COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
SAM NUN
J. JAMES EXON, Nebraska
CARL LEVIN, Michigan
EDWARD M. KENNEDY, Massachusetts
JEFF BINGAMAN, New Mexico
JOHN GLENN, Ohio
RICHARD C. SHELBY, Alabama
ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia
BOB GRAHAM, Florida
CHARLES C. ROBB, Virginia
JOESEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut
Arnold L.
Anthony J. Principi,
, Georgia, Chairman
STROM THURMOND, South Carolina
JOHN W. WARNER, Virginia
WILLIAM S. COHEN, Maine
JOHN McCAIN, Arizona
TRENT LOTT, Mississippi
DAN COATS, Indiana
BOB SMITH, New Hampshire
DIRK KEMPTHORNE, Idaho
LAUCH FAIRCLOTH, North Carolina
to, Staff Director
Staff Director for the Minority
(n)





JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF BRIEFING ON CUR-
RENT MILITARY OPERATIONS IN SOMALIA,
IRAQ, AND YUGOSLAVIA
FRIDAY, JANUARY 29, 1993
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:35 a.m., in room SR-
222, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator Sam Nunn (chairman)
presiding.
Committee members present: Senators Nunn, Exon, Levin,
Bingaman, Glenn, Graham, Thurmond, Warner, Cohen, and
Kempthorne.
Committee staff members present: Arnold L. Punaro, staff direc-
tor; Andrew S. Effron, general counsel; Richard D. DeBobes, coun-
sel; Elizabeth I. Solomon, research assistant; and Lucia M. Chavez,
research assistant.
Professional staff members present: John W. Douglass, Richard
D. Finn, Jr., John J. Hamre, and Michael J. McCord.
Minority staff members present: Anthony J. Principi, minority
staff director; Romie L. Brownlee, deputy staff director for the mi-
nority; Judith A. Ansley, George W. Lauffer, Durwood W. Ringo,
Jr., Mark B. Robinson, Tom Moore, and Charlie Abell, professional
staff members.
Staff assistants present: Camden Jones Flick and Mary J. Kyle.
Committee members' assistants present: Andrew W. Johnson, as-
sistant to Senator Exon; David A. Lewis, assistant to Senator
Levin; Patricia J. Buckheit and Suzanne M. McKenna, assistants to
Senator Glenn; Melvin G. Dubee, assistant to Senator Byrd; Al
Cumming, assistant to Senator Graham; James M. Bodner, assist-
ant to Senator Cohen; Samuel D. Adcock, assistant to Senator Lott;
Thomas L. Lankford, assistant to Senator Smith; Buzz Fawcett, as-
sistant to Senator Kempthorne.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR SAM NUNN, CHAIRMAN
Chairman Nunn. The committee will come to order.
The committee meets this morning to receive a briefing on cur-
rent military operations in Somalia, Iraq, and Yugoslavia. Our
briefers are Lieutenant General Martin Brandtner, Director of Op-
erations, J-3, of the Joint Staff and Rear Admiral Mike Cramer,
Director of Current Intelligence, J-2, of the Joint Staff.
General Brandtner last appeared before the committee on De-
cember 9, 1992, to brief us on the operation called Restore Hope,
(l)


2
which had commenced in Somalia on the previous day. I believe
that this is Admiral Cramer's first appearance before the commit-
tee, correct? Glad to have you, Admiral, General, I extend a warm
welcome to both of you.
I think it is important to note that these three military oper-
ations are similar, and that each is being carried out pursuant to
United Nations Security Council resolutions which authorize the
use of all necessary means to accomplish the specified goals of the
United Nations. They are also similar in that each operation, at
least in part, is being carried out for humanitarian purposes, estab-
lishing a more secure environment for humanitarian relief oper-
ations in Somalia, protection of the Kurds in Northern Iraq, the
Shi'ites in Southern Iraq, and the air delivery of humanitarian
relief supplies to Sarajevo.
There are also differences between the operations in terms of the
missions, whether U.S. forces are playing a lead or supporting role,
and so forth. Since we will be covering three separate operations, I
suggest that we allow the briefers to make their presentations on
Somalia first, then we will have questions on Somalia; then we will
repeat the process for Iraq, and then we will do the same thing for
former Yugoslavia.
I want to note that neither of our briefers are policymakers in
that sense of the word, and thus, they will not be able to respond
in detail to questions relating to policy. They are here to advise us
on operational and intelligence matters and to answer our ques-
tions on these matters. We will receive these briefings and have
questions on these three operations in open session, and then to the
extent that we cannot get certain information in open session, if
necessary we will go into closed session. But I think it is very im-
portant for as much as possible to be in open session so the Ameri-
can people will be able to get a glimpse of what is really happening
in these three important areas.
Senator Thurmond, before I turn to General Brandtner and the
admiral, I will call on you for any remarks.
Senator Thurmond. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to join
you in extending a warm welcome to our witnesses from the Office
of the Joint Chiefs.
Today, the United States is involved in two large operations.
American forces in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf are keeping a close
watch on Saddam Hussein. In Somalia they are bringing some
order out of chaos. And thanks to their efforts, starving women and
children are able to eat instead of having food snatched out of their
mouths by armed thugs and warlords. We may soon be drawn more
deeply into a third crisis—The Bosnian-Serbian crisis—although I
hope the new Commander in Chief will think long and hard before
committing American servicemen to that confusing, complex situa-
tion.
The world is still a dangerous, uncertain place, even though the
threat from the former Soviet Union is decreasing. There are
enough ethnic hatreds, traditional enemies, and old scores to be
settled to keep conflict raging all over the globe. Some of these con-
flicts may jeopardize U.S. interests. Others will not threaten us,
and we must resist the temptation to think we have a dog in every
fight.


3
But even if we carefully limit the scope of U.S. military interven-
tion around the world, we cannot plan for every possibility. There
will always be contingencies, emergencies, unanticipated crises,
and aggression by dictators that may require U.S. troops. Saddam
Hussein's rape of Kuwait is a good example. Desert Storm was a
war we did not plan to fight and did not want to fight, but in the
end, had to fight.
My primary concern as ranking member of the committee is
this—will we be able to intervene with sufficient force if another
dictator challenges us in some distant but critical corner of the
globe? Today, the United States has the best military forces in the
world, the best we have ever had. But how long will they remain
the best if we cut the defense budget too deeply?
Mr. Chairman, I want to make sure that in the future we will be
able to protect our vital interests if we are challenged in two or
three places at the same time. I want our future soldiers, sailors,
marines, and airmen to have the best weapons and equipment. I
want to see the discipline, morale, cohesion, and combat effective-
ness of the forces remain high. If we cannot achieve these goals,
then we can expect to pay a high price in the future. The price will
be the blood of Americans in uniform and diminished security for
all other Americans.
Chairman Nunn. Thank you, Senator Thurmond. General
Brandtner, we will ask you to begin first. I believe you plan to start
on Somalia, is that right?
STATEMENT OF LT. GEN. MARTIN L. BRANDTNER, USMC, DIREC-
TOR FOR OPERATIONS (J-3), OFFICE OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF
STAFF
General Brandtner. Yes, sir. Good morning, Mr. Chairman.
Gentlemen, it is an honor to be here. Both Admiral Cramer and I
appreciate very much the opportunity to tell what I think in large
measure is the success story of U.S. involvement in a number of
operations which we will brief. We have a lot of ground to cover,
and with your permission, what we would like to do is have Admi-
ral Cramer from the intelligence perspective sort of set the stage
and let you see where we are with respect to each of these regional
areas, and then I will discuss the operational aspects of it, and
then, we would be happy to answer questions pertaining to that
particular aspect, and then we would move on sequentially
through.
Chairman Nunn. Good.
General Brandtner. First of all, what I would like to do is turn
it over to Admiral Cramer and have him give you a background
and situation brief on the Somali situation.
SOMALIA
SITUATION UPDATE
STATEMENT OF REAR ADM. MIKE W. CRAMER, USN, DIRECTOR
OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE (J-2), OFFICE OF THE JOINT
CHIEFS OF STAFF
Admiral Cramer. Good morning, Mr. Chairman, Senators.


4
What I would like to do is to step through very quickly the gen-
eral security situation as we see it now in Somalia, the threats to
U.S. forces as we recognize them, and then give you a picture of
each of the cities, an assessment of our security situation of each of
those cities, talk a little bit of what we anticipate in Somalia, and
then turn it over to General Brandtner for specific operational con-
siderations.
The security situation overall on our first graphic here to the left
is taken directly from our personnel who have just returned and, of
course, from reports by Lieutenant General Johnston's staff in the
field on the situation as they see it.
First of all, in terms of a general statement, in Somalia there
was overwhelmingly positive Somali reaction to the deployment of
the coalition, and the provision of the security by U.S. and coali-
tion forces. It is a very popular operation. There are certainly some
exceptions to that, and I will discuss those. But overall, our oper-
ation was overwhelmingly successful.
However, it is also important to note that the Somalis' expecta-
tions of what we were there to achieve also, we believe, was too
high. In addition to providing a security environment through
which humanitarian assistance could flow, many Somalis also
thought we would concomitantly restore the infrastructure and
return society, if you will, to normal in rapid form. That was not
our original mission, but nonetheless, that was the expectation of
many of the Somalis.
The immediate impact of Restore Hope is absolutely reduced fac-
tional fighting. That does not mean that occasional fighting does
not occur. Over the last couple of days—for example, this past
weekend, we had some factional fighting in the Kismayo area. But
by and large, there has been none—no—zero—organized resistance
to either U.S. forces or the coalition forces by any of the major fac-
tions.
Particularly because of the good work of Ambassador Oakley and
his team, politically, there clearly has been reopening of talks
among the factions. We saw that initially between Aideed and Ali
Mahdi. We saw it most recently at the conference in Addis Ababa.
Gradually, at least in the major cities, and perhaps even more
importantly, the smaller cities around the countryside, are begin-
ning to return to normal commerce and economic relations. Now,
in some cases the food being traded is, in fact, humanitarian relief
food, but at least a barter economy and other aspects of life slowly
are beginning to return to normal, particularly outside Mogadishu
and Kismayo.
Internationally, it is remarkable the humanitarian support—I
would say almost the heroic humanitarian support—that is being
provided by many of the official organizations, and nongovernmen-
tal organizations that are there. Their performance has been mag-
nificent.
As far as humanitarian relief is concerned, I think it is very fair
to say that in those areas which we control directly, humanitarian
relief is flowing well because of the security that we have provided.
There are still many examples in areas where coalition forces are
not present that International Red Cross and others food deliveries


5
will be attacked, or looted by local bandits, but not by a major fac-
tion as had been the case prior to this operation.

Moving on specifically now to the threat that we see to U.S.
forces in Somalia, most serious is just common crime. If our sol-
diers and individuals who are out as unprotected individuals on the
streets, do not present a solid, strong front, particularly in the case
of Mogadishu, and Kismayo, if they appear vulnerable, they are
subject to common crime—looting, stealing, that kind of thing,
right off the trucks. Serious criminal activity continues to occur.
There are certainly occasions when there is an inadvertent con-
tact—our forces find themselves between partial factions and cross-
fire. Those things still happen. They happened as recently as this
weekend in Kismayo. But in terms of deliberately planned faction-
al actions, there has been very little of that.
We also have a problem, frankly, with the drug trade. Khat, as
we all know, is legal in Somalia. It is an accepted practice. It is
culturally accepted in Somalia. To the extent to which our forces
find themselves interfering directly or indirectly with the khat
trade, we find ourselves in threatening situations.


6

Next, I would like to give you just a graphic lay-down. It is also
contained in your background documents, which lay out the cur-
rent in color-coded section here—various Somali factions. It is still
very much a hodgepodge of many factions, and this graphic lays
those out rather clearly.


8

SOMALIA - OPERATION RESTORE HOPE
SECURITY LEVEL DEFINITIONS
SJECURE
PUBLIC SAFETY AND ORDER 18 MAINTAINED BY LOCAL AUTHORITIES.
PUBLIC FEELS GENERALLY SAFE TO ENGAGE IN NORMAL ACTIVITIES
IN MOST AREAS OF TOWN, DAY OR NIGHT.
RELATIVELY STABLE
FACTIONS COOPERATE WITH COALItToRtUOALITION PRESENCE HAS
SIGNIFICANTLY REDUCED CRIME. PUBLIC ACTIVITY BEGINS TO RETURN
TO NORMAL. ATTACKS ON COALITION MEMBERS INFREQUENT.
UNSTABLE
FACTIONAL TENSIONS HIGH. CRIME AND PUBLIC OISOROER FREOUENT,
PERIODIC SNIPING, 0TS OF AG6REB8ION ANO CRIME DIRECTED AT
COALITION MEMBERS. PROBABLE THREAT OF INDIVIDUAL ACTS AGAINST
CITIZENS ASD COAUlTION IS HIGH.
FRS.UST STBRSKS OF MAJOR FACTIONAL FIGHTING, UNCONTROLLED
CRIME AND PUBLIC (DISORDER EXIST. ACTUAL THREAT OF U.8./UN/
COALITION FORCES BEING OIRECTLY CONFRONTED EXISTS.
02JJ014
I already alluded to the military challenges that we face in Mo-
gadishu and Kismayo. Another is in Central Somalia in the Galca-
cio area. We know there are concentrations of heavy weapons,


9
technicals, and so on in that area. Many of these have deployed
from the Mogadishu area up into the central part of Somalia. To be
honest, they are not in an area which presents a security threat
directly to either U.S. forces or coalition forces. We are just watch-
ing them, monitoring them, but they are not a direct threat to our
forces.
I will be happy to turn the presentation over to General
Brandtner to get into direct specific operational considerations.
SOMALIA OPERATION RESTORE I/DPI
MILITARY CHALLENGES
• MOGADISHU
• DISTINCT PROBLEM AREA
• CRIME. ARMS CONCENTRATION
• POLITICAL CENTER
• FACTIONAL COMPETITION
• KISMAYO '\ SHpB|
• POWER CENTER OF JESS
• ARMS CONCENTRATION
• CENTRAL SOMALIA
• HEAVY WEAPONS CONCENTRATION
• AVOIDING CONFLICT
• CONDITIONS FOR CREATION OF
ATMOSPHERE FOR HUMANITAR
OPERATIONS GENERALLY ACCC
• RESTORATION OF ECONOMIC?
VIABILITY WILL BE SLOW

OUTLOOK
General Brandtner. The operation, as you know, is called Oper-
ation Restore Hope.


11
MISSION
USCINCCENT CONDUCTS JOINT / COMBINED
MILITARY OPERATIONS IN SOMALIA TO:
• SECURE MAJOR AIR AND SEA PORTS
INSTALLATIONS AND FOOD DISTRIBUTION
POINTS
• OPEN AND FREE PASSAGE OF RELIEF
SUPPLIES
• PROVIDE SECURITY FOR CONVOYS AND
RELIEF SUPPLIES
• ASSIST UN / NGOS IN PROVIDING RELIEF
UNDER UN AUSPICES

INITIAL CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS
PHASE 1: SECURE MOGADISHU AIRFIELD
AND SEAPORT WITH AFLOAT MARINE
FORCES AND SECURE BAIDOA.
PHASE 2: DEPLOY UNITAF FORCES INTO
BAIDOA AND EXPAND SECURITY
OPERATIONS INTO CENTRAL SOMALIA.
PHASE 3: EXPAND SECURITY OPERATIONS
TO THE SOUTH TO INCLUDE KISMAYO AND
BARDERA.
PHASE 4: TRANSITION FROM UNITAF TO
UNOSOM II


12

The end of Phase I occurred on the 16th of December, and as you
can see, we had U.S. Marine Corps forces in Baidoa, Bale Dogle,
and a combined task force of Marines and French Legionnaires had
secured Mogadishu. We had increased our forces somewhat in the
Provide Relief by bringing in some United Kingdom aircraft sup-
port. The position of U.S. forces offshore remained the same.


13
END OF PHASE I ■
16 DEC 92 H

Phase II commenced at that point, and ended on the 28th of De-
cember, way ahead of schedule, by the way I might add, as posed
by the unified commander, and on the 28th of December of 1992
the portrayal of forces shown here did exist at that time. We had
seized Kismayo, Bardera—the Kismayo operation was a combined
Belgium and U.S. Marine Corps operation—the others, as shown
here. Oddur was taken and secured by the French, Gialalassi by
the Italians, and Belet Weyne was secured by the Canadians. We
also had operations with ships offshore down in the Kismayo area,
and as you can see, we also brought in some German aircraft to
support the Operation Provide Relief, which had now been folded
into Restore Hope. And at this point, we had established eight hu-
manitarian relief sectors which are portrayed by the circled areas
on the slide.


