COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
JESSE HELMS, North Carolina, Chairman
RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana
JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR., Delaware
PAUL COVERDELL, Georgia
PAUL S. SARBANES, Maryland
CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska
CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut
GORDON H. SMITH, Oregon
JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts
CRAIG THOMAS, Wyoming
CHARLES S. ROBB, Virginia
ROD GRAMS, Minnesota
RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin
JOHN ASHCROFT, Missouri
DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California
BILL FRIST, Tennessee
PAUL D. WELLSTONE, Minnesota
SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas
JAMES W. NANCE, Staff Director
EDWIN K. HALL, Minority Staff Director
SUBCOMMITTEE ON NEAR EASTERN AND SOUTH ASIAN AFFAIRS
SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas, Chairman
GORDON H. SMITH, Oregon
CHARLES S. ROBB, Virginia
ROD GRAMS, Minnesota
DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California
JESSE HELMS, North Carolina
PAUL D. WELLSTONE, Minnesota
JOHN ASHCROFT, Missouri
PAUL S. SARBANES, Maryland
(II)


sition group? Even if the U.S. went forward with a program to sta-
bilize or oust Saddam, can anyone seriously hope to dislodge him?
Our witnesses today are Mr. Ahmed Chalabi, president of the
Iraqi National Congress. We also have presenting the Hon. R.
James Woolsey, the former director of the CIA, and Dr. Zalmay
Khalilzad of the Rand Corporation.
This is a difficult hearing, but one which must be held. If the
problem is Saddam, we must see if there are alternatives to him,
and God help us all around the world here and in Iraq as we con-
sider these and deliberate on this topic.
We will have tough questions for the panelists. We need tough
questions to be put forward to you and very clear answers from you
as much as we possibly can, so we will look forward to your testi-
mony.
I am delighted that joining me today is the ranking member of
the subcommittee as well, Senator Robb from Virginia, who has a
statement to make, and we may have some other members joining
us as well as we go along, but Senator Robb, if you have a com-
ment.
Senator ROBB. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for
holding this hearing. It is obviously an important hearing. We are
dealing with a very sensitive and dicey subject matter, and almost
every Member of Congress has his or her own prescription for how
to resolve the current dilemma. That is one of the difficulties.
There are clear precedents for many of the activities that have
been suggested, and there are very clear dangers to the United
States and the international community for our failure to success-
fully complete any one of a number of options that may be consid-
ered.
I would say this topic in particular deserves as much bipartisan-
ship as we can bring to the table. It is one where I think that clear-
ly our national interest is very much involved and at stake, and it
would be my hope that not only in this hearing, obviously, but in
all of our deliberations, that we would consider the implications of
whatever we may have to say in terms of what effect it might have
on those who are most intimately involved with the decisionmaking
process and the consequences of failing to take or failing to com-
plete actions that may be suggested.
So again, Mr. Chairman, I acknowledge that this is an extraor-
dinarily important and certainly timely topic, but I think it is im-
portant that we exercise much caution as we proceed so that we
do not provide anyone with misunderstandings that might com-
plicate the process for those who actually have to make the very
difficult decisions involved and in which all of us will be asked to
provide our advice and counsel at the appropriate time.
But with that, I thank you for calling the hearing, for chairing
the hearing, and I look forward to hearing from our witnesses.
Senator BROWNBACK. Thank you, Senator Robb.
Mr. Chalabi, as the president of the Executive Council of the
Iraqi National Congress, will be our first witness. We are delighted
to have you here. There has been much written about the Iraqi Na-
tional Congress and what it has gone through, its continued viabil-
ity today.


I look forward to your testimony and then we will have a number
of questions for you afterwards, but welcome to the committee. The
floor is yours.
STATEMENT OF AHMED CHALABI, PRESIDENT OF THE EXECU-
TIVE COUNCIL, IRAQI NATIONAL CONGRESS, LONDON, ENG-
LAND
Mr. CHALABI. Thank you very much, Senator.
