11
how we do this. The broad plan is detailed in our Strategic Framework Agreement
for a Relationship of Friendship and Cooperation between the United States of
America and the Republic of Iraq that lays the basis for a long-term partnership.
Our Iraqi colleagues are keen partners in implementing the agreement and this
was a focus of Prime Minister Maliki's recent visit. On July 24, Secretary Clinton
and Prime Minister Maliki convened the second meeting of the Higher Coordinating
Committee under the Agreement to review the progress made since it entered into
force in January.
The Agreement calls for the establishment of Joint Coordination Committees, as
necessary, to execute and oversee implementation. To date, four such working
groups have convened.
The Committee on Services and Information Technology provides a structure for
cooperation on capacity-development and institution-building, an area where im-
provement would yield great benefits for Iraqi society. Our programs work with
Iraqi ministries and executive offices to develop civil service skills and ministry
leadership. For example, we have helped our Iraqi counterparts improve electricity
service delivery and have provided intensive training on specialized medical treat-
ment for Iraqi doctors.
The Committee on Economic and Energy Cooperation has overseen technical
assistance and training for the Ministry of Oil on contracting, licensing, the tender
process, and dispute mitigation. The U.S. Commercial Service has made it possible
for eight delegations of Iraqi businessmen to attend trade shows in the United
States. And we are working with the Government of Iraq and the World Bank to
develop a regulatory framework for, and to invest in, microfinance institutions cur-
rently operating in Iraq.
The Committee on Law Enforcement and Judicial Cooperation focuses on
strengthening the judicial and corrections systems. There are courts operating now
in parts of Iraq where there used to be none, such as the new one in Ramadi that
we helped build in once violence-wracked Anbar. International human rights organi-
zations such as Human Rights Watch have acknowledged that the treatment of
detainees in Justice Ministry prisons—whose guards we train-has improved.
Meanwhile, legal clinics and judicial training we provide has reduced the time pris-
oners wait to get trials. Better detention conditions and faster resolution of cases
takes some of the edge off of sectarian divisions and ultimately reinforces stability
in Iraq.
Finally, the Committee on Education, Cultural, and Scientific Cooperation pro-
vides an umbrella for our many Fulbright and International Visitors Programs,
which bring scholars and experts to the United States for long- and short-term
study. Iraq recently committed $2.5 million to the Fulbright program, making it the
largest Fulbright contributor in the Middle East. We are also partnering with Prime
Minister Maliki in his ambitious program to send 10,000 young Iraqis for university
studies abroad. I mentioned the problems that hinder Iraq's economy because of dis-
credited socialist ideologies and practices. Iraqis—both the people and the govern-
ment-hunger for better education and, in the end, only better educated graduates
can ensure that Iraq is prosperous and stable in decades to come.
We are not alone. United National Assistance Mission for Iraq or UNAMI has am-
bitious plans. Our NATO allies are helping with training programs. The World
Bank and International Monetary Fund are contributing as well to our shared objec-
tives in Iraq. But all of them need to do more.
ELECTIONS AND GOVERNMENT FORMATION
Under the Strategic Framework Agreement we have agreed to work with the Gov-
ernment of Iraq to support and strengthen Iraq's democracy and democratic institu-
tions on a purely nonpartisan basis.
A legitimate national elections process and subsequent government formation is
key to improving stability. The successful conduct of the provincial council elections
in 14 of Iraq's 18 provinces in January was encouraging, and we hope to help the
Iraqis build on that success.
The national elections and subsequent government formation carry high stakes
for many political actors, successful election and a smooth transition to the new gov-
ernment are critical for Iraq's developing democracy and its people. What is hap-
pening now is that various politicians are reaching into other communities in an
effort to put together a coalition they think could win in January. This is heart-
ening. But politicking and jockeying for position will also continue following the
elections, when Iraq's elected leaders will have to work together to create a govern-
ment. This may be a long process, but it is imperative that we show our continuing


12
support for Iraq's democracy. Our focus is on building a long-term relationship with
Iraq that can survive the uncertainty surrounding elections.
OUR CONTINUING PRESENCE AND ACTIVITIES ON THE GROUND
As the United States-Iraq relationship continues to change, our civilian presence
and programs will necessarily shift along with it. In Baghdad as the relationship
between the U.S. mission and the Iraqi Government continues to normalize, the
Embassy will be rightsizing it's presence down from the extraordinary staff levels
that were required to support the interim government a few years ago. In provinces,
as our military presence draws down, the number of PRTs will decrease too, but we
want to maintain significant engagement in important provinces. Consistent focus
on key provinces could help prevent violence and instability that may spread to
other areas. We are currently engaged in a deliberative process within the adminis-
tration on the future footprint of the U.S. mission in the provinces and we will be
happy to update you as we move forward.
