Four, pursue war crimes, crimes against humanity. The Clinton administration initially talked of it and then it seemed to get dropped. Five, try to do something about the terrible destruction in the south in the marshes. And the beginning of any such action would be a vociferous campaign in the United States and Europe against the genocide that is going on there, hopefully leading them to some action. Thank you. [The prepared statement of Dr. Mylroie appears in the appendix.] Mr. HAMILTON. Thank you. Dr. Baram. STATEMENT OF DR. AMATZIA BARAM, VISITING FELLOW, THE WOODROW WILSON CENTER FOR SCHOLARS, PROFESSOR OF MIDDLE EAST HISTORY AT HAIFA UNIVERSITY Mr. BARAM. I would like to approach the subject from one addi- tional angle and then I will address also the Kurdish issue. In my judgment, the dual containment policy as defined and im- plemented so far by the administration toward Iraq has been pro- ducing reasonably good results. If you want to be more active, you can produce perhaps better results but still it is not really a fail- ure. It has weakened the Ba'th regime and you could see the begin- ning of the Ba'th serious problems maybe 2 years ago, maybe 18 months ago. And it has forced it to make concessions to the United Nations. It has not so far brought about a change of regime and cannot be expected to do so soon. Economic sanctions by their very nature work slowly. The insistence on keeping sanctions on Iraq until the Ba'th re- gime is ready to comply with the United Nations Security Council resolutions is thus justifying itself. On the domestic political level, there are signs that very slowly Saddam Hussein is losing ground within his own elite. True, many Iraqis are blaming the U.S.A. for their plight. However, as indi- cated by the Iraqi press itself, many people have also started ask- ing difficult questions about the wisdom of their own leadership. What I would suggest—1, by the way, think that the Jordan angle is a relevant one but you cannot cut Jordan off without offer- ing it an alternative. But I think also that one should start now thinking about the post-embargo period. Hopefully the embargo will succeed and perhaps some additional acts will succeed to de- pose Saddam and to get rid of his regime and whatever regime that comes instead, if it is not fundamentalist Islamic or Ba'th will be hopefully a little more democratic. Obviously if the INC is part of it, the Iraqi National Congress, I have no doubt it will be more democratic and also more friendly toward America. But even under the best of circumstances, my feeling is that the administration is not paying enough attention now to what should be the case after the embargo is lifted, whenever it is lifted. And there are also indications Saddam Hussein at least believes that he will be able to lift it without complying with all the U.N. resolu- tions. 11 tant step. Economically and even politically it should not be too dif- ficult. Another issue, for example, is they lack spare parts for their ce- ment factories. A couple of them. Very important for reconstruction and rebuilding those 4000 villages which Saddam has uprooted and I think there is no real problem in supplying them enough spare parts for those factories. Another issue, I would point out that Kurdistan is a natural ex- porter of fruits and vegetables. Also of tobacco but that of course is becoming a big no-no now in the United States as I am learning. But one way of helping them in a meaningful way is to help them build a few food processing factories because due to the difficulties of transportation much of this yield is rotten. And that is a shame. These are not very expensive things but they are very useful. A Kurdish militia. I do not think that Kurdish independence is a practical idea. I am one of those people in Israel who do not see with tremendous enthusiasm the idea of completely, fully fledged Palestinian independence either. For economic and strategic rea- sons a Palestinian-Jordanian federation seems to offer a better so- lution. Leaving the Palestinian issue alone, I think that Kurds and the INC should be allowed to do the same thing which we are going to help the Palestinians do now in Gaza or Jericho. Namely, they should be allowed to build a militia—the Kurds have a militia but it is very badly equipped—that will be equipped with light arms, just like the Palestinians, and with a uniform and nonlethal mili- tary gear. This is not very expensive. Of course, it has to be done in coordi- nation with the Turks. But I do not see how the Turks are going to be very much against it. If they are, then just nonlethal military equipment. Another issue for example is spare parts and combined harvest- ing machines. The Kurds do