103 0 6
D
1-2 ilk 1/6
GRAD
DS
318.85
.167
2011
SADDAM'S GENERALS
Perspectives of the Iran Iraq War
Kevin M. Woods, Williamson Murray, Elizabeth A. Nathan, Laila Sabara, Ana M. Venegas
DEPOSITSD BY
USD STATES OF AMERICA


NIVERSITY OF MIC
LILIDARIES
UR
VERS
MICHIGAN
1811


SADDAM’S GENERALS





SADDAM'S GENERALS
Perspectives of the Iran Iraq War
Kevin M. Woods, Williamson Murray, Elizabeth A. Nathan, Laila Sabara, Ana M. Venegas
Institute for Defense Analyses
2011


Final
July 2010
IDA Document D-4121
Log: H 10-000765/1
Copy
This work was conducted under contract DASW01-04-C-003, Task
ET-8-2579, “Study on Military History (Project 1946—Phase II)" for
the National Intelligence Council. The publication of this IDA
document does not indicate endorsement by the Department of
Defense, nor should the contents be construed as reflecting the
official position of the Agency.
© 2010 Institute for Defense Analyses, 4850 Mark Center Drive,
Alexandria, Virginia 22311-1882 • (703) 845-2000.
This material may be reproduced by or for the U.S. Government
pursuant to the copyright license under the clause at DFARS
252.227-7013 (November 1995).


Interview: Lieutenant General Abid Mohammed al-Kabi.
151
Section 13: Personal Background - History of Iraqi Navy · Expansion of Naval
Involvement in Iran-Iraq War - Preparation for Iran-Iraq War - Foreign Technology 151
Section 14: Defensive Naval Operations (1980–82) • Offensive Naval Operations (1982–86)
• Naval Operations after the Loss of Fao (1986–88) • Intelligence Capabilities
and Bombing of USS Stark.
159
Section 15: Shatt al-Arab • Attacks on Iranian Oil Terminals - Loss of Fao (1986)
Bombing of USS Stark • Recovery of Fao (1988).
160
Section 16: Intelligence Capabilities - Development of Navy and Naval Operations
Significance of Iranian Operations - Saddam and Senior Leadership .
177
Interview: Major General ‘Alwan Hassoun ‘Alwan al-Abousi
.... 185
Section 17: Personal Background - State of Iraqi Air Force Readiness . Initial Air Strikes
(Fall 1980) - Planning and Training - Foreign Technology · Saddam's Personality
Intelligence and the Bombing of Osirak Reactor
185
Section 18: Long-range Strikes · Military Cooperation - Foreign Technology - Chemical
Weapons - Intelligence.
199
Section 19: Attitudes toward the Air Force · Air Defense Systems - Bombing of USS
Stark ........
204
Section 20: Senior Leadership Foreign Assistance - Iraqi F-1s Shot Down by Saudi F-
15s during First Gulf War . Evacuation of Iraqi Fighters to Iran during First Gulf War
War of the Cities ...
207
Appendix A: References
A-1
Appendix B: Place Names Index and Reference Maps
B-1
Map 1. Iraq, with North, Central and South regions outlined.
....B-2
Map 2A. Southern Iraq. Iraqi offensives, 1980.
B-3
Map 2B. Southern Iraq. Extent of Iraqi advances, 1981–82; Iranian offensives;
Extent of Iranian advances during the war; Basra defenses 1982–87.
......B-4
Map 2C. Southern Iraq. Iraqi offensives, 1988. .......
B-5
Map 3A. Central Iraq. Iraqi offensives, 1980........
B-6
Map 3B. Central Iraq. Extent of Iraqi advances, 1981–82; Iranian offensives;
Extent of Iranian advances during the war.
B-7
Map 3C. Central Iraq. Iraqi offensives, 1988. ........
..... B-8
Map 4A. Northern Iraq. Iraqi offensives, 1980.
B-9
Map 4B. Northern Iraq. Extent of Iraqi advances, 1981–82; Iranian offensives;
Extent of Iranian advances during the war....
B-10
Map 5. Persian Gulf, Tanker War
B-11
Map 6. Persian Gulf, Air raids on Iranian islands.
B-12
Map 7. Persian Gulf, Attack on Larak Island with mid-air refueling.
B-13
Appendix C: Index of Themes..
C-1
Bibliography ........
C-2
vi


Foreword
Perhaps the only thing less insightful than the history of a war written solely by its winner is
one written exclusively by nonparticipants. The complex mix of drivers, decisions, and
perspectives that animate a war's senior leaders are often lost or obscured under the best of
circumstances. This problem is exacerbated when examining a war between closed regimes
such as occurred with Iran and Iraq in the 1980s. While the perspectives of former senior Iraqi
leaders contained in this monograph are not without biases and should be judged in light of
other sources, they offer an important glimpse into a previously closed world. The study of
the Iran Iraq War based on the perspective of senior Iraqi participants offers valuable
historical insights and will serve as a useful resource for analysts and scholars seeking to
understand distant conflicts.
This study was inspired by post-World War II efforts of U.S. Army historians and
intelligence officers to gather and preserve insights and perspectives of the German General
Staff. This is the second volume in a series of studies, sponsored by the National Intelligence
Council, designed to cast light on issues involving Saddam's Iraq by interviewing former
Iraqi officials. The first volume, Saddam's War: An Iraqi Military Perspective of the Iran-
Iraq War, contained interviews with Lieutenant General Ra'ad Hamdani, a former Iraqi
Republican Guard Corps commander. This second volume includes an additional interview
with Hamdani, along with four additional senior officers who discuss issues including Iraqi
naval operations, airpower, military intelligence, and capability development.
I am encouraged that these interviews, along with captured records from Saddam's regime in
the Conflict Records Research Center, Institute for National Strategic Studies, at the National
Defense University are beginning to break open the “black box” of Iraqi decisionmaking
under Saddam. It is important that this material be made available in a way that can help
inform a rising generation of policymakers, analysts, and scholars.
-Major General John R. Landry, USA (Ret.)
National Intelligence Officer for Military Issues
National Intelligence Council
vii


Introduction
The following is the second volume in the Project 1946 series. The project title refers to the
efforts of a team of U.S. Army historians and intelligence officers who, in the wake of World
War II sought to understand what had occurred on the “other side of the hill.” Their partners in
this effort were a select group of former German generals. Through the use of personal,
organizational, and campaign histories, as well as the review of captured German records, these
researchers forever changed the world's
understanding of the war. In over a decade of
work, the German program produced more than
500 monographs, covering an array of strategic,
operational, and tactical issues. In 1961, a key
participant in the program, former Colonel-General
Franz Halder, was presented an award in the name
of President Kennedy for “lasting contributions to
the tactical and strategic thinking of the United
States Armed Forces.”2 The program’s diverse
utility and lasting impact is evident in such projects
as the acclaimed official histories of World War II
(the Green Books), the development of early Cold
War doctrines, and the regional studies that
informed U.S. operations in the Balkans late into
the 1990s.
Franz Halder (left) briefing General
Despite the generally positive legacy of the Brauchitsch on the Poland campaign in
German example, the program affords some October 1939.

Bundesarohiv, Bild 183-H27722
Foto: o.Ang. I 1930
Franz Halder, former chief of the General Staff of the German Army led a series of research programs with
his former colleagues in support of various US Army military history projects and foreign military studies
programs in the decade following World War II. Image courtesy of the Deutsches Bundesarchiv, Bild 183-
H27722.
Cited in James A. Wood, “Captive Historians, Captivated Audience: The German Military History Program,
1945–1961,” The Journal of Military History 69, no. 1 (2005), 124.
2
1


important cautions that are applicable to Project 1946. The motivations of the individual
participants ranged from noble to base. Some of the former German officers saw cooperating
with the Americans as a way to bolster Germany's defense from the its historic and now
growing menace to the east. Halder wrote as much to his American sponsor soon after accepting
his task, “I have undertaken this task because I am of the opinion, that...we will be in a position
to make an intellectual contribution to the defensive potential of the West.” Other officers
sought to solidify the myth of the apolitical Wehrmacht or to draw a distinction between
themselves and the crimes of the regime they served. In addition to deliberate bias, there are, no
doubt, inadvertent gaps in the telling. On topics large and small, and as is the case with all
memoirs, the participants in Project 1946 suffer to some degree from “selective memory
syndrome. "4
Despite these limitations, the value of this and related efforts should be judged on its
ability to fill gaps in an otherwise limited collection of primary sources material on the Iran-
Iraq War. With the conclusion of decades of mistrust and more than a dozen years of conflict
between the United States and the Ba’ath regime in Iraq, a rare opportunity exists to develop a
deeper understanding of recent military history from the point of view of former adversaries.
If continued interest can be taken as a metric of value then this and related research efforts-
such as the U.S. Joint Forces Command's Iraqi Perspectives Project (IPP) and the Department
of Defense’s Conflict Records Research Center (CRRC)indicate healthy and continuing
institutional desire to learn from history.
3
4
Cited in Ronald M. Smelser, Edward J. Davies, The Myth of the Eastern Front: The Nazi-Soviet War in
American Popular Culture (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 70.
Wood, “Captive Historians, Captivated Audiance: The German Military History Program, 1945–1961,” 126.
For additional information on the strengths and limitations of this approach, see Kevin Soutor, “To Stem the
Red Tide: The German Report Series and Its Efforts on American Defense Doctrine,” The Journal of
American Military History 57, no. 4 (1993), 653–88; Wolfram Wette, The Wehrmacht: History, Myth,
Reality, trans. Deborah Lucas Schneider (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2006); Russel A. Hart,
Guderian: Panzer Pioneer or Myth Maker?, ed. Dennis E. Showalter, Military Profiles (Washington:
Potomac Books, Inc., 2006).
Related research includes Kevin M. Woods, Williamson Murray, Thomas Holaday, Saddam's War: An Iraqi
Perspective of the Iran-Iraq War, McNair Paper 70 (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press,
2009); Kevin M. Woods, Michael Pease, Mark E. Stout, Williamson Murray, James G. Lacey, The Iraqi
Perspectives Report: Saddam's Senior Leadership on Operation Iraqi Freedom from the Official U.S. Joint
Forces Command Report (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2006); Kevin M. Woods, James Lacey, Williamson
Murray, “Saddam's Delusions: The View from the Inside,” Foreign Affairs 85, no. 3 (2006); Kevin M. Woods,
The Mother of All Battles: Saddam Hussein's Strategic Plan for the Persian Gulf War, Official U.S. Joint
Forces Command Report (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2008); Kevin M. Woods, Mark E. Stout, “Saddam's
Perceptions and Misperceptions: The Case of 'Desert Storm”,” Journal of Strategic Studies 33, no. 1 (2010).
5
2



Members of the Project 1946 research team interview former Iraqi Major General
Aladdin Makki (center) about his experiences as an Iraqi Army Corps Chief of Staff,
Director of Developments, and Commandant of the Iraqi War College during the
Iran-Iraq War (Cairo, Egypt, November 2009)
The focus of the interviews in this Project 1946 monograph, as with the first, is the Iran-
Iraq War (1980–88). This conflict is relevant more than 20 years after its conclusion for
numerous reasons, but four are prominent.
First, given the totalitarian nature of both participants, available data on one of the
bloodiest conventional wars of the 20th century remains limited and heavily biased. While
primary sources from within Iran remain almost non-existent, the opportunity to fully develop
the Iraqi point-of-view will go a long way to illuminating this blind spot.
Second, many of the factors that precipitated the war in 1980—longstanding border
disputes, regional ambitions, local religious and ethnic strife, and geopolitical tensions-
remain in various forms. Anyone remotely familiar with the history of the Middle East can
hope, but not be assured, that tensions between neighboring states will not spark a future war.
The political and military history of past wars, to paraphrase Mark Twain, may not repeat, but
sometimes, they do rhyme.
Third, the Iran-Iraq War saw the development and extensive use of weapons of mass
destruction in a regional war. Iraq's experience as a regional power that developed and
deployed chemical weapons, improved delivery methods, and strove to develop a nuclear
weapons program, may provide a richer source of insights into proliferation than the Cold
War experience of the West.
در


Finally, the context and character of warfare in this region have always been something
of an enigma to outsiders. The debates in the West over changes in modern war, questions of
whether there is such a thing as an Arab “way-of-war,” understanding the modalities of
warfare in this politically and physically challenging region will all benefit from an in-depth
study of the Iraqi perspective.
With the assistance of General Ra'ad Hamdani (the subject of the first Project 1946
monograph), the project's researchers interviewed Iraqi veterans of that long and bloody
campaign. Those interviewed offered perspectives ranging from general strategy, the
Republican Guard, air force, navy, and intelligence, to operations and combat developments.
In each case, the interviewees worked with the research team by providing background
information on their particular experiences and, in several cases, detailed personal histories.
Each officer brought his own perspective to the questions and issues raised by the research
team. Some were more comfortable discussing controversial topics than others, but each
added significantly to our general understanding and opened the door to new lines of inquiry.
* * * * *
This monograph is composed of two parts. First is an overview essay that summarizes the
major insights derived from the totality of discussion contained in the second part. The second
part contains five interviews conducted during a seven-day period in three countries. The
interviews were conducted in both Arabic and English. The transcribed and translated
recordings of the interviews, augmented by notes taken at the time and other correspondence
with the interviewees, constitute the basis of this manuscript. In editing the text for clarity, the
authors endeavored to retain the original meaning. The editing process necessarily took into
account the difference between the spoken and written word, differences in technical military
language, and issues of transliteration. Any errors introduced during this process are the
responsibility of the authors and not of the participants in this project.
4


Summary and Analysis
This monograph represents a continuation of a series of research efforts designed to extend
the knowledge of the contemporary Middle East, military history, and Iraqi military
effectiveness during the course of three major wars: the Iran-Iraq War, the First Gulf War, and
Operation Iraqi Freedom. This second volume is based on interviews with figures significant
in the Iran-Iraq War, extensive examination and study of captured Iraqi records, and a review
of secondary sources. The interviews presented here involve not only lengthy discussions with
Lieutenant General Ra'ad Majid Rashid al-Hamdani, staff officer and battalion commander
during the Iran-Iraq War, whom the Project 1946 research team had interviewed before, but
similar types of discussions with a number of senior Iraqi military leaders who played key
parts in the Iran-Iraq War. These were Major General Mizher Rashid al-Tarfa al-Ubaydi, a
senior officer and section leader in Iraq's military intelligence service dealing with Iran during
the conflict; Major General (ret) Aladdin Hussein Makki Khamas, corps chief of staff,
division commander, and director of Iraq's Combat Development Directorate during the war;
Lieutenant General Abid Mohammed al-Kabi, commander-in-chief of the Iraqi Navy from
1982 to 1988; and Major General ‘Alwan Hassoun ‘Alwan al-Abousi, a squadron and wing
commander during the conflict.?
As a result of these interviews, the Project 1946 team deepened and extended its
understanding of a number of aspects and incidents during the period. Among the insights
gained were:
the growth of Iraqi intelligence capabilities during the war's course,
the growth of Saddam's perceptions on the nature of war and his broadening
understanding of the naval and air wars,
the development of Iraqi military doctrine,
the lack of a clear strategic or operational vision among Iraq's leaders, military as
well as civilian, at the beginning of the war, and
6
7
Interviews done to support this monograph were conducted from November 4–14, 2009.
General Kabi served in the Iraqi Navy throughout his career, but that organization used army ranks for its
officers.
5


the difficulties the Iraqis confronted in incorporating technology and modern
conceptions of war into military organizations that did not possess a high level of
education.
Background
During a 10-day period, the team from the Institute for Defense Analyses interviewed five
senior Iraqi generals in three different locations: Amman, Dubai, and Cairo. All five subjects
cooperated enthusiastically. They possessed detailed knowledge of military operations in
different areas and of the changing nature of the battlefield as both sides adapted during the
course of eight years of bloody war. To varying degrees, the generals possessed secular
outlooks, reflecting their educational backgrounds. Perhaps most importantly, they were
serious military professionals. They were also hostile to the Persians to varying degrees and
regarded the Shi’a politicians currently in power in Baghdad as mere tools in Iranian hands.8
Not surprisingly, given their attitudes toward the present government and Iran, they were
pessimistic about Iraq's future under Shi’a leadership.
For the most part, the interviews did not contradict currently held views on the course of
the Iran-Iraq War. But they did considerably extend knowledge in a number of areas and
provided new insights into the conduct and support of operations by the Iraqi high command.
This was particularly true of the intelligence area, where research has thus far examined only
scattered Iraqi estimates and perceptions of the Persian enemy. We also believe that the view
of Saddam Hussein's personality—as well as of his leadership style and ability to adapt to the
war's strategic, operational, and tactical conditions-will be more nuanced and realistic as a
result of these interviews.
Throughout our discussions the generals agreed that Saddam had been a disaster for Iraq
and its people. But at the same time, they painted a picture of a complex individual who often
showed considerable insight into where the war was going and, at times, what needed to be
done. Moreover, they agreed that there was a deep conflict within Saddam's psychological
makeup between on one hand, his love for “Bedouin” commanders whose only qualifications
were their courage, and on the other for technologically and tactically capable professional
8
One of the generals who was critical of Saddam and Ba’athist rule—particularly of its impact on the
professionalism of the officer corps—nevertheless ascribed the March 1991 uprising against the regime as
the result of Iranian agents subverting Iraq's Shi'a masses and not the result of a spontaneous rebellion
against the regime's incompetence for having invaded Kuwait.
General Tarfa, who is still closely following events in Iran, admitted that the present regime in Tehran is in
serious trouble and could collapse. Nevertheless, he still insisted that without external intervention, the
clerics in Iran would still control Iraq in the future.
9
6


officers who understood the demands of modern war. As the war unfolded, Saddam
increasingly came to rely on the latter for advice and responsibility for major operations, but
he never entirely gave up on the former in terms of major military appointments.
In addition to the interviews, the Iraqi generals each provided short personal
monographs, which, due to limited resources, are not included in this paper. These documents
obviously contain information and, more importantly, insights into the nature of the Iraqi
military and the conduct of military operations that can deepen knowledge and understanding
of the conflict. Not surprisingly, the generals were not eager to talk about the use of chemical
weapons by Iraq's military. General Abousi, for example, stated that he had no knowledge of
the air force's use of such weapons. Due to the compartmentalization of such information
within the military, it is possible, though unlikely, that some senior individuals did not know
about the use of chemical weapons in other parts of Iraq. However, the Project 1946 research
team has learned from captured Iraqi military records that the mass use of chemical weapons
by Iraqi air units was ordered in response to the successful Iranian attack on the Fao Peninsula
in February 1987. From other discussions with former members of the Ba’ath regime during
the past 6 years, members of the Project 1946 team believe the lack of recall is likely more
related to fear of legal or other jeopardy than to fading memories or a determination to hide
details of established events. Outside of the issue of chemical weapons, those interviewed
were generally willing to talk about their experiences in an open and engaged fashion.
Perhaps what was most surprising was the virulence of their anti-Persian and anti-Shi’a
feelings—one of the generals going so far as to suggest that he would rather have diplomatic
relations with Israel than with the Persians.'' He added that he would never go to Tehran given
the killings for which their leadership was responsible during the post-2003 occupation.
Origins and Planning for War
Work done thus far by the Project 1946 research team suggests that Iraq wandered into the
conflict with no clear set of strategic or operational objectives and with seriously flawed
assumptions. This view rests on captured documents of the Iraqi military and government and
transcripts of recorded conversations between Saddam and Iraq's military and civilian leaders
in summer 1980.
In general, the interviews confirmed the supposition that Iranian actions, overt as well as
covert, played a considerable role in goading Saddam into his decision to launch Iraq's
10
Not exactly Saddam's view of the world. The dictator had reissued a book written by his uncle entitled,
Three Whom God Should Not Have Created: Persians, Jews, and Flies.
7.


military forces into Iran on September 22, 1980. Khomenini's covert campaign in April 1980
to undermine the Ba’athist regime in Iraq—to include the attempted assassination of Tariq
Aziz, then-vice president, as well as other senior Iraqi officials—provided the foundation for
Saddam's and his advisors' increasing anger. By summer 1980, relations between Baghdad
and Tehran had disintegrated to the breaking point.
However, the generals indicated that what triggered the decision to go to war was the
escalation of a series of border incidents. Specifically, the Iraqis regarded a major artillery
bombardment on September 4, 1980, as the start of the war. What remains a puzzle is the
rationale behind Iranian actions. Ironically, Khomeini's regime, during the year-and-a-half it
was in power, had conducted a massive purge of the shah's military and thus was hardly in a
position to provoke a major conflict.
There are a number of possible explanations for Iran's activities. Iran's misinterpretation
of the correlation of military forces was a distinct possibility considering the ignorance of all
things military among the ayatollahs. The belief that God would stand on the side of the true
believers in a war against the godless Ba’athists is a second possibility. An assumption akin to
that made by the Soviets before they invaded Finland in November 1939 (that the workers
would immediately rally to their side) is a third possibility. Those around Khomeini believed
the Shi’a of Iraq would rally to Shi’a Persia in any conflict. Finally, Khomeini and his
followers could have believed, as was the case for leaders of the French Revolution in 1792,
that an external conflict was the easiest road to solving their political difficulties at home. The
Project team's best estimate is that all of these factors may have played a role.
What the interviewees did confirm was the general sloppiness of Iraq's preparations for
war in the months immediately before hostilities began. In July 1980, senior Iraqi army
leaders (corps and division commanders) met to discuss a potential war with Iran. Saddam did
not attend, and there appears to have been no representation from the navy)." During an
extended discussion, Saddam's representatives made clear that war with Iran could occur in
the immediate future. Nevertheless, most senior officers took the warning as indicating that a
conflict might occur within a two-year period, during which time they could prepare their
forces. At the time, however, none of the interviewed generals believed war would occur
within two months. Some senior officers simply refused to believe that Saddam would
consider invading Iran, a country with almost three times the population and, despite the
recent chaos, one possessing an American-equipped military.
11
There may have been no representative from the air force either, but the interviewees were uncertain as to
that aspect of the meeting.
8


The extent to which the decision for war surprised the Iraqi military is suggested by the
fact that the navy's senior officers were not informed of the decision to invade until
September 20, 2 days before the invasion. As a result, two major naval units—floating
batteries comprised of modified landing craft equipped with artillery—remained in Basra
where they were refitting and undergoing overhaul and maintenance. Thus, the outbreak of
war trapped them above the Shatt al-Arab and they had to be transported over land to Umm
Qasr. With regard to the air force, the plans for the air attack on September 22, which were
supposed to replay the devastating Israeli attack on the Egyptian Air Force in June 1967, were
not delivered to the attack squadrons until September 20, so there was no time for rehearsals.
Even then, the plans described the upcoming operation as a training exercise. Most of the
crews did not know they were embarking on active operations until a few hours before
takeoff.
The failure to examine the strategic and operational implications of war with Iran was
disastrous for Iraq's opening moves. This was true for all the services: the navy simply assumed
a defensive posture, the air force launched uncoordinated and ineffective attacks, and the army
advanced on a number of different axes, none of which were mutually supporting, with the
apparent goal of simply taking possession of Iranian territory."? In other words, there was little
tactical and no operational focus to the Iraqi military operations of September 22, 1980.
Perhaps the most serious weakness in the Iraqi invasion, however, was the fact that no
strategic conception lay behind the campaign. The interviewees confirmed that Saddam held a
number of differing, and in some cases conflicting, views throughout the immediate pre-war
period as to what he hoped to achieve with the invasion. In the Project team's view, Saddam
and his advisors believed that military operations might achieve a number of strategic goals.
They might persuade the Iranians to stop supporting Shi’a revolutionaries in Iraq who were
attempting to overthrow the Ba’athist regime and arrest their harassment of the border areas.
They might allow Iraq to seize the oil-rich province of Arabistan with the support of local
Arab tribes. 13 They might lead to the collapse of the already despised Khomeini regime. The
thinking in Baghdad was that an Iranian defeat in the border areas would encourage the
Iranian Army and people to revolt. Alternatively, such operations might draw forces away
12
13
Only the Austro-Hungarian Army's invasion of Russian-occupied Poland in August-September, 1914
appears to have been as poorly planned and executed.
The chance to win the Arab tribes in southern Iran died a quick death when Major General al-Duri, one of
Saddam's favorites and among the most incompetent of the Ba’ath generals according to the some of the
interviewees, began executing local Arab tribesmen for their lack of enthusiasm for Ba’ath rule. Word of his
actions spread throughout Arabistan and insured that the tribes became hostile to the occupying Iraqi forces.
9


First, the Iraqis failed to achieve defensible positions that might have improved their
prospects for holding onto their territorial gains. The failure to block the passes out of the
Zagros Mountains allowed the Iranians easy access to redeploy their ground forces from bases
largely in the north and center of the country, to the plains of the south, where most of the
fighting occurred. This simplest of mistakes underlines the baleful impact of Saddam's
choices of military leaders based on their loyalty to his person and the Ba’ath Party rather
than military experience and competence. In effect, they contributed little to the decision-
making and planning processes during the pre-war period. Additionally, the decision to halt in
front of Dezful rather than advance beyond that city meant that the key highway running from
the Zagros Mountains and Tehran in the northeast to the east of Dezful and on to Ahvaz and
the front by Khorramshahr allowed the Iranians to deploy and then support the southern front
relatively easily throughout 1981 and 1982.22
Equally deleterious to Iraqi prospects for the next 18 months was the decision for
divisions to defend where they had halted without regard for the defensibility of the terrain or
the nature of the forces. In spite of Saddam's decision that Iraqi forces would advance no
farther, there was no redeployment from an offensive to a defensive stance. There was no
reorganization that could have placed armored units in the rear as a maneuver, counter-attack
force with the infantry as a covering force. A possible explanation for the refusal to redeploy
may have been Saddam's desire to hold onto every bit of territory his soldiers had captured in
the first weeks of the conflict in order to gain a position of strength for a negotiated
settlement. It never occurred to him that Iraqi forced might have reached their culmination
point.
Furthermore, more than 9 attacking divisions were spread across the front in positions
from which they were scarcely able to defend themselves, much less support other units,
while there was no central reserve. Thus, the defensive positions the Iraqi defenders assumed
made no sense either operationally or tactically.23 Luckily for Saddam, the Iraqis did not pay
too heavy a price in 1980 and early 1981, because as Iraqi intelligence estimates had correctly
surmised, the Iranians were unprepared to effectively defend themselves in the near term.
However, by early 1982, that situation had changed as the Iranians got their act together. At
22
23
As one authority has noted, amateurs talk about operations, experts talk about logistics.
In one case, General Makki indicated that in June 1982 he had visited an armor battalion of the 9th Division
with 31 tanks emplaced on top of a hill with no infantry support. The brigade commander refused to change
the deployment and, not surprisingly, Iranian infantry overran the position one night and destroyed the unit
shortly after Makki had visited the position. The 9th Armored Division had a reputation as one of the worst
divisions in the Iraqi Army.
12


Saddam was particularly unpredictable when he was angry. General Makki suggested
that “Saddam would listen if you discussed an issue with him in a logical fashion. You just
had to be careful ſhow you phrased the answer to his question].”
Saddam judged his military subordinates by two criteria. The first lay in his belief that
Bedouin tribal courage and loyalty were the most important attributes of successful military
leadership. That certainly was reflected in the nature and capability of the military leaders he
had promoted to major field commanders before the war in 1979 and 1980. But Saddam was
no fool. According to General Makki, he understood careful analytic arguments as long as
they did not challenge his fundamental beliefs. The true military professionals were never
Saddam's favorites, even when they were most important. Increasingly throughout the war, he
understood that he needed them, and more often than not, he heeded their advice. To
paraphrase George Patton, Saddam never understood the aphorism that the business of war is
to not to die for your country, but to make the enemy die for his.
At the war's outset, Saddam was heavily influenced by Ba’ath ideology. Thus, he believed
that any Ba’ath leader could, at the same time, be a competent military commander. Thus, his
selection of senior commanders was influenced not only by their personas, but also by their
positions within the party hierarchy. As the war continued, however, and the operational
situation bordered on desperate, Saddam came more and more to rely on professionals.
Nevertheless, the process was a lengthy one and moved in stages to the considerable cost of
soldiers' lives.
Far earlier than his military advisors, Saddam understood that things were going badly in
summer 1981. However, as General Makki emphasized, at that time, the dictator simply could
not get intelligent or realistic analyses from his immediate subordinates, and it was almost
impossible for subordinate commanders to voice their thoughts. Of course, this was the result of
the nature of the regime Saddam had created, a regime that rested on fear and intimidation.?
When front-line commanders or staff officers managed to get reasonable accounts of what was
happening up the chain of command to Saddam, the military courtiers were outraged. In fact, in
1981, the army's commander-in-chief issued an order that subordinate commanders and staff
officers must not speak in Saddam's presence, but always defer to their senior commanders.
General Kabi, the navy’s commander from 1982 through 1987, attended somewhere
between 50 and 60 meetings with Saddam, only two of which were one-on-one consultations.
Some of these meetings were marathon sessions, lasting up to 12 hours. The general felt that
26
The similarities between Saddam and Stalin are striking; it is not surprising that Saddam chose the Soviet
dictator as his model.
14


by the middle of the war, Saddam was making a serious effort to inform himself about
military matters in order to understand what was happening. However, Saddam was the only
decision maker, with even his closest associates only executing his decisions.
The military disasters of 1981 and early 1982 forced Saddam to change his approach.
After initially having a number of senior officers, including a corps commander, several
division commanders, and numerous more junior officers executed, Saddam had to rely on
more professional officers left after the purges. Nevertheless, this was a slow process and
through the end of the war, Saddam at times relied on generals who were either sycophants or
militarily inept. In this regard, by 1987, Saddam willingly tolerated the opinions and actions of
his son-in-law Hussein Kamel, whom one of the generals interviewed described as a semi-
literate.27 The success of 1988 went to Saddam's head and perhaps helps to explain his hubris
that led to the disastrous course he pursued in his confrontation with the United States in the
Gulf War of 1991.
Interestingly, Saddam was more willing to tolerate professionals and their opinions in
the navy and the air force. However, the interviewees agreed that when discussing military
matters, everyone had to be careful not to overstep boundaries delineated by truths held by
Saddam or to criticize Saddam's actions. At the end of the interview, General Makki indicated
that Saddam was a mystery to him: not all evil, not all good, but in his character the bad had
outweighed the good. More often than not, he followed his instincts more than his intellect.
Saddam's character was fundamentally flawed in terms of a ruthless desire to dominate. In the
end, his personality created disaster not only for him but for the Iraqi people. The general also
noted that all Iraqis are tribal by their nature, meaning that their loyalties are first to family,
then tribe.
The Adaptation of Iraqi Military Forces to the Reality of War
The adaptation of Iraqi military forces to the combat conditions they faced was considerable
in almost every way during the course of the war. The most difficult problem they confronted
was that in the midst of conflict, they had to expand their military forces by an order of
magnitude. This involved not only the sheer challenge of expanding and handling far larger
27
Hussein Kamel's defection to Jordan in 1995 and his subsequent return to Iraq represent one of the more
bizarre incidents in the history of Saddam's regime. The fact that Kamel accepted Saddam's promises of
amnesty suggests a great deal about his intelligence. According to General Hamdani, Saddam was never the
same after Kamel's defection, distrusting even his closest relatives. See also Kevin M. Woods, David D.
Palkki, Mark E. Stout, Jessica M. Huckabey, Elizabeth A. Nathan, “A Survey of Saddam's Audio Files,
1978–2001: Toward an Understanding of Authoritative Regimes,” (Alexandria: Institute for Defense
Analyses, 2010).
15


forces on the battlefield, but also the difficulty of incorporating new technologies and
complex intelligence into tactical moves. The human material with which the Iraqis were
working, in terms of educational background and technological sophistication, represented a
considerable challenge as well. Perhaps the greatest challenge of all, however, had to do with
educating Saddam. Only the bitter defeats of the first half of 1982 awoke the dictator to the
reality that he and his regime were in mortal danger. Not surprisingly, Saddam's initial
reaction was to shoot a number of senior officers. He spared one of his favorites, Major
General Tala al-Duri, by removing him from command of the 9th Armored Division just three
days before that division collapsed during Operation Ramadan in 1982; Saddam then ordered
al-Duri's successor to be shot as a result of the division's defeat. Al-Duri went on to
command the 12th Division, the 3rd Armored Division, and the III Corps without distinction.
As the commander of the III Corps, his leadership in 1987 almost resulted in a disaster. He
then took command of the V Corps during the Anfal campaign in 1988, which saw a war of
extermination against the Kurds. He finally retired in 1991. In reference to al-Duri's effort to
return to active duty in the late 1990s, Hamdani said “[al-Duri] had caused the death of a third
of the Iraqi Army and now wanted to return to finish the job.” After the war, he was assigned
as the secretary of the general command, a job for the ineffectual and a position analogous to
that held by Hitler's toady, Field Marshal Wilhelm Keitel, head of the Wehrmacht high
command in Nazi Germany.
For the most part, Saddam paid serious attention to the professionals when rebuilding
Iraqi ground and air forces in the last half of 1982. The effectiveness, or rather the lack of it,
within modern Arab militaries has been the subject of some debate. Several scholars have
noted that, in general, Arab militaries are ineffective for reasons including a lack of unit
cohesion, poor generalship and tactical leadership, poor information management, limited
technical skills, inconsistent or even non-existent logistics and maintenance, low morale,
misguided or inadequate training, and even cowardice.28 They ascribe most of these
characteristics to economic, social, and cultural norms that hinder the development of a
modern concept of military professionalism, which in turn negatively impacts effectiveness.
However accurate these diagnoses may be, they do not fully capture the concept of military
professionalism as understood by the officers interviewed for this work.
28
For an expanded review of Arab military ineffectiveness in general and during the Iran-Iraq War, see Norvell
B. De Atkine, “Why Arabs Lose Wars,” Middle East Quarterly 6, no. 4 (1999); Kenneth M. Pollack, Arabs
at War: Military Effectiveness, 1948-1991 (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2002), 1–13, 182–235.
16


The generals interviewed distinguished between two kinds of officers: professional and
political. The former are defined as, like most definitions of a professional, those for whom
the work is a full-time occupation that has a unique body of knowledge associated with it,
requires dedicated schools, and has objective standards of ethics and performance. In contrast,
the latter exist merely within the military system without making waves, are often political
appointments, and are promoted on the basis of loyalty and relationship rather than merit. The
generals asserted that, although there were numerous good and professional officers within
the Iraqi military, they functioned in a system dominated by political officers and stymied by
political considerations. Despite the efforts of the professionals, as Hamdani and Makki
emphasized, they were unable to change the system or limit the impact of the political
generals.
By 1983–85, Iraq was performing considerably better on the battlefield. Improvements in
military doctrine and training, as well as increased and superior access to the world's arms
markets compared to Iran, factored into Iraqi adaptation to Iranian capabilities. Iraq was helped
here by the continued efforts on the part of the ayatollahs in Tehran who, in their revolutionary
zeal, were determined to thwart the development of serious professionalism within their own
military. In addition, the ayatollahs were unwilling to acknowledge the superiority of the
firepower and maneuverability of Iraqi forces outside the relatively narrow confines of the
mountains and marshes. Both of these factors contributed to Iran's ultimate failure. In all the
battles that mattered, its inferiority in military professionalism placed an intolerable burden on
Iran's military forces. Without armor, Iranian infantry, motivated by religious fanaticism, had
little chance of succeeding in the flat spaces surrounding Basra and the Mesopotamian River
Valley.
At the war's outset, the Iraqi Army had no coherent doctrine. Although it had manuals—
derived mainly from the World War II British Army doctrine—there was no coherent,
systematic approach to either training or doctrine tailored to the Iraqi armed forces and
national circumstances. That began to change in 1985, when General Makki assumed
command of the Combat Development Directorate. (General Makki's testimony was largely
confirmed by General Hamdani, the other ground force commander.) Beginning in 1982, the
Iraqis held lessons-learned conferences after each major battle. The results made their way
into tactical pamphlets produced by the Combat Development Directorate, and by 1984,
Saddam agreed that no officer could be selected to brigade command who had not attended
the staff college.
17


The crucial change came in 1987, shortly before Iraq's successful defense of Basra. Here,
Saddam played a part in pushing the ideas that were emerging from the Combat Development
Directorate. According to General Makki, the main changes included:
[A] return to the correct principles of war...namely, how to hold defensive
positions. Second, we pulled a brigade out of the front line from each armored and
mechanized division and half of the infantry divisions for training on defensive
operations, while the rest of the forces held the front line. The Republican Guard
provided a competent strategic reserve.
By 1987, the re-professionalization of the senior leadership had reached the point where
troops could successfully defend Basra against a massive assault by the Iranians. Then, the
following year, the army launched a series of devastating attacks that broke the back of Iranian
resistance. Nevertheless, as Generals Hamdani and Makki stressed, the army still remained a
third-world military organization, lacking the tactical, educational, and technological
capabilities to stand up to the challenges Coalition forces would issue in 1991. Iraq succeeded in
the Iran-Iraq War largely because Iran proved so unwilling to learn from the battlefield. That
Saddam was incapable of seeing that reality would lead to the disasters of 1991 and 2003.
Interestingly, the Iraqi Navy and Air Force displayed the greatest ability to adapt during
the conflict. In the former, Saddam's desire to widen the conflict in 1982 by attacking Iran's
economic infrastructure allowed the navy to conduct an imaginative and effective war against
the movement of freighters to Bandar-e Khomeini and the tanker traffic attempting to use
Kharg Island. That effort involved using long-range radars operating from the tip of the Fao
Peninsula, signals intelligence that provided the movement schedules for convoys, and, at
times, aerial reconnaissance. During this campaign, the Iraqis managed to lose only two of the
nine missile boats they possessed at the beginning of the war.29 While these efforts were not
able to shut down Iranian tanker traffic, they did put considerable economic pressure on Iran.
Of the three services, the Iraqi Air Force was the least prepared for war. During the first
several months of the conflict, it suffered heavy losses to Iranian F-14s and anti-aircraft
defenses. Secondary sources on the war claim the Iraqis were forced to deploy their aircraft to
neighboring countries; General Abousi said that was not true. He said that in early 1981,
Saddam ordered them to stop flying for 2 months because their losses had been so heavy. In
the summer of 1981, the Iraqis began acquiring their first Mirage fighters from France and
Mig-25s from the Soviet Union. Aircraft upgrades during the next 2 years allowed them to
29
Iraq managed to smuggle two new missile boats it purchased from the French through the Straits of Hormuz
and up to Umm Qasr.
18


gradually dominate the air. Despite help both from both Western governments and from
black-market entities in smuggling replacement parts for its Western military equipment, Iran
steadily lost the ability to maintain its irreplaceable U.S.-built aircraft and crews trained in the
United States.
By the last years of the war, Iraq's adaptation meant it could mount sophisticated air
operations far out into the Gulf against tanker traffic bearing Iranian oil. In one case, the air
force launched 14 Mirage fighters to attack tankers in the Strait of Hormuz. Two provided
electronic countermeasures cover during the first leg of the journey, six refueled the six that
continued on the second leg, and three of those refueled the remaining three that would finally
fire Exocet missiles at Iranian tankers. In another case, they apparently used a Chinese Badger
bomber to carry a Silkworm missile to attack a tanker in that same area.
On the whole, Iraq displayed considerable adaptability during the conflict at the tactical
and even operational levels of war. There were, admittedly, constraints on its abilities, the
most important being the educational level of its soldiers. Given the nature of the regime, the
most important adaptations had to take place in Saddam's mind; a process that was both slow
and tortuous. On the other hand, like the British generals in 1914–17, the Iranians failed to
adapt. Because of their penchant for making enemies, they were incapable of acquiring the
heavy arms need to conduct the fire power- and maneuver-intensive warfare required for
success in the flatlands of the Mesopotamian River Valley. An enormous distrust of the
Shah's military led the ayatollahs to refuse to make use of whatever expertise remained in the
aftermath of the purges they conducted before the war. Thus, while the Pasdaran with its
fanaticism was able to break into Iraqi positions, its units could never exploit these successes.
The illogical response of the ayatollahs, then, was to call for more fanaticism and more
volunteers for martyrdom that would break the Iraqis. This was hardly a serious adaptation.
Eventually, the butcher's bill broke the religious mania Khomeini had created, and in 1988,
Iran's leadership accepted the UN cease-fire resolution, effectively ending the war where it
had begun.
Technology, Intelligence, and the War
Technological adaptation occurred largely in response to the pressures of a conflict with no
end in sight. At the start of the war, Iran possessed considerable superiority in air-to-air
combat, but its inability to replace its losses, combined with Iraq's increasing sophistication,
wore away Iran's advantages. The French Mirage fighters that appeared in 1981 soon gave
the Iraqis a significant advantage; they represented a considerable upgrade in technological
19


complexity. While Iraqi pilots found them significantly easier to fly than their Soviet
equipment, they also found the Mirage's electronics and navigational systems far more
complex and difficult to master. In the ground fighting, the Iraqis felt their T-62s and T-72s
were far superior to the M-60s and Chieftains the Iranians possessed. The weak training
levels that were a mark of Iranian military forces early in the conflict only enhanced the Iraqi
advantage on the ground. On the whole, it was not that the Iraqis enjoyed a technological
advantage, but rather that they possessed the superior firepower along with maneuverability
that allowed them to dominate their Iranian opponents on most battlefields.
When the war began, Iraq had virtually no military intelligence capabilities regarding
Iran. In fact, the country immediately to east of Iraq was a tabula rasa, not only as far as Iraqi
high command and Saddam were concerned, but to Iraq's General Military Intelligence
Directorate as well. According to General Tarfa, in 1980 shortly before the outbreak of the
war, those responsible for gathering and analyzing intelligence on Iran numbered three
individuals—only one of whom had studied Farsi. (In contrast, the Israeli branch of Iraqi
intelligence consisted of three separate staff sections and well over 20 analysts.) The Iraqis
possessed few human intelligence sources inside of Iran, even in the border areas. Khomeini's
rise to power only exacerbated the dearth of useful human intelligence during the early years
of the war.
30
By 1981, there were six officers studying the situation on the other side of the hill in a
single section within the military intelligence branch in Baghdad. By 1986, the number had
grown to 80 officers working for Iraqi military intelligence, and the section had become a
directorate. By the last year of the war, more than 2,500 individuals were producing
intelligence on Iranian military forces and capabilities. They were divided into sections
studying air, ground, and naval forces; vital targets; and political, economic, and social trends
in Iran. That number included more than 1,500 officers and analysts assigned to intercepting,
decoding, and analyzing Iranian message traffic.
Iraqi signals intelligence began to grow at the war's outset when the Iraqis intercepted
Iranian strategic and tactical messages that had been sent in the clear (as had the Russian
messages at the battle of Tannenburg in 1914). This contributed to several Iraqi successes in
30
Those who fled from Iran during the pre-war period rarely possessed information that would be useful at the
tactical level. The more influential and well-placed loyalists from the shah's regime seem to have played a
role similar to that of Iraqi expatrioates in the United States immediately before the invasion of Iraq by U.S.
forces in 2003 by encouraging intervention and downplaying the risks.
Tarfa claimed that by this point in the war, the Iraqis were using the radical leftist Iranian mujahideen, which
had lost out in the 1979–82 struggles for power with the clerics, to gather intelligence about what was
happening in Tehran and throughout the rest of the country.
31
20


early battles of 1980, but when it was publically revealed by Saddam's press secretary, the
Iranians immediately began to encrypt their messages. The Iranians utilized manual codes
through 1982, but the Iraqis were already one step ahead, having obtained a C-52 enciphering
machine from Iranian officers who had deserted from the 64th Division in northern Iraq.32
Thus, Iraqi analysts continued to read Iran's message traffic.
In 1983, the Iranians started using T450 electronic enciphering machines obtained from
the Swiss.33 Almost immediately, the Iraqis bought the necessary computer equipment to
intercept and decipher Iranian message traffic from a Japanese company, which provided the
necessary training in Iraq and Japan for nearly 1,000 Iraqis. Iraqi intelligence also received
considerable help from the KGB in breaking the Iranian codes. Interestingly, as with the
German Enigma transmissions during World War II, much of Iraq's success breaking into
Iranian message traffic from 1984 on was due to Iranian carelessness and lack of discipline
when enciphering and transmitting its messages."
One possible explanation for the successful 1986 Iranian offensive that lead to its
capture of the Fao Peninsula lies in the fact that the attack was executed almost exclusively by
the Pasdaran. The Iranian militia utilized virtually no radio communication for transmitting
orders and plans for operations.35 Thus, the Iraqis picked up only one radio transmission that
seemed to indicate the possibility of a major operation in the area of the Fao Peninsula. At
that time, the head of the military intelligence, General Mahmoud Shahin, was trying to please
his superior, who did not believe the Iranians were interested in attacking Fao.3“ As a result, he
refused to pass up the chain of command any of the tactical intelligence that indicated the
Iranians were about to launch a major offensive.?? There was very little signals intelligence on
34
32
33
34
35
The C-52 enciphering machine was manufactured by Crypto AG, a Swiss corporation, beginning in 1952.
The T450 was the first widely available, fully electronic online text encryption device built in the early
1970s.
With regard to the Germans, see Gordon Welchman, The Hut Six Story: Breaking the Enigma Codes
(London: M.M. Baldwin, 1997).
The Pasdaran transmitted its plans and orders by individual soldiers, messengers, and, on rare occasions,
telephone land lines. Given the simplicity of their massed, human-wave attacks, the Pasdaran did not require
extensive tactical planning. Although by 1984, they depended on the army for planning the logistics and
support necessary to bring tens of thousands of their fanatical warriors to the front.
Saddam would fire General Mahmoud for the blunder in intelligence over the Iranian offensive; Mahmoud
was sent back to the field army.
Generals Hamdani, Makki, and Tarfa all indicated in separate interviews that General Mahmound blocked
from Saddam and the general staff the tactical intelligence about Iranian preparations for a major offensive.
This failure is similar to the Allied (and particularly American) intelligence failure during the Battle of the
Bulge, where tactical and logistical intelligence indicated the Germans were preparing to attack in the
Ardennes, but there was no confirmation on the operational side of the ongoing, but highly classified code-
36
37
21


radio transmissions were more useful in tracking what their enemies were about than
intelligence obtained from the Americans.
Final Comments
To a considerable extent, the answers to the Project team's questions jibe with the documents
and transcripts of Saddam's discussions we have examined so far. 39 When being questioned
about past events in which one has participated, there is a natural human tendency to cover up
one's responsibility, exaggerate one's role, or forget key events.40 Undoubtedly, these
tendencies were present to some degree in the interviews. Nevertheless, given the generals'
experiences, their answers will help fill gaps in the general knowledge of the conflict and
particularly in the decision-making process around Saddam.
Again, the generals were deeply suspicious of the Iranians. General Makki best
expressed the commonly held view:
The Iranians are good fighters; they are very stubborn, high achievers; not afraid of
death; loyal to their leaders. [Nevertheless], they are human and have limits.
Religion is not enough. [Military organizations] must [also] have good
[technological capabilities) and logistics. By 1988 it was too late. They lost their
nerve, their will to fight. Iranians are good at deceiving you, masterful at gaining
time.
At times it took perceptive questioning to push the Iraqis to provide crucial information.
It was not necessarily that they were holding back, but rather that both interviewers and
interviewees were reconciling perceptions of past events through the questions and answer
process. The story about Iraqi code breaking is instructive in this regard. It emerged only in
discussions about other issues. Indeed, it was only when the Project team expressed surprise
about the major increases in the number of those working in military intelligence by 1985 that
General Tarfa volunteered that the expansion was largely due to the Iraqi decryption efforts.
Similarly, it was only when we asked General Kabi about the nature of the specific
intelligence in the northern Gulf that indicated when the Iranians were running convoys into
Bandar-e Khomeini and Kharg Island that the general indicated that he (and he alone in the
navy) had access to what the British called “very special” intelligence during World War II.
39
At present, Project team members Kevin Woods and Williamson Murray are working on a history of the
Iran Iraq War for the OSD-sponsored Conflict Records Research Center at National Defense University.
That effort has involved intensive effort and research during portions of the past 2 years.
Along these lines, General Abousi insisted that the Iraqi Air Force never dropped chemical weapons.
40
23


