1016-A CONFLICT WITH IRAQ: AN ISRAELI PERSPECTIVE HEARING BEFORE THE COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ONE HUNDRED SEVENTH CONGRESS SECOND SESSION SEPTEMBER 12, 2002 Serial No. 107-139 Printed for the use of the Committee on Government Reform Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/congress/house http://www.house.gov/reform UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN LIBRARIES U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE FEB 2 6 2003 83-514 PDF WASHINGTON : 2003 For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office EPOSITED BY The University bookstore spook Phone: toll free (866) 512-1800; DC area (292BIZ 1800TATES OF AMERICA 512–2250 of Michigan Documents Center 2 by Saddam Hussein has been violated by him. I won't enumerate all of them, but I think the President made a very, very strong case. I know there is a lot of concern about the problems in the Middle East and Iraq and whether or not we should take military action to eliminate the threat by Saddam Hussein. And so today I hope that listening to one of the foremost experts on the Middle East, Benjamin Netanyahu, we will be able to have a lot of those ques- tions answered. I have had the privilege of meeting with Benjamin Netanyahu on a number of times, a number of occasions, and heard him speak on issues concerning the Middle East and in particular Iraq, and I am convinced he is one of the most knowledgeable people on this issue that I have had the pleasure to talk to. And with that, I want to welcome Mr. Netanyahu. [The prepared statement of Hon. Dan Burton follows:] 6 have them and the ability to deliver, we should of course eliminate those weapons; find them and dismantle them. But I would hope that as we proceed with the considerable intel- ligence of Mr. Netanyahu, that we not lose an opportunity to make still one more effort in trying to resolve our conditions of dispute with Iraq through the international community without the United States taking unilateral action and with an intention that we might be able to resolve this without resorting to war. I thank Mr. Netanyahu for being here and I look forward to his testimony. Mr. BURTON. Are there other Members that wish to make an opening statement? Mr. Barr. Mr. BARR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. As you set the example, I will submit a written statement in more detail. But I also want to thank the Prime Minister for being here today. I also want to draw attention to the President's speech today which included very important elements in the war against terror- ism. I think the President did a masterful job of laying out a sound basis for any number of options in the interest both of the United States and the world against terrorism and despotism. I think the President's message left the United States in a very solid position to exercise perhaps one of the most important tools in the fight against terrorism, and that is flexibility; not to tie oneself down to outside factors, but to always remain focused on maintaining maxi- mum number of options with which to deal with terrorism, which itself maintains by its definition tremendous flexibility. So I want to take this opportunity to commend President Bush for a masterful job of laying out the case for military action should it become necessary, but at the same time leaving options open and, at least by his actions today before the United Nations, pre- venting anyone from raising legitimate concerns or criticisms of the President for not making every effort to secure the backing of inter- national organizations and our allies. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. BURTON. Thank you Mr. Barr. Mr. Waxman. Mr. WAXMAN. I thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to welcome our witness, former Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, to our hearing. It is good to see you again. The last time we met was in this room on September 20, 2001, right after the horrible terrorist attacks of September 11th. At that time, Prime Minister Netanyahu conveyed the grief, empathy, and the solidarity of the entire world when he said, “Today we are all Americans.” And he spoke with great force and eloquence about the need to confront terrorism. Now we are considering a different question: whether the United States should take military action against Iraq. This question is not an easy one and it raises complex issues to which Congress has not yet received answers. Should the United States push for the re- turn of the international inspectors? Should we seek from the Secu- rity Council a resolution authorizing the use of force? What effects will a war on Iraq have on the war against terrorism, and what is the plan for Iraq after hostilities end? 8 If we do not attack, what may happen to Israel? If we do attack, what may happen to Israel? And I yield back. Thank you. Mr. BURTON. Thank you Mrs. Morella. [The prepared statement of Hon. Constance A. Morella follows:] 9 I loncie Thothe 도 ​Thank Opening Statement for Constance Morella for Sept. 12 Hearing I want to begin by thanking