CONTENTS
Page
WITNESS
The Honorable Christopher R. Hill, American Ambassador to Iraq
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LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING
The Honorable Christopher R. Hill: Prepared statement
The Honorable Sheila Jackson Lee, a Representative in Congress from the
State of Texas: Material submitted for the record
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APPENDIX
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57
59
Hearing notice
Hearing minutes
The Honorable Howard L. Berman, a Representative in Congress from the
State of California, and Chairman, Committee on Foreign Affairs: Prepared
statement ........
The Honorable Dan Burton, a Representative in Congress from the State
of Indiana: Prepared statement
The Honorable Gerald E. Connolly, a Representative in Congress from the
State of Virginia: Prepared statement
The Honorable Gene Green, a Representative in Congress from the State
of Texas: Prepared statement
Written responses from the Honorable Christopher R. Hill to questions sub-
mitted for the record by the Honorable Barbara Lee, a Representative
in Congress from the State of California
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(III)


OUTLOOK FOR IRAQ AND U.S. POLICY
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3
THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 10, 2009
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:39 a.m. in room
2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Howard L. Berman
(chairman of the committee) presiding.
Chairman BERMAN. The committee will come to order. First, let
me indicate that at some point, around 10:30 or 10:40, I am going
to have to leave for a while and Mr. Ackerman, the vice chair of
the committee and chair of the Middle East Subcommittee, will
preside during that time. I also wanted to make clear our commit-
tee's policy on handling protests.
We have no objection to audience members wearing T-shirts and
hats expressing their views, but to maintain order in the hearing
room, we request that the audience members do not hold up or
wave signs, make gestures to attract attention, stand up and pro-
test, shout or yell their views or otherwise disrupt the hearing. We
will ask the Capitol Police to remove anyone from the room who
violates this policy. It is the policy of the Capitol Police to arrest
anyone who is ejected from a hearing room.
I will now recognize myself for an opening statement. Six months
ago, President Obama set out his vision and timetable for United
States involvement in Iraq. Since that time, Christopher Hill, one
of our most talented and skilled diplomats, was appointed and con-
firmed as the U.S. Ambassador in Baghdad. We are very pleased
to welcome him back to the committee for the first time in his new
role, and look forward to his assessment of whether the President's
vision is taking hold, and whether his timetable is on track.
In his February 27 speech at Camp Lejeune, President Obama
emphasized that all United States combat forces would leave Iraq
by the end of August 2010—a little less than 1 year from now.
Under the agreement reached with the Iraqi Government in the
final weeks of the Bush administration, we are, in fact, obligated
to remove all our forces from Iraq 16 months after that, by the end
of 2011.
President Obama also made clear that Iraqis had been given
what he called “a precious opportunity" to shape their own future.
He emphasized, “the long-term solution in Iraq must be political,
not military,” and that “the most important decisions about Iraq's
future must now be made by Iraqis.” Two thousand and ten will
be a milestone year for Iraq, as well as the United States.
(1)


2
In January, Iraqis will go to the polls to elect a new government.
Over the following 7-plus months, our combat forces will depart.
We have already withdrawn from Iraqi cities, as of June 30.
Based on the most recent figures, we are currently at the pre-surge
level of roughly 130,000. Well over half those troops will be with-
drawn by this time next year.
Mr. Ambassador, we would like to know: Will the Iraqi security
forces be able to maintain order and protect their borders as the
United States presence dramatically dwindles? Are the Iraqis ready
to step up? More broadly, we would like to know whether Iraqis
are, in fact, seizing the opportunity they have been given.
In his Camp Lejeune speech, President Obama also noted, “Too
many fundamental political questions about Iraq's future remain
unresolved.”
Mr. Ambassador, we would like your assessment whether this re-
mains true today.
Do the Iraqis have the political will to maintain national cohe-
sion? Do they share sufficiently a national vision that will sustain
peace with their neighbors but independence from the encroach-
ments of neighbors, such as Iran, that would dominate them? What
is the attitude of Iraq's neighbors as we prepare to withdraw?
How strong is Iran's influence and what are Iran's intentions? Is
Syria harboring Iraqi Baathists who direct acts of terrorism, as
Baghdad claims, and still facilitating transit of anti-Iraqi terrorists
across its border?
Do we foresee any pitfalls ahead in Turkey's relations with Bagh-
dad, and particularly with Iraqi Kurdistan, which have heretofore
developed in a positive direction that would have surprised us just
a few years ago?
What sort of relationship should we anticipate with Iraq-politi-
cally, economically and militarily—in the wake of our withdrawal?
Are the Iraqis committed to repatriating, in the fairest and most
humane way possible, the millions of their citizens who have been
internally displaced or made refugees as a result of the war? This
last question reminds us of our own ongoing responsibilities, which
are likely to outlast our troop presence.
I want to commend our Embassy in Baghdad and the State De-
partment, which, along with the Department of Homeland Secu-
rity, have launched a rare, in country processing program to help
settle Iraqis in the United States—Iraqis who have helped us and
found their lives endangered as a result.
A great deal of the credit for this program belongs to our late
and much-missed friend, Senator Ted Kennedy, who first raised
alarm bells about Iraqi refugees on Capitol Hill and later used his
notable skills as a negotiator to ensure passage of the Iraq Refu-
gees Act of 2007. We will make sure that the United States con-
tinues to offer protection to those who have risked their lives on
our behalf in Iraq.
Mr. Ambassador, we look forward to your answers to these and
other key questions about the future of Iraq and our involvement
there.
I now turn to the distinguished ranking member, my friend,
Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, for any opening remarks that she might wish
to make.


