COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS CLAIBORNE PELL, Rhode Island, Chairman JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR., Delaware JESSE HELMS, North Carolina PAUL S. SARBANES, Maryland RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana ALAN CRANSTON, California NANCY L. KASSEBAUM, Kansas CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut LARRY PRESSLER, South Dakota JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts FRANK H. MURKOWSKI, Alaska PAUL SIMON, Illinois MITCH MCCONNELL, Kentucky TERRY SANFORD, North Carolina HANK BROWN, Colorado DANIEL P. MOYNIHAN, New York JAMES M. JEFFORDS, Vermont CHARLES S. ROBB, Virginia HARRIS WOFFORD, Pennsylvania GERYLD B. CHRISTIANSON, Staff Director JAMES P. LUCIER, Minority Staff Director (II) TV LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL NOVEMBER 26, 1991. The HONORABLE CLAIBORNE PELL, Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, Washington, DC 20510 Dear Mr. Chairman: Six months ago the fate of Iraq's Kurds was placed on the international agenda as a result of the immense human suffering following the failure of their rebellion against Saddam Hussein. International intervention helped prevent a greater catastrophe, but the people of Iraqi Kurdistan remain at grave risk. At your direction, I returned to Iraqi Kurdistan in Sep- tember to assess the situation. Between September 4 and 11, 1991, I traveled throughout the Kurdish-controlled parts of Iraq. The liberated territory now com- prises more than 80 percent of the Kurdish inhabited lands, and I went as far south as Halabja, as far east as Haj Omran on the Ira- nian border, north to the triangle where the borders of Iran and Turkey converge, and, in the west, to Amadiyah, Dihok, and Zakho where the Syrian and Turkish borders meet. Four times I crossed Iraqi lines, on two occasions disguised as a Kurd, in order to visit the populous cities of Irbil and Sulaymaniyah. This report attempts to present as comprehensive a picture of the situation in Kurdistan today as possible. This trip would not have been possible without the assistance, co- operation, and friendship of many of the Iraqi Kurds including my host Jalal Talabani, KDP leader Massoud Barzani, Samy Abdu Rahman, Hoshyer Zebari, Karim Khan of Bardohst, and Sheikh Moustafa Zinawi. Dr. Abdul Karim Rauf, who escorted me safely through Kurdistan during the March uprising, and Hoshyer Samsan were my guides in Kurdistan, and I am grateful to them as well as to Tania Ali Hasan and Erman Bahaadin. Sincerely, PETER W. GALBRAITH. (V) SUMMARY OF KEY FINDINGS • Kurdistan is a broken land where millions live on the edge of survival. At least 600,000 Kurds have no shelter and face catastro- phe as winter approaches. Food supplies and distribution are inad- equate and the situation is certain to get worse. Kurdish civilians remain vulnerable to renewed Iraqi military attacks. • Kurdish insurgents control at least 80 percent of Kurdish-in- habited lands in Iraq. The fragile unity of the Iraqi Kurdish move- ment could be ruptured by sharp differences between leaders as to whether to sign an autonomy deal with Saddam Hussein. • Iraq is evading United Nations sanctions by exporting goods to Iran, Turkey, and Jordan. Massive quantities of Iraqi construction equipment, road-building vehicles, and factory machinery are cross- ing into Iran. Fuel and other goods are being exported to Turkey. Jordan appears to be both helping Iraq evade sanctions and con- duct financial transactions. o Kurdistan is a land slowly revealing the horrors of a quarter century of Ba'ath rule. Mass graves are being uncovered in various parts of Kurdistan and compelling evidence is now surfacing that as many as 182,000 Kurds ostensibly deported to the south after 1988 were instead simply murdered. The physical destruction of Kurdistan extends to every village and many small cities. Large parts of Kurdistan have been made uninhabitable by Iraqi mine- laying operations. • The Iraqi secret police kept extensive records of their activi- ties, including torture and executions. The secret police also video- taped themselves as they conducted torture sessions, carried out executions, and gang raped Kurdish girls. Kurdish insurgents con- trol this documentary evidence and are prepared to make it avail- able to support prosecutions for crimes against humanity. • To protect the Kurds from renewed Iraqi assault, the U.S.-led coalition needs to affirm its intention to use airpower to deter at- tacks on Kurdish-held territory. Consideration should be given to providing the Kurdish guerrillas with limited military assistance to enhance their self-defense capabilities. Such assistance could in- clude spare parts and ammunition for the military equipment cap- tured by the Kurdish insurgents and could come from stockpiles of Iraqi weapons left in the Kuwait theater of operations. (VII) ments, and their families (which they rarely see) barely subsist. A palpable sense of comraderie exists among Peshmerga associated with different parties, and their working relationships are solid. Travelling the width and length of liberated Kurdistan with one of the PUK commanders, Dr. Abdul Karim Rauf, I was impressed that at each checkpoint, regardless of party, Dr. Rauf was recog- nized (although he wore no insignia) and our group easily let through. Some of the Peshmerga have impressive educational credentials; a number of my companions spoke English, and several had medi- cal, engineering, or other degrees. As Western correspondents and visitors learned during the March uprising, the Peshmerga are also extremely brave having risked, and in some cases lost, their lives to protect their guests. But the Peshmerga have many weaknesses as a fighting force as well, weaknesses that became particularly apparent as the March uprising collapsed. Since Peshmerga are associated with various po- litical parties or clans, there is no clear central command, making it difficult to coordinate military operations or to restrain errant Peshmerga bands. The Peshmerga also suffer from a lack of intelli- gence gathering and processing capabilities. I spent the night of