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The New York
Public Library
Ocker


JBF
08- 77





The following document articulates the broad strategy the President set forth in 2003
and provides an update on our progress as well as the challenges remaining.
“The United States has no intention of determining the precise form of Iraq's new
government. That choice belongs to the Iraqi people. Yet, we will ensure that one
brutal dictator is not replaced by another. All Iraqis must have a voice in the new
government, and all citizens must have their rights protected.
Rebuilding Iraq will require a sustained commitment from many nations, including
our own: we will remain in Iraq as long as necessary, and not a day more.”
- President George W. Bush, February 26, 2003
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• Safer...
– by removing Saddam Hussein, a destabilizing force in a vital region, a ruthless dictator
who had a history of pursuing and even using weapons of mass destruction, was a state
sponsor of terror, had invaded his neighbors, and who was violently opposed to America;
– by depriving terrorists of a safe haven from which they could plan and launch attacks
against the United States and American interests;
- by delivering a strategic setback to the terrorists and keeping them on the run;
- by delivering a decisive blow to the ideology that fuels international terrorism, proving that
the power of freedom is stronger than a perverse vision of violence, hatred, and oppression.
• Stronger...
– by demonstrating to our friends and enemies the reliability of U.S. power, the strength of
our commitment to our friends, and the tenacity of our resolve against our enemies;
– by securing a new friend and partner in the fight against terrorism in the heart of the Middle
East.
• More Certain of its Future ...
– politically, by bolstering democratic reformers – and the prospects for peaceful, democratic
governments – in a region that for decades has been a source of instability and stagnation;
– economically, by facilitating progressive reform in the region and depriving terrorists control
over a hub of the world’s economy.
THE CONSEQUENCES OF FAILURE
> If we and our Iraqi partners fail in Iraq, Iraq will become:
• A safe haven for terrorists as Afghanistan once was, only this time in some of the world’s
most strategic territory, with vast natural resources to exploit and to use to fund future attacks.
• A country where oppression — and the brutal imposition of inhumane practices, such as those
of the Taliban in Afghanistan – is pervasive.
• A failed state and source of instability for the entire Middle East, with all the attendant risks
and incalculable costs for American security and prosperity.
> Furthermore, if we and our Iraqi partners fail in Iraq, the terrorists will have:
• Won a decisive victory over the United States, vindicating their tactics of beheadings, suicide
bombings, and ruthless intimidation of civilians, inviting more deadly attacks against
Americans and other free people across the globe.
• Placed the American people in greater danger by destabilizing a vital region, weakening our
friends, and clearing the way for terrorist attacks here at home. The terrorists will be
emboldened in their belief that America cannot stand and fight, but will cut and run in the
face of adversity.


• Called into question American credibility and commitment in the region and the world. Our
friends and foes alike would doubt our staying power, and this would damage our efforts to
counter other security threats and to advance other economic and political interests worldwide.
v Since 1998, Al Qaida has repeatedly cited Vietnam, Beirut, and Somalia, as examples to
encourage more attacks against America and our interests overseas.
• Weakened the growing democratic impulses in the region. Middle East reformers would
never again fully trust American assurances of support for democracy and pluralism in the
region – a historic opportunity, central to America's long-term security, forever lost.
If we retreat from Iraq, the terrorists will pursue us and our allies, expanding
the fight to the rest of the region and to our own shores.
OUR ENEMIES AND THEIR GOALS
> The enemy in Iraq is a combination of rejectionists, Saddamists, and terrorists affiliated with or
inspired by Al Qaida. These three groups share a common opposition to the elected Iraqi
government and to the presence of Coalition forces, but otherwise have separate and to some
extent incompatible goals.
• Rejectionists are the largest group. They are largely Sunni Arabs who have not embraced the
shift from Saddam Hussein’s Iraq to a democratically governed state. Not all Sunni Arabs fall
into this category. But those that do are against a new Iraq in which they are no longer the
privileged elite. Most of these rejectionists opposed the new constitution, but many in their
ranks are recognizing that opting out of the democratic process has hurt their interests.
V We judge that over time many in this group will increasingly support a democratic Iraq
provided that the federal government protects minority rights and the legitimate interests of
all communities.
• Saddamists and former regime loyalists harbor dreams of reestablishing a Ba'athist
dictatorship and have played a lead role in fomenting wider sentiment against the Iraqi
government and the Coalition.
V We judge that few from this group can be won over to support a democratic Iraq, but that
this group can be marginalized to the point where it can and will be defeated by Iraqi
forces.
• Terrorists affiliated with or inspired by Al Qaida make up the smallest enemy group but
are the most lethal and pose the most immediate threat because (1) they are responsible for the
most dramatic atrocities, which kill the most people and function as a recruiting tool for
further terrorism and (2) they espouse the extreme goals of Osama Bin Laden – chaos in Iraq
which will allow them to establish a base for toppling Iraq’s neighbors and launching attacks
outside the region and against the U.S. homeland.