14
END OF PHASE II
28 DEC 92
I

USS KITTY HAWK
MARITIME PREPOSITION
SHIPS
8 HRS ESTABLISHED
USS JUNEAU
USS MTRUSHMORE
Indian Ocean
MOMBASA.
14 C-130
3 C-160 (GE)
2 C-130 (UK)
Phase III commenced immediately after that, and as you can see,
we brought in significant elements of coalition forces, both naval,
air, and ground forces. We established a UNITAF headquarters in
Mogadishu, which is a joint and combined headquarters under the
aegis of General Johnston, who is a commanding general of the 1st
Marine Expeditionary Force.
As of the 29th of January, the forces portrayed here—the Moroc-
can forces were brought in, the Marines had been relieved in toto
by the Belgians at Kismayo and had also extended out into other
areas and had begun to clear surface routes of transportation
among and between the humanitarian relief sectors that were es-
tablished.


15
PHASE III
AS OF 29 JAN 931
Ethiopia
AUSTRALIANS
GIALALASSI
ITALIANS


USS TRIPOLI
USS JUNEAU
USS MT RUSHMORE
(SPMAGTF)
MOROCCAN
9 HRS ESTABLISHED
MOMBASA
14C-130(USAF)
5KC-130(USMC)
2C-130(UK)
3 C-160 (GE)
UNITAF HQS
USMC
SAN MARCO BN (IT)
SAUDI BN
BOTSWANAN BN (-)
EGYPTIAN BN (-)
TURKISH BN (-)
NIGERIAN BN (-)
KUWAITI CO
ZIMBABWE CO
TUNISIAN CO
MOROCCAN CO(-)
UAE BN(-)
PAKISTANI BN
COALITION FORCES
ITS SAN GIORGIO
ITS GRECALE
ITS VESUVIO
INS KUTHAR
HMCS PRESERVER
TKS DERYA
PAK MULTAN
PAK MOAWIN
PAK TUGHRIL
PAK DACCA
This slide portrays a list of essentially the amounts of effort that
have been put out in terms of both strategic lift in the airlift and
intratheater lift, both in terms of supporting the forces ashore and
in continuing to support the relief missions. I show you this not to
give you just numbers crunching; but to demonstrate the magni-
tude of the effort that has been put forth to date by U.S. and coali-
tion forces.


16
RESTORE HOPE
AIRLIFTSUMMARY
STRATEGIC LIFT
C-141
MISSIONS 402
PASSENGERS 4,540
CARGO (MTONS) 6,904
C-5 KC-10 COML TOTAL
211 140 60 813
5,089 686 15,157 25,472
11,803 5,408 2,582 26,697
RELIEF MISSIONS
SUPT MISSIONS
TOTAL INTRA-THEATER
INTRA-THEATER LIFT
C-130/ C-160 (US / UK / GE)
CUMULATIVE CUMULATIVE
MISSIONS
2,079
505
2,584
CARGO (MTONS)
23,923
12.499
36,422
The sealift summary shown on this slide on the right gives you
also a magnitude of effort in terms of the sealift, and I have also
shown down at the bottom, to give you an example, that D + 49 in
similar times, the comparison of the effort that it took during Op-
eration Desert Shield versus Operation Restore Hope. And you can
see that while Operation Desert Shield was significantly greater,
nonetheless, the amount of airlift that has been employed in this
operation is indeed enormous.
The number of U.S. personnel in the UNITAF headquarters in
operating forces are shown here. I will just make sure you under-
stand the abbreviations. JSO is Joint Special Operations Forces,
ARFOR are the Army forces, AFFOR are the Air Force forces,
MARFOR, the Marine Corps forces, NAVFOR are the Navy forces,
JCSE is a joint communications support element which comes out
of the command at MacDill, and this provides connectivity activity
with the United States here, and the JTF Provide Relief which was
absorbed into the task force which is still located in Mombasa and
the liaison personnel from the various coalition countries that are
supporting the operation which are attached to the UNITAF head-
quarters working with General Johnston.


18
Although any casualties are too much, I would submit that this
operation has been enormously successful in this regard. Regretta-
bly, two Marines have lost their lives, but considering the effort
put forth in this and the amount of troops and the highly, highly
dangerous environment we are in, I think we have been blessed by
good fortune here, and I think this is a tribute to the training,
equipment, and leadership that these forces have.

TOTAL US CASUALTIES
KIA
WIA
US ARMY
0
0
US MARINE CORPS
2
1
US NAVY
0
1
! US AIR FORCE
0
0
TOTAL
2
2
The coalition forces that are involved in this operation which are
currently deployed in-country are shown here, both in terms of the
country and the numbers of forces that are participating. And you
can see that it is a significant number. I have indicated in asterisk
here those countries which have agreed formally to participate in
the UNOSOM effort which will follow this UNITAF effort in the
peacekeeping element that will occur under U.N. aegis.


19

COALITION UNITAF
(ENFORCEMENT) FORCES:; 1
DEPLOYED
IN COUNTRY
COUNTRY
PERSONNEL
COUNTRY
PERSONNEL
* AUSTRALIA
1,141
* NEW ZEALAND
67
* BELGIUM
617
* NIGERIA
4
BOTSWANA
302
* PAKISTAN
880
CANADA
1,359
SAUDI ARABIA
643
* EGYPT
240
* SWEDEN
150
FRANCE
2,372
TUNISIA
133
* GERMANY
64
* TURKEY
300
* INDIA
282
UAE
105
* ITALY
3,539
UNITED KINGDOM
90
KUWAIT
93
* ZIMBABWE
150
MOROCCO
1,239
TOTAL
13,770
UNOSOMII PARTICIPATION
The next slide shows those UNOSOM II forces that have agreed
to commit forces to this, and you can see that the numbers are sig-
nificant and they are within range of those numbers that we desire
to have participating in that force. And of course, as you all know,
this is a very delicate and sensitive negotiation process ongoing
with the United Nations, and we hope to have more Nations par-
ticipating in this. But so far we have had substantial commitment
from those countries shown.

COALITION UNOSOM II
(PEACEKEEPING) FORCES
UNITAF COMMITTED TO UNOSOM II
AUSTRALIA (900)
BELGIUM (572)
EGYPT (245)
GERMANY (1,500)
INDIA (4,000)
ITALY (2,600)
NEW ZEALAND (62)
NIGERIA (621)
PAKISTAN (4,000)
SWEDEN (134)
TURKEY (330)
ZIMBABAWE(160)
TOTAL COMMITTED 15,124


21

UNITAF DISARMAMENT POLICY
MAINTAIN PEACETIME RULES OF ENGAGEMENT
"RIGHT TO SELF DEFENSE"
UNITAF COMMANDER'S INTENT, INCREASE
SECURITY BY:
• REDUCING WEAPONS IN HUMANITARIAN RELIEF
SECTORS (HRS)
• NEUTRALIZING POLITICAL FACTIONS AND
BANDITS CAPABILITIES TO COMMIT VIOLENT
CRIMES AND EXTORTION

NEUTRALIZE FACTIONAL FORCES
AND BANDITS CAPABISSISS
• USE OF DESIGNATED CANTONMENT AREAS
(AUTHORIZED WEAPONS STORAGE SITES - AWSS).
• DECLARE HEAVY WEAPONS OR TECHNICAL WEAPONS
OUTSIDE AWSS AS ILLEGAL.
• PERMIT FACTIONAL FORCES TO MAINTAIN LIMITED
TECHNICAL WEAPONS TO PROTECT HIGH VALUE
FACTIONAL FACILITIES:
HEADQUARTERS
AWSS
RADIO STATIONS / ETC
ALLOW TASK FORCE HRS COMMANDERS TO IMPLEMENT
SPECIFIC POLICIES FOR SMALL ARMS.


22

WEAPONS SUBJECT TO
IMMEDIATE CONFISCATION
ALL WEAPONS ABANDONED OR NOT UNDER DIRECT
CONTROL OF ANY PERSON
ALL WEAPONS AIMED OR POINTED AT UTF FORCES, OR
DISPLAYED IN ANY MANNER THAT DEMONSTRATES
HOSTILE INTENT.
ALL MACHINE GUNS, RECOILLESS RIFLES, MORTARS ,
ROCKET PROPELLED GRENADES, AND CREW SERVED
WEAPONS OUTSIDE AWSS.
ALL ARMORED VEHICLES, INFANTRY FIGHTING
VEHICLES, OR VEHICLES EQUIPPED WITH MOUNTED
WEAPONS OUTSIDE AWSS.
Of course, the key to success, and we believe we have already
succeeded in this effort, is to transfer the UNITAF operation over
to UNOSOM II, and this transition phase is going on right now. As
you know, a certain element of U.S. forces, the Third Battalion, 9th
Marine, has been withdrawn, and plans are currently being made
for the continuation of that withdrawal process.
So the establishment of the nine humanitarian relief sectors has
occurred. We are going to reduce those, as we compress, down into
four larger areas for ease of management, entering the transition
process. I would submit at this point in time that the operation is
ahead of the schedule that was originally set forth by the unified
commander, based on his estimate.
And we are hopeful that our negotiations with the United Na-
tions in terms of forming a command, getting forces committed,
and all the other elements such as the expanded rules that would
allow those forces to operate, are clearly in our interest to pursue.
And we are, of course as you know, actively doing that right now.
The transition to UNOSOM II should be shown there in terms of
the slide on the left—your left, it gives the breakdown of those
areas.
At this time I would now entertain questions that you have rela-
tive to the Somali operation.


25

MISSION
USCINCCENT CONDUCTS JOINT / COMBINED
MILITARY OPERATIONS IN SOMALIA TO:
• SECURE MAJOR AIR AND SEA PORTS
INSTALLATIONS AND FOOD DISTRIBUTION
POINTS
• OPEN AND FREE PASSAGE OF RELIEF
SUPPLIES
• PROVIDE SECURITY FOR CONVOYS AND
RELIEF SUPPLIES
• ASSIST UN / NGOS IN PROVIDING RELIEF
UNDER UN AUSPICES
Chairman Nunn. So these are the four bullets: To secure major
air and seaports, installations, and food distribution points; to open
and free passage of relief supplies; to provide security for convoys
and relief supplies; and to assist U.N. and nongovernmental forces
in providing relief under U.N. auspices.
I would assume that the first two of those are basically complet-
ed. Is that right?
General Brandtner. That is correct.
Chairman Nunn. Now, the third one is an ongoing, am I correct?
General Brandtner. That is an ongoing operation, yes, sir.
Chairman Nunn. Providing security for convoys is ongoing. And
the forth one is assist nongovernmental entities in providing relief
under U.N. auspices; I assume that is ongoing.
General Brandtner. That is ongoing.
Chairman Nunn. Now, if you divide those four missions up,
when we leave, who is going to perform mission number one?
General Brandtner. The UNOSOM force that goes in there is
going to be structured to have essentially the same capability, in
terms of both combatant and supportive aspects, that the force in
there now has. The idea is to have a seamless turnover so that the
capabilities inherent in each of these sectors, that will be essential-
ly down to four, will be the same that is there now.
The forces will have the ability to enforce the peace. They will
have the ability to secure the convoys. They will have the ability to
deploy combat forces, if necessary, and also the support capability
necessary to carry on the relief.


27
You can see that some of these countries, the one with asterisks,
have people there now. There may not necessarily be the same
people or the same capability from each of these countries, but
there will be, of course, some that will remain in place as
UNOSOM II comes in there.
Chairman Nunn. What is your best estimate now as to when the
necessary forces, not simply numbers but the right forces, will be
there to replace U.S. forces? What is your best estimate, based on
the commitments you already know about?
General Brandtner. The commitments we know about now, it is
in terms of their getting there. It is more a function of establishing
the command and control mechanism and getting the United Na-
tions effort on board. Once that infrastructure and oversight is es-
tablished, which we hope to do very quickly, then we can begin to
flow these forces. So they will be able to move in as soon as we are
ready to assume the control. Others are phasing in that would
come in under the aegis of both functions and would be able to just
remain in place internally.
Chairman Nunn. And what is your best estimate of when that
can be accomplished? I am not trying to pin you down to a date
certain, I am just asking for a general range of time.
General Brandtner. I would hope that we could accomplish that
within the next month, month and a half. I am just—that is really
a hope estimate rather than an intelligent guess.
Chairman Nunn. And how many U.S. forces do you believe will
need to remain in the residual force?
General Brandtner. That is a very—what you might call an
issue of discussion right now with the administration and dealing
with the U.N. We are looking in terms of between 3,000 and 5,000
over a period of time, that would be withdrawn to probably half of
that number, perhaps down to as little as 1,000. Mostly supporting-
type forces.
We also, of course, have said that we would provide an ability to
have a reaction force of some type that would either be in the
country for a period of time or it could involve the residence of
Marine forces offshore. Those are negotiating right now. In terms
of the situation, we may find that the security there is such that
we could actually even move a reaction force back to being staged
in the United States.
Chairman Nunn. Okay, thank you. My time has expired. Sena-
tor Thurmond.
Senator Thurmond. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General, if we
leave a mobile or rapid reaction force in Somalia to back up United
Nations peacekeeping forces, would these Americans be under
United Nations or American command?
General Brandtner. The command of those forces would be—or
the way we are trying to work it out is that they would be under
the UNITAF. And these are sensitive negotiations, Senator, with
regard to how this would come out, but the hope would be, and this
is my opinion, that they would come under UNITAF, which would
be part of this other force, so that the command arrangement of
that force would hopefully remain under U.S. command.
I am aware of the sensitivities there, and I think that is how
they would probably make this agreement work. The UNITAF


29
If it is determined that U.S. civil affairs units, active or reserve,
would be required to meet some of those needs, and it was a judg-
ment of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to recommend
that to the Secretary, I am sure that we would, indeed, put those
types of units in there.
Senator Thurmond. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Nunn. Thank you, Senator Thurmond. Senator Exon.
Senator Exon. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. Gentlemen,
I have several questions on the follow-up discussions that we are
going to have, as I understand it, on the situation in Iraq and in
Bosnia.
But let me ask one question now. I want to preface my question
with the statement that I have been in Saudi Arabia, I have been
in Kuwait, and I have been in Iraq, I have never been in Somalia,
so the question that I am going to ask you first has to do with a
question to which I do not know the answer. Are the weather con-
ditions, the desert conditions, the temperature, the winds, the cli-
mate generally in the parts of Somalia that our troops are operat-
ing in similar to that that we encountered in the Gulf war?
General Brandtner. No. The part of Somalia we are in now has
arid parts, but it also has parts that do receive rain. They can grow
crops there. There is an ability, if the infrastructure is established,
to grow their own food. They have water. It needs to be processed
of course; we need to build up that kind of infrastructure. But the
nature of the terrain in that part of Somalia—agreed, there are
some that are very very barren as you get more into the desert—
there are sustenance abilities there, and once the country is back
on its feet they can begin to grow.
They did have some agriculture, as you know, before. They
raised cattle and other types of livestock which were, indeed, able
to flourish there at some point in time. Mike may have some other
thoughts on that. But that is essentially the kind of environment
there.
Senator Exon. Well then, basically, if we can maintain a degree
of peace and understanding and stop the wholesale killing and the
fear, then there is a chance that that particular part of the world
can overcome, at least partially, the hunger and starvation which
was going on, which really forced us to go in. Is that right?
General Brandtner. I agree with that assessment and I would
also say that the problem is more the actual stealing and depriva-
tion of the food as much as a lack of food. And in trying to get it
distributed to many of these people there was just—as you know, of
course, the constant moving about, the devastation of these small
villages out there where they just essentially became nomadic or
they were just dying in place, prevented them from any kind of ag-
ricultural enterprise to help themselves sustain themselves.
Senator Exon. So if we can get them back into their village or
tribal settings, we have a chance of solving this problem, to some
degree, more quickly.
General Brandtner. There is a chance to do that. I will say that
it is going to be a long and difficult process, but I have hope that it
will be achieved over time.
Senator Exon. I saw a program on television not too long ago
that in certain areas, I believe, the French took the initiative
66-547 - 93 - 2


