Y 4.SE 2/1 A: 997-98/ 51 [H.N.S.C. No. 105-51] UNITED STATES POLICY TOWARD IRAQ HEARING BEFORE THE COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ONE HUNDRED FIFTH CONGRESS SECOND SESSION HEARING HELD SEPTEMBer 16, 1998 Pennsylvania Stete Untver-ty Libraries APR 1 8 1939 Documeru U.S. Depovu ywpy U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 5&-060 WASHINGTON : 1999 HOUSE COMMIttEE ON NATIONAL SECUrITY One Hundred Fifth Congress FLOYD D. SPENCE, South Carolina, Chairman BOB STUMP, Arizona DUNCAN HUNTER, California JOHN R. KASICH, Ohio HERBERT H. BATEMAN, Virginia JAMES V. HANSEN, Utah CURT WELDON, Pennsylvania JOEL HEFLEY, Colorado JIM SAXTON, New Jersey STEVE BUYER, Indiana TILLIE K. FOWLER, Florida JOHN M. McHUGH, New York JAMES TALENT, Missouri TERRY EVERETT, Alabama ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland HOWARD "BUCK" McKEON, California RON LEWIS, Kentucky J.C. WATTS, JR., Oklahoma MAC THORNBERRY, Texas JOHN N. HOSTETTLER, Indiana SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia VAN HILLEARY, Tennessee JOE SCARBOROUGH, Florida WALTER B. JONES, Jr., North Carolina LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina JIM RYUN, Kansas MICHAEL PAPPAS, New Jersey BOB RILEY, Alabama JIM GIBBONS, Nevada BILL REDMOND, New Mexico KAY GRANGER, Texas MARY BONO, California Andrew K. Ellis, Staff Director Thomas Donnelly, Professional Staff Member Michelle Spencer, Research Assistant IKE SKELTON, Missouri NORMAN SISISKY, Virginia JOHN M. SPRATT, Jr., South Carolina SOLOMON P. ORTIZ, Texas OWEN PICKETT, Virginia LANE EVANS, Illinois GENE TAYLOR, Mississippi NEIL ABERCROMBIE, Hawaii MARTIN T. MEEHAN, Massachusetts ROBERT A. UNDERWOOD, Guam JANE HARMAN, California PAUL McHALE, Pennsylvania PATRICK J. KENNEDY, Rhode Island ROD R. BLAGOJEVICH, Illinois SILVESTRE REYES, Texas TOM ALLEN, Maine VIC SNYDER, Arkansas JIM TURNER, Texas F. ALLEN BOYD, Jr., Florida ADAM SMITH, Washington LORETTA SANCHEZ, California JAMES H. MALONEY, Connecticut MIKE McINTYRE, North Carolina CIRO D. RODRIGUEZ, Texas CYNTHIA A. McKINNEY, Georgia ELLEN TAUSCHER, California ROBERT BRADY, Pennsylvania (II) UNITED STATES POLICY TOWARD IRAQ House of Representatives, Committee on National Security, Washington, DC, Wednesday, September 16, 1998. The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10 a.m., in room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Floyd D. Spence (chairman of the committee) presiding. OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. FLOYD D. SPENCE, A REP- RESENTATIVE FROM SOUTH CAROLINA, CHAIRMAN, COM- MITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY The Chairman. The meeting will please be in order. We have other members on their way from other meetings, but we'll go ahead and get started. Today, the committee begins to turn its attention from the De- fense authorization bill to broader issues of national security policy. While we have a limited period of time left before Congress ad- journs next month, I hope we can spend as much of it as possible reviewing the extraordinary range of challenges America faces around the world. Consider just some of the events of the past few months. Two of our embassies in Africa were destroyed last month by terrorist bombs, with a number of Americans and hundreds of innocent civil- ians killed. Beyond retaliation, the administration has told us that the subsequent cruise missile strikes on terrorist camps in Afghani- stan and chemical factories in Sudan were the beginning of a war on terrorism. None of us knows exactly what that means, but any such war promises to be long, difficult, and bloody. India and Pakistan have exploded nuclear devices, raising the specter of an arms race in politically volatile South Asia, and call- ing into doubt the entire premise of contemporary arms control. Japan, our foremost ally in East Asia, is paralyzed by its worst eco- nomic recession since World War II. North Korea, again defying United States intelligence estimates, has launched at least a two- stage ballistic missile over the Japanese mainland, and apparently continues to develop nuclear weapons despite the 1994 agreed framework. Likewise Iran seems to have surprised the United States' intel- ligence community several months ago by testing a new advanced medium-range ballistic missile, a year to 18 months sooner than predicted. In Russia, a weakened Boris Yeltsin has been forced by a unique coalition of ultra-nationalists, Communists, and even reformers to form a new government under the former Foreign Minister Primakov, a man best known for his ardent nationalism and warm (1) 2 relations with America's adversaries in the Middle East. Russia's economic collapse raises the specter of increased chaos or dictator- ship, and in a country that still possesses thousands of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles. And in Iraq, Saddam Hussein is as close to slipping out of his box as he has been since the Gulf War ended in 1991. Saddam may be only months away from developing the chemical and biological weapons of mass destruction that we have sought to keep out of his hands. And as we will hear shortly, the viability of the United Na- tions inspection regime is very much in doubt. These events ought to be disconcerting to all Americans. For years I've argued that, while we no longer face the worldwide threat posed by the former Soviet Union, the post-cold war world has proven to be a complex, chaotic, and violent place. When you consider the force reductions and budget cuts that the Department of Defense has had to absorb over the past decade, our ability to protect our global national security interests is increasingly open to question. In light of these events, it is certainly appropriate to begin the committee's end-of-session review by discussing our strategy and policy toward Iraq. Coming on the heels of the collapse of the So- viet empire, the coalition victory over Iraq in the 1991 Gulf War seemed to hold the promise of a new era. Our crushing defeat of the Iraqi army seemed to codify America standing as the world's sole superpower. Eight years later, the promise of those heady days has not been fulfilled. And our troubles with Saddam Hussein seem to reflect our troubles elsewhere in the world. The past 8 years have seen Saddam increasingly able to claw his way out of his diplomatic, economic, military, and strategic isola- tion. Despite the devastation it suffered during Desert Storm, the Iraqi military still maintains significant capabilities. And if Sad- dam Hussein finally succeeds in creating and fielding an arsenal of chemical or biological weapons in perhaps as little as 6 months, he will pose an even larger threat to the region and to American interests. In recent weeks, the administration has tried to make the case that Saddam Hussein remains boxed in and isolated. Beyond such rhetoric I find myself more interested in, and certainly more con- cerned with, the fact that the Saudis and our other allies in the region have distanced themselves from us over the years. I'm also concerned with the fact that we have drawn down our force levels in recent months, not in reaction to Saddam's improved behavior, because of the serious strain that constant deployment is having on an already over-extended United States military. A reduced mili- tary presence and allies who have begun to hedge their bets, these are neither encouraging signs nor signs of strength. It would ap- pear that Saddam with a lot of patience and persistence may be slowly but surely getting the upper-hand in this 7 year standoff. What has happened? How has our position of strength eroded? Where are we now? And most importantly, where are we headed in the future? The committee begins its search for these answers, and some of these questions with former U.N. Inspector Scott Rit- ter. 3 By now I'm sure most of our members are familiar with Mr. Rit- ter's unique situation. While I regret and find reprehensible the at- tempts of some in this town to defame Mr. Ritter, I would urge my colleagues to look past these inside-the-beltway politics, and to con- sider the clarity and strength of his message. Scott Ritter may ride in a Jeep rather than in a diplomat's limousine. And his paygrade is certainly below the Foggy Bottom standard, but that doesn't mean that he is wrong. Scott Ritter's message is deeply disturbing on many levels, and his message is one that we must all consider as we struggle to understand why our containment strategy toward Iraq is in tatters. Following Mr. Ritter's testimony and the members' questions, we will hear from a second panel of experts to help us understand the broader strategic context of America's policy in Iraq. Our second panel of witnesses will be Dr. Paul Wolfowitz, former Under Sec- retary of Defense for Policy; Lieutenant General Thomas Kelly, re- tired, United States Army, director of operations for the Joint Staff during Desert Storm; Michael Eisenstadt, an analyst with the Washington Institute of Near East Policy. All together our two panels bring great experience and perspec- tive to our discussion today. Before we begin though, I'd like to call on the committee's ranking Democrat, Mr. Skelton, for any re- marks he might like to make. [The prepared statement of Mr. Spence can be found in the ap- pendix on page 57.] STATEMENT OF HON. IKE SKELTON, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM MISSOURI, RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON NA- TIONAL SECURITY Mr. Skelton. Mr. Chairman, thank you. I join you in welcoming our witnesses today, Mr. Scott Ritter, who's at the table; and re- tired General Tom Kelly, and Ambassador Paul Wolfowitz, and Mr. Michael Eisenstadt. We're here today to examine the United States policy toward Iraq. There are two levels to the hearing today: tactical and stra- tegic. At the tactical level, we'll examine the specific issue of whether the administration has been providing adequate support to the United Nations Special Commission on Iraq, UNSCOM, that is needed for it to accomplish its mission. This examination comes as a result of the decision Mr. Ritter took on August the 26th to re- sign as the chief weapons inspector for UNSCOM to protest what he described as the administration's failure to support UNSCOM. At the strategic level, we have General Kelly, Ambassador Wolfowitz, and Mr. Eisenstadt to help us on the broader issue of our policy toward Iraq: diplomatic, economic, military, and covert. I'll be interested to see what recommendations they would make to improve our current policy. If our current policy can be described as one of containment, what recommendations would they propose to shore it up? If they propose an alternative policy of removal, ousting Saddam Hussein and his regime from power, what are the elements associated with that policy? I know Ambassador Wolfowitz was part of a group which proposed such a course earlier this year. I'm hoping he can explain how we can remove Saddam 4 Hussein from power today considering we were unable to do so after having fought a major war against him some 7 years ago. Since the end of the Gulf War, U.S. policy has been to work through the United Nations to contain Iraq