The interviews contained in this document are not intended to provide a complete picture
of the events of the Iran-Iraq War. They represent nothing more than the recollections of a
group of veterans of that conflict recalling events, impressions, and lessons of battles almost
30 years later. However, the manuscripts in the Project 1946 effort and related publications
bring a heretofore unheard perspective of one of the largest wars of the last century. Given the
indeterminate nature of the war, the totalitarian character of the states that fought it, and the
pace of strategic events in the Middle East after the war, it is not surprising that primary
source materials or access to senior participants has been limited. The collapse of the Ba’ath
regime in Baghdad, the capture of a significant number of Iraqi records from this period, and
the willingness of such veterans to discuss their perspectives is providing a new and important
opportunity to examine a war whose implications echo in the events of today.
24


Historical Context and Timeline
The oral histories included in this monograph generally cover the period between 1980 and
1988. Given the limitations of time and the scale of the war under discussion, the number of
major topics not discussed far exceeds those that are. This would only be a problem if this were
an attempt to write a history of the Iran-Iraq War. As stated in the introduction, our purpose
here is limited to examining a narrower set of topics through the perspectives of a group of
senior Iraqi participants. A detailed knowledge of the major diplomatic and military events of
that war is not necessary to appreciate the perspectives presented. The following summary and
timeline of the war is provided as a general reference and is not drawn from our Iraqi subjects. 41
As described in more detail in the narratives, the causes of the Iran-Iraq War are
complex. The tensions between the peoples of modern Iraq and its larger neighbor are in some
cases echoes of causes that date to the earliest points of recorded history. A complex mix of
Cold War machinations, territorial disputes, ethnic and religious biases, economic and
political completion, pride of place, and mutual megalomania are but a few of the more
contemporary but hardly new causes. Most commentators will emphasize three general
causes: building tensions and resentments over the “settlement of the Shatt al-Arab border
dispute, growing accusations of mutual meddling in each other's internal affairs, and political
opportunism on the part of both Saddam Hussein and Ayatollah Khomeini.
The dramatic events of the Iranian Revolution in 1979 brought long-simmering issues
back to full boil. Emboldened by the seemingly divine power of the political upheaval in
Tehran, and with the explicit and implicit support of Iranian leadership, a revolutionary wind
blew through Iraq's majority Shi’a population. Despite the Algiers Agreement (1975), Iran
continued to assist Iraqi Kurds. On top of this, after the Revolution, the Ayatollah Khomeini
began encouraging Shi’a discontent in Iraq in the hopes of spreading the revolution there.
41
For a more detailed treatment of the Iran-Iraq War see Efraim Karsh, The Iran-Iraq War, 1980-1988,
Essential Histories: War and Conflict in Modern Times (New York: Osprey Publishing, 2009); Dilip Hiro,
The Longest War: The Iran-Iraq Military Conflict (London: Grafton, 1989); Edgar O’Ballance, The Gulf
War: Nineteen Eighty to Nineteen Eighty-Seven (London: Brassey's Defense Publishers, 1988); and Anthony
H. Cordesman, Abraham R. Wagner, The Iran-Iraq War, ed. Abraham R. Wagner, vol. II, The Lessons of
Modern War (Boulder: Westview Press, 1990).
25


Finally, intermittent military clashes along the Iran-Iraq border intensified between May and
September 1980.
Below is a timeline of the key battles and events from the Iran Iraq War including those
mentioned during the interviews with Iraqi generals.
1980
1981
1982
17 September Iraq declares the 1975 Algiers Agreement null and void due to Iranian
violation and claims full sovereignty over the Shatt al-Arab.
22 September Initial Iraqi air strikes target ten airfields in a failed attempt to destroy the
Iranian Air Force on the ground.
23 September Iraqi ground forces invade Iran, advancing as far as Ahvaz and Susangard
and offers Iran a ceasefire.
5 October Iran rejects the offer of a ceasefire.
22-24 October Iraq gains control of Abadan and Khorramshahr.
7 December Saddam announces that Iraq will employ a defensive strategy in Iraqi-held
Iranian territories.
24 December Iraq begins air raids on Iranian oil terminals at Kharg Island.
7 June Iraq's Osirak nuclear reactor is struck in Israeli air raid.
28 June Iran rejects Ramadan ceasefire offered by Iraq.
5 November Iran rejects Muharram ceasefire offered by Iraq.
12 April Saddam offers to withdraw Iraqi troops from Iran in exchange for a guarantee that
the conflict will end, which it does not receive.
22 May Iran liberates Khorramshahr.
10 June Iraq offers another ceasefire, which is rejected by Iran.
13 July-2 August First Battle at Basra (Operation Ramadan): Failed Iranian offensives
intended to capture Basra.
10-17 April Operation Dawn: Iranian offensive near al-Amara.
7 June Iraq offers a ceasefire, which Iran rejects.
2 November Iraq warns merchant vessels to avoid the “war zone” in the northern Persian
Gulf.
February Tanker War: With the intention of shifting the war away from the battlefield
stalemate, Saddam orders increased aerial bombing of Iranian commercial tankers in the
Persian Gulf. His intention is to force Iran to close the Strait of Hormuz, resulting in foreign
intervention on behalf of Iraq.
7-22 February First “War of the Cities": Iraq targets 11 Iranian cities with ballistic missiles.
Iran targets Iraqi cities in retaliation. Iraq fails to achieve its main objective of preventing an
Iranian offensive.
24 February-19 March Second Battle at Basra (Operation Khaibar): Iranian offensives
intended to capture Basra. Iran fails to capture Basra but does capture Majnun Island.
28 January-early February First Iraqi offensive since the opening of the war. Occurs along
the central front, in the region of Qasr-e-Shirin.
11-23 March Third Battle at Basra (Operation Badr): Failed Iranian offensives intended to
capture Basra.
22 March-8 April Second “War of the Cities."
August-December Iraq launches approximately 60 air raids on Kharg Island.
1983
1984
1985
26


1986
1987
9-25 February Operation Dawn 8: Iran captures Fao Peninsula.
12 August Iraqi long-range air raid on Sirri Island.
25 November Iraqi long-range air raid on Larak Island.
24-26 December Fourth Battle at Basra42 (Operation Karbala 4): Failed Iranian offensive
intended to capture Basra.
9 January-25 February Fifth Battle at Basra (Operation Karbala 5): Failed Iranian offensive
intended to capture Basra.
17-25 January Third “War of the Cities."
February-April Fourth “War of the Cities.”
6-9 April Sixth Battle at Basra (Operation Karbala 8): Failed Iranian offensive intended to
capture Basra.
17 May USS Stark is struck by two Exocet missiles fired from an Iraqi aircraft.
20 July UN Security Council passes Resolution 598 calls for a ceasefire between Iran and
Iraq and the withdrawal of troops from foreign soil. Accepted by Iraq but rejected by Iran.
29 February-30 April Fifth “War of the Cities."
15-16 March Iraqi forces launch a chemical attack on the Kurdish stronghold of Halabja,
killing thousands of civilians.
18 April Iraq recaptures the Fao Peninsula.
25 May Iraq recaptures Majnun Island.
13-17 July Iraqi forces cross into Iran for the first time since 1982, then withdraw and offer
a peace settlement to Iran.
17 July Iran accepts UN Resolution 598.
20 August Ceasefire goes into effect.
1988
42
Named the “Battle of the Great Day” by Saddam after hearing about the massive number of Iranian losses.
27


I had a moral commitment to my country. This is a hard subject to discuss; few
understand it except those who have experienced it.
Murray: General, when we met in Aqaba in 2007, we discussed Khuzestan and the Ba’athist
commanders who carried out atrocities and executions, who by their actions removed
any feeling of attraction for Iraq among the Arab tribes in the area. Could you explain, in
terms of incidents or individuals, if this was a systemic problem during the war?
Hamdani: There were a number of incidents regarding this subject. In general, you, as
historians, understand human nature and the nature of a third-world country. The
problems started when Saddam Hussein came to power in 1979. He believed that the
competence level, courage, and loyalty of the people were proportionate to their
commitment to the Ba’ath Party. Since Saddam was not a military person, he did not
believe in specialization. He believed as long as someone was a Ba’athist, he could be a
military commander. Thus, he promoted a number of officers several ranks above the
rank they deserved. He assigned them as division commanders to the 3rd, 6th, and 10th
Armored Divisions; the 9th Division was not formed yet. Tala al-Duri would eventually
form the 9th Division.
In the Iraqi Army, which had the same structure as the British Army, a person cannot
become a division commander unless he has been a brigadier general; one has to work
one's way up and have the requisite staff experience. Al-Duri had no military
experience, but he was [rapidly] promoted from lieutenant colonel to brigadier general
and became a division commander immediately. He had been a first lieutenant, but was
pensioned off for political reasons in the early 1960s. When the Ba’ath Party came to
power in 1968, its leaders recalled several political figures, including al-Duri. He was
not educated. He had no good qualities except courage. But Saddam loved violence. He
encouraged and created the environment for violent personalities to rise into the senior
ranks of the army. The Iraqi Army has been modeled after the concept of knights, having
morals and courage to sacrifice for others. It had a principle that commanders should
protect the people under their command. However, al-Duri was a violent personality,
who over-compensated for the military qualities he lacked. Thus, a new school of
violence emerged within the army in the period before the Iran Iraq War.
Murray: This is interesting, because the 9th Division was the division that did so badly in the
fighting in the spring of 1981.
30


Hamdani: Yes, in 1981 the 9th Division was dismantled. 44
Murray: Because the 9th Division did so poorly in 1981, Saddam said, “There will never be a
9th Division in the Iraqi Army again. Was al-Duri the division commander who lost his
Mercedes Benz when his headquarters were captured by the Iranians?
Hamdani: Yes, he was.
Murray: Saddam had hand-picked al-Duri for this command. What did Saddam Hussein do
with him after this failure?
Hamdani: Since Saddam Hussein respected violent personalities, he did not prosecute al-
Duri. The 9th Division was dismantled three days before its last mission. Al-Duri was
moved from the 9th Division to the 12th Division. He was replaced in the 9th division by
Kamal Latif. In the final three days, Latif assumed all of al-Duri's duties. Saddam knew
about Tala al-Duri and of what he did, but he wanted to save him from the loss, so he
replaced him with Latif and let Kamal Latif pay for the al-Duri’s mistakes.
Murray: Did al-Duri remain in command of the 12th Division for long?
Hamdani: Al-Duri remained commander of the 12th Division for a considerable period of
time, which resulted in heavy losses due to his ignorance as a commander.
Murray: The details of this story underscore what was wrong with the Iraqi Army in this
early period of the war; a guy who is obviously a gross incompetent was kept in a
position of command.
Hamdani: In December 1981, the Iraqi Army fought an infantry battle called “Firing Post
1172.945 Al-Duri was in command of the 12th Division in this area. He refused to take
reasonable advice. I participated in this battle as commander of a reconnaissance
armored tank battalion. It was a mountainous area. I knew the details of the area and my
troops had captured an Iranian reconnaissance team before the battle and interrogated
them. I knew the Iranians were preparing to occupy this particular hill [location unclear].
Not only was al-Duri a violent person, but he knew everything and accepted no advice.
Thus, he refused to listen to our warnings. He thought the enemy would never attack a
44
45
Other sources indicate that the division was actually dismantled in July 1982.
In an unpublished manuscript, Hamdani describes Firing Post 1172 as a lightly held hilltop between the
position of the 12th Armored and 7th infantry divisions in the central sector. The battle which occurred from
11-17 December was known to the Iraqis as the Battle of Western Qailan.
31


hill that was 1,172 meters high. I have detailed descriptions of this battle in my book.4
As a result of his stubbornness, our troops paid a heavy price—we fought for over a
month, lost 1,867 soldiers, and had four times that number wounded. All of this was the
result of al-Duri's stupidity.
Let's go back to your question about Khuzestan, now that you understand al-Duri's
personality. He led the 9th Division toward the Ahvaz region during the invasion. The area
was inhabited by Arab tribes, so the area was called Arabistan, the Khuzestan area of
Iran.47 During the Ottoman period, it had belonged to Iraq. The concept behind the
advance was that Iraq could make easy gains here because its forces were liberating the
Arabs living in the area. But these people actually considered themselves Iranians, so
some fought against the invading Iraqi Army. Al-Duri created major political problems for
the Iraqi military. During the battle, his troops captured 56 people from Arabistan. All
were wielding weapons against us because they were Iranians defending Iran. In al-Duri's
backward mind, only traitor Iraqis from Arabistan would carry weapons against other
Iraqis. He considered this treason. So he executed them and was proud of his actions.
Murray: If you want to win people over, you don't start by executing large numbers of them.
Please continue with the al-Duri story.
Hamdani: When he killed these people, he was proud of what he had done. He forgot the fact
these people belonged to tribes, not just a region. There were preliminary indications that
most of the people in the region were happy to be liberated from Iranian rule. However,
with the tribes, when you kill one member, the entire tribe turns against you. Despite his
knowledge of tribal behavior, he killed the 56 individuals. They were not Iraqi soldiers
to be viewed as traitors. Moreover, he treated the tribes in the region badly. The entire
region turned against him and, as a consequence, against Iraq. The strange part is that
Saddam did not hold al-Duri liable for his actions. Instead, Saddam considered this an
act of courage. Saddam's psychological makeup guided this action and cost us greatly.
Moreover, we had many other violent commanders whom Saddam loved, but whom the
Iraqi Army hated. They carried out executions of their own soldiers. When they suffered
a defeat, they executed their own soldiers as punishment. Saddam considered this an act
46
47
In 2006, Hamdani published a memoir of his experience as an Iraqi soldier. Ra'ad Hamdani, Before History
Left Us (Arab Scientific Publishers, 2006), (Arabic).
Arabistan is a term applied to the Khuzestan province in Iran dating back to 639 CE when the area was
conquered by Arabs. Although the increasingly Arabic population has enjoyed a semi-autonomous status
throughout its history, it was brought firmly under central-Iranian control in the 1930s.
32


of courage. Al-Duri was among the most murderous of these commanders. Other
commanders of a similar ilk who emerged during the war included [Brigadier General]
Hisham al-Fakhri; General Nizar al-Khazraji, who later became the chief of staff of the
Iraqi Army and fled the country in the 1990s to join the opposition (he currently lives in
United Arab Emirates); and [Brigadier General] Taha Shakarji. Men such as this
received Saddam's acceptance, but were despised by the army.
Murray: What happened to al-Duri after this incident?
Hamdani: He was never held accountable for his actions. After commanding the 9th and then
the 12th Divisions he was moved to the 3rd Armored Division. Saddam wanted to keep
him in a command position because he was courageous, and he loved these kinds of
commanders. In 1982, the 3rd Armored Division had just lost a major battle and the
commander, a Kurd named Juwad Shitnah, was executed. Al-Duri was given command
of the division right after the division lost the battle.
Woods: Tell us about Shitnah, and the 3rd Armored Division.
Hamdani: I worked with Shitnah on the Syrian front in 1973 and in the rebellion of Barzani
and his Kurds in 1974–75.48 Before that, we worked together in the 8th Brigade. He was
also commander of the 12th Division before Tala al-Duri; I worked with him there too.
Shitnah was courageous and experienced in counter-guerilla tactics. Because he was
Kurdish and lived in a mountainous region, he understood the nature of the region and
the Kurdish people. He knew how to give as well as follow advice. After the Muhamarra
[Khorramshahr] battle at the Karun River, Shitnah was executed in 1982, along with
Salah al-Qadhi, Commander of III Corps.49 Shitnah was an excellent commander and the
victim of poor strategic planning of the armed forces general command. Because he was
a mechanized infantry officer and not an armored officer, he tried to fight a mobile battle
against the Iranians. It was a good idea, but the number, size, and capabilities of the
enemy far exceeded his ability to manage and control. Mobile battle rests on a number of
components, including early warning and information gathered on the enemy by light
reconnaissance troops. Shitnah's idea was to allow the enemy to cross the Karun River
and create a screen by placing early warning troops [to his front]. Reconnaissance
doctrine called for small units to monitor the enemy. They built fortified observation
48
These are references to the October 1973 Arab-Israeli War and the Kurdish Rebellion (1974–75) led, in part,
by Mullah Mustafa Barzani.
The battle of Muhamarra is best known as the battle of Khorramshahr (22 September-10 November 1980).
49
33


positions. These were strong and well fortified. Even if the enemy were to cross, these
positions would hold. What is more, when the enemy advanced, they were channeled
between these fortified positions. Shitnah thought he could run a mobile battle, but that
required a number of armored units, air support, and artillery support.
The 3rd Division was a good division; it was the “mother' division for us. Shitnah thought
the enemy was going to cross the river, but he did not think that the number of forces
(army, Pasdaran,50 and Basijʻl) would be ten times greater than his force.52 The Iranians
were nontraditional forces, but in great concentration, and their morale was high. They
started their crossing in the dark and had planned well. Thus, the initial assault wave
created numerous bridgeheads [along the banks of the Shatt al-Arab]. The proper response
would have been to strike those bridgeheads immediately; this was the World War II
approach. That was the disagreement between the General Field Marshals Gerd von
Rundstedt and Erwin Rommel in 1944 at Normandy. 53 Shitnah ignored the precedent. He
wanted to pull the enemy onto the battlefield and then destroy it. That was his plan. Due to
the large number of attacking Iranian troops, the fortified points were too weak to stop
them. Shitnah tried to concentrate against the main brigades, but it was not possible to
slow the enemy, so these units started defending themselves instead of counterattacking.
As a result of this mistake and poor planning, the Iranians destroyed the 3rd Division. It
was not just the commander's mistake, but that of the corps command that had supported
his idea.
Murray: At this point in the war the Iranians had begun using human wave assaults. Had the
Iraqis not yet adapted to the extent to which Iranians were willing to sacrifice themselves?
Hamdani: Yes, the human wave attacks had begun. They were not military. Everything has a
context, a procedure, but since these Iranian’s were non-traditional troops, they kept
advancing to the point that 15 or 20 of them would keep moving. Each phase of a
50
51
The Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), also known as the Pasdaran, is one of Iran's two major
irregular light infantry forces. Its structure parallels that of the regular armed forces and comprises ground,
naval, and aviation forces. It was originally created to counter support for the shah at the time of the
Revolution.
The Nirou-ye Moqavemat-e Basij—Mobilization Resistance Force—is Iran's other major irregular light
infantry force comprising an all-volunteer paramilitary militia.
Exact figures for Iranian forces are difficult to obtain. Ken Pollack places 60,000 regular Iranian Army and
more than 80,000 Pasdaran and Basij in the area of this battle. See Kenneth M. Pollack, Arabs at War:
Military Effectiveness, 1948-1991 (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2002), 196.
Rommel argued that the Allies must be stopped on the beaches at Normandy as they landed. Von Rundstedt
supported holding the reserves back and preparing a massive counterattack.
52
53
34


Hamdani: No. We learned about the Koreans from interrogating prisoners.
Woods: You described how the defeated Iraqi commanders were executed after this battle.
Can you tell us more about how this happened? Was there a trial? Did members of the
regime intelligence service come down and take them away?
Hamdani: There was a field courts marshal in Basra in July 1982. It was not publicized. The
minister of defense, his deputy, Izzat Ibrahim al-Duri, the political deputy for Saddam
Hussein, party leaders, and several members of the general command of the armed forces
were there. It was like Field Marshal Wilhelm Keitel with Hitler. 54 Most of those in the
general command were Saddam's lackies. It was not a regular trial; it was tense with a lot
of screaming, yelling, and hurling of insults. The defeat represented a great political shock.
Since Khorramshahr had fallen, it meant that Basra could fall as well. The executions were
a nervous reaction to what had happened. That is why these commanders were considered
martyrs after time passed. The trial and executions did not help at the time, of course; the
process repeated itself every time there was a failure, in spite of whatever success a
commander might have achieved before. Nothing could save a commander from execution
once he failed.
This was a serious issue and it had a great impact on the army. From this point on,
commanders chose to avoid responsibility. For example, sending out reconnaissance
patrols is a commander's responsibility. Only a commander could send a patrol at the
battalion level. Because of this fear of responsibility, corps commanders would wait for
approval before sending units on reconnaissance missions. This killed the creative spirit
within the army's structure. I confronted this problem in my own unit when I was a
commander. I wanted to assume responsibility. I discussed this issued twice with
Saddam, several times with Qusay Hussein, and with the minister of defense and the
army chief of staff; I argued that it was important to provide a commander a margin of
error in case mistakes should happen. This particularly affected us in the last war of
2003. Commanders would wait for an order from higher up before executing any
decision.
Murray: General, in times past, such trials were known as “drum head courts marshals.” In
light of our discussion it appears that there were two threads to Saddam's treatment of the
54
Hamdani is referring to German Field Marshal Wilhelm Keitel (1882–1946). Keitel led the German High
Command of the Armed Forces throughout the war. He was considered a “political” and grossly incompetent
general by his peers.
36


officer corps. In 1982, Saddam began looking for more competent individuals to run
things, while at the same time he was looking for more violent or courageous individuals.
Hamdani: This reflected his philosophy. He believed in violence.
Murray: Doesn't this seem a bit schizophrenic? On the one hand he liked the violent thuggish
individuals. On the other hand there was a level of competence that he recognized in
people. Was there a tension here?
Hamdani: I realized this and it created a problem for me with Saddam from 1990–2003
because I was a student of the knight school, which was a moral code of command.55
That is what I learned from my first days in the army, and it is also in my personal
nature. Saddam Hussein needed competence later on, so I was not executed. I was a
soldier; he believed that I would not conspire against him because of my moral code,
which argued that a soldier should have nothing to do with politics.
57
When it became apparent that coalition forces were going to attack us in 1990, I
criticized the defense plan for Kuwait. I was referred to investigation by the military
council and political council. They wanted to put me on trial, but Qusay was on my side.
He spoke to his father on my behalf.56 Qusay knew my nature and cleared me because he
could see I had no political goals. The 1991 war continued, but I always looked over my
shoulder, because I worried that Hussein Kamel or someone else might assassinate me.
On 24 February 1991, Iraq clashed with the American armored divisions. I was badly
injured as a result of an air raid; I remained in the hospital for two months. After that,
Saddam Hussein sent for me. He said, “Unfortunately we did not follow your advice.' He
did not say ‘I’, he just said ‘we.' I agreed and explained to him the nature of the mistake.
That incident is why Saddam appointed me to command the 6th Armored Division to
defend Basra for eight months before returning to the Republican Guard.58
This conflict repeated itself in 1994 when I was commander of Medina Munawara
Armored Division.S9 Saddam wanted to re-occupy Kuwait, and he did not allow any
55
56
57
An honor code among certain Iraqi officers based loosely on the thirteenth century English code of chivalry.
Hamdani and Saddam's youngest son had a relationship dating back to when Qusay was assigned to
Hamdani’s battalion during the Iran-Iraq War for military training and the martial experience.
Hussein Kamel Hassan al-Majid, Saddam's son-in-law, eventually became one of his top advisors before
defecting to Jordan in 1995.
This was considered a lateral move at best, but generally was seen as a demotion for an experienced
Republican Guard officer.
Medina Munawara was a Republican Guard armored division.
58
59
37


discussion or objection to the idea. He sent for me again. We had a long discussion,
which lasted for approximately an hour-and-a-half on the night of 11 September 1994.
There was a special confidence between the two of us. I explained to him calmly and
quietly the real problem regarding the 1991 Gulf War and the mistakes that were made. I
explained to him there is a difference between a tribal conflict and a civilized conflict.
The standards for wills and wishes within a civil conflict are different from those of a
tribal conflict. Saddam said, 'General Ra'ad Hamdani, the problem is that you are too
limited to military academy standards, but education has two sides. You are heading
towards the more dangerous side. At the technical level, I consider you the best
commander in our army, but at the moral level and political level you are dangerous.'
Saddam was torn between two views of the world, two conflicts. He wanted complete
loyalty to himself, which required violent, ignorant personalities. On the other hand, he
needed competent leaders because of the size of his army and his goals. In the end, he
admitted that holding a high rank within the Ba’ath Party did not necessarily make one a
competent commander. Nevertheless, he only trusted his relatives, so he sent them to
work with me. In a 2002 meeting, Saddam told me he was confused and surprised with
regards to three of his relatives who worked with me. He said, “I enrolled them in the
academy then I sent them to learn from you. How come they have not reached the same
level of competence you have?' I explained that the staff college could not turn a bad
officer into a good one. The good officer exploits what you offer him to improve his
education and knowledge. If the officer is good to start with, he will get better. I argued
nat spirit and morale are characteristics of military service. I also argued that military
experience has three aspects: the material side, the intellectual side, and the spiritual
side. When Saddam asked what I meant, I said, “It is about ideology, spirit, and
behavior. The military is different from other sciences which start from the general and
become more specialized through experience.’ For example, a doctor will study general
medicine, and then specialize later. In the military, it is the other way around. You start
off with a specialty, and then end up becoming more and more general. That is why they
call the senior-most rank ‘general,' because that rank is not specialized, it requires great
knowledge and expertise. I noted the following example. The Battle of Montenotte in
1796 was between the French Army, led by Napoleon who was a brand new general, and
the Austrian Army, led by General Beaulieu.“' Napoleon was 26 years old; Beaulieu 62.
60
The Battle of Montenotte was fought during the first French Revolutionary Wars (1792–97) near the village
of Cairo Montenotte in northwestern Italy; General Jean Pierre Beaulieu de Marconnay (1725–1819).
38


Napoleon commanded a badly equipped army of the French Revolution; the Austrian
Army was one of the strongest, most advanced army in Europe. Military analysts ask
why Napoleon won. The answer had to do with the three requirements of military
leadership: professional service, broad knowledge, and talent. General Beaulieu had 40
years of service, but no education or talent. On the other hand, Napoleon had no military
experience, but he had broad knowledge and great talent. Military scholars attribute
Napoleon's victories to these qualities. I noticed that Saddam paid great attention to this
explanation. He thanked me saying, “You really explained something to me that had
completely slipped my mind.' I told him that the right way was to look for people with
experience, broad knowledge, and talent.
Murray: After Tala al-Duri escaped from the disaster of the 9th Division and sat on the trial
of his successor who had command for all of three days, did Saddam give him a new
appointment?
Hamdani: Yes, he became the secretary of the general command. He became like Field
Marshal Keitel with Hitler. We were extremely surprised when he was appointed to this
position. For the army it was step backwards, because we had been trying to work
toward competence.
Woods: What were the key responsibilities of the secretary of the general command? What
were his day to day activities?
Hamdani: The general command was formed the night of the attack on Iran, 22 September
1980. It consisted of high ranking staff officers representing all branches of the armed
forces with the responsibility to offer military to Saddam.
Murray: Did al-Duri remain in that position for the rest of the war, or did he move to a new
position?
Hamdani: He remained [on active duty] until he was pensioned off after 1991.1 Let me tell you
a story about al-Duri. In the early 1990s, I took a vacation with my wife, while I was a
division commander in the Republican Guard. I was in my civilian car on the expressway.
A blue Mercedes was following me, with someone wearing blue inside. I tried to move to
the right side so he could pass me, but he kept moving to my side. Then he passed me with
his flashers on; he wanted me to stop so I stopped behind him. When he got out of the car,
61
According to other sources, al-Duri returned to command a force in the 1986 Fao battle, and then as earlier
noted, he commanded the III and V Corp in the Kurdinsh area in 1987 and 1988.
39


I saw that it was al-Duri. I got out of the car and shook hands with him. He said, “I would
like you to tell Saddam the next time you see him that it is wrong that such a important
officer like myself has been pensioned off.' He considered himself to be a great
commander. I told him that no one could raise the issue with Saddam. I got back in my car
and drove off. My wife asked who that was. I wanted to tell her briefly who al-Duri was,
so I told her that he had caused the death of a third of the Iraqi Army and now wanted to
return to finish the job! Today, he is the military commander of the Ba’ath Party with Izzat
al-Duri in Syria. 62 Two years ago Izzat issued an order for my execution along with ten
other generals. I was at the top of the list of generals to be eliminated because I was not a
representative of the Ba’ath ideology.
Woods: Moving from al-Duri to what many Iraqi officers have said was the opposite end of
the professional spectrum, what can you tell us about Adnan Khairallah?
Hamdani: He was a great person as far as morals and principles. It is strange that many of his
characteristics were the opposite of Saddam's.
Woods: In 1978, Khairallah was a colonel. When Saddam took power in July 1979,
Khairallah was promoted to a full general. Was he viewed as a political general?
Hamdani: I regard him similarly to how many other officers view him. During the war, I
came across Khairallah in many situations. Let us begin at the beginning of his career as
a commander of a tank battalion, and then commander of the 10th Armored Brigade. He
had noble characteristics: high morals, strong professionalism, and a military spirit. His
soldiers and his officers loved him. He was a role model for other commanders.
Although he was Saddam's brother-in-law and took advantage of his position to help
many, he never took advantage of his relationship with Saddam in a way that
compromised his moral principles. He respected the people above him and below him.
The problem arose when he was appointed to be minister of defense in 1977 with the
rank of colonel. The situation was strange because the minister of defense is a political
position. He could have been pensioned off with his colonel's rank and then appointed as
minister of defense as a civilian. As the minister of defense with his colonel's rank, he
62
After the fall of Saddam Hussein's regime, Izzat al-Duri and numerous other senior Ba’ath officials fled to
Syria. After Saddam’s execution in 2006, it was reported that Izzat al-Duri was “elected” leader of Iraqi's
exile Ba'ath Party.
40


was the deputy commander of the armed forces with command over other generals
including those with ranks much higher than colonel.63
The first incident happened when Khairallah visited the III Corps in Basra in 1977.
When he paid this visit, the commander of the III Corps, Lieutenant General Adnan al-
Shawi, was a three-star general. Al-Shawi was in a bit of a dilemma here. Normally an
officer would go out to the aircraft and greet the high-ranking officials, such as the
minister of defense, with a salute. Al-Shawi found it hard to salute a man with a lower
rank. Since he was a good officer, respectful of military rank, he decided not to greet
Khairallah outside, but instead to remain at his office. The new minister of defense
arrived and was greeted by a staff officer. Khairallah asked, Where is the corps
commander?' The staff officer replied, “The commander is in his office, but is too
embarrassed to come out to greet you.' So the minister of defense walked back to his
aircraft and returned to Baghdad. He raised this issue with his political superiors. Bakr
was the president then; Saddam was the vice president.O4 For Saddam, this incident was a
direct challenge to the military chain-of-command. Bakr, who had been a general,
understood that this was a difficult situation for the corps commander to handle. The
decision was made to pension off Lieutenant General Adnan al-Shawi, because he had
not greeted the minister of defense, while Khairallah was immediately promoted to four-
star general.
Adnan Khairallah was loved by the Iraqi Army and was considered a safety valve of
sorts. Most officers did not really care about his competence as a general officer-it was
his personality they loved. In most armies the chief of staff of the army is the real person
in charge. Because Shanshal, who was a four-star general, was the chief of staff of the
army and a four-star general, he and the other senior generals did not really care that
much when Khairallah was promoted. They just wanted the minister of defense to
63
64
Khairallah was a Colonel when nominated to become the defense minister. In April 1978 he was promoted to
General prior to assuming his post.
General Ahmed Hassan Bakr was a member of the coup that overthrew the Iraqi monarchy in 1958. As the
leader of the Ba’ath Party, he orchestrated the coup that overthrew Iraq's military leader, Abdul Karim
Kasim, and assumed the positions of prime minister and vice president. In 1968, he again participated in a
coup to oust the government of President Abdul Rahman Arif and assumed the position of president. He
served as president until he stepped down from office in 1979, when he was succeeded by Saddam Hussein.
General Abdel-Jabbar Khalil al-Shanshal was appointed chief of staff of the Iraqi Army in 1970. A position
he held until 1984 when he became minister of state for military affairs and finally minister of defense during
1989–90.
65
41


him, as a friend and a doctor, that in my opinion he was faking it, and there was nothing
wrong with him. I thought he was acting like a soldier faking an injury so he could take
some time off. Adnan answered back by pointing to a picture behind him of Saddam
Hussein, with the head of Hussein Kamel behind him in the picture. Adnan said, “I am
truly sick.” I asked him the reason for his sickness; I asked, “Saddam?” He said, “No, it
is the person behind Saddam.” “Hussein Kamel?” Adnan replied, “This is your future
minister.” If this story is true, it proves that Hussein Kamel was behind Adnan's death.
Murray: Speaking of Hussein Kamel, why do you think he returned to Iraq after escaping to
Jordon in 1995 and revealing all those secrets?
Hamdani: The same stupidity that made him flee to Jordan in the first place made him return
to Iraq.
Woods: We have already spoken about some of the violent officers and professional officers.
What other officers came out of the Iran-Iraq War and rose to became good professional
senior officers? Was there tension between these two different types of officers after 1988?
Hamdani: The army had a number of first-class officers. However, the general context of
politics did not give them any significant opportunities. The first-rate commanders
included Generals Sultan Hashim and Ayad Fayid al-Rawi, a former commander of the
Republican Guard, both of whom are presently imprisoned; General Ayad Khalil Zaki,
who is currently in Oman; General Abd al-Qadir; General Salem al-Ali; General Kabi
and General Abousi were first-rate commanders in the army The army represented an
excellent school for leaders, just as the British Army is. Many of the division-level
commanders were excellent people. In Iraq, it is the nature of the military command to
submit to the political command. When I refer to these officers, I do not mean to suggest
that they were perfect people. No one is perfect, but they were considered excellent
commanders. There were other good commanders but they were not promoted beyond a
certain point, such as General Hamid Fathi and General Tariq Tawfiq.
I was a student of great professors and generals. The first one I learned from was
General Tariq Tawfiq. When I graduated from the academy in 1970, I was stationed near
the Jordanian border. Tariq Tawfiq was the commander of the 8th Mechanized Brigade;
it was the oldest and best mechanized brigade in the army. It was part of the 3rd
Division, which at the time was considered the army's school house. He was my role
model, because he was a first-rate academic and possessed a strong practical sense along
with moral fiber. I recall once as a lieutenant I attended a meeting discussing foreign
43


armies. There was a general feeling that the British Army was better than the US Army;
however, General Tawfiq disagreed, ‘No, this is not true.' Then he gave us an example.
He had once attended a training course in the United States and was impressed by the
discipline of American soldiers. Because most of us followed the British military
method, we quietly called him “General Tariq Tawfiq, The American.'
On another occasion General Tawfiq visited my unit, which was at the time assigned to a
strategic location. He saw that I had military books relating to armored warfare, as well as
the memoirs of Field Marshal Bernard Montgomery. 7 I had all the time tables, schedules
for fighting, etc., because we were preparing to fight the Israelis. He asked me many
questions, which I answered correctly in his estimation. He said, “Lieutenant Ra’ad, if you
continue to work this way, you will be a good commander one day,' but then he corrected
my tactical deployment. He mentioned an Arabic proverb: ‘If your enemy is an ant, don't
sleep; be an ant like him.' I attribute any success I achieved to General Tawfiq.
Woods: What happened to General Tawfiq?
Hamdani: Because he was a good and competent commander, the Ba’athist command
dismissed him. He was pensioned off in 1978, when he was the commander of the 3rd
Armored Division. The army lost him because politics interfered with the military.
Murray: The Ba’ath Party removed many senior officers who had training and experience
with foreign armies, whether British, American, or French. From 1970 on, the Ba’ath
Party was no longer willing to send officers to Fort Leavenworth, or Camberley, for
training the staff college to broaden their experience.68 Can you speak about why that
decision was made and any difficulties that may have arisen due to this change?
Hamdani: There were two reasons: political and practical. In 1976, the political command
wanted the Iraqi military to reject British military culture and move closer to Soviet
military culture; military commanders disagreed. The problem for the military was that
Saddam was strongly influenced by Soviet doctrine, which led to many of the changes
instituted. Ba’athist ideology is an Arabic version of Marxist ideology. This is why
Saddam thought that political leaders could run the military. Saddam's greatest mistake
in the 2003 war was allowing political leaders to run the war. The idea of having
67
Referring to Field Marshal Bernard Law Montgomery of Alamein, “The Memoirs of Field Marshal the
Viscount Montgomery of Almein, K.G.,” (New York: Collins, 1958).
Referring to the US Army Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth and the UK Army Staff
College at Camberley.
68
44


political officers in our army was a Soviet phenomenon that Saddam introduced into the
army. Saddam also wanted to replicate Soviet political guidance. These ideas all proved
misguided and failed. 69
The source of our education was primarily British, which did not inform us much about
the American military. After the 1991 war we began to study American style joint
operations, the size and strength of the American military, and its rules of engagement. We
examined American military doctrine manuals closely. We noted the significant gaps in
our doctrine, based as it was on the doctrine of the British and the Soviets. Unlike
American weapons, which were hard to integrate into the Iraqi military because they
required high levels of technical knowledge, Soviet weapons were more suitable for our
use. This was because our soldiers had a low level of technical knowledge, on par with
that of a Soviet peasant or worker. Despite this, Soviet ideology was hard to apply to our
situation.
Section 2: Chemical Weapons · Conditions and Events
Leading to the Iran Iraq War - Military Training
Woods: Can you tell us something about the impact of your mixed doctrine against the
American-trained and -equipped Iranian forces in the early phases of the Iran-Iraq War?
Could you discuss the use of foreign equipment during the war as well?
Hamdani: During the Iran Iraq War, the Iranians had far fewer American M-60 tanks than
other types of tanks.70 Their British Chieftain tanks were deployed at the divisional
level.” They placed the M-60 tanks in battalions to support infantry divisions. They also
had American M-113 armored personnel carriers and British Scorpion reconnaissance
vehicles. 72 The armor of the Soviet tanks was superior to that of the tanks the Iranians
possessed. We had experience fighting this equipment because our armor had fought the
69
70
Hamdani did a series of interviews with Russia Television in 2007 and 2008 and discussed this subject in
detail. See <www.youtube.com/watch?v=wPCDNKZVDAo&feature=related> and
<www.youtube.com/watch?v=fcwkemQ3RZs> (accessed 25 March 2010).
The American M-60 series of tanks was a second-generation main battle tank, first introduced in the early
1960s. Sources vary, but in 1980, Iran possessed approximately 780 British Chieftain tanks and 460 M-60
tanks. Iran also possessed 400 older American-made M-47 and M-48 tanks.
The FV 4201 Chieftain was the United Kingdom's main battle tank in the 1960s and 1970s. It was derived
from the Centurion tank and designed with heavy armor for maximum protection of personnel.
The M-113 is an American-manufactured fully-tracked armored personnel carrier. They were first introduced
in the 1960s. The FV101 Scorpion is a tracked British armored reconnaissance vehicle introduced in the early
1970s.
71
72
45


