COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
JESSE HELMS, North Carolina, Chairman
RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana
JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR., Delaware
PAUL COVERDELL, Georgia
PAUL S. SARBANES, Maryland
CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska
CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut
GORDON H. SMITH, Oregon
JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts
CRAIG THOMAS, Wyoming
CHARLES S. ROBB, Virginia
ROD GRAMS, Minnesota
RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin
JOHN ASHCROFT, Missouri
DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California
BILL FRIST, Tennessee
PAUL D. WELLSTONE, Minnesota
SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas
JAMES W. NANCE, Staff Director
EDWIN K. HALL, Minority Staff Director
COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND NATURAL RESOURCES
FRANK H. MURKOWSKI, Alaska, Chairman
PETE V. DOMENICI, New Mexico
DALE BUMPERS, Arkansas
DON NICKLES, Oklahoma
WENDELL H. FORD, Kentucky
LARRY E. CRAIG, Idaho
JEFF BINGAMAN, New Mexico
BEN NIGHTHORSE CAMPBELL, Colorado DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii
CRAIG THOMAS, Wyoming
BYRON L. DORGAN, North Dakota
JON KYL, Arizona
BOB GRAHAM, Florida
ROD GRAMS, Minnesota
RON WYDEN, Oregon
GORDON H. SMITH, Oregon
TIM JOHNSON, South Dakota
SLADE GORTON, Washington
MARY L. LANDRIEU, Louisiana
CONRAD BURNS, Montana
ANDREW D. LUNDQUIST, Staff Director
GARY G. ELLSWORTH, Chief Counsel
THOMAS B. WILLIAMS, Staff Director for the Minority
SAM E. FOWLER, Chief Counsel for the Minority
HOWARD USEEM, Professional Staff Member
MARY KATHERINE ISHEE, Counsel, Minority
(II)


IRAQ: ARE SANCTIONS COLLAPSING?
THURSDAY, MAY 21, 1998
U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, AND
COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND NATURAL RESOURCES,
Washington, DC.
The committees met, pursuant to notice, at 10:05 a.m., in room
SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Jesse Helms, [chair-
man of the Committee on Foreign Relations], and Hon. Frank Mur-
kowski, (chairman of the Committee on Energy and Natural Rela-
tions), presiding.
Present from the committee on Energy and Natural Resources:
Senators Murkowksi, Domenici, Campbell, Burns, and Johnson.
Present from the committee on Foreign Relations: Senators
Hagel, Thomas, Brownback, Robb, and Wellstone.
Chairman MURKOWSKI. Let me, on behalf of the chairman of the
Foreign Relations Committee, welcome you to the Iraq question,
are sanctions working or are sanctions collapsing?
Senator Helms and I have had numerous conversations on this
issue, and thanks to him and his professional staff and other mem-
bers of the Foreign Relations Committee we agreed to have a joint
hearing, and as chairman of the Energy & Natural Resources Com-
mittee, obviously we have an interest, and I see two members of
that committee, Senator Campbell and Senator Burns who are also
here as well as members of the Foreign Relations Committee.
It is my understanding Senator Helms may be delayed, and Sen-
ator Brownback will make the statement for the chairman on be-
half of the chairman and himself.
As well, I am happy to see my Democratic colleagues. I feel very
much at home back in the Foreign Relations Committee. I was on
ttee for 10 or 12 years. I had hoped to eventually make
the Finance Committee, and the worm finally turned, and I reluc-
tantly gave up this position.
But the purpose of today's hearing is to answer the question:
Have we so weakened U.N. sanctions that Saddam can keep his
weapons of mass destruction and threaten his neighbors and the
world's oil supply?
I think that the actions by the administration and the U.N. par-
ticularly have rendered the effectiveness of the sanctions less than
meaningful, and without effective sanctions the U.N. inspectors in
my opinion will never be able to force Saddam to destroy his weap-
ons of mass destruction.
Just last month, the U.N. chief arms inspector, Richard Butler,
reported that Iraq is not complying with U.N. requirements for lo-
(1)


cating and destroying weapons of mass destruction. Now, the ques-
tion is, can we verify his arsenal through intelligence?
Well, there is a mixed response to that. We obviously missed a
little of the activity in India the other day, so I will just leave that
open for further speculation, but clearly we were not and did not
detect India's nuclear weapons tests before they happened, and
how are we going to be sure about Iraq?
Perhaps some in the White House believe that Saddam Hussein
can be trusted. Well, I can tell you a little story about some experi-
ence that a number of Senators had back in 1989. Senator Dole,
Senator McClure, Senator Metzenbaum, Senator Simpson and my-
self were in that part of the world, and President Mubarak set up
a meeting with Saddam Hussein for lunch.
We flew to Baghdad to meet with Saddam Hussein and were met
at that time by our Ambassador, April Gillespie, and while we were
looking forward to the meeting, Ms. Gillespie arrived and advised
us that the meeting had been rescheduled for Mosul, and we were
quite taken aback, because we traveled a long way, and reluctantly
we would make the change, and we would fly up in our
airplane.
