D 214.2:IR I GRAD DS 318.9 .M37 173 2009 THE IRANIAN PUZZLE PIECE Understanding Iran in the Global Context CAUCASUS Ball Z DAGH 0383 ROM ucharest *Constanta ofia Varna BULGARIA Sokhumi GEORGIA Istanbul Batum Tbilisi Samsun Bursa Sumqayit Ankara ARMENIA AZERBAIJAN kmenbasy Baku ASAKMENISTAN Erzurum Yerevan CE Turkmenabat ARAGON Kayseri Lens tabat Denizli Konya Van Mashhad Divarbakır Tabr Qarvin Antalya Adana Gaziantep rehran .Herde Grozny MOUNTAINS ok DOGUKARADENIZ Trabzon DAGLAR Izmir TURKEY Kayseri TAURUS MOUNTATS Icela zaya Anak Mosul Shuad Kermanshah. AFOS Aleppo "Latakia SYRIA Nicosia KUS Estahan IRAQ Beirud Hims IRAN DASHT-E Anean Sea LEBANON Damascus Hatalans JSRAY Heights -West Bank EER Amman An Napitiyas Kerma pandrlas daira Alma JORDAN Başrah Zahedan Aga Boshehr WAIT yot ain EGYPT indar Abbas AL Ad HS'il unor Vanama онла Riyadh Y QATAR Tropical Cancer Aswa SAUDI *Doha OMAN Dubai Abu Dhabi alla Muscat Halab ARABIA UNITED ARAD EMIRATES padan, Port Sudan UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN LIBRARIES SUDAN RUB ALL DEC 0 9 2009 Omdaman Khartoum Abha ERIT Asmar Wad Madan izan Massawa DEPOSITED BY UNITED STATES OF AMERICA "pudoydon Edited by Amin Tarzian Sea Sanaa YEMEN Aden Socotra YEMEN DJIBOUTI Note on Transliteration In this work, an attempt has been made to simplify transliteration of non-Latin terms and names. As such, the system does not strictly follow any of the standard transliteration systems commonly in use in academic works in the United States. With exception of some proper names, the use of diacritical marks has been limited to few cases. Moreover, in this work, the Arabic and Persian consonant is not transliterated; however, the vowel that is attached to the consenant has been represented by that vowel. For example, Ali, not ‘Ali; or Masud, not Mas'ud. When terms of Arabic oriģin are used in reference of Iran, the Persian transliteration has been adopted, such as mojahedin, not mujahidin; or sayyed, not sayyid. Terms and names which have become Anglicized in major dictionaries of the English language, such as “Quran,” are not transliterated. Likewise, terms such as “mullah” are used in place of “mulla.” Names which have common usage but are not transliterated are used in their familiarized form, such as Saddam Hussein. Marine Corps University Press 3078 Upshur Avenue Quantico, Virginia 22134 1st Printing, 2009 For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512-1800; DC area (202) 512-1800 Fax: (202) 512-2104 Mail: Stop IDCC, Washington, DC 20402-0001 ISBN 978-0-16-084102-6 li Aros Amo Derya Burbel Urmia NITED ARAB EMIRATES ARMENIA Yerevan AZERBAIJAN Baku UZBEKISTAN Turkmenbashi TURKEY Nobitdag TURKMENISTAN Charjev Caspian Gyzylarbat Van AZARBAYJANE? SHAROI KARDABIL Astara Sea Lay Tabriz Arteo Ashgabat Mary Pasht Bandar Bonund Tarkeman Mahabad Zanjan Gorgán ZANNY Mashhad Saraihe Saragt MAZANDARAN aligne av Shahrud KORDESTAN approxima Telman railroad Cart Sananda SEMNAN Gushgy HAMADAS Semman KHORASAN EHRANU KERMANSSAHANS Hamedan Com Dasht-e Kavi Bakhtarin Jarak Kashan MARKAZI Khorramabad Baghdad LORESTAN ESPARAN VLAM AFGHANISTAN Birjand Estahan Deztül For Shahr-e Kord VAZD KHULESTAN VA BAKHTIAR Yazd Bata Ahvaz An Naşiriya A Bagak lorramshaft Yase Bandar- Umm Qadin Khome ONKLUYEH VA Kerman BUYER AHMAD KUWAIT Shatalar KERMAN BUSHEHR Shiraz Zahedan Kuwait Sirjan Bam PAKISTAN FARS SAUDI ARABIA Bandar Nok Bushehr Kunda alignment Bazman Iran approximate HORROZGÅN SISTÅN VA International boundary Persian Bandete BALŪCHESTĀN Province fostan) boundary National capital Manama Bandare Gulf Province (ostan) capital BAHRAIN Langeh OMAN Jäsk Railroad QATAR Dubai Administrative Road Bandar Beheshti Gwadar Doha Gulf of Abu Dhabi 250 Kilometers Oman Arabian 24 hooned 0 250 Miles boundary Muscat Sea LP SPINS DeFacto OMAN Boundary representation is not necessarily authoritative Base 302511 (RO1078) 9-96 Harinde Kavir Namak IRAQ Rudo Karun CHAHAR MAHALL Kangan "Abbas Home Line 0 Boundary iv Amin Tarzi (Majles). Preelection predictions were that if Khamenei stayed neutral and did not intervene on behalf of his protégé Ahmadinejad, Musavi would win. However, as pointed out by Ali M. Ansari in his chapter on Ahmadinejad, Khamenei's preelection support of Ahmadinejad's policies and presidency revealed his political leanings. Sadjadpour's prediction that Khamenei would heavily influence the electoral outcome materialized as the events of June 2009 unfolded. By placing his office and his person on the side of Ahmadinejad rather than acting as an impartial judge in the controversial elections, Khamenei has bogged down the office of the supreme leader with political minutia and raised further questions about his objectivity and apolitical position. Khamenei's backing of Ahmadinejad is not new, and as Ansari explains, does not have its roots in ideology but rather in an attempt to consolidate power within the Iranian power structure. Khamenei has been seen to largely endorse Ahmadinejad's first-term governmental reforms and his policies, even as other conservatives and a large number of Iranians find themselves farther apart from Ahmadinejad's policies and ideological worldview. For Khamenei, this partnership may prove costly. He has alienated a large number of his peers and traditional supporters, and his ability to make tough decisions on Iran's foreign relations and policies is being called into question. This short-term victory may have long-term negative effects on his or his office's position of supremacy in Iran's decision-making process. Khamenei did not follow Milani's advice to remain neutral in the electoral process so that his position would be secure. So now the questions remain: is Khamenei the person with whom the U.S. should engage, or has the pendulum of power begun to swing? What Should the Parties Discuss? If or when negotiations between the United States and Iran occur, determining the agenda will be a tricky endeavor. Ronald E. Neumann cautions, in his chapter on U.S.-Iranian negotiations, that it is important to keep in mind the almost irreconcilable positions of the parties. One country's desired outcome is anathema to the other. While the 3 Introduction commonalities are few, the list of grievances, both historical and current, is long, the latest entry being the accusations made by the Iranian regime against a number of Western countries for alleged involvement in the post-election protests and demonstrations. Neumann recounts the myriad of hurdles—historical misunderstandings, suspicion, legal battles, and internal domestic opposition—that both parties will face and have to overcome on the path to rapprochement. While daunting, Neumann sees value in pursuing negotiations, if only to chip away at the hardened positions to slowly improve relations. There are many deal breakers for both Iran and the United States. Three of the most intractable are Iran's rejection of Israel's right to exist; its support for terrorism; and of course the nuclear issue. Neumann describes Iran's nuclear posture and its continued support of terrorism as the major issues, adding that there are numerous other issues as potentially intractable. Sadjadpour lists Iran's position on Israel as the greatest obstacle to improved relations, as he notes belligerency toward Israel is one of three ideological symbols of the Islamic Republic, and he sees the nuclear and Israeli issues as inextricably linked. Gerald M. Steinberg, in his chapter on Iran in the Israeli threat perception, explains Iran's support for Hezbollah and Hamas and its nuclear ambitions as manifestations of the existential threat Israel continues to face from the Iranian regime. This threat has been in existence since the 1979 Islamic Revolution and is perceived to be escalating with the rise of Iran's nuclear ambitions. He cautions that Israel is considering all options to counter this threat. Khamenei illustrated his distaste for any hint of niceties toward Israel in his public rebuking of Ahmadinejad in July 2009, this just shortly after having backed him in the elections. As part of his new government, Ahmadinejad appointed his son's father-in-law, Esfandiar Rahim Mashaii, as his first vice president. The first vice president wields a degree of power within Iran's power structure, leading cabinet sessions in the absence of the president. Khamenei, however, issued a decree ordering Ahmadinejad to remove Mashaii from his post and asserting 4 Introduction challenges, which as stated above will prove challenging and require profound and mature diplomacy on both sides. Sadjadpour points out that the devil is in the details. The most significant detail is that of time. Once the nuclear cat is out of the bag, paradigms shift, and there is no turning back. Time is influencing the direction of both the existing multilateral diplomatic approach regarding Iran's nuclear program-E3+3, comprised of China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States—and other potential advocates of Iran changing its course. As such, Shercliff advocates for forcing Iran's hand, compelling Iran to choose between cooperation and confrontation before it is too late. Neumann promotes a two-pronged approach, borrowing former Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin's strategy of negotiating as if there is no fighting and fighting as if there are no talks. Neither talks nor pressures should restrict the employment of the other, as a balance between the two ensures a more successful outcome. Steinberg affirms Neumann's recommended approach, noting that Israel's policy is to consider all available options to resolve Iran's nuclear issue while pursuing a diplomatic solution. However, in the end, as time pressures build, patience for a lengthy diplomatic process may wane, or the process will be overcome by events. Steinberg, in closing, provides an ominous yet realistic assessment of Israeli perceptions vis- à-vis Iran's threat: Overall, the Iranian nuclear threat has reinforced the realism that forms the Israeli approach to security threats. While there is still hope that international action, including serious sanc- tions, will stop Iran before the nuclear finish line, this is by no means assured. Proposals by foreign diplomats and academics suggesting that alliances such as North Atlantic Treaty Or- ganization (NATO) membership for Israel could provide a sufficient response to an Iranian nuclear capability, or that a defense treaty with the United States would be important in this respect, are not likely to be seen as effective by Israelis. 