30
where they had, I believe, armed and, I believe, put uniforms on
Somalians who controlled and patrolled the town, a la policemen,
which relieved the French and other regular military people from
that action. Is that widespread or was that isolated—are you famil-
iar with what I am referencing?
General Brandtner. That was a specific event in a limited area.
I would say that offers a measure of hope, and certainly as we
evolve, and especially in the UNOSOM II environment, that this
kind of activity should be encouraged. I think the development of a
local police establishment that could begin to be robust, have credi-
bility, be capable, with assistance of the UNOSOM to train them
up, is obviously an ideal situation to allow them then to take
charge of their own lives, their own security, and their own well-
being.
Senator Exon. I do not think you discussed in detail at all, and
maybe you could just briefly—it seems to me that we are going to
have potential difficulties in that part of the world until some sem-
blance of national and local governments are rekindled, and I un-
derstand that has been pretty much decimated by the roving
bands.
From an intelligence standpoint, what prediction can you make
to us on the chances, and how are we going to encourage and put
together under the United Nations forces, if that is part of our as-
signment, a government? Because without a government we could
lapse back in very quickly to what we had when we went in.
Admiral Cramer. Senator, really that is the other half of the
mission out there that Ambassador Oakley, on the State Depart-
ment side of the house, has pursued vigorously. I think there are a
couple of things that bode well. For example, his ability to get Ali
Mahdi and Aideed together early on, really 2 days after the land-
ing on the 11th of December, and they met under his general aus-
pices but agreements were reached there. At the Addis conference,
at least there has been an agreement for a ceasefire, that holds
some promise.
But in terms of really reestablishing some kind of a political
entity or a government or an infrastructure along the lines of
which you are discussing here, in my discussions with the State De-
partment, which is certainly more qualified to answer the question
than I am, it is going to be a while. There is going to be no near
term solution for any kind of a political settlement.
I would remind you that as recently as last weekend in Kismayo,
General Morgan's forces had a major confrontation with forces gen-
erally allied with Aideed, and we had to go in with the Belgians to
basically separate the two warring parties. This was probably the
largest confrontation, where we used Cobra helicopters, and so on,
still in a military sense.
So the interactional fighting, interaction, and competition cer-
tainly have not stopped. But there is even a good part to that story,
and that was that Ambassador Oakley, within a day, had gone
down to Kismayo, had basically got the warring factions somewhat
under control, had met with Aideed—excuse me, he did not go to
Kismayo, these meetings took place in Mogadishu.
Met with Aideed and Aideed pulled out, the ^ader that was
causing most of the problems down there, and General Morgan


31
withdrew. So there seems to be at least political solutions to what
really had only been resolved militarily as recently as a few weeks
ago. So progress is slow, but again, in discussions with CIA, and
more importantly in discussions with the State Department, I do
not think there is any near term political solution. But that is the
other half of the game and that is exactly what Ambassador
Oakley and the U.N. are there to provide.
Senator Exon. My time is up, just one last question and I think
you can give me a short answer. From what you have just said in
response to my question, it indicates to me that we and other na-
tions under the auspices of the United Nations are likely to be
there for some extended period of time, as opposed to some of the
talk initially that we could get out of there completely in 90 days.
Admiral Cramer. I think that is a very fair assessment, certainly
on the political side of the house, in any event. I think, as General
Brandtner has very correctly assessed, our military contribution,
particularly in the combatant sense, is going down—will go down
dramatically, indeed has already begun that process. But in terms
of creating the political environment, that is going to take time.
Senator Exon. Thank you, gentleman. Thank you Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Nunn. Thank you, Senator Exon. Mr. Kempthorne.
Senator Kempthorne. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.
General, it was referenced in your remarks just a moment ago
that expectations are too high on the part of the Somali people.
What, if anything, are we doing to deal with that, and what impact
will it have if, upon our departure, those expectations that are too
high are not met?
General Brandtner. Well, first of all, as I mentioned earlier, the
mandate of UNOSOM II is hopefully going to be the same, or a
seamless transition will occur so that the Somali people will have
the same type of environment in which to attempt to bring them-
selves back to their feet. That is the desire and intent of UNOSOM
n.
Their expectations, I think, when they initially saw American
forces come in, and then as they saw them build up with the addi-
tion of the coalition forces, I think they were, at that time, of the
view that everything was going to be solved in a very short period
of time, that all their needs would be met, and that the situation
was going to quickly right itself.
Of course, it is such a volatile place that is so complex, and there
are so many factions that are being dealt with, that they then
began to realize that, over a period of time, things did not happen
as quickly as they thought they would. That some of their misery
continued because they were not subject to immediate relief.
And I think these are things that we are dealing with on a day-
to-day basis. As this evolution matures, I would say that we can
probably come to some point where their level of expectation will
begin to come more in line with reality, and they will then address
that on its own terms and begin to recover themselves with the
UNOSOM II assistance.
Senator Kempthorne. Have the warlords or the bandits been put
out of business, or are they simply lying in wait until U.S. and
U.N. forces pull out?


32
General Brandtner. I think—and I will let Mike talk to this too
because, from his standpoint, he has a great deal of knowledge.
From my operational perspective, I think that we have essentially
gotten agreement with the major factional leaders to cease and
desist, to try to come to terms with one another, and also to assist,
in their own way, this effort.
I would submit that bandits and other bands that rove around
that are essentially out of the immediate control of these larger
factional leaders will continue to be a problem, and I suspect that
they will become essentially a police problem over the longer term.
Mike, do you have anything?
Admiral Cramer. I would agree with that. I think the most im-
portant thing is that none of these relatively large factions—and
some of them are not too large—but none of the large factions at
all are conducting organized resistance to the coalition. They never
have. If anything, they are more fractionalized than they were
when we arrived. So in terms of military capability, their capabil-
ity continues to attrite each day.
That is the first point. The second point is, however, and General
Brandtner addressed it, we are seeing bandits from these factions
begin to moonlight. Now, what do I mean by that?
For example, we had an incident within the last 24 hours in
which some of our Army units on a road from Mogadishu to Afgoi
found 12 Somalis who appeared to be in the process of being robbed
by local bandits. They stopped the situation. It turned out that was
not the case at all. These 12 Somalis were about to be assassinated
by the local bandits. So obviously they saved the lives on the spot
of 12 Somalis.
Again, a different plan was the issue here. Then they started to
trace back where these bandits had come from. In fact, they were
aligned with one of the major coalitions, but we had one of the
major—factions, not coalitions. But then upon further scrutiny it
was clear that these individuals, their numbers were small, were
literally out doing this ad hoc on their own.
So, again, it falls very much in what General Brandtner had de-
scribed, more of a police action situation. So I would not character-
ize that, again, as organized, directed. It was an independent oper-
ation, but nonetheless the result could be very tragic. We still see
those kinds of situations. I would see—not on that scale, but we see
two to four of those kinds of situations generally every day in Mo-
gadishu, a fewer number in Kismayo, and a much fewer number in
the cities outside the main concentration area.
General Brandtner. I would add too that part of the mandate of
the UNOSOM II forces is to establish a police force, as I alluded to
earlier. But this is an objective not only desirable, but one of the
objectives that they seek to establish and then maintain that.
Hopefully, then, that, as it matures—and, again, the time required
to do this is going to be considerable, because there is zero there
now. It is, indeed, however hopefully going to be overtaken, that
problem.
Senator Kempthorne. Since undertaking this major operation,
have any significant weaknesses in our execution of the operation
been identified?


33
General Brandtner. I cannot think of anything, frankly, that
has caused us any difficulty. There are always little what I would
call glitches that occur, but without trying to send you a commer-
cial, sir, I would tell that this has been a very, very well executed
operation from the minute it started and up to the present time.
I would also tell you that this occurred on very short notice when
one considers that it was a matter of days from the time that the
President made the decision to do this until the actual execution
occurred. So I think all aspects of it, the sealift, the airlift, the
movement of Marine and Army forces and Air Forces, have all
been great.
Senator Kempthorne. Thank you, General, Admiral.
Senator Exon [presiding]. Thank you, Senator Kempthorne.
Senator Bingaman.
Senator Bingaman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me ask about
your disarmament policy. Where does this lead? As I understand it,
you are picking up heavy weapons and so-called technical weapons,
having them stored in cantonment areas, and I am just wondering
where all that leads. What happens to the weapons at the end of
all of this? Do they stay in cantonment areas? Do we destroy them?
What is the capability of these groups to replenish their supply of
weapons? Where are we going with these weapons?
General Brandtner. Well, first of all, those weapons that are
stored in cantonments, we have agreed that they can remain there
because they continue to provide some stability for the factional
element, if they feel secure that they can retain some of their capa-
bility to defend themselves and have some secure means. Whether
we like it or not, it is probably the only way we can get to an ac-
commodation with them in that regard.
It also keeps them off of the streets and out of the hands of the
bandits, so there is a very valuable aspect to that. As regards
to
Senator Bingaman. So those weapons, then, are still owned by,
controlled by the factions?
General Brandtner. That is correct.
Senator Bingaman. It is just that we are not permitting them
outside those areas.
General Brandtner. That is correct. Also, as you look down the
road, in the context of building a police force and eventually other
security forces that might operate to maintain stability in the
longer term, some of these weapons may prove to be valuable to be
used to arm those kinds of forces to provide them the means,
rather than just destroying them all and starting over from
scratch.
Obviously, the weapons that are confiscated on the street, that
are taken away from dissident elements during confrontations and
all, generally are collected and in many cases are destroyed be-
cause they are of no value, or they are put into a U.S. or coalition-
type cantonment, if you will, to be determined by the commander
as to how they will ultimately be disposed. A lot of these weapons,
I know you have seen pictures of them, are jury rigged ancient
kinds of things, stuff that we have not used for years that, you
know, in the long term would just not be supportable, so they are
going to probably be destroyed.


37
So this is sort of balancing it out. I am not making an apology. I
am just saying that we are obviously going to have to source it.
Senator Cohen. I am just raising the issue that has been talked
about here this morning. Number one, we are not going in and
rounding up all the weapons. We are going to have a situation in
which a smaller force, with less U.S. participation, is trying to ac-
complish the same mission and it seems to me with less money.
So I do not know how you do that in the future. We are talking
about the United States having a short-term commitment, but we
really have got a fairly long-term commitment, and it seems to me
it is going to be much larger than what we are talking about right
here, in terms of shrinking our forces down. I do not see how we
shrink our forces down and still increase our financial contribution
in order to sustain the effort in Somalia. I do not think you will see
that kind of political support for that.
That is all I have, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Exon. Thank you, Senator Cohen. Senator Graham.
Senator Graham. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Just a couple of
questions relative to the preplanning and your assessment of the
international U.N. force.
What were the steps prior to the decision to insert our forces into
Somalia, in terms of integration with other U.N. military forces?
General Brandtner. Well as you know, of course, this was an op-
eration conducted under U.N. auspices, based on a resolution. As
we developed a plan to do this—from the operator's perspective as
I was working with the unified commander through the Chairman
to develop the plan, there was a very large effort ongoing through
the agency of diplomats or the State Department working with the
U.N., working with the member nations, to achieve an agreement
on what we would do that would be a coalition effort.
And many of the countries involved that are currently there, ob-
viously those decisions and that support was clearly decided upon
and agreed to before this operation was undertaken. And it was
clearly understood that when we did initiate this on the 9th of De-
cember, that we had a large commitment from many allies and
friends who had already offered support, and who began to come in
very very quickly.
As you know within days, and I showed the phasing slides earli-
er, we had support from the Canadians, the Belgians, the French,
the United Kingdom. The Germans have come in, the Moroccans,
and other Asian and Muslim countries that have come in to sup-
port. A lot of it was timed based on the ability of the unified com-
mander to absorb these forces in country, based on the buildup of
infrastructure and support.
But a direct answer to your question is this was a very well or-
chestrated effort and it continues to be a very well orchestrated
international effort. Through the auspices of our State Depart-
ment, Ambassador Oakley on the scene out there has done a mag-
nificent job working with these various nations. We have some 34
liaison personnel currently with UNITAF headquarters, that are
working both in that environment and on to set the transition to
UNOSOM II.
Senator Graham. With that background, are there any lessons
that you think we have learned here, as well as in our previous


38
United Nations activities, particularly in Iraq, that we should be
sensitive to in applying to future relationships?
General Brandtner. Well, some of the lessons we have learned,
and we learned them in the Gulf war, naturally, and they have
carried over to this environment—which I might add I think made
some of this easier, if you will, because we understood better, in my
view, the capabilities and limitations of some of these countries to
support certain types of operations, both in terms of the political
aspect and the military and support aspect.
So we were able to approach that in an intelligent way, being
sensitive to their respective views of this. I think we have learned,
as we evolve in our operations in the Gulf also, to appreciate and
understand the sensitivities of some of these countries also. As the
major contributor, I think it is fair to say that we have been the
inspiration behind many of these ideas and have tried to make
sure that the objectives that we see necessary in our view, are em-
braced by the U.N., and have had good success with that.
And not to say that we are driving the train, so to speak, but we
certainly have a room in the engine compartment. And as a conse-
quence, I think those kinds of lessons have paid off for us and we
have been dramatically improved in our capability to gather these
coalitions and maintain them.
Senator Graham. When we transition from peace making to
peace keeping, and the United Nations takes over that second
phase, what number of U.S. forces do you anticipate will be in-
volved in the peace keeping function?
General Brandtner. As I mentioned in an earlier question, sir,
we are in the process of negotiating that now with the United Na-
tions based on the capabilities we see the force having overall and
what the United States can contribute that no one else could, for
example. We have come to terms with numbers roughly between
3,000 and 5,000, and I am just reluctant to put a fix on that be-
cause, obviously, you get stuck with those things forever. But we
say we are comfortable with that, and that as time evolves, some
period of time, we would reduce that significantly as capabilities
became more robust with UNOSOM II and other organizations.
Senator Graham. Thank you.
Chairman Nunn [presiding]. Thank you, Senator Graham. I be-
lieve we are at Senator Warner?
Senator Warner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Gentlemen, I join
others in commending you and your subordinates, particularly in
Somalia, for the superb professional manner in which you are dis-
charging the military aspect of this humanitarian mission.
I just would be interested. Admiral, how long have you been in
the Navy? Give or take a few years, near 30?
Admiral Cramer. No, sir, not quite that long. I have been in the
Navy about 24 years.
Senator Warner. And General?
General Brandtner. He is a mere child. I have been in 33 plus
years.
Senator Warner. Well, as a former Marine, I know promotions
have always come a little slower. But have you ever seen the young
men in the military better equipped, better motivated today than
in the years previous in your career, either of you?


39
General Brandtner. I think the men and women in the Armed
Forces today are absolutely superb.
Admiral Cramer. I absolutely agree. And we have seen it come
and go. It has never been better.
Senator Warner. I think the American people understand that
has come about by strong support from Presidents Reagan and
Bush, and the Congress through those years. And it is my hope
that we can expect that same strong support under President Clin-
ton.
To the question of the mission this morning, the Chairman asked
you about the components of the mission, and you provided it. Any
change in that mission as the administration shifts from President
Bush to President Clinton?
General Brandtner. There has been no change to that mission.
It has been reaffirmed, and the administration has reinforced the
objectives that we have had. And essentially from the operator's
perspective, there has been virtually no change whatsoever.
Senator Warner. When this mission was initially undertaken by
the United Nations, the United Nations turned to the United
States to perform the initial phases. Primarily, my understanding,
is because that we were really the only Nation that had the equip-
ment and the training to cross the beaches and go in. Am I correct
on that, General?
General Brandtner. Yes sir, you are. There is no other country
in the world that could have done that.
Senator Warner. Right. Well, that is the thing that troubles me
because I am deeply concerned that this Nation is being drawn into
conflict after conflict because we are the only Nation that has the
equipment and the trained men and women to perform these mis-
sions.
Now, as a result of this learning experience, do you detect among
other nations the desire to begin to provide for themselves this
same type of equipment to go inland, over the beaches, and this
type of training?
General Brandtner. I have not seen any emerging initiatives
nor have I heard said to me these kinds of things. I would submit
that other countries, our major allies, have extraordinary capabili-
ties in their own right which could be brought to bear in some of
these other instances where they would have capability to do this.
So, I would say that we are unique in our amphibious capabili-
ties. Certainly, there are other capabilities that the other armed
forces have which are held by other countries.
Senator Warner. That is clear, but I just think it is important
that we begin to make certain that we are not called on each time
for this type of mission, where we have got to go over the beach,
and the United States is the only one that can perform it.
The world is going to begin to share on some basis of equivalency
these burdens of helping people, primarily for humanitarian pur-
poses. I think that burden should be evenly borne by the other na-
tions, and that should require them to begin to acquire and train
for this type of mission.
Chairman Nunn. Senator Warner, let me just interject one thing
there. I agree with your basic point, I think it is fundamentally
sound. But I do think we need to keep it in perspective.


