C O N T E N T S
WITNESSES
The Hºle Douglas J. Feith, Under Secretary for Policy, U.S. Department
of Defense ..............................….....................................................................
The Honorable Alan P. Larson, Under Secretary, Office of the Under Sec-
retary for Economic, Business and Agricultural Affairs, U.S. Department
of State ......................................…....................................................................
The Honorable Wendy J. Chamberlin, Assistant Administrator, Bureau for
Asia and the Near East, U.S. Agency for International Development ............
LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING
The Honorable Douglas J. Feith: Prepared statement .........................................
The Honorable Alan P. Larson: Prepared statement ............................................
The Honorable Wendy J. Chamberlin: Prepared statement ................................
APPENDIX
The Honorable Donald M. Payne, a Representative in Congress from the
State of New Jersey: Prepared statement ..........................................................
The Honorable Joseph R. Pitts, a Representative in Congress from the Com-
monwealth of Pennsylvania: Prepared statement .............................................
The Honorable Nick Smith, a Representative in Congress from the State
of Michigan: Prepared statement ........................................................................
The Honorable Diane E. Watson, a Representative in Congress from the
State of California: Prepared statement ............................................................
Questions submitted for the record to the Department of State by the Honor-
able Donald M. Payne, a Representative in Congress from the State of
New Jersey and the Honorable Mark Green, a Representative in Congress
from the State of Wisconsin, and the responses ................................................
Page
(III)


UNITED STATES POLICY TOWARD IRAQ
THURSDAY, MAY 15, 2003
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.
The Committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:36 a.m. in Room
2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Henry Hyde (Chairman
of the Committee) presiding.
Chairman HYDE. The Committee will come to order.
Today the Committee on International Relations meets in open
session to receive testimony from key Administration officials on
United States policy toward Iraq. I will introduce Mr. Feith, Mr.
Larson, and Ms. Chamberlin more fully just before I call on them
to speak.
It would not be proper to begin a hearing on this topic without
saluting the men and women of our Armed Forces who executed
Operation Iraqi Freedom with inspiring valor, with admirable ef-
fectiveness and with more care to minimize non-combatant death
and injury than has ever been seen before in modern history.
The forces in the field and their commanders bore the main bur-
den, but many others made critical contributions, including those
who provide relief for non-combatants, such as USAID, its part-
ners, and the U.N. Food Program. Simultaneous efforts to avoid
war, if at all possible, while also laying the groundwork for the exe-
cution of the President's plan—a most difficult combination of
tasks—were carried on ably, primarily by the Department of State.
I do not share in the denigration of the Department of State and
its leadership that is heard in this city all too often.
While we mourn the loss of too many young coalition service
members in Operation Iraqi Freedom, Americans throughout gov-
ernment face deadly risks as they serve in the fight against ter-
rorism and tyranny.
On May 9, at the State Department, a plaque was unveiled bear-
ing the name of Larry Foley, a USAID officer murdered in Amman
last year by al-Qaeda terrorists. He and scores of others in the for-
eign affairs community have died abroad in the line of duty over
the years.
Consideration of the way forward in Iraq–which I hope will be
our focus today—requires an understanding of what has happened
in the recent past. It is easy to express disappointment in this or
that aspect of the reconstruction process as it has unfolded thus
far, but we ought to keep our concerns in perspective.
(1)


2
The United States does not have a lot of experience in occupying
other countries. It is not what we do. We simply do not have a core
of colonialists ready to spring into action.
Common sense tells me we should have anticipated the need for
forces capable of providing security in urban areas. We should cer-
tainly have been able to deploy such forces by now. Perhaps our
witnesses can address what advice was given to the military and
civilian leadership on the matter of security in cities and what spe-
cific decisions were made.
Whatever the difficulties we are now encountering, we appro-
priately did not allow the fear of the burden of temporary occupa-
tion duty deter us from doing what was right for America and right
for the world.
While we welcome help, the coalition cannot cede control over the
welfare of the Iraqi people land our forces to those who sat cyni-
cally on the sidelines—and would have allowed the tyrant to con-
tinue his rule. I include in that group of bystanders most of the
permanent members of the United Nations Security Council.
The Iraqi people will hold us responsible for their welfare in the
coming months, as will the world, and we cannot divest ourselves
of that responsibility. In this connection, I hope you would address
the record to date of the civil administration—its accomplishments
and it failures, the reasons for the changes that are in the process
of being made now, and your plans for the future.
I have criticized the lack of transparency of our reconstruction ef-
fort and the consequent difficulties faced by the Congress in exer-
cising its constitutional responsibilities. I understand, for example,
that the very charter of the Office of Reconstruction and Humani-
tarian Affairs is still classified as national security information.
During the major combat operations phase, Congress did not in-
tervene too forcefully, even to gain information. Some of the deci-
sions we made will need to be revisited.
To help us get the information we need, today I will be writing
the Comptroller General asking that the General Accounting Office
monitor the reconstruction effort in detail, concentrating on the ef-
forts to provide security and interim relief to the people of Iraq and
on the rebuilding of its economy and political system. The Com-
mittee expects the full cooperation of every element of the Execu-
tive Branch in the GAO’s efforts.
It is important that we take the time in Iraq to do the job right.
The Congress should not be rushing you to finish your work by set-
ting artificial deadlines, and we must be in this for the long haul.
There is clearly a public order problem in Iraq. In many places,
it is unclear as to who is in charge. People are grabbing author-
ity—and property—for themselves.
Among the other dangers that must be confronted are the influ-
ences of Iran and of Wahabism, and of any resurgence of Baathism.
It is in Iran's interest—and al-Qaeda's—to foment violence when-
ever it can and thus get us out of Iraq as quickly as possible. To
combat this, the population must be firmly on our side, cooperation
at the street level with the coalition.
If the first order of business is security, the second order is the
provision of basic human needs. How long will it take for the lights
to go back on and for the water to flow freely again, and what are