6 Amin Tarzi The U.S. is seen as weakened economically and overcommitted in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the weakness of European mem- bers of NATO, particularly with respect to security, reinforces the skepticism. While there are many complexities, the possi- bility for a preventive Israeli military strike remains significant. Ali-Akbar Salehi, the newly appointed director of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, called for closure of his country's nuclear dossier on 19 July 2009, citing completion of all required legal and technical discussions and noting that any remaining concerns are undocumented and unsubstantiated. If Salehi’s actions are indicative of what Ahmadinejad's nuclear posture will be during his second presidential term, the possibility of confrontation instead of cooperation is so much more real. In facing this reality, creativity and maturity need to prevail to avoid an escalation that leads to a no-win endgame. Iran's Regional Ambitions Complicating matters further are Iran's calculations that a nuclear capability will help it fulfill its regional ambitions. Salehi, when saying that the “importance of Iran's status in the region is obvious,” echoes the sentiments of a broad segment of Iranian society. He talks of Iran possessing “the golden key in the region.”This key to which he alludes has physical and historical attributes. Iran's geostrategic position and its imperial legacy propel Iran to pursue regional hegemony. Iran is the only country with access to the Caucuses, Middle East, Central and South Asia, the Caspian Sea, the Persian Gulf, and the open seas. From a hydrocarbon perspective, with its location and vast amounts of oil and natural gas, Iran has the potential of being one of the most, if not the most influential supplier and transportation hub of oil and gas not only in the region, but also in the global market. However, as Sadjadpour points out, Iranian assets have been plagued 4. “Iran's Nuclear Dossier Must be Closed: AEOI Director,” Tehran Times, 19 July 2009 (http:www.tehrantimes.com/NCms/2007.asp?code=199120). 5. Ibid. 7 Introduction by mismanagement, and this, coupled with the sanctions and political tensions, has resulted in Iran becoming “a perennial underperformer.” Shercliff posits that Iran could assume its natural position as the key country in hydrocarbon production, transportation, and politics if it would accept the “refreshed” E3+3 package, which remains on the table since offered in June 2008. Beyond geography, Iran's narrative of Persian expansionism and destined leadership in the region, led by Ayatollah Ruhollah Musavi Khomeini's message “of spreading the revolution and establishing the Islamic Republic's preeminence,” continues to resonate with the Iranian population. This imperial collective identity remains and has been reinvigorated with the removal of the Saddam Hussein and the Taliban. Milani argues that this shift in regional politics has expedited Iran's regional ambitions and that the current situations in Afghanistan and Iraq present an opportunity for cooperation between the United States and Iran, assuming that the two parties can overcome their inherent distrust and recognize that their strategic interests lie on the same path forward. It would appear that some of these fears have yet to be conquered, as Sadjadpour indicates that Iran continues to be identified as the principal source of instability in Iraq. One voice absent from this discussion is that of Iran's Arab neighbors, due to a late cancellation of the Arab presenter at the symposium. The Arab states should not be expected to take sitting down Iran's regional ambitions and its interest and influence in Iraq. Iran's involvement in Iraq and Lebanon and with Palestinian groups such as Hamas, coupled with its nuclear pursuits, has created noise in many Arab capitals. Ahmadinejad's 2007 offer to help fill the security vacuum that would be created when Western forces leave Iraq remains on the table and has been met with skepticism and suspicion from Iran's neighbors.? 6. Ray Takeyh, Hidden Iran: Paradox and Power in the Islamic Republic (New York: Times Books, 2006), 11. Takeyh uses Arab states rather than all of Iran's neighboring states. 7. See Amin Tarzi, “The World's Ninth Nuclear Power: Iran's Ambitions in the Middle East and Beyond,” Turkish Policy Quarterly 6 (Summer 2007): 63 (http://www.turkishpolicy. com/images/stories/2007-02-centraleurasia/TPQ2007-2-tarzi.pdf). 8 Amin Tarzi As Ansari notes, the apparent rise in Iranian regional influence, spanning from Lebanon to Afghanistan, has emboldened Iran, and Milani reminds readers of the power that perception wields in politics. As Iran plans its course, it needs to recognize how the region and the world perceive its regional ambitions and pursuit of nuclear technology. Iran's posturing toward Israel and its fiery politics take on a new dimension when coupled with the threat of a nuclear weapons capability. Iran needs to employ maslehat to determine its course of action and to ensure that the outcome affords Iran the prestige and status it desires and deserves. “We want Iran to calculate what I think is a fair assessment that if the U.S. extends a defense umbrella over the region, if we do even more to support the military capacity of those in the Gulf,” Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton said in Phuket, Thailand, in July 2009. “It's unlikely that Iran will be any stronger or safer, because they won't be able to intimidate and dominate, as they apparently believe they can, once they have a nuclear weapon.' The authors' expertise and in-depth analysis broaden and deepen the available discourse on Iran and provide context and guidance for confronting the Iranian nuclear issue. As revealed through their work, the Iranian puzzle piece is complex and demands close examination to ascertain its rightful place within the global puzzle. 8. Mark Landler, “Clinton Hints at ‘Defense Umbrella' to Deter Iran," New York Times, 23 July 2009 (http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/23/world/asia/23diplo.html?). 9 Iranian Power Structure Electorate Supreme Leader Assembly of Experts Couneit of Guardians Majles Expediency Council President Judiciary 1. 2. Islamic Revolution Guard Corps (IRGC) SNSC COM 3. MOIS 4. Other Min 5. MOD IRGC Army Army IRGC Navy Elected Appointed Approved Navy IRGC Air Force 1. Supreme National Security Council 2. Council of Ministers (22) 3. Ministry of Intelligence and Security 4. Other Ministries (20) 5. Ministry of Defense Air Force Basij m Qods Guardian Council—Body of twelve jurists that approves candidates for the Assembly of Experts, parliament, and the presidency and determines whether laws passed by the Majles are in line with the constitution and Islamic law. Six members are selected by the supreme leader and the other six are appointed by the Majles. Expediency Council–Council selected by the supreme leader that serves to facili- tate and streamline resolutions over disagreements between the Majles and the Guard- ian Council, as well as to advise the supreme leader. Assembly of Experts—Group of elected clerics tasked with selecting and reviewing the actions of the supreme leader. 10 Ali M. Ansari One of the striking anomalies of the hard right Principle-ist challenge is that it does not have the support of many of Khomeini's closest supporters, allies, and family members. Indeed, the Principle- ist challenge can be better interpreted as the attempt by Khamenei to supplant the founder of the revolution as the leading light of revolutionary ideology. It is quite clear that there is a tight and highly dependent relationship between Khamenei and the Principle-ist faction. This is not simply an ideological relationship, but a partnership in the consolidation of power, and it is important to recognize this relationship as one of mutual dependence. This interdependence explains the continued and critical support provided by the supreme leader for the president and his government, even when other conservatives have increasingly criticized the president's incoherent policies. Another factor also helps explain this support, and it reflects the personality of the supreme leader as much as his political relationship with Ahmadinejad. Khamenei is haunted by the example of the last shah, Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi, who is generally considered to have lost his throne through indecisiveness and weakness. Consequently, Khamenei has sought to overcompensate for what is generally regarded to be his political and theological weakness by appearing and behaving in a manner that is both interventionist and resolute. In such a climate, considerable credence is given to not changing one's mind and to appearing consistent. The immediate consequence of this approach, of course, is that Khamenei is likely to continue supporting Ahmadinejad long after most observers consider it prudent or necessary. This support is mutual, and in rejecting his predecessors' policies, Ahmadinejad emphatically allied himself with the supreme leader, to whom he has shown an unprecedented public deference. If Rafsanjani and Khatami enjoyed difficult relationships 3. Editor's Note: The Principle-ists are the religious and social conservative factions that opposed the liberal policies of former President Khatami. They arose as the result of Khatami’s reform efforts and are now a considerable political conservative force. See Ali M. Ansari, Iran Under Ahmadinejad: The Politics of Confrontation. Adelphi Paper 393. (Abingdon, U.K.: Routledge for the International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2007), 32; Raz Zimmt, “The 2008 Iranian Parliamentary Elections: A Triumph of the System,” Middle East Review of International Affairs 12 (June 2008): 41-43. 