Unem.
accept some formula to bring about peace, rather than the building
of nuclear arsenals, of chemical weapons, and the threat to use
them.
And his intentions were certainly made clear at this convention.
It is clear that Hussein must be stopped, and I believe that this
committee, hopefully, will join in an endeavor that will bring about
the kinds of sanctions that let Mr. Hussein know that we are not
going to sit by idly as he continues to build these weapons of de-
struction that put us at the brink of war.
I do not believe that we should be importing 447,000 barrels of
oil a day from Iraq, nor should we be making the kinds of credits
available to him to purchase whatever he does from the United
States, $500 million last year and $200 million in another credit
line. And I think it is time that we stood up for human rights,
whether they are human rights as it relates to the minorities being
persecuted in Iraq, whether they are human rights for people, for
those who are being persecuted in any place of the world, whether
it is for our Chinese brethren, whether it is for our brethren in
South Africa, and certainly, Mr. Chairman, you, have been a leader
in this area.
I commend you for this, and I look forward to working with you
in getting the administration to follow the law of the land.
And I thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator, for your statement and your
kind words. I have no particular questions at this time, but I would
turn to the chairman of the Subcommittee on Near East and South
Asia, Senator Moynihan.
Senator MOYNIHAN. I would like to commend my friend and dis-
tinguished colleague for a very powerful opening statement. I
would hope that it is followed by some comparable response from
the administration. You have set the tone that this hearing re-
quires, and we thank you.
Senator D'AMATO. Thank you.
The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator, for being with
us.
Senator D'AMATO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The CHAIRMAN. Is Senator Specter here? If not, we will move on
to the administration witnesses, unless Senator Moynihan has an
opening statement. And I hope they would be willing to step to one
side if necessary, if Senator Specter is under pressure. And so if the
Honorable John Kelly, Assistant Secretary of Near East and South
Asian Affairs could come forward, and also Mr. Joshua Gilder,
Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for Human Rights and Hu-
manitarian Affairs.
Mr. Kelly, maybe you could lead off.
STATEMENT OF JOHN M. KELLY, ASSISTANT SECRETARY, NEAR
EASTERN AND SOUTH ASIAN AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Mr. KELLY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The CHAIRMAN. And, excuse me, I would like to say, we are very
lucky to have you here, we are very cognizant of the excellent job
you do and the responsibility you have.


B
Mr. KELLY. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for those kind
words. I am delighted and honored to appear before the committee
this morning on this important subject. I have a brief opening
statement, with your leave, Mr. Chairman.
I welcome this opportunity to review with this committee our re-
lations with Iraq. In the 1990's, we expect the Persian Gulf and
Iraq to increase in importance to United States national security
and interests. Now and in the future Iraq will play a major role in
the gulf, whatever United States policy is. That role may be for
good or for ill. We would like to see Iraq work toward stability in
the gulf, human rights for its citizens, moderation in the Middle
East peace process, and effective global implementation of all inter-
national understandings and agreements regarding nuclear, biolog-
ical, and chemical weapons.
Energy is a salient reason for Iraq's new role. Gulf producers ac-
count for about 30 percent of world oil production and 70 percent
of world excess oil production capacity. Given trends in consump-
tion and the depletion of resources elsewhere, we expect the gulf to
provide an increasing percentage of the world's oil. Iraq's reserves
are second only to those of Saudi Arabia. Iraq not only produces a
large quantity of oil, but also has great influence for better or for
worse over the stability of the entire gulf and its oil. :
U.S. national security interests and the interests of all nations in
the region are affected by the proliferation of nuclear, biological,
and chemical w
ns and the missile systems capable of deliver-
ing them. Iraq's programs in these areas are a matter of great con-
cern to the United States.
Human rights are a central element in our policy worldwide.
And Iraq is no exception.
Iraq's human rights record is abysmal. My colleague, Josh Gilder
from the Bureau of Human Rights Affairs, will address our con-
cerns in detail in his statement. I want to make clear that Iraq's
human rights record is an integral part of our agenda with Iraq
and will continue to influence the climate of our bilateral relations.
In recent years, Iraq has taken some steps the United States has
wanted in an effort to improve bilateral relations for its own bene-
fit. One step, for example, was the expulsion of the Abu Nidal
gang, a group of terrorists. And as recently as the autumn of last
year we could point to some modest steps in the right direction.
Iraq was cooperating with Arab League efforts to end the fight-
ing in Lebanon. Iraq was discussing a new constitution which
would potentially provide greater recognition of human rights. Iraq
had participated in the January 1989 Paris Review Conference of
the 1925 Geneva Chemical Weapons Protocol.
Iraq participated in the September 1989 Canberra Government
Industry Chemical Weapons Conference. Iraq had joined as an ob-
server the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, where we are
working toward a comprehensive ban on chemical weapons.
On the Middle East peace process, Iraq was not obstructing the
parties more directly involved from moving forward. .
Since then, a series of Iraqi actions have raised questions about
Iraqi intentions. We have all noted President Saddam Hussein's
of the United States presence in the Persian Gulf, the
arrest of smugglers in Britain, the construction of missile launch


Iraq, none of which is aid. U.S. taxpayer dollars do not go to Iraq.
Each of our programs is designed to be a benefit to the United
States and its economic interest. Like other industrial countries,
we have programs designed to promote United States exports to
Iraq and to other countries on commercial terms in a highly com-
petitive international market. -
The first and largest program is a program of credit guarantees
run by the Department of Agriculture's Commodity Credit Corpo-
ration, which has been ongoing annually since 1983. The credit
guarantees that are made available to Iraq ensure against nonpay-
ment by Iraqi purchasers of loans made by commercial banks for
the purchase of United States agricultural commodities.
In past years, the program has consisted predominantly of short-
term, that is up to 3-year, credit guarantees, with a small amount
of intermediate term—that is 7- to 10-year credit guarantees. The
entire program for this year is short-term credit.
Under this program in calendar 1989 we exported about $1 bil-
lion in agricultural commodities to Iraq. Items exported included
rice and other grains. Iraq is our largest export market for rice,
which comprises 23 percent of total United States exports, for
cattle, eggs, chickens, lumber, tobacco, and a variety of other agri-
cultural products.
In the current fiscal year, we have provided Iraq some $500 mil-
lion in credit guarantees under this program. At present, release of
further CCC guarantees for this fiscal year has been deferred,
pending the outcome of investigations by the Departments of Agri-
culture and Justice into allegations of past irregularities.
The second program involves the U.S. Export/Import bank which
has a short-term revolving credit insurance program of $200 mil-
lion. Like the CCC, Ex/Im Bank ensures U.S. exporters and banks
against nonpayment. The program finances the purchase of U.S.
commercial goods, and a large number of American companies
have used it.
In other areas, trade with Iraq is limited. As a matter of policy,
we do not sell items on the Munitions List to Iraq. We do not coop-
erate with Iraq's nuclear program. An interagency committee re-
views licensing requests on the Department of Commerce's nuclear
referral list and rejects all of those which it determines would con-
tribute to Iraqi capabilities to develop nuclear weapons.
All items on the missile technology control regime annexes are
reviewed for possible use in Iraq's missile programs—50 chemicals
are now on the list of CW precursors whose export to Iraq and cer-
tain other countries is controlled.
Mr. Chairman, this brings me to the question of sanctions. There
een several bills drafted to impose sanctions against Iraq.
One, the Inouye-Kasten amendment, would impose a total trade
embargo against Iraq. It goes beyond sanctions we have imposed on
Cambodia, Vietnam, Cuba, Iran, or Libya, or any other country
outside of wartime.
Its sanctions are so extensive that an Iraqi citizen permanently
residing in the United States could not visit his family in Iraq
without incurring a $500,000 penalty. Any company that sold him
an airline ticket to do so would risk a $1 million fine.


A second piece of legislation is S. 2480. This would impose cer-
tain restrictions on trade with Iraq until Iraq submits to interna-
tional inspection of various facilities and ratifies the 1972 BW-Bi-
ological Weapons-Convention...!
Based on past experience, we do not believe that legislating uni-
lateral trade and economic sanctions would help us to achieve
United States goals with Iraq. We believe Iraq has clearly received
the important message of United States Government concern, from
both the administration and from the Congress over its recent ac-
tions.
To be effective, economic sanctions should be imposed on a multi-
lateral basis. There is no prospect of this in the case of Iraq. Most
of the major industrialized countries provide credit programs to
assist their exporters in penetrating the Iraqi market. A significant
effect of suspending our export promotion programs would be to
deny U.S. exporters the ability to compete with foreign exporters
who continue to benefit from their government's export promotion
programs. Our competitors in Canada, Australia, Europe, and
Japan would step in quickly to fill the breach.
Regarding our agricultural programs, U.S. policy in both this ad-
ministration and in the previous one has been not to single out
farm exports as a tool of foreign policy. Our trade
not been a favor to Iraq. It is a two-way street that benefits both
U.S. companies and the overall trade balance. Sanctions would
worsen our trade deficit by reducing exports.
For these reasons, the administration continues to oppose imposi-
tion of legislated sanctions. They would hurt U.S. exporters and
worsen our trade deficit. Sanctions would not improve our ability
to exercise a restraining influence on Iraqi actions.
The Government of Iraq is well aware that its recent actions
have caused a deterioration in United States-Iraqi relations. The
visit of Senator Dole and his colleagues to Baghdad helped to bring
home to Iraqi leaders the damage which has been done. We believe
it is important to give the Government of Iraq an opportunity to
demonstrate that it can act to reverse this deterioration in rela-
tions.
We are therefore opposed to legislation which would impose eco-
nomic sanctions. The administration will continue to review the
entire range of options available to it, should Iraq continue to fail
to conduct itself responsibly.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Kelly follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF JOHN H. KELLY
I welcome this opportunity to review with this committee our relations with Iraq.
In the 1990's we expect the Persian Gulf—and Iraq-to increase in importance to
U.S. national security and interests.
Now and in the future, Iraq will play a major role in the gulf, whatever U.S.
policy is. That role may be for good or for ill, however. Thus the fundamental goal
of U.S. policy toward Iraq is to influence Iraq to play a responsible regional role. We
would like to see Iraq work toward stability in the gulf, toward moderation in the
Middle East peace process, and toward effective global implementation of all inter-
national understandings and agreements regarding the proliferation of nuclear, bio-
logical, and chemical weapons, and the missile systems that deliver them.
Energy is a salient reason for Iraq's new role. Gulf producers account for about 70
percent of world excess oil production capacity. Given trends in consumption and
LIONS.
Energy is a salieal weapons, and the miregarding the proliferabitation of all inter-


the depletion of resources elsewhere, we expect the gulf to provide an increasing
percentage of the world's oil. Among Gulf oil producers1 Iraq's reserves are second
only to those of Saudi Arabia. As the gulf region's strongest military power, Iraq not
only produces a large quantity of oil, but also has great influence for better or for
worse over the stability of the entire Gulf and all its oil.
U.S. national security interests and the interests of all nations in the region-
are affected by proliferation of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons, and the
missile systems that deliver them. Iraq has made itself of concern to the U.S. in
these areas.
Human rights are a central element in our policy worldwide, and Iraq is no excep-
tion. Iraq's human rights record is abysmal. My colleague Josh Gilder from the
Bureau of Human Rights Affairs will address our concerns in detail in his state-
ment. But I want to make clear that human rights are an integral part of our ap-
proach to Iraq, and will continue to influence the climate of our bilateral relations.
In recent years, both the U.S. and Iraq have seen the advantage in developing
relations. We don't do Iraq any favors.
By the same token, Iraq has taken steps the U.S. has wanted in an effort to im-
prove bilateral relations for its own benefit. The first of these was the expulsion of
the Abu Nidal terrorist gang. As recently as October of 1989, when Secretary Baker
first met the Iraqi foreign minister, we could point to some modest positive develop-
ments on issues of concern to us. Iraq was cooperating with Arab League efforts to
end the fighting in Lebanon; it was discussing a new Constitution which would po-
tentially provide greater recognition of human rights; Iraq had participated in the
January, 1989 Paris Review Conference of the 1925 Geneva CW protocol, and in the
September, 1989 Canberra government-Industry CW Conference. It had joined (as an
observer) the Conference on Disarmament at Geneva, where we are working toward
a comprehensive ban on chemical weapons; and on the Middle East peace process
Iraq was deferring to the parties more directly involved, including Egypt and the
PLO.
Since then, a series of Iraqi actions raised new questions about Iraqi intentions.
You are well aware of Saddam's criticism of the U.S. presence in the Persian Gulf,
and of the arrest of smugglers in Britain, the construction of missile launch plat-
forms within range of Israel, the expulsion of an Iraqi diplomat from New York,
and the seizure of parts of an alleged "big-gun” by authorities in Britain, Greece,
Turkey, and Italy. You are also well aware of President Saddam Hussein's outra-
geous and irresponsible threats regarding the use of chemical weapons. You have
also seen the bellicose language President Hussein directed against the United
States at the Arab League Summit in Baghdad. We understand Iraq played a nega-
tive role in seeking to insert hard-line language on the U.S. and Israel into the Sum-
mit's communique.
These actions and statements raise two sets of serious questions about Iraq, each
of which has a great impact on U.S. Iraqi bilateral relations. One set of questions
relates to Iraq's intentions toward the region, including both the gulf and the
Middle East in general, including Israel. The other relates to Iraq's intentions
toward its obligations under the NPT, the 1925 Geneva Protocol on chemical weap-
ons, and the 1972 convention on biological weapons (Iraq signed this convention but
has not deposited an instrument of ratification). This also impacts on efforts to de-
velop a global ban on the production and stockpiling of chemical weapons.
Regarding regional goals, President Saddam Hussein seeks to enhance his and
Iraq's standing among Arab countries. He enhances his prestige by portraying him-
self as the defender of the Arab nation, whether through seeking to deter an Israeli
attack, through opposition to the presence of foreign fleets in the gulf, or through
technological advances that he says the West wants to deny Arabs. Saddam has ral-
lied support by claiming there is a U.S.-British-Israeli plot to find a pretext for an
Israeli attack on Iraq. This was a major theme at the Arab League Summit, May
28-30. It was a relatively successful theme. Many Arab leaders may have private
misgivings about President Hussein's aims and tactics, but they will stand behind a
fellow Arab country that claims to be persecuted for being Arab.
We have told Iraq there is no truth to these charges. However, it is clear that
Saddam's tough rhetoric does strike a chord with his primary audience.
Iraq's power and wealth guarantee that it will insist on playing a major role in
intra-Arab politics. The question for us is whether Iraq will use that influence re-
sponsibly. Saddam's statements about “burning up half of Israel” have only antago-
nized public opinion in the U.S. One theory is that he made his statements in an
attempt to deter what he genuinely fears is an imminent Israeli attack. Saddam has
only managed to increase regional tensions. He has raised questions about Iraq's ul-
timate intention to play a responsible role.


10
With regard to the second set of questions, on Iraq's proliferation aims, Iraq has
demonstrated a willingness to go to great lengths to develop all sorts of non-conven-
tional weapons. In that respect Iraq is placing itself on a collision course not just
with the U.S., but with the rest of the industrialized world. None of our friends and
allies among the industrial countries is willing to impose either sanctions or an
export embargo against Iraq. However, Iraq's own actions in smuggling capacitors
well suited for nuclear weapons application, and parts for a “super gun,” make li-
censing authorities and customs officials around the world doubly cautious. Iraq will
quickly reach a point at which its genuine economic development aims will be ham-
pered by its clandestine attempts to procure exotic and non-conventional weapons
from the West.
For the record, we do not believe that Iraq poses a near-term nuclear proliferation
threat. Iraq's missile material is under IAEA safeguards, and is inspected regularly.
Most recently, the IAEA published the finding that there was no evidence of diver-
sion following the inspection that took place in April of this year. However, Iraq's
intentions, and not its present capabilities, are at issue here.
In considering our response to these Iraqi actions it may be useful to review the
few programs of cooperation we have with Iraq, none of which is aid. U.S. taxpayer
dollars do not go to Iraq. Each of our programs is designed to be of benefit to the
U.S. and its economic interests.
Like other industrial countries we have programs designed to promote U.S. ex-
ports to Iraq on commercial terms, in a highly competitive international market.
The first, and the largest, is a program of credit guarantees run by the Depart-
ment of Agriculture's Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC). The credit guarantees
that are made available to Iraq under the CCC GSM 102 and 103 programs insure
against nonpayment by Iraqi purchasers on loans made by commercial banks for
the purchase of U.S. agricultural commodities, thereby facilitating U.S. farm ex-
ports. In past years the program has included a small amount of GSM 103, or 4-7
year guarantees; the entire FY 90 program is in GSM 102, or short-term guarantees
up to 3 years. Iraq has never defaulted on CCC-insured loans. Under this program,
in calendar 1989 we exported about $1 billion in agricultural commodities to Iraq.
Items exported included rice and other grains (Iraq is our largest export market
for rice), cattle, eggs and chickens, lumber and a variety of other agricultural prod-
ucts. In the current fiscal year, we have provided Iraq some $500 million in credit
guarantees under this program. Iraq has used almost all of these credit guarantees.
At present, the Department of Agriculture has suspended consideration of further
CCC guarantees for FY 90 pending the outcome of investigations into allegations of
past abuses. .
The U.S. Export-Import Bank has a short term revolving credit insurance pro-
gram of $200 million. Like CCC, Eximbank insures U.S. exporters and banks against
nonpayment. The program finances the purchase of U.S. commercial goods. A large
number of U.S. companies have used it.
In other areas, trade with Iraq is limited. As a matter of policy we do not sell
items on the munitions list to Iraq. We do not cooperate with Iraq's nuclear pro-
gram. An interagency committee reviews license requests on the Department of
Commerce's nuclear referral list, and rejects all those which it determines will con-
tribute to Iraqi capabilities to develop nuclear weapons. Likewise, all items on the
missile technology control regime annexes are reviewed for possible use in Iraq's
missile programs. Fifty chemicals are now on the list of CW precursors whose
export is controlled to Iraq and certain other countries. We continue to work within
the Australia Group-an informal group of 21 like-minded industrialized coun-
tries—to harmonize the export controls of many nations to deny Iraq materials for
its chemical weapons program.
Iraq is a signatory to the 1972 convention banning biological weapons (although it
has not deposited an instrument of ratification). We have denied Iraqi license re-
quests for technology, such as cell dryers, which could conceivably be used in fur-
therance of a biological weapons program.
The United States is active in trying to prevent the spread of missiles, especially
in volatile areas such as the Middle East. We work with our allies through our Mis-
sile Technology Control Regime to deny missile-related technology to a number of
countries, including Iraq.
This extensive network of controls is not perfect. Efforts are underway to improve
them and to remind our allies to the dangers of contributing to Iraq's weapons pro-
grams. But as the recent arrests of Iraqi smugglers in London shows, controls can
work effectively.
Mr. Chairman, this brings me to the question of sanctions. There have been sever-
al bills drafted to impose sanctions against Iraq. One, the Inouye Kasten amend-
rantees for hyment of Agricults used almost all som
ly.


11
ment, would impose a total trade embargo against Iraq. It goes beyond sanctions we
have imposed on Cambodia, Vietnam, Cuba, and Iran. I believe it goes beyond sanc-
tions we have imposed against Libya or any other country outside of wartime. Its
sanctions are so extensive that an Iraqi citizen permanently residing in the U.S.
could not visit his family in Iraq without incurring a $500,000 penalty. Any compa-
ny that sold him an airline ticket to do so would risk a $1 million fine.
A second piece of legislation is S. 2480. It would impose certain restrictions on
trade with Iraq until Iraq submits to international inspection of various facilities
and ratifies the 1972 BW Convention.
In the Executive Branch we believe in taking whatever measures are appropriate
to deal with the particular problems Iraqi actions have raised. We do not believe
that legislating trade and economic sanctions would help us to achieve any U.S.
goals with Iraq. We believe Iraq has clearly received the important message of U.S.
Government concern-from both the Administration and Congress-over its recent
actions.
Experience has shown that economic sanctions are most effective when they are
imposed on a multilateral basis. There is no prospect of this in the case of Iraq.
Most of the major industrialized countries provide credit programs to assist their
exporters in penetrating the Iraqi market. A significant effect of suspending our
export promotion programs would be to deny U.S. exporters the ability to compete
with exporters who continue to benefit from their governments' export promotion
programs. Our competitors in Canada, Australia, Europe, and Japan would step in
quickly to fill the breach. Regarding our agricultural programs, U.S. policy in both
this administration and the previous one has been not to single out farm exports as
a tool of foreign policy.
Our trade with Iraq has not been a "favor” to Iraq. It is a two-way street that
benefits both U.S. companies and the overall trade balance. Sanctions would worsen
our trade deficit by reducing exports.
For these reasons, the administration continues to oppose imposition of legislated
sanctions. They would hurt U.S. exporters and worsen our trade deficit; they would
not improve our ability to exercise a restraining influence on Iraqi actions. As the
discussions at the Arab League summit indicate, sanctions would weaken the posi-
tion of Arab moderates, with potentially negative effects on the Middle East peace
process.
The Government of Iraq is well aware that its recent actions have caused a dete-
rioration in U.S.-Iraq relations. The visit of Senator Dole and his colleagues to Bagh-
dad helped bring home to Iraqi leaders the damage which has been done. We believe
it is important to give the Government of Iraq an opportunity to demonstrate that it
does indeed wish to reverse this deterioration in relations, and we are therefore op-
posed to legislation to impose economic sanctions. The Administration continues to
review the entire range of options available to it, should Iraq continue to fail to con-
duct itself responsibly.
Iraq's own reckless words and actions have raised new questions about Iraq's ac-
tivities in the region and towards its international commitment to the 1925 Geneva
Protocol banning chemical weapons use and to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. To
dispel these questions and avoid further damage to Iraq's international standing, it
is up to Iraq to observe scrupulously its NPT and other international commitments.
It is similarly up to Iraq to demonstrate in practice its professed commitment to
respect internationally recognized human rights standards.
Iraq will have a significant influence on the political and economic landscape of
the Persian Gulf and the Middle East in the years to come, for better or for worse.
If Iraq should threaten the security of Israel and other countries in the area and
continue to violate human rights on a widespread scale, the United States and Iraq
would become increasingly at odds. We would take appropriate action on behalf of
American interests. If, however, Iraq plays an increasingly responsible role and co-
operates with international efforts to control proliferation of non-conventional weap-
ons, and improve its abysmal human rights record, the U.S.-Iraq relationship will
improve, with benefits for both countries.
Thank you.
The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. Mr. Gilder.


12
STATEMENT OF JOSHUA R. GILDER, PRINCIPAL DEPUTY ASSIST-
ANT SECRETARY FOR HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMANITARIAN AF-
FAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Mr. GILDER. Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, I appreci-
ate the opportunity to appear before the committee to discuss the
human rights situation in Iraq, and I am especially pleased to have
the chance to testify before the two distinguished Senators from
New York, which is my home State..
Ambassador Schifter has asked me to convey his regrets that he
cannot be with you today. He left this week for a long-scheduled
trip to Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. In the interest of
saving time, I thought rather than read my testimony in its entire-
ty, I would submit a written statement for the record and summa-
rize some of its major points.
The CHAIRMAN. I thank you very much.
Mr. GILDER. With your permission, I would also like to submit for
the record a copy of our latest country report on Iraq.
The CHAIRMAN. Without objection.
[The information referred to follows:]
EXCERPT FROM COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR 1989—
FEBRUARY 1990
Iraq is in effect a one-party state governed by the Arab Ba'ath Socialist Party
(ABSP) through a Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) which has both executive
and legislative authority under the provisional Constitution of 1968. Saddam Hus-
sein holds decisive power as President of the Republic, Chairman of the RCC, and
Secretary-General of the Regional Command of the ABSP. Two other small parties
are essentially support groups for the Government. In 1989 the Government an-
nounced its intention to adopt a multiparty system enshrined in a new constitution.
Elections for the National Assembly-which has few powers-were held April 1. A
draft constitution which would reportedly allow a multiparty system was completed
in 1989 and is expected to be put to a referendum in early 1990. It remains to be
seen, however, whether this will dilute the monopoly of power held by Saddam Hus-
sein and the ABSP. Iraq's population comprises many disparate groups, most nota-
bly Shi'a and Sunni Muslim Arabs, Kurds, Turcomans, and various Christian sects,
predominantly Assyrians and Chaldeans.
Iraq's military is large and well trained, and parts of it, notably the Fursan, or
Kurdish tribal levies, have responsibility for security within the Kurdish autono-
mous region. The National Police is responsible for civil order.
The Government exerts a high degree of control over the economy, dominated by
the petroleum sector, and owns all major industries. The Government has been car-
rying out a program of divestiture and privatization in agriculture, tourism, serv-
ices, and light industry, and is trying to attract investor capital and expertise in the
operation of the economy. However, close government regulation of economic activi-
ty is expected to continue.
Iraq's human rights record remained abysmal in 1989. Effective opposition to gov-
ernment policy is stifled; the intelligence services engage in extensive surveillance
and utilize extralegal means, including torture and summary execution, to deal with
anti regime activity. The civil rights of Iraqi citizens continue to be sharply limited,
and Iraqis do not have the right to change their government. The freedoms of
speech and press and of assembly and association are virtually nonexistent. Other
important human rights problems include continuing disappearances and arbitrary
detentions, lack of fair trial, widespread interference with privacy, excessive use of
force against Kurdish civilians, and an almost total lack of worker rights. In addi-
tion to the repressive domestic controls that predate the war with Iran, tight war-
time controls, including travel restrictions, remain in effect despite the August 1988
cease-fire with Iran.
An armed Kurdish insurgency continued in 1989, but at a reduced level. Although
there were no allegations that the Government used chemical weapons against
Kurdish civilians in 1989, as it did in 1988, in its efforts to crush the rebellion, it
continued to violate the human rights of elements of the Kurdish population. The
in 1982wever ise. Trauslim Armaldeansned, and parity withe
ne ac not have theembly and assocontinuing disapprivacy, excessivin addi-
not have the right to chanciation are virtually nonexistenu.
man mich of assembly to change thens continue to cution, to deal ar


13
Government announced in June that in its campaign to suppress the rebellion it has
pursued a program since 1987 of establishing a depopulated security zone along the
full length of Iraq's borders with Iran and Turkey. Under this program, the Govern-
ment has destroyed villages within a 30-kilometer-wide zone and relocated approxi-
mately 500,000 Kurdish and Assyrian inhabitants into more easily controlled and
protected towns, cities, and newly constructed settlements in traditional Kurdish
areas.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom from:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing
For years execution has been an established Iraqi method for dealing with per-
ceived political and military opponents of the government, including, but not limit-
ed to, members of the outlawed Da'wa organization (an Iran-supported fundamental-
ist Shi'a Muslim group that has engaged in acts of international terrorism). In some
cases, a family only learns that one of its members has been executed when the se-
curity services return the body and require the family to pay a fine.
Amnesty International (AI), in its presentation before the U.N. Subcommission on
the Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities in August, stated that
it had received allegations that some 80 army deserters were executed in December
1988 and charged that the Government executed 11 of its Kurdish opponents in
March and April 1989.
In its February report, “Iraq: Children: Innocent Victims of Political Repression,”
AI stated that it receives allegations of hundreds of executions in Iraq each year. AI
cited the case of 29 Kurdish children and youths allegedly executed in January
1987. In addition, AI, in its 1989 Report covering 1988, cited allegations that hun-
dreds of civilians, including women and children, were executed at Tanjaro Military
Garrison, Sulaimaniya province. Independent information to confirm the allegations
cited in AI reports is not available.
b. Disappearance
In the February report, AI asserted that thousands of people arrested over the
years by Iraqi security or intelligence forces reportedly have "disappeared” while in
detention, with many feared executed. In its August presentation to the U.N. Sub-
commission, AI reported the disappearance in mid-April of Mulla Muhammad Dal-
gayi, described as the iman of Qalat Diza, who was among delegates from Kurdis-
tan who reportedly net with government officials to appeal against forced settle-
ment of the Kurds at Qal'at Diza. He was reportedly arrested in Baghdad and has
since disappeared. An Assyrian organization based in the United States charged in
March that the whereabouts of 33 Assyrians, who took advantage of the amnesty
issued by the Government and returned to Iraq from Iran and Turkey, were un-
known.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment
The Constitution prohibits torture and prescribes stiff punishment for it, but it is
clear that both physical and psychological torture are used by the authorities, espe-
cially the security police. Given the rigid chain of command within the Government
and the security services, torture could not be practiced without the knowledge or
authorization of senior officials.
Emigre groups and former prisoners assert that persons detained by the security
police for political or security-related matters are frequently tortured arid mistreat-
ed. Treatment is reported to be worst immediately following arrest and during the
period of interrogation and investigation, which can last for months. Torture and
brutal treatment are not limited to political cases.
Security-related offenses are broadly defined and include such routine criminal
matters as currency violations. :
In its 1989 Report, AI stated that the routine torture and ill-treatment of prison-
ers continues to be widely reported. It said the victims included detainees below the
age of 18 who were reportedly beaten, whipped, given electric shocks, and deprived
of food. The Government categorically denied any use of torture against children as
an official policy or as a practice, and stated its readiness to consider folly any indi-
vidual allegation with a view to bringing perpetrators to justice. Impartial observers
have so far been unable to look into those allegations.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
While the Constitution and legal code provide for the rights of citizens and place
checks on police powers in such seas as arrest, detention, imprisonment, and search,
31-408 0 - 90 - 2