Israelis on the Golan in 1973. Initially, Iranian tanks and armored vehicles could not
hold up against us; their French and British tanks were soon destroyed. In one battle
alone, my command seized five M-60 tanks and several M-113 armored personnel
carriers. We had (Soviet-made) T-55 and T-62 tanks; one brigade had T-72 tanks.73 We
were victorious because Iraqi tanks were superior to theirs. On the other hand, at the
beginning of the war, the Iranians had a superior air force. Our aviation only became
superior to that of the Iranians later in the war. Iranian infantry was superior to ours
throughout all phases of the conflict. The spirit of the Islamic Revolution dominated and
influenced many Iranians. However, at the start of the war, the Iraqi military had an
advantage over the Iranians because Khomeini and his ayatollahs had purged the officer
corps. The Iranians had the same problem as Iraq: their political commanders ran the
war.
Murray: One of the great mistakes Iraq made in 1991 was to underestimate how different US
armor was with the Abrams tank compared to the M-60s they had encountered fighting
the Iranians. 74
Hamdani: In 1991, during a period of bombing that lasted 39 days, US aircraft destroyed most
of our air defense system and much of our air force. The Apache helicopters, which
carried 16 Hellfire missiles, emerged as one of the two biggest factors affecting our
combat with Abrams tanks.75 The other was the A-10 aircraft.“ Only Apaches and A-10s
could attack at night. These weapons had an eight kilometer range; whereas the longest
range of our weapons was three kilometers. Our tanks were hit and destroyed in an
amazing way. On the night of 24 February, I was injured as a result of an A-10 missile
attack.
I
In 1994, on the night Saddam informed me that he wanted to invade Kuwait, I explained
that the Abrams could hit five out of five targets while Iraqi tanks hit only one out of
73
74
The T-55 tank was a Soviet-manufactured main battle tank, which entered service in the early 1960s. The T-
62 was a Soviet-manufactured tank based on the T-55, which entered service in the mid-1960s. The T-72 was
a soviet-manufactured main battle tank that entered service in the 1970s. It is distinguished from its export
version by the designation M (T-72M).
The AGM-114 (Hellfire) missile is an American-manufactured air-to-ground missile primarily employed by
attack helicopters against armored vehicle targets. The M-1 (Abrams) tank is the United States' main battle
tank. The near-70 ton M-1 is protected by advanced armor and features an extremely accurate 120mm gun.
The AH-64 (Apache) is a four-blade, twin-engine attack helicopter. The AH-64 is designed to operate at
night and carried a mix of anti-tank missiles (hellfire), rockets, and a 30mm cannon.
The A-10 (Thunderbolt II) is an American single-seat, twin-engine, jet aircraft, which entered service in the
early 1970s. The A-10 is designed to provide close air support for ground forces by attacking tanks, armored
vehicles, and other ground targets.
75
76
46


five. The Abrams system is very advanced. As a division commander, I had no
comparable system. The Abrams tank fights better at night than during the daytime
because GPS could locate everything, while we were blind. The Apaches had an eight-
kilometer range with fire and forget missiles. Then, there were also the F-16 and F-15
attack aircraft, satellites, etc. 77
Woods: As you are aware, the most significant historical examples of the use of chemical
weapons were in the trenches of World War I and on the battlefields of the Iran-Iraq
War. How was the development of chemical weapons, the technology for their use, and
doctrine introduced to the Iraqi Army?
Hamdani: Yes, as a military weapon, chemical weapons were first used during World War I;
they played a major role in the Somme and Verdun battles of 1916. They were a solution
designed to open a gap in the uninterrupted enemy trench lines.
In the beginning, Iraq only trained its troops in protection protocols against chemical
weapons. This was in response to our conflict with the Israelis. We feared the Israelis
might use chemical weapons against us. We had units called “Units of Protection against
Chemical Weapons.' Soldiers were equipped with a mask and some atropine shots.
There was also Soviet technology and decontamination equipment. In 1984, I learned
from friends that the Iraqi Army chemical corps had a highly secret project to produce
chemical weapons. This was done in extreme secrecy.
In 1984, the Iranians had infantry superiority and utilized approaches like the water
channels and lakes where we could not use our armor. The first use of chemical weapons
came in the marshy area of Hawr al-Hawizeh. Our air force dropped chemical weapons
in canisters; however, we did not know which agents were deployed and whether they
were persistent or non-persistent.
We used to wonder whether using gas was effective. We asked the Iranian prisoners
about the effectiveness of gas; most of their comments indicated it was not, because the
weapons used were of the volatile type. Such use of chemical weapons was not practical,
because it required information such as the speed of wind, etc. In 1986, the Iranians
occupied the Fao area, which had a significant impact on us because it represented our
only access point to the sea. Moreover, Fao was an extremely swampy area so that we
77
The Lockhead Martin F-16 Fighting Falcon is a multirole jet fighter originally designed as a lightweight,
daytime fighter, first introduced in the late 1970s. The McDonnell Douglas (now Boeing) F-15 Eagle is a
twin-engine, all-weather tactical fighter designed to gain and maintain air-superiority in aerial combat
situations, first introduced in the mid-1970s.
47


could not use our armor, which usually gave us superiority. We learned that some of our
artillery had been modified to launch chemical weapons, in addition to air dropped
canisters.
Murray: Our sources indicate that Baghdad's first reaction to the attack on Fao was not to
move troops, because the military command believed that Basra was the main target. Do
you think this was a major factor in the heavy use of chemicals during the battle and
throughout the war?
Hamdani: A headquarters was established to rotate exhausted troops in and out of the battle.
We had significant losses among our troops; there were major failures in the field.
Victories were measured in meters; however, troops cannot use such standards in
combat.
The Iranians crossed from Iran into Hawr al-Ahwar, near Fao. There was an industrial
project in Hawr al-Ahwar to produce salt from the clayish mud in the area that was
saturated with sea water. It was done through a series of parallel channels. Although this
area was not ideal for troop movement, the Iranians were able to remain there. Missiles
fired and bombs dropped from aircraft sank deep in the mud unless they exploded in
midair. Once, when I was doing reconnaissance in the area, I was caught in an Iranian
artillery barrage. Three shells hit near me, 2-to-3 meters apart. I was covered in mud. But
the rounds sank 3-to-4 meters deep into the mud before detonating. Our artillery and air
force had to use air bursts. This limited their lethality because the special fuses required
for air bursts were hard to obtain in sufficient numbers. The Iranians quickly created
concrete fortifications to protect against the air bursts, while that caused us even larger
losses. Approximately 53,000 Iraqis died in the fighting with 287,000 wounded over a
two year period. Iran was able to replenish after similar losses, but we were not. The
result was that we resorted to the use of chemical weapons after our heavy losses at Fao.
Iranian losses were less than we had expected because the area was so soft and we did
not possess air-burst chemical weapons. We resorted to bombing the orchards to the
east; based on information gathered during the interrogation of Iranian prisoners, but our
chemical weapons had only limited impact.
In 1987, the Iranians began using chemical weapons in a limited manner. On 17-18
April 1988, we launched a chemical attack to liberate Fao, but the wind shifted direction
and affected our troops rather than the Iranians. We were forced to attack while wearing
protective masks. The damage inflicted on us was greater than on them. Despite this, the
48


attack was launched with a first-rate plan and preparations. The assault group possessed
amphibious vehicles (like ducks) and a large mat to roll over the terrain, so trucks could
drive over the swampy areas. Thousands of tons of gravel were poured into the marsh so
tanks could operate without getting stuck. During the 1988 offensive at Fao, we lost only
1,086 Republican Guards.
We used chemicals in a limited manner to liberate Majnun Island and the marshes area
later that year. We also used the airborne forces, pontoon, which carried tanks and
vehicles, and helicopters which transported the infantry. Although we did not use
chemical weapons in the other two battles, the Iranian forces collapsed.
In the north, the enemy's center of gravity was in Halabjah. Their forces held strong
positions, and they did not expect us to attack. That is why the battle was successful. We
used chemical weapons there in a limited fashion. We had the advantage of superior
timing and location. The battle at Halabjah, which lies between the Hewraman Mountains
and Buhayrat Darbandikhan Lake, occurred in March 1988.78 This was a staging area
because nobody lives there. Iran's 84th Infantry Division and their 55th Parachute
[Brigade) had occupied Halabjah. They wanted to control the mountains because that
would open up the region as far north as as-Sulaymaniyah, which is a barrier to the
interior. The 84th Division occupied Halabjah and 55th Division reached the mountain.
Intense battles took place between Iraqi and Iranian Special Forces. Our forces possessed
seven artillery battalions with missile launchers. The Republican Guard launched 720
chemical missiles, while the rest of the artillery battalions launched between 150–200
artillery shells. The battle at Halabjah was the only truly effective chemical strike; the 84th
division was exterminated. About 60 percent of the Iranian troops were affected and left
the battle. We confirmed this by listening to wire-tapped conversations and radio message
traffic. The Iranians responded by using chemical weapons themselves. The success of the
special forces was the deciding factor that led to Iraq's victory in the battle. Although 180
Kurds were killed and maybe 360 injured, they were not the intended targets of the strike.
In effect, they were collateral damage. There was an agreement whereby Jalal Talabani
was supposed to evacuate the area of civilians; he provided a document or statement
indicating that he had evacuated them from that area. It has been reported that 5,000 Kurds
78
The Hewraman is a mountainous region stretching from western Iran (Iranian Kurdistan), including the cities
of Pawe and Meriwan, to northeastern Iraq (Iraqi Kurdistan), including the city of Halabjah.
49


died because of the Iraqi chemical attacks. This is an exaggeration. The Kurdish leadership
used the incident to attack us. This is the truth for those who want a truthful to history. 79
Woods: Who had the authority to initiate the use of chemical weapons? Was it the local
commander or the higher command in Baghdad?
Hamdani: The order to use chemical weapons came from someone between the corps
commander and the chief of staff of the army with Saddam's full knowledge.
Woods: Given all their experiences using chemical weapons in the 1980s, how would you
describe the attitude of Saddam and the senior generals toward chemical weapons in
general? What did he take away from these experiences? What did do you think they
learned?
Hamdani: When the battle began, Iran had the strategic advantage because Iran and Iraq both
had deployed 60 percent of their armies in northern Iraq. The Iranians occupied Fao and
many other points across the border. Nizar al-Khazraji executed several high-ranking
army officers at the time, because they could not overcome the Iranian numerical
advantage and hold onto as-Sulaymaniyah. 80
Everyone fought hard because by this point in the war, any officer could be executed
without a court marshal if they failed, but an execution could not take place unless
Saddam authorized it. So when the 66th Special Forces Brigade returned from a mission
with only 34 soldiers including 12 officers, the commander, Colonel Jafar Sadeq, snuck
into Baghdad to beg for Saddam's mercy. He told Saddam, I'm at your mercy, please
grant me immunity.' Nonetheless, Saddam ordered Sadeq executed along with the other
officers. The executions took place during March/April 1988.
Executions only took place during the battle after a withdrawal. Before the executions
were stopped, anyone who carried out an execution was promoted by Saddam. Because
Saddam was a violent person, he resorted to violence in order to make defeat worse than
79
The history of what occurred at Halabjah remains controversial both inside and outside of Iraq. While
Hamdani was not directly involved in either operation, he presents here what is most likely the general view
of his peers. For alternative views of these events, especially on the controversial issue of civilian casualties,
see Joost R. Hilterman, A Poisonous Affair: America, Iraq, and the Gassing of Halabja (New York:
Cambridge University Press, 2007); Stephen Pelletier, “A War Crime or an Act of War?,” New York Times,
21 January 2003; Human Rights Watch Middle East, Iraq's Crime of Genocide: The Anfal Campaign against
the Kurds (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1995); Jennifer Trahan, “A Critical Guide to the Iraqi High
Tribunal's Anfal Judgement: Genocide against the Kurds,” Michigan Journal of International Law 20, no. 2
(2009).
Nizar al-Kharzraji was the Iraqi Army chief of staff (1987–91). He defected in 1996 and became associated
with various Iraqi ex-patriot movements through the fall of the regime.
80
-
50


remaining in the field. This had a negative impact on the army's morale. The
commander looses honor and dignity, and soldiers need to look up to their commander
as a father. The executions caused them to regard their commanders with fear as though
they were the enemy.
Murray: I have seen a speech by Saddam, in which he says: “When soldiers no longer fight
for the love of their leader, then they must fight by fear.'
Nathan: Was Colonel Jafar Sadeq superior officer [Kamel Sajid] held accountable for this
failure?
Hamdani: No. Kamel Sajid was commander of the I Corps at the time and earlier had
commanded an infantry division in the Republican Guard. He was also the corps
commander responsible for the 66th Special Forces. He was not a competent commander
because, although he was courageous and honest, he abdicated responsibility—he would
dump responsibility on the shoulders of his subordinates. He eventually became deeply
religious and spent the remainder of his life tormented by his sense of guilt. His
performance in Khorramshahr in 1980 was competent and brave but the situation
required more than that. Saddam admired Kamel Sajid, because he represented the ideal
of physical fitness in the Special Forces. Sajid was honest, but he did not know how to
handle problems. A commander's first task is to be responsible for his subordinate's
mistakes. He became governor of al-Muthanna province in the south. He was a good,
simple man; his weakness was that he did not want to take responsibility. He carried out
the execution of Sayef Saud, but was not responsible for it. He was executed later
because of his involvement in a conspiracy against the regime. It is a bloody history.
Woods: What were your impressions of the Popular Army? How were they used, and how did
they work with the regular army?
Hamdani: When the Islamic Revolution flared up in Iran, one of its primary goals was to
spread into Iraq because 1) Iraq had a secular regime [Ba’ath Party ideology is secular,
not Islamic]; and 2) Iraq was an obstacle to Iran's goal to liberate Palestine. Khomeini
thought a second victory could be achieved in Iraq.
Iranian intelligence began stirring up Iraqi Shi’a, which made up 60 percent of the
population. Most Shi’a leaders were graduates of Iranian religious schools. Thus, Iraq
confronted major aggression. In 1979 and 1980, religious groups started to organize and
expand within Iraq and within the Iraqi armed forces. There were more than 1,000
border violations by Iranian forces into Iraq by land, air, and sea, while terrorism
51


occurred throughout Iraq. There were also attacks at special occasions and celebrations.
Khomeini called for the overthrow of Saddam's regime. There was general belief among
Iraqi leaders that the situation would persist until overall security collapsed in Iraq, and
then Khomeini's Revolutionary Army would launch an attack.
Consequently, the Iraqi government decided to launch a preemptive war. There was some
international support for the war. S1 The assumption was that, if Iraqi troops could advance
15 to 20 kilometers inside Iran, the Revolutionary Army would have to advance from
Tehran toward the border to confront us. This would provide secular counter-revolutionary
groups in the capital a chance to seize control and establish a secular government. 82 We
believed this would not take any more than four to six weeks. A gathering of senior
officers discussed the decision to invade on 6 July 1980. Two members of the political
command asked Saddam Hussein, “The Iraqi Army has 37 brigades. If all of these
brigades attack Iran where will we get our reserves? There is a major risk here. We will be
taking a considerable chance.' Saddam did not want to admit that Iraq possessed
insufficient forces or that such a move might represent a mistake so he responded, “The
unannounced reserves are the Iraqi people. That is how the concept of the Popular Army
began.
Woods: This is interesting because, of course, the Iraqi Ba’ath is a product of two revolutions:
the 1963 revolution which ultimately failed and the 1968 revolution which succeeded.
Why did Saddam Hussein believe that presenting the Iranians with an external threat
would allow a secular counter-revolution to succeed? Did he not think this would be
used as a way to unify the Iranian population around the revolution instead of driving
them away from it?
Murray: I might add that that it seems the problem for a secularist like Saddam or even the
communists in Iran was their inability to conceive of a revolution stemming from
religion. That is the leftist tradition in the West. It is, of course, wrong; revolutions can
come from any source.
Hamdani: Saddam was a national revolutionary. The Iranian revolution was a religious
revolution. Religious philosophy appears to be the opposite of national philosophy.
Religion does not recognize patriotism or nationalism.
81
82
An apparent reference to the ongoing crisis over US hostages held at the American embassy in Tehran.
It is not clear which group or groups Hamdani is referring to here.
52


The goals of the Islamic Revolution came at the expense of a national revolution. There
were no principles to start with, there were only interests and the interests were in
contradiction. For example, Chinese Marxist theory contradicts Soviet Marxist-Leninist
theory. Such interests could take on a revolutionary framework or a secular framework.
Saddam claimed to be a revolutionary. He thought that accomplishing Ba’ath goals in
Iraq could be done only through his efforts. That posed a problem because the political
approach cannot address all interests. Saddam wanted to control the Arab world, while
Khomeini wanted to control the Islamic world. Iraq is a part of both. It was a conflict of
basic interests. Most people are idiots on this subject; they just do not understand.
Murray: Saddam had one goal: drawing the revolutionaries out of Tehran; however, in
reality, there were always multiple potential outcomes. Saddam seemed unclear about
these possibilities: 1) Iraq could advance 20 kilometers into Iran and the troubles along
the border would end, 2) Revolutionaries could leave Tehran and Khomeini's regime
could fall, 3) Iraq could grab southwestern Iran and gain control over the Sha’at Al Arab
and Iranian oil, 4) Iraq could seize control of Arabistan and rally the Arab world, 5) If
Iraq were really successful, any of these would cause the whole Arab world to recognize
Saddam as the leader. The problem with each of these assumptions is that they are all-or-
none outcomes; there is no middle ground for compromise.
Hamdani: Of course, this was the philosophy of a dictatorship. Both Saddam and the
ayatollah Khomeini were dictators with grand ambitions. I saw a story on Iraqi television
about Saddam sometime in the 1980s. Friends of Saddam were gathered to recollect
their childhoods in the early 1950s. One of Saddam's friends, perhaps Hekmat, told a
story: ‘One day you [Saddam] asked me, “What are your ambitions in the future?” I
answered, “I want to become a teacher.” I then asked Saddam Hussein the same
question. Saddam looked up at the ceiling thinking, and then he replied, “I have great
ambitions. I want to rule the Arab world and be like Salah ad-Din.”-83 To rule the Arab
world had been Saddam's ambition since he was in eighth grade; he never gave up on
that dream or working toward achieving it. Similar to Hitler, Saddam was willing to
make mistakes to succeed. Dictators are of one type, whether the dictatorship is of a
national or religious context. Two people with big dreams: Saddam and Khomeini.
83
Salah ad-Din Yusuf ibn Ayyub (b. 1137) was the Sultan of Egypt and Syria who united most of the Levant.
He is best remembered for recapturing Jerusalem from the Crusaders (1187).
53


Murray: Can you elaborate on the strategic planning between the July 1980 meeting and the
invasion in September 1980?
Hamdani: The strategic plan for war was based on the assumption that Iraqi forces could
achieve victory in four to six weeks, and military operations would not require real
reserves. The plan was to send a light reconnaissance force out along the border to locate
the enemy and determine targets. Infantry would advance and control the borders. We
would control 5 kilometers on either side for a total of 10 kilometers. The armored
forces would advance 10–20 kilometers into Iran, if the Iranians fought. Each of the
major divisions had a city or area objective, which they were to control. Iranian troops
would be forced to concentrate and engage in a battle. The counter-revolutionary forces
would then rise up and seize control of Tehran and oust Khomeini's regime.
What would Iraq gain at that time? First, Saddam would achieve a military victory and
be considered a great commander. Saddam had read that the greatest commanders in
history were those who fought and achieved victory. Second, in the process of military
victory, Iraq would regain those areas given up in the Algeria Accords in 1975, which
had been lost in exchange for Iran's ceasing to support the Iraqi Kurds, specifically small
areas along the disputed frontier, the oil fields in Abadan, and Shatt al-Arab. 84 The
Algeria Accords had been hard on Iraqi sovereignty.
If victory were achieved, Iran would owe something to Iraq, where as in the past it had
been the other way around. There is a history of discord between Iraq and Iran—people
of the hill and people of the plains. Iraq has always been subject to raids and attacks
from Iran because it was flat. The problem became worse with the discovery of oil.
Saddam thought he would achieve a great strategic, as well as political, victory, and
would become leader of the Arab world. For this he engaged in a war for which he had
not properly prepared. If the military academy and Iraqi staff college had developed the
military plan, it would have been very different from the one he executed; he violated
basic military principle during the invasion of Iran.
By 1982, the fighting had exhausted our troops. The Iranian population was three times
the size of Iraq's; it was well-suited to wage a long war. The nature of a long war is
84
The Algiers Agreement of 1975 was supposed to settle the territorial dispute over control of the Shatt al-Arab
and put an end to support for rebellious groups in each other's territories.
54


described by Sun Tzu in The Art of War.85 Saddam made a huge strategic mistake; he
later realized he needed real reserves.
Woods: On the details of the military plan, from July 1980, when Iraqi military leaders were
told to prepare for war against Iran sometime in the future, who was involved in military
planning? Was it just Saddam, or were corps and division commanders involved? Did
they have a chance to look at terrain, offer opinions, and make decisions?
Hamdani: General Shanshal was the chief of staff of the army. He and his planners adopted a
political philosophy of war and turned it into a military concept. With regards to decision-
making, the chain of command was as follows: Saddam to Adnan Khairallah to Shanshal
to the planning and operations directorate. They called this process the “Guidance for
Political Planning of War.' The leader of the planning directorate was a three-star general,
Abdul al-Asadi. He was a graduate of British schools, an excellent officer and commander.
However, the process was contrary to traditional planning in the army. What we studied at
the military academy and the staff college was completely different from this process.
Woods: When did the corps commanders become involved in the planning process?
Hamdani: On 6 July, there was a meeting attended by political commanders and the corps'
ranking military commanders. The next day, 7 July, our commanders told us of the
upcoming war with Iran. We were told that the war aimed at preventing an Iranian attack
and an escalation of rebellious activities by the Shi’a in Iraq. Iraq's security was in
extreme danger. It was such a threat that it required the country to launch a preventative
attack.
Woods: What was the reaction of the senior officers when they were told on 6 July they
would be attacking a country three times Iraq's size?
Hamdani: The corps and division commanders were convinced that war was inevitable,
because Iran's continuous attacks were threatening Iraq's security, but they disagreed
with the plan. For national considerations, not political, we were hoping that we could
stop or deter this attack. These were our feelings.
Woods: Were there any other special preparations for this rather large operation?
Hamdani: The entire country started to get ready for the war.
85
Referring to the oft-quoted Sun Tzu statement, “There is no instance of a country having benefited from
prolonged warfare.”
-
55


Murray: Were there any staff officers or commanders who verbalized their dismay over the
plan?
Hamdani: The dissent did not last for long after the political decision had been made.
Murray: Once the decision was made, none of the military officers were going to tell Saddam
that Iraq did not have the appropriate military means to execute his plan. Is that correct?
Hamdani: That issue was raised on 6 July. Saddam said, “The announced and unannounced
reserves are the people. It is not the responsibility of you, the officials.'
Murray: Were there any senior officers or planners who said that Iraq needs to do certain
things beyond this plan to ensure military security?
Hamdani: Shanshal and the planning committee led by al-Asadi were in charge and took
responsibility for political security. The training directorate from the minister of defense
took the plan and assigned training tasks that all of the units worked on from July
through September. We fulfilled all necessary quotas, equipment, and supply requests
and started the final preparations for war.
Murray: The end result of this was that the army entered Iran and ended up in indefensible
tactical positions with no possibility of coordination between the different units. They
were just stuck out there in Iran.
Hamdani: You are correct. These initial indefensible positions extended the war. Only some
of the armored troops achieved their objectives. For instance, Ahvaz is a big city and
required an infantry corps to take it, but, we lacked sufficient infantry, so the armored
troops simply moved into the desert area and the empty areas, but not into the city. The
armored troops remained in front, but should have been in the rear, behind the infantry,
which could infiltrate enemy lines at night. Our army was not sufficiently large to cover
the vast 1,300 square kilometers of desert terrain near Ahvaz. I brought these issues to
the attention of my immediate superiors.
At that time (in either October or November 1980), some academic faculty from Bakr
University visited my unit to discuss this issue. 86 These were some of our best military
professors; they supported my suggestions, my ideas. They pointed out, however, that
the decision not to withdraw to better positions was a political not a military one. That is
86
The Bakr University is more formally known as Bakr University for Higher Military Studies, which is the
Iraqi equivalent of the US National Defense University. It is comprised of four colleges: National Defense
College, Iraqi War College, Iraqi Staff College, and Iraqi Command College.
56


when the long war started. The Popular Army filled the gaps along the border so that the
regular infantry troops could move up to the front.
Murray: At what point do you think Saddam realized that Iraq was in a long war? I have seen
some indications that as early as November 1980 he recognized that the war was not going
as planned. And yet, the real mobilization of Iraq does not occur until the summer of 1981.
Hamdani: For politics, it is the same problem as for drugs. The UN and the Islamic
Conference made some attempts to broker a settlement. On 18 September, Iraq declared
the war by ending the previous Iranian infiltration. On 22 September, we entered Iran in
depth. Even though no one declared victory, as when Napoleon entered Moscow,
Saddam was waiting for someone to declare victory, but no one from the counter-
revolutionary groups made a move. On 4 October, we were told to destroy all barriers at
the borders, the control posts, etc., because on 5 October Iraq would announce a
unilateral ceasefire. The high command gave these orders because once the war ended
they thought Iraq would establish new borders. Iran refused the ceasefire, and the
president of Iran made a statement that this was Iraq's first step backwards. Iraq along
with the United Nations and the Islamic Conference then created a “Goodwill
Committee.' [Julius Kambarage] Nyerere, president of Tanzania, was head of this
committee.S' Among those working on this committee was Yasser Arafat.
Woods: You have said that the army commanders knew the war was going to start. However,
according to General Abousi, the air force was not aware the war was going to start until
the day before the air strikes. 88
Hamdani: I do not know what General Abousi said, but the air force and the navy commanders
attended that meeting. It is possible their commanders did not notify their units or
divisions the way the army did. All senior commanders were notified of the decision on 7
July and were told to submit a report evaluating the readiness of their units within 72
hours. If the tank battalion and all the other battalions were notified of the order, then all
air force units must have been notified also. Nevertheless, Abousi is a better source
regarding the air force than Iran.
87
Julius Kambarage Nyerere (1922–99). Nyerere became president of Tanganyika (later Tanzania) in 1964. A
position he held until 1985.
See interview with General Abousi, page 186 this monograph.
88
57


Section 3: Personal Interactions with Saddam - Senior
Leadership
Woods: Tell us about Saddam in his role as the supreme commander in the 1980s. What was
it like to meet with him? How about when he visited with troops in the field?
Hamdani: From 1980 to 1982, I was a battalion commander in the army. At the end of
October 1982, I joined the Republican Guard and stayed with that force until 2003.
During the first two years of the war, I met with Saddam three times, when he visited the
front. After we lost the 2003 war, looters seized all of my property so many of my
pictures of these events have disappeared. Every time Saddam visited someone or
someplace, he would have pictures taken and give them away. Each person who was in a
picture with Saddam received two copies. Unfortunately, that part of my history is lost.
My first meeting with Saddam during the war was in January 1981, but our first personal
meeting was in 1971. There was an incident with a downed aircraft and a failed coup in
Sudan. The aircraft carried an Iraqi Ba’athist group that had gone to the Sudan to support
a coup, but the coup failed and the group had to return to Iraq.89 On its way back to Iraq,
the plane crashed. One of the victims was my uncle Farouk who was a friend of Saddam.
On 23 July 1971, Saddam came to pay his condolences. I look very similar to my uncle.
I was very far away, when Saddam first saw me. He asked me if I were Farouk's brother.
I told him, 'No, he was my uncle.' Saddam then asked, “What do you do?” I told him
that I was an officer in the army and on vacation. The next day Saddam sent one of his
secretaries with an invitation to his palace.
I went to his palace on 27 July 1971. Saddam praised my uncle. He said my uncle was a
major asset within the intelligence community. Saddam suggested I should move from
the regular army to the intelligence career field. I apologized, telling him that I was a
soldier and was not fit to be in intelligence. He was disappointed and annoyed. As I was
leaving, the secretary collapsed in a chair and asked, “What have you done?!' I did not
see that there was a problem, because I did not know Saddam yet.
Saddam visited me in the field in January 1981. I explained the front line situation to
him, and he was pleased because I had a thorough knowledge of our forces and those of
the enemy. I had a reconnaissance symbol on my beret so Saddam asked about the
89
Hamdani appears to indicate that the Iraqi intelligence officers were dispatched to support a counter-coup in
Chad. On 19 July 1971, a communist-backed military group ousted President Gaafar Nimeiry. Nimeiry was
restored to power on 22 July with the assistance of several Arab states including Egypt and Libya.
58


insignia. I told him that this was the reconnaissance symbol and only the best
components of the armored corps go into reconnaissance. The minister of defense,
Adnan Khairallah told Saddam Hussein that I had been an instructor in the armored
corps and now was here on the front. 90
I next met with Saddam on the battlefield in February and March 1981. I was
commanding forces in defense of the Mandali sector. He had already visited the sector
to the [direction is unclear], which had a higher position and whose sector commander
was Kurdish. Saddam Hussein asked the Kurdish sector commander, “If the position is
hit, where will you go?' The commander replied, “That is impossible. They could not do
that. I would fight and the Iranians would never be able to occupy my sector.’ Saddam
then asked, “Would you never even consider a retreat?' The commander replied, “Not at
all.’ Saddam asked if he had prepared defensive positions to his rear. The Kurdish
commander again replied, “No.” Saddam then came to my position. I explained to him
the different deployments: the front position, the main defensive line, and the rear
positions. I told him, “If the enemy attacks, and I cannot do anything, I will retreat to
defensive positions locations in the rear. We will hold the enemy until reinforcements
arrive.' Saddam did not appear happy or comfortable with my explanation. He seemed
disappointed and left. Saddam told my commander that he (Saddam) did not think much
of me and that he liked the Kurdish commander better. Ten days later, the battle flared,
the Iranians over ran and occupied the sector to my right. I was forced to fight on my
right flank. If it were not for the positions we had prepared to our rear, we would have
been crushed as well. Saddam never again asked who would retreat or who would stand
and lose.
My troops performed well, and Saddam said he wanted the best people who fought to
join the Republican Guard. On 4 November 1982, I met with Saddam as a member of
the Republican Guard and hoped that he would not remember the previous meeting.
After that, I met him frequently.
Murray: How did Saddam deal with meetings? How did officers deal with him? Was there a
sense of fear or intimidation in the meetings?
90
91
Hamdani was an instructor at the Iraqi Armor School 1977–78.
Mandali is the northern end of the central Iraqi sector. The area is open and flat and was the scene of heavy
fighting during the Iran Iraq War.
59


Hamdani: As a matter of fact, Saddam possessed a powerful and exceptional personality. He
had charisma. When he looked at you, he paid close attention. He looked you straight in
the eye, as if to control you. In general, he was an intelligent person and an amazingly
thorough listener. Not knowing what was on his mind was scary. Moreover, the strength
of his convictions could be scary; if he believed something was true, even if he were
proved wrong, he believed it to be true.
On 17 January 1984, several commanders of the Republican Guard, including myself,
met with Saddam: Adnan Khairallah, General Fathi (Amin), and a military counselor to
Saddam. We were there to review Republican Guard capabilities. At the time, I was in
charge of fielding the new T-72 tanks. Saddam changed the subject from readiness and
started to talk about luck and coincidence in war. He asked if it were possible to make
luck and coincidence a “principle of war.' Most of the attendees nodded in agreement,
suggesting that it was possible. I interrupted to say that it was impossible for luck and
coincidence to become a principle of war. The way Saddam paid attention to me
noticeably caught Khairallah's attention. Saddam asked, “Why?' I immediately felt my
blood pressure rise to 150 even though I knew I was right. I noticed Khairallah sink in
his seat and Hussein Kamel adjust his position as he stood behind Khairallah; their body
language to me said ‘Be careful.' Saddam asked, “Why not?' I told him principles tend
to be sensible and have the power to remain steady and in place, while luck and
coincidences were metaphysical concepts. If we think of luck and coincidence, we
cannot differentiate between the two of them. I gave Saddam a number of examples.
Saddam had a stern look on his face. I was saved when Saddam had to leave the room to
take a phone call from King Fayd of Saudi Arabia. Khairallah asked, “What were you
doing?!' I said, “Did I say something wrong?' Khairallah said, “No, what you said was
right, but this is not the way you talk to Saddam. You should have approached it in a
more tactful fashion. It is hard for Saddam to accept what you argue.' I then realized that
Saddam needed to be addressed in a special fashion.
The psychologist, Sigmund Freud says that a person can have more than one personality.
In my analysis, Saddam had a number of personality traits. Sometimes he was
intelligent, other times he could be as naïve as an illiterate farmer. One moment he
would be extremely affectionate, the next moment he would be extremely hostile and
cruel. Even Satan was better than Saddam at those times. One minute he could be overly
generous, the next he could be extremely stingy. He had a great ability to listen, but then
he would not allow you to say anything or he would refuse to listen to what you said. He
60


was extremely courageous. He could take ideas from everyone and create a new idea. At
a political level, he was an excellent tactical player; however, at the strategic level, 99
percent of his concepts were wrong. His problem was that he imposed tribal standards on
the administration of a country.
On 11 September 1994, Saddam asked me what my problem was, and why I always
seemed to oppose him. He said that he had no more patience with me. I could not say
that my problem was him, so I told him, “We have a civilization problem.' He asked
what I meant. I told him Iraq's leaders were looking at war in terms of tribal philosophy.
I said, “War is larger in scope. The conflict is more than a tribal one; it is between
civilizations.' I knew that he was convinced after the reasons I gave him. Saddam then
sent me back to my division, saying he had another decision to make. I was later told
that Saddam was considering sending me to prison, but he then changed his mind. This
was rare. My colleagues told me I was lucky.
Woods: Is this when Qusay put in a good word for you?
Hamdani: As a matter of fact, Qusay saved me more than three times. The closest call was in
November 1990 when I opposed the Iraqi plan to defend [Iraq's newly acquired stake in]
Kuwait. My conclusion about US and coalition forces was right—anyone who read
American military doctrine would know US intentions. I thought our plan was bad and
that the Americans would enter Kuwait to defend it. It was as if I were speaking against
Saddam. I was investigated; afterwards, the secret police wanted to put me on trial in
Baghdad, but Qusay intervened. There were many charges against me. First, I had
disagreed with President Saddam's recommendations. Second, I was affecting the morale
of the army by saying we were going to lose the war. In total, there were seven charges
against me.
Another incident came on 27 November 1995. I gave a lecture at a military conference that
Saddam attended in which I criticized Iraq's military strategy in 1991. I recommended that
we change our military doctrine before the impending war with the United States began.
There were 200 high ranking officers in attendance. Saddam directly attacked me and my
arguments; he commented, ‘General Hamdani's problem is that he reads Western writings
and listens to the American media. They have him brainwashed.' To the minister of
defense and chief of staff of the army he commented, “This is an order: I do not want any
general to discuss our weaknesses. They may only mention the more optimistic aspects of
our situation.' He said this firmly. The resulting order severely limited our ability to
61


discuss basic military realities. Another conference presenter who was ready to state in his
talk that the Iraqi Air Force had only limited capabilities by mid-1996 changed his topic to
the Russian Air Force because of Saddam's order. This is when the lies began, which led
us to disaster of 2003. Only General Jaysh al-Hadami, who is currently in prison, defended
me at the conference. He was an excellent commander and had great ideas regarding the
war against Iran. Qusay saved me from Saddam after the conference.
Murray: In terms of Saddam Hussein's inner circle, how important was his son-in-law,
Hussein Kamel?
Hamdani: Hussein Kamel was one of the strangest phenomena in the history of Saddam's
regime. He was a negative influence on Saddam throughout. He wanted to become the
most important person after Saddam. Right before the war with Iran, the Yemeni
President, Ali Abdullah Saleh, visited Iraq.92 Saddam brought him to visit my armored
brigade. There was a young man with Saddam and Saleh’s group moving here and there,
actively jumping left and right. I asked one of the Tikriti officers, “Who is that person
jumping around?' The officer replied, 'He is Saddam's relative. He has been promoted
from a regular soldier to the rank of lieutenant.' By the time I joined the Republican
Guard in 1982, Kamel had been promoted to captain, and then two ranks higher to
lieutenant colonel. I was surprised by the speed of his promotions; it normally took eight
years to be promoted from captain to lieutenant colonel, but it had only been two years.
Hussein Kamel married Saddam's eldest daughter Raghad in 1983 and became the
supervisor of the Republican Guard. We did not care for him. We called him Abu-Ali,
which is a common nickname for anyone named Hussein. I don't understand how
Saddam could have allowed his eldest daughter to marry someone like Hussein Kamel.
Hussein's brother, Saddam Kamel, married Saddam's younger daughter, Rana. As
Hussein Kamel became more important, he gained the freedom to do as he pleased
without discipline. In 1986, Kamel was promoted to major general.
We were at a meeting to discuss the status of the battle to liberate Fao on 19 April 1988.
Saddam, General al-Rawi, and General Khairallah sat around a long table at the
Republican Guard headquarters. Hussein Kamel stood directly behind Saddam. After
explaining the first stage of the battle, I showed Saddam the progress thus far. The
Hammurabi Division was expected to carry out the next stage on the following day. Now
92
Field Marshal Ali Abdullah Saleh (b. 1942) was president of the Yemen Arab Republic (1978–90). In 1990,
he became the president of the Republic of Yemen.
62


in the military, it is well known that if you want to speak to a senior officer, you must
first receive permission. But there, in front of everyone, Hussein Kamel extended his
hand in front of Saddam and said, “No, let's advance to this position. We should move
an infantry brigade now. Why should we wait until tomorrow?' It was not polite by any
standard.
Woods: How did Saddam react?
Hamdani: Saddam looked at Hussein Kamel with affection, as if he did not find his actions
disrespectful. General Khairallah interjected and commented, “We should stick to the
original plan designed by the Republican Guard, because it is better. Let them execute it
as is.' The Republican Guard headquarters were in charge of planning and executing the
offensive. We expected Saddam to support the original concept because the minister of
defense also supported it. Saddam, with a smile on his face, replied, 'Follow the advice
of Hussein Kamel.' This created a serious problem for our forces that night, because it is
difficult to move an infantry brigade at night. I will never forget this event.
Saddam really loved Hussein Kamel. He appointed him to many political positions
including five ministries. We knew he wasn't capable of managing those tasks because
he had no education. His admiration for Hussein Kamel created Kamel's personality.
Saddam accepted that. That is why Kamel's defection had such an impact on Saddam.
From that day, Saddam turned into a completely different personality, one with no trust
even in members of his family and tribe.
Woods: General, could you talk more about Saddam's reaction to Hussein Kamel's defection?
Hamdani: Around noon on the day that Hussein Kamel defected, I was at the Hammurabi
Division's headquarters to see a new building.” An officer approached me with a
troubled expression; other officers began asking what had happened. The officer
reported that someone close to Saddam Hussein had just fled to Jordan. Meanwhile, I
saw my escort coming. My escort told me, “Sir, Mr. President [Saddam Hussein) wants
to speak with you over the phone.' It was about 100 meters to the phone, and I walked
fast. I took the phone, and the operator said, 'Here is Mr. President.' All I heard was
screaming, cursing, and insults. I could not hang up. I just had to wait. Then Qusay came
to the phone and in a hoarse voice said, 'If Hussein Kamel comes near you, he should be
killed immediately.' I could hear Saddam Hussein in the background cursing and
93
Hamdani was the division commander at the time.
63


I
screaming: “That dog! That villain!' It was horrible. Saddam told Qusay to tell me,
‘Today, I only trust General Ra'ad Hamdani because he is not one of my relatives. At
that time, Saddam was convinced that all his relatives were conspiring against him. I
could hear him asking Qusay who was loyal to Hussein Kamel. I knew that no one was
loyal to Hussein Kamel; everyone hated him because of his personality. Saddam kept
emphasizing to Qusay, “Ask General Ra'ad Hamdani if there is anyone in the
Republican Guard conspiring against us. I told Qusay to tell him I did not think so.
Saddam asked me to implement the emergency plan, to control all exit/entry points, and
to shoot anyone who mentioned Hussein Kamel's name. This was a major shock to
Saddam. After this incident, I was moved to the position of chief of staff of the
Republican Guard in Tikrit.
Murray: Did Saddam have any sense as to why Hussein Kamel fled to Jordan?
Hamdani: I stayed away from the family problems and limited myself to the military issues. I
isolated myself to within the military.
Murray: Could you speculate as to why you think Hussein Kamel fled to Jordan?94 Were
Qusay and Uday becoming more powerful?
Hamdani: I was not involved in the family conflict. I did hear that there was friction between
Hussein family members because Saddam grew powerful at the expense of the other
family members. Saddam's brothers were upset and jealous. There were also issues
between Uday Hussein (Saddam's son) and Hussein Kamel. After Hussein Kamel's
defection, Uday took on a greater leadership position. I do not know all the reasons. It is
not logical whatsoever. People were convinced it was just a theatrical play. One of the
Tikriti officers asked me, 'Do you believe all this?' I didn't know what else to do but to
believe it. He took me for a walk by the garden and told me, ‘This is just a play. It is a
scheme by Saddam to create the political and economic sanctions on Iraq that will lead
to political changes, so the sanctions will be removed. What do you think of this?' I
replied, “That is not logical either.'
94
Kamel told Time magazine in September 1995, “I was motivated by the interests of the country. I reached the
point where I found (criticizing erroneous policies] to be futile. For the past 15 years Iraq has not stopped
fighting. It has ended up accumulating debts that will require generations and generations to repay. There are
too many executions in our society, too many arrests. Whatever the age of the critic—whether 80 or 15—
many people are executed. For these reasons I left.” Dean Fischer, “Inside Saddam's Brutal Regime,” Time
Magazine, 18 September 1995.
64


Murray: It strikes me that this situation is similar to the American television show, The
Sopranos, which is about the Mafia in New Jersey.
Hamdani: There is a similarity between the Godfather and gang members and the situation in
Iraq under Saddam. Saddam actually killed his best friends while he was crying for them.
Before Hussein Kamel fled to Jordan, Saddam spent 90 percent of his time in Baghdad.
Afterwards, he would spend 80 percent of his time traveling between three places in
northern Iraq: the Fao Palace, Tikrit, and Tal Afar Lake. In early 1996, I became the
chief of staff of the Republican Guard corps in Tikrit. My headquarters was between the
Fao Palace and the palace on top of the mountain.ºs Due to my location, I received
information regarding Saddam's movements in case of an emergency. Ministers would
travel to one of these three locations to meet with Saddam, because he hardly ever went
to Baghdad then. His caravan would include two cars: a British Range Rover and a
Toyota Supra. Most of the time Saddam or his escort would drive the Range Rover and
the Supra would follow. At other times Saddam would be in the Supra and the Range
Rover would be behind. I used to wonder about his security procedures. Were enemies
following him? American satellites function 24 hours per day and Saddam was often
near the American air umbrella (the green line). If the Americans received a signal
indicating where Saddam was, it would have taken only a second to attack and kill him.
Saddam often requested that division commanders come to meet him. When I received
these orders, I always thought something important was about to happen. The first time he
sent for the commanders, when I was a corps commander, it was 1600 and we had to
travel 100 kilometers. I thought he would ask for updates so I gathered the division
commanders, while the intelligence officers brought their maps. I told the commanders, 'If
he asks you this, you answer that.' I was prepared to execute a military mission. We
gathered in a hall. Usually as we entered one of Saddam’s palaces, we would salute and
state our name and rank. I was astounded to find a friendly atmosphere with a number of
men and women. It was a poetry reading; Saddam and others were reciting poetry. I
thought, ‘After this meeting, he will tell me about the mission.' Five hours later, dinner
was served and everyone ate except for me and the other commanders because we were
waiting for our orders. It was the same casual atmosphere when Saddam's guests returned
95
96
The Fao Palace is in Baghdad. The mountain-top palace reference is unclear.
The “Green Line” was the de facto boundary between Iraq and the semi-autonomous Kurdish areas in the
northern part of Iraq. After April 1991, members of the coalition established Operation NORTHERN WATCH
north of the 36th parallel, which included an air-enforced no-fly zone.
65


from dinner to recite more poetry. Everything ended at 2300, at which point everyone left
along with Saddam. I was still waiting, so I asked the escort, “Why did Mr. President sent
for us?' He returned ten minutes later and told us, ‘Do whatever you want. There are no
orders.'
This happened again, but I was not surprised the second time, because I had noticed that
Saddam had started to change. I believe that Saddam wanted to escape his shell because
Hussein Kamel's fleeing was deeply painful. Based on these incidents Saddam's
personal secretary became more important. Saddam had one personality before Hussein
Kamel fled, and another completely different one afterwards.
Saddam blamed King Hussein of Jordan for Hussein Kamel's defection because he
believed the King convinced Hussein Kamel to flee. One of Saddam's escorts told me of
an incident that happened in a small meeting of Saddam with Ali Hassan al-Majid, Izzat
al-Duri, and wo others. Suddenly Saddam changed the subject and the atmosphere. He
banged the table hard and said, “I will never forget this of King Abdullah Hussein of
Jordan!' Everyone was scared of his temper. When he banged the table, everybody left
the room. His temper was dangerous. In a split second, he could jump from one
temperament to another.
Woods: Did Saddam ever consider doing anything about King Hussein?
Hamdani: Saddam could do nothing because Jordan was Iraq's lifeline. The Jordanian border
was the only side open without sanctions. He merely became indifferent after this
incident. For instance, on 30 June 2002, he called us to the presidential palace near the
airport. Shortly before Saddam walked in, Abid Hamid Mahmud, Saddam's personal
secretary, told us that Saddam ‘had a sore throat and was not feeling well, so don't say
anything.' Saddam walked in and greeted everyone. Qusay said, 'Okay, we see you.
Excuse us now.' Saddam said, “No, sit down. I want to listen.' General Sayif al-Din al-
Rawi, chief of staff of the Republican Guard, told Saddam about the distribution of his
divisions. When it was my turn, I said, “Sir, I am going to tell you something that
requires great attention. I want to talk about the war with the United States, which will
be a disastrous war for us.' He grabbed a cigar and said, “Go ahead.' I spoke for 45
minutes. If I had said this back in 1995, I would have been beheaded. He was calm,
quiet, and accepting so I told him that the United States had not achieved its goal during
the 1991 war. After the events on 11 September 2001, another war with the United
States was imminent. If Iraq could not avoid the war and stuck to its current military
66


doctrine, it would lose the war to the Americans. I then spoke about our weaknesses. I
said that I was the commander of an armored corps; however, the 1,098 tanks and
vehicles would never see combat because we lacked sufficient air forces and air
defenses. I explained to him the ways in which the US Army was superior to the Iraqi
Army. I wanted to train my corps to fight as guerillas, but I could not because I lacked
supporting infantry. I explained why we needed to change our military doctrine and
procedures, and why I wanted to fight the war in this fashion. I gave him an example.
The airport near where we were sitting might be the place where the Republican Guard
might be defeated, because it was a strategic target for the Americans. Even if our troops
did not make contact with the Americans, there could still be air strikes at this location.
Saddam accepted what I said, even though it was difficult for him. He said that my
arguments required attention, and he would submit what I recommended to the defense
minister and chief of staff of the army. When compared to the person he had been in
1995, Saddam had become completely different.
Group pictures were the usual way meetings with Saddam ended. I always quietly
stepped aside. Saddam told me to come closer. It was hard to believe that this was
Saddam. He was starting to show physical weakness because he was diabetic. I noticed
that his legs became thinner. With a smile on his face he asked, “Ra'ad, did you want to
scare me?' Although he said it with a smile, I could not breathe. I said, “No sir. No one
can scare you. I just wanted to give you my view of a possible war with the Americans.'
Murray: It is almost as if he knew he was going to lose, and there was nothing he could do
about it.
Hamdani: No, this incident occurred on 30 July 2002. Saddam still excluded the idea that war
was possible. However, by the time of the meeting on 1 January 2003, war with the
United States was a foregone conclusion. He said, “Let the inspectors look at what you
have. We do not want a war with America, but if god wants this war, we will win.' That
was completely illogical. Saddam probably noticed the perplexed expressions on the
faces of me and my colleagues, so he told us how he came to this conclusion: “The
Soviet Union, which was a great power, could not defeat America. However Iraq, which
is a smaller country and has been under sanctions for 13 years, achieved victory over
America in 1991. This was a divine miracle. They will come to the edge of the desert
and god willing, we will defeat them.' This was the moment Iraq lost the [2003] war.
67