7
As President Bush has announced, major combat operations in
Iraq have ended. The coalition continues to encounter attacks from
scattered small elements that remain loyal to the former regime.
Coalition forces are proceeding with so-called sensitive site exploi-
tation, working their way down a list of hundreds of locations that
may contain material or information relating to chemical, biological
or nuclear weapons.
Our forces are rounding up, more or less daily, regime leadership
figures on our most wanted list, and are collecting information on
the Saddam Hussein's regime's ties to terrorist activity.
Meanwhile, the coalition has the responsibility for the time being
to administer Iraq for the benefit of the Iraqi people. The coalition
is providing humanitarian relief, organizing basic services, working
to establish security, and creating the conditions for the liberated
Iraqis to organize a new government for themselves.
Before entering more deeply in the post-war issues, I would like
to spend a moment on the war itself. As Secretary Rumsfeld has
said, military commanders and historians will study this war with
care for many years. I think they will find much in the planning
and execution that was innovative, courageous, and successful. A
few noteworthy points.
Coalition forces began the ground war before the major air cam-
paign. This gave us a degree of tactical surprise under cir-
cumstances in which strategic surprise was clearly impossible. Our
forces demonstrated flexibility. They were able to adjust to bad
news. For example, General Franks rerouted the Fourth Infantry
Division after the Turkish Parliament refused to allow it to stage
from Turkey.,
We used special operations forces to forestall particularly worri-
some Iraqi option, such as missile attacks on Israel and sabotage
of the southern oil fields.
Our forces advanced rapidly into Baghdad to take advantage of,
indeed to accelerate, the quick-paced collapse of Saddam's regime.
And we used time-sensitive intelligence to attack high-valued tar-
gets virtually instantly.
All in all, General Franks and his team developed a plan that
was careful and detailed with scope for daring adjustment and im-
provisation. It was a plan that reflected the essence of our new de-
fense strategy, the acknowledgement that our intelligence is always
and inevitably imperfect, that the future is uncertain, and that we
must plan to be surprised.
General Franks' plan allowed coalition forces to exploit opportu-
nities rapidly as they presented themselves. I expect that histo-
rians will long debate the extent to which the plan helped us avoid
many of the horribles that we foresaw with concern; for example,
large-scale refugee flows across Iraq's border, and Iraqi use of
chemical and biological weapons.
Whatever the historians' conclusions on these difficult questions
of cause and effect, however, we can be confident they will judge
the thought and action of General Franks and of the central com-
mand as a favorable reflection on the brains, skill and character of
the U.S. Armed Forces.
Now that major combat operations in Iraq are over, our policy
goals remain:


9
struction and Humanitarian Assistance invited the General Ac-
counting Office to send people to the theater to work in ORHA.
Apparently, we had a similar thought to your own, Mr. Chair-
man, that it will be useful and important to provide the Congress
with that visibility into ORHA's operations.
Now I would like to turn for a moment to the work that the Coa-
lition Provisional Authority has just begun as Iraq emerges from
its long period of tyranny.
Humanitarian problems exist primarily in the areas of electricity
and water supply, but the overall situation is not desperate. The
war caused much less damage than many expected. The major
problems derived from the sad state of the prewar infrastructure
and from post-war violence by Baathists and ordinary criminals.
The coalition has managed to advert the humanitarian crisis
through a combination of unprecedented interagency planning and
preparation and the skill of our combat forces. In recent press re-
marks, the President of the International Committee of the Red
Cross just back from Iraq confirmed that there is not now a hu-
manitarian crisis in Iraq.
Its useful to put our recovery efforts in Iraq in perspective. Iraq
is a country that had been run into the ground by decades of sys-
tematic oppression and misrule. Even before the war, only 60 per-
cent of Iraqis had reliable access to safe drinking water; 70 percent
of sewage treatment plants were in urgent need of repair; 23 per-
cent of children under five suffered from malnutrition. Iraq's elec-
trical power system, which is critical to its water system, was oper-
ating at half of its capacity.
Eighty percent of 25,000 schools were in poor condition with an
average of one book per six students. Sixty percent of the popu-
lation is wholly dependent on the U.N. Oil-for-Food Program for
subsistence.
Now, I will quickly review the current situation. Security, as
Representative Lantos said, is the sine qua non for relief and recov-
ery efforts. It is the coalition's highest priority. There has already
been progress, as over half of Iraq's provinces, including Baghdad,
have been declared permissive. Throughout Iraq the coalition is
screening and paying local police officers and often participating in
joint patrols to address security concerns.
There is no food crisis in Iraq. The water system in Baghdad is
operating at 60 percent of prewar levels, and efforts continue to im-
prove on this. The electrical power system throughout Iraq was di-
lapidated and unreliable before the war. The north and south have
more reliable electric service now than before the war, and in
Baghdad progress is being made every day.
There is no health crisis in Iraq. Coalition partners initially pro-
vided support through field hospitals. We are now moving toward
an adopt a hospital approach. ORHA is working to reestablish the
ministry of health, and there is active cooperation on health issues
among ORHA, the World Health Organization, and the reemerging
Iraqi ministry of health.
There have been no widespread human rights abuses since the
war. There have been some property disputes and forced evictions
in the north. There is an international fact-finding team in the re-


