SIM
MIC
RIC
KERAMIES
Cover: Regimental Combat Team 7 Marines,
alongside Iraqi Army Emergency Response
Unit Soldiers, prepare for offensive operations
against enemy insurgents inside a mosque in
the city of Fallujah, al-Anbar Province, Iraq, on
10 November 2004, during Operation al-Fajr.
(Photo by SSgt Jonathan C. Knauth)



U.S. MARINES IN IRAQ, 2004–2005
INTO THE FRAY
U.S. Marines in the
Global War on Terrorism
OF THE
EMPIR FIDELIS
WIAVANO
NAVY
A
UNITED
CORPS
STATES
MARINE
by
Lieutenant Colonel Kenneth W. Estes
U.S. Marine Corps (Retired)
History Division
United States Marine Corps
Washington, D.C.
2011


Foreword
The following account represents one of the earliest efforts to chronicle Marine Corps operations in Iraq
between 2004 and 2005. This was a significant period in the history of Operation Iraqi Freedom, seeing two
battles fought over the city of Fallujah, the eruption of the Sadr revolt in an-Najaf, continuous counterinsur-
gency operations throughout Iraq, and initial efforts on the part of Marines to cultivate and forge alliances with
the tribes of Iraq's al-Anbar Province.
Almost as soon as Saddam Hussein's regime collapsed in 2003, it became apparent to U.S. commanders that
a second deployment of Marines to Iraq would be necessary to conduct security and stability operations. This
monograph recounts the first two years of this second deployment during which Marines were responsible
for Iraq's vast al-Anbar Province. This study focuses on I Marine Expeditionary Force's deployment in 2004
and II Marine Expeditionary Force's deployment of 2005, paying close attention to planning, counterinsurgency
operations, and efforts to build civil-military relations with the Iraqi population. Particular attention is also
paid to the first and second battles of Fallujah and the battle of an-Najaf.
This book was commissioned and written while U.S. forces were still engaged in combat operations in
Iraq. Even now, just five years since the events recounted in this study, we already have a sense of the sig-
nificance of these years and the Marine Corps' operations to the overall course of the war, and we can thank
Dr. Estes for making this possible.
This History Division monograph is based on the occasional paper, “U.S. Marine Corps Operations in Iraq,
2003–2006” by the same author. This revision slightly differs from that original publication in a number of ways.
First, it contains maps to help orientate and familiarize readers to Iraq, al-Anbar Province, and the two battles
for Fallujah. Second, the new edition contains photographs depicting major commanders, combat operations,
equipment, and civil-military operations. Third, several informative sidebars have been added to provide read-
ers with detailed information on specific topics. And finally, references have been redacted into short biblio-
graphical essays at the end of the book to give readers a concise overview of available documentary sources.
The author, Dr. Kenneth W. Estes, is a 1969 graduate of the United States Naval Academy who served in a
variety of command and staff assignments in the U.S. Marine Corps before retiring as a lieutenant colonel in
1993. He earned his PhD from the University of Maryland in 1984 and has taught at Duke University and the
U.S. Naval Academy. His publications include The Marine Officer's Guide, Handbook for Marine NCOs, Marines
Under Armor: The Marine Corps and the Armored Fighting Vehicle, 1916–2000, and A European Anabasis:
Western European Volunteers in the German Army and Waffen-SS, 1940–1945. He resides in Seattle, Wash-
ington.
C_P
inegar
Dr. Charles P. Neimeyer
Director of Marine Corps History
iii





Preface
This is a story of Marines, missions, and machines. The deployment of the I and II Marine Expeditionary
Forces in that sequence to Iraq during 2004–05 contains a surprising number of turns of events. These were
largely successes, but the situations did not always appear so favorable at the time and often they required
tenacious efforts, skills, courage, and stamina of Marines and their Navy and Army comrades to reach the de-
sired outcome. The combat record of Marine Corps forces in Iraq brings great credit upon the Corps and the
armed forces of the United States of America. But, as will be seen in the following pages, the combat record
lies interspersed with a seemingly endless range of tasks undertaken by the battalions and the squadrons the
Corps operated as it engaged in security and stabilization operations in al-Anbar and the surrounding provinces.
Nation-building has existed as a military mission for the U.S. Marine Corps at various junctures in its his-
tory. In contemporary usage, it has sent chills through the ranks of politicians, pundits, and observers and mil-
itary leaders. Nevertheless, most of the activities of the Marine expeditionary forces in Iraq fell within the main
lines of nation building in the classic sense. The restoration of order in the cities and towns, humanitarian as-
sistance, training of security forces, and the facilitation of local government formed the bedrock of U.S. and
Coalition actions in Iraq. In addition the concerted efforts by Multi National Forces-West to repair and recon-
struct the urban infrastructure far exceeded the war damage Iraq sustained during the U.S. occupation in
March-April 2003, and in reality began the long process of recovery from the extended period of deprivation
suffered in the dictatorial regime that the U.S. actions had removed.
The emerging evidence of the 2004–05 campaign by Marine Corps forces and other elements of the U.S.
Central Command will remain ripe for discussion and review by our institutions for decades to come. Few ex-
amples exist, however, of the extremes in operational employment experienced by the forces.
The military occupation of al-Anbar Province and its surroundings required the utmost of patience, perse-
verance, and fortitude, among many salient requirements. The cities and towns were damaged, inhabitants de-
moralized, and little vestige of civil authority remained. Hopes remained high, however, that the occupation
would
prove limited or even unnecessary and that the Iraqis would pick themselves up and begin a rebuild-
ing process in the light of newly gained freedom. But as Marines took up new and unplanned responsibili-
ties, various forms of insurgency began to build and present increasing security threats. For the Marines, nation
building and combat operations would proceed in tandem, if not simultaneously for almost all of their serv-
ice in Iraq.
The epic occupation of Iraq will long remain as one of the most novel military operations ever undertaken
by a Marine Corps organization. It only capped, however, the extraordinary performances of I and II Marine
Expeditionary Forces that remain as testimonials to the professionalism and preparedness of the U.S. Marine
Corps in the beginning of the 21st Century.
A work of this kind necessarily depends on the help and advice of many people. The original concept of
assigning this volume to an independent historian came from discussions in 2005 between then Lieutenant
General James N. Mattis, commanding the Marine Corps Combat Development Center, and retired Major Gen-
eral Donald R. Gardner, president of the Marine Corps University. General Gardner launched the project and
arranged for my appointment as a research fellow of his institution during 2006–08.
Officers and enlisted Marines of Inspector-Instructor, 4th Landing Support Battalion, Ft. Lewis, Washington,
cheerfully provided office space and support for my research and writing. Their readiness to assist extended
in many instances to their advice and valued explanations of current procedures and operational matters, in-
cluding in several cases experiences in Iraq during the period treated by this work. In particular, I thank Lieu-
tenant Colonel Richard C. Smith, Major Wesley E. Souza, Captain Gregory J. Chester, Captain Christopher J.
Murphy, Sergeant Major Thomas Glembin, and Staff Sergeant M. E. Johnston.
At the Marine Corps History Division, I enjoyed the camaraderie and shared knowledge of Dr. Charles
Neimeyer, director; Richard Camp, deputy director (2006-07); Colonel Patricia D. Saint, deputy director (2007-
08); Dr. Fred Allison, oral historian; and Master Gunnery Sergeant Robert A. Yarnall, field historian. I received
V


Table of Contents
Foreword..
..iii
Preface....
....V
Table of Contents.
vii
1
..13
....19
....31
.53
......................
.79
Chapter 1 The Return to Iraq
Chapter 2 The Deployment
Chapter 3 Early Operations in Al-Anbar Province..
Chapter 4 The First Al-Fallujah Battle and Its Aftermath
Chapter 5 The Second Al-Fallujah Battle .......
Chapter 6 Optimism and Doubt ........
Chapter 7 The Mission Continues..
Chapter 8 Into the Fray ......
Chapter 9 Protecting Self-Rule
Chapter 10 Protecting the Emerging Iraq..
Chapter 11 Continuous Operations.
Chapter 12 Redeployment and Relief.
Epilogue: New and Old ..........
....87
.95
....105
....115
....131
...141
...149
Notes
...153
Appendix A Command and Staff List
....159
Appendix B Unit List....
...165
177
Appendix C Selected Glossary of Terms and Abbreviations
Appendix D Chronology of Events, 2004–2008....
Appendix E Reviewers.
....181
....187
Index.......
..189
vii





Chapter 1
The Return to Iraq
I Marine Expeditionary Force Prepares to
Return to Iraq
The long, hot summer of 2003 drew to a close for
the Marines in Iraq. Since the brief offensive of March
and April had overthrown Saddam Hussein's regime,
Marines had conducted an unplanned occupation
and peacekeeping campaign. Lieutenant General
James T. Conway's I Marine Expeditionary Force (I
MEF) staff had announced the transition to “Post-hos-
tility Operations” on 15 April, redeploying his forces
to a new operating area south of Baghdad. Opera-
tion Iraqi Freedom shifted into security and stability
operations aimed at facilitating humanitarian assis-
tance and restoring civilian rule.
The summer had seen a dramatic reduction in Ma-
rine Corps forces in Iraq. 1st Marine Division com-
mander Major General James N. Mattis had set the
tone for the stability and security operations by dras-
tically cutting his division troop list from some 23,000
to 8,000 Marines. He retained only seven battalions of
infantry and two light armored reconnaissance bat-
talions under a reduced division headquarters. These
occupied seven key Iraqi “governorates” or
provinces, working to reinstate local police and se-
curity functions and revive the municipal services and
public utilities. The 3d Marine Aircraft Wing under
Major General James F. Amos redeployed to the
United States, leaving behind two detachments with
18 helicopters for support. The Marine Logistics Com-
mand under Brigadier General Richard S. Kramlich
worked in Kuwait to reload materiel into ships and
aircraft, supported the remaining units, and rede-
ployed itself, leaving a special purpose Marine air-
ground task force under Brigadier General Ronald S.
Coleman to oversee the withdrawal of Marine forces
in the theater.
On 3 September, General Conway held a transfer
of authority ceremony with the Polish Army com-
mander of the Multi National Division Center-South.
The remaining Marines subsequently began their re-
turn to the United States. A 1st Marine Expeditionary
Brigade command element briefly served as interim
higher headquarters during this redeployment period.
A further three weeks of patrolling and occasional
fighting in an-Najaf fell to 1st Battalion, 7th Marines
before a turnover could be effected. The 1st Marine
Division sustained no combat deaths during its sta-
bility and security operations campaign period. The
last Marine Corps organization to reach home station,
Company C, 4th Light Armored Reconnaissance Bat-
talion, returned to Salt Lake City, Utah, on 9 Decem-
ber 2003, after three months in Iraq followed by a
six-month Unit Deployment Program rotation in
Japan.
Marines of the special purpose Marine air-ground
task force (MAGTF) continued their mission into No-
vember along with a few other small elements, such
as Detachment B of the 4th Air-Naval Gunfire Liai-
son Company, which supported the Multi National
Division Center-South; 5th Platoon, Fleet Antiterror-
ist Security Team (FAST), providing security for the
U.S. Embassy, Baghdad; and some 556 Marine Corps
personnel remaining in Iraq and Kuwait. Before de-
parting for the United States, General Mattis ques-
tioned Brigadier General Coleman about some of his
equipment in the hands of the Marine air-ground task
force. General Mattis thought he might need the
equipment soon and set 10 November 2003 as the
date when the entire division's personnel and equip-
ment would be combat ready.
As the combat forces that conducted the original
invasion and occupation phase left Iraq, the 13th Ma-
rine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) arrived in the Persian
Gulf and reported to the Fifth Fleet on 29 Septem-
ber. These periodic and overlapping Marine Expedi-
tionary Unit deployments operated as part of the
theater reserve for the Combatant Commander, U.S.
Central Command, Army General John P. Abizaid,
during the remainder of Operation Iraqi Freedom. In
this case, the 13th MEU operated with the British-led
Multi National Division-Southeast. Landing elements
included 1st Battalion, 1st Marines at Kuwait Naval
Base and Umm Qasr. The Marine expeditionary unit
then conducted anti-smuggling and security missions
on the Faw Peninsula during 11-25 October.
Within a month of the change of command, Ma-
rine Corps Commandant General Michael W. Hagee
asked General Conway to prepare his forces for an-
other deployment to support Operation Iraqi Free-
dom II. Discussions in Washington D.C. had
1


2
INTO THE FRAY

120
80
le
69
72
123
Photo by LCpl Andrew Williams Defense Imagery VIRIN: 030903-M-7837W-007
At the relief in place ceremony at Camp Bablyon, Iraq, on 3 September 2003, Polish-led Coalition forces relieved
the Marines of I Marine Expeditionary Force (1 MEF).
advanced to the stage that a U.S. force rotation plan
developed, and planners at Headquarters U.S. Marine
Corps began to assess another deployment to Iraq.
An initial request for three battalions quickly ex-
panded, and within two months, 63 percent of I Ma-
rine Expeditionary Force (I MEF) was preparing to
return.
Fielding I MEF for combat operations in Operation
Iraqi Freedom caused considerable disruptions to the
forces and supporting establishment of the Marine
Corps during 2002–03. The staff of Headquarters U.S.
Marine Corps estimated that providing such a force
for another Iraq rotation would delay the normal unit
deployment cycle another year, disrupt the maritime
prepositioned shipping reconstitution by again draw-
ing away essential equipment, and drastically impact
the Marine Corps personnel policy governing de-
ployment length, reserve mobilization, and the in-
voluntary extension of tours of duty. All of these
factors later affected retention in both active and re-
serve components.
Nevertheless, the Corps mobilized about 22,000 re-
servists by 1 May 2003 and retained over 10,500 on
duty in mid-October. A planned maximum of 3,000
would remain on active duty after March 2004 by
continued call-up and demobilization of reservists.
Active duty end strength had also climbed because of
“stop-loss” and “stop-move” manpower directives,
reaching a peak of 179,630 Marines in July 2003. The
number subsided to 177,756 at the end of Septem-
ber and presumably would return to the authorized
175,000 by March 2004.
Maintaining routine deployments to Okinawa had
also required moving several battalions and aircraft
squadrons from Iraq to the United States and then to
Okinawa with 90 days or less at home station. Of
equal concern to headquarters was the need to re-
constitute the floating equipment pools carried in the
three maritime prepositioned ship squadrons that had
been used as part of the strategic deployment of I
MEF to Kuwait at the end of 2002. The forecast esti-
mated the basic reconstitution of the three squadrons
by March 2004. The staff identified further challenges
in replacing aviation ordnance, antitank missiles, and
overcoming the depot overhaul backlog, but the
larger question remained, that of supporting the next
Marine Corps contingent in Iraq.
The shortfall in Coalition troops meant that the


4
INTO THE FRAY
CONNAT
had exceeded a year, very little preparation for post-
hostilities operations existed by the time major oper-
ations had ended in April. Most authorities assumed
that the Iraqis would replace the Ba'ath regime with
new leaders and that government bureaucracies
would return to work and assist immediately in the
recovery effort. With the end of the first phase of the
war, however, the Coalition faced an Iraq whose po-
litical, civil, and economic institutions were in a state
of disrepair and collapse.
At the same time as Coalition forces prepared for
post-war reconstruction, United States Central Com-
mand initiated a rapid drawdown of forces stationed
in the country. Most important, the Coalition Forces
Land Component Command under Army Lieutenant
General David D. McKiernan would transfer respon-
sibility for stabilization to the Combined Joint Task
Force 7. Converted from the headquarters staff of
Lieutenant General Ricardo S. Sanchez's V Corps, the
combined joint task force exercised command and
control over a multinational force of more than 30
countries. Its responsibilities extended over all Iraq,
and it reported directly to the new Coalition Provi-
sional Authority under L. Paul Bremer III, the civilian
governing agency established by the United States to
oversee the establishment of a new Iraqi government.
Coalition leaders hoped that both agencies would be
able to create a new Iraq with reformed political in-
stitutions, a rebuilt infrastructure, and a reenergized
society.
Hoping for a steady improvement in general con-
ditions, Combined Joint Task Force 7's initial cam-
paign plan of June 2003 anticipated decreasing
opposition to the Coalition. According to this plan,
the Coalition Provisional Authority would revive na-
tive institutions and governmental bodies at local and
national levels. Meanwhile, ongoing U.S. military ac-
tions would decrease support for the old regime by
destroying surviving paramilitary forces, and captur-
ing, trying, and punishing former Ba’athists. The an-
ticipated improvement of basic services and the
transfer of Iraqi sovereignty to an interim government
would further undercut the opposition of radical an-
tiwestern religious groups and potential violence be-
tween different factions throughout the country. The
end of combat would permit the repairing of dam-
aged infrastructure and bring about economic recov-
ery, thus promoting a newly emerging democratic
government and discrediting antiwestern factions.
Above all, both the Coalition Provisional Authority
and Combined Joint Task Force 7 assumed that those
Iraqi institutions, which had survived the combat
phase as well as the final years of the Hussein

Photo by LCpl Andrew Williams, Defense Imagery VIRIN 030903-M-7837W-041
LtGen James T. Conway commanded I Marine Expe-
ditionary Force through both the 2003 and 2004
campaigns in Iraq, and succeeded Gen Hagee as
Commandant of the Marine Corps in 2006.
more than 3,000 reservists to the active force, not
counting individual augmentations, by the time the
2002-03 activations had been demobilized by March
2004.
Problems in Iraq: The Emerging
Insurgency: 2003–04
The fall of Saddam Hussein's Ba'ath regime in
April 2003 marked the end of the first phase of the
Iraq War. The next, signaled by a deadly insurgency
against the Coalition occupation of Iraq, would begin
almost immediately after. This phase of the war, char-
acterized by irregular warfare and sectarian violence
against Coalition forces and between Iraq's religious
and ethnic groups, lasted considerably longer and
presented many unanticipated challenges and obsta-
cles to the U.S. military. Although the planning
process by the United States for the invasion of Iraq


The Return to Iraq
5
protection of key sites and services, such as water,
power, and sewage plants, would also contribute to
general security and recovery. A large array of pub-
lic works projects and conventional civil affairs pro-
grams would assist in restoring economic prosperity
to Iraq and maintaining a sustainable quality of life,
especially in the supply of power, fuel, water, and
sanitation services. The reopening of Baghdad Inter-
national Airport and introduction of a new currency
were also major benchmarks. Finally, Combined Joint
Task Force 7 planned to assist in the installation of vi-
able and fair neighborhood, district, and city gov-
erning councils.
Due to the increasing intensity of the insurgency,
continued combat operations would be significant
features of the new plan. Under the concept of “an
adapting enemy,” the combined joint task force cam-
paign plan anticipated an enemy capable of chang-
ing tactics and targets to avoid U.S. attacks and
overcome improving security measures. The most
likely enemy actions would come in the form of iso-
regime, would continue to perform their usual secu-
rity functions.
The overall goal for Iraq was to reduce the need
for a long-term, large-scale U.S. military presence in
the country. Creating a secure environment in which
to hold local elections would encourage transition to
local authority, allowing U.S. troops to withdraw
from urban areas. American forces planned to move
out of the cities into consolidated forward operating
bases in late September 2003 and to be ready to con-
duct combat operations, assist or otherwise reinforce
Iraqi security forces, and even expand the divisional
zones of responsibilities as units such as the 101st
Airborne Division, 82d Airborne Division, and the 3d
Armored Cavalry Regiment began to redeploy to
home stations. A single U.S. light infantry division
would replace the multidivision occupation force that
had been in place during the six months following
the invasion. Thus, the new plan entailed the rapid
training and development of robust Iraqi military
forces, a capable police force, and an interim gov-
ernment. To help fulfill these goals, a program for
training the new Iraqi Army would begin in August.
Nevertheless, these initial assumptions and plans
proved too optimistic, forcing U.S. planners to devise
a new campaign in August 2003 to confront the in-
tensifying insurgency against the Coalition occupa-
tion. The insurgency had been growing at a rapid
pace. Individual and organized criminal activities had
appeared even before the occupation of Iraq began.
In April 2003, soldiers of the 82d Airborne Division
fired on a crowd of protesters in Fall, further inflam-
ing hostility toward the U.S. presence in the country.
The Coalition Provisional Authority's May 2003 deci-
sion to dissolve the Iraqi Army and dismiss all mem-
bers of the Ba'ath Party from positions in the civil
government removed thousands of Iraqis, most of
them Sunnis, from positions of political power. Such
measures created the impression that Sunnis would
be a marginal group in the new Iraq and many for-
mer Ba’athists flocked to the ranks of the insurgency.
Alongside former Ba'athists and regime supporters
were more radical groups, such as fundamentalist
paramilitary groups and international terrorist organ-
izations.
In the new plan of Combined Joint Task Force
(CJTF) 7, General Sanchez stated his mission was to
conduct combat operations to destroy enemy forces
and establish a secure environment while also en-
gaging in stability operations to support the estab-
lishment of Iraqi sovereignty. The plan also entailed
humanitarian assistance for the Iraqi population and
restoring essential services to the communities. The
Army LtGen Ricardo S. Sanchez was commanding
general of Combined Joint Task Force 7 and senior
commander of coalition forces in Iraq from 2003 to
2004.
Photo by LCpl Andrew Williams, Defense Imagery VRIN 030903-M-7837W-040

SANCHEZ
00


6
INTO THE FRAY
Photo by SSgt Quinton Russ, USAF, Defense Imagery, VIRIN: 040324-F-9927R-001
Ambassador L. Paul Bremer III was head of the Coali-
tion Provisional Authority and the chief civilian offi-
cial in Iraq from May 2003 until the transfer of
sovereignty in June 2004.
a relief anticipated sometime in the spring of 2004.
The Force Takes Shape
The I MEF and 1st Marine Division operational plan-
ning teams worked on the force structure, framed the
mission, and formulated tasks and organizations from
late September through 19 October 2003. They then
identified units to be provided for operations in Iraq by
mid-December. The I MEF command element would re-
quire its usual detachments of civil affairs, intelligence,
force reconnaissance, communications, radio, air-naval
gunfire liaison, and Army psychological operations
units, all gathered under the administration of the I MEF
Headquarters Group. The 1st Marine Division, under the
command of Major General James N. Mattis, organized
its combat power around two reinforced infantry regi-
ments (regimental combat teams), each with three in-
fantry battalions (with a light armored reconnaissance
battalion standing as the third battalion in one regi-
ment), a combat engineer company, and a combat serv-
ice support detachment. The division also had an
artillery battalion transformed into a provisional military
police unit, a tank company, and an assault amphibian
company.
The 3d Marine Aircraft Wing (Forward), commanded
by Major General James F. Amos, planned to employ a
single aircraft group. With the exception of tanker and
liaison aircraft detachments, it would include no
manned fixed-winged aircraft, entailing three medium-
lift helicopter squadrons, one heavy-lift helicopter
squadron, and two light-attack helicopter squadrons. An
unmanned aerial vehicle squadron and an air defense
battalion also accompanied the group for air control and
ground support. Brigadier General Richard S. Kramlich's
1st Force Service Support Group (Forward) organized
separate groups for the eastern and western sectors of
I MEF's planned area of operations, the vast al-Anbar
Province. Each was to support one regiment, with the
remaining assests allocated to a brigade service support
group for the rest of the force. An engineer contingent
included a naval mobile construction battalion (the
“Seabees”), three engineer and engineer support com-
panies, and several companies of military police.
Between 26 August and 9 September 2003, the
Army's Task Force Baghdad conducted Operation
Longstreet in al-Anbar and northern Babil Provinces, re-
vealing key insurgent sanctuaries and infiltration routes.
Consequently, U.S. Central Command commander,
Army General John P. Abizaid, planned to augment the
Marine Corps deployment with an Army brigade com-
bat team, additional infantry battalions, a small boat de-
tachment, and a requirement for counter-battery radars.
While the members of the I MEF, who returned to

lated and random attacks. Less likely, but much more
dangerous, would be the enemy mounting an or-
ganized, well-targeted, and highly lethal attack. In ad-
dition, planners recognized the potential for the
enemy to disrupt reconstruction of the country with
political assassinations.
Realizing the Coalition would be unable to rapidly
eradicate resistance to the U.S. presence in Iraq,
Sanchez and his staff proposed long-range plans to
defeat the former regime forces, to neutralize ex-
tremist groups, and to reduce crime by 50 percent. To
accomplish these goals, Combined Joint Task Force
7 would establish, equip, and train a large Iraqi se-
curity force; municipal police; battalions of the Iraqi
Civil Defense Corps; and thousands of Facilities Pro-
tection Service guards. Planners assumed that only
extremist groups, the most unpredictable enemy,
would remain likely opponents by the time of the
turnover to relief forces in 2004.
The end result, proposed in the August campaign
plan, was a safe and secure environment created by
a much more vigorous level of U.S. activities. Com-
bined Joint Task Force 7 concluded that the initial
deployments for combat under Operation Iraqi Free-
dom would need to be extended by a full year with


8
INTO THE FRAY

NOR 2001
Photo by LCpl Jonathon T. Spencer, Defense Imagery: 040422-M-2900S-023
MajGen James F. Amos (right), commander of 3d Marine Air Wing from 2003 to 2004, speaks with Capt Shawn
Miller of Marine Wing Support Squadron 273 while deployed to al-Anbar province in April 2004.
battalions, including an armor battalion that was partly
reformed as vehicle-mounted infantry. This task or-
ganization was augmented, near the time of embarka-
tion, with artillery batteries A and E, 11th Marines.
These two batteries arrived on 28 February 2004 and
drew 18 howitzers from the prepositioning ships sup-
porting the deployment. Counter-battery fires against
indirect fire attacks from the insurgents became the ini-
tial mission for these two batteries. Later, when needs
became more urgent, the equipment aboard the mar-
itime prepositioned shipping would permit very rapid
reinforcement of the Marine division. In addition to the
forces under I MEF control were two bridge companies
drawn from II Marine Expeditionary Force (II MEF)
and Marine Reserve Forces, a detachment of light at-
tack helicopters to operate out of Balad Air Base, and
two Navy surgical companies.
Al-Anbar Province and the Insurgency
In October 2003, the Joint Staff decided that the
Marine Corps would relieve the Army's 82d Airborne
Division. The area of operations included the large
al-Anbar Province and the northern Babil Province,
which was the heart of the Sunni Triangle and the
anti-Coalition insurgency west of Baghdad. The re-
gion posed challenges unlike those I MEF faced dur-
ing the stability and security operations campaign it
conducted in the summer of 2003. While the north-
ern Babil area was familiar to Marine veterans of
2003, al-Anbar Province was not. I MEF and division
operations planning team studied the province in-
tensely, paying particular attention to terrorist infil-
tration routes, termed “rat lines,” extending from
Syria to the major cities of Fallujah and Ramadi.
Al-Anbar Province was an active center for the in-
surgency where its vast expanses served as an infil-
tration route, training ground, and sanctuary. It was
also a latent flash point with cities such as Fallujah
known throughout Iraq as a center of religious fun-
damentalism and general hostility to the central gov-
ernment, whether it was the Ba'ath Party, Coalition
Provisional Authority, or the Iraqi Interim Govern-
ment. The original 2003 U.S. offensive through this
area had focused on enveloping Baghdad, thus by-


The Return to Iraq
9
passing most of the major population centers of the
province. As a result, those elements that would con-
stitute the bulk of the anti-Coalition insurgency, such
as veterans of the Republican Guard, Iraqi Intelli-
gence Service, and the Ba'ath Party, remained rela-
tively cohesive and unscathed by the initial invasion.
After initial combat operations ended, a single ar-
mored cavalry regiment was assigned to patrol a vast
area the size of North Carolina. Such a weak pres-
ence squandered the war's gains and allowed an
enemy sanctuary to flourish. The region was also a
stronghold of Iraq's Sunnis, and
many
of its popula-
tion feared loss of status and marginalization as a re-
sult of Hussein's fall, de-Ba’athification, and the
Coalition Provisional Authority's plan to empower
Iraq's Shi'a majority. Although most of the popula-
tion did not actively work against the Coalition
forces, many did render support to the former regime
loyalist movements.
Al-Anbar Province's geography helped make it a
safe haven for insurgents. Both its natural river and
man-made highways transformed it into a transit hub
for insurgent groups. Since the province shares

Photo by LCpl Samantha L. Jones, Defense Imagery VIRIN: 041115-M-3658J-011
BGen Richard Kramlich, commanding general of 1st
Force Service Support Group, talks with Marines at
Camp Fallujah in November, 2004.
lengthy frontiers with Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Syria,
insurgents could easily find cross-border sanctuaries
outside of Iraq. Age-old smuggling routes, tribal as-
sociations reaching across the political borders, and
Marines from the 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit establish a perimeter in Qalat Sukkar, Iraq in 2003 as civil-
ians gather to welcome them as they secured the town. As they returned to Iraq, the Marines of I MEF could draw
on almost a century's worth of experience conducting counterinsurgency operations.
Photo by SSgt Bryan Reed, Defense Imagery, VIRIN: 030413-M-0175R-089


10
INTO THE FRAY
atza
Tigris
Caspian
Sea
Lake
Urmia
TURKEY
N
DAHUK
dam
Buhayrat
Dahuk
Mosul
ARBILE.
Aribil
6
dam
Little Zab Sdam
NINAWA
SYRIA
Nahr al Khabur
Karkuk
AT
TAMIM
S SULAYMAN
AS
SULAYMANIYAH
IRAN
Euphrates
Buhayrat
al Qadisiyah
Tikrit
SALAHAD DIN
Samarra
Nahr diye
dam
Tigris
Buhayrat DVVALA
ath Tharthar
dam
Ar Ramadi AN
Fallujan Baghdad

AL ANBAR
Rudkhaneh-ye Simareh
Buhayrat al Habbaniyah
Buhayrat ars
Razazah
De Facto
Boundary
WASIT
Al Kut
Karbala
KRABIL
Andillah
dam
Tigris
IRAQ
KARBALA
JORDAN
canal
Ad Diwaniyah
AL QADAŞIYAH
Naha
An Najat
Euphrates
al Gharraf
MAYSAN
AN NAJAF
As Samawah
SOHI QAR
An
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Rud-e Karun
canal
AI
Basrat

AL MUTHANNA
Az Zubayr
AL BASRAH
Umm
Qasr
Faw
*
International Boundary
National Capital
Province Boundary
Province Capital
KUWAIT
Kuwait
o
Persian
Gulf
IRAQ
SAUDI ARABIA
0
50
100
Kilometers
1
History Division Map
In 2003, Marines had been primarily responsible for operations south of Baghdad; however, beginning in 2004,
Marine Corps deployments were based in the vast al-Anbar Province in Iraq's west.
active support from Ba’athist Syria provided the in on counterfeit documents, safe houses, and training
surgents a steady supply of money and sanctuaries.
Radical elements could infiltrate the country, relying The insurgents also had a ready source of muni-
areas.


The Return to Iraq
11
tions and arms. U.S. Army sources identified 96
known munitions sites and indicated innumerable
uncharted ones in the province. A large portion of
Iraq's arms industry was centered in the area-par-
ticularly in al-Ameriyah, Al Mahmudiyah, and Iskan-
dariyah. Although some localities faced arms
shortages and the price of weapons increased as a
result of Coalition actions, the enemy had few supply
problems for its commonplace weapons: AK-47 ri-
fles, explosives, ammunition, mortars, and rocket-
propelled grenades (RPGs).
Building on Experience and Corporate
Memory: the Marine Corps
and Counterinsurgency
As challenging as the new operations in al-Anbar
Province would be, the stability and security opera-
tions conducted during the summer of 2003 had
demonstrated that the Marine Corps' approach to
counterinsurgency, based on nearly a century's worth
of experience, remained relevant. These experiences
would continue to influence Marine Corps plans for
their return to Iraq in 2004. On 18 January 2004, Gen-
eral Conway delivered a presentation to the Marine
Corps Association Ground Dinner in which he out-
lined the new challenges that the Marines would face
in their second deployment. He asserted that the lead-
ership had to remember several factors. For example,
whereas the Marines had been responsible for an area
comprised mostly of Shi’a in 2003, the population in
the new area of operations would largely be Sunni.
Therefore, an important part of the expeditionary
force's approach would involve finding a way to mit-
igate the perceived political losses suffered by the
Sunnis as a result of the fall of the Ba’ath regime. In
keeping with I MEF's successful experience in 2003,
the Marines would focus on the Iraqi people-pro-
viding security and a better quality of life for the
pop-
ulation and preparing the Iraqi people to govern
themselves.
General Conway noted that I MEF's approach
would be based on three major lines of operation: se-
curity and stability operations, information operations,
and civil affairs. The goals of these operations were
far reaching and wide ranging, and included elimi-
nating destabilizing elements, establishing training
programs for Iraqi security forces, developing an ag-
gressive information campaign that promoted local
confidence and established effective means of dis-
seminating information, identifying and securing
funding and resources for civil affairs initiatives, es-
tablishing local government, reducing unemployment,
and ultimately preparing for the transition to Iraqi
sovereignty. Success would be measured by the ex-
tent to which the Iraqi people could assume respon-
sibility for their own security. The failure of
any
of
these elements would pose increasing difficulties and
dangers for the Coalition forces and the Iraqi popu-
lation.
While the situation in al-Anbar Province in 2004
would be markedly different from the one Marines
confronted in southern Iraq in 2003, General Conway
nevertheless noted that those earlier experiences
would play an important role in the coming mission.
He highlighted the successful accomplishments of
2003, noting that Marines demonstrated the mental
and physical ability to shift rapidly from combat to
stability operations and were able to conduct both si-
multaneously. General Conway pointed out that the
culture of the Marine Corps as an infantry force with
strong, small unit leadership enhanced the Marines'
ability to effectively perform stability operations in
southern Iraq. Battalion commanders exercised total
authority in their areas of responsibility. Frequently,
no one doctrine governed particular problems, and
commanders adapted to their unique situation. The
expeditionary force deployed a significant infantry ca-
pability, and Marines made sure to patrol the streets
so that they could be seen by the locals and reassure
Iraqis looking for a safe and secure environment.
The need to build good relations with the local
population had been critical, and General Conway re-
minded his audience of the several accomplishments
Marines had achieved in 2003. Operating from the be-
lief that the quickest way to win the support of adults
was to improve the quality of life of their children,
Marines tried to move quickly to accomplish any proj-
ect that benefited Iraqi children. These included mak-
ing children aware of unexploded mines and
constructing and repairing playgrounds and schools.
Related to this, the Marines of I MEF had focused on
consulting Iraqis and included them in the decision-
making process as they set priorities for reconstruc-
tion projects. The Marines' philosophy of inclusion
gave the Iraqis a sense of having a stake in their own
future and confidence in American concern for their
welfare.
A “trust relationship” thus formed between Marines
and Iraqis. The fact that the Shi’a formed the majority
of the population in much of the I MEF area of oper-
ations in 2003 proved significant. Harshly oppressed
by the former regime, they demonstrated more sym-
pathy for the Coalition than their Sunni neighbors to
the north, and Marines conducted themselves in a
manner to preserve good will with the Shi’as.
To build good relations with the local population,


The Deployment
15
then transferred the responsibility and authority for
the district or sector. Before such transfer of author-
ity occurred, the incoming Marine Corps units as-
sumed security of all vital infrastructure and
institutions in their assigned sectors. They introduced
themselves to local, Coalition, and non-governmen-
tal organization leaders, supervised local infrastruc-
ture projects, assumed responsibilities for equipment,
and continued the ongoing process of collecting and
disposing of weapons and unexploded ordnance.
In each case, the transfers of authority occurred
well before the deadlines. General Conway recog-
nized the need for an accelerated relief of Army units
deployed in Iraq and promised all due speed. The
early dispatch of Regimental Combat Team 7 from
Camp Udari paid off, as it completed its relief of 3d
Armored Cavalry Regiment on 15 March, five days
ahead of schedule. As part of the transfer, 3d Marine
Aircraft Wing assumed responsibility for airspace
management and aviation support for the area of op-
erations. On 21 March, General Mattis relieved the
commander of the 82d Airborne Division, Major Gen-
eral Charles H. Swannack Jr., and assumed responsi-
bility for ground operations in the Marines' area of
operations, named Atlanta in Marine Corps orders
and plans. The 1st Force Service Support Group re-
lieved the 82d Airborne Division Support Command
on 22 March. The 3d Brigade, 82d Airborne Division,
was relieved on 28 March, seven days ahead of
schedule.
Though the Marines of I MEF met General Con-
way's expectations, al-Anbar Province also lived up
to its reputation as a tough area of operations, and as
such, Marines conducted combat operations for sev-
eral days before the transfers of authority took place.
By 14 March, insurgents inflicted 11 casualties upon
the 1st Marine Division. On 18 March, insurgents
fired rockets at 3d Marine Aircraft Wing's al-Asad Air
Base killing one Marine and wounding three. A
bombing killed a second Marine on 25 March 2004.
Equipping I Marine Expeditionary Force
Although the Marines newly arrived in al-Anbar
considered themselves better prepared and organized
The 3d Marine Aircraft Wing used Boeing-Vertol CH-46 Sea Knight (pictured below) and Sikorsky CH-53 Super
Stallion helicopters in Iraq. Both types received new armor and other upgrades upon returning there in 2004.
Photo by LCpl William L. Dubose III, Defense Imagery, VIRIN: 060530-M-9529D-001

MARINES


16
INTO THE FRAY
الشركه
Photo by LCpl Kevin C. Quihuis Jr., Defense Imagery VIRIN: 030410-M-5753Q-094
Capt Tom Lacroix, commanding officer, Company C,
1st Battalion, 7th Marines,speaks on the radio while
accompanied by radio operators Cpl Kenny Bergain
(left) and LCpl Travis Ball during the clearing of Qa
dawi Baghdad in 2003. All are wearing the Intercep-
tor Multi-Threat Body Armor System Outer Tactical
Vests.
armor kits beginning in April and July, respectively.
The six KC-130Fs also received infrared jammer up-
grades in April. Much more time would be required,
however, to deploy the highly desired AN/AAR-47(2)
missile warning set and AN/ALE-47 countermeasures
dispenser into the light-attack squadrons. Only the
larger aircraft had these capabilities.
The hope that I MEF could obtain special equip-
ment needed for the 2004 deployment from units de-
parting Iraq would fall far short of expectations
despite a U.S. Central Command directive to leave all
“uparmored” High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled
Vehicles (HMMWV)—“Humvee” models M1114,
M1116, and M1109—and all tactical vehicles fitted
with bolt-on armor or ballistic doors. The 82d Air-
borne Division turned over 83 uparmored Humvees,
but the Marine expeditionary force required 250. Of
the highly desired Warlock radio frequency jammers
used to counter improvised explosive devices, only
25 could be gained from Combined Joint Task Force
7 sources; the Marine Corps required 61.
As in the case of the 2003 campaign, the support-
ing establishment of the Marine Corps, chiefly Ma-
rine Corps Systems Command, employed rapid
acquisition under the Urgent Universal Need State-
ment (UUNS) process. Commanders of forces as-
signed for the 2004 campaign received instructions
in November 2003 to request material required under
UUNS to General Conway for consolidation and for-
warding. Ultimately, the Marine Requirements Over-
sight Council reviewed the
requests
and
recommended actions to the Commandant. The ini-
tial requests before the 2004 deployment totaled ap-
proximately $170 million, in comparison to
approximately $100 million provided for the entire
2003 campaign.
The requirement for uparmored Humvees took
immediate priority. The Marine Corps Logistics Com-
mand produced steel doors for delivery to the de-
ploying units until more permanent solutions could
be approved and acquired through joint service and
Marine Corps specific programs to produce armor
kits and new production vehicles. As I MEF returned
to Iraq, the 2004 Urgent Universal Needs Statement
items already included the following (See Table 2-1):
In addition to compiling the initial requirements,
Systems Command deployed liaison teams to the I
MEF staff to assess new requirements and accelerate
the UUNS process.
The tandem requirements of human body armor
and armor kits for utility vehicles became more press-
ing in both military and political arenas after combat
continued in 2003 as the Iraqi insurgency gained mo-

for the stability and security operations missions than
in the 2003 campaign, the Marine Corps equipment
needs had increased. The brief period of occupation
duty in mid-2003 allowed no time for incorporating
new technologies and engineering into the force. By
2004, however, the experiences of U.S. and Coalition
forces had generated a comprehensive set of new
equipment requirements. Thus, the second deploy-
ment presented a range of new equipment require-
ments. Stability and security operations demanded
increased numbers of vehicles of all types, yet the
force lacked funding for maintenance and facilities
that more equipment would require.
Aircraft survivability problems dated from the ini-
tial combat phase of the 2003 campaign, necessitat-
ing the installation of modernization systems. The
completion schedule anticipated for installing most
of these systems did not cover the initial part of the
2004 deployment of aircraft from 3d Marine Aircraft
Wing. The special schedule developed for the Air-
craft Survivability Upgrade resulted in the installation
of lightweight armor kits and a ramp-mounted ma-
chine gun into the Sikorsky CH-53E Super Stallion
heavy-lift helicopters by mid-April. The 36 Boeing-
Vertol CH-46 Sea Knight medium-lift helicopters re-
ceived infrared jammer upgrades and lightweight


The Deployment
17
Table 2-1: Urgent Universal Needs Statement Items
Marking foam
500
Item
Number
Robot capability
15
1
182
Marine Expeditionary Force Combat Operations
Center
AN/PAQ-4C infrared night sights
Data distribution system upgrade
20
Medium-level vehicle hardening:
Large LVS trailer capability
20
3,049
Ditching machine
4
Door protection
Underbody protection
Ballistic glass
3,638
Air-Naval Gunfire Liaison Company communications
suites
2,704
Temporary steel plating
2,144
Battlefield tire changing systems
2
Position locating systems:
2
Blue force tracker
100
Technical control facility
Automated Deep Operation Coordination System
servers and laptops
2d MAW group-level Combat Operations Center
KIV-7 encryption devices
EPLRS with M-DACT
50
5
Combat identification devices:
7
Glo tapes
40,000
PRC-117F radios
22
Phoenix Jr. strobe lights
5,000
10
Thermal combat imaging panels
2,163
Deployable rapid assembly shelters for satellite ter-
minal
Dust abatement systems
6
MTVR trailers
20
Night vision devices
882
Semiautomatic sniper rifle
18
PRC-148 radios
1,294
Tactical photo reproduction capability
4
Advanced combat optic gun sights
3,724
Bed netting
25,000
M240G/TOW dual mount
97
Data distribution system servers
16
Tropospheric satellite support radios
22
Test stand
1
Medium tactical vehicle replacement-MTVR center 325
seats
17
Bridge erection boat trailer
Lightweight all-terrain vehicles
53
Checkpoint force protection kits
50
PRC-150
34
Personal role radios
1,487
"Dragon Eye" unmanned aerial vehicle
35
Handheld translation devices
300
Satellite-on-the-move capability
110
Mobile generator for forward resuscitative surgery 4
system
PRC-150 remotes
48
PAS-13 thermal sights
855
Vehicle barrier nets
50
1,080
Lightweight body armor
"Sophie" thermal binoculars
mentum after the declared “end of major combat op-
erations.” Armoring a fleet of utility vehicles never
intended for use in close combat was a requirement
new to the logistics system, and the system's re-
sponse proved predictably slow as casualties in-
creased. Likewise, distribution of the new Interceptor
body armor system to the troops was only partially
complete at the time of the 2003 invasion, and prior-
ities of issue left large numbers of combat units with
older design armor vests. Moreover, defective qual-
ity control and the delays in providing upgrades to
Interceptor components (heavier insert plates and ad-
ditional side and shoulder protection) exacerbated
the political uproar. The American government and
military underestimated the scope and ferocity of the
insurgency and the personal protection that fighting
insurgents would require. The military laboratories
and systems commands responded with designs en-
compassing almost total protection for vehicles and
persons alike.
The "hardness” or armor of Humvees remained a
critical problem for all U.S. troops, including Marines
as three different levels of protection appeared in the
uparmored Humvees, but only one of which offered
20
22 Kw generators
17
Vehicular mounts for PRC-150
36
Explosive ordnance disposal capabilities:
Protective suits
60
PSS-14 detectors
74
Percussion actuated nonelectric disruptors
15
Large package X-ray apparatus
7
Blast tents
15
Blast rings
15


18
INTO THE FRAY

Photo by Sgt. Jeremy M. Giacomino, Defense Imagery VIRIN: 080709-M-6668G-021
Fighting the insurgency requried upgrades to the armor on High-Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles
(HMMWVs or Humvees). These adapted vehicles, such as this M1114, were known as "up-armored” Humvees.
adequate protection against the improvised explosive
devices employed by the enemy. As a result, some
units procured locally fabricated steel plates to aug-
ment the minimal protection offered by the unar-
mored Humvee. So scarce were the uparmored
Humvees that Marines began to improvise simple,
additional protection, such as hanging bags contain-
ing Kevlar plates salvaged from vests and vehicles on
the exterior of the otherwise thinly constructed doors
of their Humvees, thus making their vehicles into
“Hillbilly Hummers.”
Personal body armor consisted of two types dur-
ing the initial stages of the 2003-04 campaign. The
superior Interceptor System, used by front-line
troops, gradually replaced the older vests worn by
Marines during 1st MEF's 2004 deployment. The
older design was the Personnel Armor System
Ground Troops (PASGT) vest that had replaced the
obsolete vinyl and ballistic plate combination of the
older M-1969 Fragmentation Protective Body Armor.
The PASGT ballistic filler consists of 13 plies of
treated (water repellent) aramid Kevlar 29 fabric and
improved the M-1969's protection against fragments.
The more effective Interceptor Multi-Threat Body
Armor System consistes of two components:a Kevlar-
weave outer tactical vest, which can stop a 9mm bul-
let, and ceramic small arms protective inserts (SAPI)
or plates. The 16.4-pound system of vest with re-
movable throat and groin protectors (8.4 pounds)
and insertable front and rear plates (4 pounds each),
can defeat the 7.62mm round common to the insur-
gents' primary AK weapon types. Straps and Velcro
fasteners allow attachment of personal equipment.
The 2003 Armor Protection Enhancement System
added sections to protect the neck, arms, and groin.
The later Deltoid Extension protected the sides of the
rib cage and shoulders but added pounds, provided
less ventilation, and limited body movement.
As the more than 20,000 Marines and sailors of I
MEF filled their new positions for the 2004 campaign,
equipped as well as the hurried measures and chang-
ing military environment permitted, the age-old prob-
lem remained: Who was the enemy; where was he;
and what were his intentions?


Chapter 3
Early Operations in Al-Anbar Province
Al-Anbar Province
At 53,208 square miles, Iraq's al-Anbar Province
occupies 32 percent of the nation's total area, and is
the country's largest province. Nevertheless, the
province is largely an unpopulated desert with most
of its 1.3 million inhabitants densely packed along
the Euphrates River, which cuts through the northern
part of the province. Most of the inhabitants, who ac-
count for 4.9 percent of Iraq's total population, are
Arab Sunnis of the large Dulaym tribal confederation.
The province's capital is ar-Ramadi.
The river brings life to one of the harshest envi-
ronments in the world. The region's subtropical tem-
peratures range, on average, from 90 to 115 degrees
Fahrenheit in summer to less than 50 degrees Fahren-
heit in the winter. All of the province's major cities sit
along or near the Euphrates' banks: Husaybah, al-
Qaim, Haditha, Hit, Ramadi, and al-Fallujah. From
Husaybah, where the river enters Iraq from Syria, it
progresses in a fairly eastwardly direction for a little
more than 50 miles before taking a sharp turn south
at the city of Rawah. Between there and Haditha is
Lake Qadisiyah, an artificial creation of the Haditha
Dam. From Haditha, the Euphrates snakes southeast-
erly through the eastern part of the province before
exiting east of Fallujah. Just south of Ramadi lie the
lakes al-Habbaniyah and al-Milh, filled with Eu-
phrates water by canal. Lake Tharthar, supplied with
Tigris River water by canal, lies between the rivers.
Down river from Ramadi are irrigation canals and
most of the pumping stations. About 140 miles from
Ramadi the Euphrates splits into two branches, al-
Hillah and al-Hindiyyah. The latter forms the main
channel and provides irrigation for rice crops, while
al-Hillah, separated among numerous canals, pro-
vides irrigation to the east and south.
The western desert, an extension of the Syrian
Desert, rises to elevations above 1,600 feet. Further
south, the Southwestern Desert (al-Hajarah) contains
a complex array of rock, wadis, ridges, and depres-
sions. Through this region, running in a fairly direct
east-west direction from Syria and Jordon is a high-
way and rail network that transforms the province
into a bridge connecting Iraq's most populated re-
gions and capital to Saudia Arabia, Jordan, and Syria.
Al-Anbar Province, especially Ramadi and Fallu-
jah, reflects the strong tribal and religious traditions
of its inhabitants. Saddam Hussein was constantly
wary of the volatile nature of the area. Depending
on which approach was most expedient, the Ba’ath
regime would alternate between openly supporting
the tribal groups through patronage and using the
tools of governance to isolate them. If it meant being
able to exert greater control over the region, the
regime was happy to curtail provincial authority to
better patronize the al-Anbari tribes. Iraq's oil wealth
enhanced the ability of the ruling clique to bypass
government institutions. The revenue generated by
oil deepened the system of patronage, as funds were
controlled by the central figures of the regime who
funneled money and public works to loyalists. Tax
revenue, already tainted by corruption, became sec-
ondary to oil wealth. Sunnis benefited the most from
this system. In any case, the regime took more inter-
est in population centers closer to Baghdad, leaving
most of the province untouched. Such conditions and
policies weakened governmental power in the
province. Crippled by persistent corruption, under-
cut by deal-making between the ruling regime and
tribal sheikhs, and monitored by an ever present,
heavy-handed security apparatus, the civic institu-
tions of al-Anbar Province fell into disrepair until the
collapse of Saddam Hussein's regime in April 2003.
The province stood rife with insurgent and crimi-
nal activity at the time I MEF took up its security and
stabilization task, and its major cities of Ramadi and
Fallujah were centers of anti-Coalition resistance.
Amid this hostile environment, the Coalition had la-
bored to deliver on its promises to restore security,
essential services, government, and a viable economy
to the people of al-Anbar Province. However, it only
had limited resources to apply to its appalling situa-
tion.
Initial Deployment
The I Marine Expeditionary Force's area of opera-
tions in al-Anbar Province-code named Atlanta-
was further divided. During the first two weeks of
March 2004, Colonel Craig A. Tucker, commanding
Regimental Combat Team 7, deployed his maneuver
19


Early Operations in Al-Anbar Province
23
Table 3-1: Marine Corps Forces In Support of Opera-
tions Iraqi Freedom II-April 2004
I MEF (Fwd), Kuwait
116
I MEF (Fwd), Iraq
29,579
13
I MEF (Fwd), Qatar
2d Medical Battalion, Kuwait
161
Fox Vehicle Detachment, Kuwait
12
29,881
Total I MEF (Fwd) assigned forces
U.S. Navy (22d NCR) and Army
(1st Brigade)
(5,565)
Total I MEF (Fwd) Marine Corps forces
24,316
116
The insurgents proved well armed. Although ini-
tially poorly trained, they were soon able to execute
lethal attacks against the Coalition forces and Iraqis
who sided with them. The intelligence services con-
sidered the former regime forces as compatible with
other groups, such as foreign fighters, transnational
terrorists, pro-Saddam tribes, radical Kurdish factions,
and Islamic extremists throughout Iraq. Former
regime loyalist elements continuously attempted to
gain favor in militant Sunni neighborhoods through-
out Iraq. They used private homes to conduct meet-
ings and cache their weapons. During the initial
period of its occupation of Iraq, the Combined Joint
Task Force 7 staff considered Ba’athist leadership
cadres and old regime forces as the primary threat to
Coalition operations. They probably were responsi-
ble for the majority of ambushes against “soft” tar-
gets, such as convoys, and symbolic centers of the
interim government, such as police stations and
council meeting locations.
While many of the anti-Coalition organizations
drew their ranks from secular nationalists and former
supporters of the regime, other groups were organ-
ized along religious lines. Wahhabist influences re-
mained strong with the Sunni tribes in the vicinity of
Fallujah with some support among their co-religion-
ists within Baghdad. A radical religious organization
with origins in Saudi Arabia, Wahhabists preach non-
tolerance of infidels, jihad against Coalition forces,
and martyrdom in the name of their goals. Baghdad
1st FAST Company (-), Baghdad
Detachment B, 4th Air-Naval Gunfire
Liaison Company
Element, MarForCent, Bahrain
33
6
Marine Corps Element, Land
Component Command, Arifjan, Kuwait
3
National Intelligence Support
15
Other
14
Total U.S. Marine Corps
24,508
In his Commander's Intent, 1st Marine Division com-
mander MajGen James N. Mattis characterized the
new mission in Iraq as a moment that would define
the Marine Corps, akin to the battles of Iwo Jima and
Hue City
Photo by LCpl Henry S. Lopez, Defense Imagery VIRIN: 030312-M-0523L-003
Sunni and Ba’ath party members typically remained
more secular in thought than Wahhabists but they
would occasionally cooperate as a matter of conven-
ience. U.S. and Coalition forces identified elements
of several recognized terrorist organizations in Iraq,
and these groups may have received support from
the former regime. Some of the Islamic extremist or-
ganizations suspected in the enemy ranks included
al-Qaeda, Ansar al-Islam, Hezbollah, and Wahhabis.
The insurgency was not only confined to militant
Sunni groups, however. Shortly after the fall of the
Ba’ath regime, radical Shi’a militias began to gain mo-
mentum and popularity. For example, the Supreme
Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (a Shi'ite
political party and armed militia) took advantage of
the security vacuum to increase influence through-
out Iraq. In addition, the collapse of the Ba'athist
regime helped increase the relative influence of Ay-
atollah Sistani and other important clerics of the key
Shi'ite holy cities of an-Najaf and Karbala. The re-
newed emphasis on an-Najaf as a center of the Shi'a
religion, the largest in Iraq-countered the former
influence of Iranian clerics seeking to fill the void,
thus causing undoubted friction between Shi’ite ele-
ments.
While Iran traditionally supported all Shi'a organ-
izations, the Supreme Council's goal of creating an
Iraq independent of Tehran left it somewhat at odds
with the Islamic Fundamentalist Republic. The Badr
Corps, the military arm of the Supreme Council, re-


24
INTO THE FRAY

CROFFT
Photo by Spc Ronald Shaw Jr., USA Defense Imagery VIRIN: 050414-A-3240S-026
Militant Sunnis and Shi'a, secular Ba’athists, and foreign fighters all took part in terrorist attacks against Coali-
tion forces. Roadside bombs, such as the one whose aftereffects are depicted here, were a common weapon de-
ployed by insurgent groups.
tained much stronger ties to Tehran, however, and it Other religious organizations, while not directly
continued to stage demonstrations openly hostile to rising against U.S. and Coalition forces, remained vital
the Coalition. The Badr Corps' followers in Iran re sources of support for the insurrection and other
portedly crossed into Iraq with Iranian intelligence forms of opposition to them. The Howza (religious
agents within their organization. Many observers be seminaries teaching Islamic theory and law once
lieved that the corps placed arms stockpiles in the banned under Saddam Hussein) had three key ele-
Shi'a sections of Baghdad and other cities to the ments for the Shi'a: the premier religious school in
south. The Supreme Council later changed the name the Shi’a religion located in an-Najaf, a body of lead-
of its militia to the Badr Organization, connoting a ers that guided the direction and conduct of the Shi'a
more peaceful and political emphasis, but it re religion, and the mutually shared goals of all Shi’as.
mained a significant military presence in Iraqi public All Shi’a-based organizations opposing the Coalition
life.
forces had some affiliation with the Howza, including
Table 3-2: I Marine Expeditionary Force Combat Power (On Hand/Ready)-April 2004
Aviation
AH-1W
UH-1N
CH-46E
CH-53E
KC-130F
RQ-2B Pioneer
18/13
34/27
24/19
6/5
8/7
34/25
74%
72%
79%
79%
83%
88%
HMMWV
Hardback
Ground (USMC)
Amphibious Assault
Vehicle
39/37
HMMWV
(Antitank)
103/94
Tank M1A1
Howitzer M198
Light Armored
Vehicle
118/89
403/365
16/16
18/18
91%
90%
95%
75%
100%
100%
Tank
M1/A1/A2
Bradley Fighting
Vehicle M2/A1/A2
Ground (Army)
HMMWV
M1064
Howitzer.
M109A6
Scout
HMMWV
128/124
14/13
30/28
8/7
6/6
93%
93%
88%
100%
97%


Early Operations in Al-Anbar Province
25
the SCIRI, Badr Corps, and the Iranian Dawa Party.
Several persons claimed to speak on behalf of the
Howza, such as the influential religious leader Muq-
tada al Sadr, son of a murdered Shi’ite cleric, and Ay-
atollah Sistani.
Marines Establish Their Presence
By 20 March 2004, the 1st Marine Division had com-
pleted its relief of the 82d Airborne Division in al-
Anbar and northern Babil Provinces. Regimental
Combat Team 7 went into action first. Its patrols and
limited offensive actions ranged far, and the 1st Light
Armored Reconnaissance Battalion reportedly put the
equivalent of 2.5 years worth of peacetime mileage on
its General Motors-Canada light-armored vehicles dur-
ing its first month of operations. Security was scarce,
and resistance against U.S. and Coalition forces in the
region was persistent. The first casualties in the divi-
sion came from an improvised explosive device deto-
nated on 6 March against a vehicle in the 3d Battalion,
7th Marines, sector, injuring two Marines.
Two days later, Marines launched their first offen-
sive action of the year when 3d Battalion, 7th Marines,
and the 1st Squadron, 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment,
conducted a cordon and search of a house in Husay-
bah. Regimental Combat Team 7's discovery of 10 im-
provised launchers and 60 57mm aerial rockets arrayed
around Camp Korean Village was sobering. On 15
March, Syrian border guards fired with small arms on
Marines of Company L, 3d Battalion, 7th Marines, near
the Husaybah border crossing point. The Marines re-
sponded with rifles, heavy and light machine guns, and
a tube launched, optically tracked (TOW) antitank mis-
sile shot. One Marine was wounded while three Syrian
border posts were damaged or destroyed. Investiga-
tions by local Iraqi guards proved that the Syrians had
opened fire first and that neither side had crossed the
frontier at any point.
Iraq's al-Anbar Province was divided into Areas of Operation. I MEF's (code named Atlanta) included Area of
Operations Denver (western region), Area of Operations Topeka (Ramadi and its surrounding area), Area of
Operations Raleigh (Fallujah and surrounding areas), and Area of Operations Oshkosh (al-Taqaddum).
I MEF Briefing Map, Adapted by History Division