Y The terrorists have identified Iraq as central to their global aspirations. For that reason,
terrorists and extremists from all parts of the Middle East and North Africa have found
their way to Iraq and made common cause with indigenous religious extremists and former
members of Saddam's regime. This group cannot be won over and must be defeated—
killed or captured – through sustained counterterrorism operations.
• There are other elements that threaten the democratic process in Iraq, including criminals and
Shi'a religious extremists, but we judge that such elements can be handled by Iraqi forces
alone and/or assimilated into the political process in the short term.
THE STRATEGY OF OUR ENEMIES
> Despite their competing goals, these disparate enemy elements share a common operational
concept: Intimidate, coerce, or convince the Iraqi public not to support the transition to
democracy by persuading them that the nascent Iraqi government is not competent and will be
abandoned by a Coalition that lacks the stomach for this fight.
• The enemy’s strategy, in short, is to intimidate, terrorize, and tear down – a strategy with
short-term advantage because it is easier to tear down than to build up. But this strategy is not
sustainable in the long term because it is rejected by the overwhelming mass of the Iraqi
population.
> Enemy Lines of Action. The enemy seeks to ...
• Weaken the Coalition’s resolve, and our resolve at home, through barbaric mass-casualty
attacks, public slaughter of Iraqi civilians and hostages, infliction of casualties on Coalition
forces, and use of the media to spread propaganda and intimidate adversaries.
• Destroy confidence in the Iraqi government by sabotaging key essential service (oil and
electricity) nodes and by derailing the political process.
• Damage trust in Iraqi Security Forces through propaganda, infiltration, and barbaric attacks on
the weak and the innocent.
• Sabotage Iraqi unity through propaganda against the Shi'a majority punctuated with attacks
intended to spark sectarian conflict and civil war.
• Establish safe havens to plan attacks and conduct intimidation campaigns.
• Expand the fight to neighboring states and beyond.
OUR STRATEGY FOR VICTORY IS CLEAR
> Our Strategy is Clear: We will help the Iraqi people build a new Iraq with a constitutional,
representative government that respects civil rights and has security forces sufficient to maintain








The Economic Track
(Restore, Reform, Build)
- Objective: To assist the Iraqi government in establishing the foundations for a sound
economy with the capacity to deliver essential services.
- To achieve this objective, we are helping the Iraqi government:
V Restore Iraq’s neglected infrastructure so it can meet increasing demand and the
needs of a growing economy.
v. Reform Iraq’s economy, which has been shaped by war, dictatorship, and sanctions,
so that it can be self-sustaining in the future.
v Build the capacity of Iraqi institutions to maintain infrastructure, rejoin the
international economic community, and improve the general welfare of all Iraqis.
THIS STRATEGY IS INTEGRATED, AND ITS ELEMENTS ARE
MUTUALLY REINFORCING
> Progress along one of the political, security, and economic tracks reinforces progress along the
other tracks. For example:
• As the political process has moved forward, terrorists have become more isolated, leading to
more intelligence on their leadership and hideouts from Iraqi citizens, which has led to better
security in previously violent areas, a more stable infrastructure, the prospect of economic
progress, and expanding political participation.
• As security operations in Fallujah, Mosul, Tal Afar, and elsewhere have killed or led to the
capture of high-level terrorists and insurgents, residents in those areas have come forward to
participate in the political process, registering and turning out to vote in vast numbers, and
providing local residents a meaningful voice in the new Iraq.
• As economic activities have progressed, ordinary citizens have returned to normal life and
developed a stake in a peaceful Iraq and thus become motivated to support the political
process and cooperate with security forces,
> Part II of this paper will discuss the three tracks – political, security, and economic – in more
detail, so Americans can better understand the elements of our vital mission, the nature of our
strategy, why we believe this strategy will succeed, the progress we are making, and how our
government is organized to help Iraqis ensure lasting victory in Iraq.