40
Before we went into Somalia, and General, you can correct me if
I am wrong on this, if you look at the United Nations deployments
around the whole world, before we went into Somalia there were
some 50,000 U.N. forces deployed around the world in various trou-
ble spots—in the Middle East, Cyprus, all over, Cambodia. Of those,
the United States had 500.
So, before Somalia we—and I think we have always done our job
because we provide intelligence, we provide logistics, we provide
airplanes and so forth. But I do think that the U.N. has an awful
lot going on where we are involved in any substantial way on the
ground. And Somalia brings it out of kilter, because we have so
many involved there.
I do not in any way disagree with your underlying point. I think
all of us are going to have to start looking at this. But there are a
lot of countries out there in the U.N. uniform.
Senator Warner. That is true, Mr. Chairman, and I am familiar
with those statistics, and we have discussed this before. But I come
back to the point that there are levels of risk associated with these
U.N. missions throughout the world. All of them have some meas-
ure of risk.
But when you are coming off an amphibious vessel, and on that
small vehicle coming up on a beach, you do not know quite what to
expect. And there is a higher degree of risk with some of these am-
phibious missions than peace keeping missions inland. But that is
an issue that I will undertake to work on.
General, this committee for several years now has been trying to
equip in an even fashion the various components of our military,
the Army and the Marine Corps. And during the Gulf operation, it
came to our attention that the Marines were very short in the
equipment of night vision equipment. And, indeed, at some point
you had to take some and borrow some from the Army to perform
your missions.
Now, I am concerned about, as you and others are, the loss of life
of this brave Marine on a night patrol. My question is, was he
equipped with night vision goggles? Do the Marines there have
night vision equipment?
General Brandtner. Whether that particular Marine was wear-
ing night vision goggles I do not know. I will find the answer for
you, sir.
Units that are in theater right now are, on a selected basis—and
I will also get this for you—equipped with night vision goggles. All
mobile units, obviously, have them; the helicopters that fly. Wheth-
er each individual marine on a night patrol is equipped, I honestly
do not know the answer to that. But I will take the question, if I
might, and get an answer for you.
[The information follows:]
Some members of the patrol were wearing night vision goggles, but the Marine
that you are referring to was not. Night vision goggles severely restrict field of view,
and in a city environment, where there are numerous bright light sources that can
temporarily blind goggle wearers, common procedure is for only one or two patrol
members to wear them.
The Marine patrol consisted of three fire teams and a machine gun team that to-
taled 19 personnel. There were five sets of night vision goggles with the patrol. The
standard issue of night vision goggles for a patrol of this size would be three, one
per fire team. The marine killed was the point man for the patrol and was not


41
wearing night vision goggles. His team leader, the number two man in the patrol,
was wearing a set of night vision goggles.
Senator Warner. Well, it seems to me that they should be so
equipped because we have come to learn that this is a very, very
valuable piece of equipment. And it is my hope that your answer
comes in that they do have it.
General Brandtner. I would offer in this case that having used
night vision goggles in a combat environment under different cir-
cumstances, that in the context of what happened to that young
marine, I would not want to leave a false sense of security that
wearing those goggles would have changed the circumstances.
Senator Warner. I understand that quite clearly, but at least he
should have the option to have that equipment. Thank you very
much. Mr. Chairman, my time is up.
Chairman Nunn. Thank you, Senator Warner. I believe Senator
Levin is next.
Senator Levin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me add my voice
of thanks and commendation as well. I was in Somalia a month ago
with a number of colleagues and was deeply impressed by what we
saw there.
Senator Warner's point that there is a different level of risk in
peace enforcement from peacekeeping I think is an important point
and is one that I share, whether that peace enforcement is hitting
the beaches or whether it is coming over land in an attack. The
rules of engagement that we have in Somalia now are a lot differ-
ent from peacekeeping, where there is already a peace in place and
we just simply are there to monitor, under rules of engagement
that we only shoot back when we are shot at.
So the typical peacekeeping, would you not agree, is much less
risky than the peace enforcement that we are now doing.
General Brandtner. In terms of the typical peacekeeping envi-
ronment, I agree with you. I would submit, sir, that the environ-
ment in Somalia, as the UNOSOM II takes over, is going to be in a
transition between peacemaking, and enforcement, and peacekeep-
ing. And as a result, we are working with the U.N. to have the
mandate expanded to include the ability to conduct operations, not
merely react, so that they can go out and aggressively pursue,
based on intelligence, an operational plan that will reduce a threat
before it is emergent upon them.
Senator Levin. So, what you are proposing is that the force to
which we would turn over the operation, would have the same
rules or similar rules of engagement to what we now operate
under?
General Brandtner. That is correct, sir.
Senator Levin. And that, then would be pretty close to peace en-
forcement.
General Brandtner. It would be, except that the environment,
hopefully by the time we have chosen to withdraw and feel success-
ful, which is very close upon us, I might add, that we would have
taken care of the larger aspects.
If you recall, when we went in there, other than some negotia-
tions that had occurred some days beforehand, there had been no
attempt to try to create any sort of rules, if you will, on the
ground. So, it was total chaos.


42
Senator Levin. I understand that. But just so that we get the
terms clear, what is going on now is peace enforcement under rules
of engagement that allow us to go after potential threats, and not
wait until we are attacked.
General Brandtner. Right.
Senator Levin. And what you are recommending is, basically,
that the force to which you turn over the operation would have
those same peace enforcement rules of engagement?
General Brandtner. Yes, sir.
Senator Levin. All right. I think the terminology here is very im-
portant. There is an awful lot of confusion about it, and I want to
keep using just those terms.
Now, when we leave troops there, as you are proposing to do in
much reduced numbers, are we going to be placing those troops
under U.N. command? •*
General Brandtner. We had discussed this earlier, and the way,
hopefully, it will work out is that there will be a command ar-
rangement where a U.S. commander will be in the structure of the
UNOSOM force who will be dual hatted, if you will, and will com-
mand the U.S. contingent. So that when they are operating, they
will operate under his aegis and he, in turn then, will operate
within the context of the UNOSOM command.
Senator Levin. Would the U.N. commander have command over
our U.S. commander in that context?
General Brandtner. He would.
Senator Levin. So that we would be under U.N. command?
General Brandtner. In theory we would. However, we would
still be meeting our own litmus test, if you will, of maintaining
U.S. control of our own forces.
Senator Levin. All right. But, again, that control would be—I am
not disagreeing with you. I just want to find out clearly what you
are recommending. That control would in turn be under a U.N.
commander.
General Brandtner. In theory, that would be the case.
Senator Levin. Now currently we have a dual hatted commander
out there, is that not correct? General Johnston is both U.S. com-
mander and U.N. commander?
General Brandtner. No, sir. General Johnston is not a U.N.
commander, but a U.S. commander operating under a U.N. man-
date.
Senator Levin. Is it not true that a number of the forces that
have been assigned to him including, I believe, the French, the
British, the Canadians, have been assigned to him only in his U.S.
command hat?
General Brandtner. I honestly do not know the answer to that
question. I will take it—I do know some of it, but I do not know all
of it.
[The information follows:]
UNITAF is a U.S. led coalition, operating under a U.N. mandate. Forces provided
to UNITAF by coalition countries operate under General Johnston, a U.S. com-
mander.
Senator Levin. Well, I will then say that he told me a very inter-
esting fact that at least the French, as I remember, were assigned


44

DEPLOYED IN COUNTRY
COUNTRY
* AUSTRALIA
* BELGIUM
BOTSWANA
CANADA
* EGYPT
FRANCE
* GERMANY
* INDIA
* ITALY
KUWAIT
MOROCCO
1,141
617
302
1,359
240
2,372
64
282
3,539
93
1,239
PERSONNEL
COUNTRY
* NEW ZEALAND
* NIGERIA
* PAKISTAN
SAUDI ARABIA
* SWEDEN
TUNISIA
* TURKEY
UAE
UNITED KINGDOM
* ZIMBABWE
PERSONNEL
67
4

880
643
150
133
300
105
90
150
TOTAL
13,770
* UNOSOMII PARTICIPATION
That one there. Given our conversation, our discussion right
now, would you not agree that the word "peace keeping" that is in
parentheses there, probably should be "enforcement" given that
the rules of engagement are going to be the same rules of engage-
ment as the UNITAF.
General Brandtner. I understand your concern and definitional
thing. The intent here is to ensure that it is understood the
UNOSOM is a force there to maintain the peace that was estab-
lished by the peacekeeping UNITAF force. What we are saying,
however, is that in order to give them the right or the capability to
operate if the environment does turn hostile, that they have the
rules of engagement and the mandate necessary to be more than
just a monitor. They can, in effect, operate. So, hopefully the envi-
ronment will be a peacekeeping environment.
Senator Levin. But the rules of engagement would be the en-
forcement rules of engagement?
General Brandtner. They will be the enforcement rules, and
they will be robust.
Senator Levin. I would suggest that somehow or other you make
that point clear, because we are taking a dramatic step here, an
important step for the world and I am all for it. The faster we turn
this over to a U.N. enforcement force, the happier I am, providing
they have got rules of engagement which will allow them to do
what we are doing now, and the capability to do what we are doing
now.
I think we ought to be very careful as to how we use those words,
"peacekeeping," and "peace enforcement" so that we do not blur or
confuse what is really going on, which is the transfer of enforce-
ment capability from a U.S. to a U.N. force. My time is up.
Chairman Nunn. Thank you, Senator Levin. Senator Glenn.


46
not very many, but any are too many. But really, is the program
working so that we really are stopping the starvation?
Baidoa is one spot. That is where we have pretty good security.
But there are a dozen other places out there in the countryside
that were in that estimate of 1,000 a day. And I would be interest-
ed in getting a figure from that. If you would supply that for us, I
would appreciate it.
[The information follows:]
No accurate statistics exist on numbers of deaths. Neither State Department nor
CIA could provide this information. Nonetheless, a rough estimate of the current
number of deaths is possible.
— The first step in calculating the death rate would be to accept the pre-interven-
tion figure of about 1,000 deaths per day in southern Somalia due to starvation, and
to combine it with current fragmentary data.
— OFDA reports that in December the daily death toll in Bardera was 250 to 300,
and in Baidoa it was 250. These two towns, then, represented roughly half the daily
death toll in southern Somalia.
— OFDA also reports that the current daily death toll in Bardera is 64 and in
Baidoa it is as high as 60.
— Therefore, if Bardera and Baidoa still constitute half of the current death toll,
this figure would be somewhat more than 240 per day. This number represents a
daily decline of about 75 percent.
A number of other indicators suggest improving conditions:
— Increasingly secure lines of communication are aiding in food delivery to the
countryside.
— Somalis are leaving the refugee centers and returning to their home villages,
especially in the agricultural area.
— Good rains this year, with the exception of the Belet Weyne area, should
produce a better-than-expected harvest. However, a note of caution: The harvest is
not sufficient to cover sustenance, marketing, storage, and planting. Relief support
is still needed to help plan for the future.
— To prepare for the next planting season, NGO's have started distributing the
necessary seeds and tools.
— Many NGO's have started to distribute dry rations instead of maintaining so
many feeding kitchens.
— Vaccination and rehabilitation programs for the existing livestock have also
begun.
— According to U.S. forces in Somalia, the price of wheat has decreased (Novem-
ber 1992-$100 for 50 lbs; February 1993-$30 for 50 lbs) and the price of an AK-47
has increased (November 1993-$50; February 1993-$300).
— The Somali Auxiliary Security Force began work in Mogadishu on February 6.
This force was a Somali initiative, encouraged by Ambassador Oakley and other
U.S. representatives in Somalia.
Chairman Nunn. Thank you Senator Glenn. I believe Senator
Cohen has one more question before we move to Iraq.
Senator Cohen. It is really more an observation. I would like to
float a question mark to the suggestion that perhaps other nations
ought to have the same capability that we have.
There has been a traditional argument in the country that if we
do not have the weapons, then we will never be in the position to
use them. And there have been members in our society who have,
time after time, lobbied against the development of, let us say, the
cruise missile, you name the system, with the argument that if we
do not have it, we can never use it. And, therefore, the best way to
ensure that we will not go to war is not to have the means to go to
war.
I do not believe that is a valid argument for this Nation's nation-
al security interests. It seems to me that there are two options that
we have, if we follow that line of argument. We can either elimi-


47
nate the means; cancel the systems. We may do that in any event.
Or we can insist that others build them.
Now, if you put that chart back up on the screen to show which
Nations are now contributing, I would like to go down through that
list and ask each one of our colleagues which one of those countries
is going to be in the position to develop the kind of amphibious
landing capability that the United States has? Which one of those
countries has the capability or will ever have the capability of
having the kind of aircraft carriers that we have in our inventory?
I would go further and then ask, would we rather have what
used to be the Soviet Union have the kind of aircraft capability
and amphibious landing capability that we have. (At one time the
Soviet Union had an interest in developing those kinds of capabili-
ties.) That was quite threatening to many, many people in this
country and around the globe. Or China, which is developing an
amphibious capability in the southern part of its country. Or do we
want Japan to develop an amphibious landing capability?
I think that we have to exercise some caution in urging other
countries to develop the kind of unique capability that we have de-
veloped over the years, because it does have not only military con-
sequences, it has great diplomatic consequences as well.
Chairman Nunn. Thank you, Senator Cohen. I think your words
are very wise.
Let me suggest this. We are going to move to the briefing on
Iraq. We took an hour and 35 minutes to make that round on So-
malia. We have Iraq, and we also want to definitely get to former
Yugoslavia. I would suggest, General, that we complete the briefing
on Iraq, complete the briefing on Yugoslavia, and then come back
for a round of questioning in the interest of time, because I would
hate for us to get to about 12:30 and not have gotten to Yugoslavia.
I think most people would like to hear both before they have to
leave.
IRAQ
SITUATION UPDATE
General Brandtner. I will turn it over to Admiral Cramer
again, as we did before. He will set the stage and provide back-
ground for the operation.
Admiral Cramer. If I could, I would like to stand up and use the
pointer on this. I would like to take a couple of minutes on the Iraq
situation that brought us to where we are today. I will give today's
situation as well.
As we all know, in late November we saw a major movement of
aircraft out of the Baghdad area, down to Al Jarrah, toward the
32nd line. The purpose of that clearly was on the part of Saddam
Hussein to take down U.S. aircraft.
In mid-December, we began to see violations of the 32 no-fly
zone. Most all those violations took place—there were 16 multiple
violations in this shaded area here; this triangular or grey area.
Following this we saw, early on the 27th of December, an at-
tempt by Saddam's MiG-25s to shoot down American F-15s that
were flying in the area. Later in that day we, in fact, an F-16 shot


48
down a MiG-25. The details of all this General Brandtner will
present.
We then saw violations continue. About the beginning of the
year, at the end of December, we saw the deployment of additional
SAM missiles, some SA-2s, some SA-3s down into this area, into
what then became known as a SAM trap. Saddam was attempting
to lure our aircraft into this area, then shoot it down. If they could
not shoot it down with an aircraft, shoot it down with a surface-to-
air missile.
We saw, on the 2nd of January, when we had one of our U2s
that was flying up in this area, an attempt again by the Iraqis to
shoot down the U2. They were unsuccessful. These violations con-
tinued on until the 6th of January when, of course, we had the de-
marche.

LATE NOV A/C DEPLOY TO
AL JARRAH
MID-OEC THREE 32N VIOLATIONS
MID-DEC 22 TRUCKS BOMBED IN
.NORTHERN CONVOYS
27 DEC POUR 32N VIOLATIONS,
ATTEMPT TO DOWN P-15 ^
27 DEC F-16 SHOOTS ^^^fl
DOWN MIG-25
28 DEC THREE 32N
VIOLATIONS WM
31 DEC SA-3 DEPLOY
SOUTH
2 JAN SA-2 DEPLOY SOUTH
2 JAN U-2 INCIDENT
4 JAN FOUR 32N VIOLATIONS
'6 JAN UN DEMARCHE
The demarche did not really slow the Iraqis down. They did, in
fact, begin to redeploy after the demarche some of the missiles in
the southern area back up to the 32 no-fly zone. And, again, began
a critical shell game of moving SA-3 missiles back down, still in a
very threatening way, below the 32 no-fly zone.
On the 8th of January, Saddam prohibited the U.N. flights into
Baghdad and effectively neutralized our inspection process at the
time. He then began to do the same kind of operation and deploy
missiles out of garrison, SA-2s and SA-6s into the 36 no-fly zone up
north.
On the 10th, the violations had been several but this particular
violation came down in the Kuwait DMZ, violated the bunkers that
were in the area, and moved equipment, including Silkworm mis-
siles directly against U.N. sanctions.


49
And at that point, on the 13th we conducted our air strikes to
neutralize the air defense sector which was controlled from An
Najat down to Samawah, at Tallil and back to Al Amarah, basical-
ly, the air defense and control network Saddam has to run his air
defense system in the southern no-fly zone, as well as go after these
SA-3 missiles that were still operationally deployed.
Again, General Brandtner will have details on this.
SINCE 6 JAN DEMARCHE
7 JAN IRAQ REJECTS DEMARCHE
7 JAN SA-3S IN SOUTH REDEPLOY
8 JAN SA-2 IN SOUTH RETURNS
NORTH, FIGHTERS DISPERSE
8 JAN UN FLIGHTS PROHIBITED
9 JAN SA-2 /6a NORTH OF 36N DEPL
FROM GARRISON
9 JAN ARMOR DISPERSED IN NORTH
10 JAN UMM QASR BUNKER RAIDED
11 JAN SA-3 MOVE TO "AN NASARI
AND TALLIL
13 JAN ALLIED AIRSTRIKE
♦ AIR DEFENSE CENTERS
DEGRADED: AN NAJAF, 4
AMARAH, AS SAMAWAH,
• SA°-3 SITES DISPERSED AN
NASARIYAH. TALLIL, BASRAH

Following on from there, we then started to have a significant
increase in events to the north. We had British, French, and U.S.
aircraft, and all received instances of AAA fire. Fortunately, none
of the aircraft were hit. We also saw Saddam begin to deploy his
aircraft and violate in a rather routine way the 36 no-fly zone with
aircraft out of Qayyarah West. And then also we began to see him
move his SAM missiles into that area. As well, we had the viola-
tions of the zone.
And then on the 17th of January, we shot down one of the MiG-
29s north of the 36 no-fly zone. And on the 17th, we had the TLAM
strikes into Zaafaraniyah. Again, the details you will have.