3
Ms. Ros-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman. Thank
you for those remarks and for the opportunity to give my state-
ment. I also will be following you to our next meeting, unfortu-
nately, off the Hill, so I will ask Mr. Burton if he would be kind
enough to step in for me when we depart. Thank you. So thank
for holding this important hearing, Mr. Chairman.
The last time the full committee reviewed United States policy
toward Iraq on April 9, 2008, General Petraeus and former Ambas-
sador Crocker reported that all major violence indicators, such as
the number of attacks against United States and Iraq forces and
Iraqi civilian deaths had been reduced to close to the low spring
2003 levels. As a result, the surge was declared as having ended
on July 31, 2008.
Among the surge accomplishments, some areas formally written
off as al-Qaeda strongholds are experiencing normal life. Similarly,
Iran-supported Shia militias in Basra, Baghdad and throughout
the southern portion of the country were confronted by the Iraq
Government and United States forces in March 2008 and have
since seen their capabilities greatly reduced.
Even with great recent gains in security, both al-Qaeda and af-
filiated insurgent groups, as well as some Iranian-supported mili-
tias, remain potent threats in Iraq and there can be no room for
complacency. The administration must reinforce a policy which
demonstrates that success in Iraq remains a national priority.
In a speech earlier this year the President stated that by August
31, 2010 our combat mission in Iraq will end. He also asserted his
intention to remove all United States troops from Iraq by the end
of 2011. However, the United States' strategy must look at more
than just when and how quickly U.S. forces should and must be re-
moved. A conditions-based strategy must be developed and imple-
mented to ensure that U.S. strategic interests are preserved be-
yond the departure of U.S. forces.
The key U.S. mission is to execute a transition over the period
up to 2011 and beyond that will create a strong, democratic, inde-
pendent Iraq that will be a strategic partner in bringing further se-
curity and stability to the Gulf. The U.S. must prepare to make the
transition to a civilian lead that is backed by an adequate mix of
U.S. resources and capabilities.
One thing is certain. The United States cannot sit idly by and
allow the situation in Iraq to determine its own course. U.S. in-
volvement, particularly the role of our diplomats, in shaping and
achieving an outcome supportive of our national security priorities
is vital. The United States strategy must include a training mis-
sion that will help Iraq become truly independent not only of U.S.
forces, but in dealing with the ambitions of all of its neighbors.
With respect to those neighbors, particularly Iran, I am con-
cerned about Iraqi actions being undertaken at the behest of the
Iranian regime with respect to Ashraf. On that issue, Mr. Ambas-
sador, what specific measures have been undertaken in the interim
to ensure that the rights of the residents in the camp are being
preserved, especially against their involuntary repatriation to Iran?
Given the tensions of dozens of Ashraf residents, what is the po-
sition of the State Department on this situation? How is the United
States protecting Ashraf residents from physical and other harm?