Section 4: Officer Corps - Loss of Fao (1986). Recovery of
Fao (1988) - Intelligence Capabilities · Fourth Battle of Basra
(1986) - Fifth Battle of Basra (1987)
Woods: Going back to our discussion of the Iran-Iraq War, General, can you tell us
omething about individual corps and division commanders during the operations on the
Fao Peninsula, both the loss in 1986 and the recovery in 1988?
Hamdani: We lost Fao in February 1986 because of mistaken estimates by our intelligence.
That is my belief, although I do not have solid proof. We received detailed information
about the enemy's intentions and plans in 1985. The source of this information was
either Saudi Arabia or Jordan, which did not have great intelligence capabilities like the
Americans. Based on the information we received, we engaged in a very successful
battle in 1985. In 1986, intelligence suggested that Iran would the attack the same way it
had in 1985. We failed in 1986 because our intelligence sources told us Iran would
attack the VI Corps sector in Majnun. The information was detailed. We had done field
reconnaissance in the sectors of the VI and VII Corps and realized that the enemy was
concentrating in VII Corps sector; troops in the front confirmed that the enemy was
going to attack the VII Corps sector, but our intelligence insisted that the attack would
take place on the VI Corps sector. The military command believed the intelligence report
and said that the attack would take place on VI Corps sector. Lieutenant General
Shawket, the commander of VII Corps, was given the order to assist General Sultan
Hashim, the commander of the VI Corps. Shawket and Nu’aymi, commander of the III
Corps at the beginning of the war, were both excellent commanders. On 9 February
1986, Iran launched a broad attack, starting with the Umm al-Rasas Island, Ma’amer
region, and the port of Fao.97 The 26th Infantry Division, led by Brigadier General Majid
Abdul Hamid, was defending the area between Umm al-Rasas to the port at Fao. The
26th Division was a weak division, as was the 111th Brigade. When the attack began,
the Iranians lowered boats in the channels using a crane. This was proof that the attack
would take place in the VII Corps sector. The director of army intelligence, Brigadier
General Mahmoudi Shahin, was not very intelligent; he thought Iraq would achieve
victory again in 1986 because it had almost achieved victory in 1985. He relied on
information provided by his intelligence sources without verifying them against field
97
Umm al-Rasas is a small island in the Shatt al-Arab south of Basra, just to the west of Khorramshahr.
Ma’amer region is an area just north of the town of Fao on the Fao Peninsula.
68


information or reconnaissance. On 9 February 1986, the Iranians launched their attack
along a broad front stretching from Umm al-Rasas in the north to Fao in the south. They
quickly established bridge heads. Even three days after the enemy had established its
bridge heads, our military intelligence still insisted the major attack would take place in
the VI Corps sector. The same was true a week later. Moreover, during this period from
9-12 February, the Republican Guard was moving by rail, air, and vehicles on the road
to position itself for a counterattack against an Iranian attack north of Basra. Signals
intelligence reported major Iranian successes in the VII Corps sector, and yet, military
intelligence continued to insist that it was only a deception attack.
Woods: Did the Iranians run any kind of deception effort in front of the VI Corps?
Hamdani: They lightly fired on the VI Corp. It was evident that they just wanted to keep the
troops deployed in that sector.
When our forces were finally deployed against the Iranians on the Fao Peninsula, the
Republican Guard special forces entered the battle on the strategic road along the
pipeline. As they approached the battle front they could monitor the battle on the radio
and took note of its ferocity. The first brigades of the armor crossed the coastal road,
while the special forces were fighting on the strategic road. The 10th Armored Brigade
and the 2nd Armored Brigade were part of the Republican Guard. There was no bridge,
so they were forced to use small floats to transport their tanks and personnel. As a result,
the I Republican Guard Corps was late. On the night of the 13–14 February, the entire
26th Division collapsed. It was by sheer luck that the commander of the 26th Division
was able to escape. He was renowned for his competence, but the situation was hopeless,
and the Iranians had achieved a great victory. We learned on 14 February that more than
one Iranian corps crossed onto the peninsula.
Woods: Were the Iranian troops engaged in the battle at Fao predominantly light infantry
troops?º8
Hamdani: The area was only suitable for infantry, so Iranian troops comprised an infantry
division and a border corps. There were four brigades in the Republican Guard
counterattack: three traditional (3rd Brigade, 2nd Armored Brigade and 10th Armored
Brigade), and one border corps, as well as one armored reconnaissance battalion.
98
The Iranians employed two major irregular light infantry forces: the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps and
the paramilitary Basij. Both were heavily employed in the Fao operations.
69


Woods: Were the Iranian infantry well-supported by artillery and helicopters?
Hamdani: Yes, they were well-supported by artillery, helicopters, and their air force. They
fired artillery from both sides of the Shatt al-Arab, which proved deadly.
Woods: Were the 3rd Brigade and the 2nd and 10th Armored Brigades out of a particular
Republican Guard Division?
Hamdani: They were from the Republican Guard division led by Brigadier General Hussein
al-Rashid.99 The division did not yet have a name, because this was before the divisions
received names. The Republican Guards were able to stop the enemy at the feed channel.
They were heavily concentrated along the strategic road. The 6th and 2nd Divisions of
the regular army tried to enter here, but met great resistance from the Iranians.
On 16 February, military intelligence was still insisting that the attack on the VII Corps
was a deception. I was ordered to move the Republican Guard 2nd Armored Brigade out
of the VII Corps sector to the VI Corps sector-called Razaid—to the south of Majnun
fields, so that I could cross Shatt al-Arab. Those of us in the 2nd Brigade had hoped for a
tank battle. But we faced only artillery as we approached the Iranian border; it was only
at the border that we clashed with Iranian troops. I reported that we did not face
significant enemy resistance in this sector. It was an economy of force operation."
Woods: So by this point the 26th Division was destroyed. What happened to the other two
Republican Guard units? How were they doing by 16 February?
Hamdani: The 6th and the 2nd were having a hard time because the tanks that moved along
Shatt al-Arab were subject to firing from the front and from the other side of the Shatt al-
Arab. These were heavily wooded areas with palm trees and so forth. The fighting was
from one palm tree to another. The weather was not conducive to a counterattack. There
was heavy rain, which made movement and supply difficult. The strategic access road
was only 20 meters wide in this area. Along it one would find tanks, ambulances, and
vehicles carrying rations, all concentrated in an area that was only 20 meters wide.
Losses were double the normal for every artillery shell that hit road. The infantry were in
mud up to their knees. The ambulances could hardly move. It took three hours to travel
just 1 kilometer. It was really depressing to watch what was happening. When we
headed away from there, we felt that we had left hell and were headed towards heaven. It
99
100
Al-Rashid became chief of staff of the Iraqi Army in 1991.
This term is generally applied to operations that receive the minimum essential amount of combat power to
allow concentrating the main effort elsewhere.
70


was a tough battle. The most difficult part was knowing that the Iranians were going to
attack, and not being able to do anything about it.
At the time, Lieutenant General Sa'ad Jabbouri was deputy chief of staff of the army. He
was an excellent officer; he became the minister of defense in 1991. When he sent our
forces in the wrong direction, he said this movement rested on the best of intelligence.
Later we realized that this was not the main Iranian attack. It was confirmed on 17
February that the enemy's main effort was against the VII Corps. We reacted late and
the Iranians were able to hold on to Fao.
There was a reconnaissance battalion at Ra’s-e Bisra [the furthest tip of Fao] who were
real heroes. I was listening on my wireless equipment as the battalion commander,
fighting alongside his soldiers, requested support because they were running out of
ammunition. They held out for three days. I listened until the commander was captured
on 19 February. I never knew his name, because I was only receiving a wireless signal,
but I sympathized with him and wished I could have done something.
This same scenario played out earlier in 1984 when the 1st Regiment of the 419th Brigade
was pinned down in the Badrah region east of al-Kut. The regiment commander kept
fighting. It is difficult to hear someone ask for help when there is nothing one can do.
The battle at Fao continued until the end of 1986. The entire army engaged in the battle,
but sporadically, at one point or another. A group would take over a sector, be destroyed,
and then be replaced. The battle see-sawed back and forth: our troops would advance
and then the next time Iranian troops would advance. Gains were never more than 100
meters at a time. The battle was similar to the [World War I] Battles of Somme and
Verdun in 1916.
Woods: After the Iranians established control at Fao, were there indications they would use it
as a launching point for offensives into Umm Qasr or Basra? Or did they intend to just
hold it?
Hamdani: The Iranians kept sending reinforcements and were able to maintain control of
Fao. We tried to prevent them from moving against Basra. On 17 or 18 February, we
captured the Iranian pilot of a downed F-5 aircraft. He told us that Fao was the main
objective of the offensive. That's when the military intelligence and the military
command were finally convinced Fao was Iran's main effort.
Woods: How did Saddam react to this intelligence failure?
71


Hamdani: For unrelated reasons, Saddam had replaced Wafiq al-Samarra’i, the intelligence
director, and Colonel Ayoub, the director of the Iran branch for intelligence, before the
battle of Fao. Not long after the battle however, Saddam gave al-Samarra’i his position
as intelligence director back.
At the end of 1985, there was a prisoner exchange between Iraq and Iran. Iraqi
propaganda wanted to prove that Khomeini was using children in combat so Saddam met
with 20 child prisoners of war in front of the media. A captured member of Iranian
military was brought in to translate for Saddam. Only after the exchange of prisoners did
Iraqi intelligence realize that the translator was an important member of Iranian
intelligence. He had deceived our counter-intelligence by claiming to be a regular
officer.
Wafiq allowed this POW intelligence officer to return to Iran with sick prisoners because
he planned to use him as an agent. Wafiq al-Samarra’i let this POW know that Iraq had
an important agent in Iran. Once back in Iran, the POW was supposed to collect
information and provide it to that agent. Thus, this POW, who was, as I said, really a
member of Iranian intelligence, returned home. After passing information that the
Iranians wanted us to have, he exposed our agent, who was immediately executed.
Saddam learned of this serious error and transferred al-Samarra’i from the Iran branch in
the intelligence directorate to the VII Corps intelligence branch at Fao. Al-Samarra’i and
Mahmoudi Shahin, the director of army intelligence, were replaced by Colonel Ayoub.
When it was confirmed that Ayoub’s intelligence on Fao had been wrong, Saddam
Hussein replaced the intelligence director and reinstated Wafiq al-Samarra’i.
Woods: What was the primary source of the intelligence pertaining to Fao?
Hamdani: There were two. The first was an American source; this one was giving us good
information. The other was our agent in Iran whom, as I just said, the Iranians executed.
Murray: In a previous conversation you told us how in early 1987 the Iranians launched a
series of deception operations between Majnun and Basra. The corps commanders got into
a competition regarding the numbers of recorded dead, prisoners taken, and weapons
captured. You indicated that each one tried to top the other corps commander with inflated
numbers. As a result, Iraqi intelligence and Saddam eventually concluded that the Iranians
must be out of forces. Then, there was the massive Iranian attack on Basra, which almost
broke through into the city. Who were the two corps commanders who inflated their
numbers? Were they replaced? Who was responsible for the victory that held Basra?
72


Hamdani: They were Tala al-Duri, commander of the III Corps, whom we have discussed
earlier in this interview, and Ma’ahir Rashid, commander of the VII Corps. They were
both friends of Saddam and two of the dumbest generals in the army. Rashid had
assumed command of the VII Corps from Shawket and responsibility for Fao. He made a
commitment to Saddam to liberate Fao. In order to honor this commitment, Saddam had
Qusay marry Ma'ahir Rashid's daughter.
Woods: This seems like such a tribal act for such a high ranking officer in the Iraqi military.
Hamdani: This was indeed tribal in nature. When Rashid promised to liberate Fao, Saddam
offered his own son to Rashid's daughter in thanks for the promise.
In December 1986, Iran launched a deception attack on the border between two corps.
The attack lasted only for a day and both corps held without serious difficulties. Tala al-
Duri and Ma’ahir immediately began exaggerating the losses the Iranians had
supposedly suffered. Every few hours they would confirm more dead in order to impress
Saddam. We had information confirming that the Iranians were going to attack Basra,
but considering these false losses, it was reasonable to assume the Iranians would delay
the attack on Basra for at least six months. Saddam titled the battle the ‘Battle of the
Great Day,' because of the large volume of alleged enemy losses. The troops were numb
and relieved that the fighting was delayed for six months. Vacations were given while
troops were withdrawn to the rear to reorganize and receive more training. There was a
state of relaxation for everyone, commanders and soldiers alike.
Woods: The corps commanders may have been lying to Baghdad, but surely the front line
troops and the forward brigade commanders knew they had not killed 7,000 Iranians.
Someone must have known this was not true.
Hamdani: When you are really stressed and fear dying, it is easy to fool yourself.
Nathan: Were they more scared of Saddam's reaction than of the opposing troops?
Hamdani: Yes, in this way, they made Saddam happy.
On 6 January 1987, General Sa'ad al-Din, the chief of staff of the army, was replaced by
General Nizar al-Khazraji. On the night of 9–10 January 1987, the enemy launched an
attack on Basra, taking advantage of the 24 December 1986 deception attack. It had been
just 16 days since the initial attack. Al-Duri was commander of the III Corps was in
charge of defending Basra.
Woods: Did he perform well in the defense of Basra?
73


Hamdani: Even if he had been a good commander, the Iranians would have achieved a
modicum of success because they had great superiority. The 11th Infantry Division, led by
Brigadier General Abd al-Wahed Shannan [ar-Ribat), deterred an attack in the Sharam
Shek area along the Shatt al-Arab.101 [Other units in the area included:] The 12th Division,
led by Brigadier General Riyadh Taha; the 5th Mechanized Division, led by Brigadier
General Hassan Yousef; the 8th Infantry Division was led by Brigadier General Abrahim
Ismael; and the 3rd Armored Division, commanded by Brigadier General Hamid Salman,
which was north of Basra. The commanders of all five of these divisions were excellent.
However, our preliminary estimates put Iranian troop numbers at approximately 300,000
soldiers at the front. The Iranians announced that they had concentrated one million
soldiers in the southern sector. The Iranian attack began on Umm al-Rasas Island, which
Iraqi special forces defended. Eventually they were commanded by Brigadier General
Barack Huntah. The attack was launched during the night of 9–10 January. The 8th
Division to the east of Fish Lake collapsed. Their commander was wounded at his
headquarters, the Bubiyan control post. The 11th Division, located in the orchard area,
helped the 8th Division hold its ground. Unfortunately, the commander of the III Corps,
al-Duri, moved the 12th Division one brigade at a time, instead of all at once. As a result,
the 37th Armored Brigade was fully destroyed. Not a single soldier of the brigade
survived, including the commander, Colonel al-Sheikhli. The III Corps was running the
battle. Al-Duri did not wait for the enemy to be contained before pushing brigades forward
one at a time. The 37th Brigade was destroyed, because it moved into the orchard area at
night. Later I saw all of the tank tracks left in the ground by the 37th Brigade. There were
bodies everywhere.
Between the time Fao fell and this battle, the Republican Guard had expanded from a
division to a corps. The Medina Munawara Armored Division, the Baghdad Infantry
Division, and the Special Forces Division became a corps. Major General Hussein al-
Rashid, who later became [chief of the general staff] in 1991, was the commander of the
Medina Munawara Division. Iranian troops crossed into Basra at the Khaled Bridge. They
also occupied [unclear location name] in small groups. The Republican Guard
counterattacks were able to confine the enemy near Fish Lake. However, the Iranians were
able to reach and occupy Tahir. 102 The Republican Guard was able to recover some
101
The location of Sharam Shek is unclear.
102
Tahir is a small town located eight miles to the east of An-Nasiriyah in Dih Qar province, just north of the
Tigris River.
74


ground. The 56th Brigade was destroyed in this battle, which lasted 24 hours. It was my
responsibility to recover the sector north of Fish Lake. I carried out a counterattack on 18
January. The Republican Guard recovered two islands: Tuwili (a long island) and Shatt al-
Ahlawat. The Medina Munawara Armored Division then advanced to the area around
Jasim. The troops were so dense in such a small theater of operations that the
concentration of fire was unbelievably thick.
Murray: Did the III Corps maintain control of the fighting throughout or did the Republican
Guard take control at any point?
Hamdani: The III Corps was there, but the orders for the Republican Guard were sent by
Saddam himself. The coordination was between Republican Guard and III Corps. This
battle was called the “Great Harvest' because there was such a harvest of dead for both
sides.
Woods: The III Corps was running the defense. The Republican Guards arrived on 19 January
to launch counterattacks. In terms of command and control, in this 30-kilometer-wide
sector, you had III Corps units in the defense, Republican Guards units came in on the
19th as a counterattack force, but at any given time, was there a single operational
commander?
Hamdani: The III Corps troops were considered defense troops. The Republican Guard was a
force that would move against the enemy. Strategically, this plan was bad, and I told
Saddam this on 11 September 1994.
The problem was one of action and reaction. The 11th Division and 86th Infantry
Brigade would enter a battle one day and then retreat because the Iranians were stubborn
and wanted to hold on to their gains near Basra. Basra was of great strategic and
potential importance to both sides. As such, Iraq did not want the Iranians to occupy it.
Ali Hassan al-Majid made a statement: ‘These efforts of the Iranians represented steps
toward occupying Basra and declaring the Shahid government there."
This was a
challenge for Saddam. I gave him my personal analysis: “The enemy was superior to us
with regards to infantry, while we were superior with regards to armor and air forces.'
We had one armored corps. We could surround the enemy in the Khorramshahr and
Shalamcheh areas back to the Karen River, which would isolate them. If we could
103
Shahid means martyr and is used here to refer to an Iranian style government.
75


exploit this advantage, the Medina Munawara Armored Division, the 3rd Armored
Division, and the 5th Mechanized Division could attack and destroy the enemy.
At this time, the opposing sides wanted to fight each other by holding the other side by
the throat. A smart commander will exploit his own strength against his enemy's
weaknesses. General Andre Beaufre, the French commander in charge of the 1956
campaign in Egypt [the Suez Crisis], once posited two requirements for achieving
military success: ‘First, achieve the superiority you really possess at the time and place
of your choosing. Second, give yourself the freedom to act.°104 In this situation, we were
evenly matched, or perhaps the advantage was slightly in Iran’s favor—we were tired
and we did not have the freedom to act. Had we used the armored corps, where we had
superiority in armor, and in terms of numbers and competence, when we had air power
superiority, we would have achieved the freedom to act at the time and place of our
choosing.
Murray: Did Saddam have any desire to learn from the Israelis?
Hamdani: Saddam did not like to hear that we learned from anyone whether they were
Americans, Israelis, etc. For example, I always say that Iraqi soldiers learn 90 percent
from their tribe. The American soldier is educated and civilized; he is better at looking
for alternative solutions in a conflict than the Iraqi soldier.
Military Training • End of
Section 5: Expansion of Iraqi Military
Iran Iraq War
Murray: General James Mattis, USMC, your opponent and commander of the 1st Marine
Division in the 2003 war has said, “There are two ways to learn. You can learn from
history or you can learn from filling body bags.' It appears that Saddam preferred the
second method. Could you talk about the expansion of the Republican Guard from a
division to a corps within a year? Where did the officers come from? How were they
chosen? What kind of training did they receive? When did the leadership transition from
Saddam's family (the Tikriti gang) to professional officers?
104
Hamdani
appears to be quoting from one among General Andre Beaufre's books: An Introduction to
Strategy, with Particular Reference to Problems of Defense, Politics, Economics and Diplomacy in the
Nuclear Age (1963), Deterrence and Strategy (1966), or Strategy of Action (1967).
76


Hamdani: The Republican Guard was created in February 1963 to replace the former Royal
Guards. Between 1963 and 1982, its mission was to protect the president, the palaces,
and the main governmental departments. By 1982, Saddam recognized the war with Iran
would be a long, drawn out conflict. Adnan Khairallah feared that the war would require
the army to expand horizontally at the expense of expanding capabilities vertically.
Because Saddam valued General Khairallah's advice, he discussed how to maintain
capabilities established before the war with high ranking government officials. It was
suggested that the Republican Guard forces expand from a protection force to a combat
force. The 2nd Brigade of the Republican Guard was formed at the beginning of 1982.
Since it was an armored brigade they chose the best officers from all of the other
divisions. I worked on this expansion along with other colleagues. There was a division
of labor between the 1st and 2nd Brigades of the Republican Guard: the 1st Brigade,
comprised of Saddam's relatives, was responsible for protecting the palace and vital
zones; the 2nd Armored Brigade was a military unit comprised of soldiers who were not
related to Saddam in any way. Interestingly, Saddam tried unsuccessfully to place his
relatives in the 2nd Brigade as security officers. In 1983, the 10th Armored Brigade
transitioned into the 2nd Armored Brigade of the Republican Guard. The 3rd Regiment
of Special Forces expanded from a battalion-sized unit to a brigade in 1983 as well. On 7
April 1984, the first headquarters of a division of the Republican Guard was established.
Before that, the Republican Guard brigades were directly controlled by Saddam. This
division consisted of the following: 1st Brigade (mixed), 2nd Armored Brigade, 3rd
Brigade Special Forces Republican Guard, 4th Infantry Brigade, 10th Armored Brigade
and smaller Republican Guard units.
Woods: Did the 1st Brigade eventually become the Republican Guard (17th Brigade)?
Hamdani: Yes, you have a good memory. Saddam established a special forces brigade within
the Republican Guard to protect him, while the other brigades transitioned to combat.
After major losses to conventional army forces during 1986 and the need to call up
reserves to hold the front, Saddam ordered the Republican Guard expanded from a
division to corps to preserve a level of combat capability. The corps consisted of six
divisions. Two were considered reserves. By 1990, the Republican Guard had the
following divisions: Medina Munawara Armored Division, Hammurabi Armored
Division, [Tawakalna Mechanized division], Baghdad Infantry Division, Adnan Infantry
Division, Nebuchadnezzar Infantry Division, and the special forces division. The special
forces division consisted of the 3rd Brigade, which had paratroopers and two special
77


forces regiments, and the elite Special Mission Brigade, which had a navy regiment of
frogmen. The 16th Brigade had two regular special forces regiments and a navy special
forces regiment comprising frogmen.
Murray: Which of these divisions existed at the time of the great Iraqi offensives in 1988?
Hamdani: All of them: Medina Munawara, Hammurabi, Baghdad, Adnan, Nebuchadnezzar,
and the 16th Brigade Special Forces.105
Murray: We have read that Saddam directed a military draft of university students. Where
were these soldiers incorporated?
Hamdani: The university students joined the Republican Guard. They were mainly scientists.
The Republican Guard was an independent army and needed skilled troops to maintain
the quality levels of the pre-war army. It had helicopters, artillery, missiles, air defense,
chemical protection, administrative, and maintenance repair units; it lacked only air and
navy forces.
Woods: While in the midst of the battles in 1986, how did the Republican Guard bring the
new recruits up to speed? Was it different than how the regular army trained?
Hamdani: The regular army was subject to Iranian artillery fire so training was slim, because
it was in the front lines most of the time. The Republican Guard remained in the rear to
receive training. Moreover, its units had just received new weapons. Its units were
maintained at 100 percent, but the army was only maintained at 70 percent. By 2003,
army levels had dropped to 60 percent. The lowest Republican Guard reached was 90
percent of its authorized strength.
Woods: How much training did young enlisted soldiers receive before being assigned to a
regular army unit in 1986? Was this sufficient to provide basic skills?
Hamdani: We used the same calculation during the war as before the war. Basic infantry
training required three months. Training at corps schools required four-to-six months. A
soldier had three months of training within the division to which he was assigned during
the war. One year later, he could be a fighter within a Republican Guard division after
proving himself in combat.
The different divisions within the Republican Guard devoted varying amounts of time to
training. I was a division commander for five years and never lowered my standards for
105
The Adnan Division was not created until 1989. Hamdani is likely referring to the brigades of the Tawakalna.
78


training. The division was always at two levels. I refused to promote soldiers who had
reached the first level to the second level unless they had completed the required training
sessions. Any army training for combat progresses through three phases: first,
preparation; second, education; and third, testing. If a soldier failed his tests, I would not
move him to next phase but move him back to the educational phase.
I was originally an armor instructor. Each firing range test has nine drills, or exercises.
In the first drill, the soldier fires on a fixed target from a stationary tank. In the second
drill, he fires and then moves the tank. The drills became increasingly complicated. In
the final drill, the soldier fires at moving targets from a moving tank. This was extremely
difficult because our tanks did not have advanced technology. The gunner had to
calculate the firing solution, while he was buttoned-up in the tank. After each battle, I
ran a test to analyze performance. I looked for mistakes.
Getting people within a squadron or company to work together in harmony was a constant
problem. Companies are the most important unit within an armored division, because they
are the smallest combat unit. If the company is competent tactically, then the rest is
command and control. I was a battalion-, then regimental-, and then a division
commander. I was always the first one tested to encourage the rest of my unit. I would
always salute someone who was competent. In this way, I forced myself to be competent.
While I was at the staff college from 1978 through 1980, I would leave at night to
participate in training exercises with the 10th Armored Brigade that had just received T-
72 tanks, because, as an armor officer, I wanted to stay current. By 1982 I was a
lieutenant colonel and my unit received the newest model, the T-72M. Within six
months, I boosted the combat capabilities, exploiting 90 percent of the designed
capabilities of the tank, and launched multiple attacks. The T-72M had smoke
generators. Because of the smoke, you could not measure losses, but I only lost one-to-
three tanks per battle. I always stressed the importance of training. There was always a
need for more training.
Woods: Early in the war Khomeini made an appeal to Shi'a Arabs to follow his lead. Clearly,
it failed to work, as most of the soldiers in the army were Shi’a. Were there any
significant problems in maintaining focus and morale among the enlisted troops?
Hamdani: Before the war, I was the staff intelligence officer with the 35th Armored Brigade.
There was a rumor that security had arrested an officer and that he would be turned over
to us because officers had to be arrested or detained by a military unit. It was confirmed
79


that he belonged to the Dawa Party.106 The Dawa organization supported the Iranian
revolution. We looked on the matter as a political issue because there is no difference
between a Shi’a, a Sunni, or an Arab for Iraqis, who are secular in outlook. Their
numbers were small, and the highest ranking officer arrested was a captain. When the
war started, there were small groups within the military working on behalf of the Dawa
Party. However, 80 percent of the Iraqi people and the Iraqi military believed Iran was
our enemy and that we must deter the Iranians.
The death, capture, or injury of a son to the enemy created major social problems for a
family. Until 1982, we had no problem with morale within the army. However
afterwards, the popular army was increasingly made up of average citizens who quit
their jobs to fight on the front. The economy and the economic capacity of the Iraqi
people were severely damaged due to losses in terms of casualties and death. Affected
families blamed Saddam and his politics. By 1987, 40,000 Iraqis had been taken
prisoner, 250,000 martyred, and 750,000 injured or handicapped, with a significant
number missing who we could not verify as martyrs or prisoners. As a result, one million
families had no one to support them or their provider could not work. Overall, the war
weakened the Iraqi economy greatly. If we estimate that two million Iraqis suffered from
the war directly and multiply that number by the size of the average Iraqi household
(five), then ten million Iraqis suffered from the effects of the war. The Iraqi population
was 18 million in 1980. Approximately two thirds of all Iraqis suffered because of the
war. Iran's population is four times larger than Iraq's. Assuming they suffered similar
numbers of captured, dead, and injured, their problem was one quarter the size of our
problem.
Murray: However, the Iranians suffered much heavier casualties than the Iraqis.
Hamdani: True. However, when someone is hurt, they look for someone to blame. In general,
the level of education of the Iraqi people is simple. Shi’a religious education instills in
its members great loyalty to religious scholars, whereas Sunnis have no connection with
scholars. Shi’a have religious institutions similar to Catholics. Khomeini is like the
Catholic Pope to the Shi’a in Iran, similar to Ali al-Sistani's position in Iraq. In Iran,
107
106
107
The Islamic Dawa Party was formed in 1957 as a religious Shi’a party whose goal was to create an Islamic
Shi’a state in part or all of Iraq.
Sistani is Iraq's Grand Ayatollah, chief religious figure for Iraqi Shi’a. Although Sistani shares a religious
sect with Khomeini, his interpretation of the role of religion in government is markedly different from that in
practice in Iran.
80


the influence of religious institutions became political influence. Shi’a clergy would say
that religion comes before the country. Although he was not sectarian, Saddam wanted
to know whether you were with him or against him. He did not put religion before
country. He once said, “If my arm were against me, I would not hesitate to cut it off.'
Saddam's rise to power, his family's influence in government, and its many mistakes
drained the high morale at the beginning of the war. Despite this, the number of soldiers
who deserted to the Iranian side remained low, which proved there was a wealth of Iraqi
patriotism. However, when sanctions were imposed after Iraq entered Kuwait, 90
percent of all Iraqis were affected and Saddam became incontestably a dictator. He
relied on private security and executed anyone whom he suspected of disloyalty. The
percentage of illiteracy within Iraq doubled. People naturally turn to religion when they
are in distress. Sunni sheiks emerged to take advantage of despair among the orthodox
Sunnis, whom we call Salafists. They strongly opposed Saddam. A large percentage of
Iraqis did differentiate between losing Iraq and losing Saddam. An educated person
should differentiate between the two.
Just two months before the United States invaded in 2003, I met with some of my friends
and relatives. They would say, “Just let America or Israel or anyone come and occupy
Iraq; we need to get rid of Saddam Hussein.' I replied, “If you hate Saddam, that is your
right, but you have no right to dismiss your country. We must differentiate and separate
Saddam as a bad ruler and our loyalty to our country. We will pay a high price if we
don't see the difference. Unfortunately, there were few who had the same opinion as I.
You have seen what has happened over the last six years as a result.
Murray: From what you say, it appears that Saddam destroyed the sense of community and
nationalism within Iraq during his 30-year reign.
Hamdani: At the beginning, Saddam had the chance to be the greatest of all Iraq's leader.
Iraq was a modern state with modern systems. We had approximately half-a-million
scientists and engineers who had studied across the globe. This was a high percentage
for a third-world country. Iraq had a strong economy, an air force, and a navy. It
possessed organized political parties with logical and reasonable ideologies. Saddam's
great ambition and his violent personality destroyed all that was good in Iraq. It was not
clear at the beginning; the mistakes accumulated over time. Saddam and the Ba’ath Party
had what the psychologist Adler called an inferiority complex. Saddam had this complex
toward the great powers. For example, when he first assumed power, he greeted the
81


ambassadors of great states, such as France, the Soviet Union, and Britain, personally.
When the ambassadors presented their papers, Saddam would tell them, “You are a great
power. You view us as a small power, but with our will we are bigger than you.' As an
observer, I was embarrassed by what he said, and I was even sadder that my president
had such psychological issues.
Woods: Could you discuss the end of the Iran-Iraq War, specifically the time period between
late 1987 and July 1988? You had said earlier that the Iranians were physically in a good
position in 1987. In retrospect, the Iraqis were weak by late 1987. Did the Iraqi military
leadership understand that at the time?
Hamdani: Until the end of 1987, the Iranians were basically winning the war. Saddam
rejected this assessment. The Arabs in the Gulf region were supporting Saddam with the
hope that Iraq had the capability to defeat Iran. There was information suggesting that
Iranian gains in the war were at the expense of the Iranian economy and the Iranian
people. Iranian capabilities peaked in 1987. There had been a desire to liberate Fao since
1986. The majority of the Republican Guard had remained around Basra since then,
waiting to seize the opportunity to recover Fao when and if Iran weakened. The Iranian
strategic weight lay in the north. Logic would suggest that Iraqi strength should be in a
position to oppose Iranian strength. However, Iraq made a courageous strategic decision.
I do not know who made this decision, but it was fully supported by Saddam.
Moving the strategic weight from the north to the south required significant time. It is
difficult to move a third-world army over a distance of nearly 1,000 kilometers. Based
on satellite information, we trained the infantry on fields similar to Fao. The chance for
which we had been waiting occurred in April 1988. Saddam made the decision to launch
an attack to recover Fao. This decision was courageous, but it was the right decision
because this situation would never have repeated itself. Lieutenant General Ayad Fayid
al-Rawi led troops from the Republican Guard Army and the VII Corps.
Woods: Who were the military minds that Saddam Hussein listened to in late 1987?
Hamdani: I do not know.
Murray: Could you speak a little about al-Rawi?
1
Hamdani: Al-Rawi was originally an armor officer. He was courageous, an excellent field
officer, and had the determination to reach his goals. He did not like to lose. However,
he lacked education and strategic understanding. All his characteristics are excellent
82


except for his lack of strategic understanding. Fortunately, field execution does not
require strategic vision.
Woods: Was al-Rawi the overall commander of the 1988 Fao campaign?
Hamdani: Al-Rawi was in charge of coordinating the Republican Guard, which made up 60
percent of the attacking forces, with the VII Corps, which made up 40 percent of the
forces. This was an opportunity for excellent first-class commander to carry out an
important and strategic plan. Lieutenant General al-Rawi was a good, competent, and
honest man. Therefore, he was suitable for this mission.
The attack was executed quickly and successfully. We estimated one week for each page
of the campaign strategy, but it was all executed in one day. There were few enemy;
reserve Iranian forces were also weak. The Pipes Bridge (a North Korean design), across
the Shatt al-Arab was the only connection between the Iraqi and Iranian sides; the rest
was isolated Iraqi lands.108 The field preparations for the soft soil were excellent. Four
artillery battalions supported the attack. Four artillery battalions multiplied by 18
artillery pieces created awesome firepower. This did not even include the missiles, the
air force, or the naval ships that supported the attack.
Murray: How many divisions did the Iranians have?
Hamdani: The Iranians had one traditional regular division and one non-traditional Pasdaran
division. Their other divisions were on the other side of the Shatt al-Arab. There were 70
Iranian observation posts that were 20–30 meters high. An Iraqi gun was assigned to fire
on each post. The operation was a quick success despite the immense psychological barrier
of knowing that 53,000 Iraqi soldiers had died at that location in the fighting in 1986.
Iraqis are pessimists, but the psychological barrier was overcome by this sudden and
complete success. Battles then followed at Shalamcheh, Majnun, and Khorramshahr. We
advanced 70–100 kilometers into Iran and captured 20,000 Iranians. Iran collapsed after
the third of the five battles. The final two battles drove the last nail into Iran's coffin.
Woods: What was the name of the battle when the Iraqi military knew that Iran was finished?
Hamdani: The first battle was at Fao and called the ‘Battle of Blessed Ramadan' because it
occurred on the first day of Ramadan. The battle at Shalamcheh, and east of Basra, was
called “Tawakalna the First,' which translated to ‘We Rely on God.' The third battle was
108
According to Hamdani, engineers laid large steel culvert pipes in the bed of the canal or river. The pipes were
stacked until they were just below the surface of the water and practically invisible from overhead detection.
The whole structure was sturdy enough to support vehicle traffic.
83


to liberate the Majnun Islands; this was the decisive battle. There was a lot of
preparation and detail. “Tawakalna the Third'happened in central Iraq where the
Iranians had dug in east of al-Marah. “Tawakalna the Fourth' occurred east of Khanaqin.
There was an air drop of soldiers from the Republican Guard special forces at Alam
Rad.109 It required three trips with 100 helicopters each to transport the special forces.
Each trip moved one regiment. The armored forces then met up with the Republican
Guard. The Iranians collapsed. Their soldiers ran toward the Iraqi helicopters that had
landed. The pilot would say, “There is not enough room. I will return to transport more
people. The Iranians had lost the will to fight, while Iranian media announced Iraq
would lose the war, because it was now fighting for America.
Murray: What if Khomeini had said, “We are not quitting. We are going to continue to fight??
Hamdani: Khomeini would have repeated the same mistakes as Saddam. Members of his
command had begged Khomeini to stop and accept the loss. He said, “I accept it, as if
from a poison chalice.'
If Saddam had not entered Kuwait and taken on the United States in 1991, we would
have respected him. It was like Khomeini and his poison chalice, but Saddam did not
want to accept defeat. He was determined, which resulted in our long, slow collapse
during the next 13 years from 1990 to 2003. The majority of Iraqi people curse
Saddam's name and memory.
Woods: Were there any new military options in early 1988? Assume Iran still had military
capabilities, were there any practical things Iraq could have done to change the static
nature of the battles of 1987?
Hamdani: There was an option to move the entire Republican Guard and liberate the northern
region. That was the opinion of the majority of generals. Moreover, agreements with
both of the Kurdish leaders Barzani and Jalal Talabani were concluded. 110
Woods: Was this an effort to threaten the regime in Tehran by pushing into Iranian Kurdistan?
Hamdani: That area is mountainous, and the Iranians had superior infantry compared to ours.
Armor is significantly less effective in mountainous regions. This northern attack
became a deception plan incorporated into the attack to recover Fao. We opened a fake
headquarters and established a wireless communications station. The media took pictures
109
110
The location of Alam Rad is unclear.
Referring to the leaders of the two main, but rival, Kurdish political parties.
84


of the Republican Guard units in the north and the minister of defense visiting them. The
Iranians really thought that we were going to attack in the north. There are others who
said this was a political, regional, and international issue, and Iraq was making political
concessions to Iran to end the war. One of Saddam's characteristics was determination.
In this instance, determination about not accepting defeat was good.
Woods: In a war this large, foreign liaison officers like to visit the battlefield. For instance,
after some of the early battles between the Iranian Chieftain tanks and the Iraqi T-62
tanks, the British were eager to see how their tanks worked. This was all in the context
of the Cold War, NATO, and US-Soviet relations. Were there other examples of
countries sending liaison officers to Iraq to observe and learn from the Iraqi experience?
Hamdani: We had many delegations after the war, the largest one was American. I do not
have any information about delegations that visited during the war. The press reported
comparisons between Russian and British weapons. British weapons were not very good.
The 90th Iranian Armored Division had Chieftain tanks; they had a lot of problems and
did not fight effectively. The 16th Iranian Armored Division, which was equipped with
Chieftain tanks, lost a battle against the 10th Iraqi Armored Brigade with T-72 tanks. It
is hard for an armored brigade to destroy a division in 12 hours but it happened; it was a
disaster for the Iranians. Kuwait was another disaster. It is hard to compare the Kuwaitis
with us, but the result was that the British weapons quickly lost the war. There was a
problem with British manufacturing. An order was issued that every tank had to carry
two types of ammunition: the first was effective against heavy armor and the second was
used against infantry and light armor. We were ordered not to inflict heavy casualties
when we entered Kuwait, so we armed our tanks with the less effective ammunition, so
the Kuwaiti tanks would be knocked out when we fired on their tanks, but their soldiers
would survive. When we fired upon them using this less effective ammunition, I realized
that even this ammunition destroyed the Kuwaiti Chieftains.
-
85





Interview:
Major General Mizher Rashid al-Tarfa al-Ubaydi
Conducted by Kevin M. Woods, Williamson Murray, and Elizabeth A. Nathan
9 November 2009 - Dubai, United Arab Emirates
Former Major General Mizher Rashid al-Tarfa al-Ubaydilli
graduated from the Iraqi Military College in Baghdad in 1975.
Additionally, he received a diploma in psychology, a BA in Farsi,
and an MA in history and civilization from the University of
Baghdad. After joining the Iraqi Army, General Tarfa served as an
intelligence officer and a military intelligence instructor. During the
Iran-Iraq War, he served in the Iran section of the general command
intelligence cell (1980–87). During the 1990s, General Tarfa also served as the Iran section
deputy director in the General Military Intelligence Directorate (GMID)."12 Between 1998
and 2000, he was a shadow military attaché at the Iraqi Embassy in Tehran. General Tarfa
was the southern sector intelligence system director when the United States invaded Iraq in
2003.

