3
curity Forces assumed primary security responsibility within Iraqi
cities, and the U.S. combat forces departed the last remaining cit-
ies.
The issue, therefore, is not whether we have won the war, but
whether we will win the peace in Iraq. With national elections set
for January, a referendum on the SOFA on the horizon, as well as
other significant unresolved political hurdles like the status of
Kirkuk, there are many unknowns that will determine the prospect
of enduring domestic peace in Iraq.
In parallel with Iraq's demanding political calendar, the Presi-
dent's February 2009 plan calls for a dramatic reduction to the
U.S. footprint in Iraq by August 2010. By next summer the Presi-
dent plans to decrease our troop strength by 60 percent, in addition
to closing bases and moving material out of the theater.
This leads to some basic questions. First, is it still safe to assume
that the Iraqi Security Forces will be able to assume security re-
sponsibility, and that electoral politics will not trigger sectarian vi-
olence? These are the assumptions underpinning the President's
plan. This plan arguably made sense in February. Does it still
make sense today? Many of us here have consistently held the posi-
tion that scheduling troop withdrawals in Iraq should be based on
the conditions on the ground. General, we would like to hear from
you on this subject. Do we have contingency plans in the event the
security situation demands revisiting the August 2010 timeline? I
am concerned we may be biting off more than we can chew in Iraq.
As we begin executing the President's redeployment plan, we
also need to keep an eye on the future. What do we want the U.S.-
Iraqi bilateral relationship to look like? This leads me to concerns
about the normalization of our relations with Iraq. After all, we
have invested in Iraq, we should be taking steps to ensure that we
pursue a robust security relationship with Baghdad. Our increase
in combat forces was not the only reason the surge was successful;
rather, Ambassador Crocker and General Petraeus knew how to le-
verage our presence to ensure Iraqi leadership made the right
choices. I am concerned that we may be retreating from this pos-
ture too quickly in an effort to normalize our relationship with
Iraq. We must remember this is an embryonic democracy,
As much as the situation in Iraq has improved, I think it is fair
to say the situation is far from normal. So as long as we have a
force presence in Iraq, our leadership should continue to improve
itself in Iraqi political-involve itself in Iraqi political affairs to en-
sure the right decisions are made. Robust engagement seems to be
the key to a redeployment plan.
Beyond the strategic and political military concerns, there are a
host of issues ranging from operational implementation of the advi-
sory and assist brigades to the enormous logistical challenges of
moving all of our equipment out of Iraq. Accomplishing this all in
such a narrow window of time is a Herculean task even if we did
not face what you rightly call drivers of instability.
I hope we can discuss these issues over the course of the hearing.
I look forward to a candid discussion on these important issues.
And again, thank you, General, for being here this morning.
I yield back.
The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman.


7
of Government of Iraq human intelligence and U.S. technical intel-
ligence. Outside the cities Iraqi Security Forces continue a com-
bination of independent, U.S.-enabled and U.S.-partnered full-spec-
trum operations.
In addition, we continue to see strides in Government of Iraq
counterterrorism operations. In May, we began national integrated
operations with Iraqi Special Operations Forces facilitated by an
Iraqi Operations Coordination Group, a standing Iraqi interagency
organization collocated with U.S. counterterrorism forces. Every
day we conduct jointly planned and executed counterterrorism op-
erations with increasing operational tempo (OPTEMPO) in results.
I believe that by 2011, the Government of Iraq will have a na-
tional counterterrorism force capable of dealing with a variety of
extremist threats. Just in the last week, we have jointly arrested
90 high-value individuals, including 52 al Qaeda in Iraq, 23 Shi'a
extremists, and 15 Sunni insurgents and ex-Baathists. Since 2006,
we have systematically decreased the number of foreign fighters
entering Iraq and significantly reduced al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) to
a small ideological core that recruits disenfranchised Iraqis and
criminals.
In the north AQI and some remnants of Sunni insurgent groups
continue in their attempt to reestablish a foothold with the objec-
tive of expanding back into Anbar and Baghdad. We are working
with Iraqi Security Forces to establish a defense in depth across
Iraq with Iraqi Security Forces in the cities and U.S. forces con-
ducting partner full-spectrum operations in the surrounding belts
and along the borders to deny extremists safe havens and reduce
the flow of foreign fighters and lethal aid into Iraq.
