6 This committee has previously and again today expressed con- cern about the impact on Reserve component of transferring non- excess items. And we are pleased to report that Reserve component equipment will not be used as a source for ISF requirements. In fact, Reserve units serving in Iraq are being offered the opportunity to take theater-provided equipment back to their home station to fill any authorized shortages. Ultimately, the ISF will only be effective if they are viewed as legitimate across Iraqi society. And to help ensure that the ISF re- mains a non-sectarian, nationalist element, loyal to the government of Iraq, we are tying continued ISF assistance to their non-sec- tarian performance. Let me close with a word on the equipment drawdown. As Presi- dent Obama has directed, by August 31st of 2010, we will seek to reduce our footprint in Iraq to a transition force of no more than 50,000, and we have already begun that drawdown. Over 143,000 troops were serving on the ground in January of this year. We are now just under 120,000. Needless to say, the challenge of drawing down our troops is par- alleled by the challenge of drawing down all the equipment that is not appropriate for transfer to the ISF or the Afghan National Se- curity Forces. At the moment, roughly 3.3 million pieces of equip- ment remain in Iraq. Although some of this equipment will be pro- vided to the ISF to help improve their capabilities, the vast major- ity of the equipment will remain with U.S. forces and will either be returned home or transferred to Afghanistan. DOD and U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) have been plan- ning this equipment drawdown for over a year. We have now begun to execute it. The services have all identified which pieces of equip- ment are not mission-essential and can therefore be retrograded early. And this way, we will be able to draw down the equipment gradually as the troops draw down. Throughout the equipment process—drawdown process, the rel- evant DOD components will be meeting on a regular basis to re- solve various issues that will inevitably arise during this very com- plex logistical operation. Let me close by emphasizing that we continue to plan for and im- plement a responsible U.S. drawdown, one that advances our goal of a stable, sovereign, and self-reliant Iraq. We are continuing our efforts to train and equip the ISF so they can effectively defend the Iraqi people and protect Iraqi institutions by the end of 2011. We are also committed to conducting the drawdown of troops, equipment, and materiel in a manner that addresses the needs of our own military and our obligations to the American taxpayer. While doing all of this presents significant challenges, we are con- fident that we are making progress towards our goals on the timeline laid out by the President. Again, I am happy to take any questions on potential develop- ments in Iraq that may—we may need to respond to and as we re- fine and adjust our plans going forward during the question-and- answer (Q&A) period. And I want to thank you for allowing us to testify today. We look forward to working with this committee on these issues as we move forward. Thank you. 10 cilitating solutions affecting the successful execution of the over- arching drawdown mission. In closing, Mr. Chairman, thank you for the opportunity to tes- tify before the committee. The Department is achieving logistics unity of effort in executing the President's directive to systemically and responsibly draw down the size of U.S. forces in Iraq. We have a plan for the equipment coming out of Iraq and have been working this for many months. We are tracking drawdown progress against specific goals and will provide whatever policy as- sistance is required to meet the President's timelines. With contin- ued support from this Congress, the Department can execute all of the required drawdown tasks. I would be happy to answer any questions that you or members of the committee may have. Thank you. [The joint prepared statement of Mr. Estevez, Secretary Flournoy, Admiral Winnefeld, and General Gainey can be found in the Appendix on page 37.) The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Lieutenant General Gainey, welcome. STATEMENT OF LT. GEN. KATHLEEN M. GAINEY, USA, JOINT STAFF, DIRECTOR FOR LOGISTICS (J-4), U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE General GAINEY. Chairman Skelton, Ranking Member McKeon, and distinguished members of the committee, good morning, and thank you for this opportunity to appear before you and to discuss the Department of Defense strategy and ongoing initiatives to re- sponsibly draw down from the United States assets from Iraq. I am Lieutenant General Kathleen Gainey, director of logistics on the Joint Staff. As director of logistics, I am the principal adviser to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs for the entire spectrum of joint logistics, to include reviewing the logistics policies and processes that are guiding the drawdown