I am honored to be here this afternoon to speak to your distin-
guished committee. Let me start by saying that I am Ahmed
Chalabi, president of the Executive Council of the Iraqi National
Congress. I am here as an elected representative of the Iraqi peo-
ple, and in their name I am proud to speak with you today.
I think that it is important that the appeal of the Iraqi people
for freedom be heard by the American people whom you represent.
For too long, U.S.-Iraq policy has been decided by a small group of
so-called experts who view the Iraqi people as incapable of self-gov-
ernment, as a people who require a brutal dictatorship to live and
work together. Such a view is racist. It runs counter to 7,000 years
of Iraqi history and to the universality of the principles of liberty
and democracy central to United States foreign policy.
I am here today to appeal to the larger America, the America
that believes in liberty and justice for all. I welcome the oppor-
tunity.
Iraq is the most strategically important country in the Middle
East. It has a central geographical position, a talented and indus-
trious population, abundant farmland and water, and lakes and
lakes of oil. Iraq has the largest oil reserves of any nation on
Earth. Iraq has so much oil that most of the country is still unex-
is enormous wealth, this enormous potential is the birth-
right of the Iraqi people. It has been stolen from them by a tyrant.
You must realize that the Iraqi people are Saddam's first victims.
Saddam and his gang of thugs took absolute power in 1968. Since
that time, the Iraqi people have been driven into slav
by the hundreds of thousands, and shackled to a rapacious war ma-
chine responsible for the deaths of millions and, if the appeasement
recently negotiated by the United Nations Secretary-General, now
being debated in the United Nations Security Council, is allowed
to stand, it is the Iraqi people who will be the first to suffer an-
other slaughter.
Kofi Annan went to Baghdad to negotiate with Saddam Hussein
Kofi Annan is proud of the fact. Kofi Annan said that the agree-
ment he negotiated was different, because he negotiated with
President Saddam Hussein himself. Kofi Annan praised Saddam as
a decisive man, as a man he could do business with, as a man
whose concern was for his people.
Saddam is a mass murderer who is personally responsible for the
genocidal slaughter of at least 200,000 Iraqi Kurds, 250,000 other
Iragis, Arabs in this case, and tens of thousands of Iraqi dissidents
in the last 10 years.
Max van der Stoel, the U.N. Special Rapporteur for Human
Rights in Iraq, has documented the repression of Iraq as the
gravest violation of human rights since the second world war.


to encompass the whole opposition and to elect a new leadership
for the INC.
With United States political support and United States military
protection, the Iraqi National Congress was able to build head-
quarters and bases inside Iraq, establish and program television
and radio stations, organize medical clinics, and conduct intel-
ligence and military operations against Saddam. .
These activities were undertaken by Iraqis on Iraqi territory,
using primarily Iraqi resources. At the height of the INC's oper-
ations, before Saddam was allowed to mass 400 Russian T-72
tanks against us, the INC directly employed nearly 7,000 Iraqis
and had organized in-country networks involving thousands more.
All were, and many are still, engaged in the fight against Saddam.
It is true that INC was hurt when Saddam's tanks were allowed
to invade Arbil, our headquarters, slaughter our lightly armed
troops, imprison and torture and execute our computer program-
mers, our TV engineers, and our medical relief staff. It is also true
that the INC had open political assurances from the highest levels
of the U.S. Government that the U.S. Government would protect
the inhabitants of northern Iraq from Saddam's repression.
On the strength of these assurances, the INC did not acquire
antitank defenses. In fact, the INC was actively discouraged by
U.S. officials from doing so. We do not, and we hope you do not,
intend to make the same mistake again.
It is important to realize that the strength of the Iraqi National
Congress, as is the case with all democratic movements, is in the
people of the country. Through INC broadcasts and INC networks
and INC diplomacy, the INC is well-known inside Iraq and has a
large but unorganized following.
I offer you an example with wood Atlanta Olympics, the Iraqi
an example with which you and your constituents
might be familiar. During the 1996 Atlanta Olympics,
Olympic flag-bearer defected to the Iraqi National Congress. Before
his defection, he had never spoken to an INC member, and yet
from INC radio he was familiar enough with the INC program for
a democratic Irag that within hours he was speaking for the INC
on U.S. and international network television.