13 Ali M. Ansari to the inevitable collapse of capitalism. For Ahmadinejad, the politics of confrontation was not a means to a redefined relationship, but a means to revolutionizing the international system in Iran's favor. Such a grandiose vision, which was derided and ridiculed by his political opponents, struck a chord with an overwhelmingly nationalistic population eager for international stature and success. Indeed, for all his religious heterodoxy, Ahmadinejad found nationalism and its accompanying rhetoric far more intoxicating for both the Iranian public and for himself. With the apparent growth in Iranian power throughout the region, from Afghanistan to Lebanon—a consequence of Western incoherence more than real Iranian strength-Ahmadinejad's belief in himself seemed justified and became contagious. The more people believed, the more the critics were silenced, and the more Ahmadinejad's self belief was reinforced. Much is said about Ahmadinejad's incorruptibility, especially in contrast to some members of the political elite, yet while this may allude to financial probity (an aspect that has come under increasing scrutiny of late), it was very clear from quite early in his presidency that Ahmadinejad was easily overcome by the possibilities and perks of power. This bent was not only reflected in his highly personal choices for government posts, with officials chosen mainly for the personal loyalty to the man (Ahmadinejad) and mission rather than professional competence, but also in his obvious contempt for what remained of process and procedure. Ahmadinejad's disdain for the Majles (the Iranian parliament) was especially irksome to the hard- line deputies who had done so much to see him elected. Rather than face questions in parliament, Ahmadinejad was far happier playing the role of leader, either on the world stage in front of an international media, who seemingly thirsted after his every statement, or in lavish provincial tours in which he performed for adoring masses in increasing desperation for some sort of hope and salvation. Ahmadinejad clearly relished the role, and a dependency culture emerged between a people in need and a leader who craved attention. 15 Ali M. Ansari of high inflation and property speculation, was their observation that the president seemed uninterested in any professional advice, appeared to appoint officials on the basis of ideology, and moreover, boasted about his “instinctive” and “anti-intellectual” approach to government. Ahmadinejad not only dismissed such comments but also sought to present himself as a new type of revolutionary intellectual with access to radical ideas. One of his supporters argued that people did not understand the president because he moved at the speed of a "phantom jet," with the idea clearly being that Ahmadinejad operated on an altogether different plane of thought. The antiestablishment posture worked for a time, but problems were bound to arise once the masses, whose loyalty he craved, began to suffer through the high inflation his policies were promoting. Ahmadinejad sought to ascribe these problems to international sanctions, but few commentators within the country believed this argument. When the Majles criticized the rise in prices of everyday goods, Ahmadinejad simply resorted to a swift dismissal of the criticisms as either politically unfounded or ignorant. His ability to remain on this path depended on two factors: the continued support of the supreme leader, who had effectively entered into a dependent relationship with him; and the continued rise in the price of oil. Indeed, even government officials and ostensible allies of the president grew weary and warned of the excessive dependence on rising oil prices. In April 2008, Interior Minister Mostafa Pour-Mohammadi, a noted hard-liner, resigned his post, citing differences that were later revealed to be concerns that the president had illegally raided the oil reserve fund. News that the oil reserve fund has been severely depleted over the last few years has come as a considerable shock to Iranians. While precise figures remain vague, the inadvertent leak from a government minister that the fund stood at $9 billion in the fall of 2008 resulted in immediate attempts at damage limitation control from the government, which countered with an estimate of $25 billion. This figure still is considerably lower than the $82 billion that the government was 6. “Iran: Oil under $60 Troubling for the Economy,” Fars New Agency, 4 November 2008 (http://english.farsnews.net/newstext.php?nn=8708141516). 17 Chapter 1: Iran Under Ahmadinejad 7 calculated to have had in March 2008, which would have provided a financial cushion in case of an oil price drop. Indeed, although they publicly gloated at the collapse of Western financial institutions in September, it took little more than four weeks for Iranian officials to realize that the consequences of this global economic downturn would affect Iran in a concomitant deflation of the oil bubble. Within weeks, the price of oil dropped to below $60 a barrel, the price that had greeted Ahmadinejad on his inauguration, creating a situation for which the president had no answer. Not surprisingly, recriminations followed. A particularly combative and boisterous Majles decided to impeach the minister of interior, Ali Kordan, for professing to hold an honorary doctorate from the University of Oxford. The impeachment is significant for a number of reasons. Ahmadinejad has to lose but one more minister (to dismissal or impeachment) to force a vote of confidence in his entire cabinet. Perhaps more importantly, it is no longer clear who will manage the forthcoming presidential elections (June 2009). Indeed, some are speculating that a combination of economic woes, a change of guard in the White House, and general disillusionment with Ahmadinejad among former allies, let alone the populace at large, will result in an opening up of the political contest. Powerful voices in support of a renewed Khatami candidacy are already being heard. However, much depends not only on developments in the economy, but on the attitude of the supreme leader, who finds himself in an increasingly awkward position. Most recently, he yet again came out in support of Ahmadinejad and his policies, thereby tying himself most emphatically to the cause. He can of course change his mind, if events force him to do so, but like all weak men, he places 7. Chip Cummins and Farnaz Fassihi, “WeakerOil May Crimp Iran's Spending,” Wall Street Journal Online, 25 October 2008 (http://online.wsj.com/article/SB122489443738668849. html). 8. Editor's Note: Khatami was the leading pro-reform candidate for the presidency until he withdrew from the race on 16 March 2009 citing the need for unity among reformists and pledging his support for former Prime Minister Mir-Hoseyn Musavi. 18 20 Chapter 2 Talking to Tehran: With Whom, About What, and How? Karim Sadjadpour T the long-standing policy debate about whether or not to “engage” Iran is now futile. In the post-September 11 world, Iran is integral to several issues of critical importance to the foreign policy of the United States, namely Iraq, Afghanistan, Arab-Israeli peace, terrorism, nuclear proliferation, and energy security. Shunning Iran will not ameliorate any of these issues, and confronting Iran militarily will exacerbate all of them. The only remaining option is talking to Tehran. The devil, however, is in the details. With whom in Iran should the U.S. talk? What should the U.S. talk to them about? And how should the U.S. talk to them? For the last several years, U.S. policy toward Iran has focused almost exclusively on short-term tactics at the expense of a coherent strategy. The results are self-evident: today Iran is more repressive, its nuclear stance has grown more defiant, and its support for extremist groups has increased. This chapter will focus less on ways to punish troubling Iranian behavior and more on a strategy that attempts to modify Iranian policies, allay the long-standing enmity between Washington and Tehran, and facilitate internal political reform with Iran. It begins with four fundamental premises:1 1. Talking to Iran does not imply offering concessions, in no way implies appeasement of troubling Iranian behavior, and does not preclude efforts to simultaneously counter Iranian in- fluence and policies that are problematic. 1. For a discussion of some of these premises, also see Ronald E. Neumann's essay, which is chapter 3 of this book. 21 Chapter 2: Talking to Tehran: With Whom, About What, and How? 2. The Islamic Republic is not on the verge of collapse, and any reform movement will require time to revive. Abrupt political change in Tehran is unlikely and would not necessarily be an improvement on the status quo, as the only groups that are both organized and armed in Iran are the Islamic Revolution Guard Corps (IRGC) and the Basij militia. More liberal po- litical groups are unorganized and unarmed. 3. U.S. concerns about the Iranian behavior—whether it is nu- clear ambitions, opposition to Israel, or support for extremist groups—will not be allayed as long as the status quo regime is in power in Tehran and its relations with Washington remain adversarial. In the current context, U.S. concerns that Iran is pursuing a clandestine nuclear weapons program will remain even if Iran were to announce suspension of uranium enrich- ment activities tomorrow. 