COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS DANTE B. FASCELL, Florida, Chairman LEE H. HAMILTON, Indiana WILLIAM S. BROOMFIELD, Michigan GUS YATRON, Pennsylvania BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, New York STEPHEN J. SOLARZ, New York WILLIAM F. GOODLING, Pennsylvania HOWARD WOLPE, Michigan ROBERT J. LAGOMARSINO, California SAM GEJDENSON, Connecticut JIM LEACH, Iowa MERVYN M. DYMALLY, California TOBY ROTH, Wisconsin TOM LANTOS, California OLYMPIA J. SNOWE, Maine ROBERT G. TORRICELLI, New Jersey HENRY J. HYDE, Illinois HOWARD L. BERMAN, California DOUG BEREUTER, Nebraska MEL LEVINE, California CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey EDWARD F. FEIGHAN, Ohio DAN BURTON, Indiana TED WEISS, New York JAN MEYERS, Kansas GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York JOHN MILLER, Washington MORRIS K. UDALL, Arizona BEN BLAZ, Guam JAIME B. FUSTER, Puerto Rico ELTON GALLEGLY, California WAYNE OWENS, Utah AMO HOUGHTON, New York HARRY JOHNSTON, Florida PORTER J. GOSS, Florida ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American Samoa GERRY E. STUDDS, Massachusetts AUSTIN J. MURPHY, Pennsylvania PETER H. KOSTMAYER, Pennsylvania THOMAS M. FOGLIETTA, Pennsylvania THOMAS C. SAWYER, Ohio DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey BILL ORTON, Utah JOHN J. BRADY, JR., Chief of Staff KRISTINE WILLIE, Staff Assistant SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPE AND THE MIDDLE EAST LEE H. HAMILTON, Indiana, Chairman TOM LANTOS, California BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, New York MEL LEVINE, California WILLIAM F. GOODLING, Pennsylvania EDWARD F. FEIGHAN, Ohio JAN MEYERS, Kansas GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York ELTON GALLEGLY, California WAYNE OWENS, Utah JIM LEACH, Iowa HARRY JOHNSTON, Florida ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York MICHAEL H. VAN DUSEN, Subcommittee Staff Director RUSSELL J. WILSON, Minority Staff Consultant CHRISTOPHER KOJM, Subcommittee Staff Consultant KATHERINE A. WILKENS, Subcommittee Staff Consultant DAVID WEINER, Subcommittee Staff Consultant (II) But, of course, it was not as clear for Mr. Kelly, as you are sug- gesting, I think, that the policy was in the mind of Saddam Hus- sein. Let me ask I will tell you the question. "If Iraq, for example, charges across the border into Kuwait, for whatever reason, what would be our position with regard to the use of U.S. forces?” That was my question. This is Mr. Kelly's response. ”That, Mr. Chairman, is hypotheti- cal or a contingency, the kind of which I can't get into. Suffice it to say we would be extremely concerned. But I cannot get into the realm of "what if answers.” Now, this is a day or two before the invasion. Our Assistant Sec- retary is testifying before this Congress that we would be extreme- ly concerned, when, in fact, you are suggesting the policy was that we would fight if Saddam Hussein went across the border, and that Saddam Hussein had no doubt about our position as you said a moment ago. SADDAM HUSSEIN UNDERSTOOD THAT THE U.S. MIGHT FIGHT Ambassador GLASPIE. Mr. Chairman, I am suggesting that Saddam Hussein believed starting on the afternoon of the 24th, before I saw him, but certainly when I saw him was the first time, I had the impression from anybody from the Iraqi Government that it had occurred to him that we at least might fight, and I would speculate, because that is all I can do, I can't look into his mind, that he believed that we probably would fight and would fight hard. The tragedy is, because of the sycophants around him who were trying to prove that they had produced high-tech weaponry which could actually compete with ours, I think it is quite possible that he truly believed he could beat us. May I remind you, sir, after six weeks of pummelling by the U.S. Air Force, he still permitted this war to go ahead and it wasn't until the second day of the ground war, when he had no army left, that he finally understood that he couldn't beat us. So is a man that had a series of very, very profound miscalculations in his- THE PRECISE NATURE OF THE MESSAGE GLASPIE RELAYED TO SADDAM HUSSEIN Mr. HAMILTON. I understand. Did you ever tell Saddam Hussein, Mr. President, if you go across that line into Kuwait, we are going to fight? Ambassador GLASPIE. No, I did not. Absolutely not. Mr. HAMILTON. Yet you think he believed that? Ambassador GLASPIE. I certainly do. I told him we would defend our vital interests. He complained to me for one hour about fleet movements and American neo-imperialism and militarism. He knew perfectly well what we were talking about. And it would have been absolutely wrong for me, without consulting with the President to inform anybody of a change in our policy. 