The INC's popular base is its greatest strength and Saddam's
greatest weakness, and it is for this reason that I am here to ask
for overt U.S. support, not covert U.S. action. Saddam can only be
removed by a popular insurgency. He is coup-proof.
The Iraqi National Congress does not support the program now
being attributed to the United States Central Intelligence Agency
to use mercenary agents to conduct sabotage against the Iraqi peo-
ple's infrastructure. The Iraqi National Congress rejects the
Central Intelligence Agency's characterization of a small group of
ex-Iraqi army officers as a major Iraqi opposition party,
The IN eplores the recent CIA-sponsored broadcasts promot-
ing military rule in Iraq. It is not up to the CIA to determine Iraq's
leadership. It is up to the Iraqi people.
The Iraqi National Congress is a democratic movement open to
all Iraqi political parties. I am here in the name of the INC and
the Iraqi people it represents to ask for an open U.S. commitment
to support Iraqi democracy. Open U.S. support for the Iraqi Na-


14
The very last paragraph of your prepared testimony you said,
best of all the INC will do all of this for free, and then you talk
about the number of assets that the international community and
specifically the United States already has in place and then you
talk about, military assistance requested by the INC for the provi-
sional government can be secured by Iraq's frozen assets, which are
the property of the Iraqi people.
First of all, do you know what constitute the frozen assets, and
by what claim do those belong to the Iraqi people?
Mr. CHALABI. Those are held now in the name of the Iraqi Gov.
ernment, and they are frozen. We know there are claims against
them from American companies who have debts now. However,
those assets are still held in the name of the Iraqi Government.
If there is a provisional government and if Saddam is
delegitimated, then one would expect that it would be possible, al-
though complicated, for the United States to say that we can block
a certain amount of these funds and lend money against them to
the provisional government. That is the idea.
Senator ROBB. Again, I am in sympathy, empathy with the desire
to find an alternative to the current government in Iraq, make no
mistake about that, but I want to also make sure that we under-
stand, even on the basis of your statement, what you are asking
the United States to do.
Now, as you suggested, what are referred to as frozen Iraqi as-
sets are, in fact, international claims, international payments that
happen to be frozen because of the fortuity of that particular ac-
tion. They do not represent the kind of assets that would provide
a base of support.
I know they have been referred to by any number of commenta-
tors as a source of potential funding because of the difficulty of the
process of direct appropriations here in the United States for activi-
ties that might be either overt, covert, whatever the case may be,
and a current desire to find a “pot of money,” but it is important
to understand what those assets represent and what they do not
represent in terms of essentially government assets that are avail-
able to some other entity that might represent in provisional form
the people of Iraq.
Is this the only way that you can see to fund any potential provi-
sional opposition by the Iraqi National Congress and others that
might be brought into some common undertaking to eventually dis-
place, without going into details, Saddam and his current regime?
Mr. CHALABI. No, Senator. There are several other alternatives.
There is an alternative of, if the United States wo
provisional government it can appropriate money for a loan to this
provisional government which would be repaid immediately out of
oil that would be produced from the areas in the south.
Senator ROBB. To whom would the U.S. Government appropriate
this loan, I think is the way you are describing it?
Mr. CHALABI. To the provisional government that would be estab-
lished, the Iraqi provisional government. Sir, this has been done in
the past. The money was given to the president of Haiti from Hai-
tian accounts in Panama. It was done the same way, also. There
are precedents farther back.


21
has
third, the fact that this whole dispute sits right at the heart of ap-
proximately 80 percent of the world's proven oil reserves. About 65
percent of those reserves lie in the Persian Gulf, and perhaps an-
other 15 percent or so in the basin of the Caspian Sea just north
of the area we are talking about.
So approximately 80 percent of the world's oil reserves, over the
long run, are essentially held by one of two types of regimes now:
psychopathic predators, such as Saddam's regime, or vulnerable
autocrats. And that is not a happy situation for the world, for any
of us.