through one, inspec- tions by UNSCOM to disarm Iraq of its chemical, biological, and ballistic missile weapons. Two, inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency, IAEA, to accomplish the same task with re- spect to nuclear weapons. Three, economic sanctions to force Iraq to comply with the two inspection efforts. At both the tactical and strategic levels, the policy toward Iraq has encountered difficulties. At the tactical level, where Mr. Ritter and his colleagues have found themselves, we know about the ef- forts of the Iraqi government to interfere with and stop UNSCOM inspections. The latest such event occurred on August the 3rd when Deputy Prime Minister Tariq Aziz announced that Iraq would cease cooperating with UNSCOM. At the strategic level, where the President, the Secretary of State, and other senior policymakers operate, the difficulties en- countered are of a greater magnitude. Since the end of the Gulf War, we know that the permanent members of the Security Council have been divided about the proper course to pursue with regard to Iraq. The United States and Britain, I say it again, the United States and Britain staunchly supported the work of UNSCOM and promoted a tough policy of maintaining economic sanctions. France, Russia, China have been less supportive of those efforts. Some of our Arab friends believe that there's an inconsistency between our tough positions with Iraq and our cautious efforts to promote the peace process between Israel and the Palestinians. Simply put, we do not have the allies, the international support that we had 7 years ago. Sanction fatigue seems to have set in. I believe, Mr. Chairman, that what we have seen over the past few months is an effort to try rebuild that unity that has mani- fested itself in a willingness to take one step back on the inspec- tions effort in order to get a greater unity on the Security Council. As a result of that shift in course, last Wednesday the United Na- tions Security Council voted 15 to nothing to suspend periodic re- views of the sanctions placed upon Iraq after the 1991 war. Those reviews will not occur until Iraq resumes cooperation with U.N. arms inspectors. This is an important step in the effort to rebuild support within the Security Council, but it's only one step in the series of actions that will be required to get full compliance by Iraq. However, no one in this room should be under any illusion that the goal of disarming Iraq will be easy or quick. We've already had 7 years experience in this effort. The problem that we have is that there are no good options. Mr. Ritter served as an arms inspector for UNSCOM over the past 7 years until his resignation in late August. During that pe- riod, he and his colleagues sought to carry out the United Nations mandate to rid Iraq of its weapons of mass destruction. They served that goal with skill, determination, and dedication, and per- sonal valor. And I congratulate Mr. Ritter on that. The job of the inspectors have been a very tough one. They've attempted to fulfill it in the most difficult of circumstances. UNSCOM and the IAEA have forced the destruction of more Iraqi weapons of mass destruc- 5 tion capability than was destroyed during the Gulf War and we should remember that. / Mr. Ritter, we salute you for the work that you and your former colleagues have done over the past 7 years. By your decision to re- sign from UNSCOM, one that I know you did not take lightly, you have indeed precipitated a general debate concerning our policy to- ward Iraq, and that's a good thing. We will listen carefully to you, and we'll listen carefully to those who follow. Our collective effort must ensure that Iraq will not be able to menace its neighbors, not be able to rebuild its military capabilities, and not be able to threaten vital American interests in that region. We welcome you, sir, as well as those who follow. Mr. Chairman, thank you. Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Skelton. Without objection, the prepared materials of all of our witnesses will be included for the record. Mr. Ritter, you've got the floor. [The prepared statement of Mr. Skelton can be found in the ap- pendix on page 65.} STATEMENT OF WILLIAM SCOTT RITTER, JR., FORMER CHIEF WEAPONS INSPECTOR, UNITED NATIONS SPECIAL COMMIS- SION ON IRAQ Mr. Ritter. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, thank you, Mr. Skelton, for the kind introduction. Thank you very much for inviting me to appear before you to discuss important issues pertaining to U.S. policy toward Iraq. I chose to resign from my position with the Special Commission in hope that in doing so I would precipitate the general debate con- cerning the direction of U.S. foreign policy toward Iraq, whether this stated policy furthered the goals of disarming Iraq in accord- ance with Security Council resolutions, and whether the policy to- ward Iraq as practiced matched those stated objectives. Recently, the U.S. policy goal toward Iraq was stated as seeking to deny Iraq the capacity ever again to threaten international peace and security. To achieve this end, the U.S. supported a two- pronged approach, with one prong seeking to support inspections by the United Nations Special Commission and the International Atomic Energy Agency to carry out disarmament, monitoring, and verification inspections in Iraq. And the other prong seeking to maintain economic sanctions because such sanctions create an in- centive for Iraq to comply with weapons inspectors and monitoring activities. This policy of the United States is praiseworthy. Its im- plementation, however, is inconsistent and ineffective. As I speak to you today, Iraq has suspended cooperation with the inspectors of the Special Commission and the International Atomic Energy Agency. As a result, there are no meaningful inspections taking place in Iraq. Iraq is not being disarmed as required by the United Nations at the end of the Persian Gulf War. In response to this illegal Iraqi action, the Security Council, after more than 1 month of deliberation unanimously adopted a new res- olution last week, number 1194, condemning Iraq's actions, and suspending all sanctions review until such time as Iraq rescinds its decision to suspend cooperation. 6 However, this resolution also contains language which offers Iraq a light at the end of the tunnel through the promise of a com- prehensive review of Iraq's compliance with its disarmament obli- gations. Such a review, conducted under the auspices of the Sec- retary General, would result in the investigators becoming the in- vestigated, all at the behest of Iraq. This is fundamentally wrong and provides a formula for continued compromise leading to the dangerous illusion of a disarmed Iraq. Equally disturbing is the impression given by many in the U.S. national security team that this resolution has real teeth because of the suspension of sanctions review, despite its unspoken olive branch. The reality is that Iraq is winning its bid to retain its prohibited weapons. Continuation of sanctions as a sole means of enforcing Security Council resolutions is a self-defeating policy. Iraq had demonstrated its resolve to survive and even prosper under sanc- tions. Combined with its ability to adapt to the rules of the "oil for food" exception, Iraq scoffs at the Security Council resolution sus- pending sanctions reviews as a mere continuation of a waiting game in which Iraq believes that time is on its side. Iraq is not disarmed. Iraq still poses a real and meaningful threat to its neighbors, and nothing the Security Council or the United States is currently doing will change this fact. I am concerned that it is the United States that has put itself into a strategic box, outwitted by an intransigent Iraq and those Security Council members whose objectives in Iraq are less than honorable. Something needs to be done to change the current course of affairs. And I am ready to answer any questions you may have of me. Thank you. [The prepared statement of Mr. Ritter can be found in the appen- dix on page 72.] Mr. Chairman. Mr. Skelton? Mr. Skelton. Mr. Ritter, you used the phrase, "intentions less than honorable." Would you tell us to whom you refer and explain your usage of that phrase? Mr. Ritter. Specifically, the Security Council members who I refer to are primarily France and Russia. France has economic goals with Iraq, which will be derived from contracts which would be beneficial to French companies once sanctions are lifted. France, while stating it has a desire to see Iraq disarmed, is doing every- thing in its power to position Iraq so that sanctions will be lifted and these economic contracts with French companies can be signed and carried out. I feel that French foreign policy, while stating they want Iraq disarmed yet pushing for a less than total disarmament of Iraq in accordance with Security Council's resolution, is indeed a policy that is less than honorable. It is disingenuous. Second, Russia. Russia has a multi-billion outstanding debt with Iraq. And it has been Russia's intent from the very beginning to get Iraq returned to where its economic life would allow it to repay the debt. This has been one of the sole driving factors behind Rus- sian foreign policy objectives in Iraq. Getting sanctions lifted so that Iraq can repay its debt. 7 In addition, the current regime in Russia has positioned itself so that it will oppose United States foreign policy objectives in the Middle East as a means of positioning itself favorably with nation- alist and ultra-nationalist elements within Russia. So, again, Rus- sia is opposing the United States on several fundamental points in the Middle East to include American policy on Iraq. And Russian policy objectives with Iraq do not point toward disarmament but point toward a rapid lifting of sanctions so that Russia can estab- lish itself as a counterpoint to America in the Middle East, and like France, achieve an economic situation where it can get its debts re- paid. Mr. Skelton. Along that line, Mr. Ritter, has the presence of French and Russians on the inspection teams affected the work of the inspection teams? Mr. Ritter. Sir, the United Nations Special Commission is an United Nations organization, and as such it draws its membership from all nations. We have French inspectors with the Special Com- mission who have served with distinction and with honor, who have put their lives at risk carrying out the job that they have been given to do. We have Russian inspectors who have likewise performed in an honorable manner. As long as the Executive Chairman, whether that was Rolf Ekeus from 1991 to 1995, or 1997, or Richard Butler from 1997 until today, has the authority to select the personnel that he sees fit to carry out the job in Iraq. Whether these persons will be drawn from the United States, Great Britain, France, or Russia, he will pick the world's best experts. And he will pick those people who he has the confidence will carry out the provisions of Security Council resolutions. It doesn't matter what the nationality is, it matters what their level of honor is in terms of carrying out the tasks given to them. However, we have a situation today where France and Russia are placing pressure on the Executive Chairman to bring personnel not of his choosing, to bring in personnel whom he doesn't want on the Commission. What are the goals and objectives of these per- sonnel? If it's not to do the mission given to them by the Executive Chairman, who's tasking them? And it's our concern that the work of the Special Commission, which was to be devoted solely to carrying out the provisions of Se- curity Council resolutions is becoming somehow politicized, and that through the inclusion of French and Russian personnel with the staff of the Special Commission and with the inspectorate in Iraq, we will be having a dual-track policy. One which the Execu- tive Chairman thinks is furthering disarmament aims, but the other one in which personnel are working behind the scenes to make the Special Commission less than effective, and to further their own national agendas which is to come up with the illusion of disarmament, and the lifting of sanctions prior to Iraq fulfilling its disarmament obligations. Mr. Skelton. Mr. Ritter, in your considered opinion based upon your work and your knowledge of Iraq, and the threats that it poses, what option or options would you recommend that we here in Congress consider? 