AO ATLANTA
RAWAH
AL QA'IM
HUSAYBAL
HADITHAH
N
BAGHDAD
HIT
AO DENVER
POE WALEED
AL ASAD
RAMADI
FALLUJAH
AO RALEIGH
RUTBAH
AO TOPEKA
POE TREBIL
AO OSHKOSN
MNF-W SECURITY AREA


Gult
Siho
Sind!
Mizun
Barados
Ribato
Shammer
Chingini
Hamawand
Shalkhan
Jibur
Jibur Tigris River
Albu Nasir Tikrit
Takaratah
(Tikriti)
Khazraj
Nafisah
Al Hindiyah Hawashim
26 INTO THE FRAY
TURKEY
N
Banwari
Dihok Zibari Barzan
O Mizun Surchi
Balik
Sinjar Herki
Ako
Kushnao
Girdi
Sinjar Mosul
Pizhdar
Aqaydat Arbil
Shaun
SYRIA
Dizai
Karkuk
As Sulaymaniyah
Jabbari
Ubayd
Jaf
Samirrai
Talabani
IRAN
Daudi
Nahr Diyala
Zangana
Euphrates
Samarra
Duri
Qarah
Akashat
Atighi
Ar Ramadi
Sathi
Dulaym
Baghdah Jibur
Ar Rutbah
Oaraghouh
Zubaydi
JORDAN
Al Kut
Janabi
Jabur
Saway ia
Laith
Banu
An Nukhayb
Rai ah
Bayat
Fatla
Banu Lam Albu
Khaza
Tamim
An Najaf
Yasir
Bani Rikab Albu
PAI
Muhammad
Amarah
Agra
Uzayrij
Bani Hijaymi
Ghalal
Abu Salin
Ribat
An Muntatid
Unizah Nasiriyah
Majority Groups
Hassan As Salman
Basraho
Asdi
Kurd
Sunni Arab
Al Busayyah
Dufir
Sunni Arab/Kurd Mix
Mutayrat Kindi
KUWAIT
Shia Arab
Kuwait
Shia/Sunni Arab Mix
Sunni Turkoman
Sparsely Populated
SAUDI ARABIA
Tribe Name Hassan

şumaydab

IRAQ
Rawlah
Ubayd
Al Halluf

Bani Malik
Khazraj
Persian
Gulf
1001
History Division Map
Although al-Anbar is geographically the largest of Iraq's provinces, it is the least populated, with most of its in-
habitants living along the Euphrates River. The majority of its inhabitants are Sunni Arabs of the Dulaym tribe.
The regiment executed operations across Area of
Operations Denver that focused on identifying and
capturing enemy mortar men, explosive device
planters, and foreign fighters. Colonel Tucker's primary
task remained to interdict the infiltration of foreign
fighters joining the Iraqi insurgent effort by using the


Early Operations in Al-Anbar Province
27
so-called “rat lines” from the porous Syrian border and
the “white wadi” emerging from the border with Saudi
Arabia. In the vital security area around al-Asad Air
Base, Regimental Combat Team 7 executed a coordi-
nated raid using special operations personnel with
Marines of the al-Asad garrison to capture suspected
insurgents conducting rocket attacks on the base.
To establish a presence north of the Euphrates and
destroy key insurgency command and control areas,
the 3d Battalion, 4th Marines, moved into Rawah on
21 March. Both mounted and dismounted patrols by
joint U.S.-Iraqi teams reinforced border security and
sought to deny emplacement and detonation of ex-
plosive devices along various routes. On 19 March, the
regiment reported that a patrol from 3d Battalion, 7th
Marines, stopped and seized a vehicle containing sev-
eral grenades, RPG-type rockets, launchers, and ma-
chine gun ammunition. Three of the six suspects fled
the vehicle, and three were detained. On 22 March,
Marines from the same battalion again stopped a sin-
gle vehicle for violating curfew, and the search of the
vehicle uncovered one U.S. identification card, a cel-
lular phone, two handheld global positioning devices,
and a mortar firing table printed in Arabic. Two indi-
viduals were arrested and brought to Camp al-Qaim
for further questioning where they provided intelli-
gence for a follow-on cordon-and-knock mission that
brought no further discoveries.
In Rawah, the 3d Battalion, 4th Marines, conducted
patrols with local police and began its campaign to se-
cure the town. Far to the southwest in Area of Opera-
tions Denver, Marines of 2d Battalion, 7th Marines,
conducted joint dismounted security patrols with the
Rutbah Iraqi Civil Defense Corps Company. The 1st
Force Reconnaissance Company tracked high-value in-
surgents and planned raids, maintained border obser-
vation, and deployed snipers as required. All units
produced information operations aimed at calming and
reassuring the local populace, while spreading the
fruits of civil affairs projects and other assistance pro-
The disposition of U.S. and allied forces in Iraq is shown as reported in a Pentagon press briefing on 30 April
2004.
Pentagon Press Briefing, April 30, 2004, http://www.defenselink.mil/DODCMSShare/briefingslide/52/040430-D-6570C-006.jpg

STATES
UNITED
TURKEY
IRAQ COALITION FORCES
Habur Gate
CENTRA
Mosul
COMMANO
х
TF OLYMPIA
XX
MNB-N
SYRIA
1 INFANTRY
Kirkuk
1 ID
• Tikrit
I MEF
Al Qaim
IRAN
Baqubah
ХХо
1CD
MND (CS)
Fallujah
Ar Ramadi
1 CAVALRY
Baghdad
MND (SE)
1 ARMORED
I MARINE
Karbala
VORDAN
Alkut
An Najaf x Ad Diwaniyah
POL
POL
EBF!
UKR
XX
An Nasiriyah
Basrah
器
​UK
US FORCES:
138,089
COALITION:
24,956
KUWAIT
Kuwait City


28
INTO THE FRAY

AO ATLANTA
RAWAH
AL QA'IM
HUSAYBALL
Bde (USA)
HADITHAH
16
N
(USA)
MAW
BAGHDAD
LAR
bra
CSSB
Markiv
FoRecon
16
MAG
AO DENVER
HIT
NUSA)
Recon
MEF
POE WALEED
AL ASAD
MWSG
RCT
38
MACG
RAMADI
FALLUJAH
AO RALEIGH
32
RUTBAH
(USA)
5
AO TOPEKA (USA)
m
AO OSHKOSN
POE TREBIL
120
(USA)
CSSB
FSSG
15
CSSG
MNF-W SECURITY AREA
CSSG
I MEF Briefing Map, Adapted by History Division
Initial Deployment of I Marine Expeditionary Force (Forward) Units, March 2004.
grams. In this manner, the regiment executed General
Mattis' intention of dual-track operations to kill insur-
gents and to help support the Iraqi people.
During this first partial month of operations (5–31
March) in Area of Operations Denver, Regimental Com-
bat Team 7 experienced 24 mine or improvised explo-
sive device attacks, found 73 other devices before they
could be detonated, and received 27 indirect- and 26
direct-fire attacks. Four Marines died in action and 51
were wounded in this introduction to the new area.
The 1st Brigade, 1st Infantry Division, continued to
center its main effort on Ramadi, bolstered consider-
ably by the attachments of 2d Battalion, 4th Marines,
and the provisional military police battalion formed by
3d Battalion, 11th Marines. The brigade's eastern
boundary with Regimental Combat Team 1 moved to
the western bank of the Tharthar Canal with Regimen-
tal Combat Team 1 assuming responsibility for the bat-
tlespace north of the Euphrates near Saqlawiyah. The
military police company, transferred from the 4th Ma-
rine Division to 3d Battalion, 11th Marines, operated
the detention facility in Ramadi and made its first de-
tainee transfer on 24 March, transporting 15 captives
to Camp Fallujah. As the unit moved, a bomb ex-
ploded. The detonation produced no casualties, and
the subsequent search of a house in the vicinity led to
the capture of four rifles, electrical switches, and a
large pile of wire. The brigade had two other such de-
vices explode in its sector the same day. One of these
explosions injured two Marines, and the other targeted
an Army M1A1 Abrams main battle tank. The search
of the area by the Army's 1st Battalion, 34th Armor, led
to the killing of two insurgents, one of whom had an
AK-47 rifle and a detonating device. Such events con-
tinued across the operating areas, taxing the men and
women of each regiment or brigade to remain vigilant
and ready for action.
Other 1st Brigade operations included security
sweeps against surface-to-air missile teams operating
around al-Taqaddum, convoy escort for units passing
between the two Marine regiment sectors, and cover-
ing the withdrawal of the last elements of 82d Airborne


30
INTO THE FRAY
way E1 just outside the eastern city limits.
On 18 March, insurgents attacked the Regimental
Combat Team 1 and 3d Brigade, 82d Airborne Division
command groups in Fallujah along Highway 10. A
week later, two more attacks on the highway within 15
hours of each other hit a special operations unit and a
Marine Wing Support Squadron 374 convoy. Colonel
Toolan ordered 2d Battalion, 1st Marines, to secure the
cloverleaf intersection with Highway 1, which runs
north-south on the eastern side of the city, and the
northeast portion of the city adjacent to Highway E1. At
dawn on 26 March, one rifle company of 2d Battalion,
1st Marines, seized control of the cloverleaf. Traffic was
stopped and diverted around Fallujah, and E and F
Companies entered the northeast portion of the city.
The insurgents responded to their approach by launch-
ing coordinated mortar and small arms ambushes
throughout the day against the Marines who engaged
the insurgents in numerous firefights. On 27 March, at
the request of the city council, 2d Battalion, 1st Marines,
pulled its forces from that portion of the city but re-
tained surveillance over the cloverleaf. The next day,
the battalion reoccupied the intersection, remaining in
place through the end of the month to prevent further
attacks on convoys.
Under these less than auspicious circumstances, the
transfer of authority with the 3d Brigade, 82d Airborne
Division, and that of the two divisions as well, took
place on 28 March at Camp Fallujah. Throughout the
week, 23–31 March, insurgents struck the camp with
indirect fire, and Abu Ghraib Prison received the same
treatment for three days. On 30 March, insurgents am-
bushed a convoy from the 1st Force Service Support
Group near Fallujah. The next day, a patrol from 1st
Reconnaissance Battalion discovered a cache of 300
mortar rounds southwest of Fallujah. As difficult as
these early experiences in al-Anbar Province had been
for the 1st Marine Division and its supporting aviation
and service contingents, hopes remained high that a
sustained and determined Marine Corps presence could
bring improved conditions to the chaotic province.
Among the many technological advantages Marines
exploited in this campaign was the much improved in-
telligence capability that had been developed over two
decades. The 2003 campaign in Iraq had seen the bap-
tism of fire for the Marine Corps intelligence battalion
formed in the MEF headquarters group under normal
organization. Accordingly, the 2d Intelligence Battalion
established its Tactical Fusion Center with the division
command post at Camp Blue Diamond and proceeded
to operate information cells as low as the company
level in the ensuing campaign. The Tactical Fusion Cen-
ter combined in a single place the intelligence from
higher echelons of national and military intelligence
services with the data from the many sources of local
Marine Corps and Army units. Overall, the positioning
of the Tactical Fusion Center adjacent to the divisional
operations center provided situational awareness un-
precedented even by standards of the 2003 accom-
plishments.
General Mattis signaled his appreciation of the situ-
ation near the end of March. Colonel Tucker's Regi-
mental Combat Team 7 had successfully positioned
units to interdict the primary rat line. Concurrently,
Colonel Toolan's Regimental Combat Team 1 had
moved aggressively against the enemy center of grav-
ity in Fallujah, while Colonel Conner's 1st Brigade pre-
empted insurgent force efforts to disrupt the authorities
of al-Anbar Province. The Marines wanted to increase
human intelligence, fused with all sources, to create op-
portunities for strikes against the insurgent networks.
General Mattis saw in the opposition a combination
of classic insurgent tactics and terrorist activities, and
these had increased during the turnover. Not only were
the more plentiful road convoys attacked, but also vio-
lence in urban and rural areas across the province
heightened. Increased patrol activity into areas not nor-
mally covered had produced attacks by both impro-
vised explosive devices and direct fire. In no case,
however, did the insurgents demonstrate any interest
in assaulting the new arrivals. Instead, they had fallen
before steady Marine infantry pressure and return fire.
The opening of the I MEF stability and security
operations campaign in March ended with an insur-
gent ambush that left four U.S. security contractors
killed and mutilated on the Highway 10 bridge in
west-central Fallujah, prompting U.S. offensive ac-
tions in reprisal. The initial campaign plan for sta-
bility and security operations would give way to
full-spectrum combat operations for Marines and sol-
diers in Iraq and not exclusively in the I MEF zone.
General Mattis Urged His Division Onward
Demonstrate respect to the Iraqi people, es-
pecially when you don't feel like it. As the mis-
sion continues, we will experience setbacks
and frustrations. In many cases our efforts will
seem unappreciated by those we are trying the
hardest to help. It is then that small unit lead-
ers step up and are counted. Keep your sol-
diers, sailors and Marines focused on the
mission and resistant to adversarial relation-
ships with the Iraqi people ... We obey the
Geneva Convention even while the enemy
does not. We will destroy the enemy without
losing our humanity.


Chapter 4
The First Al-Fallujah Battle and Its Aftermath
James T. Conway, and 1st Marine Division com-
mander, Major General James N. Mattis, cautioned
against rash action. In the division's daily report,
General Mattis' assistant division commander,
Brigadier General John F. Kelly, strove to temper the
call for immediate offensive action:
The offensive actions carried out by Regimental
Combat Team 1 on 25–27 March succeeded in send-
ing a message to the people of al-Fallujah that the
Marines were there to stay. While setting back the
civil affairs process in the city, Marines felt they were
effectively dealing with the situation.
As noted, the 1st Marine Division had developed
a measured, phased approach to stabilizing the al-
Anbar region that combined kinetic operations, in-
formation operations, and civil affairs actions to show
the residents of Fallujah both the carrot and the stick.
This planning was described in a division order pre-
pared for the regimental combat team called Fallujah
Opening Gambit. Despite these and other measures,
however, events in the city forced the division to con-
front a range of new circumstances and unanticipated
challenges.
Operation Vigilant Resolve
(3–30 April 2004)
On 31 March 2004 insurgents ambushed four
armed security contractors from the firm Blackwater
USA. The Americans died amid a volley of hand
grenades. A mob gathered, desecrated the bodies, set
them afire, and hung two of them from the nearby
Old Bridge spanning the Euphrates River. World
media broadcast the hanging bodies, and the Amer-
ican and western public saw shocking footage of
charred and almost unrecognizable bodies as resi-
dents of the city cheered and danced. Less known
was the cooperation of local Iraqis who helped the
Marines of 2d Battalion, 1st Marines, recover the re-
mains of three victims that night and the fourth the
following day.
After a series of conferences with the White House
and the Secretary of Defense, Lieutenant General Ri-
cardo S. Sanchez, commander of Combined Joint
Task Force 7, directed the Marines to undertake im-
mediate military action. On 1 April 2004, Sanchez's
deputy director of operations, Army Brigadier Gen-
eral Mark Kimmitt, promised an “overwhelming” re-
sponse to the Blackwater deaths, stating that “we will
pacify that city.” In the midst of calls for vengeance
including options of destroying what little critical in-
frastructure remained in the city, both I Marine Ex-
peditionary Force commander, Lieutenant General
As we review the actions in Fallujah yesterday,
the murder of four private security personnel
in the most brutal way, we are convinced that
this act was spontaneous mob action. Under
the wrong circumstances this could have taken
place in any city in Iraq. We must avoid the
temptation to strike out in retribution. In the
only 10 days we have been here we have en-
gaged the “good” and the bad in Fallujah every-
day, and have casualties to show for our efforts.
We must remember that the citizens and offi-
cials of Fallujah were already gathering up and
delivering what was left of three victims before
asked to do so, and continue in their efforts to
collect
up what they can of the dismembered
remnants of the fourth. We have a well thought
out campaign plan that considers the Fallujah
problem across its very complicated spectrum.
This plan most certainly includes kinetic action,
but going overly kinetic at this juncture plays
into the hands of the opposition in exactly the
way they assume we will. This is why they
shoot and throw hand grenades out of crowds,
to bait us into overreaction. The insurgents did
not plan this crime, it dropped into their lap.
We should not fall victim to their hopes for a
vengeful response. To react to this provocation,
as heinous as it is, will likely negate the efforts
the 82d ABD paid for in blood, and complicate
our campaign plan which we have not yet been
given the opportunity to implement. Coun-
terinsurgency forces have learned many times
in the past that the desire to demonstrate force
and resolve has long term and generally nega-
tive implications, and destabilize rather than
stabilize the environment.
Sanchez' headquarters ordered immediate offen-
sive action to re-establish freedom of maneuver in
31


32
INTO THE FRAY

أكبر
EE
Photo by 1st Lt Esteban Vickers, DVIDS, VIRIN 080410-M-2385J-003
On 31 March 2004, four Blackwater USA civilian contractors were ambushed and killed by insurgent forces
in Fallujah. Their bodies were burned and mutilated and two were hung from this bridge (pictured here in
2008).
Fallujah on 1 April. At I MEF headquarters, General
Conway directed General Mattis to establish 12
checkpoints around the city using local Iraqi Civil De-
fense Corps and police personnel to prevent any
movement into or out of the city by younger males.
Iraqi paramilitary personnel, at this time still consid-
ered to be reliable, manned seven of the checkpoints
positioned as inner cordons, and Marines of Lieu-
tenant Colonel Gregg P. Olson's 2d Battalion, 1st
Marines, and Lieutenant Colonel Brennan T. Byrne's
1st Battalion, 5th Marines, set up five outer check-
points to complete the ring around the city. As this
was occurring, the two Marine battalions began mov-
ing significant combat power to the northeast corner
of the city, near the Jolan District.
On 3 April, General Sanchez issued his order for
Operation Vigilant Resolve. The mission aimed to
deny insurgents sanctuary in Fallujah and to arrest
those responsible for the Blackwater killings. The
two Marine battalions moved into positions around
the eastern and northern portion of Fallujah to seal
the outer cordon of the city. The Marine and Iraqi
positions continued to be fired upon and the friendly
Iraqis soon fled. The Iraqi 36th Commando Battalion
was subsequently dispatched to replace the fleeing
Iraqi forces. A specially trained unit augmented and
mentored by the U.S. Army's Special Forces to fight
alongside American troops, the commandos would
acquit themselves well in combat during the weeks
ahead.
In his commander's comments of 3 April, General
Mattis raised the difficulties of conducting offensive
operations in Fallujah:
My intent is to then enter the city from two di-
rections, which will draw fire from guerillas and
put us in a position to exploit our own well
considered and conditions-based operation.
There are over 250,000 inhabitants in the city,
the vast majority of whom have no particular
love for the Coalition, but are also not insur-
gents. From a moral, ethical, legal, and military


The First Al-Fallujah Battle and Its Aftermath
33
perspective, we will fight smart: We do not
have to be loved at the end of the day, this is a
goal that is no longer achievable in Fallujah, but
we must avoid turning more young men into
terrorists. We will also avoid doing what the in-
surgents, terrorists, and foreign fighters, and
“Arab Street” all expect, and that is the thought-
less application of excessive force as if to strike
out in retribution for the murders.
General Mattis and his division staff planned de-
cisive operations to bring Fallujah under control
while simultaneously maintaining the counterinsur-
gency operations in nearby Ramadi and the rest of
al-Anbar and north Babil Provinces to prevent con-
ceding any advantage to the insurgents.
His orders called for a four-phase operation to be
implemented by Colonel John A. Toolan's Regimen-
tal Combat Team 1. In Phase I, the regiment would
begin sustained operations in Fallujah beginning
0100 on 5 April with a tight cordon of the city using
two battalion-sized task forces in blocking positions
and traffic control points on all motorized avenues
of approach. This stage included raids against high
value targets and the photography shop that printed
the murder photos. Phase II entailed continuous raids
against targets inside the city from firm bases estab-
lished within northern and southern Fallujah. Mes-
sages concerning the operation would be broadcast
informing citizens of measures necessary to protect
themselves and families from harm and thanking the
local population for their cooperation and for infor-
mation leading to the death or capture of insurgent
forces. In Phases III and IV, Regimental Combat
Team 1 would, at the moment of the commander's
choosing, attack and seize various hostile sectors in
the city, integrating and eventually turning operations
over to Iraqi security forces.
Colonel Toolan ordered his two battalions, the
regiment's supporting tank company, assault am-
phibian company, and its artillery battery into their
battle positions in the early morning hours of 5 April.
The 1st Reconnaissance Battalion swept to the north
and east of the city to target insurgents seeking to
fire mortar rounds and rockets into Marine positions.
Company D, 1st Light Armored Reconnaissance Bat-
Col John A. Toolan (left), commander of Regimental Combat Team 1, and 3d Battalion, 1st Marines, com-
mander LtCol Willard Buhl, discuss progress made by their forces during Operation Vigilant Resolve.
Photo by LCpl Jordan F. Sherwood, Defense Imagery, VIRIN 040813-M-0706S-030


34
INTO THE FRAY

vu
Photo by MSgt Howard J. Farrell, Defense Imagery VIRIN: 040405-M-0049F-002
A Marine M1A1 Abrams main battle tank blocks access into Fallujah to isolate insurgent forces operating in-
side the city during Operation Vigilant Resolve.
talion, moved north to cover Highway E1. Marines
of Company B, 1st Combat Engineer Battalion, and
Navy Mobile Construction Battalion 74 constructed a
berm around southern Fallujah, further isolating the
battle area.
As Captain Kyle Stoddard's Company F, 2d Battal-
ion, 1st Marines, occupied its position, insurgents en-
gaged his 2d Platoon and combat engineer
detachment with RPG-type rocket launchers and
small-arms fire. An Air Force AC-130 gunship arrived
on station and coordinated with the battalion for fire
support. When the AC-130 had stopped firing, the
Jolan District lay ablaze, and the enemy threat had
disappeared.
With 2d Battalion, 2d Marines, blocking any es-
cape to the south of Fallujah, the assault of the city
commenced on 6 April with 2d Battalion, 1st Marines,
attacking the Jolan District in the city's northwest cor-
ner while 1st Battalion, 5th Marines, attacked west
from its positions south of the cloverleaf connecting
Marines from 2d Battalion, 1st Marines, set up a perimeter in the streets of Fallujah during Operation Vigilant
Resolve.
Photo by LCpl Kenneth E. Madden III, Defense Imagery VIRIN: 040405-M-5505M-042


The First Al-Fallujah Battle and Its Aftermath
35

as possible. Marine commanders, Coalition authority
representatives, and civil affairs officers advised the
civil, tribal, and religious leaders about the situation.
These locals predicted dire consequences if the Coali-
tion continued to move into the city. But the Coali-
tion's response to the city's leaders was that their
predictions lacked credibility and that they bore
major responsibility for the present conditions in Fal-
lujah. The information operation campaign used pub-
lic
service announcements, handbills, and
notifications to the mayor, city council, sheiks, and
police. These announcements stated that a curfew
would be imposed and enforced between 1900–0600.
As operations proceeded, General Mattis signaled
his concern about I MEF's southern boundary be-
cause a revolt in Baghdad led by Shi’a cleric Moq-
tadre al-Sadr threatened I MEF's communications to
the south and east. Elements of al-Sadr's militia (also
termed the Mahdi Army) moved astride the Eu-
phrates near al-Musayyib on the Karbala-Baghdad
highway. Iraqi police managed to restore order, but
the uprising remained a serious portent of the future.
By 6 April, the inadequacy of Iraqi paramilitary
forces could no longer be denied. Most of the 2,000
Iraqi soldiers and police theoretically deployed to
support the 1st Marine Division had deserted as soon
as, or even before, the fighting began. The 2d Bat-
talion, New Iraqi Army, for instance, took fire while
convoying from Baghdad on 5 April and refused to
go into action with some 38 percent of its forces dis-
appearing at once. Many of these Iraqi soldiers re-
portedly entered insurgent ranks. Only the 36th Iraqi
Commando Battalion/Iraqi National Guard Battalion
(400 troops with 17 U.S. Special Forces advisors)
stayed the course, working alongside 2d Battalion,
1st Marines, in Jolan. The 506th Battalion of the Civil
Defense Corps proved unsteady but useful at man-
ning exterior checkpoints, but no other Iraqi soldiers
served in this action. The Civil Defense Corps' 505th
Battalion, for instance, never reported for operations.
On 6 April, General Mattis decided to order in an
infantry battalion from Regimental Combat Team 7.
At the same time, he expressed frustration with the
Iraqi security force program:
Photo by GSgt Chago Zapata, Defense Imagery, VIRIN: 040812-M-00952-074
An Iraqi soldier of the 36th Commando Battalion,
Iraqi Special Operations Forces Brigade, waits to par-
ticipate in a joint operation in Najaf Province in Au-
gust 2004. The battalion was one of the few Iraqi units
to not desert during Operation Vigilant Resolve, and
elements of the force fought alongside 2d Battalion,
1st Marines, in Fallujah's Jolan District.
Highways E1 to 10 into the industrial Sin’a District.
General Mattis planned to pinch the insurgents from
two directions, adding a steadily increasing pressure.
The fighting in late March had determined that the
enemy lacked the resolve and the fighting skill to
stop advancing Marine rifle units. A progressive ad-
vance into the city would exploit insurgent weak-
nesses and lead to their wholesale collapse.
As Marines entered the city, Colonel Toolan's es-
timation of the enemy's posture proved consistent
with his expectations. The moves from north and
southeast into the city each night drew immediate
fire from insurgents, revealing their locations, and
thus allowing the Marines to destroy them. The Ma-
rine battalions attempted to integrate Iraqi Civil De-
fense Corps troops into the blocking positions and
new Iraqi Army units into Marine battalions as rapidly
A primary goal of our planning to date has
been to “put an Iraqi face” on security functions
as quickly as possible. With three weeks on the
ground, reporting and experience has indicated
that all Iraqi civil security organizations—po-
lice, Iraqi Civil Defense Corps and border
force—are generally riddled with corruption, a
lack of will, and are widely infiltrated by anti-


38
INTO THE FRAY
operational planning effort to develop preliminary
operations in and around Fallujah to support the
main effort. The intelligence analysis identified three
key cities harboring and supporting enemy activities:
Saqlawiyah, Karmah, and Jurf as-Sakhr. The staff
made plans for combined operations in these cities.
With Colonel Toolan and his staff focused on Fallu-
jah, General Mattis activated the division’s alternate
command group “Bravo.” Led by 1st Marine Division
assistant commander, General Kelly, “Division Bravo"
moved to north Babil Province and assumed com-
mand of the two infantry battalions there. These
would play a key role in establishing a secure envi-
ronment for the ongoing Arba'een pilgrimage, which
brought hundreds of thousands of Shi'a faithful into
Karbala. Some operational planning teamwork later
occurred to conduct a relief in place by the Army's
1st Armored Division, which was by then beginning
to engage in operations to the south of Baghdad.
As Marines poised and repositioned for further op-
erations on 9 April, orders arrived from General
Sanchez to cease all offensive operations in Fallujah.
L. Paul Bremer III and the Coalition Provisional Au-
thority had prevailed upon General Abizaid, head of
Central Command, to order a cease-fire at the behest
of the Iraqi Governing Council (IGC) in Baghdad.
The halt was to allow IGC council representatives the
opportunity to negotiate the enemy's surrender. Pol-
itics brought Regimental Combat Team l’s momen-
tum to a stop. Marines received the order to cease
offensive operations with some disbelief.
The insurgents' use of information warfare played
a role in the cessation of operations. Although the
Marines of Regimental Combat Team 1 were achiev-
ing considerable gains, the insurgency was able to
effectively employ the media to stir up opposition to
the Coalition campaign. In addition to the insurgents?
surprising mobility and strength, the insurgents dis-
played an excellent grasp of information operations.
Their propaganda reached television and radio sta-
tions, appeared on the Internet, and spread through
the streets by word of mouth. Some groups distrib-
uted fliers and videos alleging Coalition atrocities and
insurgent successes. Arab satellite news program-
ming, especially the ubiquitous Al Jazeera, high-
lighted the “excessive force” of the Marines and
soldiers of 1st Marine Division, making allusions to
the Israeli actions in Palestine as further denuncia-
tion. With no western press embedded with I MEF
forces and the streets too dangerous for independ-
Although the combat operations in Fallujah garnered the most attention in April 2004, intense fighting also took
place in al-Anbar's capital, Ramadi (pictured here in 2008), during the same month.
Photo by Cpl Jeremy M. Giacominol, Defense Imagery VIRIN: 080423-M-6668G-022


The First Al-Fallujah Battle and Its Aftermath
39

Photo by SSgt D. Myles Cullen, USAF, Defense Imagery, VIRIN: 040628-F-01930-009
While the transfer of sovereignty from the Coalition Provisional Authority to the Iraqi Interim Government on
28 June 2004 occurred ahead of schedule, the country was far from stable or secure. U.S. Ambassador to Iraq,
L. Paul Bremer III, was photographed shortly before departing Iraq after the transfer.
ent reporting, the media battlefield fell to the insur-
gents.
The Iraqi Governing Council caved in to pressures
within and without its chambers. Three of its mem-
bers resigned in protest, and five others threatened
the same. Bremer met with the Council on 8 April
and received the opinions of the Sunni members that
Operation Vigilant Resolve amounted to “collective
punishment” and that even more massive demon-
strations of resistance and opposition were in the off-
ing.
Bremer was already under pressure to deal with
the al-Sadr revolt, and the British had criticized him
for his heavy-handed approach in Fallujah. He also
knew that the Abu Ghraib Prison scandals were
about to become public knowledge. Thus, he prob-
ably decided to cut his losses. For him, the larger ob-
jective of returning sovereignty to the Iraqis by 30
June likely took precedence.
An uncertain siege continued for three weeks. On
8 April 2004 the newly arrived 3d Battalion, 4th
Marines, launched an attack from Fallujah's northeast,
oriented southwest. As it took up
the main effort, the
other two battalions continued to reduce insurgent
pockets of resistance. The enemy fired rockets and
mortars from the city center but had by then lost all
of its initial defensive positions. Not surprising to the
Marine Corps battalions, the insurgents remaining
within the city limits tried to use the cease-fire to their
advantage. Colonel Toolan tightened the cordon on
the city to prevent the insurgents from withdrawing
from the city and to block reinforcements. The 36th
Iraqi Commando Battalion continued to fight along-
side the Marines, distinguishing itself as the sole Iraqi
unit to prove itself in combat. Meanwhile, the Iraqi
505th Battalion manned checkpoints under supervi-
sion on the outskirts of the city.
Captain Jason E. Smith led his Company B, 1st Bat-
talion, 5th Marines, through some of the heaviest
fighting in the industrial area during the formal of-
fensive operation. He returned to the offensive again
on 13 April. The insurgents surrounded the attached
3d Platoon, Company A, which lost an assault am-
phibious vehicle and took several casualties. Leading
the rescue effort, Smith guided his convoy toward the
smoke of the burning vehicle and then dismounted,
racing to the first vehicles to lead his Marines to the
trapped platoon. With total disregard for enemy fire,
he coordinated attacks on the insurgents. Organizing
a defensive perimeter and evacuating casualties, he
supervised the recovery of the disabled tracked ve-
hicle and coordinated the withdrawal as part of the
rear guard.
Following the cease-fire, representatives from I
MEF, the Coalition authority, and Iraqi organizations
began to negotiate with the insurgents, but little


40
INTO THE FRAY

3.
Photo by Sgt Paul L. Anstine II, Defense Imagery VIRIN 040314-M-5150A-024
In April 2004, units from Colonel Craig A. Tucker's Regimental Combat Team 7 were sent to Area of Opera-
tions Raleigh to relieve Regimental Combat Team 1 at Fallujah.
progress was made. Marines had to defend them-
selves from repeated insurgent cease-fire violations.
On 25 April, both General Conway and General Mat-
tis met with former Iraqi Army generals to discuss the
possible formation of a military unit in Fallujah. The
negotiations produced the Fallujah Brigade, which
gained the quick approval of the military chain of
command. By 28 April the Fallujah Brigade had
begun assembling and on the 30th, a turnover led to
the phased withdrawal of the 1st Marine Division
from Fallujah. While Bremer protested the creation
of the brigade, even more serious problems emerged
by the end of April that overshadowed his misgiv-
ings. For General Conway, the unusual negotiating
opportunity allowed at least a bad solution to an in-
soluble dilemma because the 1st Marine Division no
longer had authority to continue the assault and to
clear the city, and it lacked the manpower and other
resources to manage a prolonged siege.
Insurgency in Al-Anbar Province
April 2004
The 1st Marine Division fought its first battle for
Fallujah well but with considerable political interfer-
ence. The ensuing days saw a widespread rise in vi-
olence and opposition to occupying forces, in some
instances reflecting the rising temperatures and the
public's frustration with the squalid conditions in the
city. In other cases, violence was planned by anti-
Coalition factions and insurgents. In al-Anbar
rovince, insurgent groups rallied to support their
brethren remaining behind in the city, spurred by the
Fallujah insurgent and foreign fighter leaders who es-
caped in the first days of April. But another crisis
overshadowed the difficulties of soldiers and Marines
in that province, one with considerable political im-
pact.
The relatively young but influential Moqtadre al-
Sadr, scion of a Shi'a clerical dynasty, enjoyed in-
creasing power and popularity after the overthrow of
Saddam Hussein’s regime. Having served as a symbol
of Shi’a resistance to the former regime, he continued
as a resistance leader by opposing the U.S. and Coali-
tion occupation of Iraq. In 2003 he formed a militia,
which became known variously as the Sadr Militia or
the Mahdi Army, and announced a shadow Shi’a gov-
ernment in al-Kufah, where he intended to establish
government ministries. Al-Sadr continued to pose ob-
stacles to the Coalition Provisional Authority's plans
for a transition to Iraqi self-rule via the Governing
Council, and on 5 April 2004, Coalition authorities
closed his newspaper and called for the leader's ar-


The First Al-Fallujah Battle and Its Aftermath
41

FALLUJAH
Railroad Station
N
w
Jolan
District
88
10
ME
Industrial Area
N
EUPHRATES RIVER
84
90
-89-
PROTETORRINGS
ONLY NOT TO IME USED FOR TARGETS
OR PRECEPTONING
SCALE 1:9,000
100 200 000
5
6
2d Topographic Platoon Map, Adapted by History Division
Operation Vigilant Resolve, April 2004.
To provide better leadership over the Iraq War, the
Combined Joint Task Force 7 was replaced by the Multi
National Force-Iraq and the Multi National Corps-
Iraq in the summer of 2004. In July 2004, Army LtGen
Ricardo S. Sanchez was relieved as senior commander
in Iraq by Army Gen George W. Casey Jr. (shown
below testifying before Congress in 2005).
Photo by TSgt Myles D. Cullen, USAF, Defense Imagery VIRIN: 050623-F-0193C-022
rest on various charges. At the same time, thousands
of Iraqis in Baghdad (he was the de facto ruler of the
Sadr City section of Baghdad) and the Shi'a cities of
al-Kut, Karbala, ad-Diwaniyah and an-Najaf took to
the streets to support al-Sadr, while his militia seized
government buildings and police stations in a major
uprising and challenge to the Coalition Provisional
Authority.
For the first time in a year, cannon and gun fire re-
sounded through the streets of the city. The 1st Ar-
mored Division halted its redeployment movements
on 6 April, having turned over the garrison mission
to the 1st Cavalry Division. General Sanchez issued
orders to the 1st Armored Division to deploy combat
units south of Baghdad with warnings of further ac-
tions to come. He ordered Operation Resolute Sword
on 7 April against the Mahdi Army:
The Mahdi Army is declared to be a hostile

GEN. CASEY


42
INTO THE FRAY

Photo by Cpl Matthew S. Richards, Defense Imagery, VIRIN: 040812-M-4358R-052
Marines from the 11th Marine Expeditionary Unit participate in a joint raid with Iraqi Security Forces against
the forces of Moqtada al-Sadr in an-Najaf, August 2004.
and control the Northern Babil fight, a regiment
headquarters, a tank company (personnel
only), and one USMC infantry battalion have
been requested by separate correspondence.
force; Coalition forces are authorized to engage
and destroy the Mahdi Army based solely upon
their status as members of the Mahdi Army.
There is no requirement for members of Mahdi
Army to commit a hostile act or demonstrate
hostile intent before they can be engaged. Muq-
tada al-Sadr is the leader of Mahdi Army. Posi-
tive identification of Mahdi Army targets must
be acquired prior to engagement.
With the dispatch of 3d Battalion, 4th Marines, to
Regimental Combat Team 1 in support of Operation
Vigilant Resolve, General Mattis sensed that the divi-
sion had reached the end of its resources. Yet he sus-
pected that an emerging danger to the east and south
remained with the al Sadr revolt; he wrote on 8 April:
The current tempo and widespread enemy
surge across our operations area has this divi-
sion stretched. We are moving aggressively
against the enemy across our zone but there are
enemy forces operating in areas where we have
no forces and the Iraqi security forces are im-
potent. We lack sufficient forces to fully address
the enemy in the area north of Camp Fallujah
(vicinity of al Karma), Jurf al Sukr, Northern
Babil and the rocket belt south of Fallujah and
Abu Ghraib prison. We will address those ene-
mies once we free
up forces so we can destroy
their sanctuaries. Additional forces to command
In northern Babil Province, two U.S. battalions
under the 1st Marine Division sought to maintain the
flux of events between the Fallujah and al-Sadr up-
risings. The U.S. Army's 1st Battalion, 32d Infantry,
focused on securing routes for the Arba'een pilgrim-
age of the Shi'a. This required ambushing insurgents
setting explosive devices, mounting patrols along
routes in the zone, and supporting the traffic control
points manned by the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps.
When feasible, patrols of 1st Reconnaissance Battal-
ion moved in from its usual areas south of Fallujah to
counter insurgent indirect fire and booby trap teams.
While escorting a convoy into al-Anbar Province,
the reconnaissance battalion's 2d Platoon, Company
B, ran into a well-concealed and fortified position
southwest of Fallujah. When Captain Brent L. Morel,
the platoon commander, saw his lead vehicle
smashed by a rocket, he ordered his other two vehi-
cles to flank the insurgent position. As insurgent mor-
tar and machine gun fire increased, Captain Morel
led an assault across an open field and up a ten-foot
berm into firing positions from which the reconnais-
sance Marines eliminated 10 insurgents at close range
and forced the others to flee. Continuing the assault
against the other insurgents who continued to pin


The First Al-Fallujah Battle and Its Aftermath
43
down the convoy, Captain Morel received a fatal squads engaged the enemy, and the battalion sent its
burst of automatic weapons fire. Leadership fell to quick reaction force. At approximately 1145, Com-
team leader Sergeant Willie L. Copeland III, who con pany G received more fire and at 1205 was pinned
tinued the assault by fire with his five Marines while down in a house. The quick reaction force moved to
shielding and attempting to save the life of his cap the area in support but was engaged by insurgent
tain. Under the cover of hand grenades, they with forces as well, one block east of Company G. Captain
drew to safety with Morel's body. In the same action, Christopher J. Bronzi, the company commander, led
Sergeant Lendro F. Baptista led his three-man team his Marines in the ensuing 24 hours of action, per-
against more insurgent positions, single-handedly sonally destroying several enemy fighting positions
killing four of them at close range while directing fire and repeatedly exposing himself to small arms and
against several others. He then personally covered grenades. At one point on the sixth, he led a fire
the withdrawal of the team to safety with his own fir team into a fire-swept street to recover the body of a
ing.
fallen Marine.
In Area of Operations Topeka, the soldiers and At this time the battalion received notice from 1st
Marines with the Army's 1st Brigade, 1st Infantry Di Marine Division that three mosques in the area had
vision, fought feverishly against insurgents rallying to called for “jihad.” At approximately 1330 an explo-
support the fighting in Fallujah. Fighting in Ramadi sive device was reported in Company E's sector, on
reached a new level of intensity, with 6 April being the eastern outskirts of the city, and while cordoning
the worst day, when 12 Marines of 2d Battalion, 4th off the area the company received small arms fire. At
Marines, died in an urban firefight against insurgents approximately the same time just to the east, one of
operating in small groups that initially attacked the the battalion's sniper teams set up near the Euphrates
government center. The battalion succeeded in de River was attacked by 12 to 15 men. At approxi-
fending the government buildings, assisting in ex mately 1400, a Company E patrol was ambushed. A
tracting Coalition authority officials, and pushing the quick reaction force was dispatched to reinforce the
attackers into the eastern side of the city.
patrol when it engaged with the enemy still further to
At 1048 on 6 April, Company G received small the east of the city. Two Humvees were hit, and its
arms and RPG fire in the al-Malaab District. The
pa platoon commander was critically wounded. Under
trol, pursuing the attackers, cordoned off the build heavy machine gun and rocket fire, squad leader
ings in the area, when small arms fire erupted. Two Corporal Eric M. Smith assumed command of the pla-
A number of captured weapons and munitions found and seized by Marines during vehicle inspections con-
ducted throughout an-Najaf Province were displayed before being destroyed in August 2004.
Defense Imagery, VIRIN: 040821-M-555Z-001


44
INTO THE FRAY
toon and led the Marines 50 meters across open
ground, where they set up in a few fighting holes
placed along Route 10. Smith then ran back across
the field to evacuate his platoon commander and the
platoon's weapons. Employing machine guns from
the platoon's seven-ton truck, Smith led a counterat-
tack against the insurgent force and relieved another
squad that had been pinned down. When an Army
mechanized infantry platoon arrived, Corporal Smith
coordinated the evacuation of casualties and with-
drew the platoon to the company command post.
The battalion determined that fighters came into
Ramadi on motorcycles and in pickup trucks, met at
a central location (likely the soccer field), and in-
formed the town's people that they were going to at-
tack U.S. forces that day. On the spot interrogation
revealed that the insurgents forced residents out of
their homes as the fighters prepared to engage the
Americans. When the fighting subsided, the insur-
gents made a planned withdrawal on motorcycles
and possibly in boats on the Euphrates back to their
base camps.
The launching of Operation Vigilant Resolve ig-
nited festering insurgent cells that had planned in-
cursions of these types. Having stirred up a hornet's
nest across al-Anbar Province, the Coalition forces
found themselves extended beyond tolerable limits.
The insurgents established ambushes, roadblocks,
emplaced explosive devices, and fired all kinds of
weapons indirectly at Coalition forces. As part of their
efforts to cut lines of communications, they moved
against key bridges, including the Tharthar Bridge
over the canal of the same name.
These were dark hours for the U.S. and Coalition
position in Iraq, and the political-military direction of
the campaign to clear Fallujah of insurgents demon-
strated considerable weakness and discord. As
planned, the “transfer of sovereignty” between the
Coalition Provincial Authority and Iraq did occur on
28 June 2004. Bremer had advanced it two days
ahead of schedule to forestall further difficulties, and
he departed Iraq minutes after the ceremony. With
the establishment of Iraqi sovereignty, the U.S. led
Coalition Provisional Authority dissolved itself and
legal authority devolved upon
the appointed Iraqi In-
terim Government. The United States and Coalition
forces continued to operate under the “all necessary
measures” language of the U.N. Security Council res-
olutions that identified the state of conflict existing in
Iraq and the need for the multinational force to con-
duct operations and to detain individuals to help es-
tablish a secure environment.
In wake of the First Battle of Fallujah and the par-
allel al-Sadr rising in April, the transition to Iraqi sov-
ereignty on 28 June 2004 took on a rather hollow cer-
emonial character. The equally symbolic raising of
the American flag over the new U.S. Embassy in
Baghdad by Marines, marking the first time the Amer-
ican flag had flown there in 13 years, did herald some
significant changes in U.S. policies and plans for the
future. But the idea of sovereignty had little meaning
in Iraqi streets. Still ahead lay several months of fight-
ing and many casualties to restore a semblance of
order in Iraq. The lessons were hard, but Marines
knew from the moment the battle was terminated on
30 April that they would need to return to Fallujah.
Nominally, I MEF reported 27 U.S. killed in action
and more than 90 wounded in the first Battle of Fal-
lujah, but Army and Marine Corps casualties, in re-
lated incidents in Ramadi and the area surrounding
Fallujah, were just beginning to show the extent of
their losses. In April, the 1st Marine Division alone
suffered 48 Marines, two soldiers, and one Navy
corpsman killed in action, and the wounded in action
totaled 412 Marines, 43 soldiers, and 21 sailors. Little
information exists on casualties for the few Iraqi
forces fighting with the Coalition. Enemy losses can
never be known, but are estimated by some intelli-
gence sources as 800 Iraqis killed, which undoubt-
edly included noncombatants.
Regimental Combat Team 7's
Counterstrike in Operation Ripper Sweep
(14 April-1 May 2004)
warted in their efforts to eradicate the insur-
gents from Fallujah, General Conway and General
Mattis turned to the many instances of insurgency in
the surrounding areas of the province. The Army's
1st Brigade, 1st Infantry Division, worked unceas-
ingly to maintain a semblance of order in Ramadi,
using the full panoply of raids, cordons, and various
types of patrolling and ambush actions. In the west-
ern areas of the province, Regimental Combat Team
7 continued to interdict insurgent transportation
routes while also raiding suspected insurgent cells
across the Euphrates valley between al-Qaim and
Rawah.
Beginning on 10 April, General Mattis’ staff began
to work with Colonel Craig A. Tucker's Regimental
Combat Team 7 to develop a plan to move a key part
of the regiment into Area of Operations Raleigh. It
would relieve Regimental Combat Team 1 of its re-
sponsibilities outside Fallujah and deal with the in-
cipient insurgent activity in the
and
countryside surrounding that city. Tucker had his
staff devise a plan to free sufficient combat power
towns


The First Al-Fallujah Battle and Its Aftermath
45
tuaries and dominated areas in area Raleigh,
Regimental Combat Team 7 must return to the
western operating area in approximately seven
to ten days or we will face setbacks along the
rat lines that may negate our successes further
east. Limiting defensive route security missions
and maintaining the cordon around Fallujah for
as short a period as possible are tactical imper-
atives; we need to return to the offensive as
rapidly as possible.
As the task force organized by Colonel Tucker
began to assemble at al-Asad Air Base, the situation
continued to deteriorate as the division reported on
the 13th: “the two companies of effective Iraqi Civil
Defense Corps from the 507th Battalion have essen-
tially quit."
The division's order of the day for 14 April set out
the mission for Regimental Combat Team 7. Colonel
Tucker issued his orders for Operation Ripper Sweep
which would be conducted in three initial phases:
from the camps and duties in western al-Anbar
Province and to move it with the regimental tactical
command post to positions in its eastern areas.
The resulting plan juggled the missions of I MEF's
many units. The 3d Marine Aircraft Wing would have
to assume responsibility for security of Camp Korean
Village to free the 1st Light Armored Reconnaissance
Battalion, which was leaving the border crossings
Trebil and Wallid uncovered (the crossings remained
closed for most of the month during the Fallujah cri-
sis). The Azerbaijani company stationed at Camp Ha-
ditha Dam would be reinforced with only a
detachment from 3d Battalion, 4th Marines, and a
small craft company. The Taqaddum security battal-
ion, 3d Battalion, 24th Marines, replaced 2d Battal-
ion, 7th Marines, at Camp Hit. At Camp al-Qaim, only
3d Battalion, 7th Marines, remained to counter in-
surgents at the Syrian border zone. The Haditha Dam
and Hit zone formerly occupied by 2d Battalion, 7th
Marines, was covered by Task Force Walsh (Major
Bennett W. Walsh—who commanded the 1st Small
Craft Company) consisting of L Company, 3d Battal-
ion, 24th Marines; Company C, 1st Combat Engineer
Battalion; the 1st Small Craft Company; a platoon left
by 1st Light Armored Reconnaissance Battalion; a pla-
toon of military police; detachments of volunteers;
and the Azerbaijani company. The regiment’s execu-
tive officer, Lieutenant Colonel John D. Gamboa,
took command of what became known as Regimen-
tal Combat Team 7 West at the main command post
during the regiment's offensive foray around Fallu-
jah. As part of this offensive, General Mattis assigned
Tucker an additional mission of clearing the right
bank of the Euphrates along Route 10 as far as the
peninsula west of Fallujah, closed for several days
because of explosive devices and ambushes.
The force taken by Colonel Tucker on this opera-
tion consisted of his tactical command group, the 2d
Battalion, 7th Marines; 1st Light Armored Reconnais-
sance Battalion; 3d Platoon, Company C, 1st Tank
Battalion (attached at the time the Fallujah battle
began); Battery E, 2d Battalion, 11th Marines; and a
platoon from the 1st Force Reconnaissance Com-
pany. General Mattis clarified his plan on 13 April:
At al-Asad: rearm, refit, refuel and rehearse in
preparation for upcoming operation in support
of the division's efforts at Fallujah. Depart al-
Asad at 1400 on 15 April for area Raleigh. At
0600, 16 April, commence the attack astride the
main routes from Taqaddum, clearing the in-
surgents from the southwest of Fallujah through
al-Amirah. Continuing on order to clear Jurf as
Sakhr, preparing for further operations in the
security zone of Regimental Combat Team 1.
At 0600 on 16 April, the Ripper Sweep forces
began the offensive with 1st Light Armored Recon-
naissance Battalion attacking southeast where a
blocking position was established to support the fol-
low-on clearance by 2d Battalion, 7th Marines, be-
tween al-Taqaddum and Fallujah. Insurgent
resistance remained minimal. The only notable con-
tact during the clearance occurred when 1st Light Ar-
mored Reconnaissance units were engaged by small
arms from a fuel truck while south of Fallujah. The
Marines suspected a vehicular bomb and destroyed
the truck with 25mm cannon fire, wounding both oc-
cupants, who received immediate medical evacua-
tion. At 1300 on 18 April, 2d Battalion, 7th Marines,
and 1st Light Armored Reconnaissance Battalion con-
tinued the attack into the center of al-Amiriyah town,
covered overhead by Air Force F-16 Fighting Falcon
fighter-bombers and Marine Corps AH-1W Cobra at-
tack helicopters. The reaction to the Marines who en-
tered al-Amiriyah in their armored vehicles was
The division is stretched thin with the route se-
curity mission coupled with the Fallujah cor-
don. These missions tie down a significant
portion of our maneuver assets and the sooner
we receive direction about the anticipated res-
olution of Fallujah negotiations, the better.
While accepting a short term risk in the west
permits us to move against several enemy sanc-


46
INTO THE FRAY
warm, despite the fact that intelligence had reported
the town was a sanctuary for insurgents. Colonel
Tucker said of the locals' reaction to the Marines, “it
was like liberating France.” The picture began to de-
velop that the “bow-wave” caused by the over-
whelming offensive capability of the task force had
driven insurgent elements out of the entire zone well
before the Marines arrived. Among several detainees
the task force captured the eighth ranking person on
Regimental Combat Team l's high value target list.
General Mattis reacted positively to the restoration
of free movement from al-Taqaddum into and south
of Fallujah, linking with the main surface communi-
cations to Kuwait. He ordered Regimental Combat
Team 7 to continue movement as far as Jurf as Sak,
linking with 2d Battalion, 2d Marines. General Kelly's
Division Bravo group had extended that battalion to
cover any move by al-Sadr militiamen toward the di-
vision's flank. General Mattis communicated the fol-
lowing:
Following Regimental Combat Team 7's actions
this week, we will be driving the tempo
throughout most of area Atlanta. Regimental
Combat Team 7 will then return to the west and
reestablish its dominance. The relief in place
with 1st Armored Division in North Babil, free-
ing up two battalions, and the arrival of addi-
tional tank and assault amphibious vehicle
companies will enable us to maintain the mo-
mentum we are now developing in the east.
More importantly, we will have the forces nec-
essary to exploit our success with persistent
presence in key areas. It will soon be clear that
Blue Diamond is the dominant tribe in the al-
Anbar Province.
Because of actions taken by both Regimental
Combat Team 1 and the Army's 1st Brigade, 1st In-
fantry Division, to support the Regimental Combat
Team 7 task force in its attack, the al-Karmah action
amounted to a division-level fight. With the exception
of the two battles for Fallujah, large-scale operations
of this kind were uncommon On the 20th, the divi-
sion transferred responsibility for northern Babil
Province to the 1st Armored Division, which was
then in the middle of its campaign against the al-Sadr
uprising in the Karbala-Najaf-Kut region. The Divi-
sion Bravo command group returned to the division,
and the two battalions—2d Battalion, 2d Marines, and
1st Battalion, 32d Infantry—reverted to Regimental
Combat Team 1 and 1st Brigade, 1st Infantry Divi-
sion, respectively. The battalions were welcome re-
inforcements for their actions around Fallujah and
Ramadi. The 2d Battalion, 2d Marines, formally re-
lieved Tucker's Regimental Combat Team 7 of its mis-
sion at al-Karmah on 25 April. The next day, 2d
Battalion, 7th Marines, moved back to Area of Oper-
ations Denver to reestablish its presence in Hit and
Haditha.
Although Operation Ripper Sweep officially ter-
minated at this point, the task force remained at
Camp Fallujah until 1 May, while Colonel Tucker and
his staff planned a cordon of Fallujah in anticipation
of a renewed attack by Regimental Combat Team 1
to destroy remaining insurgent forces in the city. With
the creation of the Fallujah Brigade, however, Gen-
eral Mattis put these operations on hold. On 1 May,
the remaining Regimental Combat Team 7 forces de-
parted Camp Fallujah and returned to al-Asad Air
Base and Camps al-Qaim and Korean Village to re-
sume stability and security operations there. Western
al-Anbar Province had not remained quiet during the
regiment’s foray around Fallujah. Task Force Walsh
worked hard in its economy of force mission in the
Hit-Haditha zone, and the 3d Battalion, 7th Marines
(the sole infantry battalion remaining in Area of Op-
erations Denver), encountered considerable action in
Husaybah and al-Qaim throughout the month.
The ambitious sweep by Regimental Combat Team
7 around Fallujah found few insurgents, but suc-
ceeded in restoring the tactical initiative to the 1st
Marine Division, opening land communications
routes, and scattering any insurgents who either
planned ambushes or hoped to join the insurgents in
Fallujah.
Restoring Balance in Al-Anbar Province
Tucker's task force spent a day at Camp al-Taqad-
dum and Camp Fallujah conducting maintenance and
preparing to continue with Operation Ripper Sweep.
At 0400 on 22 April the force took its offensive to the
left bank of the Euphrates against al-Karmah, which
the 3d Battalion, 4th Marines, had discovered was an
insurgent base after the initial Fallujah cease-fire.
Once again, 1st Light Armored Reconnaissance Bat-
talion led the offensive, followed by 2d Battalion, 7th
Marines. In a street-by-street search-and-clear opera-
tion, the two battalions again encountered no insur-
gents but found numerous weapons caches and 57
explosive devices. On 24 April the force moved to
Camp Fallujah, while some rifle companies remained
in al-Karmah and continued operations until the end
of the month.
The festering problem of Fallujah would not see
resolution until after the U.S. forces had accom-


The First Al-Fallujah Battle and Its Aftermath
47

Photo by SSgt Demetrio J. Espinosa, Defense Imagery, VIRIN: 040909-M-2361E-008
Marines from Company C, Battalion Landing Team, 1st Battalion, 2d Marines, 24th Marine Expeditionary
Unit, conduct a cordon-and-search operation in North Babil Province in September 2004.
plished their unit rotations in mid-2004. In April and
May, reinforcements requested by General Mattis
began to arrive, with Company B, 1st Tank Battalion,
joining the Fallujah cordon on 25 April, and Com-
pany B, 3d Assault Amphibian Battalion, joining Reg-
imental Combat Team 7 at al-Asad Air Base on 13
May.
At the same time the first Marine reinforcements
began to arrive, a major shift occurred in the overall
command of the Coalition effort in Iraq. Since the
creation of the Combined Joint Task Force 7, it had
become clear that the full reconstruction effort in Iraq
was too large a project for what was initially a corps-
sized staff. General Abizaid responded to this by
placing Lieutenant General Thomas F. Metz's III
Corps in charge of tactical operations and giving
Combined Joint Task Force 7 commander Sanchez
responsibility for strategic operations. On 15 May
2004 this division of responsibility was made official
when Sanchez became the first commander of Multi
National Force-Iraq. General Metz became the new
commander of Multi National Corps-Iraq. The Marine
Corps area of responsibility subsequently became
Multi National Force-West. Less than two months
later, on 1 July, Army General George W. Casey Jr.
relieved General Sanchez of command of Multi Na-
tional Force-Iraq, and thus became the commander
of the overall Coalition effort in Iraq.
The combat forces of I MEF concentrated on se-
curity and stability operations, keeping the routes
clear, and then turning to the major problem of train-
ing more reliable Iraqi security forces. The Iraqi se-
curity forces had failed to fight effectively in too
many instances, not only in the I MEF sectors but also
in face of the al-Sadr revolt, where more than 1,000
members of the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps at Karbala
and an-Najaf had deserted. The construction of the
India Base near Camp Fallujah for Iraqi forces al-
lowed Regimental Combat Team 1 to begin training
in earnest. On 5 June, it opened to the initial class of
Iraqi Civil Defense Corps under the direction of the
regimental operations staff. With the turnover of sov-
ereignty from the Coalition Provisional Authority to
the Iraqi Interim Government at the end of June, the
Iraqi Civil Defense Corps converted to the Iraqi Na-
tional Guard. In addition, the regiment undertook the
training of the new Shahwani Special Forces, estab-
lishing a camp for their initial training at Camp Fal-
lujah under the direction of Company A, 3d Assault
Amphibian Vehicle Battalion. In July the 1st Marine
Division convened two-week courses for National
Guard officers and non-commissioned officers at
Camp Ramadi, using embedded Army and Marine
Corps non-commissioned officers to mentor and to
train them.
In Area of Operations Raleigh, Regimental Com-
bat Team 1 ran constant patrols of the main supply
routes thanks to the help of the Army 112th Military
Police Battalion. As the last of the reinforcing units
from Regimental Combat Team 7 units departed Area
of Operations Raleigh in early May, Colonel Toolan
divided the area into three sectors. The 2d Battalion,
1st Marines, oriented its efforts to the northwest of
Fallujah along Route E1 and the town of Saqlawiyah.


