IN 8/16: IR 1/9
~~ DISARMING IRAQ: THE STATUS OF WEAPONS
INSPECTIONS
HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
HOUSE OP REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED FIFTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
SEPTEMBER 15, 1998
Printed for the use of the Committee on International Relations

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
54-334 CC WASHINGTON : 1998
For sale by the U.S. Government Printing Office
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ISBN 0-16-058138-9


COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAl RElATIONS
BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, New York, Chairman
WILLIAM GOODLING, Pennsylvania
JAMES A. LEACH, Iowa
HENRY J. HYDE, Illinois
DOUG BEREUTER, Nebraska
CHRISTOPHER SMITH, New Jersey
DAN BURTON, Indiana
ELTON GALLEGLY, California
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida
CASS BALLENGER, North Carolina
DANA ROHRABACHER, California
DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois
EDWARD R ROYCE, California
PETER T. KING, New York
JAY KIM, California
STEVEN J. CHABOT, Ohio
MARSHALL "MARK" SANFORD, South
Carolina
MATT SALMON, Arizona
AMO HOUGHTON, New York
TOM CAMPBELL, California
JON FOX, Pennsylvania
JOHN McHUGH, New York
LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina
ROY BLUNT, Missouri
KEVIN BRADY, Texas
RICHARD BURR, North Carolina
LEE HAMILTON, Indiana
SAM GEJDENSON, Connecticut
TOM LANTOS, California
HOWARD BERMAN, California
GARY ACKERMAN, New York
ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American
Samoa
MATTHEW G. MARTINEZ, California
DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey
ROBERT ANDREWS, New Jersey
ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey
SHERROD BROWN, Ohio
CYNTHIA A. McKINNEY, Georgia
ALCEE L. HASTINGS, Florida
PAT DANNER, Missouri
EARL HILLIARD, Alabama
BRAD SHERMAN, California
ROBERT WEXLER, Florida
STEVE ROTHMAN, New Jersey
BOB CLEMENT, Tennessee
BILL LUTHER, Minnesota
JIM DAVIS, Florida
LOIS CAPPS, California
Richard J. Garon, Chief of Staff
Michael H. Van Dusen, Democratic Chief of Staff
Frank Record, Senior Professional Staff Member
Kimberly Roberts, Staff Associate
(ID


CONTENTS
WITNESSES
Page
Ambassador Martin Indyk, Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern Affairs,
U.S. Department of State 4
Major William Scott Ritter, former Weapons Inspector for the U.N. Special
Commission (UNSCOM) 28
APPENDIX
Prepared statements:
Ambassador Martin Indyk 45
Major William Scott Ritter 55
The Honorable Jon Fox, a Representative in Congress from Pennsylvania 57
The Honorable Jerry Solomon, a Representative in Congress from New
York 59
Ambassador Richard Williamson, former Ambassador to the IAEA 62
Additional material submitted for the record:
letter to the Secretary of State from the Honorable Porter Goss, Chair-
man of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence 110
letter to the National Security Advisor from the Honorable Porter Goss .. 112
Commentary from the September 13, 1998 issue of The Washington
Times written by Major William Scott Ritter 115
Responses by Ambassador Martin Indyk to questions submitted by Mr.
Gilman, a Representative in Congress from New York and Chairman,
Committee on International Relations 116
Responses by Ambassador Martin Indyk to questions submitted by Mr.
Hamilton, a Representative in Congress from Indiana 141
(III)





DISARMING IRAQ: THE STATUS OF WEAPONS
INSPECTIONS
TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 15, 1998
House of Representatives,
Committee on International Relations,
Washington, DC.
The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10 a.m. in room 2172,
Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Benjamin A. Gilman (chair-
man of the Committee) presiding.
Chairman Gilman. The hearing will come to order. I am pleased
to welcome this morning a constituent from Hastings, New York,
and an American patriot, Major Scott Ritter, former chief of the
Concealment Investigation Unit of the U.N. Special Commission on
Iraq. His testimony will follow that of Assistant Secretary Martin
Indyk. We are pleased that Assistant Secretary Indyk is with us
today.
I would like to express our thanks and admiration for Mr. Rit-
ter's courage and dedication in his role in disarming Iraq and lead-
ing the efforts to destroy their weapons of mass destruction. His
sharp criticism of our Nation's policy toward Iraq and the faltering
arms control efforts of American policymakers has sparked a long
overdue debate on the direction of our U.S. policy toward this rogue
regime, its increasingly successful noncompliance with U.N. Secu-
rity Council resolutions, and the obstruction of U.N. weapons in-
spections.
Today, we need to take up the challenge laid down by Mr. Ritter,
who resigned his post with UNSCOM on August 26 and put his
professional career on the line, because he realized that this Ad-
ministration would no longer provide the political support and the
credible threat of military force to ensure that UNSCOM can fulfill
its mandate.
We need to examine whether open-ended economic sanctions, as
embraced by the Clinton Administration and as embodied in the
September 9 Security Council resolution, is likely to force Saddam
Hussein to comply with weapons control agreements he made and
has violated regularly since the Gulf War.
With Iraq now pumping record levels of oil and with the United
Nations implementing an expanded oil-for-food agreement, Mr. Rit-
ter noted in an article in last Sunday's Washington Times that Iraq
now has more oil-based income than at any time since 1986.
[The article referred to appears in the appendix.]
Chairman Gilman. Citing numerous actions by this Administra-
tion to frustrate and to block these inspections, he resigned from
UNSCOM on August 26 and went public with his concerns, but the
(l)


2
Administration had moved from action to accommodation in its pol-
icy toward Saddam Hussein.
Regrettably, Secretary Albright has not accepted our repeated in-
vitations to join us this morning, but Assistant Secretary for Near
Eastern Affairs Martin Indyk is here, and we welcome him to set
forth the Administration's policies to carry out the mission of the
U.N. weapons inspectors and to ensure that Saddam Hussein does
not rebuild his arsenal of weapons of mass destruction.
In effect, the Administration has done a silent U-turn in its pol-
icy toward Saddam Hussein. Instead of threatening to take down
his economy, it is now acquiescing in an expanded oil-for-food pro-
gram and bowing to the wishes of the French, the Russians, and
the Chinese, who want to help Iraq lower the bar on UNSCOM in-
spections and monitoring.
On June 22,1 joined with Speaker Gingrich and Majority Leader
Lott in a letter to our President expressing our deep concern over
the apparent failure of the Administration to support fully the
work of UNSCOM when its efforts to verify Iraqi weapons viola-
tions were under assault. Our letter noted that 'The United States
has acquiesced in the suspension of challenged inspections by
UNSCOM designed to uncover evidence of Iraqi concealment."
The President rejected our concerns in his letter of July 8, stat-
ing, "You can be certain UNSCOM will have my full support." Yet,
Major Ritter has told us that the Administration did fail to back
his efforts to mount challenge inspections in Iraq in July and early
August. In short, the Administration has a credibility problem with
the Congress on our policy toward Iraq.
I now understand that the Administration suggests that the
adoption of the September 9th resolution by the U.N. Security
Council validates its shift in policy toward Iraq. Some of us have
doubts about that. Rather, we want to ensure that we meet our
goal of disarming Iraq by discovering and destroying their weapons
of mass destruction.
In that regard, I note that the Iraqi National Assembly has
called for the severing of the relationship with UNSCOM and cur-
tailing all of its activities in the country. If we can't summon the
will to act against Saddam Hussein today, how will we summon
the will to do so if and when he were to acquire a nuclear and long-
range missile capability?
Today, we need to hear some of those answers from our Assistant
Secretary Martin Indyk and from Mr. Ritter on this key question.
Most important, we need to remind ourselves that Saddam Hussein
will not be persuaded to give up his nuclear ambitions and to stop
trying to rebuild his weapons of mass destruction without the cred-
ible use of military force by the Security Council and by our own
Nation.
I look forward to discussing with both of our witnesses the impli-
cations of the most recent U.N. Security Council resolution of Sep-
tember 9, UNSCR 1194, for the future of UNSCOM and the even-
tual lifting of sanctions.
So I ask our Ranking Minority Member, Mr. Hamilton, for any
opening remarks, and then we will get right on with the testimony,
since we have a full day ahead.


5
Throughout this period, Iraq has tried and failed to undermine
Security Council unity on the key points of compliance and sanc-
tions. At the same time, with our all lies, we have constrained Iraq's
military options through Operation Southern Watch and Northern
Watch and, when necessary, the reinforcement of our military pres-
ence in the Gulf and the use of those forces. As a result, the mili-
tary threat posed by Iraq have been effectively contained and con-
tinues to be effectively contained. But the threat has by no means
been eliminated. ,
Despite the best efforts of UNSCOM and the IAEA, Iraq has not
disclosed the full truth about its chemical and biological weapons
programs. UNSCOM believes Iraq is probably concealing SCUD
missiles, and questions remain about Iraq's nuclear programs. As
long as Baghdad is under its present leadership, we must expect
Iraq will reconstitute its weapons of mass destruction if given the
opportunity.
Iraq's goal is to gain relief from sanctions without revealing more
about its weapons programs. To this end, Baghdad has repeatedly
probed for weaknesses in the Security Council's resolve. It has, in
particular, tried to portray itself as the victim of a confrontation
with a supposedly runaway UNSCOM being ordered about by an
arrogant and callous United States. To dramatize this charge, Iraq
has halted cooperation with UNSCOM on three occasions during
the past year, most recently, as we are all aware, at the beginning
of August.
Throughout, we have countered Iraq's propaganda campaign
with plain truth. We have backed UNSCOM s efforts to expose the
contradictions between Iraqi declarations and the physical and doc-
umentary evidence. We have stressed the importance of full compli-
ance with Security Council resolutions. We have led the effort,
which Saddam Hussein resisted for years, to establish the oil-for-
food program that is addressing the humanitarian needs of the
Iraqi people.
We have not acquiesced in this, Mr. Chairman, as you suggested;
we have led that effort, and we have done so because he will not
meet the needs of the Iraqi people. We feel that it is necessary to
do so, but to do so under a tight Security Council regime in which
all the revenues from the sale of oil are escrowed in a U.N. account
which is controlled by the United Nations and not by Saddam Hus-
sein. No contracts can be approved for payment from that escrow
account unless they are approved by the Sanctions Committee,
where the United States has a veto. So that process is strictly con-
trolled, even though, on occasion, Saddam Hussein will try his best
to use that process for his own purposes.
Last spring, we threatened to use force, as we have on three sep-
arate occasions since the end of the Gulf War, if Iraq did not per-
mit UNSCOM inspections to resume. In the face of that threat, it
did.
Today, as a result of vigorous diplomacy conducted by two Presi-
dents and four Secretaries of State, backed by bipartisan support
in the Congress, there remains an international consensus that
Iraq must comply with U.N. Security Council resolutions and co-
operate with U.N. weapons inspectors. There also remains agree-
ment that sanctions should continue until these conditions are met,


6
but some on the Security Council would like to weaken the condi-
tions and weaken UNSCOM to achieve that purpose.
But, Mr. Chairman, I think it is important for this Committee
to understand that there never has been and is not now a consen-
sus about whether or in what circumstance force should be used in
an effort to compel Iraqi compliance with the Council's postwar res-
olutions.
In my written testimony, I go through the various arguments we
have had to confront on this point, but I think that it is essential
to understand that there is no international consensus for the use
of force to back up UNSCOM. Indeed, today, outside the United
States, not a single country in the world is calling for the use of
force to respond to Saddam Hussein's latest refusal to cooperate
with UNSCOM. Not a single country in the world is now calling
for the use of force to deal with Saddam Hussein's current, blatant
violation of the Security Council resolutions. This, then, is the con-
text in which we must operate if our goal of eliminating the secu-
rity threat posed by Iraq is to be achieved.
The choices we face are not those of some ideal world in which
our perceptions are universally shared, the American people are
united, all our allies are on board, the road to success is clearly
marked, and the consequences of our decision is fully predictable.
Rather, we face hard choices in the real world in which every event
affects the next, and the political terrain shifts with each passing
day. It is a world in which the costs and benefits of alternative
courses of action must be considered with deliberation, for they are
not always obvious. This is the context in which we have to deal
with Saddam's current challenge to UNSCOM.
In recent weeks, some have suggested that the United States has
not done enough to support the work of UNSCOM. It has even
been suggested that we have tried to prevent UNSCOM from dis-
covering the truth about Iraq's weapons of mass destruction pro-
grams. The people who level these charges are, no doubt, well-in-
tentioned, but they work from a different set of facts than the Ad-
ministration does.
With respect to Mr. Ritter personally, as UNSCOM Chairman
Butler told The New York Times last week, the testimony he has
given to these facts was "often inaccurate in chronology and detail,"
and was therefore "misleading." Or, as former UNSCOM Chairman
Rolf Ekeus has told The Washington Post, and I quote, "In a very
narrow sense, Ritter is always right, but he has no political per-
spective or understanding. He could never see the whole picture."
As I said, the Administration has to work on the basis of a
broader set of facts, the broader picture. The first fact is that the
United States has been, by far, the strongest international banker
of UNSCOM. For years we have provided indispensable technical
help, expert personnel, sophisticated equipment, vital diplomatic
backing, and logistics and other support. Nothing has changed in
that regard.
For example, in May of this year, national security principals
agreed that the heads of all relevant U.S. agencies should issue
new directives to ensure that UNSCOM and the IAEA inspections
would receive high-priority support throughout our government.


8
tated its decisions. For 7 years, through Republican and Demo-
cratic Administrations alike, U.S. policy has not changed. We want
Iraqi compliance, we will insist on Iraqi compliance, but this does
not mean our tactics are rigid.
In pursuing our goal of Iraqi compliance, we have sometimes
made tactical suggestions to UNSCOM about questions of timing
and focus. This is entirely appropriate, and is done by other Coun-
cil members as well on a regular basis. Over time, we have found
that some of our suggestions were accepted and others were not.
More often, our discussions with UNSCOM have focused on where
more vigorous inspection activity might be productive, on how Iraqi
lives might be exposed, or on when an inspection might best catch
Iraqi efforts of deception by surprise.
No nation has done more to encourage UNSCOM to be thorough,
unyielding, and aggressive in its inspections, and no nation has
done more to support UNSCOM's dogged and, at times, dangerous
efforts in this regard.
Mr. Chairman, I will call to your attention a letter from Chair-
man Butler in The Washington Post on August 26, in which he
writes, "I have never had any reason to doubt the U.S. commitment
to the need for Iraq to comply with the decisions of the Security
Council and, in particular, the U.S. insistence upon the require-
ments imposed by those resolutions upon Iraq to the effect that
they must be disarmed of their weapons of mass destruction."
On a few occasions, our advice to UNSCOM has been more cau-
tious. For example, this past January when our military prepara-
tions were incomplete and the Muslim holy season of Ramadan was
on the way, we judged it was not the right time for a major con-
frontation over inspections that Saddam Hussein had already
blocked.
I note in this regard that Mr. Ritter told the Senate hearing 2
weeks ago that he had objected to a planned inspection of the Min-
istry of Defense because he thought it was "probably heading down
a slippery slope of confrontation which could not be backed up by
UNSCOM's' mandate." If it is good enough for Mr. Ritter to raise
such questions, why is he criticizing the Secretary of State for
doing so? This was precisely the kind of question we also some-
times found occasion to raise with Mr. Butler.
For the record, Mr. Chairman, we did not demand this inspection
of the Ministry of Defense headquarters, as Mr. Ritter claims.
Chairman Butler made the decision to inspect the Ministry, and we
supported those inspections. We were aware at the time that
UNSCOM's previous executive chairman, Rolf Ekeus, was con-
cerned that UNSCOM had found few Ministry of Defense docu-
ments related to Iraq's WMD programs, which made the Ministry
of Defense an obvious inspection target. So when Mr. Butler came
to us with that suggestion, we supported it.
Given the importance of Security Council unity, we have been
concerned in recent months that the responsibility for any resump-
tion of Iraqi noncooperation fall where it belongs, on the shoulders
of Saddam Hussein, not on UNSCOM. We had questions which
Chairman Butler had answered about a particular intrusive inspec-
tion planned by UNSCOM in July, but it is important to note that
other intrusive inspections were going on at the same time as we


10
National Assembly passed a resolution calling on the Security
Council to reverse its decisions and threatening to sever all rela-
tions with UNSCOM. This statement is outrageous and unaccept-
able. It is not for the Council to reverse itself, but for Baghdad to
do so, and to end its open defiance of the international community.
Saddam Hussein should heed the clear warning of Resolution 1194,
and he should not misjudge the will of the United States to act.
Mr. Chairman, force remains an option. It has not been taken off
the table. But in the first instance, we are insisting that the Secu-
rity Council live up to its responsibility to respond to his latest
challenge to its authority.
We have significant strike capability in place in the region, a
considerably stronger one than we did at the beginning of the last
confrontation with Baghdad. We can augment that force rapidly
should we need to do so. Saddam's actions have put us back on the
ladder of potentially escalating the confrontation with Iraq. So be
it. We will not accept the indefinite blockage by Iraq of the inspec-
tion activities of UNSCOM and the IAEA, and we will insist that
Iraq live up to its commitment to cooperate with UNSCOM's mon-
itoring activities.
For all its bluster, Iraq remains within the strategic box Saddam
Hussein's folly created for it 7 years ago. As we look ahead, we will
decide how and when to respond to Iraq's actions based on the
threat they pose to Iraq's neighbors, to regional security, and to
U.S. vital interests. Our assessment will include Saddam's capacity
to reconstitute, use, or threaten to use weapons of mass destruc-
tion.
The bottom line is that if Iraq tries to break out of its strategic
box, our response will be swift and strong, but we will act on our
own timetable, not on Saddam Hussein's.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Indyk appears in the appendix.]
Chairman Gilman. Thank you, Secretary Indyk, for your very ex-
tensive statement.
From your remarks, I assume that you are saying that the Ad-
ministration has not changed its policy toward Iraq from the Feb-
ruary 23rd agreement between Iraq and Secretary General Kofi
Annan and the adoption of U.N. Security Resolution 1194 of Sep-
tember 9; is that correct?
Mr. Indyk. That is correct, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Gilman. Has there been any alteration of policy, any
slight change in our policy toward Iraq?
Mr. Indyk. What I indicated, Mr. Chairman, in my opening
statement was that from time to time we have changed our tactics,
and in the wake of the denouement of the last crisis with the Kofi
Annan MOU, we did engage in a policy review.
One of the things we sought to avoid was a situation where Sad-
dam Hussein could dictate our response on his timetable, so any
time he wished to engage in confrontation, he could simply shut
down part or all of UNSCOM's activities and hope in that way to
provoke a confrontation. We would spend $1.5 billion sending forces
to the Gulf, and then he would back down, only to challenge us
again in the future.


11
So we sought to develop a different kind of response, one that
would, in the first instance, put the onus on the Security Council;
second, one that would deny him one of his objectives, which is to
lift the sanctions. You will notice in the Iraqi National Assembly
statement yesterday, that he referred to, its specific objective was
to have the sanctions lifted. The Council's action to suspend indefi-
nitely sanctions reviews was our one way of responding, to make
it clear that sanctions will never be lifted while he is not complying
with the Security Council resolutions and not cooperating with
UNSCOM.
As I also said in testimony, nothing has changed either in our
support of UNSCOM or our willingness to use force or the threat
of force to back up our objectives.
Chairman Gilman. So this change of tactics could be perceived
as a change of our policy toward Iraq, could it not?
Mr. Indyk. Some may perceive it in that way. I would say that,
in response to one of the points Mr. Hamilton made in his opening
remarks, I think it is fair criticism of the Administration that we
should have come out and articulated the change in tactics so it
was better understood.
I think that, with hindsight, we can say that. We were concerned
at the time of not telegraphing our shots to Saddam Hussein or
what our tactics would be, and we also thought that we had a cou-
ple of more months in which to prepare for this; that is, the expec-
tation was that he would cease cooperation in October, rather than
in August.
Chairman GilMAn. Was the Administration's change of tactics
communicated to the people out in the field, to the UNSCOM in-
spectors?
Mr. Indyk. Well, our change in tactics was communicated cer-
tainly to our allies in the region and to our other friends in the
Council. I am not sure what was communicated to UNSCOM in the
field. I am not privy to that. But we had ongoing conversations
with Chairman Butler about how best to achieve our common ob-
jective of disarming Iraq.
Chairman GilMAN. Was that communication to Butler made in
a timely fashion?
Mr. Indyk. It was an ongoing discussion with Chairman Butler,
as well as others on the Security Council, about how best to
achieve the objectives.
Chairman GilmAn. Spell out for us, Mr. Secretary, why the Ad-
ministration made numerous threats involving the use of force in
February and March, and then backed away from their implemen-
tation following open Iraqi defiance of U.N. Security Council 687 in
August.
Mr. Indyk. Mr. Chairman, we were earlier this year engaged in
an effort to persuade Saddam Hussein to back down and resume
cooperation with UNSCOM. In that effort, we were, as you say,
threatening the use of force and, indeed, Kofi Annan acknowledged
that there would have been no agreement without the threat of
force.
As I said before, force remains on the table. Our diplomacy has
to be backed up by the threat of force to be effective. So it is not
a question in our minds of a change in that fundamental principle


12
that we must have credible force to back up our diplomacy. It is,
rather, a tactical question, as you yourself have said, of when is the
best time to employ that threat of force.
At the moment, our focus is on getting the Security Council to
respond to the challenge to its authority. If it does not do so, then
we are left with a free hand to respond.
Chairman GiLMAn. Secretary Indyk, one last question. Does the
Administration have any knowledge that Iraq is rebuilding its
weapons of mass destruction, and if UNSCOM cannot perform on
the job, how are we going to know whether Iraq is rebuilding its
proscribed weapons system?
Mr. Indyk. Our concern is a very deep one about Iraq's ability
to reconstitute its weapons of mass destruction. I think that we
may differ with Mr. Ritter on exactly what our estimate is of the
timing it might take to reconstitute its weapons, particularly in the
nuclear field. But I think we very much share his concern and the
concern of UNSCOM that Iraq has not made full declaration of its
weapons of mass destruction. It has not been fully disarmed and
it does have the ability to reconstitute, particularly in the area of
biological weapons and chemical weapons.
UNSCOM, at the moment, still has a monitoring function, the
IAEA still has a monitoring function, which gives a certain, I would
say, limited degree of assurance on the question of reconstitution.
But as long as Iraq is not fully disarmed and there is not an ongo-
ing monitoring regime over all of Iraq's suspect activities, we would
have no assurance that it would not be able to reconstitute.
That is true whether UNSCOM is in the country or not. With
UNSCOM there and operating, we have a higher degree of assur-
ance, obviously, than if it is not there.
Chairman Gilman. Mr. Hamilton.
Thank you, Mr. Indyk.
Mr. Hamilton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and Mr. Ambassador.
I think your statement is helpful.
Let me just indicate that there are large areas of that statement
that I agree with. I think the policy objective has been constant:
You want to contain Iraq. You want Iraq to comply with the U.N.
resolutions. I don't disagree with that at all.
I agree with your statement that the United States has been the
foremost backer of UNSCOM. I really don't think there is any
doubt about that. I understand and agree with your statement
about the necessity of trying to maintain unity in the Security
Council and the integrity of UNSCOM.
Now, you make a sharp distinction between policy and tactics.
Let me just point out to you that in the President's statements in
February, I think February 23rd he said, "If Iraq fails to comply
this time to provide immediate, unrestricted, unconditional access
to the weapons inspectors, there will be serious consequences," he
is not talking there, in your terminology, about objectives or goals,
he is talking about tactics. He is saying that if these inspections
cannot go forward, there are serious consequences.
Mr. Indyk. That is exactly right, Mr. Chairman. There will be se-
rious consequences. Nothing has changed in that regard.
Mr. Hamilton. There has been no change there?
Mr. Indyk. No, sir.


14
Mr. Hamilton. But clearly it is more difficult for the United
States now to back weapons inspections with the threat of force,
right? We can't do it.
Mr. Indyk. With the threat of our unilateral force, we can and
did do it, but in terms of a multilateral coalition that supports
threatening force in order to get UNSCOM back into operation, we
don't have that support.
Mr. Hamilton. So all the world wants us to have the inspections,
Iraq is not going to let us have the inspections, but none of the
world wants us to use force to get the inspections. Right?
Mr. Indyk. That is correct.
Mr. Hamilton. So there are no inspections?
Mr. Indyk. Well, there are no inspections at the moment, but it
remains one of our objectives to have those inspections.
Mr. Hamilton. How long can this go on, this situation, where ev-
erybody supports inspections, but Iraq is not going to let us have
inspections. We then say we are going to use force, but nobody sup-
ports us on that. As this goes on, Mr. Saddam Hussein is building
up weapons, he is going ahead and doing whatever he wants to do.
How long can this go on?
This is an intolerable situation.
Mr. Indyk. It is an intolerable situation, but it is not one that
requires us to move precipitously. We need to
Mr. Hamilton. I am not accusing you of that, Mr. Secretary.
Mr. Indyk. You are suggesting that we perhaps should be mov-
ing more quickly than we are, and I think that we are moving in
a very deliberate way, week by week, to up the pressure, to build
support, and to make it clear that what Saddam Hussein is doing
is unacceptable and that the Security Council resolutions have to
be enforced.
Should it become clear that the Security Council is not prepared
to live up to its obligations in this regard, then, as was said, we
will have a free hand to act. People may not be prepared to assume
the burdens that we are for enforcing Security Council resolutions,
but if they are not, then they cannot complain if we do so.
Mr. Hamilton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman GilMAN. Thank you, Mr. Hamilton.
Mr. Brady.
Mr. Brady. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Ambassador, it is always important to reiterate that we are
all on the same side here. In this Committee and in this Congress
and this Administration, we all have the same goal for peace; we
are all for the inspections to occur, all for the weapons of mass de-
struction to end. It is just difficult at times to understand what in
heaven's name the Administration's tactics are in doing this.
It seems to me that since 1991, since the cease-fire, Saddam
Hussein has continued the pattern of delaying, obstructing, and re-
lenting. It is as predictable as night follows day. And yet we are
now in the obstruction phase, after having gone through the delay
phase after the last relenting phrase, and yet we seem shocked and
surprised that the sun has set again on our inspections.
My question to you is, since our ability to remove those weapons
without force depends upon strong enforcement, can you explain
more about the technical suggestions, as they were termed, to


15
UNSCOM about the time of these inspections? For example, who
made the decision to pressure or to discuss with the Special Com-
mission, to postpone or cancel the disarmament inspections? Was
it the President who made that decision, or the Secretary of State,
with the President's consent?
Mr. Indyk. The Secretary of State, together with other members
of the President's national security team, discussed these kinds of
technical issues. In the case of the July inspections, it was decided
that some questions should be asked about one particular aspect of
those inspections which we thought would be counterproductive.
The Secretary herself did not do that. The questions were raised
by Ambassador Burleigh, our deputy permanent rep in the United
Nations, with Chairman Butler in July. As a result of those ques-
tions and his consultations, I assume, with others, because he talks
to at least all the permanent members of the Security Council, he
readjusted those inspections, but they are still going ahead. They
are still going ahead with, as far as I understand it—and Mr. Rit-
ter may be able to clarify this—with three of the four inspections,
and those three were very intrusive inspections, which we sup-
ported, which we gave tangible support for, and which were to be
conducted in August. That is why Mr. Ritter went with Mr. Butler
into Iraq for the purpose of those inspections. So we are talking
about a very minor modification perhaps, possibly as a result of our
advice, but it was Chairman Butler's decision.
The overall effort to expose Saddam Hussein's concealment
mechanism, which was what Mr. Ritter was involved in heading
up, was something that we supported strongly.
Mr. Brady. Just so that I understand it, you are saying that the
Secretary of State made the decision to initiate those discussions
with the Special Commission without the consent of the President?
Mr. Indyk. Mr. Chairman, or excuse me, Mr. Brady
Mr. Brady. I wish. I am a long way from it.
Mr. Indyk. When you try to pin me down as to whether the
President was involved, the President delegates some decisions,
this kind of decision, which is a low-level question of what to say
to Chairman Butler or what to ask him about a certain issue. It
is not the kind of thing that would be raised to the President for
a decision.
Mr. Brady. But is it a low-level issue? It seems to me that any
time we start discussions on postponing or canceling the timing of
inspections, when the inspections and predictability of them are
key to our staying out of a war and ensuring that inspections occur,
are you saying those are low-level discussions?
Mr. Indyk. Yes. Because when we are talking about postponing
all inspections, inspections were going on at the time. This was a
very minor technical issue. I am sure it was a major issue for Mr.
Ritter but in the scheme of things, it was a very minor issue. We
were supporting the inspections. We supported a reconfigured in-
spection that was to take place in August.
Mr. Brady. As my time concludes, because I know other Mem-
bers have questions, if I forwarded a letter asking for the times
and the dates and with whom we had these discussions on tech-
nical suggestions, could you provide us more information?
Mr. Indyk. Sure, I'd be happy to.