50
14 JAN AAA FIRE AT FRENCH F-1
NORTH OF 36N
15 JAN AAA FIRE AT F-111
16 JAN POLICE POSTS IN DMZ NOT
MOVED BY DEADLINE
16 JAN MIOs VIOLATE 36N AND FIRE
F-16. UK JAGUARS TRKD BY
SA-6. AAA FIRE AT F-111
16 JAN RELIEF CONVOYS CONTINUE IN
NORTH (100 TRUCKS SINCE
13TH) v
17 JAN SA-6 TRACKS FRENCH F-1 AND
AAA FIRE AT F-16/F-111. HARM
FIRED AT SAM SITE
17 JAN THREE 36N VIOLATIONS. MlG-29
SHOT DOWN
17 JAN IRAQI INFILTRATORS CROSS
SOUTHERN BORDER
17 JAN TLAM STRIKE ON
ZAAFARANIYAH DESTROYS
FACILITY

32 u N
The next day we went back, also, and finished the last work in
the air defense zone, and completely destroyed it, and neutralized
it in the south, and went after the remaining SAM sites that are
located south of the 32 no-fly zone.
At that point, Saddam then began to respond. He removed the
border post which had been in violation since the 15th—the police
post along the border, turned over the oil fields. However, he did
continue a series of AAA instances that took place above the 36 no-
fly zone until about the 23rd of January. There have been in-
stances since the 23rd of January.


51
18 JAN TACAIR STRIKE SOUTH OF 32N
• AIR DEFENSE FUNCTIONALLY
DESTROYED AN NAJAF
. . AS SAMAWAH. TALLIL
• SA 3 SITES MOVED AN
NASARIYAH. BASRAH AREA
18 JAN IRAQ REMOVES BORDER POSTS.
KUWAIT TAKES OVER AR RITQA
OILFIELDS
18 JAN AAA FIRED AT UK JAGUAR.
HARM / CBU FIRED AT RADAR
10 JAN AAA FIRE AT F-16 IN NORTH.
HARM FIRED AT SA-6 RADAR
19 JAN RADAR REMOVED FROM TALLIL
SA-3 SITE IM
19 JAN MIOs VIOLATE 36N IN "SAM
TRAP"' AAA FIRE AT F-16 CBU
DROPPED ON SITE
20 JAN SADDAM LAKE SA-2 DEPARTS
BUT OTHER SAMs REMAIN
NORTH AND SOUTH
20 JAN IRAQ OFFERS CEASEFIRE. UN
FLIGHTS GIVEN UNCONDITIONAL
ACCESS
IMMUM
IRAQ SECURITY
SITUATION
KAMI / C*U 1t JAN

And really, since those strikes there has been a redispersal and
deployment of aircraft back to their original zones, and original
aircraft fields.
The situation as it exists today is two operational SA-3 sites in
the southern area. This entire air defense capability in the south
has been effectively destroyed. It is not functioning today. And we,
again, have no violations since the 23rd of January.


52
21 JAN FRENCH F-1 PAINTED WITH
RADAR. AAA FIRE OBSERVED.
F-4G FIRE HARM/CBU
21 JAN ACFT BEGIN RETURNING TO
HOMEBASE. SOME ARMOR UNITS
RETURN TO PREVIOUS
POSITIONS
22 JAN
22 JAN
22/23
JAN
23 JAN
, 23 JAN
ASH SHUAYABAH SA-3 SITE
REOCCUPIED
SA-3 RADAR NEAR MOSUL
PAINTS F-16/F-4G. HARM FIREO
ACFT CONTINUE RETURNING
TO HOMEBASE
AAA FIRE NEAR BASRAH. A-6
DROPS GBU
GROUND FORCES MOVING TO
NORMAL DEPLOYMENTS IN
NORTH AND SOUTH

This basically just lays down the situation. As of today, he is in
his 5th day of meetings, looking at his air defense system.
He is very dissatisfied with that. We still have a couple of SA-2s
deployed in the north; two SA-3s in the south, as well as SA-6s.
And, again, the meetings continue. And that is where I will turn it
over to General Brandtner for the operational considerations.


53

General Brandtner. I would first like to discuss the military op-
erations in Northern Iraq. As you know, we have two no-fly zones,
one north of the 32 and one north of 36. And one south of 32.


64
US MILITARY OPERATIONS IN IRAQ



The operation is called Provide Comfort II, and the mission is
shown on this slide.
The residual forces that we have there as of the current time are
shown on this slide.


56
OPERATION
PROVIDE COMFORT II
MISSION
- RESIDUAL FORCES SERVE AS A SYMBOL
OF COALITION RESOLVE AND AS A
DETERENT TO IRAQI MILITARY
ENCROACHMENT INTO THE SECURITY ZONE
IN NORTHERN IRAQ. MAINTAIN AIR
PRESENCE ABOVE THE 36N PARALLEL AS
PROVIDED BY THE DAILY ATO. BE
PREPARED TO CONDUCT AIR COMBAT
OPERATIONS OVER NORTHERN IRAQ AS
DIRECTED.
CTF PROVIDE COMFORT 201415Z JUL 91
(OPLAN)


57
OPERATION
PROVIDE COMFORT II
RESIDUAL FORCE (AS OF 26 JAN 93)
AIRCRAFT
32 US FIGHTERS
20 COALITION FIGHTER AIRCRAFT
23 SUPPORT
75 TOTAL
PERSONNEL
TOTAL PC 11-1970
TOTAL US- 1535
You will note that there is a significant participation in terms of
aircraft in the coalition, and also, of course, the nations that we are
operating with there have been very supportive.


58
PROVIDE COMFORT III
CURRENT OPERATIONS |
- MCC REPRESENTATIVES MEET WEEKLY
WITH SENIOR IRAQI MILITARY OFFICER FOR
REGION. ALSO MEETS ROUTINELY WITH
KURDISH OFFICIALS
- COALITION AIRCRAFT FLYING AN AVERAGE
OF 55 OPERATIONAL SORTIES PER DAY WITH
35 OVER NORTHERN IRAQ
- PATROLS OVER NORTHERN IRAQ TO
PROVIDE VISIBLE PRESENCE, MONITOR
POSITIONS OF IRAQI GROUND FORCES AND
ENFORCE NO-FLY-ZONE (NFZ)
- 1-2 TIMES EACH MONTH A LARGE PACKAGE
(30-40 AIRCRAFT) FLYS A COMBINED FORCE
MISSION (CFM) OVER NORTHERN IRAQ
The current operations that we are involved with and Provide
Comfort II involve the elements shown on this slide. It is a busy
operation that is in the air all the time. You can see we are flying
an average of 55 operational sorties per day, a large share of
them—generally about 35 or so—are always over Northern Iraq.
We also have on a 1 or 2-time a month basis what we call a com-
bined force mission, which is a large combined force package that
flies simulated strike missions for training purposes over selected
areas that are obviously there to make sure our presence is known.


59

Admiral Cramer had mentioned that there were a number of
events that occurred. I do not want to go through a laundry list,
but I would just throw these up there in your book, if you wanted
to just flip through them, and they give you some more detail
about the events that occurred.
Essentially, they were all as a result of some Iraqi action that
posed a threat to U.S. or coalition aircraft to which those aircraft
responded either by engaging with laser guided weapons, or actual-
ly strafing, or using a missile to take down an aircraft.
Chairman Nunn. General, have there been any actual missiles
fired at our aircraft, or has it all been AAA fire?
General Brandtner. I will let Mike take that one.
Admiral Cramer. There was actually an attempt on the 27th of
December. When the MiG-25 tried to shoot down one of our air-
craft, he actually fired a missile. The missile was ineffective. He
was out of range. But they clearly fired an air-to-air missile. I can
give you the details of that.
Chairman Nunn. Any ground missiles fired?
General Brandtner. Not that we have known. They have illumi-
nated height finding radar and things of that nature that acquire
the target. And when that occurs, it is immediately preempted. So,
we essentially take it out by the use of the HARM missile to de-
stroy the radar capability so the missile cannot be launched.
Admiral Cramer. They did, of course, fire ground missiles during
the Tomahawk strike on Baghdad.
Chairman Nunn. At our cruise missiles.
Admiral Cramer. What they thought was, that is right.


61
RECENT CONFRONTATIONS
IN NORTHERN IRAQ
19 JAN 93
- F-4G FIRES HARM AT SA-6 SITE 12 NM SE OF MOSUL
- F-16 REPORTED AAA FIRE 3 NM WEST OF SADDAM DAM
~ F-16 FIRED ON BY AAA SITE 10 NM NORTH OF MOSUL
-- 2 F-16 DROP 4 X CBU 87 ON AAA SITE AND OBSERVE
SECONDARY EXPLOSIONS.
20 JAN 93
NO REPORTED INCIDENTS

The summary of activity in Provide Comfort II is that we contin-
ue to operate in air operations over Northern Iraq.
PROVIDE COMFORT II
SUMMARY
- COALITION PARTNERS CONTINUE AIR
OPERATIONS OVER NORTHERN IRAQ
- NO IRAQI CHALLENGES TO OPERATIONS
SINCE 22 JAN 93
We have not had any challenges to our air operations there since
the 22nd of January.
66-547 - 93 - 3


62
RECENT CONFRONTATIONS
IN NORTHERN IRAQ
21 JAN 93
- FRENCH F-1 ON RECCE MISSION ESCORTED BY F-4G
AND F-16 ILLUMINATED BY HEIGHT FINDER RADAR 10
NM SOUTHWEST OF MOSUL AND RECEIVES AAA FIRE
FROM A SITE 2-3 NM NORTH OF MOSUL. F-4G FIRES
HARM MISSILES AND F-16 DROPS 2 X CBU-87 ON SITE.
DAMAGE REPORTED TO VANS AT THE SITE.
22 JAN 93
-- F-4G FIRES 2 X HARM MISSILES AT SA-3 SITE
LOCATED APPROXIMATELY HALFWAY BETWEEN
MOSUL AND ERBIL. AIRCRAFT CONFIRMED TARGET
TRACKING GUIDANCE FROM SA-3 AND THAT HE WAS
IN THREAT ENVELOPE.
I will move on to Southern Iraq. Operation Southern Watch,
which is a no-fly zone, which is established south of 32.
The mission is shown on this slide.

2.00 N
BASRA
SAUDI ARABIA
Kl


63
OPERATION
SOUTHERN WATCH
MISSION
- CONDUCT PRESENCE AND MILITARY
SURVEILLANCE OPERATIONS OVER IRAQI
TERRITORY SOUTH OF 32 DEGREES NORTH
LATITUDE TO MONITOR AND REPORT ON IRAQI
COMPLIANCE WITH UNSCR 688
In the current operations that are being conducted, we fly ap-
proximately 75 operational sorties per day with roughly 50 or 60 of
those over Southern Iraq. We also use both land and carrier-based
aircraft, and the types of aircraft are shown here.
We have surveillance by AW ACS. Combat air patrol. We fly elec-
tronic warfare and air defense suppression missions. And we also
conduct reconnaissance of Iraqi ground units. We do have partici-
pation by both the British and French, as well as the Saudis and
Kuwaitis, participating over their own territory.


66
COALITION AIRSTRIKES|
TARGETS
- TARGETS WERE SAM/COMMAND AND CONTROL
FACILITIES
- COMMAND BUNKERS
COMMUNICATION/DATA LINKS
- RADARS
- MOBILE MISSILE LAUNCHERS NOT TARGETS
- OBJECTIVE WAS TO DISABLE THE INTEGRATED
AIR DEFENSE SYSTEM SOUTH OF 32 DEGREES
The coalition air strike that occurred on the 13th of January had
a package of 112 aircraft, 80 of which were strike. Of that, 38 were
bomb-droppers, and also you had suppression of air defense. And
then 32 were support aircraft—tankers, AW ACS, and electronic
warfare—those kinds of aircraft.
We conducted the strike at night to minimize the air-to-air and
SAM threat, and we used the high-altitude weapon release to mini-
mize exposure to AAA. And to the maximum extent possible, we
utilized precision guided munitions.
We did not choose to use the TLAM for this particular set of mis-
sions because of the mobile systems and the command bunkers that
move about. We felt that the TLAM, in terms of—I know you are
familiar with the targeting procedures. It was more flexible to use
aircraft for this strike, and we did have participation by coalition
nations for the strike.


67
COALITION AIRSTRIKE
13 JAN 93
CONCEPT
-112 AIRCRAFT PACKAGE; 80 STRIKE (38 BOMB DROPPERS), 32
SUPPORT
- NIGHT STRIKE TO MINIMIZE AIR TO AIR AND SAM THREAT
- HIGH ALTITUDE WEAPONS RELEASE TO MINIMIZE EXPOSURE TO
AAA
- UTILIZED PRECISION GUIDED MUNITIONS (PGM) TO MAXIMUM
EXTENT
- TLAM NOT SUITABLE FOR TARGET TYPES. (MOBILE SYSTEMS,
COMMAND BUNKERS)
- COALITION (BRITISH AND FRENCH) AIRCRAFT PARTICIPATION
The strike sequence is shown here. We established our airborne
warning and control system and the Rivet Joint, which is electron-
ic warfare aircraft, to establish tracks along the border to build the
air defense picture, and to give information to the attacking air-
craft on exactly what the threat was, what radars were operating,
and what the state of affairs was at each of the target areas.
We established tanker orbits, the fuel combat air patrol guarding
the tankers, suppression of enemy air defense, and strike aircraft
mission profiles, and also a combat air patrol barrier established
along the 32 line to prevent any aircraft that should go airborne
from the Iraqis from pursuing U.S. and coalition forces as they re-
turned from the mission.
We did a sequential hit of the targets. The whole strike took ap-
proximately 15 to 20 minutes. It was a staggered type of hit based
on the type of target, the type of munitions being dropped, and it
was in order to manage the flow of aircraft into the target area.
We viewed that mission as highly successful, and we would be
prepared to discuss detailed battle damage assessment, but we
would ask that we do that in a closed session.
The TLAM strike that occurred on the 17th of January was tar-
geted against the Zaafaraniyah nuclear fabrication facility. We
fired a total of 45 TLAM missiles which were launched from sur-
face platforms in both the Persian Gulf and the Red Sea. We had
37 missiles that we can account for hitting the targets, and as
noted on the slide we had one missile booster that failed and went
into the sea that was destroyed.
We had six that were near-misses inside the target area or just
adjacent to it in an orchard, which did not cause any collateral


69
TLAM STRIKE
17 JAN 93
- TARGET - ZAAFARANIYAH NUCLEAR FABRICATION
FACILITY
- 45 MISSILES FIRED = 37 MISSILES HIT AIMPOINTS
- 1 MISSILE BOOSTER FAILED
- 3 CRATERS INSIDE FACILITY
- 3 CRATERS IN ORCHARD
- 1 ASSUMED SHOT DOWN NEAR RASHEED HOTEL
- ALL TARGETED BUILDINGS DAMAGED
The coalition air strike on the 18th of January was a follow up
strike to hit targets that were not completely destroyed during the
13 January strike, and also some other sites that had emerged in
the intervening period.
We decided to go with a day strike to assist the target acquisi-
tion. We used, again, high altitude weapons released to minimize
exposure to AAA, and again utilized precision guided munitions to
the maximum extent possible.
The sequence and the flow of the strike, and the target packag-
ing, and the method of entry and egress from the area were the
same as the strike conducted on the 13th of January.


70
COALITION AIRSTRIKE
13 JAN 93
STRIKE SEQUENCE
- AWACS AND RIVET JOINT ESTABLISH TRACKS ALONG
BORDER TO BUILD AIR DEFENSE PICTURE
- TANKERS ESTABLISH ORBITS AND FUEL CAP, SEAD AND
STRIKE AIRCRAFT
- FIGHTER CAP ESTABLISH BARRIER ALONG 32 DEGREE
LINE
- SEAD AND STRIKE AIRCRAFT SEQUENTIALLY HIT TARGETS
- STRIKE AND SEAD AIRCRAFT EGRESS PROTECTED BY CAP
- CAP EGRESS
We also are prepared to discuss that in more detail, but the
bottom line was that was a very successful strike, very, very dam-
aging to the air defense system.
COALITION AIRSTRIKE
18 JAN 93
- FOLLOW-UP STRIKE TO HIT AIMPOINTS NOT
DESTROYED DURING 13 JAN STRIKE
- DAY STRIKE TO ASSIST IN TARGET ACQUISITION
- HIGH ALTITUDE WEAPONS RELEASE TO MINIMIZE
EXPOSURE TO AAA
- UTILIZED PGM TO MAXIMUM EXTENT POSSIBLE
- SAME STRIKE SEQUENCE AS 13 JAN
The summary of our activities in Southern Watch is shown on
this slide. We continue today to conduct air operations in support
of U.N. Security Council Resolution 688. We do have sufficient air


72

The Bosnian crisis itself—if you look at the graphic at the right,
I know you saw this yesterday, is the ethnic breakdown of which
groups live where. You can see the genesis of the entire crisis in
Bosnia.