10
gion to investigate this issue and develop a process for property
dispute resolution.
Ultimately strategic success in Iraq requires that we lay the po-
litical groundwork for a free and representative government that
will establish the rule of law and respect the rights of the members
of all of Iraq's ethnic and religious groups.
Although many feared that without a strongman, Iraq would
tend to disintegrate. We have not seen any such tendency.
Some Irani influence groups have called for a theocracy on the
Teheran model, but it appears that popular support for clerical rule
is narrow, even among the Shi'a population.
In restarting Iraqi government operations, we face the question
of the extent to which we should keep in power former officials who
know how to run the administrative machinery. Our policy, how-
ever, is de-Baathication; that is, the disestablishment of the Baath
party, the elimination of its structures, and the remove of its high-
ranking members from positions of authority in Iraq.
We are working toward the establishment of an Iraqi interim au-
thority which will assume increasingly responsibility for the admin-
istration of the country. Over time it is to take control of an in-
creasing number of administrative functions, but its most impor-
tant responsibility will be to design the process for creating a new
Iraqi government, for example, by setting up local elections, draft-
ing a new constitution and new laws.
Now, on the subject of weapons of mass destruction, we have
found evidence of the weapons of mass destruction programs of the
Iraqi regime, but we have a long way to go before we can gain a
complete understanding of them.
Of the roughly 600 weapons of mass destruction sites we cur-
rently know about, we have only searched about 20 percent. We are
learning about new sites every day. I am confident that we will
eventually be able to piece together a fairly complete account of
Iraq's WMD programs, but the process will take months and per-
haps years.
As for oil, the United States and its coalition partners faced the
necessity of repairing Iraq’s oil infrastructure. The United States
is committed to ensuring that Iraq’s oil resources remain under na-
tional control with the proceeds made available to support Iraqis
in all parts of the country.
Iraqi oil operations are being run by an interim management
team headed by Thamir Ghadban. Other Iraqis are assisting Mr.
Ghadban, including Phillip Carroll, a former American oil execu-
tive, and Fadhil Othman, the former head of Iraq's state oil mar-
keting organization. They are the chairman and vice chairman of
an advisory team that will be filled out soon with other Iraq and
non-Iraq experts.
The main oil problem that we are facing now is different from
what we feared before the war. Then we anticipated destruction of
Iraq’s energy facilities and a long-time loss of Iraq’s oil production.
But coalition forces ceased key Iraqi petroleum and gas facilities in
the south at the war's outset and prevented Saddam's regime, the
Saddam regime from destroying them.
Some oil wells were set on fire and we found substantial explo-
sives in the southern oil facilities that Saddam's forces did not


14
• Iraq's electrical power system (critical to its water system) was operating at
half of its capacity.
• 80% of 25,000 schools were in poor condition—with an average of one book
per six students.
• 60% of the population is wholly dependent on the UN oil-for-food program for
subsistence.
The Coalition and the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance are
working to return all sectors of Iraqi life to the pre-war baseline, and then to put
Iraq on a trajectory toward º: improvement.
Security is the sine qua non for relief and recovery efforts. It is the Coalition's
highest priority. There has already been progress. Over half of Iraq's provinces, in-
cluding Baghdad, have been declared “permissive.” Throughout Iraq, the Coalition
is screening and paying local police officers and often participating in joint patrols
to address security concerns. We are bringing in international police advisors to do
retraining and are reopening courts. We are also working with the Iraqi govern-
mental ministries and local leadership to reestablish a degree of Iraqi oversight and
supervision of security.
ere is no food crisis in Iraq. This happy fact is to the credit of the US Govern-
ment, Coalition and international donations and the resumption of the oil-for-food
distribution system. The Coalition and ORHA are working with the UN World Food
Program to reestablish nationwide food basket distributions. Over one million MT
of food is enroute to Iraq and is to arrive in the next month.
The water system in Baghdad is operating at 60% of pre-war levels and efforts
continue to improve on this. Much of the rest of Iraq is at or near pre-war condi-
tions. Increasing attention is being paid to sanitation issues in order to prevent dis-
ease outbreaks. Serious illness (even cholera) was common before this war.
The electrical power system throughout Iraq was dilapidated and unreliable be-
fore the war. Coalition experts have done heroic work getting the system back on
line. The North and South have more reliable electric service than before the war;
and in Baghdad progress is being made every day. In Baghdad we reached 50% elec-
tricity coverage on 24 April and are closing in on repair of the 400KV ring around
Baghdad, expected to be complete by 15 May.
There is no health crisis in Iraq. The concern is security of hospital facilities and
reestablishment of the Ministry of Health and civil administration. Coalition part-
ners initially provided support through field hospitals; we are now moving toward
an “adopt-a-hospital’ approach. ORHA is working to reestablish the Ministry of
Health and there is active trilateral cooperation on health issues among ORHA, the
World Health Organization and the reemerging Iraqi Ministry of Health.
The Coalition and ORHA are working to identify appropriate persons to reestab-
lish key ministries and providing ministry advisors and logistical support. Over
550,000 civil servants have received emergency payments, this jo. double by
next week. ORHA is researching appropriate salary payments, which will follow in
due course.
There have been no widespread human rights abuses since the war. There have
been some property disputes and forced evictions in the North. The Coalition and
ORHA are addressing this issue with Kurdish leadership, local leadership, and
through reverse evictions where appropriate. There is an international fact-finding
team in the region to investigate this issue and to develop a process for property
dispute resolution. The Coalition and ORHA are also working out policies and proce-
dures regarding mass graves.
In summary, we have averted a humanitarian crisis in Iraq and are now working
to improve Iraqi life in all sectors. ORHA has grown into an interagency coalition
team. It has accomplished much good, transforming itself, in the midst of a war,
from a bright idea into an organization of hundreds of people doing practical work
ºghout Iraq, with impressive professionalism. Much F. remains to be
one.
The Iraqi Political Situation
Ultimately, strategic success in Iraq requires that we lay the political groundwork
for a free and representative government that will establish the rule of law and re-
spect the rights of the members of all of Iraq's ethnic and religious groups. Given
Iraq's long history of tyranny, one must expect that the political situation will re-
main volatile for some time and that the first steps toward representative govern-
ment will be unsteady. But there are grounds for hope.
Although many feared that, without a strongman, Iraq would tend to disintegrate,
we have not seen any such tendency. Among all Iraqis—Kurds and Arabs, Sunni
and Shi'a, as well as the members of the smaller minorities—there has been an ac-