14
Iraq's he may refer a victions may e court. Thenw modified bligious courtsendant is
hister Shari'a iminal, and rense if the de
these provisions have virtually no weight in political or national security cases, al-
though they are generally respected in ordinary criminal cases. Security police not
only make arbitrary arrests but also secretly detain suspects, whose fate sometimes
becomes known only after they have her executed. Security charges have included
espionage, treason, and conspiracy against Iraq, often in collaboration with un-
named foreign enemies.
The relocation of 500,000 Kurdish villagers to other areas of Kurdistan since 1987
may be considered a form of internal exile. The Government declared in June 1989
that it was creating an uninhabited security zone to ensure the safety and security
of citizens in the border regions (who were subjected to shelling and military oper-
ations during the war with Iran) and to provide better services to the villagers.
Although the Government has ceased expelling Iraq's of supposed Iranian de-
scent, most of the few remaining Iranians have been imprisoned or live under the
fear of deportation or incarceration. Spouses of Iraqis of Iranian origin are required
to obtain a divorce or suffer the same consequences. Moreover, other Iraqis, whose
grandparents are shown not to be of Iraqi origin, are subject to arbitrary detention
and deportation.
With regard to forced or compulsory labor, see Section 6.c.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
Iraq's legal system provides for investigation by police and then by an inquiry
judge who may refer a case to the courts or dismiss it. Judges try criminal cases;
there are no juries. Convictions may be appealed to the Court of Appeal and then to
the Court of Cassation, the supreme court. There are no Shari'a courts per se in
Iraq; however, family courts administer Shari'a law modified by Iraqi custom.
Trials of ordinary cases are held in civil, criminal, and religious courts and are
open. Defendants are entitled to counsel-at government expense if the defendant is
indigent. Charges and evidence are available for review by the lawyer. Appellate
courts hear cases not under the jurisdiction of the Revolutionary Courts.
In contrast to ordinary cases, security cases are handled by the Revolutionary
Courts, which usually hold closed trials. Security cases include espionage, treason,
smuggling, currency exchange violations and drug trafficking. The right of defense
in such courts is said to be severely restricted. The "special courts" constituted by
the RCC for specific incidents, such as the reported conspiracy against the regime in
1979, are also closed. These special tribunals are apparently exempt from constitu-
tional safeguards of defendants' rights; defendants are held incommunicado, and
confessions extracted by torture are admissible. Appeals can be taken only to the
chairman of the RCC. However, the utility of this appeal is questionable, since there
are reports that executions take place shortly after trial. .
Political dissent in Iraq is taken by the authorities to encompass a wide range of
activities and, in an environment where public acknowledgement of arrest or im-
prisonment is rare, it is extremely difficult to estimate the number of political pris-
oners. In its 1989 Report, AI stated that “thousands” of political prisoners continued
to be arbitrarily arrested and detained, especially members of prohibited political
parties, Army deserters, and draft resisters. Relatives, including children of sus-
pects, are said to be held as hostages to compel confessions.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or Correspondence
The Constitution provides protections for the inviolability of the home, and strong
cultural values reinforce these protections. Police must obtain a search warrant
before entering the hone of a criminal suspect. However, warrants are not required
for the arrest of security suspects. Although most arrests occur outside the home,
there have been reports of forced entry and arrest by the security police, particular-
ly of suspected members of the outlawed Da'wa organization.
Although the Constitution provides for the confidentiality of mail and telegraphic
and telephone correspondence, many Iraqi believe that the monitoring of telephones
is a common practice and that all mail is subject to review by censors. The security
services and Ba'ath Party maintain pervasive networks of informers. The Govern-
ment maintains a close watch against Iranian attempts to exploit dissatisfaction
among Iraqi Shi'a, who adhere to the branch of Islam prevalent in Iran.
g. Use of Excessive Force and Violations of Humanitarian Law in Internal
Conflicts
Elements of Iraq's Kurdish population have engaged in armed struggle with all
governments of Iraq periodically since the 1920's. The outbreak of the Iran-Iraq war
in 1980 sparked a new antigovernment insurgency by Kurdish elements, many of
whom fought with or aided Iran during the war. From 1981 to 1989, the Govern-
is said todents, such as themals are apparenheid incom
security suspeed entry ana wa organizatlity of ma


15
“any act aina regional bigotic al dissent as ja publications are ress, radio,
ernment vie information party own andent, and news
trols speechment and the Batatize the Governmewpoints.
ment's efforts to crush the rebellion militarily resulted in approximately 8,000
deaths, many of them civilians killed indiscriminately by chemical weapons in 1988.
Although the fighting was at a reduced level in 1989, Kurdish military operations
continued, as did government measures to contain them. Kurdish rebels continued
to announce their hostility towards the central Government. On August 29, 1989,
the leader of one group of insurgents stated to the press in Geneva that his group
would target foreign interests in Iraq supporting the Iraqi regime. At year's end, the
cycle of Kurdish rebellion and government repression remained unresolved.
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
The freedoms of speech and press are not respected. The Constitution prohibits
“any act aimed at undermining the national unity of the people, provoking racial,
sectarian, and regional bigotry, or violating gains and achievements of the country.”
The Government views political dissent as a threat to its security and strictly con-
trols speech and all information media. All publications are subject to censorship.
The Government and the Ba'ath Party own and operate the press, radio, and televi-
sion. The media do not criticize the Government, and news reporting is strongly
biased. There is no presentation of opposition viewpoints.
Few foreign periodicals reach Iraq and those that do may be censored. Western
newspapers are not sold. Foreign visitors' magazines, newspapers, cassettes, cam-
eras, and video cassettes may be confiscated at the airport. To control the dissemi-
nation of political leaflets, word processors and computers must be registered. Fail-
ure to register is a criminal offense. Iraqis no longer need to register their typewrit-
ers or photocopiers, hut foreigners in Iraq must do so Taking photographs of mili-
tary installations, government buildings, or areas near sensitive locations is forbid-
den arid punishable by imprisonment. Journalists and photographers visiting Iraq
at the invitation of the Government are required to present film taken in Iraq for
inspection by the authorities.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
These freedoms are severely limited. public meetings may only be organized
under the auspices of the Government or the Ba'ath Party. Association for nonreli-
gious purposes and demonstrations without government approval have met with
severe repression. Professional organizations are subject to control by the Ba'ath
Party Central Vocational Bureau.
For a discussion of freedom of association as it applies to labor unions, see Section
C.a.
c. Freedom of Religion
Iraq is an ethnically and religiously diverse society. Since its rise to power in
1968, the Ba'ath Government, while carefully controlling religious groups, has en-
forced tolerance of religious diversity, seeking to submerge religious differences in
the promotion of secular nationalism. A 1981 law gave the Ministry of Endowments
and Religious Affairs the authority to promulgate laws and regulations governing
places of worship, appointment of clergy, publication of religious literature, and par-
ticipation in religious councils and meetings. Muslim religious leaders operate under
close government supervision, are considered government employees, and receive
their salaries through the Government. The Government administers the principal
Muslim shrines and mosques and has provided allotments to them and to churches
for maintenance and refurbishing. There are no penalties under Iraqi law for chang-
ing one's religion, although there is a social stigma for Muslims who convert to an-
other faith.
While the Government has assumed much greater authority in Islamic religious
affairs since 1981, it has been less intrusive into the religious affairs of Iraq's Chris-
tians, who'number more than 500,000 and constitute nearly 4 percent of the popula-
tion. Their freedom of worship in churches of established denominations is legally
protected, but they are not permitted to proselytize or to hold meetings outside
church premises. Convents and monasteries exist, and some new churches have
been constructed, in some cases with government financial support. The Jewish
community has decreased from 150,000 following World War II to under 400. There
is no evidence of recent persecution. One synagog in Baghdad still functions.
d. Freedom of Movement within the Country, Foreign Travel, Emigration, and
Repatriation .
Iraqis are generally free to travel within the country and to change their resi-
dences or workplaces. However, they are likely to be constrained by social, cultural,
and religious traditions which define the areas occupied by the various ethnic and


16
d remolf milliwho renon. Travi
now requires años
Governmon permission is grantedenrelative with the s
avelman requidecreme Goveecree s3, the 20 year be Fenust
religious groups. Sensitive border and other security areas are off limits. There are
police checkpoints on highways and outside major towns, but Iraqis and nondiplo-
matic foreigners travel freely in nonrestricted areas.
The Government's harsh campaign to suppress Kurdish rebels, involving mass re-
locations of Kurdish villagers, has nullified the right of hundreds of thousands of
Kurds to choose their place of residence. Since the Government began its program
of forced relocation in 1987, an estimated 500,000 people have been uprooted. Since
traditional Kurdish culture has been deeply embedded in the rural village, the
forced removals and razing of villages has had a destructive impact on the lives of
some one-half million Kurds.
Most foreigners who remain in the country for more than 30 days and all Iraqis
must obtain exit permission. Travel has been severely limited since September 1986,
when the Government imposed tight restrictions on currency exchange. These re-
strictions were eased somewhat in 1989, but the most an Iraqi may exchange is
1,000 dinars ($3,220). Because of the drain on the economy caused by the war and
reconstruction, permission to travel abroad is restricted to a few categories of Iraqis,
including officials, businessmen, government-approved students, and persons need-
ing medical treatment. In 1989 the Government eased restrictions to permit one
parent to visit his or her offspring who is studying or working abroad.
While permission for medical treatment abroad may be granted, permission to
transfer hard currency abroad to pay for it may not be. In cases of those desiring
medical treatment in the United States, the Government now requires a bond to be
posted by an American friend or relative with the Iraqi embassy in Washington
before exit permission is granted. The minimum amount of this bond is $10,000. The
Government sometimes limits the countries an Iraqi traveler may visit and, should
the traveler visit a nonauthorized country, a small fine may be levied upon his
return. Iraqis who have residences abroad may depart the country, provided they
originally left before the war began. A married woman must have the permission of
her husband to travel abroad.
The Government can require a prospective traveler to post a substantial bond to
assure his return. The RCC decreed in 1987 that Iraqi students abroad who refuse to
return to Iraq must reimburse the Government for all education received in Iraq or
abroad at government expense. The decree is applicable retroactively to students
who have refused to return since May 16, 1983, the date the Government began re-
quiring employees leaving government jobs before 20 years of service to reimburse
the State for the cost of their education. Amounts due can be recovered by confisca-
tion; nonpayment may result in imprisonment. Each student must provide a guar-
antor before traveling abroad. This guarantor and the student's parents may be
held liable if the student fails to return.
There is no specific ban on emigration or special restrictions for members of mi-
nority groups; however, emigration is discouraged. For the past several years,
almost all of those given permission to emigrate have been Christian Iraqi wives of
former Iraqi citizens now living abroad as citizens of another country. Prospective
emigrants have had travel permission delayed and have been harassed. Many emi-
grants leave behind substantial property because of the difficulty of exporting
assets. Currency exchange violations are considered national security offenses, and
penalties can be severe.
Non-Iraqi spouses of Iraqi citizens who have resided in Iraq for 5 years are re-
quired to take Iraqi nationality or leave Iraq. Many people, including several Ameri-
cans, have thus been obliged to accept Iraqi citizenship and are therefore subject to
the present travel restrictions. In March 1984, an order by the RCC reduced the
residency period before naturalization to 1 year for the spouses of Iraqi citizens em-
ployed in government offices. The Iraqi spouse faces penalties for noncompliance,
including loss of job, a fine of approximately $10,000, and repayment of the costs of
education. Iraq does not recognize the concept of dual nationality, and many Iraqi
"dual nationals,” especially the children of an Iraqi father and a mother of non-
Iraqi birth, have been denied permission to leave Iraq to visit the country of their
other nationality.
In recent years, the Government has instituted special programs to encourage re-
patriation of qualified professionals. Aliens of Iraqi origin can apply for a document
permitting them to enter and exit from Iraq without a visa.
Other persons of Iraqi origin are permitted to return, including many persons
who were admitted to other countries as refugees. A number of such people, espe-
cially Assyrian Christians, have returned on temporary visits. They are free to come
and go, within the limits of the present travel restrictions, since they are not consid-
ered to have violated Iraqi laws. However, those who emigrated only after the begin-
ning of the Iran-Iraq war, including several U.S. permanent resident aliens, have
quiring employees to return since Maydegree is applicabile
o desore temo The Iraqi spouse faces penanuito
ning of thve violatedmits of the returneas refugees return, in


18
schools, and on men who were seen harassing women. While the application of these
laws has resulted in significant tangible improvements for women, a number of
problems remain. Married women may still travel abroad only with the permission
of their husbands. School enrollment of females has been increasing in recent years,
reaching 45 percent in elementary schools and 36 percent in secondary schools in
1985–86.
Women represent about 47 percent of agricultural workers and about 25 percent
of the total work force. The war accelerated the Government's drive to elevate the
status of women, and it appears to have significantly reduced, if not removed, bar-
riers to the acceptance of women in traditional male roles. Women are increasingly
employed as architects, construction engineers, oil engineers, air traffic controllers,
and factory and farm managers. Their role in the armed forces is limited to the
medical field.
Violence against women, such as wife beating and rape, is known to occur but
little is known about its extent. Such abuse is customarily dealt with within the
tightly knit Iraqi family structure because of the value attached to personal privacy
in this conservative society. Consequently, there is no public discussion of the sub-
ject, and there are no official statistics. Excessive violence against women would be
grounds for divorce and criminal charges, but suits brought on these charges in Iraq
are believed to be rare.
The use of minority languages is unrestricted. Kurdish is an official language
used in schools and media in Kurdish areas. Turcomans publish in their dialect of
Turkish, and Christians often use Aramaic as well as Arabic.
The Shi'a, who make up roughly 55 percent of the population, have historically
been economically, politically, and socially disadvantaged throughout much of the
Middle East. The Government has a declared policy to raise their living standards
and equalize opportunities for their economic and professional advancement. For
four centuries, political power in Iraq has been concentrated in the hands of the
Sunni minority. Sunni Arabs, who comprise 20 to 25 percent of Iraq's population,
dominate the RCC, the Regional Command of the Ba'ath Party, and the Cabinet.
However, increasing numbers of Shi'as hold prominent positions, and the economic
status of the Shi'a has improved through intensive government investment in the
economic and educational infrastructure of southern Iraq.
Although Christians sometimes allege discrimination in education and jobs, ad-
herence to their religion has not prevented many from obtaining wealth and profes-
sional advancement. The Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister, a Chaldean
Christian, has represented Iraq at meetings of the foreign ministers of the Organiza-
tion of the Islamic Conference. Other Christians hold important official and private
positions.
Citizens considered to be of Iranian origin carry special identification. They are
often precluded from desirable employment and their advancement may be imped-
ed. Many “Iranian" families have been in Iraq for generations. The two holiest
shrines of Shi'a Islam, the prevalent sect in Iran, are located in Iraq. For genera-
tions Iranians have come to Najaf and Karbala on pilgrimage or to study in the se-
minaries, and many settled there. Some "Iranians” say their forebears were not
from Iran but claimed Iranian nationality to evade Ottoman military conscription.
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
Trade unions independent of government control do not exist in Iraq. Under the
trade union organization law of June 2, 1987, a new single trade union structure
was prescribed for organized labor. Workers in private and mixed enterprises and in
cooperatives—but not public employees or workers in state enterprises—have the
right to join a local union committee. The committees form trade unions which in
turn are part of provincial trade union federations. At the top is an umbrella orga-
nization, the Iraqi General Federation of Trade Unions, which is organically linked
to the Ba'ath Party and required to promote party principles and policies among
union members. The General Federation is affiliated with the International Confed-
eration of Arab Trade Unions and the Communist-controlled World Federation of
Trade Unions. It is also active in the tripartite Arab Labor Organization, headquar-
tered in Baghdad.
Although workers legally have the right to strike, after providing notice to the
Labor Ministry, no such strikes were reported in 1989. There was a 1-day wildcat
walkout by Egyptian workers protesting excessive work hours.


19
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
The right to bargain collectively is not recognized. Salaries for public sector work-
ers (i.e. the bulk of the employed) are set by the Government. Wages in the private
sector are set by the employers or negotiated individually with workers.
Iraq, which has ratified International Labor Organization (ILO) Convention 98 on
the Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively, was criticized by the ILO's Commit-
tee of Experts (COE) in 1989 for the fact that its new labor code of 1987 fails to
provide workers with protection against antiunion discrimination. The COE also ex-
pressed regret that the 1987 Act on trade onion organizations did not provide for
collective bargaining.
There are no export processing zones in Iraq.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
Although compulsory labor is prohibited by law, during and shortly after the war
with Iran the Popular Army, the militia of the Ba'ath Party, employed press-gang
methods to draft recruits. However, these activities ceased in November 1988, and
the Popular Army was for the most part demobilized in 1989.
ILO supervisory bodies again in 1989 expressed concern that the Penal Code per-
mits the punishment of civil servants with imprisonment, including compulsory
prison labor, for breaches of labor discipline, which include resigning from one's job.
A November cabinet meeting, reported in the government-directed press, quoted the
remark of a minister that resignation from government jobs should be free, confirm-
ing that heretofore civil servants have had to buy their way out of government serv-
ice.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children
Children are frequently encouraged to work as necessary to support the family,
but the employment of children under age 14 is forbidden in all enterprises other
than small-scale family enterprises. Children between the ages of 14 and 18 who are
employed are protected by law: they work fewer hours and have more privileges
than adult workers.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
The workweek in urban areas is 6 days, 7 to 8 hours a day, for workers in the
private and mixed sectors. These provisions do not apply to agricultural workers
whose workweek and hours of work per day can vary according to individual em-
ployer-employee agreements. Hours for government employees are set by the head
of the ministry for which the employee works. Many government employees routine-
ly work longer than 8 hours a day, some of them as much as 12 hours per day.
Occupational safety programs are in effect in state-run enterprises, and inspectors
make visits irregularly to private establishments. Enforcement varies widely. A gov-
ernment decree to extend occupational safety and health protection was issued and
subsequently withdrawn in December 1988, reportedly resulting in the dismissal of
the Labor Minister.
A special problem arose after the Government decided in June to reduce drastical-
ly the amount of hard currency foreign workers could remit. It is widely believed
that the Government took this measure to "encourage” foreign workers to leave the
country, thus freeing jobs for demobilized Iraqi soldiers. Workers not on contract
were particularly hard hit. Most of the over 2 million Egyptian workers in Iraq
were manual laborers. When they learned they would be able to transfer only $32
per month, they began to leave Iraq in droves, an estimated 2,000 per day by air
alone. Egyptian and other foreign workers in Iraq have claimed that some Iraqi em-
ployers forced them to work 12 to 15 hours a day for 8 hours' pay or refused to pay
wages. The Government has admitted that Iraqi banks have been slow to pay remit-
tances. Egyptian workers are in fact receiving their savings a year after leaving
Iraq.
Mr. GILDER. Once again this year we found Iraq's human rights
practices were abysmal. Human rights, as such, are not recognized
in Iraq. As our report details, the ordinary Iraqi citizen knows no
personal security against government violence. Disappearances fol-
lowed by secret executions appear to be common. In some cases, a
family only learns that one of its loved ones has been executed
when the security services return the body and, in line with the
Iraqi regime's view of justice, require the family to pay a fine.


from the omnipresent threat of government repression and vio-
lence.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Gilder follows:]
family only learwed by secret ersonal securityalira
- vuco nas been executed whon 12.
th no polir:ction fairls, of oppositis
PREPARED STATEMENT OF JOSHUA A. GILDER
Human rights, as such, are not recognized in Iraq. As our report details, the ordi-
nary Iraqi citizen knows no personal security against government violence. Disap-
pearances, followed by secret executions, appear to be common. In some cases, a
family only learns that one of its loved ones has been executed when the security
services return the body and, in line with the Iraqi régime's view of justice, require
the family to pay a fine.
The penalty for expressing opinions deemed objectionable by the regime is swift
and brutal. We believe that over the past 10 years many thousands to tens of thou-
sands—and I will speak to the inexactitude of our figures in a moment-have been
arrested by the secret police on suspicion of opposition to the government. While the
judicial system seems to function fairly well by regional standards for people ac-
cused of crimes with no political implications, there is not even the charade of due
process for those charged with security-related offenses. I should add that security-
related offenses are broadly defined to include such routine criminal matters as cur-
rency violations.
Torture is routine, for security offenses and ordinary crimes alike, and confessions
extracted under torture are admissible in court. Treatment is reported to be the
worst immediately following arrest and during the period of interrogation and in-
vestigation, which can last for months.
Compiling accurate information on human rights in Iraq is made extremely diffi-
cult by the highly secretive and repressive nature of the regime. Diplomatic travel
is severely restricted, and most Iraqis are, quite understandably, fearful of speaking
their minds to foreigners—or to anyone else for that matter.
The Iraqi regime is authoritarian in the extreme. There are some exceptions. The
practice of religion is largely free. There has been some attempt to relax the worst
aspects of the statist command economy. In general, however, the regime is ruthless
in its efforts to maintain absolute control over the population.
Control is exercised in part through the Ba'ath Party apparatus. The party is a
secretive one. While it has a large grass roots membership, decision-making is con-
centrated among the few at the-top. The lower ranks serve as informers on the po-
litical reliability of their neighbors. There are many other intelligence networks
through which the government monitors the citizenry, as well as keeps a careful eye
on the military and the Ba'ath Party itself. I have already described the punish-
ment for stepping out of line, or being deemed unreliable by the government. Peri-
odically, over the last 2 years, the regime announced that it had uncovered incipient
coup plots within the military. Hundreds were arrested. We do not know how many
were executed.
The Ba'ath Party is a Pan-Arabist party. As such, it has integrated Arabs of vari-
ous religions and sects quite well, but has had trouble finding an ideological niche
for Iraq's non-Arab citizens, most of whom are Kurds. The disaffection of elements
of the Kurdish population did not begin with Ba'ath Party rule, but the current gov-
ernment's policy has resulted in enormous human rights abuses.
With respect to the Kurds, the Iraqi government has followed a policy of carrot
and stick. It has sought to gain the support of as many Kurdish tribes as it can,
using the carrot of ethnic cultural freedom. There is a Kurdish Autonomous Region
with its own institutions, providing patronage for Kurdish tribes that support the
regime. Kurdish language and culture are fostered, and education in Kurdish is
available through the secondary level.
But the stick of Iraqi policy has been brutal. During the gulf War, in which Iran
took advantage of the dissatisfaction among Kurdish tribes, the Iraqi Government
began a campaign of destroying suspect villages, relocating the populations to close-
ly-watched cities and new settlements. After the ceasefire with Iran, Iraq's cam-
paign to dislodge rebels from the areas they controlled was accompanied by the
shocking, indiscriminate use of chemical weapons-killing thousands of men,
women, and children. After Iraqi troops regained these areas, destruction of villages
and towns, and population transfers were speeded up, until finally some 500,000—
about one-seventh of the entire Kurdish population of Iraq-were displaced. Al-
though we understand Iraqi authorities are now allowing displaced villagers to com-
bolicy has resulted, the Iraqi goverhof as many Kush Aut


22
mute to their lands to cultivate the fields and orchards, we remain extremely con-
cerned about the overall effects of this massive displacement.
Let me stress that in detailing our concerns over the treatment of Iraqi Kurds we
are not taking a position on the roots or aims of Kurdish rebellions, but rather on
abuses of internationally recognized human rights. The U.S. Government supports
the territorial integrity of the states in this region, and holds that Kurds should
seek to fulfill their aspirations peacefully within this context.
During the last 2 years the Government of Iraq has announced its intention to
institute reforms. Wartime travel restrictions have been relaxed, permitting large
numbers of Iraqis to travel abroad for the first time in 8 years. Elections for the
National Assembly and the Kurdistan Autonomy Council were held in April and
September 1989, respectively. Independents were allowed to run, and some Ba'ath
Party members were defeated. However, all candidates were carefully screened for
support for the Government, and in any event neither body has any real power or
legislative function as we would understand the terms.
A new constitution has been drafted and was submitted to the President last Jan-
uary. According to a recent Iraqi press report, the draft has undergone the finishing
touches by a panel of six members of the Iraqi leadership, and it will soon be sub-
mitted to the National Assembly and to a popular referendum.
It is, however, one thing to adopt a constitution and another thing to respect it.
The current Iraqi constitution includes clauses on respect for human rights, a ban
on torture, and the independence of the judiciary-none of which has any apparent
effect in practice. If Iraq wishes to end international criticism of its human rights
record, it must take steps that are real, not cosmetic. It must end the climate of fear
imposed by its security apparatus and hold meaningful elections that are more than
a mere charade. It must institute a truly independent judiciary and allow for a
truly free press that does more than simply parrot the government line.
Most important of all, it must treat its citizens with dignity and give them the
chance to live secure in their own homes and persons—free from the omnipresent
threat of government repression and violence.
The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much indeed. Our ranking mi-
nority member has joined us and may want to make his opening
Senator HELMS. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much, and I had
ty engagement this morning as did Senator Kassebaum. We
were saying farewell to the young people who served the Senate as
pages, and they are such remarkable young people Senator Kasse-
baum and I thought we ought to go and pay our respects to them.
Since Demosthenes' time, we were hearing the younger generation
was going to the dogs. It was not so then, and it is not so now, and
these young pages prove it.
In any case, 10 years ago those nations of the Middle East who
have exhibited hostility toward American interests did not have
access to weapons of mass destruction or the means of their deliv-
ery, but as all of us know, many of them today, including Iraq,
either have such weapons or are far advanced in their develop-
ment.
The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction to unstable and
potentially hostile parts of the world is truly the most significant
new national security issue we face today, and if we are not mind-
ful of that, we are not very smart, but none of these countries, es-
pecially Iraq, developed these weapons on their own. As former De-
partment of Defense official Dr. Števen Bryan noted, and I quote
him, “The American Government and its allies have permitted and
have been accomplices in the development and stockpiling of the
Middle East's major chemical warfare capability.”
What he has said about
know it is true. It is true for chemical weapons. It is true for the
development of germ warfare, ballistic missiles, and potentially nu-
clear weapons. For example, Professor Milhollin will tell the com-


23
mittee that the very sort of nuclear triggers halted in a sting oper-
ation last March have just been decontrolled at the COCOM meet-
ing in Paris last week. Here again, if we do not recognize what is
going on, then it is probable that we have overdosed on dumb pills.
This raises the very real possibility that Iraq will be able to pur-
chase these devices on the open market.
Now, how Iraq and the other countries of the region have ac-
quired poison gas and similar weapons is a story of almost unbe-
lievable greed on one side and bureaucratic bungling on the other.
International press has identified at least 30 West German firms
involved in this trade, as well as companies from Austria, Belgium,
France, Italy, Japan, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United King-
dom, and yes, even the United States of America.
Undoubtedly, Western governments could expand upon this list
considerably, but let this be clearly understood: there has been no
failure of intelligence. Very early on, we knew who was attempting
to sell what to whom. The failure has been one of an unwillingness
to put our own house in order and insist that our closest allies do
the same. Maybe we will now wake up.
In any case, we now know that our own Centers for Disease Con-
ol in Atlanta use the regular mail service to send some of the
world's deadliest viruses to Iraq, to Communist China, to Cuba, and
the Soviet Union. No one seems to have any concern. Nobody both-
ered to even tell the centers that all of these countries are develop-
ing germ warfare weapons.
We repeatedly sent our allies polite requests asking that they
control the dangerous exports of their firms. In diplomatic jargon,
these protests are called "demarches” but these were so weak that
they should be more aptly named “demarshmallow.” Naturally,
they were ignored, and naturally we, the United States, did noth-
ing.
Mr. Chairman, I regret going on so long, but this subject bothers
me, as I know it does you, and I thank you very much.
The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much indeed. I will limit my
statement to 10 minutes and we will be under the 10-minute rule,
and I would like to start out by asking either Mr. Kelly or Mr.
Gilder, in your view, does Iraq's conduct constitute “a consistent
pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized human
rights?”
Mr. GILDER. In our annual report and in my testimony here
today, we have attempted to describe in detail the seriousness of
human rights abuses in Iraq. They are abysmal. They are appall-
ing. I feel that we have been objective and, as I said, detailed, and I
believe accurate. We have pulled no punches in describing Iraq's
just terrible record on human rights.
The violations get to the very core of the question of human
rights, which is that people just have no security in their persons
or homes against government violence, and that is very serious
indeed. We in the State Department and the administration will
continue to report accurately on this situation, and we will contin-
ue to tell it like it is. Those particular words are legal language.
They are found in approximately eight different pieces of legisla-
tion that have established programs such as foreign assistance and
foreign lending.