Section 6: Personal Background - Attitudes toward Iran
Expansion of Iraqi Intelligence
Woods: Could you give us a description of your background, and how you became an
intelligence officer?
Tarfa: I graduated from the Iraqi Military College on 6 January 1975. I served first as a
platoon commander in an infantry division in northern Iraq. I was then promoted to
111
Referred to during the interview transcripts as Tarfa.
112
The GMID-Da'irat al-Mukhabarat al-Amah in Arabic—comprised three bureaus: the political bureau, the
special bureau, and the administrative bureau. Within the political bureau was the secret service, which had
numerous offices specializing in the collection of intelligence concerning a particular country or region. Sean
Boyne, “Southwest Asia, inside Iraq's Security Network - Part Two,” Jane's Intelligence Review 9, no. 8
(1997).
87


Khomeini would cooperate with us, since Iraq was an Islamic country and he had lived
in Iraq for so many years. "15 We also thought the barriers between Iran and Iraq from the
shah's time would dissipate. Within a few months of Khomeini's seizure of power
everything turned upside down. Once we perceived Iran as a threat, we started gathering
information. We began by looking for human sources, following up on the border
region, paying attention to the Iranian press, listening to Iranian radio, and watching
Iranian television. We started submitting reports to the high command that Iran had
hostile intentions against Iraq. Everything that we expected and anticipated happened.
Woods: During the late shah’s period and into the early revolutionary period, did Iraq have
good intelligence sources in Iran?
Tarfa: No, we did not have good human sources in Iran because we respected and honored
our agreement with the shah, but there were some Iranian Kurds in our territory who did
volunteer information. Even during the revolution, working with dissident groups was
difficult because they considered themselves to be nationalists and thus, were unwilling
to cooperate.
Woods: Can you describe how Iraqi military intelligence changed organizationally during the
eight years of the Iran Iraq War?
Tarfa: At the beginning of the war, there were only three officers in the Iran section: I, still only
a first lieutenant, Major al-Samarra'i, and Major Qasim Abd-al-Mun’im. Our maps of Iran
were not up to date, and we could not decipher coded messages. After Khomeini came to
power, we received only sparse information because he created a protective shell around
Iran. We gathered information from the fleeing Iranian officers, but they passed
information we already knew. A colonel in the Iranian police also provided us with
information, but it was of little use. The Iranian Army was being dismantled, and most of
its weapons had been stolen. In this chaos we thought Iran was incapable of attacking us.
Murray: What impact did the lack of good sources have on the decision to go to war in
September 1980?
Tarfa: We did not want to go to war because we thought the Iranian Army was being
reorganized and a coup d'état against the militants was imminent. Unfortunately, the
115
The shah expelled Khomeini from Iran in 1964 and exiled him to Turkey (1964–65) and Iraq (1965–78).
Khomeini moved from Iraq to Paris for his final months of exile after then-vice president Saddam Hussein,
under pressure from the shah and in accordance with the 1975 Shatt al-Arab treaty, asked Khomeini to leave
Iraq.
89


religious scholars and ayatollahs were able to gain full control Iran. They formed militias
and executed people on the street. There was a state of panic and fear inside the ranks of
the Iranian armed forces; they had no other choice but to align themselves with the
regime. Higher ranking officers either fled or were killed. Those joining the regime were
originally enlisted soldiers while others were civilians. Iran was plagued with ignorance
then, as it is today. I was in Tehran after 1999 and saw how people acted. I expected
them to revolt against Khomeini's regime and turn to the secular leaders. You can mark
my words: the Islamic regime in Iran will be gone within the next few years. The
reaction against the behavior of the ayatollahs has made the common people hate even
Islam. The Islamic religion is not like this. At present, Islam is held hostage by extremist
Sunni and the Shi’a groups, which has turned the public against the religion.
Woods: Could you speak specifically about changes in the Iraqi intelligence profession in the
early years of the war? Could you describe the organizations that were built to deal with
signals intelligence, image intelligence, etc.?
Tarfa: When the war started, we realized we needed to update our maps. At first, we relied on
other countries. We requested maps from the military attachés in the Gulf region. We
also started taking daily aerial photographs. We focused on signals interception to a
greater extent during the initial period of fighting. The Iranians were sending messages
in the clear. Unfortunately, one of Saddam's press attachés revealed we were listening to
uncoded wireless messages, which created a problem for us.
Officers who were mathematically inclined and had already attended training on
deciphering began preliminary operations with the help of myself and Farsi-speaking
civilians. This organization was called the special intelligence group; it specialized in
deciphering Iranian codes. I was divided between this group and al-Samarra’i's Iran
section. In the early months of the war, we analyzed codes manually. We got a maximum
of two to three hours of sleep per night. We could not leave even to see our families. It was
like that for the first two to three years of the war. By the end of the war, the situation had
gotten better, and we received four to five hours of sleep per night.
Murray: Were the extreme hours the result of too few Farsi speakers?
Tarfa: There were only three Farsi speakers in the entire Iraqi Army and within the
intelligence apparatus. We had to interrogate prisoners, decipher codes, and listen to
Iranian TV and radio.
90


Woods: Do you remember the specific event when the journalist revealed that Iraq was
listening to Iranian radio transmissions?
Tarfa: It was early in the war. Saddam had consulted with a Shi’a journalist from Najaf
province. He was close to the president and worked in his office. He read my
intelligence reports on the Iranians and tried to publish a story about the suffering of the
Iranian soldiers based on signals intelligence. He did this with Saddam's knowledge. No
one could do anything unless Saddam knew about it. We considered that story a major
mistake. Saddam was arrogant; he wanted to parade Iranian losses inflicted by Iraqi
forces for the entire world to see. However, the story created major problems for military
intelligence, because almost immediately the Iranians began to send their radio
transmissions in code. Saddam was ignorant about military intelligence matters.
Murray: Did Saddam's understanding of intelligence improve during the course of the war?
Tarfa: By 1985, Saddam began to understand how essential information security was. We
used to mention in our reports specifically who or what our sources were. At one point,
Saddam wrote a comment at the bottom of a report requesting that we not disclose our
sources. He did not mean from himself per se, but rather the others in his office.
Eventually he told us not to type the reports. He knew we could not type and that we had
to give them to the commissioned officers to type. Saddam specified that intelligence
reports had to be handwritten by the intelligence officer himself.
Woods: How did you handle open source information? Did you set up a separate organization
for information gleaned from radio, TV, Friday prayers, public statements from
Khomeini, etc.?
Tarfa: Arab Iranians from Ahvaz city started fleeing from Khorramshahr and Abadan in
1982. Kurds from the Democratic Kurdistan Party of Iran, especially the followers of
‘Abd-al-Rahman Qasemlo, also started fleeing. They both started cooperating with us.
Qasemlo was killed by Iranian intelligence in Europe, because he was cooperating with
With the help of some opposition members we even gained access to civilian and
military Iranian aircraft (such as F-4s, F-5s, and Chinooks) that fled to us.
116
us.
117
116
Qasemlo (sometime transliterated Ghassemlou), the general-Secretary of the Kurdish Democratic Party
(Iran), was murdered on 13 July 1989 in Vienna. He was in Vienna as part of a Kurdish negotiating team
with the Iranian government. It is widely believed, but not proven, that Iranian intelligence was responsible
for the crime.
The McDonnell Douglas (now Boeing) F-4 Phantom II is a tandem two-seat, twin-engine, all-weather, long-
range supersonic jet interceptor fighter/fighter-bomber first introduced in the early 1960s. The Northrop F-
117
91


Murray: Did the Iranians try to mix double agents in with people fleeing from Arabistan?
Tarfa: Yes, but we knew they were double agents. We ourselves tried to run similar
deception operations. We would give the right answers to some Iranian inquiries and
then feed them misinformation.
Murray: General al-Samarra’i's organization had three people in 1980. How did the
operation expand over time?
Tarfa: In 1981, there were six officers in the Iran section, which had five departments:
ground forces; air forces; naval forces; a political, economic, and social department; and
a topography and vital targets section. In 1986, the Iran section turned into a directorate
with four sections, two platoons, one regiment of special forces (Unit 888), and one
regiment for deep reconnaissance (Unit 999), which sent troops deep behind enemy
lines. All attended Farsi language training and different tactical schools such as
sabotage, parachuting, and underwater training. The Iran branch expanded from three
officers in 1980 to 80 officers in 1986.
Woods: Can you speak about some of the different strategic civilian and military intelligence
services responsible for national level intelligence at the time?
Tarfa: Iraq had the intelligence service, which was in charge of gathering information on
foreigners located inside and outside of Iraq. It had nothing to do with the military
intelligence directorate. The intelligence service also had sections that dealt with Iran,
Israel, America, Arab countries, Asian countries, etc.
Woods: We always hear about the relationship between bureaucracies. What were relations
like between the different intelligence agencies?
Tarfa: Military intelligence definitely competed with the intelligence service because 95
percent of the intelligence personnel were civilians. The intelligence service lacked the
databases to analyze information and form conclusions, especially regarding military
information. Saddam never relied on the information coming from the intelligence
service. He would turn it over to us for analysis, which created sensitivities between us
and the intelligence service. I worked in all three security systems: the intelligence
service, military intelligence, and the special security apparatus. Our professionalism in
5A/B Freedom Fighter and the F-5E/F Tiger II are members of a family of light supersonic fighter aircraft
introduced in the 1960s. The Boeing CH-47 Chinook is a twin-engine, tandem rotor, heavy-lift helicopter
designed for troop movement, artillery emplacement, and battlefield resupply. It was first introduced in the
early 1960s and is still in production today.
92


military intelligence was high. We considered ourselves a school of analytic science, not
just with regards to Iraq, but also with intelligence issues at the regional level. Our
capacity did not compare with that of the Americans; however, in terms of analysis and
conclusions, we were much superior to the Iranians.
Woods: Were the civilian intelligence agencies as small as the military intelligence agency in
1980?
Tarfa: No, they were much bigger than us, but they did little that was useful.
Murray: Saddam once said he only wanted information from the military, and he would do
the analysis.
Tarfa: I have never heard this. If this recording exists, he probably meant that he wanted
military intelligence to do the analysis.
Murray: How long did it take General Samarra’i’s intelligence group to earn Saddam's trust?
Tarfa: Saddam relied on our analysis from the war's beginning, but he was disappointed with
us when Fao fell. However, it was not that we failed in our job. The problem resided
with the director of military intelligence, General Mahmoudi Shahin, whom Saddam
appointed to head the group. He was not an intelligence officer, but rather was an armor
officer, who had commanded a tank division.
Woods: General Hamdani described a great transition in Iraq's military forces after Saddam
became president in July 1979. He started appointing Ba'ath political officers to
important government positions. How did this affect intelligence?
Tarfa: We did not have that problem in military intelligence. Throughout my military career,
from first lieutenant to general, I was always a low ranking Ba’athist, but that did not
matter. This was also true for General al-Samarra'i; he was never more than a low
ranking Ba’athist. In military intelligence, we relied on highly professional officers; that
is why we were successful.
Section 7: Loss of Fao (1986) - General Military Intelligence
Directorate - Iranian Intelligence Capabilities - Deception
Operations
Woods: Could you describe the sources of information and the deception operations during
the 1986 battle at Fao?
93


-
Tarfa: The leaders in Baghdad thought Iran intended to attack the VI Corps sector in the
Hawr al-Ahwar region; Fao was not initially considered an Iranian target. We
concentrated Iraqi troops on the Fao Peninsula across from the Iranian troops in Hawr al-
Ahwar. The Iranians believed Iraqi troops in the Fao region were weak, so they sent
naval reconnaissance units to the area. We arrested one of the frogmen, who belonged to
the Revolutionary Guards, one month before the Iranian offensive. I interrogated him.
He told me that he was assessing the barrier system of the Iraqi forces. This was an
indication the Iranians intended to attack the area. Air reconnaissance by MiG-25s also
showed engineering efforts on the Iranian side of Shatt al-Arab across from Fao.'18 We
noticed an increased number of guns, boats, and pontoons. That confirmed Iran's
intentions. The VII Corps was responsible for defending Fao. The VI Corps, comprising
the 15th and 26th Divisions, was to the north of Fao. We mentioned in our reports
Iranian intentions regarding Fao. However, General Mahmoudi did not want that
assessment submitted because the army chief of staff, General Abdul Dhannoun, did not
agree with it. He said, 'You cannot pinpoint where the Iranians are going to attack. How
am I going to maneuver the troops? You need not mention this much about intentions so
I could use fewer troops.' Our intention was to protect Fao; we did not allow the army
chief of staff to withdraw troops from Fao. On the other hand, we were supposed to
support the troops there, which required him to bring troops from other sectors. When
General Mahmoudi arrived in Fao, nothing was there. He visited the 26th Division; their
sector appeared quiet. He did not see matters as we did. He thought he was smarter than
we were. He even told the commander of the 26th Division that his officers could be
given leave. We sensed danger in the area, but we were just low-ranking officers and
could not do anything. I was a major then. The majority of the officers were either
lieutenant colonels or colonels. This issue was related to Ba’ath Party politics: General
Abdul Jawad Dhannoun was General Mahmoudi’s superior within the Ba’ath Party. The
party should not have interfered with military issues because it affected its
professionalism.
Woods: Did General Shahin agree with your reports?
Tarfa: No, he did not. By the way, it was not my report. It was a report by all of us. I was just
one of the authors.
118
The Mikoyan-Gurevich MiG-25 was a Soviet-designed high-supersonic interceptor and reconnaissance-
bomber aircraft introduced in the early 1970s.
94


Murray: Did you get the sense that that the leaders of the intelligence agencies were trying to
keep their bosses happy by telling them what they wanted to hear?
Tarfa: Exactly. The same was true with regard to keeping Saddam happy. The officers would
say everything is great; they would present hell as heaven to him. Saddam would be
happy and laugh.
Woods: The degree to which foreign intelligence was used in 1986 was significant.
Information was provided by the United States, France, and the Soviet Union. Was it
used as part of this calculation?
Tarfa: Yes, American intelligence provided us with information before Fao. The Iraqi
intelligence service brought a [US government representative), who provided satellite
pictures, to meet us. General al-Samarra’i and I met with him twice. There was
cooperation, but there was no direct coordination. We used to sit with him only to
exchange information. As a matter of fact, when we looked at the pictures the [US
government representative) gave us, it was only raw intelligence, while our information
was much more detailed. French, Yugoslav, and Soviet intelligence agencies also
cooperated with us. The KGB helped us decipher the Iranian codes. In return, we agreed to
provide them with equipment related to the Iranian American-made F-4 aircraft. The
American information supported our conclusions regarding Fao, but failed to convince the
higher ups. Our information was complete to start with; any information we received from
the [US government] was complementary. The problem was with the intelligence director.
Murray: After the battle at Fao, did Saddam remove those who were responsible for the
intelligence failure?
Tarfa: Immediately. He moved General Mahmoudi to the II Corps. He reassigned General
Sabar al-Duri as the director of military intelligence during the operation at Fao. He then
became the commander of the 17th Armored Division, but never became a corps
commander. General al-Duri later became director of the intelligence service. They
move the director of Iran section, Colonel Ayoub, to another section. Colonel Wafir
transferred from the VII Corps to the Iran section as director. I stayed with the Iran
section throughout the entire period.
Murray: Did Saddam prefer to receive intelligence directly from the analysts rather than
through bureaucratic channels?
95


-
Tarfa: No, not from analysts directly. He used to get the final analysis from the intelligence
group. Our section received considerable raw material on Iran from deciphered codes. I
submitted daily reports to the director of the president's office of information
coordination, Dr. Ekram Othmam, who then submitted the reports to the president. The
reports contained the same information I sent to General al-Samarra’i, the director of the
Iran section. The President would follow up on how the intelligence had been exploited.
General al-Samarra’i used to blame me because he knew that I was the one sending this
information to the president.
One day early in 1987 after the battle at Fao, an Iranian train was on its way from Tehran
to Andimashq city in Yazfur carrying a division of Pasdaran, approximately 5,000
soldiers. I suggested to the president that we strike the train with the air force, since we
knew the train carried a division intending to attack us and we had the train's timetable.
The president asked the intelligence service to carry out this plan. General al-Samarra'i, in
charge of Iran section, refused to implement the plan because it might disclose our source.
The Iranians would know we could decipher their codes. General al-Samarra’i blamed me
and spoke out against me because I had turned the president against him. I suggested that
the air force strike the train station among other targets. This way we could prevent the
Iranians from realizing we had broken their codes. The air force failed to carry out this
plan, because the intelligence service failed to provide the exact time the train would leave
the station. I believe the intelligence service did this intentionally to protect its source.
Woods: Did Saddam often search for good intelligence analysts within the intelligence
apparatus to provide him his own private information, while allowing the system to
produce its reports?
Tarfa: After this instance, he did not do it as often. However, I remained in contact with the
president's office regarding the breaking of the Iranian codes. For a while I was no
longer under the control of the intelligence service. I acted independently in terms of
breaking the code.
Woods: After the loss of Fao, besides the leadership changes in the GMID, were there any
other major changes? How did Iraqi intelligence perform during the 1987 Iranian
offensives against Basra?
Tarfa: There were changes in the commands of the corps and divisions. During the
counterattack, they relied on Republican Guard's command. There was a complete
collapse of the command and control system in the Iranian military intelligence apparatus
96


from Khomeini all the way down during the liberation of Fao. As a result, our troops
crossed the border without encountering any Iranian resistance. Our job as intelligence
officers during that phase of the operation was to continuously feed the frontline troops
with information. The way intelligence officers look at matters is different from
operational soldiers. That is why the president trusted us with setting up deception plans,
as well as executing them.
Woods: Did the GMID change in any particular way when the Republican Guard expanded
from a division to a corps? How did that affect intelligence?
Tarfa: The GMID expanded to approximately three directorates and eight sections. In 1986,
we expanded from being a section to being a directorate. The Iran section became the
5th sub-directorate and was run by General al-Samarra’i. It focused on Iran and was in
charge of the secret service, strategic information, tactical information, special
operations, and deep reconnaissance. We had agents in every embassy including
Afghanistan, Pakistan, Turkey, Moscow before the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the
Gulf countries. We had sources and wiretap information reaching from the Gulf region
and worked on improving our relations with Western intelligence organizations, such as
those of the United States, Britain, France, Germany, the former Yugoslavia, Argentina,
and Brazil. This was all part of our effort to end the war in 1988. The expansion began in
1986, following the Iranian seizure of Fao.
Woods: Describe the development of the deep reconnaissance units. How were they
organized? Who did you recruit into them? What was involved in their training? Could
you give me some examples of successful deep reconnaissance operations?
Tarfa: We formed two military units in 1985: the 888, special operations; and the 999, deep
reconnaissance. In early 1986, we economized our efforts by rolling Unit 888 into Unit
999, the resulting unit was then in charge of both deep reconnaissance and special
operations. The deep reconnaissance training was done by Egyptian Army officers, since
they had gone through similar experiences during the war with Israel. Elite officers from
special forces transferred to these units. The soldiers received all types of training:
parachute, underwater training, sabotage, mine sweeping, bridge building, sabotage
operations, and languages such as Farsi. This represented a high level of training and
required a high level of fitness. Every week we made them march 100 kilometers, and
eat gravel, snakes, and scorpions...anything to make them tougher. Approximately 400
soldiers joined. We carried out operations behind Iranian front lines to gather
97


Murray: How good were the Iranians at penetrating Iraqi intelligence? Did they break Iraqi
codes? Were they good at interrogating Iraqi prisoners?
Tarfa: Yes, they were good at interrogating prisoners. They pressured them with torture and
then released them. They made them marry Iranian women and fight with the Badr Corps.
In terms of gathering information on our troops, the Iranians were not successful because
they did not have air reconnaissance.
They were unable to break our codes, because we did not buy our coding machines; we
manufactured them ourselves. We used telephone or wireless to pass along orders. The
Iranians were unable to break our codes, so they did not know about our activities, such
as our deception operations.
The Iranian Revolutionary Guard represented a major problem for us because they also
did not use communications equipment. They used couriers instead. Thus, we had
difficulty gathering information on them. However, we were eventually able to discover
their activities and operations. We had full command of the Iranian armed forces,
general command, and naval forces codes.
Our knowledge of Iranian codes benefitted us during the confrontation with the United
States in 1991.120 We lacked presence in the Gulf region, but we had broken Iranian
naval codes. Thus, we were able to monitor American and coalition naval movements
via Iranian radio traffic. We received deciphered reports regarding the movement of
Iranian naval forces in response to the movement of American ships in the Gulf. We had
no information except what we got through the Iranians. We collected all of our
information through the Iranian naval codes. Thus, we were spying on the Iranians, who
were spying on the Americans.
Woods: Can you give me some examples of deception operations? Can you describe for us a
particular one? What were the principles you used?
Tarfa: The most important deception operation occurred during the liberation of Fao. We
needed to send Iraqi forces closer to Fao, but did not want to alert the Iranians of our
intention to attack their position on Fao. Before we sent Iraqi troops south, we made it
appear as though we thought Iran intended to attack Basra from Fao. Therefore our
troops appeared to be heading to the defense of Basra. So the Iranian’s started running a
120
The United States as part of the United Nations coalition forces fought against Iraq (17 January 1991-28
February 1991) in the First Gulf War after Iraq invaded Kuwait on 2 August 1990.
99


deception of their own, pretending to send troops to reinforce our belief there really
was going to be an attack on Basra. In the mean time, we sent Unit 999 behind Iranian
front lines. They followed the movement of Iranian vehicles and equipment coming from
Ahvaz toward Fao. The Iranians tried to deceive us by visibly sending personnel
vehicles toward Fao; however, our Unit 999 soldiers could see through the open backs of
the vehicles and reported them empty. Air reconnaissance showed troop movement, but
we knew this was a deception. Thus, the Iranians saw our deception and then tried to
trick us into believing further that they were about to attack from Fao by sending empty
trucks. We set up a deception that triggered theirs and reinforced our original deception.
We also sent the minister of defense, Adnan Kharaillah, to northern Iraq to visit troops
and all the commanders. The commanders were in the south preparing their troops by the
time his visit was aired on television.
When the Republican Guard attacked Fao, Iranian troops were caught totally by surprise.
We appeared to be in a defensive posture, but we attacked them because they did not
know our troop numbers or our intention to liberate Fao.
Section 8: Senior Leadership - SIGINT - Foreign Assistance
Attitudes toward Iran
Woods: Could you help us understand and appreciate some of the senior members of the Iraqi
intelligence service during this period? What kind of relationships did they have with the
president? Who did well and who did not?
Tarfa: The best officer in military intelligence at the director level was General Sabar al-Duri.
He was trusted by Saddam. That is why when the Iran-Iraq War ended he was appointed
director of the intelligence service. Saddam appointed General al-Samarra’i as the
director of military intelligence to honor him for his service during the war. Saddam did
not like Wafiq al-Samarra’i but he liked Sabar al-Duri. Saddam did not like General
Mahmoudi Shahin, the director before Sabar al-Duri.
Woods: What became of General Sabar al-Duri after he left the intelligence service?
-
Tarfa: General al-Duri became an American prisoner in Bucca. General al-Samarra’i is
currently in London; he was considered one of the best officers within the Iraq
intelligence apparatus, and I was his student. General al-Samarra’i worked in military
intelligence throughout his entire career, from first lieutenant to general. He had a large
100


only a negative influence. I often wondered how Saddam, who thought in grand terms,
could take the advice of someone who knew nothing about science or the humanities.
Murray: General Hamdani also suggested that Saddam was attracted to two different kinds of
people: real professionals and violent people like Tala al-Duri or Hussein Kamel. Is that
reasonable?
Tarfa: I agree with what General Ra'ad Hamdani said. Saddam achieved what he wanted
through the professionals, but questioned where their loyalty lay: was it with him or with
Iraq? He knew the loyalty of the violent people, like al-Duri and Hussein Kamel, was
completely to him, while the loyalty of the professional was to our country and maybe to
Saddam; the others were loyal to Saddam, but not to Iraq.
Woods: General, in both your writings and our discussion, you have indicated that SIGINT
[signals intelligence] was one of Iraq's great advantages during the Iran-Iraq War. Is that
a fair assessment?
Tarfa: We were the unknown element within the Iraqi military. We were equal to the entire
Iraqi Army and the Republican Guard because of the work we did gathering SIGINT.
Without our help, our troops would have fought blind. Instead they were in a boxing
match where the Iranians were blindfolded and our forces were not. We created the
advantage with respect to the Iranians; they were blind, but we were not.
Woods: Could you help me understand the quality of the intelligence at the tactical level, at
the regional level, and the strategic command level? How confident were you that you
could listen in on their conversations?
Tarfa: We listened to the general command of the Iranian armed forces and the operations
commands from north to south, including the headquarters of al-Hamzah operations in
the north and the headquarters of operations in the west. We listened to the headquarters
in the south at the corps level or higher. We also listened to the Iranian naval command,
which consisted of three navy support units, the headquarters of operations in the east in
Sistan and Lojistan provinces, and along the Afghan border.
Woods: So you were able to intercept their radio communication and decrypt their codes
throughout the war?
102


Tarfa: We used the Crypto C54 machines for breaking the codes. 121 The Iranians had
modified the machine, but we analyzed and broke the codes. This machine was used by
the Iranian high command. We analyzed all coded messages sent by the Iranian high
command that we intercepted in the air, 24 hours a day, for years. We destroyed
thousands of pages every day because we did not have the time to read them all. We
would look at them quickly to find the important ones and then destroy the rest. There
was no way to read it all. Sometimes I would translate as many as 400 pages a day; the
director of military intelligence used to say I wrote him a book every day.
Murray: When did you begin to break the Iranian codes?
Tarfa: We had three phases in code breaking. Between 1980 and 1982, we broke the message
codes manually. By the end of 1981, we were using the Crypto C52 machine to analyze
codes. 122 The secret services had captured a C52 from the 64th Iranian Division, with the
aid of al-Qadhi.
Murray: Did al-Qadhi bring the machine to the Iraqis? Did he desert the Iranian 64th
Division? How did he get the machine?
Tarfa: Al-Qadhi brought it in with the help of someone within the division in Sabadash, Iran.
When he brought it to us, we knew the mechanics of the machine. We used it to decode
brigade- and division-level communications until the Iranians replaced it with an
electronic code machine. First, we broke that machine's transmissions by hand, then
mechanically, and finally electronically. We advanced our intelligence capabilities in
parallel with the Iranians efforts to improve their codes. The Iranians consistently failed
to protect their sensitive information. The Iranian commander, al-Milali, who was a big
gossip, created transparency within the command. We also took advantage of the Iranian
press, which sometimes published crucial information. We analyzed the sermons of the
senior mullahs on Friday nights in Iran and tried to read between the lines. We would
compare the information in the newspapers, or the sermons with the information we
already had before drawing conclusions. The sources of information were
121
Crypto AG is a Swiss company that has marketed an updated version of the German World War II-era
cryptography machines to nearly 120 nations worldwide. Rumors that such devices had been compromised
emerged in the early 1990s. Scott Shane, Tom Bowman, “No Such Agency - Part Four: Rigging the
Machine,” Baltimore Sun, 4 December 1995. The Hagelin C54, introduced in the mid-1950s, was a later
version of the C52 cipher machine.
The Hagelin C52 was an early 1950s Swiss-manufactured cipher machine based in part on a German World
War II design.
122
103


complementary; if there was information missing from one source, we could usually find
it in another.
Murray: How did you break the electronic cipher machines, the Crypto T450, when they
started using them?l23 Did the Iranians use what the British used during World War II,
called cribs?
Tarfa: The same was true for us. Iran would use one key for several messages. We took
advantage of this deadly mistake. It led us to conclude that they were not competent. We
used a key for only one message.
Murray: Why didn't the Iraqis make the same kinds of mistakes? What did the Iraqis do
differently from the Iranians?
Tarfa: The Iraqis were more disciplined than the Iranians. We protected the secrecy of our
information better. One day General al-Samarra’i heard an officer say the word “code.'
He asked the officer what information he was talking about. Al-Samarra’i told the
officer that this time he would not be punished, but next time he would have his tongue
cut off. The letter ‘g’ is the first letter of the word for ‘code' in Arabic; al-Samarra’i
eliminated the letter from our vocabulary. One officer said, “What if someone's name
starts with the letter “g,” like Gamil?' The general said, “Call him Kamel.' That is how
seriously he was about information security.
Woods: How well did Saddam understand all that military intelligence had done, while you
were doing it?
Tarfa: If the Iranians had known we were breaking their codes, they would have changed
their systems. Therefore, Saddam did not honor us with medals during the war in the
way he honored others. He waited until after the war so people would not wonder why
we were being honored and given medals. [Saddam understood the value of what we had
done.] That is why our project was called the Mohammed Project. If it were not for our
work, the Iranians would have reached Baghdad. That is how important our work was.
Murray: This discussion helps to explain why Iran, with its many advantages, was rarely able
to take advantage of its strengths.
Woods: The codes you were able to break were predominantly those of the Iranian
conventional forces, but you said you had problems with their other forces.
123
The Crypto T450 was an early 1970s-era, fully electronic, online text encryption device manufactured by the
Swiss company Crypto AG.
104


Murray: If there had been five or six messages, would it have been easier to overturn the
disbelief of your superiors? The great irony here is that the lack of professionalism
within the Pasdaran made for a difficult intelligence problem.
Tarfa: We had an intelligence problem with the Revolutionary Guard.
Woods: Were you able to successfully tap land lines?
Tarfa: Yes, there was a project called al-Faruq. We sent a deep reconnaissance unit between
the Iranian units, where there were some field telephones. Cables cannot be listened to in
the air because they are not wireless, but we could monitor cables from a short distance –
using our magnetized equipment. We listened to calls between Iranian troops through
wiretaps; we only gathered tactical information that way, but it was still useful.
Woods: Were you able to tap into the command-level communications?
Tarfa: As you know, Khomeini did not use telephones, but we monitored the
communications between the Iranian ministry of foreign affairs and the Iranian
embassies around the world, because they were using the same machine as the military.
We would intercept the information from the Iranian embassies in Turkey, Afghanistan,
Pakistan, and any instructions from the ministry of foreign affairs to the embassies. We
sent this information to the intelligence service to be analyzed. For example, when the
Taliban had control in Mazar-e-Sharif, [in 1998] we had this information. We even
followed up on Iranian operations beyond Iran. We exposed Iranian sources in Iraq
through the embassy. Iran continued to use the T450 at least until the Americans
occupied Iraq in 2003.
Woods: Did Iran know that their T450 has been compromised?
Tarfa: Yes, because many of the Iraqi Shi’as who worked with us at the time are now
working with the current Iranian government.
if not
Murray: We now know every major power involved in World War II was reading some,
all, of the major codes of both their enemies and their allies. The Swiss T450 machine was
from that era. It is a bit shocking that Iran continued using this machine into 2003.
Tarfa: Iran periodically updated the T450 machine. Every time they updated it, we would
have problems for a several weeks, but then we would crack the code again. It still needs
human thinking and analysis, which is more important than raw information. For me,
knowledge is more important than information. Today, information is everywhere and
easy to obtain because of the Internet. The Iranian regime cannot block the
106


dissemination of information regarding what is happening in Iran today because of the
Internet.
Woods: Is there anything else about Iraqi intelligence operations during the war we should
include, but have not yet discussed?
Tarfa: No one could have imagined three people doing all of this work at the beginning of the
war. No one could have imagined 10,000 Iranian messages being intercepted, from
which we would analyze 400–500 and destroy the rest due to lack of time. Intelligence
work is complementary. It includes the engineers in charge of wires, the technical people
who intercept the information, the officers in charge of mathematics behind code
breaking, the translators, and the analysts. It was a big job. We had lots of people
working with us. When the Iranian enemy initially attacked, the intelligence officers in
charge were happy because they had been proven correct. This happened three times, but
each time it was at the expense of tens of thousands of dead and wounded Iraqis. I had
many problems with Wafiq al-Samarra’i, who was my teacher and my friend. I believed
we should try to abort enemy attacks in Iran before they crossed our borders and
attacked us. We often specified the time of an attack. Had we used the air force and
artillery against enemy concentrations, we could have aborted most of the Iranian
attacks. This is my belief. I would have considered this a success from an intelligence
standpoint. It is not success merely to predict a given attack and watch it unfold as
predicted. Everyone was waiting for Saddam to say, 'Good for you. You did a good job.
You were truthful.' I was disappointed and frustrated by such an attitude. That is why I
provided information directly to Saddam, so that he could take preventative measures
immediately. It is a problem when someone is selfish and wants others to tell him he is
competent and knowledgeable at the expense of Iraqi lives. I was not the only one who
was frustrated—there were others who helped produce the intelligence who were also
frustrated. We hoped our efforts to produce this intelligence would be used to strike the
enemy.
Murray: By 1987, how many people were working in this intelligence effort: intercepting,
deciphering, translating, analyzing?
Tarfa: There were more than 2,500 people. Project 858, called al-Hadi, was established by a
Japanese company. 124 It had the equipment to intercept anything in the air. We sent more
124
The al-Hadi Project (Project 858) was the Iraqi intelligence organization responsible for collecting,
translating, and unscrambling SIGINT and electronic intelligence, then disseminating information to relevant
intelligence agencies. Boyne, “Southwest Asia, inside Iraq's Security Network - Part Two.”
107


than 1,500 people to Japan to learn how to use this equipment. We had translators for
different languages throughout the world. Our only problem was with the Farsi
language, because we did not know whom we could trust. There were many Farsi
speakers, but it was always a question of trust. I was the one whom the command trusted
the most.
Woods: Who was supporting Iran during the Iran-Iraq War?
Tarfa: North Korea, China, Libya, El Salvador, and Syria.
Murray: How much aid was Assad giving to the Iranians?
Tarfa: Assad had a personal grudge with Saddam over a personal issue. He wanted to
retaliate against Saddam, so he helped the Iranians. The rest of the world, including the
United States and the Soviets, was helping Iraq, which proves that we were right.
Woods: Did the Soviets provide satellite imagery or other intelligence?
Tarfa: No. The Americans provided us with more imagery than the Soviets. The Soviets
helped us by providing code-breaking experts in return for an Iranian F-4 aircraft that
had crash-landed and was only slightly damaged. We needed their help to solve some
technical problems.
Woods: What was your reaction to the news that the United States had sold missiles to Iran in
order to get its hostages released?
Tarfa: We realize that the US Government placed its interests before its principles. The
Iranian threat was great in the area. US interests required that it reinstate relations with
the current Iranian regime at the expense of its allies. We do not deserve what happened
to us in Iraq. The Iranians should have suffered this tragedy because they were more of a
threat to the region that Saddam. Saddam's biggest mistake was invading Kuwait—he
had no ambitions in other countries—whereas Iran desired the entire Middle East region
for itself. If you ask me today whether I prefer relations with an Islamic Iran or Israel, I
would choose Israel, because I do not believe Israel has ambitions outside its own
borders. There is no Israeli threat in the Middle East. The threat comes from Iran. I tell
my friends, who were commanders in the army, that, if matters required us now to go to
Tel Aviv, we should go to Tel Aviv, but I am not waiting to go to Tehran and shake
hands with the Iranians after watching all the killing they committed in our country. My
108


two brothers-in-law were killed by the Mahdi Army.125 Five of my cousins were also
killed by the militias. Israel did not enter Iraq or attack any of my family. More than
1,000,000 Iraqis have been killed by the Iranians since 1980. The rest were killed by
Americans.
Woods: At the beginning of our discussion, you mentioned that you did not believe Iran
would last five more years. How do you expect it to fall apart? What do you expect to
happen next?
Tarfa: An estimated five years is too generous. If the world imposed on Iran the same
sanctions it previously imposed on Iraq, the Iranian people would kill anyone wearing a
turban, [the conservative clergy]. Life would stop completely in Iran. This is why I say
five years is too much. I give them one year.
Murray: What type of regime do you see replacing it? Would it be secular?
Tarfa: It would be more liberal and more secular than the shah's regime. I know the Iranian
people. I lived there three years, have many Iranian friends, and read around 30-40
pages daily on Iran in Farsi. Mark my words, if there were sanctions, the present regime
would collapse, without the use of missiles and without aircraft.
Woods: Given what you have said, if that were true, it must be good news long-term for Iraq,
because those Iraqis that feel loyalty to Iran would have no regime to which to turn.
Tarfa: For a snake, its strength is in its head. Once you cut off its head, it will be dead. If just
a tail remained in Iraq or Yemen, or if the current Iranian regime collapsed, then
Hezbollah in Lebanon would end. Al-Maliki pretends to support America, but in fact he
supports Iran. Talabani told General Wafiq al-Samarra’i that Qasim Sulemani, the
commander of the Revolutionary Guard, wanted al-Maliki out. The others replied, ‘Al-
Maliki is a good man and we need him.' This happened six months ago. If Qasim wants
al-Maliki, then al-Maliki must work in support of Iran.
Murray: What would happen to al-Maliki's support if the Iranian regime collapsed?
Tarfa: If the Iranian regime ended, all of the regional problems would be solved. The Taliban
is supported by Iran. Al-Qaeda is currently in Iran. Many of Usama bin Laden's
followers are in Iran.
125
The Madhi Army is a paramilitary force established by the Shi'a cleric Muqtada al-Sadr after the US
invasion of Iraq in 2003.
109


Woods: Who are the true nationalist leaders in Iraq now?
Tarfa: The Iraqi Army that fought Iran, whether they are Shi'a, Sunni, Christian, Turkish, etc.
These are the ones capable of preserving nationalism, as well as American and Western
interests in Iraq. The stronger and more liberal Iraq is, the more it will be favored by the
region, America, and its allies. The weaker Iraq is the more Sunni and Shi’a extremists
will expand.
110


Interview:
Major General (ret) Aladdin Hussein Makki Khamas
Conducted by Kevin Woods, Williamson Murray and Elizabeth Nathan
11 November 2009 - Cairo, Egypt
Major General (ret) Aladdin Hussein Makki Khamas26 graduated
from the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst in 1957. Subsequently,
he received an MA in military science from the Iraqi Staff College at
Bakr University in 1966, a law degree from al-Mustansiriyah
University in 1973, and an MA in international law from the
University of Baghdad in 1981. General Makki joined the Iraqi
Army in 1958 and rose through the ranks. His foreign military
training includes courses at the British School of Infantry, the
British Armor School, and the US Army's Armor Center. General Makki was named
Commandant of the Iraqi Armor School in 1970. Subsequently, he taught at and was vice
president of Bakr University for Higher Military Studies. During the Iran-Iraq War, General
Makki served as chief of staff of the III Corps (1981–84) and then deputy and finally director
of the ministry of defense's directorate of combat development (1984–88). In 1988, he became
the president of the Bakr University for Higher Military Studies and retired from the Iraqi
Army in 1989.

Section 9: Personal Background - Saddam's Personality
Senior Leadership - Events Leading to Iran Iraq War
Preparations for Iran-Iraq War
Woods: Could you please start by providing us with your background?
Makki: I was trained in the West, but spent my career in the Iraqi military. I was not a
Ba’athist. I don't believe in mixing politics with the military. My father was minister of
defense during the old regime, the monarchy, and before that he was chief of staff of the
126
Referred to during the transcripts as Makki.
111


army. I entered the military voluntarily, for love of the military life and my country. When
I started, Iraq was a small flower opening up. We had good relations with everyone.
I am a pilot, not by profession but by hobby, from the time I was small. My father did not
want me to become a pilot. He said I would kill myself. I said I wanted to be a doctor, but
he said no because he said I was a donkey. So I said I would go into the military. He said,
‘Well done, my son!' In the military, I was always the first in my class.
Murray: Thucydides said that war brings out the worst in people; civil wars are the worst of
all kinds of war. General Hamdani described Saddam as a Bedouin with no vision of the
future or understanding of the world. Can you speak to these points?
Makki: Saddam was a Bedouin until his death. He governed with a Bedouin mentality. He
would willingly kill his brother or his son, if he thought that action would further his
career or position. He was clever, but not polished. Saddam even suspected those who
liked him. We in Iraq were unfortunate to have him and the revolutions that followed the
overthrow of the monarchy. Maybe our history made us like this, or maybe God meant
us to be like this, but we did not deserve this fate. The common Iraqi may deserve such a
fate, but not educated Iraqis. We are intelligent people; we are doctors, engineers, etc.,
and we are now all over the world. My grandson is in the United States, living in
Pittsburgh. He plans to return to Egypt to continue his education. My youngest son is a
plastic surgeon and is emigrating to Canada. Saddam drove the educated people out of
Iraq. They deserved a better fate.
The Shi’a clergy are the worst. Their turbans block their thinking. I am a Sunni, but
General Kabi is Shi’a. The Shi’a clergy are extremists. We say Islam is a middle path; it
takes the easy, logical, human way. Terrorism is against our nature. We have tolerated
other religions since the time of the Prophet Mohammed. For example, the Prophet
married a Christian.
Woods: General, in our discussion today there are three general themes we are interested in:
First, we would like you to describe the high-level discussions and plans relating to the
war with Iran. But more specifically, we would like to understand the dynamics of
decision-making in the run-up to and the early part of the war.
Second, we would like to hear about your time as chief of staff of III Corps. Please help us
understand the nature of the long war, and the transition from a short war to a long war.
112


Third, we are interested in your time as the director of combat development. We would
like to better understand how an Arab military, under the immense pressures of war,
adapted to difficult circumstances. As you know, there are few examples of Arab armies
adapting to the extent, speed, or scale that Iraq's Army managed in the mid-1980s.
And of course we are interested in any other insights into the Iraq-Iraq War that you feel
might be important.
Murray: So, let us begin with a discussion of the dynamics of decision-making in the early
part of the war, including the run-up to the war and the decisions leading to war. At
times, Saddam understood the value of professionals and experts. Can you describe
some of his senior military advisors and their roles?
Makki: I am the eldest general you will interview; the other generals were lower-ranking than
I, except for Lieutenant General Shanshal. General Shanshal had the worst effect on
Iraq's Army. His mentality was that of a 1940s officer. He was a good staff officer and
instructor, but a bad commander. He refused to accept any responsibility.
Later, when Lieutenant General Adnan Khairallah (who was my student in the staff
college and the defense minister), would ask Shanshal for advice, Shanshal's replies
made no sense. In his capacity as chief of staff, he refused all responsibility for any of
his decisions. He formed committees to study problems and accepted their decisions.
Saddam loved him because he never said no. Saddam kept him as chief of staff for a
long time—from 1969 to 1982. After that he became minister of state for military affairs
for a period of time. He then became minister of defense after Adnan’s death.
Here is a typical story about Shanshal during his time as chief of staff. He was an old
man, and we looked up to him as a father. He was a good man, but when he was angry
he could become nasty. At the battle east of Basra, the III Corps commander was
General Salah al-Qadhi. As a younger officer he had helped make the revolution of 1968
possible.127 Not surprisingly, he became a high ranking member of the Ba’athist Party.
Although he was a young man, he was promoted rapidly to corps command in time for
this battle. When things did not go well, he was executed. Saddam did not hesitate to cut
off his head. This story is but one of the tragedies that happened to the army. How is it
that a lieutenant could be promoted to general and commander of a division? First, they
127
The revolution of 1968, incited by corruption within Abdul Salam Arif's regime, Kurdish disturbances in the
north, Iraq's failure to support Arab countries during the 1967 Six-Day War, and Arif's subservience to
Gamal Nasser, resulted in the overthrow of the government by the Iraqi Army. Al-Qadhi's role in the
revolution was not clear. Makki noted that he was an officer in the tank regiment guarding the palace.
113


Murray: So Saddam was executing corps and division commanders. If the signal from the
president was that you would be executed for a wrong decision, the solution was to make
no decision.
Makki: We became more afraid of the commanders than the enemy.
Woods: Did you and your peers discuss the impact of Shanshal's approach?
Makki: We discussed it among ourselves, at least among those who had been educated in the
West like myself.
Woods: So you knew things were going to get worse?
Makki: We knew it was going to get worse. This practice of committee-based decisions
caused us to lose the Fao Peninsula in 1986. Everyone, especially Major General al-
Khazraji, told the leadership the enemy would attack at Fao rather than Basra or al-
Amara. The problem was that committees took too long to make decisions; we had lost
Fao by the time it decided to act.
Woods: Could you discuss the people involved and the decision-making processes?
Makki: In 1980, the Iraqi Army had been fighting a counter-insurgency against the Kurds in
the north for nearly 20 years. It is mountainous country. The army had, little by little,
transitioned from fighting a traditional (conventional) war to fighting an insurgency:
light armament, bunkers, patrols, etc. Discipline had deteriorated, because the soldiers
remained in the same place. General al-Khazraji told me that in July 1980, two months
before the war, the ministry of defense had held a conference. It asked the corps and
division commanders to attend, including General al-Khazraji, who commanded the 7th
Mountain Division at the time. Saddam was not at the meeting, but the minister of
defense, General Adnan Khairallah, General Shanshal, and the deputy chief of staff for
operations, Lieutenant General Jabar Asadi were in attendance. A question was raised at
that conference about the army's preparedness for war. Everyone was thinking about
Iran, its post-1979 threat, and defending against the Iranians. Everyone was anxious
about the possibility of war. General al-Khazraji argued that the political situation made
him think we would go to war, but that we would require two years to prepare and train.
One year would be required to bring the troops up to the standards demanded of
conventional war. A year would be needed to reorganize the army and raise the
standards of discipline. In year two, we could focus on training, resupplying, and
armaments. The attendees said he should not have said this. Afterwards, his superiors
115


Makki: That is how your democratic, educated mind sees things in Iran. It is through this
door that one can destabilize Iran. But for Iraq, Iran was always an external threat. This
is why we were uneasy. The Iranian regime believed they needed to crush anyone who
threatened its rule.
Murray: There is an interesting parallel here. During World War II, Hitler did not have to tell
people what to do. They had their own understanding of what he wanted and acted on it.
think a similar thing was going on with these border commanders? Were they
reacting to rhetoric from Tehran?
Do you
Makki: Local commanders would not do such things completely on their own. They need
orders handed down through the chain of command.
Murray: The shah's army was fleeing and the chain of command was breaking down. The
local commanders were not getting any direction except from the rhetoric. Is it possible
they were acting in line with what they thought Khomeini wanted?
Makki: As early as 4 September, the Iranians showed signs of going to war. They closed the
border and airspace; they indicated they were going to invade Iraq. The rhetoric got
stronger. They were clearly looking for signs of war. Thus, we had to make a pre-emptive
attack. According to international law, the bombardment of Iraqi villages by Iran, the
closing of the border, and the blocking of Iraq's access to the sea by closing the Shatt al-
Arab were acts of war. From a military point of view, the threat was real so we launched
pre-emptive air strikes. The air strikes were a failure. On the second day, Iranian aircraft
bombarded us. I do not know why the Iraqi Air Force did not practice. Many bad things
happened in the army, but it was not always because of Saddam. Who was the air force
commander? He was a good attack pilot, but he was also Saddam's political appointee.
This is how the war started and why the war did not finish in a two-week blitzkrieg.
Woods: In 1981, you moved on from the university to chief of staff of III Corps.
Makki: Yes, as a professional officer I wanted to participate in the war, as everyone did.
Morale was high. Everybody supported Saddam because we were supporting Iraq. We
supported him as an idea, not as a person. In a crisis, people rally around their
commander. At the time, everyone supported Saddam and thought of him as a national
hero. I was eager to go to the front and participate. Although I was an intellectual within
the army, I did not want to remain at bureau staff position. I wanted to gain experience
like General Dwight Eisenhower did in his time. He was on the army staff in early 1942
and wanted to participate directly in the fighting, but his superiors did not want him
118


I told the political officer responsible for the III Corps, who later became deputy minister
of the interior, “You are my friend and you were at the meeting. Please tell me why
Saddam is cross with me. Why doesn't he like me?' He replied, “Saddam Hussein never
said this about you. I was with him. Just wait and you will see what happens.' The next
day, I was in the corps headquarters, when Saddam returned to meet with staff officers. I
was not allowed in the meeting because I talked. I waited in the corridor. When Saddam
came out, he put his arm around my shoulder, walked me down the hallway, shook my
hand, and walked away. Afterwards an order was issued that only the commander can
respond to questions posed by the commander-in-chief. Staff officers were not allowed
to participate in discussions. This is why people had not told Saddam the truth at the
beginning of the war. One reason why Saddam was considered a tyrant was because he
refused to hear the truth.
Woods: Were the division, brigade, and corps commanders afraid this would reflect poorly on
their performance? From your story it appears that Saddam appreciated knowing about
weak performance and poor deployments.
Makki: They were all ignorant political officers. His clique was not made up of professional
officers. This type of circle of [yes men] supporters exists in every dictatorship.
Woods: Do you have any other illustrations of Saddam's interactions with his military?
Makki: I have one other incident that is worth mentioning to illustrate how he was and how
he changed later. After the battle at Allahu Akbar Hill, but before the 1982 battle of
Basra, there was a major battle near al-Amara where three Iraqi divisions were routed:
the 1st Mechanized Division and the 9th and 10th Armored Divisions of the [III] Corps.
The 1st Mechanized Division still consisted of only infantry. They were defending the
area of Bostan in the front of al-Amara near the al-Shib pass. There is a small river
called the Busatin River that ran into the Hawizeh Marsh. The Iranians routed the Iraqi
divisions and took many prisoners. All the generals went south to al-Amara. Saddam
was left alone in Baghdad with the chief of staff in charge of the presidential palace
[Tariq Aziz). Saddam was rarely alone, so he asked Tariq to bring him some first-class
officers to discuss the situation at the front, which appeared to be deteriorating. This
chief of staff had been my student at the staff college, so he asked me to come, as well as
General Na'ima, commander of the staff college, and the deputy chief of staff for
training. At the time, I was the deputy commander of Bakr University.
122