Chairman Burton and Ranking Member Waxman for holding this hearing today. Today's hearing is a topic of central importance both to the American people and the world. It is absolutely essential that Congress debate the merits of an invasion of Iraq, learn the perspectives of our allies and determine whether an imminent attack is the wisest course of action. Currently, I have serious reservations about attacking Iraq for two reasons. One, I feel the Bush Administration has not demonstrated what it would do after we ousted Saddam Hussein and two, I have concerns about the ramifications of an attack for Israel. An invasion of Iraq and the replacement of Saddam's Hussein regime by a democratic government would cost tens of billions of dollars and years of U.S. effort to occupy and reconstruct the large and diverse country. While the United States could undoubtedly win a war against Iraq on its own, it is difficult to imagine remaking Iraq on our own. The fact is, in Thomas Friedman's words, “if we invade Iraq; we own Iraq. And once we own it, we will have to rebuild it.” There will be no avoiding nation-building. It would dwarf the Balkan interventions that President Bush once portrayed as stretching the U.S. military too thin. When the United States committed militarily in that conflict, then Governor Bush supported the mission but once the Serbs withdrew, Bush disagreed with the idea of using American troops to help redevelop the region. Currently, in Afghanistan, the United States has not only mostly passed off the responsibility on rebuilding Afghanistan to other countries but we have provided very little desperately needed reconstruction aid. The majority of the disbursement, which totaled $505 million in 2002, has been for humanitarian aid such as food, medicine, potable water, shelter, and refugee care and support. Unfortunately, a minimal amount of aid has been supplied for agriculture and basic reconstruction. We have given only $12 million for vital agricultural improvements, like the rehabilitation of wells and seed multiplication, we have provided almost no money for an irrigation system even though Afghanistan is suffering from a three year drought, and no funds for repair of the major highways. Added to this list is the fact that in June, the Bush Administration announced it would close the Army Peacekeeping Institute (PKI), which is the military's central authority for planning peacekeeping strategies. Considering the Bush Administration has not demonstrated it has altered its views on nation- building, a war with Iraq without the necessary commitment to rebuild would only exacerbate tensions within Iraq and inflame the conflicts within the Middle East. We simply cannot invade without acknowledging what is required once our military victory is achieved. And what will be required is a nation building effort unlike any the United States has ever led. We have never attempted to rebuild a region surrounded by so many countries diametrically opposed to everything we support. The history of the Iraqi people and the nations that surround it are inhabited by persons who have never known a true democracy of any kind. Installing a new 11 Mr. BURTON. Mr. Clay. Mr. CLAY. Thank you for yielding, Mr. Chairman. I too will de- liver an abbreviated opening statement and submit its entirety to the record. I too would like to welcome our distinguished guest, former Prime Minister Netanyahu, to this panel. I certainly appreciate having your perspective on this highly contentious issue, the con- flict with Iraq. This issue has spawned many different points of view. There is, however, a consensus that exists between our two countries. We both believe without question that Saddam Hussein must be re- moved. Saddam's continued existence in the region serves to fur- ther aggravate an opportunity for real peace and cooperation be- tween Israel and its Arab neighbors. I realize that for the present moment, many questions still re- main unanswered. Prime Minister Netanyahu, I am very interested to learn your opinion on how a new Iraqi regime might be different from the one that is currently in place. Additionally, I am inter- ested in knowing your thoughts about the impact of regional desta- bilization and the potential loss of additional American and Israeli lives. And, Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent to submit my statement into the record. Mr. BURTON. Mr. Clay, without objection, so ordered. [The prepared statement of Hon. Wm. Lacy Clay follows:] 12 Statement of the Honorable William Lacy Clay Before the Government Reform Committee Thursday, September 12, 2002 “Conflict with Iraq - An Israeli Perspective” Thank you for yielding, Mr. Chairman, I too would like to welcome our distinguished guest, former Prime Minister Netanyahu to this panel. I certainly appreciate having your prospective on this highly contentious issue, conflict with Iraq. This issue has spawned many different points of view. There is however, a consensus that exists between our two countries. We both believe, without question, that Saddam Hussein must be removed. Saddam's continued existence in the region serves to further aggravate an opportunity for real peace and cooperation between Israel and its Arab neighbors. There is no doubt in the minds of Americans that there is a clear indubitable connection between the government of Saddam Hussein and state sponsored terrorism. Hence, the argument to remove him has been made and is fully understood. Now comes the hard part. How can he be removed and most of all when? I realize that for the present moment many questions will remain unanswered. Prime Minister Netanyahu, I am very interested to learn your opinion on how a new Iraqi regime might be different from the one that is currently in place. 