48
INTO THE FRAY
From Camp Abu Ghraib, the 1st Battalion, 5th
Marines, were positioned north of Fallujah toward al-
Karmah, and 2d Battalion, 2d Marines, established a
presence to the south of Camp Fallujah at the Eu-
phrates River. Engineers removed the Marine defen-
sive positions in the southern and northern edges of
the city, now in the hands of the Fallujah Brigade and
the Iraqi National Guard. As the Marine battalions ex-
panded their presence in the surrounding villages,
they began to mount combat patrols to attack insur-
gents attempting ambushes, laying explosive devices,
or setting up rocket or mortar attacks.
No end came to the insurgent challenges at Fallu-
jah. On 24 June, they launched coordinated attacks
on Route E1 and Traffic Control Point 1. The fighting
began early in the morning and lasted throughout the
day. Marines of Company G, 2d Battalion, 1st
Marines, effectively defended the position with a va-
riety of direct fire weapons and air support. Tanks
fired on buildings being used as insurgent bases
while a section of helicopters engaged other targets
as AV-8B Harrier attack aircraft circled overhead.
A volley of handheld rockets damaged one of the
AH-1W Cobra attack helicopters. Multiple Harrier sec-
tions dropped laser-guided bombs on buildings from
which insurgents continued to engage the Marine po-
sitions. The fighting eventually subsided as Iraqi se-
curity forces eventually responded and established
control in the area.
The opportunity to focus all of Regimental Combat
Team l's efforts on the Fallujah situation soon faded,
however. The initial suppression of the al-Sadr revolt
allowed the Army to resume the redeployment of 1st
Armored Division back to home stations, and the re-
sponsibility for northern Babil Province once again
reverted to I MEF beginning 27 June. Marines of 2d
Battalion, 2d Marines, returned to their base camp at
Al Mahumdiyah. The soldiers of 1st Battalion, 32d In-
fantry, returned to Colonel Toolan's control and to
their base-Forward Operating Base Chosin—near
Iskandariyah. The Regimental Combat Team 1 area
of operations doubled in size. Consequently, the
need for more forces, including Iraqi units, became
more apparent.
In the west, Regimental Combat Team 7 reestab-
lished its presence in the main population centers of
Area of Operations Denver. Although the improvised
dispositions managed to keep the Haditha-Hit zone
fairly stable, the 3d Battalion, 7th Marines, fought sev-
eral fierce actions in and around al-Qaim and Husay-
bah, the contentious border town. Insurgents tried
several ambushes of Marine reconnaissance and se-
curity probes, and explosive devices detonated daily
against Marine patrols. Finally, a series of pitched
fights led the battalion commander, Lieutenant
Colonel Matthew A. Lopez, to personally lead a task
force in a two-day assault and clearing operation of
Husaybah using two of his rifle companies, the
weapons company, and a detachment of 1st Force
Reconnaissance Company to cordon and sweep the
town. The fighting intensified, and battalion mortars
and helicopter close air support added to the fire-
power that killed an estimated 120 insurgents amid
considerable mayhem.
A newly constructed operations center greeted
Regimental Combat Team 7's commander Colonel
Tucker
upon
his return to al-Asad Air Base. On 7
May, 220 combat replacements arrived at the base for
the 1st Marine Division, an indicator of the changed
circumstances of occupation duty in al-Anbar
Province. With the return of 3d Battalion, 4th Marines,
from its duty with Regimental Combat Team 1, be-
ginning on 13 May the regiment could begin the
planning of new initiatives. From this planning
emerged Operation Rawah II.
The 1st Light Armored Reconnaissance Battalion
moved on 1 June into blocking positions to the north
of Rawah. The 3d Battalion, 4th Marines, set up a
staging area at Haditha Dam from where it planned
to take its objective by road. At the same time, the
battalion's L Company would be airlifted by helicop-
ter from al-Asad Air Base. The supporting unit, 3d
Battalion, 7th Marines, closed the borders and
pro-
vided blocking force. Twenty-four aircraft flew in
support over the small town, which had not seen Ma-
rine operations in over five weeks. An EC-130 Com-
pass Call electronic-warfare aircraft first over flew the
town to detonate explosive devices, followed by an
electronic snooper Lockheed EP-3 Orion. As the light
armored reconnaissance battalion units moved south
toward Rawah, multiple sections of AV-8Bs orbited
for surveillance and on-call close air support. Finally,
an AC-130 checked in for support as the main effort
moved out of Haditha toward Rawah. Company L
boarded its CH-53E Super Stallion helicopters at al-
Asad Air Base to be inserted at four different block-
ing positions simultaneously under cover of a section
of AH-1Ws. An additional section stood on the
ground in ready alert. Two CH-46Es Sea Knights car-
ried the Regimental Combat Team 7 reserve platoon,
intended to land as Airborne Vehicle Check Points to
catch insurgents. Although Regimental Combat Team
7 had scheduled an EA-6B Prowler electronic-war-
fare aircraft to jam and perform electronic surveil-
lance, it did not appear because of aircraft carrier
difficulties.


The First Al-Fallujah Battle and Its Aftermath
49
This raid netted six of the top-25 high-value target
persons on Regimental Combat Team 7 lists while the
companies of 3d Battalion, 4th Marines, remained in
the town exploiting the movement's success. The op-
eration proved the last for this battalion; its relief unit,
1st Battalion, 8th Marines, began the turnover process
on 29 June, the first of the mid-deployment rotations.
General Mattis had detailed the outline of these
operations at the time the Fallujah situation came to
a standstill:
Following recent offensive operations the
enemy has fallen back and resorted to small
scale actions intended to inflict maximum ca-
sualties on our forces with minimal risk to his
own. The key to maintaining the initiative is pa-
tient, persistent presence throughout the zone.
This is best accomplished by dismounted
troops aggressively patrolling their area of op-
erations, gaining information from the populace
and ambushing the enemy on his own ground.
Episodic vehicular forays from our firm bases
do nothing more than reveal our intentions,
make us easy targets and incur severe handi-
caps. When he is weak, as he is now, he will
implant improvised explosive devices along the
main service routes in periods of darkness in
our absence to strike our convoys. When he
comes out to operate like this—we must be in
ambush to meet and kill him. Through intelli-
gence preparation of the battlefield, that iden-
tifies his likely avenues of approach and likely
improvised explosive device sites, we must an-
ticipate his next operation. We must think,
move and adapt faster than he can and less
overtly than we have to date. When we can
keep the enemy at bay in an area, we must ex-
ploit the opportunity we have to conduct more
aggressive civil military operations and reinvig-
orate our programs to select trustworthy mem-
bers for training the Iraqi security forces.
The 11th, 24th, and 31st Marine
Expeditionary Units Deploy to Iraq
Part of the solution to the challenges I MEF en-
countered in the expansion of its battle zone to the
east came in the timely appearance of three Marine
expeditionary units (MEUs) from the United States. A
combination of early sorties and extended deploy-
ments made these important reinforcements available
from July 2004 through the end of the year. On 4 May,
the 24th Marine Expeditionary Force (24th MEU)
under Colonel R. J. Johnson received its alert to pre-
pare to deploy to Iraq from 15 June 2004 to 15 Feb-
ruary 2005, instead of from 17 August 2004 to 17 Feb-
ruary 2005 as originally planned. By deleting its
special operations capable exercises and certification,
the unit accelerated its preparations, loaded equip-
ment on board USS Kearsarge (LHD 3) and USNS
Charleston (T-LKA 113) in early June and began its
airlift to Kuwait on 26 June. The expeditionary unit's
ground combat element, the 1st Battalion, 2d Marines
(Reinforced), completed the required pre-deployment
training before beginning its airlift on 3 July. Assem-
bling in Kuwait during early July, Johnson's organiza-
tion reported to 1st Marine Division for operations on
24 July and accepted responsibility for northern Babil
Province from Regimental Combat Team 1 on 1 Au-
gust 2004. Johnson took operational control of 2d Bat-
talion, 2d Marines, and relieved the Army's 1st
Battalion, 32d Infantry, with his own 1st Battalion, 2d
Marines. Johnson's unit then began security and sta-
bilization operations on the essential main service
route south of Baghdad while asserting a continuous
presence in several key towns. His aviation combat
element, Medium Helicopter Squadron 263, only had
its normal inventory of CH-46E Sea Knights on board
the Kearsarge, and upon arrival at al-Taqaddum, drew
additional light-attack and heavy-lift helicopters from
3d Marine Aircraft Wing.
The acceleration of Colonel Anthony M. Haslam's
11th Marine Expeditionary Unit (11th MEU (SOC)) in
its deployment came after it had completed its special
operations certification. It departed San Diego on 27
May 2004 instead of the planned departure date of 17
June, embarking aboard three ships of Amphibious
Squadron 5. It comprised part of Expeditionary Strike
Group 3, commanded by Brigadier General Joseph V.
Medina.
The initial assignment for 11th MEU was the smol-
dering city of an-Najaf. After unloading from its ship-
ping at Kuwait, Haslam sent his aviation element,
Medium Helicopter Squadron 166, to al-Asad Air Base
while awaiting the preparation of Forward Operating
Base Duke. The MEU's battalion landing team, 1st
Battalion, 4th Marines, and its attachments under the
command of Lieutenant Colonel John L. Mayer, used
Forward Operating Base Hotel, which was three kilo-
meters north of the city's center. The Marines and
sailors of the 11th MEU moved into an-Najaf Province
on 16 July. Five days later, the unit reported for op-
erations to Major General Andrzej Ekiert, Polish Army,
the commander the Multi National Division Center-
South, and on 31 July they relieved the small battal-
ion task force Dragon of the 1st Infantry Division. At
this point, the 2,165 Marines and sailors of Colonel


50
INTO THE FRAY
Haslam's command held sole responsibility for the
16,000 square miles of the provinces of an-Najaf and
Qadisiyah.
The nominal mission received from Ekiert con-
sisted of conducting “offensive operations to defeat
remaining non-compliant forces and neutralize desta-
bilizing influences in an-Najaf Province” and to create
a secure environment, supported by the usual stabil-
ity and humanitarian operations. In effect, 11th MEU
shouldered the responsibility of mopping up the rem-
nants of the al-Sadr revolt following the departure of
major U.S. Army forces that had destroyed most of the
Mahdi Militia of al-Sadr during May and June.
In an-Najaf, the al-Sadr Militia had overwhelmed
both the Iraqi security forces and General Ekiert's in-
ternational military forces and occupied key positions,
including the governor's compound and the two
highly significant Shi’a religious sites, Kufa Mosque
and the Imam Ali Shrine. Successive attacks by part of
the 2d Brigade, 1st Armored Division, and elements of
2d Armored Cavalry Regiment in April and May re-
covered most of the city except for exclusion zones of
one kilometer established around the two Shi'a holy
sites, including the Old City and cemetery adjacent to
the Imam Ali Shrine. The governor announced on 4
June that the Iraqi security forces would take respon-
sibility for the exclusion zones, but the Mahdi Militia
never laid down arms nor left the holy sites. Upon
departing on 17 June, the 2d Armored Cavalry Regi-
ment staff estimated that about 100 hard core fighters
remained in each zone, along with an undetermined
number of untrained insurgents.
Haslam reported on the day he took responsibility
for the scene that “I anticipate aggressive surveillance
and incidents from Mahdi Militia in the near term to
test our reactions and resolve. The 11th MEU (SOC)
stands at the ready.” New outbreaks of fighting soon
dispelled any illusion that simply training local secu-
rity forces could accomplish the mission. Most of
Colonel Mayer's battalion fought an inconclusive en-
gagement with the Mahdi Militia around the cemetery
and governor's compound on 5-6 August, supported
by attack helicopters by day and an AC-130 Spectre
gunship at night. General Metz, the deputy com-
mander of the overall effort in Iraq, assigned an Army
cavalry squadron to reinforce the 11th MEU after the
first day. On 7 August, 1st Battalion, 5th Cavalry Reg-
iment, reported to Haslam with the 1st Company,
227th Aviation Battalion’s AH-56A Apache attack hel-
icopters in direct support.
On 9 August, Iraqi and U.S. military leaders met at
the governor's compound to discuss future opera-
tions. This group included an-Najaf Governor Arufi,
Iraqi Prime Minister Ayad Allawi, General Casey, Gen-
eral Metz, and General Conway and his deputy,
Brigadier General Dennis J. Hejlik. General Metz
transferred the responsibility for the area to General
Conway and assigned another Army squadron from
Task Force Baghdad, the 1st Cavalry Division, to
Colonel Haslam's control. After a brief interlude of
fruitless negotiations between Allawi and al-Sadr's
representatives, the Iraqi government finally author-
ized military force to settle the insurgency in an-Najaf.
General Hejlik oversaw the process with a small
staff and Colonel Haslam received his reinforcements
and planned the battle yet to come. As the reinforce-
ments arrived, they applied a steady pressure against
the al-Sadr militiamen with raids, probes, and skir-
mishes designed to determine their positions and ex-
haust their resources. The Iraqi National Guard's 404th
Battalion operated under Haslam's control since the
31 July 2004 transfer of authority as the local garrison.
The 2d Battalion, 7th Cavalry Regiment, the additional
unit from 1st Cavalry Division, reported on 10 August.
The 36th Commando Battalion, veterans of the Fallu-
jah battle, joined on 13 August, and the 2d and 4th
Battalions, 1st Iraq Army Brigade, arrived during the
operation, remaining under the tactical control of I
MEF. Several units of special operations forces oper-
ated in and around the city as well.
The final attack into the al-Sadr center of resistance
came with Haslam's order of 16 August for a three-
phase operation by U.S. and Iraqi forces to “clear
Imam Ali Mosque Complex, to defeat Mahdi Militia,
and capture or kill Muqtada al-Sadr to facilitate the re-
turn of the Imam Ali Mosque to proper Iraqi authori-
ties.” The first phase consisted of preliminary
operations in which the two cavalry squadrons (1st
Squadron, 5th Cavalry; 2d Squadron, 7th Cavalry)
launched limited attacks to occupy the cemetery and
the old city zone south of the Medina. The 1st Battal-
ion, 4th Marines, would attack in the vicinity of Kufah
and the remaining area of an-Najaf. This was followed
with penetration operations in which the cavalry
squadrons would fix the insurgents from the north
and southeast while Mayer's 1st Battalion, 4th
Marines, would push through from the northwest to
encircle the shrine, bringing the Iraqi 36th Commando
Battalion in assault amphibians to its final assault po-
sition. A third phase would entail decisive operations.
The 36th Commando troops would assault and secure
the shrine, which would then be occupied and se-
cured by follow-on troops of the 1st Iraq Army
Brigade.
After a final 22 August confirmation briefing to
General Metz, General Conway, and the Iraqi defense


The First Al-Fallujah Battle and Its Aftermath
51
minister, the attack began. Beginning late the night of
24 August, Marines and cavalrymen battled through
the streets and buildings through the following day,
culminating with Marines encircling the shrine at a
distance of 100 meters by the end of the 25th. Amid
heavy fighting, the issue never came into doubt.
Under fire support from artillery, mortars, attack hel-
icopters and AC-130 aircraft, the infantry, tanks, and
other fighting vehicles cleared all opposition. For the
next 24 hours, while the Iraqi commandos prepared
to capture the shrine, mostly sniper engagements OC-
curred in the area.
The al-Sadr Militia suffered terrible losses and re-
sistance ended. The occupants of the Imam Ali Shrine
had no hope of escape; their supporters fell back,
broken and depleted. In the end, the intervention of
Grand Ayatollah Sistani eliminated the need to assault
the shine and to continue the action against the Kufah
mosque. On 27 August, he brokered a truce on behalf
of the Iraqi government. The Mahdi Militia agreed to
surrender its weapons and to leave the Old City, in-
cluding the Imam Ali Shrine. In addition, the militia
agreed to relinquish the entire Najaf-Kufah area over
to the Iraqi government, specifically the Iraqi police
and the Iraqi National Guard. From this point onward,
al-Sadr turned to peaceful and political options.
The 24 days of action in an-Najaf cost 11th MEU
seven killed in action and 94 wounded; the Army cav-
alry units lost two men. Iraqi force casualties also in-
cluded one American advisor killed and a significant
number of Iraqi soldiers killed and wounded. These
numbers paled in comparison to those inflicted on the
Mahdi Militia. The 11th MEU estimated 1,500 of al-
Sadr’s fighters were killed and an undetermined num-
ber wounded, most likely in the thousands. A positive
aspect was the steady performance of the Iraqi secu-
rity forces at an-Najaf, as the Iraqi local police, 405th,
and 36th Battalions all fought well and steadily, well-
served by their embedded advisors. At an-Najaf, Ma-
rine Corps and Army units demonstrated an ability to
maneuver and to reinforce a deteriorating situation
even better than at the first battle of Fallujah.
The scarcity of capable Iraqi forces meant that
Coalition security efforts remained under strength and
under manned. To compensate for the shortage of
forces, General Abizaid deployed a third Marine ex-
peditionary unit to Iraq, the 31st MEU. As with the
24th MEU, the 31st MEU dispensed with its special
operations capability requirement so that it could
speed up its deployment.
The 31st MEU had operated in the western Pacific
since January 2004, landing 2d Battalion, 3d Marines,
for training in the Marianas followed by routine exer-
cises in Korea, Okinawa, and Thailand. As deploy-
ment orders to Iraq came, it replaced its ground
combat element with the 1st Battalion, 3d Marines,
and attachments on Okinawa and then embarked
with Amphibious Squadron 11 for training in the Mar-
ianas from 10 July to 4 August before going to Kuwait.
When it arrived at the end of the month, its estimated
deployment of 120 days (through 9 October) seemed
half over, but its Marines and sailors would follow the
experience of 11th MEU beginning in October.
In the midst of combat operations, the need to ex-
ecute the scheduled turnover of forces in August and
September remained. In certain cases, this had already
begun, such as with the arrival of the 1st Battalion,
8th Marines, in western al-Anbar Province on 29 June.
As specified in General Hagee's original decisions
from November 2003, combat units would serve a six
to seven-month deployment in Iraq while the per-
sonnel of I MEF's other organizations and staffs would
be replenished with fresh groups flown in from their
home bases.
The force turnover in I MEF took place over a
three-month period. In addition, in September the
Table 4-1: Ground Combat Turnover, July-October 2004
Initial Deployment
3d Bn, 4th Mar
Replacement Unit
1st Bn, 8th Mar
1st Bn, 5th Mar
3d Bn, 1st Mar
Area of Operations
Denver
Raleigh
Topeka
Denver
1st LAR Bn
3d LAR Bn
1st Bn, 23d Mar
2d Bn, 7th Mar
3d Bn, 7th Mar
Transfer of Authority
14 July
17 July
16 September
18 September
22 September
26 September
27 September
29 September
Denver
2d Bn, 4th Mar
1st Recon Bn (-)
1st Bn, 7th Mar
20 Bn, 5th Mar
2d Recon Bn (-)
2d Bn, 11th Mar
2d Bn, 10th Mar
3d Bn, 11th Mar
3d Bn, 24th Mar
Topeka
Raleigh
Topeka
Taqaddum AB
Raleigh
Raleigh
4 October
8 October
2d Bn, 1st Mar
2d Bn, 2d Mar
3d Bn, 5th Mar
2d Bn, 24th Mar
11 October


52
INTO THE FRAY
Table 4-2:Aviation Turnover, August-September 2004
Base
Relief in Place
Initial Deployment
VMU-2
Replacement
VMU-1
Taqaddum
VMA-214
al-Asad
VMFA(AW)-242
HMLA-169
HMLA-167
al-Asad
HMM-261
HMM-365
al-Asad
HMH-466
HMH-361
al-Asad
14 August
17 August
23 August
27 August
2 September
7 September
7 September
8 September
19 September
HMLA-775
HMLA-367
al-Asad
VMGR-352/234
VMGR-352/452
Taqaddum
HMM-161
HMM-268
Taqaddum
al-Asad
HMM-764
HMM-774
Army replaced the 1st Brigade, 1st Infantry Division,
with the 2d Brigade, 2d Infantry Division, com-
manded by Colonel Gary Patton. The 1st Marine Di-
vision exchanged artillery batteries and force
reconnaissance, tank, combat engineer, and assault
amphibian companies with fresh units. The I MEF in-
telligence service based in Ramadi also rotated bat-
talions, as 2d Radio Battalion relieved 3d Radio
Battalion and 1st Intelligence Battalion replaced 2d
Intelligence Battalion.
As of 31 July 2004, 29,129 Marines and sailors were
in Iraq with I MEF forces, with 190 more Marines sta-
tioned in Iraq with other organizations. Provided by
Marine Corps Reserve Forces, 10,929 Marine reservists
were on duty worldwide alongside their active com-
ponent brethren, more than one-fourth the total re-
serve structure. Casualties to date in Iraq since March
2004 were 97 killed and 1,064 wounded in action, of
which 780 of the latter had returned to duty in theater.
With the situation in Fallujah yet to be resolved and
persistent spikes in combat and violence still occupy-
ing in Ramadi, western al-Anbar Province was still un-
tamed.


Chapter 5
The Second Al-Fallujah Battle
to meet with the mayor. The convoy was
planned and executed as a combat patrol with
two powerful quick reaction forces waiting just
off stage ready to respond, supported by sig-
nificant rotary and fixed wing close air support.
The good news is the general population, while
still openly hostile towards the Coalition, is re-
portedly tired of the fighting and disruption and
willing to allow civil affairs money to flow into
the city. They see the cease-fire, as well as
today's events, as a continuation of their victory
over the Coalition.
Following the first battle of al-Fallujah in April
2004, the Marines turned their efforts toward the
pacification of the surrounding areas. Many insur-
gents had fled Fallujah before the fighting began and
sought to establish themselves in new safe havens.
The withdrawal of the reinforcements, provided by
Regimental Combat Team 7, to western al-Anbar
Province and Regimental Combat Team l's continu-
ing operations around Fallujah left the city itself in
the hands of a desultory assembly of Iraqi police,
Civil Defense Corps, and Fallujah Brigade “troops.” In
the ensuing month and a half, an uneasy peace set-
tled on the city with few incidents reported. As a re-
sult, 1st Marine Division resumed civil affairs and
humanitarian actions to reconstruct the city's infra-
structure and support self-government. The division
commander, Major General James N. Mattis, entered
the city twice on well-armed “Fallujah patrols” to
meet with city officials, and the Marines of 3d Civil
Affairs Group resumed their efforts to identify and
fund reconstruction projects.
Fallujah in Repose
Marines continued to man traffic control points in
the outer cordon, while the police, Civil Defense
Corps, and Fallujah Brigade assembled and prepared
to patrol the city itself. Marines of Regimental Com-
bat Team 7 and the Fallujah Brigade drove a demon-
stration convoy through the city on Route 10, halting
briefly at the municipal government center. At no
time, however, did the local security forces turn over
usable weapons or insurgent prisoners taken from
On 20 May, I MEF commander Lieutenant General
James T. Conway expressed his satisfaction with the
relative calm in the entire province and prepared to
leave all Fallujah checkpoints in the hands of Iraqi
security forces, except for the cloverleaf intersection
of Routes 10 and E1 east of the city. More good news
came with the arrival of air reinforcement: 20 AV-8B
Harriers of Marine Attack Squadron 214, as requested
by Major General James F. Amos. He noted that day
that:
these aircraft with their third generation target-
ing forward looking infrared [system], the Liten-
ing II pod, equipped with a digital downlink
capability, will give the Marines on the ground,
in places such as Fallujah and Ramadi, the abil-
ity to see “real-time” what is going on around
them. The Harriers will then be able to deliver
ordnance as required, confident that what they
are attacking is exactly what our ground forces
want attacked.
the city.
General Mattis saw some positive aspects of the
event:
Today's successful joint patrol with the Fallujah
Brigade represents the smallest of “baby steps”
and should in no way be considered an open-
ing of the city. Fallujah is still closed and a very
dangerous place with large sections a “no man's
land” controlled by jihadists, foreign fighters,
and terrorists. In fact, an improvised explosive
device was, without explanation, detonated at
0530, we think during emplacement and gen-
erally where the convoy principals dismounted
Marine commanders judged sporadic but increas-
ing attacks on Coalition forces in late May in oppo-
sition to the upcoming transfer of sovereignty to the
Iraqi interim government. Thus, on 31 May, the
Army's 112th Military Police Battalion departed I MEF
control and returned to the 1st Cavalry Division after
two months' service in al-Anbar Province.
The summer of 2004 saw the scheduled relief of
the commanders of I MEF's major units. General
Amos turned over command of the 3d Marine Air-
craft Wing on 29 May to Major General Keith J.
53


54
INTO THE FRAY
Photo by LCpl William L. DuBose III, Defense Imagery, VIRIN: 041205-M-9529D-002
The summer of 2004 saw the scheduled relief of most of
I Marine Expeditionary Force's commanders. MajGen
Keith J. Stalder (above) relieved MajGen James F. Amos
as commander of 3d Marine Aircraft Wing in May.
though the U.S. leadership hoped that these internal
rifts reduced the effectiveness of the anti-Coalition in-
surgency, intimidation campaigns against Iraqis seek-
ing to work for the Coalition or in Iraqi security
forces continued to increase with deleterious effects
upon the local security forces. An assessment of the
Fallujah Brigade by the commander of Multi National
Corps-Iraq, Lieutenant General Thomas F. Metz's
strategic political-military staff in early July noted that
the brigade had expanded to an overall strength of
2,075, including 23 general and 375 other officers. Al-
though capable of limited city patrols and maintain-
ing liaison with I MEF representatives, the brigade
had not attained control over the city. In the view of
the analysts, the Fallujah Brigade was a failure. At
best, it could be converted into an Iraqi Army unit.
An ominous development surfaced with the con-
tinuing attacks upon 3d Marine Aircraft Wing heli-
copters flying in the Fallujah zone. The downing of
an AH-1W Super Cobra attack helicopter during the
24 June attack was the second helicopter loss of the
campaign and the second one in the vicinity of Fal-
lujah.
Following the downing of the Super Cobra on 5
July, small arms fire northwest of Fallujah damaged
a CH-46E Sea Knight transport helicopter of Marine
Medium Helicopter Squadron 161. The aircraft came
under fire soon after lifting off from its al-Taqaddum
base and both pilots were wounded by the attack.
The co-pilot, First Lieutenant Steven M. Clifton, as-
sumed command of the aircraft. Ignoring his own in-
juries, he directed first aid efforts in the cockpit whil
flying evasive maneuvers and returned to base safely
as the aircraft suffered electrical failures, a flash fire,
and degrading flight controls. There were two other
incidents where helicopters were damaged or de-
stroyed by small arms fire, killing one pilot in one in-
cident and wounding four crewmen in the other.
Unfortunately, the command seemed reluctant to
face these trends. For example, the I MEF situation
report for 9 September began with the following:
“The overall number of attacks across the area of op-
erations remains at decreased levels from the recent
surge However, a section of helicopters flying
south of Fallujah received small arms fire and RPG
fire and one helicopter was forced to land ... Multi
National Force-West will continue to closely monitor
this emerging threat to Multi National Force-West air
assets."
The decision process leading to the final assault
on Fallujah and the eradication of the extremist and
insurgent nests that it sheltered remained complex
and diffuse. Prime Minister Ayad Allawi and the new

Stalder and departed to assume command of Ma-
rine Expeditionary Force (II MEF) at Camp Lejeune.
Major General Mattis relinquished command on 29
August to Brigadier General Richard F. Natonski and
assumed command of the Marine Corps Combat De-
velopment Command at Quantico. Both departing of-
ficers were promoted to lieutenant general in their
new commands and Brigadier General Natonski was
promoted to major general. Finally, on 12 Septem-
ber, Lieutenant General John F. Sattler relieved Gen-
eral Conway as commander of I MEF. General
Conway subsequently departed to serve as the new
Director of Operations for the Joint Staff at the Pen-
tagon. These new commanders would undertake the
resolution of the Fallujah problem in the months that
followed.
The eruption of coordinated attacks against Ma-
rine positions around Fallujah on 24 June marked
what intelligence analysts considered spikes in in-
surgent activities. Reports of internecine fighting
among tribal and extremist factions added to the frus-
trations of trying to assess progress in Fallujah. Al-


The Second Al-Fallujah Battle
55
paper iden-
Iraqi political and military leadership had to be con-
vinced of the benefits of the operation and that U.S.
and Coalition support could and would be mobilized
for the humanitarian relief and eventual reconstruc-
tion of the damaged city. The ability of U.S. forces to
limit and ameliorate damage remained a contentious
matter.
In September, the U.S. and Coalition military com-
mand authorized initial planning and the early con-
cept of operations began to emerge in the I MEF staff.
A briefing in the first week of that month character-
ized “Fallujah Clearing Operations” as a pending task
where, on order, the I MEF and Iraqi security forces
would conduct “clearing operations in the vicinity of
Fallujah proper, to defeat extremist forces in Fallujah
when ordered.” Shortly thereafter, a staff
tified the initial concept for shaping the upcoming
battle.
In sum, the I MEF staff believed that the prepara-
tion of the battlefield required a steady tempo of at-
trition operations sustainable “until time for decisive
action; mid-November.” It characterized Fallujah as a
safe haven for foreign fighters, terrorists, and insur-
gents, “a 'cancer' on the rest of al-Anbar Province.”
Among the operations necessary to prepare the city
for the final assault were precision air strikes against
leading insurgent operatives and foreign fighter
groups. Continued pressure in the form of traffic con-
trol points limited but did not stop movement into
the city. Marine attacks around the city limits could
increase pressure and instill uncertainty in the insur-
gents. By 23 September, 1st Marine Division planners
had produced a concept of operations for Fallujah,
doubtlessly reflecting the time spent on the same
problem in mid-April, when elements of both Regi-
mental Combat Teams 1 and 7 stood in position
around the city and the staff had prepared a final,
decisive attack.
The division's plans called for building a target list
that included assessments of the secondary and ter-
tiary impact of each type of strike. Typical targets in-
cluded safe houses, meeting places, weapon and
ammunition caches, heavy equipment, insurgent pa-
trols, crew-served weapons, indirect fire weapons,
fortifications (both surface and underground), and
communications. The plans proposed building pres-
sure on the insurgents through selective strikes and
using deception operations to uncover communica-
tions and movement routes in the city and discredit
and humble the insurgent groups. After sufficient
command nodes, and unfortified and fortified posi-
tions had been reduced, the Marines and soldiers
would have accomplished the preliminary objectives
required before the “decisive operations” or the as-
sault phase.
Continuing Operations in the Province
As important as the Fallujah situation became, the
rest of al-Anbar Province remained unsettled, and ar-
Ramadi frequently flared with new violence. Colonel
Craig A. Tucker's Regimental Combat Team 7 con-
ducted meetings with regional sheiks and town coun-
cils to determine their degree of support for
recruiting local security forces and making arrange-
ments for their training in Iraqi and U.S. camps. The
return of troops to the Haditha-Hit corridor and ar-
Rutbah led to renewed counterinsurgency operations
in both locations. Road sweeps and road improve-
ments, were also a priority effort while battalions con-
ducted their reliefs in place. Because of the heavy
fighting experienced in Husaybah and al-Qaim by 3d
Battalion, 7th Marines, Colonel Tucker also reviewed
the situation there. The Husaybah camp, now re-
named Camp Gannon in memory of Captain Richard
J. Gannon, the late commander of Company L, re-
ceived special attention because its new occupants,
1st Battalion, 7th Marines, would also stand in rela-
tive isolation there and at al-Qaim during the re-
newed battle at Fallujah.
As Regimental Combat Team 7 prepared to rein-
force Regimental Combat Team 1 at Fallujah, Tucker's
Marines executed a flurry of disruption actions in Op-
eration Rodeo (26–28 September). The Regimental
Combat Team 7 forces executed 17 raids and cordon
operations within 48 hours: six in Haditha, ten in
Husaybah, and one in ar-Rutbah. On 27 September,
Colonel Tucker began a command tour of Area of
Operations Denver accompanied by Colonel W. Lee
In August, MajGen Richard F. Natonski relieved MajGen
James N. Mattis as commander of 1st Marine Division.
Photo by LCpl Bryan J. Nealy, Defense Imagery VIRIN 030526-M-5455N-003
02

MONES


The Second Al-Fallujah Battle
57
Table 5-1:Al Anbar Province Operations, 2004
Date
15 July
17 July
23 July
3 Aug
11 Sep
26 Sep
Operation
1st Brigade Operations Yellow Cab Il and Speed
Bump III.
1 st Brigade Operation Black Rock.
1st Brigade Operation Cowboys.
1st Brigade Operation Traveler (with RCT-1).
2d Brigade Operation Pointer.
2d Brigade Operation Longhorn.
2d Brigade Operation Mountaineer.
2d Brigade Operation Seminole.
8 Oct
12 Oct
and Iraqi combat units to the Marine assault regiments
as well as additional forces to establish an effective
cordon of the battle space surrounding Fallujah.
The first of these reinforcements, the 1st Battalion
of the British “Black Watch” Regiment, reported to the
1st Marine Division on 27 October. The unit reported
to Colonel Johnson's 24th MEU to assist in securing
northern Babel Province and the vital main service
routes running south of Baghdad.
On 31 October, six battalion-sized Iraqi units were
attached to the division for the operation, now called
Operation Phantom Fury. Previously assigned to the
U.S. 1st Cavalry and 1st Infantry Divisions, these Iraqi
units appeared likely to perform their missions better
than the Iraqi troops fighting alongside Marines in
April. Following their arrival and assembly in Camp
Fallujah, they received U.S. liaison teams and fell
under the operational control of the commanders of
Regimental Combat Team 1, Regimental Combat
Team 7, and the incoming 2d Brigade Combat Team,
the Blackjack Brigade of the 1st Cavalry Division. A
mechanized task force from the Army's 1st Infantry
Division, the 2d Battalion, 2d Infantry, arrived for duty
on 31 October. Heavily equipped with armor, mech-
anized infantry, engineers, cavalry, and self-propelled
artillery components, it added considerable power to
United States procured several large generators for
power plants in Iraq, replacing destroyed or obsolete
equipment. Immediately christened the “mother of
all generators” by Marines and soldiers, these huge
and expensive machines originated in Jordan and
were eventually installed in Baghdad power stations.
Six or seven combined heavy-lift vehicles moved
each General Electric Frame 9E generator, weighing
more than 250 tons. A convoy for a single generator
comprised 15 heavy-lift vehicles accompanied by 10
private security vehicles. Civilian engineers preceded
each convoy to lift or cut power lines, remove fences
and guardrails, and make other minor improvements
necessary
for
passage.
An even larger generator, the Siemens V94, was
moved to the city of Taza using similar arrangements.
These slow-moving (6 kph) convoys received the
highest priority protection during weeks of transit
through the various areas of operations. The two mis-
sions conducted to transport these generators were
called Terrapin I and Terrapin II respectively. In each
case, a security detachment of 2d Battalion, 11th
Marines, remained with the generator all the way to
its final destination. Thus, amid the smoke and dust
of constant stability operations and the preparations
for the major battle of Fallujah, Operations Terrapin
I and II wound slowly across the I MEF battle space
from 24 September to 12 October.
Assembling the Fallujah Assault Force
The 1st Marine Division began detailed prepara-
tions for an urban battle of proportions not seen by
the Marine Corps since the Vietnam Battle of Hue City
in 1968. As in that battle, Marines would share a sig-
nificant
part of the fight with comrades of the U.S.
Army. The basic concept reprised some of the plan-
ning from mid-April, drawing as many forces as pos-
sible from two Marine regimental combat teams. In
this case, each of them would conduct an assault on
the city, working from north to south. Reinforcements
from Multi National Force-Iraq would add both Army
As the Coalition prepared for a second assault on Fal-
lujah, they made sure not to repeat mistakes commit-
ted during the first battle. Among these measures was
ensuring the Coalition assault would receive the back-
ing and support of the Iraqi Interim Government, then
under the leadership of Prime Minister Ayad Allawi
(below).
Photo by SrA Jorge A. Rodriguez, USAF, Defense Imagery VIRIN: 040614-F-4441R-016.


58
INTO THE FRAY

Photo by LCpl Joel A. Chaverri, Defense Imagery VIRIN: 041109-M-2789C-124
The combat zone facing Marines in Fallujah in November 2004 was an urban setting of densely packed, low-
level buildings and a number of mosques.
Colonel Tucker's Regimental Combat Team 7. In like
fashion, Regimental Combat Team 1, now com-
manded by Colonel Michael A. Shupp, received an-
other powerful battalion task force that day, the 2d
Squadron, 7th Cavalry, bringing more armor and
mechanized infantry to the fight.
The vital mission performed by the Army's Black-
jack Brigade, commanded by Colonel Michael
Formica, consisted of taking over the entire battle
space outside Fallujah, thus freeing both Marine
Corps regimental combat teams for their assault roles.
Upon the deployment of the brigade, the Marine as-
sault units assembled in Camps Fallujah, Baharia, and
Abu Ghraib for dispersal, rehearsals, and final prepa-
rations. Initially, the Iraqi battalions would operate in
support of the attacking Marine Corps and Army bat-
talions. Their essential missions eventually would in-
clude securing every building and position of the city.
Perhaps the most demanding reinforcement mis-
sion sent to the 1st Marine Division fell to the 31st
Marine Expeditionary Unit. During 18 September-2
October, the Marines of Colonel Miller's command
trained ashore in Kuwait at the Udairi Range to pre-
pare for combat. On 3 October, Central Command
head General Abizaid relinquished control of 31st
MEU to General Sattler for operations with I MEF. The
key roles envisioned for the 31st MEU included rein-
forcing the Fallujah assault and relieving Colonel
Tucker's Regimental Combat Team 7 of his responsi-
bility for western al-Anbar Province during Operation
Phantom Fury. Accordingly, 31st MEU passed to the
operational control of Major General Natonski on 14
October and began moving to al-Anbar Province. Its
ground combat element, 1st Battalion, 3d Marines
(commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Michael R.
Ramos) reported on 24 October to Colonel Tucker's
Regimental Combat Team 7, where it provided addi-
tional infantry, armored vehicle, and artillery to the
assault force. Lieutenant Colonel James A. Vohr's MEU
Service Support Group 31 (MSSG-31) provided direct
logistics support to Regimental Combat Team 7 dur-
ing the operation with augmentation from Combat
Service Support Battalion 7 (CSSB-7). The 31st MEU
command and aviation combat elements flew and
convoyed to al-Asad Air Base, from where Colonel
Miller would take command of forces in Area of Op-
erations Denver on 20 October. The 31st MEU's avia-
tion combat element, Lieutenant Colonel Matthew G.
Glavy's Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 265,
then joined the 3d Marine Aircraft Wing.
During the second battle of Fallujah, the 31st MEU
would maintain the stability of Area of Operations


The Second Al-Fallujah Battle
59
Denver, continue civil affairs operations, and support
the Iraqi security forces. After the departure of Regi-
mental Combat Team 7 and the other units assigned
to Operation Phantom Fury, Colonel Miller reallo-
cated the Denver battle space. The 1st Battalion, 7th
Marines, now covered the Euphrates River Valley
from the Syrian border to a boundary about 20 kilo-
meters short of Haditha while 1st Battalion, 23d
Marines, assumed responsibility to the eastern
boundary of Area of Operations Denver. Ar-Rutbah
and the extreme western sector became the respon-
sibility of Task Force Naha, built around reduced
companies from 3d Light Armored Reconnaissance
Battalion, 1st Battalion, 23d Marines, and Battery S,
5th Battalion, 10th Marines, a provisional rifle com-
pany.
Target Fallujah
The pause between the first and second battles of
Fallujah had permitted the insurgency to improve
their defenses, which Marines had penetrated with
comparative ease during the April battle. Intelligence
reports estimated that between 3,000 and 4,000 in-
surgents had taken up positions in the city, thus ex-
ceeding the numbers Marines had faced in April.
These sources also predicted insurgent leaders
planned to hinder any I MEF assault on Fallujah by
attacking external areas and routes, and cities such as
Ramadi and Husaybah. The reported departure of
many insurgents before the assault on Fallujah gave
credence to this prediction.
Satellite and other forms of aerial surveillance re-
vealed that the city had several lines of obstacles and
fortified positions. The monitoring of insurgent re-
sponses to the Marine's preliminary operations also
revealed the insurgents' defensive points. The rela-
tive densities of these apparent insurgent lines of re-
sistance suggested the insurgents feared an attack
from the east, especially from the much contested
cloverleaf and zones north and south of Route 10,
the location of the largest concentrations of road-
blocks, berms, fighting positions, sniper holes, and
checkpoints. A secondary concentration of positions
on the southeast edge of the city showed attention
paid to the Shuhada (Martyrs) District. Analysts also
discerned likely positions prepared for later use by
indirect fire weapons and small arms. The successive
positions showed a willingness to fight in depth
along Route 10 as well as much preparation for fight-
ing in all directions from the strongholds of Jolan,
Sook, and Muallimeen Districts. Planners presumed
all routes into and within the city were armed with
bombs and other types of booby traps.
After the Coalition forces began their attacks and
pushed the insurgents out of their initial line of re-
sistance, analysts assumed the insurgents would
move in small elements into the interior positions.
Four- to eight-man teams would fight a delaying bat-
tle back to strong points where up to platoon-sized
elements would form to resist and even counterat-
tack any Coalition troops that could be isolated in
small numbers. The enemy would remain mobile and
exploit any operational pause offered by Coalition
forces. The enemy fighters would move through a
series of caches and engagement areas built around
major intersections and public buildings such as
schools, mosques, civic buildings, and parking
garages. Marine Corps and Army leaders expected
the enemy to continually attempt to re-enter areas al-
ready cleared and to interdict supply lines after com-
bat units penetrated the city. Some insurgent teams
would
ay behind hoping that the assault troops
would bypass them, leaving them free to surface later
and to cut Coalition lines or even to escape from the
city. While insurgents favored improvised explosive
devices, they also intended to fire mortars and rock-
ets into Coalition positions within range after the at-
tack of the city began. Infiltration routes, especially
along the Euphrates River, could be used for resup-
ply or for withdrawal as needed.
I MEF anticipated Fallujah insurgent groups would
attempt to rally international opinion and mobilize
propaganda to interfere with the planned assault,
with the ultimate aim of disrupting it and causing a
suspension of offensive operations. This time, how-
ever, the Iraqi interim government was involved al-
most from the beginning, and the Coalition planned
a large-scale information operation to complement
the planned battle and counter the worst charges of
enemy propaganda. In short, the disadvantages en-
countered in the impromptu conduct of the first bat-
tle of Fallujah would not likely reappear in the more
deliberately planned second battle for the city.
The Assault Plan and Aviation Support
Although directed tactically by Major General
Richard F. Natonski and his 1st Marine Division com-
mand, Operation Phantom Fury required the partici-
pation of the entire I MEF organization and vital Army
and Coalition reinforcements. During the battle, the
stability operations of the 31st and 24th MEUs in the
western and eastern extremes of I MEF's zone of re-
sponsibility and the operations by the U.S. Army's 2d
Brigade, 2d Infantry Division, at Ramadi ensured that
the operations in Fallujah took place without interfer-
ence by the enemy in those areas. The full array of 3d


60
INTO THE FRAY
Marine Aircraft Wing capabilities was engaged in the
action as well as the resources of the 1st Force Serv-
ice Support Group.
As early as 24 September, Colonel Shupp and
Colonel Tucker, the respective commanders of Regi-
mental Combat Teams 1 and 7, had planned the as-
sault operation with only four Marine infantry
battalions (two from each regiment) with additional
Iraqi forces. As commanders realized the extent of the
problems they would be confronting, planners began
to augment the force, and the forces allocated quickly
grew. The final plan emerged by the beginning of Oc-
tober and passed through successive analysis and war-
gaming until the commanders had settled upon the
details.
The objective of the attack remained as desired in
April: to occupy the entire city, defeating all opposi-
tion, and clearing any caches or other resources that
might sustain the insurgency. General Sattler's mission
statement to I MEF set the tone:
The operational plan to retake Fallujah consisted of
five phases. The first would last from September to
October and entailed what planners described as “lim-
ited shaping operations.” These are actions conducted
to collect intelligence, disrupt, isolate, and reduce the
enemy while securing key infrastructure and routes.
Information operations would highlight enemy failures
and atrocities. Leaflets and broadcasts encouraged the
citizens of Fallujah to leave the city. At the last mo-
ment, the information campaign would notify inhabi-
tants to take cover in cellars and remain away from
any fighting
Planners described Phase II, or D-day, as “en-
hanced shaping” operations. These included “violent”
action over a short period of time (approximately 24
hours) and the positioning of I MEF forces to attack
Fallujah. Phase III, or D+1, would entail “decisive op-
erations” to destroy the insurgents in Fallujah and to
seize control of the city and to deny the use of Fallu-
jah as a safe-haven. The “transition to an interim emer-
gency government” would be Phase IV of the
operation. Combined Multi National Force-West and
Iraqi forces operations and reconstruction projects in
Fallujah would help build the legitimacy of the Iraqi
Interim Government in the eyes of the citizens. Multi
National Force-West forces would provide security to
facilitate reconstruction projects and establishing an
On order, Multi National Force-West attacks to
destroy the Anti-Iraqi forces and insurgent forces
in Fallujah-Ramadi to deny the use of Fallujah-
Ramadi as their safe haven and to facilitate the
restoration of legitimate governance, security,
and reconstruction.
A Marine F/A-18D Hornet fighter-bomber of All-Weather Fighter/Attack Squadron 332 blasts away in full af-
terburner from al-Asad Air Base. Hornets provided close air support throughout the second battle of Fallujah.
Photo by LCpl Sheila M. Brooks, Defense Imagery, VIRIN: 051025-M-7404B-455

f


The Second Al-Fallujah Battle
61

Photo by SFC Johan Charles Van Boers USA, Defense Imagery VIRIN: 041109-A-1067B-011
Soldiers from the 2d Brigade Combat Team, 1st Cavalry Division, prepare to enter and clear a building in
southern Fallujah in the early stages of Operation al-Fajr.
Iraqi government and police force. The operation
would be completed with Phase V, the transition to
permanent, local government and security.
Little difference remained between “limited” and
“violent” shaping operations in the vicinity of a dan-
gerous place such as Fallujah. The shaping operations
of Phase I were typified by an air strike called on 9
September, just after midnight, by special operations
forces against a house being used as an insurgent
headquarters. An Air Force F-15E Strike Eagle fighter-
bomber destroyed the house with two 500-pound
guided bombs with minimal collateral damage to ad-
jacent buildings. Two days earlier, the 2d Battalion,
1st Marines, conducted a typical feint using tanks, LAV-
25 light armored vehicles, and armored Humvees
against the southeast corner of the city. This set the
pattern of seemingly endless forays of various sorts
against the insurgent positions, all aimed at disguising
the true intentions of the attack, its location, and its
timing
Apart from shaping operations, Operation Phantom
Fury began with the deployment of the 2d Blackjack
Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division, directly from its Bagh-
dad bases to relieve Regimental Combat Teams 1 and
7 of their positions so that they could regroup and re-
hearse their battle plans at Camps Fallujah and Ba-
hariah. As the brigade relieved the two regiments, it
received tactical control of the 2d Reconnaissance Bat-
talion and the Iraqi 6th Battalion, 3d Brigade. The
planned positioning of the Army brigade at the last
minute gave minimal alert to the insurgents that a
major alteration of the balance of forces had been ac-
complished.
Within hours of the establishment of the Blackjack
Brigade around Fallujah's outskirts, the plan called for
Task Force 3d Light Armored Reconnaissance Battal-
ion to advance on D-day. The force included head-
quarters, one light armored reconnaissance company,
one rifle
company, a mechanized company and engi-
neer platoon from the 2d Striker Brigade, 2d Infantry
Division, and the Iraqi 36th Commando Battalion. The
plan called for the task force to maneuver the length
of the peninsula formed by the Euphrates River to the
the west of the city. By securing the peninsula, the
Coalition would prevent the hospital there from being
used by insurgents as either a sanctuary or battle po-
sition. In the last hours of D-day, initially scheduled for
5 November, but changed to 7 November, the attack
battalions moved through the night from their base
camps and occupied attack positions along the north-


62
INTO THE FRAY
ern outskirts of Fallujah, attacking at “A-hour” (for
stage A of Phase III, Offensive Operations) of 1900 on
D+1, or 8 November. During D-day, the assault bat-
talions of Regimental Combat Teams 1 and 7 moved
into covered locations beyond the railroad station and
rail lines that constituted the first barriers guarding
entry into the city from the north.
The division planned the assault to begin on D+1,
whereupon both regimental combat teams would
launch penetration attacks to prevent insurgent forces
from evading U.S. forces and escaping the city. The
leading assault battalions had the mission of over-
coming obstacles and defeating insurgents wherever
encountered. Any buildings or areas not cleared in the
initial assault had to be cleared and secured by addi-
tional battalions fighting in trace, using the support of
the Iraqi battalions assigned to each regiment. The di-
vision plan assigned the main effort to Regimental
Combat Team 1, which would attack from north to
south through the familiar Jolan district. The regiment
would then continue until the northwestern quarter of
the city had been searched and cleared. The eastern
half of the city fell to Regimental Combat Team 7 to as-
sault and clear in like fashion. Jolan Park and the Gov-
ernment Center became division objectives one and
two, respectively, for the two regiments. At this point,
the plan called for Regimental Combat Team 1 to con-
solidate and mop up in its sector, securing Route 10
for use in supporting the remainder of the operation.
Iraqi troops were to take the forefront of the mop-up
in an attempt to demonstrate Iraqi sovereignty. The
assault battalions of Regimental Combat Team 7 would
continue south and southwest, clearing and securing
the rest of Fallujah, south of Route 10. At the conclu-
sion of the mop-up of remaining resistance and the
clearing of all enemy materiel and personnel, condi-
tions for Phase IV would be met and the forces would
turn to the stabilization and recovery of the city.
Logistics preparations initially centered on stock-
piling the forward bases with the required materiel
A Marine from Company B, 1st Battalion, 3d Marines, mans a rooftop security post during Operation al-Fajr.
The buildings in Fallujah were relatively low, and most of the roofs were enclosed by a low wall that created
an easily defensible firing position for insurgents and Marines alike.
Photo by LCpl Jeremy W. Ferguson, Defense Imagery VIRIN: 041117-M-2353F-013


The Second Al-Fallujah Battle
63

Photo by LCpl Joel A. Chaverri, Defense Imagery VIRIN: 041109-M-2789C-113
A Marine from 1st Battalion, 8th Marines, fires a MK153 Shoulder-launched Multipurpose Assault Weapon
round at an insurgent stronghold during the opening phase of Operation al-Fajr.
and supplies in what came to be known as the “Iron
Mountain.” Marine planners had noted the largely un-
successful attempts by insurgents to interdict routes
and supply lines during the April Fallujah operations.
This time, the 1st Force Service Support Group pro-
vided forward operating bases a minimum 15 days of
supply in advance of the operation. Because of prob-
lems with civilian contractors, the group also mobi-
lized the I MEF Engineering Group on short notice to
build camps for the Iraqi Army battalions that had to
move into the Fallujah camp complex before the op-
eration.
The 3d Marine Aircraft Wing designed an aviation
integration plan for Operation Phantom Fury after
studying the after-action reports from the first battle
of Fallujah and the battle of an-Najaf. During Opera-
tion Vigilant Resolve in April, the air observers and
forward air controllers had to coordinate through two
levels of air command and control systems before con-
necting the attacking aircraft to the terminal controller.
The lack of a common grid reference system made for
very long times from target acquisition and engage-
ment for both fixed and rotary wing aircraft. After
studying these and other lessons from April, the air
plan established a “high density air control zone” and
devised a “keyhole template” inside it. These tactical
control measures emerged from a U.S. Central Com-
mand tactics review board held in July. In it, repre-
sentatives from I MEF's division and aircraft wing
briefed the command on the airspace requirements
and the need for unity of command to support the for-
ward air controllers. The density of the airspace and
the proximity of ground forces made the keyhole tem-
plate a good solution to achieve the safety, unity of
command, and integration of fires required by the
urban operation.
For airspace management, two temporary flight re-
strictions established templates over both Ramadi and
Fallujah. Each city had a 15 nautical mile radius and
shared a center cap. After evaluating the many vari-
ables to include the size of the cities, weapon release
parameters, Litening pod capabilities, ranges of insur-
gent weapons, safe release, egress maneuver room,
and drone employment, a five-nautical-mile radius
was chosen for this inner ring. This template essen-
tially required aircraft to hold between the contact
point and the initial point. The outer ring of 15 nauti-
cal miles served as that contact point and the 5-nauti-
cal-mile ring served as the initial point for the use of
forward air controllers. This area needed to be defined
carefully to minimize interference with neighboring air
patrols. Two semi-cardinal lines extending out of the
city center point defined each air patrol or sector. The
airplane holding technique remained at the discretion
of the pilots as long they remained within the lateral
limits of the sector and altitude assigned.
The altitudes assigned for aircraft loiter and hold-
ing in the keyhole template also reflected the pa-


64
INTO THE FRAY
rameters of target acquisition, insurgent weapons,
and the need to stack multiple sections of different
types of aircraft in each sector. In the case of the Fal-
lujah keyhole, the east sector, placed over the
friendly bases of Baharia, Camp Fallujah, and Abu
Ghraib, allowed a primary altitude of 13,000—15,000
feet and a secondary altitude of 18,000–20,000 feet.
This arrangement also allowed fixed wing aircraft on
the east and west to drop simultaneously. The 3d Ma-
rine Aircraft Wing planners added procedures for the
use of odd-numbered “time over target” for Regi-
mental Combat Team 1 and even ones for Regimen-
tal Combat Team 7 for fixed-wing aircraft. A poor
weather scheme changed the sector altitudes for a
“high war,” “low war,” or “split war,” based upon
cloud layers.
Considering combined arms needs, the plan in-
corporated the maximum elevation for artillery ord-
nance required to shoot across the city from
proposed battery locations. This measure set the min-
imum operating altitude of the inner ring so that air-
craft remained above 9,000 feet while inside,
permitting artillery and mortar fire to a maximum el-
evation of 8,500 feet. Outside the ring, artillery could
fire up to 11,000 feet. In both cases, no need re-
mained to clear aircraft before firing artillery mis-
sions. If artillery required higher elevations for their
missions, standard clearance procedures would be
used.
The plan held rotary-wing aircraft in battle posi-
tions around the city at no closer than 1 kilometer
from the city edge. Planners selected positions from
which helicopters could fire an AGM-114 Hellfire
missile against any target in the city. Operating at al-
titudes from the surface to 1,500 feet, no coordination
would be required to clear their operations.
The planners recognized the need to operate un-
manned aerial vehicles over the city but also ac-
knowledged the risk of UAVs colliding with aircraft.
They used a “little UAV, big sky” approach, hoping
for a low probability of collisions because of the
small size of the UAVs. Planners anticipated using
four to five drones in the inner ring at anytime. North
and south tracks for the drones permitted a certain
measure of control such that they could be moved
to a known track if necessary. The altitudes used de-
pended on the characteristics of the three main
drones employed: Predator, Pioneer, and Scan Eagle.
The aviation support plan specified standard loads
for each aircraft type: AH-1W Super Cobras would
be armed with four Hellfire antitank missiles, two
Tube-launched, Optically-tracked, Wire-guided
Gysgt Ryan P. Shane (center) is hit amid heavy enemy sniper fire as he and an unidentified Marine, both from
Company B, 1st Battalion, 8th Marines, try to pull a fatally wounded comrade to safety during Operation al-
Fajr. The second battle of Fallujah was among the fiercest in the history of the Marine Corps.
Photo by Cpl Joel A. Chaverri, Defense Imagery VIRIN: 041109-M-2789C-016