We were not too sure where Mosul was, up near the Turkish bor-
der, but in any event we were advised by Tarik Aziz that Saddam
had sent his airplane down to pick us up. With some reluctance we
said no, we will go in our airplane. He said, well, your airplane is
too big. Our runway is under construction.
So with Tarik we went in Saddam's airplane and got up to the
meeting, which was in a hotel overlooking the Tigris River, and
began our dialog with Saddam Hussein. At this time there was a
big issue of a cannon that allegedly was being built, and part of
it was found on the docks in London, and there was a triggering
mechanism, and we discussed everything from human rights, and
the conversational got quite emotional.
And finally at one point Saddam said, you come out on the front
porch. He said, there is a helicopter for each one of you. You go in
the helicopter, land anywhere in Iraq, ask the people what they
think of Saddam Hussein.
And Howard Metzenbaum said, I am not going. That would be
a one-way trip.
Chairman MURKOWSKI. At the conclusion Bob Dole said: Well, I
am never going
ping over there for lunch, because Saddam did not even
buy us lunch.
Šo the point of the issue is, as I started to say in my remarks,
I do not think you can trust him to keep his word, even if it is to
buy lunch.
Now, time and time again, I think we would agree Saddam has
proved himself untrustworthy. We can review the record. In the
early eighties Saddam invaded Iran. We had hundreds of thou-
sands that died. They used chemical weapons against Iran out of
desperation.
In 1990, Saddam invaded Kuwait, threatening the oil supplies,
and the United States and our allies spent billions of dollars, put
a half-million troops in harm's way to kick Saddam's—to keep Sad-
dam from invading Kuwait. He wanted the power associated with
the oil. It was an oil war.


4
very well put, about Saddam Hussein's ability to produce, and
where he is marketing it.
I welcome the Under Secretary here today on behalf of Chairman
Helms. I have got a statement to put in the record on behalf of
Chairman Helms of the Foreign Relations Committee that I will
submit for the record.
I will just note that a number of us in the Senate, Secretary
Pickering, are very worried that we are going down a course now
that does not remove the problem from Iraq, and the problem is
Saddam Hussein, and as long as he remains in power we are going
to be confronting him and his regime, and whether it is chemical
weapons or biological weapons or conventional weapons, we will be
confronting him.
And now it appears we are on a course to even finance and allow
the financing of Saddam Hussein in the region, and that is deeply
concerning to a number of us from various aspects, when he is the
oblem, and now he is going to have more money in his pocket,
and that is the sort of thing that I want to probe with you here.
And you are going to I think continue to hear a lot of comments
from the chairman of this committee, from myself, yo
to continue to hear it from Majority Leader Lott, as long as our
strategy seems to allow Saddam Hussein not only to stay in power
but to grow in strength and grow in financing, and I would like to
submit this statement into the record, and I look forward, Mr. Pick-
ering, to your statement and a frank dialog back and forth of where
the administration truly wants to take the U.S. strategy toward
Iraq.
ing, and appents have diste suspectention very United Natie
Is it just, Saddam is going to be there and we are going to gradu-
ally loosen the hold on him, or are we going to put in place a strat-
egy long-term for the removal of Saddam Hussein, and that is the
better strategy that I think we have to go at.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Senator Helms follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN JESSE HELMS
Mr. Undersecretary, we welcome you to this Foreign Relations Committee hear-
ing, and appreciate your joining us.
Recent events have distracted all of us from our responsibility to assess the situa-
tion in Iraq. However, I suspect Saddam Hussein will somehow catapult himself
back into the center of world attention very soon. He has good reason to do so: Each
time he defies the United States and the United Nations, he is rewarded by the
U.N. with lighter and lighter sanctions.
Mr. Secretary, I understand the problems you are having with the Russians, the
Chinese, and especially with the French. But I also understand that, if the Adminis-
tration does not stop seeking consensus at any cost, there eventually will come the
time when we will have whittled the Iraq sanctions down to the point where they
are meaningless. Indeed, we may already be there.
The latest oil for food deal with Iraq is a case in point. Consider how the Iraq
sanctions have been watered down since the end of the Gulf War: We have gone
from the all out prohibition on oil sales in 1991, to permitting Iraq to sell two billion
dollars worth of oil every six months in 1996 (for the purchase of food). Now, we
will permit Iraq-get this—to sell $5 billion worth of oil every six months. What for?
Supposedly to repair infrastructure, build hospitals and clinics, repair water sanita-
tion, rehabilitate the agriculture sector, import oil equipment, agricultural equip-
ment and spend $92 million on “education”, whatever all that means.