16
Mr. Brady. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Gilman. We have a very distinguished visitor with us,
the chairman of our Rules Committee, who took time out of a very
involved Rules Committee session to address our Committee for a
few brief remarks. For those new Members, I might note that Con-
gressman Solomon, chairman of our Rules Committee, formerly
was a Member of this Committee, and we welcome him back and
wish you were back with us for a permanent seat with us. I will
ask unanimous consent to allow Chairman Solomon to address the
Committee for a brief statement.
Without objection, Mr. Solomon.
Mr. Solomon. Mr. Chairman, let me assure you had I not been
brought kicking and screaming to go over to the Rules Committee,
I would still be here because this is the best committee in the Con-
gress. You are the best committee.
Mr. Chairman, let me just say in a few minutes I am going to
have to get back to my Committee, but today it is a great honor
to have the opportunity to introduce Scott Ritter, a fellow Marine
and a role model for our country. When I say role model, ladies and
gentlemen, you can believe it. I just want to preface my remarks
briefly to say I am disappointed that Secretary Albright, who I nor-
mally have a great deal of respect for, I am disappointed she is not
here. This is a critical matter and I would much prefer to see her
in her capacity as opposed to the Assistant Secretary, and of
course, Mr. Ambassador, that takes nothing away from you.
A few years ago, Scott Ritter was a young Marine officer answer-
ing his country's call by serving in combat during Desert Storm. He
showed personal courage by participating in combat operations in-
side Iraq, not outside but inside, in support of counter-SCUD ac-
tivities. When the war ended, Scott didn't stop putting his honor
on the line. Like many of us, he went on into civilian life. And let
me just say that I just have the greatest admiration and respect
for him.
When the war ended, as I said, he became the Chief of Conceal-
ment Investigation Unit, U.N. Special Commission, and that is no
easy assignment, as any of you know. His mission was to stop
weapons of mass destruction from falling into the hands of a mad-
man and you know who the madman is, Saddam Hussein, and,
Members, mark my words, the courage that Scott Ritter showed as
a Marine in combat was matched by the courage that he showed
enforcing the elimination of Iraq's arsenal of chemical and biologi-
cal weapons. The whole world should be grateful that Scott Ritter
rang the alarm on Hussein's quest for nuclear weapons and for
long-range ballistic missiles that could end up bringing American
men and women back into harm's way in the not too distant future.
Tragically, Scott Ritter had to resign to bring some light on what
I would describe, and I just have to be outspoken about it, on what
I would describe as being a craven policy of appeasement at the
highest levels of the Clinton Administration.
As a former Marine myself, I know one thing is true. You know
the troops always know, you don't kid them out there. They know,
ladies and gentlemen, and I trust Scott's observations and knowl-
edge, and I am proud to be here today in support of the quest for
truth. He knew exactly what was going on and his mission had


17
turned into a sham. Americans' leaders put Scott and his people in
harm's way with no support. This is an unconscionable policy, but
for showing courage and resigning over principles, Scott Ritter was
attacked by what I would call small-minded people in big offices
who should know better and they ought to be ashamed of them-
selves.
To belittle Scott by saying he doesn't have a clue insults him di-
rectly and, by inference, all men and women in the field, both those
in uniform and those in civilian capacity, all fighting against the
forces of totalitarianism and evil. It is also petty and arrogant.
I am going to get upset about this by those who have never worn
a uniform to mock Major Hitter's name and attack him personally
from an unconscionable position of power. This is the action of a
bully and I resent it, and whoever said it knows what I am talking
about, over in the other body, ladies and gentlemen.
Mr. Chairman and Members, I have to return to chair the Rules
Committee hearing on something very important. It has to do with
interdiction of drugs coming across our southwestern borders, and
I might also point out that Scott Ritter in another lifetime also
served patrolling that area. He is one brave American and we
ought to listen to him with all sincerity and again speaking on be-
half of the chairman of the Select Committee on Intelligence, who
has had an illness in his family and could not be here, I would like
to ask unanimous consent that two of his letters, one to Secretary
Albright and one to Sandy Berger, be a part of the record. He
makes me sound like a pussy cat.
[The letters referred to appear in the appendix.]
Senator Chafee. Mr. Chairman, thank you. Just a moment if
you would. Thank you, Chairman Solomon, for taking the time to
be with us.
Mr. Hamilton.
Mr. Hamilton. Mr. Chairman, I just want to welcome Mr. Solo-
mon to the Committee and tell him that I appreciate his coming
by and let Members know that I have occasion, along with the
Chairman and some of the other Members, to appear very fre-
quently before the Rules Committee. At no time have I ever ap-
peared before that Rules Committee that Chairman Solomon was
not courteous and gracious in his accommodations for me. I want
him to know that I appreciate that very much, and it is a pleasure
to have him back in this Committee.
Chairman Gilman. Mr. Lantos.
Mr. Lantos. Mr. Chairman, I take it I am next for the 5 min-
utes. I would like Chairman Solomon to stay here for a moment be-
cause I would like to say some things in his presence. Am I correct,
Mr. Chairman?
Chairman Gilman. Mr. Clement is next in order but if Mr. Clem-
ent will yield to you, we will be pleased to change the order.
Mr. Clement. I will yield as long as I can get some time.
Chairman Gilman. Mr. Lantos. Thank you, Mr. Clement.
Mr. Lantos. I am going to thank my friend. I am going to associ-
ate myself with the praise that Mr. Hamilton offered for Chairman
Solomon, and I want to associate myself with Chairman Solomon's
praise for Scott Ritter. But I want to take exception in the strong-


18
est possible terms to my dear friend's observation concerning the
policy of this Administration and Secretary Albright.
There is no person in our government or in this Congress, Mr.
Solomon, who is as firmly opposed to a policy of craven appease-
ment, as you called it, as is Secretary Albright. By history, convic-
tion, commitment and understanding, I have a great deal of appre-
ciation for Secretary Albright's political and international views.
And while I think it is appropriate to discuss differences in tactics,
I think it is way beyond the pale to label this Secretary of State
and her policies policies of craven appeasement.
I think the atmosphere of much of the city at the moment is that
of a theater of the absurd, and I very much regret that this theater
of the absurd has penetrated the hearing of this Committee. There
is a great deal of frustration with respect to Iraq and, with all due
respect, may I suggest that frustration is totally misdirected. And
I would like to take the moments I have to redirect that frustration
to the right sources.
I suspect the first source of that frustration is the failure of our
Administration in 1991 to finish the job in Iraq. Some of us called
for that at the time and we would not be having this hearing had
Saddam Hussein been finished as the leader of Iraq at that point.
There is proper frustration directed at Saddam Hussein, who at
every step of the way, through cheating, lying, and every technique
at his command, has attempted and continues to attempt to frus-
trate the work of UNSCOM. There is proper frustration to be di-
rected at our so-called allies and other countries in the region who
enjoy our protection when we come to their aid but refuse to pro-
vide a common front with us in facing up to Saddam Hussein. But
it is little short of tragic to have this internal division in such an
ugly fashion when we all know that the United States has been the
most effective proponent of seeing to it that Saddam Hussein lives
up to all of his commitments with respect to biological-chemical-nu-
clear weapons and missiles used for their delivery.
Now, just before we broke for the Thanksgiving break when the
crisis in Iraq was mounting, I introduced a resolution, H. Res. 322,
which among others you, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Hamilton and others
around this table, co-sponsored. I want to read just two paragraphs
from it because that resolution was adopted unanimously by the
House of Representatives. It is still the policy of the House of Rep-
resentatives, and the Administration at the time welcomed that
resolution and I take it still supports it. This is what the resolution
says in part, and I read just a very brief portion: "Expressing the
sense of the House that the United States should act to resolve the
crisis with Iraq in a manner that assures full Iraqi compliance with
U.N. Security Council resolutions regarding the destruction of
Iraq's capability to produce and deliver weapons of mass destruc-
tion and that peaceful and diplomatic efforts should be pursued but
that if such efforts fail, multilateral military action or unilateral
U.S. military action should be taken."
Now, this is our policy. This is the policy that this body sub-
scribed to unanimously and this is the policy that our Administra-
tion has embraced and welcomed, and there has been no changing
this whatsoever. I think it is important, since there was an inter-
change between Ambassador Indyk and Mr. Hamilton on tactical


19
issues, to recognize that in far more serious circumstances during
the conduct of the Second World War, there were legitimate de-
bates as to when the Normandy Invasion should take place, wheth-
er there should be a front established in the Balkans, and men of
equal commitment and equal patriotism took opposite sides of
those issues. What we are dealing with here are tactical disagree-
ments. They need to be aired publicly and with mutual respect, but
phrases such as "craven appeasement" have no place in this dialog,
and I earnestly hope that such phrases will not be repeated during
the course of this hearing.
Chairman Gilman. Thank you, Mr. Lantos. We thank the distin-
guished Member of the Rules Committee for joining us.
Our next questioner is Mr. Ballenger.
Mr. Ballenger. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Ambassador,
could we get back to the original subject. I and other Members
have received complaints from some of our armed forces in Turkey
where the overflights for Iraq are taking place. It seems to me that
the news media haven't given any coverage, our government acts
like there is nothing happening, and yet I keep getting e-mails
from our troops that are there about being physically man handled,
beat up, so forth. The strikes have begun where workers demand
unbelievable amounts of fringe benefits, or whatever you want to
call it, and somehow the Turkish Government doesn't seem to be
caring about it one way or another. It appears we may be standing
alone as far as keeping up the effort of the overflights to make sure
that Iraq is not doing anything at the northern part of the country.
Has anything occurred one way or another? It has been such a
secret—I don't know if it is a secret but nobody seems to pay any
attention to what is occurring on our base. I realize it is a joint
base, but it is our men that are being deployed there. They can't
go out and buy groceries alone. They have to have armed guards
to go anywhere. What's going on?
Mr. Indyk. Mr. Ballenger, I think the Secretary of Defense and
his people are probably the best place to answer in detail your con-
cerns and if you will allow me, I will recommend that they get in
touch with you and provide you with a full briefing on the situation
there. You are right to point out that we are dependent on Turkey
for our ability to fly Northern Watch, which polices the no-fly zone
in the north and provides a measure of protection for the Kurds.
That is a critical support function. It would be very difficult for us
to operate in the north without Turkish support, and so we are ap-
preciative of Turkey's support in that regard.
One of our constant concerns is for the pride of the Iraqi people
generally and specifically the pride of the Iraqi Kurds who have
suffered so horribly from Saddam Hussein's depredations in the
past, including gas attacks. We have here in Washington over the
last 10 days the two leaders of Iraqi Kurdish people, Mr. Barzani
and Mr. Talabani. We are engaged in a reconciliation. The Sec-
retary of State will be meeting with them on Thursday and this,
I believe, will be a premanifestation of our support for the Kurds
in Iraq, for the Iraqi opposition more generally, and our success in
working to unite the opposition so it becomes a credible counter to
Saddam Hussein.


20
Within that context of general policy, we have faced some dif-
ficulties, as you have suggested, in the operation of the base at
Incirlik where there has been a prolonged strike. That has not af-
fected our ability to conduct operations although, as you suggested,
it has made life difficult for some of our servicemen, but if you will
allow me I will get the details of that now.
Mr. Ballenger. I would appreciate that. It appears that there
is no news coverage. We are not saying anything about it. It ap-
pears that we have forgotten our own troops that are over there.
I appreciate any kind of informatics concerning that.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman GilMAN. Thank you, Mr. Ballenger. Mr. Clement.
Mr. Clement. Mr. Ambassador, good to have you here today. I
think it is regrettable that we seem to be fighting among ourselves
now and seem to be rather frustrated, knowing that Saddam Hus-
sein, being a ruthless dictator and he sure hadn't been good for his
people, and so much suffering in so many different ways with the
Kurds and so many other ethnic groups within Iraq. I do think our
tactics are different now than before. I would have thought maybe
Mr. Ritter, even though he is frustrated, realizes, you know, not
every country wants to bring military force at this time. I am one
of those that did not want it to come down to the United States
versus Iraq. When you are fighting someone who has nothing to
lose, that is not a good fight for world opinion as well as what the
United States should do, because I believe in coalitions if at all pos-
sible. I don't think we should rule out unilateral actions, but
whether we can have coalitions, and I have no doubt about the fact
that President Bush, if he hadn't—he wouldn't have been able to
put that coalition together if he agreed to march all the way to
Baghdad. Been good to march all the way to Baghdad, but how do
you do that and keep the coalition together?
Do you ever foresee a time when the sanctions would be lifted
as long as Saddam Hussein is in power? I don't see it today and
I am fearful that that is part of our problem because Saddam and
some of these other henchmen, well, nothing is going to change as
long as they are in power, you know, nothing, you know—why have
the inspections, nothing is going to change because these sanctions
are not going to be lifted, therefore we ought to take whatever
ruthless moves we can take because nothing will change. What
about that?
Mr. Indyk. That is an argument that is often made by advocates
of Saddam Hussein in the Security Council, that there has to be
"light at the end of the tunnel to encourage his cooperation." But
I think that misses the point. The first point I would make is that
the Security Council resolutions provide in very specific terms for
the lifting of sanctions when Iraq has fully complied with all the
Security Council resolutions, and that is the crux of the matter. It
is not a question of that they will never be lifted, but the conditions
on which they will be lifted will never appear to be fulfilled. That
is not the Council's fault. That is Saddam Hussein's fault because
he won't comply. There is a consensus for full compliance and that
continues, and I think that that is because it is understood that he
has to agree to those resolutions.


21
Now, in that context, our own view is that he does not want to
give up his weapons of mass destruction. He wishes to have sanc-
tions lifted without giving up his weapons of mass destruction. And
our view is very clear that that will not happen. He will not have
sanctions lifted, nor will he be able to retain his weapons of mass
destruction, and those are our two objectives. As far as encouraging
him to comply, I think that it is very clear that if he complies with
the Security Council resolution, fully complies, the sanctions will
be lifted.
Mr. Clement. I just wanted to ask one quick question and that
is concerning Mr. Ritter. When did he become so frustrated that he
felt like he had to resign or is this something that happened just
recently?
Mr. Indyk. I can't answer that question, but he is here today and
I am sure he can answer it for you. I would just repeat what I had
said before that, maybe elaborate a little bit, I think Scott Ritter
was involved in a dangerous occupation and for that the praise that
is heaped upon him is fully justified. It was not an easy job and
it took courage and more than courage, took ingenuity and deter-
mination, and he had all of those. And it is unfortunate that the
frustrations led him to resign, but I think it is unfair to pin the
blame on the United States for those circumstances.
Chairman GilmAn. The gentleman's time has expired. Mr. Roth-
man.
Mr. Rothman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Ambassador, good
morning. Good to see you.
A great deal of the problem I think a great many of my constitu-
ents have about our policies with regard to Iraq are ones of percep-
tion of America's resolve to prevent Saddam Hussein from recon-
stituting, as you say, its weapons of mass destruction capability. In
your statement you take great pains to say that our resolve hasn't
changed, our strategy has altered slightly but our resolve hasn't
lessened one iota. But for a great many of Americans, they think
that there is no willingness to use force behind our apparent threat
of force against Saddam Hussein. One of the ways that Americans
got the sense that this Administration was serious about Saddam
Hussein recently was when the President accumulated all of those
warships out there in the Gulf and the media covered it and put
it on TV daily. Perhaps, as you know, the media has now been at-
tracted to some other things. Perhaps it would have been better for
the Administration, if it is possible, to try to draw some attention
to the military force that is still currently available to back up our
threats against Saddam Hussein.
As you point out in your statement, you say that we are as a
matter of fact in a better position now—you say we have a signifi-
cant strike capability in place in the region, a considerably stronger
one than we did at the beginning of the last confrontation. Now,
I dare say I don't think one American knew that. Could you explain
that statement to us?
Mr. Indyk. As I told the Chairman, after the last crisis we went
through a policy review and one of the things that we had to deal
with was the costs involved in the last exercise. As you remember,
the Congress had to appropriate an emergency supplemental of
more than a billion dollars to cover the expenses involved in that


22
last crisis where we mobilized so as to back out of diplomacy with
the threat of force and, if necessary, to use it. So it is not a cost-
free exercise and it has some benefits, as you suggest, in terms of
the television images. But it has a lot of costs and we all need to
bear that in mind. So therefore, we reconfigured the force so that
we drew down one carrier battle group, kept one carrier battle
group on station, which by the way is not the norm over the last
7 years. We rotate them in and out of there, but there are times
in which normally there may be no carrier battle group at all.
Mr. Rothman. You say our force is stronger today than it was
at the last confrontation; is that true?
Mr. Indyk. That is correct.
Mr. Rothman. My suggestion is with all respect—the yellow
light is on and I may ask for another 30 seconds or so—is that you
communicate that to the American people a little better, with all
due respect, because they think we have got no troops in the area
and no ships in the area and we have just given up. So if I could
make that statement before my time runs out and I apologize for
not giving you a chance to answer fully, but you say here that we
are going to use force or we would be prepared to use force if Sad-
dam Hussein reconstitutes, uses or threatens to use weapons of
mass destruction. You say the bottom line is that we will do so if
Saddam Hussein breaks out of his strategic box. Now, I am won-
dering if those are two different things. And breaking out of a stra-
tegic box I understand is threatening his neighbors but the other
aspect you talked about which we're assessing closely is if he starts
to redevelop weapons of mass destruction. So which is it? Is it
both? Are there both instances?
Mr. Indyk. There is no contradiction between the two. Breaking
out of strategic box is defined broadly to include reconstitution of
weapons of mass destruction.
Mr. Rothman. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador.
Chairman Gilman. We are being notified that there is a 15-
minute vote followed by a 5-minute vote. We will continue to go on
as long as we can.
Mr. Salmon.
Mr. Salmon. Thank you. I have two questions and a short com-
ment and I will ask you both questions and then hopefully you can
respond. First of all, I thank you for being here, Ambassador
Indyk. I appreciate your time and attention to this matter. I would
like you to speculate as to why our allies who supported our tactics
under President George Bush in Desert Storm and many who ap-
peared to be more supportive of this President's tactics or policies
earlier on are now unsupportive. The second question is, is it pos-
sible that Saddam Hussein views these tactical changes as a sign
of weakness with this Administration or that there may be a lack
of resolve within the Administration to ultimately get the job done
and what threats might this pose to the security in the region and
ultimately our national security?
Mr. Indyk. Thank you, Mr. Salmon. I would say the following:
That there are a number of different reasons why we are lacking
support for the use of force. I want to make clear there is no lack
of support for Iraq's full compliance with Security Council resolu-
tions. There is full support for maintaining the sanctions, as was


23
evidenced in the vote last week. But it is not support for now going
in and using force to get UNSCOM inspections operating again,
and the problem with that is that some don't see the threat in the
way that we see it, particularly in the region. They just don't feel
threatened by these weapons of mass destruction or the ability to
reconstitute the weapons of mass destruction. They feel the con-
sequences of the use of force in terms of the reaction of their own
populations to attacks by the United States. Others are just in-
volved in a kind of fatigue with the whole issue and would prefer
it to go away and because they are not superbound, they are not
the United States, they don't feel it is their responsibility to have
to do something about it. And there are others that don't want to
go through the wrenching situation which is costly for them too.
Countries like Israel, for example, that had to go through this trau-
matic experience of issuing the gas masks again and going on full
alert, you know. There are costs to that that a lot of countries par-
ticularly came to bear. But that doesn't mean that when push
comes to shove or when we have exhausted the other possibilities
of diplomacy, and I am not talking about a long period of time to
do that, it doesn't mean that when we go back up the escalation
ladder, as I think we inevitably will, we won't have the support.
We haven't pushed those buttons yet. We have made it clear that
it is the Security Council's responsibility to respond and if the Se-
curity Council doesn't respond, then we have a much stronger case
to take to these countries to say, OK, we have got no choice but
to act and we need your support. And I believe that when it comes
to a choice between being with the United States or being with
Iraq, they will be with the United States.
Mr. Salmon. On the second question as to how they might inter-
pret our actions, I guess I would amend that to ask you how our
allies might interpret our change in tactics as well if they may per-
ceive it as a lack of resolve, if Saddam Hussein might perceive it
as a lack of resolve and give him the courage to do some things
that we don't want him to do.
Mr. Indyk. For what it is worth, our friends and allies are prais-
ing us. We like what we are doing. It is a kind of mirror image of
Congress' attitude. In terms of a lack of resolve, we have to take
into our calculation the possibility that Saddam Hussein may actu-
ally want us to hit him, that he doesn't see a lack of resolve, on
the contrary that he may be trying to provoke us to hit him in
order to be able to portray himself as the martyr, in order to crack
the coalition, weaken the sanctions regime, et cetera.
You know, I would be careful about trying to second-guess what
goes on in his head, which is always a very difficult proposition.
Mr. Salmon. A final short statement I would just like to make
is I would personally appreciate it if the red hot rhetoric used by
some toward Mr. Ritter would rather be aimed at Mr. Hussein,
who is the real problem.
Mr. Indyk. I agree with that.
Chairman GilMAn. The gentleman's time has expired. Mr. Davis.
Mr. Davis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Ambassador, I just want to clarify that what you are describ-
ing as a change of tactics insofar as the need to further collaborate
with the members of the Security Council before proceeding with


24
considerations with respect to force, is collaboration that has to do
with building support for the use of force, if we have to go that far,
as opposed to shoring up support for continuing economic sanc-
tions?
Mr. Indyk. I am sorry, could you just try it again.
Mr. Davis. What I hear you describing as a change in tactics is
a need for us to be more collaborative than ever with members of
the Security Council before we embark upon whatever process we
do to consider the use of force. My question to you is: Is that col-
laboration focused on building support for force if it has to be used
as opposed to shoring up continuing support for economic sanc-
tions?
Mr. Indyk. There is continuing support for economic sanctions.
We have to be concerned about the smuggling of gas-oil that goes
on, which does provide a revenue stream for Iraq. This is separate
from the oil for food arrangements. That smuggling takes place in
particular through the Shatt-al-Arab down through the Gulf and
we have in recent weeks been working with our other partners in
the multilateral intradiction force to conduct shore operations de-
signed to cut that off. The most effective way that we could cut
that oil smuggling off is with the cooperation of Iran because they
sneak into Iranian territory waters where the military cannot oper-
ate and we made Iranian adherence to the U.N. Security Council
resolutions in order to directly affect that kind of operation. But
other than that, there is broad support for the economic sanctions
and we don't see a lot of sanction violations. We monitor that very
closely and obviously there are a lot of activities that Iraq can get
involved in so we can't cover all of them. But in general, we have
not yet seen the kind of erosion in sanction enforcement that has
taken place, for example, in the case of Libya.
Mr. Davis. Can you be explicit in describing our policy as being
prepared to go at it alone on force if necessary?
Mr. Indyk. Yes. I think that should be very clear that if nec-
essary force is not off the table. It remains an option and we under-
stand very clearly the need to back out of diplomacy by the threat
of force and we should never threaten force if we are not prepared
to use it.
Mr. Davis. The greater level collaboration I hear you describing
as a part of this changed tactics, can you elaborate a little bit on
how much timing is involved in having to go through that process
and how that leads to any risks, as Mr. Hamilton was describing,
of greater problems on the inspection front while we are going
through that process?
Mr. Indyk. It is difficult to put a timeframe on it. We do have
a sense of urgency and concern about how long this continues, how
long the blockage of UNSCOM's inspections continues. It is a dy-
namic situation in which, you know, each week produces some new
action or reaction on either our part, the Council's part, or Iraq's
part. For example, this week they are threatening to cut off all co-
operation with UNSCOM, in effect to throw UNSCOM out com-
pletely, which would put us into a more dire situation which the
Council really would then have to respond to in even greater viola-
tion, and we are actively engaged with other Council members to
ward Saddam off from doing that kind of thing. So we will take it


25
step by step. We have to at the same time anticipate actions that
he will take along the way and be ready for those as well. But as
I outlined before in the first instance, we feel it is the Council's re-
sponsibility to respond to this challenge to its authority.
Chairman Gilman. The gentleman's time has expired.
Mr. Indyk. If it does not, we will have to take our own actions.
Chairman Gilman. We have a 5-minute vote following this vote.
We will adjourn after Mr. Rohrabacher has an opportunity to ques-
tion and, Mr. Indyk, following questions by Mr. Rohrabacher, we
hope you will be able to stay at least till noontime.
Mr. Indyk. Mr. Chairman, I have to leave at noon if that is all
right with you.
Chairman GilmAn. By noon.
Mr. Indyk. By noon.
Chairman Gilman. Thank you. Mr. Rohrabacher.
Mr. Rohrabacher [Presiding]. We will have to be quick, Mr.
Ambassador. Let me just say that I clearly have disagreements
with many of the things that you have said today and many of the
things the Administration is presenting as its policy. I think this
word game about tactics and policy is not helpful to understanding
what is going on with our problems, not only in terms of Saddam
Hussein but also in terms of what is going on throughout the
world. And what I see is the collapse of America's national security
standards that we have had and that have been arranged over the
last 15 years. I see a collapse across the board.
I know you take exception and others have taken an exception
of Mr. Solomon's use of the words "craven appeasement", but I am
going to have to say for the record right now that craven appease-
ment seems to be what this Administration is all about when it
comes to the likes of Saddam Hussein. Whether or not we are talk-
ing about the way they deal with gangsters in China or gangsters
in Afghanistan or whether we are dealing with the type of dictators
and futile dictatorship in North Korea or what is going on in Cam-
bodia, across the board this Administration is losing to these penny
ante thugs across the world because it seems that they are not tak-
ing our word seriously, and I think that is probably exemplified by
again another word game you played with us today, is severe con-
sequences. I mean, let me just go right up to the heart of the ques-
tion.
When you say severe consequences and in defending the Presi-
dent's use of those words, it didn't seem to me that you were telling
us—the only severe consequences was that the status quo wouldn't
be maintained. Is that the type of message that is going to convince
the Husseins and dictators of the world that we mean business?
Go right ahead if you can answer that specific point, if you want,
or my general point.
Mr. Indyk. Mr. Chairman, with all due respect, I can't accept
that we are engaged in craven appeasement. I find that deeply of-
fensive, but I will answer your question.
Mr. Rohrabacher. I find it deeply disappointing. You can find
it offensive all you want. The people of this world are seeing petty
dictators face down this Administration, and thus the United
States of America, and sends us into retreat. Our policy with