I arrived late. Saddam sat at the head of a table with the others beside him. His face was
tense and turning yellow, which it did when he was angry. I saluted and introduced
myself. He told me to sit down. Tea was brought, but I wondered how I could drink,
when I was worried about my safety. When Saddam was angry, he was completely
unpredictable. He asked me, ‘Do you know what happened?' I replied that I did not. I
knew something was wrong, but not exactly what it was. General Na’ima briefed me
using a situation map on the wall. “The enemy came from here and attacked from this
area. All of our forces have had to withdraw. We have taken a defensive position here.'
He directed his hand to the Iraqi border. Saddam asked me what I thought. I replied, “I
do not know what to say but I will bring my expertise to fulfill your orders as best I can
in accordance with your decisions.’ Saddam asked if I had any other ideas. I asked him,
“Sir, do you want to maintain your defenses on the border or defend the border?
Defenses on the border are one thing; defending the border is another thing. If you want
to defend the border, then you should not stay in this location. You should move our
forces forward to just inside Iranian territory.' Saddam opened his eyes and ears, and
told me to continue. I discussed the principles of defense, and how forces should be
deployed. “What about in front of the position?' he asked. I replied, “Sir, the main
defensive position should be in this area approximately 10 kilometers inside Iran. A
security area, where the screening and reconnaissance forces operate, should be placed
in front of this defensive area. When the enemy comes, these forces will make the enemy
deploy in order to gather information.' Saddam ordered his subordinates to do what I
suggested and take up defensive positions 20 kilometers inside Iran. He had changed his
orders without becoming angry. General Khairallah was near the catastrophe. No one
had told him either. People were either afraid or did not understand the situation. Either
way, they failed to tell Saddam. He would listen when he was provided good advice.
General al-Khazraji made him change his mind many times. This incident underlined for
me that Saddam would listen if you discussed an issue with him in a logical fashion. You
just had to be careful.
Woods: This seems to be another example of you providing professional military expertise to
the senior decision maker. How did Saddam's senior staff officers react to the change
when they returned from the front?
Makki: They were pleased because it was the right thing to do.
Woods: There are several instances of Saddam's being told things he did not want to hear, but
listening, if they made sense.
123


Makki: Saddam may have been arrogant; he may have been strong-willed, but he was not a
fool. Maybe he was a fool politically, such as when he invaded Kuwait, but when one
talked to him in this way, at least one was doing one's duty. If he did not act on your
advice, then the matter was his responsibility. So when I became chief of staff to the III
Corps, the new corps commander asked me to come to his room. He said, “General
Makki, you are a good staff officer and I need a good chief of staff. This was right after
the loss of Khorramshahr.
As you know we lost Khorramshahr in June of 1982. The old commander of III Corps
had been executed, while his chief of staff had been relieved. Poor General Salah al-
Qadhi had been executed. The results would have been the same at Khorramshahr for
any other commander. Nobody could have done anything in that situation because the
deployment was bad, and the forces were ill-trained.
General Sa’adi became the new commander of the III Corps. He had been looking for a
chief of staff, and he knew me well because I had been his teacher in the staff college.
During the Kuwait crisis he became minister of defense. At present, he is in a prison, the
poor man. He is a good and honest man; he was clever and courageous. Wallahi, I feel
sorry for him. Even when he bought a box of tissue, he paid for it out of his own pocket.
He never put his hand out for anything from the state. He is clever and courageous.
Anyway, General Sa'adi became corps commander and told me he was looking for a chief
of staff. However, before he told me he was looking for a chief of staff, General Na’ima
became commander of the I Corps in the north and requested me also. Sa’adi asked with
whom I preferred to work. I told him, “As long as you ask for me, I will accept the
position. You are harder than Na'ima, but I know you and you are more competent. I will
accept your position because you are right.' I started my duties as chief of staff the next
day, because I was already there. The battle of Basra was brewing. The situation was
tense. We did a reconnaissance of the front and reorganized and redeployed the defense.
The 10th Armored Brigade arrived as a reserve. After my appointment, I employed all the
military staff techniques that I had taught once upon a time. The first thing I did was a plan
of maneuver, which I learned in France (projet de manoeuvre). 131 I asked the G2 for
intelligence. Then, I wrote the plan of maneuver with my own hand, because I knew my
staff did not know how to write such a plan. I gave a series of lectures because my staff
officers were not war college graduates. I gave the plan of maneuver to the corps
commander, who approved it. The next day I explained it to the divisional commanders
131
A plan of maneuver is another term for an operations plan.
124


and the staff officers. Thus, we were prepared for defensive operations against an Iranian
attack.
That evening I received intelligence that the enemy was moving his forces and that they
had started arriving at the front. Izzat al-Duri visited the corps headquarters to raise our
morale. General Sa’adi ordered me to come to his office, where al-Duri asked me what
we should do. I replied, “We have to move the 10th Armored Brigade across the Shatt al-
Arab into Iran immediately, because once the situation develops we will not have time.'
Once the 10th Armored Brigade crossed on the second day, the Iranian assault started.
There was a major battle, and there was a great amount of dust. The first attack was near
Fish Lake. They used thousands of people in a way that we had never seen before: waves
of civilians with light personal armor, wearing skirts and dishdashara. They had been
told by their clergy that Najaf or Karbala was there. Karbala is a sacred place to the
Shi’a. If you die after seeing Karbala, you will go to heaven. I wonder why Khomeini
did not come to see Karbala with them. The attack stopped at Fish Lake, because we
moved the 10th Armored Brigade into the area. This battle continued from 14 to 31 July.
The Iranians repeated this tactic in five battles. This was the first battle of Basra.
Murray: What is your estimate of the Iranian losses?
Makki: I do not know. Their losses were immense. They kept launching the same attack five
straight times: go in with human waves and get killed. One could see corpses strewn all
over the battlefield between the tanks. When the Iranians reached the banks of Fish
Lake, it was muddy, and their Chieftain tanks got stuck in the mud. The Iranians either
died or deserted their tanks. I think thousands of them died.
Woods: On the eve of battle, in your meeting with Izzat al-Duri, how good did you think your
intelligence was about what the Iranians were about to do and how they were going to do
it?
Makki: It was accurate. Our intelligence provided us with the times of attack and the enemy's
approach.
Murray: Was intelligence good in both a strategic and tactical sense?
Makki: I am speaking in a tactical sense about the intelligence.
Murray: In a strategic sense, you knew that the main Iranian effort was coming.
125


Makki: Yes, it was obvious and right in front of us. We did not need any special information
to warn us. The Iranian attack came immediately after Khorramshahr; it was only logical
for them to attack us east of Basra.
Murray: Did they do any deception operations or employ operational security?
Makki: The Iranians had announced they were going to attack and occupy Basra and push on
to Karbala. After the attack they became slightly better about operational security. The
battle of Sharq Basra was over by the end of July. We reorganized and cleared the
battlefield of dead and wounded. We collected abandoned Iranian tanks and equipment
and sent the booty on to Baghdad in convoys so everyone could see the spoils of war.
There was a great exhibition in Baghdad of the tanks captured by III Corps. Morale rose.
The sector remained quiet for two years until the second battle of Basra, just north of
Majnun Island, at the beginning of 1984. At the time, the Iranian plan was ingenious.
Woods: Do you think the ingenious battle plan for the second battle of Basra was based in
part on lessons learned from the first battle?
Makki: Maybe. They took us by surprise. The Iranians employed a massive deception plan.
We all thought they would attack either the Shatt al-Arab, the Fao Peninsula, the III
Corps position, or al-Amara. We never thought they would cross the Hawizeh Marsh; it
seemed impassible, because it was 40 kilometers wide.
Murray: What unit took the brunt of the Iranians attack during the 1984 Majnun attack?13
Makki: The Iranians attacked the area between III and IV Corps—which was a clever
tactic—to attack the boundary line between the two corps. Neither corps thought it was
responsible for the area. Beside, the Iranians had attacked from a location that no one
considered possible, because we knew they did not have bridges or amphibious
equipment. I was chief of staff, and it never crossed my mind that they would cross in
that area.
Woods: You probably had it mapped as ‘no-go’ terrain.
Makki: Quite right. We positioned a minimum number of the second-rate troops from the
Popular Army there. We thought the Iranians might send reconnaissance patrols at night
and that troops in the area would be able to handle it.
132
Majnun Island (which comprises two islands) is located in the middle of the Hawizeh Marsh. The oil field in
the south is 13 kilometers long and 10 kilometers narrowing to 7 kilometers wide (180 square kilometers).
The northern field is 6 by 8 kilometers (53 square kilometers).
126


Murray: The advantage Iraq had in the long-term was that any major offensive across this
terrain might succeed initially, but could not be supported logistically in the long term.
Does this come down to amateurs who failed to think of the logistical implications?
Makki: True. That was the nature of the area: they could cross and attack, but could not
exploit any advantage they gained. I do not know if they were amateurs, but their
objectives were greater than their resources.
Murray: This attack also occurred in a time of year when you were not expecting it due to the
weather, is that correct?
Makki: The marsh was flooded with high water. We would see strips of foam floating on the
marsh in the morning. When joined together, these strips of foam created a bridge, about
30 kilometers long. It was an ingenious plan. They brought infantry across the bridge.
The Iranians appeared behind us on the road connecting al-Qurnah and al-Amara. The
next day they appeared in al-Qurnah on the northwest side of the border.
It was an ingenious plan. They crossed Hawizeh Marsh, appeared in al-Qurnah, and cut
the road between Basra and al-Amara. The waves of the attack consisted of large
numbers of Pasdaran and Basij infantry. The Iranians reached Majnun Island. After the
second battle of Basra, this area was reinforced and transformed it into a command
called “The East of Dijla Command,' which evolved into a divisional command. 133
Murray: Majnun Ísland had rich oil deposits, correct?
Makki: The whole area is floating on oil. Majnun Island has some of the richest oil fields in
the area. The Iranians had now seized it. They also reached al-Qurnah. The new
commander of the III Corps, Lieutenant General Ma’ahir Adbul Rashid, was busy
fighting the battle. 134 His new chief of staff, Major General Fawzi Hamid al-Ali, was in
the advance headquarters. 135 I was in the main headquarters near the Shatt al-Arab. The
political officer responsible for the southern area, Abdul Ghani Abdul Raful, called and
asked me what to do now that the enemy had arrived in al-Qurnah. He wanted military
133
134
The East of Dijla (Tigris) Operatiosl Command [later designated at the VIth Corps] was formed after the
second battle of Basra and had command and control over the divisions deployed in the region west of
Hawizeh Marsh, east of the Tigris, and between al-Amara and al-Qurnah. Responsibility for this area was not
well-defined initially because it fell between the III Corps in Basra and the IV Corps in al-Amara.
Makki added as an aside that “Rashid was from Tikrit and related to Saddam. His daughter later married
Uday. He was considered a good commander but was a very nasty person. He cursed everyone.”
Makki added that after the war, Al-Ali, a Shi’a, defected to India, when sent there for a course on national
defense.
135
127


Pakistan, [Turkey], and the United Kingdom. The pact represented a contingency plan in
the event that Soviet forces came through Iran to attack Iraq's oilfields. It assumed the
Soviets would pass through the Bytaq and Dezful Passes. The plan called for closing
these two passes to prevent hostile forces entering Iraq from the east. This plan should
have helped inform our plans, when the Iraqi Army attacked Iran.
Every campaign should have clear political objectives, upon which clear strategic
concepts, strategic, operational, and tactical planning rest. This is a well-known military
principle.
The attack into Iran should have been a short one, like a blitzkrieg, because Iraq did not
have the resources for a long campaign. We knew that we were not prepared to fight a
long war, and that Iran had a greater capacity in terms of human resources, wealth, and
land mass. Logically, if Iraq fought a war against Iran it needed to be short, such as
when Israel fought the Six-Day War. 136 Judging from the pre-emptive air strike and
attack, this was the intention of Iraq's command.
We had 9 divisions to cover the 9 roads that connect Iraq and Iran.137 Only one division
advanced along each road. There was no main axis of advance and no secondary axis of
advance. Although the literature on the war suggests the main axis was in the south and
the secondary axis was in the center, this was broadly defined. In fact, we were weak
everywhere.
Murray: Are you saying the Iraqi Army wandered into Iran without focus?
Makki: Quite right. The objectives of the attack were not what they should have been. Taking
the Bytaq Pass in the Zagros should have been one of the main objectives. The area
command should have received an airborne brigade to capture the pass. The 4th
[Infantry), 6th, and 12th Armored Divisions should have been tasked with reinforcing
the paratroopers to hold the pass. Had we closed the Bytaq Pass, the other battles in the
Serbil Zehab Plain would not have happened. The Iranians could not have done anything
if we could have controlled this terrain.
136
137
After numerous border clashes, Israel fought the Six-Day War (5–10 June 1967) with neighboring states
Egypt, Jordan, and Syria. At its conclusion, Israel gained control of the Sinai Peninsula, the Gaza Strip, the
West Bank, East Jerusalem, and the Golan Heights.
According to Makki, Iraq had 10 divisions plus two so-called combat force commands (large brigades with
staff and supporting commands of a division) on the eve of war. These two combat commands were
converted to divisions (the 11th Infantry and 12th Armored) sometime during the invasion. In total, 9 Iraqi
divisions participated in the invasion of Iran while 3 remained in Iraq as a strategic reserve.
129


north. In fact, we were fighting two wars: one against the Kurds and the other against Iran.
It was a peculiar situation. So the Iraqi offensive stopped 40 kilometers inside the Iranian
border, and we went over to the defensive. The winter, which is the rainy season, arrived
and the muddy ground made it difficult to move for tanks, armored cars, and other heavy
vehicles.
Murray: In early January, in these rainy conditions, the Iranians launched a major offensive
for political reasons. We know that Bani al-Sadr was hoping for a military victory so that
he could gain traction against the religious fanatics. Can you speak about that offensive?
Makki: The Susangard offensive was a great victory for our forces. The 92nd Iranian
Armored Division with American M-60A1 and British Chieftain tanks attacked. Bani al-
Sadr had confidence in the traditional Iranian Armed Forces. They attacked the northern
sector where Iraq's 9th Armored Division held the line near Susangard. The Iranians
attacked the center of the 9th Armored Division's line. The center brigade pulled back,
while its flanking brigades maintained their position. It became a killing zone, or a bulge
inside that position. When the Iranians advanced, the brigades on the left and right side
closed in on them. At this time, the 10th Iraqi Armored Brigade, commanded by Colonel
Mahmoud Shukr Shahin, was in the sector near Maysan. They had T-72 tanks and
redeployed rapidly. It was a battle of maneuver. The 10th Armored Brigade was under
the control of the corps commander, General Isma’il Taya [Dhiyab al-Nu'aimi].
Woods: I want to make sure I understand. There were three brigades of the 9th Armored
Division on the line. The Iranian 92nd attacked the center, which pulled back. Where did
the 10th Armored Brigade enter the battle?
Makki: When the Iranians pushed into this bulge, the 10th Armored Brigade attacked the
right rear flank of the Iranians. The enemy was moving on their tracks without
transporters and attacked on the move. The Iranians had no flank protection; their tanks
were inside the killing zone. The T-62s (tanks] were highly effective. The attacking
force moved swiftly; the tanks fired on the move using the tank's accurate stabilizers and
range-finders, and the brigade was well-trained.
Murray: It sounds like Colonel Shukashaheen was an effective brigade commander. In 1986
he refused to pass along the information that the Iranians might attack Fao up to Saddam
Hussein. Can you comment on that?
132


Makki: He was a good division commander, but he had no intelligence background. He could
not do the job of the director of intelligence. He refused to pass along the information in
order to please the new chief of staff.
Let's get back to the battle at Susangard. Some of the Iranians deserted their tanks while
their engines were still running. We put the tanks we captured in an exhibition area in
Baghdad. Our armor sabot round pierced a Chieftain on one side and the round went
through the front armor and came out the backside.
At this time the British approached us to sell us tanks. Salah Askar, director of armor,
told me that when the British called and offered to sell him Chieftains he had remarked,
*We don't want your stupid tanks!'
Section 11: Adaptation in Iraqi Military · Combat
Development Directorate - Military Training
Woods: In 1984, you were transferred back to Baghdad. Adaptation and change in any
military organization is difficult, especially in the midst of a fight for survival. Within
the political and strategic context of Iraq, how and why did the Iraqi Army decided to
change, what were its priorities, and how did you bring together the physical and
intellectual capabilities to enhance adaption? What is your perspective on the army's
combat developments from 1984 onward?
Makki: I will answer this not only as the director of the Combat Development Directorate
(CDD), which was similar to your Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), but
also as an officer who served as a chief of staff to a corps. The CDD had many sections:
one for education and military magazines, another for field manuals and pamphlets,
another for translations, and another for doctrine development. They put me in this
directorate because I had been a successful chief of staff, and in this new position I
would pose no threat. Moreover, it had become apparent that Iraq was involved in a long
war that would require all its resources.
Woods: Did this directorate [CDD) exist before the Iran-Iraq War?
Makki: Yes. But after me, they were never able to find another director for the CDD. They
brought in four or five different officers who could not handle the job, so it was rolled
into the directorate of training. I was responsible for military doctrine. When I came to
the directorate, it was chaos. I found formal military manuals from Russia, America, and
Egypt. There were contradictions among them. The officers in the CDD could not
133


reconcile the differences. The first thing I did was publish a manual describing our
military doctrine. All other manuals were then written in harmony with this main
pamphlet. I collected concepts from many armies, but we learned toward following
American doctrine because we found it to be logical, detailed, and easy to apply.
Murray: Were you aware of the major doctrinal arguments going on in the United States?
Makki: Yes, we were. In 1985 or 1986, I published a manual called Application of Force and
gave it the number ‘one' because the army's manuals were numbered officially. They
were all signed by the chief of staff himself. It was not a small manual, because the
army's leaders wanted to put everything into it.
Murray: We have a recording of Saddam in 1985 saying that military doctrine is important,
and that he wanted to read every doctrinal manual that was going to be published.
Makki: He had good intentions regarding military doctrine. He spoke well of it. I sent every
pamphlet, magazine, and publication to all of the commanders, from Saddam himself to
the lowest rank. Before I became Director of CDD, Saddam came to the staff college to
listen to a military lecture about doctrine. He also spoke at that lecture regarding his
thoughts about military doctrine. At the time, there were two schools of thought
regarding military doctrine: Eastern (Soviet) and Western. The Eastern school argued
that military doctrine was equivalent to strategy in that it should affect the entire state.
The Western school of thought argued that doctrine is not equal to strategy. I myself
supported the latter approach over the argument that military doctrine should encompass
the whole state. Officers who studied in Egypt leaned towards the Eastern school of
military doctrine, because Egypt had adopted Soviet doctrine. I adopted the other one
because it was more logical.
Murray: So it goes back to your schooling.
Makki: Saddam did not interfere much. While I was director of CDD, I wanted to publish a
strategic digest, similar to Military Review. We also translated articles from foreign
military magazines. As I indicated, Shanshal followed the Eastern school of thought
about strategy. Most of our high-ranking officers did not know about strategy at that
time, because the war college and staff college had not focused on that subject. I wanted
to educate higher ranking officers on strategy. I arranged to publish a strategic magazine.
For the first issue, I wrote an article on politics and the army: why the armed forces in
the West are not allowed to mix in politics, as opposed to why armed forces in
totalitarian regimes, communist regimes, and one-party states end up interfering in
134


politics. After I published the article, Saddam read it, was impressed, and sent me a
Mercedes. I earned this because I had written something.
Murray: I would have thought that Saddam would have been furious at such an article.
Makki: It explained why our army had become involved in politics from the earliest days. In
principle, the army is an arm of the government. In a liberal democracy, the government
is a political apparatus with a political ideology and theory which it applies. One day the
leading principle is Republican, the next day it is Democratic. For such a government,
the army must be transparent. A red government creates a red army; a green government
creates a green army. The army is prohibited from having its own color. That is why the
army is prohibited from participating in party politics in a liberal democracy. Totalitarian
regimes, or regimes governed by one party do not allow other parties to control for
leadership of the state. Their ideology influences anything. Thus, there appears to be
little harm in covering the army in the color of the government. It will not change
anything. The leaders may change, but the ideology will remain the same, so the army
can have political officers and political organization.
Woods: Was the reason Saddam liked the article because it gave a theoretical basis to what he
was doing?
Makki: Yes. I wanted to understand it, so I had to analyze it, and now I understand the reason.
In the Eastern bloc, the minister of defense wears a military uniform, while in a Western
democracy he is a civilian. He represents the idea that the armed forces should be under
civilian, not military, control. It is dangerous for military forces to be under the direction
of the military, because the military always thinks militarily. A military dictator is
dangerous, because he will use the military easily, unlike civilians. Those of us within the
military are not prepared to govern. Officers by their nature are not politicians. If I wanted
to be a politician, I should leave the army. This is an important concept for a growing
nation to understand. People must be educated to know this. I knew this reality because I
studied.
Woods: So one of your innovations in your position at the CDD was to stimulate the army's
intellectual side. You initiated this strategic magazine and these conversations. What else
did you do?
Makki: After the publication of this pamphlet, I began organizing Iraqi military thought and
strategy into categories. I emphasized the operational level of war as part of the
curriculum. Before my time in office, the army did not recognize the operational level of
135


his book. He is a professional officer and has great combat experience. He refused to be a
Ba'athist.
Woods: General Hamdani speaks highly of you. He refers to you as his real mentor, when it
comes to thinking about the profession of arms. When I met him in 2003, he mentioned
you as the individual who first made him think about his profession seriously.
Makki: I am glad to have disciples like Hamdani. Unfortunately, we are out of the military and
no longer leading our armed forces. You know the Iraqi chief of staff; what kind of
military man he is. He left the Iraqi Army either as a lieutenant or a captain and spent his
time with the Peshmerga. 138 Now he is chief of staff. The rest of the Iraqi military leaders
are like him. Please bring this to the attention of your people in Washington, who care
about American interests in Iraq, unless it is in America's best interest for the Middle East
to be Iran's Middle East. If you lose Iraq, you will lose the whole Middle East to Iran. We
know that the American occupation will eventually end, but we are afraid of an Iranian
occupation. Since the beginning of the war, people would urge me to take a stand against
the American occupation; however, I replied, “Let the Americans be. If we are intelligent,
we can be their friends and benefit from them. Be afraid of the Iranians. If they come, they
will stay for a long time, and perhaps even change our religion. You came and that is
what happened. Iraq is now a failed state with enormous corruption throughout the
government. In six years, the United States with all its money has not been able to restore
electricity to Iraq. In two months, without outside help, Saddam restored electricity to Iraq
in 1991. This is why people are looking back to Saddam. I am sorry to say this.
Murray: Who picked you for the position of director of the Combat Development Directorate?
Makki: I was a logical choice, because my seniors in the military did not want to give me an
operational command. They thought I was too dangerous, or did not understand
operations.
They were my students, but they would not give me an operational command. They did
not want to kick me out of the military, but they also did not want to promote me. They
wanted to keep me here in education. They thought I was an academic, and all I could do
was study. When the war ended, they made me president of Bakr University and kicked
me out of the army. The victorious army now had good officers like al-Khazraji and
138
Referring to General Babaker Shawket B. Zebari, chief of staff, Iraqi Joint Forces. He left the Iraq Army
after three years to fight with the Kurds in their rebellion against Iraqi control in the mid-1970s and
eventually rose to a senior position in the Kurdish Democratic Party.
137


Hamdani. They did not need people like me. I was 52 years old and had never made it to
the rank of lieutenant general, as I should have. That affected my morale, my pay, and
my pension. Who picked me? Saddam picked me to be the president of Bakr University.
They brought him three names, and he picked me.
Woods: In the four years you were at the CDD, can you describe how you interacted with
senior military leaders? Did you meet with them? Was there any real discussion at the
higher levels?
Makki: I was on good terms with senior leaders as most had been my students. I could visit
them easily. They liked me, and we exchanged ideas. Beginning in 1986, the director of
training or I would visit the scenes of recent battles to assess what had occurred. The
army chief of staff always asked for our battle reports. I had no trouble at all with the
senior leader. My publications were being read by everybody. In 1987, I was directly
tasked by Saddam to put together a manual regarding defense against the Hellfire
missiles fired from [American] Apache helicopters.
In early 1986, the late Adnan Khairallah was considering Iraq's future if Israel acquired
the Apache helicopter. He said to me, “The Apache fires 32 “fire-and-forget” Hellfire
rockets. These rockets have a 6-kilometer range. If one helicopter targets an armored
regiment while outside our anti-aircraft defense range, one salvo could take out a whole
regiment. What can we do about it?' I started to think about this issue. One day in late
1986 or early 1987, in a meeting of the general command, Saddam asked me how we
could counter the Hellfire if Israel acquired them. He said, “We do not have a weapon to
counter them. Go write me a manual.' I established a joint committee from departments
dealing with arms, anti-aircraft weapons, engineering, electronic warfare, and tanks. I
asked each one question. I used their answers to form a concept, which I explained in the
manual. This is a good pamphlet. I expected Saddam to be pleased and give me another
car, but he never did. The chief of staff presiding at the meeting gave me an Iraqi 9mm
pistol called a Tariq.
I
Woods: I have not seen your pamphlet.
Makki: It is called How to Confront the Apache Model Helicopters.
Murray: After the battles in 1987 and 1988, the army produced doctrinal lessons-learned.
When did they begin making these lessons-learned assessments?
138


Makki: After each major battle, there was a lessons-learned conference to analyze what
happened. This process started at the beginning of the war, but became more important
after 1982.
Woods: So you and the director of training would go into the battlefield, conduct interviews,
look at the terrain, and then host the conference?
Makki: Right. We also asked for a staff officer from each division and corps to write an
analysis after each battle. The lessons-learned were deduced from the reports at the
conference. Some lessons-learned were incorporated into a training pamphlet, while
others were sent directly to industry to improve the effectiveness of weapons.
Woods: Were all of the senior command on board with the process of reading analysis and
operations research?
Makki: They did not understand it at the beginning of the conflict. By the second half of the
war, no one could become a brigade commander without passing the staff college and
war college exams. This new requirement took effect in 1984. You had to study
operational research, management, etc., in order to pass the examination. That is how a
new generation of commanders was created.
Woods: So it took a few years, but had it started to pay off by 1986?
Makki: It needed time. General al-Khazraji was a rare mix: He was a good Ba’athist, but also
a good, brave, professional officer who was not afraid of consequences, even though he
did not graduate from the war college. In 1983, he wrote a paper entitled How to Regain
the Initiative and Finish the War Against Iran, which he sent to Saddam, but Tala al-
Duri, the secretary of the high command, read it superficially and then took it to
Saddam, who also read it superficially. Saddam still was not well educated in military
practices in 1983. Because al-Duri did not support the report, it was returned to al-
Khazraji and had no impact. He was told it was a good strategic analysis, but nothing
could be done, because the enemy had the advantage. General al-Khazraji was a
divisional commander then and became a corps commander only later. He was busy
fighting Kurds and Iranians, and he did not have time to write. He was a speaker, not a
writer, so he asked for my help. I met with him and recorded what he said on the topic.
When al-Khazraji became chief of staff in 1987, he asked Saddam, “Sir, do remember
when I wrote the paper on regaining the initiative in 1983? We have to finish the war
now because Iraq is on the brink of collapse. We have used up all our resources and our
139


people—some of whom have been in the army for ten years. We cannot stand this war
for even one more year. We must regain the initiative and finish the conflict.' Saddam
did not remember the paper, so al-Khazraji provided another copy and said, “Please read
this paper again.' Saddam read the paper again and began discussing the ideas with him.
Of course, the situation was different in 1987 than in 1983 in terms of equipment and
army size on our side and the Iranian side. Saddam asked al-Khazraji to rewrite the
paper according to the new correlation of forces, which he did. After reading the paper,
Saddam held a conference in 1987. Unfortunately, I was not there.
The new study's main points were that the Iraqi Army must return to the correct principles
of war and must apply what the manuals say about fighting—namely, how to hold
defensive positions. At that time, our defensive positions were manned based on old
methods of fighting: a high embankment representing the front line, with a static and linear
defense comprising a company, with a battalion or brigade slightly to the rear. There was
no depth or distance between the soldiers and other positions. When the Iranians attacked,
they hit the brigade headquarters in the first assault. This prevented Iraqi infantry from
defending optimally, because the company or battalion commanders could not issue
orders.
Murray: So you moved to the German-style defense in depth?
Makki: First, we had to return to the principles of defense in order to minimize the number of
forces holding defensive positions as well as strengthen our defense. Second, we pulled a
brigade out of the front line from each armored and mechanized division and half of the
infantry divisions for training on defensive operations, while the rest of the forces held
the front line. The Republican Guard provided a competent strategic reserve in case
anything happened.
Within six months the retrained troops were back in the front and had significantly
improved their tactical ability. Their equipment was better, their training better, their
battlefield effectiveness better. As a result, morale improved, and our soldiers became
better troops. When they returned to the front, the other half pulled off the front lines for
training on offensive operations. Not all the brigade commanders agreed to this, but
commanders who did not agree with the approach found themselves replaced. General
Jamal (the III Corps Commander) was replaced with General Salah Abboud. General
Isma'il Tail al-Raimi, the commander of the I Special Corps, which consisted of all
recalled retired officers and NCOs [non-commissioned officers], was replaced by
140


the problems of experienced between 1982 and 1983, Iraq's professional generals asked
Saddam to allow them to take charge. By 1984, Saddam supported the operational
approach of the professional generals. Is this how it was perceived within the Iraqi
military?
Makki: Do you really believe anyone would go to Saddam and say, “We're going to lose
unless we do this?' This view is wrong. As the war progressed, Saddam began to take
the lead personally. He was also receiving a considerable military education. He started
to understand more and more.
Woods: As General Mattis would say, Saddam was filling body bags during those first few
years, and with every bag he filled, he got a little smarter.
Makki: Yes he did learn. In 1984, his military education was not what it was when the war
started in 1980. Moreover, the corps commanders in 1984 were better than those in 1980.
The corps commanders still lacked initiative and authority to do what they needed to do,
but they were more experienced. General Abdul Jawad Dhannoun replaced General
Shanshal as army chief of staff in late 1982 or early 1983.141 Before that he had been the
director of intelligence. In this work, he was successful. He impressed Saddam, but he was
a young officer. He graduated from the staff college as a captain and was promoted to
battalion commander of the 5th Infantry Brigade. He led the 5th Infantry Brigade during
the 1973 War in the Golan Heights. 142 He occupied Mt. Hermon with his 5th Infantry
Brigade, though the Israelis eventually won the area back. After that, he became
commander of the 4th Infantry Division. When the [Iran-Iraq] War broke out, he became
director of intelligence. He was successful in all these posts, so he became army chief of
staff. But Abdul Jawad Dhannoun was of the Shanshal school; he was always forming
committees, late in making decisions, and a classic infantry officer. He was a good man
and a friend of mine. However, he was willing to take responsibility to a greater extent
than Shanshal.
Dhannoun was army chief of staff until early 1987 or late 1986. After the catastrophe of
Fao in 1986, he was not replaced immediately, but eventually by General Saladin Aziz.
141
140
General James N. Mattis, USMC, commander of 1st Marine Division, email to a professor at the National
Defense University, early 2003. Permission for use granted by General Mattis.
Other sources indicate Dhannoun became chief of the general staff in early 1984.
Also known as the Yom Kippur War, the Ramadan War, and the October War, the 1973 War in the Golan
Heights began when Egypt and Syria entered Israeli-held Sinai Peninsula and Golan Heights, originally
acquired during the Six-Day War, on 6 October.
142
142


Makki: Yes, they had huge numbers of casualties. But the Iranians had the advantage in terms
of population size. We could not afford to lose any more Iraqis.
Murray: By 1988, Iran had lost so many people that morale was dropping. Neither country
could afford to suffer a great defeat by 1988.
Makki: No, I do not think this is comparable because Iraq suffered a massive defeat in 1991,
and yet Saddam's regime did not collapse.
Murray: Well, the Shi’a revolt came pretty close.
Makki: Whatever. This was not a revolution. The Iranian Basij came into Iraq, but only a few
Iraqi Shi’as revolted. That is why the Americans were wise to allow our gunships to
crush that revolution at the time.
Section 12: Chemical Weapons - NCO Corps - Iranian
Operations and Tactics - Saddam's Personality
Woods: I want to talk about the use of chemicals during the war. What was your
understanding regarding the logic, timing, and placement in the deployment of chemical
weapons? What do you think the lessons were for the professional Iraqi military about
their use in deployment? What is your perspective?
Makki: I do not know if you will believe me or not, but I do not know anything about the use of
chemical weapons during the war. We did not use them in my sector, the southern sector. I
have never seen chemical weapons used in front of me or read an order deploying their
use. They may have been employed in the northern sector, where I did not work. You can
ask General Abousi, because the air force might have used them. I do not believe the use
of chemical weapons is humane. They are prohibited by international law. I have a degree
in international law and know it is against international law to use chemical weapons. I
have no firsthand experience, but I know that the Iranians also used them.
Murray: We have captured documents that describe the limited use of chemical weapons in
1983 and 1984. The first major use was the counter-attack at Fao in February 1986. The
weapons turned out to be pretty ineffective because the ground was muddy. The
chemical shells and bombs basically buried themselves.
Makki: Any bomb would sink in the mud, which would render its burst ineffective.
145


Murray: This would suggest that the use of chemical weapons was an issue Saddam
considered strictly “need-to-know”. It is interesting that chemical weapons did not
impact army's doctrinal writings and combat development.
Makki: We did not include best practices regarding chemical weapons in our pamphlets,
because that information was restricted. Our pamphlets were for the entire army. I
remember no pamphlets about chemical weapons. Perhaps the chemical directorate
wrote one, but I do not know.
Woods: We were told that the Iraqi military, organized more along Eastern European
principles, did not depend heavily on its NCOs. It was more dependent on junior officers
for tactical operations. The Iraqi Army was officer-led and officer-driven. Is that
characterization true, is that changing, or did it change?
Makki: That characterization is true. We relied more heavily on officers than on NCOs.
There are reasons for this. The Iraqi Royal Army started in 1921. It was well-organized
and modeled after the British Army. The NCOs were capable and trustworthy; the
officers were well-trained. The army began losing its NCO corps, little by little after the
Revolution of 1958. The mettle of the Iraqi soldier deteriorated over time. When the
army started to expand in the early 1980s, the importance of NCOs diminished and more
emphasis was placed on the officer corps. Second, the moral fiber and level of education
of the average Iraqi was not high. This is where the NCO corps came from. We could
not trust them—not all of them, but most of them. As a result, the position of the NCO
lost, little by little, its significance. Third, officers are better educated and more highly
motivated. We had a saying: “If you want something not to be achieved, give it to an
NCO.' The status of NCOs was low, and they were not as highly regarded as they should
have been. This was a bad thing of the Iraqi Army. Of course, we wanted to raise
standards and have educated NCOs. The Non-Commissioned Officer School in Mosul
existed even before the war, but it was not enough. We accepted educated people after
completing primary school, but before they went to high school. Because we relied so
heavily on our officers, our losses were much higher than any other army in the world.
Woods: Did the relatively low level of education among the NCOs act a limiting factor in the
execution of maneuver warfare?
Makki: Yes. Because the truth is that the citizenry of a nation has to have a higher level of
education in order to create a modern army, because a modern army is a scientific army.
This was a problem for Iraq.
146


Makki: One time when I was chief of staff in the Basra area, Saddam called while General
Sa'adi, the corps commander, was celebrating the Ramadan Eid with the troops.
Saddam knew I was not the commander and asked where General Sa'adi was. I replied
that the general was celebrating Eid with the troops. I then took the initiative and asked
Saddam how he was. To speak to Saddam was important because at that time, we all still
loved him. Everybody thought he was a hero. Little by little, as he treated people harshly
and began executing them, the truth revealed itself.
Murray: Except for those who stayed in his court.
Makki: Saddam gave gifts of land, houses, orchards, and citations for bravery. After being
awarded three citations, you became a ‘friend of Saddam Hussein.' This tradition was
modeled after Napoleon’s ‘friends of Napoleon.' I had no citations so I never became a
‘friend of Saddam Hussein.' Being a 'friend of Saddam' could help your child get into
medical school or add points to your entrance scores if it was too low. This is how he
looked after his people and friends.
Murray: It is much like a tribal chieftain.
Makki: Every Iraqi and every Arab thinks in terms of the tribe, because it is their heritage. If
you want to understand Iraq, it is important to understand the nation's social heritage and
what moves people. Iraqis are simple people. They can be moved by small things. The
feeling of loyalty and friendship is one. If I feel you are my friend, I will sacrifice myself
for you. If you lose my confidence, that feeling is lost. All Iraqis are tribal men; it was
not just Saddam who thought this way. Americans do not understand this. They think
that if we kiss you, that we like you. It is not true.
Woods: General Hamdani said Americans walk into the future looking forward. As a result,
they always forget what just happened. Iraqis walk into the future backwards; they never
forget what happened in the past.
Makki: We have to refine the facts of history. We have to understand why it happened like
that. This is part of our genetic makeup. I become nervous easily because it is in my
genes. With education, with age, one can mold this bad characteristic.
Most Iraqi religious people like to live in peace. They look to the West more than the
East for guidance, especially people my age. We see what the West and America
144
Eid al-Fitr is a three-day celebration that marks the end of Ramadan.
149


accomplished versus what happened to Russia under the communist regime. Americans
could win Iraqis over easily. They are like children.
Murray: In one of the post-war FBI interviews of Saddam, he commented that he was going
to be rescued and ‘give me eight years I will make Iraq a paradise.'
Makki: He was dreaming.
150


Interview:
Lieutenant General Abid Mohammed al-Kabi 145
Conducted by Kevin M. Woods, Williamson Murray, and Elizabeth A. Nathan
12 November 2009 - Cairo, Egypt
Former Lieutenant General Abid Mohammed al-Kabil46 graduated
from the Iraqi Military College in Baghdad in 1962. He joined the
Iraqi Navy in 1964 and rose through the ranks. His foreign military
training includes an underwater weapons course in Egypt in 1968
and a defense service staff college course in India in 1972. In 1978,
he was promoted to director of naval training. In 1980, he was
named director of naval operations and became commander-in-chief
of the Iraqi Navy in 1982, serving until 1987. General Kabi was appointed the general
secretary of the ministry of defense in 1987 and served in numerous high-level advisory
positions within the ministry through 2003.

Section 13: Personal Background - History of Iraqi Navy ·
Expansion of Naval Involvement in Iran-Iraq War
Preparation for Iran Iraq War
Foreign Technology
Woods: General, I understand you are currently working with the Iraqi Government. Can you
tell us about the nature of your work?
Kabi: I am consulting on issues dealing with the borders between Iran and Kuwait and water-
way access rights. Iraq has complicated problems with both Iran and Kuwait on this issue.
Woods: What is the issue with Kuwait? Is it Iraq's access to channels at Bubiyan Island?
145
146
Iraqi Navy Lieutenant General is equivalent to US Navy Vice Admiral (0-9).
Referred to during the interview transcripts as Kabi.
151


Kabi: Most countries with limited water access have to use common exits without claiming
them as their own because everyone uses them. There is no need to control each other's
space. Maybe the Kuwaitis have an excuse. Normally, there is trust between the two
countries, but for obvious reasons this is not necessarily true in this case.
Woods: We are looking at a strategic and operational history of the Iran-Iraq War. We are not
particularly interested in the technical aspects of naval warfare in the Gulf, but rather the
operational scheme, the Iraqi Navy's ability to understand the battlespace, the decision-
making processes from target selection to interaction with senior Iraqi ministers, how
you cooperated with your air force and army, and your impressions of Iranian naval
capabilities—what they did right and what they did wrong during the course of the war.
They had some interesting innovations and tried some interesting things, such as support
of the 1988 Fao campaign. We are interested in the economic aspects of the conflict, or
what became known in the West as the Tanker War. 147 There was a strategic logic to the
Tanker War that I do not think is very well understood.
As you know, if history becomes just a recitation of facts, it becomes dry and boring. So
we are interested in your view of some of the personalities. We want to understand how
senior naval commanders interacted with the government in Baghdad, as well as with
each other. I would like to know a bit about your peers. Who were the dynamic
commanders, and the commanders who were not so competent?
Admittedly, we are asking you questions from our perspective as American historians.
As such our questions will likely fall short because we do not have the understanding
that you have as a participant. So we will ask you to help us by tell us what is missing
from our line of questioning.
Kabi: I would like to go through the draft manuscript I forwarded to you in the order of the
chapters. If you still have questions after I present the paper, we can discuss them then.
The general outline covers the economic, strategic, and political importance of the
Persian Gulf; the operational theater and strategic targets; the nature of both Iraqi and
Iranian naval forces; a comparison of Iraqi naval armaments versus Iranian naval
armaments when the war started; Iraqi naval strategy; battles along Shatt al-Arab; the
attacks on shipping routes in the northern Persian Gulf; attacks on Kharg Island, oil
147
148
The Tanker War began when Iraq attacked Iranian tankers and oil terminals at Kharg island in 1984.
Unpublished manuscript by General Abid Mohammed al-Kabi, “An Iraqi Naval Perspective on the Iran-Iraq
War.”
152


tankers, and the oil fields in the Gulf; and finally, the future rebuilding of the Iraqi Navy.
Generally speaking, I am ready to discuss the importance of the seas and oceans, from an
economic, political, and strategic point of view.
Murray: Can you give us some sense of the development of the Iraqi Navy? In terms of
British influence and the monarchy, there was not much of an Iraqi Navy. When did Iraq
begin to pay more attention to the fact that it had clear strategic interests in
transportation by sea through the Gulf?
Kabi: Iraq started paying attention its navy during Abd al-Karim Qasim's regime, sometime
after 1958. He signed a contract with the Soviet Union for 12 torpedo boats and three
anti-sub ships. After the Ba’athists came to power in 1968, Iraq signed another contract
with the Soviet Union for 12 missile boats that were approximately 41 meters long,
armed with four ship-to-ship Styx missiles, and two aft 30-mm guns."
149
Murray: Where did the first naval officers come from?
Kabi: The first navy officers came from the army's artillery section.
Woods: I understand that early training was provided by Egyptian naval officers?
Kabi: Yes, but the commanders of the missile boats and their crews were sent to Russia for
training. When the war started, the Iraqi Navy had 12 missile boats, one Super-Frelon
helicopter squadron with each helicopter armed with two [Exocet] MM-40 missiles, two
Silkworm coastal missile batteries, six patrol boats, five minesweepers, four landing
ships, one 130mm artillery gun regiment, and one marine brigade.150 In the mid-1980s,
we created another marine brigade as well as logistics support facilities. In 1980, there
were approximately 20,000 people in the navy.
Woods: Looking back, how would you assess the quality and training of the navy before the
war?
Kabi: Normally, we did numerous exercises at sea. The missile boats crews were skilled.
149
150
Referring to the purchase of eight Soviet OSA-Class fast-attack patrol boats. The P-15 Termit (SS-N-2 Styx)
is a Soviet-designed ship-launched anti-ship missile introduced in the early 1960s.
The Exocet is a French-manufactured anti-ship missile that can be launched from surface vessels, sub-
marines, helicopters, and fixed-wing aircraft. They were first introduced in the late 1970s. The SA 321H
Super-Frelon is a French-manufactured, three-engine, heavy transport helicopter. Iraq took delivery of 16
Exocet missile-capable Frelons in 1977. The HY-2 Haiying (CSS-C-2 Silkworm) is the Chinese version of
the Soviet-manufactured P-15 Termit (SS-N-2 Styx) anti-ship missile adapted for coastal defense.
153


Woods: Were the Soviets still providing the majority of technical and logistical support for
the boats at this time?
Kabi: Yes, but they stopped when the war began.
Murray: In September 1980, when military operations began, it appeared that Iraq's military
planning was somewhat inadequate. Was any real attention given to the use of the navy
in terms of early operations?
Kabi: At the beginning of the war, high command considered the navy to be the weakest link
in the armed forces. Most early missions assigned to the navy were defensive in nature.
Woods: The Iraqi Navy appeared to be involved in the defense of installations, the
surveillance of enemy naval activity, and the prevention of enemy landings on Iraqi
shores.
Kabi: That was all the navy did. We were restricted to simple tasks. However, during the war,
operations developed in line with needs. The high command did not expect the navy to
take such an active role in the war.
Woods: Well, they were all army officers, so they probably had no concept of naval operations.
Kabi: There was a lack of understanding concerning naval affairs within the high command. I
am speaking in particular about the general chief of staff and his assistants. They had no
idea, and they had no desire to learn.
Woods: But Iraq did not have a large naval culture, as you said?
Kabi: Iraqis have no naval culture.
Murray: Given that senior military leaders had no sense of the navy and did not want to learn
about it, could the same have been said about Saddam?
Kabi: Saddam was clever. He became interested in the navy after he saw what the navy was
doing. I was among the leaders in the high command of the general armed forces.
Saddam eventually discovered what the navy could do. The navy was self-contained; it
was almost a separate military off by itself. Nobody interfered in its affairs. The navy
solved its own problems, planned its own operations, and implemented them on its own.
Woods: From early 1979 until the war broke out in 1980, did this period of Iranian provocation
include provocations at sea? Were the Iranian's being aggressive towards the Iraqi Navy?
Kabi: There were clashes on the land border. At sea there was tension, but no firing.
154