We believe the Iraqi Security Forces will develop the capacity to
conduct internal and basic external defense over the next 242 years
as we continue to draw down our forces. As most of you are aware,
the Sons of Iraq program succeeded in drawing many out of the in-
surgency, giving them the opportunity to serve in their commu-
nities and earn salaries to support their families. In April, the Gov-
ernment of Iraq assumed full responsibility for the Sons of Iraq
program. Over 23,000 former Sons of Iraq have transitioned to the
İraqi Security Forces and other nonsecurity employment since
2008, including over 5,500 in Baghdad over the last two months.
In October, 5,000 more will transition in Baghdad. Despite budget
cuts across the Government of Iraq, GOI has maintained funding
for this program, understanding its importance not only to security,
but also to building greater trust between the Sunni community
and the government. Sons of Iraq payments through the summer
are complete, and September pay is ongoing by the Government of
Iraq. The Government of Iraq's goal is to integrate all of the Sons
of Iraq into the ministries by the end of this year. I do not believe
they will meet this timeline, but I do believe they will continue to
execute the program in 2010 until it is complete. We will continue
to monitor the progress of this program very closely.
In January, Iraqi's Independent High Electoral Commission or-
chestrated successful provincial elections in which all Iraqi sects
and ethnicities participated and voted out also many of the incum-
bents since they failed to deliver tangible results and rejected those
who were overtly supportive by Iran. The United Nations Assist-


8
ance Mission in Iraq (UNAMI) and international observers deem
these elections credible and legitimate, and the seating of the pro-
vincial government happened peacefully,
In July, Iraqis experienced another milestone with the Kurdistan
regional government (KRG) elections, with over 78 percent voter
turnout of the approximately 2.5 million eligible voters in the
Kurdistan region. Kurds voted in their first direct and open elec-
tion for the KRG President. President Masoud Barzani was elected
with 70 percent of the votes. Voters also signaled a desire for
change with the success of the Change List, which won 21 percent
of the KRG Parliament, a moderate loss to the Kurdistan Alliance.
On 20 August, 2009, the KRG Parliament and President were
peacefully seated.
Although security is improving, it is not yet enduring. There still
remain underlying, unresolved sources of potential conflict. I call
these drivers of instability. From the beginning security in Iraq has
been a complex problem that has required nuanced, evolving ap-
proaches, and our strategy has reflected this. In this environment,
we cannot focus on immediate and traditional security threats
alone, especially as the United States continues to assist Iraq in re-
building the foundations of the security, civil, political, and eco-
nomic institutions.
We continue to assist the Government of Iraq in addressing and
finding ways to mitigate these root causes of instability. Current
drivers of instability include communal and factional struggles for
power and resources, insufficient Government of Iraq capacity, vio-
lent extremist groups, and interference from external state and
nonstate actors.
Iraq is a nascent democracy emerging from 30 years of authori-
tarian rule based on ethnosectarian privilege. Its future as a stable
multiethnic representative state rests upon its ability to deal with
a myriad of these challenges, and some of these issues will take
time to resolve.
The national elections in January of 2010 are critical to deter-
mining the path that Iraq will take into the future. The rules of
the game are being debated in the Council of Representatives
today. Having just returned yesterday from the Eid holiday, they
have a condensed timeline to pass an election law and many issues
to discuss, including Kirkuk, open versus closed lists, and a single
versus multiple district election. There is a potential to build a
competent, capable representative government, but there is also
the potential to exacerbate societal divisions by appointing people
based on their affiliations rather than their abilities.
Even as the Iraqi political system continues to mature, there is
not yet consensus on the exact nature of Iraq's representative gov-
ernment, one that is accepted across ethnic, sectarian, and regional
lines. Issues include the role and power of the central Iraqi Govern-
ment vis-à-vis the provinces, the integration and balance of ethnic
and sectarian groups within the government, revenue sharing, and
long-standing Arab-Kurd issues.
Iraqi Government institutions continue to evolve, and their abil-
ity to provide essential services is improving, yet it will take time
to develop the institutional process and bureaucratic expertise nec-
essary to sustain
programs over
time. Also, decades of


12
our military has been greatly stressed over the past several years,
and we potentially face increased demand for troops in Afghani-
stan. So what are the risks in speeding up the redeployment of
troops from Iraq?