24
We in our bureau in the Department are very sensitive to this
legislation and the will of Congress. We pay very close attention to
this legislation, and we are very careful never to do anything that
would in any possible way contravene it. I want to assure you of
that. We take this with utmost seriousness and follow it very close-
ly.
We have never made this finding formally. This is in part, I
think, an attempt to maintain in the conduct of foreign policy a
certain degree of flexibility. We have in this extremely volatile
region an extremely complex situation, and we in the Human
Rights Bureau sometimes have to grudgingly admit that human
rights is not the only issue. There is the issue of nuclear prolifera-
tion, chemical proliferation, regional politics, and the peace proc-
ess. Human rights is one of the paramount issues, but not the only
one. All these issues and concerns have to be balanced and taken
into consideration in the formulation of policy, especially in a situ-
ation as difficult as this. This sometimes demands a certain degree
of flexibility to be able to respond to events as they unfold.
The CHAIRMAN. I must press you a little bit on that, because I
recognize these words have legal meaning, but either in your view
it either does constitute a consistent pattern of gross violation of
human rights, or it does not constitute it, or the Department de-
clines to take a position. But which of those three positions is
yours?
Mr. GILDER. The Department is not prepared to make a formal
finding in that regard.
The CHAIRMAN. But you cannot affirm that Iraq's conduct has
constituted such a consistent pattern?
Mr. GILDER. I can describe to you in detail the types and the
character of the human rights abuses in Iraq.
The CHAIRMAN. That is not my question. My question is, does it
not constitute a consistent pattern of gross violation of
internationally recognized human rights?
Mr. GILDER. All I can respond, Senator, is that the Department is
not prepared to make a formal finding in that regard.
The CHAIRMAN. That is an unsatisfactory answer, but I realize
you are merely the instrument that speaks for a larger entity than
just you. Has the administration made a determination whether
Iraq's conduct constitutes a consistent pattern of the gross viola-
tions? Obviously your answer is “No, it has not made that.”
Mr. GILDER. We have not.
The CHAIRMAN. How can you then enforce the laws imposing
sanctions on countries that do meet this standard?
Mr. GILDER. Excuse me, I am not quite sure what you mean.
The CHAIRMAN. How can the administration enforce the laws im-
posing sanctions on countries that meet this standard?
Mr. GILDER. Well, I will try to be responsive. As I said, we are
very aware of the law and we follow it very closely. We are very
careful never to take any action or to go forward with any lending
programs, or any other kind of foreign assistance, that would in
fact contravene that legislation. I can confidently say that we are
not doing that.


26
Middle East? Or is President Hussein just getting involved in a lot
of bombast?
Mr. KELLY. Senator, you raise several questions, let me try to
tackle them. First of all, Iraq's military capability, almost 2 years
after the ceasefire in the war with Iran remains significant. Iraq
still has an army in the neighborhood of 50 divisions; it has a very
large air force as you pointed out. And it is certainly, I suppose, the
strongest military power in that particular part of the Arab world.
In public statements by members of the Iraqi Government, by
Saddam Hussein, they identify two potential enemies: Iran, which
they fear might at some point reinaugurate the fighting; and in
that regard, there is a cease-fire, but there is not a peace agree-
ment or settlement between Iran and Iraq. And very obviously,
Saddam Hussein has identified Israel as a potential enemy.
In the public statements by Saddam Hussein and other members
of the Iraqi Government they have talked about deterring war,
they have talked about retaliating against attacks against them.
They have not publicly threatened on their own to initiate a war
with countries in the region. But, clearly, Iraq's record is signifi-
cant and worrisome in this regard.
Senator BOSCHWITZ. Well, they certainly have threatened the Is-
raelis with chemical attacks and so forth.
Mr. KELLY. They certainly did, although, Saddam Hussein in sub-
sequent comments when asked about that has said in each case
that he specified an attack against Israel in retaliation for an Is-
raeli strike against Iraq. And he has since qualified that as an
attack by Israel with weapons of mass destruction, nuclear weap-
ons or something along those lines. But, clearly, his bombast has-
we have described it as outrageous and inflammatory and as heat-
ing up the region.
We have said that nobody should be trumpeting chemical weap-
ons or threats to use them. And this administration has very
firmly and publicly, the President himself has spoken to the issue,
deplored and regretted this kind of rhetoric.
Senator BOSCHWITZ. So that the Iraqis have rebuilt their mili-
tary? How big are their divisions?
Mr. KELLY. I am sorry?
Senator BOSCHWITZ. How big are their divisions? Are they small
divisions? Large divisions? 9,000? 14,000?
Mr. KELLY. I think they are in the neighborhood of 10,000 to
12,000, but I could correct that for the record, if necessary.
Senator Boschwitz. Do that, if you will. And so now they have
restored their military vigor from the exhaustion following the Ira-
nian war?
Mr. KELLY. Well, their military position is certainly very strong.
How exhausted the populace is, or what kind of a taste the popu-
lace has to reengage in warfare is a different question.
tor BOSCHWITZ. Let us turn to Mr. Arafat, who has not yet
clearly indicated what he intends to do with respect to Mr. Abu
Abbas, and that would certainly, at least from my vantage point,
draw into question whether or not talks with the PLO should con-
tinue. I did not object to those talks beginning, and as a matter of
fact, welcomed them. Can you give us an update on the status of
that and how you feel that is going to move?


27
Mr. KELLY. Senator, I can add little to what Secretary Baker has
said on the public record before this committee 3 days ago, and
before a committee in the other House 2 days ago. But the adminis-
tration remains extremely concerned by the involvement of PLO
elements in terrorism in the attack on the beaches of Tel Aviv.
The administration has set forth publicly and privately in com-
munication to the PLO what steps the administration believes need
to be taken: denunciation and steps to discipline members involved
in that. And the administration is not yet at the point where it is
going to make a decision on the continuation of the dialog. But the
President and the Secretary take the matter very, very seriously
and they are weighing the matter very carefully. And as Secretary
Baker said, “We will not allow our pursuit of peace to undercut our
commitment to fight terrorism.”
And we believe that the PLO understands that. But an actual de-
cision has not been made yet, Senator.
Senator BOSCHWITZ. Well, the Senator from Minnesota has not
signed resolutions or letters or other things with respect to that.
But I must tell you that I trust the administration will hang very
tough with respect to the PLO. And that if they are going to be
players they cannot play that way and still remain in contact, in
my judgment, with the United States and be an active participant
and try and solve the Middle East problems, not just exacerbate
them.
Let me turn for a moment, I believe, that you went with Deputy
National Security Advisor to India to deal with Kashmir, did you
not?
Mr. KELLY. I did, Senator.
Senator BOSCHWITZ. And would you just give me an overview of
that situation, and which way it is going? It seems to have reached
a point of exactly what the solution can be is difficult to imagine.
Neither Pakistanis, nor the Indians, nor the Kashmiris themselves
are at such sore points. What are the possibilities of working our
way through that situation? And what can we do?
Mr. KELLY. Senator, President Bush sent the Deputy National
Security Advisor, Mr. Gates, and myself and Dr. Haass of the Na-
tional Security Council Staff, to India and Pakistan to deliver a
message from the President to the leadership of both countries and
to discuss with the leadership of both countries the President's
grave concern that the two countries were in a situation which
could be heading toward a war, a war that we understand neither
government to want, but a war that would be terrible and obvious-
ly have a very destructive impact on both nations and on our rela-
tions with each nation and on much of the rest of the world's rela-
tions with each nation.
The reason we have this concern was because of the continued
conflict, internally, in Kashmir, a disputed territory between the
two countries, because both countries were making deployments of
military forces which were disturbing to the other. The United
States did not want to attempt to become a mediator between the
two nations, but wanted to express our concern and to discuss with
each country ways in which miscalculation could be avoided and in
which tensions might be reduced. We were received cordially and
listened to fully in both capitals.


Since that visit 3 or 4 weeks ago, there have been a couple of
signs that tensions, at least, have the potentiality of being reduced.
Both governments have talked publicly about withdrawal of mili-
tary forces away from the border. Both countries have been in
touch diplomatically about other confidencebuilding measures,
which could lead to perhaps a less tense situation.
And we understand that there is the prospect now for direct
talks between the two countries in the near future. We hope those
talks will contribute to a reduction of tensions between the two.
The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.
Senator Moynihan, the chairman of the Oversight Subcommittee.
Senator MOYNIHAN. Mr. Chairman, I am sure we would all like
first to welcome Secretary Gilder. I believe this is your first ap-
pearance before the committee.
Mr. GILDER. It is.
Senator MOYNIHAN. We are very happy to have to you here.
Thank you for your very clear, if not always happy, statement.
I would like to say to Secretary Kelly that this subcommittee has
received a briefing on the Kashmir situation, a closed briefing. And
I think, our judgment certainly tracks with yours about what
seemed to be building up, and it may be building down just a bit.
Surely those two nations know how ruinous a war would be, and in
particular, the Pakistani military has to understand that if they
should take the initiative and make their way into Kashmir that
the result would be an all-out war with India, and the Indian Army
would have invested the Port of Karachi in 10 days' time; and
there goes the navy, and there goes Pakistan. They will not survive
another defeat of that kind.
And they ought to understand that there will be no new Ameri-
can tanks. A new set of American tanks will not replace the old set
of American tanks. That has been their experience through the two
previous wars. But the Cold War is over, and nations need to un-
derstand that. And the Indians need to understand that. The Sovi-
ets will be sympathetic, but it will end right there.
And, so, let us hope that some sanity is involved, not that the
leaders of those countries can always control what happens in their
populations, which I think we should understand.
I have two other questions. And one is a question that we keep
addressing to administration officials, not this particular adminis-
tration, but a succession of them, with respect to just what does it
mean to establish a norm in international law? What follows? Now,
I think it is clear that in the recent war, which Iraq started over
the Sha'at-Al-Arab, there was widespread use of poison gas. The
first time it happened since the 1914 War, the First World War.
That was the great event of the Second World War that neither
side used gas. And that gave us the image of the two scorpions in
the bottle that might control the use of nuclear weapons.
After the First World War, we adopted in Geneva the Geneva
Protocol for the prohibition of the use in war of asphyxiating, poi-
sonous, or other gases. Now, Iraq was a party to that protocol, and
they violated it, the clearest possible violation of a rule, of a treaty,
not some supposed emerging standard, but a written document.
What do you do?


29
You wish they had not done it. Does it mean anything to violate
the treaty? Does it mean anything to violate an international con-
vention on something as serious as gas warfare? Can the United
States do anything?
Mr. KELLY. Senator, in the autumn of 1988 following the outra-
geous uses of these noxious gases--
Senator MOYNIHAN. Instead of saying “outrageous” why do you
not say “illegal”?
Mr. KELLY. Following the use of these gases in contravention of
the 1925 Geneva Protocol--
Senator MOYNIHAN. That is pretty close for the Department of
State. [Laughter]
Mr. KELLY. I should hasten to add, I am not an international
lawyer, but nevertheless—-
Senator MOYNIHAN. International law is not something for which
you take a bar exam.
Mr. KELLY. Well, I am not any kind of a lawyer, I guess I should
say.
Senator MOYNIHAN. But you are a diplomat, and you are in-
volved with the standards of international conduct which this con-
vention-please do not recuse yourself, or excuse yourself. You are
the Assistant Secretary of State. The Geneva protocol was violated.
It was signed with the utmost concern of mankind at the time that
this never happen again. It happened. It finally happened. What
have we done?
Mr. KELLY. There was indeed a vigorous debate, as you well re-
member, Senator-I think you took a leading part in it—in the
autumn of 1988. The administration then in office condemned the
ut resisted the imposition of sanctions. My recollection-
and I was not present in the city of Washington then-was that the
administration took the position that it wanted to attempt to influ-
ence Iraq never to repeat the use of chemical weapons.
Senator MOYNIHAN. But not to punish. If we could go back to
1925 and remember the horrors of the First World War—the
horror. A shock to mankind, and nothing was more shocking than
poison gas, and we solemnly undertook never to use it again, with
the absolute presumption that the first nation that did would be
punished, would wish it had not, that the international community
would punish it.
That is what law means. When you bring these treaties to us and
you ask us to take them seriously, well, there was never a more
serious treaty agreed to in the world. I think I can say that honest-
Mr. Chairman, I think that the Geneva protocol on poison gas
was probably the most solemn undertaking the world has ever
made. It was an absolutely hideous assault on humanity, and never
again would it happen-and never did it happen. Through the bru-
talities of the Second World War it never happened, and then it
does happen.
What do we do? We say, we certainly cannot withhold agricultur-
al credits. Oh, dear. The Iowa primary. I mean, did we not go to all
the other—there are about 80 other nations that have signed that
protocol, or—are there probably more? Probably 120.
Mr. KELLY. I suspect more, yes.
ly.
31-408 0 - 90 - 3


30
Senator MOYNIHAN. Did we not convene them in New York in
absolute outrage that an elemental standard of human behavior
that the international community said will never be violated had
been violated and there must be consequences? If not consequences
to this, sir, then what brings consequences?
Mr. KELLY. An international conference was called in response to
that use, sir, in Paris in January 1989, to discuss ways to reinforce
the treaty, and to try to deter--
Senator MOYNIHAN. But nothing happened, and it is the same
thing as Senator Boschwitz was asking about the PLO. These were
conventions, and again it is the fact that poison gas was used first
by German forces in 1914, and then outlawed, and in 1949 the
Geneva convention, we tried to make law-make illegal under
international law-practices of Nazi Germany that the Nuremberg
trials had dealt with, and the Geneva convention relative to the
protection of civilian persons in time of war, which specifically for-
bids violence to life and person and particularly murder of all
n in the case of armed conflict not of an international
character.
Now, clearly the raid on Israel from Abu Abbas, from the PLO,
violated that 1949 Geneva Convention. We do not protest particu-
larly. We deplore, but we do not feel as if there is a standard which
has been violated for which, people having made commitments,
there must be sanctions.
I mean, the whole idea of law is being frittered away. Law be-
comes an assertion of what nice people do, but if they do not, well,
what are you going to do about that? That takes a magisterial con-
cept that there will be standards and they will be enforced and re-
duces it to a form of wishful thinking.
I do not mean in any way to be difficult with you, Mr. Secretary.
It is just to say that, what does it mean if we are not going to insist
that the Geneva convention be enforced on poison gas? Where will
we take a stand?
Mr. KELLY. May I respond?
Senator MOYNIHAN. Please, sir.
Mr. KELLY. You put your finger on one of the semipermanent di-
lemmas of how you deal with countries that commit outlaw acts.
The debate which comes up year after year after year is whether
one responds to that effectively by imposing sanctions, economic or
what have been discussed about Iraq, and whether that is effica-
cious.
Now, this administration and the preceding one have both taken
the position that they do not want to use agricultural exports as a
foreign policy weapon. They have not wanted to cut off the sale of
agricultural commodities to Iraq, feeling that this is of benefit to
the American farmer and that a country like Iraq can easily obtain
those agricultural supplies—that rice, that lumber, that tobacco,
those other products that are sold-easily elsewhere on the world
market.
Sanctions, to be effective, I think require multinationality. In
other words, application by the international community. We have,
Senator, I think, virtually zero expectation that any other nations
would join us in the imposition of sanctions against Iraq, and there-
fore it would be the American farmer and the American exporter


31
who would in effect be punished. The Iraqis would be able to pur-
chase the same kinds of goods and products elsewhere on the world
market, so there is that intrinsic problem.
It came up with South Africa. Do you engage with South Africa,
or do you cut off contacts? Do you sanction them? When the Sovi-
ets shot down the Korean airliner in 1983, there was a debate then.
Do you cut off contacts with the Soviets? How do you alter this
kind of outrageous behavior?
One school is: sanctions. Walk away from them. Cut off contacts.
The other school is: you attempt to remain engaged, to persuade, to
argue, to dissuade, to bring moral pressure to bear. Obviously these
are incomplete solutions, Senator.
Senator MOYNIHAN. My time is up. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much indeed, Senator Moyni-
han.
Senator Helms.
Senator HELMS. Senator Moynihan, amen.
Let us get down to the nitty-gritty. Greg Stanko of the committee
staff is posting a satellite photograph.
Mr. Kelly, you see a satellite photograph of what has been al-
leged to be a germ warfare facility at Salman Pat, which is, as you
know, an ultramodern facility south of Baghdad. Now, the photo of
this plant was revealed by NBC News on April 11 of this year. My
questions—and I have three of them on this-does the U.S. Govern-
ment believe that biological warfare research is going on at that
facility?
Mr. KELLY. At that particular facility? I think that answer will
have to be provided on a classified basis, Senator.
Senator HELMS. Well, why?
Mr. KELLY. Because it derives from intelligence sources and
methods.
Senator HELMS. Bullfeathers. The Iraqis know they have got it.
They also know whether we have got it or not. It was on NBC
News. You know, something that pains me around this city is that
there is so much stuff that the American people have a right to
know, is slapped under a classification.
But let me ask you another one and see if the answer is going to
be the same. Does the United States Government believe that Iraq
is conducting research on anthrax, typhoid, and cholera?
Mr. KELLY. Senator, the answer is going to have to be the same.
We will be happy to supply that answer on a classified basis.
or HELMS. Which means that we can learn it, but we
cannot let the American people know. Is that correct?
Mr. KELLY. There are good and sufficient reasons to protect
sources and methods that have existed for many decades, Senator.
Senator HELMS. Well, my third question, which will elicit the
same answer, I am sure, is which non-Iraqi firms provided plant
and equipment to that facility?
Mr. KELLY. I do not know the answer to that question, but we
will try to provide it for the record.
[The information referred to follows:]
Question. Is the West Nile fever virus being investigated at Fort Detrick, MD?
Answer. This question should be directed to the U.S. Army Medical Research and
Development Command at Fort Detrick, MD.


33
Senator HELMs. Mr. Chairman, we had a little bill pass the
Senate twice, did we not?
The CHAIRMAN. Correct. It was opposed by the administration
and also by some of our friends in the House.
Senator HELMS. Well, my time is almost gone, and I want to get
into another line of questioning, and so I am going to yield my
time.
The CHAIRMAN. Before yielding it, it would seem to me that the
witnesses could at least give their impressions as to whether the
statements were correct or not in your first questions.
Senator HELMS. Well, I guess they would say that is classified.
The CHAIRMAN. Would your opinion be classified? That has noth-
ing to do with sources.
Senator HELMS. Now, please do not feel compelled to give a quick
answer. I mean, it is a serious question.
Mr. KELLY. I think prudence dictates that we are going to have
to supply that answer on a classified basis to the committee, sir.
[The information referred to follows:]
Question. Why do things like the CDC's shipping West Nile fever virus to Iraq and
other such countries occur?
Answer. Until recently, there were no controls on the export of microorganisms
from the United States to medical or research institutions overseas. Controls were
established last year and the CDC itself tells us that Iraq has been placed on a pro-
scribed destination list for such microorganisms.
Senator HELMS. Mr. Chairman, maybe you will let me have a
little extra time in my next round by surrendering the rest of my
time at this time, but before I do I ask unanimous consent that
today's hearing be printed. I at least want Senators to have the
benefit of the answers.
The CHAIRMAN. Without objection.
Senator HELMS. I also ask unanimous consent that the record be
kept open until the witnesses can answer some questions that I
intend to put to them in writing.
The CHAIRMAN. Without objection.
[The information referred to follows:]
RESPONSES OF MR. MILHOLLIN TO QUESTIONS ASKED BY SENATOR HELMS
Question. In your prepared testimony you say that our exports to Iraq are secret.
Could you elaborate?
Answer. Over the past few years the United States has sold Iraq high-speed oscil-
loscopes and powerful computers that are undoubtedly being used to develop long-
range missiles. As Iraq's nuclear program progresses, the equipment will also be
used to help develop nuclear weapons. These exports were only possible because the
Commerce Department, which approved the exports, refuses to open its records to
public scrutiny.
The Commerce Department argues that all records of its export licensing deci-
sions must be confidential in order to protect business information obtained from
U.S. exporters. This position prevents Congress and the public from learning about
exports that could threaten U.S. and world security. I am convinced that if Congress
or the public had known about the applications that were approved for Iraq, Com-
merce would have not have dared to approve them. Under the current system, only
the exporters have the ear of the licensing authorities. This results in special plead-
ing, and in licenses which sacrifice national security to short-term commercial inter-
est.
Congress should request from the Commerce Department a list of all exports of
nuclear- and missile-related items sent to Iraq over the past five years, together
with a list of all pending applications for such items to Iraq. The names of the ex-
porter could be deleted in order to protect any commercial interest. After inspecting


34
these lists, Congress would see that the export licensing process should be opened to
public scrutiny.
Question. Do you think that our policy towards Iraq's nuclear smuggling effort
has been sufficiently vigorous?
Answer. Our response has been too timid. Iraq has established a world-wide net-
work of well-financed agents who are trying to buy the means to make nuclear
weapons and long-range missiles. To stop this effort, Iraq must be made to bear
some cost for violating other countries' export laws. The only cost so far has been
the arrest of the small fry who get caught. That is not sufficient to deter further
efforts. United States is segught. The uning all U.S. ex
If the United States is serious about stopping Iraq's agents, Iraq itself must bear a
cost when the agents get caught. The United States must be willing to consider
sanctions. At a minimum, I recommend halting all U.S. exports to Iraq of high-tech-
nology items that could be used to develop nuclear weapons or long-range missiles.
Congress should ask the Commerce and Energy Departments to suspend approval of
such licenses until further notice.
Senator HELMs. I thank the Chair. I yield back the balance of my
time.
The CHAIRMAN. Senator Kassebaum.
Senator KASSEBAUM. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Gilder, I would like to go back to an answer, first, that you
gave the chairman, and see if I understood it correctly. I believe
that the chairman asked you if the Amnesty International report
regarding Iraq's purported execution of children was correct, and
you said “You believed that from references that you had that in
general those allegations were correct.” Is that correct?
Mr. GILDER. I think it is very possible. We know that the regime,
for instance, when it moved against the Kurds slaughtered whole
families at a time. So, they are perfectly capable of this type of ac-
tivity.
There are no legal safeguards, no safeguards of any kind, against
it happening. So, we have absolutely no reason to dispute that this
has happened. That is why we referred to the Amnesty report in
our own country report.
Senator KASSEBAUM. And that we cannot really do anything
about it because we have never done anything about anything like
this before. Is that right?
Mr. GILDER. Well, I think within the usual diplomatic channels
we do everything we can possibly do about it. We do not have the
friendliest relations with the Iraqis, but whenever we—the Human
Rights Bureau, the Department, or our Ambassador to Iraq-talk
to them, human rights is at the top of the agenda.
We raise these issues forcefully, and we bring them up in inter-
national forums. We were one of the leaders at the U.N. Human
Rights Commission this year, in trying to get a resolution against
Iraq.
We have spoken out forcefully about it.
Senator KASSEBAUM. Well, I do not mean to be critical of you.
And I know through diplomatic channels—which is the process of
the State Department-you are doing perhaps all that you can do.
But I just want to say it just makes me weep to think that we are
not doing more to call this to the world's attention, that we are
sort of standing by and just saying "Well, we are trying through
diplomatic channels.”