Second, what mistakes have we made in the past with respect to
dealing with Iraq?
In my judgment, beginning almost in the closing hours of the
Gulf War, at the end of the Bush administration and for the first
5-plus years of this administration, our policy with regard to Iraq
en both flaccid and feckless. We have had no long-run strat-
egy for dealing with this nation and the threat that its government
poses.
In 1991, as Mr. Chalabi said, we abandoned the Marsh Arabs,
the Shia of the South, to being murdered in large numbers by
Saddam's forces, when we had the forces there to stop it. In 1993,
it was as demonstrable as these things ever get that Saddam and
his regime attempted to assassinate former President George Bush.
The U.S. Government, at the time, fired a few cruise missiles at
night into an empty building so that no one would be hurt, a pin-
prick response. And in 1996, when Saddam came north into Arbil,
murdering hundreds of Iraqis, perhaps thousands, the United
States and its military force, particularly its air power, also stood
silent.
Why did we follow these policies from the spring of 1991 until
today?
I believe there are two reasons. First, there has been a general
view, I suppose, among government policymakers that it is better
to bear those ills we have than fly to others that we know not of.
People have been concerned to some extent about the dissolution
of Iraq and the uncertainties that would be produced by some fu-
ture absent Saddam. And, second, we have listened rather closely
to some of Iraq's neighbors, our friends in Saudi Arabia and other-
wise, who were particularly concerned about uncertainty.
On the whole, I believe this has been a bad call. It has been a
mistake to avoid the uncertainty of the future and to believe we
could deal with a weakened Saddam instead. I believe both the
Bush administration and the Clinton administration have made
that mistake.
Third, what should we do now?
We have not had a long-term strategy, and we need one. I agree
with Mr. Chalabi, what we need is an open program, no more cov-
ert than absolutely necessary. I would hope that it could be entirely
n. I might call it containment-plus, but that is a big plus.
I believe we need to espouse democracy and representative insti-
tutions for Iraq. I believe that the desire of the Iraqi people on this
can be made clear and will become clear as that goal becomes more
likely. I believe the Iraqi people and their neighbors and the world
deserves an Iraqi Government with leaders who exhibit the values


29
for which Mr. Chalabi speaks, rather than the danger for all of us
exhibited by Saddam's regime.
The only point at which I would differ with him is that I believe
such a policy is not easy, and it may take years. We have already
wasted over 6 years by the feckless and flaccid policy we have had
since the spring of 1991. And it may well take a long time before
what he has suggested, and others will suggest and I am suggest-
ing, will take effect. Nonetheless, one has to begin when one can
begin.
I believe it would be wise for us to recognize a government in
exile. Probably the Iraqi National Congress is the only realistic
place to start. We should use sea power to stop Saddam's smug-
gling of oil from which he gains substantial resources today. I
would not object to fully controlled sales, such as the Security
Council has approved, the proceeds of which would go to the Iraqi
people for food and medicine. But the smuggling which goes on in
the Gulf, we should stop.
Insofar as it is possible, we should provide any frozen assets or
loans based on such assets to such a government in exile, either
to make it possible for it to arm itself or to assist with arms, par-
ticularly some specialized arms such as antitank weapons.
I believe we should remove the sanctions from the liberated
areas of Iraq. And if those areas expand, continue to remove sanc-
tions from areas that are not under Saddam's control. If possible,
any liberated areas should be able to export oil and to profit there-
by.
"I think it is wise and important to bring charges against Saddam
and others senior in his government for war crimes before inter-
national tribunals. I believe that we should protect the north and
the south with air power, as Mr. Chalabi suggested—as we did not
do in 1991 and as we did not do in 1996—whenever Saddam seeks
to exercise military power in those parts of the country.
Saddam is in breach of the current cease-fire, which has been in
effect since the spring of 1991. And I believe we need no further
authority to conduct ourselves in such a way as to enforce that
cease-fire.
I believe broadcasting into Iraq is an excellent idea. Lech Walesa
and Vaclev Havel both said that Radio Free Europe was the single
most important thing that the United States did during the cold
war.