13 So we couldn't and shouldn't have prevented him from going bankrupt. In that sense I don't think there was anything we could have done. That was the new factor that entered into his calcula- tions, which I think swung his attention to Kuwait. Mr. GILMAN. So then in your mind there was very little we could have done to prevent him from heading toward Kuwait, because his mind had been made up pretty strongly prior to August 2nd. Ambassador GLASPIE. I am sure Members of this committee will find it perfectly extraordinary that I can say yes to that question, but I can. I am not suggesting that the policy succeeded because, obviously, it didn't. We had to go to war. But what we could have done to prevent it. First let me recall what a previous boss of mine said. He said, there are some things in the world the United States just can't help, and Iraq this is one of them. How could we have prevented him? Either by diplomacy or by war. I tried to explain before he invad- ed Kuwait, that we couldn't forge a blocking coalition, we just couldn't do it. The Arabs wouldn't let us use their land. They didn't agree on the approach we should take. The idea of sanctions, for example, would have made us feel mor- ally good—I would have felt great. As I said in the statement the other day, but nobody would have followed us. So if there was something that we could have done I admit I haven't thought of it, and I have given it a great deal of thought. Our best chance was to tell him, draw a line in the sand. We did, and he walked over it into defeat for himself and his country. PRESENTATION OF THE U.S. POSITION TO SADDAM HUSSEIN Mr. GILMAN. Do you feel you told him as forcefully as possible that we would use every bit of our influence and force to prevent him from moving against any other nation in the Gulf? Ambassador GLASPIE. I certainly can't say, Congressman Gilman, that I said we would use everything in our arsenal, so to speak, I wouldn't do that. I used precisely the words I gave you. I am abso- lutely confident that he understood what I was saying. Mr. GILMAN. Those instructions were to you, we would defend our vital interests in the Gulf? Ambassador GLASPIE. We would support the sovereignty and in- tegrity of the Gulf countries. We would maintain freedom of navigation in the Gulf and move- ment of oil through the Gulf. It is an inclusive list. Mr. GILMAN. Did he ask you for any explanation of that list? Ambassador GLASPIE. Not at all. He felt this was our neo-imperi- alist agenda, and I would like to add one point that I think is abso- lutely critical SADDAM HUSSEIN'S HOSTILITY TO THE UNITED STATES Throughout this period, he remained as convinced as he had been for the previous 20 years the United States was irredeemably hostile to Saddam Hussein Government. He, over and over, accused us of trying to subvert his government. 43-452 - 91 - 2 19 partment to lay off of sanctions; and yet we knew his history up to that time. On July 25, what was the rationale to tell Saddam Hussein that the Administration was constantly against sanctions? Ambassador GLASPIE. That, of course, is the general United States Administration position on sanctions, which I am sure you know, Congressman Johnston. I would like to clarify what I said before in response to Congress- man Lantos. SANCTIONS WOULD HAVE BEEN COUNTERPRODUCTIVE IN 1988 In the fall of 1988, when the Iraqis were, without any question, gassing Kurdish citizens in the north, I believe that the kind of sanctions regime that was being discussed in the Congress would have resulted in the withdrawal of our diplomatic mission ulti- mately from Baghdad. My point was, by staying there, we could un- dertake diplomatic activity. It is very.difficult, as we all know, to undertake diplomatic activ- ity if you are not present and you do not have access to the host government. I think that is an important clarification. U.S. POSITION ON IRAQ-KUWAIT BORDER DISPUTES Mr. JOHNSTON. Let me read another part of your transcript, ac- curate or inaccurate. I absolutely trust in your observation, your comments to Saddam Hussein. "I admire your extraordinary effort to rebuild your country. I know you need funds. We understand that. We are of the opinion that you should have the opportunity to rebuild your country, but what we hold no opinion about are the inter-Arab disputes, such as your border disagreement with Kuwait. "I was in the American Embassy in Kuwait during the late 1960s. The instruction we had at that time was that we should not have anything to