CONTENTS
STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
Page
Bartlett, Hon. Roscoe G., a Representative from Maryland 38
Bateman, Hon. Herbert H., a Representative from Virginia 41
Dellums, Hon. Ronald V., a Representative from California, Ranking Minority
Member, Committee on National Security 3
Edwards, Hon. Chet, a Representative from Texas 52
Geren, Hon. Pete, a Representative from Texas 51
Hefley, Hon. Joel, a Representative from Colorado 45
Hunter, Hon. Duncan, a Representative from California 49
Pickett, Hon. Owen, a Representative from Virginia 83
Sisisky, Hon. Norman, a Representative from Virginia 43
Skelton, Hon. Ike, a Representative from Missouri 40
Spence, Hon. Floyd D., a Representative from South Carolina, Chairman,
Committee on National Security 1
Taylor, Hon. Gene, a Representative from Mississippi 47
PRINCIPAL WITNESSES WHO APPEARED IN PERSON OR SUBMITTED
WRITTEN STATEMENTS
Eisenstadt, Michael, Washington Institute for Near East Policy:
Statement 16
Prepared statement 20
Haass, Richard N., Director of Foreign Policy Studies, The Brookings Institu-
tion:
Statement 4
Prepared statement 8
Perle, Richard, The American Enterprise Institute:
Statement 26
Prepared statement 30
Riedel, Bruce, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Near east and
South Asian Affairs:
Statement 54
Prepared statement 57
Van Alstyne, Maj. Gen. J.A., Vice Director for Operations, Joint Staff: State-
ment 67
DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
Authority for United States Strikes Against Iraq 64
Relevance of U.N. Resolution 688 66
Riedel, Bruce O., Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Near East and
South Asian Affairs, Memo To Hon. Floyd D. Spence, Chairman, Committee
on National Security 63
Was the U.S. Response "Proportional?" 65
(III)


13
6
politically.
Such a policy should at a minimum make sure that Saddam does
not re-emerge as a strategic threat. This policy also has the
potential to create a context where the Iraqi people move against
Saddam. Toward that end, the United States needs to do a much
better job of articulating just how Iraq would benefit under a
different leadership that demonstrated it was prepared to act
responsibly. Such a comprehensive overt policy--a mixture of
tough sanctions, substantial uses of military force when
warranted, and clear public diplomacy--should at a minimum
prevent Saddam from breaking out and has the potential to
accomplish more.
It is also useful to point out what we want to avoid in the
way of policy toward iraq. One trap would be to develop an
obsession with Saddam. As I have already said, it is wrong to
exaggerate the threat he currently poses. Similarly, it would
also be wrong to make his ouster an explicit goal. If we were to
do so, every day he survived would be construed as a victory for
him. Moreover, we lack the tools to achieve the goal. Our
conventional military forces are all but irrelevant to the task,
while our intelligence assets are limited in what they can be
expected to accomplish. The United States encountered great
difficulty in apprehending Manuel Noriega with 20,000 troops on
the ground and Panama fully occupied. It is difficult to see how
we could undertake and succeed in so ambitious an effort in Iraq.
I also believe we are wise to continue to support Iraq's
territorial integrity. I am aware of the arguments of those who
disagree — that it would eliminate Saddam and the threat posed by
a rogue Iraq, that it would free up the Kurds and Shia. But I
fear that the splitting of Iraq would stimulate all sorts of
fighting among Iraqis, between Iraqis and their neighbors, and
between those neighbors. I also believe both this process and
the outcome would benefit Iran, which would then emerge as the
single strongest local state. And even if the United States were
to conclude otherwise, we would have to confront the reality that
none of our Arab friends in the region (nor Turkey) would be
disposed to seeing Iraq dismantled.
Toward a Comprehensive Approach for the Region
Success vis-a-vis Iraq will also require a number of other
efforts on our part. The first involves intelligence. Iraq and
the Persian Gulf more broadly needs to remain a priority for the
intelligence community. Open sources cannot possibly carry the
burden of either collection or analysis. In particular, the
United States will need to develop more human intelligence if it
is to have necessary warning and insight into Iraqi behavior.
37-705 - 97 - 2