Mr. Pickering, what incentive does Saddam Hussein now have, under this grand
plan, to cooperate with the U.N. inspectors? Every time Saddam defies the UN, we
punish him by letting him sell more oil. Iraq was exporting barely $10 billion worth


And it also really bothers me, that agreement that Secretary-
General Annan made, as I understand it, puts a politically ap-
pointed group as the overseers of the UNSCOM inspectors, and I
know when Madeleine Albright testified here we asked her specifi-
cally about that, and she said, well, they will not have any veto au-
thority.
But that is not what Saddam Hussein has said publicly. He be-
lieves they do have veto authority, and I think we made some bad
international policy decisions that are going to come back to haunt
us in a few years, and I am interested certainly in hearing your
witnesses, but one thing for sure, we have certainly raised his stat-
ure in the Middle East and diminished ours in this whole sordid
affair.
So I am looking forward to the hearing. Thank you for calling it,
Mr. Chairman.
Chairman MURKOWSKI. Thank you very much. Senator Burns.
Senator BURNS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I want to
broaden this discussion a little bit this morning, and I want to
broaden it even to the point where we talk about sanctions.
Sanctions with any country—and yes, there are a lot of them, we
just returned from the Middle East 2 or 3 weeks ago and we talked
to our troops down there, and we also were in Bosnia for 4 days,
and the only reason I went on the trip, I thought it would be a
fancy trip because the chairman of the Appropriations Committee
was going to go, and they travel in style. However, 18 hours in a
C-141 dispelled that idea.
I want to broaden this a little bit, and I am also going to be a
little bit parochial, Mr. Pickering, because we have a crisis on the
Northern Great Plains of the United States of America. We have
a problem that when we make our foreign policy and we do certain
things, because of certain actions it causes a lot of distress to us
locally.
I think the Senator from South Dakota is here, probably knowing
what I am going to allude to, and that is, whenever we put sanc-
tions in place there is usually retaliations, and even though, ever
since the grain embargo of the seventies, you cannot stop us from
exporting agricultural products, the countries retaliate in that
area.
We are looking at a drought. We are looking at the worst wheat
prices that we have looked at in a long time, and there are many
factors to that that are uncontrollable even by us, and that is the
total financial collapse of the Pacific Rim, where the vast majority
of our exported products go.
Those exports have gone to nil. Last fall, we had two railroads
that merged, and they tried to do business down on the Gulf of
Mexico, and that was a snafu, and a lot of our producers did not
get to ship in a timely manner to take advantage of the market.
Here are some facts I want you to think about whenever we talk
about sanctions, and I am going to refer to an article that was in
Farm Journal in March. Wheat imports by Cuba, Iran, Iraq, Libya,
and North Korea, all of which are off-limits to U.S. products
doubled since 1995, and account for over 10 million tons, or 11 per-
cent of the world trade, and we are not allowed that market.


Now, I say that in the context of sanctions do not work. In fact,
on our list, Mr. Pickering, on our list there are some 75 countries
that represent 52 percent of the world's population that we are not
allowed to ship to. Other countries are shipping there. They ship
their product at a premium because of the psychology in the mar-
ket. Then we have to compete on the rest of the world
the lower end of the market.
We wanted to use some export enhancement programs, some ex-
port credits, and we finally got EEP on chickens.
Chairman MURKOWSKI. Chickens?
Senator BURNS. Chickens.
Chairman MURKOWSKI. That is what I thought you said.
Senator BURNS. We do not raise a lot of chickens in Montana or
South Dakota.
Chairman MURKOWSKI. We do not raise them in Alaska, either.
Senator BURNS. Well, there is a reason for that.
I want to broaden this just to say this morning that I think we
are going to see legislation that we will hope will deal with this,
because we have a crisis.
I am losing people, and yet the truck loads of wheat keep pouring
across the border from Canada, and we cannot even get a hearing
on some fairness or balance in this particular situation.
I do not think Saddam Hussein has any sanctions on him. I
think he is doing exactly what he wants to do, and yet he will re-
taliate on our agricultural products. He will absolutely, this man,
starve his own people to serve his own purpose, and I do not know,
the carrot has not worked very good. Maybe the stick will.
But I just want to make you aware of those figures, of what sanc-
tions do, and we should look at them very carefully, because I will
tell you, we have a segment of our economy that is responsible for
24 percent of the GDP in this country in trouble, and if you think
this economy is going to go on forever, with that big an industry
that has that much
much impact on our economy, is going to stay forever,
I would advise that you consider otherwise.
I am very, very upset this morning about this situation, and I
would like some time to get a hearing, and this is my only oppor-
tunity that I have. This is the only shot I get, is when we have
joint hearings.
But I am very concerned about the oil embargo. I said on the En-
1 Committee, along with the chairman, I am very concerned
about energy security, and yet we will allow different groups to bar
us in Montana from going on public lands and developing an en-
ergy supply that we have so much of. It is unbelievable. But we
t because we make policy by a feel-good methodology.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman MURKOWSKI. Thank you very much, Senator Burns.
You have obviously got your message across.
Senator BURNS. Well, we do not know yet.