26
Mr. Indyk. I am responsible for the Middle East, and I don't see
which dictator is facing us down at the moment. If you are talking
about Saddam Hussein, he is subjected to the most severe con-
sequences on a daily basis. There is not a nation in the world that
suffers more severe consequences from the sanctions that are the
most comprehensive in the history of the world, and those have
just been strengthened. If that is not a severe consequence, then
I don't know what a definition is. But as I made clear to Mr. Ham-
ilton, that is one severe consequence. It is not the final severe con-
sequence and that is a tactical question as to when and if to lower
the boom. But this is a dynamic situation and we are engaged in
an effort to get him to back down and that effort is ongoing.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Do we support the removal of Saddam Hus-
sein from power?
Mr. Indyk. Mr. Chairman, we have made clear that we would
look forward to the day when we could deal with a government
that was more representative and more responsive to the needs of
the Iraqi people.
Mr. Rohrabacher. I guess that is about as close as we can come
to an answer on that.
Mr. Indyk. That is correct. I think one thing you need to under-
stand is that there is no international consensus for the removal
of Saddam Hussein. That is one of the reasons that the Bush Ad-
ministration gave for its unwillingness to go and unseat Saddam
Hussein. We need to maintain an international consensus if we are
to maintain the sanctions on Iraq. Now, if you take the view that
the sanctions don't count for anything, then you can tell the rest
of the world to go take a hike and not care about their concerns.
But if those sanctions are important, then we have to act within
the hand of the Security Council resolutions, which do not provide
for his overthrow.
Mr. Rohrabacher. I understand when an Administration is
seeking consensus rather than seeking to provide leadership to the
world how that will hamstring our efforts to bring about any
change anywhere in the world, especially when dealing with petty
dictators like Saddam Hussein or the gangsters that I have talked
about before. It seems to me that the consensus strategy that led
us to a situation where we committed 500,000 troops and much
treasure and a great deal of risk of our country in a confrontation
with Saddam Hussein has left us with that very same problem 8
years later. Perhaps it is about time—again, this isn't just aimed
at this Administration, although I think this Administration exem-
plifies that more than anyone I have ever seen. Do we have to go
with the consensus all the time? Shouldn't the United States be
providing a tough, strong leadership that the world will follow, as
has happened before during the cold war?
Mr. Indyk. As I tried to make clear in my opening statement, I
believe that we have provided that tough, strong leadership when
it comes to the containment of Iraq and that had we not insisted
on full compliance with Security Council resolutions over all these
years and put a hell of a lot of effort into that we would not be
where we are today. Where we are today is that despite his refusal
to cooperate with UNSCOM or to comply with the Security Council
resolutions, he is paying the consequences. He is paying a very


27
steep price in terms of foregoing hundreds of billions of dollars, in
terms of a significant weakening of his military capabilities and the
destruction of much of his weapons of mass discussion.
Saddam Hussein today does not pose a threat to his neighbors.
He is contained. He has the potential to do so and that is of grave
concern. That is what we have focused on. But to imagine that
nothing has happened over the last 8 years, when the Iraqi econ-
omy has been taken down severely as a result of the sanctions,
when his ability to threaten his neighborhood has been severely
constrained, is to ignore the realities.
Mr. Rohrabacher. The Saddam Husseins of this world do not
care what happens to their economy. Perhaps the Administration
should understand that whether they are in North Korea or, as I
say, Afghanistan or Cambodia or all these places across the world
where we find ourselves in conflict or in confrontation with these
types of petty gangsters, they don't care what happens to the econ-
omy of their country.
Mr. Indyk. I agree with you. He cares about his economy because
his economy is the way that he can rebuild his army and that is
the point.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Is there anything that we have done that has
given Saddam Hussein the idea that he could get away with defy-
ing our demand that he comply with his commitments?
Mr. Indyk. I think on the contrary. As I said to Mr. Solomon, he
rather thinks that by refusing to cooperate he can provoke us and
that he will again benefit from the very thing that you would like
us to do.
Mr. Rohrabacher. So we haven't done anything that suggested
to him that there is a weakness in our commitment?
Mr. Indyk. Not at all, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Rohrabacher. All right. What I will do is I will leave that
at that point because I know Mr. Ritter will probably have some-
thing to say about that particular question.
Mr. Indyk. I am sure he will.
Mr. Rohrabacher. But I am going to give you the last word and
then I have to run off to go for a vote.
Go right ahead. Would you like to add something?
Mr. Indyk. I would. I would just like to reemphasize that our
policy toward Iraq has been one in which we have consistently
sought to contain the threat that he poses to our neighbors and we
have done that successfully. We have also sought consistently to
ensure that the Security Council resolutions are complied with and
UNSCOM. If you look at the history of its activities as being very
successful in that regard in terms of disarming Iraq, the job has
not been completed and we will continue to support UNSCOM and
insist that the job be completed.
Mr. Rohrabacher. You got the last words, Mr. Ambassador.
Thank you very much.
Mr. Indyk. Thank you.
Mr. Rohrabacher. This hearing is recessed until after the votes.
[Recess.]
Chairman GilMAn. The Committee will come to order.
I have been advised that our witness had to leave by noon. We
will now proceed to our next witness, Scott Ritter.


29
yet another concession. So one must look askance at any new effort
to appease Iraq by calling for a new comprehensive review of its
compliance with Security Council resolutions. Such a review is very
disturbing.
The Special Commission has been placed under such pressures
in the past, always at the behest of Iraq. Prior to my departure
from the Special Commission, I know the Executive Chairman was
under pressure to define Iraq's outstanding disarmament obliga-
tions in a manner which would allow such a comprehensive review
to achieve the closure of the chemical and ballistic missile files. To
do this, the Special Commission would have to cease its investiga-
tion of Iraq's concealment mechanism and agree to place its re-
maining concerns about retained components and means of produc-
tion under a program of ongoing monitoring and verification. Such
a move would be fundamentally wrong and would lead to what I
have called the "illusion of arms control."
This most recent Security Council resolution on Iraq is only re-
flective of the continuing pattern of confrontation and concession.
I cannot see how the recent resolution did anything more than
delay the inevitable. Iraq has paid no real price for telling one lie
after another and continuing its obstruction of the weapons inspec-
tion teams. If Iraq chooses in the future to allow the resumption
of inspection activity, will it be rewarded with yet another round
of comprehensive reviews? The danger rests in the objectivity of
such a review. The track record of the Secretary General on Iraq
is mixed, at best.
I believe that the world, and especially the Congress of the
United States, must pay close attention in the weeks and months
ahead to keep the process of disarming Iraq honest. If recent his-
tory is any guide, there will be many pressures placed upon the
Special Commission, most behind the scenes and, as such, out of
public view, to make compromises of substance concerning Iraq's
unfulfilled disarmament obligations. The credibility of the United
Nations and the United States is at stake here.
I hope that in my testimony here today I might be able to help
shine a light on this most important issue.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Gilman. Thank you, Major Ritter.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Ritter appears in the appendix.]
Chairman Gilman. Major Ritter, in your September 3 testimony
you asserted it would take 10 years for Iraq to have operable nu-
clear weapons, if it had to reconstitute its own fissile material pro-
duction program. How long would it take Iraq to activate its nu-
clear weapons if it obtained the needed fissile material from the
black market or any other source? How many such potential weap-
ons does Iraq have at the present time?
Mr. Ritter. Mr. Chairman, that question really needs to be an-
swered by a nuclear weapons design specialist, because the fissile
material, it depends on what form the fissile material is when Iraq
obtains it, what kind of machining they had to do to get it down
to the proper core size. There are a number of technical issues at
stake there.
What I have indicated in the past is that the Special Commission
had received sensitive information of some credibility which indi-
54-334 99 - 2


30
cated that Iraq had the components to assemble three implosion-
type devices, minus the fissile type material, and if Iraq were able
to obtain fissile material of the quality and of the proper physical
properties conducive to such a weapon, then they could assemble
three nuclear devices in a very short period of time.
Chairman GilMAn. Are you confident, Major, that Iraq's obtain-
ing fissile material from an outside source for its nuclear weapons
would be detected by a U.N. weapons inspector or by any other
means? How difficult an intelligence task would that be?
Mr. Ritter. Mr. Chairman, I can only address the issues that
are pertinent to the work of the Special Commission and insofar as
we cooperate with the International Atomic Energy Agency. The
International Atomic Energy Agency has a comprehensive program
of conducting gamma surveys in Iraq which would allow it to map
out specific areas of Iraq, and the sensors they use are of a sen-
sitivity that if Iraq obtained fissile material, if the fissile material
was packaged improperly, there is a high likelihood that it would
be detected by the International Atomic Energy Agency through
their ongoing survey work.
In terms of finding it through the process of inspections, our in-
formation is that materials such as the components of a nuclear
weapon are protected by the special security organization, as are
chemical, biological, and ballistic missile components; and this, in
fact, was the purpose of the inspection teams that I was tasked
with leading, to break through the wall of concealment put up by
the special security organization and get to these components.
We have not been allowed to do these jobs, so, right now, my con-
fidence in the ability of the inspection process to find these compo-
nents or this fissile material is very low indeed.
Chairman Gilman. Well, then, Major, the Iraq facilities you were
blocked from inspecting include those in which Iraq is thought to
be hiding its components for the nuclear weapons?
Mr. Ritter. Mr. Chairman, we were attempting to conduct a
comprehensive campaign of inspections against the special security
organization in an effort to define the precise methodologies that
they used to hide all components—chemical, biological, ballistic
missile and nuclear—from the Special Commission. We were not
going after solely the nuclear capability or the chemical capability
or the biological capability. We were going after them from a stra-
tegic standpoint. So, in blocking the inspections, you, in effect,
blocked our ability to find the components in all four areas of con-
cern.
Chairman GilmAn. Major, a respected trade journal called Nucle-
onics Week has reported that IAEA was informed that Iraq had de-
veloped a scale model of a nuclear weapon. Did UNSCOM have any
access to information about such a scale model?
Mr. Ritter. Mr. Chairman, in my role as the chief of the Con-
cealment Investigations Unit, I coordinated very closely with the
International Atomic Energy Agency's action team, and we shared
a lot of sensitive information. I think I need to yield the exact na-
ture of those discussions. I think it would be inappropriate for me
to discuss those. But I should say they were very forthcoming in
telling us what they knew, and we were likewise forthcoming in
letting them know what we knew about Iraq's nuclear programs.


31
Chairman Gilman. Are you aware of any other activities of Iraq
that would indicate they are preparing to conform the nuclear
bomb components to a missile delivery vehicle?
Mr. RiTTER. The Special Commission has conducted investiga-
tions into activities that took place in the fall of 1990 in which a
SCUD-type ballistic missile warhead was turned over to the nu-
clear weaponization team of the Iraq nuclear weapons program,
and we have concerns that measurements were being taken and
that a redesign of the weapon was being done so that it could fit
into a conventional dimension SCUD warhead.
One of the problems is that Iraq refuses to discuss the time de-
sign phase of its nuclear weapons program. This is an outstanding
issue I believe the IAEA has highlighted to the Security Council,
and it is one which is still under investigation today.
Chairman Gilman. Major, one last question. You mentioned a
short period of time. Would that be weeks, months, years? What
would you define as a short period of time?
Mr. Ritter. If the components of the implosion device are oper-
ational, if they have not been damaged through moving them
around the country and hiding them from the inspection teams and
the fissile core is of the correct properties, it is a matter of days,
maybe weeks, before they could be assembled into a device.
Chairman Gilman. Thank you, Major.
Mr. Menendez.
Mr. Menendez. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Ritter, first of all, let me thank you for your service to our
country in this regard. There are many of us who share the frustra-
tions that you have exhibited through your resignation and your
comments today.
I want to pursue some of the things you have said in your testi-
mony and get a better sense of them specifically.
When you say, "I have been very critical of specific actions un-
dertaken by the United States to interfere with the difficult inspec-
tion task being carried out by the Special Commission," can you tell
the Committee what specific actionsyou are referring to?
Mr. Ritter. Yes, Mr. Menendez. The actions basically are a devi-
ation from an agreed-upon course of action that was undertaken in
May 1997 in which the Special Commission carried out a joint
briefing with the United States and United Kingdom representa-
tives. We set forth our model of how Iraq is concealing prohibited
materials and weapons from the Special Commission and our meth-
odologies of how we proposed to go after this.
At that time, both the United States and the United Kingdom
embraced the model and gave the go-ahead for us to proceed in this
course of action. However, once the inspection teams were ob-
structed by the Iraqis decisively in October 1997, since that time
the United States has undertaken a series of actions which have
retarded the ability of the concealment-oriented inspection teams to
carry out their work.
This was most recently exhibited in the events of July and Au-
gust in which two teams that I was responsible for forming and
leading were prevented from carrying out their disarmament tasks
in Iraq because of specific intervention by the United States in the
form of telephone calls with the Executive Chairman.


32
Mr. Menendez. Where did those calls come from, to your knowl-
edge?
Mr. Ritter. Again, I was not there. In July, I was in New York.
I know that the meetings took place and they were person-to-per-
son meetings, one meeting taking place at the United Kingdom
mission in New York and the second meeting taking place at the
U.S. mission in New York. That was in July.
Then in August, while I was in Baghdad awaiting orders, the Ex-
ecutive Chairman received telephone calls while he was in Bahrain
and then again once he returned to New York.
Mr. Menendez. Did the Executive Chairman let you know in fact
that these interventions were taking place and that is why he was
giving you new instructions?
Mr. Ritter. Yes, sir. I had a very close and professional relation-
ship with the Executive Chairman. These were not small-level deci-
sions that were being taken. They were actually the heart of some
of the major inspection activities we were doing. As such, the Exec-
utive Chairman kept me fully informed.
Mr. Menendez. Did he share with you who, what individuals
from what departments, were giving him those instructions?
Mr. Ritter. The personnel who were close to the Executive
Chairman informed me on who he was talking with. The Executive
Chairman merely said it was senior representatives of the United
States.
Mr. Menendez. Were they from the State Department?
Mr. Ritter. My understanding from personnel who were familiar
with the conversation is that, on at least several of the occasions,
the intervention was conducted by the Secretary of State and, on
others, by the deputy Ambassador to the U.S. mission and, on the
part of the United Kingdom, by the head of the Middle East De-
partment of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office.
Mr. Menendez. Two other quick questions. You say in your testi-
mony, "I know that the Executive Chairman was under pressure to
define Iraq's outstanding disarmament obligations in a manner
which would allow a comprehensive review to achieve the closure
of chemical and ballistic missile files." Again, from where was that
pressure?
And since I see my time is almost going to run out, I would like
to ask one other question, and you can respond to both.
Each time that you were foiled in your attempts on inspections
and concealment and whatnot, do you know if in fact that created
opportunities for the Iraqis to move what you suspected were the
types of weapons that would have fallen under the purview of the
U.N. resolutions and, therefore, frustrate any potential opportunity
to truly determine the extent of their components and the develop-
ment that they had acquired?
Mr. Ritter. Thank you, Mi*. Menendez. To answer your first
question concerning pressure, understand that one of the policies
of the United States is consensus building. Therefore, the United
States gives, at a minimum, equal weight or in some cases a great-
er weight to the viewpoints of members of the Security Council
that are in opposition to the U.S. policy—namely, France and Rus-
sia.


33
What happens when we back away from inspection-based con-
frontations and we seek a diplomatic alternative, the voice of Rus-
sia and France, China and other members becomes much stronger,
and the Executive Chairman is placed under continual pressure
from these nations to seek a compromise solution to reduce the dis-
armament obligations, to minimize them in a manner which would
be acceptable to Iraq, while being a deviation from the provisions
of Security Council resolutions.
This is the kind of pressure that I am talking about. There is no
corresponding pressure from the United States placed on the Exec-
utive Chairman to withstand these pressures. In fact, he is encour-
aged to receive the advice from these representatives. This same
pressure comes from the Secretary General.
Concerning being foiled or frustrations once inspections are
stopped, understand that the concealment mechanism operates on
a phased cycle. We have been assessing this for several years now.
We currently believe that Iraq changes its phase of concealment,
that is, the practices used to conceal material from the Special
Commission and the International Atomic Energy Agency, on a 30-
day basis, a 30-day cycle. So we must receive information, assess
information and act on this information in a very short timeframe.
If we do not do so, we will be punching, in effect, into an empty
bag. We will be going to sites which have been vacated. That is
why timing of inspections is crucial.
If you interrupt an inspection, you interrupt not only that par-
ticular effort but you disrupt an entire campaign which the Special
Commission has undertaken to defeat that particular cycle of con-
cealment. That was the heart of the program that I was charged
with carrying out on behalf of the Executive Chairman, and this is
why such interventions by the United States in July and August
are disastrous, if we are serious about taking on Iraq's concealment
mechanism.
Mr. Menendez. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Gilman. Mr. Bereuter.
Mr. Bereuter. Mr. Ritter, thank you very much for your testi-
mony.
I would explain that the Committee on Banking and Financial
Services caucus, and distinguished visitors from Thailand, kept me
from being here while Ambassador or Secretary Indyk was speak-
ing. However, I did want to make a couple of comments that would
relate to him and the Administration. Of course, if it prompts you
to say anything as a result, Mr. Ritter, I would be happy to hear
it.
I did want to say to the Administration and to the Secretary, and
I hope it gets back to him, that while informing the allies in
UNSCOM was important, we are allies. We are in the same gov-
ernment. We have not been involved or informed about changes in
tactics which are perceived to be changes in policies.
Chairman Gross's letters, which Chairman Solomon submitted,
talk about three recent instances where he feels that the Adminis-
tration on crucial issues has failed to consult with Congress prop-
erly or else has avoided a full and truthful discourse with this
branch of government, the Congress.


34
Chairman Gross says, 'The green light to Iranian involvement in
Bosnia, various Chinese proliferation activities and the Russian
complicity in the Iranian weapons development program are but
that three that come to mind."
There are two things I hope the Administration keeps in mind
with respect to Iraq. One is that the more the Administration
threatens without delivering on that threat, the more difficult the
situation, the consequences and the actions that will eventually
face this country.
The second thing to remember is that Saddam Hussein was de-
feated. He may not have been deposed, but he was defeated. He is
not really regarded as a full and legitimate member of the inter-
national community, and neither is his country. Therefore, we
should not treat them as if they are full and legitimate, accepted
members of the international community in the actions we take or
that we encourage the United Nations to take.
Finally, I would say, and this is the part to which you might
want to refer and comment upon, Mr. Ritter, I think that the limi-
tations imposed upon our UNSCOM inspections or those that we
have applied to ourselves do give me little confidence that we will
be able to detect the resumption of development of weapons of
mass destruction by Iraq.
I expect some day we are going to have to use force again. We
are going to say, in retrospect, we were wrong in expecting that the
UNSCOM inspections were able to detect those kinds of resump-
tions of programs to develop weapons of mass destruction or mis-
siles. I am afraid that is where I am today. I have little confidence
that even under the full regime that had been implemented, that
we would have been able to detect those development programs
being resumed.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. If Mr. Ritter has any comments on
particularly the last point, I would welcome them.
Mr. Ritter. Thank you, sir.
All I would like to add to that is that there is no doubt that the
inspection tasks that the Special Commission and the IAEA have
today are more difficult than had been originally envisioned when
these two organizations, one, the Special Commission was commis-
sioned in 1991 and, two, the IAEA was given the task of inspecting
Iraq.
The world expected a conventional disarmament program con-
ducted along classic lines, where Iraq would declare its holdings,
we would verify their declaration, and then we would oversee the
disarmament. The world did not envision a confrontational regime
where Iraq would conduct active measures to protect retained pro-
hibited materials, and the inspection bodies would have to under-
take active measures to try and expose these activities.
There is no book on this. There is no precedent. We have no
standard operating procedure to fall back on. So if there is confu-
sion around the world, to include the United States, on how to pro-
ceed down this path, it is because in part we have never done this
before.
Can we succeed? I was given a job to do, along with all my other
colleagues. It is a very difficult job, and no one thought it would
be easy, but we were trying to succeed. A lot of people said we had


35
no chance, but we felt that we had come up with a methodology
of work that, had we been allowed to go forward, we could have de-
tected, we could have uncovered these programs and, given the free
rein that the Security Council promised us, we would prevent them
from reconstituting weapons. But it is not happening today.
Chairman Gilman. The gentleman's time has expired.
Mr. Lantos.
Mr. Lantos. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield to Mr. Rothman.
Mr. Rothman. Thank you, Mr. Lantos. I am grateful.
Mr. Ritter, two questions. One, do you have evidence that Iraq
has reconstituted any of its weapons of mass destruction? And, two,
Ambassador Indyk was here earlier. He testified that America has
a significant strike capability in the region, a considerably stronger
one, those are his words, a stronger one than we did at the begin-
ning of the last confrontation with Baghdad, and that we can aug-
ment that force rapidly, should we need to do so.
Do you agree with his assessment on our level of force in the re-
gion and has there been any evidence of reconstituting of weapons
of mass destruction by Saddam Hussein?
Mr. Ritter. Yes, sir. Let me first say that I am here before you
as an inspector with 7 years experience implementing Security
Council resolutions in Iraq. That was my job, and that is what I
feel capable of responding to. I can't answer your question about
the level of military force in the region. That is an issue that the
national security policymakers of this government must formulate
this, and they are the ones that have to be held accountable for
that. It is outside my purview as an inspector to talk about that.
About the evidence of reconstitution, one of the problems is that
we are frustrated by the fact that Iraq has never provided a full
accounting of its past programs, so we cannot, therefore, tailor a
regime of inspections and monitoring to detect reconstitution if we
don't know from the beginning what they had to start with.
What I can say is that, through the work of not only my team
but the entire Special Commission and the IAEA, we have found
sufficient hard evidence of Iraq's attempts to acquire dual-capable
machines, to acquire components which can be used in weapons of
mass destruction, and that they have retained components and ma-
chines of dual capability and of a prescribed capability that they
have not turned over to the Special Commission which would give
them the ability to rapidly reconstitute prohibited weapons, chemi-
cal weapons, biological weapons and long-range ballistic missiles.
Mr. Rothman. Do you know the location of those, the last cat-
egory, those that they retained?
Mr. Ritter. One of the jobs I was given was to try and find those
locations. Understand that they moved them around the country
quite frequently, so we have a very difficult intelligence problem.
Mr. Rothman. You know, nonetheless, that they have them?
Mr. Ritter. We have what I would say is evidence of such high
credibility that we have a very high degree of certainty that they
have these capabilities. It is impossible to say whether you have
them or not until you actually get your hands on them, but the in-
telligence information is of such a high degree, high quality, that
we have a very high degree of certainty that these weapons exist;


36
and in August we had high-value intelligence on a specific location,
on locations in Iraq where components of this nature were hidden.
Mr. Rothman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, Mr. Lantos.
Mr. Lantos. Major Ritter, I said this earlier, but let me repeat
this. You have done great service to this country, and we are all
deeply in your debt. I personally have great admiration for your
work.
Mr. Ritter. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Lantos. I hope you understand that this is about as far from
an adversarial hearing as the Congress is capable of holding. What
I would like you to react to, and perhaps reflect on, is the comment
in your Senate testimony concerning your frustration, because we
certainly appreciate and understand your frustration and have tre-
mendous respect for the fact that, despite this frustration for 7
years, you stuck it out and did an outstanding job.
How would you deal with the issue that perhaps your frustration
is misdirected? You are a man of great intelligence. You surely un-
derstand that the U.S. Government has been, by far, the strongest
on the issue to which you have dedicated 7 years of your life. It
seems to me that, at bottom, the dispute between you and the De-
partment of State is a fairly classical dispute of the individual in
the field and the individual at headquarters. Each one has advan-
tages.
You certainly understand what is happening in the field infi-
nitely better than anybody in the State Department, but I think it
is probably fair to say that people in the State Department who
have dealt with international policy issues—and this is not the first
one where we need to obtain support of many other countries and
deal in a very murky and complex environment—they may under-
stand better the issues of timing and tactics.
Because I would give my right arm if I could somehow persuade
you to reconsider your decision. You are an invaluable member of
a most critical operation, and while I fully understand your frustra-
tion and the reasons for your frustration, time has now elapsed.
You have probably received accolades from across the political spec-
trum, and I am very proud to be part of those accolades.
But I think it is important to step beyond the range of the dis-
pute you have had so far and recognize that Secretary Albright and
the State Department and you are, in fact, on the same team, that
you may have some technical differences or timing differences but
it would be very important and very critical for the goal to which
you have given 7 years of your life to close ranks and move to-
gether.
I know my time is running out, but there is just one small quote
I would like to offer from a gentleman you know very well, because
I think you worked under him, Ambassador Rolf Ekeus, who was
the first chairman of UNSCOM, as I recall. I presume you share
my high regard for him. He is the current Swedish Ambassador to
the United States and did an outstanding job, as did you, as did
Ambassador Butler.
But Rolf Ekeus is quoted in the September 9 issue of the Post
saying, and I will paraphrase, "In a very narrow sense, you, Major


37
Ritter, you are always right. But you lack political perspective," he
says, "and you had difficulty seeing the whole picture."
This is not a hostile statement. It is the quintessential juxtaposi-
tion of the statement from headquarters and the statement from
the field, and it has been going on ever since we have had oper-
ations of this kind.
Would you entertain the possibility, and I would be most happy
to attempt to facilitate it, of sitting down with Secretary Albright
and discussing this matter, which I think would be very salutary
for both of you? And I think it would close a gap which is present
and, in my judgment, in a manner which is very damaging to our
national interests, which surely you do not wish, and I know she
does not wish?
Chairman Gilman. If the gentleman will yield, I think that could
have been facilitated if the Secretary had been here today at our
request. Thank you for yielding.
Mr. Lantos. I don't think that a congressional hearing is the ap-
propriate forum for a tete-a-tete, with all due respect, Mr. Chair-
man.
Chairman Gilman. Thank you. The gentleman's time has ex-
pired.
Mr. Lantos. Would you respond to the issues I raised?
Mr. Ritter. Yes, sir. Mr. Lantos, you understand that I have
spent 7 years of my life doing this job.
Mr. Lantos. I do, and I respect it.
Mr. Ritter. Also, understand that the U.N. Special Commission
was the sole authority for carrying out the provisions of Security
Council resolution.
Mr. Lantos. Right.
Mr. Ritter. That I was stationed in New York, not in Baghdad.
Therefore, I was stationed at the headquarters. So I don't view my-
self as a field personnel with limited, myopic vision. In fact, I was
a key member of the staff of both Executive Chairmen responsible
for carrying out these difficult inspections. We carried out these in-
spections in an international environment.
While I may not have sat in on all of the policy coordination
meetings that took place in Washington, DC, as American policy
work was formulated, I did have very close relations with people
who did sit in on these meetings, who passed on the results of
these meetings to me. I believe that I was very well informed at
all times about what U.S. policy was toward Iraq and what the pol-
icy objectives were toward Iraq.
Let me make a statement here. America, the United States of
America, is and was the No. 1 supporter of the Special Commis-
sion. There can be no doubt about that. The Special Commission
could never have achieved what it did achieve without the support
of the United States. Madeleine Albright is a person whom I have
the highest respect for. She is a woman of strong will, she is a pro-
fessional, and she has held Iraq to strict accounting for their mis-
deeds, and she will continue to hold them.
Mr. Lantos. It is nice to hear you say this, because that is ex-
actly my judgment.
Mr. Ritter. Having said this, I need to again reiterate the fact
that I traveled around the world in an effort to get support for a