General ODIERNO. Again, as we continue to look at the competing
demands—first, my responsibility, as you stated, Mr. Chairman, is
to present to my chain of command what the risks are inside of
Iraq as we draw down our forces. And as I stated, the important
part is that we do not want to lose the security progress that has
been made. The physical and psychological presence of U.S. forces
help significantly as Iraq continues to move forward. So what we
don't want to do is we don't want to see what I mention as the
drivers of instability cause a reduction in the confidence of the
Iraqi people in moving forward with developing their nascent de-
mocracy. So we have to ensure that we don't take enough risk
where ethnosectarian violence is able to continue, for example, over
Arab-Kurd tensions, or that we don't allow al Qaeda and some of
the outside external influences by Iran and others to cause violence
inside of Iraq that will cause the Iraqi political system to fall.
So those are the risks. The plan we have I believe allows us to
withdraw deliberately and maintain what I believe is an appro-
priate level of security that the Iraqi Security Forces ultimately
can sustain and continue to improve.
That said, we work very carefully—I work very carefully with
General Petraeus in order to identify any capabilities that we have
and no longer need that can be used in Afghanistan. We have done
that over the last several months, and we will continue to do that.
We will not require—within our plan I have flexibility to speed up
if I think the situation on the ground allows it or to slow down, and
I will continue to make those judgments as we move forward.
As I announced, we will probably be down to about 120,000
strength by the end of October. That is a bit faster than we origi-
nally planned, and that is based on the improvement that we have
seen out in Anbar Province where we have now replaced two bri-
gades with one brigade out in Anbar. And so we are able to make
those decisions as we see progress on the ground, and we will con-
tinue to do that. So what I have to do is delicately do this without
losing the gains we have made, while understanding I cannot have
forces there that are not being used efficiently.
The CHAIRMAN. General, the country of Iran has been in the
news a great deal lately. What influence does that country have on
your efforts in Iraq?
General ODIERNO. Well, obviously, as a neighbor Iran-all neigh-
boring countries have influences inside of Iraq. What we want over-
all obviously is an Iran that wants to have positive influence inside
of Iraq. Unfortunately we still see some malign intent with Iran as
we continue to see training conducted in Iran of Iranian surrogates
that now then come back into Iraq. We still continue to uncover
large caches of rockets, rails to shoot rockets, and some explosively
formed projectiles that are made in Iran. We continue to see the
potential interference in the political process inside of Iraq. So
those obviously are concerns.
The good part about this is that the Iraqi Security Forces are un-
covering many of these elements in southern Iraq. They have con-


21
Iraq with the security force capable of defending the Iraqi people
and protecting the Government of Iraq institutions."
Obviously, that is the long-term goal that we all want, very, very
cogent remarks. What in the final analysis is your biggest concern
with achieving this goal? What can we do to make sure that hap-
pens? What can the Congress do? I think you have carried Con-
gress on your back this whole time. So I just want to make sure
you can give us some perspective.
General ODIERNO. I would just say is that it is about strategic
patience, and even after we leave in 2011, we can't just say, okay,
Iraq is finished. We are going to need some additional supp be-
tween now and 2011 to help build some of the capacities. We will
identify what we need to you.
We will also need to continue to support them in some way be-
yond 2011, not by having troops in Iraq but by helping them to
continue to develop their institutions, and we can have an influ-
ence on that.
So we have to make sure that we allow them to do that, and we
keep that in mind as we move forward. Ultimately, I believe that
will contribute to our own security and stability in the region.
Mr. FRANKS. Well, thank you, General. My time is gone, but I
thank you again for your commitment to human freedom. My two
little babies I think will live in a brighter place in life because of
people like you, and I appreciate it.
The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman.
The gentlelady from California, Mrs. Davis.
Mrs. Davis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, General, Mr. Secretary, for being here and for your
outstanding work. I know, General, you certainly are being credited
for helping to turn this situation around, and we appreciate that.
I wanted to ask you, the Wall Street Journal reported yesterday
that the Iraqis are having difficulty with their budget crunch and
oil prices decreasing and purchasing equipment that they had al-
ready requested from the U.S. Government, and there are a num-
ber of issues combined with that. How difficult and how high a pri-
ority is it for us to get this straight, and are there policies that we
in fact should be looking at right now that would allow them to
purchase more of those in advance?