8 Mr. Ritter. Yes, sir. Keeping myself to my remit, that is as a weapons inspector, I concur with people who say that the coalition that was assembled in 1991 is not the same coalition or does not carry the same force that it has today. What we have been trying to do through the weapons inspection process is to create a situa- tion which the world would rally around the just requirements of Iraq to disarm. Through the inspection process, we have tried to uncover Iraq's deceit and to expose their retained prohibited capa- bilities. In doing so, we believe strongly that once the extent of Iraq's lies have been put on the table, once we have exposed the weapons, there would be, therefore, just cause for the coalition to rally around. If you denigrate the inspection process, if you make the inspection process less than meaningful, there is no cause. The coalition will not rally. As a weapons inspector, I believe you cannot get adequate con- sensus, meaningful consensus in the Security Council unless there is unanimous consent on what it is they're supporting. When you have a fractured Security Council, with some members of the Secu- rity Council trying to denigrate the work of the Special Commission and move toward sanctions removal, other members of the Security Council elevating the work of the Special Commission or misusing the work of the Special Commission to keep sanctions on, you're not going to have a situation where a coalition can be formed. The Special Commission has tried to keep the process pure. We've tried to keep the process focused on the disarmament tasks given to us by the Security Council. In my opinion, only through that process can you get a coalition built where you can get 15 na- tions united on a single objective, that is the disarmament of Iraq. Congress should, in my opinion, seek to have the United States fully support the inspection process in Iraq, allow the inspectors to get back to the task so that we can expose these weapons, and in doing so rally international support around an honorable cause, which is the disarmament of Iraq. If you don't support the inspection regime fully, it's an illusion. You create the illusion of arms control, and you also create a situa- tion where you will have the inspection process denigrated and misused and used in a manner which allows for sanctions maybe to be prematurely lifted. Mr. Skelton. Mr. Ritter, thank you for your thoughts and your testimony. And I applaud your forthrightness here. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Ritter. Thank you, sir. The Chairman. Mr. Hunter? Mr. Hunter. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Ritter, any tough foreign policy, and I think our foreign policy initially with respect to Iraq, post-war Iraq, could initially be described as at one time a tough policy, any tough foreign policy requires a strong military capability behind it to serve as a foundation of that policy. I don't know if you've been following the reductions that we've made in force structure, but for practical purposes we almost halved Amer- ican military strength since Desert Storm. Do you have any opin- ions on the effect that that reduction of American military capa- bility has had on our Iraq policy, and the perception of our ability to carry out that policy by the Iraqis? 9 Mr. Ritter. Again, sir, I have to respectfully remind you that I only feel comfortable responding in my role as a weapons inspector. As such, how a member nation of the Security Council chooses to constitute or re-constitute its armed forces and deploy them is the business of that member nation. What I can say based upon my ex- perience as a weapons inspector is that Iraq does not hold the Se- curity Council and the members of the Security Council in fear, that Iraq believes today that it will get away with these actions, and will not be held subject to any meaningful punishment. That whatever the Security Council or individual members of the Secu- rity Council choose to do to Iraq in the form of military or economic punishment, Iraq today is confident, and these are words that come from minister-level people in Iraq, they are confident they can ab- sorb this punishment and outlast the will of the Security Council, or any of its individual members to inflict such punishment. So it's the perception as a weapons inspector, it's my perception of Iraq's perception that they can outlast whatever it is the Secu- rity Council or any individual members will be willing to dish out. Mr. Hunter. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The Chairman. Mr. Sisisky? Mr. Sisisky. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to begin by say- ing I thank you for what you did, and I think it took a lot of cour- age and devotion to your country and your duty. And I thank you personally. I'm sure one of the things that concerns all of us, and I'm sure it concerns you and it has been talked about in the press, it's how this issue to some extent became focused on personality issues instead of what you were after, the policy issues that we should have focused on. I think everyone is aware of some of the unkind and in my mind unfortunate things that have been said over the past few weeks. And, of course, the barbs going back and forth between the Sec- retary of State and the Assistant Secretary of State. There's another thing that stands out and I wish you'd comment. And that's the reaction and response from your fellow inspectors, without names or anything else. But also I would like for you to comment, and I don't know if you've done this already. I read so much material last night. And I quote what the Secretary of State said you did not have a clue about U.S. policy toward Iraq. I would like for you to comment on those two things. Thank you. Mr. Ritter. Yes, sir. Let me start off by saying that I have noth- ing but the highest respect for the Secretary of State, the National Security Advisor, for all the people who are doing the very impor- tant work of formulating and implementing foreign policy and na- tional security policy for the United States of America. Madeleine Albright has been one of the foremost supporters of the Special Commission, and she has worked very, very hard to get America's foreign policy on Iraq back on track so that we can achieve the disarmament of Iraq. I think people have said here that's a very complicated situation. It's an extremely complicated situation, and one that does not offer any immediate solutions. I felt on August 26th, the situation had reached the point where the foreign policy was a failure. This does not reflect—I mean it does reflect badly on some of the people on 10 the foreign policy team. It doesn't mean that they behaved less than honorably. They were trying to carry out a task, a very dif- ficult task. They just weren't succeeding. So my resignation wasn't a personal attack against the Secretary of State or any members of the national security team. I had noth- ing but highest esteem for them, and today I still have the highest esteem for them. They have a tough job to do, and they have to get on with doing it. I had hoped that by talking about it in this forum, that through public debate maybe some options could be provided to them or some guidance could be given to them that could get the policy back on track. There's no doubt that my resignation put the national security team in a tough situation. It wasn't expected. It wasn't something that was closely coordinated with them. They had been reliant upon me and other inspectors to carry out the difficult job of dis- arming Iraq. And in resigning in the manner that I did, I was hold- ing them accountable for a failed policy. They might have spoken out defensively, but I do not believe that we should take these un- fortunate comments out of context. Madeleine Albright wants to disarm Iraq. Madeleine Albright wants to hold Iraq accountable. And I certainly understand why she would say that I don't have clue about the foreign policy of the United States. I did not sit in on her policy coordination meetings. I was not at the table when she and the other members of the national security team made the hard decisions that they had to make. She's absolutely correct on that point. However, as an inspector, especially a senior inspector, I was very closely involved with personnel who did sit on the policy coordination meetings, with personnel who did have input to these meetings, and who were aware of the conclusions that came out of these meetings. And I coordinated very closely with them to ensure that the work that I was doing as a chief inspector, the work I was doing on behalf of the Executive Chairman, was indeed in concert with the foreign policy and national security policy objectives of the United States. I believe that Madeleine Albright was under pressure when she made these statements. This is not reflective of a personal attack by her against me. And I believe that she and everybody else on this administration want to get down to the hard task of holding Iraq accountable for their illegal behavior. And I'm hoping that through general debate such as this that Congress will be able to provide guidance and assistance to her to help her formulate a just and wise policy. Mr. Sisisky. One other part, you did not answer about your col- leagues. Have you heard much from your colleagues? I know four of them protested what I read last night. Mr. Ritter. Yes, sir. My resignation also put them in a very dif- ficult position. I think as committee members you're aware there are many times when personnel come here and they have personal opinions but because of bureaucratic restraints, chain of command problems, personnel can't speak freely. It doesn't mean that they're lying. It means they can't speak freely. I right now have been liber- ated from any gag that may have been in my mouth when I was an inspector. 