38
counter-concealment strategy. It is not conventional arms control.
This is not what the world envisioned when they formed the Spe-
cial Commission. The task that I started under Ambassador Ekeus
and I continued under Ambassador Butler at the Special Commis-
sion is something new, something no one had ever tried to do be-
fore. We would not set forth without support from around the
world.
So not only do I feel comfortable in talking about American for-
eign policy and how my actions were conducted to keep in concert
with American foreign policy objectives, but I feel comfortable talk-
ing about the foreign policy objectives of the members of the Secu-
rity Council and people around the world who were responsible for
providing support to the Special Commission.
My frustration was not solely the frustration of a field com-
mander. My frustration was the frustration of somebody in the
know, who has been in the know for a sustained period of time,
who came up to the reality that, in August 1998, that the work
that I have been trying to conduct was going nowhere and, in fact,
we were being asked to make compromises of integrity by the Secu-
rity Council, by the Secretary General, and indeed, although not
explicitly but implicitly, by the United States.
This could not be allowed to stand and was one reason why I
chose to resign. And, believe me, I would love to be in Iraq today
doing my job of finding these horrible weapons or in New York sup-
porting the other brave people in the Special Commission who do
this task. But I realized that I was not going to be allowed to carry
out this task, and only through resigning and bringing this issue
to the forefront, to this kind of debate here, were we going to get
a policy change that would get the inspection teams back in Iraq,
back on track, back toward the difficult job of disarming.
Chairman GilmAn. The gentleman's time has expired.
Mr. Chabot.
Mr. Chabot. I thank the Chairman.
This Administration likes to talk tough but then not follow up
with action. Back during the era of President Teddy Roosevelt, we
talked about walking softly and carrying a big stick. I think far too
often this Administration walks with a great deal of bluster but
doesn't seem to have a clue of what to do with the stick.
I just want to say, Major, that I consider you to be a patriot, a
true patriot, and having the courage to resign when it was being
made virtually impossible to really do your job right I think took
a lot of courage. I think by resigning—although I agree with Mr.
Lantos to the extent that I would love to have you over there doing
these inspections, because I think you are probably the most quali-
fied and the most hard-nosed and best inspector that we have—but
I think by resigning you have drawn attention to the fact that the
inspections aren't being done and the U.S. role, apparently, behind
the scenes in not only not pushing for the inspections but not want-
ing to draw attention to it.
So I think we can have it both ways. You have drawn attention
to it, and that was a courageous thing for you to do. I want to
thank you for it.
In The Washington Times they had a recent editorial, and I just
wanted to quote one small section from that. This talked about,


40
What do you make of that statement, in terms of what the reali-
ties of what has gone on?
Mr. RittER. Thank you, sir.
The June 22 letter, I believe, reflected frustration that grew out
of the aforementioned April relook at American policy toward Iraq
that I believe Ambassador Indyk has discussed. At that time, the
United States decided that to carry out inspections of discovery
which would lead to confrontation, that that was not in the best
interests of the U.S. Government, that that would allow, in their
opinion, Iraq to pick the time and place of confrontations.
So the United States put pressure on the Special Commission,
through a number of ways, to stop these inspections. In fact, one
of the things that occurred was that the team that I had assembled
and built in August 1997 was actually dismantled and reconsti-
tuted in a manner which was more in keeping with what would be
politically acceptable to the French and to the Russians and not
what was practically acceptable in terms of carrying out meaning-
ful inspections.
We were also told that the standard of information that we had
to act upon would be raised to a much higher level. We could no
longer carry out inspections based upon information that might not
be 100 percent. We tried to adjust to this. In fact, we did adjust.
When we heard that the President came back and said we could
carry out inspections using the means of our own choosing, we
went to Washington, DC. I traveled to Washington, DC and met
with representatives from the State Department and asked, does
this mean we have the green light to move on? I am ready. Is the
United States ready? I was told at that time, yes, you can go for-
ward.
We gathered the intelligence, we assessed the intelligence, and
we came up with sites in Iraq. We put together a comprehensive
plan to avoid detection by Iraq, and we got 45 inspectors in place
in country ready to carry out this inspection.
Yet, in July, the United States had a change of mind, maybe a
change of tactics. They stopped the inspection. We lost the capabil-
ity, we lost the information that we were basing the inspection
upon, and we were forced to shift our time lines forward into Au-
gust.
So the June 22nd letter, I believe, had a good impact in that it
got the President of the United States to say that we could carry
out inspections using the means of our own choosing, but there was
no real practice to this policy by the United States.
Mr. Fox. The last question, has Iraq used the U.N. Oil for Food
programs to import dual-use goods or other programs for its
banned weapons programs? And does the U.S. Government have
any information that Iraq is receiving or has received illegal ship-
ments through this program?
Mr. RiTTER. The Special Commission has no direct way of mon-
itoring the Oil for Food program. However, through the work that
my unit was carrying out, we did receive information, very specific
information of the highest quality, that indicated that Iraq was
using Oil for Food as a cover, procurement cover, for receiving ma-
terial related to ballistic missile production. We assumed that they
would be doing the same for chemical and biological as well.


41
We also had information that Iraq maybe, perhaps not through
Oil for Food but through sanctions violations, has received high-ca-
pability, computer-controlled power tools for access, machine tools
which they are now currently using as part of their ballistic missile
program which were imported illegally, and if strict enforcement of
the resolution issue was indeed what people wanted, should be im-
pounded and, in fact, destroyed by the Special Commission.
Mr. Fox. Mr. Chairman, may I ask one final question?
Chairman Gilman. Yes, proceed.
Mr. Fox. Could the U.N. Security Council or any member of the
Council take action to stop these shipments if they were to be pub-
licly documented?
Mr. Ritter. I have always been led to believe through my work
that it was best if we worked away from public scrutiny. Maybe the
experiences of this last summer will lead me to believe that it
might be more effective to work in public.
But the problem with public documentation is that sensitive
sources and methods of intelligence collection would therefore be
compromised, and the Special Commission has spent the last sev-
eral years developing a very capable capability in that regard, one
which would need to be protected.
Mr. Fox. Thank you for your testimony and your leadership and
courage.
Mr. Ritter. Thank you, sir.
Chairman GilmAn. Thank you, Mr. Fox.
Mr. Brady.
Mr. Brady. Mr. Chairman, first, I would like to ask unanimous
consent that a statement on the matters we have been considering
today by Richard S. Williamson, Assistant Secretary of State for
the International Organization Affairs during the Reagan Adminis-
tration, be included in the record of today's proceedings.
Chairman Gilman. Without objection.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Williamson appears in the ap-
pendix.]
Mr. Fox. Mr. Chairman, may I have my opening statement put
in the record?
Chairman Gilman. No objection.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Fox appears in the appendix.]
Mr. Brady. I am sorry Mr. Lantos had to leave the hearing
today. I have a great deal of respect for him, and his contributions
to this Committee over the years are remarkable. But the fact that
he is not here at this moment, I will suffice it to say that his ear-
lier statement that the reason we are here is because President
Bush did not finish the job is simply wrong.
The fact of the matter shows that the objectives of Operation
Desert Storm to roll back Iraq's brutal invasion of Kuwait suc-
ceeded brilliantly, and the fact of the matter is that the inspections
process and the destruction of weapons of mass destruction and bi-
ological weapons in Iraq that this Administration claims as
achievements are, in fact, a direct result of President Bush's efforts
leading the coalition forces.
The facts also show that on this Administration's watch the
progress has been just the opposite. The fact of the matter is that
this Administration has not, and will not, do the job necessary to


42
enforce vigorously and aggressively enforce investigations that
allow us to seek out and destroy these weapons and to keep Amer-
ican troops from entering that country out of frustration. The proof
is in the pudding, and the fact that Major Ritter is here today fur-
ther demonstrates it.
Major Ritter, earlier we heard testimony that U.S. efforts to
pressure the Commission to avoid provoking Iraq by postponing or
canceling disarmament inspections were dismissed as merely tech-
nical suggestions, routine in nature, low-level issues—even though
they had been discussed at the National Security Council by a Sec-
retary of State—low-level issues that, in fact, were so routine that
you yourself participated in similar efforts. Would you comment on
that?
Mr. Ritter. Yes, sir.
The job of disarming Iraq is the responsibility of both the Special
Commission in the fields of chemical, biological and ballistic mis-
siles and the International Atomic Energy Agency in the field of
nuclear weapons and fissile materials. How that fits in vis-a-vis
what the overall foreign policy objectives of the United States are,
whether that is a low-level objective or something, that is some-
thing that the United States has to address.
But from the perspective of the Special Commission, these are
very serious issues. We were given a very serious task by the Secu-
rity Council, and we didn't view this disarmament as something
being routine in nature or a low-level issue. We, in fact, viewed it
as a major issue, and every inspection that we undertook in Iraq
was not routine. It was a unique exercise specifically tailored to
achieve a specific disarmament objective.
Therefore, when somebody intervenes to disrupt a campaign of
discovery—and that is what we were conducting, campaigns, each
inspection we viewed as a battle, a battle to achieve a specific goal,
but we tried to string these inspections together in an overall cam-
paign which would seek to expose Iraq's concealment mechanism.
So once you intervene and stop a specific inspection, you have dis-
rupted the entire campaign. That is not a technical issue. That is
not a routine issue. That is not a low-level issue. Such intervention
I would state is, in fact, a high-level issue. When you intervene to
disrupt a campaign you have disrupted something on a strategic
level. You have prevented the Special Commission from carrying
out, using the means of its own choosing, inspections of discovery
which were designed to expose the concealment mechanism used by
Iraq to retain components, means of production and, indeed, per-
haps weapons which are proscribed by the Security Council resolu-
tion.
Mr. Brady. Major Ritter, you have a unique perspective. I am
sorry it has come to the point that, after so many years of dedicat-
ing yourself to this issue, that the support was lacking for the
troops in the inspection battle and campaign and that you had to
reach the level where you needed to step down out of principle. I
appreciate your courage and your perspective today.
Mr. Ritter. Thank you.
Mr. Brady. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman GilMAN. The gentleman's time has expired. Thank
you, Mr. Brady.





APPENDIX
Statement of Martin S Indyk
Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern Affairs
Department of State
House International Relations Committee
September 15, 1998
I welcome this opportunity to be here to discuss United States policy towards
Iraq.
In recent weeks, there have been a lot of charges leveled at the
Administration, and at the Secretary of State personally, for supposedly pursuing a
"duplicitous" policy towards Iraq. I welcome the opportunity to set the record
straight.
The objective of Operation Desert Storm was to roll back Iraq's brutal
invasion of Kuwait. In that, it succeeded brilliantly due to strong leadership from
President Bush and the courage and skill of coalition forces, led by the United States.
But as President Bush recalls in his new book, the war did not end like World War
II, with the surrender of the beaten Army and the punishment of the villainous enemy
leaders. Although humiliated and weakened, Saddam Hussein and his military
survived.
We have been dealing with the consequences ever since. From the outset,
our goal and that of the UN Security Council has been to deny Iraq the capacity ever
again to threaten international peace and security. Our tools have included:
• the UN Special Commission (UNSCOM), which was authorized by the Security
Council: 1) to carry out inspections to verify Iraq's declared programs for
chemical and biological weapons and missiles, and to seek out what Iraq would
not declare; 2) to destroy those programs or render them harmless, and 3) to
monitor Iraq in order to deter any attempt to revive these programs;
• inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to accomplish
the same tasks in the nuclear weapons area; and
• economic sanctions, which create an incentive for Iraq to comply with weapons
inspection and monitoring activities, as well as its other obligations under
Security Council resolutions.
This effort has paid dividends.
(45)


46
2
Year by year, Iraqi efforts to conceal its weapons of mass destruction
programs have been unmasked. Slowly but surely, the world has learned more about
the extent of Saddam's preparations for biological warfare, the use of poison gas and
the development of nuclear weapons. In the process, UNSCOM and the IAEA have
forced the destruction of more Iraqi weapons of mass destruction capacity than was
destroyed during the entire Gulf War.
Throughout this period, Iraq has tried and failed to undermine Security
Council unity on the key points of compliance and sanctions.
At the same time, with our allies, we have constrained Iraq's military options
through Operations Southern and Northern Watch and, when necessary, the
reinforcement of our military presence in the Gulf. As a result, the military threat
posed by Iraq has been effectively contained.
But that threat has by no means been eliminated.
Despite the best efforts of UNSCOM and the IAEA, Iraq has not disclosed
the full truth about its chemical and biological weapons programs. UNSCOM
believes Iraq is probably concealing SCUD missiles. And questions remain about
Iraq's nuclear programs. As long as Baghdad is under its present leadership, we must
expect that Iraq will reconstitute its weapons of mass destruction if given the
opportunity.
Iraq's goal is to gain relief from sanctions without revealing more about its
weapons programs. To this end, Baghdad has repeatedly probed for weaknesses in
the Security Council's resolve. It has sought to create divisions among Council
members. It has exploited with breathtaking cynicism the suffering of its own
people. It has appealed to Arab solidarity.
And, most tellingly, it has tried to portray itself as the victim in a
confrontation with a runaway UNSCOM being ordered about by an arrogant and
callous United States. To dramatize this charge, Iraq has halted cooperation with
UNSCOM on three occasions during the past year, most recently at the beginning of
August.
Throughout, we have countered Iraq's outrageous propaganda with plain
truth. We have backed UNSCOM's efforts to expose the contradictions between
Iraqi declarations and the physical and documentary evidence. We have stressed the
importance of full compliance with Security Council resolutions. We have led the
effort—which Saddam Hussein resisted for years—to establish the oil for food
program that is addressing the humanitarian needs of the Iraqi people. And last
spring, we threatened to use force—as we have on three separate occasions since the
end of the Gulf War—if Iraq did not permit UNSCOM inspections to resume. In the
face of that threat, it did.


47
3
Over the past year, senior Administration officials have probably had more
conversations with our foreign counterparts on these subjects than any other. In
Washington and in capitals abroad, we have relendessly advanced the U.S. position
that the consequences of Iraqi noncompliance are unacceptable and that firmness is
the only language Saddam understands. Many governments agree with that, but
others have a different view.
It is worth recalling that the international coalition assembled by the Bush
Administration in 1990 came together to drive Iraq out of Kuwait, and not for any
more far-reaching purpose. As former National Security Adviser Scowcroft recalls,
even before the ground war against Iraq began, "the political situation was volatile
and the coalition perhaps deteriorating"
Today, as a result of vigorous diplomacy conducted by two Presidents and
four Secretaries of State, backed by bipartisan leaders in Congress, there remains an
international consensus that Iraq must comply with UN Security Council resolutions
and cooperate with UN weapons inspectors.
There also remains agreement that sanctions should continue until these
conditions are met, but some on the Security Council would like to weaken the
conditions and weaken UNSCOM to achieve that purpose.
And there never has been, and is not now, a consensus about whether or in
what circumstances force should be used in an effort to compel Iraqi compliance with
the Council's postwar resolutions
Some countries that supported the use of force to roll back Iraq's brutal and
blatant aggression in 1990 simply feel less threatened today by a weakened Iraq and
do not see failure to comply with UN inspections as a "bombing" offense.
Others argue that military strikes would backfire because they would
engender sympathy for Iraq while not restoring the effective operation of UNSCOM
or ending Iraq's ability to build chemical and biological arms.
Some governments are content, perhaps for commercial reasons, just to sit on
the sidelines and let the United States assume the full costs and consequences of
dealing with Saddam Hussein.
Some nations, including some historic allies of the United States, argue that
our goal is simply to keep sanctions on Iraq forever, and that we are not providing
Baghdad with any real incentive to cooperate.
Finally, there exists a perception in parts of the Arab world that the
enforcement of UN Security Council Resolutions reflects a double standard. We
have tried our best to rebut that presumption, but it persists nevertheless.


48
4
For a combination of these reasons, outside the United States not a single
country in the world is calling for the use of force to respond to Saddam Hussein's
latest refusal to cooperate with UNSCOM.
This, then, is the diplomatic context within which we must operate if our goal
of eliminating the security threat posed by Iraq is to be achieved. Aspects of it were
mirrored in our discussions here in the United States about the wisdom of taking
military action during a similar confrontation with Iraq last winter. The widely
disparate advice provided to the Administration by the Congress and by others is a
symptom of the difficulties involved.
The choices we face are not those of some ideal world in which our
perceptions are universally shared, the American people are united, all our allies are
on board, the road to success is clearly marked and the consequences of our
decisions are fully predictable. Rather, we face hard choices in the real world, in
which every event affects the next, and the political terrain shifts with each passing
day. It is a world in which the costs and benefits of alternative courses of action
must be considered with deliberation, for they are not obvious.
In recent weeks, some have suggested that the United States has not done
enough to support the work of UNSCOM. It has even been suggested that we have
tried to prevent UNSCOM from discovering the truth about Iraq's weapons of mass
destruction programs.
The people who level these charges are undoubtedly well-intentioned. But
they work from a different set of facts than the Administration does With respect to
Mr. Ritter personally, as UNSCOM Chairman Butler told the New York Times last
week, the testimony he has given as to these facts was "often inaccurate in
chronology and detail" and was therefore "misleading"
As I said, the Administration has to work on the basis of a broader set of
facts. First is the fact that the United States has been by far the strongest
international backer of UNSCOM. For years, we have provided indispensable
technical help, expert personnel, sophisticated equipment, vital diplomatic backing
and logistics and other support. Nothing has changed in that regard. For example, in
May of this year. National Security principals agreed that the heads of all relevant
U.S. agencies should issue new to directives ensure that UNSCOM and IAEA
inspections would receive high priority support throughout our government. The
Secretary of State issued that directive to State Department officials on June 23,
1998. As to Mr. Ritter's specific charge that we cut vital support to UNSCOM, it is
simply not true.
On the diplomatic front, we have taken the lead in rebutting and disproving
Iraq's contentions in disputes with UNSCOM before the Security Council. We have
pushed and pushed and pushed some more to help UNSCOM break through the
smokescreen of lies and deception put out by the Iraqi regime. Secretaries Albright
and Cohen and the rest of the President's foreign policy team have traveled the world


49
5
attempting to keep the heat on Iraq and demanding that it cooperate with UNSCOM.
The suggestion that we urged other governments not to support UNSCOM turns the
truth on its head; it is exactly the opposite of what we have been doing.
A second fact is that, Iraqi intransigence aside, UNSCOM's inspection efforts have
continued to make important progress.
For example, just this summer, UNSCOM was able for the first time to
conduct inspections of sensitive sites, such as Iraqi Air Force Headquarters, where it
found new evidence that Iraq had lied about the size of its chemical weapons stocks.
Those inspections were talking place, with U.S. support at the very time Scott Ritter
claims we were blocking inspections
A third fact we have to take into account is the importance of maintaining
Security Council and coalition unity in dealing with Iraq. There is a very hardheaded
reason for this. Unless we are prepared unilaterally to send tens of thousands of
American ground troops into Baghdad to remove Saddam and destroy Iraq's military
infrastructure, we are not going to eliminate by force Iraq's ability to conceal and
possibly reconstitute weapons of mass destruction. If we are not prepared to take
such action, we will have to rely on the help of others through sanctions, support for
inspections, and acceptance of the need to use military strikes for limited objectives if
necessary.
This has an influence on the tactical decisions we make. As I suspect the
veterans among you would agree, there is great value in any confrontation in being
able to choose your own timing and terrain. Saddam's provocations are designed
with political purposes in mind: to spark a reaction, divide the Security Council,
isolate the United States and diminish support for sanctions. Our strategy is to deny
Saddam that opportunity, and to keep the world spotlight not on what we do, but on
what Iraq is failing to do—which is to comply with its obligations.
A fourth fact, related to the third, is the importance of maintaining the
integrity and independence of UNSCOM.
The continuation of UNSCOM's work is essential if we are to achieve our
goal, and the world's goal, of moving beyond containment to the elimination of Iraq's
capacity to pose a serious military threat. Unfortunately, if UNSCOM is to succeed,
it must, among others things, both be and be perceived to be independent.
It is ironic that Scott Ritter, whom we respect, and Saddam Hussein, whom
we deplore, both argue that UNSCOM's independence has been compromised by the
United States. If we were to agree with Scott Ritter on that point, we would be
conceding a very key point to Saddam Hussein. It may be precisely the opposite of
his intention, but Mr. Ritter's allegations have profoundly undermined the perception
that UNSCOM is independent. And that will make it much harder for UNSCOM to
do its job.


50
6
As UNSCOM Chairman Butler has repeatedly affirmed, the United States has
never impinged on UNSCOM's integrity or dictated its decisions. But UNSCOM's
purpose is to assure that there are no prohibited weapons in Iraq. So it is not hard
for us to work together towards that common long-term goal. And, make no
mistake, the purpose of every conversation and contact we have had with UNSCOM
has been to move us closer to achieving that goal.
For seven years, through Republican and Democratic Administrations alike,
U.S. policy has not changed We want Iraqi compliance. This does not mean our
tactics are rigid. If a climber scaling a cliff finds one route blocked and switches to
another, that is not lack of resolve, nor is it inconsistency, it is common sense.
In pursuing our goal of Iraqi compliance, we have sometimes made tactical
suggestions to UNSCOM about questions of timing and procedure. This is entirely
appropriate and is done by other Council members, as well, on a regular basis.
Over time, we found that some of our suggestions were accepted, others
were not. Most often, our discussions with UNSCOM have focused on where more
vigorous inspection activity might be productive, on how Iraqi lies might be exposed,
or on when an inspection might best catch Iraqi efforts at deception by surprise.
No nation has done more to encourage UNSCOM to be thorough, unyielding
and aggressive in its inspections, and no nation has done more to support
UNSCOM's dogged and, at times, dangerous efforts in this regard.
I call to your attention a letter from Chairman Butler to the Washington Post
on August 26 in which UNSCOM's Executive Chairman writes that: "I have never
had any reason to doubt the United States commitment to the need for Iraq to
comply with the decisions of the Security Council, which are binding in international
law, and in particular, the United States insistence upon the requirements imposed by
those resolutions upon Iraq to the effect that they must be disarmed of their weapons
of mass destruction."
It is also true, that on a few occasions, our advice to UNSCOM was more
cautious. For example, this past January when our military preparations were
incomplete and the Muslim Holy season of Ramadan was underway, we judged that
it was not the right time for a major confrontation.
I note, in this regard, that Mr. Ritter told a Senate hearing two weeks ago
that he had objected to a planned inspection of the Ministry of Defense because he
thought it was "probably heading down a slippery slope of confrontation which could
not be backed up by UNSCOMs mandate." If it is good enough for Mr. Ritter to
raise such questions, why is he criticizing the Secretary of State? For, this was
precisely the kind of question we also sometimes found occasion to raise.
For the record, we did not "demand" this inspection, as Mr. Ritter claims.
Chairman Butler made the decision to inspect the Ministry, and we supported those


51
7
inspections We were aware that UNSCOM's previous Executive Chairman, Rolf
Ekeus, was concerned that UNSCOM had found few Ministry of Defense documents
related to Iraq's WMD program, which made the Ministry an obvious inspection
target.
Given the importance of Security Council unity, we have been concerned in
recent months that the responsibility for any resumption of Iraqi non-cooperation fall
where it belongs, on the shoulders of Saddam Hussein, not UNSCOM. We had
questions, which Chairman Butler had answered, about a particular intrusive
inspection planned by UNSCOM in July. But it is important to note that other
intrusive inspections were going on at the same time as we were raising these
questions. And we made clear our support for the inspections Scott Ritter was to
have led in August.
The issue became moot, however, when Iraqi officials informed UNSCOM
on August 3 that they were halting any further cooperation. At that point, we
believed it was best to let the onus fall clearly on Saddam Hussein Chairman Butler
agreed that it would be wise to allow the Security Council to respond to Iraq's
decision before attempting the planned inspections We also knew that some in the
Security Council were planning to blame UNSCOM for the renewed breakdown in
cooperation As events have developed, it turns out that our initial judgment in
August was absolutely right. On the issue of Iraq and UNSCOM, the Security
Council is now much more united as last week's vote demonstrated.
To summarize, if the allegation is that we sought to influence the pace of
UNSCOM inspections, we did. But we did it in order to have the greatest long-term
chance of overcoming Iraqi efforts at deception. If we hadn't, we would not have
been doing our jobs.
If the allegation is that we have undermined the effectiveness and
independence of UNSCOM; the answer is no. On the contrary, we have been the
foremost backer of UNSCOM.
If the allegation is that we have retreated from our determination to achieve
our goals in Iraq, the answer is that we have not and will not.
In the Security Council, even the members who have been most sympathetic
to Iraq's point of view can find no excuse—or even any sense—in Saddam's latest
actions as the council's most recent resolution demonstrates.
Accordingly, we are pressing Council members to take the steps necessary to
enforce their Resolutions. Iraq's latest refusal to cooperate with UNSCOM is a
direct challenge to the Council's authority. As a Council member, the United States
is seeking a firm and principled response.
Our success in persuading the Security Council to pass resolution
1194 is one important element in this response. That resolution— which the Council


52
8
passed unanimously— condemns Iraq and suspends indefinitely the bimonthly Iraq
sanctions reviews. This suspension means that, until Iraq rescinds its decision of
August 5 and resumes full cooperation with UNSCOM, there is no chance that the
Council will consider any modification to the sanctions regime. Simply put, the
Council's firm action means that Saddam's flagrant violation of the Council's
resolutions ensures that he cannot get the one thing he wants most: an end to
sanctions with his WMD capabilities intact. Our success in gaining unanimous
Council approval for the resolution also underscores the wisdom of the tactical
approach we have been taking toward Iraq since Saddam initiated his confrontation
with the Council in August.
While the impact of the Council's decision has been lost on some in the West,
I can assure you it is well understood in Baghdad. On September 13, Iraq's
National Assembly passed a resolution calling on the Security Council to reverse its
decisions, and threatening to sever all relations with UNSCOM. This statement is
outrageous and unacceptable. It is not for the Council to reverse itself; it is Baghdad
that must end its open defiance of the international community and comply with
Security Council resolutions.
Saddam Hussein should heed the clear warning of resolution 1194. And he
should not misjudge the will of the United States to act. Force remains an option. It
has not been taken off the table. But in the first instance, we are insisting that the
Security Council live up to its responsibility, to respond to this latest Iraqi challenge
to its authority. We have a significant strike capability in place in the region, a
considerably stronger one than we did at the beginning of the last confrontation with
Baghdad. We can augment that force rapidly should we need to do so
Saddam's actions have put us back on the ladder of potentially escalating
confrontation with Iraq. So be it. We will not accept the indefinite blockage by Iraq
of the inspection activities of UNSCOM and the IAEA. And we will insist that Iraq
live up to its commitment to cooperate with UNSCOM's monitoring activities.
For all its bluster, Iraq remains within the strategic box Saddam Hussein's
folly created for it seven years ago. As we look ahead, we will decide how and when
to respond to Iraq's actions based on the threat they pose to Iraq's neighbors, to
regional security and to U.S. vital interests. Our assessment will include Saddam's
capacity to reconstitute, use, or threaten to use weapons of mass destruction. The
bottom line is that if Iraq tries to break out of its strategic box, our response will be
swift and strong. But we will act on our own timetable, not Saddam Hussein's.
From the perspective of our own security, we are in a position of strength.
Our ability to project force in the region is significantly more robust now than it was
a year ago. We have added a rapid reinforcement capability. With our allies, we are
maintaining a close eye on Iraqi troops through the enforcement of Operations
Northern and Southern Watch. The multi-national Maritime Interception Force is
keeping the teeth in UN sanctions, having seized more than 30 vessels since January.