BOSNIAN
I2ETBEG0VIC PUSHES
FdR INDEPENDENCE
DESPITE ETHNIC
DIVERSITY
STATUS QUO MEANS
SERB DOMINATION
EC RECOGNITION OF
SLOVENIA AND CROATIA
*UN PEACEKEEPfNG PLAN
IN CROATIA
REFERENDUM APPROVES
INDEPENDENCE
28 FEB-1 MAR 92
INDEPENDENCE DECLARED
3 MAR 92
MUSLIMS (41%)
SERBS
CR&AT8 (If*)
MIXED
Moving on to the next graphic, we can see fighting erupted last
March. That portion which you see in the pink color is essentially
what the Serbs control today. Those in white are controlled by the
Croats and the Muslims, although there is some variation to that
as well.


I
74
rPrf CR
SFIGHTING ERUPTS
MARCH 92
• JNA IN B-H
BECOMES BSA
•BSA SEIZES 70%
OF COUNTRY
•TENUOUS MUSLIM/
CROAT ALLIANCE
RESISTS
•HUMANITARIAN
CRISIS DEVELOPS
•UNPROFOR TROOPS
DEPLOY
REMAINING VOfltflUV
ARMY TRdoinf* (£fl*|
BECOME BOSNIAN ItfTI AflMf

NON-tfAtf,S ruddfiUV
AflMf TKCOT. WlTHo*-* M
1

SBBH (SERB REPUBLIC
OF BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA
•UNSC DECLARES NO-FLY ZONE
*' 1
■
The next graphic is a more specific breakdown of what is actual-
ly under Serbian control today. That which is in yellow is Croat
and Muslim control.

B lint CONTiOUlO ARIAS
■ CROAT / MUIUM CONTROL
«HJlO


75
The next graphic just shows the lay down of force levels in
Bosnia depicting pretty well who has what, and what arms they
control.
The next graphic is a summary.
Chairman Nunn. Let us look at that a little bit more.
Admiral Cramer. The Bosnian Serb Army, of course, was created
from the residue of the Yugoslavian Army, which had served in
Bosnia at the time. Some 70 to 80 percent of the equipment which
the Bosnian Army—the Bosnian Serb Army had received, of
course, was left over from the Yugoslavian National Army.
Chairman Nunn. Correct me if I am wrong on that chart, but it
appears to me that primarily the disadvantage the Muslim defense
forces have and the Croat defense forces, is the lack of any kind of
mortar or tanks, or the heaver equipment, longer range equipment.
Is that right?
Admiral Cramer. That is essentially correct, Senator. That is
certainly correct in the case of the Muslim forces. The Croats do
have some limited artillery capability, limited tank capability. But
the Muslim forces are by and large left to what they overrun and
what they are able to obtain on the battlefield in terms of residue.
But you are absolutely correct, in terms of the overall balance of
heavy artillery and tanks, certainly it falls dominantly in the Ser-
bian and Bosnian-Serbian area.
i-'DilCS L'i'IZL'6 hi ,>-s.
a JUJJ1A
ATED F
CO TRO
APCt, I
MORTARS

BOSNIAN SERB IRREGU
± §0,000 MEN
SMALL ARMS, MORTARS
PREDOMINANTLY RESP0NS
FOR ETHNIC CLSANSINS
IRRee.LARS
MAINLT SMALL ARMS, LIMITED
NUMBERS OF HSAVY EQUIPMENT
BOSNIAN CROAT FORCES
10,00* - 29,000 TROOPS
MAINLY SMALL ARMS, SOME
TANKS / ARTY
CROATIAN DEFEN8E FORCES
UP TO 18,000 TROOPS IN l-H
LESS THAN SO TANKS AND 100
arty pieces IN S-H

Moving on to the next graphic, which is a lay down in terms of
what we have seen in terms of no fly activity and no fly zone activ-
ity.
One, the no fly enforcement was placed around the middle of De-
cember. We have seen a significant fall off to that time.


76
You have really got to go back until the 10th of October to find a
verifiable, conflrmable example of where the Bosnian Serb Air
Force used fixed wing aircraft in air to ground attack. There clear-
ly have been violations, and the U.N. has laid these out very care-
fully—of helicopters and so on that have flown. But if you really
want to go to the Banja Luka area and look at the Oraos and the
Astra Galebs that have been used fairly extensively over the
summer and somewhat effectively in air to ground attack. This has
not occurred since the middle of October.
Chairman Nunn. In other words, even if the coalition were to
completely enforce the no fly zone with no planes flying, you are
saying, as I understand what you are saying, it would not make an
appreciable military difference?
Admiral Cramer. Yes, sir, that is correct. That is what I am
saying.
Senator Levin. Are you saying it would have no military effect?
Admiral Cramer. I did not say "no." I would use the chairman's
word, no appreciable effect.
Senator, you are absolutely right, that there are logistics flights,
some quasi-humanitarian flights, probably some command and con-
trol work that is going on there, not only, by the way, with Bosnia
and Serbian Helos, but also Croat Helos across the area. But I es-
sentially agree with the chairman.
Chairman Nunn. Am I reading that last bullet right up there,
where it says, now most violations are resupply flights to Croatian
to Muslims?
Admiral Cramer. Yes. In terms of specific numbers. Also, I want
to caveat these, sir. And I need to do so carefully. Our ability to
monitor all these flights is not absolute. It depends on when NATO
AW ACS is in there and other sources that we use. So there certain-
ly could be a few flights, but the number is a few more than what
you see here in terms of flights.
But overall, the majority of flights are of a logistic nature and
that last bullet applies.
Chairman Nunn. Based on what you are saying right here then,
if we were to decide tomorrow morning to enforce the no fly zone
and if the patterns—I guess this is the last, what, 60 days
Admiral Cramer. Yes, sir, that is correct, the last 90 days.
Chairman Nunn. If we look at the last 60 days, if we shot down
every aircraft that flew, you are saying we would be shooting down
more Croatian aircraft than we would Serbian?
Admiral Cramer. Perhaps that would be the case. I would have
to say perhaps, because the most recent activity over the last
couple of days, 3 or 4 days, we have had some Bosnian-Serbian helo
activity, particularly related to what is going on in sector one,
sector south, I should say.
But if you want a specific answer, I would take it for the record
that
Chairman Nunn. Would you get it for the record?
Admiral Cramer. I will.
Chairman Nunn. As best you can tell.
[The information follows:]


78
And that is why you are seeing all the fighting going on in the
southern sector over the last 2 or 3 days. And you saw the dam
problem and all of that.
What is crucial to them is strategically linked Croatia itself and
the Croatian Dalmatian coast to the south. So what we are seeing
right now in the last couple of days is very important strategic
fighting from the Croatian standpoint.
As far as the Muslims are concerned, they by and large are being
concentrated down into this yellow zone that you see in the middle
and even really concentrated more than that into enclaves and
places like Sarajevo, Tuzla, Gradacac, et cetera and in a small
group up in Behash. The Moslims by far are the largest losers in
terms of net gain of territory in this conflict so far.

Turning to the last graphic, which is the offensive that we have
really seen within the last 3 or 4 days and what is going on there.
The Croats particularly in the Maslenica Bridge area, again, have,
it appears, been frustrated by—particularly in these pink zones—
the lack and the inability of the U.N. to make progress in turning
these areas over to the Croats for Croatian control. Now it seems
they have taken matters into their own hands.
President Tudjman has said such. And they are now mounting
an offensive that would allow them to link, again, central Croatia
with Croatian Dalmatian coast south and of course, the Serbs, par-
ticularly the Krajinan Serbs, are just as determined to ensure that
that does not happen.
If, in fact—and this is a big if—if the strategic situation here,
particularly in the Krajina area, really turns and takes its worst
form, we would be back essentially to where we were before the


80
US MILITARY OPERATIONS
- THREE MAJOR CATEGORIES
- HUMANITARIAN AID
- UN OPERATIONS SUPPORT
- US UNILATERAL OPERATIONS
The map graphic here gives a lay down of the locations in broad
sense of these activities and some numbers associated with them.
And I will talk in more detail to each of those.
The humanitarian aid situation is that prior to the operation
Provide Promise, the United States had provided the amount of
equipment and supplies through the means shown here, essentially
a fairly conservative effort. Nonetheless, it did provide a lot of food
and equipment, blankets and medical supplies to the area.
And we also had a number of sea containers that were trucked
in to assist, as you can see, a very large amount of food.
Humanitarian aid that has continued is that we support the
U.N. lead on humanitarian relief. We began Operation Provide
Promise on the 3rd of July 1992 and currently we have a three-
person liaison team that is attached to the UNHCR headquarters
in Geneva, which is under EUCOM control and is supporting there.
And coordinates the U.S. airlift and the supply.
We have five C-130 aircraft that are dedicated to delivering aid
along with our other allies. And the average schedule is eight U.S.
and some 14 allied sorties per day, which as you know, has been
interrupted from time to time by events and weather and so on.
The number of flights shown on the slide represent what have
you accomplished to date and the amount of supplies that have
been lifted by U.S. forces.


81
US MILITARY OPERATIONS
IN THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA
- PRIOR TO OPERATION PROVIDE PROMISE THE US PROVIDED:
-- 5 X C-141 SORTIES TO SARAJEVO (18-19 APR 92)
— 90,000 MEALS READY TO EAT (MRE), 18,000
BLANKETS, $250,000 MEDICAL SUPPLIES
-- 2 X C-141 SORTIES TO GRAZ, AU (15 JUN 92)
— $3.5 MILLION MEDICAL SUPPLIES (SUPPLIES
SUBSEQUENTLY MOVED VIA LAND TO YUGOSLAVIA)
- 155 X SEA CONTAINERS (29 JUN 92) TRUCKED FROM
ROTTERDAM AND PISA TO ZAGREB
— 3.2 MILLION MREs
L, Ljubljana \

HUMANITARIAN AID|


82
HUMANITARIAN AID
(PROVIDE PROMISE)
- US IS SUPPORTING UN LEAD ON HUMANITARIAN RELIEF
- OPERATION PROVIDE PROMISE BEGAN 3 JUL 92
- 3 PERSON LIAISON TEAM TO UNHCR, GENEVA
— COORDINATES US LIFT AND SUPPLIES
- AIRLIFT OF HUMANITARIAN SUPPLIES TO SARAJEVO
— 5 X C-141 AIRCRAFT DELIVER AID WITH OTHER
ALLIES
— AVERAGE SCHEDULE IS 8 US/14 ALLIED SORTIES
PER DAY
— 639 US FLIGHTS TO DATE -1,781 ALLIED FLIGHTS
— 7137.3 SHORT TONS OF GOODS DELIVERED BY US
In addition to that shown, we also have a 10 person mobile aerial
port squadron, essentially cargo handlers and logisticians who are
in support of the operation at Zagreb. They are under EUCOM con-
trol and working in support of the U.N. high commissioner for ref-
ugees. They are not what we call blue helmeted troops.
There is also a 16 person staff augmenting to the UNHCR in
Zagreb, Belgrade, and Metkovic and they are there to provide tech-
nical assistance. Again, they are under the operational command of
EUCOM, working in support of the UNHCR as technical advisors.
And they are not under blue helmet aegis, if you will.
We do, however, have by arrangement with the United Nations,
the appropriate diplomatic protection. We also have two officers
that are attached to an air operations cell at Zagreb who are under
the command of EUCOM. And they assist in providing real time
monitoring of air lift support to Sarajevo.


85
UN OPERATIONS SUPPORT)
- UNPROFOR MISSION SUPPORT
- 60 BED FIELD HOSPITAL (343 PERSONS), ZAGREB
- 7 PERSONNEL TO AUGMENT UNPROFOR B-H HEADQUARTERS,
KISELJAK
- PROVIDE STAFF SUPPORT TO UNPROFOR B-H WHOSE
MISSION IS ESCORT SECURITY TO UN CONVOYS
Admiral Cramer. This is basically a lay down of the Yugoslav
Army versus the Croatian National Army. It is clear that Yugo-
slavia, at least in terms of numerical strength and many other
ways, is a far superior force. However, you have got to put that in
context a little bit.
They also have far broader missions than does Croatia, and look-
ing at the situation in Kovoso, Macedonia, Montenegro and within
Bosnia itself, if the two forces were lined up side by side, you would
have to anticipate the Yugoslavian National Army would win. But
I am not sure that would ever be the case in the field.
So whether it has a decisive capability against the Croatian
Army remains to be seen.
Senator Warner. Mr. Chairman, would you yield? Is there a pre-
cise definition as to what is the Yugoslavian National Army? Be-
cause the warlords have a lot of troops, the volunteers that have
come over to the Yugoslav
Admiral Cramer. Yes, when we talk about the Yugoslavian Na-
tional Army, we are really talking about those forces that are in
current Serbia, Belgrade, outside of Bosnia. I am not including—in
none of these forces do you see
Senator Warner. Correct.
Admiral Cramer. So the warlords or the irregulars, the Bosnian
Serb Army and so on that I referred to are exclusive from the
forces that you see here.
Senator Warner. And what sort of approximation of size?


87
Obviously, it would be preferable to use sealift and surface routes
of transportation to enhance the movement of large amounts of
cargo. We have used some sealift, but largely the U.S. aspect of it
has been air.
Chairman Nunn. Are we not flying a lot of the aircraft, some of
the aircraft at least, for some of the relief into Belgrade?
General Brandtner. Yes, we are. And there is some surface
movement there. As I mentioned, we would obviously prefer to do
this relief operation with mostly surface means.
Chairman Nunn. It just looks like to me on this map—maybe I
am not looking at it right—that from the port that we are using,
Ploce, the port to Sarajevo is really much closer than the route you
have to take from the airport, from Belgrade.
General Brandtner. The problem is both security and condition
of the road network. You are driving through any number of differ-
ent factional types of areas of responsibility, if you will. And trying
to get through there is an extremely difficult problem. If it can be
done at all, it has been not successful and they are subject to essen-
tially varying degrees of intimidation along the way, to include
armed conflict.
In addition, the road itself—and Admiral Cramer can give you
some more details of that—is essentially in many cases impassible
in bad weather.
Chairman Nunn. Okay, let me go on to the next question. I
would like to get into that later, but what, General Brandtner, do
you think would be the situation if the U.N. lifted its embargo and
supplied arms to the Bosnian Muslims, which a number of people
have advocated, including me for instance.
But what do you think would be the military result of that?
General Brandtner. I think it would be continued chaos, sir,
with all due respect. You open it up to providing more arms for
other factions, I think you would discover that the effect would be
that each of the sides would continue to acquire illicit and legalized
support. I think it would just be contributing to the violence and
would have no salutary effect.
Chairman Nunn. Well, the Muslims, though, are so outgunned
and so outnumbered and they have lost all their territory, clearly
the territorial gains have gone to those who had the guns.
General Brandtner. But I do not think the solution is to open
the embargo and just let them have access to more of that. I think
there is probably a political solution that has to be applied here to
try to reduce the violence, rather than giving them increased capa-
bility to up the violence.
Chairman Nunn. Okay, we talked a great deal about a stable
Persian Gulf area during the Persian Gulf war and we talked
about it right after it.
We talked about having some kind of gulf council of defense
forces with Egypt participating. It seemed to me that that was
very, very important to get that done. But what it appears—correct
me if I am wrong—it appears to me that right now what has hap-
pened in the last year, year and a half, is that the gulf countries
and Egypt have not done much in terms of getting together. There
is really no strong gulf defense force, so the countries in that
region are basically saying to the United States implicitly, well, we