MT


The Second Al-Fallujah Battle
65

Photo by SSgt Jonathon C. Knauth, Defense Imagery VIRIN: 041110-M-5191K-035
Marines from Regimental Combat Team 7 are deployed along a roadway in Fallujah during Operation al-
Fajr. The regiment's drive into the city's western districts provided important support for the main thrust con-
ducted to the east by Regimental Combat Team 1.
(TOW) antitank missiles, a rocket pod, and 300 to
400 rounds of 20mm cannon ammunition. F/A-18
Hornet fighter-bombers were equipped with one
GBU-38, 500-pound JDAM (Joint Direct Attack Mu-
nition) bomb, two GBU-12 500-pound laser guided
bombs, or one GBU-12 and one laser-guided Maver-
ick air-ground missile. The F/A-18 airborne controller
replaced one of the weapons noted above with four
5-inch Zuni rockets. AV-8B Harriers were armed with
one GBU-12 or Maverick.
The Marine fixed-wing aircraft all carried a Liten-
ing targeting pod. Mounted externally, the system
provided an infrared detector, video camera, laser
rangefinder, and laser designator in a single unit.
Four of these pods were downlink-capable to the
RQ-2B Pioneer drone system operated by the Marine
Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Squadrons 1 and 2. The
Army also furnished continuous coverage with two
AH-64 Apache helicopters in a direct support role of
the Blackjack Brigade
The air plan used a single “gridded reference
graphic” based upon the target reference points,
phase lines, and building naming conventions of the
two assault regiments. The graphic was designed for
both cockpit and ground use and was made readable
in red lighting, which is used to preserve night vi-
sion. The 1:7,500 scale image included overlays with
the grid lines, phase lines, and target references. The
image was further subdivided into 250 meter incre-
ments and labeled for eight-digit grid coordinates to
facilitate quick target acquisition. A 1:5,000 scale ver-
sion was also available. An additional overlay of ap-
proximately 700 buildings with accompanying
coordinates and designated city blocks outlined for
ground combat use was provided. All units received
these aids through the military secure internet about
four weeks before Operation Phantom Fury began.
Each regiment was assigned an AC-130 gunship,
with both aircraft given the call sign “Basher.” These
would operate at night at altitudes of 9,000–11,000
feet initially with slightly overlapping tracks. While
hesitant about operating two aircraft inside the five-
nautical-mile ring, the Air Force crews practiced this
procedure before the commencement of Phantom


66
INTO THE FRAY
Fury and executed it without error or mishap. During
Operation Vigilant Resolve, AC-130s often ran out of
ammunition, but 3d Marine Aircraft Wing succeeded
in having the aircraft “floor loaded” with additional
40mm and 25mm ammunition for the second battle.
Having prepared command and control meas-
ures in great detail for the operation, schedulers
had to line up the required aircraft. The fixed-wing
aircraft would be “pushed” from bases to provide
two sections of aircraft continuously overhead for a
17-hour period. With AC-130s on station at night,
the requirement dropped to a single section of
fixed-wing aircraft as augmentation. 3d Marine Air-
craft Wing's KC-130 refueling planes provided
around the clock coverage to prevent fuel exhaus-
tion limiting ordnance delivery. The usual proce-
dure of strip alert, quick fueling, and rearming also
would be used so that tempo, not fuel, drove the
fight. In short, the airmen wanted to respond to the
tactical situation without concerns for logistical
needs.
Additional AV-8B Harrier aircraft deployed to
Iraq for this battle in addition to the first squadron
ordered in after Operation Vigilant Resolve, Marine
Attack Squadron (VMA) 214, which had arrived on
20 May. By the time the battle began, the 3d Marine
Aircraft Wing wielded a “super-squadron” of AV-8Bs
built around VMA-542, supplemented with planes
and pilots from VMA-214, a detachment from the
31st MEU's VMA-211, and a detachment from VMA-
311. The relief squadron for VMA-214 arrived at al-
Asad Air Base on 17 August and Marine All Weather
Fighter-Attack Squadron (VMFA[AW]) 242, operated
its two-seat F/A-18D Hornets to good effect. The
rotary-wing plan used the scheme of “pull” in that
a two-section presence with two more available in
alert status would be maintained for about 17 hours
a day. The attack helicopters planned to fly from
0900–0200 daily, thus providing overlap of the AC-
130 by several hours to attack targets on the outer
edges of the city, to support additional ground
units, and exploit their night combat capabilities.
The Seizure of Fallujah
(7–19 November 2004)
At the urging of the Iraqi Interim Government,
A Marine from 1st Battalion, 8th Marines, Regimental Combat Team 7, uses his helmet to draw insurgent fire
from atop a Fallujah roof during the early phase of Operation al-Fajr.
Photo by LCpl Joel A. Chaverri, Defense Imagery VIRIN: 041110-M-2789C-005


The Second Al-Fallujah Battle
67

FALLUJAH
TF
Jolan District
10
HE
Industrial Area
N
EUPHRATES RIVER
Doors
TF "Stryker
SCALE 1:9,000
BCT "Black Jack"
2d Topographic Platoon Map, Adapted by History Division
The al-Fajr plan called for Task Force LAR and supporting Iraqi units to seize and secure the hospital located
west of Fallujah on 7 November. Meanwhile, Army mechanized infantry and cavalry units would set up cor-
dons to the east and south of the city in order to prevent insurgents from escaping the city.
the U.S. military command renamed Operation tions by the Coalition to re-establish Iraqi govern-
Phantom Fury Operation al-Fajr (Dawn). Hours be mental control of Fallujah and to liberate the citizens
fore the assault, Major General Natonski visited Army, from the insurgents. The Iraqi Interim Government
Marine Corps, and Iraqi units in their attack positions appointed an ambassador to make political overtures
outside the city. The Iraqi Interim Government in of inclusion and reconciliation to the people of Fal-
voked emergency powers and instituted a curfew in lujah but in the meantime declared a state of emer-
the Fallujah/Ramadi area. I MEF expected a surge in gency. Iraq closed its borders with Syria and Jordan
insurgent violence when the operation commenced. (although the Jordanian crossing was only partially
Commanders initiated curfews throughout the I MEF closed) and made available the Iraqi security forces
area of operations as engineers prepared to cut the necessary to support the operation, including Iraqi
city's power supply.
Army, National Guard, and police units.
These final measures reflected the political prepa-
D-Day and D+1 (7–8 November)
rations deemed necessary by the Coalition military
commanders for successful operations in Fallujah. On 7 November, the Iraqi 36th Commando Battal-
Leading up to the decisive assault, the Iraqi Interim ion and 3d Light Armored Reconnaissance Battalion
Government announced the upcoming joint opera-
task force seized the Fallujah Hospital on the penin-


68
INTO THE FRAY

RCT
RET
KE
☆
TF 27
TE 2-2
TF
Jolan District
Industrial Area
N
90
EUPHRATES RIVER
TF "Stryker
88
FALLUJAH
SCALE 1:9.000
BCT "Black Jack
6
2d Topographic Platoon Map, Adapted by History Division
The second day of the assault on Fallujah was 8 November. With the hospital to the city's west secure and es-
cape routes to the east and south cut off by U.S. Army forces, Marine Corps and Army battalions attacked the
city from the north, clearing the city of insurgents as they methodically advanced south.
sula at 2207. The reconnaissance battalion secured
the bridges from the peninsula to Fallujah at 0005 on
8 November and established three vehicle check-
points. By 1045, Marines of 4th Civil Affairs Group
completed their
survey of the hospital and unloaded
medical and humanitarian assistance supplies for its
1
use.
The units of Regimental Combat Team 1 and Reg-
imental Combat Team 7 moved to attack positions
during the night of 7-8 November. The 3d Battalion,
5th Marines, attacked at 1052 on 8 November to clear
an apartment complex northwest of Fallujah and
completed its seizure of the area at 1255 with only
light resistance. The 3d Battalion, 1st Marines, pre-
pared to seize the train station east of the apartment
complex. The A-hour of 1900 approached for the as-
sault battalions, beginning the vital clearing of the
lines of departure of remaining obstacles and explo-
sive devices. To breach the railroad tracks at the
planned penetration point,
point, four F/A-18Ds of
VMFA(AW)-242, one flown by wing commander
Major General Stalder, dropped eight GBU-31 2,000-
pound guided bombs on the berms and tracks at
1420 when 3d Battalion, 1st Marines, assaulted the
station to effect the breach. As a final step, a team of
Navy Seabees and 4th Civil Affairs Group Marines en-
tered the power substation just west of the apartment
complex and cut Fallujah's electricity supply at 1800.
The Marines hit the train station at 1859, taking spo-
radic small arms and rocket launcher fire. They se-
cured the station by 2034 and began the hasty
clearing of the breach area. The lead companies of 3d


The Second Al-Fallujah Battle
69

.:26.
Photo by LCpl J.A. Chaverri, Defense Imagery, VIRIN 041111-M-2789C-038
In contrast to the first battle of Fallujah, during Operation al-Fajr the Iraqi forces trained and assigned to 1st
Marine Division did not desert, and fought alongside Coalition troops throughout the battle.
Battalion, 5th Marines, jumped off from their posi-
tions at the apartment complex at 1926, with tanks
leading through their breach lanes, joining the tanks
supporting 3d Battalion, 1st Marines, as they engaged
insurgent
antitank teams.
The engineers began their breach operations at
2200, and the advance elements of 2d Squadron, 7th
Cavalry, began to cross at 0014, 9 November. The
cavalrymen judged the breach as insufficient for their
wheeled vehicles, however, so the engineer efforts
continued. The 3d Battalion, 1st Marines, passed
through the breach between 0503–0538, and 2d
Squadron pushed its lead armor elements forward in
sufficient strength to protect the left flank of the main
effort by that Marine battalion as it thrust south into
the heart of Jolan. By 0636, 3d Battalion, 5th Marines,
neared its limit of advance for the first day, having
cleared the Jolan Cemetery, and the cavalry squadron
began to occupy strong points along its axis of ad-
vance. The Iraqi follow-on forces began to cross into
the city in trace of the assault battalions at 0852, and
began to secure cleared areas and guard some of the
numerous weapons caches uncovered in the assault.
The small craft company, placed under Colonel
Shupp's Regimental Combat Team 1 for the opera-
tion, began to fire and move at 1114 against insur-
gents trying to flee the city along the bank of the
Euphrates where it rounds the peninsula.
The assault of Regimental Combat Team 7 into its
zone of action began at A-hour using three reinforced
battalions line-abreast, attacking to penetrate the city
and clear an area to Route 10, seizing the Govern-
ment Center (Division Objective 2) and supporting
Regimental Combat Team 1's attack. Colonel Tucker
assigned his main effort to 1st Battalion, 8th Marines,
commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Gareth F. Brandl,
on his right flank, moving somewhat east of the
boundary with Regimental Combat Team 1, desig-
nated Phase Line George, but angling to the west to
seize the Government Center and coordinating with
Colonel Shupp's regiment via the 2d Squadron, 7th
Cavalry. The center unit, 1st Battalion 3d Marines, at-
tacked in zone at the center, and the U.S. Army 2d
Battalion, 2d Infantry, attacked on the left flank of
Colonel Tucker's force.
On 9 November, accompanied by Iraqi Special


70
INTO THE FRAY
Forces, the 1st Battalion, 8th Marines, penetrated boulevard of Phase Line Henry, the 3d Battalion, 5th
along Phase Line Ethan and took the regimental ob Marines, cleared its zone in the northern half of the
jective, Hadrah Mosque, at 0900 . The Army mecha Jolan District. The regiment's other Marine assault
nized infantry battalion moved rapidly along the left battalion cleared areas in the cavalry squadron's rear.
edge of the city, all the way to Route 10, killing ap The intense fight for the heart of Jolan District by the
proximately 48 enemy and then sending indirect fire 3d Battalion, 1st Marines, took the rest of 9 Novem-
into insurgent targets. The 1st Battalion, 3d Marines, ber and culminated in a turn to the west in prepara-
experienced difficulty clearing its penetration point tion to complete clearing operations to the river's
and instead moved its vehicles through the Army bat edge. The 2d Squadron, 7th Cavalry, reached Route
talion, continuing to move south afterward with little 10 (Phase Line Fran) at 2200 and controlled the
further difficulty.
streets to the east and west of its attack route. The ac-
Leading the attack, Lieutenant Jeffrey T. Lee (Com companying Iraqi 4th Battalion continued to clear
pany A, 1st Battalion, 8th Marines) aggressively di buildings along Phase Line Henry, which had armor
rected his tank platoon through major firefights. strong points now posted along its entire length
Initially operating continuously for over 12 hours, he north of Route 10. The insurgents could do little
ran the risk of low fuel while continuing to destroy against the firepower and armor of the cavalry
insurgent resistance, enabling the battalion to reach squadron, and any who resisted were quickly elimi-
its objectives. Days later, while leading Company A in nated. Fire from tanks and 25mm automatic cannon
its drive south, he was shot through his right arm yet fire from armored vehicles destroyed many of the im-
refused to leave his unit and instead advanced two provised explosive devices and car bombs arrayed
blocks further south, reaching the assigned battalion along the routes, with little effect on the attacking
phase line. Surrounded by enemy insurgents, he sup forces. The cavalrymen took Jolan Park (Division Ob-
ported the Marine riflemen taking positions in nearby jective 1) at the end of the day, well ahead of the at-
buildings, eliminating more insurgents who at tack plan schedule. The 3d Battalion, 1st Marines,
tempted to attack the position. His aggressiveness began its attack to the west at 1305 on 10 Novem-
and bravery contributed to the breaking of enemy re ber to clear the remaining unoccupied part of Fallu-
sistance.
jah north of Route 10 to the river's edge. On its left
D+2 to D+3 (9_10 November)
flank, the cavalrymen of 2d Squadron attacked along
Route 10 to secure the two highway bridges from the
While the Army cavalrymen of the 2d Squadron, east at 1424 . The 3d Light Armored Reconnaissance
7th Cavalry, continued south on their thrust along the Battalion already held the western sections. By the
A Marine from Company B, 1st Battalion, 3d Marines, watches the smoke rise as a building in Fallujah burns
in the distance.
Photo by LCpl Jeremy W. Ferguson, Defense Imagery: 041112-M-2353F-002


The Second Al-Fallujah Battle
71
The broadcast by loudspeakers of the Marines'
Hymn over Fallujah by B Company, 9th Psychologi-
cal Operations Battalion, took place in the early
evening of 10 November as units set in for the night.
The observation of the Marine Corps birthday varied
throughout the zone, and most units celebrated in
small groups during the early morning hours. Ob-
serving the date allowed Marines to revel in their
cherished traditions at a time of great danger.
D+4 to D+13 (11–20 November)
end of 10 November, Colonel Shupp's regiment had
captured the entire northwest quadrant of Fallujah
with a classic cavalry screen established on the east-
ern edge of his zone and the two Marine battalions
poised to mop up the interior and continue the attack
south of Route 10.
In Regimental Combat Team 7's zone of opera-
tions to the west, the 1st Battalion, 8th Marines,
began its movement at 0100 on 10 November south
from the Hadrah Mosque area with two rifle compa-
nies. At 0400 it launched Company A, mounted in
amphibious assault vehicles and escorted by tanks
and light armored vehicles. The mounted company
seized the Government Center at noon, but the other
companies fought for several more hours to over-
come snipers and pockets of resistance before se-
curing their sections of Route 10. Two rifle platoons,
however, had to return to the Hadrah Mosque that
night to prevent insurgent reoccupation of the site.
As 1st Battalion, 3d Marines, joined the rest of Reg-
imental Combat Team 7 on the Route 10 line, several
changes to the planning took place on 10 Novem-
ber. The rapid advance of both regiments to Route 10
(Phase Line Fran) had eliminated any need for Regi-
mental Combat Team 7 to undertake the clearing of
southern Fallujah alone. Instead, each regiment
would continue south following the extended traces
of the same boundaries and phase lines already in
use. The securing of the northern part of the city,
however, already taxed the Iraqi forces in the oper-
ation even though they had performed well sup-
porting the assault battalions. Command and control
of Iraqi units remained problematic, and Marine bat-
talions would remain behind in each regimental zone
to complete the mopping up phase. Therefore, 3d
Battalion, 5th Marines, and 1st Battalion, 3d Marines,
were assigned to secure the northern half of Fallujah
within their respective regimental sectors while the
assault to the south ensued.
Sergeant Jeffrey L. Kirk led his 1st Squad, 3d Pla-
toon, K Company, 3d Battalion, 5th Marines, in suc-
cessive assaults of a fortified building and courtyard,
eliminating insurgents and a machine gun position
personally with rifle fire and grenades. Although
wounded, he refused medical attention and led a
third assault. Nearby, K Company's Private First Class
Christopher S. Adelsperger executed a series of sin-
gle-man attacks, clearing houses, rescuing wounded
Marines, and leading the charge into a courtyard after
an assault amphibious vehicle crashed through its
wall. Although he did not survive his wounds,
Adelsperger used amazing courage and energy in de-
stroying the last strongpoint in the Jolan district.
Regimental Combat Team 1 continued the attack
into southern Fallujah, sending 2d Squadron, 7th Cav-
alry, south along Phase Line Henry to act once again
as the supporting effort beginning at 1900. The armor
company leading the thrust encountered a complex
obstacle that required close air support and AC-130
fire to reduce. The armored attack continued south to
the assigned limit of advance for the day, some 1,200
meters south of Route 10, by 0300 on 12 November.
Supporting arms suppressed enemy fire, and the
mechanized infantry company, following in trace, es-
tablished a screen. Operating several hundred me-
ters to the east, 3d Battalion, 1st Marines, began its
main attack at 1600 on 11 November, undertaking the
mission of clearing the entire zone between the cav-
alry advance and the river's edge.
During the daylight hours of the 11th, the insur-
gents in front of Regimental Combat Team 1 had re-
treated south and attempted to regroup and
reorganize what men they could for their defenses.
Marines and soldiers moved into the night, not mak-
ing much contact. The cavalry screen anchored the
regiment's left, with a section of either M2 Bradley
fighting vehicles or M1A1 Abrams tanks at every
major intersection. True to form, as the sun came up
on 12 November, the enemy came out to fight.
At 1030, Marines of 3d Battalion, 1st Marines, re-
ported strong insurgent contact, receiving mortar and
small arms fire about 500 meters south of Route 10
near the cavalry advance. A Pioneer drone showed
eight to 10 men fighting along rooftops of four
houses. Although the battalion reported two compa-
nies were running low on fuel and ammunition, one
of these companies had reached the limits of south
Fallujah by 1640.
The last major contact by Regimental Combat
Team 1 with organized resistance came the next day
(13 November) at 1017, when Marines of 3d Battal-
ion, 1st Marines, fought squad-sized enemy elements.
Several Marines fell wounded in one house and six
insurgents in the upper floor prevented four of the
Marines from being evacuated. First Sergeant Bradley


The Second Al-Fallujah Battle
73
what they already termed the “ten-second firefight”
and effectively applied combined arms to eradicate
resistance at every encounter.
As his regiment continued clearing its zone,
Colonel Shupp crossed the south bridge over the Eu-
phrates on 15 November, officially opening it for mil-
itary traffic. Navy Seabees assessed the north bridge
as being in good condition, and it opened shortly
thereafter. The next day, shortly after noon, the 3d
Battalion, 1st Marines, reported that its sweep of the
south bridge with dogs and explosives ordnance dis-
posal teams had uncovered six bombs. The removal
of these came just before the symbolic crossing of
the bridge by General Casey, accompanied by
Colonel Shupp, and led by Lieutenant Colonel
Willard Buhl, the commander of 3d Battalion, 1st
Marines.
On the eastern side of Fallujah, Colonel Tucker re-
sumed his advance with the Army's 2d Battalion, 2d
Infantry, pushing armor south of Route 10 at 1900, 11
November, along the eastern fringes of the city. 1st
Battalion, 8th Marines, operated further to the west in
the zone. The Marine battalion crossed Route 10 in
the attack at 1500 with two companies on line, tanks
in the lead, and assault amphibious vehicles follow-
ing in trace. Here they encountered their heaviest re-
sistance in the entire operation. Marines crossed the
highway, and insurgents responded with automatic
gunfire and antitank rockets. In three hours of fight-
ing, both companies battled their way 250 meters to
the south and stopped in some buildings at dusk.
They advanced another 250 meters under the cover
of darkness beginning at 0001 on 12 November with-
out incident and again set into defensive positions.
Iraqi troops joined later in the morning and cleared
a mosque with no resistance. At 1800, another move
south and west, under the cover of darkness, brought
the lead companies of the battalion to the vicinity of
Regimental Combat Team l's 2d Squadron, 7th Cav-
alry, screen without incident.
Although the Army mechanized task force en-
countered some heavy resistance in the southeast
corner of Fallujah, Colonel Tucker's regiment effec-
tively switched from its attack phase on 15 Novem-
ber and commenced mopping up in the interior of
The Army's 2d Battalion, 2d Infantry, continued
house clearing as well, and 2d Squadron, 7th Cav-
alry, continued occupying strong points on the
boundary between the regiments. Of the assault bat-
talions, the Army mechanized battalion task force be-
came the first to depart Fallujah, leaving on 21
November for its parent organization.
Phase IV Operations in Fallujah
(21 November-23 December 2004)
There was no clear-cut distinction between com-
bat and stabilization operations following the suc-
cessful assault on the city. The assault battalions
occupied assigned sectors of the city and crossed and
re-crossed them in sweeps and house-clearing oper-
ations, using the attached Iraqi battalions to the ex-
tent that their abilities permitted.
Colonel Shupp's Regimental Combat Team 1 re-
ports noted increasing humanitarian assistance efforts
and civil-military operations in the last third of the
month. Colonel Tucker's Regimental Combat Team 7
reported the same by 27 November and the regiment
began rotating Marines by platoon back to base
camps for 24-hour rest periods beginning on 29 No-
vember. The 2d Squadron, 7th Cavalry, completed its
withdrawal to Camp Fallujah on 23 November. Con-
tinuing discoveries of arms caches plagued the op-
eration in its final weeks, creating security problems
and also permitting renewed attacks in the city by
surviving insurgents. The total number of caches un-
covered reached 370 at the end of the month.
Throughout the last weeks of November and the
first two weeks of December, the 4th Civil Affairs
Group staff worked with a variety of higher com-
mands and the Interim Iraqi Government to develop
a return and reconstruction plan for the city that
would allow its residents to return to their homes but,
at the same time, preclude insurgents from returning
to the city. A new scheme of internal movement con-
trol came into practice, making use of biometric iden-
tification technology, a variety of scanners, and a new
series of movement control points. The city's water,
sewage, and electrical systems were repaired as the
more than 200,000 residents of Fallujah began to re-
turn and restore the city to some sense of normalcy.
I MEF's staff created an inter-ministerial coordination
group, located in the civil-military operations center
that coordinated all Iraqi and Marine stabilization op-
erations in Fallujah.
On 23 December 2004, the shift from assault to re-
covery operations in Operation al-Fajr occurred. It
was the first day that Fallujah's inhabitants began to
return to the city as 600 civilians returned to the al-
the city.
Combat operations did not cease with the occu-
pation of the city. Hard pockets of resistance contin-
ued even as most insurgents sought to flee the city.
The reports of the two assault regiments for 20 No-
vember showed each using two Marine infantry bat-
talions in clearing operations, encountering some
defended houses, especially in the southern sectors.


74
INTO THE FRAY
areas of Fallujah are cleared of enemy activity.
Identified forces must roll into these tasks on
the heels of our advance. We must keep the cit-
izens of Fallujah informed through creative info
ops that readily offer aid and assistance. We
must reach out to the citizens to reduce their
human suffering and quickly restore daily op-
erations. We must introduce the Interim Iraqi
Government as soon as possible and steadily
transition to their control and operations. The
citizens must be impressed with the power of
Iraq's legitimate authorities and identify with
the government as their benefactor and hope
for the future. We must destroy any ties to crim-
inal elements and seek the assistance of the
people. Maintaining security is paramount to
enabling all other operations, but it must not
consume our focus.
Andalus District. In other respects, the day was little
different from previous ones as Marine rifle compa-
nies with attached Iraqi troops continued to conduct
security patrols. The 3d Battalion, 5th Marines, fought
10 to 15 insurgents in northern Fallujah. Its Marines
employed tanks and air strikes to destroy buildings
occupied by the combatants. Three Marines were
killed in action, and five more suffered wounds. Ser-
geant Jarrett A. Kraft led three assault squads on three
separate instances to repel insurgents and clear
houses. Despite receiving repeated blast effects from
grenades and being knocked down stairwells, he
continued to lead his Marines with courage and spirit.
At the same time, another squad leader in the same
platoon, Corporal Jeremiah W. Workman, led his
Marines into several buildings, rescued wounded
Marines, and then personally covered them with his
fire after receiving fragment wounds in his arms and
legs. He led his Marines in one more assault before
reinforcements arrived to complete the action.
The Phase IV (stability operations) plan used by I
MEF and the 1st Marine Division aimed at establish-
ing competent Iraqi security forces in the city that
would require only minimal backup from U.S. forces.
Civil affairs group teams and detachments from 1st
Force Service Support Group operated with every
battalion in the Fallujah operation, assessed damage,
and sought to protect infrastructure wherever possi-
ble. In the aftermath of combat operations, the pri-
orities for Marine commanders in restoring the city's
operation were public health, public works and util-
ities (water, food, electricity, medical), infrastructure
(communications and transportation), the economic
infrastructure, emergency services, and finally the
reevaluation of projects previously begun that might
prove salvageable. During 14–16 December, the
Army's 2d Blackjack Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division,
departed 1st Marine Division, transferring responsi-
bility for the area outlying Fallujah to Regimental
Combat Team 7. The latter regiment left Fallujah on
10 December, leaving 1st Battalion, 3d Marines,
under the tactical control of Colonel Shupp’s Regi-
mental Combat Team 1, which now conducted the
occupation and stabilization of the city proper.
Colonel Shupp's instructions to Regimental Com-
bat Team 1 conveyed the complexity of the change
in mission:
As the troops of Regimental Combat Team 1 began
to occupy the “secured” eastern half of Fallujah, some
surprises occurred. Although combat also continued
in the western half, where 3d Battalion, 1st Marines,
held security and stabilization responsibilities, most
engagements and many cache discoveries occurred
in the eastern side after 10 December. The 3d Battal-
ion, 5th Marines, and 1st Battalion, 3d Marines, com-
bined to fight and kill approximately 35 insurgents
on 12 December using tank fire and close air sup-
port. Another engagement on the following day saw
seven bombs dropped and more tank fire used to kill
five insurgents. Assistant division commander,
Brigadier General Joseph F. Dunford, told the divi-
sion that more clearing and reclearing operations
would be required even as the city was returned to
a more peaceful state.
As in all combat operations conducted in Iraq, the
civil affairs teams accompanying the assault troops
included payment teams compensating owners for
battle damage to property and paying death claims to
families who lost members during the battle. As soon
as feasible, labor and construction contracting would
employ local workers and provide basic items
(wheelbarrows, shovels, etc.) to clear and repair
roads and streets. Humanitarian assistance measures
sought to provide essential services (initially water,
food, and fuel distribution) to mosques and 1st Force
Service Support Group operated humanitarian serv-
ice centers. Depending upon the Iraqi government
actions, the civil-military teams (Marine Corps and
U.S. diplomatic) sought to once again establish a
civil-military operations center with the local gov-
ernment in the downtown government center capa-
Our operational success depends on our efforts
in this phase. At no time is the phrase “No bet-
ter friend, no worse enemy” more applicable.
This phase however, will be complicated with
no clear beginning and probably starting as


The Second Al-Fallujah Battle
75
ble of coordinating military assistance.
As stabilization operations came to a close, Iraqi
forces were given responsibility for maintaining se-
curity in the city (Phase V). Meanwhile, U.S. quick
reaction forces were maintained to support subse-
quent security and civil military operations.
Assessing Operation al-Fajr/Phantom Fury
The second battle of Fallujah defined I MEF's cam-
paign of 2004–05. Marines and soldiers fought
through the city at close quarters, frequently engaging
in point-blank firefights and hand-to-hand fighting.
No enemy tactic or procedure sufficed to repel the
ferocity and effectiveness of squads, teams, and even
individual Marines and soldiers. Caught in their de-
fensive maze, the insurgents fought to the death, sur-
rendered, or fled, the latter move becoming
increasingly difficult as the assault forces cleared the
city.
An exchange monitored between two insurgents
demonstrated the decisive blow of the battle:
A: What about Jolan?
B: War zone.
A: They said Mujahideen reinforcements were ar-
riving
B: Well they haven't arrived yet. There are still Mu-
jahideen in Askeri, only because they regrouped there
from Souq and crossed over the new road. Fallujah is
finished. It is the attack of all attacks. All the sheikhs
have left us and are happily organizing demonstra-
tions and protests in other parts.
A: How can you say the sheikhs have left?
B: They fled with the families from Jolan and else-
where. They may still be leaving; they are still getting
families out somehow. Today a family of a woman
and children had a house fall down around them.
They got them out and took them to Jubeil or some-
where ...
A: Look, call me if anything develops. I don't care
what time you call. Try to find A
B: I'll do what I can. We did burn one tank.
A: That's good at least.
B: Yes, but if you burn one tank they send three
more. It's useless.
A: Two aircraft were brought down. Hang in there.
A: Where is this shooting?
B: Everywhere. In every area.
A: What is it, artillery?
B: Artillery, mortars and tanks everywhere.
A: Where are you?
B: By the flour mill.
A: They are attacking the flour mill?
B: Yes, and they are attacking us too. The artillery
is destroying us. All of Fallujah is in ruins. Not a house
is left standing. What can stand? The tanks come
down every street with artillery falling ahead of them.
A: Get out of there!
B: Where? How? If I go in the streets I get shot. If
I stay inside I get shelled. And let's not forget the mor-
tars and the aircraft and the snipers!
A: But . . . They said the Americans had with-
drawn!
B: The Americans are everywhere.
A: They said Nazl was still safe ..
B: Nazaal is a warzone.
A: Where is A
B: No one knows.
A: Try to make it somewhere ...
B: Even if I go in the yard I will be attacked.
A: What about Shuhada?
B: Just bombing there, they have not entered yet.
A: Listen, on the streets, it's just tanks right? No-
body on foot ...
B: Yes but you see, a tank is roughly as big as a
house . . . You can hit it with a rocket and it doesn't
The tactical surprise accomplished at the second
battle of Fallujah ranks as one of several remarkable
accomplishments of I MEF and the 1st Marine Divi-
sion during a highly complex battle. The attack dis-
oriented the insurgent defenses at the outset, and they
never recovered their balance. Although the Jolan dis-
trict contained the heart of Fallujah's insurgency, the
rapid penetration into it forced insurgents from their
positions and prevented a sustained defense. After the
operation Coalition soldiers and Marines discovered
the majority of safe houses and other insurgent sanc-
tuaries in the area. In the south, specifically in Nazl
and Shuhada, the assault units found the most formi-
dable defenses, including foxholes, spiderholes, and
tunnels inside and between fortified houses and in-
surgent billeting areas. Considerable caches of ord-
nance were found throughout the city.
The enemy typically fought in small groups of four
to 12 individuals, armed with small arms and RPG-
type rocket launchers, who generally chose to fight
from inside buildings rather than out in the streets. In
general, the insurgents chose not to fight at night. Al-
though these groups tended to congregate in houses,
which were close to one another, they fought as indi-
vidual groups rather than establishing a mutually sup-
porting series of positions. Although Marines sustained
some casualties from rooftop shootings, most casual-
ties occurred inside buildings where the enemy waited
?
blow up.


76
INTO THE FRAY

300
الدرة
Photo by Cpl Theresa M. Medina, Defense Imagery, VIRIN: 041202-M-2583M-007
Maj M. Naomi Hawkins, the public affairs officer of the 4th Civil Affairs Group, is interviewed by an Arab tel-
evision news crew in front of the Dr. Talib Al-Janabi Hospital in Fallujah. The foreign media toured the city in
December 2004 to view ongoing reconstruction efforts by multi national forces in the wake of the November bat-
tle of Fallujah.
for assault troops to come to him. These tactics were
probably a result of dominant U.S. firepower on the
streets and rooftops. The enemy usually opened fire
on Marines as the latter were entering a house or as-
cending the stairwell. The insurgents often used rifles
and grenades to initiate the engagements and would
usually continue to fight until killed. Fighting to the
death does not mean, however, that Marines fought a
suicidal enemy. In many instances, insurgents at-
tempted to escape by throwing down their weapons
and either trying to evade U.S. units or approaching
them pretending to be civilians. By all accounts, how-
that Marines encountered in Fallujah
proved more willing to stand and to fight to the death
than any enemy forces met elsewhere in al-Anbar
Province.
As noteworthy as the ground assault of 1st Marine
Division and its reinforcements was, the employment
of the aviation support of the Coalition and 3d Marine
Aircraft Wing and the various artillery batteries pro-
vided supporting arms fire. The operating altitudes
changed to the poor weather plan on D+1. The fixed-
wing aircraft loitering for close air support came to the
10,000 to 12,000 or 11,000 to 13,000 feet blocks many
times due to the weather. In the following days, these
lower blocks continued in use even when the weather
was good. Lower altitudes enhanced targetting ability
by reducing slant range for sensor acquisition and had
very limited effect on the clearance of artillery fires.
Although insurgent antiaircraft missiles were always a
concern, the airmen accepted the risk of low-altitude
flight needed to retain the accuracy demanded in this
complex environment. Many times fixed-wing aircraft
would use the lower block to find or verify the target
location and then exit the ring and come in at a higher
altitude for release of guided bombs. Several times
during the battle multiple aircraft in multiple sectors
worked on targets both inside and outside the 5-nau-
tical-mile ring.
The staging of multiple aircraft in the keyhole pat-
ever, the
the enemy


The Second Al-Fallujah Battle
77
Table 5-2:Artillery Missions Fired during Second Fallujah Battle
7-8 Nov
8-9 Nov
9-10 Nov
10-11 Nov
11-12 Nov
Call for Fire
47
53
37
35
45
Counter Fire
22
15
10
21
11
12-13 Nov
13–14 Nov
14-15 Nov
15-16 Nov
16-17 Nov
Call for Fire
28
31
24
7
7
Counter Fire
9
8
23
22
4
17-18 Nov
18-19 Nov
19-20 Nov
20-21 Nov
21-22 Nov
Call for Fire
2
1
0
0
0
Counter Fire
10
3
5
4
4
Expended
7-22 Nov
155mm High-explosive Ammunition Expenditure
Daily Avg. Call for Fire
Daily Rate
Rate, per mission
379
21.1
Daily Avg. Counterfire
Rate, per mission
11.4
5685
terns served to maximize the response time and Many times rotary wing aircraft flew up to 3,000 to
tempo of air support. Often a section of aircraft per 4,000 feet to avoid the high volume of small arms fire
formed target acquisition in the ring at 16,000 to and to improve pilot visibility. Drone and manned sur-
18,000 feet for one assault regiment while another air veillance aircraft flights over the city averaged seven at
craft section circled at 13,000 to 15,000 feet delivering night and four to five during the day. Although more
ordnance for the other regiment. These aircraft shared than anticipated, the keyhole system template accom-
their space with five to seven drones while six to eight modated them well.
battalions engaged insurgent forces on the ground. A The employment of laser-guided Maverick and gun
thorough knowledge of the plan and good situational attacks required more coordination. The keyhole tem-
awareness allowed these operations with minimal plate was designed for efficiency and speed, and when
risks. No friendly fire of any kind occurred at the sec aircraft used such flat trajectory weapons, the controllers
ond battle of Fallujah as the result of supporting arms moved the drones and restricted the maximum eleva-
fire.
tion of artillery and mortar fire. The pilots and forward
Table 5-3: Second Fallujah Battle Casualties
Fallujah Assault Force:
WIA
RTD
Unit
KIA
NBD
NBI
HQ RCT-1
5
5
3d Bn, 1st Mar
22
206
123
8
3d Bn, 5th Mar
8
56
39
4
3d LAR Bn
1
36
11
5
HQ RCT-7
15
14
1
1 st Bn, 8th Mar
16
102
51
16
1 st Bn, 3d Mar
10
79
45
11
Army Units
5
24
16
1
2d Bn, 2d Inf
2d Sqdn, 7th Cav
1
12
5
1
Rest of al-Anbar Province:
2d Bde, 2d Inf Div
9
6
1
2d Bn, 11th Mar
1
1
31 st MEU
2
-
2d LAR Bn*
7
5
2d Recon Bn*
1
2d Tk Bn*
3
5
2
2d Assit Amph Bn*
1
12
7
3
Total
65
582
339
1
54


78
INTO THE FRAY
air controllers modified the delivery parameters to ac-
complish the Laser Maverick and gun attacks. While
these required more coordination, only minutes were
required to move the drones and to coordinate other
fires.
During Operation al-Fajr, aviation expended ap-
proximately 318 precision bombs, 391 rockets and mis-
siles, and 93,000 machine gun or cannon rounds. The
artillery consumption demonstrated the relative inten-
sity of the ground fighting during the battle.
The overall Marine Corps casualties for the opera-
tion, according to summaries of the Manpower Depart-
ment, Marine Corps Headquarters, totaled 70 Marines
killed in action, 651 wounded in action (394 returned to
duty), with another three non-battle deaths and five
deaths from wounds received in action.
The brunt of these losses fell upon the 1st Marine Di-
vision and its attachments.
Among the immediate results of the second battle of
Fallujah, non-combatants fled the fighting in large num-
bers before the operation, and many insurgents left the
city by hiding among the non-combatant populace de-
parting Fallujah. The attempts at organizing sympathetic
uprisings in other parts of the province failed. The sur-
viving insurgents could only seek to rearm and reor-
ganize, waiting for a return of civilians to the city.
In the immediate aftermath, the insurgent operational
capacity seemed severely impaired as indicated by the
notable drop in indirect fire attacks on Coalition bases
and camps. These indications directly encouraged I MEF
and the staff of Multi National Force-Iraq to set condi-
tions for some form of exploitation operations.


Chapter 6
Optimism and Doubt
During the last phases of Operation al-Fajr,
Marines began to pursue those forces no longer ca-
pable of offering effective resistance. These opera-
tions would continue into 2005 and would comprise
part of the military operations conducted in support
of the 30 January elections. In the al-Anbar Province
insurgency, however, the multifaceted and numerous
enemy factions and elements had simply melted into
the network of hiding places, sanctuaries, and train-
ing areas. Bringing them to battle remained difficult.
Making contact proved typically elusive.
Operations outside Fallujah
Pursuit operations began with Operation Plymouth
Rock, conducted by the 24th Marine Expeditionary
Unit (24th MEU) in northern Babil Province between
24 and 27 November 2004. A complicated series of
targeted raids on known and suspected insurgent
sites by 1st Battalion, 2d Marines was combined with
maneuvers by the British Black Watch Battalion and
2d Battalion, 24th Marines, with Iraqi units in block-
ing positions. These raids and maneuvers were in-
tended to keep the enemy off balance and away from
the vital Route 8 linking Baghdad to Kuwait. The two-
stage Operation Lightning Bolt (28–30 November, 3–
19 December) saw the 2d Blackjack Brigade first
isolate and clear Amariyah, with the Black Watch Bat-
talion blocking from the south, and then execute a
similar operation on the opposite side of al-Fallujah
against Al Khalidiyah and Karmah, while cooperat-
ing with 2d Brigade, 2d Infantry Division, to clear
Saqlawiyah. A second Plymouth Rock operation (22-
23 December) repeated raids in northern Babil
Province as the 24th MEU sought to capitalize on the
resulting enemy movement away from the Army
brigades in Area of Operations Raleigh. At this last
juncture, however, the responsibility for northern
Babil Province and tactical control of the 24th MEU
had already (6 December) moved to the 1st Cavalry
Division, another regional modification undertaken
as the Coalition commanders shifted priorities toward
Baghdad and the January election. From 4–5 De-
cember, the Black Watch Battalion began its return
to southern Iraq, having sustained five soldiers killed
in action while serving with I MEF. At that point, all
the non-Marine Corps reinforcements previously de-
tailed for Operation al-Fajr had departed.
As 2005 began, I MEF planners focused on the 30
January national election, defeating the insurgency,
preparing Iraqi security forces, and repopulating Fal-
lujah. The expected arrival of II Marine Expeditionary
Force (II MEF) in February and March instilled
thoughts of a smooth turnover and departure by the
sailors and Marines for their home stations. For the
election to succeed, its security and the smooth func-
tioning of the electoral process had to be guaranteed
by military authorities throughout Iraq. Soldiers and
Marines carried out numerous operations in Areas of
Operations Raleigh, Topeka, and Denver, aimed at
upsetting insurgent regrouping, destroying arms
caches, and, where feasible, supporting Iraqi secu-
rity and government entities, however disparate they
might be in their nascent state. The border stations
with Syria remained closed, and Jordanian access was
limited to authorized commercial traffic.
In the eastern part of al-Anbar Province, 1st Cav-
alry Division's responsibilities and the Baghdad po-
litical center of gravity led to the turnover of all of
an-Najaf and Karbala Provinces to I MEF. Given the
number of units already transferred out of the Fallu-
jah operation, the additional area had to be taken
over by Colonel Haslam and his 11th MEU, a logical
choice in light of the unit's success in stabilizing an-
Najaf the previous summer. All the Marine expedi-
tionary units sent to Iraq, however, now required
relief and return to home stations in the very near fu-
ture. An Army brigade would arrive in February and
relieve both the 11th MEU and 24th MEU of their re-
sponsibilities in a combined Area of Operations
South, operating under the tactical control of the I
MEF commander, Lieutenant General Sattler. For the
time being, however, Colonel Johnson's 24th MEU
continued to operate with the cavalry division, which
even took tactical control of 2d Battalion, 24th
Marines, on 27 December to support its operations
securing Route 8. Meanwhile, 1st Battalion, 2d
Marines, continued to cover Taheer Firm Base, Eskan
Patrol Base, Haswah Police Station, and patrols in
zone. Only on the first day of February did 24th MEU
return to I MEF tactical control, when it began relief
in place activities with elements of the U.S. Army
155th Brigade Combat Team. On 6 February, 1st Bat-
79


80
INTO THE FRAY

Photo by LCpl Zachary R. Frank, VIRIN: 041201-M-5901F-010
In the aftermath of the second battle of Fallujah, Marines from I MEF conducted a series of pursuit operations
to destroy insurgent forces that had fled the city. Here, Marines from Company B, Battalion Landing Team,
1st Battalion, 2d Marines, 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit, fire at enemy insurgents in Jurf as Sakhr, during
Operation Plymouth Rock, a counterinsurgency operation conducted in November and December 2004.
talion, 155th Infantry, and 2d Squadron, 11th Ar-
mored Cavalry Regiment, relieved 1st Battalion, 2d
Marines.
The 2d Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division, handed over
responsibility for Karbala Province to 11th MEU on 22
December, bringing it not only extensive territorial
responsibilities but also new Iraqi police and military
units for its Marines to train, direct, and mentor. With
very little interference from insurgents and criminal
elements, the 11th MEU ended its first campaign in
Iraq with major success in stability operations and in
facilitating the elections in Karbala and an-Najaf. On
14 February, Colonel Haslam transferred authority of
his vast area of responsibility to the 155th Brigade
and the next day his organization joined the depar-
ture movements to Kuwait and local air bases. By this
point, the newly arrived 15th MEU under Colonel
Thomas C. Greenwood offloaded in Kuwait and as of
20 January was the Central Command operational re-
was hoped that the displaced inhabitants could re-
turn in time to participate in the elections and at the
same time they could receive humanitarian relief and
begin the reconstruction of their city.
The efforts of Regimental Combat Team 1 Marines
and sailors produced one significant benchmark
when the notorious Jolan District opened on 30 De-
cember to receive citizens. The openings of specific
districts continued until 14 January, when all of them
stood ready to receive their residents. Civil-military
operations at this point focused on resettling Fallujah,
rendering humanitarian assistance, and re-establish-
ing Fallujah and al-Anbar Province's governance at
all levels.
The bulk of election support actions centered on
the key cities of ar-Ramadi, Fallujah, Karbala, and an-
Najaf. In mid-January, the Independent Election
Commission of Iraq (IEC-I) requested that Coalition
military forces provide “life support” (meaning shel-
ter and subsistence), transport election materials, and
support Iraqi forces as they provided security at
polling sites. Anticipating these needs, the Marine
commanders had begun preparations for election
support by surveying and determining the most suit-
able voting sites.
serve.
Security for the 30 January Elections
The Iraqi elections directly affected the pace of
op-
erations in al-Anbar Province, as well as the efforts to
plan and to conduct the repopulation of Fallujah. It


Optimism and Doubt
81
Photo by GSgt Kevin W. Williams, Defense Imagery, VIRIN: 050130-M-9015W-005
Providing a secure and stable environment for elec-
tions on 30 January 2005 was a critical mission ob-
jective for I MEF. Here, an Iraqi translator attached to
1st Battalion, 23d Marine Regiment, prepares to sub-
mit his vote at Haqlaniyah.
(MEG) hardened the polling sites with field fortifica-
tion and highway barrier materials. They also re-
ceived and transported election materials and life
support sets to the sites for the workers and the In-
dependent Election Commission personnel who
would train and supervise the workers. Most workers
and IEC-I personnel arrived in al-Anbar Province on
board C-130 flights of the 3d Marine Aircraft Wing,
which transported some 2,300 of these passengers
between 26 and 29 January.
At Fallujah, units of Regimental Combat Team 1
cooperated with Iraqi security forces and provided
outer cordon security for voting centers. Citywide,
they enforced election curfews and operated the
entry checkpoints and humanitarian assistance mis-
sions. The infantry battalions also screened the city
perimeter to prevent infiltration by insurgents, en-
countering light enemy contact. A raid conducted on
the peninsula captured 17 men suspected of insur-
gent activity.
In the area surrounding the city, Regimental Com-
bat Team 7 provided similar security at its polling
centers while enforcing election day curfew, driving,
and weapons restrictions. The 2d Reconnaissance
Battalion patrolled Zaidon with the Iraqi 2d Battal-
ion, Muthanna Brigade, during which the troops dis-
covered weapons caches near Nasr Wa Salam and
Abu Ghraib.
In and around ar-Ramadi, the U.S. Army 2d
Brigade enforced curfews, provided the outer cordon
at election sites, and conducted patrols, random
checkpoints, and raids. The insurgents launched nu-

Operationally, the Coalition plan for securing the
elections involved controlling borders, securing
Baghdad, neutralizing insurgents in selected key
cities, and supporting the election process. Dubbed
Operation Citadel II, the Coalition military election
support countered insurgent activities, selected of-
fensive actions against known targets, erected multi-
ple cordons of security for voting sites, and organized
the logistical support for the election process.
Marines and sailors of the 1st Force Service Sup-
port Group (1st FSSG) and the MEF Engineer Group
On 26 January 2005, a CH-53E Super Stallion from Marine Heavy Helicopter Squadron 361 (similar to the one
pictured here) crashed in a sandstorm in western al-Anbar province. Thirty Marines and a Navy corpsman died
in the crash.
Photo by LCpl William L. Dubose III, Defense Imagery VIRIN: 041213-M-9529D-01


82
INTO THE FRAY
merous small attacks, several of which targeted
polling centers or troops guarding them. Marines of
2d Battalion, 5th Marines, guarded the government
center and conducted security patrols along Route
10. In western al-Anbar Province, the battalions of
31 st MEU stretched to counter numerous attacks with
rockets, mortars, and improvised explosive devices.
It was during these operations that a CH-53E crashed
26 January in a sand storm near ar-Rutbar, killing the
four-man crew from Marine Heavy Helicopter
Squadron 361 and the 26 Marines and a Navy corps-
man from 1st Battalion, 3d Marines. As of mid-2010,
this event remained the deadliest single incident suf-
fered by U.S. forces during the Iraq War.
In considering the results of the 30 January elec-
tion, the deep sectarian division within the Iraqi pop-
ulation was apparent. In the mixed and Shi'a
dominant provinces of Karbala and An-Najaf, an es-
timated 90 percent of eligible voters turned out at 431
polling centers, with women representing more than
half that number. In Sunni-dominated al-Anbar
Province, the Sunni election boycott prevailed and
only 16,682 voters entered the 49 polls. The excep-
tion came at Fallujah, where 7,679 persons, believed

Photo by MSgt Dave Ahlschwede, USAF, Defense Imagery, VIRIN: 050130-f-1631A-029
Fingers stained with purple ink became the symbol of
the 30 January 2005 Iraqi elections. An Iraqi citizen
in Baghdad proudly displays proof that he voted.
Table 6-1: Polling Sites Established in I MEF Area of
Operations, January 2005
MSE
Area
No.
Polling
Centers
Alt. Polling
Centers
2 BCT
Ramadi
10
4
Tammin
2
0
Khalidyah
1
1
1
Habbaniyah
1
1
RCT-7
Karmah
0
Nasser Wa Salem
2
3
RCT-1
Fallujah
3
6
31 MEU
Hit
1
2
to number one-third to one-half of the eligible voters
present, cast their ballots. This first of several elec-
tions in 2005-06 created a 275-seat transitional Na-
tional Assembly, a provincial assembly in each of the
18 provinces, and a Kurdistan regional assembly. The
election system used proportional representation
with voters indicating a preference for a list of can-
didates posted by a specific party or other political
entity.
Conducting a fair and secure election remained
the primary objective of the I MEF commanders. De-
spite the Sunni boycott, I MEF met those objectives.
The insurgents made considerable efforts to disrupt
voting, making 38 separate attacks on 16 sites during
28–30 January. No voters were harmed. The Marines
and soldiers remained alert after the polls closed and
until all workers and their election materials had left
the sites. On 31 January, border crossings reopened
and on 2 February, the Iraqi security details returned
to their garrisons.
The results of the January election became known
about two weeks later, and the clear winners
emerged among the Shi’ite United Iraqi Alliance,
Kurds, and a few secular parties. Sunni Arabs won
only 17 national assembly seats spread over several
lists and very few seats on the provincial assemblies.
Hadithah
2
1
Al Qa'im
1
1
Trebil
1
0
Baghdadi
1
Akashat
Waleed
1
1
1
1
1
ololo
Rutbah
2/11
Nukhayb
0
Musayib
0
1
1
Ar Ar
0
Total
27
22


84
INTO THE FRAY

Photo by LCpl Ryan L. Jones, Defense Imagery: VIRIN: 050131-M-43293-005
An Iraqi woman and boy walk toward the female and children search tent at the edge of Fallujah in January
2005. Residents began to return to the city in December 2004, and by the end of March, about 30 percent of
the city's pre-battle population had resettled in the city.
squadron returned to al-Asad Air Base the following
day and rejoined the 31st MEU. Colonel Miller then
began the retrograde movements of his reunited or-
ganization back to Kuwait, using both ground con-
voys and aircraft of 3d Marine Aircraft Wing. The
embarkation on USS Essex (LHD 2) and accompany-
ing ships of Amphibious Squadron 11 began on 26
February, and the force sailed for Okinawa on 6
March 2004.
The reconstitution of Regimental Combat Team 7
in Area of Operations Denver during February culmi-
nated in the launch of Operation River Blitz (20 Feb-
ruary—6 March), the last major operation conducted
by 1st Marine Division before its rotation to home
bases. Centered in the western Euphrates River Valley,
the operation assigned Regimental Combat Team 7
and the Army 2d Brigade, 2d Infantry, to a series of
counterinsurgency operations against major sanctuar-
ies and logistical routes to prevent any interference
with the pending turnover of forces with the 2d Ma-
rine Division. The staffs of both divisions participated
in the planning and execution of River Blitz with 2d
Marine Division taking over the operation under the
successor name, Operation River Bridge (10–25
March). The transfer of authority between the two di-
visions took place on 17 March, and the second cam-
paign of I MEF in Iraq ended on 27 March. At that
point, 307 Marines had died in action and 3,456 were
wounded. Added to the 2003 campaign losses, I MEF
had sustained 365 killed and 3,740 wounded in ac-
tion since the Iraq War began. Of the wounded, 2,203
had returned to duty. Furthermore, there were 90
non-combat deaths and 145 non-combat injuries in I
MEF.
In the aftermath of the Fallujah Campaign, Marines
of the outgoing I MEF saw the tide apparently turn-
ing against the Iraqi insurgency. The operational re-
porting emphasized nearing success, and I MEF
planning forecast the pending establishment of Iraqi
regional control.
Considerable doubt remained, however, that fa-
vorable conditions had been achieved. During De-
cember, as the Army reinforcements sent
participate in the second battle of Fallujah began to
withdraw from Area of Operations Raleigh, Lieutenant
Colonel Jeffrey R. Chessani, the operations officer of
to


Optimism and Doubt
85
Regimental Combat Team 1, sent a poignant memo
to his commander, Colonel Shupp:
I spoke with the (division] G-3 this evening and
he indicated that the chain of events that are
eventually going to happen is going to happen
sooner than we like, but when we expected it.
The G-3 indicated that Blackjack Brigade would
be folding up shop and heading out on 15 Dec,
which means there will be a relief in place be-
ginning on or about 12 Dec between Regimen-
tal Combat Team 7 and Blackjack Brigade.
Regimental Combat Team 7 will take 1/8 (1st
Battalion, 8th Marines] out of the city with them
to relieve Blackjack Brigade. Regimental Com-
bat Team 7 will have 1/8 and 2d Recon Bn to
run area Raleigh. As you know 1/8 and 3/1 are
slated to go home on time and currently have a
latest available date of 13 January. If they were
to execute this, 3/1 would need to leave Fallu-
jah in December so they could embark and pre-
pare for redeployment. Exactly when would be
up to you. However, their initial cut for being
relieved in place is 15 Dec. Not sure they need
an entire month to get ready to redeploy. It can
be done in less time. . . . But why would higher
headquarters want to create a vacuum like this
after successfully crushing an insurgency that
has been a thorn for more than a year? I under-
stand there are other fish to fry in Iraq, that we
are not the only show. What I do not under-
stand is why higher headquarters would not
want to ensure there was some semblance of
stability in Fallujah before they walked away
from Fallujah. Higher headquarters got what it
wanted ... a destroyed insurgency in Fallujah
or so it would appear. They are going to walk
away thinking they did their part and the smol-
dering heap of rubble that is Fallujah is going to
start sparking again because higher headquar-
A Marine MK48/18A1 Series Logistics Vehicle System delivers humanitarian aid to the Jolan District of Fallu-
jah in December 2004.
Photo by Cpl Theresa M. Media, Defense Imagery VIRIN: 041211-M-2583M-082


86
INTO THE FRAY
create by re-deploying the Blackjack Brigade.
ters failed to follow though with the resources
we need to smother the embers. Then they are
going to ask us why we let the embers become
a fire again.
I sincerely believe . . . our immediate head-
quarters is going to contribute to snatching de-
feat from the jaws of victory. By forcing division
to move Regimental Combat Team 7 and 1/8 out
of Fallujah before the conditions are right, Multi
National Force-Iraq will in effect contribute di-
rectly to the destabilization of a situation that is
currently under control. I am not sure they have
even thought about let alone considered the 2d,
3d and 4th order effects of simply moving
Blackjack Brigade out of area Raleigh. This is
not a hard one to read, but they seem to be
missing the effects and the situation they will
The first stabilization campaign of I MEF ended
with the recapture of Fallujah. A large number of local
insurgent fighters were killed and a surging Sunni re-
bellion had been defeated. The level of destruction
achieved in the Fallujah battles, however, almost pro-
hibited repetition by the Iraqi-U.S. leadership. The
costs and efforts required to repopulate and rebuild
the city would in fact tie down enormous resources
when the rest of al-Anbar Province remained outside
of Coalition control. The battle did not engage the in-
surgents decisively, for their leadership and many
non-local insurgents had likely fled before the No-
vember assault, leaving mostly local militants behind.
Much work remained, therefore, for the incoming II
Marine Expeditionary Force.


Chapter 7
The Mission Continues
Following the national elections in 2005 and the
creation of a national assembly, the Iraqi Interim
Government (IIG) was replaced by the Iraqi Transi-
tional Government. The government ministries al-
ready bore the responsibility for governing at
regional and local level as well as the administration
and control of Iraqi security forces. U.S. forces in Iraq
would no longer control the pay and formation of
these forces. For the foreseeable future, the Iraqi Civil
Defense Corps and new Iraqi Army would remain
under the operational control of the Commander,
Multi National Corps-Iraq, who also took the re-
sponsibility to equip, train, and mentor them in the
field. Regardless the outcome of these ambitious
plans for Iraq's future, the Multi National Force-Iraq
staff forecast that a force totaling 17 U.S. or Coalition
brigades would be required to meet the security mis-
sion for the ensuing 12 to18 months.
The Multi National Corps-Iraq staff also undertook
a new campaign plan because the scope of the ex-
isting one had extended only to the transition to Iraqi
sovereignty. Thus, effective from that point, the new
mission called for:
II Marine Expeditionary Force (Forward)
2d Marine Division
Regimental Combat Team 8–three infantry battal-
ions, a company each of light armored reconnais-
sance, tanks, assault amphibious vehicles, artillery
and combat engineers.
Regimental Combat Team 5-three infantry battal-
ions, a company each of light armored reconnais-
sance, tanks, assault amphibious vehicles, and
combat engineers.
2d Marine Aircraft Wing (Forward)
Marine Aircraft Group 26–three light attack, three
medium transport and two heavy
two heavy helicopter
squadrons, plus one fighter or attack squadron and
an aerial refueler detachment.
Ground support units and a squadron of un-
manned aerial vehicles.
2d Force Service Support Group-six support bat-
talions of various types.
full spectrum counter-insurgency operations in
support of the Interim Government, and in
partnership with the Iraqi security Forces, to
provide a safe and secure environment; en-
abling the functioning of legitimate governance
and allowing the restoration and development
of Essential Services and the Economy; to as-
sist Iraq in rebuilding itself as a stable and re-
sponsible sovereign state and to permit the
redeployment of Coalition Forces.
As with the previous guidance given for the de-
ployment of I MEF, the plan included the authority to
draw upon normally scheduled deployments of
ground and aviation units of III Marine Expeditionary
Force (III MEF) on Okinawa. Planning anticipated the
assignment of an Army brigade to the force, with the
required capability of supporting an additional Army
brigade for surge operations. The secretary of de-
fense approved the planning on 21 June. Because the
new Multi National Corps-Iraq organization placed a
lieutenant general in overall command of the forces,
a major general would now head the Marine Corps
contingent. Considerable thought was given to as-
signing the commanding general, 2d Marine Division,
to a dual position as the commander of II MEF (For-
ward), but in the end the force structure included
separate commanders and staffs. Marine Corps doc-
trine prevailed amid the inevitable bureaucratic in-
fighting in the Iraq military command structure, and
Major General Stephen T. Johnson, the deputy II MEF
commander, led the new contingent relieving Lieu-
tenant General Sattler's I MEF.
The assignment of only three battalions from the
1st Marine Division to the 5th Marines to create Reg-
imental Combat Team 5 in the June force plan did
not survive long, probably reflecting uncertainties
In the summer of 2004, Headquarters Marine
Corps began planning for a series of deployments to
replace I Marine Expeditionary Force (I MEF) in early
2005. Marine Corps Commandant General Michael
W. Hagee, promulgated his guidance for the relief
deployment, tentatively termed “Operation Iraqi
Freedom III” by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in early July.
Based upon initial planning conducted since the re-
quirement had first been identified in February 2004,
the Commandant published the task organization
agreed to by mid-summer:
87


88
INTO THE FRAY
Forces and perceived collaborators in an at-
tempt to disrupt election preparations and de-
legitimize the Iraqi Interim Government.
Anti-Coalition Forces may increase the level of
attacks or attempt a “spectacular” attack prior
to the elections to prevent popular support of
the Iraqi Interim Government and promote in-
stability throughout the area of operations.
There are indications that the rift between com-
peting agendas of different Anti-Coalition
Forces is widening and Coalition Forces infor-
mation operations may be able to exploit it. De-
veloping credible Iraqi security forces and
performing successful civil military operations
will help win the information operations war
during this pivotal period. The potential for vi-
olence hinges on success or failure of these ef-
forts.