14
The second consideration is military. U.S. ability to deal
with a wide range of scenarios is essential. These include
deterring and defeating conventional aggression, preventive and
preemptive attacks against weapons of mass destruction, punitive
strikes against state supporters of terrorism, and interdiction
on behalf of sanctions. All of these needs involve Iraq,
although several also might be relevant vis-a-vis others, most
notably Iran. The point is a simple one, that U.S. diplomacy can
only succeed against a backdrop of the availability of military
forces and the will to use them. What makes fulfilling this need
more difficult than would be the case in other regions is the
requirement that our presence not become too large or visible
lest it cause as many problems for our friends as it is designed
to manage.
Third, U.S. policy toward Iraq has a far better chance of
succeeding if U.S. policy toward Iran is effective. The most
important proximate goals ought to be to prevent Iranian
acquisition or development of weapons of mass destruction and to
stop Iranian-sponsored subversion and terrorism. Iran, like the
Soviet Union, is a repressive power at home with imperial
ambitions and economic feet of clay. It should be our aim to
frustrate its reach and exacerbate its economic problems in order
to stimulate domestic forces promoting change. An Iran that
"broke out" and threatened the region would fundamentally change
Arab attitudes and end any support for efforts to oust Saddam or
contain Iraq.
As a result, U.S. policy toward Iran must include concerted
efforts to deny Iran an unconventional weapons capability; a
willingness to use force if there is clear evidence of Iranian
support for terrorism; and a clear message to Iran that future
incursions into Iraq are unacceptable. We cannot achieve these
goals alone, however. For this reason, the United States should
consider approaching its friends in Europe and the Asia-Pacific
region and propose a structured dialogue with Iran. If our terms
were met, then there could be a degree of economic interaction;
if not, everyone would agree to hold back.
Fourth, we need to better understand the risks and costs of
unilateralism. A strategy against Saddam and Iraq can only
succeed if it is supported by others in the region and beyond.
This translates into a requirement for far more frequent and
senior consultations with governments of the region. The sort of
unilateralism demonstrated by the Clinton Administration over the
past few weeks is not so much the exercise of leadership as its
abandonment. Much the same applies for our policy toward Iran.
Fifth, we need to encourage our friends in the region to
undertake reforms that will leave them less vulnerable to
revolutionary change. This does not mean hectoring them publicly


16
The Chairman. Let's proceed to Mr. Eisenstadt next.
STATEMENT OF MICHAEL EISENSTADT, WASHINGTON
INSTITUTE FOR NEAR EAST POLICY
Mr. Eisenstadt. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much for invit-
ing me to address the committee today.
Recent events in Iraq have spurred calls for a reevalauation of
United States policy toward Baghdad. Some have advocated a re-
vival of the balance of power in the gulf, using Iraq or Iran to bal-
ance off each other and render the United States presence in the
region superfluous.
Others have called for the breakup of Iraq, asserting that Iraq
is a failed state, an artificial construct that binds together mutually
antagonistic communities in a hostile embrace, resulting in insta-
bility at home and aggression abroad.
And finally some have called on the United States to stay the
course, continuing its policy of containment despite its manifest
problems. Today, I would like to attempt a preliminary examina-
tion of the efficacy of each approach and outline options for the fu-
ture.
The balance of power approach: During the 1970's and 1980's,
the United States tried to create a balance of power in the gulf in
order to maintain regional peace and stability. In the 1970's, the
United States built up the Shah as the region's policeman, but
these efforts came to grief as a result of the Islamic revolution.
During the 1980's, the United States helped indirectly to build up
Iraq as a bulwark against Iranian expansionism. However, this
probably contributed to Iraq's 1990 decision to invade Kuwait. As
a result of this bitter experience, the United States now no longer
depends on unreliable, aggressive regional powers to maintain the
balance in the region. Rather, since the 1991 gulf war, Washington
itself has emerged as the keeper of the regional balance.
Clearly, it would be desirable if the regional parties could main-
tain a regional balance without a United States presence, and this
should be the long-term goal of the United States in the region. In
the short term, however, it is unrealistic. Why? Some people for in-
stance have argued that the United States will eventually have to
ease sanctions on Baghdad or rehabilitate Iraq to counterbalance
an ascendant Iran. This is wrong for several reasons. First, Iran's
military buildup is much less rapid and extensive than widely be-
lieved. It will be many years before Iran can achieve numerical
parity with Iraq.
Second, because the main threats from Iran are nonconventional
capabilities, its capacity for subversion and terror, and its naval ca-
pabilities, Iraq is not at all well suited to serve as a counterweight
to Iran. In the nonconventional arena, this would require rearming
Iraq perhaps with nonconventional weapons, thereby undoing what
was accomplished by Operation Desert Storm.
Moreover, Iraq can contribute little, if anything, to counter Ira-
nian terror and subversion. Iraq is primarily a land power. In the
aftermath of the gulf war, it has no navy to speak of; it is ill suited
to serve as a counterbalance to Iran in the naval arena.
Third, Iraq would not be easily manipulated as a counter to Iran
and would use its strength to menace the gulf states against which