do with this issue, and this issue was not connect- ed with U.S. concerns.” Ambassador GLASPIE. The context here is, this issue is precisely where you put the border posts. The issue in the late 1960s and again in 1990 was whether or not the bilateral border commission would meet on the border and physically put posts in the ground. That is what we were talking about. Mr. JOHNSTON. Thank you very much. Mr. HAMILTON. Mrs. Meyers? Mrs. MEYERS Thank you, Mr. Chairman. ADMINISTRATION WAS NOT OPPOSED TO SANCTIONS It has been inferred, and I think it is probably accurate that our relationship with Iraq during the 1980s was difficult because of our relationship with Iran. I would like to say, however, to make a point that I made yesterday in committee, Mr. Chairman, and that is that I think there is an inference that after Congress discussed levying some kind of sanctions, taking away agricultural credits from Iraq, that the Administration somehow ignored us or did not do it. 26 hope the Iraqi people have a chance to organize their own partici- patory democracy. We feel strongly that Iraq must remain as a ter- ritorial entity in that area. POSSIBILITY THAT SADDAM HUSSEIN WILL BE OVERTHROWN Mr. GALLEGLY. What is your assessment of the opposition, indi- vidually or collectively causing the personal demise of Saddam Hussein? · Ambassador GLASPIE. It is a very difficult call to make. Our own analysts are being extremely careful, and I don't blame them. It is possible that the fighting in the south will go on and on. It is going on or it was going on this morning. Although the Army has of course armor down there and heaven knows what else, they have not been able to stamp it out. It keeps popping up. The north is a very different issue. Of course there have been long periods in the history of modern Iraq when the north was not in any way under the sway of Baghdad. But if the central govern- ment cannot control the north and if they lose Mosul and Kirkuk then I think the central government's days must be numbered. If he hangs on then I think the importance of holding on to sanctions becomes critical because the economic pinch, I think, would begin to be very important. On that point, I would like to emphasize that the President's view is very strong that we want nothing that we do to contribute to the tragic suffering of the Iraqi people. We will be working with the ICRC and UN to see what we can do to send food and medicine to alleviate their suffering. Mr. GALLEGLY. Thank you very much, Madame Ambassador. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. ENGLE. We are going to have to take a break. I wonder if we could break for about 10 minutes and come back. [Recess.] Mr. HAMILTON. The subcommittee will resume its sitting. Mr. Leach. SADDAM HUSSEIN'S MISCALCULATION OF U.S. ACTIONS Mr. LEACH. Thank you. It strikes me that when we review all of this that we put a lot of attention on the fact that maybe we misjudged Saddam Hussein. But part of it was his misjudgment about the United States. Yes- terday you used the adjective “stupid” applying to his judgment. My own sense is Saddam Hussein concluded based on his refer- ences about the Iran episode in particular that perhaps we were co- ercible. The reason I say that is that it strikes me that as we look at the Bush Administration's record which basically is one of warn- ing through action, that is through a maneuver with a very small Gulf state as well as with statements that we would not tolerate aggressive action, that he must have concluded that we did not mean particularly what we meant. I wonder if you would like to elaborate about the historical back- ground in terms of how you assess Saddam and whether you think 27 the whole Iran episode was part of his calculations about the United States. Ambassador GLASPIE. I think that Saddam burst onto the politi- cal scene as a young man. He attempted to be a man literally who undertook the assassination of the President of Iraq and then had to flee the country and spent some years in exile studying. I have been told that the thing that interested him, I am sure among many things, but the thing that interested him very much was how you get in to power if you are somebody from a small vil- lage with no connections and how you hold on to that power. It is said that he studied, for example, the life of Stalin, not of course because he was a Communist, he was rabidly anti-Commu- nist, but of course the typical interest that one has, on how could a country boy move up through the party and then somehow get hold of the military and civilian intelligence organs so as to get that power for himself. I think that tasks that he set for himself was almost all consuming for most of his career. INFLUENCE OF THE 1979 IRAN HOSTAGE CRISIS ON SADDAM'S THINKING Mr. LEACH. The question I am interested in is how he looked at the United States. Did the Iran episode have a formative influence? Ambassador GLASPIE. Certainly it had a traumatic effect on the Iraqi government. They thought they understood what our policy was. It certainly was hostile to Iraq. It was absolutely traumatic. It was one of the few issues with grassroots resonance in the country. 