Photo by Kayli Olinde, Defense Imagery, VIRIN: 031001-M-15270-016
The creation of the Multi National Corps-Iraq meant
that the most senior Marine in Iraq from 2005 on
would be a two-star general. In 2005, II Marine Ex-
peditionary Force (Forward) deployed under the com-
mand of the MEF's deputy commanding general,
MajGen Stephen T. Johnson (pictured in 2003).
about the readiness of 2d Marine Division forces to
handle all competing global requirements. By Au-
gust, the 2d Marine Regiment had been selected as
the second regimental combat team headquarters in
the task organization, and was assigned only two in-
fantry battalions normally assigned to the 1st Marine
Division. The staff officers of II MEF and subordinate
commands developed the details of the deployment
including the final organization and the identity of al-
most all units during August and September. Given
the ongoing campaign of the two battles for Fallujah
then being waged by I MEF, the studies and planning
ranged widely.
The planning guidance's initial assessment of Area
of Operations Atlanta highlighted the persistent un-
rest that II MEF would be facing:
The two regiments of Major General Richard A.
Huck's 2d Marine Division brought six infantry, one
reconnaissance, and one light armored reconnais-
sance battalion to Iraq. The force was smaller than
the one sent the previous year, lacking the two in-
fantry battalions and a provisional military police bat-
talion that had been deployed a year earlier with 1st
Marine Division. In theory, the more robust Iraqi se-
curity forces now present in the province would
compensate for such a shortfall in ground combat
power. However, that Iraqi security presence had
proven illusory in 2004 and remained to be proven in
2005.
Though the deployment of II MEF varied consid-
erably from I MEF, there was wide agreement on the
exchange of equipment and like Marine Corps units
replaced each other in all cases. For the renamed
“Operation Iraqi Freedom 04-06.1” (a new Joint
Chiefs of Staff term reflecting the fiscal year and se-
quencing of the deployment) strategic deployment
by II MEF, little sealift took part although the pres-
ence of prepositioned shipping in Kuwait ports
served to provide fresh ground and aviation support
equipment as required. A single roll-on, roll-off ship,
USNS Cape Hudson (T-AKR 5066), supported the II
MEF movement. The scheduled air transport move-
ments of civilian charter and military aircraft moved
the more than 22,000 Marines and sailors of II MEF
in approximately eleven weeks during the period 9
January to 30 March. This comparatively unforced
pace of the relief of I MEF by II MEF permitted se-
quential relief of battalions with key areas such as al-
Fallujah and Area of Operations Topeka first in the
cycle. It also allowed for a generous overlap in forces
As the provincial capital Ramadi will be the
focus of Anti-Iraqi Forces attacks, Anti-Coalition
Forces will continue standoff attacks, assassi-
nations and coercion of IIG leaders, Coalition


90
INTO THE FRAY

SU
Photo by LCpl Tasha M. Fontaine, VIRIN: 050619-M-1828F-019
The major commanders of Multi National Force West units in June 2005 included (from left): BGen Robert E.
Milstead Jr, commanding general, 2d Marine Aircraft Wing (Forward); Army BGen Yves J. Fontaine, com-
manding general, 1st Corps Support Command; BGen Ronald S. Coleman, outgoing commander, 2d Force
Service Support Group (Forward); BGen John E. Wissler, incoming commander, 2d Force Service Support Group
(Forward); LtGen James F. Amos, commanding general, II Marine Expeditionary Force; MajGen Stephen T.
Johnson, commanding general, II Marine Expeditionary Force (Forward); and Army BGen Augustus L. Collins,
commanding general, 155th Brigade Combat Team.
Initial Employment of II Marine
Expeditionary Force
served as the primary producer of Marine Corps
armor for the program, both in the form of kits and
armor plates. This effort included fabrication of the
3/16-inch and 3/8-inch plates for the Marine armor
kit as well as explosive resistant coating processes.
Later in the year, the equivalent facility at Barstow,
California, became an armor producer. Additional
armor components for undercarriage, tailgate, back
plates, and gunner's shields also entered production
during 2004. In that year, the Logistics Command
processed some 5,000 tons of steel to produce armor
for 5,000 vehicles, including 1,000 delivered to the
Army.
The next objective was upgrading the force with
uparmored and armor-kit Humvees and fitting all
seven-ton trucks with their specific armor systems.
The Albany armor installation team arriving at Camp
Taqaddum in late February was ordered to begin in-
stallation in March, building to a capacity of 200 units
per month. The parallel seven-ton truck armor in-
stallation began in May at 40 per month. By 30 April,
II MEF reported the processing of 276 Humvees by
the Marine armor installation site.
Colonel Stephen W. Davis, commanding Regi-
mental Combat Team 2, deployed his three battalions
to Iraq during 24 February-1 March from Camp Leje-
une. He conducted his relief with Regimental Combat
Team 7 in Area of Operations Denver. From 10–17
March, Regimental Combat Team 7, followed by Reg-
imental Combat Team 2 from 17–25 March, con-
ducted Operation River Bridge, interdiction
operations to disrupt and defeat enemy elements that
might endanger the relief as well as countering
enemy infiltration in the area. On 17 March, Regi-
mental Combat Team 2 effected its transfer of au-
thority at al-Asad Air Base. As an indicator of the new
look hoped for in future operations, the battalion
commander of the 503d Iraqi National Guard Battal-
ion, operating out of Camp Hit, attended the cere-
mony. During this phase, 3d Battalion, 2d Marines,
replaced 1st Battalion, 7th Marines, at al-Qaim, and
3d Battalion, 25th Marines, relieved 1st Battalion, 23d
Marines, at Hit and Haditha. The 2d Light Armored
Reconnaissance Battalion initially operated with two


92
INTO THE FRAY

Photo by Cpl Robert R. Attebury, VIRIN: 050629-M-3301A-025
Marines from Company A, 1st Battalion, 6th Marines, prepare to raid a house occupied by suspected insurgents
in Saqlawiyah. With cooperation between Marines and Iraqi forces a critical component of counterinsurgency
operations in Iraq, the Marines are assisted in the June 2005 operation by Iraqi Security Forces (wearing green
helmets).
Company B, 2d Tank Battalion; Anti-Tank Platoon,
2d Tank Battalion; Company B, 2d Assault Amphib-
ian Battalion; and Scout Platoon, 8th Tank Battalion.
Regimental Combat Team 8 entered its first full
month of operational control by holding Fallujah and
striving to disrupt insurgent bands throughout the
area. Operation White Feather began on 1 April with
a mission to clear main supply roads of improvised
explosives and other threats. Marines of 3d Battalion,
4th Marines, routinely screened Iraqi civilians, gov-
ernment officials, and contractors entering the city at
entry control points 1, 4, 5, and 6. Elements of 1st
Battalion, 6th Marines, conducted equivalent searches
at entry control points 2 and 3. Regimental Combat
Team 8 and the 5th Civil Affairs Group also worked
to improve the quality of life for the Fallujans and the
inhabitants of the surrounding areas. The regiment
experienced its first coordinated attack on 2 April,
when the Abu Ghraib prison received an indirect fire
and small arms insurgent attack.
Brigadier General Robert E. Milstead's 2d Marine
Aircraft Wing (Forward) replaced the 3d Marine Air-
craft Wing elements in detail, sending a light attack
helicopter squadron detachment to al-Qaim; another
Table 7-2:Tactical Vehicles Operated by Marine Corps Forces in Iraq (February 2005)
Level 1 UAH
Level 2 AOA
"Level 3 "Hardening"
No Protection
Total
On Base
Off Base
HMMWV
364
2683
12
196
0
3255
MTVR
0
940
0
31
0
971
LVS
0
236
0
0
0
236
5 Ton
0
179
8
0
187
TOTAL
364
4038
12
235
0
4649
Note: UAH: Up-Armored HMMWV, a new production item (M1114) AOA: Add-on Armor, armor kits, in-
stalled in theater. “Hardening”: expedient or improvised of plating.


The Mission Continues
93
detachment to Camp Korean Village. General Mil to Brigadier General John E. Wissler. The task-orga-
stead also deployed a light attack helicopter nized detachments deploying from the al-Taqaddum
squadron, a medium helicopter squadron, and most base reflected the new logistics doctrine under way
of the unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) to al-Taqad in the Marine Corps. Combat Logistics Regiment 25
dum. At al-Asad Air Base, Colonel Thomas M. Mur provided general support to the entire II MEF (Fwd)
ray, commanding Marine Aircraft Group 26, exercised area of operations. Combat Logistics Battalion 2 sup-
control over all aircraft squadrons at al-Asad Air Base, ported the vast Area of Operations Denver from
including a second light attack helicopter squadron, Camp al-Asad, while Combat Logistics Battalion 8
two medium helicopter squadrons, and one heavy performed the same from Camp Fallujah in Areas of
helicopter squadron, as well as one squadron of F/A Operations Raleigh and Topeka. The supporting 22d
18D Hornets, one AV-8B Harrier squadron, and a Naval Construction Regiment based one battalion at
squadron of EA-B Prowlers. The usual aerial refu Camp Fallujah and another in Ramadi. The Seabee
eler squadron detachment provided logistics support regiment executed a transfer of authority with the I
using the KC-130J. An Army air ambulance company MEF Engineer Group on 11 March, and the two force
was attached for casualty evacuations. At Fallujah, the service support groups transferred authority the fol-
air control squadron and a detachment of drones lowing day.
supported the immediate needs of the II MEF com The deployments of the 11th and 24th MEUs came
mander. The two aircraft wings conducted their trans to an end on 14 and 15 February, respectively. The
fer of authority on 1 March.
Army's 155th Brigade Combat Team, deployed from
In June, command of II MEF (Fwd)'s support ele Mississippi and other home stations, took responsi-
ment, the 2d Force Service Support Group (Forward), bility for the northern Babil, Karbala, and an-Najaf
changed from Brigadier General Ronald S. Coleman Provinces, an area designated Area of Operations
Initial Deployment of II Marine Expeditionary Force (Forward) Units in al-Anbar Province, March 2005.
I MEF Briefing Map, Adapted by History Division

AO ATLANTA
2
RAWAH
AL QA'IM
HUSAYBAB
HADITHAH
N
MAW (Fwd)
BAGHDAD
36
MAG
HIT
MEF
AO DENVER
FE
POE WALEED
RCT ALASAD
RCT
Cbt Eng
FORecon
CLB
©
RAMADI
Assh Amph
Tank
LAR
☆
FAULUJAH
AO RALEIGH ☆
Eng
10
AO TOPEKA
RUTBAH
Recon
POE TREBIL
10
AO OSHKOSN
CLR
FSSG
CLB
MNF-W SECURITY AREA
155
BCT (USA


94
INTO THE FRAY
Biloxi. Unlike the previous command relationships,
where Army brigades were under the operational
control of the deployed Marine division, the 155th
Brigade was under the tactical control of the com-
manding general, I MEF, with the commanding gen-
eral, Multi National Corps-Iraq, retaining operational
control. Although this arrangement spared the 1st
and 2d Marine Division commanders the additional
operational responsibilities, the Marine expeditionary
force commanders and staffs had to work out the op-
erating relationships, with special attention to air sup-
port and logistics responsibilities yet to be specified.
With a battalion each of motorized infantry, armor,
armored cavalry, combat engineers, and field ar-
tillery, the 155th Brigade, under Colonel (later
Brigadier General) Augustus L. Collins, proved a ca-
pable partner in the campaign, operating under the
tactical direction of the II MEF commander.
Almost unnoticed in the shuffling of the forces,
the special operations capable 15th MEU operated in
Iraq during the period 11 March–7 April, but only
partially with I MEF and II MEF. Colonel Thomas C.
Greenwood reported this organization for duty as the
new Central Command theater reserve on 23 Janu-
ary, having conducted humanitarian operations in
Sumatra and Sri Lanka for two weeks while en route
from the United States. After a period of combat train-
ing in Kuwait, the 15th MEU moved to the south-
eastern edge of Baghdad, and on 11 March occupied
Forward Operating Base Falcon, the former base of
the 5th Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division. Now under the
tactical control of the 3d Infantry Division, the
Marines and sailors of the 15th MEU secured a por-
tion of northern Babil province until the later arrival
of the 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment the following
month. The 15th MEU Marines stopped insurgent
mortar and rocket attacks into the city from the south
as the newly elected Iraqi parliament convened for
the first time.
The aviation component of 15th MEU did report to
I MEF tactical control, however, and Medium Heli-
copter Squadron 165 operated from al-Asad Air Base
and al-Taqaddum bases with the 2d Marine Aircraft
Wing, supporting I and II MEF activities during the
deployment. From its Falcon base, the rest of Colonel
Greenwood's command, especially 1st Battalion, 1st
Marines, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel David J.
Furness, worked for Army commanders while con-
ducting mechanized patrols on National Route 8,
counter-rocket and counter-mortar sweeps, and the
usual range of security patrols and cordon operations
in its sector. MEU Service Support Group 15, under
Lieutenant Colonel Jay L. Hatton, provided the usual
logistical support for all 15th MEU operations from
Falcon and carried out six humanitarian assistance
operations at villages in the 15th MEU area. In addi-
tion, the MEU Service Support Group 15 Marines con-
ducted a number of security missions to complement
the efforts of the infantry battalion, including route
security patrols, security for raids, and vehicle check
points. For these missions, the Army Multi National
Command-Iraq issued 15th MEU a large number of
uparmored Humvees with radios and a few Blue
Force tracker devices to perform these missions and
to interface adequately with the Army command and
control systems. After participating in Army directed
Operations River Sweep, Iron Fist, Warning Track,
and Strong Will, 15th MEU returned to Kuwait after
having turned over
over its
its responsibilities to 3d
Squadron, 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment, on 6 April.
It left the theater on 22 April.
The 2d Marine Division executed its transfer of au-
thority with 1st Marine Division on 17 March. Mean-
while, subordinate elements continued their own
reliefs. This was an advantage of having major for-
mations of the same service at hand, each containing
units of the two U.S.-based Marine divisions. II MEF
conducted its transfer of authority on 27 March and
subsequently stood up as Multi National Force-West.
Expeditionary force units continued to flow into the-
ater until months' end, when 22,630 Marines and
sailors of II MEF were in Iraq with 10,599 Army and
Navy personnel attached with various units. Marine
Corps forces in Iraq totaled 30,887, including 5,699
personnel of I MEF awaiting redeployment. At this
point 12,997 Marine and Navy reservists of the Marine
Corps Reserve were on active duty Marine Corps,
wide, of whom 92.5 percent served in operating
forces with 43 percent serving in Iraq.
The relief operation by the two Marine expedi-
tionary forces required 325 inter-theater and 1,059
intra-theater airlift missions to transport some 52,010
Marine Corps and Navy personnel during 10 Janu-
ary_4 April 2005. This effort represented a significant
level of achievement for Marine Corps operations but
remained somewhat obscured by what was likely the
largest troop rotation in U.S. military history.


98
INTO THE FRAY

Photo by Cpl Neill A. Sevelius, Defense Imagery, VIRIN: 050511-M-28195-001
Marines from 3d Battalion, 2d Marines, provide security for a patrol as al-Ubaydi is secured during Operation
Matador in May 2005.
10 hours. While the exact number of enemy killed in
action or wounded remained unknown, commanders
estimated that the Marines killed at least 16 enemy in-
surgents and wounded 15 during the 24-hour en-
gagement. The
enemy force, including support
personnel, must have approached 100.
With Operation Matador, Regimental Combat Team
2 responded to insurgents in the 3d Battalion, 2d
Marines, sector to eliminate their sanctuaries in the
vicinity of Ramana. Several elements comprised Lieu-
tenant Colonel Timothy S. Mundy's Task Force 3d Bat-
talion, 2d Marines: Companies I and K, 3d Battalion,
2d Marines; Company L, 3d Battalion, 25th Marines;
Company B, 2d Light Armored Reconnaissance Bat-
talion; Combat Logistics Battalion 2; and the Army's
814th Bridge Company. The initial plan called for the
deployment of two rifle companies, (Company L, 3d
Battalion, 25th Marines; and Company K, 3d Battal-
ion, 2d Marines) by helicopter using six CH-46E and
four CH-53E helicopters in three waves. Intelligence
received shortly before the operation, however,
caused a shift from helicopters to assault amphibious
vehicles, because the insurgents seemed to be react-
ing too well in advance. The tank and light armor sec-
tions secured the old Ramana Bridge site near Ubaydi,
and tank sections and the Army bridge unit moved to
place a temporary span across the Euphrates, permit-
ting all Regimental Combat Team 2 vehicles to oper-
ate throughout the city. The assault amphibious
vehicles filled with the assault companies moved for-
ward as well and prepared to sweep the objective
area with mounted infantry and tanks, while the light
armored reconnaissance company screened the
northern flank. A vehicle accident and other difficul-
ties with the bridging company, however, led to a 13-
hour delay before the assault units crossed the river.
The operation produced some fierce fighting dur-
ing the first 24 hours when both the blocking position
at the Ramana Bridge and the bridge-crossing units
became decisively engaged, leading to significant in-
surgent losses and the clearing of most of New
Ubaydi, which had been considered calm after a re-
cent civil-military operation. On the morning of 9
May, the amphibious vehicles crossed the river and
the mounted infantry commenced clearing opera-
tions. By the evening of the ninth, the Army ribbon
bridge became operational and with it Regimental
Combat Team 2 established a secure line of commu-
nications on the north shore of the river. The Task
Force cleared from Ramana to ar-Rabit. Once at ar-
Rabit, the Marines scoured the suspected cave net-
works lining the dominating escarpment that
bounded the river valley. As the task force withdrew
to the south side of the river on 14 May, it attacked
New Ubaydi prior to returning to base. All forces re-
turned to al-Qaim by 1930 on 14 May.
At the Ramana Bridge position, Second Lieutenant
Brian M. Stann led his mobile assault platoon of 3d


Into the Fray
99
Battalion, 2d Marines Weapons Company, to seize the Lieutenant Colonel Lionel B. Urquhart's Task Force
position and then defend it by traversing across four 3d Battalion, 25th Marines, reinforced with Company
kilometers of urban terrain at New Ubaydi. Effectively K, 3d Battalion, 2d Marines.
employing air support with his heavy machine gun Company K, 3d Battalion, 25th Marines, made a
Humvees and attached tanks, Stann defeated
every helicopter assault on the left bank of the Euphrates,
insurgent attack over a six-day period. The regiment's while two companies, Company K, 3d Battalion, 2d
air officer made good use of ground-data links to the Marines, and Company L, 3d Battalion, 25th Marines,
Litening system on board the supporting F/A-18D air swept into town from the west, mounted in assault
craft, which permitted him to see and then to direct amphibians and accompanied by tanks and LAVs.
strikes at the insurgents in the town. Enemy casual The operation killed 11 insurgents, wounded eight,
ties included an estimated 144 killed and 40 prison and produced 31 detainees. Over 300 82mm mortar
ers. Ongoing intelligence collection confirmed the rounds were seized and destroyed as were several
presence of foreign fighters.
other, smaller caches of ordnance. Friendly losses in
During the operation six vehicles rigged with Operation New Market included two killed, nine
bombs were captured and destroyed along with a wounded, and the disabling of two assault amphib-
significant quantity of enemy weapons and bomb ians.
making materials. Friendly casualties as a result of During one of the 25 May sweeps by Company L,
Operation Matador included nine killed and 39 an insurgent ambush pinned down the command el-
wounded. Equipment losses consisted of two assault ement. To overcome the enemy, Sergeant David N.
amphibious vehicles, one M1A1 tank, one M88A2 Wimberg left his covered position and crossed enemy
tank recovery vehicle, and four armored Humvees. fire to scale a wall and enter a courtyard from which
Ten days later, Haditha received the same treat the fire originated. Opening the gate to the courtyard,
ment. On 24–30 May, Regimental Combat Team 2 he covered the entry of his fire team and then led
conducted Operation New Market to neutralize and the assault on the door of the house containing the
disrupt insurgents there. This operation was led by insurgents. Breaking in, he came face-to-face with
LCpl Williams, radio operator with Company L, 3d Battalion, 25th Marines, carries the radio used by Capt
Toland, the commanding officer of Company L's 3d Platoon, during Operation Matador.
Photo by Cpl Eric C. Ely

o


100
INTO THE FRAY

LEAR
Photo by Cpl Eric C. Ely, Defense Imagery, VIRIN: 050621-M-8172E-004
Col Stephen W. Davis, commanding officer of Regimental Combat Team 2, examines weapons captured from
caches in Karbilah in June 2005 during Operation Spear.
four insurgents, fired his rifle until he was wounded,
wounding one, but stunning the enemy. Corporal Jeff
S. Hunter, stepped forward to assist Wimberg, firing
his rifle at the four men as he pulled the sergeant out
of the house. He then led a squad back into the
house and killed the insurgents. Wimberg died but
saved many lives by his selfless actions. Hunter vir-
tually repeated the feat three days later, leading a
squad in three repeated assaults, the last with tank
support, to capture a house from which insurgents
had ambushed another squad.
The 1st Force Reconnaissance Company con-
ducted Operation Night Stalker III during 4–8 June.
Snipers killed seven insurgents who were positively
identified as they were digging and emplacing mines
or bombs. Marines also uncovered bomb making ma-
terials that had been cached for use. This typical dis-
covery included one 152mm round, four 130mm
rounds, three 122mm rounds, a video camera, two
Motorola receiver-transmitters, a cell phone, and a
washing machine timer.
During 15–20 June, Regimental Combat Team 2
conducted Operation Spear in the vicinity of Karabi-
lah, located on the south shore of the Euphrates mid-
way between al-Qaim and the border town of
Husaybah. As in previous operations, it was a show
of force drawing several units temporarily from
nearby Regimental Combat Team 2, and aimed to dis-
rupt insurgent refuges and kill or capture their lead-
ership. This force consisted of the regimental
command element, 3d Battalion, 2d Marines; Com-
pany L, 3d Battalion, 25th Marines; Company C, 2d
Light Armored Reconnaissance Battalion; Company
A tanks and assault amphibians, 1st Force Recon-
naissance Company; Iraqi 7th Reconnaissance Com-
pany; and Iraqi 2d Battalion, 4th Brigade. After
establishing blocking positions south and northeast
of the town, Task Force 3d Battalion, 2d Marines, sent
Company K, 3d Battalion, 2d Marines, and Company
L, 3d Battalion, 25th Marines, to clear the town of
Karabilah from south to north, beginning at 0300.
As they cleared the town, Marines fought numer-
ous engagements with insurgents, and several build-
ings were destroyed by attack helicopter fire and
fixed wing aircraft bombs to overcome resistance.
The advancing riflemen found numerous caches of
weapons and explosive materials, and a tank section
discovered and eliminated more than two dozen ve-
hicles, rigged with bombs, discovered in a parking
lot.


Into the Fray
101
All units withdrew from Karabilah to al-Qaim on 20
June. While disrupting this insurgent nest, Task Force
3d Battalion, 2d Marines, destroyed 24 vehicles rigged
with bombs, two explosive devices, and numerous
munitions caches. Marines killed an estimated 47
enemy fighters and detained one suspect. The Marines
suffered one killed, six wounded, and eight non-com-
bat injuries.
Operation Sword, conducted from 28 June to 6 July
brought the Regimental Combat Team 2 clearing ef-
fort to the town of Hit.
The operation commenced with 1st Force Recon-
naissance Company conducting a raid into the city
aimed at capturing an insurgent leader while elements
of Task Force 3d Battalion, 25th Marines, simultane-
ously moved into blocking positions to isolate Hit
from the north, east, and west. For this operation,
Company C, 1st Battalion, 9th Infantry; Company B,
2d Light Armored Reconnaissance Battalion; and two
Iraqi companies reinforced 3d Battalion, 25th Marines.
The raid detained two people while 3d Battalion, 25th
Marines, moved through Hammadi and Company L,
3d Battalion, 25th Marines, and Company C, 1st Bat-
talion, 9th Infantry, gained a foothold in their
respec-
tive sectors in southern Hit. The light armored
reconnaissance company drove by night from Rutbah
and crossed the Euphrates Bridge and secured the far
shore. The task force cleared Hit and established two
“firm bases” intended for permanent occupancy in an
abandoned school and a youth center. Hit thus be-
came the first town in Area of Operations Denver per-
manently occupied by Regimental Combat Team 2.
Marines of Combat Logistics Battalion 2 provided
Texas and Jersey barriers (usually made of concrete
to separate traffic lanes or to stop vehicles) as it forti-
fied both bases. They also set up generators and
swamp coolers to improve living conditions. Explo-
sive devices remained the most likely threat at Hit with
19 destroyed on 2 July alone.
Operation Sword ended on 5 July with the detach-
ment of the Army and light armor companies. From 27
June to 5 July the battalion received Task Force Lion-
heart from the control of Colonel Davis. This task
force swept the left bank of the Euphrates River for
weapons caches with limited results. The battalion
then received two infantry companies and a head-
quarters company from the 2d Battalion, 1st Brigade of
the Iraqi Army. Each Iraqi infantry company was as-
signed to a firm base. Company I, 3d Battalion, 25th
Marines, rejoined its battalion from al-Asad Air Base
and conducted a relief in place at Firm Base 1 with
Company L on 19 July. Company K remained at Firm
Base 2. The battalion also transferred its main head-
quarters from Camp Haditha to Camp Hit on 15 July.
The two rifle companies conducted joint combat pa-
trols with their Iraqi partners daily. Engagements with
the insurgents varied as the patrols encountered car
bombs, explosive devices, and indirect and direct fire
engagements. Task Force Lionheart returned in the
middle of July and swept south of Hit, locating and
destroying a large number of weapons caches.
In Area of Operations Topeka, 1st Battalion, 5th
Marines, occupied the central core of Ramadi, be-
tween the Euphrates River and the canal, with 1st Bat-
talion, 503d Parachute Infantry (motorized), covering
the eastern quarter of the city and its approaches and
the 1st Battalion, 9th Infantry, holding the sector ex-
tending south of the canal into farmland beyond. In its
exclusively urban sector, 1st Battalion, 5th Marines,
worked diligently to maintain patrol coverage and op-
erated entry checkpoints, traffic control points, obser-
vation posts, and secured vital government facilities
in the city. The continuous patrolling and constant
pressure of raids kept the insurgents off balance. Dur-
ing 15–16 June the battalion saw its heaviest fighting,
and simultaneous attacks against several of its posi-
tions confirmed that the enemy remained present and
offensively oriented. The battalion responded with
mandatory vehicle inspections at chokepoints, in-
creased patrolling, and cordon and search operations
of the more troublesome neighborhoods.
Checkpoint duty continually exposed the soldiers
and Marines to perils. On 3 May, First Lieutenant
David T. Russell oversaw his platoon's operation of an
A Marine from Company L, 3d Battalion, 25th
Marines, stands on lookout on a rooftop in the city of
Hit during Operation Sword in June 2005. Hit was
the first town permanently occupied by Regimental
Combat Team 2 during the operation.
Photo by Eric C. Ely, VIRIN: 050628-M-8172E-039


102
INTO THE FRAY

Photo by Cpl Robert R. Attebury, Defense Imagery, VIRIN: 050618-M-3301A-059
A house is searched by Marines of Company B, 1st Battalion, 6th Marines, during Operation Khanjar at Lake
Tharthar in June 2005. Khanjar was one of several dozen counterinsurgency operations conducted by Multi
National Force West units to clear al-Anbar Province of insurgent activity.
entry control point in Ramadi when 13 insurgents as-
saulted it with small arms, machine guns,
and
grenades. From his position on the second level of a
uilding, he saw an insurgent manning the machine
gun and killed him with a single shot. Ignoring the
fire of six insurgents, he then crossed to a bunker
where one of his Marines needed ammunition. While
directing subsequent fire and maneuver, a rifle bullet
hit his helmet, knocking him to the ground with head
injuries. After recovering his wits, he crossed the kill
zone several more times to direct his Marines and also
retrieve a wounded Iraqi soldier. Only when ordered
to receive medical treatment did he relinquish com-
mand at the scene.
Colonel Gurganus's Regimental Combat Team 8
commenced its portion of the 2d Marine Division's
Operation Patriot Shield with Operation White
Feather, conducted from 1–7 April. It focused on the
main service roads in Area of Operations Raleigh and
disrupting insurgent actions, especially those placing
bombs. Battalions continued integrated patrols with
their Iraqi counterparts throughout Fallujah and along
nearby major routes. In addition, the 1st Battalion, 6th
Marines, secured Jolan Park to support Operation
Greenback, which was the extensive compensation
payment program for the people of Fallujah who had
lost property during the November offensive. Third
Reconnaissance Battalion commenced its Operation
Zaidon Focus with offensive actions in the southern
portion of Area of Operations Raleigh.
Operation Clear Decision, conducted from 30 April
to 5 May, marked the beginning of Regimental Com-
bat Team 8's efforts to clear towns that Coalition forces
had not garrisoned. Colonel Gurganus deployed Lieu-
tenant Colonel Stephen M. Neary's 3d Battalion, 8th
Marines, to al-Karmah, reinforced by elements of 3d
Reconnaissance Battalion, Company B tanks and as-
sault amphibians, Company A engineers, Combat Lo-
gistics Battalion 8, and the Regimental Combat Team
8 command group with its security detachment. After
establishing a cordon with the tank unit at 0300, a pair
of CH-46E Sea Stallions dropped leaflets, and 3d Bat-
talion, 8th Marines, began to clear the town at 0530,
using cordon and knock techniques. The reconnais-
sance battalion scoured the countryside north of the
town. Combat Logistics Battalion 8 and the regimen-
tal commander's security detachment took the normal
posts of 3d Battalion, 8th Marines, during the opera-
tion.
Company L, 3d Battalion, 8th Marines, and the


Into the Fray
103
area of operations and 1st Battalion, 6th Marines,
continued with its operations in northern Fallujah, as
did 3d Battalion, 4th Marines, in the south. Third Bat-
talion, 8th Marines, continued to maintain security in
al-Karmah, Nassar Wa Salaam, and connecting routes.
The move north by Teams Brawler and Gator ini-
tiated a string of significant events for Regimental
Combat Team 8. The first 24 hours produced two in-
direct fire attacks, five by small arms, and then the
discovery of three explosive devices. Insurgents
made several efforts to strike 3d Battalion, 8th
Marines, in al-Karmah, and the tank and assault am-
phibian units continued to uncover significant caches
of weapons and ordnance, including one uncovered
on the last day near Lake Tharthar by Team Gator,
which included 19 mortars and two rocket launch-
Iraqi 2d Muthanna Battalion moved into the southern
sector of al-Karmah. Marines reestablished old Camp
Delta and established observation posts in and
around the city. Scout-sniper teams dispersed to sev-
eral locations to conduct surveillance and to prevent
insurgents from escaping the cordon. Company B
moved its assault amphibians into the city and se-
cured the police station to facilitate its use by civil af-
fairs and medical units. Company I, 3d Battalion, 8th
Marines, and the 1st Company, 2d Muthanna Battal-
ion, then moved into the northern sector of al-
Karmah. By 2 May, al-Karmah was declared secure
with no friendly casualties and only one civilian ca-
sualty from an escalation of force incident. Third Re-
connaissance Battalion continued to find several
weapons caches, including a large cache just inside
the 3d Infantry Division's Baghdad area of opera-
tions. On 13 May, the town was turned over to the 2d
Muthanna Battalion.
Team Brawler, comprising elements of Company
B, 2d Tank Battalion, and Team Gator, similarly
formed from Company B, 2d Assault Amphibian Bat-
talion, moved into the regimental security sector
north of Fallujah. Regimental Combat Team 8 subse-
quently began Operation Firm Control on 8 May,
which lasted until the 16th. At 0300 on 8 May, Team
Brawler commenced cordon and search tasks in the
eastern portion of the northern regimental security
area, while Team Gator worked the western half.
Regimental Combat Team 8 established a joint com-
bat operation center in the area. Simultaneously, 3d
Reconnaissance Battalion conducted two raids in the
Zaidon area in the southern portion of the regiment's
ers.
As the sun sets, Marines with 2d Squad, 1st Platoon,
Military Police Company, Combat Logistics Regiment
25, 2d Force Service Support Group, mark improvised
explosive devices in an up armored Humvee at al-
Taqaddum.
Photo by LCpl Bobby J. Segovia, Defense Imagery: 050930-M-37178-117
June inaugurated 2d Marine Division's Operation
Guardian Sword. Regimental Combat Team 8 con-
tributed with Operation Dagger conducted from 1-21
June. Attacking as far as the Lake Tharthar resort to
disrupt insurgent operations, Company B, 2d Assault
Amphibian Battalion, and Company B, 2d Tank Bat-
talion, surged into the northeast region to find enemy
command and control, logistical, and training areas.
Within hours of arriving in their zone, Marines of
Team Gator discovered a cache containing 11 122mm
rockets and 71 120mm mortar rounds. The team later
found intelligence materials and military manuals
near the northeast corner of the regimental security
zone as well as several underground facilities and
more weapons and ammunition caches. One house
held insurgent materials and evidence of recent use.
These discoveries by Regimental Combat Team 8 in-
dicated that the insurgents used this area for training,
equipment storage, and planning. Dust storms then
pummeled Area of Operations Raleigh between 6
and 8 June, resulting in the early return of the teams
from the northern regimental security area.
At 0330 on 18 June, Task Force 1st Battalion, 6th
Marines, with supporting attachments (Company B,
2d Assault Amphibian Battalion, and B Company, 2d
Tank Battalion) moved to the northern regimental se-
curity area to conduct the next stage of Operation
Dagger. These units received support from elements
of Combat Logistics Battalion 8, including a fully
functional field surgical hospital.
U.S. Army forces located further north outside the
II MEF area also operated to support the regiment,
blocking insurgents from fleeing. The Army's 2d
Brigade supported 1st Battalion, 6th Marines, pro-
viding mortar fire and blocking positions southwest
of the Marine battalion. Aviation and fire support fur-


104
INTO THE FRAY
Table 8-1: Munitions Confiscated and Destroyed
155mm shells
20
122mm shells
31
120mm mortar rounds
233
45
80mm mortar rounds
82mm mortar rounds
82mm fuzes
10
4
60mm mortar rounds
69
60mm fuzes
50
60mm mortar tubes
2
RPG warheads
15
5
RPG propellants
RPG boosters
4
Powder bags
5
Primers
8
nished key elements of the operation. Battery A, 1st
Battalion, 10th Marines, moved two 155mm artillery
pieces north to the 1st Battalion, 6th Marines, forward
command post to provide on-call fire support for the
task force. Marine and Coalition aviation units came
to the fight, providing almost 20 hours of continual
air support during the first day of task force actions.
Company K, 3d Battalion, 8th Marines, reported for
operations as Regimental Combat Team 8's reserve
to the south.
The more detailed coverage of the zone by the in-
fantry battalion uncovered caches of munitions that
were confiscated and destroyed (Table 8-1):
These results remained typical throughout the
campaign of 2004–2005 for that level of effort and in-
dicated that a seemingly inexhaustible supply of mu-
nitions remained within easy
reach of the insurgents
and foreign fighters. Upon return of its units from
Operation Dagger, Regimental Combat Team 8 had
completed numerous major and minor operations
since its assumption of the mission. Thus far, six of
its Marines and sailors had died in action and 88
more were wounded. Still, the focus remained on
maintaining control of Fallujah.
On the southern approaches to the city, a mobile
patrol of Weapons Company, 3d Battalion, 4th
Marines, ran into an ambush on 19 June when an es-
timated 50 insurgents triggered an explosive device
and opened fire with small arms. The section leader
on the scene, Corporal Wyatt L. Waldron, ordered his
vehicles into the oncoming automatic weapons fire,
gained fire superiority with vehicular weapons, and
then called for a dismounted assault against the
enemy flank. Waldron personally killed five insur-
gents and captured two of their fighting positions as
the Marine assault broke the enemy's resistance. Wal-
dron's team then remounted, pursued, and killed 16
and captured six more insurgents. Another six im-
provised explosive devices were found at the am-
bush site.
On 23 June a car bomb ambush in Fallujah killed
the first female Marine during Operation Iraqi Free-
dom. The coordinated attack with small arms fire left
five Marines and one sailor dead and more than 12
Marines wounded. The daily rituals at Camp Fallu-
jah, however, continued with female Marines ready
to conduct searches of female Iraqis while continuing
to provide basic security for Fallujah's inhabitants.
On 30 June, Regimental Combat Team 8 assumed
control of Area of Operations Jackson from the 155th
Brigade Combat Team. This measure expanded its
area of operations another 1,000 square kilometers.
Such boundary shifts in this area continued to ebb
and flow throughout the Iraq campaign depending
upon the priorities claimed for the Army forces op-
erating in and around Baghdad.
II MEF headed into July and the pending rotation
of its Army brigade after a highly active period in
which U.S. forces and insurgents tested each other.
With limited manpower, the regiments and brigade
managed to extend their reach with operations out-
side urban boundaries, striking into the countryside
to disrupt enemy sanctuaries. Inside the urban cores,
they continued stability and security operations to
deny easy movement to the insurgents, to assist the
public with civil affairs and security measures, and
to find insurgent cells with cordons and raids. The
enemy replied with continued attacks by explosives,
small arms, and indirect fire. An unsettling discovery,
given the mission at hand, came with the unreliabil-
ity of the Iraqi Security Forces, which were repeat-
edly formed and trained only to dissolve and
necessitate reformation and retraining. The Iraqi gov-
ernment and its advisors had yet to develop an in-
digenous security force of any depth and reliability.


Chapter 9
Protecting Self-Rule
Assessing the Mission
Major General Stephen T. Johnson's campaign
planning before the entry of II Marine Expeditionary
Force (Forward) (II MEF) into al-Anbar Province rec-
ognized the essential need for Iraqi security forces to
augment his forces and to take over local security.
The campaign planning by the staff of Multi National
Force-Iraq had set specific goals in this regard: local
control in key cities by 30 December 2004; provincial
authority established by 31 July 2005; and constitu-
tional elections in mid-December. That ambitious
plan, however, had already failed since local control
in key cities remained an illusion to date.
Thus, the outlook for Marine Corps commanders
in 2005 changed in the face of these and other reali-
ties. The establishment of local control could only be
hoped for in Karbala and an-Najaf by mid-2005, and
perhaps the ar-Ramadi-Abu Ghraib sector by mid-De-
cember and the elections. Expectations remained that
local control might be established in all of al-Anbar
Province by March 2006 and provincial control by 31
July
The planned establishment of a division and two
brigades of Iraqi security forces in al-Anbar Province
remained key to these plans. Whether those forces
proved capable or not, the political goal of conduct-
ing national elections in mid-December was an unal-
terable requirement for II MEF and the other U.S.
forces in Iraq. With or without the recovery of Iraqi
political and security authority at the local and
provincial levels, the elections remained a paramount
goal.
Coalition forces also adjusted the estimated enemy
order of battle by adding a new sub-category of
enemy: “Sunni Arab Rejectionists.” This group, made
up primarily of former regime loyalists, now posed
the most significant threat to stability in Iraq. Al-
though the Sunnis ranked statistically as an ethnic mi-
nority in Iraq, they had maintained political,
economic, and military dominance over the country's
other major ethnic groups for nearly 600
for nearly 600 years. Given
the Coalition objective of assisting Iraq in forming a
democratic form of government, the Sunnis stood to
lose considerable influence. As discussed in Chapter
1, the loss of political and economic power, a lack of
security, and decisions made following the collapse
of Saddam Hussein's regime acted as catalysts for this
insurgency. While many Sunnis did not necessarily
oppose a new form of government, the perceived in-
justices imposed on them since the collapse of their
minority rule in 2003 created a level of distrust and
animosity toward the Coalition and Iraq's Interim
Government. This particular insurgency therefore
sought to rouse Sunni anxieties and create a pool of
recruits. Their motivations reflected a wide range of
political objectives primarily driven by socio-eco-
nomic concerns.
The II MEF campaign strategy for counterinsur-
gency centered on conducting five “Lines of Opera-
tion” simultaneously to improve local conditions and
counter the discontent and chaos that fed the insur-
gencies: Security, “Operationalize” the Iraqi Security
Forces, Governance, Economic development, and
Influence. These concepts provided an operational
Table 9-1: Ground Combat Turnover, July-October 2005
Initial Deployment
Replacement Unit
Area of Operations
Transfer of Authority
3d Bn 4th Mar
2d Bn 7th Mar
Raleigh
Topeka
2d Bde 2d Div
2d Bde 28th Div
23 July 2005
28 July 2005
6 August 2005
10 September 2005
3d Bn 8th Mar
2d Bn 2d Mar
Raleigh
3d Bn 2d Mar
3d Bn 6th Mar
Denver
1 st Bn 5th Mar
3d Bn 7th Mar
Topeka
20 September 2005
3d Bn 25th Mar
3d Bn 1st Mar
Denver
21 September 2005
2d LAR Bn (-)
1st LAR 6th Mar
Denver
24 September 2005
1 st Bn 6th Mar
2d Bn 6th Mar
Raleigh
4 October 2005
3d Recon Bn (-)
1st Recon Bn (-)
Raleigh
7 October 2005
105


106
INTO THE FRAY

زان
Photo by LCpl Vrian M. Henner, Defense Imagery VIRIN: 050220-M-9019H-048
One of the coalition's primary goals in 2005 was to stand up effective Iraqi military forces. Cpl Robert W. John-
son, from the 3d Battalion, 4th Marines, sights targets alongside an Iraqi soldier during marksmanship train-
ing in February 2005.
framework for applying the kinetic and non-kinetic leviating legitimate political grievances is an impor-
actions necessary to change the environment, which tant element for a successful counterinsurgency.
alone could bring a separation of the insurgents from
Economic Development. Create an environment
the Iraqi population of al-Anbar Province.
allowing jobs to be created, where people are free to
The plan provided specific definitions for each of
earn a living and can procure or receive essential
the lines of operations:
services fundamental to a decent quality of life, and
Security. Create an environment in which insur-
where critical infrastructure exists to support eco-
gents are not allowed to intimidate or to cause fear
nomic growth.
among the people, to inhibit legitimate self-gover-
Influence. Influence binds the other four lines of
nance, or to prevent the development of Iraqi infra-
structure.
operation by affecting information content and flow
in the area of operations, particularly into and out of
Operationalizing the Iraqi Security Forces. The Iraqi
its key population centers. This will involve affecting
Security Forces must be trained, equipped, sup three distinct information audiences: anti-Iraqi forces,
ported, and mentored in a manner enabling their or-
local and regional populations, and friendly forces.
ganizations to grow in size, confidence, and skill. The
II MEF and the 2d Marine Division sought to im-
effectiveness of the Iraqi Security Forces must be de-
plement these lines of operation for the rest of the
veloped so they can assume an increasingly greater
role, allowing Multi National Force-West (II MEF)
year following the transfer of authority from I MEF.
After the March operations successfully protected the
presence to be proportionally reduced.
turnover between the two Marine expeditionary
Governance. Create an environment that allows forces, the 2d Division ordered Operation Patriot
elected officials to govern in an effective manner con Shield in April and May. As noted in the previous
sistent with the expectations of the electorate. The chapter, the two Marine regiments and the Army's 2d
Iraqi populace must perceive that its local elected of Brigade planned and conducted numerous local
ficials can provide basic security and quality of life combat operations under Patriot Shield to interdict
services such as electricity, water, and sanitation. Al insurgent lines of communications from the border,


Protecting Self-Rule
107
Table 9-2:Aviation Turnover, August-October 2005
Base
Relief in Place
Initial Deployment
VMFA-224
Replacement Unit
VMFA-332
al-Asad
HMLA-269
HMLA-167
al-Asad
VMGR-252(-)
VMGR-252(-)
Al-Asad
HMM-264
HMM-266
Al-Asad
1 August 2005
21 August 2005
21 August 2005
24 August 2005
28 August 2005
8 September 2005
27 September 2005
VMFA-142
VMA-223
al-Asad
HMM-364
HMM-161
Taqaddum
HMH-465
HMH-466
al-Asad
HMM-764
HMM-774
al-Asad
30 September 2005
HMLA-775
HMLA-369
4 October 2005
Tagaddum
Taqaddum
VMU-2
VMU-1
6 September 2005
to operationally shape the Ramadi sector by control-
ling access and establishing Iraqi security forces, and
to protect the gains made in pacifying al-Fallujah by
disrupting insurgent enclaves in the surrounding
areas.
Under the overarching II MEF operation plan for
2005, Operation Sunrise, the Marines in al-Anbar
Province conducted a wide range of operations. The
Patriot Shield series ended on 30 May and gave way
to Operation Guardian Sword, actually a series of op-
erations conducted between 6 June and 15 August.
Here, the objectives called for neutralizing the insur-
gencies in Ramadi while covering the rotation of
combat units and personnel in other units for the sec-
ond half of the deployment, including the Army's ro-
tation of the 2d Brigade. Guardian Sword was
followed by Operation Sanguine Thunder after the
completion of final rotations in September. The op-
eration entailed a range of goals, including training
and arming Iraqi police in northern Babil Province,
transferring Karbala and an-Najaf to Iraqi local con-
trol, and in general supporting Operation Liberty Ex-
Marines from the 3d Battalion, 2d Marines, and Iraqi Special Forces prepare to enter a building in Karabilah
during Operation Spear in July 2005.
Photo by Cpl Neil A. Sevelius, Defense Imagery VIRIN 050618-M-2819S-131


108
INTO THE FRAY

Photo by Cpl Robert R. Attebury, Defense Imagery: VIRIN: 050629-M-3301A-007
Marines from Company A, 1st Battalion, 6th Marines, search a car for weapons during Operation Shadyville
in Saqlawiyah. The operation was conducted by the 2d Marine Division and Iraqi security forces.
press, the Coalition program for safeguarding and
supporting the December national elections.
Major General Richard A. Huck predicted favor-
able results for Operation Guardian Sword in a 30
May message to his division:
Operation Patriot Shield comes to a close today
and Operation Guardian Sword is ready to
commence 6 June. I feel confident that we will
be able to pick up the tempo of operations and
apply more Iraqi security forces to operations
in Guardian Sword. As you know, the Iraqi se-
curity forces projections for Operation Patriot
Shield fell short of the mark. Our ability to train,
integrate and operate with Iraqi security forces
will allow us to significantly increase our forces.
Put an Iraqi face on all of our operations.
commanders to employ against enemy targets.
In westernmost al-Anbar Province, Regimental
Combat Team 2 commander Colonel Stephen W.
Davis deployed 3d Battalion 25th Marines, to find
arms caches and to interdict insurgent flow near
Dulab, on the left bank of the Haditha Dam reser-
voir. The 3d Battalion, 2d Marines, continued its nor-
mal cordon and knock operations and similar cache
searches in its zone, exclusive of Husaybah and Kara-
bilah which remained highly contested, while begin-
ning a site survey for polling stations. The 2d Light
Armored Reconnaissance Battalion continued pa-
trolling main routes, especially against bomb and
mortar teams and provided direct support to the
Army 224th Engineer Battalion, assigned to clear and
to maintain the main supply routes for the regiments
as Task Force Ironhawk. The 1st Force Reconnais-
sance Company continued its sniper operations, and
the Azerbaijani Company, charged with internal se-
curity at the Haditha Dam, prepared for its own re-
lief slated for early July.
The Army's 2d Brigade employed 1st Battalion, 5th
Marines, with combined U.S.-Iraqi combat patrols,
cache sweeps, and stay-behind ambushes in western
Ramadi, partnered with the Iraqi 2d Battalion, 1st
Brigade, 7th Division. On the other side of Ramadi,
1st Battalion, 503d Infantry, conducted a company
movement in the Mulaab district. In Tammin, the 1st
Battalion, 9th Infantry, patrolled, deployed snipers,
and planned company-size attacks if targets ap-
peared. The 1st Battalion, 506th Infantry, partnered
with the Iraqi 3d Battalion, 2d Brigade, 1st Division,
for patrols in Civil Camp and Abu Flies.
As noted in the preceding chapter, the battalions
of Regimental Combat Team 2, Regimental Combat
Team 8, and the Army's 2d Brigade continued to ex-
ecute the same types of operations as under
Guardian Sword. These organizations truly had few
new options for kinetic or offensive combat opera-
tions because their extensive static security responsi-
bilities aggravated the relative paucity of units
available for offensive operations. In addition, the
routine logistical and administrative support for the
three major units of 2d Marine Division, spread over
the 335-kilometer corridor from al-Qaim to Abu
Ghraib, required frequent recourse to armed con-
voys, road sweeps, and other force protection tasks
that reduced even more the resources available for
-


110
INTO THE FRAY

Photo by A1C Kurt Gibbons III, Defense Imagery, VIRIN: 050408-F-8584G-079
Soldiers from the 1st Battalion, 155th Brigade Combat Team, uncover the grave of a victim of an insurgent at-
tack near al-Iskandariyah.
meters to the north heard a few seconds of small
arms and machine gun fire coming from that loca-
tion, then radioed the two teams without receiving a
response. Team Six requested permission to move
south and investigate. The battalion approved and
also launched its quick reaction force from Haditha
Dam. On the scene, Team Six found five Marines
dead and one missing, and their weapons and
weapon systems were missing.
Lieutenant Colonel Urquhart detailed the L and
Weapons Companies of 3d Battalion, 25th Marines,
to cordon Barwanah to search for the insurgents re-
sponsible for this attack. In the early hours of 2 Au-
gust, reports from tip lines indicated that a body was
located 3 kilometers south of Haditha on the west
bank of the Euphrates. The body was the sixth Ma-
rine, and they recovered his remains that day from
the village of Haqlaniyah. This killing of a trained and
experienced team of Marine rifleman brought a rapid
response from Colonel Davis' regiment. The forces
slated for Operation Lightning Strike II instead were
reset for Operation Quick Strike (3–6 August, ex-
tended to 11 August), a cordon and search of
Haqlaniyah and Barwanah.
While 2d Light Armored Reconnaissance Battalion
screened the flanks, 3d Battalion, 2d Marines, moved
with Companies K and L and 2d Platoon, Company
A, 1st Tank Battalion, into an assembly area on the
west bank of the Euphrates after an Iraqi Special Op-
erations Company had secured it. At the same time,
a 3d Battalion, 25th Marines, task force comprised of
L and Weapons Companies, and Company A, 1st
Tank Battalion, prepared to clear Barwanah on the
east bank of the river, where the 3d Battalion, 25th
Marines, task force had been operating for three
days, fighting insurgent small arms and mortar teams
with infantry and tank weapons and precision air
strikes. The Marine battalions had with them the 3d
and 2d Companies, respectively, of the Iraqi 2d bat-
talion, 1st Infantry Division. These companies had re-
ported to Regimental Combat Team 2 on 17 July. The
1st Force Reconnaissance Company provided raid
and sniper support as required. Late in the first day
of the operation, an assault amphibian vehicle carry-
ing Marines of Company L, 3d Battalion, 25th
Marines, was hit by an explosive device of such size
that it badly damaged and overturned the vehicle,
killing 15 crewmen and passengers.
On 4 August, Marine battalions attacked north and
conducted cordon and searches through the villages.
The 3d Battalion, 2d Marines, encountered only spo-
radic resistance in Haqlaniyah and established a base
to support continuing actions. Resistance then stiff-
ened for both engaged battalion task forces, and a
number of air strikes were used to destroy buildings
from which insurgents fired small arms and rocket
launchers.
Operation Quick Strike, which began as a re-
sponse to the killing of Marine snipers, uncovered a
considerable nest of resistance in the three towns lo-
-


Protecting Self-Rule
113
Table 9-3: II MEF Combat Power, September 2005
Combat Power (Air)
AH-1W
AV-8B
CH-46E
CH-53E
EA-6B
FA-18A+
25/20
10/7
38/35
16/14
5/4
6/6
80%
70%
92%
88%
80%
100%
FA-18D
KC-130
RQ-2B
UC-35
UH-1N
12/11
6/4
8/7
1/1
15/10
92%
67%
88%
100%
67%
Combat Power (Ground-USMC)
AAV
Howitzer M198
HMMWV Hardback
Tank M1A1
LVA
UAH M114
34/31
67/63
89/84
14/14
307/288
574/537
91%
94%
94%
100%
94%
94%
Combat Power (Ground) (2-28th BCT)
M1A1/A2
M2/M3
Mortar 120MM
Howitzer M109A6
Scout HMMWV Armored
UAH M114
43/32
49/47
15/14
8/7
176/158
226/201
74%
96%
93%
88%
90%
89%
Combat Power (Ground-155th BCT)
Mortar 120MM Howitzer M109A6 Scout HMMWV Armored
M1A1/A2
M2/M3
UAH M114
74%
90%
100%
83%
100%
93%
M113
79/72
91%
Army's 155th BCT covered the an-Najaf Department
of Border Enforcement Brigade in Area of Operations
Biloxi. The Department of Border Enforcement serv-
ices planned a fourth battalion of its al-Anbar Brigade
at al-Qaim to occupy nine border forts covering the
rest of the Syrian border in al-Anbar Province north-
east of the last manned Border Fort 10 at Akashat.
After it was properly secured, that sector of the fron-
tier would reopen for commerce with Syria by reac-
tivating the abandoned port of entry facilities at
Husaybah.
The Iraqi Armed Forces and Its Problems
In mid-2005, however, the Iraqi forces were inad-
equate for operations along the al-Anbar Province
border. The third and fourth battalion of the al-Anbar
Province Department of Border Enforcement Brigade
had not formed, and the building of forts had not
even begun. In any case, the Marine Corps had yet
to send the required 10 border transition teams for
assignment to each brigade and battalion of the bor-
der forces in the II MEF area of operations. These
ten-man teams, specially prepared and trained at
Camp Lejeune, arrived during July and by August and
evaluated the border forces based at an-Najaf, Trebil,
and Waleed. Given the continuing delays in con-
struction and operations, three of the border transi-
tion teams converted to military transition teams and
assisted in the stand-up of new Iraqi Army units at
Ramadi. In the last two months of the year, the bor-
der posts began to take form north of Walid, and the
makings of a three-brigade Department of Border En-
forcement structure emerged: 1st Brigade operating
from an-Najaf and covering all the posts facing Saudi
Arabia; 2d Brigade at Waleed operated four battal-
ions covering the posts facing Jordan and Syria, and
a new 3d Brigade at al-Qaim operated a single bat-
talion stationed in Area of Operations Saber. The
seven Marine Corps transition teams operated with
the 2d and 3d Brigades, and two units of Regimental
Combat Team 2 provided the decisive military power
if required: 1st Light Armored Reconnaissance Bat-
talion (Korean Village) and 3d Battalion, 6th Marines
(al-Qaim).
From the outset of its campaign, the II MEF staff
planned to eventually receive control of two Iraqi
Army divisions comprising six brigades and 18 bat-
talions for operational commitment in al-Anbar
Province, with another brigade and three battalions
established in an-Najaf and northern Babil Province.
In tandem with the political consolidation of the Iraqi
government through the national elections, estab-