Chairman MURKOWSKI. Well, I certainly heard it. Senator Hagel.
Senator HAGEL. Mr. Chairman, thank you. I, like my colleagues,
am grateful for an opportunity for the hearing. I wanted to advise
my friend and colleague from Montana that we do raise some
chickens in Nebraska.
Senator BURNS. You do not feed them to those footbal


21
on, and we are doing it in a way that makes a great deal of sense,
and we are doing it in a way that obviously takes into account the
fact that we do not have to starve 19 million people to do it.
Senator BROWNBACK. If I were an Iraqi citizen, and the situation
was getting better, and Saddam Hussein was still in power, I do
not think I am going to give that credit to the United Nations. I
think I am going to give that credit to Saddam Hussein. .
And I would direct your attention just to yesterday, a Reuter's
report that was out yesterday that said that Iraq is now requesting
funds in the oil-for-food program to improve their mobile telephone
network, and the response was from the officials of the United Na-
tions, they are saying, well, they cannot show a clear link between
that and the oil and food needs, and so the U.N. then asked, in re-
turn said, ask Iraq to restate its request for phone equipment mak-
ing it clear it would lead to better warehouse management and
other improvements in food distribution.
Well, that sure seems a long ways from food, and it appears as
if we have opened this completely wide open.
Mr. PICKERING. It does to us. We have made it very clear we will
not support that particular effort.
Senator BROWNBACK. Well, good, and I hope you will keep the
strategy of removing him from power.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman MURKOWSKI. We have been joined by Senator
Wellstone, and also Senator Domenici was here and is coming back.
In the order of attendance it would be Senator Hagel next.
Senator HAGEL. Mr. Chairman, thank you. Secretary Pickering,
thank you.
This is obviously a difficult situation, no easy answers, but I
want to focus a little bit on a couple of comments you made in pick-
ing up a little bit where Senator Brownback was going. You ref-
erenced our U.N. Security Council partners being a little less than
enthusiastic about continuation of these sanctions.
Realistically, you have asked yourselves, I suspect, and we must
all ask ourselves, what is the viability—the real question here is,
how long can we sustain these sanctions, and if we stay with the
core issue here of the hearing, are these sanctions collapsing in
Iraq with an erosion of U.N. Security Council support, with an ero-
sion of some allies' support, and other complications that you have
enunciated clearly, and with other Senators here talking about
some of the specifics.
Could you give me some comment, analysis of where you think
all this is going, and that then leads into the next part of this, Mr.
Secretary. We know short-term solutions can work for a while, and
sanctions are short-term solutions. What is our long-term solution?
What is our policy toward Iraq beyond enforcing the implementa-
tion of sanctions?
Mr. PICKERING. Senator, I think there are two quite simple an-
swers to both parts of that question. Answer number one, it is the
U.S. policy that he has to comply with all of the resolutions be-
fore-I was going to say all the revolutions, but all the resolutions
before the sanctions can come off.
Second, having had the pleasure of participating in writing these
sanctions, it was very clear that when we wrote the original sanc-


22
tions we made it possible for any single permanent member, in-
cluding the United States, to oppose the removal of sanctions using
the veto that we have, so that they would not come off if we were
not fully satisfied that all the resolutions had been met, and so we
have in that sense a unique and dispositive role in the removal of
sanctions, and I see no interest on the part of the United States
in changing its policy in this regard.
The second question is, where do we want Iraq to go? I think
quite obviously we would like to see a successor regime to Iraq that
would represent the interests of all the Iraqi people, the three
major ethnic and religious groups, that would move the country in
the direction we would like to see all countries move, one that ob-
serves human rights, one that has democracy. This would be a real
revolution, to go back to my former Freudian slip, and take the
question that far forward.
Nevertheless, I think it is in our interests to continue to promote
that direction for Iraq, however difficult it may seem now to see the
disappearance of Saddam Hussein right around the corner.
It is certainly what we would like to see, but it is not an issue,
and it has been debated in these halls and in my halls and in the
press, that we have, to borrow Senator Robb's phrase, a silver bul-
let magic early tomorrow solution to.
We must be patient. We must be persistent. We must use the
very effective sanctions regime that has been put in place to con-
tinue to keep all possible pressure on this and, at the same time,
because we have not discussed this in detail, we must continue
fully to support UNSCOM in the remarkable work that they have
done, but which is still not complete, in getting at the weapons of
mass destruction.
We believe that there are real possibilities he still has serious
weapons, particularly in the chemical and biological area, and we
at there have not been answers to all the
questions on nuclear and certainly on missiles.
Senator HAGEL. Well, I want to go back to another part of the
question, because it is not your fault that we found ourselves a few
months ago with one ally who was willing to step forward with the
United States and say, yes, we will be with you, Great Britain said,
but we are the only one who will be with you to enforce the sanc-
tions, and I think we are kidding ourselves a little bit, Mr. Sec-
retary, if we congratulate ourselves on sanctions when in fact there
is no only an erosion, but there may be a rather significant gap
here in what is happening for the future.