not have enough of those. And very soon they are going to start the harvest. Without that, again, a lot of which they can and do produce is rotting. And another point: I would suggest considering the possibility of defreezing part of the Iraqi frozen assets in America and making it available not only to the Kurds but to all the democratic opposi- tion movements, mainly the INC and the Kurds who are working against Saddam. I am aware that this is not an easy issue legally speaking be- cause of the whole issue of the embargo and Iraqi unity, and again I want to be on record saying that I think that Iraqi territorial unity is important. And the Kurds will have, to my mind, in a democratic Iraq, a meaningful autonomy and freedom. In the meantime, however, the Kurds and the INC are very short of im- mediate cash, Now, it is interesting that those who suffer from it most are those whom, as I understand it, the administration should be most interested in. Those are the intellectuals, the teachers, the engi- neers, the public servants and so on in Kurdistan. Mainly those secular intellectuals who are on government pay. I think we should try and help these guys rather than make their lives much more difficult. 14 This is exceptionally pernicious and something that our policy needs to make very explicit that it is not our goal. So, yes, it is the removal of Saddam and it should not stop there, Mr. Chairman. What we are talking about is a Germany or Japan after World War II syndrome. We are talking about removing a Stalin from the So- viet Union but it is not enough to remove a Stalin, you have got to remove the system that produced and supported Stalin and that is the Ba'th party. So let the commander that will remove Saddam, that will put the bullet through his head or pull the coup or whatever else, let that commander know that we wish him well in attempting to change the regime but Iraq cannot join the community of nations until there has been fundamental changes in the way that government is run and that means restoration of parliament, rewriting a con- stitution and some sort of democratic processes for the selection of the next government. As long as that is on record, there will be no disappointment and no disillusionment. But these same people must know, too, that ev- erything good will happen the minute those conditions are met. That they will immediately be able to sell oil; they will be fully rec- ognized by everyone; there will be cooperation and assistance in re- building Iraq. Indeed, I think some of the conditions set by the U.N. would probably be negotiable at that point with a new Iraq. Lastly, I would suggest that the Arabs in the region and the Iraqi people themselves must know that we are not seeking to im- pose the INC as the next cabinet and President of Iraq. The INO is a remarkable organization. It has brought together for the first time in modern Iraqi history a group which virtually has freely dis- cussed all aspects and all problems of that country: Kurds, Shi'ites, fundamentalist Shi'ites, secular Shi’ites, Sunnis, left, right, a whole bunch of people. This is a remarkable accomplishment. These peo- ple are, in effect, establishing the basis for future understanding of how Iraq will be. Nobody knows who might be elected in the future Iraq. We are not seeking to impose the INC. I think you all know that but I am not sure that the Saudis and the Syrians and others who are concerned with this thing fully un- derstand that we are not imposing an American regime or even a purely pro-American regime in that area. So you are faced with an immense challenge, Mr. Chairman, in this region. I am optimistic that with a will and with a long term carefully thought out policy we can bring dramatic change to the last real holdout of the old, harsh, cynically pan-Arab authoritarian regimes that Saddam Hussein typifies. Thank you. [The prepared statement of Mr. Fuller appears in the appendix.] Mr. HAMILTON. OK. Thank you, Mr. Fuller, and each of you for your excellent testimony. STATUS OF SADDAM HUSSEIN Let us begin now with just your assessment of Saddam Hussein. Is he stronger or weaker today than he was a year ago? Mr. FULLER. I will start. I hope my colleagues will join me. I would say he is weaker. There are rumors and perhaps- Mr. HAMILTON. Is he vulnerable? 