Research Triangle Institute
In April 2003, another initiative got under way to help establish local democratic insti-
tutions in Iraq. The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) gave one of its
largest contracts ever (worth a potential $236 million over two years) to the Research
Triangle Institute (RTI), a North Carolina-based nonprofit organization experienced in
the development of government institutions. RTI had four major tasks: (1) to help local
governments restore essential services such as water, sanitation, sewage, and emergency
power; (2) to improve the effectiveness of public servants responsible for administra-
tion and service delivery in their districts; (3) to strengthen access of citizens to local
government and other mechanisms; and (4) to help the coalition bring Iraqis together to
discuss the type of government they desired, the role of federalism, the election process,
and other matters. Without coordinating with ORHA, the CPA, and the MSCs, RTI began
its mission in late April, when it started work in Basra. By the time RTI arrived, British
coalition forces had already set up a city Council there. RTI soon relocated a substantial
part of its effort to Baghdad, where it helped to establish Councils at the neighborhood
and district levels, and eventually a city and a provincial council.
During this initial period, OHRA, coalition military commanders, and RTI operated
independently with little effort at coordination.
PhaseTwo (May 2003-November 14, 2003)
In early May, the coalition made its first major change in course on Iraqi governance.
It abandoned Gen. Garner's plan to hold elections and rapidly establish an Iraqi admin-
istration. On May 6, 2003, the administration appointed Ambassador L. Paul Bremer III
as head of the CPA, which subsumed ORHA. On May 17, 2003, a day after his arrival in
Baghdad, Bremer (accompanied by British diplomat John Sawers) announced the coali-
tion would remain in charge of Iraq for an indefinite period. Instead of a provisional
government, the coalition would create an Iraqi interim authority that would assist the
CPA in drafting a constitution and planning future elections.
In late May and June 2003, members of Ambassador Bremer's governance team fanned
out across the country, looking for influential Iraqis who could represent critical elements
of the society in the interim authority. One or more members of the CPA staff visited all of
the country's eighteen provinces. They talked to hundreds of individuals, including tribal
Sheiks, religious leaders, academics, engineers, lawyers, and businessmen. They selected
twenty-five members, and, in July 2003, Ambassador Bremer announced the creation of
the Iraqi Interim Governing Council (IGC).
The IGC attracted criticism almost immediately. Iraqis who had been involved in
Garner's conferences had been encouraged by the prospect of an early handover of power
and were disappointed by the change in course. The large number of exiles in the IGC and
the opaque manner in which the council was appointed led to objections that it did not
represent the Iraqi people. Further, it was difficult for the coalition to find Sunnis willing
to join the IGC. Iraqis suspected that the IGC had no real power and was merely a puppet
of the coalition. As a result, the IGC suffered a legitimacy gap that worsened over time.
The IGC's role was set out in a seven-point plan. Significantly, one of its key tasks
was to develop a process for drafting an Iraqi constitution by December 2003. According
to this plan, after the document was written, it would be ratified in a referendum, and
then a sovereign Iraqi government would be elected. The entire process would have taken
Several years.
The large number of exiles in the
IGC and the opaque manner in
which the council was appointed
led to objections that it did not
represent the Iraqi people.
The IGC suffered a legitimacy
gap that worsened over time.