And I do not know what the answer is. It is difficult. It is com-
plicated. It is connected to Iran and all the pieces that you know
so well, better than probably any of us, but what I would like to
hear more is about what we are doing to deal with that for the long
term, because it is pretty clear to me that this is a slow death kind
of thing.
We are eroding and eroding, and everybody is backing off from
the latest position that the administration is taking that Senator
Brownback' mentioned on the ILSA sanctions, and I think, by the
way, there is some thoughtful pieces to that, and I think it is de-
fensible in some areas, but we do not want to keep going through
this and have to put you in a position, nor do you want to be in


25
Mr. PICKERING. I think there is a serious debate that his number
one objective exclusive of any others is the removal of sanctions. I
also think his number one objective, together with removal of sanc-
ons, is the preservation of everything he can preserve in his
weapons of mass destruction program.
Senator ROBB. Let me look to the other side of the question.
Again, I feel a little awkward in the situation, because I have con-
sistently been advocated a tougher position in many cases than the
administration, or succeeding administrations have taken against
not only Saddam Hussein but others who have thwarted the will
of the international community in much the same way, but what
would be the effect if we were to end the food-for-oil program a
this point on the Iraqi people, and what would be the reaction of
the international community?
Mr. PICKERING. I covered that in my prepared statement. The op-
tions if we end the oil-for-food program I think would be serious
mass starvation in Iraq, at least major reductions in caloric intake
levels of very serious proportions. I am not a nutrition expert or a
specialist in this.
It is also very clear that that would take place because Saddam
began by feeding his people on a minimal basis and then has taken
advantage of unfortunately the oil-for-food program to reduce that
support. It would take a more deep study to know whether there
was a cash advantage to him in that or not. I just do not know.
The other alternative would be, in my view, adding impetus to
the pressure that we have seen to remove sanctions in order to deal
with the problem of mass starvation, or at least mass underfeeding
of the Iraqi people, and as a result, that is why I make such a
strong case for the oil-for-food program.
Senator ROBB. What is your sense, and I know you alluded to
this as well as to the ultimate effect, at least in a more cataclysmic
sense, of what would happen if the oil-for-food program were elimi-
nated, but what is your sense of the effect of the rather porous
sanctions effort that is taking place to date with all of the carve-
outs that you alluded to in your opening statements?
How would you characterize the health of the people that the
food-for-oil sanctions, or the exception to the sanctions are designed
to assist, as compared to those that are particularly loyal to and
surrounding Saddam Hussein, to include the Republican Guard
and other echelons of society that he might favor?
Mr. PICKERING. Well, as I said in simple terms when I was in
New York before the Gulf War began, Saddam in relation to the
sanctions regime would eat the last chicken sandwich in Iraq, so
we know in fact that he and his people are certainly taken care of
by whatever money the regime had hidden, had in the bank, se-
questered, or is able to chivvy out of illegal oil smuggling, which
is his principal source of income, and that remains the case.
Second, it does seem to me clear that with the oil-for-food pro-
gram, which began in late 1996, the health and nutritional status
of the people of Iraq has improved. The Secretary-General went to
look at it because in November a team that went out there was still
disturbed by both what they hear and thought they saw. His rec-
ommendations that came forward earlier in the year a
looked at by the Security Council in February, or the increase that


26
we are now talking about, were based on that and that, of course,
is coming forward.
I would just add one other point, and that is that the United
States is not in any way barred under U.N. supervision from par-
ticipating in this program and, indeed, a very large share of the
food, to get back to Senator Burns' question, that goes into Iraq
would come from American sources through the U.N. program,
carefully monitored and supervised.
Finally, if sanctions were to come off we would be literally turn-
ing over to Saddam something between $10 and $15 billion in free
money to use. If the oil-for-food program stays on, certainly we
would like to keep it there for as long as that can possibly be kept
on in order to keep the sanctions from coming off.
That money is in escrow accounts in the United Nations, care-
fully supervised. We and others make decisions about how it is
pent, and the issue is that it is spent on food and medicine for the
Iraqi people and not free money available to Saddam. It seems to
be something that the committee had a misimpression about when
we started out today.
Senator ROBB. In your judgment, is that program working?
Again, I do not want to get into a whole Iraqi frozen assets ques-
tion, but is that working?
NG. I believe it is. No program this large, as I said
in my opening statement, is going to be free of problems or glitches,
but I can tell you that the people inside our Government who
watch these things very carefully have recently told me that they
believe both the monitoring and the absence of diversion is in
their view that standard is being met quite well by the United Na-
tions.
They have not said we do not have any problems, but they said
we do not have any major problems, if I can put it that way, in
this area.
Senator ROBB. Thank you. My time has expired. Thank you, Mr.
Chairman.
Senator BROWNBACK. Thank you very much, and I do not get this
honor to do this very often, but I would like to call on Mr. Domenici
for a round of questioning.