33 WITHHOLDING OF FOOD Relatives who do not report deserters may lose their ration cards for purchasing government-controlled food supplies, be evicted from their residences, or face the arrest of other family members. The Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq reported in October and December 1999 that authorities denied food ration cards to families that failed to send their young sons to the "Saddam's Cubs” compulsory weapons training camps.43 CRIMES AGAINST MUSLIMS The Government consistently politicizes and interferes with religious pilgrimages, both of Iraqi Muslims who wish to make the Hajj to Mecca and Medina and of Iraqi and non-iraqi Muslim pilgrims who travel to holy sites within the country. For example, in 1998 the UN Sanctions Committee offered to disburse vouchers for travel and expenses to pilgrims making the Hajj ; however, the Government rejected this offer. In 1999 the Sanctions Committee offered to disburse funds to cover Hajj-related expenses via a neutral third party; the Government again rejected the offer. Following the December 1999 passage of UN Security Council Resolution 1284, the Sanctions Committee again sought to devise a protocol to facilitate the payment for individuals making the journey. The Sanctions Committee proposed to issue $250 in cash and $1,750 in travelers checks to each individual pilgrim to be distributed at the U.N. office in Baghdad in the presence of both U.N. and Iraqi officials. The Government again declined and, consequently, no iraqi pilgrims were able to take advantage of the available funds or, in 2000, of the permitted flights. The Government continued to insist that these funds would be accepted only if they were paid in cash to the government-controlled central bank, not to the Hajj pilgrims.44 More than 95 percent of the population of Iraq are Muslim. The (predominantly Arab) Shi'a Muslims constitute a 60 to 65 percent majority: The Iraqi government has for decades conducted a brutal campaign of murder, summary execution, and protracted arbitrary arrest against the religious leaders and followers of the majority Shi'a Muslim population. Despite nominal legal protection of religious equality, the Government has repressed severely the Shi'a clergy and those who follow the Shi'a faith.45 Forces from the Mukhabarat, General Security (Amn Al-Amm), the Military Bureau, Saddam's Commandos (Fedayeen Saddam), and the Ba'th Party have killed senior Shia clerics, desecrated Shi'a mosques and holy sites, and interfered with Shi'a religious education. Security agents reportedly are stationed at all the major Shi'a mosques and shrines, where they search, harass, and arbitrarily arrest worshipers.46 43 Page 8, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices -- Iraq, March 4, 2002; US Department of State; www.state.gov 44 ibid, Page 11-12 45 lbid, Page 11 48 lbid, Page 11 16 42 chemical payloads, at the Jewish state. And though I am speaking here today as a private citizen, I believe and I know that I speak and reflect the sentiment of not just the majority, but the over- whelming majority of Israelis in supporting a preemptive strike against Saddam's regime, and this cuts across political lines in Israel. We support this preemptive American action even though we stand on the front lines, while others criticize it as they sit com- fortably on the sidelines. But we know that their sense of comfort is an illusion, for if action is not taken now, we will all be threat- ened by a much greater peril. We support this action because it is possible today to defend against chemical and biological attacks. We have gas masks that are available. We have vaccinations. They are available. There are other means of civil defense that can protect our citizens and re- duce the risk to them. And indeed, a central component of any strike on Iraq must be to ensure that the Israeli Government, if it so chooses, has the means to vaccinate every citizen of Israel before action is initiated. And I want to stress that ensuring this is not merely the respon- sibility of the Government of Israel but also the responsibility of the Government of the United States. Let me repeat this: The Government of Israel and the Govern- ment of the United States must jointly ensure that the people of Israel have all the available means of civil defense before action be- gins. But equally I can say that no gas mask and no vaccine can pro- tect