18
The long-term transformation of Iraqi's economy will, however,
be a big job. Saddam Hussein made Iraqis dependent on the state-
run ration system, evicted thousands from their lands, destroyed
families and businesses, agricultural production plummeted, vi-
brant businesses suffocated, and Iraq’s oil infrastructure was ne-
glected. A whole generation of Iraqis has been denied the skills
necessary to compete in the modern world.
In 1978, Iraq had a GDP per capita greater than that of Hong
Kong. Today, it is GDP per capita is % that of Hong Kong. Eco-
nomic reform, like political reform, will be a partnership between
an emerging Iraqi leadership, the coalition, international organiza-
tions, and others. Transparency will be a key factor in reforming
Iraq, and in attracting foreign private investment.
The United Nations will play a vital role. To speed the progress
toward our goal, we seek urgently a Security Council resolution to
do three main things: One, lift the burden of sanctions from the
Iraqi people; two, define the vital role the United Nations should
play in Iraq; and three, encourage the international community at
º to play a constructive role in helping build a free and peace-
Iraq.
The U.N. sanctions on imports and exports of goods are outdated
and must be lifted now. They were imposed to contain the threat
of a regime that no longer exists.
We also look to the World Bank and the United Nations Develop-
ment Program to assist, including by preparing an initial needs as-
sessment. We welcome the strong support of other countries who
have pledged over $1 billion in support of the Iraqi people.
Iraq's creditors must contribute as well. Significant debt relief
will almost certainly be necessary. Iraq’s oil sector can make a
major contribution to the financing of national reconstruction.
As Mr. Feith indicated, the coalition has identified a senior Iraqi
official, Thamir Ghadban, to serve as interim administrator. He
will be consulting closely with coalition authorities and inter-
national advisory board, but he and his team will make decisions
on production, sale and marketing of oil.
During this interim period, the coalition and the interim man-
agement team will not engage in new development or act on devel-
opment contracts signed under the Saddam regime. Decisions re-
lated to future development of the sector will be left to a new Iraqi
government, one responsible to all Iraqis.
Oil revenue must return to Iraq. Working with Iraqi officials, we
will help establish an Iraqi assistance fund in the Central Bank of
Iraq. All disbursements will be made with direct Iraqi participa-
tion, and the fund will be subject to full transparency by an inter-
national advisory board and audited by independent public ac-
countants.
Iraqis will have to transition away from the ration distribution
system and centrally planned economy of the past. It will take time
to convert this centrally controlled economy to a free market econ-
Omy.
The President's appointment of Ambassador L. Paul Bremer is
an important step in our efforts to rebuild Iraq. The State Depart-
ment will put its full force into the task of assisting Ambassador
Bremer and his team.