35
Now, Assistant Secretary Kelly I think made a good point. Our
actions frequently become limited. Do sanctions work if all of our
major trading partners are not engaged in it?
But just because sometimes it might not work does not mean, I
think, that we should not be more vigorous and vigilant in stand-
ing up to say what we believe is wrong and a tragedy.
Mr. GILDER. Secretary Kelly has spoken to the sanctions issue,
but we do make our feelings well known publicly.
Senator KASSEBAUM. Well, it has not done much good. So, maybe
we ought to try some other channel.
Mr. GILDER. The report that we publish every year does not have
a magic effect. It does not change events overnight. But nations
around the world are extremely sensitive to what we write in that
report.
The Iraqis have been extremely sensitive to what we have been
writing about in that report. They read it, and it makes an impres-
sion. Unfortunately, it often does not change behavior overnight,
and sometimes never. But my feeling is it does have a real effect. It
is noticed. And it is one of our most effective tools.
Senator KASSEBAUM. Well, let me ask about some specifics, then,
that perhaps we should consider, not just in the light of what can
be done to assist with the children and the families in Iraq but
through other sources that we have.
One is, Secretary Kelly, your comment in your opening state-
ment that the smuggling and continued smuggling of systems,
parts of systems by Iraq-is something that is causing licensing au-
thorities and customs officials around the world to be doubly cau-
tious.
Well, I just find that beyond, again, understanding, because if we
are concerned-and certainly Iraq is not the only one that is en-
gaged in chemical proliferation of chemical or nuclear equipment
and means, but it is Iraq we are talking about at this moment.
It is my understanding, even with the months of knowing what is
going on, we have done nothing to tighten controls. We have not-
we have to declare Iraq a country of concern, is that correct-
before we would place export controls. And we have not done that.
Mr. KELLY. Senator, that particular formulation—I am looking, I
have got a text that relates—that particular formulation "country
of concern” does not have any particular significance in law or
statute. It has no special meaning under U.S. export control laws
and regulations pertaining to the exports of weapons. And we do
have tremendously serious concerns. We share yours and we do
have controls in place, and they are working. I
For instance, we, and the British cooperated and were able to
intercept, prevent and arrest the individuals who were attempting
to smuggle out those capacitors. We do have this international
regime on missile parts, the missile control regime. We do have the
International Nuclear Suppliers Agreement on this. We have 50
chemicals which cannot be sold to Iraq from here in the United
States and which the other industrialized nations have agreed they
will not sell to Iraq or to other countries that are pursuing these
things.
So, there are controls in place. And we are tremendously con-
cerned about it. All questionable sales to Iraq are reviewed by the


37
that. I would be glad to make it from this spot or at the witness
table.
The CHAIRMAN. Well, why do you not make it there, and then
Senator D'Amato, I think, has some questions he would like to ask.
He will follow you. Go ahead.
Senator SPECTER. I thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
The CHAIRMAN. And we would be glad to put any portion of it in
the record, if you wish.
Senator SPECTER. I very much appreciate the opportunity to testi-
fy before this very distinguished committee and I thank you, Mr.
Chairman, for scheduling this important hearing.
The testimony has touched on a great many matters of tremen-
dous importance. I start with the proposition that the United
States should maintain an active role in the Mideast peace process.
From that generalization, there are many specifications. I strong-
ly disagree with what Secretary of State Baker said earlier this
week when he said to the Israelis that when they are interested in
peace, they should call the telephone number he provided.
I believe that Israel is within its rights in refusing to deal with
the PLO and in establishing stringent conditions on the peace talks
with the Palestinians. I do believe that Palestinian representation
can be obtained and that peace talks can go forward without deal-
ing with the PLO.
The record has been plain, in my judgment, since December 1988
that the PLO continues to engage in terrorism. I think the record
was plain on that before the failed attack by Abu Abbas within the
past 3 weeks.
The situation with Abu Abbas is a very serious one, and I think
it underscores the failure of the United States to deal effectively
with terrorism. We moved against Abu Abbas after he was the
principal party in the hijacking of the Achille Lauro, which result-
ed in the death of Mr. Leon Klinghoffer and we proceeded to try to
bring him to custody in the United States.
A Navy plane forced down the Egyptian airliner in Italy in 1985,
and regrettably the Italian authorities let Abu Abbas go. They
later convicted him in absentia in a meaningless proceeding and
gave him 30 years in jail which did not amount to anything at all.
I believe that we have the means at our disposal under U.S. laws,
which we passed in 1984 and in 1986, making it a violation of our
laws to kidnap or hijack or assault or maim or murder U.S. citizens
anywhere in the world.
We have not done that job, and we have outstanding indictments
against many terrorists. We simply have not done what we should
in bringing them to justice.
When Israel refuses to deal with the PLO, I believe that is an
understandable position. And there are many in the international
community, including Italy's former Prime Minister Craxi and
Yugoslavia's former President Moisov, who have let Abu Abbas slip
through their fingers and really through our fingers as well.
I had intended to comment about the violations of international
law and the use of poison gas, but Senator Moynihan has said it
very eloquently and there needs to be no supplement there.
I believe that we are facing very tough times, very difficult
times, really unparalleled in the Mideast at this moment with


38
what is happening there. And it has been my thought for some
time that Iraq and Syria are central to an ultimate solution in the
Mideast.
I believe that if we could find a way to bring Iraq and Israel to
the bargaining table and also Syria and Israel to the bargaining
table, as Egypt and Israel solved the peace process with the Camp
David Accords, I think, if it could be done as well with Syria and
Iraq, that we could establish security in the region. Then the issues
in the administered territories and the issues with the Intifada, al-
though difficult, would all fall into place.
Although I believe it is a tough matter to deal with Iraq and
Syria, I think we have to try. And that comes under my general-
ized category about U.S. maintaining an active role in the Mideast
peace process.
I believe that there have been some openings which have oc-
curred in the course of the past several years. Here I will refer
very briefly to Syria, because I think Syria is analogous to Iraq.
I have visited Syria on a number of occasions, and in 1984 found
Syria very hostile to a visiting United States Senator. But in 1988 I
found a significant change in attitude after President Assad got a
cold shoulder from Mr. Gorbachev in Moscow in the spring of 1987.
And I have had occasion to talk extensively with Presi
Assad, and there have been significant changes in Syria's position.
For example, Syria had maintained the position that it would
attend an international conference on Mideast peace only if con-
vened by the five permanent members of the U.N. Security Coun-
cil. That has been unacceptable to Israel, because it is a 4-to-1 bal-
ance against Israel. But within the course of the past several
months, President Assad has said he would attend an international
nce convened only by the United States and the Soviet
Union, which is a big change.
I believe that that ought to be pursued. And I think that there
may well be some Israeli interest there and some interest in our
State Department in pursuing that.
A number of Senators have had an opportunity to visit in Bagh-
dad in the course of the past several months. And I think that
there may well be an opportunity to try to effect some similar al-
teration in the policies in Iraq. I emphasize the word “may” be-
cause I do not know for sure, but I think it is worth pursuing. Even
to suggest that raises a lot of eyebrows because of the Iraqi record
and the record of President Saddam Hussein.
I have made two trips to Iraq. In January 1989 I was unable to
see President Saddam Hussein but talked to a number of other offi-
cials in Iraq and saw a mixed review—some very, very hostile to
anything in regard to the peace process, and other younger diplo-
mats affirming U.N. Resolutions 242 and 338.
Last January, Senator Richard Shelby and I visited Iraq and had
a long meeting, 1 hour and 20 minutes, with President Hussein and
found it very useful.
President Saddam Hussein is misinformed on many basic U.S.
policies. He asked why the United States excluded all of the Soviet
Jews in order to compel the Soviet Jews to go to Israel, and we cor-
rected him on the facts that we do allow 50,000 Soviet Jews here


39
and we exclude everybody, not just Soviet Jews, in terms of num-
bers.
Senator MOYNIHAN. How about Brighton Beach?
Senator SPECTER. If you will join me in the invitation, Senator
Moynihan, I will invite him to Brighton Beach.
I will not go into the details as to President Saddam Hussein's
misinformation. I will conclude in just a moment or two, Mr. Chair-
man.
There was a large delegation led by Senator Dole, including Sen-
ator Metzenbaum, Senator Simpson, Senator McClure, and Senator
Murkowski which visited Iraq. And our meetings in Iraq have been
followed by discussions with Iraq's Ambassador Al Mashat here.
I believe that there is an opportunity-or may be an opportuni-
ty—to pursue discussions with Iraq and think that it is not the
right time to impose sanctions. But it may be the right time to
impose sanctions at some point in the reasonably near future, de-
pending on what events occur.
Not to impose sanctions, however, is not to say we should make
gifts to Iraq. I strenuously disagree with the advance of $500 mil-
lion in credit guarantees. I do not think that is the sensible course.
And I had discussed this with Secretary Yeutter of Agriculture.
And the second $500 million are on hold for a variety of reasons.
So that I think that, while the imposition of sanctions at this
moment is unwise, that we ought not to be making gifts. It is a
very complex subject, Mr. Chairman, and those are just a few of
my thoughts on the matter. But I counsel a very active pursuit by
the State Department, and I have discussed this with Secretary
Kelly. And we have some plans as to what we would like to accom-
plish. Perhaps, an effort to get a specific positive statement from
Iraq and President Saddam Hussein in regard to the peace process.
I think there are opportunities. And the Iraqi Ambassador Al
Mashat thinks that that is a possibility. So that the stakes are very
high; it is a perilous course. We have to proceed very
ought not to be making any gifts, but we ought to be very, very
active in focusing U.S. attention on the Mideast peace process, be-
cause the possibilities are fraught with extreme peril on what is
going on there now, and we ought to act with dispatch.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.
I would point out that we still have more questions on the part of
the Senators here, and then we have a public panel following.
I think Senator D'Amato, one of our guests, has a couple of ques-
tions, and then Senator Helms, I know, does, and Senator Moyni-
han does, and then I would hope we could move to the public
panel.
Senator D'AMATO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Secretary Kelly, on page 10 of your testimony, and I quote, you
say: “We believe Iraq has clearly received the important message
of United States Government concern from both the administration
and Congress over its recent actions.” That implies, it seems to me,
or are you attempting to imply that somehow their behavior is
changing and would lead us to believe that there is hope that they
are going to stop the kinds of practices that we have all talked
about? In other words, their treatment of their own population, the


40
Kurds, the use of chemical weapons, the threat of the use of weap-
ons, et cetera, what leads you to believe this?
What outward manifestation have we seen in a positive sense
that gives substance to this conclusion?.
Mr. KELLY. Senator, that was not the interpretation of the state-
ment. What I meant to say, is what it says, that they have received
the message, I think, from public statements, from the debates, the
colloquies in the Senate, and from the visits by Senator Dole and
other Senators. I do not contend that they have altered their be-
havior.
Senator D'AMATO. Well, then, in light of that, I find it incredible
and unacceptable for the United States to be engaged in a policy
that says that commerce is more important than saying publicly
that we are not going to have anything to do with a man who by
all reasonable standards should be tried as a war criminal.
I think Senator Kassebaum said it best, that even it relates to
some special interest that might be enhanced economically in our
own country, that we have got some principles we have to stand up
for, and that is freedom and justice and human rights.
Now, if there is anything to mitigate against some of the-my
colleague, the distinguished Senator from North Carolina, comes
forward with an Iraqi germ war plan. And we hide behind the
muffle of security and say, “Well, you know, we cannot compro-
mise sources.” He is not asking to compromise a source. And I ask,
Senator, and with your indulgence that your staff would put that
picture up there, because it says more than you could talk about in
a thousand words.
This is absolutely unconscionable. And 1-you know, I very
seldom disagree with my good friend and distinguished colleague
from Pennsylvania, Senator Specter. We have, if you look at our
voting records, an 83-percent similarity, the greatest similarity in
the Senate. But, I have to tell you, “the fellah is a mad dog." He
threatens destruction of people, and he is not just talking about it,
he is doing it. This is the same son-of-a-gun, who in 1982, was build-
ing an atomic facility, and we half of the civilized world was aghast
when Israel sent in the jets and knocked it out. We should say
“Thank you; they did the right thing.” Because he then shows you
in subsequent wars that he will use the weapons of mass destruc-
tion, that those of us are so horrified over and are attempting to
control.
What about the building of the supercannon? I see you have “al-
leged” in your statement. Does that not bother you? I mean, do you
really think it was an alleged supercannon?
Mr. KELLY. A “big gun” I called it.
Senator D'AMATO. A big gun. An alleged-an alleged big gun. I
mean, do you think-do you really think he was trying to build
this for a pipeline?
Mr. KELLY. No, I do not, Senator.
Senator D'AMATO. It was a gun.
Mr. KELLY. And I would not want to stand within 2 miles of it
when they fired it.
Senator D'AMATO. Well, the point is—all right, I understand this
business, when you say, you know, you cannot impose sanctions,
the United States cannot be the policeman for all the world and


41
disadvantage itself, others and people—take place. But, you know, I
would like to know something, what if anything, have we done, the
United States, to ascertain how many, if any, of our allies and part-
ners would join in with us as it relates to undertaking certain sanc-
tions, economically and otherwise, with Iraq? Have we reached out
to any?
Mr. KELLY. Senator, we have discussed this.
Senator D’AMATO. Among ourselves.
Mr. KELLY. No, with a number of our allies.
Senator D'AMATO. The Canadians? Did you talk to them about
grain? That if we, wheat and agricultural products, if we were to
take a certain action, whether or not they would comply with us?
Have we really done that?
Mr. KELLY. I am not certain if we have talked to the Canadians.
I know we have talked to the Europeans.
Senator D’AMATO. They do not-come on, now what about the
Australians? We are talking about certain commodities, et cetera,
that do not come out of that European market, and you are talking
about the Europeans, my God, my own Italianos, they turned over
Abu Abbas. It shows how much spine they have.
I mean, have we really—we have not even undertaken the kind
of counsel with some of the people who do business with them.
Why do we have to buy their oil? What would happen if we did not
buy their oil? Did we ever do an analysis if we did not take 447,000
barrels of Iraqi oil? The market is a glut with it.
Are we afraid that the oil energy prices would go down a little
bit? Maybe we would buy it on the open market. Would that consti-
tute a problem? You tell it, your statement is replete with trade in
here, trade, trade. I did not know that that was the compe
factor.
You are really saying in this statement, Mr. Secretary, and I do
not wish to take you to task, because I think this is the administra-
tion's policy here that trade is more important than the basic
issues that we are talking about, whether it is nuclear prolifera-
tion, chemical weapons, the use of these weapons, the deprivation
of human rights, the threatening of war, a mindless kind of war,
and then we say, “Well, maybe we are making some progress.”
Would you care to respond?
Mr. KELLY. Yes, I would, Senator.
Clearly, we are not saying that trade is the be-all and end-all.
Senator D'AMATO. You know what, I have to tell you, and I beg
your indulgence for this, if you read this statement carefully, that
is almost—that is the underlying theme. That all that has gone on,
all that Senator Moynihan has indicated, that Senator Helms has
indicated, Senator Kassebaum is being papered over as it relates
to, you know, energy is important, 70 percent comes out of there.
Iraq is a big player, whether for better or for worse, and in conse-
quence, we are doing nothing.
This is like the spoiled kid. You just let them continue, because
he is in the family, and you do not know what to do. Do you think
he is going to get any better? Why should they change their poli-
cies, if they have been able to get away with the kinds of things
that the documents through this committee and others have dem-
onstrated? Killing people, using weapons, breaking international
31-408 0 - 90 - 4


42
law, and it is the breaking of international law, thumbing their
nose at people, why should they change?
Mr. KELLY. Senator, the purpose of describing those trade rela-
tionships was to try to demonstrate that if we are going to bring
influence and pressure to bear on Iraq, I would argue that it ought
to be effective. And my point is that, absent any international coop-
eration, that we are going to have minimal, if any noticeable effect,
on Iraq.
Senator D’AMATO. Then let me make a statement. I do not think
we have done a darn thing to really galvanize that kind of interna-
tional cooperation, and I have not heard of any. And if you knew of
any, you would tell me.
Mr. KELLY. Senator, I told you already, we have taken it up with
the Europeans.
Senator D'AMATO. What did you take up with them, specifically?
Mr. KELLY. I have myself talked to some of the Europeans and
said “Would you gentlemen be interested in putting some interna-
tional pressure on Iraq? And the answer is: No, you know, we have
our exporters to be concerned about and so on and so forth.”
Senator D’AMATO. Mr. Chairman, I thank you for your indul-
gence, and for the time, and for permitting this Senator the oppor-
tunity of participating in these.
I find, Mr. Secretary, that as it relates to attempting to use our
clout the way we can and whether we should and even if we have
to go it alone, and then when some of our allies and others need
some help with us, which they do regularly, to get them to join.
Sometimes you have to be the first, and you just cannot wait to
bring everybody into line, and I do not think we should permit this
situation to continue.
Are we the leaders of the free world or are we not? Do we stand
up when it is right and it is proper or do we not? And we are cer-
tainly, as it relates to our relations with Iraq, they are terrible,
they are poor, there should be economic sanctions. And at the very
least, we certainly should not be providing the kind of credit guar-
antees that we have in the past.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator D'Amato, for being with us.
I would also without objection like to have inserted in the record a
brief history of the fate of the bill that Senator Helms and I insert-
ed in the last Congress called Prevention of Genocide Act of 1988.
[The information referred to follows:)
A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE “PREVENTION OF GENOCIDE ACT OF 1988”
On September 8, 1988, Senator Pell introduced the "Prevention of Genocide Act of
1988” which imposed comprehensive sanctions against Iraq, including a near total
trade embargo and the cut-off of all commercial credits and credit guarantees. The
legislation was cosponsored by Senators Helms, Byrd, Levin, Ford, Proxmire, and
Gore. The Prevention of Genocide Act was a response to Iraq's poison gas attacks on
its Kurdish minority which began August 25, 1988.
The Prevention of Genocide Act unanimously passed the U.S. Senate on Septem-
ber 9, 1988. The Reagan administration opposed this and all other efforts to sanction
Iraq. It described the Pell bill as “premature” and the House of Representatives de-
clined to endorse such drastic action.
Senator Pell commissioned a Foreign Relations committee study of Iraq's use of
chemical weapons against its Kurdish minority. That study, based on a factfinding
mission to Eastern Turkey between September 11-17, 1988, constitutes the most


comprehensive documentation of Iraq's use of chemical weapons against the Kurds
and the only U.S. Government document published on this issue. See “Chemical
Weapons Use in Kurdistan: Iraq's Final Offensive,” October 1988.
On September 30, 1988, Senator Pell, with the cosponsorship of Senator Helms
and others, secured Senate passage of a scaled-back version of the Iraq sanctions
legislation as an amendment to the foreign assistance appropriations bill. This was
rejected by the House.
On October 11, 1988, a House-Senate compromise version of Iraq sanctions was
introduced by Senator Pell as an amendment to the Technical Corrections Tax Act
of 1988. The House conferees on the Technical Corrections Tax Act agreed to accept
the Iraq sanctions provision and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee was so no-
tified.
On October 21, 1988, the Reagan administration persuaded the House Foreign Af-
fairs and Ways and Means Committees to drop the Iraq sanctions provision. As this
was the last day of the session, this effectively killed the Iraq sanctions legislation.
The CHAIRMAN. And thank Senator Moynihan very much for
taking over at this point, and turn to Senator Helms.
Senator HELMS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
On the previous round of questions, I raised a number of issues
regarding the export of U.S. Centers for Disease Control of biologi-
t can be and probably are used in the development of
biological weapons.
Now, since then I asked the staff to compile a list of such exports
of biological agents to countries such as Iraq and Cuba and the
Soviet Union and Communist China. And the list was compiled, I
must say, from information obtained through a Freedom of Infor-
mation Act request from NBC. I ask unanimous consent, Mr.
Chairman, that this compilation be included in the record.
Senator MOYNIHAN. Without objection.
[The information referred to follows:]
CENTERS OF DISEASE CONTROL EXPORTS OF BIOLOGICAL AGENTS
Date
Country
Agent
1990
Communist China
Rickettsia prowazaki
[Comment: Exported to Institute of Epidemiology and Microbiology, Beijing by air
freight; agent is an incapacitent experimented with by the Nazis in World War II
for possible biological warfare applications]
1988
Communist China
Japanese encephalitis
[Comment: Exported to the School of Medicine in Shanghai; agent causes death in
2-50 percent of cases; identified as BW agent in Erhard Gessler (ed.) Biological and
Toxic Weapons Today (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1986]
1988
Cuba
St. Louis encephalitis
[Comment: Exported to the Institute for Tropical Medicine in Havana (hand car-
ried), identified by Gessler, ibid, as BW agent with mortality of 2-22 percent]
1989
Soviet Union
Yellow fever
[Comment: Exported to National Institute for Virology in Moscow (hand carried); In-
stitute thought to be center of BW research in Soviet Union; agent identified as BW
agent Gessler, ibid, with mortality rate of 5–19 percent]
1988
Soviet Union
Japanese encephalitis
[Comment: Also exported to National Institute for Virology in Moscow by certified
airmail; for agent characteristics, see Communist China above.]
1985
Iraq
West Nile Fever
[Exported to unidentified location in Basra, Iraq by express mail; incapacitent under
investigation by United States BW specialists at Ft. Detrick, MD]
Obtained by NBC News through a FOIA request.
Senator HELMS. All right. Now, then, Greg, if you would put up
the next chart.


44
Mr. Kelly, Professor Mulhollin, if you will read his statement, is
going to testify-And I quote him that, "The very nuclear triggers
that Iraq tried to smuggle out of the United States in March were
deleted from the COCOM list last week.” Now is this true?
Mr. KELLY. Senator, I heard that allegation a couple of days ago,
and I asked our experts “Is this true?” And they said, “No, it is not
true.” And I am told that I can supply documentary, that the De-
partment can send documentary information to substantiate that.
[The information referred to follows:]
Question. Provide documentary evidence that krytrons have not been removed
from COCOM list.
Answer. CCL Item 1542, which includes krytrons, has been deleted from the
COCOM list. Certain items in CCL 1542 are now controlled by the United States for
nonproliferation reasons. Krytrons are not now included, but the United States is in
the process of implementing unilateral controls.
Senator HELMS. Very well. So then it would not be true as well,
that spin-forming and flow-forming machines used to make the
bodies for uranium enrichment have been deleted?
Mr. KELLY. Senator, I have to confess, I do not know what those
machines are. But I would happy to—if you give us the question.
[The information referred to follows:]
Question. Have spin-forming and flow-forming machines been removed from the
COCOM list?
Answer. Yes, CCL Item 1075, which includes spin-forming and flow-forming ma-
chines, was deleted from the COCOM list. However, 1075 did not cover machines of
concern for nuclear proliferation. We are now considering which machines of this
type should be subject to nonproliferation controls. .
Senator HELMs. Now then, before you is a chart showing Saad 16
facility near Baghdad. Der Spiegel, a West German newspaper, on
March 27 alleged-and they had pretty good documentation, I
might add—that this is a chemical warfare and ballistic missile re-
search facility. Is that right?
Mr. KELLY. It is my understanding it is ballistic missiles. I think
our intelligence people do not hold any chemical stuff there, but
ballistic missiles, yes.
Senator HELMS. Now, how many Hewlett-Packard computers
were sold to that facility?
Mr. Kelly. I do not know that answer. I know that Hewlett-
Packard computers were sold to Iraq, yes, sir.
Senator HELMs. Would you supply that information for the
record?
Mr. KELLY. Yes, sir.
[The information referred to follows:]
Question. How many Hewlett-Packard computers have been sent to the Saad-16
facility in Iraq?
Answer. The Department has no record of approving exports to Iraq of computers
subject to foreign policy controls. However, most computer exports do not require
review by the Department of State. Only those computers which meet specific crite-
ria of the missile technology control regime or nuclear nonproliferation controls (or
when country specific controls are in effect) would be reviewed by the Department.
Senator HELMS. Now, who approved the sale of these computers?
Mr. KELLY. The sale, as I understand it, was a few years ago. I do
not know who approved that at the time. But let me make one
point, because I have looked into this myself, Senator. Apparent-
ly—and I am not a computer expert-computers are licensed de-


45
pending on how-how should I say it-how capable they are. How
many calculations they can handle. So, you know, the simple per-
sonal computer, the kind everybody has around their desks now, or
that are in the schools, there are no controls on sales like that.
I guess you have a medium category which is relatively uncon-
trolled because they are available freely on the world market, and
it is only the advanced computers, the supercomputers, that are
limited and carefully controlled. Now, I do not know which catego-
ry the Hewlett-Packards fell into, but I am highly confident they
were not in the advanced supercomputer category..
Senator HELMS. You had better check on that, because the sale of
these computers brought the folks at the Defense Department out
of their chairs, because they were not even informed of the sale.
Now, that is my information. Now, I just wonder if the State De-
partment was informed about it.
Mr. KELLY. I am advised that we probably were not informed,
but we will get that information out for you for the record.
[The information referred to follows:]
Question. Who approved the sale? Was the Department informed?
Answer. Iraq is in country group V in the Export Administration Regulations. Ex-
ports of computers to this country group only require a validated license if they
exceed certain parameters. The license applications are submitted to the Depart-
ment of Commerce and do not require State Department review unless the comput-
ers meet specific criteria of the Missile Technology Control Regime or nuclear non-
proliferation controls. Computers that fall below the capability parameters can be
exported under a general license and would not be reviewed individually by the
Commerce Department.
Senator HELMS. This is what Senator Moynihan was talking
about a while ago. The right hand does not know what the left
hand is doing, and we end up doing nothing.
Well, we have got another chart that I would like for Greg to put
up. This chart lists the firms which have been identified as export-
ing weapons production equipment or technology to Iraq. Now, you
will acknowledge that that is not a short list.
Mr. KELLY. That is not a short list, Senator.
Senator HELMS. Now, I was interested—I had some information
independently, but I was interested that back in May, toward the
end of the month, it was the New York Times, I believe that
charged that a score of French technicians helped expand the
range of Iraq's Soviet Scud B missiles to 500 miles, and that the
French firm-Sagem-provided equipment to Iraq's ballistic mis-
sile program. Do you understand that to be accurate?
Mr. KELLY. I saw the same article, Senator, and I asked the same
questions. The French Ministry of Defense denied that those allega-
tions were true.
Senator HELMS. Is that as far as we are going? What do our intel-
ligence capabilities say?
Mr. KELLY. The intelligence, as I understand it, does not demon-
strate that we have evidence that that is true.
Senator HELMS. Have they looked?
Mr. KELLY. I sure hope so.
Senator HELMs. Will you find out?
Mr. KELLY. Yes, sir.
Senator HELMS. All right. The Department of Justice has impan-
eled a Federal grand jury in Atlanta to determine if the Atlanta


46
branch of an Italian bank funded weapons sales to Iraq. Now, on
June 7, it was reported that the Department of State had held “nu-
merous” meetings, and I have got the word “numerous” in quota-
tion marks, because that is the way it was given to me, "numer-
ous” meetings with the Department of Justice, and that the De-
partment of State had “cautioned”—and again I use quotation
marks—the Justice Department about even investigating this
thing.
Now, according to my sources, and these have been published in
various newspapers, including the New York Times, as I recall, I
cannot conclude other than that the State Department seems to be
trying to prevent the criminal indictment of an Iraqi official. Now,
is that so?
Mr. KELLY. No, Senator, I concluded otherwise, because I saw the
same article anū, like you, I had the same reaction. What is going
on here? I have asked questions. I have talked to State Department
lawyers. They tell me they have not told Justice to go easy in this
criminal thing. This is that old article, you know, Mr. Anonymous
Source, who talks every day in Washington. You know, let us have
some names and then we can ask some questions. But I saw that,
and that would be inappropriate.
Senator HELMS. Are you saying to me that the State Department
has done no such thing?
Mr. KELLY. I know of no such thing. I know of no written or oral
communication, and I have talked to the State Department law-
yers.
Senator HELMS. Well, I have had problems with anonymous
sources, as has Senator Moynihan, I am sure, but has the National
Security Council looked at this?
Mr. KELLY. I am sorry, looked at--
Senator HELMS. This whole sale matter.
Mr. KELLY. There is a committee of the National Security Coun-
cil that is meeting to take a look on how to tighten up on all these
kinds of sales in the chemical area, the biological area and so on,
yes, sir. There is a committee that is meeting to do that.
r HELMS. One final question, and then I am sort of leap-
frogging backward. Richard Perle-you know who he is.
Mr. KELLY. I do indeed. He is a friend of mine.
Senator HELMS. Mine, too. He is not ambivalent about this, and I
seldom find that he is not correct. He referred to our demarches to
our allies as "demarshmallows."
Now, what I would like for you to do is supply to the commit-
tee-and I do not expect you to do it now—the number of de-
marches that we have made in the past 5 years to our allies involv-
ing equipment sales to Iraq and the response by our allies to these
demarches. I think that would be very interesting for the commit-
tee to have, and I do not ask you to put it out publicly, but we
ought to take a look at that, I think.
Mr. KELLY. Yes, sir.
[The information referred to follows:]
Question. How many demarches have we made to our allies in the past 5 years
about equipment sales of foreign firms to Iraq, and what were their replies?
Answer. We have no good means of tallying all our diplomatic communications in
the past 5 years covering equipment sales to Iraq. These approaches have taken


47
many forms: official demarches including detailed information we have received and
specific action we expect to be taken, general approaches covering our concerns
about trends that we observe, informational papers educating countries to our non-
proliferation policies and notification of actions the United States has taken.
We discuss these issues on a continuing basis with close allies, both in bilateral
discussions and in multilateral forums such as the semiannual Australia group
meetings. Recent Iraqi activity, such as the attempted smuggling of military capaci-
tors and the “big gun" case has heightened concern among our allies, making them
more responsive to our approaches. The Germans, Swiss, Dutch, Japanese in par-
ticular are wary of Iraqi procurement activity, and have reciprocated our demarches
with warnings of their own about suspicious Iraqi behavior.
Senator HELMs. Well, I timed it pretty well.
Senator MOYNIHAN. Senator Helms, take as much time as you
wish.
Senator HELMS. Well, I am sort of like the fellow that was given
a speech to read and he has not read it before, and he says heck-
he got down to a point and he said heck, I do not believe that
myself. [Laughter]
I guess this is all right. I ask that the list of Western companies
reported having assisted the Iraqis be included in the record.
Senator MOYNIHAN. Without objection, that will be printed in
the record.
[The information referred to follows:]
WEAPONS SALES TO IRAQ
WEST GERMAMY
Siemens West Germany—[Non-echoing room-Der Spiegel, March 27, 1989)
Messerschmidt-Boelkow-Blohm-Parent Firm of Transtecnics-Profil, March 6,
1990]— [Lab Equipment-Stern, January 26, 1989]
Mannesmann-Rexroth—[Components for Dr. Bull's gun-Groot Bijgaarden De Stan-
daard (Belgium), May 18, 1990]
H and H Metalform, Ltd.-Machinery for production of gas, ultracentrifuges
(used for uranium enrichment and missile casings)-Der Spiegel December 18, 1989]
Consen-[Missile Production Plant-Stern, April 6, 1989]
Projecta-[Affiliate of Gildemeister-Stern, April 6, 1990]
Blohm-[Computer controlled grinding facilities-Per Spiegel, March 27, 1989)
Carl Zeiss-[Unspecified equipment-Der Spiegel, March 27, 1989]
Daimler Benz-Security Vehicles-Der Spiegel, March 27, 1989]
Degussa—[Unspecified equipment-Der Spiegel, March 27, 1989)
Fritz Werner Industrial Equipment, Ltd.—[Universal Drilling Equipment-Der
Spiegel, March 27, 1989]
Gildemeister Projecta Ltd. - [General Contractor-Der Spiegel, March 27, 1989]
[Computer Programs-Stern, January 26, 1989]
Karl Kolb-[Laboratory Equipment-Der Spiegel, March 27, 1989] [Chemical warfare
plant-Christian Science Monitor, December 13, 1988]
Koerber AG—[Parent firm of Blohm-Der Spiegel, March 27, 1989]
Mauser—[Unspecified equipment-Der Spiegel, March 27, 1989)
Tesa-[Unspecified equipment-Der Spiegel, March 27, 1989)
Transtecnica-[Calibration Equipment-Der Spiegel, March 27, 1989)
Aviatest—[Wind tunnel facilities-Profil, March 6, 1989)
Rheinmetal—[Parent firm of Aviatest-Profil, March 6, 1989]
Sigma Chemie-[Chemical precursors-biological-The Washington Times, January
31, 1989)
Plato-Kuehn—[Toxins-Der Spiegel, January 30, 1989]
Anton Eyerle-[Mobile toxicological labs-Der Spiegel, January 23, 1989]
Magirus Deutz-[Vehicles for mobile toxicological labs-Der Spiegel, January 23,
1989]
Integral/Sauerinformatic/CME-[Computer programs-Stern, January 26, 1989)
WTB Walter Thosti Boswau—[Construction of four nerve gas plants-Stern, Janu-
ary 26, 1989]
Krauss-Kopf-[Unspecified equipment-International Herald Tribune, January 7-8,
1989]