23
entities into the arms of lccnl regional powers—such as Iran-if c^y for self-pnscrvation In order for the U S
to hrep Iraq apart, it would have to assume an open-ended commitment to use fierce against Baghdad to prevent
its return to the north and the south, while simultaneously trying to prevent Iranian intervention (although
Tehran's reliance on surrogates to do it bidding—such as the Badr Brigades-are likely to stymy these effort!)
As for America's regional allies, those who count most here—Turkey, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia-would
probably not be averse to seemg Baghdad return to the north and south (if only to prevent Iran from acquiring
greater influence there) They therefore probably would not support U.S. efforts to limit Baghdad's influence
to the canter of die aountry. The US. would find itself in a similar situation to that which it found itself recently
when trying to counter Baghdad's efforts to restore its control to Irbil in northern Iraq.
The disintegration of Iraq would Therefore probably not end the problem of conflict and instability in
Iraq, while imposing severe strains on the coalition. Does the U.S. have the capability and the staying power
to impose indefinitely such an outcome against a determined adversary and against the wishes of our allies?
Recent experience would seem to suggest that the answer to this question is no.
Active Containment?
nr. a useful approach for dealing with the difficult challenges
the 1991 Gulf War, though the contradictions inherent in the policy have
je with the passing of time. It is now clear that this policy of containment
to create the necessary conditions for the overthrow of Saddam Husayn,

Efforts to overthrow Saddam Husayn have failed. The U.S. may have played some role in at least three
unsuccessful attempts to foment coups in July 1992, March 1995, and June 1996. The recent conquest of Irbil-
•base of a CIA operation to overthrow the regime—will probably hamstring such efforts for some tune to come
Moreover, Saddam's success in Irbil probably restored some of his aura of invincibility for domestic opponents
and enhanced his standing among his armed forces, making a coup less likely, at least in the near term.
On the other band, efforts to curtail Iraq's trouble making potential have been reasonably successful.
First, the ban on the sale of oil has denied Iraq the funds needed to engage in large-scale smuggling of
equipment and technology that could be used to resume large-scale clandestine production <
weapons (although Iraq's residual capabilities in this ana—particularly relating to biological <
significant).
Third, the ban on trade has prevented it from acquiring rhe spare parts and raw materials needed to

of the no-fly zone to
forces to parry any future
4


24

in put by sanctions has
an Iraq's military
in the event of a war. Other units would probably suffer massive desertions.
Finally, the armed forces suffer from a number of critical shortcomings that inhibit their ability to
engage in sustained combat poor maintenance, severe deficiencies in the logistical system, a lack of spares,
and low morale. None of these problems are likely to be ratified as long as sanctions remain in place.
On the down side, it need be said, mat sanctions—though a response to the aggressive policies of
Saddam Husayn and Ins regime—are imposing severe hardships on the Iraqi people, who are likely to bold the
U.S. at least partly responsible. On the other hand, the easing of sanctions would likely help perpetuate
i*3 rule and thus the suffering of the Iraqi people—and perhaps that of other peoples in the region if