Woods: We talked to Generals Hamdani, Tarfa, and Makki about war planning during the
summer of 1980. They referred to a meeting in July 1980 that discussed the possibility of a
war with Iran. As they described it, all the services were represented. Was the navy
represented?
Kabi: I was the director of naval training when the war commenced. A few months later I
became the director of naval operations. There were studies about the possibilities of war
between Iran and Iraq when I was a commander. I took part in them at that time. The
session that you refer to was conducted in the planning directorate of the ministry of
defense. There were many officers from all three services who participated in the
discussion.
Woods: I am trying to understand the period just before the war started and the kind of
planning that went on. Do you recall talking to your peers? Was it specific, or because
the navy was independent, was it still up to the navy to think about what it would mean
if Iraq went to war with Iran?
Kabi: As far as the navy was concerned, there was no serious planning before the war.
Murray: In terms of long-term planning and studying the potential implications of a long
conflict, our impression of the Iraqi Army was that the situation was similar.
Kabi: Even in the army, I found there was no great standard of planning. For example, there
were no maps available when the land forces began the invasion Iran.
Woods: As a naval officer during the period immediately before the war, can you recall
thinking about the potential of a war with Iran? What were your top concerns? What were
the things you worried about in terms of the Iraqi Navy and the potential of a clash with
Iran?
Kabi: I was the commander of the training directorate. We were most afraid of their
combatant missile boats; they had 6 with a contract with the French to buy 12 more.
Their boats were armed with the American Harpoon missile. 151 The Harpoon missile has
a significantly longer range than our Styx missiles. 152 Later in the war, we expanded the
range of our [Styx] missiles to approximately 54 kilometers by increasing the fuel in
their tanks.
151
The AGM-84 (Harpoon) is an American-manufactured, all-weather, over-the-horizon anti-ship missile that
entered service in the late 1970s.
The Harpoon missile had a range of approximately 90 kilometers, whereas the Styx missile had a range of
approximately 40 kilometers.
152
155


point of view, our boats were inferior to those in the Iranian Navy. Iran also had a
significant number of patrol ships and P-3C Orion surveillance aircraft.153
Woods: What equipment did the Iraqi Navy use for surveillance? How did you extend your
eyes out beyond?
Kabi: At the beginning of the war, we had problems with surveillance in the Gulf, because we
did not have any plans in place related to that task, and the Iraqi Air Force had no
experience flying over water. Of course I am speaking about the beginning of the war.
the air force flew deeper and deeper out into the Gulf.
Later on,
Murray: Was there any cooperation between the navy and the air force in 1980?
Kabi: No, never.
Murray: Did that develop over the course of the war?
Kabi: In November 1980, there was a major battle between the Iraqi and Iranian navies. Our
air force failed to provide air cover for our ships. As a result, our naval ships became
targets for the Iranian Air Force.
Murray: Was the air force supposed to provide air cover?
Kabi: No, but they did begin providing air cover in late 1982.
Woods: Why did this change in 1982? Who was responsible for making the air force do
combined operations with the navy?
Kabi: The needs of the navy drove the change to greater cooperation. The navy requested air
cover at all armed forces council meetings. We said that this situation could not
continue, that we must find a solution, otherwise we could not continue to operate.
Woods: Was there an advocate outside the navy in Baghdad?
Kabi: Saddam's general commander of the armed forces told us to sit together and find a
solution. We were located close to the coast, not in the deep sea, within the area of the
two oil terminals. 154 Under these circumstances, we were obliged to operate only at
night, to avoid air attacks. Even our helicopters were not trained for operations over the
sea. They had no IFF (identification friend-or foe) equipment. They had no way of
differentiating between Iranian ships and ours. This was a dangerous situation. Thus,
153
The Lockheed P-3 Orion is a four-engine turboprop anti-submarine and maritime surveillance aircraft
introduced in the 1960s.
Oil terminals refer to the location where crude oil is delivered by pipeline or tanker before being refined.
154
157


sometimes our aircraft hit our own merchant ships. Moreover, there was no coordination
between the navy and the port administration at the beginning of the war.
Murray: When did the navy start acquiring French-built Exocet missiles for its helicopters?
Kabi: In the late 1970s, perhaps 1978. France supplied them during the war.
Murray: But without air cover, you did not want to fly your helicopters in the daytime, and at
nighttime they were dangerous to everybody, including your own ships.
Kabi: Occasionally we had to sink a boat in order to supply the ſoil pipeline] terminals. We
placed one battalion of marines armed with 57mm guns and small caliber machine guns on
each terminal. Their task was to protect the terminal from Iranian attack. Khor al-Amaya
was situated 20 miles offshore. 135 The other terminal was 25 nautical miles offshore. They
are shown on Chart 1,235 of my paper. The Shatt al-Arab was controlled by both sides, so
we could not move through that waterway. The Iranian missile boats came out of the ports
of Bandar-e Khomeini and Bandar-e Mashahar. They were new, well-equipped, and close
to the front. The Iranians relied on them. We reduced the flow of the convoys moving
through those ports by using helicopters, missile regiments, and Styx (SS-N-2) missiles,
which have a 100-kilometer range. The latter could cover all this area.
Woods: The Iraqi Navy placed a Silkworm missile battery on the tip of Fao Peninsula. When
did you start using them?
Kabi: We started using the Silkworm in 1983.
Murray: What kind of intelligence did you have?
Kabi: We relied on three long-range detection radar stations, which could reach out more than
100 kilometers. In 1985, we put a radar station on one of the terminals. Starting in 1983,
we added a radar station with Silkworm missiles. We had another in Umm Qasr so we
could monitor the entire northern portion of the Gulf.
Woods: Covering the northern part of the Gulf was only one of your three defensive missions.
Operating within 100 kilometers of Fao allowed you to do that, but did not help you do
anything farther down in the Gulf.
Kabi: We launched an operation to Bushehr with missile boats. We sank approximately 20
tankers, using the helicopter, mostly after 1983.
155
Khor al-Amaya is an Iraqi offshore oil terminal built and cargo transfer port on a man-made “island”
supported by pilings, located 20 miles south-southwest from the entrance to the Shatt al-Arab in the northern
Persian Gulf.
158


Kabi: They launched two operations. The first occurred at the beginning of the conflict-in
November or December 1980. They landed on the terminal by helicopter and attempted
limited, ineffectual sabotage. The second occurred in 1984. I was commander-in-chief of
the navy and in Baghdad at the time. The chief of staff of the navy told me there had
been an attack on one of the terminals around 0200. I drove through the night and
reached the headquarters in the sector at 0830. The officers there told me that the
Iranians had already captured the terminal.
There were several stages in each of the naval missions. The first, from 22 September
1980 through 21 November 1982, was a defensive stage. The navy surveyed the northern
Gulf area, prevented the Iranians from attacking our territorial waters or landing on the
Iraqi shore, provided protection to the Mina al-Bakr and the Khor al-Amaya terminal,
provided fire support to ground forces in the Basra-Abadan sector, and attacked ships
from the Iranian fleet cruising in the Khawr Musa channel, which leads to the ports of
Khorramshahr and Khomeini. 156
Murray: Before we get to the second stage, could you describe the navy's involvement in the
siege at Abadan? We know Iraqi land forces had cut off the Iranian garrison in Abadan
from the land routes, and the Iranians had to supply their troops by sea.
Kabi: We stationed two landing ships in the port at Basra. Each ship had two Katyusha rocket
launchers mounted on it to support army troops on land.157 They bombarded targets that
could not be reached by the army's artillery.
Woods: When did you modify the landing craft with Katyusha rocket launchers—before or
after the war started?
Kabi: We adapted the ships at the beginning of the war, when Iraqi forces invaded
Khorramshahr. The army asked us to provide artillery support. We said it was possible,
but could use the ships only at night.
The second stage, from 21 November 1982 through 8 February 1986, represented an
offensive stage. We attacked the Iranian ships near Kharg, Bushehr, and the southern
part of Kharg, using our missile boats and Katyusha rocket launchers.
156
157
Mina al-Bakr is an Iraqi offshore oil terminal in the northern Persian Gulf. Khawr Musa is a channel that
connects the Iranian port of Bandar-e Khomeini to the northern Persian Gulf.
The Katyusha multiple rocket launchers are Soviet-manufactured, simple truck-mounted rails (the BM-31 being
the most common configuration) designed to launch a high volume of 82mm rockets (there are also 132mm and
300mm versions) in a short period of time. Variations of this system first entered service during World War II.
160


Woods: So by 1983, Saddam had realized he would need to conduct an economic war against
Iran. He turned to his navy to start attacking Kharg and the northern Gulf area economic
zone. Can you explain how you developed your targeting method, what the information
was, how crews were briefed, and whether they knew the nature of the targets they were
going after? Were the targets specific? If I were a helicopter pilot taking off from Umm
Qasr to look for targets at Kharg, would I have been briefed to look for a specific target,
or would I have been told to go to the area south of Kharg and attack any naval target?
Kabi: We began offensive operations, when I became commander of the navy. For the first
operation, I decided to attack ships in the Bushehr area. We sent three attack boats to
troll for targets between the Persian Gulf base and the Khawr Abdullah channel. Then,
they changed course towards Iran. The operation lasted 20 hours, and the missile boats
launched six missiles and sank five ships. We knew we had to develop our offensive
naval operations.
Murray: Was the initiative directed by Saddam?
Kabi: This was my initiative; it was not directed by Saddam. I went to the armed forces
headquarters to discuss it with the general staff. They indicated they could not authorize
such an operation. A few minutes later, Saddam arrived and asked me if I had anything
for him. I told him my intentions to launch an attack on ships anchoring south of
Bushehr. He asked me to explain the operation, so I laid the map out in front of him. He
asked me a question, which is important because it is proof he was clever, ‘Are you sure
you will find ships in the area, when you get there? If there is any anchorage in this
sector, you definitely will find ships there, and you can attack.' I told him that I was sure
this was an anchorage and that we would find ships. Saddam approved the plan, but it
had been completely initiated by me and my staff.
Woods: There was a degree of risk: you had never run offensive operations across the Gulf.
This was a new operation for your crews.
Kabi: Yes. Let me give you an example. On the first mission, the missile boat, which was
commanded by the man who currently commands the Iraqi Navy, broke down
approximately nine miles from one of the Iranian oil fields.158 We considered two different
courses of action to help him: we could tow the boat back, or we could send spare parts to
the boat by helicopter. In the end, he used pipes from a fire extinguisher to replace the fuel
158
The head of the Iraqi Navy at the time of this interview was Rear Admiral Muhammad Jawad.
161


Kabi: All of these operations started in 1983. In 1984, the movement of ships in the area
began to slow and by the end of the year, they had stopped completely. We had hit 58
tankers in Kharg Island area alone.
Woods: Some of the histories we have read of this period expend much effort trying to
understand if there had been a strategy to hit tankers from certain countries more than
other countries. In other words, part of the strategy would be, if we attack Indian tankers
supporting Iran, we can influence Indian political support for operations against Iraq.
Was there any specific kind of guidance that led you to think about targets?
Kabi: Although we could detect a ship or tanker by radar, we could not determine its port of
origin. Because we relied on radar, its mere presence in the northern Gulf made it a
target. We attacked everything that our radars detected.
Between March and September, we had a station, which could detect any movement
within 30 miles and as far south as Bushehr and Kharg. We could detect ships once they
were five-to-six miles outside of the harbor. So we made what we call a 'casual plan’
where we projected the future point of the target. We originally had our helicopters at al-
Sha’iba Air Base. 159 We built an air base in Umm Qasr, which placed the helicopters 15
minutes closer to their targets. Typical flight plans were approximately 1.5 hours to
target areas. By the time the helicopter was within range, we would have pinpointed the
target, and the pilot would fire. In one month, we sank 20 tankers, all in night operations.
We relied on the helicopters.
Woods: Were there any particular problems for your crew flying that far out over open water
at night?
Kabi: It was a naval helicopter, so it was provided with sea-going instrumentation and had a
good range. It was well-equipped with navigational devices, and as I told you, we trained
them for this type of flying. Eventually the pilots were tasked with attacking ships (in the
northern gulf) and laying mines.
Woods: You laid mines from helicopters?
Kabi: We replaced the helicopter's missile equipment with a rail system and loaded the mines
inside the helicopter. We initially used old-fashioned Russian contact mines.
159
Al-Sha'iba Air Base is located 11 miles southwest of Basra.
163


Woods: Were the alternative channels non-navigable?
Kabi: It was not very navigable, and it belonged to Kuwait. Kuwait would not let us use this
channel. The Iranians protected the channel with small boats armed with heavy machine
guns and anti-tank armament. They made two or three lines to prevent our boats from
passing. Before we could even attempt our missions, we had to fight our way into the
Gulf.
Woods: These are like army “screen lines.' You had to fight through them to get out of Umm
Qasr before you could go on your operations.
Kabi: It was difficult to do. Moreover, during this period, the enemy attacked and seized the
northern terminal of Khor al-Amaya. We still held the southern terminal. Nevertheless, the
Iranians held the northern terminal for only 48 hours before we were able to recapture it.
Woods: The Iranian screen lines were comprised of small boats or skiffs armed with RPGs
[rocket-propelled grenades] and machine guns. Correct? Did you develop any particular
tactics to break through?
Kabi: We just fought our way out. We had no choice but to go through.
Woods: Before the loss of Fao in 1986, can you describe any naval commando operations or
marine operations along the coast aimed at disrupting Iranian radar and patrols?
Kabi: During this period, we depended mostly on helicopters and Silkworm missiles. They
could cover the entire area.
Woods: Did you send naval infantry or naval frogmen along the northern Iranian coast?
Kabi: No.
Woods: Did the Iranians attempt to do naval raids, even commando raids, on Umm Qasr?
Kabi: No, never. During the Fao invasion, Iranian warship casualties included one frigate,
four corvettes, one logistics support ship, fifteen small minesweeper and patrol boats, six
hovercrafts, and several small logistics support ships.
Murray: You not only lost your Silkworm base, but you also lost the radars located on the
peninsula.
Kabi: We were able to withdraw the Silkworm post to Umm Qasr. It still covered part of the
original area, though the range was reduced.
165


the navy’s command. The navy knew how to use the aircraft and how to conduct an
operation in the Gulf.
Murray: Did you coordinate with the commander of the air force in discussing procedures?
Kabi: Sometimes. For example, during the missile boat operations conducted against Kharg
in 1984, we coordinated with the air force for air cover at certain times and the air force
provided the cover. This was in 1984.
Woods: Was it possible that your intelligence was good enough to decide which country
owned which ship and that you were targeting specific countries to influence their
support of Iran?
Kabi: We could not.
Woods: The way you're describing it, I agree: nighttime operations that fire on a radar
picture, which itself is a vague target, make it impossible to discern the nationality of a
ship.
Kabi: The radar picture does not show which country owns the ship. You just detect a tanker
or ship.
Murray: This explains why the USS Stark was hit.162 Basically, the plane was flying and fired
at the first ship that appeared on its radar and then headed home.
Kabi: It was in the wrong area at the wrong time. The air force could not identify a ship’s
country of origin. The pilot saw a ship and attacked. We launched missiles against Iranian
oil fields: 15 against Narouz, 16 against Ardashiya, 12 against Soroosh, 8 against
Bahregan Sar, 2 against the western jetty of Kharg, and 4 against the eastern jetty of
Kharg
Woods: Could you describe the Iranian reaction to Iraq's missile boat raids and more
specifically the air attacks on shipping during the defensive stage, the offensive stage,
and the loss of Fao? You said they tried to bottle you up in Umm Qasr.
Kabi: They tried to bottle us up during the third stage. After we started the offensive stage,
they began to withdraw their fleet to Bandar-e Abbas, and tried to interfere with ships
passing through the Strait of Hormuz. They depended on their F-4s and F-14s because
162
The USS Stark was struck with an Exocet missile in the Persian Gulf on 17 May 1987, when it was
accidentally targeted by an Iraqi aircraft. For more particular information regarding the Stark incident, see the
Abousi interview pages 203–04 of this manuscript.
167


163
they could fly over open sea. They continued sending merchant ships carrying
munitions, armaments, etc., to this area and we continued sinking most of them.
Woods: For all practical purposes, you controlled the northern Gulf by late 1984, correct?
Iran was able to get small things into Bandar-e Khomeini, but with your continuous
pressure, it was never going to be anything large.
Kabi: Yes.
Woods: At what point did you start coordinating with Kuwait, United Arab Emirates, and
others with economic interests, who were supporting Iraq in the war? You did not want
to hit Gulf State tankers while they were loaning money to Iraq and supporting Iraq's
cause—especially Kuwait. Was there any coordination at this point to de-conflict
between the navies?
Kabi: Most of our attacks occurred at least 12 miles outside of territorial waters.
Murray: Were the tankers coming to Kuwait inside their territorial waters?
Kabi: We normally watched this area, but we did not interfere in activities. If we launched
any operation, it was normally outside of territorial waters.
Woods: I just want to confirm that that the Iraqi Navy effectively controlled south of Bandar-e
Abbas.
Kabi: This is the operational area.
Woods: You avoided commercial shipping lanes heading toward Gulf States. You focused
your attacks on Iranians shipping lanes.
Kabi: Exactly. We defined the operational area in such a sketch. We announced the
operations area. In any case, what we learned from this war was that for Iraq to succeed,
it could not rely on war inside the Gulf. It must have naval power outside of the Gulf. It
needs facilities outside of the Gulf.
Woods: Like where?
Kabi: The political leadership tried to establish bases in Arab nations, such as Somalia,
Yemen, and Djibouti.
Woods: When did this concept begin to emerge? Was it actively pursued by Iraq’s diplomats?
163
The Grumman F-14 Tomcat is a supersonic, twin-engine, two-seat, variable-sweep wing fighter aircraft
introduced in the mid-1970s.
168


Kabi: The leadership was thinking about this during the war. We were unsuccessful because,
as you know, most of these countries are under the influence of European countries. For
example, Djibouti refused because the French refused to agree. The same was true of
Somalia.
Woods: Getting bases outside of the Gulf would have allowed Iraq to pressure Iran in the south,
correct? Once you controlled the northern area, Iran switched its shipment of oil to
Bandar-e Abbas. You were looking for a way to continue the economic war further south.
Kabi: During the final stage of the war, we started to use Silkworm missiles on board
airplanes and to attack the whole area of the Gulf.
Woods: Silkworms are heavy missiles. What kind of airplane were they launched from?
Kabi: Russian transport aircraft refitted to launch missiles. At the beginning of 1988, there
was a major battle here when Iraqi aircraft attacked Iranian tankers and facilities in this
area. The missile is 6 meters long and can be launched from 60 to 70 kilometers away
from its target.
Woods: I have read that at least on one occasion, Iraqi aircraft had to divert to the Gulf States
for fuel or damage.
Kabi: Sometimes, but seldom.
Woods: Had you been successful in getting an Iraqi naval installation in Djibouti, Somalia,
Oman, or Yemen, how do you think that would have changed things?
Kabi: We could have controlled all the traffic coming and going from Europe to Iran. This
would have put pressure on Iran to make peace. That is why Iraq contracted Italy to
supply Lupo class frigates. 164
Woods: Could you expand on the lessons learned from the Iran-Iraq War in terms of the
future of the Iraqi Navy?
Kabi: Based on our deductions, the lessons we learned during the ground war, the naval war,
and the construction of the fleet, it becomes clear how to rebuild the Iraqi fleet and what
types of operations are required. To achieve Iraq's interests in any future war, the navy
must operate outside the Gulf. Oil will remain a strategic commodity, which Iran will
depend on to support its war machine. Iran will search for an alternative solution outside
of the Gulf, in the Oman Gulf. Even if Iran were to establish links outside of the Gulf to
164
The Lupo class of Italian-manufactured frigates are designed to conduct anti-surfice warfare operations.
169


export oil, its main installations—I mean oil fields and so on—are still vulnerable to
attack.
Woods: This is because the primary oil fields are in the northern Gulf, so even if the Iranians
operate outside of the Gulf, they will still need to get oil out of the north.
Kabi: Yes, to achieve a strategic naval victory, Iraq must depend on facilities inside the Gulf to
maintain fast and powerful capabilities—missile boats, corvettes, helicopters, slip boats,
and patrol craft like the Italian Sparviero.165 The Sparviero can reach speeds of more than
100 kpm. It has a Boeing gas turbine, two automatic missiles, and one 76mm gun. It is a
hydrofoil. Outside the Gulf, the navy would need big ships, such as frigates, ships with
helicopters for reconnaissance, and long-range guidance systems for missiles.
Murray: One thing that was noted from reviewing naval operations during the war is that the
possession of Bubiyan was crucial for any sort of expansion of Iraq's naval capabilities
into the Gulf.
Kabi: Bubiyan was one of the goals to which the leadership gave great attention.
Unfortunately, Kuwait was unwilling to provide us access to the island.
Murray: There are many reasons and explanations for why Saddam invaded Kuwait. Was
Bubiyan an important consideration?
Kabi: No, the main reason was the oil. Bubiyan was not one of the reasons for the [Persian
Gulf] war. After the Iran Iraq War, Iraq had severe economic problems. Oil prices were
low, somewhere between $7 and $10 per barrel. Oil prices kept dropping. This was the
main reason for the war.
Section 15: Shatt al-Arab - Attacks on Iranian Oil Terminals
Loss of Fao (1986) - Bombing of USS Stark - Recovery of Fao
(1988)
Woods: Let us continue with the broader outline.
Kabi: In the paper I sent you, I discussed the operations conducted along the Shatt al-Arab.
As you know, there was a 1975 agreement between the shah and Saddam, regarding that
165
The Sparviero class of guided-missile patrol boats is an Italian-manufactured hydrofoil capable of 46 knots,
originally in service in Italy and Japan.
170


Fao Peninsula. We sent two missile boats there and replaced them regularly. They
permanently disrupted the Iranian efforts to build the bridge.
Woods: You stationed two missile boats in front of the mouth of the Shatt al-Arab?
Kabi: Each one has four missiles. We could see the efforts to build a floating pontoon bridge
by radar. We destroyed the bridge as soon as they finished building it.
Woods: So this was a continuous operation? How long did it last?
Kabi: This continued for seven days.
Murray: Finally, the Iranians gave up?
Kabi: Yes. Because of this operation, they relied on dam bridges instead of pontoon bridges.
They sank pontoons and then built a fixed bridge on them.
Woods: They filled the channel? What happened to the water? Did this cause a flood?
Kabi: They left gaps in between the bridges so the water could get through. When the army
attacked and retook Fao in 1988, its troops attacked this bridge.
Woods: The description I had heard is that the Iranians took large sewer pipes and laid them
side by side so that water could go through the pipes, while they could drive across the top
of the pipes to cross the channel. That was a pretty smart solution to filling in the channel.
Kabi: The bridge was destroyed by the air force during the attack on Fao.
Woods: Did the navy use its rocket boats to provide fire support for the campaign?
Kabi: No, but we provided fire support during the first stages of the attack. When the enemy
invaded the area, there was no artillery on the peninsula, so the landing ships armed with
Katyusha rockets provided support.
Woods: Was the naval brigade you described as controlling this long front under the
command of the navy or was it attached to VII Corps?
Kabi: It was attached to the VII Corps.
Woods: The loss of Fao had a major impact on the navy. The Iranians could now control your
access to the channel.
Kabi: The width there is about seven kilometers.
Murray: Each sortie from Umm Qasr had to fight its way through a line of small boats with
RPGs and anti-tank missiles to get out.
175


Kabi: The method of targeting stayed the same; there were no major changes.
Woods: It probably flows from the nature of the mission. You had decided how to conduct
these operations earlier in the war, and they had been successful to that point. Given your
objective of disrupting Iranian shipping, you were being successful, so why change tactics.
Kabi: Of course.
Woods: Can you tell me about the planning for the operation to recover Fao in 1988? To what
extent was the navy involved in planning to re-capture the peninsula?
Kabi: The navy was not given a major role in the operation. It depended on the landing forces.
We only had two marine brigades at the time. The 440th and the 441st Marine Brigades
led the attack under the command of the Republican Guard, because the marines knew the
area better than the Republican Guard. General Abboud Kombar, my coastal defense
assistant, and General Muayid Abdul Gharfour, commanded these brigades.168
Murray: General Hamdani did not mention that the marine brigades were in the lead.
Kabi: General Aladdin Makki was here yesterday. I showed him my paper and asked his
opinion. Later he told me that he did not know of most of the things in it. He told me, ‘I
had no idea about this operation.' We attacked along Shatt al-Arab from two directions.
One was from the front and the other was from the southern part of Umm Qasr. Here we
launched approximately 200 frogmen from Umm Qasr. They swam up the Shatt al-Arab
and attacked enemy fortifications from the rear. This provided an excellent diversion
when the army attacked the fortification from the front. General Ma’ahir led one attack
while the Republican Guard led from the other direction.
Section 16: Intelligence Capabilities - Development of Navy
and Naval Operations · Significance of Iranian Operations
Saddam and Senior Leadership
Woods: Historically, communications in naval warfare are incredibly important. For example,
deciphering German communications was a major factor in the Allied success during the
‘Battle of the Atlantic' in the 1940s. To what extent did you have the capability to
decipher Iranian communications?
168
General Abboud Kombar is currently in command of the Baghdad Operations Center charged with military
security inside the capital city.
177


Kabi: Yes, we had listening equipment (signals intelligence) during the war.
Woods: Was that a capability resident in the navy?
Kabi: It was in the navy. Sometimes we received information from the army and the military
intelligence command.
Murray: Did this involve breaking Iranian codes?
Kabi: Yes.
Murray: Do you think this code breaking was helpful in terms of identifying Iranian ship
movements for air attacks?
Kabi: Yes, particularly in the Strait of Hormuz. When we felt there were abnormal
communications occurring in that area, our analysis suggested there was a convoy in the
area.
Woods: To what extent did the navy take advantage of non-Iraqi tactical advisors from other
countries? To what extent are you aware that the Iranians took advantage of advisors
from other countries?
Kabi: No advice was given to the navy during the war. Frankly speaking, I have no idea about
the Iranians.
Woods: There are rumors of Iranians getting naval advice from North Koreans. I do not know
if you came across that from intelligence or captured equipment. This has been written
about in journals and magazines since then.
Kabi: I have no idea.
Murray: We have identified what we call ‘analysis of traffic' which simply translated means
that more radio traffic means a convoy, while less radio traffic means no convoy. Did
you have direction finding stations to identify that?
Kabi: The radar would give you direction and distance. It gives you practically all of the
information that you need.
Murray: So you could identify where a convoy was and where it was moving via the radio
traffic?
Kabi: That was one of the indications. Although the detection improved between March and
September, the opposite is true the rest of the time. One time as I sat in the headquarters, I
thought Iran might have a convoy that moment in this area, because visibility was
178


Kabi: I cannot tell you because I am not sure what the situation in the navy is right now. No
one understands the current commander of the navy's ideas. He has difficulties
expressing himself and has problems with the minister of defense. But as you can see,
there are many lessons that one could learn from the war that could be useful for those
who intend to rebuild the navy.
Murray: In thinking about what the Iranians were doing in 1986 at Fao the general
explanation is that the Fao offensive was aimed at opening the door to Basra. It strikes
me that the real reason for the offensive could have been cut off the Iraqi Navy in Umm
Qasr and prevent further damaging operations.
Kabi: The aim of the Iranian operation was just a demonstration. The area around Fao is not
important except to the navy.
Murray: If it was more than a demonstration, its aim was to prevent the Iraqi Navy from
doing the damage it was doing.
Kabi: That was one of its major goals.
Murray: Nobody has mentioned that to us, nor have I read it. The Fao campaign is described
in terms of a land battle entirely. The land is all swamp and bad terrain with no strategic
value except for cutting the Iraqi Navy off.
Kabi: The other goal was to make the Persian Gulf countries afraid of Iran.
Murray: But in terms of straight military operational impact, the damage you were doing to
the Iranian economy from bases here had reached a significant level. Umm Qasr could
have been seen as a major objective, not just as an objective en route to control of Basra.
Woods: When the Iranians occupied Fao, what kind of systems did they emplace here to
affect the shipping channel?
Kabi: Conventional artillery, small boats with RPGs, and machine guns.
Woods: How densely did the Iranians populate the area with weapons systems? How many
boats would you have had to pass to get out of the channel?
Kabi: I have a point that is even more important than what you are mentioning. After the
Iranians invaded Fao, they tried to advance to Umm Qasr. As you know, there were no
troops in this area when the Iranians came except the 26th Division headquarters here.
There was a mix of troops with enough to form one brigade, no more. In the event that the
Iranians succeeded in reaching this point, they would have been on the east bank. I formed
180


a group that consisted of two battalions from the naval forces, commanded by General
Abboud and supported by landing ships with Katyusha launchers. He was the assistant
commander of coastal defenses. He stopped the enemy 30 kilometers away from the base.
If the enemy had reached there, they could have destroyed the naval base. This was 9
February
Murray: The offensive began on 8 February. The next day the navy set up a blocking
position on the western road out of the Fao Peninsula?
Kabi: People should ask why the enemy stopped and failed to advance farther up through this
area to Umm Qasr and Basra.
Murray: By this time, the 26th Division was smashed.
Woods: You said the 26th Division headquarters was forward on the Fao. You said they had a
small brigade. The unit you put together, the two battalions, what were they made of?
How many rocket boats?
Kabi: They were marines. Two landing ships took part and provided fire support to this
group. You asked me why we did not launch the full brigade or the two brigades into
this battle. The general of the armed forces sent the two brigades except for one battalion
up to the III Corps front.
Woods: So in one way the Iranian deception to make the Iraqi Army defend north of Basra
was effective, because it removed the two brigades of infantry meant to defend that
coastal road out of the Fao Peninsula.
Murray: It was shortsighted of ground commanders; given the damage you were doing to the
Iranian economy, to shift those two brigades from the peninsula.
Kabi: They were thinking that there was no threat to this area.
Woods: Do you remember anything about the particular types of operations done along that
road? Did the two battalions fit into a static line? What kind of fight did they encounter
when they got there?
Kabi: They established fortifications along the coast. We deployed the Silkworm launchers.
We established defensive barriers along the roads. A barrier was established here either
by the army or the navy for some other purpose. They used it as a fortification to prevent
the enemy from advancing.
Woods: Were you able to get air support from the air force for your defense?
181


Kabi: Yes.
Murray: But Iraq paid a heavy price for the fact that he was an amateur at the beginning.
Kabi: From a political point of view, I agree with you. Saddam should have tried to avoid this
war because it led to the destruction of Iraq. I cannot deny that Saddam was a dictator.
Iraq's fate was the consequence of his dictatorship, just like Hitler's and Mussolini's
impact on their countries. He was the only decision-maker. There were only three men
with whom Saddam discussed the attack on Kuwait: himself, Chemical Ali, and Hussein
The rest of his advisors had no idea about the attack.
Kamel. 170
170
Chemical Ali (Ali Hassan abd al-Majid al-Tikriti) was tried and found guilty of crimes against humanity for
his involvement in the use of chemical weapons against Kurdish insurgents and civilians in Iraqi Kurdistan.
183


.
Interview:
Major General 'Alwan Hassoun 'Alwan al-Abousi
Conducted by Kevin M. Woods, Williamson Murray, and Elizabeth A. Nathan
13 November 2009 · Cairo, Egypt
Former Major General ‘Alwan Hassoun “Alwan al-Abousil71
joined the Iraqi Air Force in 1963 and rose through the ranks. He
graduated with a BA in science aviation from the Egyptian Air
Force Academy in 1966. Subsequently, he received an MA in
military science from the Iraqi Staff College at Bakr University. His
foreign military training includes training in Egypt, India, Russia,
France, and Greece. During the Iran-Iraq War, he served as
commander of multiple squadrons, groups, and air bases. Late in the war, he became the
director and deputy commander of air force training. In the early 1990s, General Abousi
became the dean of the national defense for higher political and military studies, and later the
commander of air force administration.

Section 17: Personal Background - State of Iraqi Air Force
Readiness . Initial Air Strikes (Fall 1980) - Planning and Training
• Foreign Technology Saddam's Personality - Intelligence and
the Bombing of Osirak Reactor
Woods: Could you give a brief description of your position within the Iraqi military during
the war?
Abousi: Let me start with my time as a squadron commander. I flew a ground attack aircraft
between 1975 and 1978; I was a wing commander of Sukhoi-22s in Kirkuk between 1978
and 1981; I was a base commander in Kirkuk between 1981 and 1982.172 Between 1982
171
172
Referred to during the interview transcripts as Abousi.
The Sukhoi Su-22 was a Soviet-designed tandem two-seat cockpit combat-trainer, export version of the
Su17UM attack aircraft.
185


Murray: How many hours of flying time did you have?
Abousi: Approximately 3,000 hours as a fighter pilot.
Murray: Was the Iraqi military running a full staff college course during the war?
Abousi: Yes, they ran courses continuously.
Woods: How long were you at the National Defense College [at Bakr University]?
Abousi: I was at the National Defense College for three years between 1989 and 1993. I was a
student while I finished a course during the first year and then became the dean.
Murray: So you watched the 1991 war from the sidelines?
Abousi: No. The army, the minister of defense, Shanshal, and al-Khazraji do not know this.
Only General Ra'ad Hamdani knows what I am about to tell you. The air force was only
given 24 hours notice before the start of the invasion of Kuwait. The pilots were asleep
on the ground. At 0400, they were ordered, “This is the route; fly to Kuwait.' There were
a lot of accidents. We lost approximately 20 aircraft, as a result of pilots flying into high-
tension wires because they had not taken the QFE.176 Altimeters were not set for Kuwait.
It was tragic, but no one could say anything.
Woods: You were at the university until 1993, and then you became the administrative
commander for the air force?
Abousi: Yes, I was administrative commander for air force management from 1993 to 1994. I
transferred, because Uday had asked to be a student at the national defense college. Once
he joined the college, he wanted to be the dean of faculty and eventually the president of
the university. Because I was dean, I could not talk to him. I received the air force
appointment through a connection. So I re-joined the air force and worked as an
administrative assistant.
Woods: Did Uday ever finish the course?
Abousi: Uday finished three courses in one year-defense, staff, and national defense-
without attending a seminar or class. He kept giving orders and changing curriculum,
which I could not stand.
Woods: Then, you went back to training?
176
QFE refers to atmospheric pressure and altimeter settings.
187


Abousi: The equipment was hard on the pilot, like other World War II aircraft. When we flew
against the Iranians at the beginning of the war, we suffered from these problems. For
example, the maps we used for our sorties were necessarily large. But the cockpits of
Soviet fighters were small and space was limited, which made flying and navigating at
10-to-15 meters above the ground extremely difficult. Before the war, we needed to
establish a balance between the Iraqi and Iranian air forces, so we increased the tactical
training our pilots received. We did this in extreme secrecy. Mohammed Jissam al-
Jibouri was named the commander of the air force just before the start of the hostilities;
he was an excellent commander. Within the air force there were jokes made about the
fact that they were bringing a new commander who would train the air force in a new
way. None of pilots or the staff realized that this was in preparation for war with Iran.
Woods: When did al-Jibouri become the air force chief? What was he specifically working on
to change and why? What was motivating him?
Abousi: Al-Jibouri became air force chief in 1979. He was a British Hunter pilot and trained
in America. In addition, he was aggressive, courageous, and dedicated to the air force.
He attended training exercises regularly. On one occasion, he attended a training
exercise brief at Hurriya Air Base and got personally involved."79 He had lots of sessions
with the pilots. He had a good relationship with the airmen.
Murray: In 1980, Saddam brought in a series of incompetent Ba’athist officers to lead the
army. Did Saddam do the same thing with the air force?
Abousi: Not at all. The air force was mainly led by competent officers. Incompetent officers
were not allowed to join the air force. Besides, General Adnan Khairallah was in control
of the air force. We used to say that if Adnan had still been alive, Iraq would never have
invaded Kuwait. Saddam listened to Adnan, but not to anyone else. When Adnan was
killed, the army died too.
Woods: In 1979, what was Saddam's attitude toward the air force? Did he view it as a strong
element of the Iraqi military?
Abousi: Saddam had no knowledge of or experience with air matters. It was Adnan
Khairallah who came to the air force, flew our aircraft, and had a great relationship with
everyone.
179
Hurriya Air Base is located on the western edge of Kirkut. It is Iraq's major northern air force base and home
of the northern air defense sector command.
189


Woods: Was General Khairallah your patron?
Abousi: He was a good person and a friend. When I was commander of air force training, he
told me, “We want to do such and such a thing. Can you please help me?' I would
execute his request because of the relationship. He wanted to build up the air force. Our
loss was enormous when he died. The army was also killed. The people who led the
army, like Ali Hassan al-Majid and Hussein Kamel, knew nothing about the military,
because they were just politicians. They interfered in the army. Then Saddam Hussein
started to interfere.
Murray: Is it true that in 1980 Saddam said that any good Ba’athist could be a good soldier,
but he understood that a good Ba’athist could not necessarily become a good pilot?
Abousi: I have never heard of this. He used to say that good soldiers were good Ba’athists,
even if they were not Ba’athists.
Murray: Saddam's attitude in 1980 was that people like Tala al-Duri could be good division
commanders, because they were good Ba’athists.
Abousi: Tala al-Duri just talked; he never had any impact or influence on the army the way
Nizar al-Khazraji did.
Woods: Could you tell us the story of the initial air strikes in 1980? We have your write-up,
but I am fascinated by the planning. As you describe it, the initial mission was planned
and then delivered to the pilots as a training mission, but in fact turned out to be the
plans for war.
Abousi: Like I said, we intensified training in order to enhance the capabilities of the air force
to counter-balance the Iranian Air Force. As a wing commander, I could not tell whether
it was possible or not to carry out the strike and achieve success. Therefore, maybe 48
hours before the operation, I told my pilots that what turned out to be an attack on Iran
was a training mission that this was a part of an intense training program that we had
been on for months.
Woods: Forty-eight hours before the start of the war did you know this was a combat mission
or did you still think it was a training mission?
Abousi: As a formation commander, I actually did not know. I thought to myself this might
be real. But when nobody told us to stop, I knew it was the beginning of war. I was on
the runway with some other pilots. We usually ran taxi exercises—turn on power, roll to
190


a speed of 150, shut off engine, reduce RPMs, taxi back, and park. Nobody told us to
stop and return to our parking spot, and the aircraft were soon airborne. We were at war.
Murray: Most Western accounts say that Iranian aircraft were parked in the open. Your
earlier written account indicates that they were under shelters.
Abousi: I flew several sorties on 22 and 23 September. When we arrived over the Iranian
bases, I was looking for aircraft on the ground but could not find anything. Shahrokhi
Air Base is large with three runways and many shelters, but there were no aircraft! 180
Woods: Who did the detailed planning—flight plans, location of refueling, communication
plan—for the mission?
Abousi: Headquarters planned everything, but we suggested changes to parts of it, because
their plan would expose our aircraft to Iranian defenses. The original flight plan took the
planes over a large town with a lot of people and army personnel who could report our
air raid. We recommended a change that diverted the flight path.
Murray: Were any changes made between the time you received the plan on 21 September
and the morning of the mission on 22 September?
Abousi: We learned of the plan on the 20 September. An officer named Haldoun was the base
commander.
Woods: As a wing commander, were you made aware of the training plan on 20 September?
Abousi: The plan for the air force was sent to us on 20 September. They told us to choose the
pilots, but not tell them anything because the mission only involved training.
Woods: But you recommended changes to the plan not to fly over Iranian cities? Did they
implement your changes to the plan?
Abousi: I made my suggestion to a base commander. He sent someone to Baghdad to notify
the command of the changes. They approved it. The major difficulty we encountered
was that the bomb load of the aircraft was small—only 1,000 kilograms (approximately
2,500 pounds). This limited amount could not cover the entire target, so our results were
not sufficient to prevent the Iranians from striking back. On the first afternoon after our
strike, the Iranians attacked al-Sha’iba Air Base and al-Kut. However, they could not fly
missions after our second strike. Their engineering efforts were excellent. For instance,
they were already repairing the runway by the time our second strike began. The Iranians
180
The Shahrokhi Air Base is located just outside of the Iranian city of Hamsadan.
191


had completed repairing the runway by the time we launched our second strike on the
second day. They had a lot of aircraft prepped and ready for missions. I even hit one
aircraft myself on the runway.
Murray: Did Iran attack with F-4s?
Abousi: Iran attacked with F-4s and F-5s. The F-4s carried a two-and-a-half-ton payload.
Even the F-5s could carry more [ordnance) than the Sukhois. Iran has plans to develop
its own version of the F-5. They say they can build this aircraft, but it is an Iranian-
modified American-developed aircraft. We do not believe anything Iran says.
Woods: Did the tactical training that General al-Jibouri began in 1979 include precision strikes
against enemy airfields as a specific target? Did your crews practice hitting airfields?
Abousi: Yes, we were trained in striking runways, because our aircraft did not have electronic
equipment that could detect or deal with missiles. Our mission success relied on visually
identifying the target: a shelter, a runway, a taxiway, a tarmac. On the other hand, the
Mirages had an electronic targeting system, but we did not yet have them in the
squadrons. In the Sukhoi, the pilot flies the aircraft; in the Mirage, it is the other way
around. The pilot has nothing to do; it is all programmed and easy. We believed even the
Americans could not have executed the strikes the Mirages carried out.
Murray: One of our sources suggests that part of the Iraqi difficulties in the early days was
that Saddam was afraid of the air force participating in a coup, so he limited the low-
level training of Iraqi aircraft. You seem to be suggesting the opposite.
Abousi: At the beginning of 1979, when Saddam came to power, General Khairallah was
Saddam's advisor, and Saddam was not afraid of the air force. By the end of the war in
1989, Adnan Khairallah was dead and Saddam feared the air force. For example, when
Saddam attended an air force show, he was very careful about the pilots who carried out
the demonstration flying. The drop tanks were removed from the aircraft to prevent the
pilots from dropping them as a bomb.
Woods: By 1988, the Mirages were carrying heavy drop tanks on them. In September 1980,
did you have any special munitions for cratering runways, or were they just heavy iron
bombs?
Abousi: We used drag bombing, especially for runways. They were not rocket bombs. They
were regular bombs-called the Shah 500. However, the Iranians were good at repairing
runways. It was harder for us to repair runway damage greater than 30 meters across.
192


The American-made M84 could create craters greater than 50 meters wide by 10 meters
deep. 181 We had difficulty repairing the runways quickly enough for aircraft to take off
the next morning. The cement would not have set by that time.
Woods: Can you describe the morning of 23 September, when the Iranians struck your bases?
Abousi: The Iranians struck Baghdad and many other targets on 23 September. I was at
Hurriya Air Base in Kirkuk, but it was not struck that morning. Most bases were not
struck on 23 September; Iran targeted industrial installations. We expected the air force
headquarters in Baghdad to be struck, but by mistake the Iranian bombs hit another
location—a grain silo or a non-vital target.
Woods: Did their target selection seem random or did the Iranians have a plan?
Abousi: They had a plan. When we captured prisoners on the 23 September, they had plans to
strike all the Iraqi bases, but our strikes had surprised them and prevented their attack. If
it had not been for this surprise, they would have destroyed Iraq's air force.
Murray: It strikes me that the Iranian strikes focused on Iraqi's command and control system?
Abousi: If you mean the headquarters, then yes.
Murray: Were any of the squadron and wing headquarters struck as well?
Abousi: They intended to strike the command, but missed their targets and accidentally hit
other areas—mostly the Muthana Zayuna [district in Baghdad], where the officers lived. 182
Murray: In 1991, the United States struck the same targets as the Iranians with precision
weapons. Do you think the Iranians were following American doctrine in their target
selection?
Abousi: The American strikes in 1991 were accurate and had a major effect on us. We were
surprised that Saddam Hussein had not learned any lessons from the Iranian strikes [of
the 1980s] by 2003. He refused to accept our warnings; he called us cowards.
Murray: Our sense is that the Saddam in 1980 was different from the Saddam of 2000.
Abousi: In 1980, he was more reasonable; he listened to us when we met with him. Later he
acted on his own. In 1996, we did a study assessing approaches to counter the US Air
Force. General Ra’ad Hamdani was present when we presented our arguments. We
181
The Mark 84 is a general purpose, free-fall, 2,000-pound bomb capable of creating a crater 50 feet wide and
36 feet deep.
Muthana Zayuna is located in west central Baghdad on the east side of the Tigris River, south of Sadr city.
182
193