114
INTO THE FRAY
lishing a trained and viable Iraqi security force re-
mained the real pillar of achieving regional control.
The Iraqi Army lacked a combat service support
capability and remained dependent upon Coalition
support. Contractors built a support base at Hab-
baniyah for a division headquarters and two brigades.
Some form of base support unit was proposed for
Habbaniyah as the initial Iraqi logistics hub for al-
Anbar Province with the addition of another when a
second division came to al-Anbar Province. A nearby
“India” base was built to support the third brigade.
The units of the new Iraqi Army replaced the last
of the Iraqi National Guard battalions that had proven
ineffective in al-Anbar Province because of their ev-
ident tribal affiliation and vulnerability to the insur-
gent murder and intimidation campaign. Thus, no
new Army units reconstituted from formerly Sunni-
affiliated National Guard forces were acceptable in
al-Anbar Province, and the Iraqi Ministry of Defense
policy took recruits from al-Anbar Province to units
outside the province.
Initially, the Ministry of Defense and the Coalition
command assigned the 1st and 7th Iraqi Army Divi-
sions to II MEF for employment in counterinsurgency
operations. In addition, the 25th Brigade, organic to
the 8th Division, drew the assignment to the an-Najaf
and northern Babil Province sector (Area of Opera-
tion Biloxi). In all, the Coalition planned sending
seven Iraqi brigades to Multi National Force-West in
addition to the specialized military and paramilitary
units designed for border and internal security tasks.
Under the same plan, the Iraqi 1st Division head-
quarters at Habbiniyah exercised control over all Min-
istry of Defense units from Ramadi to the eastern
boundary of Area of Operations Raleigh. From Ra-
madi, the 7th Division headquarters controlled simi-
lar forces west of Ramadi to the Syrian border.
Numerous operational requirements existed
throughout the Marine Corps zone of action and sev-
eral Iraqi Army battalions and brigades deployed to
al-Anbar Province before the 7th Division established
its headquarters in the province.
The conditions demanded considerable opera-
tional flexibility by the fledgling Iraqi units to oper-
ate with their American counterparts before the rest
of the Iraqi Army had in fact developed as a fully ca-
pable and manned combat force.
Timing, as usual, counted for almost everything.
By October 2005, the 1st and 4th Brigades of the 8th
Division, based at an-Najaf and Karbala, operated
three battalions, all partnered with the U.S. 155th
Brigade in Area of Operations Biloxi with military
transition teams provided by the 155th. These teams
rated the battalions as becoming militarily capable in
three to six months. The Iraqi 1st Division, which had
a Marine Corps transition team since May, arrived in
Camp Habbiniyah in October. Most of its three
brigades and nine battalions preceded it, but it re-
quired another three to four months to reach a “ca-
pable” rating. That tentative status did not apply to
the 1st and 2d Battalions, 1st Brigade, 1st Division,
which had joined the U.S. Army's 2d Brigade at Ra-
madi and Regimental Combat Team 2 at Hit and Ha-
ditha during Operation Guardian Sword.
Characteristic of the initial operations of the Iraqi
security forces, those two battalions had operated
without their parent brigade (never assigned to al-
Anbar Province) under direct control of 2d Marine
Division, yet remained two to six months short of
being fully fighting capable because of their chronic
shortage of personnel. The Iraqi 7th Division head-
quarters lagged considerably in arriving in the
province, first to Fallujah in January and then to the
Iraqi compound in Camp Blue Diamond, Ramadi in
late February 2006. Its 1st and 2d Battalions, 1st
Brigade, had joined the U.S. Army 2d Brigade at Ra-
madi during Operation Guardian Sword. Their per-
sonnel, leadership, and equipment shortfalls placed
them in an 8- to 10-month delay in reaching full fight-
ing capability. Their transition teams came from the
three Marine Corps border transition teams left unas-
signed because of delays in activating the Iraqi units
to cover the Syrian frontier. The remaining units of
7th Division formed in July-September 2005 and after
training deployed to al-Anbar Province from Sep-
tember 2005 to January 2006.
The manpower requirements for the military tran-
sition teams, providing liaison and training advice for
elements of the Iraqi Army sent to the II MEF area of
operations, proved demanding. In addition, local U.S.
commanders and staffs spent considerable effort
mentoring their counterparts. These demands fell
upon the combat units despite efforts by Marine
Corps Headquarters and the Multi National Forces-
Iraq to provide them from the United States and al-
lied nations. In all, the Marine Corps provided 366
officers and enlisted personnel to the teams in 2005,
170 of whom came from II MEF. A few of the II MEF
Marines became involved with the unending police
training team mission in Fallujah as did Army solders
in Ramadi. The Iraqi security forces began to assem-
ble under the tactical direction of 2d Marine Division
in al-Anbar Province and under the Army 155th
Brigade in an-Najaf, northern Babil Province.
---


Chapter 10
Protecting the Emerging Iraq
The U.S. and Coalition strategy for 2005 was based
on two pillars. The first, building security and stabil-
ity, was showing little headway due to the slow de-
velopment, provisioning, and deployment of Iraqi
military and paramilitary forces. The second, self-gov-
ernment, became the focus of operations in late 2005.
Despite the lack of improvement in the security situ-
ation, plans proceeded to hold elections for a new
national government. Concurrent with these plans,
Coalition forces continued to conduct counterinsur-
gency operations.
Supporting the Election
Operation Liberty Express, lasting from 1 Septem-
ber to 30 December 2005, covered the military ac-
tions of II Marine Expeditionary Force and its
subordinate units as they provided security and en-
sured conditions for a successful Iraqi national con-
stitutional referendum on 15 October 2005 and
national election on 15 December. Although the 2d
Marine Division provided the major contribution to
this operation, the 2d Marine Aircraft Wing and the
2d Marine Logistics Group (the new designation for
the 2d Force Service Support Group) remained in-
dispensable throughout the operation.
Major General Richard A. Huck published his op-
erations order for Liberty Express on 30 July, setting
three phases: completing unit rotation, as an exten-
sion of Operation Guardian Sword; supporting the
referendum; and supporting the national election. He
identified his mission as:
paigns in al-Anbar Province that would provide the
secure environment for polling sites managed by the
Iraqi transitional government and the election com-
mission. In particular, the subordinate commands
would “execute focused disruption operations from
1–12 October, targeting extremist groups with the ca-
pability and intent of interfering with the referendum
to disrupt their operational planning and execution
cycle.”
Using Iraqi security forces remained essential to
securing and operating the polling sites and provid-
ing force protection, transportation, and sustainment.
The U.S. and Iraqi forces would have to provide an
election support team for each polling site within the
zone for liaison with and support to the election
workers.
According to the 2d Marine Division estimates, the
expected threat to the elections included both Mus-
lim extremists and the Sunni Arab resistance. Muslim
extremists sought to inflict a high U.S. and Coalition
casualty rate in Iraq while also waging an aggressive
information operations campaign to erode public
support and force a Coalition withdrawal from Iraq.
They also aimed to prevent any strong central gov-
ernment from establishing itself in Iraq. The Sunni
Arabs in Iraq had lost ground to the Shi'a and Kur-
dish factions in the 2004 election, and moderates in
their ranks sought to regain some degree of Sunni in-
fluence through the political process.
Marine Corps intelligence estimates predicted that
insurgents would focus on Ramadi because of its sig-
nificance in the governmental process and Fallujah
because of its symbolic importance. Their expected
tactics included attacking polling sites and the areas
around them using proven techniques such as indi-
rect fire, improvised explosive devices, and sniping.
Their information campaign painted the elections as
a conspiracy of the Shi'a, Kurdish, U.S., and Zionist
interests against the Sunni Arabs. Thus, the extremists
portrayed themselves as the defenders of Sunnis in
Iraq.
The Coalition hoped that the moderate Sunnis and
some insurgent groups would urge their followers to
vote and avoid the debacle caused by the Sunni boy-
cott of the 2004 elections. The Coalition feared that
uncontrollable sectarian violence would persuade
2d Marine Division continues partnership with
the Iraqi security forces and conducts combined
counterinsurgency operations in al-Anbar
Province to neutralize anti-Iraqi forces, secure
designated polling centers, and provide support
to the Independent Election Commission-Iraq
to maintain operational momentum, prevent
anti-Iraqi force interference with unit rotations,
and ensure the conduct of free, fair and legiti-
mate constitutional referendum and national
elections.
To support the referendum, the 2d Marine Divi-
sion planned continuing counterinsurgency cam-
115


116
INTO THE FRAY

$
Photo by SSgt Michael E. Schellenbach, Defense Imagery, VIRIN 050708-M-9708S-020
MajGen Richard A. Huck, commanding general, 2d Marine Division, speaks with Marines from Regimental
Combat Team 8 at Camp Fallujah in the summer of 2005.
Sunni Arabs that a favorable outcome in the elections
remained impossible. Such an outcome could lead
Sunnis to align with extremist elements.
General Huck and 2d Marine Division planners
sought to meet these conditions by combining the
types of combat operations successfully used in Op-
eration Guardian Sword with a civil affairs campaign
that focused on the local Sunni leaders and public
opinion. The II MEF Campaign Plan thus continued
in effect with the goals of interdiction in Regimental
Combat Team 2's Area of Operations Denver, neu-
tralizing extremists in the Army 2d Brigade, 28th In-
fantry Division's Area of Operations Topeka (which
included ar-Ramadi), while continuing to control al-
Fallujah and the remainder of Regimental Combat
Team 8's Area of Operations Raleigh. Marines esti-
mated that they could maintain operational momen-
tum throughout al-Anbar Province and thereby
disrupt insurgent operations, develop and act upon
intelligence, and establish a “relatively secure envi-
ronment” for the Iraqi referendum and election. In
contrast to 2004, Marines could look to newly arriv-
ing Iraqi units, with up to three brigades joining to
add combat power and an improved measure of in-
ternal security in the cities. The orders to civil affairs
commanders and planners were equally clear. They
were to continue efforts supporting the nascent
provincial councils and provincial reconstruction de-
velopment committees and to improve economic and
infrastructure development throughout al-Anbar
Province. Specific actions, however, would also sup-
port the elections. These included persuading local
Iraqi leaders to encourage their followers to partici-
pate in the electoral process and to themselves edu-
cate the populace about the elections and their
importance. On the other hand, the U.S. forces had
to avoid a perception that they controlled or directed
the election process, which had to remain an au-
tonomous and fair Iraqi action in the eyes of all. Fi-
nally, Marine commanders ordered a surge in
counterinsurgency operations immediately before the
voting days that, combined with the civil-military en-
gagement of the al-Anbar leaders at municipal and
provincial level, would persuade the Iraqi public that
participating in the voting was safe.
Supporting the elections required considerable
planning and allocation of resources for both the 15
October and 15 December polls. Throughout the II


Protecting the Emerging Iraq
117
MEF zone of responsibility, Marines set up several
dozen voting centers, encompassing 15 to 24 sites in
each area of operations to handle the voter turnout,
which the Iraqi Independent Election Commission es-
timated would be some 575,000 persons in al-Anbar
Province. At each of the polls, election support teams
of one or two Marines or soldiers and an interpreter
would maintain order over the election commission
workers and equipment provided by the Coalition.
They also served to maintain liaison and communi-
cations at each site with the U.S. and Coalition forces.
In the 2d Marine Division areas of responsibility, for
example, more than 170 military personnel and 70
interpreters comprised this contingent. Although
many of these Marines and soldiers came from the
civil affairs units, the combat and support units of the
division provided approximately half of these per-
sonnel.
Logistical support for the estimated 3,000 poll
workers included flying them from Baghdad Interna-
tional Airport to al-Asad and al-Taqaddum Air Base,
and driving workers to camps where they received
billeting and subsistence, and instruction from the
election commission. Poll workers hired within the
province reported to local bases for transportation to
the camps. From there, the election workers were
driven to military forward operating bases near their
polls three or four days before the elections. At each
point of entry, the forces screened and processed the
poll workers and segregated potential security risks
for further scrutiny. At all assembly locations for the
poll workers, Coalition forces provided emergency
medical care, billeting, feeding, and hygienic facili-
ties.
Security measures for the poll worker camps and
voting sites required dedicated security forces in both
close and distant protection modes and materials for
segregating the inner and middle cordons and the
traffic and entry checkpoints. Fortification material
came from the 30th Naval Construction Regiment
while 2d Force Service Support Group provided all
other items. Election materials arrived in packaged
containers for each site, and election commission
personnel retained responsibility for the chain of cus-
tody and accountability of ballots. Route security
measures included surged sweeps by both ground
LCpl Mike O'Rielly, attached to Company A, 1st Battalion, 5th Marines, checks an ID card as he searches Iraqis
in Ramadi for weapons and contraband. Throughout 2005, Anbar's capital city was targeted by insurgents be-
cause of its administrative and political importance.
Photo by LCpl Kenneth Lane, Defense Imagery, VIRIN: 050518-M-0616L-016


118
INTO THE FRAY

ments.
Cpl Michael R. McMaugh, Defense Imagery, VIRIN: 051106-M-8530M-019
Sgt Dennis Howard of the 6th Civil Affairs Group interacts with Iraqi children at the displaced persons com-
pound in Husaybah during Operation Steel Curtain.
and aerial electronic devices. Aviation support re help the election commission inform the public about
mained dedicated to normal military operations in the election processes. Colonel Brier's command also
September and early October, although the KC-130 played a key role in planning the movement, billet-
transport-refueler aircraft would support movement ing, and training of polling workers for al-Anbar
of election commission and polling workers into the Province, providing civil affairs Marines as members
air bases. During 11–14 October, and on election day, of the election support teams as well as liaison per-
most rotary-wing aircraft (transport and attack) in sonnel during all the poll workers' movements and
creased flights to support aerial and ground move processing
Counterinsurgency Operations Before
The 6th Civil Affairs Group relieved the 5th Civil
the Elections
Affairs Group between 8 September and 22 Septem-
ber 2005. Much of the efforts required in working The combat operations supporting the summer
with local leaders and public affairs would come turnover of units and personnel gradually evolved
from the newly arrived group. Colonel Paul W. Brier's into a new series of operations designed to shape the
concept of support called for a major effort to en battlefield and to disrupt any insurgent disruption of
gage the provincial and local civilian leadership. The the electoral processes. The operational pattern re-
governor, provincial council, and mayors received mained unchanged, as noted above, in Major General
briefings to inform them of the importance of the Huck's orders: interdict in the west, neutralize insur-
constitutional referendum, to encourage them to in gents around Ramadi, and hold Fallujah and areas fur-
form their constituents, and to provide them with ther east under firm Coalition control. Largely for this
election materials for their constituents. Working with reason, Operation Hunter continued as Operation
the governorate election official of the Independent Hunter II. Not only did the operations support the es-
Election Commission, Marines of the 6th Civil Affairs tablishment of the Iraqi forces in al-Anbar Province
Group sought to help develop ideas and strategies and strengthen the border defenses, but they also
to identify poll workers from al-Anbar Province and covered the desired interdiction of the al-Qaim-Hit


120
INTO THE FRAY
On 11–12 September, the attacks resumed after
preparing targeting packages employing M270A1
guided multiple-launched rocket systems supporting
the Army units in Area of Operations Sabre. Six rock-
ets hit the Mish Al Bridge and destroyed it. Aircraft
attacked Al Bu Hardan Bridge with GBU-38 and GBU-
12 bombs following a mechanical malfunction of both
M270A1 launchers. The eight 500-pound bombs used
this time achieved the desired effects.
Due to the lack of available forces in western al-
Anbar Province, the 2d Marine Division concurred in
the destruction of the bridges without using forward
controllers or the direct involvement of ground
troops. Given the number of units rotating in Regi-
mental Combat Team 2 during the month, small scale
local raids and patrolling remained the norm except
for the Army units operating in Area of Operations
Sabre.
The 2d Light Armored Reconnaissance Battalion
developed Operation Cyclone with Regimental Com-
bat Team 2 support to clear ar-Rutbah of persistent
insurgent activity. Assembling reinforcements at
nearby Camp Korean Village on 9 September, the bat-
talion commander, Lieutenant Colonel Austin E. Ren-
forth, and his staff briefed and incorporated 2d Force
Reconnaissance Company; Company K, 3d Battalion,
6th Marines, and an Iraqi special forces unit into his
task force. Moving out of their camp at 0100 on 11
September, the light armored reconnaissance units es-
tablished a cordon of the city and launched two as-
sault forces to clear its eastern and western parts. The
force reconnaissance and Iraqi Special Forces troops
cleared their sectors from north to south. Moving in
the opposite direction, the Marines of Company K, re-
inforced by a section of amphibious assault vehicles
and a platoon of Company C, 2d Light Armored Re-
connaissance Battalion, cleared their zone. At 1100
the next day, the troops had detained a total of 61
people and had confiscated numerous weapons and
explosive devices.
The relative lull during September permitted the
planning of several larger scale operations for Octo-
ber, and here Operation Hunter II began to show
some results. The operations of October coincided
with the arrival of three battalions of the Iraqi 7th Di-
vision's 3d Brigade, deploying to Hit, Haditha, and
Rawah. At the same time, the Iraqi 1st Brigade, 1st Di-
vision, established its headquarters at al-Qaim with its
SSgt Dan Jamison, crewchief of a UH-1N Huey helicopter of Marine Light Attack Squadron 369, checks his GAU-
16/A machine gun while flying close air support over Ubadyi during Operation Steel Curtain in November
2005.
Photo by Cpl James P. Aguilar, VIRIN: 051115-M-6538A-154


122
INTO THE FRAY
southeast corner of the city from the north. Two Army Davis sought to establish a U.S. and later Iraqi army
infantry companies, accompanied by the Iraqi 1st and presence and in general prepare these towns for elec-
3d Battalions, 1st Brigade, 7th Division, cleared and tions.
secured their targeted districts on the southern side Under the control of Colonel Davis and his Regi-
of the canal, while 3d Battalion, 7th Marines, cleared mental Combat Team 2 command group, the opera-
the northern side accompanied by the 2d Iraqi Bat tion opened with isolation moves blocking movement
talion and supported by a tank platoon of Company out of the target area: an Iraqi special operations com-
D, 2d Battalion, 69th Armor. Marines, soldiers, and pany blocked movement to the north near Haditha
Iraqi troops searched all houses and vehicles in a Dam, and on the left bank of the Euphrates River, the
major demonstration of combined U.S. and Iraqi mil Iraqi 7th Reconnaissance Battalion, 7th Division, cov-
itary presence. After being attacked by explosive de ered the eastern flank while 1st Light Armored Re-
vices, small arms, and rocket fire, the 3d Battalion, connaissance Battalion screened and then occupied
7th Marines, called in both fixed- and rotary-wing air Barwanah. On the right bank, 3d Battalion, 504th
support, which remained overhead until all objectives Parachute Infantry, moved against Haqlaniyah by air
had been cleared and the ground Marines had re assault, using 12 CH-46E helicopters supported by 3d
turned to their base.
Platoon, Company B, 1st Tank Battalion, and a com-
With the even larger Operation River Gate, Regi pany of the Iraqi 2d Battalion, 1st Brigade, 1st Divi-
mental Combat Team 2 placed more pressure on in-
sion. At Haditha, 3d Battalion, 1st Marines,
surgent groups operating in the western Eurphrates commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Jeffrey R. Ches-
River Valley, well-timed with Operation Iron Fist. sani, moved into three zones supported by the tank
Commencing on 3 October, elements of three U.S. company headquarters and 1st Platoon; another com-
and one Iraqi battalions searched the towns of Ha pany from the Iraqi 2d Battalion, 1st Brigade; and the
ditha, Haqlaniyah, and Barwanah, the scene of the 2d Battalion, 3d Brigade, 7th Division.
impromptu Operation Quick Strike conducted in re During this operation, Iraqi troops discovered so-
action to the killing of the Marine sniper teams of 3d phisticated propaganda production equipment in a
Battalion, 25th Marines, in August. In addition to house in Haditha. The items seized included numer-
killing foreign fighters and insurgent groups, Colonel ous al-Qaeda in Iraq compact discs and audiotapes,
LCpl Christopher Ahrens of 1st Platoon, Company G, 2d Battalion, 2d Marines, uses the scope on his M4 rifle
to scan the horizon during a security patrol in downtown Kharma in October 2005.
Photo by Sgt Paul S. Mancuso, Defense Imagery VIRIN: 051026-M-5213M-032


Protecting the Emerging Iraq
123

Photo by LCpl Samuel D. Corum, Defense Imagery, VIRIN: 051118-M-6412C-004
In the early morning fog outside a forward operations base in November 2005, vehicles of Company E, 2d Bat-
talion, 2d Marines, await their drivers who are preparing for Operation Trifecta in Zaidon.
three computers, several printers, banner makers, Anbar Province, as the three battalions of the Iraqi 3d
multi-disc copiers, and thousands of blank discs and Brigade, 7th Division, deployed to Hit, Haditha, and
tapes. Troops later discovered a complete bomb-mak Rawah, while the 1st Brigade headquarters and its 1st
ing facility in the same town.
Battalion of the 1st Division deployed to al-Qaim. On
When the operation terminated on 20 October, 13 October came another welcome reinforcement in
Huck reported construction of the firm bases under the form of the 13th Marine Expeditionary Unit (13th
way and polling places secured. The damage to the MEU) under Colonel James K. La Vine, reporting to
enemy included 12 enemy killed and 172 suspects de Huck for tactical direction after it reported to Major
tained with 30 caches and 96 explosive devices dis General Stephen T. Johnson for operations and re-
covered. The 3d Platoon, Company C, 1st Combat ceived its own Area of Operations Tucson on 26 Oc-
Engineer Battalion, built the firm bases Sparta, Raider, tober, where it began counterinsurgency and route
and Horno in the three towns (Haditha, Haqlaniyah security operations.
and Barwanah). In addition to the helicopter support
The Constitutional Referendum,
for the Army paratroopers, Regimental Combat Team
15 October 2005
2 also conducted a combined air assault raid by 2d
Force Reconnaissance Company and the Iraqi special During the weekend of 1–2 October, the Inde-
operations company in the vicinity of Abu Hyat pendent Election Commission-Iraq, apparently on
against a known, high-value target, taking several de the basis of local sentiments and to demonstrate
tainees in the process. Marines called for air support greater autonomy, changed the logistics and security
to deliver ordnance as large as 2,000-pound bombs, arrangements for the more settled
parts of al-Anbar
when targeting a cave complex.
Province. Instead of using the voting centers sur-
Operations Iron Fist and River Gate also covered veyed and secured by Coalition forces, the election
part of the continued Iraqi Army movement into al commission opened approximately 87 independent


124
INTO THE FRAY
centers, operated and provisioned by the local Iraqi dad International Airport, airport security personnel
population, with local police and unarmed guards for confiscated the cellular telephones of election com-
security. Accordingly, the centers east of Ramadi to mission personnel assembled there for flights to al-
the eastern limits of the II MEF area of operations op Asad and Taqaddum Air Bases. Although al-Anbar
erated with Facility Protection Service and Iraqi po Province had limited cell phone service, the com-
lice security. In the western zones, the original plan mission relied on these phones for communications
prevailed for employing Iraqi Security Forces, in nationwide. Even satellite telephones failed to con-
cluding Iraqi Army troops, in the inner and middle nect in western al-Anbar Province, and so Marines
cordons of the polling centers, backed up by Coali had to assist in unsnarling the communications at
tion military quick reaction forces at the outer cor most polling centers.
don.
The commission's expectations for local arrange-
Despite these changes, II MEF helped to execute ments in the eastern part of the zone were met. Be-
the referendum with few setbacks and successfully sides moving commission officials, polling center kits
supplied, transported, and billeted the poll workers. and ballots between air bases and local distribution
Providing sufficient food had been more problem points, Marines there provided little in the way of lo-
atic. Contractors provided food to poll workers at al gistics support to the commission. The “local” model
Asad and Taqaddum Air Bases. Beyond these likely succeeded for a number of reasons such as the
arrangements, the plan was to provide workers with improved security environment, emergent Fallujah
halal meals and bottled water. Most remained for one leadership, and the adaptability of Marine and Army
to three days at the air bases before moving on to units. The security model used by 2d Marine Divi-
forward bases near their polling centers. In some in sion proved effective, however. On 12 October, Ma-
stances poll workers staged protests due to their dis rine units seized polling sites and immediately moved
satisfaction with halal meals. Providing adequate pre-staged force protection materials to properly bar-
communications for them was also an issue. At Bagh ricade the sites. Between 13 and 14 October, poll
EA-6B Prowler electronic warfare aircraft helped jam insurgent communications during cordon-and-knock
operations. Below, a Prowler from Marine Tactical Electronic Warfare Squadron 4 taxis to a hangar at al-
Asad Air Base in May 2005.
Photo by LCpl Andrew D. Pendracki, VIRIN: 050511-M-5865P-020


Protecting the Emerging Iraq
125
workers occupied the sites with U.S. units providing
security escort. While insurgents conducted a few ha-
rassing attacks during the referendum, no voters or
poll workers were injured at a voting site.
Imperceptible to the outside observer, several
measures taken by II MEF provided for better results
than in the January 2005 election. In the days leading
up to the referendum, 2d Marine Division attacked lo-
cations considered likely firing positions for insurgent
rocket and mortar attacks by indirect fire. During the
January 2005 election, the daily average of indirect
fire attacks had increased from the usual 12 to 36 the
day before the election to 57 on the day of the elec-
tion. Radar coverage of potential attack sites was eval-
uated to ensure previously used firing locations were
appropriately covered. In the case of the referendum,
no increase in these kinds of attacks occurred. Only
five attacks by explosive devices happened during the
voting period, all while the supporting electronic war-
fare aircraft was off-station refueling. The division re-
quested continuous airborne fixed-wing coverage for
close air support and surveillance patrols over three
sectors: Ramadi-Fallujah, Hit-Haditha, and al-Qaim-
Rawah. These aircraft remained on station from six
hours before the polls opened until six hours after
voting ended. Finally, E-8 Joint Surveillance Target At-
tack Radar System (J-STARS) aircraft monitored vehi-
cle movement along routes around Ramadi during
voting and curfew hours. The aircraft also remained
ready to track indirect fire trajectories, although none
occurred in that sector.
Due to the detailed planning and actions of
Marines, soldiers, and Iraqi security troops, tens of
thousands of voters in al-Anbar Province ignored
the threat of attack. They cast ballots in the consti-
tutional referendum on a remarkably calm day with
isolated insurgent attacks but no major bombings or
mass killings. Ramadi, however, remained a prob-
lem, and U.S. soldiers forced three of the city's main
polling centers to close shortly after opening at
0700. Hospital officials said that at least seven peo-
ple seeking to vote were killed by insurgents.
Ammar Rawi, manager of the electoral commission
in Ramadi, added that most of the “turnout came
from the outskirts of the city.” Muhammed Jamaili,
manager of the electoral commission in Fallujah,
opined that 93 percent of the city's 257,000 regis-
tered voters participated in the referendum. The
population in the far west, in the area of Regimen-
tal Combat Team 2, cast a mere 7,510 votes, virtually
none at Hit and Haditha.
Although Sunni Arabs rejected the terms of the
constitution, they took a significant part in the vot-
ing in this referendum and therefore in the process
of moving toward self-government. The soldiers,
sailors and Marines under the direction of II MEF
could take pride in the results posted in their areas
of responsibility.
With the approval of the constitution, Operation
Liberty Express remained in effect to support the re-
quired 15 December elections for a permanent gov-
ernment. Had the constitutional referendum failed,
the National Assembly would have been dissolved,
and a new transitional government would have
been elected to attempt to write another permanent
constitution, thus reverting to the awkward situation
of the previous year.
Continued Counterinsurgency Operations
Supporting ‘Liberty Express'
Area of Operations Tucson furnished battle space
for the newly arrived 13th MEU elements. General
Huck charged it with interdicting smugglers and in-
surgents operating in the vast area between ar-Rut-
bah in the west and al-Muhammadi in the east,
where Iraqi Route 10 approaches its junction with
Route 12 (the main route running along the right
bank of the Euphrates from Hit to al-Qaim). Because
of the frequent assignments of the light armored re-
connaissance battalions to operations in the west-
ern Euphrates River valley throughout the campaign,
Marines had spent little time covering the valley to
date. Colonel La Vine established his headquarters at
al-Asad Air Base, where his Medium Helicopter
Squadron 163 worked under the direction of 2d Ma-
rine Aircraft Wing. He detailed 2d Battalion, 1st
Marines, to Rutbah on 26 October, where it oper-
ated out of Camp Korean Village. At the other ex-
tremity of Area of Operations Tucson, Battery C, 1st
Battalion, 11th Marines, an artillery battery turned
into a provisional rifle company, covered the inter-
section of the two highways, taking its direction di-
rectly from Colonel La Vine's command post. This
security mission also served to prepare 13th MEU
for its major contribution the next month in Opera-
tion Steel Curtain.
The II MEF staff also worked to support the new
“Desert Protector” program, used as a form of tribal
engagement to produce reliable scouts in the
province. The initial cohort came from the Albu Mahal
tribe of al-Qaim. They were sent to the East Fallujah
Iraqi Army Camp for two weeks of training and then
returned to al-Qaim to work with special operations
units as scouts. Coalition and Iraqi commands re-
leased little information about special forces' missions
in Iraq, but 2d Division monthly summaries indicated


Protecting the Emerging Iraq
127
three rifle companies at Camp Gannon facing the
town with the Syrian frontier to the rear. Affecting a
lodgment in the town's northwestern corner at 0400
on 5 November and then joined by a company of the
Iraqi 1st Battalion, 1st Brigade, the battalion held while
2d Battalion, 1st Marines, and another Iraqi company
moved into the southwest quadrant of the town and
came abreast at about 1000 . Together, the two battal-
ions then advanced to clear every structure in Husay-
bah, from west to east. By the end of the first day, the
two battalions held a quarter of the town, inflicting
several casualties on the insurgents and foreign fight-
ers, who defended with small arms, rocket launchers,
and explosive devices. In three days, the two battal-
ions cleared the town and encamped on its eastern
limits, having killed dozens of
enemy
and detaining
more than 200 additional suspects while other ele-
ments of Regimental Combat Team 2 gathered several
hundred displaced persons into holding areas where
they received food, water, and medical attention, and
processing
The two battalions continued across an open trian-
gular area between Husabayah and the next objective,
western Karabalah, clearing houses and encountering
explosive devices and mines the next two days, 8-9
November. Shifting to the north, the 3d Battalion, 6th
Marines, cleared western Karibalah from north to
south in three days, encountering mostly mines and
booby traps, while 2d Battalion, 1st Marines, moved
west to east in coordination. By 12 November, both
of these towns had been cleared of enemy insurgents,
foreign fighters, and their explosive devices.
Leaving 3d Battalion, 6th Marines, holding the two
cleared towns, 2d Battalion, 1st Marines, and the Army
parachute infantry battalion shifted east to repeat the
clearing operation, this time at Ubaydi. Beginning in
the early morning of 14 November, the Army para-
troopers cleared Old Ubaydi in a day, while 2d Bat-
talion, 1st Marines, took two days to clear New Ubaydi
against stiff opposition. The 2d and 3d Battalions of
the Iraqi 1st Brigade also provided a company each
in the clearing of this, the last targeted town of the op-
eration. With the occupation of a battle position in
Ubaydi by Weapons Company, 3d Battalion, 6th
Marines, all three towns had been cleared. As Lieu-
tenant Colonel Alford noted to a combat correspon-
dent on 20 November, “This place has needed to be
cleaned out for awhile."
The two Marine Corps assault battalions lost 10
men killed in the operation, and a total of 59 Army
and Marine Corps and nine Iraqi Army wounded. The
enemy lost 139 killed with one wounded prisoner. A
further 388 suspected insurgents became detainees
and more than 1,000 displaced persons entered Coali-
tion humanitarian relief facilities from Husabayah and
Ubaiydi. Operation Steel Curtain saw nearly continu-
ous air support, with 67 air strikes called in by con-
trollers. Over 100 precision-guided munitions were
employed during this operation. Aviation also played
a key role by providing combat re-supply of tank am-
munition and water as well as multiple casualty evac-
uation missions.
In the aftermath of Operation Steel Curtain, the
Iraqi 1st Brigade began to establish itself with head-
quarters at al-Qaim. As the soldiers of its 1st Battalion
patrolled the streets of Husaybah, Karabilah and
Ubaydi, the 3d Battalion occupied the newly built
northern combat outpost on 30 November, partnering
with 4th Squadron, 14th Cavalry, in backing up the re-
occupied border forts to the north of the Euphrates,
and the 2d Battalion occupied the southern combat
outpost on 14 November, although then only 15 per-
cent complete.
The upcoming rotation of the Army's 155th Brigade
signified that a relief of its 2d Battalion, 114th Field
Artillery, at Hit would become necessary. The Army
declined to replace the battalion, so the II MEF and
2d Marine Division commanders alerted Colonel La
Vine that 13th MEU would take responsibility for Hit
and its surrounding battle space. On 23 November,
Colonel La Vine assumed tactical control of the Army
battalion, the Iraqi 1st Battalion, 2d Brigade, 7th Divi-
sion, and a new Area of Operation Fairbanks.
This area assigned not only Hit to the 13th MEU
but also maintained much of the eastern portion of
former Area of Operations Tucson. After a brief pe-
After three months of negotiations following the 15 De-
cember 2005 national elections, Nouri al-Maliki
(below) became Prime Minister of a national coali-
tion government in Iraq.
Photo by Sgt David J. Murphy, Defense Imagery, VIRIN: 070313-M-0948M-046


Protecting the Emerging Iraq
129
Tank Battalion, equipped with T-55 tanks, on 10 De-
cember, indicating the importance of taming this most
dangerous Iraqi city.
Supporting the National Election
(15 December 2005)
Marine Corps and Army commanders in al-Anbar
Province benefited greatly from the previous experi-
ences with election security and support. Planning for
the national election in December now incorporated
the contingencies of adjusting to frequent and unpre-
dictable changes in the concept for conduct of the
election by the Independent Electoral Commission of
Iraq. This aspect bore fruit right away because the
commission this time allowed the citizens of Ramadi
to provide security for the voting sites within the
provincial capitol and surrounding area. Ultimately,
this concept provided an expanded voting opportu-
nity by adding to the number of polls on election day.
The Action Plan to increase Sunni participation in Ra-
madi from only two percent for the October 15 Ref-
erendum was based on the assumption that
intimidation by al-Qaeda of Iraq and other extremist
and foreign groups was the principal cause of the
province's chaos. The plan's countermeasures in-
cluded the assignment of the 2d Special Police Com-
mando Brigade and the Iraqi Army tank company to
Ramadi to assist in bolstering official Iraqi presence in
placards issued by the Ministry of Interior.
Essentially, the U.S. forces in al-Anbar Province em-
ployed the same measures for air and electronic sup-
port, and surveillance as in the October referendum,
achieving at least equal success. Approximately 800
poll workers and election support team members
were flown by helicopter between the transit centers,
such as al-Asad Air Base, and nine outlying sites.
While complex, the air movements were executed
smoothly because lift requirements and movement
plans were identified and coordinated with higher
headquarters early in the planning process and then
synchronized daily with subordinate units. Addition-
ally, back up ground movement plans were devel-
oped as an alternative if inclement weather precluded
air operations. Providing contracted hot meals for poll
workers helped maintain morale and alleviate behav-
ior problems. In addition, commission officials billeted
at the command and control locations for extended
periods required sustenance. In eastern al-Anbar
Province, Coalition and Iraqi army forces provided
area security, while Iraqi police and local guards gave
point security. In western al-Anbar Province, Coalition
and Iraqi security forces served point and area needs.
The troop commitments required for security in west-
ern al-Anbar Province limited the number of voting
sites the division could establish.
Only two attacks by indirect fire occurred during
the national election, compared to ten during the ref-
erendum. By almost every measure, the 15 December
election succeeded in al-Anbar Province beyond ex-
pectations. Sunnis turned out in such large numbers
that additional ballot materials had to be provided
from reserves held by the regiment and brigade com-
manders in each area of operations.
Just over 12 million people voted, about 75 percent
of the electorate. Sunnis in particular voted in much
greater numbers than in January, and perhaps more
than in the October election judging by the temporary
ballot shortages in al-Anbar Province. Some insurgent
groups apparently kept their promised election day
moratorium on attacks, even going so far as to guard
the voters from attack.
Six months after the election, negotiations for a
"government of national unity” succeeded and a po-
litical coalition supported it under the leadership of
Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki.
Closing Out 2005: Counterinsurgency Op-
erations and Force Realignments
With the completion of the national election, Op-
eration Liberty Express terminated on 22 December.
That day also marked the official end of Operation
the city.
As before, the 2d Marine Division and 155th
Brigade Combat Team began securing voting sites on
12 December and transporting poll workers and ma-
terial from forward bases to election sites. In eastern
al-Anbar Province, U.S. and Iraqi forces provided area
security and limited logistics support for the 113 In-
dependent Election Commission voting centers. In
western al-Anbar Province the Coalition forces pro-
vided both area and point security and logistics sup-
port for 30 Coalition-established sites. By noon on 14
December, troops or police had secured all polling
centers throughout al-Anbar Province with their work-
ers inside.
To facilitate the vote and aid security measures, the
Iraqi government declared a national holiday during
13–15 December, a nationwide curfew for 13–17 De-
cember from 2200 to 0600, and a prohibition on car-
rying of weapons, even with a valid weapons card,
during 13–17 December. In addition, the government
closed international and provincial borders, except for
fuel, food, and medical vehicles; closed international
airports; placed all security forces on full standby sta-
tus; and prohibited vehicular movement during 14–17
December except for security forces and vehicles with


130
INTO THE FRAY
Hunter. The Iraqi government had announced the
restoration of control of its borders on 30 November,
with a celebration conducted for the benefit of the
media. The 3d Battalion, 6th Marines, participated in
a flag raising ceremony at battle position Hue at
Husaybah, signifying the transfer of control of the area
from U.S. to Iraqi forces. General Casey attended, ac-
companied by the Iraqi defense and interior ministers,
and the battalion provided a rifle company reinforced
by tanks as security, which also included continuous
air coverage. In the view of the II MEF commander,
Major General Johnson, “This is a significant milestone
that will highlight the initial progress to date in border
defenses, training of Department of Border Enforce-
ment personnel, and the commitment and growing ca-
pability of the Iraqi government and its security
forces.” Although Border Forts 4 through 6 remained
incomplete at the end of the year, Iraqi Army units
had already moved into border town garrisons and
manned the combat outposts north and south of the
Euphrates. Construction would begin before year's
end in refurbishing the former port of entry at Husay-
bah. In December, however, the II MEF staff urged
higher headquarters to first upgrade the ports of entry
at Walid and Trebil before opening the port of entry
in the al-Qaim zone.
Very few named counterinsurgency operations oc-
curred in the immediate aftermath of the December
election, but the ongoing operations sufficed to keep
order in the province, and a certain euphoria could
be noticed among the population as well as the U.S.
and Coalition fighting forces. In the Haditha area, 3d
Battalion, 1st Marines, ran some sweeps through sus-
pected cache sites in Operation Red Bull (20–31 De-
cember). A similar operation, Operation Green Trident
(23–31 December), saw 1st Reconnaissance Battalion
sweeping around the Coalition logistics base Area of
Operations Dogwood and uncovering numerous
caches. Outside Ramadi, 1st Battalion, 172d Armor,
cleared Tammin and Jazirah on the eastern and north-
ern outskirts as a disruption effort in Operation Bull-
dog (28–31 December) but in this case fought four
engagements, taking 17 detainees and had two attacks
each by indirect fire and explosive devices. Clearly,
Ramadi remained a dangerous area.
In total, Operation Hunter encompassed 3,840 ac-
tions during the second half of 2005. The number re-
flects the vastness of western al-Anbar Province as
well as the absence of adequate control over the re-
gion. At the same time that II MEF's staff reported
these accomplishments, it began to adjust to reduc-
tions in its forces in the aftermath of the elections and
the focus of effort that Ramadi and Fallujah had at-
tracted from the Multi National Corps-Iraq.
The pending rotation of the Army's 2d Battalion,
112th Infantry, in December left al-Taqaddum without
a local security infantry unit, and the Army offered no
replacement for it. The same applied to the 3d Battal-
ion, 504th Parachute Infantry, which had served in the
2d Marine Division only as part of the Operation
Hunter reinforcements received with the return of
Area of Operations Saber in October. The II MEF plan-
ners began to study base consolidation as a way to
continue operations with fewer units, although the
Iraqi Army forces at year's end began to approach
what the campaign plan had envisioned as the mini-
mum requirement for success. In the end, the Army
made available for al-Taqaddum the Illinois National
Guard 2d Battalion, 130th Infantry, one of many units
it began to extend to meet increasing manpower
needs. The future was clear for succeeding Marine
Corps deployments: more and more of these security
unit assignments would come from Marine Corps
commands.
One reduction in II MEF responsibilities came with
the decision by the Multi National Corps commander
to realign the provinces of Karabala, An-Najaf, and
northern Babil under the Multi National Division-
Baghdad, commencing with the relief of the 155th
Brigade and the transfer of its authority to the incom-
ing 2d Brigade, 4th Infantry Division, on 5 January
2006. Henceforth, the Marine Corps contingent took
responsibility in Iraq for al-Anbar Province.
The end of the 13th MEU's deployment to Iraq
drew closer. The incoming 22d MEU had been made
available for employment in al-Anbar Province in time
for a relief by like units in Area of Operations Fair-
banks. The decision by Central Command chief Gen-
eral Abizaid to permit the 13th MEU to remain ashore
in Hit through mid-February allowed for its relief to
be incorporated into the rotation of the entire II MEF
in 2006. Accordingly, Colonel Kenneth F. McKenzie
reported with his 22d MEU to 2d Marine Division on
17 December and relieved 13th MEU ten days later.
Only two more months remained for the II MEF cam-
paign at this point. Since late 2003, 470 Marines had
been killed in action and 4,823 wounded in Iraq.


Chapter 11
Continuous Operations
Although no large urban battle occurred during
the II Marine Expeditionary Force campaign in Iraq,
the myriad of tasks confronting its Marines, soldiers,
and sailors differed little from the previous year's ef-
fort. The immediate military tasks included the con-
tinuous requirements for military checkpoints,
patrols, police patrols, road sweeps, offensive mis-
sions, raids, cordons, and searches. The force pro-
tection requirements were equally large, and the
additional penetration by 2d Marine Division units
into the towns and villages surrounding the major
cities and in the western Euphrates River valley mul-
tiplied greatly the number of forward operating bases
and camps requiring garrisons and guards.
These continuous missions required everyone to
perform typical infantry roles and tasks regardless of
the type of unit or its members' specialties. Every-
body had his or her duty manning guard posts and
check points, mounting convoy security, and con-
ducting all forms of surveillance. Proper force pro-
tection in populated areas, however, required more
than sentry duty; it also required frequent sweeps
well outside the perimeter, local counterinsurgency
measures, and serving in quick reaction forces des-
ignated for responses both inside and outside the
camps. Marines and soldiers of all specialties found
themselves conducting offensive missions such as
raids and neighborhood sweeps. Because of the
shortage of women in combat units, most female
Marines, sailors, and soldiers were assigned to search
female civilians, suspects, and detainees.
In addition, the Marine Corps employed many
units in the Iraq campaign in “provisional” roles, i.e.,
performing missions they were not trained or meant
to perform. Combat engineer, amphibious assault,
and artillery units were often used as provisional in-
fantry units. The Iraq campaign saw the fielding of
such units in an increasingly widespread fashion. The
initial employment of the entire 3d Battalion, 11th
Marines—an artillery unit—as a provisional military
police battalion in 2004 set the mark for using other
artillery units in similar roles. What followed was
their widespread use as well as headquarters and line
companies from 4th Tank and 4th Assault Amphibian
Battalions as military police units. Provisional small
boat detachments for Haditha Dam security came
from assault amphibian, reconnaissance, light ar-
mored reconnaissance units, and an infantry regiment
headquarters. In the Marine aircraft wings, the 2d and
4th Light Antiaircraft Defense Battalions were em-
ployed as provisional infantry battalions defending
al-Asad Air Base. Antitank platoons, not needed as
such, were used as convoy escorts and mobile reac-
tion forces. The scarcity of civil affairs units and
graves registration or personnel remains platoons
caused the formation of provisional units to perform
these tasks as well, drawing from various organiza-
tions of the Marine Corps Reserve.
Civil Affairs
One of the most persistent challenges in the Ma-
rine Corps campaign in Iraq remained the lack of
civil affairs organizations available for employment.
The Marine Corps had only two civil affairs groups,
both comprised of Selected Marine Corps Reservists:
3d Civil Affairs group based at Camp Pendleton, Cal-
ifornia, and 4th Civil Affairs group based at Anacos-
tia, Washington, D.C. As the campaign in Iraq entered
its third year, the tempo and duration of operations
made clear that the 3d and 4th groups would de-
ploy to Iraq every seven months. Accordingly, Ma-
rine Corps Commandant Michael W. Hagee approved
establishing two provisional civil affairs groups to
provide operational and personnel relief for the two
existing groups, the 5th and 6th Civil Affairs groups
(Provisional). On 4 January 2005, the Marine Corps
activated the 5th Civil Affairs group (Provisional),
using cadres drawn primarily from the 4th Combat
Engineer Battalion, 4th Marine Division, and de-
ployed it to Iraq from March to September 2005 with
the initial II MEF contingent.
Planning continued to prepare and activate the 6th
Civil Affairs group (Provisional) for activity beginning
in September 2005. The 6th was activated on 1 June
2005, less than a month after it had been established,
using cadre drawn principally from the 4th Mainte-
nance Battalion.
In each case, the challenge remained to identify
more than 190 Marines and sailors from Marine Corps
Reserve Forces to comprise a complete group and to
qualify most of them in the civil affairs military oc-
cupational specialties required for officers and non-
131


132
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Photo by LCpl Ryan B. Busse, Defense Imagery, VIRIN: 041228-M-5585B-011.
Cpl Erica Renee Steel searches an Iraqi woman at an entry point outside Fallujah in December 2004.
commissioned officers. For instance, only the com-
manding officer and 14 Marines who joined the 6th
Civil Affairs group had civil affairs qualifications, The
need for this training greatly complicated existing re-
quirements to complete other required combat skills
training they would need for deployment to Iraq.
Civil affairs training began using mobile training
teams formed by the 3d and 4th Civil Affairs groups
after their return from Iraq. As a result of their expe-
riences, the training teams brought not only “book”
training to the provisional civil affairs groups, they
also provided recent experience and lessons-learned
from their tours of duty in Iraq. The training covered
a full range of civil affairs topics: roles and missions
units, civil-military operations, the Iraqi Transitional
Government, and interactions with U.S. government
agencies, nongovernmental organizations, and the
media. Additional training focused on the law of war,
information operations, psychological operations,
human exploitation teams, interpreters, negotiations,
and mediations. In addition to the classroom train-
ing, the Marines of the provisional groups partici-
pated in practical exercises such as how to hold town
meetings and manage crowds while conducting pa-
trols. The civil affairs training conducted by the 3d
and 4th Civil Affairs groups, combined with the
mandatory completion of the U.S. Army correspon-
dence course and three months on-the-job training,
finished the necessary qualification of the provisional
groups.
Each civil affairs group organized personnel into a
headquarters detachment and four detachments. De-
tachment 1 comprised the government support team
and the Marines who would man the civil-military
operations center collocated with the II MEF opera-
tions center in al-Fallujah. Detachments 2, 3, and 4
would support the ground combat elements in the
field. Each detachment comprised five civil affairs
teams of six to seven Marines each.
The 5th Civil Affairs group deployed to Iraq with
II MEF and relieved the 4th Civil Affairs group at Fal-
lujah on 10 March 2005. It immediately began to
work with the temporary Fallujah city council, estab-
lished a civil-military operations center in al-Karmah,
and began to facilitate completion of key projects,
such as reopening the ar-Ramadi glass factory. In
western al-Anbar Province, teams worked with Reg-
imental Combat Team 2 to support operations. Dur-


134
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*
أدوار
Photo by LCpl Daniel J. Klein, Defense Imagery VIRIN: 050128-M-8096K-026
It was not all combat for the Marines in Fallujah. They helped out the local population when they could, such
as these Marines from the 4th Civil Affairs Group aiding Iraqis in loading a water tank onto a pickup truck to
move it to a more accessible area.
detachments began to work with the leadership of
the city. The Marines spoke continuously with local
officials to address their needs and determine prior-
ities for projects to improve the quality of life for
civilian inhabitants.
Headquarters Battalion, 2d Marine Division, in-
stalled a communications network at the Provincial
Civil Military Operations Center at Ramadi. This serv-
ice helped facilitate a more expeditious flow of in-
formation to research and staff for provincial
reconstruction projects. The civil affairs detachment
supporting Regimental Combat Team 8 rehabilitated
the Fallujah mayor's building, which became the cen-
ter for the ongoing efforts by local officials to make
Fallujah autonomous and self-sufficient in govern-
mental matters.
A key civil affairs function in every operation in
the Marine Corps campaign in Iraq aimed at building
positive relationships and securing the trust of Iraqi
citizens and influential local officials. This process
began with the distribution of 150 billion Iraqi dinars
as financial compensation for damages and loss
caused by the insurgents and operations against
them. The Iraqi Provincial Reconstruction Develop-
ment Committee promoted provincial government
capability and legitimacy as it acted to determine the
allocation of Coalition projects. Two water treatment
facilities were restored in addition to constructing five
new facilities for villages in al-Anbar Province to pro-
vide fresh water for more than 100,000 inhabitants.
The civil affairs relationship with electrical represen-
tatives brought improvements to three substations,
and the installation of additional electrical transform-
ers increasing electrical output. Using funds from the
Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP)
allowed the refurbishing of over 25 schools for use
by more than 10,000 students as well as providing
medical supplies, incubators, and funding for new
medical clinics. Civil affairs Marines provided food,
water, shelter, clothing, blankets, and medical assis-
tance to 4,000 displaced persons in al-Ubaydi. In the
Hit area they provided 1,200 hygiene kits, 2,000
water buckets, 1,600 kerosene heaters, 1,700
sweaters, 10,000 blankets, and several thousand
pounds of food items. Additionally, civil affairs per-
sonnel delivered 39 primary care health care kits en-


Continuous Operations
135
abling the Iraqi Ministry of Health to provide service
to 1.5 million citizens of al-Anbar Province. The over-
all reconstruction efforts resulted in completing 483
projects worth $18.3 million with 183 projects valued
at $13.3 million in progress.
The civil affairs effort discovered the absence of a
functioning plan for economic development, so one
was developed to engage U.S. agencies to determine
programs for economic development and what fund-
ing was available to begin pursing an economic de-
velopment plan in Fallujah. The city was chosen
based on its improved security situation. Execution
typically began in a simple meeting with Iraqi busi-
nessmen and quickly grew to include more busi-
nessmen, key leaders, representatives from the
United States Agency for International Development,
the Iraq Reconstruction Management Office, and
nongovernmental organizations. Civil affairs Marines
developed relationships to fund a micro-financing
program and develop a business center to promote
economic growth, training, and better business prac-
tices. The plan injected more than $5 million in Iraq
Reconstruction Management Office funds for al-
Anbar Province. From this beginning in Fallujah, the
same plan was used in Ramadi where 6th Civil Affairs
group began developing a business center and sys-
tematic micro-financing. Civil affairs actions also es-
tablished an agriculture development plan addressing
irrigation as the primary means to improve crop pro-
duction. Canals were cleared of debris using funds
primarily from the United States Agency for Interna-
tional Development Office of Transitional Initiative.
The Regional Reconstruction Operation Center sup-
ported II MEF, the Iraqi government, the U.S. Embassy,
and all organizations involved in reconstructing Iraq
by coordinating reconstruction efforts, information, lo-
gistics, and security between the contracting commu-
nity, military, and Iraqi government. The reconstruction
program included 531 projects in al-Anbar Province,
valued at $440 million with 92 percent contracted and
45 percent work-in-place by February 2006. The re-
construction projects restored essential services in sev-
eral infrastructure sectors including electrical, water,
wastewater, health, education, security, justice, trans-
portation, and communication.
Aviation Support
The chief aviation challenge in 2005 continued to
be the excessive operation of aircraft because of the
continuous need for numerous mission types. The
School supplies are distributed to Iraqi children in Fallujah by Marines of the 4th Civil Affairs Group. The pupils
were returning to school in February 2005.
Photo by Cpl Thomas D. Hudzinski, Defense Imagery, VIRIN: 050205-M-7403H-027

WOUN


138
INTO THE FRAY
dling the new convoy routes also was introduced in
the theater.
The theater transportation network depended to
a great extent on privately contracted flat-bed de-
livery systems, drivers, and commercial equipment
items supplied by the principal contractor, Kellogg
Brown, & Root. By December 2005, the contracted
support was so inadequate that 2d Marine Logistics
group had to employ organic tactical vehicles and
engage in open contracting of third country na-
tional equipment and drivers. The demands in De-
cember grew partly from the national election
support but also from the decision made by the
commander, Multi National Corps-Iraq, to close the
An explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) technician, among Marines and soldiers attached to Combat Logistics
Battalion 8, 2d Marine Logistics Group, stages unexploded ammunition at Camp Fallujah. The EOD technicians
were preparing the ordnance for destruction.
Photo by LCpl Bobby J. Segovia, Defense Imagery, VIRIN: 051119-M-3717S-114


Continuous Operations
139
Coalition logistics base at Camp Dogwood, further
ordering II MEF to effect the transfer of U.S. equip-
ment, munitions, and supplies to Taqaddum. On 28
December the last convoy departed Dogwood for
Taqaddum, completing the movement of 599 trac-
tor-trailers in the month.
Related to all the reshuffling of storage capacity,
the group completed the enlargement of Taqad-
dum's field ammunition storage point in December
by adding seven new magazines to accommodate
a new explosive weight of 35 million pounds,. An
equally important task performed by the group
came in the maintenance of worn equipment to the
Arifjan, Kuwait, rework facility operated by Com-
mander, Marine Forces Central Command, and to
depots in the United States. A constant flow of gen-
erators, material-handling and construction equip-
ment, and combat systems moved by air and
ground transportation in and out of Iraq.
Security at Taqaddum largely centered on the as-
signed infantry battalion provided by the Army:
first by the 2d Battalion, 112th Infantry, of the
Texas National Guard, and then by the 2d Battal-
ion, 130th Infantry, from the Illinois National
Guard. These soldiers not only provided point de-
fense of the base and related facilities but also
mounted most of the essential security patrols in
the surrounding areas required to stop insurgents
capable of firing mortar shells and rockets into the
base or firing hand-held missiles at aircraft.
In the field, Colonel Robert Destafney's Combat
Logistics Regiment 25, based at Camp Fallujah, es-
sentially provisioned the two direct support combat
logistics battalions aiding Regimental Combat
Teams 2 and 8 and the Army brigade at Ramadi.
The primary means of resupply was by convoy in
the eastern part of Area of Operations Atlanta and
by air in western al-Anbar Province. The latter ef-
fort required a daily C-130 sortie dedicated to the
regiment’s requirements, but occasionally opera-
tions in the west required up to three daily flights
as well as ground convoys sent as far as Camp Ko-
rean Village.
The situation for the two direct support battal-
ions varied drastically with the terrain and end or-
ganizations. At Camp Fallujah, Lieutenant Colonel
Patrick N. Kelleher directed his Combat Logistics
Battalion 8 to aid Regimental Combat Team 8 and
the Army brigade at Ramadi, especially its attached
Marine Corps infantry battalion, with occasional
missions to the 155th Brigade in Area of Opera-
tions Biloxi. In a typical month, the battalion dis-
patched up to 100 supply convoys, also termed
combat logistics patrols, to needy units as well as
hundreds of crane and material handling missions.
The military police and explosives ordnance dis-
posal platoons performed dozens of convoy escort,
road sweep, road repair, and explosives disposal
missions each week. The battalion maintenance
company provided dozens of vehicle recovery mis-
sions and contact team visits each week, including
several dozen “rapid requests” in the same inter-
val. The battalion also coordinated explosive ord-
nance disposal for the region, handling responses
called in on the telephone hotlines for that pur-
pose. Because of its personnel composition, the
battalion also provided a squad of female Marines
each day for duty with Regimental Combat Team 8
entry control points and checkpoints to assist in
screening and searching Iraqi women. Battalion en-
gineers constructed several of the control and
checkpoints for the combat team and provided en-
gineer support to it as well as the II MEF head-
quarters group, and Iraqi security forces in Area of
Operations Raleigh.
In the non-urban “wild west” of al-Anbar
Province, Colonel William S. Aitkin's Combat Lo-
gistics Battalion 2 relied much more on aviation
support in performing its mission as well as using
three ground supply routes while assisting Regi-
mental Combat Team 2 and its units from al-Asad
Air Base. With Company A, 8th Engineer Support
Battalion, in direct support, the battalion also un-
dertook road sweeps, road repair, and explosives
disposal tasks throughout Area of Operations Den-
ver. The surface convoys, several dozen per month,
drove to Korean Village, Hit, Haditha, and al-Qaim
initially, expanding their routes as other towns
came under control of Regimental Combat Team 2
and Iraqi forces. The initial airdrops began in April
and became a regular adjunct to helicopter support
to the outlying operating bases.
The frequency varied according to operations,
but the routine became three helicopter missions
and two airdrops to al-Qaim per week with one
additional airdrop to Camp Korean Village. The en-
gineers of the battalion and attached engineer sup-
port company worked to expand the al-Asad Air
Base ammunition capacity and found considerable
work constructing forward operating and perma-
nent bases, as well as platoon battle positions in
the area as more towns and villages came under
presence and control of U.S. and Iraqi forces.
Because of the distances involved and relative
scarcity of quick reaction forces, the convoys and
road sweeps of Combat Logistics Battalion 2 and


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INTO THE FRAY
Table 11-2:2d Marine Logistics Group Accomplishments
Number
Activity
Combat logistics patrols
Security and transportation escorts
3,900
17,500
Miles driven
2,800,000
4,937
Explosive ordnance disposal calls
Patients treated at six trauma centers
20,380
23,390
Dental patients attended
Surgeries performed
Units of blood transfused
818
1211
its attachments almost always relied upon recon-
naissance, escort, and close air support by light and
attack helicopters of the 2d Marine Aircraft Wing.
The air logistics effort in al-Anbar Province sup-
porting II MEF forces contributed in no small way
to the high operating tempo of the 2d Marine Air-
craft Wing. At the end, the 2d Marine Logistics
group staff calculated that it had saved 3,115 out-
bound and 5,034 inbound tractor-trailer equivalent
loads of cargo by employing air transportation.
Using aircraft to move supplies undoubtedly pre-
vented many casualties that many
have been in-
curred in ground transportation especially given the
increasing mine and improvised explosive device
threat in theater.
In summarizing its activities in this first II MEF
campaign in Iraq, the 2d Marine Logistics Group
noted that it had completed the following (Table
11-2):
The 30th Naval Construction Regiment used its
considerable capabilities to improve camps and fa-
cilities throughout the II MEF area. Typical contri-
butions included electrical and force protection
Route repairs
1,126
138,756,000
1,230
Gallons of fuel dispensed from 16 sites
Short tons of ammunition distributed
Supply transactions handled
Short tons of mail delivered
2,325,000
10,847
upgrades to existing buildings, constructing roads
and berms, runway repairs, and building camps for
Iraqi security forces ranging from the 670-man
combat outpost south in the border defense
scheme to the Iraqi 1st Division's headquarters
camp at Ramadi for 2,100 people.