The intrepid men and women serving in our PRTs have amassed a record of
achievement that all of us can be proud of. They have contributed significantly to
the decline in violence in most parts of Iraq; helped prepare for provincial and now
national elections; provided capacity-building assistance for provincial officials;
spurred good governance and reconciliation; strengthened civil society and much
more. More importantly, it is a record of achievement that local Iraqi communities
are eager to build on.
The transition from a military- to civilian-led mission will involve significant pro-
grammatic and management challenges. We are planning for the civilian-led pro-
grams to follow on from military ones that have yielded successes and will need to
be continued, such as police training. An effective transition from a military-led
presence to a civilian-led presence will require strong civilian leadership in Baghdad
and the provinces. Part of the transition will involve making necessary, sometimes
tough, decisions about the types and degrees of programs that will be critical for
us to continue in order to secure and build on the achievements made to date. As
the State Department takes the lead from the Defense Department, we will be
developing a resource plan that enables us to carry out the mission in Iraq.
We will align our assistance efforts, both in Baghdad and in the provinces, toward
the goals most important to achieving economic growth, stability, and ultimately a
secure Iraq. Ambassador Pat Haslach is coordinating our foreign assistance pro-
grams in Iraq, as well as the transitions those programs will undergo as the mili-
tary presence draws down. Helping develop capacity in Iraq's government institu-
tions, assisting women and widows who have suffered disproportionately from the
violence, and aiding returning refugees and internally displaced persons seeking to
reintegrate into Iraqi society are some of the important aspects of our activities on
the ground in Iraq. Our programs also support the President's Cairo initiatives,
improving economic development and access to opportunities, education exchanges,
and so on—and make it possible for Iraqis to participate in American programs with
citizens of other countries in the region.
Looking out longer term, we can see where our civilian effort reaches its objec-
tives. We will have finished training programs and helped the Iraqis establish sus-
tainable economic growth, and stable governance and management systems. We can
then continue to ramp down our effort. Already the Embassy is planning for a grad-
ual reduction in the number of agencies and American personnel both in the prov-
inces and at the Embassy starting in 2010.
CONCLUSION
We are at a new stage in our relationship with Iraq. We must maintain strong
engagement to prevent backsliding and build close and constructive ties. Such ties
are squarely in our interests, in Iraq's interests, and in the interests of the region.
An Iraq focused on economic development will want stable, predictable relations
with its neighbors.
An Iraq where different ethnic and sectarian groups work together to solve com-
mon problems will improve security—and free people to get down to building busi-
nesses, not bombs.
An Iraq where people go safely to the polls and have a say in the decisions that
affect their lives will make for a better future. To paraphrase a former mayor of
New York, issues-based politics will help drive home the point that there is no Shia
or Sunni way to clean the streets.
The Strategic Framework Agreement provides a solid foundation for civilian
engagement and cooperation. We hope this will help us develop that relationship.
As we transition responsibilities from military to civilian agencies, we will need your


14
We're ready. We're moving forward on this and that,” et cetera, et
cetera. We are at least 3 or 4 years later now, and still those con-
tentious issues remain contentious. It seems to me that those may
be the flashpoint, in the absence of an American presence. Would
you lend your view on that, and on the prospect of actually resolv-
ing these
Ambassador Hill. Well, first of all, I'd like to say that I think
getting the economy there operating-namely, getting oil starting
to be pumped out of the ground—is essential to the future of that
country. And frankly, we cannot be funding things that should be
funded by the Iraqis, and would be funded if they were able to
move on the oil sector.
With regard to the hydrocarbons law, I went out there with the
expectation that we would move on that; I know and you know it's
been held up for 3 or 4 years. I have really worked that issue. We
have tried to break it down, find out where the real differences are
between the Kurdish Government and the Iraqi Government. It's
a complex piece of legislation, actually involving four separate
pieces of legislation having to do with revenue-sharing, having to
do with institution-building, having to do with how the ministry
would operate. And I think, realistically speaking, it will probably
not get done before the January elections.
So, our concern has been, we cannot have Iraq's future held up,
or simply held hostage, to this one piece of legislation. Therefore,
we were pleased that the Iraqis did move ahead with the beginning
of something they hadn't done for decades and decades; begin the
process of bidding oil fields to foreign concerns. They didn't do it
during Saddam, they didn't even do it pre-Saddam. So, they have
begun that. They began it in June.