22
The international community, and particularly the expertise in the international
financial institutions, will play an important role in helping Iraqis establish the
ground rules for this new economy. After years of a planned, statist economy, we
will now help Iraqis plan for the day when their economy is driven by the free
choices of families and businesses, not the dictates of a corrupt elite. We have had
discussions with officials and others from Central and Eastern European states, who
led their economies through similar transitions over the past decade. These leaders
and officials have a keen interest in sharing “lessons learned” with Iraqis as they
move forward.
Involving experts from other countries that have gone through sweeping economic
and political transformations will help underline a key point: economic freedoms
and political freedoms are mutually reinforcing. Free markets require individuals to
make rational informed choices, to think critically, and to act independently within
the rule of law and the rules of the marketplace. At the same time, unless there
is a system of justice, and unless people feel they have a stake in the country and
its system, there cannot be a lasting or prosperous free market.
In his speech at the University of South Carolina last week, President Bush out-
lined an ambitious plan of economic reform in the Middle East, and a commitment
to strengthen our economic ties to the region. “By replacing corruption and self-deal-
ing, with free markets and fair laws,” the President said, “the people of the Middle
East will grow in prosperity and freedom.”
SEEKING SECURITY COUNCIL ACTION TO LIFT SANCTIONS; ENGAGING THE
INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY
In the Atlantic Summit Declaration of March 16, President Bush, Prime Minister
Blair and Prime Minister Aznar made clear they valued the assistance of the inter-
national community in meeting the “solemn obligation to help the Iraqi people build
a new Iraq.” President Bush subsequently reaffirmed this approach in *. meeting
at Hillsborough with Prime Minister Blair, where they called for the UN to play a
“vital role” in post-Saddam Iraq.
A critical step moving forward is swift Security Council approval of the resolution
introduced on May 9 by the United States, the UK, and Spain. Passage of the reso-
lution will demonstrate clearly to Iraqis that the restrictions of the past are behind
them, and that the international community will assist their efforts to reclaim their
country, not punish them for the crimes of the fallen regime. Saddam treated the
Iraqi people as pawns in his decades-long rule of tyranny; the international commu-
nity must now come together to demonstrate that the needs of the Iraqi people come
first . we move to address critical issues in a pragmatic way. Our resolution does
just that.
Our proposal is designed to do three things: lift the burden of sanctions from the
Iraqi people; define the vital role the UN should play in Iraq; and encourage the
international community to play a constructive role in helping to build a free and
peaceful Iraq. I would like to quickly sketch our vision and the importance of the
first two objectives, and then address in more detail the third, where I have focused
considerable energy along with my colleagues from the Departments of Treasury
and Defense.
Our resolution lifts the economic sanctions that currently limit the freedom of
Iraqis to benefit from participation in the global economy. UN economic sanctions
on imports and exports of goods are outdated; they were imposed to contain the
threat of a regime that no longer exists. They no longer serve a useful function. In
fact, we know that it is the actions of individuals and businesses—operating in a
transparent, just, and open system—that will set the course for Iraq's future, and
establish the economic environment for a prosperous and optimistic life for all
Iraqis. Continued imposition of economic sanctions only hinders Iraq's recovery.
Our resolution also fulfills President Bush's commitment to seek a vital UN role
in all aspects of Iraq's reconstruction, through the appointment of a Special Coordi-
nator. The Special Coordinator will coordinate participation by the UN and other
international agencies in humanitarian assistance and economic reconstruction, and
assist in the development of a representative government. The Coordinator will also
support international efforts to contribute to civil administration, to promote legal
and judicial reform and human rights, and to help rebuild the civilian police force.
There is a tremendous amount of work to be done, and UN expertise will be instru-
mental. As a practical matter, the Coordinator will serve as a principal point of con-
tact for the and UN agencies in working with the Coalition and the Iraqi people.
In addition, our proposal encourages #. international community to support
Iraq's political and economic transformation. The resolution calls on the UN Special
Coordinator and the international community to support the Iraqi people in their


23
effort to establish a representative government based on the rule of law that affords
equal rights to the people of Iraq without regard to ethnicity, religion, or gender.
It also encourages the international community to support the Iraqi people in build-
ing a free, prosperous and secure Iraq, including by responding to UN funding ap-
peals and providing resources for reconstruction and rehabilitation of Iraq's infra-
structure. It welcomes the assistance of international financial institutions to the
people of Iraq, and mandates the seizure and return of assets stolen by Saddam and
his regime to Iraq.
We already are engaged in active consultations with countries around the world,
stressing the need for governments, the UN and international financial institutions
such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund to bring their assets
and experience to bear in helping Iraqis rebuild their country. Many hands will be
needed to make this effort a success. Although we are still in the initial stages of
building this global effort, the response to date is heartening. I and others in the
State Department have met with numerous foreign ministers, economic and finance
ministers, foreign assistance officials, ambassadors and special representatives to
talk about how we can best help the Iraqi people. There is intense interest in an
international event to build donor support for Iraq, although we are still early in
the process. And there appears to be strong interest in supplying the contributions—
financial as well as in kind—that will be needed. A number of countries have indi-
cated to us the importance of UN Security Council action to facilitate post-conflict
contributions beyond immediate humanitarian relief assistance.
CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES “DOWN THE ROAD” IN IRAQ
As the new Iraqi leadership moves forward to build a better future for all the citi-
zens of Iraq, there are a number of areas that pose both important challenges and
present real opportunities.
Iraq's abundant natural resources, particularly its oil wealth, were misused by the
previous regime as a political and economic tool of regime power, internationally
and within Iraq. In addition to using oil income for wars, weapons of mass destruc-
tion and their own personal comforts, Saddam and his regime created a sizeable
level of debt which will need to be managed. A new Iraqi regime will face the chal-
lenge of developing Iraq's abundant natural wealth for the benefit of all Iraqis.
Following the conflict, it has been talented Iraqi technicians, engineers and min-
istry officials, supported by the Corps of Engineers and U.S. funded contractors, who
have quickly restored oil production capability for domestic use and are steadily in-
creasing production. Future management of this sector will be a key factor in the
success of the emerging and future Iraqi political and economic leadership.
It is Iraqis that control the day-to-day decisions in the Iraqi oil sector. That is
true today, and will be true for the future. The coalition has identified a senior Iraqi
oil sector officer, Thamir Abbas Ghadhban, to serve as interim administrator of the
oil sector. He will consult closely with both the coalition authorities and an inter-
national advisory board, but he and his team will make decisions on production, sale
and marketing of oil. During this interim period, the Coalition and the Interim
Management Team will not engage in new development or act on development con-
tracts signed under the Saddam regime. Decisions related to future development of
the sector, including the establishment of new export routes, will be left for a new
Iraqi government, elected by and responsible to all Iraqis.
And oil revenues must return to Iraq. Working with Iraqi officials, we will help
establish an Iraqi Assistance Fund in the Central Bank of Iraq. All disbursements
will be made with direct Iraqi participation, and the fund will be subject to full
transactional transparency by the international advisory board and audited by inde-
pendent public accountants. Funds in this account will be used to meet the humani-
tarian needs of the Iraqi people, for the economic reconstruction and repair of Iraq's
infrastructure, for the continued disarmament of Iraq, and for the costs of indige-
nous civilian administration, and for other purposes benefiting the people of Iraq.
It is vitally important now that Iraqis be allowed to sell oil and use the proceeds
to fund their humanitarian and reconstruction needs. Outdated provisions relating
to the sale of oil and restricting the flow of funds to the Iraqi people need to be
abolished. In the interim period, transactions related to oil will be audited by inde-
pendent public accountants, who will report their findings to an international advi-
sory board that will include representatives from the UN, World Bank, and IMF.
To ensure that the Iraqi people are not penalized because of Saddam and can re-
ceive the benefits of their national patrimony, oil sales should continue to be immu-
nized against attachment by international creditors or others with claims against
the former regime.