4. The greatest impact Washington can have to help advance the causes of democracy, civil society, and human rights in Iran are policies that facilitate, rather than impede, Iran's path to modernization. Improved Iranian ties with the United States are a prerequisite to Iran's reintegration into the global econo- my, which would expedite internal political and economic re- form in Iran and dilute rather than fortify hard-liners' control of power. I. Who to Talk to There is good reason why policy makers have often struggled to understand where and how power is wielded in Tehran. From the Islamic Republic's inception in 1979, the revolution's father, Ayatollah Ruhollah Musavi Khomeini, aimed to set up the government's power structure in a way that would make it impervious to foreign influence. This meant creating multiple power centers whose competition would provide checks and balances to prevent one branch or individual from becoming too powerful and susceptible to outside influence. The result 22 Karim Sadjadpour has been frequent political paralysis, an inability to make big decisions, and a tendency to muddle along with entrenched policies. The Power of Khamenei While three decades later it remains difficult to discern why and how important decisions are made in Tehran, what can be said with confidence is that Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Hoseyni Khamenei is Iran's most powerful man. He may not make decisions unilaterally, but no major decisions can be taken without his consent. As supreme leader, he has constitutional authority over the main levers of state, namely the judiciary, military, and media. He also has effective control over the country's second most powerful institution, the Guardian Council, a twelve-member body (all of whom are directly or indirectly appointed by him) that has the authority to vet all electoral candidates and veto any parliamentary decisions. Various domestic factors have made Khamenei's role in the consensus-building process greater than ever before: 1) a vast network of commissars stationed in strategic posts throughout government bureaucracies, dedicated to enforcing his authority; 2) the rapidly rising political and economic influence of the IRGC, whose top leaders are directly appointed by Khamenei; 3) the political disillusionment and disengagement of Iran's young population, prompted by the unfulfilled expectations of the reformist era;- 4) the 2005 election of hard-line President Mahmud Ahmadinejad, who trounced Khamenei's chief rival, former President Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, in a second-round runoff; and 5) the conservative- dominated parliament, headed by Khamenei loyalist Ali Ardashir Larijani. Individuals who are either directly appointed by Khamenei or unfailingly obsequious to him currently lead the most influential institutions in Iran's byzantine power structure. 2. Editor's Note: The reform movement (1997-2005) was the political momentum behind President Khatami’s terms in office. The movement promised to bring greater freedom and democracy to Iranian politics and government, and the failure of its efforts has given strength to its conservative detractors. See Ray Takeyh, Hidden Iran: Paradox and Power in the Islamic Republic (New York: Times Books, 2006), 44-45. 23 Chapter 2: Talking to Tehran: With Whom, About What, and How? 6 continued strife in Afghanistan and has sought to play a leading role in the country's reconstruction, ranking among the top ten aid donors. Counter-narcotics. With one of the highest incidence of drug addiction in the world and a strict penal code prohibiting drug use, Iran has been highly vigilant in policing drug traffickers. Support for the government of Afghan President Hamid Karzai. While it has not abandoned its support for other allies in Afghanistan, Iran has been supportive of the Karzai government and made numerous pledges of security and economic cooperation. Opposition to the Taliban. Iran nearly fought a war against the inherently anti-Shiite Taliban in 1998 and supported the opposition Northern Alliance long before September 11. Similar to Iraq, however, in an effort to make life difficult for the United States, Tehran's behavior has been at times schizophrenic and counter to its own national interests. Iranian state radio programs broadcast in Afghanistan have referred to Karzai as the “stooge of the U.S.,” but most egregious are accusations that Iran has provided support to its old nemesis the Taliban.? Nuclear Proliferation The impetus for Iran's nuclear ambitions remains nebulous. Is the country's clerical leadership fixed on acquiring a nuclear weapons capability in order to dominate the Middle East and threaten Israel? Is Iran a misunderstood and vulnerable nation driven by a need to protect itself from unstable neighbors and a hostile U.S. government? Or is Iran simply moving forward with its nuclear program to gain leverage with the United States?8 6. Editor's Note: According to the Central Intelligence Agency's “World Factbook," “Iran remains one of the primary transshipment routes for Southwest Asian heroin to Europe; suffers one of the highest opiate addiction rates in the world, and has an increasing problem with synthetic drugs” (https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/ fields/2086.html?countryName=Iran&countryCode=IR®ionCode=me&#IR). 7. For example, see Amin Tarzi, “The World's Ninth Nuclear Power: Iran's Ambitions in the Middle East and Beyond,” Turkish Policy Quarterly 6 (Summer 2007): 61-65. 8. For more on the nuclear issue see, Simon Shercliff's essay, which is chapter 4 of this book. 28 Karim Sadjadpour While threat perception, geopolitics, and national pride are important facets of Iran's nuclear ambitions, the nuclear issue is more a symptom of the deep mistrust between Washington and Tehran than the underlying cause of tension. The United States has no confidence that Iran's intentions are peaceful and believes that in light of Tehran's past nuclear indiscretions, hostility toward Israel, and support for extremist groups, it should not be permitted to enrich uranium (the process required for both a civilian nuclear energy program and a weapons program). Iran is equally convinced that Washington is opposed to its technological advancement and is using the nuclear issue as a pretext to confront it. Ultimately, the nuclear issue will never be fully resolved absent a broader diplomatic accommodation between the two sides, wherein the United States alters its approach to Iran and Tehran alters its approach toward Israel. If there is one common goal that both the United States and Iran share, it is the avoidance of nuclear arms race in the Middle East. Arab-Israeli Conflict The greatest impediment to an improvement in U.S.-Iran relations is Tehran's position toward Israel. Whereas regarding the prospect of normalized relations with the United States, Iranian leaders have sometimes allowed room for ambiguity, Tehran's public rejection of the Jewish state has always been vociferous and unequivocal. Iran's policy is a two-pronged approach of armed resistance as a prelude to a “popular referendum.” Reasoning that “the Zionists have not pulled out of even a single square meter of occupied territories as a result of negotiation,”? Tehran openly supports militant groups such as Hamas and Islamic Jihad. But rather than seek Israel's physical destruction, Iran's proposed solution is a scenario whereby all inhabitants of Israel and the occupied territories—Jewish, Muslim, and Christian—would be given a vote to determine the country's future outlook. Given that Palestinians—including those in refugee camps—now constitute a 9. Karim Sadjadpour, Reading Khamenei: The World View of Iran's Most Powerful Leader (Washington D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2008), 20. 29 Chapter 2: Talking to Tehran: With Whom, About What, and How? demographic majority, Iran believes that a popular referendum would lead to the Jewish state's political dissolution. 10 Yet behind Tehran's seemingly intractable position, an important caveat exists: Iran's leaders have long made it clear that they will accept any territorial solution agreed upon by the Palestinians. Energy Security With the world's second-largest oil and natural gas reserves, Iran's importance to the global energy market is self-evident. 11 Yet a variety of factors—mismanagement, sanctions, and political tension—have made Iran a perennial underperformer. Its oil output, around 4.2 million barrels per day, is far below the 6 million barrels it produced prior to the revolution, and while it has 15 percent of the world's natural gas reserves, it has only 2 percent of total production." Notwithstanding the political implications, the benefits of a U.S. energy relationship with Iran would be numerous. For one, energy cooperation between the two countries would decrease the political risk premium currently in established oil prices; increased Iranian supply to the market would likely reduce cost; and development of Iranian national gas reserves and pipelines would weaken the tremendous leverage Russia currently holds over Europe. There are economic imperatives for Iran to cooperate with the United States as well. Given the combination of heavily subsidized 10. Editor's Note: This takes into account UN Resolution 242, which some argue grants Palestinian refugees the “Right of Return.” This resolution is not recognized by Israel, and as Ruth Lapidoth has written, “Neither under the international conventions, nor under the major UN resolutions, nor under the relevant agreements between the parties, do the Palestinian refugees have a right to return to Israel.” Ruth Lapidoth, “Do Palestinian Refugees Have a Right to Return to Israel?” Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs Web site, 15 January 2001 (http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Peace+Process/Guide+to+the+Peace+Process/Do+Palestinian +Refugees+Have+a+Right+to+Return+to.htm). 11. Editor's Note: According to the U.S. Department of Energy's Energy Information Administration, Iran holds the world's third-largest proven oil reserves and the world's second-largest natural gas reserves. Energy Information Administration, “Iran Energy Profile” (http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/country/country_energy_data.cfm?fips=IR). 