53
9
And let us remember that, since 1991, sanctions have deprived Saddam
Hussein's coffers of more than $120 billion. Although it is not an end in itself, the
sanctions regime is what denies Baghdad the resources it needs to rebuild its military,
and its weapons of mass destruction programs.
In closing, let me say in fairness to our critics that the diplomatic language we
have used to describe our policy towards Iraq may have sometimes lacked clarity.
Let me be clear now
To Saddam Hussein, our message is: Do not miscalculate. Do not misread
our public debates, which are an expression of the freedoms we enjoy in America, as
a sign of fundamental weakness or disunity. We have our differences. But on the
central issues of upholding law and responding to aggression, the American people
are united
To the Members of the Security Council, our message is that, together, we
must meet our responsibility. We must be firm, united and determined in our
insistence that Iraq meet its obligations and in the actions we take to back up that
insistence. The integrity and credibility of the Security Council is at stake.
To the American people, we will be true to our principles, our interests and
our character. We are not spoiling for a battle. We are not eager to put our fighting
men and women at risk. We do not wish to shoulder burdens and assume costs that
others, by right, should share. But we will not allow the scorpion that bit us once to
bite us again. We have not ruled out any options. If Saddam provokes a fight, he
will get one, and he will lose
Finally, to the Iraqi people, the United States looks forward to the day when
Iraq can rejoin the family of nations as a responsible and law-abiding member. And
to those Iraqis inside and outside the country who want to build a democratic future
for their nation: the United States is on your side.
As part of its on-going effort to help the people of Iraq address their basic
needs, the U.S. has long sought to foster cooperation between the Kurdish parties in
northern Iraq. We have invited Mr Barzani, the leader of the Kurdish Democratic
Party, and Mr. Talabani, the leader of the Patriotic Union Party, to Washington this
month to help them reconcile their differences
Over the past six months, with the help of the U.S., these two leaders had
made progress to resolve practical problems. They represent the interests of millions
of Iraqi Kurds. We look to them to promote stability and reconciliation among the
peoples of that region, which is in their interest and ours. They may now be ready to
make significant progress toward a more lasting reconciliation, one that is fully
consistent with Iraq's territorial integrity and unity.


55
News Release
September 15, 1998
For Information:
Matthew L. Lifflander
29* Floor, 30 Rockefeller Plaza
New York, New York 10112
Telephone: (212) 698 - 7777
Facsimile: (212) 698 - 7825
e-mail:
Statement of
Scott Ritter
September 15, 1998
at
United States House of Representatives
Hearing of the Committee on International Relations
Room 2172 Rayburn House Office Building, Washington, DC
Thank you for the opportunity to present my concerns to this distinguished
body. There are serious problems in the foreign policy of the United States toward Iraq and
the necessary inspection, monitoring and verification procedures to ensure that Iraq does
not reconstitute its prohibited weapons program.
I applaud the repeatedly stated policies of the United States. I am very
disappointed in the deviations from that policy. I have been very critical of specific actions
undertaken by the United States to interfere with the difficult inspection tasks being carried
out by the Special Commission.
I welcome this hearing as part of an overall public review of United States
foreign policy objectives in Iraq, something I had hoped that my resignation and speaking
out would have occasioned.
If the direct nature of my statements have caused discomfort, so be it. My
criticism is based upon facts and experiences obtained over the course of seven years
actively attempting to implement the provisions of Security Council resolutions calling for
the disarmament of Iraq — to deprive it of its weapons of mass destruction.
I have great concern about the text of the most recent Security Council
resolution, 1194, which condemns Iraq for suspending cooperation with the Special
Commission and the International Atomic Energy Agency. The provision of this last
resolution that causes me concern is the same one I referred to in my letter of resignation. I
voiced strong objection to the concept of a "comprehensive review" of Iraq's compliance
with its obligations under Security Council resolutions, and especially so if such a review
were to be conducted under the auspices of the Secretary General. Based upon our previous


56
experience at the Special Commission, such a "comprehensive review" is most likely to
result in some redefining of Iraq's obligations for disarmament to the point that meaningful
disarmament of Iraq would be jeopardized. Once again, Iraq, through its consistent policy
of obstructionism, has achieved yet another concession.
So one must look askance at any new effort to appease Iraq by calling for a
new "comprehensive review" of its compliance with Security Council resolutions. Such a
review is very disturbing.
The Special Commission has been placed under such pressures in the past,
always at the behest of Iraq. Prior to my departure from the Special Commission, I know
that the Executive Chairman was under pressure to define Iraq's outstanding disarmament
obligations in a manner which would allow such a comprehensive review to achieve the
closure of the chemical and ballistic missile files. To do this, the Special Commission
would have to cease its investigation of Iraq's concealment mechanism, and agree to place
its remaining concerns about retained components and means of production under a
program of ongoing monitoring and verification. Such a move would be fundamentally
wrong, and would lead to what I have called the "Illusion of Arms Control."
This most recent Security Council resolution on Iraq is only reflective of the
continuing pattern of confrontation and concession. I cannot see how the recent resolution
did anything more than delay the inevitable. Iraq has paid no real price for telling one lie
after another and continuing its obstruction of the weapons inspection teams. If Iraq
chooses in the future to allow the resumption of inspection activity, will it be rewarded
with yet another round of "comprehensive reviews." The danger the objectivity of such a
review. The track record of the Secretary General on Iraq is mixed at best.
I believe that the world, especially the Congress of the United States, must
pay close attention in the weeks and months ahead to keep the process of disarming Iraq
honest. If recent history is any guide, there will be many pressures placed upon the Special
Commission, most behind the scenes and as such out of public view, to make compromises
of substance concerning Iraq's unfulfilled disarmament obligations. The credibility of the
United Nations and the United States is at stake here.
I hope that in my testimony here today I might be able to help shine a light
on this most important issue.
Thank you
-30-


57
STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE JON D. FOX
BEFORE THE HOUSE INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS COMMITTEE
REGARDING IRAQ AND THE STATUS OF WEAPONS INSPECTIONS
SEPTEMBER 15, 1998
THANK YOU MR. CHAIRMAN. I BELIEVE THAT THIS IS A VERY
IMPORTANT TOPIC THAT WE ARE DISCUSSING TODAY. THE
DISARMING OF IRAQ AND THE REMOVAL OF ANY WEAPONS OF MASS
DESTRUCTION SHOULD STILL BE CONSIDERED A TOP PRIORITY FOR
THE UNITED STATES. ALTHOUGH IT SEEMS NOW LIKE IT HAS BEEN
PUSHED INTO THE BACKGROUND, THE WORK OF THE INSPECTION
TEAMS MUST BE BROUGHT BACK INTO FOCUS.
I WOULD LIKE TO TAKE A MINUTE TO THANK MISTER SCOTT
RITTER FOR HIS EXCELLENT WORK IN THE PAST AS A MEMBER OF
THE U N SPECIAL COMMISSION. HIS DEDICATION TO THE VITAL
TASK OF DISARMING IRAQ MUST BE COMMENDED. WE NEED MORE
PEOPLE WITH THE CHARACTER AND INTEGRITY OF SCOTT RITTER
WORKING OVERSEAS AND HERE IN THE US. I LOOK FORWARD TO
HEARING HIS IMPORTANT TESTIMONY.


58
I ALSO AM GREATLY LOOKING FORWARD TO HEARING THE
REMARKS OF AMBASSADOR MARTIN INDYK, THE STATE
DEPARTMENT'S EXPERT ON NEAR EASTERN AFFAIRS. HIS
KNOWLEDGE AND INSIGHT WILL PROVIDE THE MEMBERS OF THIS
COMMITTEE VALUABLE INFORMATION FOR OUR WORK ON THE IRAQ
SITUATION.
AGAIN, I THANK THE CHAIRMAN FOR THE TIME AND I LOOK
FORWARD TO THE TESTIMONY FROM THESE GENTLEMAN.


59
Congressman Jerry Solomon
INTRODUCTION OF SCOTT RITTER BY CHAIRMAN GERALD B H SOLOMON
TO THE COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, SEPT 15, 1998
MR. CHAIRMAN— TODAY IS A GREAT HONOR
FOR ME - I GET TO INTRODUCE SCOTT RITTER, A
FELLOW MARINE AND A ROLE MODEL FOR OUR
COUNTRY.
A FEW YEARS AGO SCOTT RITTER WAS A YOUNG
MARINE OFFICER ANSWERING HIS COUNTRY'S
CALL BY SERVING IN COMBAT DURING DESERT
STORM. HE SHOWED PERSONAL COURAGE BY
PARTICIPATING IN COMBAT OPERATIONS INSIDE
IRAQ IN SUPPORT OF COUNTER-SCUD EFFORTS.
WHEN THE WAR ENDED SCOTT DIDN'T STOP
PUTTING HIS HONOR AND LIFE ON THE LINE. HE
BECAME THE CHIEF OF CONCEALMENT
INVESTIGATION UNIT, UNITED NATIONS
SPECIAL COMMISSION. HIS MISSION WAS TO
STOP WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION FROM
FALLING INTO THE HANDS OF A MAD MAN -
SADDAM HUSSEIN.

Rules Committee Chairman,
House of Representatives
New York


60
MARK MY WORDS, THE COURAGE SCOTT RITTER
SHOWED AS A MARINE IN COMBAT WAS
MATCHED BY THE COURAGE HE SHOWED
ENFORCING THE ELIMINATION OF IRAQ'S
ARSENAL OF CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL
WEAPONS. THE WHOLE WORLD SHOULD BE
GRATEFUL SCOTT RITTER RANG THE ALARM ON
HUSSEIN'S QUEST FOR NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND
LONG-RANGE BALLISTIC MISSILES.
TRAGICALLY, SCOTT RITTER HAD TO RESIGN TO
BRING SUNLIGHT ON WHAT I WOULD DESCRIBE
AS A CRAVEN POLICY OF APPEASEMENT AT THE
HIGHEST LEVELS OF THE CLINTON
ADMINISTRATION.
AS A FORMER MARINE, I KNOW ONE THING IS
TRUE - THE TROOPS ALWAYS KNOW. I TRUST
SCOTT'S OBSERVATIONS, KNOWLEDGE AND I AM
PROUD TO BE HERE TODAY IN SUPPORT OF THE
QUEST FOR TRUTH. HE KNEW EXACTLY WHAT
WAS GOING ON AND HIS MISSION HAD TURNED
INTO A SHAM. AMERICAN LEADERS PUT SCOTT
AND HIS PEOPLE IN HARM'S WAY WITH NO
SUPPORT. THIS IS AN UNCONSCIONABLE POLICY.
BUT FOR SHOWING COURAGE IN RESIGNING
OVER PRINCIPLE, SCOTT RITTER WAS ATTACKED
BY SMALL-MINDED PEOPLE IN BIG OFFICES WHO
SHOULD KNOW BETTER ~ AND OUGHT TO BE
ASHAMED OF THEMSELVES.


61
TO BELITTLE SCOTT THAT "HE DOESN'T HAVE A
CLUE" INSULTS HIM DIRECTLY AND BY
INFERENCE ALL MEN AND WOMEN IN THE FIELD,
BOTH THOSE IN UNIFORM AND THOSE IN CIVILAN
CAPACITY, ALL FIGHTING AGAINST THE FORCES
OF TOTALATARIANISM AND EVIL.
IT IS ALSO PETTY AND ARROGANT BY THOSE
WHO HAVE NEVER WORN A UNIFORM TO MOCK
MAJOR RITTER'S NAME AND ATTACK HIM
PERSONALLY FROM AN UNTOUCHABLE POSITION
OF POWER. THIS IS THE ACTION OF A BULLY.
I HAVE TO RETURN TO CHAIR A RULES
COMMITTEE HEARING, BUT LET ME AGAIN STATE
IT IS AN HONOR TO BE HERE TODAY WITH SCOTT
RITTER. I KNOW HE WILL BE TREATED WITH THE
RESPECT HE EARNED IN WAR AND PEACE.
54-33499 -3


62
STATEMENT FOR THE COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Hearing: "Disarming Iraq: The Status of Weapons Inspections"
September IS, 1998
The Spread of Weapons of Mass Destruction:
The Threat The Danger and U.S. Failures in Iraq
Statement by
Richard S. Williamson
While the Cold War is over, the fact is that today America faces a "clear and present
danger."
The continuing spread of weapons of mass destruction - nuclear, chemical, biological
and ballistic missiles - is a clear and terrifying danger. And unstable regimes, rogue states and
acts of terrorism against Americans here and abroad clearly are real, present, immediate dangers.
Earlier this year in the intelligence chiefs annual "state of the world" briefing to the
Senate Intelligence Committee, they said that America "confronts dangers to world peace,
personified by President Saddam Hussein of Iraq, and a Pandora's box of potential threats,
exemplified by the spread of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons."1 While Assistant
Secretary of State for intelligence and research Phyllis Oakley testified that "the danger of
nuclear attack, large scale conventional attack and other threats to our national existence is low,"
Mr. Williamson is a partner With the Chicago Law Firm of Mayer, Brown & Piatt. He served as
U.S. Ambassador and Resident Representative to the IAEA and Assistant Secretary of State in
the Reagan Administration.


63
CIA Director George Tenet cited as America's first and foremost threat the spread of weaponry,
pointing to China's sales of military hardware to Iran and Pakistan, and Russian companies'
sales of missile technology to Iran.2
Tragically, the Clinton Administration has not dealt with this "clear and present danger"
as a central priority of American foreign policy. Rather, the Administration seems to have
weighed the stop of weapons of mass destruction as a marginal preference of U.S. foreign policy;
one too easily expendable to economic concerns, United Nations collegiality or even as a
preference that can be compromised for domestic political considerations.
The Clinton Administration's dismal record in this area of central importance to
American security concerns is disheartening and dangerous. The latest evidence of the failure of
U.S. policy in nonproliferation is Iraq. Where last winter, President Clinton mobilized U.S.
troops in the Persian Gulf and threatened military force to insure that Saddam Hussein complied
with the United Nations weapons inspection regime in Iraq, now the U.S. appears to have a two
track policy of retreat: publicly affirm U.S. "irritation" over Saddam's recent violation of his
prior commitments to permit inspections (not a total public reversal, but a nuanced de-
escalation); while at the same time compromising and, perhaps, even undercutting the U.N.
inspector's capacity to carry out their mandate.
Seen in the broad context of the failure of United States resolve in trying to stop weapons
of mass destruction, the resignation of the senior American U.N. weapons inspector in Iraq,
William Scott Ritter, Jr., is very alarming. In his resignation letter he charges that the Clinton
Administration, the United Nations Secretary General and the U.N. Security Council have
stymied the inspectors on "the doorstep" of uncovering Iraq's hidden weapons programs. And
2


65
the terrorists involved in the Kenya and Tanzania U.S. Embassy bombings in distressing. Their
capacity for evil has grown.
And terrorists have shown their willingness to use weapons of mass destruction. In
March, 1995, the Aum Shinrikyo cult exposed thousands of Tokyo subway commuters to the
sarin nerve agent. And in October, 1995, a band of Chechen rebels threatened Moscow claiming
they had obtained nuclear fissile materials and were prepared to use it against Russian citizens if
their demands were not met. The next month Russian officials discovered a package containing
low-grade radioactive material in Ismailou Park. If the terrorist acts in Oklahoma City and the
World Trade Center had used one hundred pounds of highly enriched uranium, about the size of
a grapefruit, much of Oklahoma City would have disappeared and the tip of Manhattan would
have been destroyed.4
Last year the National Defense Panel issued a report, "Transforming Defense: National
Security in the 21 st's Century" which warned that in the next 20 years, America will have more
to fear from terrorists attacking its civilians with disease germs, nerve gas and other weapons of
mass destruction than from possible military conflicts abroad. In receiving the report, Secretary
of Defense Cohen said, "The NDP paints a compelling and, I believe, accurate picture of a future
in which terrorism ... and weapons of mass destruction play a more prominent role, even posing
direct threats to the U.S. homeland."5
The Pentagon is preparing for terrorist attacks that employ lethal microbes and toxic
chemicals. In June the Administration asked Congress for $294 million in additional counter-
terrorism spending to stockpile antidotes and antibiotics and to train federal and local officials in
how to respond to a chemical or biological attack.6
4


66
Last month, President Clinton ordered the United States military to take retaliatory
airstrikes against Osama bin Laden, the Saudi terrorist blamed for the Embassy bombings in
Africa. Eighty cruise missiles were fired toward the hills of Afghanistan and a plant in
Khartoum.
Clearly, the war on terrorism has gone from rhetoric to combat. American resolve to
confront the growing threat will be tested. But the danger from the terrorist threat is
unavoidable.7
Rogue States
In addition to the growing terrorist threat, serious dangers increase from rogue states.
Each year the State Department notifies Congress pursuant to the Export Administration Act of
1979 of countries where significant terrorist acts occurred and nations that have repeatedly
provided state support for international terrorism - premeditated, politically motivated violence
perpetuated against non-combatant targets usually intended to influence an audience.1
By 1994, seven nations had made the terrorism list: Cuba, Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea,
Sudan, and Syria. A willingness to sponsor terrorism is a key element of a country being a rogue
state. But the characteristics of rogue states and the dangers they pose to American citizens
abroad and at home go beyond a willingness to sponsor terrorist acts. In the cases of Iran, Iraq,
Libya, North Korea and Syria, these rogue regimes also possess large-scale conventional forces
and seek weapons of mass destruction. These miscreants increase the danger daily for American
peace and security.
S


67
Policy options vary for dealing with these menacing rogue states: contain them with
economic sanctions and deter or coerce them with threats of force; embrace them with promises
of rewards, or embrace as well as contain them with carrots and sticks.9
Opinions will vary on which policy option is the best course with which rogue state at
any particular time or in any given circumstance. But what is absolutely certain is that these
rogue states are bad actors, they threaten American interests and American lives, and that their
acquisition of weapons of mass destruction greatly compromise U.S. security.
This past July 15th, as you are well aware, the bipartisan commission established by
Congress in the National Defense Authorization Act for 1997, the Commission to Assess the
Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States, chaired by former Secretary of Defense Donald
Rumsfeld, issued its report. It challenges the assessment made by the U.S. intelligence
community in 1995 that the missile threat to the United States was at least 15 years away. The
Rumsfeld Commission warned that the missile threat may be immediate.
The report states that "[a] nation that wants to develop ballistic missiles and weapons of
mass destruction can now obtain extensive technical assistance from outside sources. Foreign
assistance is not a wild card. It is a fact."
Elsewhere the Rumsfeld Commission report states, "Nations are increasingly able to
conceal important elements of their ballistic missiles and associated weapons of mass destruction
and are highly motivated to do so. The extraordinary level of resources North Korea and Iran are
now devoting to developing their own ballistic missile capabilities poses a substantial and
immediate danger to the U.S., its vital interests and its allies."


68
The report found that among others Iran, Iraq and North Korea are aggressively seeking
missile technology and, if they got it, could inflict "major destruction" on the United States.
Further, it found that Russia and China are supplying equipment and expertise to those countries.
And, just as disturbing, the Rumsfeld Commission found that the U.S. intelligence communities'
ability to provide "timely and accurate" estimates of the threat is "eroding."10
Mr. Rumsfeld, speaking at a briefing on Capitol Hill in July said that recent U.S.
intelligence assessments of nuclear missile threats have failed to consider possible developments
in the missile capabilities of rogue states that could swiftly endanger the U.S."
Rumsfeld said, "Things have happened. [Nuclear missile proliferation] is a moving
target... We see an environment of little or no warning of ballistic missile threats to the U.S.
from several emerging powers."12
Unstable Nations/Unstable Regions
The dangers from the spread of weapons of mass destruction are compounded by the
risks inherent in unstable nations and unstable regions of the world. Unfortunately these various
tinderboxes are often armed with weapons of mass destruction.
The most prominent unstable regime today is Russia where the nation faces the twin
problems of economic and political collapse. The economy is in collapse. The value of the ruble
plummets daily. The Russian stock market is in a free fall. Consumer goods are disappearing
from store shelves. IMF loans are in jeopardy. Economic reform is in retreat. President Boris
Yeltsin's personal and political health are tenuous. He fired young, reform Prime Minister
Sergei Kinyenko. Last week Yeltsin's choice for Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin was


69
twice rejected by the Duma. Yeltsin yielded to the Duma and picked former Soviet spymaster
Yergeny Primakov as Prime Minister. And early indications point to a Russian government that
will be more statist and more inward-looking. While it may be too dramatic to declare that the
Russian government is teetering on the verge of collapse, its hold on power certainly is
tenuous.13
And in Russia you have twenty-two thousand nuclear missiles. Whose hand will control
them in the months ahead, and will it be steady? Nuclear seepage from Russia remains an
enormous problem.14
North Korea is a mess. The Soviet Union "fathered North Korea in 1948 as a child of the
Cold War."15 The U.S.S.R. is now gone, Russia must deal with its own dilemmas. Fending for
itself, Pyongyang faces the crisis of devastating famine;16 tenuous political transition to the new
leadership of Kim Jong II,17 and perceived threats from abroad. Concurrently, North Korea
continues to sell weapons of mass destruction, develop ever more effective ballistic missiles,"
and evidence suggests, continues to pursue nuclear weapon capabilities.19
Joseph Nye, Dean of the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University
has worked extensively on the North Korean nuclear issue while a senior official in the C.I.A.
then the Pentagon in the Clinton Administration's first term. He says, "The danger is that the
weaker [North Korea] becomes the less willing they are to bargain. While they may seem
counterintuitive, the North Koreans usually get tougher as they get cornered. In cultural terms,
they may be more willing to accept risks in a situation of desperation."20 As noted in a recent
New York Times editorial, "North Korea is a dangerous, unpredictable country."21
8


71
over Kashmir has "become an emotional test of principle and identity."26 And during the past
decade Kashmir has been torn by insurrection. 20,000 lives have been lost.
Since the nuclear tests last May, armed clashes have increased. In late July and early
August, government officials claim, 57 Pakistani civilians had been killed and 75 wounded by
Indian mortar, rocket and military fire. Indian officials claimed 30 killed on their side.27 India
continues to reject Pakistan's proposal for outside mediation to help resolve the Kashmir issue.2*
Pakistan Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif has said that "India is demonstrating irresponsible
behavior" unacceptable by a nuclear power.29
Following a meeting in June with a U.N. envoy to urge Pakistan to sign a nuclear test-ban
treaty, Pakistan Foreign Minister Guha Ayub Khan said that Western nations were "putting the
cart before the horse." He said that "the nuclearization of very large armies on the subcontinent
is a direct result of the Kashmir dispute... [Once the Kashmir issue is settled] the necessity to
maintain large armies or nuclear weapons or delivery systems goes away."30 But the Kashmir
issue is not settled. It is a tinderbox. And this regional instability, now armed with nuclear
weapons on both sides, present immediate and terrifying danger to the world.
The Clinton Record
In this world fraught with "clear and present danger" the Clinton Administration's record
on proliferation is disappointing. It is "all hat, no cattle." Firm in rhetoric, but weak in resolve.
In recent years, there has been some progress in the campaign to stop the spread of
weapons of mass destruction. Nuclear weapons were removed from the territories of these
former Soviet republics: Kazakhstan, Belarus and Ukraine. 178 nations agreed to extend the
10