against nuclear weapons. Science has not yet invented such a device. And this is why regimes that have no compunction about using weapons of mass destruction and will not hesitate to give these weapons to their terror proxies must never be allowed to ac- quire nuclear weapons. These regimes must be brought down be- fore they possess the power to bring us all down. If a preemptive action would be supported by a broad coalition of free countries—and if it is the United Nations, all the better- but if such support is not forthcoming, then the United States must be prepared to act without it. International support for actions that are vital to a Nation's security is always desirable, but it must never constitute a precondition. If you can get it, fine. If not, act without it. I don't want to sound like something familiar to you, but I would say, if you can't get it, just do it. Now, my friends, under exceptional circumstances, public figures may sometimes be forgiven for quoting themselves, and I hope today that you will indulge me and grant me this privilege, because nearly two decades ago I wrote the following. I said that: The West can win the war against terrorism. It can expose its duplicity and pun- ish its perpetrators and its sponsors. But it must first win the war against its own inner weakness, and that will require courage. We shall need at least three types of courage. First, statesmen must have the political courage to present the truth, however un- pleasant, to their people. They must be prepared to make difficult decisions, to take measures that may involve great risks and subject them to public criticism. Second, the soldiers who will be called upon to combat terrorists will need to show military courage. Third, the people will have to show civic courage. The citizens of a democracy threatened by terrorists must see themselves in a certain sense as soldiers in a com- 46 the engineering of an effective nuclear device. But our assessments kept shrinking; that is, our Intelligence Community, as we moved along the axis of time, the time that we assumed it would take him to create nuclear weapons was constantly shrinking, but we couldn't say with absolute precession how long it would take him. Mr. KUCINICH. Do you have any new evidence of Iraq's weapon capabilities-nuclear capabilities? Mr. NETANYAHU. I cannot give you even an oblique reference to information in the last 3 years because I am busy going around the world, visiting Washington. I am not prying into privileged dos- siers. There is this thing, “need to know," and I do not really need to know right now. But I think you can be sure that when I did need to know, there was a constant upgrading of these weapons. Constant upgrading of these weapons. Constant efforts to make them more lethal and to expand the reach of the delivery systems to deliver them. Mr. KUCINICH. I would respectfully suggest to the Prime Min- ister, notwithstanding the great affection I have for Mr. Prime Minister, that there is a need to know if the United States is being called upon to launch preemptive action against Iraq. There is a need to know the evidence. I share the concern that other Members have articulated here about the effect that a preemptive attack on Iraq by the United States would have not only on the people of our country who would be called upon to wage that, and innocent civil- ians, but also the effect that it would have on Israel. Now, you stated in your remarks that if the United States launched a preemptive attack on Iraq, that Iraq in Saddam Hus- sein's—as you described it—dying gasp would be expected to launch a counterattack on Israel. If the United States does not launch a preemptive attack on the State of Iraq, do you see any indication that Iraq is prepared to launch an attack on Israel? Mr. NETANYAHU. First of all, let me comment on when I said I do not need to know, I meant I do not need that kind of detailed information. It always involves, just by the nature of the informa- tion, some indication of source, and I for one try to avoid that when I am not in office. That is what I meant. But I also say that if you connect the dots, here is a man who from the minute he achieved power is trying to create a nuclear weapon. Twenty years ago he is very close to producing it. He is foiled. He changed the technology to centrifuges that will prevent him from being foiled again. We know that he is taking in nuclear technologists and nuclear technologies from various countries. We know that he is developing the means to deliver these weapons. We have defectors who describe how committed he is to this above all else. So we have all of these dots, and we say, well, we do not know exactly what is happening. You know, it is like you are about to see somebody plunging a knife into someone, you look in a keyhole, you followed a murderer. You know that he has already killed a few people, and you see him trail somebody, and you are trailing him. He shuts the door, you are looking through the keyhole, and you see him grasping the throat of this person, raising the knife, and then the light goes out,