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Strategic Studies Institute
S
STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS
OF INTERCOMMUNAL WARFARE IN IRAQ
W. Andrew Terrill
Prudouer
prudens
Futurt
Future
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U.S. Army War College


HATCH/GRAD
Gift
03/15/05
FOREWORD
The future of Iraq is uncertain. The country is in a dangerous phase.
The removal of a brutal dictatorship by coalition forces in April 2003
has given the Iraqi people hope for a new and better political system,
where individuals do not have to live in continuing fear and uncertainty.
Nevertheless, the Iraqi people must also address the difficult challenges of
self-government for a diverse population, with major ethnic and sectarian
groups that often maintain widely divergent agendas. If they fail to do
this and an ethnic/ sectarian war ensues, the consequences will be dire, not
only for Iraq, but for the entire Middle Eastern region.
This monograph, by Dr. W. Andrew Terrill, does not predict an Iraqi
civil war, which is the worst-case outcome for the current struggle in
Iraq. Neither can this monograph fully rule out this possibility since the
responsibility for preventing such an eventuality is ultimately Iraqi and not
American, and U.S. analysts cannot predict with certainty what Iraqis will
do once they take full control of their own country. Rather, this monograph
underscores what is at stake in the Middle East by a comprehensive
discussion of potential region-wide consequences should an ethnic and
sectarian war actually occur. This work therefore serves as an important
warning of how an Iraq civil war could offer new strategic opportunities,
but especially dangers, to many of the states within the Middle East. Dr.
Terrill's work performs this important task by examining how an Iraqi civil
war may develop and how this could influence the internal stability and
foreign policies of regional countries.
The Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to offer this monograph as a
contribution to the national security debate on this important subject as
our nation grapples with a variety of problems associated with the U.S.
presence in Iraq and the new strategic reality following Saddam's removal
from power. This analysis should be especially useful to U.S. military
strategic leaders as they seek to understand the complicated interplay
between Iraq and its neighbors at this critical point. It reflects analysis
conducted with an information cutoff date of December 2004.
Veadlo L health
DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
Director
Strategic Studies Institute


and ethnic lines, this conflict will have thunderous echoes
throughout the area. Group identity, which is critical throughout
much of the Middle East, will provide a compelling context for
regional bystanders watching ethnic and sectarian bloodshed. Such
a conflagration will undoubtedly influence regional co-religionists
and ethnic kin of the embattled communities within Iraq. Many
individuals and nations would feel compelled to take sides. Some,
perhaps many, young men will consider traveling to Iraq to join
the fight. Moreover, various nations would involve themselves in
the fighting in ways up to and including the possibility of military
intervention. Additionally, intercommunal harmony and tolerance
in other regional states may suffer as the result of Iraqi fighting and
the responses of neighboring governments to that fighting.


also suggest that the U.S. CIA is concerned about the danger of an Iraqi
civil war. Indeed, public opinion data also indicates that many Iraqis
are concerned over the possibility of a civil war in the post-Saddam era,
while some foreign Arab leaders have expressed similar concerns.5
Obviously, the danger of civil war is particularly pressing for the
United States, if this eventuality occurs while significant numbers of
U.S. military forces remain in Iraq. Civil war under these circumstances
is nevertheless unlikely since U.S. and allied troops in Iraq are currently
serving as a deterrent to serious intercommunal fighting. Another more
realistic scenario is that widespread ethnic and sectarian fighting breaks
out during or shortly after a major U.S. troop withdrawal, when these
forces are no longer able to prevent Iraqi communities from challenging
each other over conflicting demands for political representation, power
and resources. It is also possible that civil war will be staved off for
years, but then finally break out in response to changing internal
political events or efforts by one group to consolidate disproportionate
levels of power. The most desirable alternative is, of course, for Iraqi
sectarian groups to resolve their differences without resorting to
violence of any kind. A key requirement for achieving this outcome will
be the development of a broad based and legitimate Iraqi government
supported by respected and professional Iraqi security forces willing to
protect that government.
If the new Iraqi leadership fails in its efforts to prevent catastrophic
levels of sectarian violence, leaders throughout the region will feel the
need to respond to the unfolding crisis. Most of Iraq's neighbors fear a
deeply-fragmented Iraq as a potentially destabilizing threat to their own
domestic politics and tranquility. Many are especially concerned about
the possibility of an Iraqi civil war. Yet, many of these governments will
also face domestic political pressures to involve themselves ever more
deeply in Iraq's troubles, should an intercommunal war break out.
Some governments will also see opportunities to expand their influence
in Iraq in ways that either contradict or support U.S. goals in the region.
Seasoned terrorists and inexperienced, but angry, young men may also
enter the strategic equation as they involve themselves with Iraqi ethnic
or sectarian warfare.
How an Ethnic-Sectarian War Might Ignite and Develop in Iraq.
VI
Many Western observers reflexively view Western-style democracy
as the way to address the divisions within Iraq society that may