12. Ibid. 30 Karim Sadjadpour gasoline, rising domestic consumption, and stagnating or decreasing production due to infrastructure deterioration, Iran's oil exports are projected to drop. 13 If the trends continue—increased consumption and decreased output-Iran could conceivably be on the path to being a net oil importer. Such a situation would force very painful decisions. Either the regime would have to cut gasoline subsidies—a difficult task for a president who ran on a populist platform-or the leadership would have to alter its policies to attract rather than repel outside investment. Most likely it will require a combination of both. Terrorism For more than a decade, Iran has been atop the State Department's list of “state sponsors of terror,” due mainly to its support for Hezbollah and the Palestinian militant groups Hamas and Islamic Jihad. Absent either a Palestinian-Israeli settlement or a U.S.-Iranian diplomatic accommodation, this situation will likely continue. At the same time, however, Iran and the United States share a common enemy in the inherently anti-Shiite al-Qaeda. III. How to Talk to Iran The long-standing taboo about talking to America has seemingly been broken in Tehran. While just five years ago, individuals could be imprisoned in Iran for advocating dialogue with the United States, today Iran's president has written open letters to former President Bush and challenged him to debates. Nonetheless, there are a variety of reasons why even a sincere, sustained American attempt to dialogue with Tehran may not bear fruit: 13. Editor's Note: According to the Central Intelligence Agency's “World Factbook,” Iran produces 4.7 million barrels of oil per day and consumes 1.6. The country also produces 111.9 billion cubic meters of natural gas and consumes 111.8 billion cubic meters (https:// www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/IR.html). 31 Chapter 2: Talking to Tehran: With Whom, About What, and How? • Historically, the Islamic Republic has tended to make dif- ficult decisions only under duress. Intoxicated by their new- found standing, Iran's hard-liners may not feel compelled to make any compromises. • Paralyzed by the competing ambitions of various factions and institutions, the Islamic Republic may prove incapable of reaching an internal consensus, falling back on long-en- trenched policies. • Unconvinced of U.S. intentions, the regime may shun in- creased ties with Washington, believing it to be a Trojan horse for a counterrevolution. • Fearful of the unpredictable domestic change that an open- ing with the United States might catalyze, Iran's leadership may well perceive reconciliation with Washington as an exis- tential threat. To ensure the greatest possible chance of success, there are eight useful prescriptions the Obama administration should keep in mind when dealing with Iran: 1. Build Confidence on Areas of Common Interest In the past, the one issue on which there is intense disagreement and seemingly no common ground—the Israeli-Palestinian conflict-has dominated the context of the U.S.-Iranian relationship and set the underlying tenor of distrust and ill will between the two sides. Given that the fundamental source of tension between Washington and Tehran is mutual mistrust, confidence will be easier to build on areas of common interest, such as Iraq and Afghanistan, as opposed to areas of little or no common interest, such as the Palestinian-Israeli conflict or the nuclear issue. The Obama administration should seek to resume the U.S.-Iran discussions that the Bush administration initiated in Baghdad, while opening a similar channel of discussion 32 Karim Sadjadpour With its weekly “death to America” diatribes, the Iranian government is certainly complicit in engaging in bellicose rhetoric. The United States need not take its behavioral cues from an insecure, repressive, undemocratic regime. Instead of reciprocating a culture of threats and name-calling, the Obama administration should project the dignity and poise of a superpower rather than allow the Iranian regime to define the tenor of the public discourse. A rhetorically hostile U.S. approach allows Iran's leadership to paint the United States as an aggressor, both internationally and domestically, and absolve itself from responsibility for its largely self-inflicted isolation and soiled international reputation. 5. Do Not Let the Spoilers Set the Tenor Though small in number, powerful cliques, both within Iran and among Iran's Arab allies, have entrenched economic and political interests in preventing U.S.-Iran reconciliation. Domestically, these actors recognize that improved Iranian ties with Washington would likely induce political and economic reforms and competition that would undermine the quasi-monopolies they enjoy in isolation. Among Iran's Arab allies such as Hezbollah and Hamas, the prospect of a U.S-Iranian accommodation could mean an end to their primary source of funding. For this reason, when and if a serious dialogue commences, the spoilers will likely attempt to torpedo confidence- building efforts. Their tactics vary. They may issue belligerent rhetoric, target U.S. soldiers and interests in Iraq or Afghanistan, or see to it that a shipment of arms originating from Iran on its way to south Lebanon or Gaza is “discovered.”Their intention is to leave fingerprints in order to sabotage any chance of a diplomatic breakthrough. If Washington ceases dialogue or confidence-building with Tehran in retaliation for an egregious act committed by the spoilers, they will have achieved their goal. 35 Karim Sadjadpour 8. Have Realistic Expectations Around the same time President Obama was inaugurated in January 2009, the Iranian revolution marked its thirty-year anniversary. Throughout these last three decades, the U.S.-Iran relationship has been mired in deep-seated mistrust and ill will on a myriad of issues. Mindful of this mutual skepticism, results will not be instantaneous. Such antagonism will not melt away after one, two, or even six meetings. The initial pace will likely be painfully slow as each side ascertains whether the other truly has good intentions. 37 38 Chapter 3 When U.S.-Iranian Negotiations Start: A Primer Ronald E. Neumann W hether the United States should talk to Iran is fiercely debated. Rarely discussed are the obstacles a U.S. administration will face, and issues it must be prepared for, when the time does come to talk. Yet success or failure may well turn on just such matters. Talking with enemies is a long tradition in diplomacy. This is so because unless defeat of the enemy is likely, some compromise is eventually needed. If total victory seems unlikely, discourse is useful. However, negotiations are not an end in themselves and may reveal that resolution is not possible. Nor are negotiations an alternative to conflict; both can be pursued simultaneously. Indeed, that was exactly how the United States negotiated independence from Great Britain. But that analogy should remind us that one may have conflict and discussions continuing side by side for long periods. Advocates of talks tend to point to opportunities missed. Recent books have noted particularly an Iranian offer in May 2003 to enter into comprehensive talks.? Writers have pointed to the interests in common and suggested the possibility of a “grand bargain.”? That is one possible outcome. But to attempt to reach a bargain without adequate advance reflection on how to overcome the problems that must be dealt with along the way is unlikely to lead to successful negotiations. And failure may be politically painful. 1. See Tarita Parsi, Treacherous Alliance: The Secret Dealings of Israel, Iran, and the United States (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 2007); and Barbara Slavin, Bitter Friends, Bosom Enemies: Iran, the U.S., and the Twisted Path to Confrontation (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2007). 2. The question of dealing with Iran on issues of common interest is addressed by Karim Sadjadpour in chapter 2 of this book. 39 Chapter 3: When U.S. - Iranian Negotiations Start: A Primer True, there are some common interests, including the potential for stability in Iraq and Afghanistan. And each side has things to offer the other, including an end to support for terrorism and development of Iran's oil and gas resources without the impediment of U.S. hostility. However, it is important to remember is that each side wants things that the other will be most loath to concede. To reach an agreement, the United States will have to cut through massive amounts of suspicion, misunderstanding, legal obstacles, and the domestic political opposition each side will face. Suspicions That the United States does not trust Iran needs little proof. It is worth understanding that they may be equally mistrustful. The Iranian government believed the George H.W. Bush administration would open talks after the hostages in Lebanon were released, but that did not happen. The Six-plus-Two talks led to Iranian cooperation in neg ting the Afghan peace arrangements of the Bonn Accord but withered thereafter. The Iranian offer of 2003 appears to have met without even the courtesy of a response. For Iran, the present demand for nuclear preconditions to talk may look very much like a continuation of a familiar pattern in which U.S. willingness to engage disappears once U.S. goals are achieved. This does not mean that a deal cannot be reached, but it does suggest that preconditions will be hard to achieve and that Iran will seek guarantees from the United States, and vice versa. Domestic suspicions and political opposition will complicate matters for each side. There remain Iranian elements with a deeply entrenched ideological opposition to talking with the United States. Talks themselves, and any arrangement reached, will potentially be a political stick that various Iranian opposition elements will find convenient to attack whoever is conducting the talks. Whatever the complexion of 3. These talks involved Afghanistan's six neighboring countries plus the United States and Russia. 