strategy in Iraq, as well as the Joint Staff lead in the effort to equip the Iraqi security forces. Mr. Chairman, we have been redeploying significant amounts of forces out of Iraq and Kuwait for each of the past six years. The Department of Defense has been planning for and executing the mandated drawdown of forces from Iraq for over a year. The plan- ning and execution have been a coordinated effort among Multi-Na- tional Force-Iraq, the services, the Department of State, Central Command, and its components. Central Command, through its service components, is orches- trating the process that determined the responsible drawdown strategy and additionally has positioned teams in Iraq whose pri- mary focus is providing on-site assistance for the drawdown. Those teams, in concert with their parent service, have identified materiel and equipment no longer required to support operations in Iraq and can either be re-postured to support operations in Afghanistan or sent back to the United States. My assessment concludes that the process guiding the drawdown and the strategic transportation infrastructure in Iraq and in Ku- wait are sufficient to fully support the drawdown strategy. If need- ed, we have the option to direct the flow of some equipment 12 The CHAIRMAN. General, thank you for your testimony. Admiral, it was kind of you to compliment the committee for our work and for what we have done for the young men and young women in uniform. And I think you specifically spelled out the Fis- cal Year 2010 National Defense Authorization Act that we just passed a few days ago. Back on July the 22nd, Madam Under Secretary, we asked that the Department of Defense provide our committee with a copy of up forward 0901, which is, so the members will remember, the order that lays out the organizations and responsibilities for var- ious functions in how the redeployment will work. Despite repeated requests by our staff of the Department of Defense, then up for- ward 0901 has not been provided, nor has there been a legal reason given for not providing it for us. Now, we pass legislation based upon testimony, based upon brief- ings, based upon documents, and all of this goes together to put us in a position to receive compliments like Admiral Winnefeld just gave us, on putting out good legislation. But this one piece of legis- lation which is highly important on redeployment from Iraq thus far, unless you are willing to give it to us this morning, has not been furnished. Secretary FLOURNOY. Sir, I am—we are quite happy to bring that Operations Plan (OPLAN) over to you to have staff brief you on the details The CHAIRMAN. And you will leave it with us in our classi- fied Secretary FLOURNOY. And I regret that we were not more respon- sive to your request earlier. But what we would like to do is come over and share it with you, brief you on it, and we can work out the details of how it should be handled in declassification. The CHAIRMAN. Well, the details are not just come over and show it to us and walk back with it. Secretary FLOURNOY. I understand. The CHAIRMAN. We are very responsible in this committee, and we are Secretary FLOURNOY. I understand. The CHAIRMAN [continuing]. Responsible in classified material, as you know. It is some 400 pages long. And come over- Secretary FLOURNOY. I understand. The CHAIRMAN [continuing]. And give us a rough look at 400 pages is pretty difficult. And we would expect full cooperation. And, really, is there some reason I mean, we really want to know. I am not trying to be difficult. Secretary FLOURNOY. There is The CHAIRMAN. I just really want to know. Secretary FLOURNOY. There is no intention to keep the informa- tion from you at all. And, again, we want to be responsive to your request. The CHAIRMAN. But that was July the 22nd. Secretary FLOURNOY. I understand. I think it was recently brought to my attention, and we want to make sure that we are responsive to your request as soon as possible. So I don't have it physically with me today, but I can promise you that we will get it over- 19 a national institution. It is not a tool that any one individual or party or person in power can use for sectarian aims. We continue to monitor that. In many instances, we have had many opportunities to work through specific issues. And, frankly, the Iraqis have been very responsive over time on this point. They understand that the only way we can get the support here to sup- port them is to demonstrate that they truly are a non-sectarian in- stitution, so we continue to bring that home at every level, from the tactical all the way up to the headquarters here in Washington when we have interactions. The CHAIRMAN. If we do see some sectarian performance, what do we do? Secretary FLOURNOY. Generally what has happened is the am- bassador and General Odierno have called the government and the military on the issue, immediately gone in to discuss it with them, and worked out remedial steps to either, you know, isolate a unit, to step in and deal with a situation, and