The danger of civil war is much closer if political differences appear
to become irreconcilable and negotiations between groups break down.
The factor that allows these types of disputes among communities
to devolve into civil war is the capacity of various sides to employ
violence effectively. In Iraq, this capacity now exists among all major
groups due to the rise of regional and sectarian militias, a process that
began occurring immediately after Saddam's removal. Some of these
groups returned to Iraq after political exile following the elimination
of the former regime. Others existed in Iraqi Kurdish areas outside
of Saddam's control since 1991, while still others were established
within Iraq following Saddam's ouster. The growth in militia activity
is a natural by-product of an insecure political environment in which
security is not effectively guaranteed by national level political and
security organizations. Since the individual cannot depend on the state to
provide security, self-defense becomes imperative. A variety of militias
are thereby able to assume the tasks of self-defense and security for
various portions of their sectarian or ethnic community. These militias
may also be used as instruments of domestic political aggression and
are usually only accountable to a small leadership core. Militias may
therefore protect some members of an ethnic or sectarian group from
outsiders, while simultaneously exploiting and intimidating the same
people to ensure their own dominance over them.
Immediately following Saddam's ouster, the U.S. leadership hoped
that militias would not take root in the Iraqi political system, and strong
efforts were made to pressure them into dissolving. 11 This hope has
now proven illusory, and senior U.S. officials acknowledge the need
to tolerate some militia activity.12 Kurdish leaders even took offense at
having their forces referred to as militias.13 Senior U.S. policymakers
currently suggest that militias will become unnecessary as legitimate
governmental security institutions are strengthened, and militias are
replaced or absorbed by national and regional governmental security
forces.
Most major Iraqi militias are associated with religious and ethnic
political parties, although some are also tribal. As such, these militias
would be expected to fight in the interests of their sectarian or ethnic
communities, should relations among Iraqi communities decline or
collapse. A massive Shi'ite electoral victory will unquestionably serve
as a spur to the further development of Sunni and Kurdish militias since
the Shi'ites would then appear closer to the control of national military