March 30-31 in Dihok with many of the top Kurdish political and military leaders, all apparently unaware that the Iraqi army was just on the city's outskirts, poised for an early morning assault. Similarly, the Peshmerga did not anticipate the strength or mobili- ty of the Iraqi offensive of that Easter weekend. Finally, the Pesh- merga seem amply armed with light weapons, and have captured much in the way of heavy arms from the government, but they are short of ammunition for their automatic rifles, and lack spare parts, ammunition, and operating knowledge for the heavy weap- ons. To protect the Kurdish people from renewed Iraqi attacks, the self-defense capabilities of the Peshmerga will need to be enhanced. The allies recovered enormous quantities of Iraqi military equip- ment left behind in Kuwait, and, from these stocks the Kurds could be provided with ammunition as well as spare parts needed to make captured tanks and howitzers operational. At least arguably, the return to Iraq in the foregoing manner of Iraqi military equip- ment (admittedly to different Iraqis than those who lost it) does not violate any U.N. mandate relevant to the Persian Gulf crisis. The Peshmerga also need military training and financial sup- port. They particularly need training in the operation of the tanks and other heavy weapons in their possession as well in military tactics involving these weapons. The vast increase in numbers of Peshmerga as well as the responsibilities associated with holding large amounts of territory have greatly increased the financial bur- dens on the parties supporting the Peshmerga. Kurdish leaders es- timate their unmet financial requirements at $12 to $15 million a month, such funding being needed to provide subsistence for Pesh- merga and their families, for the purchase of ammunition, and for logistical support for the military struggle. Essential to the protection of the Kurdish people is the continu- ation of United States and coalition air cover. Flying out of the U.S. base at Incirlik, Turkey, fighter aircraft patrol the skies over Military and political support for the Iraqi opposition is a second leg of an effective anti-Saddam strategy. In practical terms such as- sistance would go mainly to the Kurds, and the types of assistance most needed have been discussed above. While such assistance will enhance the ability of the Kurds to defend themselves, it probably will not contribute directly to the opposition's ability to overthrow Saddam. To the extent, however, such assistance enables the Kurds to deny Saddam's regime access to a large part of Iraq, it will di- minish the legitimacy of his rule. Elements of the military may then conclude that the integrity of Iraq requires a change in regime. The indictment of Saddam Hussein and his accomplices for war crimes and crimes against humanity is the final element in an en- hanced anti-Saddam strategy. The case for crimes against human- ity prosecution is described in the next part of this report. Absent a change of regime, it will be very difficult to obtain custody over Saddam and associates and any prosecution is fraught with serious jurisdictional questions. The fact of indictments-even if in the na- tional court of a coalition country rather than in a still unconsti- tuted international tribunal—will strike a serious blow against the legitimacy of Saddam's rule. Such indictments will clearly signal to Iraqis that their country will never be accepted back into the inter- national community as long as the Ba'ath regime remains in power, and that Saddam's current strategy of hoping to outlast sanctions will not work. If the United States is seen as a prime mover for indictments or if the indictments are brought in a U.S. court, their political effect will be magnified. U.S. passivity during the March popular uprising in Iraq left many Iraqis with the im- pression that the United States preferred to see a weakened Saddam continue in power. U.S. leadership in the effort to indict Saddam and his cronies for war crimes and crimes against human- ity will send the most unequivocal message possible that Saddam must go. To date, in the view of many Iraqis, the message has not been sent and the impression of U.S. ambiguity helps sustain the regime in power. 22 Rae McGrath is an Australian munitions expert hired by Middle East Watch to do a survey of mine fields in Kurdistan. What he has found is not encouraging. After moving Kurdish villagers out of sensitive areas, the Iraqis laid mines to keep them from coming back. As a result, most of the more mountainous parts of Kurdis- tan are uninhabitable. McGrath believes some mountain grazing land can be recovered by training Kurds on how to mark and de- mine minefields; other land, he says, will never be recovered. A000019262543 Two women living in a mine field on the Iran-Iraq border Traveling through Kurdistan, one becomes intensely aware of mines. It is not possible to stroll among the ruins of Barzan, the nome village of the Barzani family, because mines have been strewn in and around the village. Massoud Barzani does come to visit the rubble of the house his father built; he does not walk around however. The mountains east of Sulaymaniyah and in the vicinity of Penj- win are beautiful to view and would be deadly to walk through. Spring rains wash some mines out of the mountains and down sea- sonal streams into Kurdistan's rivers. In the years to come, Kurds in supposedly safe areas will die from errant mines. The mining of the Kurdish countryside is just another facet of Saddam Hussein's strategy for depopulating rural Kurdistan. From an ecological point of view, it has had a curious effect. Wild ani- mals, long thought to have vanished in the Middle East, are re- claiming the habitat from which humans now have been driven. Visitors driving through the mined countryside can spot the mag- nificent shezan, a Middle East eagle, and bears and wolves are said to be increasing in number. Mines, it seems, are less of a threat to wildlife than the presence of humans. Rae McGrath's venom is reserved for the European companies that sold Iraq mines in apparent disregard to how the mines would