The CHAIRMAN. That's all well and good, but if all those reve-
nues-
Ambassador HILL. Yes.
The CHAIRMAN [continuing). If all those revenues are piling up
in even greater amounts, and—without some distribution mecha-
nism
Ambassador HILL. Yes.
The CHAIRMAN [continuing). You would have
Ambassador HILL. Well, there is a distribution mechanism. The
17 percent is basically agreed by all sides. So, even when the Kurd-
ish regional government were able to export some oil with an
agreement with Baghdad, they did it under the provision of 17 per-
cent.
So, I think these things can be properly distributed. The issue is
in the—I won't say “long run”—but certainly in the medium run,
they're going to need this law, because the main issues go to things
like infrastructure. Iraq's oil sector is very much in trouble, with
very aging infrastructure. They have to have agreements on how
they're going to pay for that. Is that the responsibility of local
authorities? There are other issues having to do with the southern
part of Iraq and their own regional concerns. So, I think they can
deal with some of the key elements, but it would be much better
if they dealt with a hydrocarbon law.
But, I'm giving you my sense of the situation, and I don't think
we're going to get there before January. And therefore, we really


18
I'm extremely pleased that we finally have a timetable for ending
our involvement in the war in Iraq. And, while I'm concerned that
the redeployment is not being done as promptly as it should be,
this step will allow us to refocus on the global threat posed by
al-Qaeda.
I remain convinced that foreign occupations are usually not a
good strategy for combating a global terrorist network. We need to
find ways to relentlessly pursue al-Qaeda while simultaneously de-
veloping long-term partnerships with legitimate local actors, and
doing so through civilian, diplomatic, and development efforts that
do not involve a massive military footprint.
And now, as we transition out of Iraq, it is extremely important
that we focus on making this an orderly withdrawal and doing ev-
erything we can, through diplomatic means, to help promote the
political reconciliation needed to bring lasting peace to Iraq.
As to some questions, Ambassador, how do the Iraqi people feel
about the redeployment of all United States troops by the end of
2011, as currently required by the bilateral agreement? Is there
any-is there a danger that any indication that we're backing away
from that commitment would be greeted with strong opposition?
Ambassador Hill. I think the dates of December 2011, August
2010—these were agreed with the Iraqi Government in—at the end
of 2008. I think any indication that we were not prepared to live
with these dates would be very poorly received by the Iraqi people.
And indeed, we saw this in the movement out of the cities on June
30, 2009. Whenever we tried to discuss that, in terms of nuances,
immediately the Iraqi media and the Iraqi public got concerned
that somehow we were looking for ways not to accomplish that. In
the end, we did exactly what we said we would do, which was, we
pulled our people out of the cities. And I think it really has estab-
Iished a reservoir of trust that, when you reach an agreement with
the Americans, you can take it to the bank.
So, I think it's very important to live up to these agreements.
And I think the Iraqi people, even though they do have great con-
cerns about security-I think they want to be responsible for
their-see their country responsible for their own security. As I
said earlier, I think these will be difficult moments ahead, but
these are nonetheless, Iraqi moments to handle, and I think they
will deal with this. We are dealing with some very competent peo-
ple there, very intelligent people, and they will know what to do.
Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you for that answer.
The Iraqi Government intends to hold a nationwide referendum
on the bilateral Status of Forces Agreement and while there's been
a lot of speculation about how this could impact our redeployment
timetable, I'd like to also point out that both the Iraqi Parliament
and the Iraqi people will have had a chance to vote on the agree-
ment, even though the United States Senate has not. Can you
assure us that any potential modifications to the security agree-
ment will be submitted to the Senate for ratification?
Ambassador HILL. The issue of the Senate ratification goes
beyond my writ, but I will certainly take that question to the State
Department and get you an official answer on that.
Ambassador Hill. I can give you my personal opinion, that we
would not


19
Senator FEINGOLD. Would you, please?
Ambassador HILL [continuing]. Want to be changing this—we
would not engage in changing this security agreement without con-
siderable consultation. But, as for the actual relationship between
the Senate and the executive on this, I'd like to defer to our law-
yers at the State Department.
Senator FEINGOLD. Well, thank you for that answer, and I look
forward to further comments on that after you've done that.
[The written information from the State Department follows:]
We do not intend to amend the Security Agreement at this time, and we would
not negotiate with the Iraqi Government to amend the Security Agreement without
considerable consultation with Congress. We would expect to discuss with Members
of Congress, in appropriate settings, the objectives of any changes and the substance
of any issues under negotiation, and we would expect that State Department law-
yers would carefully review any proposed amendment and advise how such an
amendment as a matter of domestic law, should be concluded.