especially around Kirkuk. The June 2004 assassination of Ghazi Talabani,
the head of oil field security in northern Iraq, for example, is widely
believed to have been a warning against Kurdish ethnic and economic
separatism. Ghazi Talabani was from the same Kurdish clan as Jalal
Talabani, the head of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), one of the
two major Kurdish political parties, advocating a more decentralized
form of Iraqi federalism.44
Iraqi Kurds seek to retain the militias associated with their major
political parties and ban non-Kurdish military units from their region.
Additionally, disarming Kurdish militias is not a realistic prospect. The
Kurds are aware that ethnic conflict is a realistic possibility, and they
are much more inclined to improve their military capabilities rather
than disarm. Moreover, the U.S. leadership has good reasons not to
press too tenaciously on this issue. The disarmament of the Kurdish
militias could lead to a power vacuum that will allow the expansion of
the al-Qa'ida affiliated terrorist group, Ansar al-Islam, which is based
in Kurdistan. Mainstream Kurdish militia forces include about 50,000
fighters.45 Kurdish members of the New Iraqi Army openly state that
they will desert and return to Pesmerga (Kurdish irregular fighters)
units if their Kurdish homeland is threatened.
Many Iranian, Syrian, and Turkish leaders doubt that the Iraqi Kurds
would be satisfied with their own independence, even if they were able
to achieve it. Rather, they assume that an independent Kurdish state in
territory carved out of Iraq would serve not only as an inspiration to
their own Kurdish populations, but also as a base for subversion against
the national unity of their respective countries. The Kurds are also faced
with solid opposition to "federalism" by most of the major leaders
within Iraq's other communities. Indeed, Shi'ite religious leader Grand
Ayatollah Sistani denounced elements of the Interim Iraqi Constitution
that were designed to reassure the Kurds. To face these rivals, Iraqi
Kurds have attempted to bring the United States into their disputes,
apparently in the hope that the United States will lose patience with
the prospect of working with Shi'ite and Sunni Arabs. Many Kurdish
leaders have, for example, indicated that they favor an indefinite U.S.
presence in northern Iraq.
Additionally, the Kurds have engaged in at least a limited forced
expulsion of non-Kurdish Iraqis from disputed areas of northern Iraq
including the oil-rich city of Kirkuk, and this type of activity could
expand dramatically in a period of increased sectarian strife.46 These
13


Syria is probably concerned about the rise of Islamic extremism in
an Iraqi civil war and will be especially concerned about Sunni Islamic
extremism, which became a serious and perhaps regime-threatening
problem for the Syrians in the early and mid-1980s. 92 The potential
for Iraqi unrest to spread to Syria is uncertain, but Syrian citizens will
think carefully before provoking their government, which is willing to
employ a great deal of force to ensure its survival. Nevertheless, Syria
is already reported to be experiencing an upturn in religious devotion
in conservative neighborhoods within the cities and small Sunni Arab
towns for a variety of reasons, including the disappointment associated
with President Bashar Assad's stillborn reform and liberalization
movement. 93 Increased religious devotion and anti-regime Islamic
activism are two distinct phenomenons, but this trend is still unlikely
to reassure the government. Syria's long border with Iraq provides
many opportunities for Islamic rebels in both countries to coordinate,
even if they see only temporary or tactical value in doing so, and Syria
has a continuing concern over the potential rise of a regime-threatening
Islamic opposition in Syria. U.S. insistence that Syria improve its border
security appears to have led to some improvements, but complete
control of the border is beyond the reach of the regime.
There are also between one and two million Kurds in Syria, although
exact estimates vary widely.94 Kurds in urban areas seem to have
assimilated much more fully into Syrian society, and some of the lower
estimates may not count all of them as Kurds. Other Kurds, particularly
from the rural areas, maintain a highly-distinct Kurdish identity and
are not fully integrated into Syrian society. Some Kurds from northeast
Syria refused to register in the 1962 census to avoid military conscription
and were thus denied citizenship. Others were denied citizenship on
various other pretexts, including an inability to prove that they or
their parents had lived in Syria since 1945.95 These policies prevented
these Kurds and their descendents from obtaining Syrian nationality,
furthering their status as outsiders. Between 200,000 and 360,000 Syrian
Kurds currently do not have Syrian citizenship.9 Not surprisingly, one
of the first post-Saddam challenges to Damascus came from Syrian
Kurds. During a March 12 soccer match, a brawl erupted between fans
of teams supported by Arabs and Kurds.97 In the aftermath of the riots,
more clashes took place, and statues of the late President Hafez Assad
(the current President's father) were defaced in Syria's Kurdish areas. 98
The Syrians reacted to these actions with characteristic harshness.
24