48
Ludwig Hammer—[Unspecified equipment-International Herald Tribune, January
7-8, 1989]
Sauer Informatic-[Computer software-Stern, January 1989]
Pilot Plant-[Chemical warfare plant-Christian Science Monitor, December 13,
1988]
Quast—[Corrosion-resistant alloy parts-Christian Science Monitor, December 13,
1988]
AUSTRIA
Delta Consult-[Detailed estimates-Profil, April 24, 1990]
Feneberg—[Construction planning-Profil, April 24, 1990]
AST-[Building construction-Proill, March 6, 1989]
Consult Co.- [Project management-Profil, March 6, 1989]
Emmerich-Assman-[Parent firm of Mutter and Schrantz-Profil, March 6, 1989)
Girozentrale Bank-[Financing-Profil, March 6, 1990]
Hutter and Schrantz—[Iron and steel construction-Profil, March 6, 1989
Swatek and Cerny-[Sanitary equipment-Profil, March 6, 1989)
Consultatio—[Buildings-Stern, January 26, 1989]
New Berger-[Precursor chemicals-Austria State Radio, January 4, 1989]
BELGIUM
Amalgamated Trading Industries (ATI)—[Components for Dr. Bull's gun-Groot Bij-
gaarden De Standaard, May 18, 1990]
Poudrieres Reunies de Belgique (PRB)—[Solid fuel for self-propelling ammunition-
Groot Bijgaarden De Standaard, May 17, 1990]
Space Research Corporation-[Dr. Bull's Corporation-AFP, May 5, 1990]
FRANCE
Sagem- [Missile Guidance Equipment-The New York Times, May 24, 1990]
ITALY—UNITED STATES
ILVA—[Parent of Le Fucine-Financial Times, May 15, 1990]
Le Fucina Steelworks—[Components for Dr. Bull's gun-Corriene Della Sea (Milan),
May 14, 1990)
Banco National Lavaro—[Atlanta branch financed exports to Iraq-Chicago Trib-
une May 6, 1990]
JAPAN
Minolta—[Duplicating Equipment-Document obtained by NBC News]
NETHERLANDS
Melchemie—[Chemical precursors-Christian Science Monitor, December 13, 1988]
SPAIN
Trebelan—[Steel cradles for Dr. Bull's gun-Financial Times, May 26, 1990]
SWEDEN
Bofors—[Missile Equipment-Financial Times, January 8, 1990]
SWITZERLAND
Institute for Advanced Technology-[Major Contractor-Profil, April 24, 1989)
Companies Inc.—[Chemical precursors-New York Times, January 31, 1989]
UNITED KINGDOM
Matrix Churchill—[Precision lathes-US News and World Report, June 4, 1990]
Astra Holdings-[Owner of PRB of–Belgium-Dr. Bull's gun-AFP, May 5, 1990]
International Highway Transport-[Dr. Bull's gun-Ankara TRT-TV, April 29,
1990]
Walter Somers LTD—[Hydraulic equipment for Dr. Bull's gun-Wall Street Jour-
nal, April 23, 1990]
Eagle Trust-[Owner of Halesowen-London Press Association, April 17, 1990)
Halesowen-[Parts for Dr. Bull's gun-London Press Association, April 17, 1990)
Sheffield Forge Masters—[Dr. Bull's gun-London Press Association, April 12, 1990]


49
Global Technical and Management Internat'l—[Acoustic detonators for sea mines-
London Press Association, March 30, 1990]
UNITED STATES
Alcolac International—[Chemical precursors-US News and World Report, June 4,
1990]
Banco National Lavoro Italy/United States-[Atlanta branch financed exports to
Iraq-Chicago Tribune, May 6, 1990]
Lummus Crest—[Ethylene oxide-possible mustard gas precursor-The Washington
Times, April 27, 1990)
Hewlett-Packard, Inc.—[Electronic equipment-Washington Post, May 3, 1989]
Scientific-Atlanta-[Telecommunications-Washington Post, May 3, 1989]
Tektronix, Inc.—[Computer graphic terminal-Washington Post, May 3, 1989]
Wiltron Co.—[Scalar analyzer system-Washington Post, May 3, 1989]
United Steel and Strip Corporation-[Precursor chemicals-New York Times, Janu-
ary 31, 1989]
Senator HELMS. Thank you very much. I believe you have been
as candid as you can possibly be under the circumstances.
Mr. KELLY. Yes, sir. I share your concern about these things.
Senator HELMS. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Senator MOYNIHAN. Just to wrap up, Mr. Secretary, and then to
give Mr. Gilder a chance to say something—he has been very pa-
tient with us—may I suggest that in the setting of the new world
we are entering into this committee, the Senate Committee on For-
eign Relations, is trying to anticipate difficulties which the Nation
will face. We are in such a new world, everything is changed, it
seems, but our way of thinking about it.
I was in the Senate dining room the other day, and walked in
saw a few Secret Service types in the hallway, and I said
“What is going on?” They said, "The President's having lunch in
there.” So I went in, and it was interesting the President was
having lunch, and it was interesting that he had his Chief of Staff,
Mr. Sununu with him, but what was rather extraordinary is that
with Mr. Sununu was Mr. Gorbachev's Chief of Staff, who was over
here checking out the White House to see how things are done.
That may be our secret weapon. [Laughter.] .
Senator MOYNIHAN. Now, Mr. Sununu, we learned today, is on
his way to Moscow and what could be a disinformation campaign of
massive consequences in international relations. [Laughter.]
But in all truth, that Cold War confrontation is past. The con-
frontation is past. The possibilities of a nuclear exchange have not
past, but you know, that is different. Not 4 weeks ago here in
Washington I went to a private home for dinner one evening with
Marshal Akhromeyev, the former head of the S
chief military advisor to Mr. Gorbachev, and the day before he had
been taken on a tour of the Gettysburg Battlefield by his former
counterpart, Admiral Crowe. Now, this is a different world, can we
agree? You do not disagree. Mr. Gilder does not disagree.
We are going to see, instead of this bipolar and often frozen con-
frontation of the last 40 years—call it 40 years since the founding
of NATO in 1949—we are going to see the diffusion of weaponry
and the diffusion of advanced technological violence around the
world.
One of the concerns we had and we held a closed hearing of the
Subcommittee on Near East and South Asian Affairs on the subject
of Kashmir-was the prospect that this could become a nuclear


50
confrontation. We all know that both those nations are nuclear-ca-
pable.
The surprising thing is how little proliferation there has been. I
think if you go back 30 years and asked physicists how many
powers would have nuclear weapons at this point, they would have
estimated in the range of 15 to 25 would have tested weapons.
Well, this is not so. No nation has tested a weapon since China in
the 1950's. Still, the technology is easy. I mean, any really good un-
dergraduate physicist can design a weapon.
Chemical warfare is even more dangerous, and at some level
even simpler, because it does not take an enormous technology to
produce it. Just the power to produce missile material is an enor-
mous challenge. In 1944, I believe, one-third of the electricity gen-
erated in the United States went to Oak Ridge. That kind of thing
is required. It is not required for a chemical plant or for germ war-
fare. The great problem of World War I was to carry poison gas out
into the trench areas and then try to hope the wind blew in the
right direction. It is a very different thing when you can send it
500 miles on a rocket, and rockets are very easy to make.
So, the question if we have international regimes of law, are we
going to see that it is understood that this is serious. You cannot
violate these laws without expecting consequences. Mr. Secretary
and Mr. Gilder, this hearing is in a way our first post-Cold War
hearing, and our subject is United States policy toward Iraq.
Humans rights, weapons proliferation, and international law. We
have a sense that the idea of international law got lost in the fog of
the Cold War. You would have to go back, it would be difficult for
Americans today to remember the shock of the First World War,
the slaughter of the machinegun and poison gas. It changed civili-
zation, the horror of poison gas, and so the whole world came to-
gether in Geneva in 1925 and said, never again will poison gas be
used. Never. The Nazi regime in Germany abided by that commit-
ment. A regime capable of any inhumanity was not capable of that.
Such was the world's horror at poison gas.
Then we turn around and in 1983 there is Iraq. Iraq commences
to use it, the first time since 1918. The first time since the Geneva
Convention, and nothing happened to Iraq. No serious effort was
made. Sir, when I mentioned to you that this is a violation of inter-
national law, you, sir, said, “Well, I am not a lawyer.” Internation-
al law is not a specialty that deals with procedures and statutes
and cases. It does that too, but it is the business of every diplomat
and every member of the Department of State.
You said that we had a conference in 1989. I think that was just
a review conference on the 1925 Geneva Chemical Weapons Proto-
col technically. Nothing happened. Can you help us on that, and I
wonder if Mr. Gilder could join us? Because you see we are trying
to say that either the world understands these things have conse-
quences, or we are going to have a much more difficult world. It is
going to be difficult enough—far more. It is going to be anarchic.
Let me just put this question, and you two talk. Tell me what
you think this committee should know and think, and be open
about it. Do not hesitate to be as candid and blunt as you can. Is it
not so, Mr. Secretary, that right now, in Geneva, the Conference on


52
They expelled the Soviet Union after the invasion of Finland.
They did impose sanctions.
Mr. KELLY. I beg your pardon, they did?
Senator MOYNIHAN. The League voted sanctions on Italy. They
just were not upheld by the institutions that could do it, which
would be the national Governments of Britain, of France. In this
case we have not done anything. . .
Those of you who think in terms of the future of the internation-
al order, does it not bother you that we could have taken this issue
to the Security Council? And I am reminded by Mr. Galbraith that
Franklin D. Roosevelt imposed sanctions on Italy for the invasion
of Ethiopia.
There was a sense that there were rules. I am wondering, is
there any sense of the rules today? And I say, again-and Mr.
Gilder, you wanted to say something-supposing a chemical war-
fare treaty is agreed to in Geneva, why should this Committee on
Foreign Relations pay any attention to it?
Mr. GILDER. If I might, chemical weapons, until they are actually
used on people, is not my field. But, from the angle of human
rights, we very much share your frustration with the inefficacy of
international law. It is a very imperfect instrument.
Senator MOYNIHAN. To speak about the inefficacy of internation-
al law is to speak about the unwillingness of nations and to abide
by it and insist that it be abided by.
Mr. GILDER. That is exactly true.
Senator MOYNIHAN. You are carrying around the U.N. Charter.
Mr. GILDER. Well, I carry this around. It happens to be the unfor-
tunate fact that probably a majority of the nations who have
Senator nus do not really ani majority of the natio be the unfor-
Senator MOYNIHAN. Those early provisions about the word
“human rights” is about--
Mr. GILDER. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
Senator MOYNIHAN. Well, I think if you look at the preamble,
the words “human rights” appear at about the 40th and 41st
words, round there on the first page.
Mr. GILDER. Yes. But if I might, I think that-
Senator MoYNIHAN. That is a treaty. That is international law.
Mr. GILDER. Well, yes, it is. I mean, there are no actual signato-
ries to it, but one assumes that if one--
Senator MOYNIHAN. There are not signatories to the U.N. Char-
ter?
Mr. GILDER. I have talked to the lawyers about this and tried to
get some sense of just exactly how binding it is, and I am not
lawyer enough to tell you all the permutations.
Senator MOYNIHAN. I am not a lawyer either. I will tell you it is
absolutely binding.
Mr. GILDER. Well, one would expect them to abide by it as mem-
bers of the U.N. But if I might, another one that --
Senator MOYNIHAN. That is a very—I mean, are things so bad in
the State Department that they say that the United Nations Char-
ter is optional?
Mr. ĜILDER. No, we certainly do not say it is optional, and we use
every opportunity to--


Senator MOYNIHAN. But has it come to that? I mean, it is not
really binding, it is sort of. Did anybody sign it? Well, nobody re-
members. It is a treaty solemnly entered into in San Francisco in
1945, I believe. And any new nation achieving independence ad-
heres to the U.N. Charter, which is a treaty and is binding, and it
contains the most fundamental elements of international law with
respect to relations of states.
Mr. GILDER. The Charter and the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights are two separate things international agreements.
This confusion is because we are discussing two separate docu-
ments.
Senator MOYNIHAN. They are indeed. But let us be clear, the
Charter-wow.
Mr. GILDER. But I think there is another analogy--
Senator MOYNIHAN. Did anyone ever suggest that they were co-
terminous things? Mr. Gilder, you say to me that the U.N. Charter
and the Declaration of Human Rights are two different things.
Well, yes. I mean, is that presented as information to the commit-
tee?
Mr. GILDER. I have absolutely no disagreement with you on this
at all. We would have to get a lawyer to explain the distinction. I
do not think it makes any difference--
Senator MOYNIHAN. A lawyer to explain the distinction? All
right, sir.
Mr. GILDER. There are, however, other treaties which are very
Senator MOYNIHAN. No lawyer offers to explain the distinction.
Mr. KELLY. Fools rush in.
Senator, I wanted to respond to your question, which was the
focus, about should the Senate take seriously a treaty on chemical
weapons when and if, God willing, it is presented to this body. And
I said, "Yes, I think it will”; I think it should. But let me say a
couple of things in less than 1 minute about-
Senator MOYNIHAN. Take your time.
Mr. KELLY [continuing]. About the treaty that is under negotia-
tion. It will, as we see it, include sanctions provisions through the
United Nations Security Council. It will also include intrusive veri-
fication of allegations of possession or use. Now, both of those fea-
tures, I believe, are absent from the 1925 protocol.
Senator MOYNIHAN. You are quite correct. And I think that point
is important. Intrusive, as you said. The world is learning some-
thing about that. But just because it is not in the protocol does not
mean that there is not an agreed international convention that
says we will not do this.
Mr. KELLY. I agree with you. I mean, the whole purpose of the
1925 protocol inherent in the reason for the agreement was to at-
tempt to prohibit, preclude.
Senator MOYNIHAN. But will you go back and say to your col-
leagues on both scores that the Committee on Foreign Relations is
concerned about this. We do not think international law is some-
thing to be dismissed. We do not think the vagueness in the De-
partment is very helpful.
clearly-


56
Mr. GRAHAM. Mr. James Graham. Mr. Goering could not be here
today, so I will be representing Amnesty International.
Senator MOYNIHAN. We welcome you. Mr. Najmaldin Karim. Do
I have that pronounced correctly, Karim? Mr. Karim, good morn-
ing—or, I suppose, good afternoon. We welcome you here, sir-and
Prof. Gary Milhollin. Professor Milhollin. You are a panel, gentle-
men. That is the way we organize this. So, Mr. Milhollin, sit right
down there.
Gentlemen, we welcome you, and in the order that I called the
names, that is how they are listed on our agenda, so Mr. Graham,
will you proceed, representing Amnesty International.
STATEMENT OF JAMES GRAHAM, AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL USA
Mr. GRAHAM. We have an additional brief report on the status of
Iraqi refugees which we would like to have added to the record, if
we could.
Senator MOYNIHAN. Without objection, so ordered.
Mr. GRAHAM. Amnesty International welcomes the Foreign Rela-
tions Committee's review of human rights in Iraq. It believe it has
come at a crucial moment, and greatly appreciate the opportunity
to present our concerns here today. Amnesty International has
been concerned about the widespread and systematic violation of
fundamental human rights in Iraq for some time. These concerns
existed well before the Iran-Iraq war and increased during the war
years.
Since the cessation of hostilities, we have been particularly
alarmed by the continued assaults by the Iraqi armed forces
against the Kurdish population and other groups or individuals
who are perceived to be opponents or critics of the Government of
Iraq. Amnesty International believes the abuses detailed below
clearly amount to a gross and consistent pattern of human rights
violations and a greater effort must be made by the international
community to hold the Iraqi Government accountable for its ac-
tions.
Amnesty International is also concerned about the fate of an es-
timated 27,500 Iraqi Kurds who are currently in refugee camps in
southeast Turkey. The absence of any legal protection places them
at great risk of being forcibly returned or extradited from Turkey
to Iraq where they could face disappearance, torture, or execution.
According to reports, pressure has been used by the Turkish au-
thorities to coerce some Iraqi Kurds to return to Iraq under official
amnesties. Reports suggest that in the past 18 months, hundreds of
Iraqi Kurds, as well as Assyrians, Arabs, and Turcomans who
sought to benefit from official amnesties have since disappeared in
custody, or tortured, or executed.
The Government of Iraq permits no meaningful expression of dis-
sent. Thousands of political prisoners, including possible prisoners
of conscience, are arbitrarily detained without charge or trial, or
after summary trials. They include actual or suspected members of
prohibited political parties, army deserters, and draft resisters. Rel-
atives of such people are arrested as hostages in lieu of suspects
being sought by the authorities. The children of political opponents
have also been arbitrarily arrested and detained as hostages in


57
order to compel their parents or relatives to confess to alleged po-
litical offenses.
Routine torture and ill treatment of prisoners continues to be
widely reported. The victims include political prisoners tortured in
order to force them to sign confessions or to renounce their politi-
cal affiliation. Some political prisoners have reportedly been tor-
tured shortly before being executed. The victims include detainees
below age 18 said to have been beaten, whipped, sexually abused,
given electric shock, and deprived of food. On at least one occasion,
the bodies of executed children and youths have been returned to
family members with their eyes gouged out and with other marks
of torture.
In recent years, thousands of individuals have disappeared, many
of whom it is feared have been killed. Some 178 Shi'a declared by
the government to be of Iranian descent disappeared while in de-
tention between 1980 and 1985. The fate of some 8,000 Kurds, in-
cluding 315 children who disappeared following their arrest in
August 1983, is also unknown.
All 8,000 were male members of the Barzani clan ranging in age
from 8 to 70. It is believed that the action was in retaliation for the
Kurdistan Democratic Party's military activities, as the detainees
included close relatives of Mas'ud Barzani, leader of the KDP. It is
feared that many have been executed.
In October 1988, a group of 353 Kurds, including 52 children, re-
portedly disappeared while in custody in Duhok Province, despite a
government amnesty for all Kurds announced the previous month,
and in March 1989, 33 Assyrian Christians, including entire fami-
lies, reportedly disappeared after returning from Turkey and Iran
in late 1988 and early 1989.
Each year, hundreds of executions are reported, but it is never
possible to ascertain the precise number. In the last 2 days of 1987
alone, more than 150 political prisoners reportedly died before
squads in Abu Ghraib Prison, on the outskirts of Baghdad.
Included in their number were Arabs, Kurds, and Turcomans.
Those executed have included members of banned political parties,
other suspected government opponents, and army deserters. In
most cases, it is difficult to determine whether they have been
tried and sentenced to death or extrajudicially executed.
In order to demonstrate the gravity of concern about the situa-
tion of human rights in Iraq, Amnesty International in May 1988
made a 1503 submission to the United Nations seeking to demon-
strate a consistent pattern of gross violation of human rights. Con-
cerns raised include the death penalty and execution after unfair
trials, extrajudicial executions, disappearance, torture and ill-treat-
ment, arbitrary arrests of political prisoners, and unfair trial pro-
cedures.
Since then, Amnesty International has registered its concerns on
numerous occasions with the U.N. Commission on Human Rights
and directly with the Government of Iraq. The Commission for the
most part has chosen not to act. The government has sought to
deny that abuses occur or that government forces are responsible
for them.
The government have announced amnesties for those who have
fled, yet reportedly imprisoned or executed some of those who sub-


58
sequently returned. It has spoken of possible changes in its consti-
tution and protested its respect for human rights, but the killings
and torture continue. In March 1989, Amnesty International stated
before the U.N. Commission on Human Rights that Iraq clearly
and incontrovertibly presents a situation of the most flagrant and
massive violations of human rights, and that the situation cried out
for international attention and action. That remains our assess-
ment today.
Amnesty International believes that no member of the interna-
tional community should be free to abuse the basic human rights of
its citizens at will. We ardently hope that these hearings will in
some way ensure that the Government of Iraq is held to the same
standards of decency and humanity to which all governments must
adhere.
One final remark I wanted to make before I conclude my state-
ment, I would like to point out that when the congressional delega-
tion was visiting in Baghdad last January the Iraqi military was
extensively engaged in the south of Iraq. Over 30 villages were as-
saulted at that time. The military was ostensibly in search of de-
serters and their sympathizers, and according to our information
hundreds of individuals were killed during a 2- or 3-week period.
Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Amnesty International USA follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL
INTRODUCTION
Amnesty International welcomes the Foreign Relations Committee's review of the
situation of human rights in Iraq. We believe it has come at a crucial moment and
greatly appreciate the opportunity to present our concerns here today. Amnesty
International has been concerned about the widespread and systematic violation of
fundamental human rights in Iraq for some time. These concerns existed well before
the Iran Iraq War and increased during the war years. Since the cessation of hostil-
ities we have been particularly alarmed by the continued assaults by the Iraqi
armed forces against the Kurdish population and other groups or individuals who
are perceived to be opponents or critics of the government of Iraq. Amnesty Interna-
tional believes the abuses detailed below clearly amount to a gross and persistent
pattern of human rights violations and greater effort must be made by the interna-
tional community to hold the Iraqi government accountable for its actions.
Amnesty International is also concerned about the fate of an estimated 27,500
Iraqi Kurds who are currently in refugee camps in southeast Turkey. The absence
of any legal protection places them at risk of being forcibly returned or extradited
from Turkey to Iraq, where they could face I, “disappearance,” torture or execution.
According to reports, pressure has been used by the Turkish authorities to coerce
some Iraqi Kurds to return to Iraq under official amnesties. Reports suggest that in
the past 18 months hundreds of Iraqi Kurds, as well as Assyrians, Arabs and Turco-
mans, who sought to benefit from official amnesties have since “disappeared” in
custody, were tortured or executed.
The government of Iraq permits no meaningful expression of dissent. Thousands
of political prisoners, including possible prisoners of conscience, are arbitrarily de-
tained without charge or trial, or after summary trials. They include actual or sus-
pected members of prohibited political parties, army deserters and draft resisters.
Relatives of such people are arrested as hostages in lieu of suspects being sought by
the authorities. The children of political opponents have also been arbitrarily ar-
rested and detained as hostages in order to compel their parents or relatives to
“confess" to alleged political offenses.
Routine torture and ill-treatment of prisoners continues to be widely reported.
The victims include political prisoners tortured in order to force them to sign “con-
fessions” or to renounce their political affiliation. Some political prisoners have re-
portedly been tortured shortly before being executed. The victims include detainees
below age 18, said to have been beaten, whipped, sexually abused, given electric
from thing to reports return to Of Iraqi Kurds amnesties !


59
Kurds annoding entire fans and early 1989orted but it is nee than 150 politiskirts of
shock and deprived of food. On at least one occasion the bodies of executed children
and youths have been returned to family members with their eyes gouged out and
with other marks of torture.
In recent years thousands of individuals have “disappeared," many of whom, it is
feared, have been killed. Some 178 Shi'a, declared by the government to be of Irani-
an descent, “disappeared” while in detention between 1980 and 1985. The fate of
some 8,000 Kurds, including 315 children, who “disappeared” following their arrest
in August, 1983, is also unknown. All 8000 were male members of the Barzani clan
ranging in age from 8 to 70. It is believed that the action was in retaliation for the
Kurdistan Democratic Party's (KDP) military activities as the detainees included
close relatives of Mas'ud Barzani, leader of the KDP. Its feared that many have
been executed.
In October of 1988 a group of 353 Kurds, including 52 children, reportedly "disap-
peared” while in custody in Duhok Province, despite a government amnesty for all
Kurds announced the previous month. And in March of 1989, 33 Assyrian Chris-
tians, including entire families, reportedly “disappeared” after returning from
Turkey and Iran in late 1988 and early 1989.
Each year hundreds of executions are reported but it is never possible to ascertain
the precise number. In the last two days of 1987 alone, more than 150 political pris-
oners reportedly died before firing squads in Abu Ghraib Prison in the outskirts of
Baghdad. Included in their number were Arabs, Kurds, and Turcomans. Those exe-
cuted have included members of banned political parties, other suspected govern-
ment opponents, and army deserters. In most cases it is difficult to determine
whether they had been tried and sentenced to death or extrajudicially executed.
In order to demonstrate the gravity of its concern about the situation of human
rights in Iraq, Amnesty International in May 1988 made a 1503 Submission to the
United Nations seeking to demonstrate a "consistent pattern of gross violation of
Human Rights.” Concerns raised included the death penalty and execution-after
unfair trials, extrajudicial executions, “disappearances,” torture and ill treatment,
arbitrary arrests of political prisoners and unfair trial procedures.
Since then Amnesty International has registered its concerns on numerous occa-
sions with the U.N. Commission on Human Rights and directly with the govern-
ment of Iraq. The Commission, for the most part, has chosen not to act. The govern-
ment has sought to deny that abuses occur or that government forces are responsi-
ble for them.
The government has announced amnesties for those who have fled yet reportedly
imprisoned or executed some of those who subsequently returned. It has spoken of
possible changes in its constitution and protested its respect for human rights, but
the killings and torture continue.
Amnesty International believes that no member of the international community
should be free to abuse the basic human rights of its citizens at will. We ardently
hope that these hearings will in some way ensure that the government of Iraq is
held to the same standard of decency and humanity to which all governments must
adhere.
EVENTS SINCE THE CEASEFIRE IN AUGUST 1989
In March of 1988 the international community was justifiably appalled when it
learned that an estimated 5000 people were deliberately killed and thousands
wounded as a result of chemical weapon attacks by Iraqi forces on the town of Ha-
labja, in Sulaimaniya province. Most of the victims were civilians, many of them
women and children.
Unfortunately, this was not an isolated incident. In recent years Amnesty Inter-
national has received numerous indications of the willingness of Iraqi government
forces to commit widespread deliberate killings of unarmed Kurdish civilians and
the mass execution of political prisoners.
At about the same time as the chemical attacks in Halabja, some 400 Kurdish
civilians, including women and children, were said to have been wounded as a result
of chemical weapon attacks on villages in the Qaradagh region, and to have been
apprehended as they made their way to the city of Sulaimaniya to seek medical
treatment. They were reportedly taken to the military garrison of Tanjaro and exe-
cuted by firing squad on April 2, 1988.
In another incident in mid-April 1987, following a chemical attack on the Balisan
Valley in Arbil Province, some 360 people from the village of Shaikh Wasanan who
had been wounded in the attack were transferred to Arbil hospitals for treatment.
The victims were reportedly denied media treatment and were transferred by secu-
rity forces to a detention center. They "disappeared” several days later after being