73
force was necessary "to resolve past North Korean nuclear transgressions as well as to preclude
future nuclear threats."31 Senator John McCain expressed similar sentiments on the Senate
floor.32
Karen Elliott House wrote in The Wall Street Journal that "[T]ime is not on America's
side... Thus, the administration has to be willing not only to go to war on the Korean peninsula
but also to put the U.S.-China relationship on the line." Ms. House concluded that "capitulation
in Korea will mark the end of effective nuclear non-proliferation. This is the ultimate national
security issue for the U.S. and its allies."33
But the Clinton administration did not raise another "Desert Shield" against non-
proliferation in North Korea. The administration even was unwilling to challenge China by
bringing the issue before the U.N. Security Council. Instead the administration "privatized" our
foreign policy by allowing former President Jimmy Carter to travel to Pyongyang with the
indicia of legitimacy to negotiate with North Korea to resolve the issue. The final resolution was
seriously flawed.
Under the agreement, North Korea pledged to dismantle its existing nuclear program,
including two graphite nuclear reactors under construction, in exchange for an American
promise to help pay for the construction of two light-water nuclear reactors and the delivery of
500,000 metric tons of oil a year. The total aid package was about $4.6 billion. The North
Koreans also promised to help the Atomic Energy Commission gather evidence to confirm the
size of its plutonium stockpile.
At the time, critics complained that the agreement was heavily "front loaded" in favor of
North Korea. Georgia Anne Geyer called the agreement "foreign policy through buy-off."34
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Even more troubling, from the outset, critics charged that the verification provisions of the
agreement were too weak.35 They charged that the U.S. and its allies would pay billions to
Pyongyang to build new state-of-the-art nuclear reactors and still lack adequate safeguards
against proliferation. Unfortunately, the critics seem to have been correct.
According to a General Accounting Office report issued this summer, there were
significant gaps in the inspection program imposed by the 1994 nuclear freeze agreement. The
North Koreans have refused repeated requests for information about the whereabouts of nuclear
components that North Korea had planned to install in two nuclear reactors that were scrapped
under the agreement. The North Koreans also have refused to allow the IAEA to install
monitoring devices on nuclear waste tanks. The GAO report says that the North Koreans may
have tampered with the tanks since the 1994 agreement and secretly removed some of the
nuclear waste in an effort to hide evidence of earlier diversions of plutonium from the reactor.36
Chairman of the Senate Energy and Natural Resources Committee Frank Mukowski has
said that the GAO investigation shows that the 1994 agreement was "folly." He said, "Our
carrot-and-stick approach is all carrots, no sticks. We were too quick to provide North Korea
with the goodies before we knew the truth."37
Since the GAO report, more evidence has emerged indicating that Pyongyang is breaking
the 1994 agreement. Two weeks ago it was reported that American intelligence analysts believe
nearly 15,000 North Koreans are at work on a vast, secret underground nuclear facility.
Reportedly a large-scale tunneling and digging operation in a mountainside about 25 miles
northeast of Yongbyan, a former nuclear research center where North Korea may have produced
enough plutonium for two nuclear weapons.31
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The Clinton Administration claims that this secret operation does not "technically"
violate the 1994 agreement. For example, they say that North Korean workers have not begun
pouring cement for the foundation of the facility, which is explicitly forbidden.39 This is absurd.
Or as Henry Sokolski, executive director of the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center, said:
"That the Administration was implementing this understanding and publicly asking for money
[from Congress for oil for North Korea] when they knew this facility existed is outrageous."40
China
The People's Republic of China is a major arms exporter.41 It is a means for China to get
foreign currency. It helps underwrite expenses for the development and production of weapons.
It is a means to gain access to Western technology. And it is a means for China to gain influence
on recipient states through leverage as the supplier.42
In early 1996, the C.I.A. discovered that Beijing broke the law by selling to Pakistan
material related to nuclear weapons. The Chinese sold Pakistan magnet rings used in nuclear-
weapons technology. In May, 1996, Beijing said they did not do it and that they would not do it
again. In August 1996, U.S. intelligence uncovered that Beijing again was breaking the law.
China was caught selling special furnace and diagnostic equipment with weapons application to
a Pakistani plant not subject to "international safeguards."
These were clearly documented cases where China sold to Pakistan equipment used for
the production of weapons-grade enriched uranium. American law requires that sanctions be
imposed in cases that violate international laws intended to stop the spread of nuclear weapons.43
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The law's intent is clear. China's sale of nuclear technology to Pakistan is uncontested.
But, the Clinton Administration, in announcing it would not punish China for this sale, accepted
China's claim that the government was "unaware of any transfers" of equipment, therefore the
transfer was not "willful." The Chinese company that made the nuclear technology sale is part
of the Chinese military system and owned by the government. The issue is not whether
President Clinton's clever lawyers found a "defensible" loophole to hide behind. In fact, it was a
charade.
China received no sanction for its illegal act of nuclear proliferation. Pakistan was
another step closer to fully developing its nuclear weapon capacity. And India saw that the
United States was not committed to stopping the spread of the bomb but rather was complicit in
helping its one neighbor and adversary China help arm its other neighbor and adversary Pakistan
with nuclear capabilities.
A consequence of this wobbly U.S. policy is that Beijing continues to boldly violate other
nonproliferation regimes. For example, U.S. intelligence sources fear that Chinese equipment
may be involved in an underground chemical/biological weapons factory outside Damascus.44
China has supplied Iran with cruise missiles that could be used against U.S. forces in the Persian
Gulf.45 And last year it became public that Beijing deliberately deceived Washington in 1994
when they claimed they were importing machine tools for civilian purposes. Reportedly,
satellite photos show the American machine tools were illegally diverted to a missile factory.46
Gary Milhollin, director of the Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control, has written
that these instances of Chinese proliferation violations "should come as no surprise. The Clinton
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Administration's penchant for putting trade above national security has convinced China that
even the greatest outrages will go unpunished."47
India and Pakistan
Thirty-five years ago, President John F. Kennedy saw the possibility of a world in the
1970s with 15 to 25 nuclear-weapon states, a situation he regarded as "the greatest possible
danger." When President Clinton took office there were five declared nuclear weapons states
(China, France, United Kingdom, Russia and U.S.), the same number as 30 years earlier. While
there were a number of countries believed to be just below the explosion threshold, and there
were cracks in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation regime, no new nation had exploded a nuclear
device and declared itself to be a nuclear weapon state. There had been no nuclear break out.
None until now.
On May 11th of this year India tested nuclear weapons. U.S. intelligence failed to detect
preparations for the explosion.
China's nuclear technology assistance to Pakistan clearly influenced India's decision to
go nuclear.4* And, contributing to the decision in New Delhi undoubtedly were U.S. legal and
diplomatic contortions to avoid sanctioning Beijing for providing nuclear technology to
Islamabad. Threatened by China and Pakistan and, understandably, uncertain about the resolve
of the sole global superpower, the United States, to stop rising nuclear threats to India; New
Delhi acted to protect itself.
As Jaswant Singh, a senior advisor on Defense and Foreign Affairs to Indian Prime
Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee and a Member of Parliament, writes in the current issue of
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Foreign Affairs, for fifty years India's nuclear policy has been to seek global disarmament or, in
the alternative, equal security for all. The Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime was discriminatory,
according to the Indians, because it sanctioned the possession of nuclear weapons for the
permanent five members of the U.N. Security Council while prohibiting them for the have-nots.
The end of the Cold War has not ushered in an era where globalization and trade have rendered
meaningless traditional security concerns. And, writes Mr. Singh, India felt increasingly
threatened and "sandwiched" between two nuclear weapons powers, Pakistan and China. And,
he asks, if nuclear deterrence works in the West, why won't it work in India?49
Predictably, within weeks Islamabad detonated its own nuclear weapons and declared
itself a "nuclear weapons state." Consequently an already unstable region of the world is more
precarious.
Since May, while India and Pakistan have announced moratoriums on further testing,
neither has agreed to sign the 1996 Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. Furthermore, both continue
to develop missiles that threaten the other and can be outfitted with nuclear warheads.50 And, as
noted earlier, reportedly India plans to build nuclear-powered submarines eventually to be
outfitted with missiles carrying nuclear warheads.51
So far the Clinton Administration has had uncertain footing in dealing with a nuclear
armed Asia sub-continent. Secretary of State Madeline Albright, for example, has insisted that
India will never be permitted to enter the international nuclear nonproliferation system as a
declared nuclear power. The Indians see the U.S. position as pointless. "India is now a nuclear
weapon state," Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee said in a statement to Parliament after the
tests. "This is a reality that cannot be denied. It is not a conferment that we seek; nor is it a
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status for others to grant. It is an endowment to the nation by our scientists and engineers. It is
India's due."52
The clear and present danger from this nuclear break out are staggering. Today both
India and Pakistan lack organizational resources to produce acceptable mechanical safety
devices and safe weapon design features.53 These neighbors have immediate proximity to their
rival and less reliable warning systems than the United States and the Soviet Union. Neither
India nor Pakistan have gone through the gradual, incremental process of tests, experiments and
deployment that the previously declared nuclear weapons states went through and consequently
they have less organizational learning about nuclear safeguards. And both India and Pakistan are
likely to experience political and social unrest in the future. All these factors accentuate the
enormous dangers of India and Pakistan as newly declared nuclear weapon states.
Iraq
Iraq has a long and troubling history in its determined quest to acquire and use weapons
of mass destruction.
In the late 1970s Iraq paid the French to build a research reactor in Osirak. But in
September 1980, Iraq temporarily evicted all French technicians, saying it could not protect them
because of its war with Iran. Two months later, Iraq's government announced it would not
permit International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspections of its nuclear facilities until the
war with Iran ended. The Iraqi government refused French entreaties to allow it to substitute
less highly enriched uranium rather than bombgrade uranium for the research reactor. Due to
these troublesome acts and based on its own intelligence, on June 7,1981, Israeli planes attacked
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the Osirak research reactor. It was the first military action taken to prevent the development of
nuclear power.
A diplomatic firestorm erupted. Even the United States condemned Israel's action in the
U.N. Security Council.54 At its June, 1981, meeting, the IAEA Board of Governors passed a
resolution by 29 to 2 (with 3 abstentions) strongly condemning Israel "for this premeditated and
unjustified attack on the Iraqi nuclear research center," and recommended the IAEA General
Conference consider suspension of Israel.55 That fall there was a heated debate at the IAEA
general conference. Israeli technical assistance was suspended.56 The next September, the IAEA
General Conference passed another resolution condemning Israel and voted to deny Israeli
credentials.
However, the Persian Gulf War in 1992 revealed that the Osirak reactor was indeed part
of Iraq's program to build a nuclear weapon. Later Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney thanked
Israel for its 1981 military intervention that delayed Iraq's capability to build a nuclear bomb.
From 1980 to 1988, Iraq engaged in a bloody war with Iran. Before the U.N. brokered
peace plan (UNGA Res. 598), Iraq became the first nation since World War I to use large scale
amounts of chemical weapons in the battlefield. Later Saddam used chemical weapons against
Iraqi Kurds in the north to put down a crisis. Thus Saddam Hussein has demonstrated not only
his determination to be armed with weapons of mass destruction but his willingness to use them
against his enemies, foreign and domestic.
Following the armed expulsion of Iraq from Kuwait in the Persian Gulf War, Saddam
Hussein's troubled history in developing and using weapons of mass destruction led the United
Nations to pass Resolution 68757 which calls for the destruction of all weapons of mass
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destruction within the defeated Iraq. To implement this resolution, the United Nations
established Unscom (United Nations Special Commission on arms inspections) and initiated an
intrusive inspection regime. In its seven years, Unscom has managed to destroy many Iraqi
missiles and weapons of mass destruction notwithstanding Saddam Hussein's constant efforts to
thwart the U.N. inspectors at every turn.
Unscom has uncovered evidence that Iraq developed a staggering menu of weapons of
mass destruction. Furthermore, Iraq has not been able to show to the satisfaction of international
inspectors that it has destroyed these weapons. The Iraqi arsenal includes home-produced A-l
Hussein ballistic missiles, biological agents including anthrax, botulinum, aflatoxin and what
cover smut; chemical poisons including mustard, Sarin and Tabun; and delivery systems
including drop tanks, 2-400 aerial bombs and the Zubaidi spray device.5*
Just this past summer, Unscom reported on new evidence that Iraq put the deadly VX
nerve agent into missile warheads. The presence of VX was found in a number of samples of
Iraqi scud warheads recovered from a destruction site at Nibai, north of Baghdad. Iraq had
fought the removal of the shells for inspection in a weapons laboratory in America.59 Iraq had
insisted that its VX development had been limited to the laboratory. Now it is clear that Iraq
loaded VX gas into missile warheads before the 1991 Persian Gulf War, and then tried to conceal
the evidence.60 But, as The Washington Post editorial writers wrote, "Now, thanks to the
courageous and patient work of United Nations inspectors, we know that Saddam Hussein —
once again — has been lying."61
Furthermore, a document examined at Iraqi air force headquarters on July 18 suggest that
Iraq still has hidden about 6,300 air-dropped chemical bombs and 730 tons of chemical agents.62
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Weapons inspection is a slow and meticulous process. It is an inexact science, but the
combination of surveillance cameras, monitoring, accounting and on-site personal verification is
generally reliable. During Unscom's 7 years, they have uncovered lots of information about
Saddam Hussein's extensive program to maintain and expand his arsenal of mass destruction.
At least 13 times, Unscom officially has informed the U.N. Security Council that Iraq is
blocking access to suspected weapons sites.63 As Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright has
written, "Periodically, Saddam rattles his cage, hoping that by provoking a crisis he can wear
down the will of the international community, while we spend our precious defense dollars
dispatching and recalling our forces."*4
Last October the Iraqi Parliament recommended that Iraq suspend cooperation with
Unscom to counter a Security Council resolution threatening more sanctions against Iraq.65
Within days Iraq announced that it was expelling the Americans working on Unscom accusing
the Americans of being spies.66 While there were divisions within the 15 member U.N. Security
Council, the United States pushed hard for an Iraqi reversal, explicitly leaving open the option of
a military strike against Saddam.67 The Clinton Administration also said it reserved the right to
take unilateral military action against Saddam if he remained defiant.6' At the time there were
20,000 U.S. troops in the region and a dozen warships capable of sending cruise missiles into
Iraq. There also were 200 fighter planes stationed on the aircraft carrier Nimitz or at bases in
Saudi Arabia.69
During the inspection interregnum forced by Baghdad, the Iraqi's hid sensitive
equipment and tampered with U.N. surveillance cameras. For example, the apparatus was
hidden that could be used to calibrate prohibited missile gyroscopes.70
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As diplomatic efforts to find a solution dragged on, President Clinton ordered a further
U.S. military build up in the Persian Gulf.71 And an Iraq newspaper owned by Saddam
Hussein's son called for commando assaults on U.S. and British embassies and warships.72
In the midst of this crisis, Ambassador Richard Butler, executive chairman of Unscom,
briefed the U.N. Security Council about evidence that Baghdad continued to pose a threat in
almost every area of weapons development. He also laid out ways and means that the Iraqis
continued to try to conceal their arsenal. It appeared that many times materials had been moved
or hidden after the Iraqis were notified that an inspection visit was planned. Inspectors had been
delayed or denied entry to 83 percent of "sensitive" sites.73
Then in late November after a month of brinkmanship, Saddam relented and let the
Unscom inspectors return. But it is clear that Iraq used the time when inspections were
interrupted to hide its weapons.74 Saddam lost nothing in this confrontation. There was no
penalty for illegally forcing Unscom inspectors out of Iraq. No more was asked of him than
another promise to give inspectors full access to sites where weapons were made or stored.
Indeed, he gained time to hide weapons and he created greater fragmentation among the U.N.
Security Council coalition necessary to continue sanctions on Iraq.75
Even as Unscom inspectors returned, Iraq insisted that they must avoid sensitive sites and
property belonging to Saddam Hussein, so called presidential palaces. Iraq ruled 78 sites off-
limits.76 This triggered a new crisis. There was immediate and broad concern that these so-
called presidential palaces hide weapons. Secretary of Defense William Cohen promptly
reinitiated threats of U.S. force to compel Iraq to comply fully with the U.N. inspection regime.77
Meanwhile growing divisions within the U.N. Security Council seemed to paralyze that body.
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"Iraq is very adroitly taking advantage of the Council divisions," said Ambassador Park Soo Gil
of South Korea.71
Then in January Saddam Hussein again blocked the work of a monitoring team.79 Once
again he was trying to dictate conditions to U.N. weapons inspectors. Once again U.N. and
American resolve were being tested.*0 Russia and China broke ranks. They urged the U.N.
Security Council to certify that Iraq had halted its nuclear weapons program, despite a U.N.
report indicating that Baghdad still was withholding information. As U.S. Ambassador Bill
Richardson said at the time, "There are still patterns of concealment, insufficient information
provided by Iraq and generally a lack of cooperation."" Secretary of Defense Cohen
acknowledged at the time that Iraq retains the ability to make chemical and biological weapons
in a matter of hours or days.82 C.I.A. Director George Tenet went to Capitol Hill to warn that the
Agency had concluded that Iraq is still hiding a major chemical and biological weapons
development program that poses a direct threat to U.S. forces, interests and allies in the Middle
East." Unscom Chairman Richard Butler said that biological warheads were already loaded on
Iraqi mobile missile launchers.*4
As the crisis drew out week after week, the United States urged allies to support the use
of force. The administration made plans for a military strike on Iraq. Leading Congressional
Republicans publicly stated support. Senator John McCain called for "sufficient and sustained
military operations" against Iraq. He said, "I will support (and attack) if I believe that it is of
sufficient significance to make a difference."*5 Secretary Albright made clear at the time that the
U.S. would act alone militarily against Baghdad if necessary.*6 But in any event, President
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Clinton cautioned Saddam that "You cannot defy the will of the world. You have used weapons
of mass destruction before. We are determined to deny you the capacity to use them again."87
The United States engaged in vigorous diplomacy. Britain supported the U.S. position
early on. Warily Saudi Arabia approved the use of force." Eventually, as a consequence of
intense U.S. diplomacy, offers of military assistance to the U.S. were given by Canada,
Germany, Australia, Oman and others." Washington mixed diplomacy with the threat of force
to pressure Iraq. President Clinton clearly stated U.S. goals in Iraq, "unconditional and
unfettered access" to suspected weapons sites by United Nations. "We want a diplomatic
solution to the crisis, but success or failure of diplomacy rests on Saddam," said British Prime
Minister Tony Blair. "If he fails to respond then he knows that the threat of force is there and it
is real."90
The Chicago Sun-Times reflected the consensus in America that "a severe military blow
will serve clear notice to Hussein that the world can and will respond when his arsenal reaches
the threshold of endangering others."91 Or as a Chicago Tribune editorial read, "If Hussein
won't see the light, then the use of force will be inevitable."92
In mid-February, in a last ditch effort to find a diplomatic solution to resolve the crisis
created by Saddam short of war, the U.N. Security Council authorized Secretary General Kofi
Annan to go to Baghdad for talks with Iraq. Guidelines were carefully crafted for the
negotiations. Principally, any arrangement had to make clear that "the role and powers of the
United Nations weapons inspectors working for the United Nations Special Commission...
must not be undermined or limited."93 Meanwhile, President Clinton continued to rattle U.S.
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swords. In an address at the Pentagon, he said "Force can never be the first answer. But
sometimes it's the only answer."94
In Baghdad, Secretary General Annan negotiated with Saddam Hussein and reached an
agreement. Iraq agreed to lift its ban on arms inspections at presidential properties.95 Iraq gave
up most of its demands, including a time limit on inspections of presidential sites. Quickly the
Clinton Administration endorsed the deal, but retained its right to strike if Iraq reneged on the
deal.96 Wary of Saddam Hussein, United States forces maintained their readiness. Even at the
time of this diplomatic breakthrough, the biggest question was how long Saddam's publicly
cooperative stance toward U.N. inspectors would last. Or as one observer said at the time,
President Clinton bought a deal whereas Saddam bought time.97
The Chicago Tribune editorialized that "The big question now is whether Hussein, who
ignored a similar commitment just last November, will live up to his promises this time or
quickly resume scheming to sabotage the inspections program and preserve his capacity to make
weapons of mass destruction... Hussein's brinkmanship as further proof he responds only to the
threat of imminent force."*'
Clearly Saddam Hussein accepted the diplomatic escape offered by Secretary General
Annan because he had become convinced that the United States was ready to use military force
against him. As Kofi Annan said when the agreement was reached, the U.S. and Britain were
"perfect U.N. peacekeepers" who knew that "the best way to use force is to show it in order not
to use it."99 But to sustain the Annan agreement, to insure free and unfettered access to possible
weapon sites, to permit integrity of the inspection regime, it was evident that "the U.S. has to
make clear to Iraq and U.S. allies that if there is any violation America will use force, without
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negotiation, hesitation or U.N. approval."100 So how did America fall from the clarity last
February to the murky, curious case of the resignation from Unscom of Steve Ritter, senior
American weapons inspector?
Iraq - The Latest Crisis
Saddam Hussein's brinkmanship with U.N. inspectors from November 1997 to February
1998 had strengthened his hand. The divisions among the U.N. Security Council's permanent
five members had grown. On the one side Russia, France and China pushed to remove U.N.
sanctions, while the U.S. and Britain continued to insist that Unscom stay the course and root out
all Iraqi weapons of mass destruction.
In accordance with the agreement worked out between U.N. Secretary General Kofi
Annan and Saddam Hussein, in late March U.N. arms experts went into each of the 1,058
buildings inside Saddam's eight "presidential compounds." During the searches, the inspectors
found no prohibited material or documents.101 Inspectors had not expected to find much at the
sites. Iraqi sources reportedly said that many of the buildings were emptied months earlier when
tension escalated over Iraq's refusal to grant access to the palaces. Nonetheless, Unscom wanted
to set a precedent of entering sites that Iraq had said were off limits.102 Iraq Deputy Prime
Minister Tariq Aziz seized the opportunity to claim that "the visit has verified Iraq's credibility."
And Iraq sympathizers used this to press their case to end sanctions.103
Iraq continued to press for an end to the intrusive weapons inspection regime using
threats of defiance if there was no movement toward long-term monitoring. Russia advocated
Iraq's case within the U.N. Security Council.
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In May, the International Atomic Energy Agency said it was ready to move out of an
active, intrusive disarmament phase and into long-term monitoring. Soon thereafter Russia and
the United States agreed on how to proceed with future Iraq nuclear arms inspections. They
agreed that the IAEA would report in July on Iraq's response to a number of outstanding
questions.104
Inevitably moving to "long-term monitoring" would mean a lower level of inspections. It
would provide more opportunity to Iraqi obstruction. At the time Paul Leventhal and Stephen
Dolley of The Nuclear Control Institute criticized the deal, claiming that any move to long-term
monitoring was premature. They pointed out that the IAEA's own report showed that many
crucial documents on weapons design and research were missing. Furthermore, the IAEA report
said that nuclear components, including equipment for uranium conversion were missing while
larger stockpiles of uranium remained in Iraq.105 David Albright, president of the Institute for
Science and International Security in Washington, said that a new level of inspections would
encourage Iraq to "whittle down" enforcement.106
Within weeks the Clinton Administration announced that the United States was reducing
its forces in the Persian Gulf in half. During the military showdown with Iraq earlier in the year,
44,700 American troops, 34 warships and more than 400 fighter jets and bombers were stationed
in the Gulf. By early June America would drop that number to less than 20,000 troops, roughly
the force level that the U.S. had in the region before the winter showdown over Unscom
inspections of Iraq. This action, taken less than a month after yet another threat that Iraq would
again challenge Unscom inspectors, could only be seen as a weakening of United States
resolve.107
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Iraq (and Russia's) hopes to have the sanctions lifted suffered a major set-back in early
June. There was growing sentiment in the U.N. Security Council that the Unscom intrusive
weapons inspection had lasted long enough. Brazilian representative Celso L.N. Amorim and
other Security Council members asked for a briefing on Iraqi compliance with technical details
that could serve as a "road map" for Iraq to follow to gain lifting of sanctions and shifting the
arms inspections from intrusive "search-and-destroy" mode to long-term surveillance.10*
Unscom Chairman Richard Butler went before the Security Council on July 3rd and 4th
and presented evidence that showed as ludicrous Iraqi claims that it had met all disarmament
demands. Ambassador Butler provided a detailed technical accounting of information Iraq had
failed to provide on biological, chemical and missile programs. Ambassador Butler told the
Security Council that serious unanswered questions remained on the disposal "of missile
propellants, warheads and production efforts in which Iraq tried to recreate Russian weapons
from Baghdad resources."109 Following the briefing, Ambassador Richardson said, "Iraq has
been dealt a devastating blow to its credibility."110
Nonetheless, out of these U.N. Security Council briefings, a "road map" was compiled
for Iraq. Ambassador Butler said that "if Iraq answered the outstanding questions and met
demands for material and information, the Security Council could move a long way in lifting the
eight-year embargo during the next major review, in October, of Iraqi compliance."1" Saddam
Hussein's problem, however, was that he could not follow the "road map" without disclosing his
vast program for developing and concealing weapons of mass destruction.
In mid-June Ambassador Butler flew to Baghdad for talks with Iraq Deputy Prime
Minister Tariq Aziz about the so-called "road map." After two days of discussions, Ambassador
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Butler declared the negotiations a success. He said that "We have... agreed upon a schedule of
work for the next two months. The aim of this activity is to bring to an end as soon as possible,
but legitimately, validly, the work of the disarmament of Iraq's prescribed weapons of mass
destruction."112 A cynic — or perhaps a realist — would have been skeptical of Iraq's pledge to
cooperate. Then why, we might ask, did Mr. Butler give something for another hollow promise?
Up until that meeting, Ambassador Butler had insisted that Unscom needed "conclusive
proof that Iraq had destroyed all its weapons of mass destruction. In June in Baghdad, he
lowered the bar. He showed flexibility. Ambassador Butler said his experts were willing to
acknowledge that it is impossible to get "100 percent verification."113
Immediately there were concerns among diplomats in New York that Iraq would try to
rum any cooperation with Butler's road map into proof that it had met all demands. Ambassador
Richardson said, "The Iraqis are good at rhetoric about complying but when it comes to fulfilling
their commitments they are always woefully short. We don't expect the Butler road map to be
met.""4 Yet even then, in mid-June, some Security Council members were questioning the
United States resolve on Iraq. With a range of international crises to confront, they questioned
the U.S. ability to give sufficient attention to Iraq."5
At least one analyst went even further. Jim Hoagland of The Washington Post speculated
that Ambassador Butler's Baghdad meeting reflected his feeling that "he can no longer count on
strong, unequivocal support from Washington and London.""6 At the same time he reported that
in late-April the Clinton Administration had decided "to avoid open confrontation with Iraq over
U.N. weapons inspectors.""7 If the Clinton Administration had made such a policy shift while
publicly unacknowledged, it helps explain the set backs over the summer. It also raises the issue
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of the Clinton Administration's decision to undermine the authority and confidence of Unscom,
and consequently giving Saddam Hussein running room for his program to conceal and further
develop weapons of mass destruction.
Iraq hoped that its nuclear program would be the first to be certified as satisfying
weapons inspectors. Baghdad quickly confronted with a major set back. From June 29 to July 3,
IAEA inspectors visited Iraq. In late July the IAEA reported to the U.S. Security Council the
documents, equipment and material needed to make a nuclear weapon."*
While they had found no evidence that Iraq has nuclear weapons, the IAEA report
criticized Iraq for not being forthright. The report stated, "Indeed it is prudent to assume that
Iraq has retained documentation of its clandestine nuclear program, specimens of important
components, and possible amounts of non-enriched uranium."119 For example, inspectors were
troubled by their inability to confirm Iraq's destruction of a vacuum induction furnace capable of
turning to melt uranium into the spheres forming the core of a nuclear bomb. Inspectors also
criticized Iraq for refusing to turn over drawings of a weapon design, experimental test data and
other documents related to its nuclear program.120
At the same time, Iraq suffered setbacks in its efforts to shift from intrusive weapon
inspections to long-term monitoring for biological, chemical and missile systems. In late June,
Unscom reported evidence that Iraq put the deadly VX nerve agent into missile warheads,
contradicting Iraqi declarations that the gas had never been weaponized.121 And in July, Iraq
continued to refuse to give Unscom material on its extensive biological program.
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On August 1st, Ambassador Butler returned to Baghdad. On August 5th, Iraq announced
its decision to free to cooperation with Unscom inspectors. Although surveillance went on, no
actual site inspections were permitted.
Unscom reported to the U.N. Security Council that Iraq knew that problems in
accounting for biological and chemical compounds were serious and growing. Repeatedly Iraq
had been forced to revise stories when confronted with evidence uncovered by Unscom. At the
time it suspended cooperation with Unscom, Iraq continued to change figures and alter other
information earlier presented as "full, final and complete" declarations.122 Further, Iraq
continued to refuse to turn over documents including one discovered in July that could prove that
there are larger quantities of chemical agents unaccounted for.123 Unscom also reported that they
found problems with Iraqi accounts of what they had done with biological weapons such as
bombs, spraying devices and quantities of agents themselves such as botulinum toxin, anthrax
bacillus and aflatoxin.124
Secretary General Annan told the U.N. Security Council that Iraq's freeze on cooperation
with Unscom was "clearly in violation of the resolution of the Security Council and the
memorandum of understanding I concluded in Baghdad in February."125 While the U.N. Security
Council demanded that Iraq reverse its decision, it took no further action.
A few days later Secretary of Defense William Cohen reminded Saddam Hussein that
American forces remained on guard in the Gulf. But Secretary of State Madeleine Albright said,
"This, at this stage, is not a problem between Saddam Hussein and the U.S. It is a problem
between Saddam Hussein and the United Nations, and the United Nations has to stand up for
what it has obliged him to do."126 That was certainly a long slide from the position in February
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that if there was any violation by Iraq of the inspection agreement that America would use force
"without negotiation, hesitation or U.N. approval."
Within days senior Clinton Administration sources were explaining U.S. retreat from its
vow to use immediate military punishment of Iraq blocked U.N. weapons inspectors. Sources
were quotes as saying that "the act that would bring retaliation from Washington has shifted to
Iraqi moves to produce weapons of mass destruction or threaten its neighbors."127
The Clinton Administration shifting policy faced immediate criticism. Tom Friedman of
The New York Times wrote "[t]hat U.N. resolution (1154) stated that Iraq had to provide
'immediate unconditional and unrestricted access' to U.N. inspectors, and 'any violation would
have the severest consequences for Iraq.' Well, last week the Iraqis informed the U.N. that they
were totally 'suspending cooperation' with the U.N. inspectors. What was the U.S. response? It
sure wasn't the severest consequences."12*
A New York Times editorial read, "Instead of warning Mr. Hussein that his resistance
was no more acceptable now than it was before, and would be met with military force if
necessary, the Administration has deliberately downplayed the defiance... Without a clear and
consistent message from Washington that it is prepared to enforce the inspection system, Iraq's
weapons program cannot be reliably contained."129
Reacting to the softer U.S. position, within days Iraq announced that it not only was
freezing all current Unscom inspections but it was blocking any follow-up searches in cases
when monitoring indicates something suspicious. As part of its monitoring program, Unscom
had strategically placed state-of-the-art surveillance equipment including cameras and sampling
devices for air, soil and water. But this system works only if inspectors have the right to return
54-33499 -4
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95
going back on absolutely unambiguous language by the president, the Secretary of State and the
Secretary of Defense ... For Saddam, it is the final signal to the gulf region that he has survived,
he has been able to outmaneuver the coalition and they are going to have to politically and
militarily come to terms with his still being around."137 And, I might add, it means that Saddam
Hussein, a man who has demonstrated his willingness to use weapons of mass destruction, will
be armed with them again and ready to use them.
Unquestionably U.S. policy on eliminating weapons of mass destruction in Iraq had
changed. Perhaps the Clinton Administration can justify this shift. But, as Barton Gellman has
written, "[Arguments (pro and con) have not been fully aired because President Clinton and his
top advisors do not acknowledge a policy shift and therefore decline to explain it."131
Forcing The Issue
In the face of drifting U.S. policy toward Iraq, Scott Ritter took a courageous act to force
the issue.
Mr. Ritter was a Marine officer in the Gulf Wars. He joined Unscom in September, 1991
soon after its creation. At the time of his resignation last month, Mr. Ritter was the senior
American arms inspector in Unscom. On August 26th in his letter of resignation, Mr. Ritter
charged that the U.N. Security Council had abdicated its responsibility to disarm Iraq. He
signaled out the Clinton Administration, the U.N. Secretary General and the Security Council for
having stymied Unscom. He charged that their failure to strongly support the weapons
inspections was "a surrender to Iraqi leadership."139
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96
In an interview, Mr. Ritter emphasized that Saddam Hussein "was allowed to avoid
complete destruction in 1991 by promising the world to give up all his prohibited weapons and
to prove he had done so."140 "Iraq is being allowed to redefine the terms of the U.N. cease-fire
resolution that stopped the Gulf War. I fought in that war and cannot be part of that. It would
mean that hundreds of Americans would have died in vain."141
Since his resignation, Mr. Ritter, and in an article, has detailed the lack of Security
Council support for Unscom to carry on its mission effectively and the consequences of that
retreat. On several occasions, he charges, that Clinton Administration officials have urged
Unscom to stop trying to hold surprise inspections in Iraq. Administration officials confirmed
this report and said that they wanted to avoid an open confrontation with Iraq.142
The final straw for Mr. Ritter came a few weeks ago. He reports that Unscom had
identified specific sites where Iraq was hiding ballistic missiles and another that "contained
documents that confirmed the management of Iraq's concealment program by a member of
Saddam Hussein's personal staff."143 The team of inspectors were in place in Baghdad. Unscom
chairman Richard Butler supported die inspection. Then at the last minute after consulting with
Secretary Albright and other Security Council members, Ambassador Butler was forced to
cancel the mission. There no longer was support for surprise inspections. Mr. Ritter felt he had
no choice but to resign.
In remarks following the resignation, Unscom chairman Butler praised Mr. Ritter, calling
him a man of integrity. He said, "Scott and I agree that thee is still work of disarmament to be
done."144
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97
Last week, Mr. Ritter testified before a Senate Committee that Iraq was about three years
from making nuclear weapons, and six months from biological weapons. This is serious. The
United States must treat this threat as the "clear and present" that it is.
Where Do We Go Now?
During the Clinton Administration the world has become a more dangerous place. Most
alarming is the spread of weapons of mass destruction. We have squandered time. In addition to
the nuclear setbacks in India, Pakistan and North Korea, there are many more distressing examples
of proliferation of biological and chemical weapons, as well as ballistic missiles. For example Iran
has tested missiles able to reach Israel.145
Iraq, however, is in many ways the most troubling failure. Saddam Hussein has a history of
producing weapons of mass destruction and using them against his foes; foreign and domestic. In
1991 a war was fought to drive Iraq from its illegal occupation of Kuwait. In defeat Saddam
Hussein was allowed to survive in exchange for committing to give up all prohibited weapons.
There was a global consensus in support of the war and in support of the U.N. resolutions that
created the arms inspection regime. Some hailed it as evidence of a new world order.
Tragically, Saddam's long campaign of delay, obstruction and confrontation has fragmented
the world community and thwarted the arms inspectors. If Saddam Hussein ultimately prevails it
we'll be a crippling blow to the campaign to stop the spread of weapons of mass destruction, a major
defeat for world order, and a disgrace for the Clinton Administration.
As former U.S. Ambassador and Resident Representative to the International Atomic Energy
Agency, I am familiar with the mechanics and the reliability of sophisticated surveillance monitoring
36