Based on my prior occupation for 2 years, a bit of pride suggests
that I should at least remind this committee that for most of its
existence, Radio Free Europe was a CIA covert action. It ceased
being covert in the 1970's. It is now a fine functioning institution.
I know that the head of Radio Free Europe, Mr. Thomas Dyne,
would be delighted to begin broadcasting into Iraq, and it would
also be fine, I believe, for the Iraqi government in exile, of course,
to do that.
I believe that we should prepare to use force from the air when-
and I do not say if—when Saddam violates the most recent agree-
ment that was negotiated by Kofi Annan. When that violation oc-
curs, when he blocks inspections, we should not limit our air
strikes to sites where there might or might not be weapons of mass
destruction or the wherewithal to produce them. The latter would


28
fused to come clean and give up completely its weapons program. The recent agree-
ment brokered by Kofi Annan will probably do little to change this. Saddam has re-
peatedly agreed to cooperate with the UN and just as frequently broken his prom-
ises.
(2) A gap is evident between our objective the elimination of Iraq's WMD and
missile programs and our "containment” strategy, which has included among other
things sanctions, “no fly” zones, and the occasional use or threat of military strikes.
This strategy has not produced the elimination of the WMD programs. Although
some argue that we may eventually succeed if we stay the course in the coming
years, this is becoming increasingly difficult. Support for our strategy is eroding,
both in the region and in the world.
(3) We will probably ultimately confront two alternatives: abandoning our objec-
tive and allowing Iraqi WMD and missiles or sending a large number of US air and
ground forces to Iraq for combat to eliminate both Saddam's regime and his WMD
program.
(4) We can still avoid these unpleasant alternatives. In addition, to maintaining
a robust military capability in the region and pressing Iraq to allow UNSCOM to
do its job, we should seriously consider encouraging the establishment of and sup-
port for a broad-based opposition to remove Saddam from power. The ultimate goal
should be to establish a regime that has peaceful intentions in the region, pursues
good relations with the United States, and respects the rights of the Iraqi people.
Will Saddam's Overthrow Be Beneficial?
The removal of a leader does not always produce positive results. In the case of
Iraq, however, things cannot be worse. Saddam has killed hundreds of thousands
of Iraqis, invaded two of his neighbors, used chemical weapons with disturbing regu-
larity, spoiled the Gulf environment with oil slicks and burning the Kuwait oil
fields, supported international terrorism, pursued weapons of mass destruction, and
sought regional hegemony. Thus, it is hard to imagine a successor regime worse
than Saddam. But the question is not just would a new leader be better, but how
to ensure that the successor government was the best possible one for the United
States, the region, and the people of Iraq.
The replacement of Saddam by another strongman, while a marginal improve-
ment, is not enough. Another dictatorship bent on regional hegemony is unlikely to
seek regional peace or give up Iraqi weapons of mass destruction. Only a broad-
based democratic regime offers the best prospects for an Iraq which pursues peace
at home, with the Gulf states and with the United States. Such an Iraq can be inte-
grated in regional security arrangements and can have the confidence to give up its
WMD and long range missile programs.
Can Saddam Hussein be Overthrown?
Overthrowing Saddam is difficult. He has a large security and intelligence appa-
ratus devoted to his personal security. He is brutal and has killed thousands of his
opponents. Nevertheless, he can be overthrown. There are several options:
(A) U.S.-led military operations to liberate Iraq. This will require a large-scale
military operation involving air and ground forces. An invasion of Iraq could involve
significant casualties and might risk involvement in a protracted war. Once Saddam
is removed from power, the United States would incur long-term obligations and
costs of occupation. Air strikes alone are unlikely to do the job even if a carefully
considered decision was made to go after Saddam. He moves frequently, employs de-
ception, and maintains tight security about his locations and his movements. To suc-
ceed, one would need real-time intelligence on his location and the capability to
strike targets effectively within the window provided by intelligence.