4:30 p.m. Mr. LEACH. The reason I am raising this, is because I don't think you understand, because it is a little oblique. It strikes me as we look back at the Iran episode, that the United States seemed to be coerced by the hostage-taking. The reason I raise this again is the Bush policy was fairly consistent, was fairly principal. One could argue whether we should impose sanctions or not in a firmer way. The fact from the Iraqi perspective was that they were looking at America which seemed a little bit flabby in her foreign policy. Again, the reason I raise this is not to suggest that the decision- making by Saddam Hussein was influenced by Jimmy Carter, I think that would be a little ridiculous, but simply to say that those who think that an episode of one meeting of an American Ambas- sador with the Head of State, which is determinative kind of deci- sion-making around which the Head of State then made a decision to invade another country stretches credulity. It strikes me our record in that part of the world, stretching back decade, was not one of as great firmness as the Bush Administration has subsequently reversed. And I just raise this as strongly as I can, because it may be April and March in this com- mittee, but up is not down in foreign policy. And the fact of the matter is the people that would latch on to a single meeting be- tween the United States Ambassador and Head of State and then suggest somehow that we are responsible for precipitating a con- flict, or those critics in the Middle East who think we in effect at- tempted to seduce him in so we could have a ground presence in the region, and there are those that argue that I think are pro- foundly misled. 34 haps as a background to the negotiations, that they hoped he was going to begin, it would be yet another in a long series of incur- sions that Iraq had made since 1963, or even '61 since Kuwaiti in- dependence. There had been a number of incursions, some very fla- grant ones. In 1973 a well-known one, for instance, and I think as I men- tioned yesterday, a less well known one about a year before August 2nd. So it was true that Arabs talked about this as a possibility, but after the 25th, King Fahd and President Mubarek felt they had a commitment that would not be broken. SYRIAN PURCHASE OF SCUD MISSILES FROM NORTH KOREA Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. One more question. One very serious con- cern that I was given-at least this is something I am sure every- one is aware of; Syria has recently purchased several scud missiles from North Korea. Now Syria and Iran are not the most destabiliz- ing forces now in the Persian Gulf. Where do we go from here? Ambassador GLASPIE. It is very tempting for me to answer that question, Congressman. I would like to offer my views, but I am not the person to ask. I am assured the Secretary of State will be ap- pearing before this committee right after the Easter break. I think he is the one. ASSIGNMENT OF FOREIGN SERVICE OFFICERS TO POSTS ABROAD Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Your expertise is in the Middle East, is it not? Ambassador GLASPIE. Yes. Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. It strikes me funny that I met with one of the Foreign Service agents who is Chinese and who is affluent in Mandean, and he is assigned to the Middle East. Ambassador GLASPIE. It is his choice. Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. It blows my mind. Here is someone who spe- cializes in Asian Pacific issues and who can make a contribution to our country-has he gone through five years in training and appre- ciating Middle Eastern- Ambassador GLASPIE. He is a very fine Foreign Service officer. I think he will make a real contribution wherever he is. Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. That is not the point. Ambassador GLASPIE. I know. Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. It is like if I were to go to the university, if I want to understand more about the Middle East, would I be study- ing Arabic, I mean Chinese, if I–I just am a little confused on how you move personnel within the State Department when they are not—they don't have the necessary tools to work—and this is not in any disparaging remark against this gentleman for whom I have the highest respect. Mr. Chairman, I know my time is up. Thank you very much. Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Solarz. Mr. SOLARZ. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. April, you and I go back a long way together. I think we met for the first time almost 17 years ago to the week in Cairo during the course of my very first trip abroad as a member of the Foreign Af- fairs Committee and you were assigned to me as my control officer. 35 Ambassador GLASPIE. I didn't do very well controlling you, either, Congressman. GLASPIE'S MEETING WITH SADDAM HUSSEIN Mr. SOLARZ. I have watched your career with considerable inter- est over the years, and even though I had little to do with your ad- vancement, I must say I took a certain amount of pride in it, be- cause I was tremendously impressed with you at the time, and I always thought you were one of the best and brightest in the For- eign Service, and in a way, it was precisely for these reasons that I was so dismayed when I read the transcript that Iraq released of your meeting with Saddam Hussein, particularly when the State Department, by refusing or failing to issue any denials as to its ve- racity appeared to lend the kind of implicit legitimacy to that ac- count. I hope you understand, if I fulfill my institutional responsibilities by asking you some questions about it. First of all, I would like to know, did they make a videotape of that meeting? Ambassador GLASPIE. They may well have, but the camera was hidden. Mr. SOLARZ. You didn't see one? Ambassador GLASPIE. No. Mr. SOLARZ. Who is your note-taker for the meeting? Ambassador GLASPIE. Since I had been invited to come back for the Foreign Ministry, which I assumed was a resumed session, I didn't have a note-taker with me. We had a small Embassy, every- body was real busy. Mr. SOLARZ. The cable you subsequently sent back, you wrote, or dictated from your memory of the meeting? Ambassador GLASPIE. I did. Mr. SOLARZ. Did you take notes during the course of it? Ambassador GLASPIE. As you know, we are perhaps immodest to believe after 25 years of training, we can remember-in my case, I was lucky, because it was broken by the President Mubarak tele- phone call, so I had plenty of time to take notes during the meet- ing. Mr. SOLARZ. On July 25th, when the meeting took place, had you been apprized of the fact they had deployed 100,000 troops along the Kuwaiti border? Ambassador GLASPIE. I don't recall, frankly, Congressman, what our count was at that time, but it was certainly a high count, yes. Mr. SOLARZ. But you knew they had deployed forces? Ambassador GLASPIE. Oh, yes, of course. WHY DIDN'T THE STATE DEPARTMENT DENY THE VERACITY OF THE IRAQI TRANSCRIPT OF THE MEETING? Mr. SOLARZ. After you returned to Washington, and following the release by Iraq of their version of this discussion, were you explicit- ly instructed by the Department to say nothing about it, to neither confirm nor deny, as it were, the veracity of their version of the discussion? Ambassador GLASPIE. I don't believe I was explicitly instructed not to say anything. It was explained that a decision had been that this is the way the media works in America, even when it af- fects American politicians? Ambassador GLASPIE. I would be delighted to answer that ques- tion. I think you weren't here when I mentioned we worked all through 1989 to get journalists in to see Saddam Hussein. Since diplomats couldn't see him, many of us hoped that by having jour- nalists see him, he would begin to learn more than we knew about the outside world and the concerns, and the basis of the concerns about Iraq that were held in the outside world. The initial encounter he had was a shock to him. He was hardly used to being cross-questioned by anybody, much less by a journal- ist. I wanted to say two things to him, having the opportunity to be in his presence. First, I wanted to get over to him that we regard editing of video- tapes which are labeled as complete, as cheap and unjust, and we had noticed that he had authorized-presumably he authorizes ev- erything in the country, exactly that, as far as the videotapes are concerned which were being produced by the Ministry of Informa- tion. I did it, and I think he took the point by my saying that the President of the United States and I think I said Mrs. Thatcher, are constantly under the gun, if you will, of tough cross-questioning by journalists. This is the way we do it. If you want to get your