40 Ronald E. Neumann largest (and politically most sensitive) issues to be resolved. Assuming at least some of the Iranian claims are sustained, the U.S. paying them may require the use of appropriated funds. Congress may not agree. Additionally, the Iranians have brought new claims for damages inflicted by U.S. sanctions that they claim are in violation of the Algiers Accords. They have also alleged that U.S. covert actions have caused damages and that these too are in violation of the accords. It is not known whether these are serious claims or bargaining positions. Another particularly troubling issue will be the private claims of U.S. citizens upheld by U.S. courts against Iran on grounds of terrorism. Some estimates of these claims put them in the neighborhood of $16 billion in compensatory damages and perhaps another $25 billion in punitive damages. An additional $50 billion or so in such judgments relate to Iranian actions in Iraq. Iran has never recognized U.S. jurisdiction. It is unlikely to do so now and still less likely to pay such claims. Unless the issue is settled, a wide variety of U.S. and international businesses and even some international organizations could find their assets under threat in the United States for settlement of these damages. It is highly unlikely that Iran would close a deal on other matters and leave itself vulnerable to pressure from this source. There would be no shortage of congressional voices ready to defend American citizens and U.S. court judgments from “giveaways to terrorists.” An American administration that begins negotiations would be well-advised to have thought through this issue and found some negotiating ideas. Other troublesome issues may arise. The Iranians previously wanted the United States to turn over leaders from the Mujahdin-e-Khalq 8. I am indebted to the Legal Advisor's office at the U.S. Department of State for background on these legal issues. Figures are estimates, but the order of magnitude makes the point. 43 Ronald E. Neumann a victory in the negotiations. Grand bargains and one-sided victories are uneasy bedfellows. Negotiating Styles and Starting Points With so many domestic political perils awaiting, there may be a desire for secret talks. This was a repeated idea when Iran flirted with contacts during the Clinton administration.12 It may be again.13 However, it is a temptation that should be avoided since the probability of leaks from one side or the other is high, and the results are usually to put one or both governments on the defensive with domestic critics. The United States may, and probably should, try to keep the content of negotiations under wraps but should avoid the vulnerability of trying to keep the talks themselves secret. The secrecy issue is but one example of the difference in styles and starting points between Washington and Tehran. While a new U.S. administration may have different tactics, the U.S. tendency in negotiations has usually been to precede them with extensive interdepartmental negotiations (the interagency process). Departments of State, Defense, Homeland Security, and Justice are likely to have different views in regard to negotiations with Iran. This is akin to negotiating with oneself before negotiating with others. The result is that U.S. negotiators often lack flexibility, and negotiations can stall for long periods while the U.S. government fights within itself. Some administrations have tried to avoid this by negotiating in great secrecy from most of the government. Sometimes this works. U.S. Secretaries of State James A. Baker III and Henry A. Kissinger were masterful in this regard. But poorly handled, the results of such an approach produced the Iran-Contra scandal, complete with a key- 12. I was Iran Country Director for part of this time. Our answer that we could only pledge best efforts at confidentiality but not promise it was for us an honest answer, recognizing the probability of leaks. The Iranians seemed to regard the response as a trap, leaving us free to leak on purpose to weaken them at a time of our choosing. 13. Editor's Note: See also Karim Sadjadpour's essay, chapter 2 of this book. 45 Chapter 4: The Iranian Nuclear Issue the inability to understand Iran's urgent determination to develop uranium enrichment and heavy water projects for which it currently has no apparent civilian need, but which would give it the capabilities to produce fissile material for a nuclear weapon. The Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) does allow its nonnuclear-weapon state parties to develop sensitive fuel cycle technologies, but only if they are properly declared and safeguarded. Iran has fallen short compared to other countries in this last regard. It has been found in past noncompliance with the treaty's safeguards obligations and has continued to be much less than fully cooperative with the IAEA. This is another major reason for the confidence deficit in Iran's intentions. The international community has many questions about why Iran is in such a hurry to develop its enrichment program. Enrichment facilities are expensive, and most operators of civilian nuclear power stations contract their fuel supply from elsewhere for this reason, particularly if they only have a few power reactors. Iran has only one civilian nuclear power station, which is being built in Bushehr by the Russians. It is not yet completed. The Russians have guaranteed the fuel supply for the first ten years of Bushehr's operation, with the prospect of continued supply beyond that period. No one is trying to prevent the Russians from completing construction on the Bushehr plant or from supplying its fuel. There are two other reasons for concern. First, prior to 2002, Iran deliberately concealed the proliferation-sensitive elements of its nuclear program for almost twenty years. It did so in clear contravention of its Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA under the NPT, and it has never been able to explain why. Second, once the 1. Editor's Note: The Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons entered into force in 1970 and currently has 187 member states. The United Nations site has information about the treaty as well as the full text (http://www.un.org/Depts/dda/WMD/treaty/). 2. Editor's Note: According to the IAEA site, “Safeguards are activities by which the IAEA can verify that a State is living up to its international commitments not to use nuclear programs for nuclear-weapons purposes.” See IAEA, “IAEA Safeguards Overview: Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements and Additional Protocols” (http://www.iaea.org Publications/Factsheets/English/sg_overview.html). 50 Chapter 5: Reflections on Iran's Policy Toward Iraq them. This explains the Iranian support for the rebel cleric, Muqtada al-Sadr, and his Mahdi Army.20 Iran has supported Sadr not so much because it endorses and appreciates his nationalistic and anti-Persian sentiments, but because he can provide insurance for Tehran in case Tehran's two favorite organizations alluded to earlier were to fail. Moreover, al-Sadr's movement is popular among the lower-class Shiites, particularly in Baghdad, and Tehran cannot afford to not support them. Tehran also views al-Sadr as a potential counterforce against the more moderate clerics, particularly Grand Ayatollah Ali al- Husayni al-Sistani, whose views on velayat-e faqih, the philosophical underpinning of Iran's system of governance, are radically different from Iran's governing ayatollahs. Finally, Tehran has supported Sadr because his insurgency opposed U.S. occupation and undermined the American presence in Iraq. Iran's third goal is to reduce U.S. influence in Iraq and prevent the United States from establishing permanent military bases in Iraq. This goal is probably the most complex of all of Iran's objectives, and its nature has changed over time. At first, the remarkably easy U.S. victory in Iraq frightened the ayatollahs who thought Iran, as a certified member of the “Axis of Evil,” might be the next target of American wrath. That initial fear dissipated as the Iraqi insurgency gained momentum, however, and Tehran came to the conclusion that a U.S. invasion of Iran is no longer feasible. For years now, Tehran appears to have made an important strategic decision to avoid any direct military confrontation with the United States. This does not mean or imply that Iran has not actively sought to undermine the Americans in Iraq. It surely has. It is clear that Tehran's policy has oscillated between the two goals of preventing the U.S. from a total and clean victory and of avoiding any direct confrontation with the United States. Iran's fourth goal is to expand its sphere of influence in southern Iraq. Just as Iran has created a sphere of influence in Herat Province in 20. Editor's Note: The Mahdi Army is an Iraqi Shiite paramilitary force that has opposed the Coalition presence within post-Saddam Hussein Iraq. Created in 2003 by Muqtada al- Sadr, this group has received support from Tehran. See Ibid. 68 Chapter 5: Reflections on Iran's Policy Toward Iraq have had a significant impact on Iranian politics. Today, there are those in Iran, including some clerics, who either seek to democratize or altogether reject the velayat-e faqih doctrine. These voices are often suppressed. A powerful hawzeh in Najaf could reverse this trend. Ayatollah Sistani, who has millions of followers in Iran, belongs to the “quietist” school of Shiite thought, which rejects Khomeini's interpretation of the velayat-e faqih doctrine. Could a Najaf hawzeh that is unfriendly toward Iran's version of the velayat-e faqih doctrine and is supported with Iraqi petrodollars pose a significant threat to the durability of Iran's clerical government? It appears that Iran enjoys more power in Iraq than the other neighbors of Iraq. Still, its power is rather limited, and it is unable to determine the future of Iraq, although it can become a spoiler and disrupt any Western design for Iraq. Additionally, Iraqi Shiites, who are Iran's main lever of influence in Iraq, are first and foremost Iraqis and thus will not allow Iraq to become anything more than an ally of Iran—and certainly not a proxy. Today, Iran has clear security concerns and identifiable interests in Iraq. The United States could simply ignore Iran and seek to marginalize it. This path would likely lead to more instability in Iraq and the Persian Gulf. Alternatively, the two countries could recognize each other's interests and concerns and negotiate.22 The fact that the two countries have held a few meetings at the ambassadorial level in Iraq is a small but prudent step in the right direction. 