General ODIERNO. I think it is very important. We have been
working this for quite some time.
First, the Iraqi budget, I know because of the price of oil, their
budget has decreased quite significantly. Their combined Ministry
of Defense-Ministry of the Interior (MOD-MOI) budget is about
$10 billion a year. About 85 percent of that is fixed, non-discre-
tionary, and it has to do mainly with salaries and other things. So
that leaves a very small piece left to invest in modernization. They
have already purchased several things such as patrol boats and
many other Army and some Air Force equipment that they have
to still pay for. So almost all of their even discretionary income is
taken up.
So what I want to be able to do is assist them in some small
ways by using stay-behind equipment, potentially leaving for them,
as well as improving their ability to not have to pay all costs up


22
front for foreign military sales (FMS), where they can spread it
over a longer time period.
Mrs. DAVIS. As I understand it, they don't meet a number of the
criteria that we have.
General ODIERNO. That is exactly right. The International Mone-
tary Fund (IMF) bank has to certify them. And, of course, they are
trying to get through that certification by having enough reserves
so they get certified. So it is a very complex problem, and we have
things competing against each other. So we are trying to come up
with many different ways to help them to get the equipment we
think is necessary for them to have a foundational capability by
2011.
Part of that might be is we might have to—what we believe is
there is, in fiscal year ’10 and ’11, we think we have a requirement
of about $3.5 billion that we need to help them in order to finish
getting the foundational capacity that they need in order to be able
to have security by 2011. Then we will have to continue some sort
of a foreign military financing (FMF) program through the State
Department after 2011. If we are able to do that, that will allow
them to slowly build up and have the security capability necessary
to protect themselves.
Mrs. Davis. Thank you. I appreciate that.
One of the things that must be frustrating is that violence does
continue to flare from time to time. I noticed that one of the high-
ranking Iraqi Army generals was recently killed as well. I
guess
that was reported yesterday.
What effect does that have in terms of the government, the
army? Or have we gotten so numb to that now in a sense that it
doesn't have the kind of impact?
General ODIERNO. I think for the Iraqis—first of all, it was a bri-
gade commander that was killed yesterday up in Mosul. No, it does
have an impact. The Iraqi Security Forces, like our forces, under-
stand what their duty is and what their mission is, and they are
very dedicated to providing security to their people. And I have
seen many acts of bravery by Iraqi leaders and their soldiers, and
in a lot of ways they are no different from our soldiers when it
comes to that.
So they see that as their mission, and they are trying to root out
these last remnants of al Qaeda and other insurgents in some of
these very difficult areas.
The sad part, Congresswoman, is that we continue to see these
attacks against innocent civilians. They absolutely mean nothing to
the outcome, and all it does is kill innocent people. It is frustrating
to us, and it is frustrating to the Iraqis. That is what we are trying
to stop inside of Iraq now, these mass bombings that occur. Al-
though much less frequently than before, they still occur and kill
many innocent people. Those are the kinds of incidents we are try-
ing to stop.
Mrs. DAVIS. Are our civilians able to move freely, go down and
have a cup of tea, to engage in an informal fashion yet at this
point?
General ODIERNO. They can, in order to meet with Iraqi officials.
I would say you can, but it is still a little bit difficult to move free-
ly. They are targets, is part of the problem.


23
The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentlelady.
The gentleman from Texas, Mr. Conaway.
Mr. CONAWAY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General, thank you for being here this morning, and Secretary
Vickers, thank you. I will have a question in a second.
General, the hash marks on your right sleeve I think indicate de-
ployments away from family and the comforts of this country. I
can't count them from here. But as a representative of all the men
and women sitting behind you who have earned those stripes and,
more importantly, their families who endured during those deploy-
ments, thank you very much. We sincerely appreciate your great
service to this country. Please pass that on from us to the folks
who you lead. I know you are very proud to lead them.
Following up a little bit on what Susan just asked, the Depart-
ment of Defense has asked for $750 million of legislative authority
to give equipment to the Iraqis. Much of that will be excess equip-
ment that it might be cheaper to leave it than bring it home. And
this may be a better question for the Secretary. Much of it is going
to be non-excess equipment, equipment that we may need or do
need, judge that we need in other places. How do we reimburse the
services that give that equipment up? How do they replace it? Is
that going to be a supplemental? Where do we find the money to
replace that equipment that otherwise would be needed for some
of the other forces?