Abousi: We had to achieve an element of surprise to guarantee the success of our strikes. We
did not have any intelligence. We did not know anything about the Iranian air bases. We
merely identified the location of Iranian air bases on a map. Fortunately, they were
where we expected. Moreover, we did not know anything about the Iranian air defense
system. If it were not for the courage of the pilots and the training they had received, the
strikes would not have been successful. Formation commanders who had experience led
the wings. We had experience from the northern war with the Peshmerga in 1974–75
and with Israel in 1967 and 1973.185 On the morning of the strikes, one of my pilots,
Sa'ad Khamas, was crying. When I asked him why, he said, “Because you will not let
me fly.' I told him he was a novice and to wait.
Murray: In the fall of 1980, Saddam supposedly dispersed the air force to the airfields of
Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Abu Dhabi in the United Arab Emirates.
Abousi: No, that is not correct. Bandar-e Abbas Airport in Iran was far away. The 36th
Squadron was supposed to fly Tu-22s out of Oman, but the runway there was too short.
Because the Tu-22 requires a runway at least three kilometers long, we flew from
Habaniya. We struck the Tehran Airport and nearby oil installations. This was two or
three days before the start of the war. It was not supposed to be war, but a cooperation
and partnership building exercise between the Iraqi Air Force and Omani Air Force.
Woods: In a book published in the United States, there was a discussion that after the Iranian
counterstrikes in the fall of 1980, some Iraqi aircraft were dispersed to Jordan and Saudi
Arabia in order to preserve the Iraqi Air Force.
Abousi: Not at all.
Woods: They all stayed in Iraq?
Abousi: A MiG-25 did make an emergency landing in the Emirates, a Mirage landed in Saudi
Arabia, and Super-Frelon helicopters landed many times in Kuwait, but our aircraft were
never dispersed to other countries.
Woods: After the initial strike, the air force knew Iraq was at war. Was there mobilization
planning?
185
Though unsuccessful in quelling the insurgency, during the conflict with the Peshmerga (1974–75), 80
percent of Iraqi forces saw action. Iraqi troops also saw action when Iraq sent troops in support of Egypt and
Syria to fight in the Six-Day War (1967) and the Yom Kippur War (1973).
195


Abousi: The air force started to improve its level of performance throughout the first half of
1980. The close-air-support (CAS) was the main mission for the air force. Close air
support, interdiction, reconnaissance, air defense also became missions of the air force.
At the beginning, the army had many requests for CAS and as a result, we lost a number
of our aircraft, because the level of training in the Iraqi air defenses was bad. They shot
down 16 of our own aircraft. More often than not, they failed to recognize our aircraft.
Murray: Clearly Saddam must have been upset by the relative ease with which the Iranians
were able to slip F-5s and F-4s into Iraq and attack targets, but the Israeli raid at Osirak
in 1981 must have pointed out to him the inadequacies of the air defense system.186 We
have recordings in which Saddam is furious at the Israeli success.
Abousi: The air defense fighters were not very good, but it was also good timing on the part
of the Israelis. The Iraqi pilots were tired late in the afternoon, so they were allowed to
sleep in the evenings. The Israelis took advantage of this. The strike took place at
approximately 1900, just as our fighters were coming back from patrol missions. They
had no threat, and the Israeli aircraft carried out their strike on the reactor. Saddam was
extremely upset with the air force; the air defense commanders were blamed for their
negligence. After that, Saddam asked for security measures to be increased around the
reactor. For instance, the defenders of the reactor attached balloons on 300 meter long
cables around the reactor. High tension wires were placed around the balloons to knock
any attacking aircraft down. However, it was not an effective security measure. An
aircraft with a long range weapon could still target the reactor.
Woods: Who took the blame?
Abousi: The air defense deputy director of operations, Shakir Mahmoud, was the officer who
took the blame for this failure.
Murray: We understand that the other weakness in the defense of the Osirak Reactor was that
the ground air defense missile commander and his crew were on a supper break. This
suggests outstanding intelligence by the Israelis.
Abousi: The Israelis are known for their good intelligence. All of these weaknesses were
taken into account in their plan.
186
After Iran's pre-emptive strike on the Osirak nuclear reactor located in the al-Tuwaitha Nuclear Research
Center (18 kilometers southeast of Baghdad) in September 1980 failed to forestall Iraq's ability to develop
nuclear weapons, Israel bombed the nuclear reactor in June 1981. Abousi speculates that Israel's intelligence
capabilities must have been highly sophisticated because the attack occurred at the plant’s most vulnerable
time, when a personnel shift was taking place.
196


Woods: It represents the kind of intelligence you needed on the 22 September.
Abousi: The intelligence we had on Iran was extremely weak. That is why we relied on the
courage of our pilots. The Iranian air defenses were strong. Each air base was like a ball
of fire. We would lose one or two of our aircraft on every mission.
Woods: Can you describe the air support the Iraqi Air Force provided to the army? How did it
coordinate that support? How effective was it? You have said already that the
coordination for air defense was weak, but how did you receive your missions and
coordinate the targets?
Abousi: The air force command comprised of officers from the air bases who used to be wing
commanders or base commanders. We thought the close support missions were not that
important. Artillery could be used, for instance. We assigned these missions to army
aviation (helicopters). The requests or orders came from corps or division commanders,
who were not well-informed regarding the problems and the limitations of the air force.
One day in early 1981, Saddam realized that our air losses were disproportionately
higher than those of the Iranians. He stopped flights for approximately a month so the air
force could reorganize. From then on, all requests for air cover went through air force
command directly to the armed forces general command. The general command and the
air force commander then made the final decision on targets. Moreover, between late
1980 to mid-1981, the Soviets stopped supplying us. Beginning in July 1981, the French
started supplying Iraq with French aircraft.
Murray: So, from September 1980 to July 1981 the Soviets provided no supplies for your
aircraft?
Abousi: They provided no support. But after that, the Soviets supplied us with MiG-25s, and
we had the Mirage. I believe the first MiG-25 squadron was formed in August. The
Mirage squadron was formed in late 1981. The latter were Western aircraft, while our
doctrine was Eastern. The Western aircraft required equipment that we did not have.
Murray: They also required more training for pilots and more maintenance.
Abousi: Western aircraft require more sophisticated maintenance and a cleaner storage space
without dust, which we did not have. Soviet aircraft could survive the conditions
inherent on our bases. Therefore, it took time to prepare the Mirage squadrons. The
pilots attended three-to-four-month training courses in France starting in early 1981.
Murray: Did the pilots have a difficult time adjusting to the new aircraft?
197


Section 18: Long-range Strikes - Military Cooperation - Foreign
Technology - Chemical Weapons - Intelligence
Murray: In terms of the aggressive campaign of long-range raids carried out against Iranian
tanker and transport traffic around Kharg Island and in the north of the Gulf, how much
cooperation was there between the air force and the navy?
Abousi: Iraq wanted to put an end to the war as early as 28 September 1980. Saddam gave a
speech that night. We were ordered to stop all combat flights for three days. Iran took
advantage of this period and bombed all our bases. Saddam waited approximately 24
hours; then we resumed military operations. When Saddam realized that Iran had refused
to end the war, we focused on paralyzing the Iranian economy. Our most important
targets were the oil reserves and refineries. We controlled the air and sea. We targeted
aircraft carrying supplies and ammunition from Israel to Iran. We defined a zone in the
Persian Gulf area, where we targeted every Iranian ship. The navy's capabilities were
limited, so it made a lot of demands on the air force. When we could not keep up with
their demands, they accused us of refusing fulfill the mission. General al-Kabi, when he
was navy force commander, he and I had a feud, because he continued the same
demands as the navy forces.
Woods: This is a little like the story you told us about cooperation with the Iraqi Army.
Abousi: We stopped filling the requests, because they were always telling the high command
they had such great capabilities. They always said they had the same capability as the air
force as far as aircraft and could meet the demand. After that, we started planning for the
navy. The navy would alert us when an Iranian ship was approaching the range of our
aircraft. Iraqi intelligence intercepted the message traffic of international companies and
knew ship movements as tankers approached. Gulf countries also helped us regarding
ships along the Iranian coast. In the latter half of the war, the Americans also started
helping us. We used to inform them when we were launching strikes in the Gulf,
especially after the Stark was hit.188 They started being more careful and reporting their
position and coordinating with us to prevent a repeat of that incident.
188
According to most public accounts, the Stark was hit by an Exocet fired from an Iraqi F-1 Mirage. The fact
that Iraq had secretly modified a small transport aircraft, the French Falcon-50, to serve in an anti-shipping
role was no doubt a state secret and may explain why the pilot was never made available for interview to the
US Government team investigating the USS Stark incident. See also Frank Francona, Ally to Adversary: An
Eyewitness Account of Iraq's Fall from Grace (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1999), 35.
199


Woods: Prior to this, had the Iraqi Air Force ever considered anti-shipping missions? Had it
practiced, or thought about attacking ships in the Gulf?
Abousi: No, we had no training for this, so we began with significant losses.
Woods: What did your pilots think when you gave them their first missions?
Abousi: The missions were difficult because we were flying Soviet aircraft. The C5K Rocket
was not effective against ships. 189 After we acquired the Exocet missile, the situation
improved. We used to provide the pilots briefings in the middle of the night; they would
fly to operate out of Kuwait and return to base in the morning. Then, the Iranians started
using reflectors that countered the Exocet guidance system. They could not shoot the
Exocets down directly, but did direct a few missiles off their targets by chaff. In the end,
I do not think the Iranian economy was affected by the air force's targeting of their
shipping. The ships were not really targeted by the Exocet, although those handling the
Exocet missiles had good, detailed preparations. The Iranians had anti-Exocet reflectors.
They would not shoot the missiles down directly.
Murray: They were using chaff dispensers like the British did in the Falklands.
Woods: And they put reflectors on boats to give the Exocets mixed signals.
Abousi: Those near the ports and along the Iranian coast. The Mirage could go much farther.
We would locate and intercept ships at great distances. The only air defense the ships
had were F-14s. This affected air force operations.
Woods: Especially in the Strait of Hormuz.
Abousi: Exactly. F-14s were there in the Bushehr area [in Iran] because of the reactor. At the
beginning of war, there were no F-14s in the Bushehr area; they were protecting Tehran.
The anti-ship issue was such a complicated issue. We lost a lot of pilots, as I recall
approximately ten, in the Gulf.
Murray: Were you losing pilots to F-14s carrying Phoenix or Sidewinder missiles?
Abousi: We were losing pilots to Phoenix missiles, which had a range of approximately 70
kilometers, but their radar can reach out nearly 200 kilometers. Our radar had a range of
about 200 kilometers. The Mirage carried C-530 air-to-air missiles and could target F-
14s at a range of approximately 40 kilometers. 190
189
190
The C5K is a versatile Soviet-designed 57mm air-to-ground rocket.
The C-530 (Mantra) is a French-manufactured medium- to short-range air-to-air missile.
200


refueling, though we did not use it after the war. We also learned to modify the Ilyushin-
76 transport aircraft as a refueling aircraft for the Sukhoi-22.1
194
Murray: When did you begin doing air-to-air refueling of Mirage aircraft?
Abousi: From 1985–86 onwards.
Woods: During the missions to attack Larak Island, were the Mirages refueled off Saudi
Arabia and then Qatar, before the strike?
Abousi: They were refueled twice. Fourteen aircraft were involved in the operation: two were
electronic aircraft; six were the second-leg aircraft; the remaining six were the refueling
aircraft, and they returned to al-Sha’iba Airport afterwards. Somewhere off the coast of
Qatar, three of the attacking aircraft were then refueled; the refueling aircraft returned to
Saudi Arabia, while the other three aircraft attacked their targets.
Woods: How often did Iraq use air-to-air refueling during the course of operations?
Abousi: There were a hundred missions. There were many missions like this one. All of the
difficult refueling missions occurred near the end of the war.
Murray: How often were these kind of long-distance raids with Mirages done?
Abousi: Only once, approximately one month before the end of the war. It required numerous
aircraft and complex planning. All of these strikes required training over Lake Habaniya.
We rehearsed out in the western desert.
Murray: These kinds of raids were obviously designed to increase the pressure on the Iranians.
Abousi: Of course. They were intended to pressure Iran to end the war. Iran occupied much
of our territory late in the war. If we had not pressured them, they would have occupied
Kirkuk.
Woods: Can you tell us about chemical weapons and the Iraqi air force?
Abousi: No one in the air force ever used chemical weapons. Some people have said so, but
that is not correct."
194
195
The Ilyushin Il-76 (Candid) is a Soviet-designed multi-purpose, four-engine strategic airlifter introduced in
the mid-1970s. Originally designed as a commercial freighter, military versions include use as an airborne
refueling tanker.
Although General Abousi was adamant that he had no knowledge of Iraq's use of chemical weapons, the
Project 1946 research team has reviewed captured Iraqi documents that clearly indicate Iraqi Air Force
participation in chemical weapons attacks during the Iran-Iraq War. It is possible, although improbable, that
202


Woods: Well, in fact there is quite a lot of evidence that says the charge that Iraq used
chemical weapons was true. I can accept that you may have had no knowledge of it, but
we know the Iraqi Air Force had the capability.
Abousi: The artillery may have used chemical weapons, but I was in charge of the three main
bases, and we never used chemical weapons. We did use napalm. We dropped it from
Ilyushin aircraft making low-speed passes over a target. For an occupied country such as
Iraq, you have to take extreme measures. Iran used to push hundreds of thousands of
people to the front. They used human wave attacks. They did not care if their soldiers
got killed or not.
Woods: The Ilyushin-76 napalm mission is an interesting use of transport aircraft.
Abousi: We used napalm in Khorramshahr and Penjwin. The entire strip between Penjwin to
Halabjah was occupied by Iranians and Peshmerga.
Woods: How big were the napalm containers?
Abousi: The barrels held about 200L. We mixed the napalm material and attached a fuse to
the capsule. When the barrels were dropped, the fuse would go off spreading napalm
everywhere.
Woods: What did the Ilyushin pilots think about becoming bomber pilots?
Abousi: They were like many other soldiers; they followed their orders.
Woods: What altitude did they drop the napalm from?
Abousi: Approximately 6,000 meters.
Murray: I want to get back to the intelligence, particularly in 1982 and 1983. General Kabi
suggested that long-range naval radars from Fao were crucial to providing information
for air and naval strikes. I am interested particularly in cooperation between the navy and
air force. Was this naval radar information from Fao passed to you when convoys were
moving north to Bandar-e Abbas? According to the naval commander, the radars at Fao
could reach all the way to Kharg Island.
Abousi: Kharg is between 280 and 300 kilometers from Fao. Are you talking about the
ground radar?
Murray: Yes, long-range ground radar.
General Abousi had no knowledge of the use of chemical weapons in other parts of Iraq due to the
compartmentalization of such information within the Iraqi military.
203


Abousi: I do not know exactly. We had no cooperation in this regard. The navy asked the air
force to run constant sea patrols in order to provide them with information on shipping in
the Gulf. If they had such radar, why would they need aircraft to carry out
reconnaissance missions?
Section 19: Attitudes toward the Air Force · Air Defense
Systems - Bombing of USS Stark
Woods: Can you describe events as they unfolded after 1982? What was the opinion of Iraqi
senior leadership, including Saddam and the general command, with regard to the air
force? How did it change?
Abousi: Saddam and the command realized that the air force was achieving major successes.
Unlike the ground forces and the naval forces, we did not get any rest; we flew
constantly. Saddam changed his perception of the air force to be in line with the opinion
of the minister of defense, Adnan Khairallah. Adnan interacted with us directly. He
occasionally flew reconnaissance missions with us in the Sukhoi. Aadil Suleman was a
pilot who worked with General Khairallah at the headquarters. He was the best pilot in
the world. One day on our way to France, he asked the French to let him dogfight with
their best fighter pilots. He shot him down three times in simulated dogfights. The
French then removed their pilot from squadron operations, because he was unfit.
Suleman was always with General Khairallah. He always trusted him when they went
out. Three of Khairallah's sons were Mirage pilots. The oldest was killed in a plane
crash.
Woods: How about the Iraqi air defenses? What was their reputation over time, after 1982?
Abousi: Air defense depends on three things: fighter aircraft, ground-to-air rockets, and anti-
aircraft artillery, in that order. Air defenses improved in a number of ways during the
war. The only thing we lacked was a long-range detection capability. We were forced to
maintain and man observation posts. These posts possessed early warning equipment,
such as radar.
Woods: How many layers of observation did the air defense maintain?
Abousi: Generally two, but some areas had no detection. An important target would have a
small mobile radar that could detect targets up to 50 kilometers away. We only had
seven squadron fighters at the war's beginning; they flew MiG-21s and MiG-23s. The
!
204


air force had formed the Mirage and MiG-25 squadrons by the end of 1981. This gave
our air defense a longer reach. This really helped to improve our air defenses. The
organic field air defense inside the divisions and corps had limited weapons and SA-
6s.196 But at all times the main regional air defense system was superior and controlled
the field air defense. However, there was chaos at the beginning of the war; the regional
air defense was forced outside Iranian territory. When we improved command and
control, the air defense situation also improved.
Murray: What were your impressions of Saddam as a leader when you interacted with him
during the war?
Abousi: During the war, Saddam really loved and adored the air force. He awarded me three
Mercedes for my work as a base commander. I was photographed with Saddam in 1993,
right after the American retaliatory air strike on Baghdad; the US Force fired 40 cruise
missiles at the Iraqi intelligence headquarters after the assassination attempt on President
Bush. So they gathered all the commanders together and took pictures.
Woods: Can you describe your meetings with Saddam during the war?
Abousi: He loved the air force so much. He advocated 50 percent of the defense budget for
the air force; the rest was split between the army and the navy.
Murray: How receptive was Saddam to new ideas during this period?
Abousi: Saddam had no military ideas of his own. He learned much of what he knew from
Adnan Khairallah. Saddam was interested in how an aircraft flew, but felt as though the
air force did not accept him. Saddam would ask sadly, 'If they can accept Adnan, why
can't they accept me?'
Woods: There is considerable interest in the Stark incident. Describe, in your own words,
how that took place and what happened after the Stark was hit. Can you tell us anything
about the personalities and reactions of the leaders and the pilot?
Abousi: I was the commander of Habaniya Air Base at the time of the incident. The aircraft that
carried out that mission was not from our base; it was originally an Iranian aircraft that had
been modified after the pilot had fled in it from Iran. It was a French-built Falcon 50 and
196
The 2K12 “Kub” (SA-6) was a Soviet-designed mobile surface-to-air missile for low-to-medium level air
defense systems designed to protect ground forces.
205


mission. If both aircraft detected a radar signal that meant it was a false target because
the beam should separate; if only one of the aircraft received the radar signal, then it was
a real target, and they would attack using the X-28. When the Mirages arrived, we began
using the Bazaal.
Murray: Did you have much trouble transitioning pilots from the relatively simple Soviet
aircraft to the more complex electronics of the Mirage?
Abousi: All Sukhoi pilots were good pilots. However, the Mirage required more than just a
good pilot; the pilot needed to be more intelligent.
Murray: Did some of the pilots fail the transition?
Abousi: When they graduated from the flight school, the best pilots were assigned to fly the
Mirage. We reassigned all the Tu pilots to the bombers, because the original bomber
pilots were not good. At the beginning of the war, a bomber pilot was executed, refused
to fly a mission.
Woods: Did you have occasion to hear either through intelligence or through POW-
debriefings what kind of training the Iranian Air Force was receiving?
Abousi: Under the shah, Iranian Air Force training was excellent. The pilots attended training
sessions in Pakistan and the United States. We could see how good their air force was in
the early days of the war. They downed a reconnaissance aircraft on 13 September, just
before the war started.
Murray: What kind of Iraqi aircraft was shot down?
Abousi: They shot down a Sukhoi-22. After the fall of the shah, many of the experienced
Iranian pilots fled; only the novice pilots remained. We learned this from Iranian
prisoners during their interrogations. The Iranian Air Force was divided into two parts:
the main air force and the al-Haras al-Thawri al-Irani.203 The Iranian Air Force had the
same basic equipment as the Iraqi Air Force; we had the Sukhoi-24 and the Mirage AQ6,
while they had the Adnan-1 and Ilyushin-76.20
204
Woods: Were you aware of foreign trainers in Iran helping the Iranians during the war?
203
204
Al-Haras al-Thawri al-Iran is the official name for the Iranian Revolutionary Guard.
The Suhkoi Su-24 was a Soviet-designed all-weather interdiction and attack aircraft introduced in the mid-
1970s.
210


Abousi: I do not think so. Iran did not have good relations with the rest of the world before or
during the war. Only after the war did Soviet and Chinese pilots assist them.
Woods: I read a report that there was some concern that Iranian aircraft were operating from
Syrian airfields. Did that ever happen, or was that just a false report?
Abousi: That did not happen. Iraq had a good relationship with Syria. In fact, one time an
Iranian Phantom F-4 formation flew through Syrian airspace to strike al-Walid Air
Base.205 This was not Syria’s fault. When we asked Syria for clarification, there was no
indication that they had anything to do with this Iranian mission. On one occasion an
Iranian bomber aircraft entered our air space by flying under a civilian aircraft. It flew
with the civilian aircraft, refueled in the air, entered our border that way, bombed, and
then flew back via the same route. This was what was wrong with our air defense in
1982. Saddam blamed the air force and executed the commander of the 2nd Air Defense
Sector.
Murray: You mentioned that the Iraqi Air Force was intercepting and attempting to shoot
down transport aircraft from Israel to Iran. Did the air force actually shoot any such
aircraft down?
Abousi: Yes, we shot one Iranian C-130 down using a MiG-25.206 We destroyed four
transport aircraft flying to Turkey from Argentina. I do not know the type of the aircraft
though.
Woods: Were the Iraqi air force pilots captured by Iran repatriated?
Abousi: They were returned in batches, in 1989, 1990, and 1991. Not all of the pilots returned.
For example, Talal Jamil, who flew Sukhoi-22 aircraft, defected to Iran in 1982. He was a
coward and a poor pilot. He would get nervous and sweat when briefed on a mission.
Woods: The questions we have ask come from our limited understanding. Our questions may
not do service to the nature of your story. Could you tell us anything you think is
important that we have not asked about yet?
Abousi: The most important thing to note is that the air force developed in a way that was not
expected at the time. Western nations, especially Israel, started looking at us differently
206
205
Al-Walid Air Base is the main base in the H-3 base cluster. It is located 240 miles west and slightly to the
south of Baghdad in al-Anbar Province.
The Lockheed C-130 Hercules is a four-engine turboprop military transport aircraft designed for troop,
medical evacuation, and cargo transport and could utilize unprepared runways for takeoffs and landings.
211


Abousi: This was 25 January. Saddam had ordered the air force to attack the Saudi oil facility
at Ras Tanura. Two Mirages attempted to reach the refinery three times, but could not.
Every time they left base, the American aircraft would surround them. It was like God
telling us not to fight.
Murray: We discovered after the war that the combat air patrol (CAP) was being flown by F-
14s based in the Pacific. The Pacific carrier air wings (US Navy) did not work with the
US Air Force often. They did not have the call-sign and codes for getting the AWACS
transmissions.209 AWACS called them regarding the two Iraqi aircraft, but the CAP was
not listening to the transmission. The aircraft went right past the CAPs. A Saudi F-15
pilot, who heard the AWACS transmission, shot down the Iraqi aircraft.
Abousi: We thought the American aircraft were saying, “Why are you letting them fly? Shoot
them down when they are over the sea.' The Americans swarmed the airfield on the first
two days that we tried to launch. We felt like every time we tried to fly we were
swarmed. A successful take off on the third day was very surprising. We did not
understand why we were being allowed to do this when the earlier missions were
stopped.
Woods: When did al-Duri speak to the Iranians about this?
Abousi: Two days before the war. The pilots did not receive any assistance. The conditions
were so poor that many of them landed in the streets.
Woods: Were the pilots returned immediately or held until the end of the war?
Abousi: They were returned one week later, after the Iranians had interrogated them. We lost
approximately 10 aircraft in this mission. Some were hit by American aircraft, while
others crashed.
Murray: Initially, the American aircraft thought the Iraqi aircraft were heading south to
attack. The Americans were not prepared for when they turned east. It surprised them.
Abousi: In the ‘War of the Cities,' Iraq was patient.211 There was no part of Basra left un-hit;
it was badly destroyed. Most people living in Basra Province left the by 1982. Iraq was
209
210
AWACS is an airborne early warning and control system based on radar.
For a detailed explanation of this incident, see Marvin Pokrant, “Desert Storm at Sea: What the Navy Really
Did,” (Washington DC: The CNA Corporation, 1999), 48-51.
The “War of the Cities” refers generally to a period of tit-for-tat missile attacks on civilian targets between
Iran and Iraq using Scuds beginning in 1984. Iraq targeted multiple Iranian cities, Tehran in particular. In
retaliation, Iran targeted multiple Iraqi cities including Baghdad.
211
213


patient until the Iranians launched missiles at Baghdad in 1987. That is when Saddam
threatened them; we bombed all Iranian cities, big and small. The purpose of the air
assault was to indicate to the Iranians that war was not what the Iran's political
command would lead them to believe.
The Iranians and the Kurds, led by the traitor Jalal Talabani, occupied Halabja. The battles
started in January 1988 and continued until the entire region was occupied on 14 March
1988. We noticed unusual Iranian movements. They moved 70 percent of their troops in
the center and 60 percent of the troops in Fao north with the intention of occupying the oil-
field region of Kirkuk. The Iraqis and General Khairallah, in particular, devised a smart
deception operation; Adnan Khairallah appeared on television mobilizing the troops in
Kirkuk [while our troops mobilized around Fao).
Woods: What was the air force doing to assist in this deception operation?
Abousi: We withdrew small units from other sectors. Iran expected an attack on Halabja.
Even our own troops expected an attack on Halabja because we deceived them as well.
Iraqi command prohibited any movement near Fao. The Republican Guard was already
there. After Iraqi troops mobilized in the Halabja area, we attacked Fao on 17 April.
The air force prepared all of our air bases to use in the Fao campaign. The air force did not
lose one person in the Fao campaign. It was easy; the Iranian troops fled quickly. It was
hard for the Iranians to pull back their troops from Halabja. That was when the second,
third, and fourth Tawakal al-Allah operations began. There was excellent cooperation
between the air force and the army during these operations. The ground operations were
supported by the air force. Thousands of Iranians were killed on the Great Day as they
attempted to occupy Basra, thanks to our bombers. Saddam honored the pilots because he
was so pleased with their success. The only victory the bombers ever achieved was on the
Great Day in December 1987.
214


Appendix A: References
Al-Kabi, General Abid Mohammed, An Iraqi Naval Perspective on the Iran-Iraq War (Unpublished
Manuscript in Arabic).
Boyne, Sean. “Southwest Asia, inside Iraq's Security Network - Part Two,” Jane's Intelligence
Review 9, no. 8 (1997).
Cockburn, Andrew and Patrick Cockburn, Out of the Ashes: The Resurrection of Saddam Hussein
(New York: Harper Perennial, 1999), 155–56.
Cordesman, Anthony H., and Abraham R. Wagner. The Iran-Iraq War, Abraham R. Wagner, ed., Vol.
II, The Lessons of Modern War, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1990).
De Atkine, Norvell B., “Why Arabs Lose Wars,” Middle East Quarterly 6, no. 4 (1999).
Dodds, Joanna and Benjamin Wilson, “The Iran-Iraq War: Will without Means,” in Conflict and
Insurgency in the Contemporary Middle East, Barry Rubin, ed., (London: Routledge, 2009).
Fischer, Dean, “Inside Saddam's Brutal Regime,” Time (18 September 1995).
Francona, Frank, Ally to Adversary: An Eyewitness Account of Iraq's Fall from Grace (Annapolis:
Naval Institute Press, 1999).
Hamdani, Ra’ad, Before History Left Us (Arab Scientific Publishers, 2006).
Hart, Russel A., “Guderian: Panzer Pioneer or Myth Maker?” Dennis E. Showalter, ed., Military
Profiles, (Washington: Potomac Books, Inc., 2006).
Hilterman, Joost R., A Poisonous Affair: America, Iraq, and the Gassing of Halabja (New York:
Cambridge University Press, 2007).
Hiro, Dilip, The Longest War: The Iran-Iraq Military Conflict (London: Grafton, 1989).
HRW, Genocide in Iraq-The Anfal Campaign against the Kurds, Human Rights Watch,
http://www.hrw.orgreports/1993/iraqanfal/.
Karsh, Efraim, The Iran-Iraq War, 1980-1988, Essential Histories: War and Conflict in Modern Times
(New York: Rosen Publishing Group, 2009).
Knox, MacGregor, Mussolini Unleashed, Facist Italy's Last War (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1983).
Mackey, Sandra, The Reckoning, Iraq, and the Legacy of Saddam Hussein (New York: W.W. Norton
& Company, 2002).
Montgomery of Alamein, Field Marshal Bernard Law, The Memoirs of Field Marshal the Viscount
Montgomery of Alamein, K.G (New York: Collins, 1958).
O’Ballance, Edgar, The Gulf War: Nineteen Eighty to Nineteen Eighty-Seven (London: Brassey's
Defense Publishers, 1988).
Pelletier, Stephen, “A War Crime or an Act of War?” New York Times (21 January 2003).
Pokrant, Marvin, Desert Storm at Sea: What the Navy Really Did (Alexandria: Center for Naval
Analyses, 1999).
A-1


Pollack, Kenneth M., Arabs at War: Military Effectiveness, 1948-1991 (Lincoln: University of
Nebraska Press, 2002).
Post, Jerrold M. and Amatzia Baram, “Saddam Is Iraq: Iraq Is Saddam,” in Counterproliferation
Papers Series, 77, USAF Counterproliferation Center, 2002.
Shane, Scott and Tom Bowman, “No Such Agency - Part Four: Rigging the Machine,” Baltimore Sun
(4 December 1995).
Smelser, Ronald M. and Edward J. Davies, The Myth of the Eastern Front: The Nazi-Soviet War in
American Popular Culture (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007).
Soutor, Kevin, “To Stem the Red Tide: The German Report Series and Its Efforts on American
Defense Doctrine,” Journal of American Military History 57, no. 4 (1993).
Trahan, Jennifer, “A Critical Guide to the Iraqi High Tribunal's Anfal Judgment: Genocide against the
Kurds,” Michigan Journal of International Law 20, no. 2 (2009).
Welchman, Gordon, The Hut Six Story: Breaking the Enigma Codes (London: M.M. Baldwin, 1997).
Wette, Wolfram, The Wehrmacht: History, Myth, Reality Deborah Lucas Schneider, trans.,
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2006).
Wood, James A., “Captive Historians, Captivated Audience: The German Military History Program,
1945–1961,” Journal of Military History 69, no. 1 (2005).
Woods, Kevin M., The Mother of All Battles: Saddam Hussein's Strategic Plan for the Persian Gulf
War Official US Joint Forces Command Report, (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2008).
Woods, Kevin M. and James Lacey, Iraqi Perspectives Project-Saddam and Terrorism: Emerging
Insights from Captured Iraqi Documents (Alexandria: Institute for Defense Analyses, 2007).
Woods, Kevin M. and Mark E. Stout, “Research Note: New Sources for the Study of Iraqi Intelligence
During the Saddam Era,” Intelligence and National Security 25, no. 5 (2010).
Woods, Kevin M. and Mark E. Stout, “Saddam's Perceptions and Misperceptions: The Case of ‘Desert
Storm”,” Journal of Strategic Studies 33, no. 1 (2010).
Woods, Kevin M., James Lacey and Williamson Murray, “Saddam's Delusions: The View from the
Inside,” Foreign Affairs 85, no. 3 (2006).
Woods, Kevin M., Williamson Murray and Thomas Holaday, Saddam's War: An Iraqi Perspective of
the Iran-Iraq War, McNair Paper 70 (Washington: National Defense University Press, 2009).
Woods, Kevin M., David D. Palkki, Mark E. Stout, Jessica M. Huckabey and Elizabeth A. Nathan,
Survey of Saddam's Audio Files, 1978–2001: Toward an Understanding of Authoritative
Regimes (Alexandria: Institute for Defense Analyses, 2010).
Woods, Kevin M., Michael Pease, Mark E. Stout, Williamson Murray, and James G. Lacey, The Iraqi
Perspectives Report: Saddam's Senior Leadership on Operation Iraqi Freedom Official US
Joint Forces Command Report, (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2006).
A-2



Rüd-e
Kärün
Shushº
Rūdkhaneh-ye Dez
MAYSAN
Radkhaneh-ye Karkhen
Tigris
Shalan horramshahr
Map 2A. Southern Iraq. Iraqi offensives, 1980
Iraqi Offensives 1980
Andimeshk
At Tib
Dezfül
Dasht-e Lali
Shushtar
3:
Masjed-e
Soleyman
- Al Amarah
Bostan
Suwaylim
Al Mazlag
marsh
Hitwr Neizeh
marsh
Al Majar
al Kabir
Súsangerd
Busativer
Veys
Qal'at Şalih
Hoveyzeh
marsh
Ahvaz
Majnun
Islands Hawr al Hawizeh
marsh
Al Qurnah
Euphrates
Silk al Atiyah
lammar
Shatt al Arab
Shahban
al'at
qayt
Fish
Bandar-e
marsh
Shadegan
Mähshahr
Ar Rumaylah
Lake
land subject
to inundation
Bandar-e Emamo
At Tübah
Khomeyni
Az Zubayr
o Abadan
landect
Bamanship
todation
River
Khawr az Zubayr
Hawr
Khosowabad
Safwan
Al Jabjud
Al Ahwar
Markaz Hadud
30
al 'Abdali
Umm Qasi
Warbati
Al Faw
Ar
Abu Fulos
Rasa Bisra
Rawqatayn
agreed-upon
maritime boundary
Bubiyan
pon
Kärün
Al Başrah
Gud-e
BAŞRAH
Shall al Arab
Khair Abd Allah
Jazirat
Source: U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, “Iraq," Di Cartography Center/MPG 80295041 (C00519), 1-03.
B-3


1111
Rüd-e
Kärun
Apr 1983
Rüdkhaneh-ye Dez
MAYSAN
Audkhaneh-ye Karkhen
Tigris
Veys
Shalamches de
Map 2B. Southern Iraq. Extent of Iraqi advances, 1981-82; Iranian offensives;
Extent of Iranian advances during the war; Basra defenses 1982–87.
Extent of Iraqi Advance 1981-82
Iranian Offensives
Extent of Iranian Advance
Andimeshk
Defenses around Basra 1982-87
Deztül
Dasht-e Lali
Shush
Shushtar
3:
Masjed-e
Soleyman
Al 'Amarah
Bostan
Suwaylim
Al Mazlag.
marsh Hlwr al Hawizeh
marsh
Al Majarr
Fel 1984
al Kabir
Súsangerd
Busatin River
Qal'at Salih
Hoveyzen
marsh
Ahvaz
Feb-Mar 1984
Majnun
Islands Hawr al Hawizeh
marsh
Qurnah
Euphrates
Dik al Atiyah
Feb Mar 1984
lammar
Shatt Arab
Shahban
al'at
qayt
Fish
Shadegan
Bandar-e
marsh
Mähshahr
Ar Rumaylah
Lake
land subject
to inundation
Al Başrah
Khorrashshahr
Bandar-e Emamo
At Tübah
Khomeyni
Az Zubayr
Abádán
land subject
Bamanshi
to inundation
River
Khawr az Zuba Feb 286
Hwr
Şafwan Al Jabjud
VEKTIOSrowábad
Al hwar
Markaz Hadud
Umm Qası
30
al 'Abdali
Warbat
Al Faw
Ar
Abu Fulas
Ras- Bisra
RawÇatayn
agreed-upon
maritime boundary
Bübiyan

S
Kärun
BAŞRAH
Khawr 'Abd Allah
-
Jazirat
Source: U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, "Iraq," Di Cartography Center/MPG 802950A1 (C00519), 1-03.
B-4



Rüd-e
Karun
Rüdkhaneh-ye Dez
MAYSAN
Rudkhaneh-ye Karkhen
Tigris
Shalam horramshahr
Map 2C. Southern Iraq. Iraqi offensives, 1988.
Iraqi Offensives 1988
Andimeshk
At Tib
Dezfül
Dasht-e Lali
Shush
Shushtar
3
Masjed-e
Soleymän
Al 'Amarah
Bostan
Suwaylim
Al Mazlag.
marsh
HAwr al Hawazeh
marsh
Al Majar
al Kabir
Súsangerd
Busatin River
Qalat Şalih
Hoveyzeh
marsh
Ahväz
Majnun
Islands Hawr al Hawizeh
marsh
Al Qurnah
Euphrates
Silk al Atiyah
lammar
Shatt al Arab
Shahban
al'at
qayt
Fish
Bandar-e
Shadegan
marsh
Mähshahr
Ar Rumaylah
Lake
land subject
Al Başrah
10 Inundation
Bandar-e Emamo
At Tübah
Khomeyni
Az Zubayr
Abádan
land subject
Bamanshir
to ljundation
River
Khawr az Zubayr
Hawr
Şafwan A Jubjud
Khosrowabad
Al Ahwar
Markaz Hadud
30
Umm Gast
al 'Abdali
Warbat
Al Faw
Ar
Rawdatayn
agreed-upon
maritime boundary
Bubiyan
wa
shovers
Karun
id-e
BAŞRAH
Shatt al Arab
Abu Futos Rasa Bisra
Wur Abd Allah
Jazirat
Source: U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, "Iraq," Di Cartography Center/MPG 802950A1 (C00519), 1-03.
B-5


Iraqi Offensives 1980
Hama
Karim
Al Azim Dam
(Al-Adheem)
Qasre
Shirin
Pol-e Zahab
• Ad Dawr
Taq-e Bostan
Buhayrat
Shani
Khănaging
Kermānshah
На
Karand
Nahr al 'Uzaym
Jalula
Karwi
dam
Samarra
Buhayrat
Diyala
Diyala Dam
(Al Makarin)
Eslamabad-e
Gharb
As Sa'diyah
Tigris
Balad
Al Miqdadiyah
Naft Shahr
Al Khalis
Sumar
Mandali
Al Mansiriyah
Zagros Mountains
Ba'qubah
Qishlaq
DIYALA
llam
Dhu Shaykh
Source: U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, “Iraq," Di Cartography Center/MPG 80295041 (C00519), 1-03.
Al Jadidah
Kühdasht
Zayal
Nahr Diyala
Map 3A. Central Iraq. Iraqi offensives, 1980.

Алајн
Tursaq
Rudkhaneh-ye
Al Fallujah
marsh
Şimareh
BAGHDAD
Abu Ghurayb Baghdad
Population est
5,605,000
Ad Dawren
Ctesiphon
Vyah Dam
srah Canal
Salmap Pak
appák
Badrah
Mehran
Khan Azad
Af Mahmudiyah
Al 'Aziziyah
Al Iskandariyah
Buhayrat
ar Razzah
Al Haswah
Tigris
Al Musayyib
Rūdkhaneh-se/Meymeh
Hawrash
Shuwayah
WASIT
Dehloran
Saddat all
marsh
Karbala' Hindiyah
Hindiyah BABIL
Tigris
Shaykh
Sa'd
An Nu'maniyah
Barrado
Bazazah Dam
(Bahr al Milh)
Al Küt
Al Hindiyan
Babylon
Al Hillah
Al Madhatvah
Hasan as Sa'dun
"All al Gharbi
At Tibi
B-6


Hama
Karim
Iraqi Offensives 1988
Al Azim Dam
(Al-Adheem)
Ad Dawr
Buhayrat
Shall
Qasi-
Shirin
Pol-e Zahab
Jaq-e Bostan
Khănagin
Kermanshah
Ha
Karand
Nahr al "Uzaym
Jalula
Karwi
dam
Samarra
Buhayrat
Diyala
Dlyala Dam
(Al Makarin) 3
Eslamabad-e
Gharb
As Sa'diyah
Tigris
Balad
Al Migdadiyah
(Naft Shahr
Al Khaliş
Sumar
Mandali
Al Mansjriyah
Ba'qubah
Qishlag
Zagros Mountains
llam
Dhu Shaykh
Al Jadidah
Kühdasht
Source: U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, “Iraq,” Di Cartography Center/MPG 80295041 (C00519), 1-03.
Zayat
Nahr Diyala
DIYALA
Map 3C. Central Iraq. Iraqi offensives, 1988

ALATI
0
Tursa
Rudkhaneti-ye
Al Fallujah
marsh
Simaren
BAGHDAD
Abu Ghuray Baghdad
Population est
5,605,000
Ad Daleht
Ctesiphon
vyah Dam
rah Canal
Salmap Pak
apak
Badrah
Mehran
Khan Azad
Al Mahmudiyah
Al 'Aziziyah
Al Iskandariyah
Rūdkhaneh-se
Buhayrat
Var Razázah
Al Haswah
Tigris
Al Musayyib
WASIT
Hawrash
Shuwayjah
Dehloran
Karbala
Saddat al
Andiyah
marsh
Shaykh
Tigris
Sa'd
An Nu'maniyah
Ramada
Pazazah Dam
(Bahr al Miln)
BABIL
Babylon
Al Hillah
Al Madhalivah
Al Kut
Al Hindiyah
Hasan as Sa'dun
All al Gharbi
At Ti02
B-8



Map 4A. Northern Iraq. Iraqi offensives, 1980
Iraqi Offensives 1980
Naqadeho
Miandoāb
Zarrineh Rud
Mahābādo
Nandoz
Rāyāt
Haji Umran
Piran
Shahr
PBūkān
Cham-e Kalveh
Daryachen-y
Sadde
Zamine Rud
Qal'at
Dizah
Saqqezo
Sar Dasht
Koi Sanjaq
Buhayrat
Dokan
Baneh
Dokan Dam
(Dukan)
Dokan
Taqtaq
Little Zab
Mawat
Sürawa
Pēnjwin
Arūzãyr
As Sulaymaniyah
Marivan
Chamchamal
Kirkuk
Sayyid
Şadiq
Khurmal
AS SULAYMANIYAH
Daquq
Buhayrat
Darbandikhan
Darbandikhan Dam
Darbandikhan
Halabjah
Hewramar
Mtns
Påveh"
Ág şü
Tozkhurmato
Nahr Diyala
Kifri
Sangar
Source: U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, “Iraq," Di Cartography Center/MPG 80295041 (C00519), 1-03.
B-9


Map 4B. Northern Iraq. Extent of Iraqi advances, 1981–82; Iranian offensives;
[1
Extent of Iranian advances during the war
Extent of Iraqi Advance 1981-82
Iranian Offensives
Extent of Iranian Advance

Naqadeho
Miandoab
Zarrineh Rud
Mahābād
Nandoz
Räyát
Piran
Hāji Umran Shahr
July 1983
PBūkān
Cham-e Kalveh
Daryacher-
Sadd-e
Zarrineh Rud
Saqqezo
Qal'at
Dizah
Sar Dasht
Oct-Noy 1983
Buhayrat
Dokan
Koi Sanjaq
Paneh
Dokan Dam
(Dukan)
nakan
Taqtaq
Little Zal
Mawat
Feb-Mar 1986
Surawa
Phwin
Oct-Nov 1983
Arūzāyr
As Sulaymaniyah
Marivān
Chamchamal
Kirkuk
Sayyid
Sadiq
KNürmål
AS SULAYMANIYAH
Däquq
Buhayrat
Darbandikhan
Darbandikhan Dam
Darbandikhan
Halabjah
Hewramar
Mtns
Pāveh
Aq Şü
Tozkhurmato
Nahr Diyala
Kifri
Sangar
Source: U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, "Iraq," Di Cartography Center/MPG 80295041 (C00519), 1-03.
B-10


Ganaven
Kazeran
Kuwait
othark
Khark
Mina' 'Abd Allah
Iraq Shipping Exclusion Zone
Iran Shipping Exclusion Zone
Neutral Shipping Routes
Iranian Shipping Routes
Iraqi Attacks on Shipping
Iranian Attacks on Shipping
Fasa
Mina' Su'ad
Bushehr
S.
Firozabada
Jahrom
Ra's al Khafi
www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/middle_east.html.
Gahkom
Rud e Mand
Deyyer
Manifah
Ilydy
Abu All
í
Bandar
Abbas
Al
Jubayl
Map 5. Persian Gulf, Tanker War

Deshm Olarak
Persian
Bandar e Moqam
Lavan
Al Qatif
Ras Tanura
Hanidha
Guit
Source: Perry-Castaneda Library Map Collection, University of Texas at Austin. “Persian Gulf Region (Political) 1981,"
Dhahran
Ad Dammām
Al Khubar
Manama
al
BAHRAIN
Al Khuwayr
ROMAN
Strait of
Bandar-e
Hormuz
Lengeh
O
Tanbs
Abú
Ad Sha'm OMAN
Sirie
Musay Ra's al
admin. line
Khaymah
Umm al Qawayn
Hişi
Diba
Dubayy
Al Fujayrah
Mina' Jabal 'Alis
Hawar
SAUDI
Al Hufat
QATAR
Dukhan
Doha
Khurays
Das
Musay'id
ARABIA
in
dispute
Shina
Al Salwa
o Şir Bani
Abu Dhabi
Yas
Al 'Ayn
julaymaniyah
sin
8
Harad
WIRATES
B-11






Research
INSS
Records
Conflict
Center
NATIONAL
UNIVERSITY
patefacio et percipio
DEFENSE
INSTITUTE FOR NATIONAL
STRATEGIC STUDIES