34
Resources
The generosity of the U.S. Congress and taxpayer has allowed USAID to under-
take critical assistance to date. The President's $2.45 billion supplemental budget
for Iraq provides sufficient resources to bring Iraqi infrastructure and systems into
working order before Iraqis’ own revenue from its oil industry are available to fund
government services.
Iraqi Participation
In the past two short weeks, Iraqis have been fully involved in our implementa-
tion efforts, and USAID's reconstruction objectives cannot be achieved without their
full participation and leadership. It is also critical that Iraqis receive compensation
for their work. Many dedicated Iraqi people are returning to their jobs and making
a significant contribution to the reconstruction of their communities. We are already
seeing emerging leadership.
Partnerships
The United States Government could not achieve its objectives without the efforts
of the private sector, NGOs, and international community. We are actively working
with other donors to identify priority needs for assistance. Other donors have gener-
ously provided support for Iraq, particularly with respect to humanitarian relief ef-
forts. We will continue to engage other donors to meet the significant reconstruction
requirements in Iraq.
In closing, I would like to join the millions of American people who are proud of
the contributions and sacrifices our dedicated serviceman have made in the libera-
tion of Iraq. I would like to also note that as we enter the reconstruction period,
America is served by a second set of heroes. They are the courageous individuals
from the private sector and non-governmental community who are the backbone of
our “war for peace”. They risk their lives daily to support USAID efforts in Iraq,
Afghanistan and other insecure areas. The bombings earlier this week in Riya
and the death of two Department of Defense contractors in Kuwait prior to the war
demonstrate the inherent risks of this work and the vital importance of continuing
it.
Chairman HYDE. Thank you, Ambassador Chamberlin.
We will now begin questioning, and I gently urge the Members
to confine their questions to 5 minutes because we want to get as
far along as we can and get as many Members as possible to ask
questions.
Mr. Lantos.
Mr. LANTOS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I want to
identify myself with your very thoughtful and powerful opening
Statement.
Many of my colleagues will be asking questions with respect to
your testimony, and I want to commend all three of you on excel-
lent testimony.
I would like to broaden our vision a bit because clearly this spec-
tacular military victory in Iraq has reshaped the power realities of
the whole Middle East, and I would like to ask some specific ques-
tions with respect to Syria.
As you know, a couple of weeks ago I had a long visit with the
President of Syria, Mr. Assad, and I pointed out to him, which is
obvious, that this is a new Middle East. Syria is now surrounded
by four countries friendly to the United States: Turkey, Jordan,
Israel and what will be a friendly government in Baghdad.
I pointed out to him that his own and his country's horrendous
behavior during the war and in the weeks and months leading up
to the war was just abominable. They encouraged 5,300 Syrians,
so-called volunteers, to go fight with Saddam Hussein. They trans-
ferred military equipment during the war to Saddam Hussein. Sec-
retary Rumsfeld mentioned night vision goggles, but there were
plenty of others.


mºm -
39
ysis has been made at this point. The information is just breaking
on these mass graves right now.
General SCHWARTZ. Sir, the analysis continues. We do have
teams who are expert at exploiting documents as well as the chem-
bio which we talked about earlier, and as you indicated we have
identified in a rough order of magnitude 30 locations of potential
mass graves. The most recent one was about six miles northeast
of Al Hila, south of Baghdad where perhaps up to 3,000 casualties
were buried.
It does not appear, however, that those that were buried were ei-
ther American or Kuwaiti. They appear to be Iraqis. Some were
still in uniform.
Chairman HYDE. Mr. Schiff.
Mr. SCHIFF. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I would like to pose a question to the two under secretaries, and
I want to preface it by saying that I recognize the task in post-war
Iraq is extraordinarily complex and difficult. Nonetheless, there
have been some serious questions raised in press accounts since the
military combat operations concluded. And given that Members of
Congress thus far are not permitted to go to Iraq to have a first-
hand impression, we are very reliant on press reports among other
sources of information.
But collectively over the last few weeks the press has reported
that General Garner's administration was to isolate it from the
Iraqi people; that we have used Baathists in relatively high posi-
tions against the objections of the local population; the Shiites are
far better organized than we anticipated; that we failed to take
quick enough or adequate steps to prevent looting; that there are
far longer gas lines than previously in Iraq; that the sniping of
United States soldiers is affecting the morale of United States sol-
diers; that there are inadequate troop levels to maintain security;
that there is a problem with sewage and possible cholera; and the
sum total impression from these press accounts is that while the
war plan was very well planned and executed, the peace plan was
either not as well developed or not as well executed.
I wonder if you can respond to those issues that have been
raised. Maybe tell us which of those criticisms you think are valid,
which are invalid, and for those that are valid what steps you are
taking to address them.
Mr. FEITH. Representative Schiff, the work that has been done
on reconstruction and humanitarian relief has produced some suc-
cesses. Not everything wrong in the country has been fixed in the
several weeks that have elapsed since the fall of Baghdad.
We reviewed in our opening statements a number of the achieve-
ments and a number of the problems that we are continuing to ad-
dress. You highlighted some of the problems. The issue of ORHA
and its isolation, for example. It is true that when the Office of Re-
construction and Humanitarian Assistance moved from Kuwait to
Baghdad for the first several days, there were serious communica-
tions problems. I mean, it was isolated as a result of various com-
munications problems in the country and for that matter even con-
nected back here. The communications issues have been addressed
and things are getting better.