Senator FEINGOLD. The recent revelations about gaps in security
at the Kabul Embassy continue to highlight our apparent inability
to maintain discipline over our security contractors. In order to
ensure adequate security for our missions, do you think it would
be preferable to have the military provide security for U.S. embas-
sies in war zones, which would ensure that we have a legally bind-
ing command-and-control over such personnel?
Ambassador HILL. You know, I believe our military has been
tasked with a lot. And this is one where—when we talk about secu-
rity personnel in an embassy, this is one where Chief of Mission
ought to take this. And I believe that with these contractors, who
report to mission elements, who, in turn, report to me, that we
have adequate control. And what I can assure you is that I will do
my best to make sure we don't have incidents. Incidents do happen.
They happen everywhere. They happen in every institution. But, I
can assure you that we do a lot to try to ensure that they don't
happen. And I would rather not task the military with still another
mission.
Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you. According to the Department of
State's inspector general, there's no plan in place for transition to
a diplomatic presence in Iraq, and we're, therefore, not adequately
prepared for our military's redeployment. In response, the State
Department indicated it has produced a unified transition plan,
which was under review. When can we expect to see a final ap-
proved transition plan to ensure our diplomatic operations remain
uninterrupted? And is the Embassy jointly producing a plan with
the Department of Defense in order to ensure that the transition
is well coordinated?
Ambassador HILL. We are working very closely with our col-
leagues at MNFI—really, on a daily basis—and we have stood up
an entire planning cell at the American Embassy, in our political-
military section, under Ambassador Cameron Munter, who deals,
on a daily basis, with the military on this. We also have a joint
campaign plan, and we work through it, really, on a daily basis.
We know the absolute responsibility we have in the State
Department to ensure that the gains that have been achieved by
our men and women in uniform are not lost; that we pick up and
take the ball when they give it to us, and we're ready to move with
it. So, we have an overall joint campaign plan. We have many


23
to have a written update as to what's happening to change that,
because my time is up.
And again, thank you for your service.
Ambassador Hill. Senator, that is one of my favorite subjects,
and I would be happy to be in touch with you on that.
The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Corker.
Senator Cardin.
Senator CARDIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you for
holding this hearing.
The CHAIRMAN. Let me say to everybody, we have a vote, I think,
in 10 minutes or so. And there may be another round that people
want to have, so we'll see where we are.
Senator CARDIN. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Ambassador Hill, it's always a pleasure to be with you. And
thank you, again, for your service in Iraq.
I've talked to you before about the issues of Iraqi refugees and
displaced persons. A significant number still live in Jordan and
Syria, and many no longer live where they used to in Iraq. Can you
bring us up to date as to what the Iraqi Government has been
doing in regards to refugee issues, what's happening in the neigh-
boring countries, and whether we are actively involved in trying to
encourage more refugee-related activities?
Ambassador HILL. Senator, we are very much actively involved.
First of all, in terms of internally displaced people, there has been
progress in getting people back to their homes. It's often not an
easy process, because you have to, often, evict people from homes
before you can bring the original homeowners back.
I will tell you, though, very frankly, that the progress on refu-
gees, some 1 million or 142 million refugees, who are mainly in Jor-
dan and Syria, that progress in those areas is inadequate. We have
named a special coordinator to deal with this on the Washington
end. I have an extremely capable refugee coordinator, in the
Embassy in Baghdad, who has a lot of experience in this—Mark
Storella—and we have—we need, from the Iraqis, a similar com-
mitment to bringing these refugees home. The Iraqis often tell us
that there are no barriers; they can simply come home. We believe
more needs to be done to make sure that they feel welcomed and
feel safe. So, I can assure you, this is a real priority, because these
refugees, who are in places like Syria and Jordan, are not having
an easy time of it; it is costing everyone money, and we would like
to get them home.
I have raised this with the Iraqi Government, and I will continue
to raise this. There's one very specific thing, which is, they have
agreed to name an interagency coordinator, because this can't just
be dealt with in their Ministry of Migration; they need to have a
more interagency process. They've agreed to do this, and I think
we're going to really hold them to it.
Senator CARDIN. Well, I thank you for that. I've had a chance to
visit with some of the Iraqi refugees in both Syria and in Jordan,
and you're absolutely right. There is a concern over safety issues
upon return. There are more complications than just being able to
return to Iraq itself, and it does require the attention of the Iraqi
Government. It's one of the areas that I've had great concern over,
as to whether they're giving a high enough priority to this issue.