60
ent of imputed pesty Internificant
transferred to an unknown destination and their fate and whereabouts remain un-
known.
In August 1988, just three days before a ceasefire in the Iran Iraq War went into
effect, Amnesty International brought these incidents to the attention of the U.N.
Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities and
characterized them as part of “a systematic and deliberate policy on the part of the
government of Iraq to eliminate large numbers of Kurdish civilians, both as punish-
ment for their imputed political sympathies and in retaliation for the activities of
opposition forces.” Amnesty International further cited “grave fears that in the
aftermath of the war a further significant deterioration in human rights could occur
in Iraq if the government takes further action against its internal critics and oppo-
nents.”
These fears were soon realized as the ceasefire permitted military units on the
war front to be redeployed to join the tens of thousands of troops already in north-
ern Iraq. By early September, 1988, there were numerous reports that hundreds of
unarmed Kurdish civilians, including women and children, had been deliberately
killed and thousands of others wounded as a result of attacks by Iraqi government
forces on Kurdish villages in the north. The Iraqi military utilized tanks, helicop-
ters, gunships, artillery and chemical weapons in its assault on hundreds of Kurdish
villages in the northern provinces of Duhok, Mosul and Arbil.
Thousands of villagers fled the affected areas in August to seek refuge in Turkey.
Amnesty International estimated that some 120,000 Kurds crossed the border into
Turkey within a two week period. On September 4 the flow of refugees was reported
to have halted as Iraqi armed forces reached the northern border and prevented fur-
ther crossings into Turkey. On the same day, several thousand Kurds fleeing from
similar attacks reportedly crossed the eastern border into Iran.
On August 28 government forces reportedly entered several villages near the
town of Duhok and arrested over 1,000 people who had been unable to flee. Some
were suffering from wounds sustained in chemical weapon attacks. Those detained
were allegedly summarily executed and then buried in mass graves nearby.
There was also fear for the lives of several thousand Kurds, many of them un-
armed civilians, who were reported to have been arrested in late August in the
Zakho region by advancing government forces. Iraqi armed forces reportedly cut off
their retreat as they fled towards the Turkish border.
Two days after Iraqi forces had successfully sealed off the border with Turkey,
and after a six-week military offensive by government forces in northern Iraq in-
volving the killing of hundreds of unarmed civilians, Iraq's Revolutionary Command
Council announced an amnesty for all Iraqi Kurds in the country and abroad. The
decree called upon those wishing to take advantage of the amnesty to return to Iraq
within 30 days.
On September 8, 1988, Amnesty International issued an unprecedented appeal to
the U.N. Security Council to act immediately to halt the massacre of Kurdish civil-
ians by Iraqi forces and stated that “these killings represent a most serious denial
of the purposes of the United Nations Charter and a flagrant contravention of fun-
damental international human rights norms.” A qualified welcome was given to the
Iraqi government's announced amnesty, but it was noted that there had been re-
ports in the past of Kurds being imprisoned and executed after responding to previ-
ous amnesties.
The following month, October, 1988, a group of 353 Kurds, including 52 children
ranging in age from 11 to 17, reportedly “disappeared” from custody in the Qal'a
(Castle) in Duhok Province. Their fate remains unknown.
Despite the Turkish government's initially positive steps taken in granting tempo-
rary refuge on humanitarian grounds to some 50,000 Kurds, there was concern in
late October of 1988 that some refugees had been returned to Iraq against their will:
As of October 28, some 1400 Kurds had been returned to Iraq under the amnesty.
Amnesty International expressed fears for the safety of those who had been repatri-
ated. Amnesty International was also concerned that Turkish authorities considered
verbal assurances given by the Iraqi government that the terms of the amnesty
would be applied to all Kurds to be a sufficient guarantee for their safety.
In December 1988, large numbers of military personnel and civilians, perhaps as
many as 200, were believed to have been arrested on suspicion of plotting a coup. Of
those arrested, 14 army personnel and officials of the ruling Ba'th Party were re-
portedly executed in early January, 1989. In a separate incident, approximately 83
people, mostly army deserters, arrested in June or July, 1988, were reported to have
been executed in mid-December. Army deserters had not been included in the vari-
ous amnesties proclaimed by the Iraqi government after the ceasefire announce-
ment.
olving i anna upon
verbal assuraied to all Kurds Thers of military on suspicion of th Pa


61
N
In February of 1989, Amnesty International issued a report on Iraq subtitled Chil-
dren: Innocent Victims of Politico Repression. The report contained information
which suggested that the government had over the years been repeatedly and fla-
grantly in breach of its own domestic legislation as well as that of international
human rights treaties it had ratified. The report described a clear and long-standing
pattern of political abuse of young people. Among the evidence cited was an account
of school children who had been apprehended, lined up and summarily shot in
public; the case of a boy, Mirza Rasho, who was still imprisoned in Mosul after his
arrest with his brother 3 years before, when he was 6 years old; and the case of a
former political prisoner released in 1985 who described how 12 relatives, some aged
between 5 and 13, were tortured in front of him and how an incarcerated five-
month-old baby had been deliberately deprived of milk in an effort to force his par-
ents to confess to political offenses.
Despite the evidence cited by Amnesty International and numerous other sources,
the political realities in March, 1989 were such that the U.N. Commission on
Human Rights decided to take no action on the systematic and wide ranging abuses
in Iraq. On March 7, it was announced that the Commission would not consider the
human rights situation in Iraq under its confidential 1503 procedure used to exam-
ine consistent patterns of gross violations of human rights. The following day the
Commission rejected a resolution calling for a special rapporteur to be appoints to
study the country's human rights record.
Tragically, at about the same time that the Commission on Human Rights chose
not to act, thirty-three Assyrian Christians, including entire families from Duhok,
apparently “disappeared." These had been among the Iraqis who had returned in
**ar of 1988–89 from Turkeycast 1989 to the chairman of we
In a statement delivered in August, 1989 to the chairman of the U.N. Sub-Com-
mission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, Amnesty
International reiterated its major concerns about summary band arbitrary execu-
tions in Iraq and urged the Sub-Commission to express its “profound concern about
Iraq's grave human rights abuses and to recommend effective action to combat
them.” Amnesty International noted in its statement that the Iraqi government had
previously announced amnesties for all Kurds and for political opponents, and that
seven Kurds executed in April, 1989, were said to have given themselves up to au-
thorities in order to benefit from those amnesties. At least 4 other Kurds had been
similarly executed in March or April. All eleven were suspected of having links to
Kurdish opposition groups. Amnesty International was also concerned that the situ-
ation of 1900 other Kurds who had returned remained unclear.
The Sub-Commission failed to pass a resolution on Iraq.
In addition to the various amnesties of 1988 and 1989, the Iraqi government took
other steps to counter adverse international publicity. Early in 1989 it announced a
major liberalization program and issued official statements indicating a commit-
ment to the protection of human rights. In anticipation of increasing public pres-
sure, the Iraqi government issued a press release during the convening of the U.N.
Sub-Commission in which it sought to justify the forcible relocation of hundreds of
thousands of Kurds in the north and extended an invitation to selected journalists
to observe the democratic process in the country. Farzad Bazoft, a journalist for The
Observer, was one of those who was invited. Bazoft was hanged by that same gov-
ernment on March 15, 1990.
In late 1989 it was reported that the Iraqi government was seeking the extradi-
tion of 138 Iraqi Kurds from Turkish refugee camps in Diyarbakir and Mardin os-
tensibly for criminal offenses, including smuggling and drug trafficking. It was be-
lieved, however, that many of these individuals were wanted for suspected member-
ship or support of the prohibited Kurdistan Democratic Party. There were also con-
tinued unconfirmed reports during this time of the arrest, "disappearance” and exe-
cution of those who had returned to Iraq to benefit from the various government
sponsored amnesties.
The Iraqi military turned its attention to the south this past January when, be-
tween the 10th and the 23rd, it reportedly attacked over thirty towns and villages in
the predominantly Shi'a provinces. Apparently this attack was related to the gov-
ernment's attempt to capture hundreds of army deserters who for some years had
been hiding in the alahwar (marshes) region in the provinces of al-Basra, al Nasir-
iyya and al-Amara. Reports indicate that large numbers of both army deserters and
unarmed civilians were killed or wounded, although actual numbers are not yet
known. It should be noted that this onslaught was occurring bat the same time Iraqi
government officials were meeting in Baghdad with a U.S. Congressional delegation.
The execution of British-based journalist Farzad Bazoft this past March received
world-wide attention and need not be reviewed in depth in this report. Amnesty


62
press and the should be recannounced, the W.Nid have simply allo. In March of
International believes, however, that this case illustrates two important points.
First, it should be noted that Bazoft was originally invited into Iraq as part of a
government attempt to demonstrate its increasing liberalization. His execution dem-
onstrated, on the contrary, that the government's contempt for basic human rights
has not changed in practice, despite post-war talk of reforms that would increase
press and political freedoms.
Second, it should be recalled that on March 7, 1990, only three days before Ba-
zoft's death sentence was announced, the U.N. Human Rights Commission voted to
take no action on a draft decision which would have simply allowed human rights
violations in Iraq to be brought before the commission next year. In March of 1989,
Amnesty International stated before the U.N. Commission on Human Rights that,
"Iraq clearly and incontrovertibly presents a situation of the most flagrant and mas-
sive violations of human rights. We can think of none which cries out more for
international attention and action.” That remains our assessment today.
Three months after his death there is nothing this body can do for Farzad Bazoft
and the thousands like him who have been killed by the Iraqi government in recent
years. There is a great deal that can be done for those who reside in Iraq and more
especially for those who have managed to find refuge in Turkey and elsewhere. It is
this latter group for which Amnesty International is currently extremely concerned
and on whose behalf the U.S. Congress must act. :
«° 3. Conduct aof such people a international the return to Ira
and execuva suitably qua (ICRC), to Licial amnestie Governmer
der officia especially those or rof consciente de the following
RECOMMENDATIONS
(1) Amnesty International believes that the abuses by the government of Iraq con-
stitutes a gross and persistent pattern of internationally-recognized human rights
violations and strongly encourages Congress and the Administration to examine the
evidence on which this assessment is based, and to take into account seriously this
information when determining U.S. policy with respect to Iraq. The U.S. Govern-
ment should use all available opportunities to act against these violations.
(2) Amnesty International calls on the administration to appeal to the govern-
ment of Iraq to cease the systematic abuse of human rights and to adhere to its
international treaty obligations, and specifically to take the following steps:
1. Release from detention all prisoners of conscience.
2. End executions, especially those of Kurds and other Iraqis who have returned
to Iraq under official amnesties.
3. Conduct an immediate and impartial inquiry into the reported disappearance
and execution of such people, and make the findings public.
4. Allow a suitably qualified international agency, such as the International Com-
mittee of the Red Cross (ICRC), to monitor the return to Iraq of Kurds and other
Iraqis who choose to return under official amnesties.
(3) Amnesty International also calls on the U.S. Government to implement vigor-
ously the provisions of the Congressional Resolution Against Torture (P.L. 98-447),
including to instruct the U.S. chief of mission in Iraq to:
1. examine allegations of the practice of torture;
2. express concern in individual cases of torture brought to the attention of the
U.S. mission;
3. report to the Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights and Humanitarian
Affairs regarding efforts made by the mission to implement U.S. policy with respect
to combating torture; and
4. meet with indigenous human rights monitoring groups knowledgeable about
the practice of torture.
(4) Amnesty International also calls on the Government of the United States to
appeal to the government of Turkey to prevent the forcible return of refugees to
Iraq.
mittee of the suitably qualified in make the findings into the reported disa
rnational is concerned camps in southeast and other military at
IRAQI KURDS: AT RISK OF FORCIBLE REPATRIATION FROM TURKEY AND HUMAN RIGHTS
VIOLATIONS IN IRAQ
Amnesty International is concerned about the fate of an estimated 27,500 Iraqi
Kurds who are currently in refugee camps in southeast Turkey. More than 21
months since they fled from Iraq to escape chemical weapons and other military at-
tacks by government forces, they are still without any legal protection and their
future remains uncertain. This absence of legal protection has placed many of them
at risk of refoulement or extradition to Iraq, where they could face torture, execu-
tion, or "disappearance” following arrest. Refoulement is the forcible return of per-
sons to a country where they risk being subjected to human rights violations. It is
prohibited by internationally recognized standards. Reports received by Amnesty


63
ties declade ill-treficials tos receiverabs ander surrent they
----stional also opposes the extradition
International in recent months suggest that pressure has been used by the Turkish
authorities to coerce some Iraqi Kurds to return to their country while official am-
nesties declared by the Iraqi Government remain in effect. Such pressure has been
said to include ill-treatment, reductions in food and water supplies and allowing del-
egations of Iraqi officials to visit the refugee camps. Amnesty International's con-
cern is intensified by reports received in the past eighteen months that hundreds of
Iraqi Kurds, as well as Assyrians, Arabs and Turcomans, have “disappeared” in cus-
tody, were tortured or executed in Iraq, after surrendering to the authorities under
official amnesties or after receiving assurances that they would come to no harm.
Amnesty International opposes the forcible return of any person to a country
where he or she may reasonably be expected to be imprisoned as a prisoner of con-
science, or to be subjected to torture, “disappearance,” or execution. To this end, it
seeks to ensure that states where such people seek asylum provide them with effec-
tive and durable protection against being sent to a country where they would be at
risk of such human rights violations, which would normally include legal protection.
Amnesty International also opposes the extradition of any individual whom it be-
lieves may reasonably be expected to be imprisoned as a prisoner of conscience, or
to be subjected to torture, “disappearance” or execution upon his or her return. This
includes those whose extradition is sought for criminal offense which carry the
death penalty.
The Turkish Government ratified the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of
Refugees in 1962 and acceded to its protocol in 1968, but has stipulated that it will
apply the provisions of the Convention only to persons who have become refugees as
a result of events occurring in Europe. Turkey does not consider itself to be a coun-
try of asylum for refugees from countries outside Europe. Therefore Iraqis are not
granted asylum or the right to remain in Turkey as refugees. The Turkish authori-
ties have offered them only "temporary shelter," in the expectation that they would
seek permanent asylum in other (third) countries.
In August and September 1988, over 55,000 Kurds fled to Turkey from northern
Iraq to escape military attacks by Iraqi government forces on civilian targets, in-
cluding with chemical weapons. Amnesty International welcomed the Turkish Gov-
ernment's decision to grant these refugees temporary shelter on humanitarian
grounds. However, the organization expressed its concern that the government's
policy of only granting refugee status to refugees originating from countries in
Europe provided the Kurdish refugees with no legal protection and thereby in-
creased the risk of their forcible repatriation to Iraq. This point was reiterated to
Turkish Foreign Ministry officials by Amnesty International delegates during a
fact-finding mission to the country In October 1988.
Since the August 1988 chemical weapons offensive, Iraq's Revolutionary Com-
mand Council (RCC) has granted five amnesties to political offenders, two of which
were intended specifically for Kurds. The first, announced on 6 September 1988, was
for Iraqi Kurds sought for crimes committed before that date (RCC Resolution No.
736). The second, announced on 8 September 1988, was for prisoners convicted of
certain criminal or political offenses (RCC Resolution No. 735). The third, an-
nounced on 30 November 1988, was a general amnesty for those wanted fur or con-
victed of political offenses (RCC Resolution No. 860). The fourth, announced on 28
February 1989, was for all Iraqis living abroad who were wanted for or convicted of
political offenses, provided they returned to Iraq between 1 and 30 April 1989 (RCC
Resolution No. 130). Under the terms of the amnesty, all legal proceedings against
them would be dropped. Those considered “agents of the Iranian regime” were ex-
cluded. On 10 April 1989, the terms of this amnesty were amended, allowing Iraqis
to postpone their return until their circumstances permitted, provided they in-
formed the authorities of their wish to benefit from the amnesty (RCC Resolution
No. 238). The fifth and most recent amnesty, announced on 10 March 1990, was for
Kurdish opponents living abroad. It was initially valid for two months but on 12
May it was extended for one month, and on 10 June for a further month.
According to figures received by Amnesty International from the Iraqi Govern-
ment in May 1990, the number of people who benefited from these amnesties (in-
cluding those who returned from abroad) are: 6 September 1988 amnesty—7,644; 8
September 1988 amnesty—54; 30 November 1988 amnesty—305; 28 February 1989
amnesty—77; and 10 April 1989 (amended) amnesty–49, totaling 8,129. No official
figures were available yet regarding the number of people who benefited from the
10 March 1990 amnesty, which at the time of writing was still in effect [for unoffi-
cial estimates, see page 7]. Amnesty International requested from the Iraqi Govern-
ment the names, details and current whereabouts of all persons who have benefited
from the amnesties. The organization was informed that it would not be possible to
provide such information on those who had returned from abroad since they were


64
Iraqi return to Iraq. Foint invited the Interefugees who expres2 October 1988 it
Octobereign Ministement of thorities neva
too numerous, but that it could provide details of individuals who had been released
from detention as a result of the amnesties. Amnesty International is awaiting re-
ceipt of that information. At the same time, the organization has received reports
indicating that the number of refugees who have returned from Turkey alone may
be as high as 9,300, somewhat higher than that suggested by the Iraqi Government's
figures.
The Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) estimates that
between 6,000 and 8,500 Iraqi Kurds have returned to Iraq under the various am-
nesties, many of them from Turkey. Amnesty International is seriously concerned
about the lack of formal procedures to provide protection to those Iraqi Kurds who
wish to remain in Turkey, which would ensure that none are returned to Iraq
against their will, and fears that the Turkish authorities may continue to seek to
induce the refugees to return. Furthermore, the lack of independent international
monitoring of the repatriation process at all stages is all the more crucial since the
Iraqi Government, for its part, has failed to protect the lives of its citizens upon
their return to Iraq. Following the announcement of the 6 September 1988 amnesty
the Turkish Government invited the International Committee of the Red Cross
(ICRC) to handle the repatriation of those refugees who expressed a wish to return
to Iraq. The ICRC initially accepted to play this role, but on 2 October 1988 it an-
nounced that it had “declined to handle the repatriation” following the Iraqi Gov-
ernment's objection to its involvement. The Iraqi Government informed the ICRC
that since Iraq and Turkey enjoyed diplomatic relations, all repatriation would be
handled on a bilateral basis, thereby making the involvement of a third party un-
necessary. The Turkish authorities nevertheless proceeded with the repatriation
without the involvement of the ICRC or any other suitably qualified agency. Turk-
ish Foreign Ministry officials informed Amnesty International's delegates in early
October 1988 that they lad received “verbal assurances” from the Iraqi Government
as to the safety of the returning refugees, and that these assurances were deemed to
constitute sufficient guarantees.
As a result of the ICRC's announcement, some of the Kurdish refugees who had
initially expressed their willingness to return to Iraq became reluctant about doing
so. Nevertheless, an estimated 1,900 Kurds were repatriated by 6 October 1988.
Turkish officials informed Amnesty International that none of the Kurds had been
forcibly returned. Yet, according to accounts given by many of the refugees inter-
viewed in Turkey by Amnesty International in October 1988, some of those who had
changed their minds about returning were nevertheless forced by Turkish camp offi-
cials onto buses bound for Iraq.
On 28 October 1988 Amnesty International once more called on the Turkish Gov-
ernment to allow a suitably qualified international agency, such as UNHCR, to be
involved in the protection of the Kurdish refugees at all stages. However, the gov-
ernment continues to refuse the UNHCR such involvement. UNHCR is not allowed
to conduct regular visits to the temporary shelters to provide material assistance
and protection to the camp population. Assistance, in the form of food and shelter
and work permits for those who wish to work outside the camps, is provided entirely
by the Turkish authorities. However, since September 1988 the Turkish government
has allowed UNHCR approximately six 'unofficial visits to the camps, after which
the organization reportedly expressed its concerns about the inadequacy of the shel-
ters with respect to overcrowding and sanitation, particularly in Kiziltepe camp
near Mardin, where refugees remain housed in tents.
According to UNHCR's mandate, the organization's protective (legal) role extends
to all refugees, regardless of whether the country where they seek asylum is a party
to the 1951 refugee Convention. In this capacity, while it has not been granted
access to the camp population as a whole, in some cases it has provided assistance
and protection to those Iraqi Kurds who approach the organization individually.
The organization provides documentation to such people who have entered Turkey
without official authorization. It interviews them to ascertain whether they have “a
well-founded fear of persecution” which would qualify them as refugees under
UNHCR's mandate. Provided they have not been granted asylum elsewhere before
their arrival in Turkey, the UNHCR then arranges for other governments to offer
the permanent asylum. Such people are granted temporary financial assistance, but
are not eligible for UNHCR's resettlement program. UNHCR has also assisted some
of the Kurdish refugees in the temporary camps who have been threatened with re-
patriation or extradition to Iraq by intervening with the Turkish authorities on
their behalf and providing them with lawyers as necessary. Nevertheless, Amnesty
International has continued to receive reports of the attempted repatriation or ex-
tradition of Kurdish refugees and is concerned that they are being systematically
pressed its unofficial er 1988 the Tus provided.es


66
"disappeared” included some members of the Pesh Merge forces (armed Kurdish
units), but most were civilians. Before their arrest, some of them had been in hiding,
but they surrendered after reportedly receiving assurances from the Iraqi authori-
ties in Amadiyya that they would not be harmed. Amnesty International has sub-
mitted details of these cases to the Iraqi Government for investigation, and it await-
ing a response.
În a telex to the Iraqi Government dated 15 May 1990, Amnesty International ex-
pressed serious concern about the lack of any independent international monitoring
of the repatriation of Iraqi Kurds, following reports that large numbers of them had
returned to Iraq in April and May after the extension of the deadline of the 10
March amnesty. The organization again urged the Iraqi authorities to take immedi-
ate steps to ensure the physical safety of all Iraqis returning under official amnes-
ties.
In June 1990, Amnesty International received reports that 30 Turcomans were ex-
ecuted in Iraq in late January of this year. Among them were said to be four who
returned from Turkey in order to benefit from official amnesties.
Reports such as these explain the reluctance of many Kurdish refugees currently
in Turkey to return to Iraq. Their fears are further compounded by reported at-
tempts on the part of the Iraqi Government to seek the extradition of some of them.
Amnesty International has been informed that under the terms of an extradition
treaty between Turkey and Iraq dated 29 May 1946, persons accused of political of-
fenses would not be extradited. The organization has not received any information
indicating that this treaty has since been abrogated, and while recognizing that
countries may be affected by serious security problems unrelated to bona fide refu-
gees, it is Amnesty International's view that the fundamental principle of nonrefou-
lement, including nonextradition of anyone who could reasonably be expected to
face human rights violations, must be scrupulously observed.
In December 1989, Amnesty International received reports that the Iraqi Govern-
ment was seeking the extradition of 138 Kurds from refugee camps in Diyarbakir
and Kiziltepe (Mardin). The 138 Kurds were said to have committed criminal of-
fenses in Iraq, including smuggling and drug trafficking. However, other informa-
tion received by Amnesty International suggests that among them were suspected
members or supporters of the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), whose extradition
was being sought on ostensibly criminal grounds. Amnesty International received
the name of three of them, one of whom was reportedly arrested by Turkey's Na-
tional Intelligence Organization (MIT) in Diyarbakir on 12 December 1989, and was
last seen at the Habur crossing point on the Turkish-Iraqi border on 14 or 15 De-
cember. Amnesty International later learned that he had escaped custody and has
since left Turkey.
Also in December 1989, Amnesty International received the names of two Kurds
from the refugee camp in Mus, whose extradition was allegedly being sought by the
Iraqi Government. The two men, Muhammad Tawfiq and Haji Arafat, were report-
edly sent to Iraq against their will on or around 8 December 1989, and their fate
and current whereabouts are unknown. They were said to have been ill-treated by
Turkish camp authorities and forced to sign false statements to the effect that they
wanted to return to Iraq. It was not known whether they were among the aforemen-
tioned group of 138 Kurds. In January 1990 Amnesty International received reports
that six Kurdish refugees from Kiziltepe camp (Mardin) were informed in late De-
cember 1989 that they were to be returned to Iraq. The six are: Ali Jawad Kadhim,
Taleb Abed Ahmad, Arkan Ibrahim Matti, Ibrahim Muhammad Wali, Salem Mirza
Nuri and Basem Muhammad Fathi. Subsequent reports indicated that five of them
were members of the Pesh Merga forces, and that they were forcibly returned to
Iraq on 2 and 3 January 1990. In addition, another 40 Kurdish refugees were report-
ed to have been forcibly repatriated to Iraq on 21 January 1990. Their fate and cur-
rent whereabouts are unknown.
Amnesty International has continued to urge the Turkish authorities to ensure
effective protection for Iraqi Kurdish refugees from forcible repatriation, and not to
extradite those who risk falling victim to further human rights violations in Iraq.
On 5 January 1990 the organization submitted to the government the names of
seven such Kurds who faced extradition. On 1 February 1990, Amnesty Internation-
al received a response from the Turkish Embassy in London, which reiterated the
government's position on the status of the Iraqi Kurdish refugees and denied the
threat of extradition: “Turkey ratified the Geneva Convention of 1951 and the proto-
col of 1967 on refugees with a reserve on geographical basis. According to this re-
serve, Turkey assured the obligation of accepting refugees only from European
countries.
Jauh Kurds who faced the Turkish Embas Kurdish refugees 1 and the proto-


67
tempore of the Iraqisple (is) out of tion of 138 Iraq1951 refugee crope, Amnesty, onal law
sent for the extrations under the countries in bar
In line with this disposition, the Iraqis who arrived in Turkey during September
1988 are not in a position to be granted the 'Status of refugee' by the Turkish au-
thorities. However, with a humanitarian approach to this problem, Turkey provided
temporary shelter to these people.
None of the Iraqis were sent back to their country against their will. Forced repa-
triation of these people [is] out of the question and no request was received from the
Iraqi Government for the extradition of 138 Iraqis.”
While Turkey's treaty obligations under the 1951 refugee Convention and its Pro-
tocol apply only to refugees originating from countries in Europe, Amnesty Interna-
tional believes that non-refoulement is a principle of general international law
which is binding on all states, regardless of their specific treaty obligations or of the
country of origin of the refugees concerned.
In March 1990, Amnesty International learned that the Iraqi Government was
seeking the extradition of a Kurdish man who could face the death penalty If re-
turned to Iraq. Reports indicated that he was accused of killing a member of the
Iraqi secret police who was pursuing him. He is also said to be a KDP activist and
draft evader who was sentenced to death in absentia after fleeing Iraq in May 1988.
He was recognized as a refugee under UNHCR's mandate in late 1988. The Turkish
authorities arrested him in late February or early March 1989' reportedly for the
purpose of extradition, but he remained in detention in Turkey pending investiga-
tions into his case to determine whether the alleged murder was a political or crimi-
nal offense. Two officials of the Iraqi Government arrived in Turkey in late March
1990 reportedly to put pressure on the Turkish authorities to release him into their
custody. Amnesty International learned in late May that he was extradited to Iraq
earlier that month and is reportedly to be tried in June for murder, which carries
the death penalty. He was initially held at a detention center in Baghdad but his
current whereabouts are unknown. This extradition has taken place despite
UNHCR's involvement in his case, including providing him with a defense lawyer.
In June Amnesty International condemned the extradition and urged the Turkish
authorities once more not to extradite to Iraq any persons who are clearly at risk of
human rights violations there.
In early May 1990 the Prime Minister of Turkey, Yildirim Akbulut, met President
Saddam Hussein in Baghdad. Among the topics reportedly discussed was the return
of the Iraqi Kurdish refugees who remained in Turkey. Between March and early
June 1990, 2,548 refugees were said to have been repatriated to Iraq under an offi-
cial amnesty announced on 10 March. Of these, 1,923 were from Mus camp, 475
were from Kiziltepe (Mardin) camp and 150 were from Diyarbakir camp. More are
expected to be repatriated before the current deadline of 11 July, suggest that poor
hygiene and intolerable camp conditions, notably three outbreaks of large-scale food
poisoning (on 8 June 1989 in Kiziltepe camp; on 17 December 1989 in Mus camp;
and on 1 February 1990 in Diyarbakir camp) affecting several thousand refugees,
has contributed to a general climate of insecurity which may be driving some reluc-
tant refugees back to Iraq. In addition, pressures in the form of reduced food and
water supplies, limited medical treatment, official bans on work outside the camp,
curfews and other security restrictions, allowing Iraqi Government officials to visit
the camps, and threats of forcible repatriation, are reportedly being used by the
Turkish authorities to coerce some of the Kurdish refugees to return under the cur-
rent amnesty.
These practices are said to be most widespread in Mus and Kiziltepe (Mardin) ref-
ugee camps, where the majority of the Kurds who returned to Iraq in April-June
1990 had been living. Recent Information received indicates, for example, that there
have been outbreaks of typhoid, malaria and dysentery in Kiziltepe camp, for which-
only a handful of people are said to be treated daily. The following are extracts
from the testimony of a Kurdish refugee in Kiziltepe (Mardin) camp received by
Amnesty International in June 1990, and is one of a number of such testimonies
received by the organization:
ty Intermony of ae care said to be and dysentericates, for exam in April-June
the camps of Mus and Mardin, began adopting a practical program to pressurize the
refugees to return to Iraq. That is what the Iraqi regime wants and is also working
to achieve it. For this purpose, an exchange of visits at various levels took place
between the two countries * * * The aim is to force the refugees to return to Iraq
under any circumstances. A policy of depriving the refugees of food began in the
camps of Mardin and Mus. Much of the nutritious foods given to the refugees every
fifteen days has disappeared. They also imposed further restrictions on movement
within and out of the camp * * * Hitting the refugees on their hands with sticks
and slapping them has become a daily practice. Here are some documented exam-
ples:


68
1. On 21/5 the police attacked the refugee Yassin Abdal, aged 36, married and has
two children. They hit him with sticks on his hands until they started bleeding be-
cause he was late in returning [to the camp].
2. On the night of 22-23/5 two refugees were arrested: Sabah Sidiq and Ghazi
Sidiq, who are brothers. They wanted to go through the barbed wire in order to
enter the camp, since the past incidents of beatings and insults had frightened the
refugees who had been visiting their relatives in Diyarbakir. So they (the two refu-
gees] were intending to enter the camp out of sight of the police in order to avoid
the beating and torture. They were beaten to the point of losing consciousness and
were transferred to the hospital as a result.
3. On 1/6 the police severely beat these refugees: Sulaiman Mustafa-aged 42, a
village “mukhtar” [government-appointed village chief].
Sidiq Bilizani-aged 60, he is ill and had gone to the police center to obtain a
permit allowing him to receive treatment at Diyarbakir hospital, even though he
had a paper from the doctor for that.
Hamid Jamil Shaikho Bamarni-aged 25. They hit him for no reason other than
that when he was talking to the police officer he raised his head a little more than
necessary and there arej hundreds of other similar incidents
And after these attacks of the refugees by the police on 1/6, a delegation from the
camp [composed of seven camp leaders) confronted the police officer * * * in charge
of the police center in the camp, asking him to call the Governor and tell him] that
we wished to visit him in order that ſhe may] relieve our suffering and the attacks
to which our sons are being subjected to. The officer's reply was that the Governor
is not prepared to meet anyone, and that our method's (of dealing] with you will not
change. If you accept you can stay, and if life here does not suit you, go to Iraq
*
*
of the crowds and toighting. The securifovince and securitwith the
extracts happened on the refugees, and thmad Salman, whice to go toad been made
On 3 June, six refugees in the same camp ware reported to have been beaten by
police with hose pipes. Four of them are: Ja'far Haji Mustafa Hruri, aged 35, mar-
ried; Mustafa Salim Hruri, aged 32, married; Ibrahim Ihsan Hruri, aged 18, single;
and Hussain Isma'il Garka, aged 45, married and has eight children.
On 12 Hay 1990, clashes broke out between Kiziltepe (Mardin) camp authorities
and the refugees, leading to arrests and threats of forcible repatriation of some refu-
gees to Iraq. According to Initial accounts of the incident, disturbances had broken
out in the camp between a group of refugee's and suspected “collaborators” with the
Turkish and Iraqi authorities. The Governor of Mardin Province and security forces
reportedly intervened to break up the fighting. The security forces were said to have
fired at random into the crowds and to have beaten some of the refugees. Reinforce-
ments in the form of additional security forces and armed personnel carriers were
brought into the camp, which was sealed off and a curfew imposed. Subsequent re-
ports received by Amnesty International linked this incident to attempts by the
Turkish authorities to return a group of Kurdish refugees to Iraq. The following are
extracts from an account of the incident made by one of the refugees in the camp:
"What happened on the night of 12-13/5/1990 surpassed anything that had hap-
pened before. A group of refugees, and they are: Hussain Besifki, Jumhur Uzmani,
Mustafa Bamnrni, Amin Ali and Muhammad Salman, were summoned to the camp
administration, and there they were asked by the police to go to the town of
Mardin, at a distance of 12 kms. from the camp. The hospital car had been made
ready for that purpose. The police clarified that the Governor was asking for them
in order to meet some people who had arrived from Iraq. The refugees] refused to
get into the car * * * The police threatened that they would be handed over to the
Iraqi authorities if they did not obey the orders, but their threats were to no avail.
When the police) gave up trying to make them go, they told the Governor * * *
who ordered the release (of the refugees). Directly after that the Deputy Governor)
himself came to the camp. A group of people were gathered at a distance of about
100 meters from the administration and police center. [The Deputy Governor), with
a stick in his hand, headed toward them and started beating one of the refugees
called 'Izzat Barbahari * * * who tried to get away * * * [The refugees] could not
contain themselves and threw stones at the Deputy Governor and the armed police
* * The police started firing with the guns which I believe the state had provided
them with for our protection. The bullets went through the tents and frightened the
sleeping refugees * * * After half an hour an armored carrier with a police contin-
gent entered the camp * * * the refugees took refuge in their tents ** * The fol-
lowing day the armored carrier made a military display, going through the passages
between the tents at top speed. The children did not venture out and people re-
mained in their tents. When the armored carrier could find nothing to run over, it
proceeded to level the camp store * * * to the ground * * * And when they gave up
trying to provoke us they withdrew their armored carrier. And on 15/5 the police
eos from the headed towardried to be deputy Governer the state had vered the
hrew stones bat guns which the tice tents and a police contini-
Thish for our profe After the refuge military did not vendu nothing to they apelice


filled with babies by torture their lies of yn tax!
en "execuhe form een belone
national provides numerous precisions on torture and execution, as well as the
names of the better known victims.
In February, 1989, Amnesty International published a voluminous report (70 pgs)
filled with figures and names of the Kurdish children martyrized in Iraq. From the
torture of babies in the presence of their parents to force the latter to talk, to the
putting to death by torture of children aged from 12 to 13 years because of the al-
leged political activities of their parents, this report teems with unendurable infor-
mation. It also notes that the bodies of young victims are only returned to their rel-
atives after the payment of an “execution tax!”
The repression sometimes takes the form of massive extermination. On July 30,
1983, approximately 8,000 women and children belonging to the Barzani tribe and
living in the Couchtepe resettlement camp, 10 kilometers from Arbil, placed under
the control of the Iraqi army, were taken to an unknown destination. The steps
taken by humanitarian organizations and the Red Cross to obtain information about
them have remained without response. Saddam Hussein contented himself with
stating on television that these “traitors are doubtless in hell.” A Kurdish source
maintains that they have been exterminated after having served as guinea pigs in
experiments on chemical and bacteriological weapons.
ble Fativity shoula ough these any order ofsidered as hose regions sho
is strictly forbidos, as well as an those emanal zones where
ANNEX I
TEXT OF THE DECREE OF THE MILITARY GOVERNOR OF IRAQI KURDISTAN
The letter of the first legion SF/1725 dated June 21st, notified by letter of the
positions FL 1 SF/4089 dated June 22 and begins as follows:
(A letter from the commander of the offices of the Northern Organizations SF/
4008 dated June 20) in consideration of the end of the period officially announced
for the collectivization of the "villages forbidden for security reasons” which expires
June 21, we have decided to execute the following, beginning June 22:
1. All the “villages forbidden for security reasons” should be considered as sites
(bases) of the subversive agents of Iran, successors of treason and the equals of Iraqi
traitors.
2. The existence of human beings and animals in these regions should be absolute-
ly forbidden, these regions should be considered as operational zones where firing
should not be restrained by any order other than those emanating from our base.
3. Traveling through these regions, as well as all agricultural, animal or industri-
al activity should be strictly forbidden, and the authorities concerned are responsi-
ble for following this order to the letter, each within his field of competence.
4. Your commanders should, from time to time, prepare special attacks using ar-
tillery, helicopters and combat planes, as often as possible and without respite
against those living in these regions, and day and night.
5. Anyone found in these forbidden regions should be taken and interrogated by
the organs of security. Those whose ages vary from 15 to 70 years should be execut-
ed after one has benefited from the information that they have given.
6. The organs of security concerned should interrogate those who surrender for a
maximum of three days, and for 10 days if necessary. If the questioning requires
more time than this, they will receive our assent, which will be communicated
either by telephone or by telex.
Any object confiscated by the combatants of the Regiments of National Defense
(government militia) should be given to them, with the exception of heavy, medium
and support weapons. On the other hand, they may keep light weapons under the
condition that they simply inform us of their number.
The officers of the regiments should inform actively and in detail the unit and
detachment commanders of the army about their activities within the Regiments of
National Defense. We hope that the above will be executed by everyone within their
field of competence.
Mr. KARIM. I also would like to introduce into the record this
book, which shows the villages in Kurdistan, which has been de-
ported of its population. The date and the number of people who
lived in those villages, the schools, the churches, and the hospitals
that have been destroyed by the government, and also the areas
that have been Arabized, where the Kurds have been depopulated
and non-Kurds have been settled in their place.
Senator MOYNIHAN. Dr. Karim, earlier the chairman, Senator
Pell, had the same document and asked that it be made part of the


75
citizens who are supposedly protected as citizens under the Iraqi
constitution are crimes as heinous and abhorrent as its more fla-
grant abuses of human rights.
Among these are: No. 1, 4,000 Kurdish villages and towns have
been destroyed and leveled. There are no villages left in Kurdistan.
A militarized zone of—–
Senator MOYNIHAN. There are no villages left in Kurdistan?
Mr. KARIM. In Kurdistan. A militarized zone of 20 to 30 kilome-
ters wide has been established along Iraq's border with Turkey and
Iran in Kurdish areas only. Anything that moves in this area is
shot on the spot. Some estimates place the number of Kurdish vil-
lages deprived of their homes, land, livestock, property, and liveli-
hood at the very least at half million; this is a conservative figur
No. 2, displaced Kurdish villagers have been forced to live in
camps located near largest population centers, Erbil, Sulaimaniya,
and Dihoak. Others were dispersed to the southern deserts and
others to unknown locations. All camps are located next to heavily
armed Iraqi army garrisons. The camp inhabitants are at the
mercy of the Iraqi Government to provide them with food. There
are no means of economic support for them. Some of the camps
have no water. Even the wells dug there were dry.
No. 3, dislocated Kurds are prohibited from visiting their villages
of origin. For example, Kurds from Sinjar cannot go back to Sinjar.
No. 4, Kurds are prohibited from buying land in areas targeted
for Arabization, such as Kirkuk, Sinjar, Khanakeen, Sheikhan,
Tuzkhurmatoo, Kifri, and other places.
No. 5, an Iraqi Arab who marries a Kurdish woman is paid 500
Iraqi dinars by the Government of Iraq.
No. 6, the Kurdish land has been damaged environmentally.
There is a massive project to divert water from Kurdish areas. Nat-
ural springs in Kurdish areas have been plugged by cement, trees
have been cut and roots poisoned so that they will not grow back
again.
No. 7, Kurdish students are not admitted to military or police
academies nor to college of education, unless they are members of
the Arab Ba'ath Socialist party; and
No. 8, all teachers must become members of the Arab Ba'ath So-
cialist party to keep their job.
The Iraqi Government's intrusion into every aspect of every citi-
zens' daily life is beyond comprehension of persons who have
grown up and lived in a free society. They have even sent Iraqi
agents into refugee camps to intimidate the Iraqi Kurds in Turkey,
they succeeded in poisoning the bread given to the refugees; 2,000
persons fell ill. Kurdish refugees who accepted Iraq's offer of am-
nesty and return to Iraq have never been heard from again.
As Kurds we are grateful to those who, at last, are telling the
alarming story that needs to be told about Iraq. But for the 150,000
Kurds still in refugee camps in Turkey and Iran words are not
enough. For the 4 million Kurds inside Iraq today, words are not
enough. .
Their very lives, their culture, their heritage, their identity, their
future and the future of their children is in jeopardy. We, there-
fore, ask for the following actions be taken, if you allow me, Mr.
Chairman.


76
Senator MOYNIHAN. Please do, Doctor.
Mr. KARIM. No. 1, we ask that the United States grant refugee
status to the Kurdish refugees from the Turkish and Iranian camps
and admit those who wish to come to the United States. We have
compiled a list of the people who have relatives in this country and
are willing to come here.
We ask that the United States grant political asylum in the
United States to those Kurds who seek it. We ask that the United
States Embassy in Baghdad grant visas to those Kurds who wish to
visit their relatives in the United States or seek medical care in
this country.
No. 2, we ask that the United States use its influence and put
pressure on the Governments of Turkey and perhaps on Iran,
which may be more difficult, and work with the U.N. High Com-
mission of Refugees and with the International Red Cross and
other organizations to improve the condition of the refugees in the
refugee camps.
Kurdish refugees in Iran are not forced to remain in camps like
they are in Turkey, but most have been forced to become beggars
in the streets for lack of food. Just this week, we learned that three
Kurds who have been arrested in Dyarbakir, Turkey, for attempt-
ing to deliver $6,000 to the refugees which have been donated by
the Kurds in the United States and elsewhere.
About a month ago, a Kurdish medical student in Dyarbakir,
Turkey publicly burned herself to death to call world attention to
the plight of the Kurdish refugees. Unfortunately, this received
little notice.
No. 3, we ask that the position of observer status be created for
Kurdistan in the United Nations like that has been created for the
Palestinians. We ask that a session of the United Nations be devot-
ed to a discussion of the Kurdish issues, as was proposed by the
late Dr. Andre Sakharov in the Paris conference on the Kurds.
No. 4, we ask that the United States exert pressure on Iraq to
compensate those Kurds who have suffered from its chemical
weapon attacks and forced dislocations, that Kurds be allowed to
return to their villages and rebuild them, that their human and
ethnic rights be respected.
And last, we ask that the United States discontinue its credit to
Iraq through Import-Export Bank and impose military and econom-
ic sanctions on Iraq until its genocidal policies are discontinued,
compensation paid, and human rights restored to all Iraqi citizens.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Karim follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF NAJMALDEEN KARIM
It is indeed a great honor to speak before you today, as a Kurdish American on
behalf of the four million Kurds in Iraq who cannot speak to you on their own
behalf. The Kurdish National Congress of North America, of which I am a member
of the Executive Committee, is deeply grateful to your distinguished committee for
the attention you have directed to the denial of Kurdish human rights in Iraq. A
day does not go by that each one of us Kurds does not think of our family members
now trapped in a Kurdistan that is no longer theirs, a Kurdish nation that is brutal-
ly and systematically being forced into submission and extinction by all the govern-
ments that occupy it.
Today, the focus is on Iraq, a country whose oppression of the Kurdish people has
gone beyond mere "violation of human rights” to a full scale, systematic, genocidal


77
side Iraations and attempted and their relatives inre, and execution
human rights.n, are crimezens who are
policy of eradication of the Kurdish identity within Iraq, and the elimination of any
persons who oppose this policy. No policy of this scope is set in Iraq without the
direct orders of Iraq's president, Saddam Hussein.
A full comprehensive account of many of the atrocities that have been and contin-
ue to be committed by the Iraqi government against the Kurds would take many
hours to present, but are well documented elsewhere. Your committee staff report
on Iraq's use of chemical weapons against the Kurds by Peter Galbraith and Chris-
topher Van Hollen, Jr., David Korn's comprehensive report, "Human Rights in
Iraq,” published this year by Middle East Watch, the State Department's annual
report on human rights, the proceedings of the First International Conference on
Kurdish Human Rights in Paris last October sponsored by France Liberte headed by
Madame Danielle Mitterand of France, reports by Amnesty International, Physi-
cians for Human Rights, Cultural Survival, numerous journalists and others have
described vividly in sickening detail the terror to which the Kurdish people of Iraq
have been and continue to be subjugated.
The list of crimes committed by the Iraqi government against the Kurdish people
grows longer with each passing day, adding to an increasing body of evidence that
reveal Iraq's intent to destroy the Kurdish identity is more than a policy to stamp
out and repress political opposition. It is a policy whose ultimate goal is the elimina-
tion of four million Kurds and all things Kurdish from Iraq.'
The crimes committed by the Iraqi regime to eliminate political opposition: the
use of chemical weapons; the imprisonment, torture, and execution of suspected op-
ponents of the Iraqi regime and their relatives including infants and children, the
assassinations and attempted assassinations of dissidents and Kurdish leaders out-
side Iraq are in themselves enough to justify the condemnation and boycott of Iraq
both economically and militarily by the rest of the world community. But the
slower, more insidious forms of Iraq's genocide against the Kurds, the policies
against its own Kurdish citizens who are supposedly protected as citizens under the
Iraqi constitution, are crimes as heinous and abhorrent as its more flagrant abuses
of human rights. Among these are:
1. Four thousand Kurdish villages and towns have been destroyed and level led.
There are no villages left. A militarizedzone 20 to 30 kilometers wide has been es-
tablished along Iraq's borders with Turkey and Iran in Kurdish areas only. Any-
thing seen moving in this area is shot on the spot. Some estates place the number of
Kurdish villagers deprived of their homes, land, livestock, property, and livelihood
at the very least one half million.
2. Displaced Kurdish villagers have been forced to live in camps located near
larger population centers: Erbil, Sulaimaniya, and Dihoak. Others were dispersed to
the southern desert, others to unknown locations. All camps are located next to
heavily armed Iraqi army garrisons. The camp inhabitants are at the mercy of the
Iraqi government to provide them with food. There is no means of economic support
for them. Some of the camps have no water. Wells dug there were dry.
3. Dislocated Kurds are prohibited from visiting their village of origin. For exam-
ple, Kurds from Sinjar cannot go to Sinjar.
4. Kurds are prohibited from buying land in areas targeted for Arabization, like
Xirkuk, Sinjar, Khanakeen, Sheikhan, Tuzkhurmatoo, and Kifri.
5. Any Iraqi Arab man who marries a Kurdish woman is paid 500 dinars (official-
ly $1,500) by the Iraqi government.
6. The Kurdish land has been damaged environmentally. There is a massive
project to divert water from the Kurdish area. Natural springs in the Kurdish area
have been plugged by cement. Trees have been cut and the roots poisoned so that
they will not grow back.
7. Kurdish students are not admitted to military or police academies, nor to the
College of Education unless they are members of the Arab Ba'ath Socialist party.
8. All teachers must become members of the Arab Ba'ath Socialist party to keep
their job.
The Iraqi government's intrusion into every aspect of every citizen's daily life is
beyond the comprehension of persons who have grown up and live in a free society.
They have even sent Iraqi agents into the refugee camps to intimidate the Iraqi
Kurds in Turkey. They succeeded in poisoning the bread given to the refugees. Two
thousand persons fell ill. Kurdish refugees who accepted Iraq's offer of amnesty and
returned to Iraq have never been heard from again. As Kurds, we are grateful to
those who at last are telling the alarming story that needs to be told about Iraq.
But for the 150,000 Kurds still in refugee camps in Turkey and Iran, words are
not enough. For the four million Kurds inside Iraq today, words are not enough.
Their very lives, their culture, their heritage, their identity, their future, and the
future of their children is in jeopardy.


78
We therefore ask that the following actions be taken:
1. We ask that the U.S. grant refugee status to the Kurdish refugees from the
Turkish and Iranian camps and admit those who wish to come to the U.S. We have
compiled a list of approximately 700 persons there who have relatives in the United
States. We ask that the U.S. grant political asylum in the U.S. to those Kurds who
seek it. We ask that the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad grant visas to those Kurds who
wish to visit their relatives in the United States or who seek medical care here.
2. We ask that the U.S. use its influence on the governments of Turkey and Iran
to work with the U.N. High Commission on Refugees and the International Red
Cross to improve the conditions of the refugee camps. Kurdish refugees in Iran are
not forced to remain in camps like they are in Turkey, but most have been forced to
become beggars in the street for lack of food. Just this week we learned that three
Kurds have been arrested in Dyarbakir, Turkey for attempting to deliver $6,000 to
the refugees which had been donated by Kurds in the United States and elsewhere.
About a month ago a Kurdish medical student in Dyarbakir publicly burned herself
to death to call world attention to the plight of the Kurdish refugees. Unfortunately
this received little notice.
3. We ask that a position of observer status be created for Kurdistan in the
United Nations, like what has been done for Palestine and Eritrea and others.
4. We ask that a session of the U.N. be devoted to a discussion of Kurdish issues
as was proposed by the late Dr. Andrei Sakharov.
5. We ask that the U.S. exert pressure on Iraq to compensate those Kurds who
have suffered from its chemical weapon attacks and forced dislocations, that Kurds
be allowed to return to their villages and rebuild them, that their human and
ethnic rights be respected.
6. We ask that the U.S. discontinue its credit to Iraq through the Import/Export
Bank, and impose military and economic sanctions on Iraq until its genocidal poli-
cies are discontinued, compensation paid, and human rights restored to all Iraqi citi-
zens.
Thank you.
Senator MOYNIHAN. Thank you, Dr. Karim.
Thank you particularly for the specifics that you put before us.
You give us decisions that we have to make. And I must say, I am
very impressed by those particulars.
But let us first hear from Professor Milhollin, and good after-
noon to you, sir. Thank you for being patient. You are the cleanup
hitter.
STATEMENT OF GARY MILHOLLIN, PROFESSOR, WISCONSIN
PROJECT ON NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL
Mr. MILHOLLIN. I am the barrier to lunch.
Senator MOYNIHAN. No, you are not. You have been very patient,
saving your own lunch, if that is what you mean. But take your
time; we have taken your time.
Mr. MILHOLLIN. Thank you very much, Senator.
I am pleased to appear before the committee. I would ask the
committee to insert my statement at this time as if read.
Senator MOYNIHAN. Without objection, as if read.
Mr. MILHOLLIN. And I will simply try to make a few major points
and correct some statements that the State Department made
which I believe are in error.
First, Iraq is engaged in a giant experiment at this time which
consists of trying to import the means to make ballistic missiles
and nuclear weapons. Iraq has already succeeded in importing the
means to make chemical weapons. The outcome of this experiment
will depend on export control systems in the developed countries.
They are the only practical barrier to the achievement of Iraq's ob-
Iraq does achieve these objectives, it will cause a major


79
shift in power in the Middle East, and I believe it will be a clear
and present threat to world peace.
So, I think that it is—I cannot imagine a thing more important
than preventing Iraq from succeeding in this import effort. The
fact is that the United States over the last few years has exported
to Iraq technology that Iraq is now using to make ballistic missiles.
Senator MOYNIHAN. Do we have some specifics on that?
Mr. MILHOLLIN. I was hoping you would ask that question, Sena-
tor. Yes. The Commerce Department approved the export of high-
speed oscilloscopes to Iraq. These machines are on the nuclear re-
ferral list, which means that they can used in the production of nu-
clear weapons. These machines also are used to develop and test
and maintain the guidance systems of long-range ballistic missiles.
These were sent to Iraq, I understand, by the Commerce Depart-
ment over the last few years.
Senator MOYNIHAN. The Commerce Department agreed that they
could--
Mr. MILHOLLIN. Agreed that they could be exported to Iraq.
Senator MOYNIHAN. All right. Let us have the staff get right on
to that. All right, Peter? Let us learn of that. I mean, that is a spe-
cific, and we will pursue that.
Mr. MILHOLLIN. I also have the impression that the Commerce
Department and the State Department are now considering the
export of other similar items on the nuclear referral list to Iraq
and that the Government is divided over whether these should be
approved.
I recommend to the committee that the committee inform the
Department that it opposes any further export of sensi-
tive technology to Iraq until further notice. It seems to me that
that is the least we could do to translate into action our feelings
about what Iraq is doing.
Senator MOYNIHAN. Yes, very clearly. COCOM—that is an inter-
national organization.
Mr. MILHOLLIN. All right. Let us go to the COCOM question. Iraq
tried to smuggle a thing called krytrons out of the-
Senator MOYNIHAN. Yes.
Mr. MILHOLLIN [continuing]. Out of the United States. I have a
list of the items that were deleted in the last week from the
COCOM list. Item 1542 covers krytrons. It was deleted from the
COCOM list last week.
Senator MOYNIHAN. COCOM, that is the Coordinating Committee
on Multilateral Export Controls to Communist Countries?
Mr. MILHOLLIN. Yes.
Senator MOYNIHAN. That is a Cold War structure.
Mr. MILHOLLIN. That is right.
Senator MOYNIHAN. The Cold War is kind of coming apart now.
Why would those have been deleted?
Mr. MILHOLLIN. They have been deleted because of the desire to
free the transfer of technology to the newly free countries in East-
ern Europe.
Senator MOYNIHAN. Exactly. So, it is a Cold War structure.
Mr. MILHOLLIN. Yes..
Senator MOYNIHAN. That does not respond to the kinds of situa-
tions we are dealing with here.


81
us or n
us C
IL-1602 Pyrolitic deposition technology and specially designed components
therefor.
IL-1635 Steel alloys in crude or semi-fabricated form, containing a specified
combination of elements.
IL-1734 Low density rigid, carbon-bonded, fibrous or nonfibrous carbon thermal
insulating materials.
IL-1749 Polycarbonate sheets.
IL-1760 Tantalates and niobates, except fluorotantalates.
Mr. MILHOLLIN. I have a copy that I can supply the committee.
Senator MOYNIHAN. Good.
The second piece of technology which has been deleted from the
COCOM list is the machine that makes the bodies of centrifuges.
Centrifuges are what Iraq is counting on to make the material for
its first atomic bomb. I believe that the fact that this has been de-
leted from the COCOM list will make it much easier for Iraq to
import these machines. A German company has already been in-
vestigated for quietly supplying Iraq with perhaps one machine in
the past.
So, we are looking at a situation in which the barrier to Iraq's
success in making bombs and missiles is the international export
control system, and at the same time we are weakening that
system in order to facilitate the East bloc.
The problem is that we have not thought through the conse-
quences of our actions, and we are still fighting the last war. We
have not realized that we have a new arms race on our hands. In-
stead of an East-West arms race, we now have a North-South-East
arms race, and we simply have not adjusted our minds.
Senator MOYNIHAN. Nice. North-South.
Mr. MILHOLLIN. It is happening. It will be the next arms race.
There is one more point that I want to cover, and that is that I
believe that Iraq's effort to import the components of the nuclear
trigger from the United States, to smuggle them out of the United
States, was a violation of Iraq's obligations under the nonprolifera-
tion treaty to refrain from making nuclear weapons..
I believe that the United States should declare that Iraq has
either violated the nonproliferation treaty, or attempted to violate
it. So far, the State Department has not brought itself even to the
point where it is able to declare that Iraq has violated the treaty. It
seems to me, as you have said, that if a treaty can be violated with
impunity, then it means nothing. The nonproliferation treaty is a
crucial international undertaking. It must be defended, and it must
be defended by the State Department. I find it unacceptable for the
State Department to be unable to declare a country in breach of
the treaty after such a thing as Iraq has done.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Milhollin follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF GARY MILHOLLIN
I am pleased to have this opportunity to address the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee on the subject of Iraq's effort to build nuclear weapons, chemical weap-
ons and long-range missiles.
I am a member of the University of Wisconsin Law School faculty and director of
the Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control in Washington, D.C.-a project de-
voted to slowing the spread of nuclear weapons to developing countries.
Iraq has now begun a great experiment. After importing the means to make
chemical weapons, it is trying to import the means to make nuclear weapons and
long-range missiles. The experiment will consist of testing the export control sys-
tems of the developed countries to see whether such an effort can succeed.