7
into Camp Ashraf, killed 11 people, captured these 36, now holding
them even though an Iraqi Judge has ordered these individuals to
be released 2 weeks ago. They are still in captivity.
What obligation, other than a letter that has been sent by the
State Department to the Iraqi Government to do the right thing
and obey the law, that has obviously been filed, what are we doing
to make sure we have the ability to secure the safety of these peo-
ple, especially as we turn down or leave the area next year and the
year after? We have the moral and legal obligation to secure the
safety of these individuals. What are we doing? Thank you. I yield
back.
Chairman BERMAN. The gentleman from Texas, Mr. Green, seeks
recognition and is recognized for 1 minute.
Mr. GREEN. Mr. Chairman, I would like to place a statement in
the record and welcome Ambassador Hill. Look forward to your tes-
timony. I yield back.
Chairman BERMAN. Anyone else seek recognition on the minority
side? Mr. Scott, the gentlemen from Georgia, is recognized for 1
minute.
Mr. SCOTT. Yes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Hill, I think that
given what is happening now and with the situation and the rela-
tionship that is impending with the borderous states of Iraq and
Syria, with blame being placed on the former Hussein Baathists,
a combination of that and al-Qaeda Sunnis, the arguments between
now the President of Iraq and the Prime Minister of Iraq, all of
this spells a formula of imminent disaster.
In the midst of all of that, the troops, our troops who are main-
taining order and security in the region, have left, we have got the
issue of the refugees needing protection, so it begs the question at
what point is there a tipping point? Is there any indication where
we could get to that point where we alter the schedule of with-
drawal of troops in the face of the need to maintain order? Is there
that point?
Is there that set of circumstances that the President could say
wait a second, we may need to pause, we may need to slow this
withdrawal, we may need to keep these troops in there to maintain
order? I think that is the fundamental question that we need to ex-
amine today as well.
Chairman BERMAN. The gentleman from South Carolina, Mr.
Inglis, is recognized for 1 minute.
Mr. INGLIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think others have men-
tioned this. Mr. Ambassador, we look forward to hearing from you
about what is happening at Camp Ashraf, and really would join in
expressing concern about the violation of Geneva Convention and
hope that the United States can put appropriate pressure on the
Iraqis to act in a humane way and consistent with the conventions.
So look forward to hearing from you about that, as well as other
things. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman BERMAN. Thank you. The time of the gentleman has
expired. Does anyone—the gentleman from California, Mr. Costa,
is recognized for 1 minute.
Mr. COSTA. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for this impor-
tant hearing. Mr. Ambassador, I, obviously with the other com-
ments that members have made, am interested in your testimony


14
Over time, as our programs make progress on these economic and
political goals, we will significantly reduce in our civilian presence both
in the provinces and at the Embassy in Baghdad.
Reality on the Ground
Iraq has suffered a series of attacks over the past several weeks,
including several on minority communities. Particularly horrifying were
the attacks on the Iraqi Foreign and Finance ministries on August 19.
The reality, however, is that the Iraqi people have stood firm and rejected
retribution and a new cycle of violence such as the one that brought Iraq
to the brink in 2006.
This does not mean we don't take the attacks seriously. We do.
Our civilian and military personnel have been cooperating extensively
with Iraqi counterparts on investigations, security and medical treatment.
There has been some good news. Iraq staged two rounds of
successful elections this year – the provincial council elections in 14 of
Iraq's 18 provinces in January, and elections for the Kurdistan Regional
Government in July. Today, new provincial councils operate, aware that
voters will have an opportunity to judge their performance in the next
elections. Preparations have begun for the national elections scheduled
for January 2010 – the Council of Representatives is working on an
elections law to govern the conduct of the elections, Iraq's High Electoral


18
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prepared to make room for an Arab state that will be led – by a
government in which Shia play a leading role? How Iraq deals with its
neighbors will define what kind of region emerges in the coming years.
We need to help Iraq find solutions to longstanding regional disputes.
We want to see an Iraq that is at peace with its neighbors, one that can be
an anchor of stability and prosperity, where the chances of having to put
our excellent service members back at risk are small.
Iraq still faces internal threats to its stability. The extreme Sunni-
Shi'a violence of 2006-2007 has abated, thanks in part to some of our
efforts, such as enlisting the help of the Sons of Iraq. In the bombings we
have seen in recent months we detect an effort by al-Qaeda in Iraq to
rekindle that violence, but to the great credit of the Iraqi people, they
have not risen to the bait. At the same time, there is a risk of escalation in
tensions between Arabs and Kurds around the disputed areas in northern
Iraq. And we are working with Iraq to address the return of refugees and
internally displaced persons in ways that will help avoid instability and
contribute to Iraq's development.
Our diplomacy has a vital role to play. I have expanded our effort
to facilitate first containing, and then beginning to resolve, disputes in
northern Iraq between the Kurds and the Arabs. I was just in Iraqi
Kurdistan discussing how we can move forward on issues like developing
the vital oil sector in a way that benefits all Iraqis and also how to address