General ODIERNO. I will let the Secretary answer that.
Mr. CONAWAY. He has been very quiet all morning.
General ODIERNO. I will say just one thing. We divide it into sev-
eral groups. There is excess equipment that is truly excess to all
of our requirements, so that is not required. But there is some
equipment that might not be completely excess but what we have
determined is it actually costs us more money to send it back than
it would to leave it there. So that is the decision process we go
through on this equipment.
Now, in terms of the authority and reimbursing, I leave that to
the Secretary
Mr. VICKERS. Our J-4, our logistics director to the Joint Staff, is
leading a process right now looking at this issue with the services
about, as General Odierno said, what amount of the inventory is
excess that we could leave in Iraq, what costs too much to bring
back, how we reimburse the services, but also what we would ship
elsewhere, for example, for other needs, and that process is still
under way.
Mr. CONAWAY. Sure. I understand that. But how do we get the
services reimbursed for that equipment that is considered non-es-
sential? I have great confidence in your ability to decide which is
which and to figure out it costs more to ship it home. But how do
repay? Is it going to be a supplemental, an additional budget re-
quest? Where are you guys coming up for the money for the serv-
ices? Out of hide, or what are you going to do?
Mr. VICKERS. I think that is being worked in the 2011 budget
process, sir, is my understanding; and it will be resolved before
then. But I am sorry I don't have a better answer for you right
now.


25
General, when you and I had the opportunity to meet when I was
there to visit in Iraq over the Memorial Day recess, it was just
prior to the beginning of the drawdown of troops; and the par-
ticular area that you still had concern about was in Mosul in par-
ticular, the presence there still of al Qaeda in Iraq. Can you give
me an update on the current situation there, the strength of insur-
gent forces there, and what you have seen as we have started to
withdraw?
Also, on a broader sense, as we get closer to 2011 and once we
have completed withdrawal of all of our forces, can you give us an
assessment of what the intelligence sources suggest, what does
your personal assessment conclude, is the strength of those that
might be waiting for us to leave and their ability to carry out at-
tacks to undo everything that we have achieved to this point?
General ODIERNO. Thank you, Congressman.
First, with Mosul, Mosul continues to be probably the most dif-
ficult area. Nineveh Province, Mosul is part of Nineveh Province,
is probably still the most difficult area. However, we are still mak-
ing progress. Incidents have come down a little bit.
What we have been able to do is, with the Iraqi Security Forces
taking responsibility inside of the cities, that has allowed us to
move outside in the belts around Mosul and also move towards the
border with Syria, which has made it much more difficult for for-
eign fighters and other groups to transit. So I think, because of
that, we are starting to see a reduction in some of the capacity up
there.
But the current concern goes back to their attempt to exploit
some of the political fissures, Arab-Kurd tensions being one of
them, in Nineveh Province, where you have some of the groups
such as al Qaeda trying to ignite some sort of conflict between
Arabs and Kurds and potentially some Shi’a minority groups and
Kurdish minority groups.
Mr. LANGEVIN. Is al Qaeda still the main problem?
General ODIERNO. It is. Again, its capabilities are degraded, but
they are still a bit resilient, and they are still able to conduct oper-
ations. We have been able to cut into their finance network a bit,
but they are like a Mafia organization. They extort money from
many small businesses in order to fund their operations. We realize
that, and we are going after that, working with the Iraqis. We be-
lieve if we can really go after their funding it will significantly
limit what they can do.
Mr. LANGEVIN. On the broader question of those who would be
waiting for us to leave and the assessment of their strengths and
ability?
General ODIERNO. Yes. I think the important part is if we can
get the Iraqi Security Forces, as I stated earlier, to a level, they
are on the right track. If we continue to progress over the next two-
and-a-half years, if we continue to fund some of the things they
need, I believe that they will be ready and they will be able to han-
dle the groups that are remaining.
The development of the Iraqi special operations forces and their
ability to do counterterrorism operations improves every day. The
improvement of the conventional forces to do counterinsurgency op-
erations is getting better. Police primacy is probably the one area


31
So it is important that they start to develop an atmosphere
where businesses—there is lots of opportunity in Iraq for invest-
ment, but it is about does it have the environment for investors to
go in. That is what we have to continue to help them to focus on.