Chapter 12
Redeployment and Relief
Although the optimism following the second bat-
tle of al-Fallujah and January 2005 elections had
faded for the Marines of II Marine Expeditionary
Force, indications suggested in early 2006 that the in-
surgency had passed its apogee and that self-gov-
ernment and security for Iraq would be obtained in
the near future. Hope existed that the culmination of
these efforts would occur in 2006 and that II MEF's
relief units from I Marine Expeditionary Force (For-
ward) might be the last deployment of Marines as the
Multi National Forces-West in Iraq.
In addition to the December 2005 national elec-
tion and the noteworthy Sunni participation that took
place, Marines and soldiers also took heart in the
long-awaited arrival of new Iraqi military and security
forces in al-Anbar Province. The Iraqi divisions and
brigades even began to take over forward operating
bases previously manned by U.S. forces and em-
boldened thoughts that they would replace Ameri-
can forces in their roles and tasks as well. Although
fielding an effective police force remained a difficult
objective, planners sought to produce a new police
force in the same manner that an effective national
Army seemed to be taking form.
Near Term Missions Assessed
population. Thus, no reductions in force levels for
the foreseeable future would be considered. Rather,
the existing Coalition forces had to maintain their
presence and to exploit the successes claimed for
Operation Hunter.
The enemy situation by year's end indicated that a
change in the Sunni resistance in the province might
be occurring. The insurgency continued to demon-
strate resiliency with the ability to re-arm and recon-
stitute forces and to fund itself. At this point, the
insurgency included religious extremists, former
regime elements, emerging elites, tribal groups, and
criminals.
The oft-touted foreign fighter element in the over-
all insurgency posed less of an immediate problem.
In all of 2005, forces under II MEF had detained 9,695
Iraqis as suspected insurrectionists, some 40 percent
of those captured nationally, compared to only 141
third-country nationals detained or killed, amounting
to 30 percent of those taken across Iraq.
Marines and soldiers at the forward operating
bases had reported incidents of combat between
competing insurgent groups during the year. Analysts
determined that the second half of 2005 had seen a
widening schism developing. Extremists and moder-
ate Iraqi groups pursued divergent agendas, mainly
over the alternatives of participating in the Iraq po-
litical process or in continuing to wage war. The
Sunni who had previously rejected the political al-
ternative began to see participation as a means to
counter the perceived Shi'a threat and to restore
Sunni power and influence in what seemed now an
emerging, democratic Iraqi state.
If the Coalition forces could demonstrate the
power to restore at last the damaged infrastructure
and to provide local security for the population, U.S.
analysts foresaw a possible weaning of the Iraqi in-
surgents from violence and redirecting them into sup-
porting the political processes. The reconstruction
effort in al-Anbar Province drew from a fiscal pooling
of $202.5 million from the Iraq Relief and Recon-
struction Relief Fund, $65.5 million of the Develop-
ment Fund for Iraq and $92.3 million of the
Commander's Emergency Response Program. The
first two programs supported 239 projects in al-Anbar
Province, all but ten under contract by 10 January
The II Marine Expeditionary Force (Fwd) com-
mander Major General Stephen W. Johnson and his
staff presented their assessment to the incoming Multi
National Corps-Iraq commander, Army Lieutenant
General Peter W. Chiarelli and his V Corps staff in
January. Although Marines and soldiers had regis-
tered success in 2005, al-Anbar Province remained a
dangerous place with a local active Sunni insurgency.
It was also frequently targeted by insurgent forces
operating across the Iraqi state. A persistent and per-
manent presence of Coalition troops continued as a
requirement for future success. Only with such a
sound military presence could the development of
the Iraqi Army and police forces be undertaken.
Operating in tandem, Coalition and Iraqi forces
needed both experience and numbers to carry the
fight to the enemy and deny it sanctuary and free-
dom of movement. Only when augmented by suffi-
cient and capable Iraqi forces would the Coalition
begin to effectively interact with the local civilian
141


142
INTO THE FRAY
2006. These projects completed by then amounted
to those shown in Table 12-1.
The Commander's Emergency Response Program
added local projects reported in separate categories
During the same year, the fielding of Iraqi security
forces to al-Anbar Province had improved markedly
The missing link at this juncture was the police forces
required for the Euphrates River Valley west of Fal-
lujah.
Table 12-1: Commander's Emergency Response Program
Amount ($million)
Project
33 (25%)
Electrical substations and distribution
Anbar Province was the priority task for the Multi Na-
tional Forces-West during 2006: the goal was to tran-
sition from Coalition and Iraqi security forces to
civilian police. The plan for reconstruction of the po-
lice sought to establish nine districts deploying 11,330
policemen in the province, with the main concentra-
tions at these locations (Table 12-2):
Table 12-2: Concentration of Police Officers
2,000
al-Qa'im and Hussayba
Hadithah
800
Hit
900
Ramadi
4,000
39 (30%)
Potable water; wastewater systems
Fallujah
1,700
26 (20%)
Healthcare and education facilities
28 (20%)
Police and fire stations; army and border
enforcement
8 (5%)
Roads and bridges
Local Projects
Water and sanitation
$26.1 million
Telecommunication
$11.4 million
Education
$9.2 million
Healthcare
$5.8 million
Others
$39.8 million
Iraqi Security Forces Fielded
Nov 04
No effective forces
Mar 05
2,829 personnel
19,000 personnel
Jan 06
Mar 06
Projected: 21,000 personnel
2 division headquarters
7 army brigades (21 battalions)
2 special police battalions
7 Border Defense Force battalions
1,700 Fallujah police
The “Fallujah Model” consisted of screening and
vetting the candidates and training them at the Bagh-
dad or Joint Iraqi Police Center. After their training
and equipping, the police units would deploy with
advisors, local military assistance, and with a system
of mentoring and partnering with experienced police
officers including transition teams from Coalition na-
tions. Ongoing assessment and retraining remained
the last crucial parts of the model.
The establishment of local police would signal the
ability of Iraqi security forces to at last take the lead
in providing local security, freeing U.S. and Coalition
forces for purely military operations to support the
pacification of the province.
Combat Operations Continue with
the Rotation of Forces
Operations in al-Anbar Province in the first two
months of 2006, leading up to the relief of II MEF by
the incoming I MEF, fell under Operation Patriot
Shield II (2 January–4 April). Because of the almost
continuous rotation of battalions and squadrons dur-
ing the period, no major operations occurred in Jan-
uary and February. The operational objective
remained to disrupt, neutralize, and interdict insur-
gent operations in every area of operations while the
reliefs took place.
A few examples must suffice for the many reported
in the period. Operation Red Bull II teamed 3d Bat-
talion, 1st Marines, with the Iraqi 2d Battalion, 2d
Brigade, in counterinsurgency operations aimed at
three towns downstream from the Haditha Dam. Be-
ginning on 14 January, companies and sniper teams
moved into assigned zones and then commenced
clearing operations simultaneously in four zones.
Company K cleared South Dam Village, while Com-
panies I and L and the Mobile Assault Company
cleared Senjick, Khaffayrah, and the nearby train sta-
The Year of the Police'
in Al-Anbar Province, 2006
Using a model developed in Fallujah, Marine
Corps commanders and their planners saw a solution
to establishing a police force. Beginning in al-Qaim
and working through the Haditha-Hit corridor, as-
sessment teams engaged the local leadership to de-
termine their level of support, calculating numbers
of former police officers, equipment, and infrastruc-
ture remaining and required for each town and vil-
lage. The teams included engineers able to assess
station suitability and begin drafting the renovation
projects. After finishing their surveys, the teams re-
turned to al-Qaim and began screening candidates
for the police academy. Police transition teams then
took over and sustained the process.
The fielding of an effective police force in al-


Redeployment and Relief
145
Table 12-4: II MEF Combat Power, January 2006
Combat Power (Air)
CH-53E
AH-1W
AV-8B
CH-46E
EA-6B
FA-18A+
25/19
10/6
35/33
16/14
5/4
11/10
76%
60%
94%
88%
80%
91%
KC-130
RQ-2B
UC-35B
UH-1N
6/5
8/7
1/1
11/9
83%
88%
100%
82%
Combat Power (Air) (220 MEU)
CH-46E
CH-53E
AH-1W
UN-1H
AV-8B
4/2
2/2
12/11
4/4
6/5
50%
100%
83%
92%
100%
Combat Power (Ground) (USMC)
AAV FOV
Howitzer M198
Tank M1A1
LAV FOV
HMMWV Hardback
UAH M1114
33/27
75/73
94/92
12/12
313/293
709/661
82%
97%
93%
98%
100%
94%
Combat Power (Ground) (2d Brigade)
TRK Mortar Howitzer M109A6 Scout HMMWV Armored
16/16
8/8
177/170
M1A1/A2
M2/M3
UAH M114
43/43
50/45
279/270
100%
90%
100%
100%
100%
100%
Combat Power (Ground) (220 MEU)
AAV FOV
Howitzer M109A6
HMMWV Hardback
Tank M1A1
LAV FOV
4/3
5/4
15/14
6/4
18/16
75%
80%
93%
67%
89%
operated the UH-60-series Blackhawk helicopters.
This turnover also maintained an element of con-
tinuing Army ground reinforcement in the province,
but it could only be temporary until the Army spring
rotations were completed. The Army, as strained as
the Marine Corps, could not leave all its units in
Iraq—most would have to rotate to the United States
BGen Robert B. Neller (left) served as I MEF (Fwd)
Deputy Commanding General for Operations.
Photo by LCpl Angela Hitchcock, Defense Imagery, VIRIN: 060823-M-7416H-006
following their normal rotation schedule. In some in-
stances, their return dates were extended, but in the
end I MEF would be reinforced by one Army brigade,
as it had been during its al-Anbar Province campaign
in 2004.
The last turnover of major subordinate commands
under the two Marine expeditionary forces came on
14 February when the forward deployed headquar-
ters of the 1st Marine Logistics Group, led by Colonel
David M. Richtsmeier, relieved Brigadier General
Wissler and his 2d Marine Logistics Group at Taqad-
dum. The 2d Marine Division headquarters departed
Iraq during February.
In contrast to earlier deployments, the 1st Marine
Division headquarters did not deploy with I MEF. This
unusual departure from standard Marine Corps or-
ganization and doctrine began with the consolidation
of the 2d Marine Division and II MEF staffs and op-
erations centers at Camp Fallujah on 31 January. The
measure had its origins in 2004, when Major General
James N. Mattis assumed responsibility from the 82d
Airborne Division and noted how that division han-
dled the ground command and control require-
ments—specifically, the Army's method of detailing a
commanding general and two deputy commanders
for maneuver and support. He also sensed that the


148
INTO THE FRAY

has been established at key points with Coalition continue to see it manifested until the political
forces and increasingly capable Iraqi Army process has time to develop. The people have
forces. This presence is providing the conditions gone to the polls and voted. They've elected of-
under which Iraqi police will be introduced and ficials. Those officials will be seated and that
assist the local governments in assuming a process will allow people to see that they have
greater role in providing services to their people. the opportunity for success, that they have the
Secondly, Coalition force partnering with the opportunity to be heard, and that there are alter-
Iraqi security forces will be key. Coalition part- natives to violence.
nership with Iraqi security forces for training of The detainees that we take in this province are
operations is key to their continued growth. primarily local. They are people who live in the
Through this partnership, Iraqi security forces towns in the Euphrates River Valley. When we
and readiness will grow, security conditions will fight them, we fight them locally. That's where
improve, and opportunities for good governance, they live, and that's where they come from. The
reconstruction and economic development will vast majority is local. And while there is an ele-
appear.
ment of foreign fighters who influence or who
Third, police. The reestablishment of Iraqi po try to influence the local insurgency, it's a very,
lice in Fallujah has been a success story. With very small part of the insurgency.
1,200 trained police on the streets supported by Ramadi is not in flames. There are key places
limited numbers of Iraqi Army and Coalition where there are more insurgents than are others,
forces, Fallujans were able to vote safely and in and we, along with our Iraqi security force part-
large numbers in the recent election and the ref ners, are going after them. But I do not see that
erendum. With 350 locally recruited police in Ramadi has become a place where they are fo-
training and 160 more in training, the force will cusing a lot more effort. I think, again, it is local
soon reach its authorized strength of 1,700. people, local insurgents, primarily, who are caus-
In other parts of the province, an assessment ing the difficulties in key places, not the entire
of conditions conducive to the introduction of town of Ramadi.
police in towns and cities is under way. Police As far as turning it over [to Iraqi forces), our
stations are being identified for repair. The local forces are still partnered with those Iraqi security
police chief has been nominated in the al-Qaim forces. We still provide support—logistics sup-
region, and Iraqis are screening and recruiting port, communication support and so forth, and
potential policemen. The reintroduction of a pro we still work very closely with them. But they're
fessional police force in al-Anbar will provide taking the lead in planning in a number of areas.
local leaders with security and stability that they Also, where and when those forces take over is
need to take care of their own. These police will a function of how long they have been together,
start to be introduced over the coming months how long their training is—or how long have
in conjunction with the completion of their train- they been functioning together. Some have only
ing. And finally, the political process. As a result come out of training since September, those in
of the recent elections and increased persistence the western Euphrates primarily, and those to the
conditions are favorable for change and for pro east are a little more mature. One size doesn't fit
viding Iraqis with an opportunity to take advan all with the Iraqi security forces. Some will ma-
tage of the choices that are before them. ture more quickly, and others will take longer. I
We are hearing an increasingly larger number suspect within the next-probably in the next
of moderate voices. We want to give the political four to six months you're going to see a number
opportunities, political process a chance. The of forces who will be able to take an increasing
people want an inclusive government that pro role in the lead or increasing lead here in this
vides an alternative to the violence like we saw area, down here in the Fallujah-Ramadi area, and
yesterday in Ramadi and to sectarian divisive it'll take a little longer for those that are newer
ness. They want to focus on the needs of their out in the Euphrates River Valley to assume a
community: schools, hospitals, jobs and their greater role in their area. But I think in 2006
you
families. We're continuing to see a Sunni insur will see a continuation and a continuing to ma-
gency in al-Anbar Province, and I think we will ture of these forces throughout the battlespace.


Epilogue
New and Old
The 2004–05 security and stability campaign by
Marine Corps forces in Iraq began with the objective
of reversing the nascent Iraqi insurgency and begin-
ning the process of rebuilding a shattered society.
The emerging resistance against the allied Coalition
that had defeated Iraq in 2003 took U.S. forces and
civilian authorities by surprise. Higher authorities cal-
culated that the extended presence of occupation
forces, the persistent application of counterinsur-
gency and security techniques, and the fielding of
Iraqi security forces would pacify the country. In par-
allel with the establishment of security, the U.S.-di-
rected Coalition Provisional Authority projected the
creation of a provisional Iraqi government and the
facilitation of democratic elections at national and re-
gional levels such that “governance” would be es-
tablished within a year of the scheduled mid-2004
“reversion of sovereignty” to the Interim Iraqi Gov-
ernment.
In almost every aspect, the expectations of these
higher civil and military authorities proved overly am-
bitious and, in effect, repeated their earlier underes-
timation of resistance and insurgency in Iraq. The
U.S. military forces deployed in Iraq remained un-
dermanned and thus incapable of maintaining the se-
curity presence in numerous Iraqi towns that could
and did shelter dissident elements that plotted and
executed violent attacks upon security forces and
civilians alike. Predictably, hopes that an Iraqi con-
stabulary could be formed failed when a large con-
tingent of the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps refused to
participate in face of the Sunni revolt in al-Anbar
Province and the al-Sadr uprising of April-August
2004 or otherwise failed to report for duty in assist-
ing U.S. and coalition forces in smaller scale security
operations throughout Iraq.
The Iraqi Civil Defense Corps received too little
basic training, no more than three to four weeks in
duration, intended for the more benign environment
expected in mid-2003. Instead, these newly formed
and untested units faced insurgents and extremists
that had gained combat experience fighting against
well-armed and seasoned troops, mostly fielded by
the United States. Nevertheless, when the first annual
rotation of U.S. forces began in the spring of 2004,
preparations continued to move the Iraqi security
units into the towns and to shift the U.S. forces out-
side the urban areas in permanent base camps al-
ready under construction to replace the forward
operating bases improvised from Iraqi military and
government compounds.
Into this tenuous situation of early 2004 came I
Marine Expeditionary Force, returning after the brief
and successful 2003 operation in which the Iraqi de-
fenses had been overcome with such quick, decisive
and violent action that vast areas and major cities fell
with relative ease to U.S. and coalition control. The
summer and fall occupation duty experienced by ap-
proximately 8,000 Marines of the 1st Marine Division
in the largely Shi’ite populated areas between Bagh-
dad and Basrah bore little resemblance to the chal-
lenges that the new campaign in al-Anbar Province
would bring
The Marines, sailors, and soldiers comprising the
Multi National Force-West comprised by I MEF and
its reinforcements came prepared for the challenges
in the spring of 2004 and harbored no illusions that
the “Sunni Triangle” would prove easy as a security
and stabilization operation. The extent to which the
various Sunni insurgencies and small foreign terror-
ist elements thrived in both urban and rural areas ex-
ceeded all predictions. Although leaders such as I
MEF commander Lieutenant Generals James T. Con-
way and 1st Marine Division Major General James N.
Mattis sensed that the larger numbers of infantry they
introduced in the area of operations would signifi-
cantly effect the security situation, the number of
Marines remained woefully insufficient to cover an
area of approximately 32 percent of Iraq's total sur-
face area. To that end, the Marine Corps command-
ers saw only the possibility of applying the patience,
persistence, and presence of their troops, and at-
tacking the insurgent leadership when detected and
raiding the sanctuaries of the insurgents to destabilize
their activities.
These realities came to fruition very quickly in the
spring of 2004. After a few sporadic encounters with
insurgents in each of the regimental zones of opera-
tions, the murder of civilian contractors in al-Fallujah
and the mutilation and display of their corpses
brought orders to I MEF and 1st Marine Division to
clear the city of insurgents. The subsequent effort that
149


150
INTO THE FRAY
exposed the scope and depth of the insurgencies in
the province at large. The two battles for al-Fallujah
remained pivotal in the I MEF campaign of 2004–
2005, although the successful measures for subduing
that urban center could not be repeated because of
the cost and destruction wrought in its execution.
Even as the scheduled election of January 2005 took
place, the situation faced by I MEF and the incoming
II MEF remained all too clear. Until some form of re-
liable Iraqi security forces could be established in suf-
ficient numbers and competence, the U.S. Marine
Corps forces in al-Anbar and neighboring provinces
would have to wage an aggressive campaign. The
enemy had to be dug out of their enclaves and
brought to battle, but in selected cases and in situa-
tions in which the rest of the province would not suf-
fer without sufficient security. At the same time, what
few Iraqi security forces could be established had to
be nurtured and mentored to the point that they
could at least operate with U.S. forces such that the
coalition could begin to overcome the cultural barri-
ers that separated the public from the coalition forces
that sought to protect it.
The firepower and military technology wielded by
Marine Corps forces with all their training and ex-
pertise remained decisive, vital weapons when com-
bat occurred: armored vehicles, artillery, and various
forms of air support could and did dominate portions
of the battlefield, but in the end the Marines soldiers
and sailors used rifles, grenades, and explosives to
confront insurgents at close quarters to eliminate their
hold over the population. Such work did not always
fall to the lot of the infantrymen, who remained
sorely under strength for the distances and scope of
the assignments. Many military personnel, regardless
of specialty, found themselves engaged in routine
scouting, patrolling, convoying, and screening tasks
in which ambushes or other forms of combat led to
counterattacks, pursuit, or search and clearing oper-
ations that many men and women of I MEF and II
MEF and other services experienced for the first time.
The progress in fielding an Iraqi security force
proved slow. What the Marines of I MEF initially
found in al-Anbar Province largely comprised only
seven Iraqi Civil Defense Corps battalions, renamed
Iraqi National Guard after the assumption of sover-
eignty by the Interim Iraqi Government. These units
mostly comprised local Sunnis recruited and trained
by the U.S. Army. Only one such unit could be
moved from its recruiting locale. When added to
what local police remained on duty, this force
amounted to approximately 2,000 Iraqis. A reason-
able formula for counterinsurgency would have re-
quired over thirty battalions of combat troops for al-
Anbar Province. The I MEF was comprised of only
eleven U.S. battalions, not counting provisional units
employed for base defense. II MEF arrived in early
2005 with even fewer battalions.
The Iraqi security units displayed key vulnerabili-
ties: they were subject to local infiltration, intimida-
tion, and threats by local Sunnis. Regardless of the
degree of assistance provided by local Marine and
Army units, even including the vaunted Combined
Action Platoon doctrine used successfully by the Ma-
rine Corps in Vietnam, the Iraqi battalions failed to
the point of wholesale breakdown. A few units
manned by Shi’a or Kurdish soldiers proved much
less vulnerable to the Sunni insurgents' intimidation
tactics. In general, however, the Iraqi units fielded in
2004–05 lacked strength, experience, and resilience
to fight the insurgents or to continue operating for
sustained periods of time. The Iraqi defense estab-
lishment also failed consistently to replace losses of
Iraqi soldiers and to provide adequate equipment for
their forces in al-Anbar Province. With the eventual
arrival of over two divisions of the Iraqi Army in the
province by early 2006 along with a marked im-
provement in the military competence of the Iraqi
soldiers, the continuing problems of violence and in-
security in the Marine Corps' areas of responsibility
began to dissipate. These units drew their soldiers
largely from the Shi’a population but added some-
what to the existing discontent of the Sunni popula-
tion of al-Anbar Province.
Improvements in security, realized by the end of
the two-year pacification campaign, meant that a cer-
tain part of the Sunni population could be persuaded
to cooperate with governmental authorities and to
participate in the basic restoration of Iraqi gover-
nance, rebuilding damaged towns and cities, and op-
posing the further use of violence. Results remained
uneven, and already in early 2006, the realization that
ar-Ramadi was one of—if not the most—dangerous
cities in Iraq suggested that it, not the infamous al-
Fallujah, functioned as the true center of the Sunni
resistance and insurgency in the surrounding lands.
The continuing campaign to gain control over ar-Ra-
madi, without resorting to the devastation wrought
against al-Fallujah, remained a slow and often unre-
warding process of vigilance, combat, and persist-
ence. Aerial and artillery bombardment in many ways
threatened to become counterproductive. The Sunni
population continued to resent its lost status in the
former regime, and local leaders were skeptical that
U.S. forces would continue to fight insurgents and
terrorists with vigor. The Sunni population also be-
-


Epilogue: New and Old
151
lieved that the Iraqi national government would
never earn Sunni support and participation in mod-
erate forms of political action.
For the men and women serving in the two Marine
expeditionary forces and numerous Marine expedi-
tionary units deployed to Iraq, the tasks at hand re-
mained all too obvious and challenging. Marines
could not engage in self-doubt or self-pity. All the
day-to-day violence, aggravated by devastating ex-
plosions of improvised devices, mines, and suicide
bombers, had to be endured with patience, resolve,
and tactical savvy. They continued to treat the pop-
ulation as a peaceful entity, requiring the Marines
protection and vigilance. The dissident and insurgent
elements required the use of violent force, but still
preserving the essential humanity of the situation
such that Marines soldiers and sailors could discern
the boundaries between the violence of combat and
the limitations posed by a nearby civilian populace
that in the end had to be “won over” to the cause of
the western occupier and the awkwardly functioning
native government. For the Marines, soldiers, and
sailors of the Marine expeditionary forces in Iraq,
service there was their “finest hour,” especially since
it was under great military and political pressures.
These included at times being outnumbered, being
watched from near and far for any signs of weakness,
being second-guessed by military and civilian offi-
cials and the mass media; operating under restrictive
rules of engagement preventing them from using
their full array of combat power and weaponry; and
fighting an enemy, often at close quarters, who did
not wear a uniform and who blended in the popula-
tion of noncombatant civilians. In such an environ-
ment, the thought of failure or letting down one's
fellow Marines remained unthinkable. The attitude
and accomplishments of the Marines inspired new
legendary feats of courage in the long history of the
Marine Corps.
The Marine Corps forces in Iraq, with the rein-
forcing organizations that joined them in Multi Na-
tional Force-West operated with initial handicaps that
could be overcome only by gaining experience and
applying it at a rapid pace. The myriad tasks facing
Marines in both urban and wide open rural terrain
almost defy description. A series of broken cities and
communities literally lay at their feet, occupied by in-
habitants thoroughly demoralized by the shock of
war and occupation, lacking any level of experience
in self-government and self-sufficiency to make a
concerted effort at rebuilding. The Marines, however,
did not, as other armies have done, celebrate victory
with triumphant parades and speeches. Their actions
and attitudes were low key and those of profession-
als who had accomplished their missions to the best
of their abilities. They did not treat the Iraqis as the
enemy or a conquered people. They did not hoist
American flags atop buildings in triumph.
In a remarkable series of events, the Marines and
their comrades reached into themselves and drew
upon their training, discipline, pride, dedication to
duty, physical readiness, and fighting spirit to adapt
to the novel conditions and dangers of counterinsur-
gency missions and executed them with steady re-
solve, overcoming setbacks and generally remaining
benign in victory.
Those mission successes and achievements did not
come without cost. During the campaign of 2004–05,
some 500 Marines of Multi National Force-West were
killed while serving in Iraq with thousands more
wounded—many grievously—in combat. Since 20
March 2004, elements of I MEF and II MEF, aug-
mented by the rest of the active and reserve estab-
lishments, provided continuous presence in Iraq.
The new battle streamers on the two Marine Ex-
peditionary Forces' colors symbolize much. They rep-
resent more than a year of the lives and the service of
the individual Marines and sailors. They recall the 500
fellow Marines and sailors who lost their lives for the
mission and who made the journey home ahead of
their comrades. They represent great courage in bat-
tle. They represent remarkable stamina over months
and even years. They represent unshakable honor
tested in a war against a treacherous, often invisible
enemy in the worst of conditions. They represent im-
measurable personal sacrifice by the Marine expedi-
tionary forces' Marines and sailors and their families.


152
INTO THE FRAY


Notes
Chapter 1
The principal sources for this and subsequent
chapters are the official records and working papers
held by the Marine Corps Archives, Gray Research
Center, Marine Corps University, located at Marine
Corps Base, Quantico, Virginia. In addition, certain
reference materials located at the Marine Corps His-
tory Division, Marine Corps University, have been
used. Relevant classified records held by the
archives of the Gray Research Center were exam-
ined and catalogued by the author during 2006-07.
Because no formal inventory or finding aids have to
date been produced by the archives, the classified
records used herein are identified by use of their
classified material control center (CMCC) registry
number assigned by the CMCC, Marine Corps Com-
bat Development Command, Quantico, the cog-
nizant security management authority. These registry
numbers take the form of S-1234-06, in which the
letter designates a classification of secret, the four
numbers the sequential assignment of the item or
document by the CMCC in its registry, and the last
numbers the year of accession into the control sys-
tem, i.e. not the date of the document concerned.
Although less satisfactory than a true inventory, the
use of the CMCC registry numbers permits the re-
searcher to locate the requisite items.
Unless otherwise noted, the material in this chap-
ter is derived from the following material:
For the situation in Iraq following the overthrow
of Saddam Hussein, see Donald P. Wright and
Colonel Timothy R. Reese with Contemporary Op-
erations Study Team, On Point II: Transition to the
New Campaign: The United States Army in Opera-
tion Iraqi Freedom, May 2003-January 2005 (Fort
Leavenworth, KS, 2008); Michael R. Gordon and
General Bernard E. Trainor, Cobra II: The Inside
Story of the Invasion and Occupation of Iraq (New
York: Pantheon Books, 2006); Kenneth W. Estes,
“1st Armored Division: Operation Iraqi Freedom,
May 2004–July 2004” (Wiesbaden: HQ 1st Armored
Division, 2005); Charles E. Kirkpatrick, “V Corps Be-
comes CJTF-7: The Month of Plans and Decisions”
(Heidelberg: HQ V Corps, draft November 2004).
For the Iraqi insurgency, see Carter Malkasian,
“Counterinsurgency in Iraq,” in Counterinsurgency
in Modern Warfare, edited by Daniel Marston and
Carter Malkasian (New York: Osprey Publishing,
2008) and Ahmed S. Hashim, Insurgency and
Counter-Insurgency in Iraq (Ithaca: Cornell Univer-
sity Press, 2006).
For General Hagee's plans for the Marine Corps'
second deployment to Iraq, see General James T.
Conway Interview, in Al-Anbar Awakening, Volume
I American Perspectives: U.S. Marines and Coun-
terinsurgency in Iraq, 2004–2009, edited by Chief
Warrant Officer-4 Timothy S. McWilliams and Lieu-
tenant Colonel Kurtis P. Wheeler (Quantico: Marine
Corps University Press, 2009); General Michael W.
Hagee oral history, part I, 14 July 2005. Unedited
and unreleased version provided by Dr. Fred Alli-
son, Marine Corps Historical Center.
For the challenges and problems faced by the
new deployment, see Headquarters Marine Corps,
EOS Update Briefing, 150ct03; S-3991-06; Marine
Corps Chronology 2003, Reference Section, Marine
Corps Historical Center; Headquarters Marine Corps
Operations Center (POC) “Current Operations
Briefs” for 01Dec03, 17Dec03, 23Feb04, S-1764 to
1816-06.
For the makeup of the I Marine Expeditionary
Force deployment, see 1st Marine Division Opera-
tion Iraqi Freedom II draft manuscript, (unpub-
lished, undated); Headquarters Marine Corps
Operations Center (POC) “Current Operations Brief”
21 Nov03; 1st Force Service Support Group Com-
mand Chronology (ComdC), July-Dec03; “I MEF OIF
II RFP MSG FINAL,” S-3937-06\ Archived OIF-II-1
Files; “Matrix_New_Baseline_09_JAN_2004_1100,” S-
3937-06\Archived OIFII-1 Files; Regimental Combat
Team 7 ComdC Feb-Mar04 shows E/2/11 arriving
Kuwait 28Feb04, S-0306-06\1 MarDivClassified
\Disk2\Regimental Combat Team 1 Mar04PartV\CC
A/1/11 Feb-Mar04.
For the situation in al-Anbar Province and I MEF
planning for operations there, see Bing West No
True Glory: A Frontline Account of the Battle for Fal-
lujah (New York: Bantam, Books, 2005); Com-
manding General Talking Points-OIF II Update,
Ground Dinner-18Jan04, S-3937-06; Headquarters
Marine Corps Operations Center (POC) “Current
153


154
INTO THE FRAY
Operations Briefs” for 5Jan04, 12Jan04, 28Jan04,
“Force Flow Update” 28Jan04, S-3937-06.
Chapter 2
For information on the deployment of forces, see
1MarDiv ComdC Jan-Jun04; “Draft I MEF OM and RIP
Frag 18Feb04,” S-3937-06\Archived OIF-II-1 files; “First
60,” S-3937-06; “I MEF input DRAFT 2 MARCENT to
CJTF-7 confirmation of dates” 23Jan04 in S-3937-
06\RIP&TOA; 1MarDiv ComdC Jun-Jun04 (unclassi-
fied); “Sequential Listing of Significant Events (U)”
S-3801-06\1MarDiv June-Jul04; 1FSSG ComdC Jan-
June04; 3MAW (fwd) ComdC 10Feb-31 Mar04; Opera-
tion Iraqi Freedom-II ASE Completion Schedule,
System description, Headquarters Marine Corps Oper-
ations Center (POC) “Current Operations Brief”
29Jan04; Lieutenant General Michael A. Hough, “State
of Marine Aviation,” Marine Corps Gazette 88 (May04),
5: pp. 11-27; PPO 040129; USCENTCOM msg was his
040803ZJan04; CJTF-7 reported a shortfall of 2,780 up-
armored HMMWVs in Iraq; Brigadier General William
D. Cato, “Rapid Acquisition in Support of Operation
Iraqi Freedom II” Marine Corps Gazette 88 (May04), 5:
pp. 48-50.
Chapter 3
For information on the geography and population
of the al-Anbar province see Department of Defense,
Iraq Transitional Handbook, Dec 2003, DOD-2630-
IRQ-005-04; Iraq Tribal Study: Al-Anbar Governorate,
Global Resources Group, June 18, 2006; Gretchen A.
Sparkman “COLISEUM Requirement K506-04-0029-S,"
a contracted précis, S-4522-06\HistoricFilesl-Anbar
Historical; Lewis Owen, “Tigris-Euphrates river sys-
tem.” Encyclopedia Britannica (2007); “2004 World
Data,” Encyclopedia Britannica (2006).
For the deployments of I MEF's component units
see Regimental Combat Team 7 ComdC Feb-Mar04;
1MarDiv ComdC Jan-Jun04, 3d MAW ComdC Jan-
Jun04, 1st FSSG Comdc Jan-Jun04, 1st Marines 7th
Marines ComdC Jan-Jun04, 1st BSSG ComdC Jan-
Jun04; pilot controller handbook 15Jun05, S-0265-
06\FECC Encl\Air Web Page Files.
For I MEF's relief of the 82d Airborne Division and
initial I MEF engagements in al-Anbar see Regimental
Combat Team 7 Intentions messages, 19-29Mar04, S-
3933-06\Intentions Mssg\Mar04\Regimental Combat
Team 7; Regimental Combat Team 7 ComdC Feb-
Mar04; 1MarDiv Sequential Listing of Events, S-3801-
06; 1BCT Intention messages,
21Mar04-30Mar04,
S-3933-06\Intentions Mssg\Mar04\1BCT; 1MarDiv
ComdC Jan-Jun04; 1MarDiv Sequential Listing of
Events, S-3801-06; Michael S. Groen, “The Tactical Fu-
sion Center,” Marine Corps Gazette 89 (April, 2005) 4:
pp. 59-63; Headquarters Marine Corps Operations
Center (POC) “Current Operations Brief” 18April04;
Combat Power 15Apr04; S-3937-06\I MEF
Sitreps\SitrepOfficer\AsstSitrepOfficer\Combat Power.
Chapter 4
For Operation Vigilant Resolve, including back-
ground of the battle and operation, see 1MarDiv
ComdC Jun-Jan04; 1st Marine Division Operation Iraqi
Freedom II draft manuscript, (unpublished, undated),
Ch4; 1MarDiv Intentions 01April04, S-393306\Inten-
tions Mssg\Apr04; 1MarDiv Intentions 03April04; Reg-
imental Combat Team 1 ComdC Apr04; “1/5 Frag
Order 005-04” 11Apr04, Ref Sect, 1-5 Historical Docs
OIF1-2; 1st Bn, 2d Mar, 1st Bn, 5th Mar, A Battery, 1st
Bn, 11th Mar, and Regimental Combat Team 1 Comd-
CApr04; U.S. Army National Ground Intelligence Cen-
ter, “Complex Environments: Battle of Fallujah, 1 April
2004,” S-4504-06.
For Company B, 1st Bn, 5th Mar action during the
first battle of Fallujah, see J. Smith Silver Star Citation,
RefSect; Robert D. Kaplan “Five Days in Fallujah,” The
Atlantic Monthly 294 (July/August 2004), 1:pp. 116-26.
For the indecisive conclusion to the first battle of
Fallujah, see 1MarDiv ComdC Jan-Jun04; U.S. Army
National Ground Intelligence Center, “Complex Envi-
ronments: Battle of Fallujah 1,” April04, S-4504-06.
For the Sadr Uprising and the Mahdi Army, see
CJTF-76 April Frago 581; Estes, “1st Armored Division:
Operation Iraqi Freedom, May 2004 - July 2004” (Wies-
baden: HQ 1st Arm Div, 2005); 1MarDiv 8Apr04 In-
tentions; 1MarDiv 11Apr04 Intentions.
For fighting in Ramadi during the spring of 2004,
see 2d Bn, 4th Mar Intsum 06-07April04-7, S-0306-
06\Disk Four\ 2-4J a n Apr(Sec)TabKS 2\T
\KS2\INTSUMS\APR; Morel and Copeland Navy
Cross, Baptista, Bronzi and E. M. Smith silver star ci-
tations, RefSect.
For the redeployment of Regimental Combat Team
7 and Operation Ripper Sweep, see 1MarDiv Inten-
tions 13Apr07; 1MarDiv Intentions 14Apr07; 1MarDiv
17Apr04 Intentions; 1MarDiv Intentions Apr-May04;
1Mar-Div ComdC June-July04; Regimental Combat
Team 7 ComdC Apr-May04.
For the reorganization of the Combined Joint Task
Force 7 into Multi National Force-Iraq and Multi Na-
tional Corps-Iraq see Donald P. Wright and Colonel
Timothy R. Reese with Contemporary Operations
Study Team, On Point II: Transition to the New Cam-
paign: The United States Army in Operation Iraqi Free-
dom, May 2003-January 2005 (Fort Leavenworth, KS,
2008), pp. 173-176.


Notes
155
For I MEF operations during the spring and early
summer of 2004, see 1MarDiv Intentions May-June04;
1Mar-Div ComdC Jan-Jun04; Regimental Combat Team
1 ComdC May04 and Jun04; Regimental Combat Team
7, ComdC May and Jun04; Silver Star citation Matthew
A. Lopez, RefSect; 1MarDiv Intentions 26April04.
For the deployments of the 11th, 24th, and 31st Ma-
rine Expeditionary Units, see USMC Chronology, Ref-
Sect; Headquarters Marine Corps Operations Center
(POC) “Current Operations Brief” 040518, 040621,
041004; 24 July report to 1stMarDiv by 24th MEU
based upon 1MarDiv Intentions message that date; S-
3937-06\IMEF sitreps\Jul04\11th MEU sitrep 31Jul04;
Headquarters Marine Corps Operations Center (POC)
"Current Operations Brief,” 06June04; 040604; US-
CENTCOM RFF serial 325 (020847Zjun04; Headquar-
ters Marine Corps Operations Center (POC) “Current
Operations Brief” 21Jun 2004; COMMARFORPAC DE-
PORD 151900ZJun04.
For the Battle of an-Najaf see, Francis X. Kozlowski,
U.S. Marines in Battle: an-Najaf, August 2004 (Quan-
tico, VA: Marine Corps History Division, 2009); Jack-
son, 89; G-3 I MEF “Information Memorandum on
Operations in An-Najaf.
For the status of forces in July 2004, see Headquar-
ters Marine Corps Operations Center (POC) “Current
Operations Brief,” 20July2004.
Chapter 5
For the situation in Fallujah during the summer of
2004, including security operations, the Fallujah
Brigade, and attacks against I MEF forces, see I MEF
Cdr Update 11 May04, S-3709-06\CdrsUpdate High-
lighted\May04; MajGen Amos in IMEF Cdr Updates
5May04, 20 May04, S-3709-06\CdrsUpdate High-
lighted\May04; “Talking points for Fallujah Brigade Sit-
uation,” S-3811-06\MEF Briefs; IMEF Cdr Updates
1May-1Sept04, S-3709-06\CdrsUpdate Highlighted
\May04; “OIF II Aircraft Loss Report (as of 14Sep04)”
in Headquarters Marine Corps Operations Center
(POC) “Current Operations Brief” 041001; Sitrep
092200Sep04, S-3709-06\IMEF Sitrep\Sep04.
For preparations for the second battle of Fallujah,
see Clifton Distinguished Flying Cross citation, RefSect;
Slide, “Laptop Standalone” (7Sep04) and briefing,
“Shaping Fallujah” (9Sept04), S-3811-06\MEF Briefs for
Historical Purposes\VIP briefs; “TF 6-26 Fallujah Shap-
ing Operations” (27Sept04), S-3811-06\MEF Briefs for
Historical Purposes\VIP briefs\Prospective Slides;
1MarDiv Frag Orders 0295, 0300 and 0314-04, S-3925-
06\1DivChron\DivClasChron IV items; 1MarDiv
Comdc, July-Dec04; Headquarters Marine Corps Op-
erations Center (POC) “Current Operations Brief”
010ct04; Regimental Combat Team 1 and Regimental
Combat Team 7 Comdc, July-Dec04; 31st MEU, “Op-
eration Phantom Fury, Mission Analysis Briefing
280ct04,” S-3925-06\1st DivChronology\Ops His-
tory\ChronFileS3.
For the rocket attack on RCT-l's headquarters, see
1st Marines Comdc, 1Sept-31Sept04 (Gray Research
Center, Quantico, VA), pp. 15-16.
For the plans for Operation Phantom Fury/al-Fajr
see App 11-Intell Est, RCT7 Frago 0220-04 31Oct04, S-
3813-06\Regimental Combat Team 7 docs\Operation
Phantom Fury CD; ”Regimental Combat Team 7 Mis-
sion Analysis and COA Development Fallujah
24Sep04,” S-3815-06\Chessani\planning docs; cf. “Fal-
luja II OPT” (10ct04) Regimental Combat Team 1, S-
3815-06\Chessani\planning docs; 1 Div Chronology
July-Dec04; Regimental Combat Team 1 Intentions
Messages, S-3925-06\1st MarDiv ComdC Dec04\RCT1
Part III TAB C\November Intentions; Regimental Com-
bat Team 7 Intentions messages, S-3925-06\1st Div
Chronology Dec04\Regimental Combat Team 7 July-
Dec04\Regimental Combat Team 7 Command
Chrono\Regimental Combat Team 7\November Sup-
porting docs; Lee Silver Star citation, RefSect.
For the events of the second battle of Fallujah see
Regimental Combat Team 1 “Air in Fallujah," S-4501-
06.
For details and illustrations, see “Aviation FiresCon-
Ops,” S-3925-06\1st DivChronology Dec04\RCT1 Part
IV\H Tab \"Phantom
Fury Air
Brief v.3.ppt"
(11/2/2004). “I MEF OIF2.2 11 Sept for BG Mcabee,”
S-3811-06\MEF briefs historical\VIP briefs VIP briefs
for WEB. Fred Allison, “Urban CAS Marine Corps Style
Fallujah 2004” unpublished essay, Marine Corps His-
torical Division (December, 2007); 1MarDiv Comdo
July-Dec04; MNF-I “Fallujah Strategic Mission Analysis
Briefing (30ct 04),” S-4501-06; I MEF Sitrep of 9
Nov2004; Regimental Combat Team 1 Intentions, S-
3925-06\1st Div Chronology Dec04\RCT1 Part III TAB
C\November Intentions; Regimental Combat Team 7
Intentions, S-3925-133 06\1st Div Chronology
Dec04\Regimental Combat Team 7 July-Dec04\Regi-
mental Combat Team 7 ComdC\Regimental Combat
Team 7\ November Supporting docs; 2-7 Cavalry,
“Optimized Fallujah Storyboard, S-3925-06\1st Div
Chronology Dec04\2-7 Cav; Adelsperger Navy Cross
(posthumous) and Kirk Silver Star citations, RefSect;
Regimental Combat Team 1 Intentions 12 Nov04, S-
3925-06\1st Div Chronology Dec04\RCT1 Part III TAB
C\November Intentions; 1MarDiv Jan-July04 Sign-
Events, S-3801-06; Fallujah Capt Winslow\S-3515 to
3519-06; Department of Defense “Fallujah Update 05
Nov 04" S-4503-06; “Optimized Train Station Recon-


Notes
157
17Mar05; II MEF ComdC Feb-Apr05; Regimental Com-
bat Team 2 ComdC Jan-Jun05; Bn, 8th Mar ComdC
Jan05; 3d Bn, 4th Mar ComdC Jan-Mar05; A/2d LAR
Bn ComdC Jan-Apr05; Regimental Combat Team 8
ComdC Jan-Jun05; Headquarters Marine Corps Oper-
ations Center (POC) “Current Operations Brief”
050211-15; 155th BCT Sitrep 132000Feb05, S-4489-
06\155BCT Feb; Headquarters Marine Corps Op-
erations Center (POC) “Current Operations Brief”
25Jan05, 08Jan05, 17Mar05, 04April05, 07April05; 1st
Bn, 1st Mar ComdC Jan-Jun05; MAG-26 Comdc, Mar05
and Apr05.
Chapter 8
For Operation River Blitz and River Bridge, see
2MarDiv Sitrep 050317, S-4489-06\2MarDiv Intentions
Messages Mar ; Headquarters Marine Corps Oper-
ations Center (POC) “Current Operations Brief”
31Mar05; II MEF ComdC Feb-Apr05.
For the insurgent attack on Camp Gannon and
other operations on the Syrian-Iraqi border, see
1stMarDiv Intentions 050221,
Intentions 050221, S-4489-06\2dMar-
Div\2dMarDiv Intentions, see Regimental Combat
Team 2 ComdC Jan-Jun05; Steve Fainaru, “The Grim
Reaper, Riding a Firetruck in Iraq: Marines Recount
Dramatic Assault At Base Near Syria” Washington Post,
(10Apr05), A1.
For II MEF counterinsurgency operations through-
out Area of Operations Atlanta, see Regimental Com-
bat Team 2 ComdC JJ05, 3d Bn, 25th ComdC Mar JJ05;
for
ор
order and maps, photos see S-4491-06\Oper-
ation Matador\S3; RCT2 ComdC Jan-Jun05 and Jul-
Sep05, 3d Battalion, 2d Mar ComdC July05, 3d
Battalion, 25th Mar ComdC Jan-Jun05, July-Dec05;
Stann and Wimberg (posthumous) Silver Star citations,
RefSect; 1st Bn, 5th Mar ComdC Jan-Jun05; Russell Sil-
ver Star citation, RefSect.
Force West (MNF-W) Operations Order 1-05 (Title:
Operation Iraqi Freedom 04-06 Campaign Plan)”, S-
0259-06\Opord-Annexes; 2MarDv Intentions 30May05,
S-4489-06\2dMarDiv\2dMarDiv Intentions Mes-
sagesMay; 2MarDiv Intentions 06Jun05, S-4489-
06\2dMarDiv\2dMarDiv Intentions MessagesJun;
Regimental Combat Team 2 ComdC Jul-30Sep05;
Headquarters Marine Corps Operations Center (POC)
"Current Operations Brief” 01Aug05.
For the situation on the Iraq-Syrian border and II
MEF efforts to address the weak defenses there, see II
MEF Sitrep 050901; S-0259-06\MNFW Sitreps\Sep05;
“Task Force Phantom Tacon To 2d MarDiv (revised)”;
S-0627-06\publishedfragorders; “FECC Classified Com-
mand Chronology May 05 to Dec 05; S-4523-06\G-
3\FECC; Regimental Combat Team 2 Comda
Jul-Sep05.
For information on training Iraqi military forces see
“BTT Location” “POE Brief v7.1” and “Al Qaim COA
Brief,” S-0266-06\ISF\DBE; Headquarters Marine
Corps Operations Center (POC) “Current Operations
Brief” 05May05, 01Jun05, 31Aug05; “BTT Location 25
Dec," S-0266-06\ISF enclosures.
Chapter 9
For the Sunni insurgency, see Regimental Combat
Team 8 ComdC Jan-Jun05; 1st Bn, 6th Mar ComdC Jan-
Jun05 also featuring excellent maps; Waldron Silver
Star citation, RefSect.
For II MEF's campaign plan for 2005, see MEF Cam-
paign Plan 28Jan05,5-0259-06\MNF-WSitreps\OpOrd-
Annexes.
For II MEF's combat power in al-Anbar, see Head-
quarters Marine Corps Operations Center (POC) “Cur-
rent Operations Brief” 04Aug05; RCT2 Comdo
Jul-Sep05; 3d Bn 2d Mar ComdC Aug05; 3d Bn, 25th
Mar ComdC July-Dec05; A/1st Tk Bn ComdC Aug05.
For II MEF counterinsurgency operations in al-
Anbar during the summer of 2005, see “Multi-National
Chapter 10
For information on Iraqi Security Forces, see “Strate-
gic Basing & ISF Laydown Narrative” (16Apr05), S-
4489-06\ISF; "MNF-W ISF Monthly Status,"
Headquarters Marine Corps Operations Center (POC)
“Current Operations Brief” 31Aug05; 7th IA Div move-
ment in Headquarters Marine Corps Operations Cen-
ter (POC) “Current Operations Brief” 15Feb06; MTT
data from Headquarters Marine Corps Operations Cen-
ter (POC) “Current Operations Brief" 31Oct05; 2Mar-
Div G-3 ComdC Nov05 and Dec05; 13th MEU Comdo
July-Dec05; “021600CDec05. Cg. Loo.Briefing. Graph-
ics,” S-0261-06 Dec05.
For II MEF efforts to encourage voting in al-Anbar,
see 2MarDiv Frago 0158-05 of 30Jul05: Operation Lib-
erty Express; S-4509-06lections Turnover.
For counterinsurgency operations during the latter
half of 2005 see “Div Liberty Express OPT Outbrief (08
Aug 05) V.2 (Optimized)” [with excellent illustrations),
S-4509-06lections Turnover\Liberty Express Docu-
ments; II MEF Future Ops (staff section] ComdC JD05,
S-4523-06\G3\FOPS; “Border FortCode Words 5-18”
(15Jan06), S-0266-06\ISF enclosures\DBE; FECC Clas-
sified Command Chronology May 05 to Dec 05; S-4523-
06\G3\FECC; Headquarters Marine Corps Operations
Center (POC) “Current Operations Brief” 03Oct05; 3d
Bn, 6th Mar ComdC Oct-Dec05; 1st Tk Bn ComdC July-
Dec05; Foncon au with Lieutenant Colonel Alford,
03Jun08; Headquarters Marine Corps Operations Center


158
INTO THE FRAY
(POC) “Current Operations Brief” 03Oct05; 2MarDiv Hq
Bn G-3 ComdC Oct05; 2MarDiv Hq Bn G-3 Comda
Oct05; Headquarters Marine Corps Operations Center
(POC) “Current Operations Brief” 051019; I MEF Future
Ops ComdC July-Dec05, S-4523-06\G3\FOPS;
“270001.Cdec05.Firm Bases.Hadithah.Haqliniyah.Bar-
wana”; S-0621-06\Dec05; 2Mardiv 061212COct05 Mod
2 To Frago 0158-05, S-4509-06 Elections Turnover\Lib-
erty Express Documents\Div Liberty Express FragO;
After action reports of 2d Marine Division, 8th Marines
and 2d Brigade: S-4509-06lections Turnover\Liberty
Express Documents\After action reports; Headquarters
Marine Corps Operations Center (POC) “Current Oper-
ations Brief” 280ct065; 13th MEU ComdC July-Dec05;
2MarDiv G-3 ComdC Sept05 and Oct, Nov05; 2MarDiv
G-3 ComdC Nov05; “010001CDec05.Op.Hard.Knock;"
S-0261-06\Dec05; 2MarDiv G-3 ComdC Dec05; “Div
Liberty Express Transition Brief (11 Dec 05)”; S-0237-
06\1-LibertyExpress Documents; 2MarDiv G-3 ComdC
Dec05; “312400CDec05.3.1.Op.Red. Bull” “Green Tri-
dent” and “Bulldog," S-0261-06\Dec05; II MEF FOPS
ComdC July-Dec05; 2MarDiv G-3 ComdC Dec 05; ca-
sualties from Headquarters Marine Corps Operations
Center (POC) “Current Operations Brief” O3Jan06.
For information on the Constitutional Referendum
Elections, see John Ward Anderson and Jonathan
Finer, “Pollings Close in Iraq: Large Numbers Turn Out
Despite Sporadic Violence” Washington Post (October
15, 2005).
For a summary of Operation Hunter see 13th MEU
ComdC Oct-Dec05; ComdC 3d Bn, 6th Mar Oct-
Dec05; “012400CDec05. Op.Hunter.Effects.Com-
plete”, S-0261-06\Dec05; 2MarDiv G-3 Comda
Nov05; II MEF, “012400CDec05.Op.Hunter. Ef-
fects.Complete,” “012000CDec05.ISF.Laydown,” S-
0261-06\Dec05; 2MarDiv G-3 ComdC Nov05;
MNF-W Sitrep 051110, S-0259-06. 3d Bn, 6th Mar
Oct-Dec05; “012400CDec05. Op.Hunter.Effects.Com-
plete”, S-0261-06\Dec05; 2MarDiv G-3 ComdC
Nov05.
sional)," in a 362Mb disc filed with the ComdC Jul-
Dec05 and Jan-May06. Operational archives of 5th
CAG are in S-4488-06, for 6th CAG in S 0237, 0238,
0243-06; II MEF Presidential Unit Citation Award Rec-
ommendation 2005–2006, RefSect.
For aviation operations during 2005, see MAG-26
ComdC Mar05; VMU-1 and VMU-2, ComdC 2005; II
MEF Aviation Universal Needs Statements on UAV,
common data/ground links and pods are contained in
S-0265-06; 2d MAW, “Operation Matador 8-14 May
Rollup;” S-0265-06\Aviation Strike Reports; “MNF-W
Combat Operations in Review (28Jan06), S-0262-
06\Jan06.
For logistics operations, see 2d MLG, CLR-25, CLB-
2, CLB-8 ComdC Mar-Dec05; “MNF-W Combat Opera-
tions in Review (28Jan06), S-0262-06\Jan06.
Chapter 12
For the need for police forces and plans for train-
ing them, see II MEF, “Al Anbar: Near Term Way
Ahead (13Jan06)," S-4557-06\G3 10f7\V Corp Brief on
Al Anbar (13 Jan) (ver5.2).
For II MEF operations during the first months of
2006, as well as the relief of II MEF by I MEF in early
2006, see MNF-W Combat Operations in Review
(28Jan06),” S-0262-06\Jan06; 22d MEU ComdC JJO6;
Headquarters Marine Corps Operations Center (POC)
“Current Operations Briefs” 03Jan06-28Feb06; II MEF
Sitrep 051231, S-0259-06\MNFW Sitreps\Dec05
For General Mattis' recommendations for new com-
mand structures for Marine Expeditionary Force de-
ployments to Iraq, see Mattis interview 120ct07; I MEF
ComdC Jan-Jun06.
For Marine Corps casualties sustained in Iraq since
2003, see Headquarters Marine Corps Operations Cen-
ter (POC) “Current Operations Brief" 01Mar06.
Major General Johnson's thoughts on the accom-
plishments of II MEF in Iraq can be accessed at
http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?tra
nscriptid=879.
Chapter 11
For the operations of Marine Corps civil affairs
groups as well as reconstruction projects, see 5th CAG
ComdC Sept-Dec05; 4th CAG ComdC Jul-Dec05; 5th
CAG ComdC Jul-Dec05; 6th CAG, “Finding Guide for
the Records of the 6th Civil Affairs group (Provi-
Epilogue
For analysis of whether or not the coalition de-
ployed enough troops to Iraq, see Carter Malkasian,
“Did the Coalition Need More Forces in Iraq? Evidence
from Al Anbar,” (Alexandria: Center for Naval Analy-
ses, 18 November 2006).