22
development and trade promotion; all to capitalize on this opportunity to
make Iraq genuinely stable and secure. Najaf's airport is but one small
example of how we do this. The broad plan is detailed in our Strategic
Framework Agreement for a Relationship of Friendship and Cooperation
between the United States of America and the Republic of Iraq that lays
the basis for a long-term partnership.
Our Iraqi colleagues are keen partners in implementing the
agreement and this was a focus of Prime Minister Maliki's recent visit.
On July 24, Secretary Clinton and Prime Minister Maliki convened the
second meeting of the Higher Coordinating Committee under the
Agreement to review the progress made since it entered into force in
January
The Agreement calls for the establishment of Joint Coordination
Committees, as necessary, to execute and oversee implementation. To
date, four such working groups have convened.
The Committee on Services and Information Technology provides
a structure for cooperation on capacity development and institution
building, an area where improvement would yield great benefits for Iraqi
society. Our programs work with Iraqi ministries and executive offices to
develop civil service skills and ministry leadership. For example, we
have helped our Iraqi counterparts improve electricity service delivery


25
A legitimate national elections process and subsequent government
formation is key to improving stability. The successful conduct of the
provincial council elections in 14 of Iraq's 18 provinces in January was
encouraging, and we hope to help the Iraqis build on that success.
The national elections and subsequent government formation carry
high stakes for many political actors, successful election and a smooth
transition to the new government are critical for Iraq's developing
democracy and its people. What is happening now is that various
politicians are reaching into other communities in an effort to put together
a coalition they think could win in January. This is heartening. But
politicking and jockeying for position will also continue following the
elections, when Iraq's elected leaders will have to work together to create
a government. This may be a long process, but it is imperative that we
show our continuing support for Iraq's democracy. Our focus is on
building a long-term relationship with Iraq that can survive the
uncertainty surrounding elections.
Our Continuing Presence and Activities on the Ground
As the U.S.-Iraq relationship continues to change, our civilian
presence and programs will necessarily shift along with it. In Baghdad as
the relationship between the U.S. Mission and the Iraqi Governement
continues to normalize, the embassy will be rightsizing it's presence


27
presence will require strong civilian leadership in Baghdad and the
provinces. Part of the transition will involve making necessary,
sometimes tough, decisions about the types and degrees of programs that
will be critical for us to continue in order to secure and build on the
achievements made to date. As the State Department takes the lead from
the Defense Department, we will be developing a resource plan that
enables us to carry out the mission in Iraq.
We will align our assistance efforts, both in Baghdad and in the
provinces, towards the goals most important to achieving economic
growth, stability and ultimately a secure Iraq. Ambassador Pat Haslach is
coordinating our foreign assistance programs in Iraq, as well as the
transitions those programs will undergo as the military presence draws
down. Helping develop capacity in Iraq's government institutions,
assisting women and widows who have suffered disproportionately from
the violence, and aiding returning refugees and internally displaced
persons seeking to reintegrate into Iraqi society are some of the important
aspects of our activities on the ground in Iraq. Our programs also support
the President's Cairo initiatives - improving economic development and
access to opportunities, education exchanges, and so on – and make it
possible for Iraqis to participate in American programs with citizens of
other countries in the region.