82
At present, Iraq has no means of making nuclear weapon material. Its forty
megawatt, French-supplied nuclear reactor called Osirak is not operating. The reac-
tor is still suffering the consequences of having been bombed by Israel with U.S.
planes in 1981. If the reactor is rebuilt, it could make enough plutonium for up to
two atomic bombs per year. There has been one report that the reactor may be
about to start, but the International Atomic Energy Agency states that the reactor's
fuel has not been taken out of storage.
Iraq is also trying to make enriched uranium-the other nuclear weapon materi-
al. It hopes to build gas centrifuges that will enrich natural uranium to nuclear
weapon grade. To do so, it has imported machines from Germany for making centri-
fuge bodies and, according to press reports, special magnets from China that will
help the centrifuges operate. It is unknown how far Iraq's centrifuge effort has pro-
gressed.
To make parts for the bomb itself, Iraq tried to smuggle the components for a
nuclear weapon triggering system out of the United States in March. The nature of
the components, and the fact that Iraq tried to smuggle them, show that they were
not intended for peaceful purposes.
Iraq also has an ambitious program for making long-range missiles. It has modi-
fied a Soviet-supplied tactical missile to increase its range to about 400 miles, it has
tested a longer range version of that missile that flies 560 miles, and it has cooperat-
ed with Egypt and Argentina to develop a two-stage, solid fuelled intermediate-
range missile. In December 1989, Iraq surprised the world by testing the first stage
of a satellite launcher made from five Soviet-style tactical rockets strapped together.
During the same month, Iraq. claimed that it had tested a ballistic missile with a
range of over 1000 miles.
I have appended to my statement tables showing the current status of Iraq's nu-
clear and missile programs.
It is clear that Iraq has fielded a well-financed, world wide procurement network
that will test export controls to their limit. Unfortunately, the Western countries
are weakening their export controls at exactly the same time that this is going on.
Last week, the COCOM countries met in Paris to remove thirty items from the
COCOM export control list. COCOM (the Coordinating Committee on Multilateral
Export Controls to Communist Countries) was set up by the United States and its
allies after World War II. COCOM was invented to stop the Soviet Union from get-
ting the American technology going to Europe under the Marshall Plan. Since then,
COCOM has expanded to include Japan and all the NATO countries except Iceland.
It prohibits high technology exports to the Warsaw Pact and other Communist coun-
tries.
Among the items decontrolled last week were the very nuclear weapon triggers
that Iraq tried to smuggle out of the United States in March. Also decontrolled were
the very machines that Iraq is counting on to make the bodies for its uranium en-
richment centrifuges-called spin-forming and flow-forming machines. Although the
COCOM countries intended to decontrol these items mainly to benefit the newly-
free countries of Eastern Europe, the effect will probably be to decontrol them for
Iraq too.
This is true for several reasons. First, by dropping these items from the COCOM
list, they will, in the normal course of events, be removed from any licensing control
at all for buyers in Eastern Europe. From any COCOM country they can go to
Poland, Hungary or Czechoslovakia like a bag of onions. There will be no record of
the shipments. Hence, there will be no control on reexport from East Europe to
other destinations. This means that Iraq can order U.S. bomb triggers through front
companies in Eastern Europe without breaking any laws. So can India, Israel, Paki-
stan, South Africa and any other country that wants to make the bomb or long
range missiles.
Second, these items will fall completely off the export control lists of the Europe-
an members of NATO unless each country makes a special effort to keep them on.
Unlike the United States, where the commodities dropped off the COCOM list will
still be controlled because of the U.S. policy against nuclear arms proliferation, the
COCOM list is the only basis for export control in most European members of
NATO. There is no separate control list for stopping nuclear arms proliferation or
the spread of ballistic missiles. If an item falls off the COCOM list it drops complete-
ly out of these countries' export control systems. So far, there is not much evidence
that our COCOM partners will make a special effort to control these items for nu-
clear or missile proliferation purposes. If they don't, our partners' companies will be
able to export the decontrolled items to the Third World directly.
Third, even if there were some form of control over these items when exported to
Eastern Europe, there would still be a great risks of diversion. These cash-starved
ra Secondheits of Na Teates, where the policy control in more af arms prope complete


83
This She exportsame compuntow helpim missilaintain res the dat oscilloscoent has
Desecret. Thehted decis quietly are helping develont tests. It guidancem nucleato Iraq.
and capital-poor regimes do not have functioning export control systems. There will
be a great risk that their companies will break the conditions of sale even if condi-
tions are imposed.
The thirty items taken off in June are just the beginning. By the end of 1990 the
entire COCOM export list will be scrapped and a much shorter one substituted.
Unless something happens to change things, the deletions will be a giant import bo-
nanza for Third World bomb and missile makers.
Unfortunately, the United States itself is not entirely free of guilt when it comes
to exporting to Iraq. During the past few years, the Commerce Department has ap-
proved the export of mainframe computers and high speed oscilloscopes to Iraq.
High speed oscilloscopes are uniquely able to process the data from nuclear tests.
They are also used to develop, test and maintain missile guidance systems and to
receive and sort the telemetry from missile flight tests. It is virtually certain that
the U.S. oscilloscopes are now helping Iraq develop ballistic missiles. It is very likely
that the mainframe computers are helping too.
These exports were quietly approved in the days when Iraq was fighting Iran.
This short-sighted decision was only possible because the U.S. export control process
is secret. The Commerce Department, which makes the export decisions, and the
Department of Energy, which keeps the records, refuse to tell the public what cases
have been approved or even considered. Not even the export license, which is the
official record of a government action, is available despite the fact that all of these
exports are required to be for civilian purposes. I believe that if the Commerce De-
partment's export control process were opened to public and Congressional scrutiny,
dangerous exports like the oscilloscopes would not be approved.
There are other examples of U.S. confusion on exports to Iraq. In March 1990, the
Commerce Department announced a list of commodities that would be controlled to
inhibit missile proliferation. The list was intended to implement the Missile Tech-
nology Control Regime, a seven country accord to which the United States is a
party. Two of the commodities added to the U.S. list in March, however, were delet-
ed from the COCOM list in June. This means that a U.S. exporter will not be able
to send the commodities to Iraq without a validated license, but could send them
almost anywhere in Europe without such a license. Thus, an Iraqi buyer could
obtain the U.S. items simply by ordering through a European front company. The
United States seems to be controlling the same commodities with one hand that it is
trying to decontrol with the other.
The United States has also been too timid in its reaction to Iraqi smuggling. Iraq
tried to buy the same switches in March that Israel obtained in 1980 and Pakistan
tried to obtain in 1983. Iraq's chance of success in such a clumsy operation was
probably less than ten percent. It is clear that the risk of getting caught was not a
deterrent. If the United States is going to stop such brazen actions, it must do more
than arrest the small fry that get caught. It must act against the governments that
hire them.
This does not appear likely under the current policy of the State Department. Ac-
cording to the Los Angeles Times, the State Department opposed the sting operation
against Iraq in March. State said that it preferred to "work quietly with Iraq to
discourage Iraq from trying to produce nuclear weapons without creating a public
furor * * *” According to the Washington Post, a State Department official even
said that, “Our approach has been to try to find common areas to engage Iraq so
that the more antisocial aspects of its nature could be modified in time by drawing
it into international activities.”
It is time to recognize that the spread of weapons of mass destruction to countries
such as Iraq threatens U.S. security at least as much-and possibly more-than
technology transfers to what remains of the Warsaw Pact. The East-West arms race
is being replaced by a North-South arms race. We must now change our export
policy to accommodate this fact.
Iraq: Status of Nuclear Reactors in 1990
Research reactors
Type of capacity
Start-up date
Plutonium
generated through
1989
Safeguards
Yes
1967
Destroyed in 1981
air strike
1987
Yes
IRT-5000
Pool; 5-10MWt
Osirak (Tammuz I)
Pool; 40 MWt;
HEU fuel
Tammus II (critical assem- Pool; 500-800
bly)
KWt
.............
Yes


84
Iraq: Missiles in Service in 1990
Name
Range (miles)
Accuracy (CEP
Payload (pounds) | in varda)
Comments
FROG-7
1000
550–750
SS-1 Scud-B
170-190
1900-2200
975-1000
Single stage, solid-fueled,
unguided, spin-stabi-
lized, with mobile
launch platform. Import-
ed from the Soviet
Union.
Single stage, storable
liquid-fueled, inertially
guided, with mobile
launch platform. Import-
ed from the Soviet
Union.
Single stage, storable
liquid-fueled, inertially
guided, with mobile
launch platform. Iraqi
modification of Soviet
Scud.
300-860
1760-3520
Al-Husayn (modified-Scud 380-400
B)
Iraq: Missiles Under Development in 1990
Name
Range (miles)
Payload (pounds)
Accuracy (CEP
in yards)
Comments
Al-Abbas
(modified-Scud | 560
250+
3520-5280
B)
Condor II
500-600
1000
N/A
Single stage, storable
liquid-fueled, inertially
· guided, with mobile
launch platform. Iraqi
modification of Soviet
Scud. Status: flight-
tested.
Two stage, solid-fueled, in-
ertially guided, with
mobile launch platform.
Original development
undertaken as a joint
effort by Egypt, Argenti-
na and Iraq. Egypt and
Argentina subsequently
dropped out. Status:
rocket engines tested.
Status: Iraq claims to have
tested: reported uncon-
firmed by third party
Tammouz I
1250
N/A
N/A
sources.
Senator MOYNIHAN. That is a very powerful statement. You are
part of the Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control. Would it
be possible to ask if you could give the committee a brief to this
point about a violation of the nonproliferation treaty?
Mr. MILHOLLIN. I can supply you with additional materials in
support of the statement I have just made, or I could cover it quick-
ly orally.
Senator MOYNIHAN. Go right ahead. Do that, or do both.
Mr. MILHOLLIN. At the time the treaty was put together, it was
generally agreed that making bomb parts would be a violation of
the treaty, and it was also provided in the treaty that a country
such as Iraq, a nonnuclear weapons state, would n
ance from outside in order to make the bomb. It seems to me that
to attempt to smuggle parts for the bomb out of another country is
to seek assistance, and does violate the treaty.


85
Senator MOYNIHAN. Yes. That is your basic statement?
Mr. MILHOLLIN. That
yes.
Senator MOYNIHAN. Is there not a problem that we will look to
some international obligations as very serious, and then others
become, well, of a long time ago, and we cannot remember, and
what difference would it make, anyway?
I just ask Dr. Karim and you, Mr. Graham, this is our first post-
Cold War hearing, and you are talking about a North-South nucle-
ar arms race. There seems to be a certain kind of lassitude in the
State Department with respect to just how firm these commitments
are, and I am not speaking with any derogatory intent.
It just seems to me that in the long confrontation with the Sovi-
ets we have acquired habits that well, we just did not think they
abided by these arrangements, nor was there any effort to try to
make them, and the general notion of international law just began
to evaporate, and if the State Department begins to have the same
quality, same lassitude with respect to the NPT, the Non-Prolifera-
tion Treaty, then we are in trouble. Do you sense what I have been
trying to say here, or have I not been coherent?
Mr. MILHOLLIN. Would you like for me to respond to that, Sena-
tor?
Senator MOYNIHAN. Yes.
Mr. MILHOLLIN. I think one of the problems with the Non-Prolif-
eration Treaty is that there is no mechanism for causing anything
to happen if somebody breaks it. That is also a fault in many other
treaties, but as a minimum, it seems to me that if a country breaks
an important treaty, the least that one could expect is that the
other members of the treaty, the other countries, would at least
point that out.
I am not asking the State Department to declare a war on Iraq. I
am just asking it to say that it has violated the treaty.
Senator MOYNIHAN. Could we not ask the Soviets to join us? The
Soviets have been very restrained about the export of nuclear tech-
nology, have they not? Is that not generally the record?
r. MILHOLLIN. Well, there are some activities by the Soviets
that are not generally known which might cause you to qualify
that statement, but nevertheless, I think the Soviets would join
with us in any reasonable effort to define what a breach of the
treaty is.
Senator MOYNIHAN. The Japans of the world have a right to
think that we will take this seriously. The Non-Proliferation
Treaty says, you will not make a nuclear weapon, and they do not,
but if they do not and others do, and we do not seem to mind, then
what have we told the Japans of the world?
Mr. MILHOLLIN. Precisely.
Senator MOYNIHAN. The Italys of the world. This connection
seems to evaporate.
Mr. MILHOLLIN. There are other countries which are members of
the treaty who have had nuclear weapon ambitions. If the treaty
can be broken with impunity, that lesson will be immediately ap-
preciated by all those countries.
Senator MOYNIHAN. Precisely. Dr. Karim, Mr. Graham, would
you not agree? I should think you would.


86
Mr. GRAHAM. If I could shift it a bit from the question of nonpro-
liferation treaties back to the whole focus of human rights, which
is Amnesty's focus, there are several international standards and
laws, as well as U.Ś. law, that we are concerned about not being as
vigorously enforced as they should be.
Senator MOYNIHAN. These are?
Mr. GRAHAM. The activity that was alluded to earlier in the U.N.
Commission on Human Rights, although in March perhaps--
Senator MOYNIHAN. They have not done anything?
Mr. GRAHAM. That is correct. The ultimate decision for several
years has been no action out of the Commission.
Senator MOYNIHAN. Has there been a vote?
Mr. GRAHAM. Three days before Mr. Bazhov was sentenced to
death, the Commission voted at that time to not consider looking at
the human rights situation in Iraq next year.
Senator MOYNIHAN. The size of the Commission has been in-
creased, has it not?
Mr. GRAHAM. I believe so.
Senator MOYNIHAN. We may find ourselves with a Human Rights
Commission in which only one-third of the members can be said to
represent regimes that are law abiding in this regard. Well, get an-
other commission or insist on it. Make them vote. Press them.
Shame them.
Mr. GRAHAM. Precisely. In 1988 the United States was not among
those that were seeking an examination of the situation in Iraq.
Senator MOYNIHAN. But the situation in Kurdistan, Dr. Karim-
I think the word “genocide” should be used carefully. It is too im-
portant a word to be applied to birth control or high-rise apart-
ments, or whatever. It is one of those words we start using careless-
ly. It is a very serious word. The treatment of Kurds in Iran and
Iraq is approaching the genocidal, is it not?
Mr. KARIM. Yes, Senator, it is approaching. The Kurdish society
in Iraq, most of the people used to live in the villages and were
mostly peasants. That does not exist any more. You go to Kurdis-
tan, you see it has become like a desert.
Senator MOYNIHAN. Mr. Galbraith has just given me a note that
says it is a landscape-a desert landscape interspersed with rubble
that once was villages and has been deliberately destroyed. Not
abandoned, but destroyed.
Mr. KARIM. That is very accurate, Senator, and just to add to
that, some people who have managed to go secretly through the
border, you can see in certain places even the livestock are dead
from the use of the chemical. The corpses and everything are still
there, and nobody has touched them since the time that the weap-
ons had been used.
Senator MOYNIHAN. That is savage. You have given us very spe-
cific things to deal with, and this committee must do.
I am sorry that the hearing went late. I am very glad it was
held. We have a record of compelling concerns.
Are there any further questions? I think there will be some writ-
ten questions, if you could handle them.
We thank you all. We particularly thank you, Professor, for
having come from Wisconsin. Oh, I guess you are located in Wash-
ington, are you not, now—the project is. We thank you all for being


87
here. We thank our guests. They have been very thoughtful and
surprisingly patient through a long and painful morning, and a
necessary one.
We thank our recorder, and the very able staff behind us, and
with that, the hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon at 1:05 p.m., the committee adjourned, to reconvene
subject to the call of the Chair.]





APPENDIX
RESPONSES OF MR. KELLY AND MR. GILDER TO QUESTIONS ASKED BY SENATOR PELL
HUMAN RIGHTS
human rights.” If notch pattern of gross violations of internatier Iraq's conduct
role in thatravene thons,” we are
in the reghich would serve the
Question. Has the administration made a determination whether Iraq's conduct
constitutes “A consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized
human rights.” If not, how can the administration enforce the laws imposing sanc-
tions on countries that meet this standard?
Answer. The United States has described Iraq's appalling human rights record in
detail in our annual human rights report. We have been objective, we believe accu-
rate, and we have pulled no punches. This question, however, uses a specific legal
formulation that has implications affecting at least eight statutes relating to prohi-
bitions of assistance and other forms of cooperation with foreign countries. We in
the Department are keenly aware of these statutes. Although The President has
never made a formal finding that any country is guilty of "gross violations," we are
extremely careful never to engage in actions that could contravene these statutes.
In the case of Iraq we also note that country's role in the sensitive Middle East
region. We believe it important to preserve the Executive's flexibility in responding
to events in the region which would have significant and long-term impact on our
overall interests in the region.
Question. In your opinion, what countries in the last two decades have engaged in
“a consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized human
rights?” How does Iraq's human rights record compare to that of the countries you
cite? (For example, how many killings of its own citizens has the Iraqi Government
engaged in as compared to that of other countries?)
Answer. As I have explained above the United States has never made a formal
finding that a country is guilty of “gross violations.” Clearly, Iraq's human rights
record is extremely poor. In our annual human rights report, we have described
Iraq's appalling human rights record in detail, describing that record as abysmal.
The United States is fully aware of this situation and as a result human rights is
one of our highest priorities in dealing with the Iraqi Government.
Because of the closed and secretive nature of the Iraqi's regime, compiling accu-
rate information on the overa ll number of killings due to extrajudicial executions,
execution without due process, the use of torture and other government violence is
extremely difficult.
Question. The Iraqi Government asserts that it is undertaking reforms to bring
about political pluralism and respect for fundamental human rights. What is your
assessment of these reforms? Do you see any actual improvement in Iraq's human
rights record?
Answer. Iraq is engaged in drafting a new constitution which Iraqi authorities
have said will liberalize Iraq's political system and contain other guarantees protect-
ing human rights. We have not yet seen a draft of this document and, therefore,
have no firsthand assessment of it. However, we note that the present constitution
provides guarantees against torture and other violations, with no apparent effect on
practice. The key is for the Government of Iraq to take specific actions to improve
its human rights record. This is what we are looking for, not merely words in a new
constitution.
ofag is ealize Iraqe not e. Howexher vio to t
THE KURDS
Question. What is your estimate of the total number of Iraqi Kurds to die in
chemical weapons attacks carried out by the Iraqi military?
Answer. There are no reliable figures with which to answer this question. Rebel
Kurdish sources put the figure at between 5,000 and 10,000.
Question. What specifically has the administration done to protest the treatment
of the Iraqi Kurds?
(89)


90
Answer. The administration has repeatedly raised directly and at a senior level
with the Iraqi Government our concerns regarding Iraqi Kurdish citizens. You will
recall that the United States was in the forefront of those who publicly and private-
ly criticized Iraq's use of chemical weapons against its Kurdish citizens. We have
also expressed our concerns about the forced relocation of hundreds of thousands of
Iraqi Kurds from the border regions to settlements in the interior. Our overall effort
is to promote greater respect for the human rights of all Iraqi citizens, which will
directly affect the lot of the Kurdish minority.
Question. The Iraqi Kurds find themselves isolated from the outside world. Would
Voice of America broadcasts in Kurdish help alleviate that isolation?
Answer. VOA broadcasts would have only a marginal effect, especially in relation
to the resources they would consume. Iraqi Kurds speak two distinct dialects (Kur-
manche and Sorani) which are not easily mutually intelligible; VOA could probably
not broadcast to both groups. VOA and BBC broadcast to the region in Arabic and
Turkish, which many Iraqi Kurds understand.
Question. What information do you have about the torture and execution of Kurd-
ish children?
Answer. Amnesty International has issued reports on the subject based on
charges by rebel groups, and has published a report stating that the Iraqi Govern-
ment has confirmed the execution of 29 Kurdish youths. Amnesty alleged that the
bodies of these youths bore the marks of torture. Independent information to con-
firm the allegations cited in AI reports is not available.
Question. Does Iraq's treatment of the Kurds constitute “a consistent pattern of
gross violations” of their human rights?
Answer. The answer we have provided to the first question addresses the "con-
sistent pattern” issue.
The Iraqi Government has used a carrot-and-stick approach to the Kurds seeking
to gain the support of as many tribes as possible.
During the war with Iran the Iraqi Government began a campaign of destroying
villages of Kurds suspected of siding with Iran, and relocating their inhabitants to
closely watched cities and new settlements. After the cease-fire with Iran, Iraq's
campaign to dislodge rebels from the areas they controlled was accompanied by the
shocking, indiscriminate use of chemical weapons killing thousands of men, women
and children. After these campaigns, destruction of villages and towns and the pop-
ulation transfers were speeded up until finally some 500,000—about one-seventh of
the Kurdish population-were displaced. Although we understand Iraqi authorities
are now allowing displaced villagers to commute to their lands to cultivate the
fields and orchards, we remain extremely concerned about the overall effects of this
massive displacement.
Question. What is the extent to which the government of Iraq has depopulated the
rural areas of Iraqi Kurdistan? In your judgment, does the depopulation of Iraqi
Kurdistan constitute a human rights violation?
Answer. Since 1987, the government of Iraq has acted to establish a depopulated
security zone along the full length of Iraq's borders with Iran and Turkey. The gov-
ernment has destroyed villages within a 30-kilometer wide zone and relocated about
500,000 Kurdish and Assyrian inhabitants into more easily controlled and protected
towns, cities and newly constructed settlements within traditionally Kurdish areas.
This program of forced relocation violates the human rights of those affected and is
a matter of great concern, particularly against the background of Iraq's abysmal
overall human rights record.
EFFECT OF PELL-HELMS SANCTIONS BILL
Question. What impact did threatened U.S. sanctions legislation (the 1988 Pell/
Helms bill) have on Iraq's treatment of its Kurdish population? Do you believe the
1988 Pell/Helms sanctions bill, which passed the Senate three times, had an impact
on Iraq's thinking about the use of chemical weapons as a counterinsurgency tool?
If so, how?
Answer. We have no evidence that Iraq was influenced by the Pell/Helms sanc-
tions bill. Lacking direct information, we have no good means of accurately assess-
ing Iraqi thinking on such U.S. legislation.
CHEMICAL WEAPONS USE
Question. How extensively did Iraq use chemical weapons in the Iran Iraq war?
Did Iraq initiate the use of chemical weapons in that war? Did Iraq's use of chemi-
cal weapons put it in violation of the 1925 Geneva Protocol?


92
IRAQ AND KUWAIT
Question. What is the status of Iraq's dispute with Kuwait?
Answer. Iraq has in the past put forward historical claims on Kuwaiti territory.
This is reflected, inter alia, in the problem of an undemarcated border with Kuwait.
The Iraqi port of Basra was unusable during the war with Iran, and Iraq is interest-
ed in securing approaches to its port of Um Qasr, which abuts Kuwaiti territory.
On July 16 Iraqi Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz sent a letter to the Secretary Gener-
al of the Arab League that listed other alleged Iraqi grievances against Kuwait and
the United Arab Emirates. The letter accused Kuwait of encroaching on Iraqi terri-
tory and oil fields and of seeking to undermine Iraq's economy.
The United States takes no position on the issues in dispute. However, we feel
strongly that they can only be resolved by peaceful dialog between the countries in-
volved in an atmosphere free of intimidation and inflamed rhetoric. We have made
our views known to both governments.
Our gulf policy is unchanged: We remain determined to ensure the free flow of oil
through the strait of Hormuz and to defend the principle of free navigation. We also
remain strongly committed to defend the individual and collective security of our
friends in the gulf with whom we have deep and longstanding ties.
IRAN-IRAQ PEACE TALKS
Question. What are the prospects for a peace settlement between Iran and Iraq?
Answer. The foreign ministers of Iran and Iraq had their first direct talks under
U.N. auspices in Geneva on July 3. We hope these discussions will lead to progress
toward a lasting peace and the implementation of U.N. Security Council Resolution
598.
We continue to support the Secretary General's efforts to implement Resolution
598, which calls for the exchange of POW's, noninterference in the internal affairs
of each country, and withdrawal of forces to international boundaries. Iraq still oc-
cupies more than 2,000 square kilometers of Iranian territory.
We are especially concerned that over 100,000 POW's are still held on both sides
against the principles of the Geneva Convention on prisoners of war.
LEBANON
Question. What is Iraq's involvement in Lebanon? Has Iraq's role been construc-
tive?
Answer. On balance, Iraq's role in Lebanon has not been constructive. Iraq ini-
tially refused to support the Taif agreement or recognize the Hrawi government.
Until September 1989 it provided Michel Aoun military supplies.
Iraq has now ceased its direct support of Aoun, and it has specifically recognized
the Taif agreement and the Hrawi government.
BINARY CHEMICAL WEAPONS
Question. In recent remarks, Saddam Hussein seemed to indicate that Iraq pos-
sessed the capability to produce binary chemical weapons. Do you believe Iraq has
that capability? If so, how was it acquired? If not, how do you explain his assertion
that Iraq possessed the "dual chemical,” which was believed to exist only in the
United States and the Soviet Union?
Answer. We believe Saddam Hussein's claim to possess binary technology or
weapons is credible. Given other Iraqi technical advances we believe Iraq probably
could manufacture a relatively simple binary device indigenously, with little or no
foreign assistance.
SIZE OF IRAQ'S CW ARSENAL
Question. How large is Iraq's chemical arsenal, and what capabilities do we know
it to possess for delivering chemical weapons?
Answer. We do not have a good estimate on the current size of Iraq's CW stock-
pile. We believe that Iraq has the largest and most advanced CW program in the
Arab world with a stockpile in the thousands of tons. Iraq can deliver chemical
weapons using a wide variety of weapons systems, including artillery, multiple
rocket launchers, mortars, and air-delivered bombs.
CW WARHEAD FOR SCUD MISSILE
Question. Is it possible that Iraq can mount chemical warheads on its modified
SCUD missiles with a 400-mile range?


93
Answer. Although we have no evidence to confirm Iraq has developed a chemical
warhead for its SCUD or modified SCUD missiles, we judge Iraq's advances in other
areas of missile development indicate that it could probably develop a warhead of
this type.
BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS
Question. What is your opinion of reports that Iraq is engaging in a biological
weapons program?
Answer. Iraq is actively engaged in the development of BW, including botulinum
toxin and anthrax, and either has already achieved or may soon achieve full scale
production. There is some debate among technical experts over whether Iraq has
actually weaponized BW agents, but all agree that it is close to having an operation-
al BW capability.
IRAQI SUPERCANNON
Question. What is the status of the case in Iraq attempted to secure eight forged
steel tubes in order to construct a 131-foot cannon?
Answer. The British Government has stated that the tubes seized by British cus-
toms are components of a large cannon, based on designs for a long-range gun by
Gerald Bull, a ballistics expert who was murdered in Brussels in March 1990. The
matter is now in the courts in both Britain and the United States.
CAPACITOR SMUGGLING CASE
Question. In your view, does the recent case in which Iraq attempted to secure
krytons (high voltage nuclear triggers) violate Iraq's commitments as a charter
krymber of the N
iches are contro applications. Thclear appli
Answer. The switches are controlled military electrical components which could
conceivably be used in a variety of applications. These include nuclear applications,
such as in firing sets of nuclear devices, and nonnuclear applications, such as in the
separation of missile stages. Thus, although this procurement effort calls into ques-
tion Iraq's nuclear intentions, we have no evidence to indicate that this attempt is a
violation of Iraq's NPT commitment.
BNL INVESTIGATION AND CCC
Question. What is the status of the investigation of irregularities in Iraqi pur-
chases through the Banco Nazionale del Lavoro under loans guaranteed by the Com-
modity Credit Corporation?
Answer. The Department of Agriculture released a report May 21 on its review of
the Iraq CCC program. I refer you to USDA for a detailed explanation of the report.
Briefly, it concluded that the high prices paid by Iraq for corn, rice, and sugar from
1985 to 1987 reflected market conditions, and there was no evidence to suggest that
commodities sold to Iraq had been diverted.
The report suggested that certain exporters improperly included freight charges
in amounts registered with and guaranteed by USDA. In addition, it concluded that
a number of exporters provided Iraq with “after sales services," which, if unreport-
ed at the time the guarantees were obtained, would violate GSM regulations. These
possible violations have been turned over to the USDA Inspector General for
review.
The BNL case is the subject of a grand jury investigation in Atlanta, and I there-
fore cannot comment on any aspect of it.
IRAQ-POISON GAS
Question. German machinery produced the poison gas which was used against the
Kurds. Under the precedent of the Nuremberg trials, could the German business-
men who sold poison gas equipment to Iraq be charged with war crimes or crimes
against humanity?
Answer. No. The Nuremberg trials involved crimes committed as part of the Nazi
war effort in the Second World War. Use of poison gas by Iraq against its own popu-
lation occurred during an internal military action that would not fall under the law
of international armed conflict. Moreover, the Nuremberg trials were conducted in
an international penal tribunal specially established following the war. There is
presently no such international penal tribunal under which international crimes
may be tried.
Criminal prosecution of persons who may have sold poison gas equipment to Iraq
would depend upon applicable domestic laws.


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