story over the airways to the American people through the Ameri- can journalists, you have to put up with that. That was the point of my comments. As far as Diane Sawyer is concerned, I will say again, I did not in any way discuss Diane Sawyer's videotape. I was talking about the Iraqi Ministry of Infor- mation's videotape of the Diane Sawyer interview, which cut out all the footage, if that is the right word, which Diane Sawyer her- self used. In other words, the controversial parts. Mr. SOLARZ. You are referring when you said it was unfair, to their coverage of Diane Sawyer's interview and not to Diane Saw- yer's interview itself. Ambassador GLASPIE. Not just Diane Sawyer's interview, but all the videotapes they were putting out by then. THE STATE DEPARTMENT SHOULD HAVE CLARIFIED THESE POINTS EARLIER Mr. SOLARZ. Assuming it is true that the Iraqi version of your meeting is as fundamentally flawed as we have been told it is, I think the State Department did a very serious disservice to the President's own efforts to counter this exercise in disinformation and also a fundamental disservice to Ambassador Glaspie, because I think these kinds of points, if they had been cleared up earlier, and presumably they could have been cleared up without breach- ing diplomatic confidentiality, would certainly have avoided a situ- ation in which, as you know, a distinguished career Foreign Service officer was permitted for several months to have her reputation significantly impaired and impugned by virtue of an unrebutted transcript, which if accepted at face value, did not put her in the most favorable light. 53 Ambassador GLASPIE. May I just say very quickly, Mr. Chairman, that the relationship that we had by March or April was a very flimsy one. The flavor became more and more sour. When you say "our policy didn't change,” I would simply like to reiterate that our policy was to be there, to see if we could not in- fluence the Iraqis in a positive way, and that is what we continued to do. The idea, Mr. Chairman, that a speech about incinerating half of Israel, which caused weeks of great concern and high tension in the area, didn't have the primary attention of the Secretary of State and the President of the United States seems to me Alice in Wonderland. It really does. I wasn't here, but I feel absolutely confident that the highest levels of the American Government was as concerned as everybody else in the world when we learned that missiles had been moved to Western Iraq and pointed at Israel. So with the greatest due respect, Mr. Chairman, I really must ask that you reconsider the notion that in the summer and spring of any time after April the 1, that the events in the Middle East and Iraq's belligerent attitude did not have high level attention. I really reject the notion that our policy didn't change. Our policy, if I may say for the third time, was simply to be there, to do what we could. We originally were thinking in terms of carrots and sticks. We had not carrots on the table and and none in our pocket. We were using sticks. And we were helpful, Mr. Chairman. We helped to reduce the tension between Israel and Iraq as I believe the Israe- lis said. Mr. HAMILTON. While you are telling me that our policy was to be there, Mr. Kelly is telling me our policy toward Iraq has been to attempt to develop gradually mutually beneficial relationships. Ambassador GLASPIE. Absolutely. I couldn't have put it better. Indeed, that is just what I said. When we could, we drew out some positive trends, and we did get a few things along the way, Mr. Chairman. I want to say that again. Mr. HAMILTON. Why didn't Mr. Kelly convey to us this sense of deterioration in the relationship? Ambassador GLASPIE. When was this? I am sorry. Mr. HAMILTON. April 26th, and then again in July. Ambassador GLASPIE. Well, I mean, honestly, Mr. Chairman, this is right after this extraordinary speech of Saddam's of April the 1st, publicized first on April the 2nd. I mean, I don't know any- thing about this exchange between you and Mr. Kelly, but it seems to me, perfectly fair to assume that the tension in the Middle East would be well known in this committee, and, of course, that is pre- sumably why you were asking him these questions. But I think the sentence you just read absolutely encapsulates what we were trying to do. If it was impossible at a certain period to pull out any positive threads from this relationshi threads from this relationship, then the best we could do was to be there and make sure that we did what we could to lower the tension, and hope that we would be able to influence Iraq in the future along positive lines.