groups in the new Iraq, and building national Iraqi institutions and international support to
advance the rule of law and offer the Iraqi people a solid framework for a better and more
peaceful future.
How will this help the Iraqis – with Coalition support — defeat the enemy and achieve our
larger goals?
Progress in the political process – meeting political benchmarks – will provide
momentum against the insurgency and indicate to people “on the fence” that the old
regime has passed and that the effort to build a new Iraq will succeed.
Inclusive institutions that offer power-sharing mechanisms and minority protections
will demonstrate to disaffected Sunnis that they have influence and the ability to
protect their interests in a democratic Iraq.
Commitment to democracy – rather than other forms of governance — not only is
consistent with our values, but is essential to keeping the long-oppressed Shi'a and
Kurds as our partners in Iraq.
Increasingly robust Iraqi political institutions expose the falsity of enemy propaganda
that Iraq is “under occupation,” with decisions being made by non-Iraqis. Such
institutions also provide peaceful means for reconciliation and bridging divides.
Due to the historical, cultural, political, and economic links between Iraq and its
neighbors, many surrounding countries can help Iraq secure its borders and
encourage Sunni rejectionists to renounce violence and enter the political process.
Expanding international support for Iraq will demonstrate to Iraqis and the world
that Iraq is a valuable member of the international community and will further
broaden the political and economic support provided to Iraq.
PROGRESS ON THE POLITICAL TRACK
> Our Isolate, Engage, and Build strategy is working: Iraqis have hit every political
benchmark in their transitional political process – and are on track to hit the next one:
elections in December to select a four-year government under a democratic constitution, with
full participation from all of Iraq’s main ethnic and religious communities.
In January, 8.5 million Iraqis defied terrorist threats to vote for Iraq’s first freely elected
national government and provincial governments.
In April, the elected leaders of Iraq’s national legislature came together to form a diverse
cabinet that represented all groups, despite election results that heavily favored the Shi'a
and Kurdish communities.
In June, the national legislature formally invited non-elected Sunni Arab leaders to join
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• Building political movements based on issues and platforms, instead of identity;
• Encouraging cooperation across ethnic, religious and tribal divides when many wounds
are still fresh and have been exacerbated by recent hardships;
• Convincing all regional states to welcome and actively support the new Iraqi state
politically and financially;
• Building ministerial capacity to advance effective government and reduce corruption.
THE SECURITY TRACK IN DETAIL
Strategic Summary: Clear, Hold, Build
> The security track is based on six core assumptions:
First, the terrorists, Saddamists, and rejectionists do not have the manpower or firepower to
achieve a military victory over the Coalition and Iraqi Security Forces. They can win only if
we surrender.
Second, our own political will is steadfast and will allow America to keep troops in Iraq — to
fight terrorists while training and mentoring Iraqi forces – until the mission is done,
increasing or decreasing troop levels only as conditions warrant.
Third, progress on the political front will improve the intelligence picture by helping
distinguish those who can be won over to support the new Iraqi state from the terrorists and
insurgents who must either be killed or captured, detained, and prosecuted.
Fourth, the training, equipping, and mentoring of Iraqi Security Forces will produce an army
and police force capable of independently providing security and maintaining public order in
Iraq.
Fifth, regional meddling and infiltrations can be contained and/or neutralized.
Sixth, while we can help, assist, and train, Iraqis will ultimately be the ones to eliminate their
security threats over the long term.
STRATEGIC LOGIC BEHIND SECURITY TRACK
> We are helping the Iraqi Security Forces and the Iraqi government take territory out of enemy
control (clear); keep and consolidate the influence of the Iraqi government afterwards (hold);
and establish new local institutions that advance civil society and the rule of law in areas
formerly under enemy influence and control (build).
Efforts on the security track include offensive operations against the enemy, protection of
key communication and infrastructure nodes, post-conflict stabilization operations, and the
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substantial demand. In the past several months alone, nearly 5,000 recruits have joined from
Sunni areas. In the recently cleared Tal Afar, more than 200 local volunteers have begun
police training before returning to help protect their city. In Anbar, Sunnis have lined up to
join the Iraqi army and police, planning to return to their home province and help protect it
from terrorists.
• Iraqis are taking on specialized missions central to overall success. Four Strategic
Infrastructure Battalions, with more than 3,000 personnel, have completed training and will
soon assume the specific mission of guarding vital infrastructure nodes from terrorist attack.
A Special Police Unit highly trained for hostage rescue has almost 200 operators and is
conducting operations almost every week in Baghdad and Mosul. In the past several months,
hundreds of Iraqi soldiers have undergone intensive special operations training and are now
in the fight, hunting, killing, and capturing the most-wanted terrorist leaders.
• Iraq is building an officer corps that will be loyal to the Iraqi government, not a particular
group or tribe. The Iraqi army now has three officer academies training the next generation
of junior officers for its army. In September, NATO inaugurated a new military staff college
in Baghdad that will eventually train more than 1,000 senior Iraqi officers each year. Today,
however, the vast majority of Iraqi police and army recruits are being taught by Iraqi
instructors. By training the trainers, we are creating an institutional capability that will allow
the Iraqi forces to continue to develop and grow long after Coalition forces have left Iraq.
CONTINUED CHALLENGES IN THE SECURITY SPHERE
> Even with this progress, we and our Iraqi partners continue to face multiple challenges in the
security sphere, including:
• Countering the intimidation and brutality of enemies whose tactics are not constrained by
law or moral norms;
• Building representative Iraqi security forces and institutions while guarding against
infiltration by elements whose first loyalties are to persons or institutions other than the Iraqi
government;
• Neutralizing the actions of countries like Syria and Iran, which provide comfort and/or
support to terrorists and the enemies of democracy in Iraq;
• Refining our understanding of the constantly changing nature of, and relationships between,
terrorist groups, other enemy elements, and their networks;
• Addressing the militias and armed groups that are outside the formal security sector and
central government command;
• Ensuring that the security ministries – as well as the fighting forces – have the capacity to
sustain Iraq’s new army;
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