so forth. They have also taken very proactive initiatives, such as initiatives to try to get the ISF, for example, and the Peshmerga working much more closely in border areas where the two forces come up against each other. And so I think they have done both reactive steps and proactive steps. But, again, we have seen—we have—you know, we have seen a decrease, a decline in that kind of behavior over time. And so that is the good news. It is something we need to keep—continue to be watchful for, but it is something that has been very well-man- aged to this point. The CHAIRMAN. If there is a severe sectarian act, at what point do we say, “Sorry, we are out of here”? Secretary FLOURNOY. Well, you know, again, I think, you know, I don't want to speculate on exactly what could provoke that kind of thing. What I can say is we take it very seriously, we have taken it very seriously, and we The CHAIRMAN. Well, the important thing is- Secretary FLOURNOY [continuing]. And the trend has been in- creasing The CHAIRMAN [continuing). Is, do they take it very seriously? Secretary FLOURNOY. They certainly understand, when this has—you know, in the instances this has happened, the reaction from us has been very swift and very clear. And it has had impact. So I don't think there is any question in the minds of the Iraqi gov- ernment where our red lines are on this issue. The CHAIRMAN. Thank you so much. Mr. Hunter. Mr. HUNTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you, panel, for being here today. The first question is, is there any correlation between a troop drawdown in Iraq and the ability to surge troops in Afghanistan? Admiral WINNEFELD. There is not a direct correlation in the sense that we are making judgments about the debate that is going on right now, the discussion, if you will, about the strategy for Af- ghanistan and tying that directly to the drawdown from Iraq. We have adequate capacity right now to do what we believe—whatever decision the President makes on Afghanistan, well within the cur- rent drawdown plan for Iraq. 27 That said, I think there has been substantial improvement since the period when you were there. I think you have increasingly ef- fective Iraqi forces in the city. You have U.S. forces, when invited in, backing them up, providing support, doing joint operations with them, and so forth. So we have made progress. I think, again, most importantly, I would underscore the political evolution in the area. You have a population that is really in the process of turning against the more extremist elements and opting into the political process at the local level, the provincial level, and now in January with the—at the national level. I don't know if you have anything to add to that, but it is still an area that we are keeping a close eye on. We are working it hard, but it is, you know, moving in the right direction. Mr. COFFMAN. In terms of redeployment, as far as equipment goes, can you give me a categorical definition as to what we are giving the Iraqis versus selling the Iraqis? Secretary FLOURNOY. I would defer that to my colleagues. General GAINEY. Sir, I can't give you a specific item, but I can tell you that the type of equipment that would be identified trans- fer might range from non-standard equipment, like generators or tents, to equipment that is that they are purchasing that is an end- item weapon system. They may also be purchasing some of the items where we may be using Iraqi Security Forces Funds (ISFF) to support them for re- pair or for training, also for possible repair parts. The types of equipment that we have identified for transfer that we are looking at today ranges everything from, again, tentage to perhaps the wheeled vehicles, ASVs, you know, armored security vehicles, Humvees. That is the sort of thing that, if it is excess, that is going to go ahead and be transferred. But most of the newer weapon systems would have to be purchased, that which could be an exportable version. Mr. COFFMAN. We are required by the SOFA agreement to have our forces out of Iraq by, I think, December 31, 2011. Will we have all of our equipment out of Iraq by December 31, 2011? Secretary FLOURNOY. I will let you answer that, General. General GAINEY. We have a process by which we are going to be bringing that equipment out and staging it in various locations. So we believe that we will be able to meet that requirement. There may be some items that might be in DRMO that we are still proc- essing through that would not have totally departed the location. Does that answer the question, sir? Mr. COFFMAN. It does. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. The gentlelady, Ms. Shea-Porter. Ms. SHEA-PORTER. Thank you. And thank you all for being here today. I have had concerns about the rest time for servicemembers, some who have experienced three and four tours, and we know the impact on readiness and also the impact on our troops and their families. We know about the PTSD, the divorce rates, the increas- ing suicide rates, et cetera.