98
to stop diversion of sensitive materials. While the mechanical tools are impressive, they are not
reliable without on-site inspections. Both are needed to guard against the spread of weapons of mass
destruction. And as Mr. Ritter has said, "The illusion of arms control is more dangerous than no
arms control at all."146
And as a former Assistant Secretary of State for International Organizations, I am familiar
with multilateral diplomacy, especially in the United Nations. The U.N. can be a frustrating arena
for the United States. It is a place of promise and of mischief. But it is an arena where the U.S. can
prevail and through which the U.S. can advance its interests if an issue is important enough to the
U.S. and if the U.S. is willing to work the issue hard in capitals and on Turtle Bay.
The Clinton Administration should not be allowed to hide behind the U.N. Security Council
for its failure to vigorously support Unscom inspections in Iraq. The Clinton Administration should
not be allowed to hide behind the U.N. Security Council for its failure to back up the Unscom
inspectors with force if necessary.
Our failure in Iraq is a failure of conflicting and unsorted priorities. It is a failure of
ineptitude. It is a result of neglect.
The spread of weapons of mass destruction is a clear and present danger to Americans living
at home and abroad. It is a clear and present danger to United States interests. It is a clear and
present danger to a safe and stable world order.
No failure of conflicting and unsorted priorities can be tolerated when it comes to the
struggle to contain weapons of mass destruction.
Scott Ritter's resignation has helped bring attention to failures in U.S. non-proliferation
policy. It has helped create political pressure on the Clinton Administration. And last week we saw
37


99
the Clinton Administration response to that pressure when the U.S. led the Security Council to vote
to get tough with Iraq.
The new U.N. Security Council resolution freezes future reviews of Iraqi sanctions until such
time as Saddam Hussein resumes cooperation with Unscom. The resolution also calls for a complete
review of Iraqi relations with the United States.147 This is progress, but it is not a final victory.
Last week Secretary Albright said that she was dismayed by dissension over U.S. policy on
Iraq. She reaffirmed the United States commitment to support the U.N. arms inspectors in Iraq. It
was a good speech.14* But in the past, the Clinton Administration's record on proliferation has been
firm in rhetoric, but weak in resolve. It is "all hat, no cattle." We must back up the demand for free
unfettered intrusive inspections, with the credible use of force, unilateral force if necessary. And
if Saddam Hussein determination to produce nuclear, chemical and biological weaponry continues
and he stands in the way of effective inspections, the United States cannot afford to choose
appeasement the U.S. must use armed force against Saddam Hussein.
Congress has an important role to play. The continuing spread of weapons of mass
destruction - nuclear, chemical, biological and ballistic - is a clear and present danger. Congress
must help firm up wobbly legs in the Clinton Administration. It should work to keep non-
proliferation a central priority of American foreign policy and to insure it is treated as such.
ENDNOTES
1. Tim Weiner, "U.S. Spy Agencies Find Scant Peril on Horizon," The New York Times.
January 29,1998.
2. Bad.
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100
3. Tim Weiner, "Sophisticated Terrorists Pose Daunting Obstacle," The New York Times.
August 13,1998.
4. See, Barclay G. Jones, "Atomic Terrorism: The Real Threat," Chicago Tribune.
December 12,1996.
5. Michael Killian, "Pentagon Told to Rethink Strategy: Era of Terrorism Replacing Cold
War, Panel Says," Chicago Tribune. December 2,1997.
6. Terry Atlas, "Officials Anxiously Prepare For Germ, Chemical Terrorism," The Chicago
Tribune. August 13,1998.
7. For an excellent discussion of what fighting terrorism will require, see Robert M. Gates,
"What War Looks Like Now," The New York Times. August 16,1998.
8. Raymond Tantor, Rogue Regimes: Terrorism and Proliferation (New York, St. Martins
Press, 1998) p. 40
9. See generally Raymond Tantor, Ibid.
10. Bruce B. Auster, "Should America Worry About Missiles Again? Experts say Rogue
States Soon Could Get Them," U.S. News and World Report. July 27,1998, p. 25.
11. Michael Killian, "Panel Disputes C.I.A. Assessment, Fears Attacks By Rogue States,"
The Chicago Tribune. July 16,1998. See also, Baker Spring, "The Rumsfeld
Commission Corrects A Faulty Assessment of the Missile Threat," The Heritage
Foundation, July 24,1998.
12. Killian, Ibjd-
13. See generally, Peter Rutland, "Yeltsin: The Problem, Not the Solution," The National
Interest Fall 1997, pp. 30-39; Richard Pipes, "Is Russia Still an Enemy?" Foreign
Affairs. Vol. 76, No. 5, SeptyOct. 1997, pp. 65-78.
14. See Bill Powell, "If You Really Want to Worry, Think Loose Nukes," Newsweek, May
28,1998, p. 32-33. See also Graham T. Allison, Jr., Owen R Cote, Jr., Richard A.
Falkenrath, and Steven E. Miller, Avoiding Nuclear Anarchv: Containing the Threat of
Loose Russian Nuclear Weapons and Fissile Material (Cambridge, Mass: MJT Press),
1996; Graham T. Allison, Jr., "Loose Nukes from Russia," The Brown Journal of World
Affairs (Winter/Spring 1997): pp. 65-72; Associate Press, "Georgia Seeks Non-Military
Buyer for Soviet Uranium," Chicago Sun-Times. January 8,1997; and Andrew and
Leslie Cockburn, One Point Safe (Anchor Books, New York, 1997)
15. Tantor, flad-P-219.
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101
16. , "U.S. Delegation Gets Disturbing Look at Famine-Ridden North Korea,"
Chicago Tribune. August 20,1998.
17. "Some analysts see [Kim Jong II] as a maniac, noting that he has been accused of
kidnaping a South Korean actor-and-actress couple whose work he admired, of planning
the bombing of the South Korean Cabinet in 1983, and of plotting the bombing of a
civilian South Korean airliner in 1987." Nicholas D. Kristof, "North Koreans Officially
Inherit Another "Great Leader," The New York Times. September 6,1998.
18. Robert S. Greenberger, "North Korea Launch Missile, Stirring Call to Halt U.S. Funds,"
The Wall Street Journal. September 1,1998, Steven Lee Myers, "Missile Test by North
Korea: Dark Omen for Washington: U.S. Fears New Sales to Belligerent Nations," The
New York Times. September 1,1998.
19. David E. Sanger, "North Korea Site An A-Bomb Plant, U.S. Agencies Say," The New
York Times. August 18,1998.
20. David E. Sanger, "North Korea Site An A-Bomb Plant, U.S. Agencies Say", The New
York Times. August 17,1998.
21. Editorial. "North Korea's Nuclear Ambitions." The New York Times. August 19,1998.
22. Ramola Talwar, "Report: India Plans Nuclear Subs," Chicago Sun-Times. June 27,1998.
23. John F. Burns, "India, Eye on China, Insists It Will Develop Nuclear Deterrent," The
New York Times. July 7,1998.
24. Barbara Crossette, "Pakistan Says India Uses False Threats to Justify Nuclear Arms,"
The New York Times. July 8,1998.
25. John Kifher, "Train Blast Kills 23 and Pakistan Blames India," The New York Times.
June 8,1998; Zahid Hussain, "Bomb Kills 26 Aboard Train in Pakistan: Government
Says India is to Blame," Chicago Sun-Times. June 8,1998.
26. Editorial, "The Kashmir Tinderbox," The New York Times. June 28,1998.
27. Reuters, "Pakistan calls India Irresponsible in Kashmir," Chicago Tribune. August 3,
1998.
28. , "Indian Shells Kill 10, Officials Say, Chicago Tribune. July 31,1998.
29. Reuters, Ibid.
30. Reuters, "Pakistan Ties Test Ban To a Kashmir Solution," New York Times. June 29,
1998.
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103
46. Jeff Gerth, "Officials Say China Illegally Sent U.S. Equipment to Military Plant," The
New York Times. April 23,1997. See also, Jeff Gerth, "U.S. Approved Equipment Sale
to China Despite Hint of Misuse," The New York Times. November 22, 1997.
47. Gary Milhollin, "China Cheats (What a Surprise!)," The New York Times. April 24,
1997.
48. Prem Dshankar Jha, "India's Choice, and Pakistan's," The New York Times. May 29,
1998.
49. Jaswant Singh, "Against Nuclear Apartheid," Foreign Affairs. September/October 1998,
pp. 41-52.
50. Lynne Duke, "Pakistan, India Agree to Hold Security Talks: Premiers Remain Divided
on Kashmir, The Washington Post, July 30, 1998.
51. Ramola Talwar, Ibid.
52. Thomas W. Lippman, "What Can Be Done About India?" The Washington Post National
Weekly Edition. June 29,1998.
53. Michael A. Lew, "Nuclear Neophytes Lack Many Safeguards: India and Pakistan Lack
Firm Grip on Managing Arsenals," Chicago Tribune. June 7,1998.
54. On June 29, the Security Council unanimously adopted resolution 487 (1981).
55. The United States opposed the resolution because it pre-empted prerogatives following
within the competence of the U.N. Security Council; because the U.S. opposed in
principle the exclusion of any member from an international organization, except in strict
compliance with statutory provisions, which did not exist in this case; and because all
member states have the right to benefit from Agency technical assistance.
56. Later that fall, the UNGA adopted an Iraqi-initiated resolution condemning Israel
(UNGA Resolution 38/9).
57. UNGA Resolution 49/687.
58. Barton Gellman, "Drawing a Fuzzier Line in the Sand," The Washington Post National
Weekly Edition. August 24,1998, p. 3.
59. A. M. Rosenthal, "The Weapon Called VX," The New York Times. July 10,1998.
60. Terry Atlas, "Nerve Agent Found on Iraq Missile," The Chicago Tribune. June 24,1998.
61. Editorial, "The Smoking Warhead," The Washington Post National Weekly Edition. July
6,1998.
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104
62. Md.
63. A. M. Rosenthal, "Six Years of Sabotage," The New York Times. November 18,1997.
64. Madeleine K. Albright, "The U.S. Will Stand Firm on Iraq, No Matter What," The New
York Times. August 17,1998.
65. Reuters, "Iraqi Lawmakers Urge a Hold in Dealing with U.N. on Arms," The New York
Times. October 28,1997.
66. Steven Lee Myers, "A Defiant Iraq Bars Entry to 3 U.S. Arms Inspectors," The New
York Times. October 31,1997.
67. "This is a very serious matter, and we are not ruling any option out at this time," the State
Department's spokesman, James P. Rubin, said today. Steven Lee Myers, Ibid. See also
William Neikirk and David S. Cloud, "Iraq Pulls Clinton Into Risky Strategy Dilemma,
Chicago Tribune. November 7,1997.
68. William Neikirk, "Verbal fray heats up between U.S., Iraq," Chicago Tribune. November
4,1997; Steven Lee Myers, "U.S. Says It Is Prepared to Use Force on Iraq," The New
York Times. November 11,1997.
69. James Bennet, "Basking Inspectors, Clinton Urges "Very Strong" U.N. Action on Iraq,"
The New York Times. November 10,1997.
70. Robert Reed, "Iraqis Hide Equipment, U.N. Says," The Chicago Sun-Times. November
6,1977.
71. Storer H. Rowley, "Clinton Orders Gulf Buildup As 'Precaution'," The Chicago Tribune.
November 15,1997. See also, Eric Schmitt, "U.S. Weighing Value of Bombing in
Coercing Iraq," The New York Times. November 16,1997.
72. , "Iraq Newspaper Urges Attacks on U.S., British," Chicago Sun Times.
November 16,1997.
73. Barbara Crossette, "U.N. Council Gets Evidence of Illicit Iraqi Arms Buildup," The New
York Times. November 20,1997.
74. Ray Moseley, "Hussein Retreats But Looks Like a Winner: Analysists believe Iraq Used
Time To Hide its Weapons," Chicago Tribune. November 21,1997; Jonathan G. Tucker,
"Hide-and-Seek, Iraqi Style," The New York Times. November 22,1997.
75. Steven Erlanger, "A Teetering Coalition," The New York Times. November 21,1997.
See also, Barbara Crossette, "Russians Press U.N. to Relax Iraq Sanctions, "The New
York Times. November 22,1997; and Robin Wright, "Iraq Forces Dialogue On
Sanctions," Chicago Sun-Times. November 23,1997.
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105
76. Craig Turner, "Iraq Won't Let U.N. Into Presidential Palaces," Chicago Sun-Times.
November 25,1997.
77. David S. Cloud, "U.S. Cites Deception by Iraq on Weapons," Chicago Tribune.
November 26,1997, and Tim Weiner, "Iraq Could Face Still More Sanctions or an
Attack, U.S. Says," The New York Times. November 26,1998.
78. Barbara Crossette, "Security Council's Rising Discord Is Music To Iraq," The New York
Times. January 4,1998.
79. Storer H. Rowley, "Testing Resolve, Iraq Again Bars U.N. Monitors," Chicago Tribune.
January 13,1998.
80. David S. Cloud, "Iraq Again Puts U.S. On The Spot," Chicago Tribune. January 14,
1998.
81. Associated Press, "Russia, China Support Iraq on Sanctions," Chicago Tribune. January
23,1998.
82. Jim Hoagland, "A Real Target," The Washington Post National Weekly Edition. January
26,1998, p. 5.
83. Michael Killian and David S. Cloud, "CIA Chief Says Iraq Hiding Major Toxic Arms
Program," Chicago Tribune. January 29, 1998.
84. A. M. Rosenthal, "America's War Goals," The New York Times. January 30, 1998.
85. David S. Cloud, "U.S. Making Plans for Military Strike on Iraq," Chicago Tribune.
January 27,1998. See also, Tim Weiner, "U.S. Lists Options On Use Of Force In Iraq
Standoff," The New York Times. January 25,1998.
86. Steven Lee Myers, "Albright Says U.S. Could Act Alone Against Baghdad," The New
York Times. January 29, 1998.
87. Steven Erlanger, "Iraqis Must End Defiance on Arms, Clinton Warns," The New York
Times. January 28, 1998.
88. Daniel Williams, "Iraq Diplomacy Intensifies," Chicago Sun-Times. February 3,1998.
89. Paul Richter, "Iraq Strike Gains Backing, U.S. Says," Chicago Sun-Times. February 11,
1998.
90. Eric Schmitt, "Republicans Seek Clearer Iraq Goal," The New York Times. February 6,
1998.
91. Editorial, "Iraq's Clock Ticking," Chicago Sun-Times. February 11,1998.
44


106
92. Editorial, "Annan Gives Comfort to Iraq," Chicago Tribune. February 12, 1998.
93. Steven Erlanger, "U.S. Seeks to Limit Role of U.N. Chief During Iraq Talks, The New
York Times. February 17,1998.
94. James Bennett, "Clinton Describes Goals for a Strike on Iraqi Arsenals," The New York
Times. February 18, 1998. See also, Roger Simon, "Diplomacy Window Closing,"
Chicago Tribune. February 18,1998.
95. Barbara Crossette, "Iraqi Agrees to Inspections in a Deal with U.N. Leader; Washington
Awaits Details," The New York Times. February 23,1998.
96. David S. Cloud and Roger Simon, "Clinton Endorses Iraq Deal: But He Retains U.S.
Right to Strike if Hussein Reneges," Chicago Tribune. February 24,1998.
97. R. W. Apple, Jr., "Buying a Deal as Hussein Buys Time," The New York Times.
February 24,1998.
98. Editorial, "Now Make Hussein Keep His Word," Chicago Tribune. February 24,1998.
99. Christopher S. Wren, "Annan Says He Has the Council's Backing," The New York
Times. February 25, 1998.
100. Thomas L. Friedman, "Craziness Pays, The New York Times. February 24,1998.
101. Leon Barkho, "UN finds Iraq Palaces Bare," Chicago Sun-Times. April 4,1998.
102. The visits which began March 26, were designed to "establish our right to unrestricted
access," said Charles Duelber, deputy head of Unscom. Ibid.
103. Ibjd.
104. Barbara Crosette, "U.S. and Russia Reach Accord on Iraq Inspections," The New York
Times. May 14,1998.
105. IbM.
106. Ibid.
107. Steven Lee Myers, "Clinton Cuts Gulf Forces in Half as Showdown With Iraq Recedes,"
The New York Times. May 27, 1998.
108. Barbara Crossette, "Top U.N. Inspectors to Brief Security Council on Iraqi Failures to
Provide Information," The New York Times. June 1,1998.
45


107
109. Barbara Crossette, "U.N. Inspectors Tell How Iraq Concealed Weapons Programs," The
New York Times. June 4,1998.
no. Bad.
111. Barbara Crossette, "U.N. Arms Experts Brief Security Council on Iraqi Compliance,"
The New York Times. June 5,1998.
112. Reuters, "U.N. Team and Iraq Set on Timetable of Inspections," The New York Times.
June 15,1998.
113. Leon Barkho, "A Farewell to Arms Inspections? U.N. Rapporteur Set to Lift Iraq
Sanctions Despite Restoration," Washington Times. June 16,1998.
114. Barbara Crossette, "Goals Are Set for Iraq, But U.N. Aides Remain Wary," The New
York Times. June 17,1998.
115. Ibid.
116. Jim Hoagland, "Shift and Drift," The Washington Post National Weekly Edition. June 29,
1998, p. 5.
117. Mi.
118. Barbara Crossette and Judith Miller, "Nuclear Suspicions Cling to Iraq in Latest Report,"
The New York Times. July 28,1998.
119. Ibjd,
120. Some outside critics still felt the IAEA report did not go far enough. David Albright,
president of the Institute for Science and International Security said, "[T)he report
doesn't raise the alarm sufficiently about Iraq's nuclear capabilities." Ibid.
121. Terry Atlas, "Never Agent Found on Iraq Missile," The Chicago Tribune. June 24,1998.
122. Barbara Crossette, "Security Council Closes Its Ranks Against Baghdad," The New York
Times. August 7.1998.
123. Iraqis had told Unscom that they had filled 101,080 warheads with chemical weapons in
the 1980s. The new document stated that fewer than that were actually deployed.
Unscom sought to discover what happened to the rest. Ibid.
124. Ibjd.
125. Bud.
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108
126. Jim Abrams, "U.S. Reminds Iraq About Its Firepower," Chicago Sun-Times. August 10,
1998.
127. Steven Erlanger, "U.S. Retreats From Vow to Use Force if Iraq Blocks Inspectors," The
New York Times. August 14, 1998.
128. Thomas Friedman, "Forgive and Forget," The New York Times. August 11,1998.
129. Editorial, "Drifting to a New Iraq Policy," The New York Times. August 12,1998.
130. Barbara Crossette, "Toughening Stand on Weapons, Iraq Foils Long-Term Monitoring,"
The New York Times. August 13,1998.
131. Ibid.
132. Editorial, "Saddam Hussein Makes His Move," The New York Times. August 14,1998.
133. Madeleine Albright, "The U.S. Will Stand Firm on Iraq, No Matter What," The New
York Times. August 17,1998.
134. Paul Lewis, "U.N. Council Prepares Mild Reply to Iraq," The New York Times. August
17,1998.
135. Paul Lewis, "Mediator Failed To Sway Iraq on Arms, Security Council is Told," The
New York Times. August 18,1998.
136. Judith Miller, "Arms Inspector Quits, Rips Clinton, U.N.," Chicago Tribune. August 27,
1998.
137. Barton Gcllman, "Drawing a Fuzzier Line in the Sand," The Washington Post National
Weekly Edition. August 24,1998, p. 13.
138. Ibid.
139. Judith Miller, "American Inspector on Iraq Quits, Accusing U.N. and U.S. of Cave-In,"
The New York Times. August 27,1998.
140. Jim Hoagland, "Ritter's Resignation," The Washington Post National Weekly Edition.
August 31,1998, p.5.
141. Ibid-
142. Judith Miller. Ibid.
143. Scott Ritter, "The Final Straw," The Wall Street Journal. September 3,1998.
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109
144. Nicole Winfield, "Chief U.N. Weapons Inspector Sympathizes with Ex-Aide," Chicago
Sun-Times. August 28,1998.
145. Tim Weiner, "Iraq Said to Test Missile Able to Hit Israel and Saudis," The New York
Times, July 23,1998.
146. Judith Miller, "American Inspector on Iraq Quits, Accusing U.N. and U.S. of Cave-In,"
The New York Times. August 27,1998.
147. Barbara Crossette, "U.N. Keeps Sanctions on Iraq, Citing Its Balking of Monitors," The
New York Times. September 10,1998.
148. Philip Shenon, "Rebuilding Ex-Arms Inspector, Albright Defends U.S. Role," The New
York Times. September 10,1998.
48


110
UUTWUUIIH
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES


PERMANENT SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON. DC 20515-6415
August 27, 1998
The Honorable Madeleine K. Albright
Secretary of State
Department of State
2201 C Street. NW
Washington, DC 20520
Dear Secretary Albright:
I am writing to express my dismay at the Administration's apparent
decision to back away from supporting a vigorous United Nations Special
Commission (UNSC0M) inspection regime meant to halt Iraq's continuing
efforts to build weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems. In
particular, I am distressed by reports that the Administration decided in early
August to withdraw support of UNSCOM's efforts to uncover Iraq's
"concealment mechanism," that is, the sophisticated and comprehensive
program Saddam Hussein has developed to hide his proscribed weapons
programs. Yet, my preliminary inquiries into this matter have led me to
conclude that, as reported, it was the Administration's lack of support that
led to the withdrawal of the most recent UNSCOM inspection team without
if s having even tried to carry out a series of inspections that had the
potential of exposing the scope of Saddam Hussein's violation of Security
Council resolutions and the Memorandum of Understanding of February 23,
1998.
In my role as Chairman of the House Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence, I have been kept current of the U.S. Intelligence Community's
assessment of Iraqi weapons proliferation activities. I do not exaggerate in
saying that I have grave fears for the security of our nation if those activities
are not brought to an immediate halt. I had felt somewhat comforted
knowing that this attitude was also reflected in the Administration's
professed policy towards Iraq. After all, it was the President who at the
Pentagon on February 17 of this year said that we must exercise "constant
vigilance" in maintaining the inspections program. "(Saddam Hussein] has
tried to thwart it in every conceivable way. But the discipline, determination,
the year-in, year-out effort of these weapons inspectors is doing the job.
And we seek to finish the job." The President also said that, if we do not
keep up the pressure to uncover his weapons programs, "some day, some
way, I guarantee you, he'll use the arsenal."


117
Question for the record submitted to Martin Indyk
House International Relations Committee
Hearing on Disarming Iraq: Status of Weapons Inspections (9/14/98)
IRAQ'S WMD PROGRAMS. IAEA DIRECTOR GENERAL EL-BARADEI
TOLD THE UNSC ON OCTOBER 13 THAT THE IAEA HAS NO
INDICATION THAT IRAQ ASSEMBLED NUCLEAR WEAPONS WITH OR
WITHOUT FISSILE CORES.
2


118
Question for the record submitted to Martin Indyk
House International Relations Committee
Hearing on Disarming Iraq: Status of Weapons Inspections (9/14/98)
IRAQI FISSILE MATERIAL PROCUREMENT
In answer to Congressman Gilman's Question #2
Q: Are you confident that Iraq's obtaining fissile
material from an outside source for its nuclear weapons
would be detected by UN weapons inspectors or by other
means? How difficult an intelligence task would this
be?
A: THE IAEA IS REASONABLY CONFIDENT THAT ITS PLAN FOR ON-
GOING MONITORING AND VERIFICATION (OMV) COULD ENABLE
IAEA TO DETECT AN ATTEMPT BY THE IRAQIS TO RECONSTITUTE
FISSILE MATERIAL PRODUCTION. DETECTION OF SMUGGLED
FISSILE MATERIAL WOULD BE MUCH MORE DIFFICULT; WE HAVE
BEEN WORKING ACTIVELY WITH THE IAEA AND OTHER MEMBER
STATES TO ASSIST THE IAEA IN STRENGTHENING ITS OMV
SYSTEM IN THIS REGARD.
1


119
Question for the Record Submitted to Martin S. Indyk
by Chairman Benjamin A. Gilman
Committee on International Relations
September 15, 1998
3. Did the Iraqi facilities that you were blocked from
inspecting include those in which Iraq is thought to be hiding
its components for the nuclear weapons?
Answer:
Because the question implies knowledge which we do not have,
it is important to say first that neither we nor the
International Atomic Energy Agency are aware of specific nuclear
weapon components believed to be hidden in Iraq, though the
possibility certainly exists.
It is also necessary that I clarify that it is not we, the
USG, that is blocked from inspecting, but UNSCOM, an
international organization chartered by the Security Council.
There are important gaps in Iraq's required disclosures in
every weapons area. So UNSCOM's efforts to uncover Iraq's
concealment mechanism are aimed across the board. What UNSCOM
might find in any one place, we do not know, because the Iraqis
are very good at hiding things.