Senator DOMENICI. I am very respectful of your chairmanship.
Thank you very much for calling on me.
First, Mr. Pickering, one of the things that happens around here
at is not so good for me is that for maybe 10 years or so I do
not get to talk to you very often. Our paths do not cross.
And I remember back when we were in the U.N. and we used
to see each other a little more—I do not know why. Maybe the as-
signments—but I had great respect for you then, and I continue to
have it now, and when we come down hard on what is happening
over there with Saddam Hussein and where we are going, none of
it is directed at anybody personally, and certainly not at you.
I happened to, within the last 242 weeks, go to both Kuwait and
Saudi Arabia, and I guess my first question, or the first thing I
learned in Saudi Arabia that was startling to me, and I just want-
ed to ask you if you were aware of this, we had the luxury of hav-
ng the equivalent of their OMB Director in Saudi Arabia, and you
understand who that gentleman is, highly respected, used to be on
111.


32
sein, we are facing a political diplomatic defeat of historic signifi-
cance in the Gulf. The administration, bereft of ideas, energy, and
imagination, is doing nothing to stop it. On the contrary, they are
working hard to blunt, deflect, and defeat such initiatives as have
been forthcoming from the Congress.
You will hear from others perhaps in classified meetings as well
as this one about violations of the existing sanctions against Iraq.
I am sure that even the CIA, which has a nearly unbroken record
of failure in assessing, understanding, and operating in the Gulf,
will report how Iraqi oil is loaded on barges and shipped to UAE
waters where, after appropriate fees have been collected by Iran,
the cash-flows back to Saddam.
You will certainly hear that enough South Korean four-wheel-
drive vehicles to equip two Republican Guard brigades made it eas-
ily through the barriers erected to enforce the current sanctions-
barriers, by the way, based on 151 United Nations inspectors over-
seeing a country of 22 million people.
The committees will learn how Saddam controls the Republican
Guards that tighten his grip on a hapless Iraqi people as they
queue up to receive humanitarian food purchased with oil-for-food
dollars. I think your point, Mr. Chairman, was exactly on. The
Iraqis who receive food through this program, which Ambassador
Pickering suggested was firmly under our control, in fact receive
the food when Saddam Hussein grants them a ration card, and I
leave it to you to decide who they consider to be the benefactor.
After you have been briefed by the administration and its ex-
perts, after you have examined the facts about the efficacy of the
current sanctions and the prospects of their being kept in place and
made effective, I suspect you will come to the following 10 conclu-
sions, which I urge you to consider.
First, there is no reason to believe that a continuation of the
sanctions will drive Saddam Hussein from power in Iraq, or that
they will be effective in eliminating his relentless pursuit of weap-
ons of mass destruction.
Second, the pressure to relax sanctions, which has already
pushed to more than $10 billion per year the amount of revenue
Iraq is allowed to receive from the sale of oil, will not subside and
will almost certainly increase.
Third, the French, Russians, and others will continue to agitate
for the further relaxation of sanctions and the United States will
almost certainly make further concessions in this regard.
Fourth, there are already significant violations of the sanctions,
and these can be expected to continue and even increase. The
United Nations is hopelessly ill-equipped to monitor and enforce a
strict sanctions regime.
Fifth, Saddam's exploitation of the health and hunger issue has
created the impression that sanctions and not Saddam's manipula-
tion of the humanitarian food and medicine programs are the cause
of mass suffering and ill-health in Iraq.
Sixth, no one in the region—no one in the region believes that
the United States has or will soon adopt a policy that could be ef-
fective in bringing Saddam down. The result was a collapse of the
support for the United States when it blustered about getting


45
against U.S. forces or regional allies. Finally, perhaps the greatest problem we
would face would be what to do with Iraq once we had conquered it. All of Iraq's
neighbors have very different ideas about what a future Iraqi state should look like.
Most of these ideas are in conflict with one another, few would accord with Amer-
ican desires to establish a representative democracy in Iraq, and all of Iraq's neigh-
bors have demonstrated a capability and a willingness to meddle in Iraqi affairs and
undermine U.S. efforts there. In short, we would undoubtedly win the war but we
could easily lose the peace if we were to invade.
At least for the moment, these are both bad options. Everything we are left with
is a variant of containment in some way or another. But this does not mean that
we are already doing the best we can. There are different versions of containment
and important ways to reform the policy.
SUPPORTING THE IRAQI OPPOSITION
First, let me say a few words about supporting the Iraqi opposition.
Many of the Iraq experts around town simply dismiss this idea altogether. I do
not. I think there could be real benefits from such an approach. I firmly believe that
a real opposition with real support from the United States would put real pressure
on Saddam's regime.