160
INTO THE FRAY
Chief of Staff: Col Joseph F. Dunford Jr. (until July 2004)
Col Robert J. Knapp
1st Marine Regiment (-) (Reinforced) (Regimental Combat Team 1)
Commanding Officer: Col John A. Toolan (until September 2004)
Col Lawrence D. Nicholson (14 September, 2004)
Col Michael A. Shupp
7th Marine Regiment (-) (Reinforced) (Regimental Combat Team 7)
Commanding Officer: Col Craig A. Tucker
1st Brigade, 1st Infantry Division (U.S. Army)
Commanding Officer: Col Arthur W. Connor Jr., USA
2d Brigade, (-) (Reinforced), 1st Cavalry Division “Black Jack” (U.S. Army)
Commanding Officer: Col Michael D. Formica, USA
2d Brigade (-) (Reinforced), 2d Infantry Division, “Strike Force Brigade” (U.S. Army)
Commanding Officer: Col Gary S. Patton, USA
Marine Aviation Combat Element
3d Marine Aircraft Wing (-) (Reinforced)
Commanding Officer: MajGen James F. Amos (until May 2004)
MajGen Keith J. Stalder
Assistant Wing Commander: Col Roy A. Arnold
Chief of Staff: Col Gerald A. Yingling Jr. (until July 2004)
Col Rex C. McMillian (until October 2004)
Col Rick W. Schmidt
Marine Aircraft Group 16 (-) (Reinforced)
Commanding Officer: Col Stuart L. Knoll (until April 2004)
Col Guy M. Close
Marine Air Control Group 38 (-) (Reinforced)
Commanding Officer: Col Ronnell R. McFarland (until June 2004)
Col Jonathan G. Miclot
Marine Wing Support Group 37 (→ (Reinforced)
Commanding Officer: Col Juan G. Ayala
Marine Combat Service Support Element
1st Force Service Support Group (-) (Reinforced)
Commanding Officer: BGen Richard S. Kramlich
Deputy Commander: Col John L. Sweeney Jr.
Chief of Staff: Col Tracy L. Mork
Combat Service Support Group 11 (-)
Commanding Officer: Col David B. Reist
Combat Service Support Group 15 (-) (Reinforced)
Commanding Officer: Col Michael E. Kampsen
I Marine Expeditionary Force Engineer Group


Appendix A: Command and Staff List
161
Commanding Officer: RAdm Charles R. Kubic
RAdm Raymond K. Alexander
II Marine Expeditionary Force (Forward)/Multi National Force-West
March 2005-February 2006
Commanding General: MajGen Stephen T. Johnson (until January 2006)
MajGen Richard A. Huck
Deputy: BGen Charles S. Patton
Chief of Staff: Col John L. Ledoux
G-1: LtCol John R. Armour (until September 2005)
Maj Blair S. Miles
G-2: Col John T. Cunnings
G-3: Col Glenn T. Starnes (until October 2005)
Col Thomas L. Cariker
G-4: Col John J. Fitzgerald Jr. (until July 2005)
Col. Donald C. Hales
G-5: Col Kenneth D. Bonner
G-6: Col Sean T. Mulcahy
II MEF Headquarters Group: (-) (Reinforced)
Commanding Officer: Col Daniel D. Leshchyshyn
13th Marine Expeditionary Unit (-)
Commanding Officer: Col James K. LaVine
15th Marine Expeditionary Unit (SOC)
Commanding Officer: Col Thomas C. Greenwood
22d Marine Expeditionary Unit
Commanding Officer: Col Kenneth F. McKenzie
5th Civil Affairs Group (Reinforced)
Commanding Officer: Col Steven E. McKinley
6th Civil Affairs Group
Commanding Officer: Col Paul W. Brier
155th Brigade Combat Team (Reinforced) (Army National Guard)
Commanding Officer: Col Augustus L. Collins, USA (until April 2005)
Marine Ground Combat Element
2d Marine Division (-) (Reinforced)
Commanding General: MajGen Richard A. Huck (until January 2006)
Assistant Division Commander: BGen Joseph J. McMenamin
Chief of Staff: Col Robert G. Sokoloski
2d Marine Regiment (-) (Reinforced) (Regimental Combat Team 2)
Commanding Officer: Col Stephen W. Davis
8th Marine Regiment (-) (Reinforced) (Regimental Combat Team 8)
Commanding Officer: Col Charles M. Gurganus (until August 2005)
Col David H. Berger
2d Brigade, 2d Infantry Division (Reinforced) (U.S. Army)
Commanding Officer: Col Gary S. Patton, USA


166
INTO THE FRAY
Marine Ground Combat Element
1st Marine Division (-) (Reinforced) [1st MarDiv]
Headquarters Battalion (Reinforced) (HqBn]
Small Craft Co (> [Small Crft Co]
2d Battalion (-) 11th Marines (Reinforced) (2d Bn, 11th Mar]
3d Battalion, 24th Marines [3d Bn, 24th Mar]
3d Battalion () 11th Marines (Reinforced) [3d Bn, 11th Mar]
2d Battalion, 4th Marines (2d Bn, 4th Mar]
1st Marines (-) (Reinforced)/Regimental Combat Team 1 [1st Mar/RCT-1]
2d Platoon (-), 1st Force Reconnaissance Company (2d Plt, 1st ForReconCo]
Fire Control Team, 1st Air Naval Gunfire Liaison Company (FCT, 1st ANGLICO]
2d Battalion, 1st Marines (2d Bn, 1st Mar]
3d Battalion, 1st Marines [3d Bn, 1st Mar]
2d Battalion, 2d Marines (2d Bn, 2d Mar]
3d Battalion 4th Marines (Reinforced) [3d Bn, 4th Mar]
1st Battalion, 5th Marines (1st Bn, 5th Mar]
3d Battalion, 5th Marines [3d Bn, 5th Mar]
3d Battalion, 8th Marines (Reinforced) [3d Bn, 8th Mar]
Task Force 2d Battalion 7th Cavalry (U.S. Army) (TF 2d Bn, 7th Cav]
Task Force Light Armored Reconnaissance (TF LAR]
1st Reconnaissance Battalion (1st ReconBn]
2d Reconnaissance Battalion (2d ReconBn]
Company B, 1st Battalion 4th Marines (-) (Reinforced), [Co B, 1st Bn, 4th Mar]
Company D, 2d Assault Amphibian Battalion (Reinforced) [Co D, 2d AABn]
Company C, 2d Tank Battalion (Reinforced) [Co C, 2d CmbtEngBn]
Company B, 2d Combat Engineer Battalion, (-) (Reinforced) (Co B, 2d CEB]
Battery M, 4th Battalion, 14th Marines (Reinforced) (Btry M, 4th Bn, 14th Mar]
7th Marines (~) (Reinforced)/Regimental Combat Team 7 [7th Mar/RCT-7]
1st Battalion, 7th Marines (1st Bn, 7th Mar]
2d Battalion, 7th Marines (2d Bn, 7th Mar]
3d Battalion, 7th Marines (3d Bn, 7th Mar]
1st Battalion, 8th Marines (Reinforced) (1st Bn, 8th Mar]
1st Battalion, 23d Marines (1st Bn, 23d Mar]
Battalion Landing Team 1st Battalion, 3d Marines (Reinforced) [BLT 1/3]
1st Force Reconnaissance Company (1st ForReconCo)
2d Force Reconnaissance Company (2d ForReconCo]
3d Light Armored Reconnaissance Battalion (3d LAR Bn]
Task Force 2d Battalion, 2d Infantry (-),(U.S. Army) [TF 2d Bn, 2d Inf]
Company C, 3d Battalion, 82d Field Artillery (U.S. Army) (Co C, 3d Bn, 82d FldArty]
Company A, 2d Tank Battalion (™) (Reinforced) (Co A, 2d Tank Bn]
Detachment, Company C (-), 2d Combat Engineer Battalion [Det, Co C, 2d
CmbtEngrBn]
Detachment, Company A (-), 3d Light Armored Reconnaissance Battalion
[Det, Co A, 3d LAR]
Marine Expeditionary Force Service Support Group 31 (MSSG-31]
2d Brigade (-) (Reinforced), 1st Cavalry Division “Black Jack” (U.S. Army) [2d Bde, 1st CavDiv]
15th Forward Support Battalion (U.S. Army) (15 FwdSptBn]


Appendix B: Unit List
167
Task Force 1st Battalion, 5th Infantry “Stryker” (U.S. Army) (TF “Stryker"]
Task Force 1st Battalion, 5th Cavalry (U.S. Army) (TF 1st Bn, 5th Cav]
Battery A, 3d Battalion, 82d Field Artillery (U.S. Army) [A Btry, 82d FldArty]
Attack Helicopter (U.S. Army) (Atk Helo]
Company B, 312th Military Intelligence Battalion (U.S. Army) [B Co, 312th MilIntelBn]
Company B (-), 13th Signal Battalion (U.S. Army) [B Co, 13th SigBn]
759th Composite MP Battalion (U.S. Army) (759th Comp MPBn]
2d Reconnaissance Battalion () (Reinforced) (2d ReconBn]
Company A (Reinforced), 2d Light Armored Reconnaissance Battalion,
[Co A, 2d LAR Bn]
Detachment, Explosive Ordinance Disposal Platoon (-), 63d Ordnance Battalion
(Det, EOD Plt, 63d OrdBn]
1st Brigade, 1st Infantry Division (U.S. Army) [1st Bde, 1st InfDiv]
2d Battalion, 4th Marines (2d Bn, 4th Mar]
2d Brigade (-) (Reinforced), 2d Infantry Division “Strike Force Brigade” (U.S. Army)
[2d Bde, 2d Inf]
2d Battalion, 2d Force Support Battalion (Reinforced) (U.S. Army),
(2d Bn, 2dForSuppBn]
Task Force 1st Battalion, 503d Infantry (-), (U.S. Army) (TF 1st Bn, 503d Inf]
Task Force 1st Battalion, 506th Infantry (-) (U.S. Army) (TF 1st Bn, 506th Inf]
Task Force 1st Battalion, 9th Infantry (U.S. Army) [TF 1st Bn, 9th Inf]
Task Force 2d Battalion, 17th Field Artillery (U.S. Army) [TF 2d Bn, 17th FldArty]
44th Engineering Battalion (-) (U.S. Army) (44th EngrBn]
Company A, 102d Military Intelligence Battalion (U.S. Army) (Co A, 102d MilIntel Bn]
Company B(-), 122d Signal Battalion (U.S. Army) [Co B, 122d SigBn]
Company B, 5th Battalion, 5th Air Defense Artillery (U.S. Army) [Co B, 5th Bn,
5th AirDefArty]
2d Battalion 5th Marines (Reinforced) (2d Bn, 5th Mar]
Marine Aviation Combat Element
3d Marine Aircraft Wing () (Reinforced) [3d MAW]
Marine Wing Headquarters Squadron 3 (-) (Reinforced) [MWHS-3]
Marine Aircraft Group 16 (-) (Reinforced) [MAG-16]
Marine Light Attack Helicopter Squadron 367, MAG-39 (HMLA-367]
Marine Light Attack Helicopter Squadron 169 (-), MAG-39 [HMLA-169]
Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 268, MAG-39 (HMM-268]
Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 365, MAG-29, 2d MAW (HMM-365)
Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 774, MAG-42, 4th MAW (HMM-774]
Marine Heavy Helicopter Squadron 361 (HMH-361]
Marine Fighter Attack Squadron (All-Weather) 242, MAG-11 [VMFA(AW)-242]
Marine Attack Squadron 542 [VMA-542]
Marine Attack Squadron 311 [VMA-311]
Marine Aviation Logistics Squadron 16 (-) (Reinforced) [MALS-16]
Marine Air Control Group 38(-) (Reinforced) [MACG-38]
Marine Tactical Air Command Squadron (-) (Reinforced) [MTACS-38]
Marine Air Support Squadron 3 (™) (Reinforced) (MASS-3]


168
INTO THE FRAY
Marine Wing Communications Squadron 38 (-) (Reinforced) (MWCS-38]
Marine Air Control Squadron 1 (-) (Reinforced) [MACS-1]
Marine Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Squadron 1 [VMU-1)
Marine Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Squadron 2 [VMU-2]
Marine Wing Support Group 37 (-) (Reinforced) [MWSG-37]
Marine Wing Support Squadron 373 (MWSS-373]
4th Low Altitude Air Defense Battalion (Reinforced), 4th MAW (Prov Sec
Battalion, Al Asad) [4th LAAD Bn]
Battery F, 2d Battalion, 10th Marines (Tactical Control from 1st FSSG) [Btry F,
2d Bn, 10th Mar]
Battery K, 4th Battalion, 14th Marines (Btry K, 4th Bn, 14th Mar]
Battery P, 5th Battalion, 14th Marines [Btry P, 5th Bn, 14th Mar]
Detachment, Marine Air Control Squadron 1 (Det, MACS-1)
Marine Wing Support Squadron 472 (MWSS-472]
Detachment, 9th Communication Battalion (Det, 9th CommBn]
326th Area Support Group (U.S. Army) (326th AreaSptGru]
1439th Engineer Team (U.S. Army) [1439th EngrTm)
767th Engineer Team (U.S. Army) [767th EngrTm)
Marine Combat Service Support Element
1st Force Service Support Group (-) (Reinforced) [1st FSSG]
Headquarters and Service Battalion (HqSBn]
2d Battalion, 10th Marines (~) (Reinforced) (2d Bn, 10th Mar]
Combat Service Support Group 11 (-) (CSSG-11)
Combat Service Support Battalion 1 (CSSB-1]
Combat Service Support Battalion 7 (CSSB-7]
Combat Service Support Group 15 (~) (Reinforced) [CSSG-15]
I Marine Expeditionary Force Engineer Group [I MEFEngrGru]
Task Force Charlie (TF Charlie]
Task Force Echo (TF Echo]
Task Force Sierra (TF Sierra]
Task Force Tango [TF Tango]
With Participating Members From:
1st Naval Construction Battalion (1st NCB]
7th Naval Construction Regiment [7th NCR)
22d Naval Construction Regiment (22 NCR)
20th Seabee Readiness Group (20th CRG)
31st Seabee Readiness Group (31st CRG]
Naval Mobile Construction Battalion 3 (NMCB 3]
Naval Mobile Construction Battalion 4 (NMCB 4]
Naval Mobile Construction Battalion 7 (NMCB 7]
Naval Mobile Construction Battalion 14 (NMCB 14]
Naval Mobile Construction Battalion 15 (NMCB 15)
Naval Mobile Construction Battalion 17 (NMCB 17]
Naval Mobile Construction Battalion 23 (NMCB 23]


Appendix B: Unit List
169
Naval Mobile Construction Battalion 74 (NMCB 74]
Naval Mobile Construction Battalion 133 (NMCB 133]
120th Engineer Battalion (Combat Heavy) (U.S. Army) (120th EngrBn]
II Marine Expeditionary Force (Forward)/Multi National Force-West (II MEF (FWD)/MNF-W]
March 2005-February 2006
Command Element
13th Marine Expeditionary Unit (-) [13th MEU]
Command Element
Battalion Landing Team 2d Battalion, 1st Marines (BLT 2/1]
Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 163 (HMM-163]
Marine Expeditionary Unit Service Support Group 13 (MSSG-13]
22d Marine Expeditionary Unit (-) [22d MEU]
Command Element
Battalion Landing Team 1st Battalion, 2d Marines (BLT 1/2]
Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 261 (HMM-261]
Marine Expeditionary Unit Service Support Group 22 (MSSG-22]
II MEF Headquarters Group (-) (Reinforced) [II MEF HqGru]
Headquarters and Service Company (HqsCo]
Headquarters and Service Company, 4th Tank Battalion, 4th Marine Division
(Provisional MP) (Reinforced) [HqsCo 4th Tank Bn, 4th MarDiv]
Company A, 4th Tank Battalion (A Co, 4th Tank Bn]
Company B, 4th Tank Battalion (B Co, 4th Tank Bn]
Battery C, 1st Battalion, 14th Marines (Btry C, 1st Bn, 14th Mar]
Battery D, 2d Battalion, 14th Marines (Btry D, 2d Bn, 14th Mar]
Headquarters Battery, 5th Battalion, 14th Marines (HqBtry, 5th Bn, 14th Mar]
Battery N, 5th Battalion, 14th Marines (Btry N, 5th Bn, 14th Mar]
Battery O, 5th Battalion, 14th Marines (Btry 0, 5th Bn, 14th Mar]
Company E, 2d Battalion, 25th Marines (Co E, 2d Bn, 25th Mar]
Battery D, 2d Battalion, 14th Marines (Btry D, 2d Bn, 14th Mar]
Battery C, 1st Battalion, 14th Marines (Btry C, 1st Bn, 14th Mar]
Weapons Company, 1st Battalion, 23d Marines (Wpns Co, 1st Bn, 23d Mar]
1st Platoon, 2d Fleet Antiterrorism Security Team Company (1st Plt, 2d FAST)
Antiterrorism Battalion, Combined Antiarmor Team (AT Bn, CAAT 3]
1st Intelligence Battalion (-) (Reinforced), I MEF (1st IntelBn]
2d Radio Battalion (-) (2d RadBn]
8th Communications Battalion (-) (Reinforced) (8th CommBn]
5th Civil Affairs Group
6th Civil Affairs Group
155th Brigade Combat Team, Army National Guard (Reinforced) (155th MissANG]
Task Force 2d Battalion, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment (U.S. Army) (TF 2d Bn, 11th
ArmCavReg]
Marine Air Support Squadron 1 [MASS-1)
Marine Aircraft Group 14 (MAG-14]
Marine Air Control Squadron 2 [MACS-2]
Marine Wing Support Squadron 271 (MWSS-271)
Marine Wing Communications Squadron 38 (MWCS-38]


Appendix B: Unit List
171
3d Battalion, 4th Marines (Reinforced) [3d Bn, 4th Mar]
1st Battalion, 6th Marines (1st Bn, 6th Mar]
2d Battalion, 6th Marines (Reinforced) [2d Bn, 6th Mar)
3d Battalion, 6th Marines [3d Bn, 6th Mar]
2d Battalion, 7th Marines (Reinforced) [2d Bn, 7th Mar]
3d Battalion, 8th Marines (3d Bn, 8th Mar]
1st Reconnaissance Battalion (Reinforced) (1st ReconBn]
Company D (Reinforced), 2d Tank Battalion (Co D, 2d TkBn]
Company A (Reinforced), 2d Assault Amphibian Battalion (Co A, 2d AABn]
2d Brigade (Reinforced), 2d Infantry Division (U.S. Army) (2d BCT 2d Inf]
1st Battalion, 503d Infantry (U.S. Army) (1st Bn, 503d Inf]
1st Battalion, 506th Infantry (U.S. Army) (1st Bn, 506th Inf]
Air Defense Artillery, Battery B, 5th Battalion, 5th Field Artillery (-) (ADA, Btry B, 5th
Bn, 5th FldArty]
1st Battalion, 9th Infantry Regiment (U.S. Army) (1st Bn, 9th InfReg]
2d Battalion, 17th Field Artillery Regiment (U.S. Army) (2d Bn, 17th FldArty]
44th Engineer Battalion (U.S. Army) [44th EngrBn]
3d Battalion, 82d CSE (U.S. Army)
Battery B, 1st Battalion, 4th Artillery, 2d Forward Support Battalion (U.S. Army) [Btry
B, 1st Bn, 4th Arty, 2d ForSptBn]
1st Battalion (Reinforced), 5th Marines (1st Bn, 5th Mar]
2d Brigade, 28th Infantry Division (Reinforced) (Army National Guard) [2d Bde, 28th InfDiv]
228th Forward Support Battalion (U.S. Army) (228th FwdSptBn]
1st Battalion, 506th Infantry (U.S. Army) (1st Bn, 506th Inf]
1st Battalion, 110th Infantry (U.S. Army) (1st Bn, 110th Inf]
1st Battalion, 172d Artillery (U.S. Army) (1st Bn, 172d Arty]
2d Battalion, 222d Field Artillery (U.S. Army) (2d Bn, 222d FldArty)
2d Battalion, 116th Field Artillery Regiment (U.S. Army) (2d Bn, 116th FldArty]
3d Battalion, 7th Marines (Reinforced) [3d Bn, 7th Mar]
224th Engineer Battalion (C) (M) (Reinforced) (224th EngrBn]
Company C, 4th Tank Battalion (Co C, 4th TkBn]
54th Engineer Battalion (U.S. Army) (54th EngrBn]
Battery E, 2d Battalion, 11th Marines (Provisional MP) (Btry E, 2d Bn, 11th Mar]
Marine Aviation Combat Element
2d Marine Aircraft Wing (Fwd) [2d MAW]
Marine Wing Headquarters Squadron 2 (~[MWHS-2]
Marine Aircraft Group 26 (-) (MAG-26]
Marine Headquarters and Headquarters Squadron 26 [MHHS-26]
Marine Fighter Attack Squadron 224 [VMFA-224]
Marine Fighter Attack Squadron 332 [VMFA-332]
Marine All Weather Fighter Attack Squadron 142 [VMFA(AW)-142]
Marine All Weather Fighter Attack Squadron 242 [VMFA(AW)-242]
Marine All Weather Fighter Attack Squadron 224, MAG-31 [VMFA(AW)-224]
Marine Fighter Attack Squadron 142, MAG 42, 4th MAW [VMFA-142]


174
INTO THE FRAY
1st Reconnaissance Battalion (1st ReconBn]
2d Reconnaissance Battalion (2d ReconBn)
3d Reconnaissance Battalion [3d ReconBn]
7th Marines/Regimental Combat Team 7 (-) (Reinforced) [7th Mar/RCT-7]
1st Force Reconnaissance Company (-) (Reinforced) (1st ForReconCo]
4th Force Reconnaissance Company (-) (Reinforced) (4th ForReconCo]
4th Reconnaissance Battalion (4th ReconBn]
2d Battalion, 37th Armor Regiment (U.S. Army) [2d Bn, 37th AR]
1st Light Armored Reconnaissance Battalion (~) [1st LAR Bn]
2d Light Armored Reconnaissance Battalion (-) (2d LAR Bn]
3d Light Armored Reconnaissance Battalion (-) [3d LAR Bn]
1st Battalion, 7th Marines (1st Bn, 7th Mar]
3d Battalion, 1st Marines [3d Bn, 1st Mar]
3d Battalion, 3d Marines [3d Bn, 3d Mar]
3d Battalion, 6th Marines (3d Bn, 6th Mar)
3d Battalion, 4th Marines (3d Bn, 4th Mar]
3d Battalion, 7th Marines [3d Bn, 7th Mar]
3d Battalion, 8th Marines [3d Bn, 8th Mar]
1st Battalion, 6th Marines (1st Bn, 6th Mar]
1st Battalion, 36th Infantry Regiment (Mechanized) (U.S. Army) (1st Bn, 36th Inf]
4th Battalion, 14th Stryker Cavalry Regiment (U.S. Army) [4th Bn, 14th Stryker CavReg]
1st Brigade Combat Team, 1st Armored Division “Ready First” (U.S. Army)
(1st BCT, 1st ArmDiv]
1st Battalion, 6th Marines [1st Bn, 6th Mar]
3d Battalion, 8th Marines [3d Bn, 8th Mar]
1st Battalion, 506th Infantry Regiment (U.S. Army) (1st Bn, 506th InfReg]
1st Battalion, 9th Infantry Regiment (U.S. Army) (1st Bn, 9th InfReg)
1st Battalion, 37th Armor Regiment (U.S. Army) (1st Bn, 37th ArmReg]
2d Battalion, 37th Armor Regiment (U.S. Army) [2d Bn, 37th ArmReg]
1st Battalion, 77th Armor Regiment (U.S. Army) [1st Bn, 77th ArmReg]
1st Battalion, 35th Armor Regiment (U.S. Army) (1st Bn, 35th ArmReg]
Marine Aviation Combat Element
3d Marine Aircraft Wing (Forward) (Reinforced) [3d MAW]
Marine Wing Headquarters Squadron 1 (-) [MWHS 1]
Marine Aircraft Group 16 (MAG-16]
Marine Aircraft Logistics Squadron 16 (-)(Reinforced) [MALS-16]
Marine All Weather Fighter Attack Squadron 533 (VMFA(AW)-533]
Marine All Weather Fighter Attack Squadron 242 [VMFA(AW)-242]
Marine Attack Squadron 223 (-) [VMA-223]
Marine Attack Squadron 513 (> [VMA-513]
Marine Attack Squadron 211 - [VMA-211]
Marine Light Attack Helicopter Squadron 369 (HMLA-369]
Marine Light Attack Helicopter Squadron 169 (HMLA-169]
Marine Light Attack Helicopter Squadron 269 (HMLA-269]
Marine Light Attack Helicopter Squadron 367 (HMLA-367]
Marine Light Attack Helicopter Squadron 167 (-) (HMLA-167)
Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 268 (HMM-268]


176
INTO THE FRAY


178
INTO THE FRAY
EFIC-East Fallujah Iraqi Camp
EKMS-Electronic Key Management System
EOD-Explosive Ordnance Disposal
FLT-Fallujah Liaison Team
FOB-Forward Operating Base
FSS-Fast Sealift Ships
FSSG-Force Service Support Group
GIC-Gulf Investment Company
GCE-Ground Combat Element
HIDACZ-High Density Airspace Control Zone
HQMC-Headquarters Marine Corps
IA-Iraqi Army
IDF-Israeli Defense Force
IECI-Independent Electoral Commission of Iraq
IED-Improvised Explosive Device
IED WG-Improvised Explosive Device Working Group
IIF-Iraqi Intervention Force
IIG-Interim Iraqi Government
IMO-Information Management Officer
ING-Iraqi National Guard
IO-Information Operations
IPT-Integrated Process Team
IPSA-Intermediate Pumping Stations
IRMO-Iraq Reconstruction Management Office
ISF-Iraqi Security Forces
ISR-Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance
IW-Irregular Warfare
JCC-Joint Coordination Center
JDAM-Joint Direct Attack Munition
JIDI-Joint IED Defeat IPT
KIA-Killed in Action
LAR-Light Armored Reconnaissance
MA-Mortuary Affairs
MACCS-Marine Air Command and Control Squadron
MAG-Marine Air Group
MAGTF-Marine Air-Ground Task Force
MARCORSYSCOM-Marine Corps Systems Command
MarDiv-Marine Division
MAW-Marine Aircraft Wing
MCCDC-Marine Corps Combat Development Command


180
INTO THE FRAY
TACON–Tactical Control
TAL-Transition Administrative Law
TF_Task Force
TOC-Tactical Operations Center
TTP-Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures
UAV-Unmanned Aerial Vehicle
USAF-United States Air Force
USA-United States Army
USMC-United States Marine Corps
USN-United States Navy
VBID/VIED-Vehicle-Borne Improvised Explosive Device
VCP-Vehicle Checkpoints
WIA-Wounded in Action


184
INTO THE FRAY
Marines and one female sailor—three males and three females—are killed in
the attack and 13 others are wounded, 11 female.
June 28–July 6
Regimental Combat Team 2 conducts Operation Sword in Hit and Haditha.
July
Marine, Army, and Iraqi Army units conduct Operation Sayaid (Hunter) to
continue efforts to secure Anbar Province.
July 7
Operation Scimitar begins with raids in the village of Zaidan, approximately
20 miles southeast of Fallujah, and at least 22 suspected insurgents are de-
tained.
August 3
Fourteen Marine reservists and a civilian interpreter are killed in Haditha
when the amphibious assault vehicle they are traveling in is struck by a road-
side bomb. Two days earlier, six other Marines are killed near the same city
by enemy gunfire.
August 3–10
Marines participate in Operation Quick Strike, an offensive operation aimed
at disrupting insurgent activities in Haditha, Haqliniyah, and Barwanah.
Marines net nine car bombs, 28 other explosive devices, and capture 36 sus-
pected insurgents.
October 1
Marines from Regimental Combat Team 2 conduct Operation Iron Fist to dis-
rupt insurgents filtering into the country from Syria.
October 4-19
Marines conduct Operation River Gate in Haditha, Haqlaniyah, and Barwanah
to disrupt insurgent activities and secure the triad region.
October 15
The referendum on the Iraqi Constitution, and the first phase of Operation
Liberty Express.
October 18
sinated in
The deputy governor of Anbar Province, Talib al-Dulaimi, is ass
Ramadi.
November 5–17
Regimental Combat Team 2 participates in Operation Steel Curtain against
insurgents in al-Qa'im along the Iraq-Syria border.
November 19
Haditha Incident: Marines from the 3d Battalion, 1st Marines, are attacked by
an insurgent land mine. In the aftermath, several civilians are killed or
wounded in questionable circumstances.
November 19
Roughly 150 Iraqi Army soldiers and 300 U.S. Marines and soldiers launch
Operation Dhibbah (Bruins) in Ramadi.
November 26
Approximately 400 U.S. Marines and 150 Iraqi Army troops launch a new of-
fensive in the Ma-Laab district of eastern Ramadi, Operation Tigers (Nimur).
November 30
Operation Iron Hammer conducted by Marine and Iraqi armed forces to rid
the Hai al-Becker region of insurgents traveling from Syria into Iraq.
December 2
Three hundred Marines from the 3d Battalion, 7th Marines, and 200 Iraqi Army
soldiers from the 1st Brigade, 7th Division, conduct Operation Harba (Shank)
in Ramadi to secure the Anbari capital for elections on 15 December.


Appendix D: Chronology of Events
185
December 15
The election for the Iraqi National Assembly. Operation Liberty Express pro-
vides security for polling.
December 17
Iraqi soldiers begin Operation Moonlight to disrupt insurgent activity along the
Euphrates River near the border with Syria.
2006
January 15–27
Marines with Battalion Landing Team 1/2, and Iraqi Army soldiers conduct
Operation Koa Canyon along the western Euphrates River Valley.
February 22
The bombing of the Golden Mosque in Samarra sparks an outbreak of sec-
tarian violence.
February 28
I Marine Expeditionary Force (Forward) assumes control of the Multi National
Force-West area of operations from II Marine Expeditionary Force (Forward).
March 9
U.S. Army LtGen Peter W. Chiarelli, commander of Multi National Corps-Iraq,
directs further investigation into events surrounding the 19 November 2005 at-
tack in Haditha.
April 7
The battalion commander of 3d Battalion, 1st Marines, as well as two company
commanders, are relieved of command amid the investigation into the Ha-
ditha shootings.
April 17
Marines repel an attack by Sunni Arab insurgents in Ramadi, when the insur-
gents launch a coordinated assault against the city's main government build-
ing and two U.S. observation posts. No U.S. casualties result from the
90-minute attack.
May 26
Gen Michael W. Hagee, Commandant of the Marine Corps, announces Marines
will face criminal charges for the November 2005 shootings in Haditha.
June 7
Al-Qaeda in Iraq leader Abu Masab al- Zarqawi killed in an air strike.
June 14-July 20
Operation Together Forward: U.S. and Iraqi Security Forces establish cur-
fews, security checkpoints, and more patrols in cities across Iraq.
June 17
1st Brigade Combat Team of the 1st Armored Division launches operations to
prevent Ramadi from become a center of al-Qaeda in Iraq.
August 8–October 24
Operation Together Forward II: 15,000 U.S. soldiers clear disputed areas and
cede security responsibilities to Iraqi soldiers. Iraqi troops ultimately fail to
secure the cleared cities.
Summer-Fall
U.S. Army LtCol Sean B. MacFarland of the 1st Brigade Combat Team begins
forging anti-al-Qaeda alliances with Iraqi tribal awakening councils.
September
Sheikh Sattar al-Rishawi of the Dulaimi confederation's Albu Risha tribe
launches a campaign against al-Qaeda in Iraq.
October
Marines from 1st Battalion, 6th Marines, commanded by LtCol William M. Ju-
rney fight to secure Ramadi in support of Awakening operations.


186
INTO THE FRAY
November 6
Saddam Hussein found guilty by Iraqi tribunal for the 1982 murder of 148
Shi’ites in Dujail and sentenced to death.
November 7
U.S. midterm elections end Republican control of both houses of Congress.
November 8
Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld resigns. His successor, Robert M.
Gates, is confirmed by the Senate on 8 December 2006.
December 21
Eight Marines are charged for the killings of 24 Iraqi civilians in Haditha in No-
vember 2005. Four of the Marines, all enlisted, are charged with unpremedi-
tated murder while four officers are accused of dereliction of duty for failures
in investigating and reporting the deaths.
December 30
Saddam Hussein executed.


188
INTO THE FRAY


Index
Abizaid, General John P. (USA), 1, 6-7, 37-38, 47, 51,
58, 130
Abu Ghraib, 21, 81, 105, 108,
Prison, 21, 29-30, 39, 42, 92,
See Camp, Abu Ghraib
Abu Hyat, 96, 123
ad-Diwaniyah, 41
Adelsperger, PFC Christopher S., 71, 155
Agency for International Development, 135
aircraft
AAI/IAI RQ-2B Pioneer, 64-65, 71, 136
Bell AH-1 Cobra, 97,
Bell AH-1W Super Cobra, 20, 36, 45, 48, 54,
64
Bell UH-1N Iroquois (Huey), 20, 36, 120
Boeing CH-47E Chinook, 121
Boeing ScanEagle, 64, 136
Boeing Vertol CH-46 Sea Knight, 15-16, 48-
49, 54, 98, 102, 122
General Atomics RQ-1/MQ-1 Predator, 64
General Dynamics F-16 Fighting Falcon, 36,
45
Grumman EA-6B Prowler, 48, 93, 124, 128
Lockheed AC-130 Spectre, 34, 36, 48, 50-51,
65-66, 71
Lockheed C-130 Hercules, 20, 81, 89, 139
Lockheed EC-130 Compass Call, 48
Lockheed EP-3 Orion, 48
Lockheed KC-130 Hercules, 14, 16, 20, 66,
93, 118
McDonnell Douglas AH-64 Apache, 50, 65
McDonnell Douglas AV-8B Harrier, 48, 53,
65-66, 93
McDonnell Douglas F/A-18 Hornet, 14, 60,
65-66, 93
McDonnell Douglas F-15E Strike Eagle, 61
Northrop Grumman E-8 Joint Surveillance
Target Attack Radar System (J-STARS), 125
Sikorsky CH-53D Sea Stallion, 144
Sikorsky CH-53E Super Stallion, 16, 48, 81,
102
aircraft operations, 63
Air-Ground Training Center, 89
Aitkin, Colonel William S., 139
Akashat, 95, 113
Al Bu Hardan Bridge, 119-20
Al Fajr (newspaper), 83
Al-Jazeera, 38, 95
Al-Amiriyah, 11, 45
Al-Anbar, 14, 15, 33, 40, 147, 148, 150
Brigade. See Iraqi Army, 113
civil affairs, 132–35
counterinsurgency, 115–21
election security, 80–83
insurgency, 8, 40, 42, 44-46, 79, 149
Iraqi military, 141-142, 147, 150
logistics, 136, 139-40
map, 10, 25-26, 93
operations, 19, 25, 30, 55, 105–8, 112–14
police, 142, 148
Province, 6, 11, 15, 31, 48, 51–53, 58, 76, 79,
86, 95, 123-26, 143, 145
voting, 129-30
Al-Andalus District, 73-74
Al-Asad, 27, 109, 143
Air Base, 20-21, 27, 45–49, 58, 60, 83, 89,
111, 117, 124, 129, 131, 136, 144
Camp. See Camp al-Asad, 93, 137
Marine units, 20, 36, 101
Regimental Combat Team 2, 90-91, 139
Regimental Combat Team 7, 14, 46–48
squadrons, 66, 84, 93-94, 125
3d Marine Aircraft Wing, 15
Al-Ash, 112
Al-Fallujah, 8,19, 29–39, 42–86, 88-89, 91–93, 95 102–
4, 107, 109, 111, 114–16, 118, 125, 130, 143-
44
Brigade, 40, 46,
Camp. See Camp, Fallujah
civil affairs in, 132–35
civilian contractors, 149
clearing operations, 55, 70, 73, 150
first battle of, 40, 44, 51, 59, 63, 91
hospital, 61, 67-68, 76
logistics, 139
model, 124, 142
Opening Gambit, 31
police, 148
second battle of, 58-60, 64, 66, 75, 77-78, 84,
126, 141
189


190
INTO THE FRAY
Regimental Combat Team 7, 20, 27-
28, 46, 48, 55, 83-84
Dogwood, 130
Fairbanks, 127, 130, 143-44
Jackson, 104
Manassas, 14, 21
Raleigh, 40, 79, 84–86, 93, 102-3, 109, 114,
133
map, 25
Alford, Lieutenant Colonel Julian D., 121, 127
Al-Habbaniyah, Lake, 19
Al-Habbaniyah (city), 114, 133
Al-Hajarah, (Southwestern Desert), 19
Al-Hillah (river), 19
Al-Hindiyyah (river), 19
Al-Karabalah, 100-1, 107-8, 119, 121, 126-27, 130
Al-Karmah, 38, 46, 48, 79, 91, 95, 102-3, 109, 132
Al-Khalidiyah, 79
Al-Kufah, 40, 50-51
Allawi, Ayad, 50, 54, 57
Al-Malaab District, 43
Al-Mahmudiyah, 11, 21, 48
Al-Milh, 19
Al-Musayyib, 35
Al-Qaeda, 23, 111, 122, 129
Al-Qaim, 19, 44, 48, 55, 90, 92, 98, 100-1, 108-9, 111-
13, 119-21, 123, 125-26, 130, 133, 139, 142, 148
garrison, 119, 127
Al-Qaim-Hit corridor, 118-19
al-Sadr, Moqtada, 25, 35, 40-42, 50-51,
al-Sadr Militia, 35, 40, 46, 50-51,
revolt, 39, 42, 44, 47-48, 50, 149
uprising. See revolt.
Al-Shahabi, 95
Al-Taqaddum, 20, 25, 28, 45, 103, 130, 136, 145
Air Base, 20, 54, 93, 111, 124
Camp, 20-21, 90
Al-Ubayd, 97-99, 119, 126-27, 134
Al-Walid, 45, 112-13, 130
Amariyah, 79
ambushed contractors, 31-32
Amos, Major General James F., 1, 6, 8, 20, 53-54, 90
amphibious assault vehicle, 39, 46, 71, 73, 87, 89, 98-
99, 120-21
Anah, 109, 112
An-Najaf, 1, 35, 41-43, 47, 49, 63, 79-80, 105, 107,
112, 130
holy city, 23-24
losses, 51
province, 50, 94, 114, 143
Shi'a majority, 24, 41, 82
Ansar al-Islam, 23
Ar Ar, 112
Ar’ar Wadi, 21
Arba'een pilgrimage, 38, 42
Area of Operations
Atlanta, 15, 19, 20, 25, 46, 88, 111, 139
Biloxi, 94, 112-114, 126, 139
Denver, 25-26, 58-59, 79, 90-91, 93, 97, 111
Regimental Combat Team 1, 83, 95
Regimental Combat Team 2, 96, 101,
116, 139
Regimental Combat Team 1, 21, 47,
83, 91
Regimental Combat Team 7, 44-45,
47
Regimental Combat Team 8, 111,
116, 139
Saber, 112-13, 120, 130
Topeka, 21, 25, 43, 79, 88, 93, 101, 111, 116
Tucson, 123, 125, 127
Army, U.S.
III Corps, 47
V Corps, 4, 141
1st Armored Division, 38, 41, 46, 48, 50
1st Cavalry Division, 41, 50, 53, 57, 79
2d (Black Jack) Brigade, 57, 61, 74,
80
5th Brigade (Provisional), 94
1st Infantry Division, 49, 57, 109
1st Brigade, 7, 14, 20-21, 28-29, 43-
44, 46, 52, 56
2d Battalion, 2d Infantry Regiment,
57
2d Infantry Division,
2d (Stryker) Brigade, 52, 56-57, 59,
61, 69, 73, 79, 84, 111
3d Infantry Division, 94, 103
4th Infantry Division
2d Brigade, 130
10th Mountain Division, 21
28th Infantry Division
2d Brigade, 111, 116, 121, 128, 144
42d Infantry Division, 95
82d Airborne Division, 3, 5, 8, 13, 14, 15, 16,
22, 25, 28-29, 145
3d Brigade, 14, 15, 29, 30
101st Airborne Division, 5
155th Brigade Combat Team, 79, 80, 90, 110,
127, 129-30, 137, 143-44
area of operations Biloxi, 112, 114,
139
area of operations Jackson, 104
home stations, 94
2d Armored Cavalry Regiment, 50
3d Armored Cavalry Regiment, 3, 5, 13–15,


Index
193
in western Euphrates River Valley, 84
Iraqi troops, 114
near Haditha Dam, 142
operations in Ramadi, 33
strategy, 105
Davis, Colonel Stephen W., 90, 96-97, 100-1, 108, 110,
112, 122, 126
Dawa Party, 25
Department of Border Enforcement, 112-13, 119, 130
Desert Protectors, 126
districts
Dulab, 108
Jolan, 29, 32, 34, 35, 37, 59, 62, 69–72, 75,
80, 85, 102
Muallimeen, 59
Sook, 59
Ekiert, Major General Andrzej, 49-50
elections, 82, 87-88, 105, 108, 113, 115, 125, 130, 133,
148
local, 5.
support of, 79–81, 91, 112, 116-17, 122, 149
voting, 126
enemy (Iraqi insurgent groups), 5, 21-22, 26, 34-35,
39, 43, 59-60, 62, 64, 70, 72, 74, 76, 80-81, 90, 95, 100,
108, 128, 141, 150-51
air strikes against, 136
center of gravity, 30
combat losses, 44, 98-99, 101, 104, 121, 123,
127
elements, 71, 75, 79
improvised explosive devices, 18
infiltration routes, 20
movement, 49
organizations, 23, 105
potential, 6
sanctuary, 9, 38, 45, 97, 103, 111
supplies, 11
surge,
42
territory, 37
urban combat, 75
Eskan patrol base, 79
Essex (LHD 2), 84
Euphrates River, 19-20, 26, 29, 31, 35, 61, 69, 73, 101,
109, 121-22, 127-28, 131
Old Bridge, 31
valley, 59, 84, 91, 111, 119, 125, 142, 147-48
Fall, 5
Fallujah. See Al-Fallujah
Faw Peninsula, 1
female Marines, 104, 131, 139
Fifth Fleet, 1
firm base, 33, 49, 79, 101, 123
1stLt Baldomero Lopez (T-AK 3010), 13
flight restriction templates, 63
Forkin, Major Keith A., 56
Formica, Colonel Michael, 58
Forward Operating Bases
Chosin, 48
Duke, 49
Falcon, 94
Hotel, 49
Furness, Lieutenant Colonel David J., 94
Gamboa, Lieutenant Colonel John D., 45
Gannon, Captain Richard J., 55
generators, 57, 95, 101, 139
Glavy, Lieutenant Colonel Matthew G., 58
Greenwood, Colonel Thomas C., 80, 94
gridded reference graphic, 65
Gronski, Colonel John, 111, 128
Gurganus, Colonel Charles M., 91, 102
Habbaniyah, 19, 114, 133
Haditha, 19, 46, 48, 90-91, 95, 112, 114, 120, 123, 130,
139
Dam, 19-20, 45, 48, 108, 110, 122, 131, 142
garrison, 109, 119
raids, 55, 99, 122
voting at, 125
Haditha-Hit corridor, 46, 48, 55, 91, 95-96, 125, 142
Hadrah Mosque, 70-71
Hagee, General Michael W., 1, 3-4, 51, 87, 131, 146
Hai al Becker district, 128
Hammadi, 101
Haqlaniyah, 81, 96, 110, 122-123
Haslam, Colonel Anthony M., 49-50, 79-80
Haswah police station, 79
Hatton, Lieutenant Colonel Jay L., 94
Hejlik, Brigadier General Dennis J., 50
Hezbollah, 23
Hibbinaya, 21
High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles
(HMMWV) “Humvee”, 16–18, 43, 61, 90, 94, 99, 103,
137
Highway,
1, 30
10, 29-30, 35-36, 53
E1, 29-30, 34–36, 47-48, 53
Hit, 19, 46, 90, 101, 109, 112, 119-20, 123, 127, 130,
139
civil affairs in, 134
garrison, 119, 143
interdiction in, 95, 101
security, 128
voting, 125
Howza, 24-25
Huck, Major General Richard A., 88-89, 108, 115-16,
118, 123, 125, 146, 148


194
INTO THE FRAY
human exploitation team, 12, 132
humanitarian assistance, 1, 5, 68, 73-74, 80-81, 83, 94
Hunter, Corporal Jeff S., 100
Husabayah, 127
Husaybah, 19, 25, 46, 48, 55, 59, 95, 100, 108, 111,
113, 118-19, 126-27, 130
Hussein, Saddam, 9, 19, 24, 40, 105
Imam Ali Shrine, 50-51
improvised explosive device, 12, 16, 18, 25, 28, 30,
49, 53, 59, 70, 82, 96, 103-4, 111, 115, 140, 148
Independent Election Commission of Iraq (IECI), 80-
81, 115, 117-18, 123, 129
individual augmentees, 22
information warfare, 38
insurgency, 4-5, 8-9, 16-18, 22-23, 27, 38, 40, 44, 50,
54, 59-60, 75, 79, 84-85, 97, 105, 141, 148-50
insurgents, 8–10, 15, 17-18, 21, 23, 27-28, 30–40, 42–
46, 48, 50, 53, 55-56, 59–63, 67–71, 73–76, 78, 80–82,
86, 92, 95–104, 106, 109–11, 115, 117-18, 121, 125–28,
133-34, 139, 141, 143, 148–50
intelligence, 6, 9, 12-13, 23-24, 27, 30, 38, 44, 46, 49,
52, 54, 59-60, 95, 98-99, 103, 111-12, 115-16, 136
Iran, 23-25
Iraq, 1-12
Army, 5, 35, 40, 54, 63, 67, 87, 96, 101, 109,
113-114, 119, 122–30, 141, 144, 147-48, 150
Civil Defense Corps, 6, 27, 32, 35, 42, 45, 47,
53, 87, 149-50
intelligence service, 9
interim government, 4-5, 8, 23, 39, 44, 47, 53,
57, 59-60, 66-67, 87-88, 105
Islamic Party, 22
military units,
1st Division, 114,
1st Brigade, 120, 140
1st Battalion, 114,
126
2d Battalion, 114,
122
2d Brigade,
3d Battalion, 108
3d Brigade, 111
4th Brigade,
1st Battalion, 109
7th Division, 114, 124,
1st Brigade,
1st Battalion, 122
2d Battalion, 108,
122, 128
3d Battalion, 122
2d Brigade,
1st Battalion, 127-
28
3d Brigade, 120, 123
2d Battalion, 122
7th Reconnaissance Battal-
ion, 122
8th Division, 114
2d Special Police Commando
Brigade, 128-29
2d Battalion, Muthanna Brigade, 81,
103
36th Commando Battalion, 32, 35,
39, 50-51, 61, 67, 144
404th (Iraqi National Guard) Battal-
ion, 50
405th Battalion, 51
503d (Iraqi National Guard) Battal-
ion, 90, 96
504th Battalion, 96
505th Battalion, 39
506th Battalion, 35
507th Battalion, 45
7th Reconnaissance Company, 96
Shahwani Special Forces, 47, 96, 100
1st Division, 2d Battalion, 109-10
1st Brigade, 1st Battalion, 114
1st Brigade, 2d Battalion, 101, 114
1st Brigade, 4th Battalion, 50
2d Brigade, 2d Battalion, 142
3d Brigade, 6th Battalion, 61
4th Brigade, 2d Battalion, 100
2d Battalion, 35
4th Battalion, 70
Ministry of Defense, 114
National Assembly, 82-83, 87, 125, 133
National Guard, 35, 47-48, 50-51, 67, 90, 95-
96, 114, 150
Reconstruction Management Office, 135
Republican Guard, 9, 96
security forces, 5, 11, 22, 33, 42, 47–51, 53–
55, 59, 67, 74, 79, 81, 87-88, 92, 102, 104–8,
114-15, 124, 129, 139-40, 142, 147-48, 150
special forces, 47, 96, 107, 111, 120, 126
transitional government, 87, 115, 125, 132
Iron Mountain, 63
Iskandariyah, 11, 48, 110
Islamic Fundamentalist Republic, 23
al-Jafari, Ibrahim, 83
Jamaili, Muhammed, 125
Jazirah, 111, 130
joint direct attack munition (JDAM), 65, 111
Johnson, Colonel R. J., 49, 57, 79
Johnson, Corporal Robert W., 106
Johnson, Major General Stephen T., 87-88, 90, 105,
123, 130, 141, 143, 146–48


Index
195
Joint Chiefs of Staff, 83, 87-88
joint staff, 3, 8, 54
Jolan, 35, 59, 69, 72, 75
cemetery, 69
district, 32, 34, 37, 62, 70-71, 75, 80, 85
park, 62, 70, 102
quarter, 29
Jordan, 9, 19-20, 57, 67, 79, 95, 113, 147
Jubeil, 75
Jurf as Sakhr, 38, 42, 45, 46, 80
Karbala, 23, 38, 41, 47, 79, 80, 82, 94, 105, 107, 112,
114, 143
province, 80
Karmah, 38, 46, 48, 79, 91, 95, 102-3, 109, 132
Kasal, 1stSgt Bradley A., 72
Kearsarge (LHD 3), 49
Kelly, Brigadier General John F., 31, 38, 46
keyhole template, 63-64, 76–78
Kimmitt, Brigadier General Mark (USA), 31
Kirkush military training base,
Kosid, Lieutenant Colonel Robert R., 143
Kraft, Sergeant Jarrett A., 74
Kramlich, Brigadier General Richard S., 1, 6-7, 9, 20
Kubaysah, 96, 111
Kufa mosque, 50
Kurds, 23, 82-83, 115
soldiers, 150
Kuwait, 1, 2, 13, 21, 46, 49, 51, 58, 79-80, 83-84, 88-
89, 94, 139
La Vine, Colonel James K., 123, 125, 127
Lake Qadisiyah, 19
Lake Tharthar, 19, 95, 102-3, 109, 143
Lee, Lieutenant Jeffrey T., 70,
light armored vehicle (LAV-25), 25, 61, 71
Liles, Lieutenant Colonel Donald J., 128
lines of operation, 11, 105-106
Litening targeting pod, 53, 63, 65, 99
Lopez, Lieutenant Colonel Matthew A., 48
Madaysis, 21
Mahdi army, 35, 40, 41-42
militia, 50-51
Maintenance Center, Marine Corps Logistics Com-
mand, Albany, Georgia, 89
March Air Force Base, California, 89
Maritime Prepositioned Squadron, 2, 3, 13
Marine Corps,
aviation units,
2d Marine Aircraft Wing (2d MAW),
87, 90, 92, 94, 111, 115, 125, 136,
140
3d Marine Aircraft Wing (3d MAW),
1, 6, 13–16, 20, 45, 49, 53-54, 58, 63-
64, 66, 76, 81, 84, 92, 144
Marine Aircraft Group 16 (MAG-16),
20, 144
Marine Aircraft Group 26 (MAG-26),
87, 93, 136, 144
Marine Air Control Group 38
(MACG-38), 20
Marine Wing Support Group 37
(MWSG-37), 20
Marine All Weather Fighter Attack
Squadron 242 (VMFA[AW]-242), 66,
68
Marine Attack Squadron 211 (VMA-
211), 66
Marine Attack Squadron 214 (VMA-
214), 53, 66
Marine Attack Squadron 311 (VMA-
311), 66
Marine Attack Squadron 542 (VMA-
542), 66
Marine Heavy Helicopter Squadron
361 (HMH-361), 81-82
Marine Medium Helicopter
Squadron 161 (HMM-161), 54
Marine Medium Helicopter
Squadron 163 (HMM-163), 125
Marine Medium Helicopter
Squadron 165 (HMM-165), 94
Marine Medium Helicopter
Squadron 166 (HMM-166), 49
Marine Medium Helicopter
Squadron 263 (HMM-263), 49
Marine Medium Helicopter
Squadron 265 (HMM-265), 58, 83
Marine Unmanned Aerial Vehicle
Squadron 1 (VMU-1), 65, 136
Marine Unmanned Aerial Vehicle
Squadron 2 (VMU-2), 65, 136
Marine Wing Headquarters
Squadron 3, 20
Marine Wing Support Squadron 374
(MWSS-374), 30
casualties, 52, 78, 148
Combat Development Command, 54
ground units,
Headquarters US Marine Corps, 2
Marine Logistics Command, 1, 16,
89-90
Special Purpose Marine Air-Ground
Task Force, 1
1st Marine Division, 1, 6-7, 13–15,
20-21, 23, 25, 30-31, 35, 38, 40, 42–
44, 46–49, 52-53, 55–59, 69, 74–76,
78, 84, 87–89, 94-95, 145, 149


196
INTO THE FRAY
2d Marine Division, 84, 87–89, 94,
102-103, 106, 108, 111, 112, 114–17,
120, 124-25, 127, 129–31,
133-34, 137, 144-45
4th Marine Division, 28, 89, 111,
131-32
I Marine Expeditionary Force (I
MEF), 1–4, 8, 13, 15, 19, 28, 31, 56,
87, 95, 149
II Marine Expeditionary Force (II
MEF), 54, 79, 86–88, 90, 93, 95-96,
105, 115, 141, 147
III Marine Expeditionary Force (III
MEF), 87
Regimental Combat Team 1 (RCT-1),
7, 14, 21, 28–31, 33, 36, 38, 42, 44
49, 53, 55–58, 60–62, 64, 68-69, 71–
73, 74, 80-81, 83, 85, 91, 95
Regimental Combat Team 2 (RCT-2),
90-91, 95-96, 98–101, 108–14, 116,
119–20, 122-23, 125–27, 132-33, 139
Regimental Combat Team 5 (RCT-5),
87
Regimental Combat Team 7 (RCT-7),
14-15, 19, 21, 25, 27-28, 30, 35-36,
40, 44–49, 53, 55–62, 64–66, 68-69,
71, 73-74, 81, 83–86, 90, 95, 128
Regimental Combat Team 8 (RCT-8),
87, 91-92, 102–104, 108-109, 111,
116, 134-35, 139
1st Marine Expeditionary Brigade
(1st MEB), 1
2d Brigade, 91, 103, 106, 108, 113-
14
11th Marine Expeditionary Unit
(11th MEU (SOC)), 42, 49, 51, 79-80
13th Marine Expeditionary Unit
(13th MEU), 1, 123, 125–27, 130
15th Marine Expeditionary Unit
(15th MEU), 80, 94
22d Marine Expeditionary Unit (22d
MEU), 130, 143-44
24th Marine Expeditionary Unit
(24th MEU), 49, 51, 57, 59, 79, 93
25th Brigade, 114
31st Marine Expeditionary Unit (31st
MEU), 3, 49, 51, 56, 58-59, 66, 82, 84
1 st Marines
1st Battalion (1/1), 1, 94
2d Battalion (2/1), 21, 29–
32, 34-36, 47-48, 61, 125–28
3d Battalion (3/1), 33, 68–
71, 73-74, 112, 122, 142
2d Marines
1st Battalion (1/2), 47, 49,
79-80, 143
2d Battalion (2/2), 21, 29,
34, 46, 48-49, 122-23, 128
3d Battalion (3/2), 90, 97-
101, 107–11, 121, 136
3d Marines
1st Battalion (1/3), 51, 58,
62, 69–71, 74, 82-83, 91
2d Battalion (2/3), 51
4th Marines
1st Battalion (1/4), 49-50
2d Battalion (2/4), 7, 14, 21,
28, 43
3d Battalion (3/4), 20, 27,
36, 39, 42, 45, 46, 48-49, 91-
92, 103-4, 106
5th Marines
1st Battalion (1/5), 21, 29,
32, 34, 36, 39, 48, 91, 101,
108, 117
2d Battalion (2/5), 56, 82,
91
3d Battalion (3/5), 68–72,
74, 144
6th Marines
1st Battalion (1/6), 91-92,
102-4, 108
2d Battalion (2/6), 128
3d Battalion (3/6), 111, 113,
120-21, 126-27, 130
7th Marines
1st Battalion (1/7), 1, 16, 55,
59, 90
2d Battalion (2/7), 27, 45-
46, 144
3d Battalion (3/7), 20, 25,
27, 45-46, 48, 55, 122, 128
8th Marines
1st Battalion (1/8), 49, 51,
63-64, 66, 69–71, 73, 85, 91
3d Battalion (3/8), 91, 102–
4, 112
10th Marines
1st Battalion (1/10), 91, 104
3d Battalion (3/10), 91
5th Battalion (5/10), 59
11th Marines,
1st Battalion (1/11), 36, 125
2d Battalion (2/11), 45, 57
3d Battalion (3/11), 21, 28,
131


Index
199
Rumsfeld, Donald H., 3
Russell, First Lieutenant David T., 101
Rutbah, 20, 27, 55, 59, 101, 120, 125, 133, 143
Sadr,
city, 41
Sanguine Thunder, 107
Scimitar, 111
Southern Fire, 111
Southern Hunter, 128
Spear, 100, 107
Steel Curtain, 118, 120-21, 125–27
Strong Will, 94
Sunrise, 107
Sword, 101
Terrapin I, 57
Terrapin II, 57
Terrapin III, 95
Trifecta, 123, 128
Vigilant Resolve, 31–36, 39, 41-42, 44, 63, 66
Vital Ground, 111
Warning Track, 94
Western Shield, 143
White Feather, 92, 102
Zaidon Focus, 102
Patton, Colonel Gary S., 52, 56
Pennella, Captain Brad S., 36
personal body armor, 16–18
phase line
Ethan, 70
Fran, 70-71
George, 69
Henry, 70-71
PFC William B. Baugh (T-AK 3001), 13
Put Franklin J. Phillips (T-AK 3004), 13
Provincial Civil Military Operations Center, 133-34
Provincial Reconstruction Development Committee,
116, 133-34
Qadisiyah, 19, 50, 109, 112
Mahdi Army, 40
Mahdi Militia, 50
Sanchez, Lieutenant General Ricardo S. (USA), 46,
31-32, 38, 41, 47
Saqlawiyah, 28, 38, 47, 79, 92, 108
Sattler, Lieutenant General John F., 54, 56, 58, 60, 79,
87
Saudi Arabia, 9, 14, 21, 23, 27, 112-13, 147
Seabees, 6, 68, 73, 119
security, 5, 13, 19, 21, 27, 29, 45, 47, 60, 80–83, 87-
88, 129-30, 149-50
Azerbaijani company, 45, 108
forces, 5-6, 21, 33, 42, 47-48, 50-51, 55, 74,
105–9, 115-16, 124, 140, 142
operations, 1, 3, 7-8, 11, 14, 16, 30,
shaping operations, 60-61
Shea, Major Kevin M., 56
Shi'a, 9, 11, 23-24, 38, 40–42, 50, 82, 115, 141, 150
Shi'ite, 23, 25, 149
Shuhada, 75
Shuhada (Martyrs) District, 59
Shupp, Colonel Michael A., 56, 58, 60, 69, 71–74, 85
Sin’a District, 35
Sistani, Ayatollah , 23, 25, 51,
Skaggs, Captain Michael D., 37
Smith, Captain Jason E., 39
Smith, Corporal Eric M., 43-44
Souq, 75
South Dam Village, 142
Southwestern Desert, 19
special forces, 125-26
stabilization operations, 49, 56, 73, 75
Stalder, Major General Keith J., 54, 68
Stann, Second Lieutenant Brian M., 98-99
Stoddard, Captain Kyle, 34
Stryker Brigade, See 2d Infantry Division
suicide vehicle bombs, 97
Sunni, 5, 9, 11, 19, 22–24, 26, 39, 82-83, 86, 105, 114–
16, 125, 129, 141, 149–51
Triangle, 8, 22, 29, 149
Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq,
23-24
Swannack, Major General Charles H., Jr. (USA), 15
Syria, 8–10, 19–21, 25, 27, 45, 59, 67, 79, 112–14, 119,
126, 147
Syrian Desert, 19
Tactical Fusion Center, 30
Taheer Firm Base, 79
Ramadi. See Ar-Ramadi
Ramana, 98
Bridge, 98
Ramos, Lieutenant Colonel Michael R., 58
Rawah, 19, 27, 44, 48, 95, 109, 112, 119-120, 123, 125
patrol base, 20
combat outpost, 112
Rawi, Ammar, 125
regimental combat teams, 6, 57-58, 62
Regional Reconstruction Operation Center, 135
Reist, Brigadier General David G., 146
Renforth, Lieutenant Colonel Austin E., 120
reservists, 2, 4, 52, 131
Richtsmeier, Colonel David M., 145
Route,
8, 79, 94
10, 44, 53, 59, 62, 69–71, 73, 82, 125
12, 125
E1, 36, 47-48, 53