120
Question for the record submitted to Martin Indyk
House International Relations Committee
Hearing on Disarming Iraq: Status of Weapons Inspections (9/14/98)
IRAQI SCALE MODEL NUCLEAR WEAPONS
In answer to Congressman Gilman's Question #4
Q: A respected nuclear trade journal, Nucleonics Week has
reported that the IAEA was informed that Iraq had
developed a scale model of a nuclear weapon. Did
UNSCOM have access to information about such a scale
model? Are you aware of any other activities of Iraq
that would indicate they are preparing to conform their
nuclear bomb components to a missile delivery vehicle?
A: WE ARE AWARE THAT THE IAEA HAS LOOKED INTO THIS MATTER,
AND THAT THEY FOUND NO TRACE OF A SCALE MODEL OF A
NUCLEAR WEAPON. AS SUCH THERE WAS NOTHING FOR THE IAEA
TO REPORT.
THERE ARE STILL UNANSWERED QUESTIONS ABOUT IRAQ'S
WEAPONIZATION EFFORTS. THE IAEA HAS HIGHLIGHTED THE
LACK OF INFORMATION ABOUT WEAPONIZATION AS ONE OF
SEVERAL AREAS WHERE IT HAS CONTINUING UNCERTAINTIES AND
WHERE THERE IS A LACK OF COMPLETE AND VERIFIABLE
INFORMATION.
THE IAEA HAS STATED IT WILL FOLLOW-UP ON ANY
INFORMATION IT RECEIVES REGARDING IRAQ'S NUCLEAR
PROGRAM. THE IAEA HAS ALSO NOTED IT HAS TAKEN INTO
ACCOUNT VARIOUS UNCERTAINTIES IN DESIGNING ITS ON-GOING
MONITORING AND VERIFICATION PROGRAM.
1


122
Question for the record submitted to Martin Indyk
House International Relations Committee
Hearing on Disarming Iraq: Status of Weapons Inspections (9/14/98)
CERTIFYING IRAQI COMPLIANCE
In answer to Congressman Gilman's Question #6
Q: Do you believe that the UN should close the file on
Iraq's nuclear weapons?
A: WE CANNOT ENDORSE A SHIFT TO ON-GOING MONITORING AND
VERIFICATION (OMV) AT THIS TIME.
IN THE UNSC'S MAY 14 PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENT THE COUNCIL
AFFIRMED ITS INTENTION TO AGREE TO A RESOLUTION THAT
THE IAEA DEDICATE ITS RESOURCES TO OMV, UPON RECEIPT OF
A REPORT FROM THE IAEA THAT THE NECESSARY TECHNICAL AND
SUBSTANTIVE CLARIFICATION HAVE BEEN MADE, INCLUDING
PROVISION OF THE NECESSARY RESPONSES TO ALL OF THE
IAEA'S QUESTIONS AND CONCERNS. IRAQ HAS NOT PROVIDED
ANY INFORMATION IN RESPONSE. UNTIL IRAQ PROVIDES SUCH
INFORMATION, PARTICULARLY WITH REGARD TO DOMESTIC PENAL
LEGISLATION OUTLAWING PROSCRIBED WEAPONS AND ASSOCIATED
ACTIVITIES AS DEFINED IN UNSC 687, WE CAN NOT ENDORSE A
SHIFT TO OMV.
1


123
Question for the Record Submitted to Martin S. Indyk
by Chairman Benjamin A. Gilman
Committee on International Relations
September 15, 1998
7. Please describe how the Security Council and the U.S.
have over the past year taken actions to limit the role of UNSCOM
to make it progressively easier for Iraq to comply with its
disarmament obligations? Where is this process taking us? And
how will the most recent Security Council resolution (UNSCR 1194)
further limit the ability of UNSCOM to carry out its original
mandate?
Answer:
The Security Council has repeatedly, and unanimously, found
that Iraq is in violation of its disarmament obligations under
relevant Security Council resolutions.
The Security Council has not reduced any of Iraq's
obligations in those resolutions.
While some members of the Council would like to give Iraq
partial credit for partial progress, we believe that resolutions
687, 707, 715 and 1194 are good resolutions that should be firmly
supported.
Resolution 1194 does not limit UNSCOM at all. It
specifically condemns Iraq's decision to suspend cooperation with
UNSCOM, and clearly states that no sanctions reviews will be
conducted until UNSCOM and the IAEA report to the Council that
they are satisfied that they have been able to exercise the full
range of activities provided for in their mandates.


124
Question for the Record Submitted to Martin S. Indyk
Committee on International Relations
September 14, 1998
8. Has the Administration adopted a "deterrence" strategy toward
Iraq ensuring only that Saddam Hussein does not use weapons that
he might already have or might soon acquire? Has the
Administration changed its policy toward Iraq from the February
23 agreement between Iraq and Secretary General Kofi Annan and
the adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 1194 on September
9?
Answer
Our Iraq policy remains to contain a dangerous regime and
prevent that regime from acquiring dangerous weapons of mass
destruction. Under UN Security Council resolutions, Iraq is
obligated to provide full and complete disclosure of its
ballistic missile, chemical, biological and nuclear weapon
programs, and to destroy any prohibited weapons. It is also
prohibited from seeking to acquire or develop such weapons.
UNSCOM and IAEA are charged with verifying Iraq's compliance with
these obligations. We fully support UNSCOM and IAEA in their
missions.
Iraq's August 5 suspension of cooperation with UNSCOM and
the IAEA violates the February 23 Memorandum of Understanding
signed by the Secretary General and Iraq, as well as numerous UN
Security Council resolutions, including resolutions 687 and 1154.
UN Security Council resolution 1194 adopted on September 9,
which we supported, condemns Iraq's decision to suspend
cooperation with UNSCOM and IAEA as a "totally unacceptable
contravention of its obligations" and demands that Iraq rescind
its decision and resume cooperation immediately. We are working
with the Council to achieve that shared goal.


125
Question for the Record Submitted to Martin S. Indyk
by Chairman Benjamin A. Gilman
Committee on International Relations
September 15, 1998
9. Please describe how the Security Council and its member
states have blocked or otherwise frustrated your inspection
efforts over the past several years. Is the Administration in
your view running away from a confrontation with Saddam Hussein?
How has this affected UNSCOM's efforts in the field?
Answer:
It is Iraq that has blocked and frustrated UNSCOM inspection
efforts.
We have worked very hard to maintain Security Council
unanimity in supporting the work of UNSCOM and in condemning
Iraq's failures to cooperate with UNSCOM. To date, that
unanimity has been formally and publicly expressed, as in the
recent Resolution 1194.
The Administration isn't running away from anything. If
Saddam Hussein seeks confrontation, he will continue to find firm
resolve on the part of the United States to contain his efforts
to threaten his neighbors and to pursue weapons of mass
destruction.
UNSCOM's efforts in the field have benefited greatly from
the support of the United States Government, as is well known by
everyone who works with UNSCOM.
54-33499 -5


126
Question for the record submitted to Martin Indyk
Houso International Relations Committee
Hearing on Disarming Iraq: Status of Weapons Inspections (9/14/98)
CERTIFYING IRAQI COMPLIANCE
In answer to Congressman Gilman's Question #10
Q: If UNSCOM can't perform its job, how are we going to
know whether Iraq is rebuilding its proscribed weapons
systems?
A: THE UNSC STATED IN RESOLUTION 1194 THAT IRAQ'S AUGUST 5
DECISION TO RESCIND FULL COOPERATION IS "TOTALLY
UNACCEPTABLE." AND DEMANDED THAT IRAQ IMMEDIATELY
RESCIND ITS DECISION TO HALT COOPERATION WITH UNSCOM
AND THE IAEA. IN AN AUGUST 12TH LETTER TO THE UN
SECURITY COUNCIL PRESIDENT, UNSCOM EXECUTIVE CHAIRMAN
RICHARD BUTLER STATED "THE COMMISSION CANNOT CONTINUE
TO PROVIDE THE COUNCIL WITH THE SAME LEVEL OF
ASSURANCES OF IRAQ'S COMPLIANCE WITH ITS OBLIGATIONS TO
NOT RE-ESTABLISH ITS PROSCRIBED WEAPONS PROGRAMS."
IAEA DIRECTOR-GENERAL MOHAMED EL-BARADEI STATED IN AN
AUGUST 11th LETTER TO THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL PRESIDENT
THAT, "IRAQ'S REFUSAL TO CO-OPERATE IN ANY ACTIVITY
INVOLVING INVESTIGATION OF ITS CLANDESTINE NUCLEAR
PROGRAM MAKES IT IMPOSSIBLE FOR THE IAEA...TO
INVESTIGATE, THROUGH THE FOLLOW-UP OF ANY NEW
INFORMATION THAT COMES TO ITS KNOWLEDGE, THE REMAINING
QUESTIONS AND CONCERNS RELEVANT TO IRAQ'S CLANDESTINE
1


127
Question for the record submitted to Martin Indyk
House International Relations Committee
Hearing on Disarming Iraq: Status of Weapons Inspections (9/14/98)
NUCLEAR PROGRAM, AS WELL AS ANY OTHER ASPECT OF THAT
PROGRAM, AND TO DESTROY, REMOVE, OR RENDER HARMLESS ANY
PROHIBITED ITEMS THAT MAY BE DISCOVERED THROUGH SUCH
INVESTIGATIONS."
WE CONTINUE TO WORK IN DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS TO PRESSURE
IRAQ TO RESCIND ITS AUGUST 5 DECISION. WE WILL
CONTINUE TO PURSUE THE DIPLOMATIC TRACK AS LONG AS
PRACTICAL, BUT WE HAVE TAKEN NO OPTIONS OFF THE TABLE.
2


128
Question for the Record Submitted to Martin Indyk
House International Relations Committee
September 15, 1998
11. Has Iraq used the United Nations Oil-for-Food program to
import dual use goods or other components for its banned weapons
programs? Does the U.S. government have any information that
Iraq has received, or is receiving, illegal shipments through
this program?
We have no doubt that the government of Iraq wants to circumvent
sanctions in any way it can, including, where possible, by
misusing humanitarian programs. Therefore, every effort is made
to prevent such abuse of the Oil-for-Food program. Every
proposed Oil-for-Food contract is reviewed by the UN Iraq
Sanctions Committee, of which the U.S. is a member; objection to
a proposed contract by any one member of the Committee will
prevent that contract from going forward. The Committee can, and
repeatedly has, refused to approve contracts because of dual use
concerns. If the U.S. government were to become aware of
specific information that Iraq had received or was receiving
unauthorized shipments through this program, we would immediately
engage with the Sanctions Committee and the UN Office of the Iraq
Program (OIP) in an effort to halt dual-use diversions. However,
to the best of our knowledge, such a situation has not occured.


129
Question for the Record Submitted to Martin Indyk
House International Relations Committee
September 15, 1998
12. Could the UN Security Council or any member of the Council
take action to stop these shipments if they were to be publicly
documented?
If the Iraq Sanctions Committee approved a contract and later
learned that the proposed contract had misrepresented the end use
or the end user of the goods, the Sanctions Committee could take
action. As a member of the UN Security Council, the U.S. sits on
the Iraq Sanctions Committee.
Depending on the precise circumstances of the case, the Committee
could ask the UN Office of the Iraq Program (OIP) to notify the
contractor that approval for the contract was being withdrawn.
If the shipment had not yet reached Iraq and the goods were being
sent by sea, the Committee could notify the Multinational
Interception Force to be on the alert for the shipment and turn
back the vessel carrying the goods. For goods arriving over
land, Lloyds inspectors at the Iraqi border could be instructed
to refuse entry for the goods. If UN inspectors inside Iraq were
to find items which had been diverted, they would report this to
the UN Office of the Humanitarian Coordinator in Iraq, which
would send a note verbale to the Iraqi Foreign Ministry and a
report to the UN Office of the Iraq Program in New York.
Following up on the note verbale, UN officials would also consult
with the Iraqi government and ask for measures to rectify the


130
diversion of goods. If the Iraqis did not comply with the
request, OIP could bring this to the attention of the Security
Council. (However, according to OIP, no such diversions have
come to the attention of the UN during its regular monitoring.)
I
i


132
the staff of UN agencies operating in Iraq, focus on specific
areas to ensure appropriate use of imported items.
UNSCOM is in frequent communication with the UN's Office of the
Iraq Program (OIP) and as necessary with the Sanctions Committee.
While the mission of UNSCOM is to investigate Iraq's Weapons of
Mass Destruction (WMO) programs, if UNSCOM inspectors were to
uncover goods which had been diverted from civilian to military
use, they could easily notify OIP. UNSCOM reviewed the current
Oil-for-Food distribution plan and identified possible dual use
items. Every contract approval letter is sent to UNSCOM and to
the Multinational Interception Force (MIF), so that those
entities are aware of approved goods going into Iraq. UNSCOM
routinely visits sites such as FAO warehouses where dual use
items are stored. UNSCOM has not to date notified the OIP of any
such diversions of goods from civilian to military uses. UNSCOM
inspectors have notified the Committee of goods which they
discovered which were smuggled into Iraq.
I


134
Question for the record submitted to Martin Indyk
House International Relations Committee
Hearing on Disarming Iraq: Status of Weapons Inspections (9/14/98)
UNSCOM'S MONITORING CAPABILITIES SINCE 5 AUGUST
In answer to Congressman Gilman's Question #15
Q: In light of the decision of August 5 by the government
of Iraq to stop cooperating with the UN weapons
inspectors, hasn't UNSCOM lost its eyes and ears by
which it can expose and destroy Iraqi weapons of mass
destruction?
A: THE UNSC STATED IN RESOLUTION 1194 THAT IRAQ'S AUGUST 5
DECISION TO RESCIND FULL COOPERATION IS "TOTALLY
UNACCEPTABLE" AND DEMANDED THAT IRAQ REVERSE ITS
DECISION AND RESUME COOPERATION IMMEDIATELY. BOTH
UNSCOM AND THE IAEA HAVE REPORTED TO THE UN SECURITY
COUNCIL PRESIDENT THAT, AS LONG AS IRAQ FORBIDS
INSPECTIONS TO TAKE PLACE, UNSCOM AND THE IAEA CANNOT
PROVIDE THE SECURITY COUNCIL WITH THE SAME LEVEL OF
ASSURANCE THAT IRAQ IS COMPLYING WITH UNSC RESOLUTIONS.
WE CONTINUE TO WORK IN DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS TO PRESSURE
IRAQ TO RESCIND ITS AUGUST 5 DECISION. HOWEVER, WE
HAVE TAKEN NO OPTIONS OFF THE TABLE.


136
Question for the record submitted to Martin Indyk
House International Relations Committee
Hearing on Disarming Iraq: Status of Weapons Inspections (9/14/98)
IRAQ'S DECLARATIONS ON ITS BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS PROGRAM
HAS BEEN FOUND BY INTERNATIONAL EXPERTS TO BE
INCOMPLETE, INADEQUATE, AND TECHNICALLY FLAWED. THE
MATERIAL BALANCE OF IRAQ'S BIOLOGICAL GROWTH MEDIA
CANNOT BE DETERMINED. THERE IS EVIDENCE OF THE
EXISTENCE, BUT NOT OF THE QUANTITIES PRODUCED, OF BW
AGENTS AND MUNITIONS (MISSILE WARHEADS FILLED WITH
ANTHRAX AND BOTULINUM TOXIN, R-400 AERIAL BOMBS, DROP
TANKS, AND AEROSOL GENERATORS). IRAQ HAS LIED
REPEATEDLY ABOUT ITS BW PROGRAM. IN SOME CASES, IT
DENIES THAT DOCUMENTATION OF ITS BW PROGRAM EXISTS
WHILE, CONCEALING OTHER DOCUMENTS ON ITS BW PROGRAM IT
ACKNOWLEDGES DO EXIST. IN THE PAST, IRAQ HAS
CLANDESTINELY DESTROYED PROSCRIBED WEAPONS MATERIALS,
OR FALSELY CLAIMED TO DESTROY MATERIALS WHILE ACTUALLY
RETAINING THEM.
2


137
Question for the record submitted to Martin Indyk
House International Relations Committee
Hearing on Disarming Iraq: Status of Weapons Inspections (9/14/98)
IRAQI USE OF TOOLS FOR PROSCRIBED ACTIVITIES AND WEAPONS
In answer to Congressman Gilman's Question #17
Q: Has the administration demarched countries on a regular
basis to ensure that its companies are not providing
equipment and technical assistance that can be used to
manufacture and produce proscribed weapons? How did
Iraq recently acquire some 20 four-axis machine tools
for use in its ballistic missile efforts? Are those
machines being used for proscribed activities? What
efforts has UNSCOM made to destroy or disable these
machines?
A: THE UNITED STATES HAS REPEATEDLY DEMARCHED OTHER
COUNTRIES EMPHASIZING THE REGIONAL AND GLOBAL THREAT
IRAQ'S WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION PROGRAMS POSE.
WITH REGARD TO THE FOUR-AXIS MACHINE TOOLS, THESE ARE
DUAL-USE ITEMS WITH SOME SIGNIFICANCE FOR MISSILE
DEVELOPMENT. THERE ARE A NUMBER OF THESE AXIS MACHINES
CURRENTLY UNDER OBSERVATION AT SITES DESIGNATED BY
UNSCOM. TO ENSURE IRAQ DOES NOT IMPORT ANY MATERIALS,
INCLUDING AXIS MACHINE TOOLS, THAT ARE INCONSISTENT
WITH THE ITEMS' DECLARED PURPOSE AND END-USER
DESTINATION, UNSCOM AND THE IAEA HAVE SET UP AND
JOINTLY ADMINISTER AN EXPORT/IMPORT MONITORING
MECHANISM FOR IRAQ. UNSCOM ACTIVELY TRACKS THE USAGE
OF THESE MACHINES AND PURSUES ANY REPORTS OF THEIR USE
IN PROSCRIBED WEAPONS DEVELOPMENT.
1


139
Question for the Record Submitted to Martin S. Indyk
Committee on International Relations
September 15, 1998
1. Two cornerstones of United States policy toward Iraq since
1991, as I understand policy, have been a tough inspection regime
and the maintenance of tough sanctions. I sense that in recent
weeks and months, there has been a tension between a robust
inspection regime and keeping unity on tough sanctions.
- Do you agree that tension exists?
- Is it fair to say that your highest priority has been to keep
robust sanctions in place and that the timing and nature of
inspections should not jeopardize efforts to maintain robust
sanctions?
Does this necessarily mean that aspects of the
inspections regime have been weakened?
- Has there been a change of policy on the interplay between
sanctions and inspections?
- How do you get back into a situation in which it is possible to
have both a strong inspections regime and robust sanctions?
Answer
There is no inherent conflict between sanctions and
disarmament inspections; in fact, the two have complementary
roles. UN sanctions on Iraq deny Saddam Hussein the revenues
with which to reconstitute Iraq's HMD. UNSCOM verifies Iraqi
compliance with its HMD obligations and, in the absence of Iraqi
disclosure, attempts to uncover the details of Iraq's weapons
programs. Iraq has repeatedly attempted to break free of both
the sanctions and inspection regimes without complying with UN
Security Council resolutions.


140
UNSCOM and IAEA reports are an integral part of UN Security
Council consideration of whether Iraqi policies and practices
merit action on the Council's part to alter the sanctions regime.
In the 40 reviews held prior to the adoption of UN Security
Council Resolution 1194 (which suspended such reviews in response
to Iraq's decision to suspend cooperation with UN weapons
inspectors), no grounds were ever found for Security Council
action with respect to sanctions.


141
Question for the Record Submitted to Martin S. Indyk
by Hon. Lee H. Hamilton
Committee on International Relations
September 15, 1998
2. I wanted to ask you about the credibility of U.S. forces
in the Gulf today. We have drawn down our forces that were in
the Gulf in February when there was the last confrontation with
Iraq over inspections.
— Can we do more with less?
— Do we have the ability today with far fewer forces in the
region to project credible firepower should that be necessary?
Answer:
It is my understanding that the Department of Defense has
changed the weapons mix deployed in the Gulf region since
February, greatly increasing the ready availability of cruise
missiles.
It is also my understanding that U.S. military forces now
deployed in the Gulf region do have the ability to project
significant firepower.
I must defer to the Department of Defense on these matters.


143
Testimony of A/S Martin Indyk
House International Relations Committee
September 14, 1997
Question
In the 1998 Supplemental Appropriations Act enacted earlier
this year, Congress provided $5 million this year for Radio Free
Iraq, $5 million for support of the Iraqi opposition, and $3
million for a process to indict Saddam Hussein.
— How much money has been expended since the enactment of this
bill?
— How much of these funds has been obligated?
— Is Radio Free Iraq now broadcasting from the Czech Republic?
— When will it be fully operational and how many hours will it
broadcast a day?
Answer
Regarding the $5 million to support the Iraqi opposition and
promote the collection of information on Iraqi war crimes, the
State Department was receiving grant requests from NGO's and non-
profit organizations when new legislation compelled us temporarily
to put this process on hold. The FY99 Appropriations Bill—which
provides $8 million for the opposition—may effect implementation
of the 1998 Supplemental Appropriation. As the new bill requires,
we will report on the opposition program 30 days after the bill is
signed. About $3.9 million in grant requests were under
consideration when the new appropriations bill was passed.
Radio Free Iraq plans to begin broadcasting around the end of
October. Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty administers the new
service and will have details on the service's budget and its
hours of operation.


144
-2-
Testimony of A/S Martin Indyk
House International Relations Committee
September 14, 1997
Question
What programs to support the Iraqi opposition are up and
running now?
— Are we supporting mainly exile groups?
— Which groups are we supporting?
— What specific activities do these funds support?
— Is this effort supporting both the INC and the National Accord
groups?
— What are your specific goals? Where do you want to be with
this program in 1999?
Answer
As noted above, funding for opposition activities has been
affected by the FY99 Appropriations Bill, so grant awards have
been placed on hold. We plan to report on efforts to implement
this initiative within 30 days of signature.
It is the policy of the USG to support the Iraqi opposition by
funding unifying programs in which all of the opposition can
participate. This approach is not presently centered around any
specific group or groups. In FY99, we hope to encourage and
assist political opposition groups, nonpartisan opposition groups
and unaffiliated Iraqis concerned about their nation's future in
peacefully espousing democracy, pluralism, human rights and the
rule of law for their country. These committed Iraqis want to
build a consensus on the transition from dictatorship to
pluralism, convey to the UN their views on Iraqi noncompliance
with UN resolutions and compile information to support holding
Iraqi officials criminally responsible for violations of
international humanitarian law.
We will ensure that any support to opposition groups enhances
their efforts at unity, is fully consistent with our other policy
initiatives on Iraq and is attuned to what the opposition itself
can effectively make use of as it develops over time.


145
Iraqi War Crimes Questions
Question:
How are you proceeding on a campaign to indict Saddam Hussein?
Answer:
Saddam and his regime have demonstrated their criminal character in acts against the peoples of
Iraq and Iraq's neighbors. These acts go back to Saddam's accession to power in 1979. The
criminal record of Saddam's regime must become better known before action in the U.N.
Security Council to establish a tribunal will succeed. The United States Government is working
to gather and prepare evidence that would be of use to a commission or tribunal that would be set
up by the Security Council to investigate and prosecute Saddam Hussein and key members of
his regime. We are also working with a number of non-governmental organizations and
governments to gather evidence and to make sure that this evidence becomes better known. We
are also discussing this Iraqi war crimes issue bilaterally with a number of interested States.
Question:
When can we expect a formal indictment?
Answer:
Indictment depends on the establishment of a tribunal by the U.N. Security Council, the date of
which is not yet known. After a tribunal is established, the prosecutor of that tribunal must
conduct an investigation and present evidence to the judges of the tribunal before an indictment
would be issued. For purposes of comparison, the period from the startup of the International
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) to the indictment of Karadzic and Mladic
was a little over two years (May 1993-July 1995).


146
-3-
Testimony of A/S Martin Indyk
House International Relations Committee
September 14, 1997
Question
Two of the Iraqi Kurdish leaders are in town this week, Jalal
Talabani and Masood Barzani.
— What was the purpose of their visit?
— What do you hope to accomplish during their visit?
— Do you seek to work out an agreement between them on revenue
sharing, on military deployments in the north, or on greater
political cooperation between the factions?
— Is either leader pledging not to cooperate with Baghdad and
Saddam?
— Are we seeking a commitment from the Kurdish leaders on their
ties to Baghdad?
— What is the next step with the two leaders?
Answer
Jalal Talabani (PUK) and Massoud Barzani (KDP) met for the first
time in more than four years in talks held at the Department of
State. Each leader had concluded a bilateral visit with USG
officials immediately prior to these talks. Each asked the US to
mediate to give new impetus to their attempts at reconciliation.
Secretary Albright, welcoming the leaders, congratulated them on
the courageous step they were taking on behalf of their people.
She expressed the United States' deep concern for the safety,
security and economic well-being of Iraqi Kurds, Shias, Sunnis and
others who have been subject to brutal attacks by the Baghdad
regime.
The joint statement which the two leaders signed includes a
timeline to improve the regional administration of the three
northern provinces in the context of the 1996 Ankara Accords.
Over the next nine months, they will seek to unify their
administrations, share revenues, define the status of their major
cities, and hold elections. A key component for the success of
this program will be continued meetings between the two leaders.
To make this possible, both parties have condemned internal


147
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fighting, pledged to refrain from violence in settling their
differences, and are resolved to eliminate terrorism by
establishing stronger safeguards for Iraq's borders.
The presence of both Mr. Barzani and Mr. Talabani together in
Washington, their request for our mediation, and the commitment in
their joint statement to "endeavor to create a united, pluralistic
and democratic Iraq that would ensure the political and human
rights of Kurdish people in Iraq and of all Iraqis" should make
their attitude towards the Baghdad regime clear. Since the
Washington talks, we continue to work closely on these issues with
the Iraqi Kurds and with Turkey and Great Britain.


148
Question for the Record Submitted to Martin S. Indyk
Committee on International Relations
September 15, 1998
8. Three are persistent reports that Iraq is smuggling 50,000 to
60,000 barrels of oil per day into Turkey through northern Iraq,
in violation of sanctions against Iraq.
- Are these reports accurate?
- Is this smuggling directly benefiting the Iraqi Government and
the KDP Kurdish faction?
-What incentive does either party or Turkey have for ending
this illegal trade?
- Why don't these sales take place under the "Oil for Food"
program?
Answer
We estimate that Turkey imports 30,000-50,000 barrels of
diesel/gasoil per day from Iraq outside of the UN-approved oil-
for-food program. UNSCR 986 authorized the export of petroleum
products, such as gasoil, to Turkey under the oil-for-food
program; however, the authorized outlet for this trade, the
Kirkuk-Yumurtalik pipeline, is not equipped for the transport of
petroleum products. Equipment approved by the UN Sanctions
Committee under the oil-for-food program should increase the
pipeline's crude capacity, but will not make it suitable for the
transport of petroleum products.
We are working with the Turks to try to bring the trade
under the oil-for-food program, and we believe that arrangements
can be devised that would elicit the required cooperation both
from the Turkish government and the KDP. Regularizing the trade


149
would deny the Baghdad regime the revenues it currently derives
from this trade and eliminate one of the principal violations of
the sanctions regime.
o