However, I also think we have to be realistic about the current limitations of the
Iraqi opposition and the limits these failings place upon our policy. The Iraqi opposi-
tion is currently moribund. Whether you blame the Bush Administration, the Clin-
ton administration, or the opposition leaders themselves for this state of affairs, the
fact remains that the Iraqi opposition today is impotent. Its leadership is divided,
it has no support inside Iraq-especially in the Sunni heartland, it has not dis-
played any ability to organize resistance to Saddam, and during its four years in
northern Iraq it demonstrated neither military skill nor an ability to cajole mean-
ingful numbers of Iraqi military personnel to defect to their cause. It would take
a tremendous effort on the part of the United States, including hundreds of millions
of dollars and several years, to reform, reorganize, rearm and retrain the Iraqi oppo-
sition to the point where it could return to Iraq as a credible opposition.
This would hold true even with a massive commitment of U.S. air power to sup-
port the Iraqi opposition. There is simply no way around the necessary time and
effort to get the Iraqi opposition to the point where it could be effective enough even
to walk in and occupy charred fields cleared by American air power. To do otherwise
would be to invite another Bay of Pigs.
Consequently, even supporting the Iraqi opposition can only be seen, ultimately,
as an adjunct to containment and not an alternative to it. During the years it would
require to recruit, train and equip an Iraqi opposition capable of effective operations
inside Iraq the United States will still have to keep Saddam weak and isolated
through continued containment. Moreover, we must recognize that even after a via-
ble opposition is up and running, the probability that Saddam will actually fall as
a result of such an effort is low. Thus, the United States will still have to ensure
an effective containment regime to guard against the very real risk, indeed the like-
lihood, that even a well-supported opposition will fail to remove him from power.
REFORMING CONTAINMENT
Thus, Mr. Chairman, we return inevitably to the policy of containment. Not be-
cause it is the best policy, but because it is the “least-worst” option available to us
given what we hope to achieve and what we are willing to pay. Nevertheless, while
it is clear that the United States will have to rely on some form of containment for
the foreseeable future, it is equally clear that we cannot continue with business as
usual.
Containment is under attack from a variety of directions. What's more, these at-
tacks are doing real damage. Over the last three years, the United States has been
forced to give ground on a number of issues in the face of such pressure. The United
States supported Resolutions 986, and 1153 simply because we recognized that it
was impossible to do otherwise. Although, one must give credit to the Administra-
tion for the ingenious approach embodied in the resolutions which make concessions
on Iraqi exports while retaining control over Iraqi imports, we must still recognize
that both resolutions entailed sacrificing part of the sanctions regime in the face of
pressure from the international community. Similarly, our limited response to
Saddam's attack on Irbil in 1996 and our willingness to accept Kofi Annan's com-
promise deal with Saddam in 1998 both speak to the great difficulty we now have
finding states willing to support us on those occasions when it is necessary to use
force to prevent or punish Iraqi defiance.
Mr. Chairman, we are reaching a point where we must act to restore containment,
to bolster it so that it can last over the long-term. We are already being forced to
Om
w guard against the very real risk indonda
was in the ingeniohile retaining crificing part of similarly, accept Kofi Ant


46
hold' it diplomatics Iraq's Wemilitary conter Iraq's nice thoug
make concessions in some areas of the containment regime in order to hold the line
on others. In the future, to make containment last, we will have to make additional
trade-offs. The question that the United States must answer is what kind of a con-
tainment regime do we want to have and what trade-offs are we willing to make.
Essentially, there are two different sets of trade-offs we could make to bolster con-
tainment. On the one hand, we could make trade-offs among our various foreign pol-
icy agendas: we could make concessions on other foreign policy issues in order to
secure greater cooperation from our allies on Iraq. On the other hand, we could
make trade-offs within our Iraq policy: we could make concessions on some aspects
of the sanctions and inspections regimes in order to lock-in other, more important,
mechanisms for the long-term.
Broad Containment. The former option I call "broad containment.” The goal of
this approach would be to preserve the current sanctions against Iraq intact and
in toto. There is real reason to try to preserve containment as it currently exists.
Simply put, the containment of Iraq we have held in place for the last seven years
is the most far-reaching and effective the modern world has seen. Bad mouth it
though we may, fret over Saddam's non-compliance though we may, the sanctions
and inspections regimes established after Iraq's invasion of Kuwait have been re-
markably successful: Iraq's military continues to whither, UNSCOM has obliterated
vast quantities of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction, and ultimately, Bagdad re-
mains diplomatically isolated. If we can find a way to keep this regime intact and
hold it together over the long term, we should do so.
Unfortunately, it is the very strength and comprehensiveness of broad contain-
ment that has created our problem. It is the effectiveness of this containment re-
gime that causes Baghdad to fight it so ferociously and causes France, Russia,
China, and so many other states to increasingly oppose it. Consequently, if we are
going to keep containment this strong and this comprehensive, we will have to be
willing to make very significant sacrifices on other issues to hold it together.