11 The Special Commission is a United Nations body. It is a body that has to be conscious of the political realities that it exists in. It would be impolitic of the Executive Chairman to come out and say some of the things that I have been saying whether he agrees with them or not. And I believe that it's unfortunate that some peo- ple have put pressure on both Executive Chairmen, Richard Butler and Rolf Ekeus, to come out and make public statements that sought to distance themselves from me because that is not in con- cert with the understanding that I have about some of the issues that I have been discussing and what their stance is. But it's unfair I think to go down that track. It puts Richard Butler in a very dif- ficult situation. He's an honorable man. He's trying to do an ex- tremely difficult task. And the United States should be focused on how they can formulate a policy that allows him to continue them to Iraq, Iran, Pakistan, and India. And yet we've only imposed sanctions three times, and we've waived them in each of the three cases. Mr. Weldon. My question to you is do you think that there is proliferation still going into Iraq involving chemical, biological, nu- clear, and missile technology? Mr. RittEr. Thank you, sir. One of the difficult tasks that the Special Commission has been faced with is that when it was cre- ated, it had a mandate to operate only within the borders of Iraq. It was a conventional disarmament task that we were given. Mr. Weldon. I understand. Mr. Ritter. But over the years, we found that Iraq has no inten- tion of complying with its requirements, and that the task has be- come much more complicated. This now includes Iraq setting up covert procurement companies around the world to procure dual- use equipment, that is equipment that can be used for civilian pur- poses but also for prohibitive purposes, as well as procuring prohib- ited materials, chemicals used in ballistic missile solid composite fuel, material used to produce liquid-propelling engines, guidance and control equipment, and perhaps even chemicals that can be used for precursors in chemical agents. We have ample evidence of this taking place. Our problem is we don't have a mandate which allows us to operate outside of the bor- ders of Iraq so we're in a difficult position where a United Nations body is put in a position where it's investigating a member nation who is not covered by the Security Council resolution. Mr. Weldon. I understand. Mr. Ritter. But the short answer is we do have evidence of this. It's significant evidence, and the Commission is trying its best within the framework of the rules governing how it behaves to come up Mr. Weldon. I thank you for your answer. And I would submit to my colleagues to further bolster the comments by Mr. Ritter, if you would ask your respective members on the Intelligence Com- mittee to give you reports of intercepts that this country has just between July and August to monitor not just the lack of ability to do what Mr. Ritter was doing, but the continued effort to send technology into Iraq, it's continuing today. And this administration is not stopping it. 12 Second question: Are you aware of an article or the results of an article that ran in the Arabic Daily News on August the 31st where Egypt has alleged that diplomatic sources in Cairo say that they expect the U.S. to direct a military strike at Iraq in October to di- rectly precede the November elections should Baghdad continue to refuse to cooperate with the Special International Committee, UNSCOM? This article further goes on to state and I quote: "The USA has informed France, Russia, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt that it expects to be supported in military operations against Iraq if Baghdad continues its current status." And they expect this to take place in October. Many of us who supported the President with the last strike did so with a great deal of concern about tim- ing. And I can tell you I am outraged to think that this administra- tion would be planning a retaliatory response because of the res- ignation of you and the lack of success we've had just because it's before a November election and just because this President is in deep problems at home. Are you aware of that? Mr. Ritter. No, sir, I'm not aware of that. Mr. Weldon. Mr. Chairman, I would ask this committee to re- spectfully request the administration to respond to this article which ran on August the 31st in the Arabic news, and specifically to ask the administration to respond to the allegations that these countries in fact have been informed of a strike that is planned for mid-October. The Chairman. Mr. Spratt? Mr. Spratt. Mr. Ritter, thank you very much for your testimony, and thank you also for your diligence and your dedication. I think you've done your country a great service. And I think you've also done an honorable thing because you sincerely believe the position you've taken, and you've taken it in a forthright way. I also thought you were magnanimous in the response about the state- ment about your understanding of Iraqi policy. Let me ask you, it appears that—if I'm wrong, correct me, but you would agree that we don't have much chance of going it alone. We have to do this in a multilateral manner. Would you agree with that or disagree? Do you think there's a way for us if we don't like what the Security Council is decreeing, or the cooperation we're re- ceiving from our foreign allies in the coalition that we can break out and go it alone? Mr. Ritter. Sir, with all due respect again, I'm here before you based upon my 7 years as a weapons inspector. I would say that we can't do weapons inspections without the support of the Secu- rity Council. We were an organ of the Security Council working under laws established by the Security Council. And in passing these laws under Chapter 7, the Security Council gave us a prom- ise that they would enforce these laws. So without Security Council Support, it's impossible for the Special Commission to carry out its work. So the concept of the Special Commission being able to carry out disarmament inspections in Iraq without the full support of the Security Council, it's impossible. It will never happen. Mr. Spratt. Now you have said that—if I understood what you were saying correctly—expose the lies, focus on the lies and deceit of Saddam Hussein and his regime and do a better job of exposing the weapons caches, different kinds of weapons capabilities that he 13 has, and that he is still harboring. Are you saying we've failed to focus enough attention on this and failed at the argument of con- vincing the Security Council, the United Nations, and the world as a whole that this man still constitutes a major menace? Mr. RittEr. Yes, sir, that would be my assessment. I think there's general agreement, even among the members of the Secu- rity Council who are not in support of the kind of intrusive inspec- tions that the Special Commission is conducting, that Iraq has across-the-board lied to the world about its prohibitive programs. It doesn't take anybody by surprise anymore when we say Iraq is lying. Iraq has requested comprehensive reviews in the past of its dis- armament obligations, some were called technical evaluation meet- ings that were proposed in January. We carried these out using a panel of international experts not directly associated with the Spe- cial Commission. And the results of these panels were unanimous. Iraq is lying, they're deceiving in all areas of categories of weapons of mass destruction. And that the Special Commission's case is a just one, a sound one, based upon sound scientific and technical facts. We published these reports. We presented these reports to the Security Council and nobody cared. Nobody cared. In June, the Se- curity Council put pressure on us despite the fact that we exposed the extent of Iraq's lies to narrow the focus, again, through a proc- ess of comprehensive review, to narrow the focus to major out- standing disarmament issues. And the Executive Chairman, under pressure, agreed to a schedule for work requested by the Iraqis. Even with this Iraqi-driven program, Iraq could not live up to its obligations, and the Special Commission exposed again its lies, its deceits, and the fact that it hasn't disarmed. It is the exposure that led to the August 3rd decision by Iraq to discontinue cooperation with the Special Commission. One of the reasons why we've been focused on going after weap- ons, is that we need something that will generate enough shock value to get the Security Council to rally around the cause of dis- arming Iraq. It doesn't seem to be enough any more to say that Iraq is lying, that Iraq has not provided the data required so that we can verify that it has rid itself of these proscribed weapons. The potential for weapons no longer seems to be enough to gen- erate support within the Special Commission. We have dem- onstrated the potential for weapons through the inspection process, we were trying to demonstrate the reality of weapons, that these weapons do exist, they pose an immediate real threat, and this is why the Security Council must again rally behind the cause. Stop- ping the inspections terminated that effort. We're now back to the area where all we can show is that Iraq is lying. And, again, as I've mentioned, this new resolution which is tout- ed as a diplomatic success contains a hidden olive branch, the com- prehensive review to be carried out by the Secretary General. And this will allow the disarmament obligations to be further narrowed and redefined in a manner which will be conducive to closing the files prematurely and moving Iraq into an ongoing monitoring and verification regime that is not effective and not capable of detecting 55-060 99 - 2 14 its retained weapons. In effect, Iraq will be given a clean bill of health when it is, in fact, in violation and has these capabilities. Mr. SPrAtt. Thank you very much. Mr. Ritter. Yes, sir. The Chairman. Mr. Ritter, we've been inspecting now for a good while. How long you say you've been our chief inspector on our side? Mr. Ritter. I've been associated with the Special Commission since September 1991, and then since The Chairman. I've been reading in the papers about on and off, the shut downs of the business, and the run around we've been get- ting from Saddam Hussein and the other people there in Iraq. And I just wonder what, if anything, in the way of evidence have you found in these inspections so far as to the storage or capability of weapons of mass destruction that Saddam Hussein has? Mr. Ritter. Yes, sir. The inspection process does two things. One, it uncovers the lies that Iraq tells. Iraq is supposed to provide a declaration, and then we verify the declaration. So through the process of verification, we have exposed the lies. We have shown Iraq that their declarations are incorrect. This is done through the inspection process where we scientifically, logically, technically dis- pute or are able to refute Iraqi claims. And it has been a long and difficult process. To give you two ex- amples recently though of successes undertaken by inspections, and these were inspections that I was not involved in. We're a team. I'm just a small part of a greater disarmament team. In April 1998, United Nations inspectors excavated a pit in Iraq where they had unilaterally destroyed, that is destroyed without supervision of the Special Commission, chemical and biological warheads for Al-Hus- sein missiles, long-range ballistic missiles. These parts were re- moved from Iraq, taken to a laboratory here in Edgewood, in Aber- deen and were tested. They were found to be contained with a VX, weaponized VX. Iraq has denied they ever had a VX program. They said they never weaponized VX. They never stabilized it, and yet we found the chemical evidence through examination of the deg- radation products that indeed Iraq not only produced stabilized VX, but had weaponized it, put them in warheads for use on long-range ballistic missiles. This was the inspection process that achieved this success. In July, inspection teams found a document which shows that Iraq has grossly lied about how it has accounted for chemical bombs, air-delivered bombs filled with chemical agents. They claim that they have accounted for a large number of these weapons dur- ing the Iran-Iraq War, but we found a document which proves that Iraq has falsely accounted for over several thousand aerial bombs and 730 tons of chemical agent. They gave us one accounting for it. We exposed that that is a lie. We now have several thousand bombs which are unaccounted for, and 730 tons of chemical agent unaccounted for. This was exposed by the inspection process. So the inspection process, if allowed to go forward, is a good process, one that can and will achieve results. The Chairman. Mr. Snyder? Mr. Snyder. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Semper Fi, Mr. Ritter. I had a college professor years ago who flew planes off of carriers 15 in World War II, and he always thought that war should be con- ducted with cotton balls in the South Pacific so that when the big cotton ball hit the carrier, it would be knocked out of the war, but the planes would come back, land safely, and then go on back home and be out of the war. I need you to help me. When you're in Iraq as a weapons inspec- tor, and you're trying to be taken seriously in what you do, specifi- cally, what's the problem? Is it that you feel like you're lacking the international moral authority in a united fashion standing behind you? Or is it specifically that what was once a strong military threat has turned into a cotton ball threat? Mr. RiTTEr. Yes, sir. If you examine the history of the Special Commission, you'll find that the kind of confrontations that the Special Commission had in 1998, 1997, 1996 existed in 1995, 1994, 1993, 1992, and 1991. This is not a new situation. From the very beginning, Iraq has refused to cooperate with weapons inspection teams in Iraq. That's part and parcel of the problem. In 1991, in June 1991, when International Energy Atomic Agen- cy inspectors were stopped outside of Presidential Security Force barracks which were holding vehicles loaded with nuclear enrich- ment material, equipment, machines, et cetera, the Security Coun- cil responded with a resolution, 707. In that resolution, they used the terms, "We find Iraq to be in material breach." Now that phrase, "material breach," meant a lot to Iraq. It meant that they were going to be held accountable for their actions. And Iraq imme- diately rescinded its orders, declared certain aspects of its nuclear program, and allowed inspections to resume. In 1996, when inspection teams were outside the facility, again, the Presidential Security Force facility, and were denied entry, these facilities we likewise believe contain material prohibited by Security Council resolution, the inspection teams were withdrawn. There was no resolution. There was no threat of condemning Iraq and finding them to be in material breach. That's what happened. That's what has taken place. Starting in 1996, whenever Iraq confronted the Special Commis- sion, there was a stand-down by the international community, and Iraq was rewarded with a concession because in addition to stop- ping us, Iraq achieved a concession. They were able to redefine cer- tain facilities in Iraq as being sensitive. And the Special Commis- sion had now to subject itself to special procedures for inspection of these cites, called the "sensitive cite modalities." And it's that kind of confrontation and concession, that pattern, that cycle, that's been taking place since 1996, that's put us in the difficult position where we are today. Mr. Snyder. So if I understand what you're saying, as you're in the country, you don't have the sense, or there's not this implied threat when things are working well, that if you all don't comply, a cruise missile is going to come in. What you're really saying is if the world is united, and the Iraqis have this sense of being united through the resolutions, that is where your authority comes from. Is that a fair statement? And certainly part of that would be a potential military action. Mr. Ritter. Our authority comes from the Security Council, and our strength comes from the Security Council's determination to 16 enforce its law. It's a Chapter 7 resolution. We are in there doing a very difficult job, which does impinge on the national security and sovereignty of Iraq, but they've foregone that because the world found them to be a threat. The Security Council passed a resolution under Chapter 7. The Security Council has an obligation in sending forward these international inspection teams, putting them in harm's way to give them not only the moral authority to carry out their job, which is contained in the resolution, but also the means of enforcing the res- olution should Iraq not comply. And it's very difficult for us to do our job when we go into Iraq, and we confront Iraq and get our- selves in these very difficult situations when Iraq feels that by stopping the Special Commission and the International Atomic En- ergy Agency, there will be no price to pay. Mr. Snyder. Now, when you say when you go in and confront Iraq, I assume that through your work you come in contact with just a variety of different people at different levels of authority. Has it been your impression that—how do I want to say it? The fact that Iraq doesn't take you so seriously as they used to is a top to bottom kind of effect. When you're dealing with Iraqi officials at levels, is that the impression you're getting? Or is it just of people at the uppermost levels that you feel are not responding appro- priately to the mandate of the UN? Mr. Ritter. Iraq is a dictatorship. It's ruled by one man and one man alone, and that is Saddam Hussein. There is no wherewithal within Iraq for individual thought or individual initiative. What Saddam Hussein chooses is what Iraq does. We saw in March 1998 when Saddam Hussein embraced the Memorandum of Understanding, and the Security Council resolu- tion which endorsed that, that when we tried to get into sites in Iraq that we had hitherto been denied access to, gates were opened, doors were opened, and we could do what we wanted to do. That was because a decision was made at the top to let the teams in. We also found when we tried to get into sites where the decision was made not to let us in that the doors were closed, the guns were out, the threat of force was applied to us if we tried to push our luck. Mr. Snyder. The signals are getting from top to bottom very rap- idly is what you're saying? Mr. RiTTEr. Absolutely. Mr. Snyder. Thank you, Mr. Ritter. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Ritter. Yes, sir. The Chairman. Ms. Harman? Ms. Harman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And welcome, Mr. Rit- ter. I think our country is better off for your service, and I want to thank you for it. And I want to tell you one member's impression of you which is that you are forthright, that you engaged in an act of personal courage, and that a lot of people are focusing on the sit- uation because of what you did. Having said that, I am concerned about the fact that you sit here alone and that we're asking you military, strategic, and diplomatic strategic questions about what our policy should be toward Iraq. And I think that may be a little above your paygrade. And I'm con- cerned that there's a vacuum. I think that's what this points to. I'm 17 very concerned that there's a vacuum. And I'm sure that these are questions that will be put to the next panel, but I thought I would ask you since you are a thoughtful person about this. In a more perfect world, how would you see policy being made in which UNSCOM and you, the generic you, would play a role? Mr. RiTTEr. Thank you very much. First of all, I want to reit- erate and support what you have said. I'm a weapons inspector. I'm not the Secretary of State. I'm not the National Security Advisor, and I make no pretensions of being such. I've tried my best in an- swering questions to contain myself to my experience as a weapons inspector, and if I step outside of bounds, I should be brought back in. It's not my intention to speak on behalf of the National Security team of the United States. As a weapons inspector, again, we work for the Security Council, and we work to implement the law set by the Security Council. And we can achieve our task only if backed by the Security Coun- cil. Now, what has taken place, in my opinion, is that people have said this law is too difficult to enforce so we're going to stop the Commission from trying to implement the law, but get the Security Council united in the theory of disarmament. Ms. Harman. Now, "people," you mean U.S. people? Mr. Ritter. Yes, ma'am. Again, if you listen to the words of Mar- tin Indyk, who testified yesterday before the International Rela- tions Committee, they're very concerned about building consensus in the Security Council, as they should be. However, if you take a look at the most recent example of consensus building, which is Resolution 1194, you see words that speak of a comprehensive re- view. What price have we paid for building a consensus? How is building this consensus going to achieve the Special Commission getting back into Iraq to carry out its difficult disarmament tasks? I can say that my experience with the Special Commission shows that any time you talk of a comprehensive review, it is the Iraqis who are pushing for such a review. And the Iraqis, in pushing for such a review, are trying to denigrate the role of the Special Com- mission, its Executive Chairman, and its staff members. And this comprehensive review that's being proposed now under the aus- pices of the Secretary General, while getting your consensus will achieve the opposite effect in terms of getting Special Commission teams back in-country. Ms. Harman. So if I can paraphrase your answer, you're saying that in a more perfect world, the generic you, would be given full authority to complete the job while other people might be building consensus on more general issues or maybe the over-arching stra- tegic policy? But to build consensus first undermines your ability to do your job, at which point we don't achieve any objectives that are in the strategic interests of the United States? Mr. Ritter. To build consensus while having the illusion that in- spections are taking place is wrong. If it is indeed the policy to hold back inspection teams while you are building a consensus, than so state this policy. You cannot ask me or other chief inspectors to go to the Executive Chairman and put 40 to 50 inspectors' lives at risk in-country doing a confrontational task if there is no will to back up those inspectors. If the job of the inspectors is too difficult for the Security Council or its members to deal with, than hold the 18 team back. But say so. Don't say that you want us to carry out the job of disarming Iraq while at the same time doing something be- hind the scenes which prohibits us or prevents us from carrying out the job. Ms. Harman. I thank you. That was a clear answer and my re- sponse to that is more leadership is needed. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. The Chairman. Mr. Pickett? Mr. Pickett. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Ritter, we appre- ciate very much your being here today and the sacrifice you've made to come here and talk with us. As I understand your comments, you feel strongest about the support that your group gets from the Security Council, is that cor- rect? Mr. Ritter. Yes, sir, we work for the Security Council so that's the body that needs to support us. Mr. Pickett. And that's made up of what? Fifteen members, as I recall? Mr. Ritter. Five permanent members and then a rotating body of 10 non-permanent members, yes, sir. Mr. Pickett. So our country constitutes one member of that group? Mr. Ritter. One-fifth of the permanent members of the Security Council. Mr. Pickett. Yes. Is it your thought that the United States is not exercising enough effort to influence the other four members in the direction of providing additional support for your group? Mr. Ritter. There's two aspects to this. One is that I agree to- tally with what Madeleine Albright and others have said that they are the foremost supporters of the Special Commission. The United States stepped into the breach. In 1991 when Iraq chose not to co- operate with the Special Commission and when our arms control tasks were redefined from conventional verification tasks to mis- sions of discovery, the United States stepped in, took the lead, and said, "We will support you in carrying out these difficult tasks." Having set us down the path, I believe the United States has taken on its shoulders the responsibility to back us up in carrying out these important tasks which they have, in many ways, pushed us to do. So they have preponderance of burden placed on them that's perhaps greater than other members of the Security Council. Mr. Pickett. Well, now are you suggesting that the United States proceed unilaterally in this matter, or do you feel that it's appropriate that the United Nations be the sponsor of the inspec- tions? Mr. Ritter. Of course the United Nations must be the sponsors of the inspections. What I'm saying is the United States has, and I don't think there's anybody here that will dispute the fact, the sole remaining superpower in the world, the United States being the Nation upon which the world looks to for leadership, and the United States having chosen to exercise that leadership in spon- soring the kind of difficult inspections the Commission was taking place, the onus is on the United States to provide leadership within the framework of the Security Council to get the Security Council to enforce the laws that it passed. That's what Fm saying, sir. 19 Mr. PicKETT. Well, hasn't it led to problems in the past where the United States has gotten out ahead of its alliance members in doing things and they have felt that the United States has exceed- ed its role in the United Nations framework by proceeding unilater- ally to take certain actions? Mr. RiTTEr. Sir, this is what I would call a failed foreign policy. And that's what I've been saying is taking place in Iraq today. Whether the United States is ahead or behind or somehow not in step with the other members of the Security Council isn't my prob- lem. My problem is that the Security Council has given us a task to carry out, and the United States has sponsored that task. And, therefore, it's incumbent upon the United States to formulate a for- eign policy which will allow us to achieve those stated objectives. Mr. PicKETT. Well, what you're saying, as I understand it is, you're suggesting that the United States should proceed unilater- ally here, notwithstanding the other members of the Security Council, is that correct? Mr. RiTTEr. No, sir. If you recall the answer I gave to Congress- woman Harman, what I said is that if the United States does not feel that they have a consensus in the Security Council toward de- cisive action or toward achieving the disarmament goals, then they need to inform the Special Commission that it must stand-down from these kinds of inspections; and they must formally inform the Special Commission so that we are not putting inspectors in harm's way without the backing, the full backing of the Security Council and its most important member, the United States. Mr. PiCKETT. Are you suggesting, when you said "they," are you talking about the United States giving notice to the inspection team not to continue inspecting, is that your point? Mr. Ritter. The United States is a member of the Security Council and, as has been said by Richard Butler and other per- sonnel, provides guidance to the Executive Chairman in their role as a member of the Security Council. He receives similar guidance from Russia, France, China, and other members of the Security Council. In their role as providing guidance, and because the United States took upon itself the burden of the Special Commis- sion, especially in terms of pushing for these kinds of inspections, I feel it's incumbent upon the United States to inform the Execu- tive Chairman if they have made a policy decision not to support these kinds of intrusive inspections because they do not have the level of support required in the Security Council to enforce these resolutions, these inspections, yes, sir. Mr. Pickett. Mr. Chairman, could I ask just one follow-up ques- tion at this period because I don't fully understand the response that I'm getting because I get the impression that you're saying that the United States—and I may agree with you, but I'm just try- ing to understand that you're suggesting that the United States has a special role, different from the role of other Security Council members insofar as inspections are concerned, is that your point? Mr. Ritter. Absolutely, when Madeleine Albright says the United States is the foremost supporter of the Special Commis- sion's role, you have to understand what that means. It. means it's not only the provision of personnel, of material support, of technical support, of information support, but it's the provision of political 20 support. Therefore, the United States has assumed a special role in terms of getting the Special Commission to accomplish its task in Iraq. There's no other country that has stepped into the forefront of doing this as the United States. Therefore, they carry a greater share of the burden in terms of getting us back on track to do our job. Mr. Pickett. So you're saying the United States should proceed unilaterally? Mr. RiTTEr. No, sir, I'm saying Mr. Pickett. That's exactly what you just said. Mr. RiTter [continuing]. The United States should be a leader, a leader in a multilateral environment. Mr. Pickett. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I got my answer. Mr. Spence. Mrs. Fowler? Mrs. Fowler. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you, Mr. Ritter, for being with us here today. I really admire the courage and integrity that you've displayed in taking the step you did in your resignation and appreciate your being here. It's my understanding that when you were testifying in the other body in the Senate that you made a statement that you believe that Iraq could develop their nuclear weapon capability, re-estab- lish it within about a three-year time frame. And while I know the nuclear part hasn't been officially under the UNSCOM inspection part, I know the information you've been forward with on that. I just have three questions in relationship to that statement I'd like to ask you: Is your estimate based on Iraq's use of existing infrastructure and equipment that you know it has covertly retained, or on the utilization of Iraq's current level of technological knowledge com- bined with the acquisition of replacement infrastructure and equip- ment? Two, how much replacement infrastructure or equipment would be needed to ire-establish their nuclear weapon building capabili- ties? And, three, is UNSCOM, or you, or IAEA aware of nuclear weap- ons-related technologies that have been made available to Iraq since the end of the war, and if so, by whom? Mr. RiTTEr. Yes, ma'am. Thank you very much. Again, I'll pref- ace my response by saying that the nuclear disarmament require- ments in Iraq are the responsibility of the International Atomic En- ergy Agency. The Special Commission and myself became involved in this area because when we made the decision to go after the sys- tematic mechanisms used by Iraq to conceal retained capability from the United Nations, this included both the Special Commis- sion and the International Atomic Energy Agency. So we started a close cooperation with the IAEA on this issue. What I was referring to in the Senate testimony was information which we had passed on to the International Atomic Energy Agen- cy which was what we believed to be of sufficient quality to be of concern that held that components of an implosion device, that's the lenses, the explosive lenses, the detonators, and other materials used to create an implosion device are still in the possession of Iraq today, and they were under the protection of the Presidential Secu- 21 rity Forces, and being moved around as part of the systematic mechanism of concealment. However, the information stated that these devices lacked the fissile core, so it wasn't necessarily a nuclear weapon but it was components of a nuclear weapon. This is what we were trying to track down through some of our inspections. So in this way, I think you would call this existing infrastructure. Eight years has passed, this material has been moved around in conditions other than of laboratory quality. One would have to be realistic in assessing what its current viability is as an implosion device. However, you can say, to answer another aspect of your question, Iraq has the technical knowledge to build an implosion device. And we believe they are developing or retaining dual-use infrastructure that could be converted in the future to build the explosive lenses and maybe the initiators and other aspects of a device. But the International Atomic Energy Agency is or was, until Iraq sus- pended cooperation, monitoring these sites in a very effective man- ner. In order to produce the fissile core, it requires the enrichment of nuclear material which means Iraq has to acquire the feed stock and then enrich it. This is a significant infrastructure requirement. One which has been effectively dismantled by the International Atomic Energy Agency. I gave an estimate of three years to re- build. That, again, is my informed opinion but it is not the expert opinion and I would hesitate to say that I would be speaking on behalf of the International Atomic Energy Agency. They actually are the ones who should be asked that question. If Iraq is given full wherewithal to acquire infrastructure devel- opment, how long would it take them to rebuild their enrichment program? I said three years. Other people might say something dif- ferent. The International Atomic Energy Agency and the Special Com- mission have been working hard to try and identify prohibited ma- terials before they get into Iraq. And I know that the IAEA had some successes in having material of that nature interdicted. Our problem is that the Iraqi procurement, covert procurement network is so massive and is protected by these mechanisms of concealment to avoid penetration by the Special Commission and foreign intel- ligence services that we just don't know to what extent Iraq is pro- curing material today. We do know that material is going to Iraq. I can't say that nuclear specific material is going into Iraq but be- cause we don't know what the totality of the covert procurement is, it would be irresponsible for me to say that we know that nu- clear related material is not going into Iraq. We just don't know the answer to that. Mrs. Fowler. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The Chairman. Mr. Reyes? Mr. Reyes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I apologize for hav- ing had to run out and attend another meeting. So if I go over some previously covered area, I hope you will bear with me. But it seems to me that reading and studying what has gone on with the inspections, we're having to walk somewhat of a diplomatic tightrope on this issue, and on the issue of whether the United 22 States can still count on or foster the support of the same countries that helped us in the Gulf War. And so my question—I have a number of questions, but the first one is in your opinion, if Iraq continues to defy this inspection proc- ess in the many different ways that you have testified they have successfully done, what are the implications for U.S. credibility in the region? And do you think our influence, in particular in the Middle East, has been greatly reduced? Mr. RiTTEr. Yes, sir. I'll answer the question this way. Again, be- cause I have to be careful to keep myself contained to my experi- ence as a weapons inspector and not be seen as speaking on behalf of U.S. policy-makers, the implications of Iraq retaining weapons of mass destruction should be clear to everybody. This is a nation that has shown a propensity to use these weapons in the past, both against its neighbors in terms of actual employment of weapons or through blackmail. They employed weapons against Iran. They have blackmailed Israel. They have also used these weapons to suppress internal dissent. I think everybody should be concerned about the propensity of this regime to behave in this manner. The regime suffered a defeat in 1991 because a coalition of 28 nations was brought together to liberate Kuwait after Iraq invaded Kuwait. However, we have a situation today where the world-body, the 28 nation coalition and the Security Council has said that there is requirement, pre-conditions have to be met before that war can end. And the pre-conditions are disarmament of Iraq of these weap- ons of mass destruction. It's 1998, 7 years later, and Iraq has not been disarmed. In fact, the situation is occurring where it appears as though Iraq may win. Sanctions may be lifted and Iraq may be allowed to retain these capabilities. If you took in Iraq that prior to the Gulf War had a proclivity toward using these weapons, and you've emboldened them by allowing them to stand up to the world, to the world's sole remaining superpower, to a coalition of 28 nations, and to the Security Council, stand up and emerge victorious, at least in their minds, victorious, I can't see how that has improved the situation any from what existed prior 1991. So I would say the im- plications of backing down are dire indeed. It will be other experts I believe who would have to talk about what the exact nature of that implication is. But I can also say that as an inspector dealing with senior Iraqis on a day-to-day basis over the course of 7 years, they are more con- fident now than they have ever been. They feel that their influence once they emerge from this crisis, their influence will be greater in the region. They will hold more sway over their neighbors. And I think then that you would have to say if Iraq holds more sway over their neighbors, one would have to infer that perhaps the sway of the United States would have been diminished somewhat. So I think the consequences of backing down would be disastrous in- deed. Mr. Reyes. One of the concerns that I have, and you made men- tion to that in resigning from your position that you wanted to pre- cipitate a general debate concerning the direction of U.S. policy to- ward Iraq. And my question is this, you know oftentimes an indi- vidual becomes a lightening rod because of whatever issue is at 23 stake. It's my perception that you have become a lightening rod in terms of the process. And I'm curious to learn your opinion about first being a lightening rod? Second, if it's not more useful for the individual to step aside and allow the diplomatic process or a com- bination of diplomacy and military strategy to proceed? And I'm just curious to get your opinion on that? Mr. RiTter. Yes, sir. It was something I had to factor in on Au- gust 25th prior to writing my letter of resignation. I had two drafts in front of me. One said, "Dear Mr. Butler, I quit." End of story and then turn it in. That would have been me shaking his hand saying, "Thank you very much and going home and disappearing." And this way I wouldn't have become a lightening rod. But I'm here to tell you today that I don't think people would be discussing the foreign policy failure of the United States in Iraq had I chosen that route. I think people would have accepted Resolution 1194 at what appears to be face value, and wouldn't understand the sick- ness that exists behind the resolution, the real problems of Iraq's non-compliance. So I took the decision to submit my other resignation, that I would publicly resign, that I would bring this issue to the forefront. With every decision, there's unintended consequences. And there's no doubt that by stepping forward, I have done some harm to the national security of the United States. I have perhaps pre- emptively exposed or interfered with some diplomatic initiatives that may have been taking place, or some military options that might have been taking place. I wasn't aware of these. And if I in- terrupted them prematurely, I'm sorry. But my position as a weap- ons inspector led me to believe that such activities were not taking place, and if they were taking place, they were being done in the framework of an illusion of arms control, creating the illusion of arms control where a diplomatic solution would exist where the Special Commission was allowed to carry out pretend inspections which really didn't disarm Iraq, and the world-body would close files prematurely allowing Iraq to get credit for disarmament which it had not been held to task for. So in order to expose this, I had to become a lightening rod. Now if one of your questions about a lightening rod is am I com- ing under unjust attack or anything of that nature, I'm not con- cerned about that. I have big enough shoulders to take such at- tacks. And I don't think that such attacks are taking place. I men- tioned before people are under pressure. They may say things that are not reflective. I know that I have the highest respect for Mad- eline Albright and the national security team; and I believe in their words they have exhibited the fact that they respected me for the work I did with the Special Commission. So I don't believe that I'm coming under any sort of smear campaign or attack. Mr. Reyes. All right. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman. Mr. Bateman? Mr. BATEMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Before asking some questions, I want to make some observations. Mr. Ritter, I think you are a remarkable citizen and I mean that in the most positive context. I think you have set an example that a number of others in my humble opinion should well emulate in principled resigna- 25 fairs in the wide-open all the time. But I do not understand that complete dichotomy. If you put it in the context, if we have any na- tional will to do what our national security interests require, the American people at some point have to be brought into this loop and prepared to back up the judgments of their national security policy leaders when they take some action that's meaningful. Again, I think what you've done is at least made us aware of pol- icy decisions and judgments that the American people need to be prepared to make and I hope have the will to make. Mr. Chairman. Mr. Taylor? Mr. TAYLOr. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Ritter, in your mind having been inspecting Iraq first-hand, the nuclear, biological, and chemical threats coming out of Iraq, how would you rate them? Mr. Ritter. In all honesty it's hard to rate them with the degree of certainty that I think that you want because we just don't know what the extent of all their programs are. They have never given us a full accounting of these programs. What I would say is that if you take a look at the level of obstruction that Iraq has put up for their programs, you might be able to get a sense of what they view as being more valuable. And it's the biological program that they have lied about and obstructed more consistently than any other program. This means that they view it as having more value than perhaps the chemical and ballistic missiles. Although the ballistic missile is different because they're allowed to have a ballistic missile program, and it's one in which they have developed in a manner which gives them a rapid break-out capability. So they believe they already have ballistic missile delivery capability in place. Now what will they arm that with? And there's two things of concern: one is the biological program, but the other is the VX pro- gram. Even after we exposed the VX program in April and con- fronted Iraq with that reality in June, they have denied outright that they had a VX program. And they're using the same pattern of outright denials, absolute denials that they exhibited with the biological programs and applied it to VX. So I think I have to say that both VX and a retained biological capability are highest on the list of what Iraq wants to hold on to. Mr. Taylor. Mr. Ritter, what, and again, I may have missed your point, what would you, if given the opportunity to make things right, what would you do? Mr. Ritter. I would continue along—again, I need to make sure everybody understands that there is no easy solution, that you can't just reach in your pocket the magic card that tells you this is the route to take. We made a decision in 1995 that it would be in the best interest