88
like you protecting us; and we are going to let you protect us from
now on.
Let us just say Kuwait right now, could Kuwait protect itself,
even from what is left of the Iraqi forces without the United States
coming back in? Would Kuwait and the other Gulf States be able
to put up a defense even against the remnants of what is left from
Iraq without us?
General Brandtner. My own personal judgment is that if Iraq
mounted an attack with the residual forces it has, which I will tell
you I believe we would have very ample indications and warning of
such an attempt. But let us say it were to occur without U.S. forces
on the scene.
Chairman Nunn. Let us say without the United States helping
at all.
General Brandtner. I think that Kuwait would be in dire
straits. I do not think they could.
Chairman Nunn. Well, we are then taking on a permanent pro-
tecting role, it seems to me, unless we, on the other hand, start
doing something to tell the Gulf States, which have plenty of
money and Egypt, which has plenty of manpower, that you had
better get your own act together. That we are not going to be here
for the next 50 years.
I mean, I have seen this before and I think as long as we act like
we are going to protect Kuwait forever and those other countries
out there, they will not do much in terms of getting together for
collective defense.
We started off saying that was our goal. I guess my question is,
what has happened to that goal? What are they doing? Are they
working with Egypt? Are they developing any kind of defensive re-
sources of their own?
General Brandtner. I think, first of all, that question would be
better answered by the unified commander, who is involved in a
day-to-day basis working with those countries to build those capa-
bilities. And I think that he could give you a much better answer
than I.
I will say that I know that a large effort is ongoing by him and
the State Department to attempt to try together, to enhance the
ability of these nations to function militarily. We are working with
them to deployments for training. And, as you know, we are selling
arms and equipment to upgrade their armed forces. And there are
exercises and all kinds of assistance in terms of training being of-
fered to them on a continuing basis throughout that region.
Chairman Nunn. Thank you. I will pursue that with others,
General. I appreciate your answer.
I would just say this and then I will yield. Unless Egypt is tied
into it, there is no way in the world those small countries are ever
going to have a collective defense that is going to be able to protect
them against Iraq or Iran.
What I hate to see us do inadvertently, just sliding into a perma-
nent, looks like dependency, by those countries on the U.S. forces.
And what I really worry about, down the line, is how they are
going to protect themselves from indigenous forces that are not
coming across the border, but may be guerrilla forces from within
at some point. That would propose a much more difficult situation


89
for us because it would not be an invasion, like we saw from Iraq,
but rather more of a guerrilla warfare.
That is not all your responsibility, General; I think somebody
better start thinking about that.
Senator Exon. I do not think that he answered fully your ques-
tion. The question, I believe, was: Could the Iraqi forces overrun
Kuwait?
I believe you also included Saudi Arabia in that.
Could they also, without intervention of American or other
forces, continue and overrun Saudi Arabia, which is what got us
into the Gulf war in the first instance?
General Brandtner. I honestly do not know whether he would
have the capability to sustain operations, militarily. I would defer
to my colleague, the intelligence officer, to give you a better assess-
ment.
My own judgment is that that would be extremely difficult for
him to do. And I would also submit that based on what he has rem-
nant now, that any long-term effort which would be very, very de-
manding both on his logistics and sustainment, his ability to com-
mand and control it, I think would be not very effective. I would be
speaking more in terms of a foray, an incursion, that might strike
and do damage, a raiding kind of thing. But I doubt seriously, in
my own judgment, that he could sustain that.
Senator Exon. Was that not part of your question?
Chairman Nunn. Yes.
Admiral Cramer. I certainly would go along with what General
Brandtner says. For example, the Iraqis, right now, have only got
eight divisions south of 32 degrees north. They only have five divi-
sions north of 36 degrees.
And, to be honest with you, they are very concerned—more con-
cerned, frankly, about the Kurds, the Shia problem and, most im-
portantly, the security of the Baath Party around Bagdad, and the
regime's continuity, than to push these divisions out in any aggres-
sive way against either Saudi Arabia or Kuwait.
I just do not see it on the horizon. You could come up with a hy-
pothetical, a theoretical, a few months or years downstream, if the
situation changes, that they might be in a different category than
they are right now. But I will guarantee you, at least in the north
and the south, the vast majority of their military capability is di-
rected against the security problems just mentioned rather than
direct it at any external threat.
Also important to note, although we did see some infiltration ex-
amples, three Iraqi soldiers into Kuwait here recently, throughout
all of this evolution and confrontation that we have just had with
Iraq, in no time, in no case was there any generation of force
which indicated movement external to Iraq.
So, yes, it is possible. But it is more likely they would do it in
other ways, terrorist ways, those kinds of ways, than any overt
military action, given their current military capability.
Chairman Nunn. My time has expired, but at some other point I
will pursue the Iranian threat, which is something I think we are
not looking at very carefully now.
My point was not in any way implying that we were about to
have another invasion from Iraq but, rather, that the time now


90
being given Kuwait and those other Gulf countries should be taken
advantage of in building up their own capability to defend them-
selves over a period of time, or at least to put up enough defense so
we would be able to get our forces over there in time to help.
Senator Thurmond.
Senator Thurmond. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Brandtner, what role do Serbian heavy artillery and
tanks have in the Bosnian conflict, and how difficult would it be to
neutralize these weapons?
General Brandtner. Well, first of all, right now, the role they
have is essentially harassment. They are applying artillery, and
the tanks are there more as a presence. There have not been any
major tank battles. They are there as intimidation. They can be
used in roadblocks and other kinds of things.
The artillery is being fired, essentially, in my own personal judg-
ment, in an indiscriminate way, as a weapon of terror. It is not
being applied as a military support mechanism to sustain oper-
ations.
So that is my view of how they are being employed by the Serbs.
The targeting of weapons like this in the environment and the
terrain that we are seeing there, the circumstances are very, very
difficult. They are highly mobile. In order to conduct effective air
strikes on targets of this nature, you need to have forward air con-
trollers on the ground that can target these through the use of pre-
cise coordinates offered up, based on weapons activity, the use of
laser-type of acquisition means, and so on.
In an environment where you would go in and conduct an air
strike against this target, your margin of success is vastly reduced
from the kind of environment you saw in the Gulf, for example,
where targets were exposed and open, such as recently in southern
Iraq.
Senator Thurmond. Admiral Cramer, in view of the Vance-Owen
peace talks in Geneva, what do the Croatians hope to achieve with
that current offensive?
Admiral Cramer. Sir, I think as I alluded to in my remarks, on
the one hand, there seems to be real frustration on the part of the
Croatian leadership with the inability of the U.N. to make good on
the pink zone turn over that we had talked about, particularly
around the southern sector.
I think it is rather clear what they are trying to do is, again, re-
establish the strategic link from northern Croatian to the Dalma-
tian Coast, and that is exactly what this fighting is all about.
Senator Thurmond. General Brandtner, in view of the situation
now in Iraq, if you had the power of decision, what would you do
from the best interests of the United States?
General Brandtner. Well, I think the idea of building up the ca-
pability of the regional forces of the nations there and the support
of the large Arab capabilities of Egypt and others, we would contin-
ue the efforts we have now to strengthen that coalition of forces to
prevent Saddam Hussein from beginning to believe he could recon-
stitute and have an impact.
I think we are meeting with success, and it is a long process. The
countries involved clearly have a mutual interest in doing this.


91
I would also begin to gradually withdraw our presence there in
staged bases—and this again is hypothetical—that we would allow
this transition to occur. I think it is important for our own national
interest that we retain a capability to defend those interests over
there in a form that is appropriate to the situation.
Senator Thurmond. General Brandtner, is there any question in
your mind that Saddam Hussein will continue as a dictator as long
as he can and, in view of that, is there any further steps that
should be taken by the United Nations at this time?
General Brandtner. Well, I think that Saddam Hussein is going
to attempt to remain in power to the best of his ability as long as
he has the capability to do that. And I would submit that the
United Nations should continue to put the sanctions into effect, to
attempt to make him conform and to comply with those resolutions
that have been put into effect, and that that effort should continue.
Senator Thurmond. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Exon [presiding]. Senator, thank you very much.
I would ask a series of questions, and I will leave it to each one
of you as to who you think would best answer, to try to move
things along.
First, I would like to back up to a matter that has been put on
the back burner now, and that is the repeated and frequent reports
that we hear about our soldiers that were involved in the Desert
Storm war, several or many have come back with some kind of a
disorder, evidently based on a nerve disorder of some kind that has
mystified the medical profession.
There has been some speculation that possibly they were affected
in some way with some kind of chemical warfare that maybe was
not used directly at them, but maybe partially destroyed by the air
strikes that we made, and filtered down. Do either of you have any
information at all as to that mystery that seems to be still con-
founding us?
General Brandtner. I will answer, and then I will let the admi-
ral also.
I have no information whatsoever to indicate the nature of the
illnesses that are being suffered. I can say that there was never
any report of any type of incident with respect to chemical muni-
tions being employed by the enemy.
There was one spurious report which you may have read in the
newspaper, where one commander believed that he was under a
chemical attack. That was later determined to be not true. It was
based on circular reporting that had come around, and he was ac-
tually reading a message, I believe.
The other thing I would say is that, given the circumstances, the
fact that we did not have evidence of any chemical weapons being
employed, the chances of a chance encounter with them—we did
not until well after the war discover caches of munitions that had
chemical capability, in every case that I am aware of, and I am
aware of virtually every one I believe, these were stored in a situa-
tion where they were not leaking or contaminating the area.
Senator Exon. Okay. I understand all that. To conserve time,
you have heard the reports that I have heard about these soldiers
being ill-affected, have you not?


92
General Brandtner. I have heard reports that there are soldiers
who are ill or suffering from some malady which they do not know
the cause of.
Senator Exon. You do not know anything about that?
Admiral Cramer. Sir, I have read the same reports. I have the
same concern you do. I have nothing to substantiate it.
Senator Exon. All right. Let us move back to the situation in
Bosnia.
We heard reports which clearly indicate what most of us have
felt, that while at the present time we are not even enforcing the
no-fly zone, if we would enforce that it might help some. If we
would make selective air strikes it has been pretty well established
this morning from your testimony that that is not likely to have
any quick effect, at least, on bringing the hostilities to an end.
We certainly should keep, in my view, the embargo in place.
That may be helping the cause some now. The administration is re-
portedly studying this very intently at the present time, and are
not planning any action in the near term, as I understand it.
But let me ask you. You must have done some assessment. What
would happen if we would decide, and if the United Nations would
decide to commit ground troops, how many ground troops would it
take, and over what extended period, regardless of where the
troops came from, a combination or otherwise, what would be the
force necessary to really do anything as to bring order over there?
And if so, how long would it take?
General Brandtner. Well, first of all, I know that there has
been testimony before this committee before in similar terms. But
let me just say that this is so mission-dependent because there are
so many ways that you could apply ground forces there, providing
convoy security, conducting security of cantonment areas or vil-
lages that would set up as feeding sites, much along the lines that
we do in Somalia.
Are you going to essentially reduce the Serbs' capability to wage
war?
So, it is problematic as to how many you would say, and it varies,
depending on those terms.
I know you have heard numbers of up to half a million and nu-
merous corps size activities. I would submit to you, in the general
sense, that no matter what you do on the ground in this location,
you are going to have a requirement for a force that is going to
have to be able to fight. Because I doubt seriously if this is going to
be done in a benign environment.
We know from experience, and I know you have been told this
before by other witnesses, the experiences of the German Army
during World War II and others attempting to maintain control of
this area. And those forces were, by the way, some of their very
best armed forces that were dedicated to that job.
I would submit that you here have to have a clear objective in
mind before you do that, that the cost would be very heavy, that it
would be very long-term, and that you probably, without a specific,
very focused objective that you had in mind with what you were
trying to achieve and when it was accomplished, this would be an
enormous pool that would drain resources. And I just do not be-
lieve this is an effective way.


94
Mr. Chairman, I want to say that some weeks ago Senator Levin
and I asked Chairman Nunn for this hearing. And it has developed
the testimony'that I hoped it would develop. And I wish to thank
the Chair and others for making it possible.
I am going to say a few words here, and I am going to preface it,
in fairness to you, by saying that for months now I have advocated
and I have been on the side of those advocating great caution as we
get further and further into the temptation for U.S. involvement in
the former State of Yugoslavia. I have spoken on the floor of the
Senate many times about it, and today, we have gotten the infor-
mation that is useful to those of us who continue to believe that
this caution should be exercised. We can use this testimony as fur-
ther debates take place.
Here is what concerns me.
This is an advertisement that appeared in the paper here in
Washington on January 27. It is an open letter to President Clin-
ton and the U.S. Congress:
Stop genocide in Bosnia. We are now witnessing in Bosnia a
replay of one of the darkest eras of modern history, the invasion of
one sovereign nation by another. It is the attempted genocide of
people who have lived in peace and tolerance with their neighbors
for centuries. The scale of atrocities and appalling human suffering
tell the story.
And it goes on.
We all agree with that. This, and I presume it is accurate, there
are three Presidents who have allowed their names to be used:
Ford, Reagan and Nixon.
There are three Secretaries of Defense, Democrat and Republi-
cans. A totally bipartisan group of persons, and many of whom
that I and other members of this committee have known for years.
And they have held responsible positions in our government.
And after a description of these violent crimes, and no one dis-
putes the violence and the inhumanities going on, it concludes by
saying: Join certain international organizations and international
leaders in coalition for international security in calling for a mean-
ingful peace.
Now, my concern is that the readers of this are very concerned—
and they should be—the people in this country. And I think to
themselves, well, we are succeeding in Somalia. We succeeded in
the Gulf operation. Let us do the same thing in Yugoslavia.
But you have given the testimony today to point out the differ-
ences between the situation in the former State of Yugoslavia and
those two immediately past military operations. I am hopeful other
leaders in our country will be cautious as they go out and call on
President Clinton, to take action, and stop to read and understand
what you, the experts, are telling us. Because I think there is the
danger of raising the hopes of the American people that we can
stop this genocide in some manner.
Now, yesterday we had testimony, General, in closed session, but
that part relating to the World War II experiences was spelled out.
Not only were there 700,000 casualties in connection with the
German forces occupying this region, but at the very time that
World War II was raging throughout Europe, these same peoples,
the Croatians and the Serbians, were conducting their own civil


95
war. Upwards of a million casualties were experienced in that civil
war going on at the same time there was a major conflict in
Europe.
My own research on this indicates that, for reasons which—and I
will ask our senior intelligence person here, Admiral Cramer—but
these people have fought each other for not hundreds of years, but
thousands of years for religious, ethnic, cultural differences.
You mentioned the indiscriminate use of artillery by the Serbs in
Sarajevo. I took it upon myself, and others have done this, to go to
Sarajevo and actually witness this indiscriminate firing. And I
have had some modest experience in military matters myself. But
there is no targeting. They just fling the shells about—both sides,
as far as I know—not knowing where they would land or the
damage that would be inflicted.
So that is why I am so concerned about injecting into this situa-
tion American men and women of our Armed Forces. Indeed, many
of the persons who allowed their names to be used here have said,
"Oh, well, no U.S. ground forces." No U.S. ground forces. Let some-
body else do the heavy lifting if the decision is decided along the
lines of the question of Senator Exon about the need to go in for
ground operations.
And we have also gotten today the evidence, that the enforce-
ment of the no-fly zone will be some sort of quick solution. I think
it is clear from your testimony that the use of both fixed wing and
rotary air is very small, in terms of the relationship to military op-
erations. And even if you were to suppress it all, it would have a de
minimus effect on the military operations over there.
You have been very candid in your views about lifting the em-
bargo which would allow arms to freely flow to the Bosnians. That
has a lot of appeal. On the floor of the Senate we have had some
fierce debates on that very subject.
As a matter of fact, there is one action by the Senate, which I
opposed, authorizing up to $50 million to buy arms, approved by
the U.S. Senate, to buy arms to help the Bosnians.
You have made it very clear today in your professional opinions
that would just exacerbate the situation and result in more killing.
Furthermore, given the terrain of this country, which is highly
mountainous, and the severity of the weather, the fighting condi-
tions both for those in uniform doing the fighting and the civilians
in proximity to the fighting, again, you are looking at serious
number of casualties, both with the civilians that are there and the
military forces fighting.
So my question to you, Admiral: As we continuously search in
our own minds why, why, why, this killing and rape and pillage, is
there any answer? Are there any answers to why these people, who
live peaceably side by side, intermarry, go to the same churches,
held an international sports event in Sarajevo, why is it that they
fall upon themselves periodically, and have done this for a thou-
sand years?
Admiral Cramer. Sir, I wish I had the answer to your question,
and perhaps if we had the answer we could begin to resolve the
situation in Bosnia. But there is certainly a history, going back, at
least into my study of the problem, as far as the 13th century, of