Moreover, recent events have shown that it is
contradictions inherent in America's containment policy.
First, there is growing pressure for the casing or lifting of sanctions by countries—France, Russia, and
China—eager to resume trade with Iraq. To help fend off these pressures, the U.S. sponsored the drafting of
UNSCR 986 ("food for ail") which would permit the limited sale of Iraqi oil to generate income for mod and
medicine for the suffering Iraqi people. However, even if arrangements prevent this new income from falling
into Saddam's hands, the arrangement will enable him to divert funds now being used to feed his people to
underwrite arms smuggling operations and pay off his Republican Guard and security services, thus
strengthening him in the short term Implcmentaiioc of this resolution was suspended, at least temporarily, after
Iraqi forces retook Iibil.
Second, fissures in the coalition are increasing. While the Gulf War coalition was assembled to deal
with a specific scenario (threats to Kuwait and Saudi Arabia), and while it is wrong to exaggerate the extent
to which the coalition has weakened on the basis of recent events in northern Iraq, there can be no doubt that
U.S. freedom of action has been eroded since 1991. For a variety of reasons (for Turkey—the economy, for
Saudi Arabia—domestic politics), some of our allies are increasingly wary of the U.S. approach for dealing
with Iraq.
Third, growing tensions in the Arab-Israeli arena, if left unresolved (and things look they might get
worse before they get better), could create fertile ground for Iraqi efforts to rally Arab opinion for the easing
or lifting of sanctions and create pressures for the reintegration of Iraq into the Arab mainstream.
All of these factors are likely to make it more difficult for die U.S. to preserve the international
rnalirinn and maintain support for sanctions on Iraq in the coming months. This makes the removal of Saddam
a more urgent conosn than ever before, at a tune that prospects for success in this endeavor are less favorable
: he is a
5


26
The Chairman. Mr. Perle.
STATEMENT OF RICHARD PERLE, THE AMERICAN
ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE
Mr. Perle. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I welcome this opportunity to appear once again before you, this
time to discuss American policy with respect to Iraq.
This is no easy task, not least of all, because the United States
does not have a policy with respect to Iraq. Indeed, I don't believe
we had a coherent policy in place before August 31, and we cer-
tainly do not have one now.
If you had asked administration officials to describe their Iraq
policy before August 31, they would have said it was a policy of
dual containment. But a slogan is not a policy. And if the idea of
containing Saddam meant anything, it must surely have meant
limiting his influence in Iraq and beyond; influence that has been
growing.
At the very least, such a policy would have entailed keeping him
at bay in the one area of the country he did not fully control: The
northern zone, which had long been denied to him and which was
protected by Operation Provide Comfort.
Mr. Chairman, the pretense of an Iraqi policy has now collapsed.
Saddam has achieved his biggest victory since the end of Desert
Storm. The American objective of containing Saddam has been
shattered. The coalition that was formed to oppose him in 1990,
has disintegrated.
We have abandoned—betrayed really—betrayed friends who
trusted us. We have seen our partners in northern Iraq lined up
and executed. The credibility of the United States in a region of un-
questioned vital interest has been damaged, perhaps irreparably.
The administration's claim that Saddam's actions would meet
with a disproportionate response has turned out to be embarrass-
ingly true. His forceful, widespread, and effective aggression was
met by a disproportionately weak, narrow, and ineffective response.
Indeed, this is perhaps the most serious development of all. De-
spite the massive damage that has been done to the United States
position in Iraq, the region, and the world, the administration has
responded with feckless pinprick air strikes against repairable tar-
gets which are only important when suppressing them is necessary
to enable us to mount air operations on a large scale, something
the administration never seriously considered.
Against this background, it is an act of monumental nerve, a
towering conceit, for the administration to claim that it has
achieved a victory in the continuing struggle with Saddam Hus-
sein. As a Member of this House recently observed: The side that
is forced to evacuate its people is usually not the victor.
In a transparent attempt to salvage some sense of competence
and purpose, both of which have been wholly absent in this sordid
episode, the administration has sought to redefine American inter-
ests in Iraq. Thus, we have been told that our interests lie to the
south, not the north, as if honor and credibility can be lost in one
place and found in another.
The idea that enlarging the no-fly zone in the south could some-
how compensate for our abject defeat in the north is ludicrous. No