(B) Encourage the Iraqi military to remove him from power. Since Desert Storm,
this has been the option tacitly sought by the United States. According to press re-
ports, we have provided support and encouragement to former military officers for
such an operation. However, all attempted coups against Saddam have failed. He
has been both efficient and ruthless in crushing coup plotters. Whether future coups
attempts will succeed remains uncertain. Equally uncertain is the type of regime
that might be produced by a military coup. It is likely that a coup would produce
another dictatorial regime.
(C) Supporting the Iraqi people in establishing a broad-based and democratic op-
position and assist it in starting a more effective insurgency aimed at liberating
their country from Saddam Hussein. A new regime produced by a such a movement
is likely to be better in terms of Iraqi and US interests than continued rule by Sad-
dam or another military regime.


37
cances en are prepared to commit to it.
A containment policy along the lines outlined here promises to be better than ex-
plicit roll-back options. It may not offer the promise of a near-term solution that
Americans tend to favor, but it will limit the problem. Moreover, it is both doable
and affordable, something than cannot be said of more ambitious proposals. As a
rule, containment succeeds unless it is allowed to fail; roll-back fails unless it is able
to succeed.
To make containment effective, though, will require that it become a priority of
American foreign policy. It is not enough for the president and his chief lieutenants
to turn their attention to Iraq after Saddam creates a crisis. As was demonstrated
in our struggle with the Soviet Union, and as is demonstrated by what we are doing
in Korea, containment—"longterm, patient but vigilant” in George Kennan's original
formulation-can work if we are prepared to commit to it.
Moreover, Kennan's original formulation teaches us something else. A successful
containment policy can set in motion forces that can actually lead to the demise of
the regime in question. Change, if and when it comes to Iraq, is most likely to come
from actions taken by those in or near the center of power who have access to Sad-
dam and who would not be opposed by the majority of those in or near power. This
is what took place in the Soviet Union and much of the formerly communist world.
As a result, it is quite possible that the policy most likely to result in Saddam's
ouster is one that does not place this goal at the center of what it is we are trying
to bring about.
In the case of Iraq, this argues for a policy that would relax export restrictions
on Iraq only in the event of its full compliance with WMD-related obligations, main-
tain critical import sanctions for the foreseeable future, and regularly remind the
Iraqi people of improvements they can expect when they are led by a different lead-
ership that meets its international obligations. It would also require a readiness to
attack directly and with great intensity Saddam's domestic sources of support on
those occasions military force is justified. If all this leads to a change in Iraq's lead-
ership, so much the better. But the advantage of containment over the alternatives
is that it protects our core interests even if Saddam manages to hang on for months
or even years.
Senator BROWNBACK. Thank you, Dr. Haass.
We are going to close this hearing at 5, if we can, so we will each
try to make our questions maybe as germane and as short as pos-
sible. And if we can get as many answers as we could, I would ap-
preciate that. .
Having said that, I want to violate that at the very outset. I have
the Vice President's letter to Dr. Chalabi that is interesting from
the standpoint of its statements in here. And we will enter this
fully into the record.
But it says in this August 4, 1993 letter:
The President and I share the concerns you raised in your letter, and I assure
you that we will not turn our backs on the Kurds or the other Iraqi communities
subjected to the repression of Saddam Hussein's regime. Since April 1991, coalition
forces have protected the inhabitants of northern Iraq from Baghdad's repression,
and the administration is committed to continuing that effort.
And then it states their pledge of support for a democratic alter-
native to Saddam Hussein's regime:
I can assure you that the U.S. intends to live up to these commitments and to
give whatever additional support we can reasonably provide to encourage you in
your struggle for a democratic Iraq.
I can see what they base their views upon. We will enter that
into the record.
Mr. Woolsey and Dr. Khalilzad, if we could, I take it really from
what you are stating, you think we should reject the U.N.-nego-
tiated agreement and pursue this different, long-term strategy of
destabilizing Saddam?
Mr. WOOLSEY. I would put it a little differently, Mr. Chairman.
I do not have any real confidence that the U.N.-negotiated agree-
ment is going to deter Saddam for more than a very brief period,