Ultimately, Iraq is not a primary foreign policy concern for France. Nor is it for
Russia, nor for China, or Egypt or most other countries. For most of the world, Iraq
is less important to them than it is to the United States. On the other hand, there
are policy issues that matter far more to these other countries than does Iraq. Con-
sequently, if the United States is going to hold on to broad containment of Iraq it
will have to be willing to make concessions to other states on foreign policy issues
more important to them than Iraq. This could mean making concessions to Russia
on NATO expansion, to China over trade issues, to France over Iran, and so on.
Narrow Containment. If we are unwilling to make sacrifices on other foreign
policy issues to try to persuade other nations to be more cooperative on Iraq, the
alternative is to make concessions within the containment regime itself. The option
I will call “narrow containment” would trade-off the more comprehensive aspects of
the sanctions currently in existence in return for a new set of international agree-
ments locking in the most important aspects of containment over the long term.
There are four areas that are crucial to the continued containment of Iraq over
the long-term:
• Limiting Iraq's conventional military forces. Although Iraq's WMD capability
grabs the headlines, in the end, it has been Iraq's ability to project conventional
military power that has proven the greatest destabilizing force in the Gulf re-
gion.
• Preventing Iraq from acquiring weapons of mass destruction. In particular,
Iraqi possession of a nuclear weapon could have catastrophic consequences.
• Maintaining Iraq's diplomatic isolation. It is crucial that even under a narrow
containment regime, there be no illusion that Saddam is free to act as he wants.
Iraq and its neighbors must always know that Iraq will live under the constant
scrutiny of the United States and the international community as long as it is
scani enending. Ultimately, the omy ore
• Monitoring Iraqi spending. Ultimately, the only way to be sure that Saddam
cannot rebuild a large conventional or WMD arsenal is to continue to oversee
Iraqi spending.
A policy of narrow containment would envision trading off other aspects of the
current containment regime in return for locking in regulations that will allow con-
tainment of Iraq to proceed long into the future in these four areas. It would envi-
sion new international agreements re-affirming the prohibition on Iraqi possession
of WMD, banning the sale of offensive conventional weaponry to Iraq (offensive
weaponry here defined as tanks, combat aircraft, attack helicopters, long-range ar-
tillery, and a number of other categories of weapons), and reaffirming the inviolabil-
ity of Iraq's international borders. To see these enforced, the United States would
seek, among other measures, a clear reaffirmation of: UNSCOM's charter and par-


48
off today than he was a year ago, 2 years ago, 3 years ago, 4 years
ago?
The fact that he is able to survive and continue to rebuild his
economic base, namely oil, through the reconstruction of his refin-
eries, his exploration and production of his oilfields under this pol-
icy certainly supports his continuity as head of his regime, and I
find that just a stark reality and self-evident as a consequence of
our containment policy.
Your reference that—the importance of Iraq relative to other
parts of the world is interesting, as we reflect on the reality that
we saw Iraq and its objectives 7 years ago important enough to
fight a war over. The war was over oil and power. Who won that
war? Saddam Hussein is still with us, and still surviving, and I
think, if we honestly ask the question, Saddam Hussein is better
off today than he was 6, 5, 4 years ago, whatever.
Gentlemen, there has been a suggestion of some legislative ap-
proach to this dilemma. Where we have a policy of containment, its
success is somewhat in the eyes of the beholder. What specific leg-
islation do you have in mind, if any, for congressional action that
might alleviate this dilemma?
Mr. PERLE. Well, Senator, if I could take a crack at that, the Ma-
has sponsored legislation that would begin to give
some American support to the opposition in Iraq. If you believe, as
I do, that Saddam Hussein is either going to achieve a victory or
he is going to be removed but there is no in-between, this is not
going to be a stand-off. It is not going to be a draw. Eventually the
sanctions will disappear altogether and he will triumph, or he goes
before the sanctions do.
But we are dithering now. We are doing nothing to hasten his
departure. I share high regard for Tom Pickering, but when Tom
Pickering described as our heart's desire, the hope that Saddam
might somehow be eliminated, I thought, that is not the robust ter-
minology with which I would wish to see American policy objectives
toward a murderous dictator like Saddam Hussein described.
Our heart's desire that there be a successor regime? There is not
going to be a successor regime unless we do something about it,
and contrary to what we have just heard, I believe the best possi-
bility of removing Saddam Hussein from power is to support the
opposition to Saddam Hussein. We have no other policy and pros-
pect.
Chairman MURKOWSKI. Our track record on that relative to some
previous situations has been that he has been able to take care of
his adversaries very effectively, even some of his relatives.
Mr. PERLE. He has certainly been able to eliminate coups against
himself. I would not think that would be the way to go about it,
but there is very widespread dissatisfaction, as you might imagine,
with Saddam Hussein. There is an opposition, with the potential
for being mobilized—not by attempting to engineer a coup but by
very broad and open support for that opposition.
We have talked all morning, and everyone is in agreement that
we have lost the propaganda war. One of the reasons we have lost
the propaganda war is that we have shut off the opposition propa-
ganda—the opposition to Saddam Hussein. He now dominates the