I think I also believe getting a new government in will help. I
think you will see the Iraqi Government continue to mature. I
think the next government will be more mature than the last gov-
ernment. They will understand the process more, they will under-
stand their roles, and I think that will help them to also work some
of these key issues that have to be worked in order to diversify the
economy.
Mr. SHUSTER. When you are in the economy diversifying it, edu-
cation has got to play a key role, as well as building a representa-
tive democracy. What has been happening as far the education?
Have you been building that up?
General ODIERNO. First of all, a week ago, they reported that 6.6
million children will go to school in Iraq. Their school year will
start here at the end of September, the beginning of October. That
is the highest number that they have had in a very, very long time,
in fact, maybe the highest number on record. I know the highest
number since 2003, and I think it is actually the highest number
even before that. So that is a positive sign, that they will have 6.6
million children that will go to school.
Their universities are now developing relationships with U.S.
universities. We know that some of the land grant universities
around the U.S. have visited and are conducting regular engage-
ments with them and exchanges.
The Government of Iraq also approved $4.5 million in grants for
Iraqi students, Fulbright scholarships for Iraqi students to study
around the world, mostly in the United States and Western Eu-
rope. So I think these are all positive steps that are starting to be
taken that will allow them to continue to educate their population.
The Iraqis have always been a fairly educated population, but
there has been some problem with that based on what has hap-
pened here in the aftermath of 2003. But we see that starting to
regenerate itself, and we are encouraged, but there is still quite a
bit of work to do.
In the Strategic Framework Agreement, this is one of the strong
parts of this agreement, is the education piece.
Mr. SHUSTER. Thank you very much.
The CHAIRMAN (presiding]. I thank the gentleman.
The gentleman from Pennsylvania, Mr. Sestak.
Mr. ŠESTAK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, General.
General, I just have two questions. One is just a tactical issue.
You have mentioned that we have withdrawn 150,000 pieces of
equipment already from Iraq. GAO says there is 31 million pieces
of equipment in Iraq. Do you really believe that we can be totally
out of there by the end of 2011, in view of that number and all the
other numbers attendant to that? And do you plan per the Army
requirements to close up the bases even with the environmental re-
quirements?
As you know, in Korea, they have been closing them up, but they
put a stop to them because they haven't followed the correct proce-
dures, nor have we funded for it.


37
The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman from Arkansas.
The gentleman from Missouri, Mr. Taylor.
Mr. TAYLOR. General, like everyone else in this room, on behalf
of the people in south Mississippi, we are very grateful for what
you have done and continue to do over there in the many years of
your life that you have devoted to this effort in Iraq.
I have always been impressed by the brilliance of whoever dis-
covered the Sons of Iraq policy, and literally found out that for a
fairly small amount of money, we can take people who were shoot-
ing at us to become our defenders. Since that has been such a suc-
cessful program, you did touch on it for about a paragraph in your
testimony, what steps are being taken to see to it that those people
who are now on our side remain on the side of the Government of
Iraq? Do they recognize the significance of what has happened?
What steps are they taking to work those people, to either keep
them on the payroll in their present capacity or find some other job
within the Iraqi Government for them?
General ODIERNO. Thank you, Congressman. The Government of
Iraq does understand the importance they play. It is very inter-
esting. They have a plan in place to move all of them—they actu-
ally showed us a list of all the names of the Sons of Iraq. And they
showed us the list, that some will go to this ministry, some will go
to this ministry, some will go to the local governmental ministry.
And they laid it all out and said, we are going to begin to execute
this, and they started to execute that in August. So that is a posi-
tive sign.
But what is interesting is after the bombings on 19 August in
Baghdad, the Commander of the Baghdad Operational Command
came back and said, I want to slow down the movement of the Sons
of Iraq into the other nonsecurity ministries, I want to keep them
on longer because of what they do for us in order to help us in the
security. So they made a decision to keep them on a bit longer. I
think that shows first the recognition of the senior commanders of
how important the Sons of Iraq are to the security, and, secondly,
that they, I believe, will transition them and take care of them. In
2009, when they had all the budget cuts, the only line that was not
cut was the Sons of Iraq, and they continue to have that fully fund-
ed. So I think those are all positive signs.
