth on this incident.109 Currently, Da'wa
claims to have several thousand fighters under arms, although the
organization is also reported to be deeply fragmented.110
Da'wa has close ties to radical Lebanese Shi'ites, including the
Lebanese Hizb'allah (party of God). Moreover, many individuals
within Da'wa are believed to look to the Lebanese Hizb'allah spiritual
guide, Mohammad Fadlallah, as a marja al taqlid from which they
draw inspiration and guidance.111 This linkage could be a problem
for U.S. forces at some later point. Fadlallah, whose organization is
deeply involved in the conflict with Israel, has strongly asserted that
the United States invaded Iraq on behalf of the Israelis, who viewed
Saddam as a threat. In an interview with Lebanese television, he
maintained,
28


of power for himself and some economic assistance for his Shi'ite
supporters. This Faustian bargain occasionally was made available
to Western-educated intellectuals, but it was never an option for the
clergy. Formal clerical participation in the Ba'thist government was
less acceptable to Saddam even on this limited scale. Certainly no
ayatollah would hold any of the positions Hammadi held.
The question remains as to how sullied some secular Shi'ite leaders
have become through their association with Saddam's government.
On the one hand, any effort to obtain favors and concessions from
the government involved working with Saddam and his regime.
Saddam was, after all, the head of state and working with his regime
a concession to reality. On the other hand, Saddam led a criminal
regime, and the requirement to look the other way was excessive.
The dilemma for the future of Iraq is how to treat Western educated
and other secular Shi'ites who were not involved in the military,
security, or intelligence fields. These people may find support in
Iraq even if they did collaborate with the Saddam Hussein regime.
Hammadi, himself, was arrested by U.S. troops in early June. His
son and members of his al Karakshah tribe stringently protested the
arrest on grounds that he did not take part in any crime against the
Iraqi people.131 While he is likely to be released at some future time,
Hammadi will probably always be tarnished by his collaborationism,
as will other secular leaders who followed his path.
Conclusion and Policy Recommendations.
The United States, through its military presence in Iraq, has
found itself in a position whereby its civilian and military leaders
must understand the internal dynamics and activities of the
Shi'ite clergy within larger Shi'ite and Iraqi societies. While this
clergy may not actually rule Iraq, it is likely that it will be highly
influential in determining Iraq's future. Moreover, any breakdown
in relations between the United States and the Shi'ite clergy during
the occupation could threaten grave consequences for U.S. troops
remaining in Iraq. With this situation in mind, the following policy
recommendations are made.
1. U.S. leaders need to recognize the non-American values of most
of the Shi'ite clergy and correspondingly understand that Shi'ite clerical
33


Hizb'allah: Party of God (Hizb= party; ‘Allah =God or the God). A
powerful political movement in Lebanon; there is also an Iraqi
Hizb'allah, which is much smaller and less significant. Other
Hizb'allah organizations exist either legally or illegally in a variety of
Middle East countries.
Hojat al islam: Literally: Authority on Islam. A mid-range to senior
cleric ranking just below ayatollah.
Imam: The leader of an often small Islamic Community (“a village
Imam"). Sometimes the title also is used to suggest an individual
who stands at the pinnacle of the entire Shi'ite Islamic community.
In recent decades, the title has been applied by followers to Musa
Sadr of Lebanon and Ruhollah Khomeini of Iran.
Khamenei, Ali: The current supreme religious guide (faqih) of Iran.
Khomeini, Ruhollah: The father of Iran's 1979 Islamic Revolution.
Marja al Taqlid: Source of Emulation. Title given to a cleric by his
followers when his life and thoughts are taken to be the model for
good conduct and his statements are taken as authoritative.
Mubellegh al risala: Literally: carrier of the message. A mid-level
clerical ranking in Shi'ite Islam.
Sadr, Muqtada: Firebrand cleric and son of Grand Ayatollah Sadiq
al Sadr.
Sadr, Musa: A Iranian-trained cleric who became the head of the
Shi'ite community in Lebanon in the 1970s. Sadr is one of the early
models of an activist Islamic cleric.
Sayed: Roughly translated as “the honorable.” An honorific denoting
the holder as a supposed descendant of the Prophet Mohammad.
Clerical holders of this title, such as Muqtada al Sadr and Iran's
Grand Ayatollah Khomeini, wear black turbans.
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