22. For further reading on negotiations, see the Karim Sadjadpour and Ronald E. Neumann essays in this book (chapters 2 and 3). 70 Chapter 6: Iran in the Israeli Threat Perception Prevention and Defense in Israeli Strategy The failure of diplomacy and sanctions, to date, have revived Israeli discussion of the “Begin Doctrine,” formulated in 1981 under Prime Minister Menachem Begin, when the government acted unilaterally to destroy the French-supplied Iraqi reactor in Osiraq after diplomatic efforts failed to result in international action. According to the Begin Doctrine, any state that acquires nuclear weapons and is actively involved in promoting violence and conflict would constitute an unacceptable threat.® (Pakistan is not considered to be a “confrontation state” and is not included in this category.) The Israeli raid that destroyed Syria's nuclear reactor in 2007 marked a second example of the Begin Doctrine and served as a reminder to Iran of Israeli policy and capabilities. In addition, there are unconfirmed media reports regarding discussions of options with the U.S. government. 1º On 13 August 2008, the deputy prime minister and defense minister, Ehud Barak, who also served as prime minister and Israel Defense Forces chief of staff, declared that “our position is that no option is to be taken off the table, but in the meantime, we have to make diplomatic progress.”11 Prior to becoming Israel's prime minister in March 2009, Benjamin Netanyahu had compared the Iranian threat to that posed to Europe by Germany in 1938, declaring that “there is time to act in a variety of ways, and all ways must be considered, and all ways that work must be 8. Haaretz, 9 June 1981, cited in Shai Feldman, “The Bombing of Osiraq Revisited,” International Security 7 (Fall 1982):114-43; Gerald M. Steinberg, “The Begin Doctrine and Deterrence,” in Israel in the Middle East—The Legacy of Menachem Begin. Begin-Sadat (BESA) Colloquia on Strategy and Diplomacy 15. (Tel Aviv: BESA Center for Strategic Studies, 2000). 9. Editor's Note: On 6 September 2007, it is believed that the Israel Air Force performed an air strike on what some say was a Syrian nuclear reactor. For further reading on this event, see Ephraim Asculai, “Syria, the NPT, and the IAEA” (INSS Insight 53, Institute for National Security Studies, Tel Aviv, 29 April 2008; online at http://www.inss.org.il/research. php?cat=6&incat=&read=1778). 10. Aluf Benn, “U.S. Puts Brakes on Israel Plan to Hit Iran Nuclear Facilities,” Haaretz (English edition), 13 August 2008 (http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/1010938.html). 11. “U.S. Against Strike on Iran: Israeli Defence Minister,” AFP Worldwide, 13 August 2008 (http://afp.google.com/article/ALeqM5hbHuCrDv8ufAXISJÓSLUMFe_FxHw). 74 Gerald M. Steinberg employed." He spoke of preemption, noting that “of all the activities required in the political, economic, and military fields, preemption is the most difficult. For us the Jewish people, too many times in our history we didn't see danger in time, and when we did, it was too late.”12 At the same time, in considering a preventive military strike, Israelis are aware of the differences between the two previous implementations of the Begin Doctrine in the cases of Iraq and Syria. No single air attack would be able to destroy the multiple elements that constitute the Iranian nuclear program. The Iranians have learned from the Osiraq case and have dispersed, hidden, and hardened their nuclear facilities, making them far less vulnerable to attack. However, the United States and Israel have also advanced significantly in terms of intelligence, targeting, and penetration in the past quarter century, including the development of precision long-range surface- to-surface missiles, reducing the need for vulnerable manned aircraft sorties. To destroy the fifteen to twenty key installations that are at the heart of Iran's nuclear weapons program, there would be no need for ground attacks and massive waves of airborne missiles aimed at Iranian military assets. Even if some facilities survive and others are well hidden and are not subject to attack, the large buildings housing the banks of centrifuges used for enrichment, as well as their very visible power supplies and related systems, and the foundations of the production reactor, could be damaged to the point that rebuilding would take many years. Regarding the bellicose Iranian threats of retaliation, many of these are based on exaggerated military claims, including the use of photo-enhancement techniques and announcements of nonexistent exercises. Nevertheless, this is a factor in Israeli decision making. 12. Peter Hirschberg, “Netanyahu: It's 1938 and Iran is Germany; Ahmadinejad is Preparing Another Holocaust,” Haaretz, 14 November 2006 (http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/ spages/787766.html); for partial text of the speech, see “Netanyahu’s ‘1938' Speech,” Jewish Current Issues, 16 November 2006 (http://jpundit.typepad.com/jci/2006/11/netanyahus_1938. html). 75 Chapter 6: Iran in the Israeli Threat Perception While Israel has reportedly addressed this issue by acquiring a small number of advanced diesel submarines, this is far from an ideal solution to the problem. 3. In a multipolar environment in which Egypt, Algeria, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, perhaps Syria (after the destruction of the North Korean-built reactor) and other Arab countries can be expected to follow the Iranian nuclear lead, stable deterrence is far more complex than the bipolar system of the Cold War. In addition to the absence of direct communications between Israel and Iran, the lack of any form of significant contact is likely to create major misunderstandings and misconceptions, which could be extremely dangerous in a crisis. Leaders in Tehran and Jerusalem do not know how to assess the other's red lines and are not able to predict responses to various moves and countermoves. In this situation, there would be a strong likelihood of a spiral of destabilizing actions in which the decision makers respond to perceived threats through worst-case analyses without any history of interaction or expertise by which to interpret and predict further moves. In the murky Iranian decision-making process, the power of elected and visible leaders and government officials is often secondary to the power of the clerics and the supreme leader, who operate in far greater secrecy, and whose understanding of the intricacies of stable deterrence is likely to be low. As a result, Israeli decision makers will have difficulty predicting Iranian policies and reactions. And while the Israeli decision-making process is far more public, and the governmental leaders are the key decision makers, the members of the Iranian inner circle appear to have no understanding of Israeli operational codes and responses to threat.1 The impact of such lack of contact and understanding was illustrated in the 2006 Lebanon war, in which Hezbollah leader Hassan 18 18. See Gerald M. Steinberg, “Parameters of Stable Deterrence in a Proliferated Middle East,” The Nonproliferation Review 7 (Fall-Winter 2000): 43-60 (http://cns.miis.edu/ npr/pdfs/73stein.pdf); Steinberg, “Walking the Tightrope: Israeli Options in Response to Iranian Nuclear Developments,” in Judith S. Yaphe and Charles D. Lutes, Reassessing the Implications of a Nuclear-Armed Iran. McNair Paper 69. (Washington, D.C.: Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, 2005; online at http://www.ndu.edu/ inss/mcnair/mcnair69/McNairPDF.pdf). 78 Chapter 6: Iran in the Israeli Threat Perception Bush administration's decision to agree to European leadership in the diplomatic efforts to contain Iran, despite recognition that the European Union policy was unlikely to slow or end the nuclear weapons program. Following the realization that this effort had failed, and as the United States again became the de facto global leader on this issue, including the sanctions process, the Israeli reliance on Washington returned to the previous level. In November 2007, however, the publication of a short summary of the National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on the Iranian nuclear program came as a major shock and shattered Israeli confidence in, and reliance on, American leadership. The summary, which was widely reported in the media around the world, claimed Iran had frozen its active efforts to manufacture nuclear weapons in 2003 and estimated that the Iranians would not have such a capability until at least 2012. This public document stated that the U.S. intelligence community had “high confidence” that the Iranians halted their nuclear weapons program in 2003, but only “moderate confidence” that Tehran had not restarted the program.21 Israeli intelligence analysts, as well as their British and French counterparts, had reached totally different conclusions. Israeli Defense Minister Barak stated in the wake of the NIE release that while it is “apparently true that in 2003, Iran stopped pursuing its military nuclear program for a certain period of time,” he added that “in our estimation, since then it is apparently continuing with its program to produce a nuclear weapon. A number of factors can explain the differences in assessments. Israel, which would be the prime potential target for a nuclear Iran, cannot afford to take the chance of underestimating the threat. Therefore, it relies on what policy makers refer to as a “worst-case” analysis. This »22 21. Editor's Note: See National Intelligence Council, “Iran: Nuclear Intentions and Capabilities” (National Intelligence Estimate, November 2007; online at http://www.dni.gov/ press releases/20071203_release.pdf). 