43 Mr. Chairman, I believe that it is time for the United States to encourage the U.N. Security Council to lift the embargo on the areas that are being administered by the elected leadership of Iraqi Kurdistan. The Kurds are making a valiant effort to become independent and self-sufficient. Rather than impeding that effort, we must actively support it. Indeed, with appropriate support from the international community, the Kurds would be able to utilize some of the natural resources at their disposal. For example, Iraqi Kurdistan is endowed with rich oil deposits but is unable to exploit them because it lacks refineries. Cessation of the international embargo would enable the Kurds to import small refineries and to begin producing their own fuel, oil and petroleum products. In closing, I would point out that what is most disturbing about our current policy is that it penalizes equally those Iraqis seeking a more democratic rule and those who remain loyal to Saddam Hussein. This "equal treatment" sends the wrong message to the region. We should be rewarding the one segment of the Iraqi population that has succeeded in freeing itself from Saddam's rule -- not punishing it. The people of Kurdistan deserve the opportunity to achieve self-sufficiency and permanently remove themselves from the grasp of Saddam Hussein. The U.N. embargo must be lifted if that dream is to be fulfilled. # # 55 interests do not change overnight. Inter-communal and other kinds of political violence were rife in Iraq before the Bacth rule (1968-1; Iraq tried to annex Kuwait by force under General Qasim, seven years before the Bath came to power, and the decision to develop nuclear weapons was taken under the Bath in 1972, but seven years before Saddam became the sole ruler of Iraq. Even when Iraq is ruled by a more democratic regime and a friendlier one to the West, the military will still have a decisive say in terms of the approach to non-conventional weapons. Historically speaking, the Iraqi military has been an exceptionally aggressive and nationalistic institution. When fused with the aggressive and nationalistic Balth regime and Saddam's personality they brought Iraq to where it is now. In order that they can not overpower the government and dictate to it radical (and expensive) armament policies, it has to be clear to them that international sanctions are hanging over Iraq's head long-term. In other words, for the good of its own citizens, and for the good of its regional neighbors, Iraq needs to know that in terms of non-conventional weapons, it is on long-term probation. This has to be enshrined in a UN Security Council Resolution in an unmistakable way. 2. The Kurdish Zone as a way to Affect Change in Baghdad The fact that much of the Kurdish area is outside the reach of the central government is a constant source of worry for Saddam and his regime. Had it not been for the American protecting umbrella, Saddam would have tried, and possibly succeeded to re-conquer Iraqi Kurdistan. While the Regional Kurdish Government should be discouraged from any attempt te secede and declare itself independent, American and other international help to Iraqi Kurdistan may produce three positive results. It may prevent a new Kurdish refugee disaster; it may.enable the Kurds to withstand Saddam's siege and not fall into his arms; and it may be yet another way to undermine Saddam's rule in addition to the embargo. The more prosperous and democratic Iraqi Kurdistan · the starker contrast with Bathist Iraq. The present Kurdish autonomy should serve as a laboratory and example for all the Iraqis of how things can and should be done. Once the experiment is successful (and it is partially successful even now), it should become household information in every Iraqi home. This will inevitably be the case through word of mouth, but this will take time. A short-cut may be to establish a strong TV station. It should be in the position to broadcast to Baghdad ample information on life in the freed part of Iraq. Economic prosperity in the Kurdish zone holds also a promise of curbing and rolling back the influence of Kurdish Muslim fundamentalist extremists. What is necessary to turn the Kurdish experiment into a greater success? Right now Iraqi Kurdistan is the only place where more-or-less democratic elections took place in Iraq since 1946. Admittedly, there are still tensions between the two main Kurdish factions, the PUK and the KDP, and recently there were armed clashes between the PUK and a Kurdish Islamic group. But despite that, the coalition government of the Kurdish zone is functioning reasonably well. The main difficulty seems to be an economic one. So far American aid to Kurdistan (some $ 20 m per annum) has come under an emergency program through the Department of Defense (DOD). This arrangement, while extremely successful until now, is not ine best way to develop a future aid program, because it is operated by a body (DOD) that is not custom-made for such purposes, and it hinders the USA from extending the kind of help which is most urgently needed. The Kurds should not be dependent for long on hand-outs.