27
one outside the White House takes seriously the claim that we
have strengthened our position by enjoining Saddam from flying
over parts of the south that he controls with his superior ground
forces; not even, one hopes, the administration itself.
For however unappealing this disingenuous pretense may be, the
possibility that the administration believes its own lies is down-
right dangerous. We will never even try to fix our Iraq policy if we
nurture the illusion that it is not broken. I urge you to bear that
in mind as you hear the administration witnesses.
Our interests in the north of Iraq, which was supported by Oper-
ation Provide Comfort, included but were not limited to, dem-
onstrate that this opposition to Saddam Hussein was such that he
could not control a large part of Iraqi national territory. Moreover,
control over the north was, and remains, a necessary precondition
for any effective concerted action against Saddam Hussein's re-
gime.
In any case, the United States offered protection to the Kurds of
northern Iraq and others, worked with them and sought to rec-
oncile differences among them, supported non-Kurdish opposition
groups based in northern Iraq, and promised to deter action
against them by making it known to Saddam Hussein that an at-
tack against them would have, and I quote, "serious consequences."
When tested, those interests were abandoned. The promises were
broken and the fiction that we never had any interests in the north
was created to excuse the failure. The serious consequences turned
out to be a few dozen costly cruise missiles delivered against low-
cost targets.
In sum, the 7 weeks since Saddam invaded Irbil and other north-
ern cities and towns, have been a disaster for American policy in
Iraq that calls into question the underlying competence of the de-
partments responsible for developing and administering adminis-
tration policy as well as the competence and resolve of the most
senior officials in this Government.
Let me just add, Mr. Chairman, that I am critical here not only
of this administration, but its predecessor as well. And in this re-
gard, permit me to observe that Mr. Eisenstad has demolished the
cliche to which the administration and its predecessor so erringly
subscribed; that we should look with equanimity on the continued
rule of a thug like Saddam Hussein because, however objectionable
he may be, Saddam is necessary to contain Iran.
And I was disappointed to hear my friend Richard Haass repeat
that rubbish here this morning. In what sense? In what sense does
Saddam Hussein in power inhibit Iran from its support for inter-
national terrorism?
In what sense does Saddam's continuation in power diminish
Iran's search for nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass de-
struction? In what sense does Saddam in Iraq diminish Iran's sup-
port for radical fundamentalist insurgencies around the world?
The truth is this is a simplistic cliche that was adopted unhap-
pily by the previous administration and has been continued by this.
And I urge this committee to examine it in detail, because it won't
stand up.
Mr. Chairman, the essential points about Saddam Hussein can
be stated simply: He rules Iraq by force without legitimacy and


32
terms acceptable to the membership of the INC. Until this is accomplished, we should regard the KDP
as allied with Saddam Hussein against the INC. The INC still holds territory in northern Iraq. If
necessary, we should be prepared to use air power and the supply of military equipment to protect it.
Third, future actions taken in response to unacceptable behavior by Saddam Hussein must be
aimed at the Republican Guard and the secret police, Saddam's elite forces and the instruments by
which he retains power.
Fourth, we should no longer consider that Saddam Hussein is entitled to the respect accorded
the legitimate head of a sovereign state. By his actions, including the execution of unarmed civilians
in early September and his wanton disregard for United Nations resolutions, he has lost any claim to
the normal trappings of sovereignty. Instead, we should seek, as a matter of priority, to obtain an
indictment at the Hague for his many war crimes.
Fifth, the Congress should launch an independent investigation with eventual public hearings
on the development and implementation of American policy toward Iraq. All of the government
departments responsible for the current debacle should be scrutinized with respect to substance and
procedure at whatever level of detail is necessary to establish responsibility.
Mr. Chairman, I hope the Committee will forgive the tone of outrage that I have failed to
suppress in making these remarks. But following the Administration's shameful policy toward
Bosnia, which left thousands dead who believed they were assured safety, the magnitude of this latest
failure, the human cost of the abandonment of promises on which people, now dead, had relied and the
damage to our honor and our interests—I find it hard to be dispassionate and harder still to abide the
lies and deceit with which it is being explained away.