22. Steven Erlanger and Graham Bowley, “Israel Unconvinced Iran Has Dropped Nuclear Program," New York Times, 5 December 2007 (http://www.nytimes.com/2007/12/05/world/ middleeast/05webreact.html?_r=1&scp=1&sq=Israel%20Unconvinced%20Iran%20Has%20 Dropped%20Nuclear%20Program&st=cse). 80 Gerald M. Steinberg means that the focus is on Iranian capabilities, rather than intentions, which can only be guessed. Using this approach, when Iran reaches the technological potential to produce enough fissile material necessary to make a nuclear weapon, it will be considered a nuclear state, capable of threatening Israel with annihilation. Israeli analysts have warned their U.S. counterparts about the potential for a parallel “black” Iranian weapons program, based on a small nuclear reactor producing plutonium, following the North Korean model, as illustrated in Syria. Indeed, Iran is known to be constructing just such a reactor at Arak, leaving room for another undetected facility.23 The consequences of a small, secret Iranian nuclear program are less significant for the United States, given its massive military superiority over Iran. Therefore, there is more room for political factors and influence in the official U.S. estimates. The publication of the NIE summary and the headlines proclaiming that Iran had halted its nuclear program also had important political consequences and greatly reduced the ability of the United States to pressure and deter Iran through the threat of military force. Although President Bush responded to the NIE report by reconfirming his determination to prevent Iran from gaining nuclear weapons, Iranian policy makers most likely concluded that the probability of attack from the United States in the next five years had been rendered much less credible. Given the disquiet in America over the status of the situation in Iraq, and with an official assessment stating that Iran gave up its program to develop nuclear weapons four years ago, it was clear to all parties that the U.S. president would face strong opposition to any decision ordering U.S. forces into battle again. The fear of a potential Iranian counterattack, in the form of mass terror and possible missile attacks against American assets in the region, serves to increase this opposition. The overall result of both the content of the NIE publication and the manner in which it was suddenly released, without any prior 23. Editor's Note: Arak is where Iran's heavy water reactor is located. 81 Epilogue: The 2009 Iranian Presidential Election and its Implications deal with a disgraced regime that presents urgent national security challenges, while at the same time not betraying a popularly driven movement whose success could have enormously positive implications for the United States. I. Implications for Iran The Regime's Eroded Legitimacy The events of the last six weeks have had enormous implications for Iran. At a political level, the Islamic Republic of Iran has ceded any pretensions of being a republic. Past Iranian governments did not necessarily represent a wide swath of Iranian society, but they did encompass a fairly wide swath of the Iranian political elite. If the Ahmadinejad government maintains power, the country will be ruled by a small cartel of hard-line clerics and nouveau riche Islamic Republic Guard corpsman who reflect not only a relatively narrow swath of Iranian society, but also a narrow swath of the political elite. Along with the legitimacy of the republic, another election casualty is the legitimacy of Iran's most powerful man, Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. For two decades, Khamenei had carefully cultivated an image of a magnanimous guide who stays above the political fray, allowing him to deflect responsibility for Iran's deepening economic malaise and political and social repression. Those days are now over. In defiantly supporting Ahmadinejad, Khamenei has exposed himself as a petty partisan. Formerly sacred red lines have been crossed, as for the first time people have begun openly challenging Khamenei with chants of “marg bar dictator”—death to the dictator. Despite the popular outcry, Khamenei has refused to cede any ground, believing that compromise projects weakness and invites more pressure. Today, his future rests largely in the hands of the regime's most elite fighting force, the 120,000-strong Islamic Revolution Guard Corps (IRGC). While growing fissures and dissent among senior clergy in Qom is certainly worrisome for Khamenei, dissent and fissures among top IRGC commanders would be fatal for him. While at the moment 84 Acknowledgments This work is a compendium of essays that were presented on 17 September 2008 during a one-day symposium, “The Iranian Puzzle Piece: Understanding Iran in the Global Context,” sponsored by Marine Corps University (MCU) and the Marine Corps University Foundation (MCUF) as part of the efforts of MCU's Middle East Studies. I wish to thank Major General Donald R. Gardner, USMC (Ret), under whose leadership as the president of MCU (2004-2009) the Middle East Studies was established. Many other Marines and civilians from MCU also made contributions toward the organizing and execution of the symposium. In particular, a special note of gratitude is due to Dr. Jerre W. Wilson, vice president for academic affairs, for supervising the symposium from its infancy; to Dr. Kurt A. Sanftleben, vice president for instructional and research support, for providing the space and conference support; to Mary M. Lanzillotta for her tireless and patient handling of the contractual aspects; and to Bud Hilbmann and his team for making everything work. The symposium was sponsored generously by MCUF from the beginning. Special gratitude is due to Brigadier General Thomas V. Draude, USMC (Ret), president and CEO of the foundation, and to John R. Hales, the COO. The symposium and the current publication would have not been possible without the participation of the panelists, chairs, and those who enriched the session with their contributions in the form of questions and discussion. To the panel chairs, General Draude and Dr. Douglas E. Streusand, professor of international relations at MCU, thank you for making the symposium punctual and for guiding the question-and-answer period in a manner which made the entire day so much richer and more informative. I want to especially thank Professor F. Gregory Gause, director of the Middle East Program at the University of Vermont, for accepting the invitation to speak on Iran's policies in the Gulf region on short notice. General John P. 97 Acknowledgments Erika A. Tarzi of the USMC Center for Advanced Operational Culture Learning read and edited the introduction and the final proof of the work and provided invaluable suggestions making it much fuller and finer. I am indebted to Erika for her efforts on this project and am eternally grateful for her companionship in walking this journey called life together with me. Last, but certainly not least, I thank Michael C. Joel for working on every aspect of this project from the very beginning to the end. He was instrumental in organizing the symposium, worked—and often led—the publication process, and helped in the editing of the papers. 99 Index ElBaradei, Mohamed M.: on Iranian nuclear program, 52 European Union (EU): and negotiations with Iran, 36, 55-56, 80 Expediency Council, 10, 92 Al-Faisal, Saud, 57 France: party in talks with Iran, 6, 53; supplies reactor to Iraq, 74 Gaza, 35, 71-72,93 Germany: party in talks with Iran, 6, 53; mentioned, 74, 76 Ghalibaf, Mohammad Bagher, 85 Grand Bargain, 39, 45 Guardian Council: defined, 10,92; Khamenei and, 23 Gulf War. See Persian Gulf War India, 77 International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA): defined, 93; and Iranian nuclear program, 49, 50-52, 53, 54, 73, 91 Iraq: British establish (1921), 66; and Iran, 2,8-9, 26, 27, 32, 35, 41, 43, 57-70, 71; Israel destroys reactor in, 74, 75, 92; MEK prisoners in, 43-44, 69-70, 94; U.S. in, 7, 8-9, 21, 24, 26, 27, 28, 32, 35, 40, 47, 53, 57-70, 80, 81, 82, 88; mentioned, 54. See also Hussein, Saddam Iran: 2005 election in, 11, 23, 33-34; 2009 election in, 2-3, 4, 18, 24, 33-34, 41, 83-90; and Afghanistan, 9, 15, 26, 27- 28, 32, 35, 40, 41, 62, 63, 65, 69; and G.H.W. Bush, 40; and G.W. Bush, 14, 24, 32, 64, 80, 81, 87; and China, 6, 36, 48, 53, 54-55,69,73; and W.J. Clinton, 44, 45; economy of, 11-12, 16-18, 53-54, 84; and France, 6, 54, 74; and Germany, 6, 54; governmental structure of, 10, 22-23, 59-60; and Hamas, 4, 8, 29, 31, 34, 41, 71; and Hezbollah, 4, 31, 35, 41, 71, 78-79; human rights issues in, 31, 33, 89,90; and IAEA, 49, 50-52, 53, 54, 73, 91; and Iraq, 2, 8-9, 26, 27, 32, 35, 41, 43, 57-70, 71; and Israel, 4, 5, 6-7,9, 22, 25, 28, 29-30, 48, 58, 71-82; and Lebanon, 8, 9,35, 63, 65, 71, 79,93; nuclear ambitions of, 2, 3, 4, 5-7,9, 14, 21, 22, 26, 28-29, 41, 49-56, 58-59, 62- 63, 65, 72-82, 83, 88; and Obama, 26, 32-33, 34, 37, 83, 86-87,89; oil prices and, 11-12, 16, 17-18, 24, 34, 53-54, 86; oil and gas resources of, 7-8, 24, 30-31, 40; reform movement in, 12, 23; Hamas: defined, 92-93; Iran support for, 4, 8, 29, 31, 34, 41, 71 Hawzeh, 70,93 Hejab, 25,93 Herat Province, Afghanistan: Iranian influence in, 69 Hezbollah: defined, 93; Iran support for, 4, 31, 34, 41, 71, 78-79 Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU), 53, 93 Holocaust: Ahmadinejad denies, 58, 72, 76-77 Hostage Crisis (1979-81), 42, 60, 61 Human rights: in Iran, 31, 33, 89,90 Hussein, Saddam: Dawa party opposes, 92; deposed, 8, 63, 66-67, 71; Iraq after fall of, 57, 65, 68; and Iran-Iraq War, 61, 66, 89, 94; and MEK, 66, 94; nuclear ambitions of, 54 103