What I have to make sure happens is since they will not get
them all transitioned to the ministries by the end of 2009, we have
to make sure that that will be taken care of in 2010. And we will
work very hard with the Reconciliation Committee of the Govern-
ment of Iraq in order to do that.
Mr. TAYLOR. I didn't see it in your prepared remarks, but obvi-
ously one sign of things getting back to normal would be electricity
to the average Iraqi. And I know-have we gotten to the point
where we have reached or they have reached prewar levels of elec-
tricity to the average citizen?
General ODIERNO. Actually they are above the prewar levels.
They are producing I think it is an average of 155,000 megawatts.
What that means basically is about a 20 percent increase from last
year. And even more importantly is they have less units now going
off line. So what they are able to do is maintain a more stable grid.


A P P E N D I X
SEPTEMBER 30, 2009


General Odierno's HASC Testimony, 30 September
as of 29 Sep
Chairman Skelton, Congressmen McKeon, and distinguished members of the committee,
thank you for providing me the opportunity to appear before you today to provide my
assessment of the current situation, the challenges in Iraq and how our strategy is
adapting in order to achieve the President's vision.
It is a great honor to command Multi-National Forces-Iraq. Having now spent a significant
amount of time in Iraq, I remain encouraged by the steady and deliberate progress that
has been made particularly over the past two-and-a-half years. Operation Iraqi Freedom,
now in its sixth consecutive year, has been a complex and challenging mission in a
continuously evolving environment. But, the one thing that remains constant is the
demonstrated courage, compassion, and commitment of our Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen,
Marines, Coast Guardsmen and Civilians who continue to selflessly serve. I am humbled
by the opportunity to serve with and priviledged to lead these great Americans. I also want
to recognize the families of our service members who have sacrificed so much, yet
continue to give their unwavering support in order to allow our service men and women the
ability to focus on the mission at hand.
Although challenges remain in Iraq-with the continued support of Congress and the
American people-I believe we are now within reach of our goals.
Iraq – An Enduring National Interest
Iraq is strategically located in the Middle East and remains vital to stability in this region. It
has always played a significant role in regional security dynamics. But, too often in the past
Iraq has been a source of instability rather than stability. Today, with our help, Iraq is
slowly reestablishing diplomatic, economic and security relationships with its neighbors.
As a developing democracy in the heart of the Middle East, Iraq has formalized its
relationship with the United States. This past January, our countries implemented two
historic, bilateral agreements establishing the foundation for a long-term, comprehensive,
strategic partnership. Together, the Security Agreement and Strategic Framework
Agreement demonstrate America's continued commitment to Iraq, its people, and stability
in the region. And, they also reflect the maturing relationship and enhanced cooperation
between our two nations.
The Strategic Framework Agreement (SFA), signed in November 2008, establishes the
foundation and mechanisms for an enduring relationship between Iraq and the US through
long-term cooperation in a variety of areas including technological, educational and cultural
exchanges-just to name a few. The Security Agreement focuses on our current military
relationship within the context of Iraqi sovereignty--by regulating the temporary presence
and activities of all US Forces in Iraq-and directing the withdrawal of our forces from Iraq
by December 31, 2011. Since implementing the Security Agreement this past January, we
have conducted all military operations by, with and through the Iraqi Security Forces,
operating within the Iraqi rule of law. I am proud of how our leaders and service members
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General Odierno's HASC Testimony, 30 September
as of 29 Sep
adapted rapidly-quickly adjusting our mindset and operations to maintain operational
momentum within the framework of the Security Agreement.
In line with the Security Agreement, on June 30, 2009, the Iraqi Security Forces assumed
primary security responsibilities within the cities and US combat forces departed the last
remaining cities.
June 30 was a major milestone for the Government of Iraq, its security forces, the Iraqi
people—and a first step in the ISF assuming full control of security. The positive
psychological impact has been profound. The Iraqis wanted to be in charge; they wanted
the responsibilities, and they have demonstrated that they are capable. After some initial
coordination issues immediately following 30 June, the strong partnerships that we have
developed over the last two years in particular have grown even stronger.