40
Regarding the use of Baathists, we do not have excellent infor-
mation about all of the party lists. We have databases but they are
not perfect. There is a vetting processing underway for people with
whom we are working in different capacities in different ministries
and in different local governments.
Part of the vetting process, as Secretary Rumsfeld has pointed
out, is when you do not know terribly much about an individual
and you put that individual forward in some capacity or another,
you find out when a hue and cry is raised by colleagues that this
is a bad person that you have just put in that position. You learn
that this is a bad person, and then you remove them, and that is
part of the trial and error process of vetting in a country of tens
of millions of people where, as I said, our information about many
of the individuals is less than perfect.
As I noted in my opening remarks, our policy is clear on the sub-
ject, however. Our policy is de-Baathification, and it includes the
removal of Baath party leaders from public positions. And when
you talk about the Baath party, the Baath party has somewhere
between a million and two million members in the country, and we
are not taking the position that anybody merely because he was a
member of the Baath party has to have some disability attached
to him or some punishment.
But we are focusing on the leadership group in the neighborhood
of 20 to 30 thousand people, and saying that those people should
not be working on the Iraqi public payroll.
Mr. SCHIFF. Well, may I interrupt for a quick question on the
issue of the sniping at U.S. soldiers. This seems to present a par-
ticular challenge in terms of not being removed from the people of
Iraq, but nonetheless not exposing our troops to excessive risk
when you have soldiers who are shot at point blank range at inter-
sections.
How are we going to deal with that problem? And would not our
soldiers be more secure as part of a NATO force that looks less like
the U.S. occupying force and more like an international force.
General SCHWARTZ. Sir, I think, first of all, let me make clear I
have not traveled to Iraq, but the Chairman just returned last
night, and it was his clear impression as expressed this morning
that the morale is quite good notwithstanding the reports that we
may have seen here in the states.
Secondly, there is risk out there. There are criminal elements
and there are recidivist elements that remain in certain areas. But
it is important to make the point, sir, that while you have anec-
dotes of hostilities toward Americans, that the north is relatively
calm, the west is calm, and the south is generally calm, so that the
troublesome areas are in the center, in Baghdad in particular, and
I am not minimizing that.
But the way to control the problem is to be aggressive and to get
out and patrol, and to pick up those who are potential liabilities,
and we are doing that.
Mr. SCHIFF. Would not the use of
Chairman HYDE. The gentleman's time as expired.
There is a vote pending, and the Chair will recess the Committee
for a reasonable period after the vote to give Members a chance to


mºm -
43
fense Department's responsibilities in Iraq'? Who is the lead agen-
cy? Who is making the calls? Where is the policy being created?
With respect to Turkey in that same light, last week Secretary
Wolfowitz enunciated a policy which, in fairness to him, and I read
his interview twice, was more complete than what was reported.
But the essence of it I think could be said that according to Sec-
retary Wolfowitz the status of our relationship with Turkey was
that Turkey made a grave mistake, that Turkey must acknowledge
that mistake, and apologize to the United States, and then we can
In OWe On.
Secretary Grossman and others in the State Department, I be-
lieve it will be fair to say in an after-interview to Secretary
Wolfowitz's, categorized our relationship or the status of it, I think,
a bit differently by saying that there was grave disappointment in
the United States by Turkey's decision to deny our ground forces,
but that there were commonalities of interest and that Turkey was
still an important ally of the United States.
While on our side of the equation of that relationship we may
say, well, that is just nuance, the difference between the two. But
on the other side of that relationship, for certain, they view it as
two very different policies, particularly when it is combined with
their perspective that they have been unable to participate. I un-
derstand that their perspective may not reflect a decision of all gov-
ernment, but from their perspective they have been unwilling to
participate in the peacekeeping effort in Iraq even though they are
willing to do so, and view, possibly incorrectly so, that as being a
reflection of the Department of Defense's policy of essentially wait-
ing for Turkey to apologize.
So in that light I would like to ask two questions if I may. What
are the Department of Defense and what are the Department of
State's responsibilities in Iraq” And what is our current policy and
the status of our relationship with Turkey?
Mr. FEITH. Mr. Wexler, the answer to the first question about
the role of the different departments in Iraq, the Coalition Provi-
sional Authority head right now is Mr. Bremer. As I mentioned a
few days ago, he was appointed the head of the Coalition Provi-
sional Authority. He is the President's envoy in Iraq and he has re-
sponsibility for all of the United States personnel in the country
other than the Armed Forces. The Armed Forces in the country are
in the chain of command under General Franks.
Both Mr. Bremer and General Franks report directly to Sec-
retary Rumsfeld.
The efforts that we are making in Iraq are being made by United
States personnel in the country from numerous agencies of the
United States Government, the Department of State in AID, and
the Commerce Department, and all kinds of other offices of the
United States Government are represented in the country; but they
| all, all of those offices work for Mr. Bremer, who reports to Sec-
retary Rumsfeld. So I think that is the answer to the first part of
your question.
Now on the issue of Turkey, I am glad you raise that because it
gives me an opportunity to correct the record on what I understand
to be a serious misplaying in Turkey of what Mr. Wolfowitz said.