CA
The Jordanian government, in addition to addressing its legitimate
concerns about Iraqi instability, is also seeking to appear active and
concerned over Iraq as a way of maintaining domestic support for the
government. 116 To these ends, Amman has attempted to mediate with
the United States to reduce tensions with Iraq's Sunni Arabs. These
measures include urging the United States to reach out to Sunni leaders
and to ease the de-Ba'athification process. 117 King Abdullah has also
stated that the United States may be insufficiently concerned about
Iranian domination of Iraqi Shi'ites' leading to an Islamic government
in Iraq.118 Nevertheless, the Jordanians may have much less to fear from
a Shi'ite-dominated government than do other Sunni Arab leaders.
King Abdullah is a Sunni Muslim, but he is also as a member of the
Hashemite family, and, as such, claims direct family descent from the
Prophet Mohammed. This lineage has salience to a variety of Muslims,
and it is well-received by many Shi'ites worldwide. The original break
between Shi'ites and Sunnis occurred because of the Shi'ite belief that
members of the Prophet's family are the most legitimate leaders of the
Muslim community. While contemporary Shi'ites do not seek their
leadership from the family of the Prophet, many do have considerable
respect for the Hashemites. King Hussein's widow, Queen Noor, for
example, has commented on what she perceives as Shi'ite esteem for
the Hashemite family.119
Israel is, of course, a special case in the Middle East, and Israelis,
not surprisingly, had radically different views from the rest of Middle
Easterners about the opportunities presented by the U.S. invasion of
Iraq. Most Israeli leaders, as well as the Israeli public, strongly favored
a U.S. invasion of Iraq because of Saddam Hussein's suspected strategic
weapons programs and his perceived willingness to use such systems
against Israel.120 Additionally, Saddam provided extensive financial
support to the families of Palestinian suicide bombers killed in operations
against Israeli civilians. While the Iraqis attempted to present such
actions as a humanitarian effort to support the dependents of martyred
fighters, the Israelis considered Iraqi actions as an incitement to the
Palestinians to commit murders that they might not otherwise carry
out.121 On the eve of war, close to 80 percent of the Israel public favored
a U.S. invasion, despite the perceived possibility that it could trigger
a missile strike-perhaps even with chemical or biological weapons-
against Israelis cities.122
Those Israelis who held high hopes for improved relations with Iraq
have been overwhelmingly disappointed by the aftermath of Saddam's
29


purchasing oil from any Iraqi faction will infuse that faction with funds,
which they would almost certainly use to improve their position within
the ongoing struggle against other Iraqi groups. A decision to buy oil
from one group may also endow that group with an increased amount
of international legitimacy and may be seen as bolstering their claims to
rightful authority. International deals with the Kurdish leadership, for
example, may be viewed as tacit endorsement of any future Kurdish
claims to independence.
Additionally, oil infrastructure in the hands of any one faction may
face constant sabotage efforts from other factions. Since sabotaging oil
infrastructure can be quite simple, it is likely that such sabotage would
emerge as a major problem should civil war conditions develop.156
Targets vulnerable to such strikes would include pumping stations,
refineries, and especially pipelines. Some 250 guerrilla attacks against
pipelines have already occurred in Iraq since the removal of Saddam
Hussein.157 Such attacks may be easier and more frequent should a civil
war develop. Additionally, skilled Iraqi workers needed to keep the
industry performing may be threatened or killed. Foreign oil specialists
would find Iraq an uninviting place to work under such conditions
and would not be able to keep the system functioning. Thus, Iraq,
with 10-11 percent of the world's oil reserves, may be removed from
the international oil market, except for a small trickle resulting from
smuggling. 158
The problem with Iraq may be intensified if further political
problems develop in Saudi Arabia or among the Arab Gulf states. The.
Saudis, as noted, are currently under siege from a terrorist group that
seeks to both destabilize the country and to drive foreign workers from
Saudi Arabia. The strikes against foreign workers directly threaten the
productivity of the oil industry. Simultaneous disruption of Iraqi and
Saudi oil activity would therefore become a serious economic crisis, since
the two countries combined control around 35 percent of the world's
known oil reserves. The economic welfare of the West consequently
depends on maintaining some level of political stability in at least one,
and preferably both, of these countries.
Conclusion and Policy Recommendations.
As noted throughout this monograph, the author does not intend
to convey the impression that a civil war in Iraq is inevitable. The
Iraqis are deeply concerned about this danger, and this awareness
38