96
constant ethnic and religious fighting among and between these
groups.
Indeed, I would say that except for the post-World War II period,
when Tito had control
Senator Warner. With an iron fist.
Admiral Cramer. With a very iron fist, in a dictatorial sense,
that was the only period where there was, as you would character-
ize in your article, peaceful living together.
Basically, since the Tito regime, nothing has replaced it, in terms
of the iron fist approach, there has been no political capability to
continue living together in a peaceful situation.
Sir, I simply do not have an answer for your question.
Senator Warner. We in this country and, indeed, other coun-
tries, have searched for that answer for several years now, to try to
get an understanding of this conflict and what it is that we, the
free world, might do, either through diplomacy or political endeav-
ors or military action to bring about a measure of peace and stabil-
ity for these people.
Admiral Cramer. Yes, sir.
It would seem to me that the only solution, ultimately, will be
essentially when the Serbs and the Croatians achieve their mili-
tary objectives. But, regrettably, the Bosnian Muslims, of course,
are the net loser in that process.
Senator Warner. They are the victims.
Admiral Cramer. Yes, sir.
Senator Warner. Mr. Chairman, I would like to return to a
second round of questioning when the time arrives.
Senator Exon. Yes, Senator Warner.
Let me just say that we are checking now with the chairman to
see what his wishes are. If there are additional questions that you
and others have we will try and stay here.
Senator Warner. I would think another 5 minutes for the Sena-
tor from Virginia.
Senator Exon. Senator Levin would be next. And I was hopeful
after that maybe we could have an agreement on some time and
wind up in the next 15 or 20 minutes.
Senator Warner. Yes.
Senator Exon. Senator Levin.
Senator Levin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
First, let me say I agree with Senator Warner on a number of
points, but we disagree in our conclusion. First of all, much of the
testimony here this morning has been helpful to those of us that
believe we should enforce the no-fly zone.
The testimony this morning is very important for lots of reasons.
It shows differences, for instance, between Somalia and Iraq. And
yet we acted in both.
I agree with Senator Warner there are major differences be-
tween Bosnia and Somalia, major differences. That does not mean
that you act in one and do not act in the other. It means there are
major differences and you have got to look at each situation on its
own: its own complications, its own history, its own difficulties, its
own risks not only of acting, but of not acting.
And we heard a lot about the risks of not acting yesterday, by
the way, in terms of the spreading of a war from Bosnia into sur-


97
rounding countries. And I want to get to that with both of you in a
moment.
But, basically, I agree: There are differences between Bosnia and
Somalia, and between Bosnia and Iraq, and between Somalia and
Iraq. That does not solve the problem of whether we should do any-
thing or not.
It is also incredibly complicated. I happen to agree with Senator
Warner on that. And there are great risks, particularly in ground
action, which no one is recommending. There are also risks in any
enforcement using air power.
The reason we come out differently is I emphasize and look at
the risks of not acting, not enforcing the no-fly zone after the
United Nations has imposed a no-fly zone.
We have enforced a no-fly zone in Iraq. Has it been militarily de-
cisive?
No.
Has it knocked out Saddam Hussein?
No.
We have enforced it.
Have I supported the enforcement?
I have.
I think it has been useful.
Has it been decisive?
No.
I would also like to read from some newspaper clips. One says
that our new Secretary of State has reiterated the fact that the
President favors action by the United States and its NATO allies to
enforce the no-fly zone that the United Nations has declared over
Bosnia. That is Mr. Christopher, who is a very cautious person in
terms of the use of force.
And even a more cautious person is our NATO commander. I
want to quote to you from General Shalikashvili's apparent views
as quoted in the Los Angeles Times of January 12:
General Shalikashvili has suggested that a punitive air strike on Serbia might
have some value in deterring an aggressive Serbian move into Kosovo, a Serbian
province where most of the population is ethnic Albanian, and laying down a
marker that if the Serbs move in an aggressive way into Kosovo, the West is pre-
pared to punish such action.
Sending such a signal is crucial, said Shalikashvili, Supreme Commander of
NATO, because if the fighting spreads to Kosovo, it could escalate the Bosnian crisis
from a human tragedy into a nightmare scenario into which neighboring countries
would be drawn into the combat.
Shali's comments on Kosovo and his conviction that it would be disastrous to
permit fighting to spread there have been echoed by some Bush administration offi-
cials. The General maintained that enforcement of a no-fly zone is not terribly im-
portant from a military point of view. There have been few Serbian flights, he said,
and those that have occurred have not contributed significantly to the Bosnian car-
nage.
But stiff international enforcement of the no-fly zone would deliver to Serbia an
important message of international resolve, he said.
That is similar to what we have heard offered as the reason for
enforcement of the no-fly zone in Iraq.
Is the JCS familiar with Shali's position on enforcement of the
no-fly zone?
General Brandtner. Yes.
Senator Levin. Do you agree with it?


98
General Brandtner. Essentially, I agree with it, yes. The issue
of resolve, I think, is a perceptive type of thing.
Senator Levin. Is it important?
General Brandtner. I think it is important. I think there are
other ways, also, that you could demonstrate resolve, and I showed
a chart that had a very large force posture staged in the Adriatic,
and also the intent to continue relief operations demonstrates re-
solve.
Senator Levin. Is it a legitimate objective to weaken the capabil-
ity of the Bosnian Serbs?
General Brandtner. If one were to say that that was the mis-
sion, it would be indeed a legitimate objective.
Senator Levin. Might it be? Let me put it that way. Might it be a
legitimate objective to weaken the military capability of the Bos-
nian Serbs?
General Brandtner. Yes, in those terms, I would say so.
Senator Levin. Might it be a legitimate military objective to
weaken the military capability of Serbia itself?
General Brandtner. Again, you have
Senator Levin. I am saying might it be, I am not saying is it. I
am just saying might it be a legitimate military objective?
General Brandtner. I would say yes.
Senator Levin. Might it be a legitimate objective to act in a way
which would weaken the will of Serbia to continue to support the
Serbs in Bosnia?
General Brandtner. That is a little more complex because you
would have to be sure that what you did would, in effect, do that.
Senator Levin. But if that is your objective. I agree with you
that the question is could you achieve it through a particular
action. Might it be a legitimate objective to weaken the will of
Serbia to support the Bosnian Serbs?
General Brandtner. It would be a legitimate objective, but I
would caveat that by saying that history has proven that we have
very seldom weakened the will of nations by the kind of action that
is contemplated.
Senator Levin. Okay. Fair enough.
Might it be a legitimate objective to weaken the ability of Serbia
to resupply the Serbian Army in Bosnia?
General Brandtner. Yes.
Senator Levin. I guess my time is up.
Senator Warner. Go ahead and finish, Senator, because I will
follow on your questions.
Senator Exon. Go ahead and finish the question.
Senator Levin. Those might all be legitimate objectives. That is
all I wanted to obtain from you is that those might all be legiti-
mate military objectives.
Have our commands and has NATO prepared contingency plans
for military action, either enforcing the no-fly zone or otherwise, in
Bosnia?
General Brandtner. I will not
Senator Levin. I am not asking what the plans are; I am just
asking have plans been produced?


102
dreds of thousands of ground forces to perform a military operation
that would bring about the cessation of much of this fighting.
Am I not correct on that? Those are the figures that have been
used before.
General Brandtner. Yes, that is correct.
Senator Warner. Last question.
What nations are overtly or covertly supplying the various fac-
tions that are now fighting? The expenditure of this ammunition,
the expenditure of food and logistics requires resupply. And I be-
lieve that there are some nations that are providing that logistic
support.
Are you able here in an open session to identify which countries
have provided logistical support to either, be it Croatian or Serbian
or Bosnian?
Admiral Cramer. Sir, the way I would respond to that question
is the vast majority of the arms that are being used here and em-
ployed by all sides were, are and continue to be indigenously pro-
duced in Bosnia and Serbia and Croatia.
I would be happy for the record or in closed session to respond to
those limited examples—but I do want to emphasize—limited ex-
amples of where outside forces are supplying the factions. It would
be incorrect to leave the Senator with the impression that there is
a great dearth or a lack of weapons or difficulty of arms and resup-
ply. Regrettably, that is not the case.
Yugoslavia, as a country, before this conflict began, indigenously
produced, I have been told, upwards of 80 percent of its own arma-
ment; indeed, was a net exporter of much of its equipment.
So the vast majority of the arms, sir, are contained in a zero-sum
game within the factions.
[The information follows:]
[Deleted.]
Senator Warner. Let me follow on with another question here.
Yesterday, in our testimony, and I think this should be brought out
here today, and I think both of you can do it, even though yester-
day was a closed session.
If the United Nations begins to accelerate the military pressure,
there is some likelihood that Russia will begin to be in strong dis-
agreement with those actions.
For example, the enforcement of the no-fly zone—Senator Levin,
as you heard yesterday, there is considerable disagreement in the
United Nations as to what that would involve, just what type of
operation would be involved.
So, can you address two questions: the nature of the disagree-
ment now in the United Nations with respect to how you would en-
force a no-fly zone; and second, the statement to date by Russia as
to what their position would be in terms of that enforcement, and
the likelihood that a strong ground contingent began to move in,
what Russia would do.
I think the background is helpful, too, Admiral. Many of the cul-
tures in Russia have a strong ethnic tie to the Serbian side. Would
you elaborate on that when you start out?
Admiral Cramer. I will try to answer and maybe we can give
you a little bit of response for the record. But in general terms the


103
situation, as I understand it, and the positions that have been
taken by the U.N. and the various parties, seem to follow along
with the following categories.
If the western allies conduct a major operation against the Serbs,
particularly military and particularly on the ground, there seems
to be real resistance on the part of Russia to support any such
move.
Indeed, the Serbs believe—and I am not sure that this is a cor-
rect position—but the Serbs believe that Russia would come in and
support them, at least diplomatically.
But on the other side of the fence, you have also got real growing
concern on the part of countries like Turkey, some of the Persian
Gulf States—and they have voiced this very clearly—about an in-
consistent policy of how on the one hand, western allies would con-
duct and energize a very active no fly zone in Iraq, but would not
apply with the same level of vigor a no fly zone over Bosnia; which
for their part they think is an important gesture.
Of course there is a lot of pressure on the part of Turkey and
some of the other Muslim countries to release the arms embargo
and to have their Muslim brothers be supportive in that regard.
So it seems to me that we are kind of all around the yard in
terms of which countries would support one action that we might
do and those which would directly oppose it.
I do not know if that is an adequate response.
[The information follows:]
[Deleted.]
Opposition in Russia's Parliament to use of force is based on a combination of po-
litical factors.
— Russia has historic religious and ethnic ties to Serbia.
— Conservatives and some moderates oppose a Russian foreign policy that aligns
Russia too closely with the West, and especially the United States. The West is seen
as attempting to take advantage of Russia's weakness.
— Some Russian nationalists view the conflict in the former Yugoslavia in sim-
plistic ethnic terms. They identify strongly with Serbia and ethnic Serbs in Bosnia
as fellow Orthodox Slavs, ignoring the Slavic ethnicity of all the parties to the con-
flict.
— Russian Communists sympathize with the Milosevic government, and view ef-
forts to impose sanctions on Serbia and on Bosnian Serbs as ideologically motivated.
[Deleted.]
Senator Warner. It raises the point I wish to make, which it is
not a static situation with relations of the border nations. If the
United Nations starts in with a major ground action, this could
well spill over and cause a lot of repercussions with the bordering
nations.
I thank the Chair.
Chairman Nunn. Thank you, Senator Warner.
Before I recognize Senator Levin, let me just make a statement.
Ordinarily, I do not like to listen to lawyers argue—but I think
the discussion that we have held here today between my two col-
leagues, the Senator from Michigan and the Senator from Virginia
has been most informative. I congratulate both of you, which I gen-
erally do not do.
I really believe that this is a fundamental issue that we, as a
committee, are going to have to address. I would like to say now,
for the record, what I said yesterday and what I said before; that
the more I hear about the pros and cons of the United Nations'


104
action, the more I feel its critically important that this committee
take the lead in holding hearings on the fundamental questions
that nobody seems to be paying much attention to.
That is the slippery slope, as I call it, that I feel the United
States of America and its forces and its Presidents—and I empha-
size the plural there—seem to be getting ourselves into as being
the police force of the world, almost at the direction of the United
Nations.
Now I am not saying whether that is good, bad or indifferent. I
am not asking anybody to draw any conclusions on it now. But it
seems to me that it was true in Vietnam, it was true to some
extent in Korea and certainly was true in the Gulf war and it is
certainly true in Somalia; it is certainly true with the new empha-
sis that we are placing, indicating some strong arm tactics, warn-
ing Saddam Hussein not to once again try to invade Kuwait. And
certainly it is even fundamentally true with regard to the consider-
ations that are going on right now, however serious, about what we
do for selective air strikes, and maybe eventually ground forces, in
what was formerly Yugoslavia.
So I did want to say that I think that is very important. I do not
believe that we have given much attention to that. But obviously,
we are getting ourselves into a position where everyone seems to be
looking at the United States of America as the ultimate, when nec-
essary, police force.
With that, let me suggest, since we would like to wind this up as
soon as possible, would it be agreeable to Senator Levin and Sena-
tor Warner if the Chair would now recognize Senator Levin for 5
minutes and then if Senator Warner would like 2 minutes for re-
buttal, then we would try and wind up with the understanding that
the chairman would like to come back in and ask a question or
two.
Would that be reasonable?
Senator Levin. Other than the rebuttal, I do not have—Senator
Warner, you can have all the time you want when I am done. And
I will be done in 5 minutes.
I just want to spend a few more moments, and then I am done.
Senator Warner. I just would like to say to the Chair, I believe
this has been a very valuable hearing and I am hopeful that this
record can be reproduced and made available publicly as soon as
possible.
Would the Chair entertain trying to look into this, how quickly
this record can be made available to the public?
Senator Levin. I would join that.
Senator Warner. We are fortunate with the media being here,
but I think this entire record should be read by people who want to
run full page ads calling for action so that they know the problems.
Senator Exon. We will make every effort to expedite this being
made available to the public.
Senator Levin.
Senator Levin. I hope that the record would also be read by
people who think that by doing nothing we are solving a prob-
lem
Senator Warner. We are not doing nothing.


107
The genocidal policy of ethnic cleansing, constitutes a crime against humanity that
continues to take innocent lives and produce thousands of refugees.
The credibility of the United Nations and international law have already been se-
riously undermined by the failure of the community of nations to take stronger ac-
tions or even to enforce previously adopted resolutions of the United Nations Securi-
ty Council.
We urge you to take a leadership role in formally requesting the United Nations
Security Council to enforce the no-fly zone over Bosnia and to do so even if other
members of the Security Council threaten to veto such actions.
Sincerely,
/

: .: / S

u


I
L


108



1/8/93.
Senators who signed the Levin/Lugar letter to President Bush concerning U.N.
enforcement of a no-fly zone over Bosnia.
Levin (D-MI)
Lugar (R-IN)
Biden (D-DE)
Bingaman (D-NM)
Cochran (R-MS)
D'Amato (R-NY)
Daschle (D-SD)
Dole (R-KS)
DeConcini (D-AZ)
Durenberger (R-MN)
Feinstein (D-CA)
Hatch (R-UT)
Heflin (D-AL)
Kerry (D-MA)
Leahy (D-VT)
Lieberman (D-CT)
Mathews (D-TN)
Metzenbaum (D-OH)
Mikulski (D-MD)
Mitchell (D-ME)
Mosely-Braun (D-IL)
Moynihan (D-NY)
Pressler (R-SD)
Riegle (D-MI)
Shelby (D-AL)
Simon (D-IL)
Thurmond (R-SC)
Wellstone (D-MN)
Wofford (D-PA)


110
Chairman Nunn. I understand Senator Warner wants to be rec-
ognized.
Senator Warner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Just for a few min-
utes to again thank the Chair for this hearing. Senator Levin and I
asked for it and it certainly has, in my judgment, come a long way
to prepare a record.
And Senator, my point is, before we send these airmen in, if the
United States is to participate—it is a decision of our President
and the Congress and others to enforce this no-fly zone—I want to
know how we are going to get a downed aviator out of there.
You recall very vividly that those of us in this room were active
participants in the debate before the shooting started in the Gulf.
We had strong differences of view, but nevertheless it was a good
debate.
And we informed the American public as best we could, together
with our advice and counsel from the professional military, of the
parameters of that action and what would happen and what would
the likely casualties be. And we thank God it did not turn out to be
as high as some of the estimates.
But before I sign on around here, I want to know exactly how we
are going to go in and get those downed flyers out. And if we are
not going to contribute the ground troops—and I certainly do not
want to do it—but if we are not, who is? In other words, I want the
American people to be fully informed with respect to the param-
eters of this conflict to bring about the peace that everybody is
asking for, what the casualties would be and what the expenditures
would be, not just dollars, but I am talking about life and limb.
And what is the likely reaction of other countries? I asked the
admiral. Some of them are not going to stand by. And which side
are they going to join? So therein rest our differences, I would say.
Senator Levin. I fully agree with you. I think whoever makes
this decision, the President of the United States should lay that out
for the public just the way the President of the United States
should know before we enforce the no-fly zone in Iraq, what will
happen to get out a downed flyer in Iraq?
Those options, those contingency plans are there.
Senator Warner. You bet, and you and I know it.
Senator Levin. They better be there in any military operation. I
go with you 100 percent.
Senator Warner. And the difference in the desert, my good
friend, and in the mountains in the cold and the cloud cover.
Senator Levin. I am talking about an airmen who is downed in
Iraq.
Senator Warner. Mr. Chairman, this hearing has been, I think,
the most thorough held to date in Congress by any committee. And
we have begun to compile a record and I have asked the Chair, at
the earliest possible time to allow this record to be made public.
Chairman Nunn. We are as public as you can get.
Senator Exon. What Senator Warner is referencing is something
we talked about a few minutes ago. Since this is an important
hearing, we would ask you to expedite the transcript of this record
to make it public and as widely disbursed as possible, as soon as
possible.