50
Mr. DELAHUNT. But I would like to receive something in writing,
Mr. Secretary, and I would like to share it with my colleagues.
I think it was General Shinseki that estimated some 200,000
troops would be necessary to secure stability in Iraq. What is the
current estimate from the Department of Defense, and for how long
would they be required?
Mr. FEITH. These kinds of questions have been an issue for some
weeks, and we continually being asked, and we obviously are not
quite getting through on a key point, which is there are so many
things, so many different aspects of reconstruction and security.
Each aspect depends on events, and it depends on things that we
do not know about and we cannot know about; for example, how
smoothly is the transition to an Iraqi interim authority going to
take place; how quickly are the Iraqis going to be—
Mr. DELAHUNT. I respect that, Mr. Secretary. At the same time
I would hope that the Department would be prepared to provide a
range in terms of a worst and best case scenario. I think we have
a right to have that information.
Mr. FEITH. Well, sir
Mr. DELAHUNT. Let me ask you another question.
Do you have an estimate in terms of when an election in Iraq
may occur?
Mr. FEITH. We are very early in the process of
Mr. DELAHUNT. Do you have an estimate, Mr. Secretary? The
time is limited.
Mr. FEITH. No, we do not
Mr. DELAHUNT. Then thank you. I appreciate your answers.
You indicated that there appears to be narrow popular support
for a theocracy similar to the one in Iran. Do we have polling data
to support your thesis or is this just an opinion through intel-
ligence?
Mr. FEITH. It is an opinion that comes from intelligence, that
comes from diplomatic reporting, it comes from the
Mr. DELAHUNT. But there is no polling data I take it?
Mr. FEITH. I do not know whether there—
Mr. DELAHUNT. Okay, let me—
Mr. FEITH. I do not have off the top of my head—
Mr. DELAHUNT. Let me ask you this question.
Mr. FEITH [continuing]. Whether there is polling data on that.
Mr. DELAHUNT. Let me pose you a hypothetical question. If we
have a free and fair election, and if there should be as a result of
that election a leadership that does not necessarily feel warmly to-
ward the United States, are we unconditionally willing to accept
that particular leadership, presuming again free and fair elections?
Mr. FEITH. We are going to be working with Iraqis to get a gov-
ernment organized, and part of that is going to be organizing a con-
stitution and a bill of rights
Mr. DELAHUNT. You are not responding to my question.
Mr. FEITH [continuing]. And election. I mean, you are welcome
to answer your own questions but if you want me to answer your
question
Mr. DELAHUNT. I do not want to—I am asking you
Mr. FEITH [continuing]. You ought to give me—


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64
Finally, with respect to the bill that Mr. Lantos has introduced,
I did want to say that we believe that a properly structured NATO
role would be very beneficial, very much in the interests of the
United States, and we would be very pleased to work with Mr.
Lantos and the Congress on that particular piece of legislation.
Mr. LEACH. Thank you.
Ambassador Chamberlin.
Ms. CHAMBERLIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I would like to correct two misstatements of mine for the record.
One, my staff reminds me that we were never in the business of
bringing into Iraq bottled water. In fact, as a point of clarification,
in order to get drinking water to populations that did not have, it
we were bringing water in in tankers with spigots, and they would
come with their own bottles. Minor point but worth making that
correction.
And secondly, I do not want to leave the impression in something
that I may have said earlier, that we had a policy of commence-
ment of the war as early as January. It was still very much under
discussion at that time.
Thank you.
Mr. LEACH. Well, thank you very much, and let me thank you
both for your testimony and service, and I appreciate your forbear-
ance in extending extra time, particularly to the minority party.
And so I thank you both.
And the Committee is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 3:21 p.m., the Committee was adjourned.]


69
QUESTIONs subMITTED FOR THE REcoRD to THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE BY THE HON-
ORABLE DONALD M. PAYNE, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF
NEw JERSEY AND THE HONORABLE MARK GREEN, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS
FROM THE STATE OF WISCONSIN, AND THE RESPONSES
Questions for the Record Submitted to
Under Secretary Alan P. Larson by
Rep. Donald Payne (#1)
House Committee on International Relations
May 15, 2003
Question:
Internationally, there is a lot of pent-up goodwill on
behalf of the Iraqi people. What efforts are currently
being made to coordinate the flow of humanitarian
assistance, to effect its distribution, and to ensure that
there are no major gaps in necessary goods or services?
Answer:
U. S. Government humanitarian assistance is coordinated
with other donors at both the field level and in Washington
to avoid overlaps and ensure the most effective use of
humanitarian resources. In addition, all USAID partners
are required to coordinate their activities with other
agencies providing humanitarian assistance.
Even before the fighting stopped, the State
Department, working closely with colleagues from Defense,
Treasury, and USAID, launched a series of quiet
consultations with countries that shared our interest in
meeting humanitarian needs and in helping Iraq rebuild.
These consultations provided an initial, effective
mechanism for coordination of needs and assistance among
some major donors until the Coalition Provisional Authority
(CPA) was able to establish a mechanism to do so.