Current Operating Environment: Consistent, Deliberate Progress
Positive Trends in Security Incidents
Today, nine months after we began implementing the Security Agreement and began fully
transparent operations by, with and through the Iraqi Security Forces—and three months
after US combat forces departed the cities—we continue to make consistent, deliberate
progress in improving the security environment in Iraq. The combined, sustained efforts of
US, coalition and Iraqi security forces-coupled with the efforts of our civilian partners-
have reduced security incidents and attacks of all types to levels on par with 2003. While
statistics do not paint the whole picture, they help provide some context in understanding
the progress made to date.
In the charts before you, we used six month increments to specifically highlight the trends
in both events and casualties over time. The “Security Incidents” chart clearly shows the
improving trends across all types of attacks and incidents. Overall attacks have decreased
85% over the past two years from 4064 in August 2007 to 594 in August 2009—with 563 in
September so far through 28 Sep) In that same time period, US military deaths have
decreased by 93%, Iraqi Security Force (ISF) deaths have decreased 79%, and ethno-
sectarian deaths have decreased 88%. In fact, there is another noticeable decrease in
ethno-sectarian incidents, specifically during Ramadan which has always reflected a sharp
increase in insurgent and extremist activity. This year, there were only 19 ethno-sectarian
incidents compared to 978 in 2006. Additionally, improvised explosive device (IED)
explosions have decreased 74%.
IEDs remain the weapon of choice for insurgents. The second chart shows high profile
explosions that are specifically intended to have a large impact. You can see the steady
decrease-even after the Iraqis assumed responsibility in the cities. But these HPAs
remain a concern especially following the two bombings in Baghdad on 19 August which
targeted the Ministries of Finance and Foreign Affairs. These were horrific attacks, claimed
and perpetrated by Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) and aimed specifically against Government of
Iraq (Gol) institutions in order to undermine the public's faith and confidence in the Gol.
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General Odierno's HASC Testimony. 30 September
as of 29 Sep
voters in the Kurdish region, Kurds voted in their first direct and open election for the KRG
President. President Masoud Barzani was reelected with 70% of the votes. Voters also
signaled a desire for change with the success of the Change List which won 21% of the
KRG parliament-a moderate loss to the Kurdistan Alliance. On 20 August 2009, the KRG
Parliament and President were peacefully seated.
But Irag Still Faces Significant Challenges: Drivers of Instability
Although security is improving, it is not yet enduring. There still remain underlying,
unresolved sources of potential conflict. I call these drivers of instability. From the
beginning, security in Iraq has been a complex problem that has required nuanced,
evolving approaches—and our strategy has reflected this. In this environment, we cannot
focus on immediate and traditional security threats alone, especially as the United States
continues to assist Iraq in rebuilding the foundations of their security, civil, political and
economic institutions. We continue to assist the Government of Iraq (Gol) in addressing
and finding ways to mitigate these root causes of instability. Current drivers of instability
include communal and factional struggles for power and resources, insufficient Gol
capacity, violent extremist groups, and interference from external state and non-state
actors. Iraq is a nascent democracy emerging from over 30 years of authoritarian rule
based on ethno-sectarian privilege. Its future as a stable, multi-ethnic, representative state
rests upon its ability to deal with the myriad of these challenges-and some of these
issues will take time to resolve.
The national elections in January 2010 are critical to determining the path that Iraq will
take into the future. The rules of the game are being debated in the Council of
Representatives. Having just returned yesterday from the Eid holiday, they have a
condensed timeline to pass an election law and many issues to discuss, including Kirkuk,
open versus closed lists and a single versus a multiple district election. There is the
potential to build a competent, capable and representative government, but there is also
the potential to exacerbate societal divisions by appointing people based on their
affiliations rather than their abilities.
Even as Iraqi political system continues to mature, there is not yet consensus on the exact
nature of Iraq's representative government that is accepted across ethnic, sectarian, and
regional lines. Issues include the role and power of the central Iraqi government vis-à-vis
the provinces, the integration and balance of ethnic and sectarian groups within the
government, revenue sharing, and long-standing Arab-Kurd issues.
GOI Development and Capacity
Iraqi governmental institutions continue to evolve and their ability to provide essential
services is improving; yet, it will take time to develop the institutional processes and
bureaucratic expertise necessary to sustain programs over time. Also, decades of
infrastructural neglect require substantial capital investment, and the recent decline in the
price of oil the mainstay of the Iraqi economy—has resulted in budget shortfalls,
negatively impacting the Gol's ability to fund its many requirements. While endemic
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