46
side powers using them as pawns? If you could shed some light on
those two things I would appreciate it.
Mr. PeRle. Without getting into the complicated history of the
Kurds, let me just say that since the gulf war, the Kurds, who have
exercised significant control over northern Iraq, have been pre-
vented effectively from earning a living, if I can put it that way.
We have, because of the embargo on Iraq, prevented the Kurds
from exporting from their own area. So they have suffered more
than the regime in terms of holding their people together and feed-
ing their families, to say nothing of strengthening their ability to
resist Saddam Hussein.
For example, there is a great deal of oil in areas under Kurdish
control, but we would not allow that oil to be shipped outside, out-
side the Kurdish areas. So they were embargoed in effect both by
Saddam and the United States and its coalition partners, an in-
credibly stupid policy. So the two groups were in effect quarreling
over a shrinking pie. Obviously, one of the solutions would have
been to assist them in finding a way to survive.
Beyond that, we became important to their efforts to reconcile
longstanding differences and at crucial junctures when a modest ef-
fort on our part might have gone a long way toward holding them
together, because through much of this period despite quarrels,
they managed to put things together, we didn't make those efforts
at crucial times.
I believe that the history of American handling of this set of is-
sues is a very discouraging history. We are simply not competent
to do it very well. And this is a bipartisan condemnation against
Republican and Democratic administrations alike who have failed
to handle this well.
Under these circumstances, I have kind of a simple rule. That is,
if you have a friend who shares your goals and aspirations who un-
derstands something better than you do, subcontract. Which is why
I put the emphasis in my remarks on turning to the Iraqi National
Congress and asking them to organize in the north, which they
have done. They understand the situation a great deal better than
we do. They know how to put a coalition together. They need and
deserve support. They are broadly representative. They have
Democratic aspirations.
And I see no reason why we shouldn't support them fully and
give them an opportunity to demonstrate that they know better
than we how to manage the process of maintaining that coalition
in the north against Saddam, and they still have territory in the
north from which they can operate.
The administration has been urged to do this on a number of oc-
casions and have chosen not to do so. I hope that if you do have
the inquiry I am urging that you get into the question of why,
given our dismal history, we didn't ask people who know more
about this than we do to act in our behalf.
Mr. Eisenstadt. If I could provide my understanding of the na-
ture of the conflict between the Kurdish factions, you have personal
rivalries between Barazani and Talabani, partly ego-driven. Over
money, basically Turkish trucks, there is a crossing on the Turkish-
Iraqi border used by Turkish trucks that come in on a daily basis
and get Iraqi oil. This is an area controlled by the KDP. They were