41
.
share the view that, frankly, I would like to hear it more, but I do
hear it every day and it is really quite gratifying to hear it.
I have heard it expressed in quite emotional terms from Iraqis
about how our sacrifice has made them free, so I want to stress
that that goes on. That is a daily occurrence in my life there. With
regard to the issue of contracts, I think the best thing we can do
for our companies, frankly, is to ensure that the Iraqis play by the
rules and have a transparent system.
I was very pleased with the way they handled the oil bidding in
June. I mean, it was at the Al-Rasheed Hotel, there was a big glass
jar. It looked like something out of a state lottery or something as
they pulled bids from it, and really, I think, were very transparent.
They did it on national TV and live. This was not some back room
deal or some deal where you go into someone's tent and come out
with an oil concession. This was very much open.
I am sure that as they go forward and if they continue this type
of approach, our companies will do fine in this. It was a British
company that won the contract, but I am sure United States com-
panies will do fine. I also take note of the fact that our companies
are very interested in working in Iraq. I believe that Iraq holds the
promise for our companies of strong exports to Iraq.
They need a lot of infrastructure sorts of things, our companies
can build well, so I think we are going to do just fine there.
Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. It is my understanding that out of a popu-
lation of 23 million people, over 1 million now are refugees in other
countries, like Jordan, Egypt, and the other million, ņ believe, are
also homeless within Iraq. Sixty percent of the population is Shiite,
20 percent is Sunnis, for which Saddam Hussein was a Sunni, and
one of the big ironies that I find interesting in history is the fact
that we supported Saddam Hussein during the 8-year war that he
had with Iran because we hated the Ayatollah more than we did
Saddam Hussein.
Who do we appoint as a special envoy to Saddam Hussein at the
time? A fellow named Donald Rumsfeld. Talk about contradictions
of history and what we are dealing with here. I just wanted to ask,
I appreciate the fact that you are sharing this, that they do appre-
ciate, but, boy, I am telling you, I am not hearing it in our media,
the American people have not heard it as often, maybe it should
in some way or somehow.
I for one, and I am sure there is not one member here that does
not have relatives and friends who have served and died in the war
there, but I really, really would deeply appreciate if you can convey
that message. How about a little more public acknowledgement of
what we have sacrificed for? Thank you, Mr. Ambassador.
Ambassador HILL. Just a postscript on that. I would like to
stress that Prime Minister Maliki, when he came here, he asked
to go to Arlington Cemetery, it was his idea to do that, and pay
respect to those who have fallen. Mr. Congressman, believe me, I
hear you loud and clear on that issue.
Mr. ACKERMAN. Thank you. Ms. Jackson Lee.
Ms. JACKSON LEE. Ambassador, let me thank you very much for
a very long tenure of service. I don't think anyone can deny the
commitment that you have had to the American people. We are
most grateful. We are grateful to this President, and we are grate-


70
DynCorp will continue to perform under WPPS Task Order 15, but the State Department
and DynCorp have modified the task order to significantly reduce its scope. The helicopters and
associated personnel have been removed from the task order, at no cost to the Government.
Under the modified contract, DynCorp will provide the following:
The Government exercised the option to purchase one new light helicopter from
DynCorp and provide for use as Government aircraft,
• Fixed-wing aircraft will continue to be provided as a wet lease;
The Baghdad main operating base will be built by DynCorp, on Government
provided land, and will become government-owned property upon completion;
• Durable and expendable goods (contractor-acquired property such as tools,
ground support equipment, vehicles, personal equipment) purchased by DynCorp
will be provided to INL/A for use in Iraq.
Question 13:
Camp Ashraf
Earlier this summer, the Iraqi Security Forces' incursion into Camp Ashraf resulted in the deaths
of 11 unarmed Ashraf residents and the detainment of more than 36 residents of the camp.
Has the State Department taken a position as to whether these actions are in violation of the
assurances received by the United States from the Iraqi government indicating the residents of
Ashraf will be treated humanely?
Answer:
The outbreak of violence at Ashraf was an avoidable tragedy, and we deplore the injuries
and loss of life. The Government of Iraq's effort to establish a police station inside Ashraf was
a lawful exercise of its sovereignty. The MEK leadership rebuffed Gol efforts to arrange this
peacefully and met the GOI entry into Ashraf with violent demonstrations. At the same time,
we have asked the Government of Iraq to investigate any excessive use of force in the security
forces' actions to quell the MEK rioting, and take appropriate action if it did occur.
Question 14:
Can you detail any specific agreements or assurances that have been provided to the residents of
Camp Ashraf to date by the United States regarding their rights and protections?
Answer:
With the end of the occupation in June 2004, the United States undertook as a matter of
policy to continue to treat the individual MEK members at Ashraf as “protected persons” under
the Fourth Geneva Convention; this treatment continued until January 1, 2009, at which time the