67
Mr. Hunter. Were those airbases used and major instruments in
the move against the Kurds, the ones that you say we closed down?
Mr. RleDEl. Not in the move against the Kurds. He did not use
significant airpower with the Kurds. But has used them in previous
military operations and they were used to support Iraqi forces dur-
ing Desert Storm.
Mr. Hunter. These were military airbases. We effectively closed
down two military airbases with our cruise missile attacks?
Mr. Rledel. With the extension of the no-fly zone by not allowing
him to fly out of those bases. And he moved the aircraft that were
based in those two airbases out of the region immediately.
Mr. Hunter. OK. I am just trying to link up what we did in
terms of extending the no-fly zone. We didn't physically with cruise
missiles destroy those airbases but by extending the no-fly zone we
prohibit, assuming that they live within the prohibition, the use of
the airbases?
Mr. RleDel. That is correct. Effectively they can't use them to
fly.
Mr. Hunter. Where did he move his aircraft when they moved
them out?
Mr. Rledel. He moved them to airbases north of the 33d par-
allel.
Mr. Hunter. How did that disadvantage him?
Mr. Riedel. By keeping them further away from what we regard
as our most strategic interest, the oilfields and energy resources in
our gulf allies, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. His ability to threaten
what is important to us has been reduced by literally forcing his
forces further back.
Mr. Hunter. How much further back do we send them? If the
general wants to help on that, fine.
Mr. RleDel. We expanded it roughly by 60-nautical miles from
south to north.
Mr. Hunter. So you moved—this forced him to displace his mili-
tary aircraft maybe 60 miles?
General, do you have any elucidation on that? I am just trying
to figure out what happened as a result of this. It sounds good; I
just want to know what happened.
STATEMENT OF MAJ. GEN. J.A. VAN ALSTYNE, VICE DIRECTOR
FOR OPERATIONS, JOINT STAFF
General Van Alstyne. As a direct result of the close down of the
airfield, a number of high performance Iraq aircraft were moved at
least 60 miles north of those air bases to 75 or 80 miles.
Mr. Hunter. What were those aircraft? What general types of
military aircraft was he forced to move?
General Van Alstyne. These were high performance MiG 25 air-
craft.
Mr. Hunter. Does this really—has the Iraqi air force really been
a threat to us in the past?
Mr. RleDel. It certainly makes it far more difficult for him to
contemplate an operation moving south because he would have to
move without air support.
Mr. Hunter. And how many planes did he move again?
Mr. Riedel. Roughly 45 to 50.


79
Mr. Geren. When they began this 3,000 tank invasion of Irbil,
how far away was the base from which those tanks were launched?
Mr. Riedel. Very close. Thirty to fifty miles a way. Very close.
Mr. Geren. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. I appreciate that. Thank
you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Hunter. Certainly. Mr. Dellums.
Mr. DellUms. I have one question I would like to ask that goes
to the whole issue of coalition. It is fairly complex, but the stream
of continuity is there. How do these recent unilateral actions ad-
vance or retard on the other hand the United States ability to pre-
serve a multinational coalition organized to implement internation-
ally sanctioned activities?
Doesn't such unilateral activity attenuate international consen-
sus on an appropriate course of action to contain potential Iraqi ag-
gression? Thereby undermining in the long run the legal basis for
the strategy? Isn't it vital to our success of the region that we not
step too far in front of our allies, both those from the region, and
those outside the region in our interpretation of both what is allow-
able under the various resolutions and what is required as a prac-
tical matter to maintain security in the region?
Mr. Riedel. The short answer to your question is, I don't think
we undermined our coalition. The longer answer is, I would say the
following: Coalition maintenance is not easy work. It required a
great deal of effort.
I can speak for the Department of Defense. Secretary Perry and
Chairman Shalikashvili and others spent a lot of time working
with our coalition partners of the region not just in crisis but in
inviting them to the Pentagon and talking to them in times of non-
crisis, in talking with them on the telephone in times of noncrisis,
and in visiting the region when we do have serious problems.
By the nature of coalition politics, oftentimes what is said in pub-
lic is less clear cut than what is said to us privately in meetings
that we have face-to-face with coalition partners. In this case when
the Secretary went out to the region 2 weeks ago and visited key
partners whose support we have to have because it is their bases
that we operate from, we got the support we need to have.
It is something I think Dr. Haass and others alluded to this
morning that requires a great deal of effort and is subject to a lot
of outside events. Events in the Arab-Israeli peace process, events
in the history of Russia, events in the European theater all impact
on the ability to have this coalition.
And make one final note, the coalition. I was a participant in the
process of putting the coalition together in 1990 and 1991. It wasn't
so perfect then. There is a tendency to think of it as it was, iron-
clad and 10 feet tall. If one goes back, one will look and see that
even then we had a lot of difficulties holding some of our European
partners with us. We had attempts with the Russians and the
French right up until the last moments of Desert Storm to try to
broker separate deals.
Coalition building is a full-time job. The Secretary and I think
his colleagues recognized that, and that is why we have gone out
to the region repeatedly to try to hold this coalition together.
Mr. Dellums. The final followup—your answer to my question
occasions this. This morning there was a very aggressive assertion,