of everybody if we broke through Iraq's wall of concealment and actually obtained a weapon. If we did more than just expose their lies, and we actually attained a weapon that we could show to the world and say, "This is the result of ineffective disarmament. This is the price that you will have to pay if you don't disarm Iraq." And we thought we had a program of inspec- tions, no matter how imperfect and no matter how difficult, that would eventually achieve that objective. So what would I do? I would say that if you want your resolution that you passed in April 1991 to be implemented, you have to get 26 the inspection teams back in Iraq doing the difficult job of disar- mament oriented inspections. Mr. Taylor. And what are the hindrances to making that hap- pen? Mr. RittEr. Disunity in the Security Council. Mr. Taylor. From which members? Mr. RiTTEr. Right now we're in a situation where you have 15 members of the Security Council, five permanent members, and we find that three of the five are lined against this kind of activity: Russia, France, and China. We have the United States and the United Kingdom that are very supportive of disarmament type in- spections, and then you have 10 rotating non-permanent members. Whenever we brief the Security Council, and we present them with the facts, we tend to sway the 10 members over to our side, but we're still confronted with three members with veto power, veto au- thority, and their concerns have to be taken into consideration. So something has to be done to convince these three members that inspections are the right thing to do, that the only way to get sanctions lifted, to get the horrible economic hurt that's been in- flicted on the Iraqi people by sanctions finished and bring Iraq back into the fold is through the inspection process. Right now, they believe that they can denigrate the inspection process, mini- mize it, get sanctions lifted, and get Iraq back into the fold quicker. And we need to somehow change their philosophy. Mr. Taylor. There's a school of thought that with the disintegra- tion of the Soviet Union that the people who made their living in their biological warfare research went and began to peddle their wares in other places, and that many of them ended up in Iraq. Is it possible that that accounts for some of the Russian reluctance to be fully supportive in this measure? Mr. RittEr. I think that the Russian foreign policy objectives are driven by a broader sense of feeling very defensive vis-a-vis the United States. You have the expansion of NATO, you have the re- duction of the status that Russia enjoyed when it was the former Soviet Union. Russia is now an economic wasteland. They have dif- ficulties asserting their authority around the world. The Middle East because of the previous experience of Yvgeni Primakov is an area that Russia feels comfortable in operating in, and I think one of the reasons why you see obstruction in Iraq is it's a chance for Russia to stand juxtaposed to the foreign policy of the United States, and that plays well with the nationalists and the ultra-na- tionalists in Russia today. I don't believe that their policy is driven by the fact that their trying to siphon biological weapons into Iraq. That could be hap- pening, and hopefully people are alert to that. Mr. Taylor. Are you a personal witness to any scientists with the former Soviet Union working in Iraq? Mr. RiTTEr. We have intelligence information of an undeter- mined quality that we haven't been able to follow-up and verify that indicates that weapons scientists from the former Soviet Union, all the republics of—not all, but republics other than Russia have made their way into Iraq to support Iraqi military programs to include programs which are proscribed by Security Council reso- lutions, but I can't prove that. 27 Mr. Taylor. You're not a personal witness to that? Mr. RiTter. I've only seen the reports and tried to investigate the reports, but I haven't personally seen a Russian in Iraq doing prohibited activity, no, sir. Mr. Taylor. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman. Mr. Redmond? Mr. Redmond. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Ritter, I would like to concur with my colleagues in thanking you for the coura- geous move of resignation so that this could be made known, not only to this committee, but also to the American people. I couldn't help but think, as I was listening to the testimony and the questioning, that we are very much like the parent in the su- permarket who is being held hostage by a young child screaming in the check-out line. And in order to pacify the child, we buy it a sucker. Basically when we won in 1991, we put Saddam Hussein on be- havior modification program but over these 7 years, he has not de- veloped the internal will to do the right thing. And until he does change internally, it will require external force to modify the be- havior of the Nation of Iraq. He's moved from active aggression in 1991 to a 7-year pattern of passive aggression which has placed not only the region but the entire world at risk. I would like to thank my colleague, Mr. Taylor, for raising the question concerning rating this particular risk because it appears to me that minimally that there are three things that we need to do and if you could shed some light on any of these three, I would appreciate it. First, I believe that this committee, and also, Mr. Chairman, that this committee needs to send a letter to the administration strongly urging that the files not be closed. We do not need to hand that sucker to that child that is making demands. I think that the ad- ministration needs to know the desire of this committee that we continue on with the open files. Second, I was somewhat disturbed learning of the methodology that is used for the verification process. It appears that the verification process and the methodology itself is flawed in that Iraq issues the statement of declaration whereby we verify, but when Iraq does that they're basically identifying the perimeters of discussion and what can and what cannot be investigated. And it seems to me that in addition to the letter sent to the ad- ministration concerning keeping the files open, I think that we need to establish a new methodology where it is not Iraq that takes the initiative for verification in setting the perimeters but the United Nations with the leadership of the United States who sets the perimeters for the investigation. And, third, I think that the connection that our good colleague, Mr. Weldon, had mentioned between the former Soviet Union, with Russia and Iraq, that that close relationship and the fact that Rus- sia is not now responsibly attending to its nuclear stock pile, this is some work that Senator Domenici is working on in conjunction with Los Alamos National Lab. I think that we need to be very cur- rent with what's happening on the Senate side with Senator Domenici, and that nuclear material that is present there. Because of the strong link between Russia and Iraq, it appears that we need 28 to be aggressively pressuring the Russian government into a stock- pile stewardship program where the material is not readily avail- able. If you could answer those three, and then I have just another comment? Mr. RittEr. Yes, sir. I think, again, one of the actions that would be very helpful is if a signal was sent to the United States adminis- tration that files should not be closed prematurely. That if a com- prehensive review of Iraq's compliance with its disarmament obli- gations is going to take place as indicated in the Resolution 1194, that it is carefully monitored to ensure that compromises are not made, that Iraq is held fully accountable to the original intent of Security Council Resolution 687; and that if a file is to be closed, it's because every single point that must be addressed by Iraq of a disarmament nature is indeed addressed to the satisfaction of the Special Commission, not anybody else. We're the body that has to determine that satisfaction. Second, through this process of a comprehensive review, any sig- nal that was sent that it is indeed the Special Commission that's in the driver seat, it's the Special Commission that establishes the pre-conditions for determining disarmament in accordance with the resolutions passed by the Security Council. That's a good signal, but what I'm concerned that's going to happen is that there will be new standards set for determining disarmament of Iraq which are not in accordance with Security Council resolution and with will be conducted under the auspices of the Secretary General, and pres- sure will be placed upon the Executive Chairman and the Special Commission to fall in line with this, and Iraq will be given a artifi- cial clean bill of health. On the issue of Russia and its stockpiling, again, I have to re- spectfully decline to answer because that does fall outside of my remit as a weapons inspector in Iraq. Mr. Redmond. OK. Mr. Chairman, just a closing comment. There are two phrases in the testimony by Mr. Ritter that just leaped out at me. And they're on page 30 of the testimony. He states that "Iraq believes that time is on its side." And immediately following, "The truth of the matter is that Iraq is not disarmed. We have not accomplished what we set out to accomplish." And I'd like to make reference real quickly to the Declaration of Independence where the Founding Fathers stated that, "Mankind are more disposed to suf- fer while evils are sufferable." And here we have a 7-year abuse of passive aggression with no remorse at all, and it appears that his- tory would tell us that the sooner we act on this, the better it will be not only for the region but for the world. I would encourage us to take action and to take action sooner rather than later. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman. Thank you. Mr. Pappas? Mr. PAPPAS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Ritter, thank you very much for being here and for answering questions. I want to focus a bit upon you as a professional and those that you work with, and what your sense of things were. First of all, how many other people served on that inspections team with you? Mr. Ritter. On my unit, or the inspection as a whole? 29 Mr. Pappas. The inspection team as a whole. Mr. RiTter. It fluctuates depending on which task we're going to have, but generally there's around 30 to 40 full-time experts in New York, a staff of a dozen or so support personnel in Bahrain who support inspection teams when they form up in Bahrain. And then about 120 inspectors and support staff in place in Baghdad on a full-time basis to oversee the monitoring inside Iraq. Mr. Pappas. Your unit was the approximately 120? Mr. RiTter. The Special Commission was actually closer to maybe 150 to 160 people. Mr. Pappas. And the countries, just focus on that unit, folks that you worked with on a daily basis, was it from Mr. RittEr. Around the world. Mr. Pappas. Around the world? Mr. RiTter. On inspection teams that I've led, for instance in January, we had 41 inspectors from 16 different nations. On other inspections, I've had 21 nations represented on my teams. Some- times as few as 12 nations, but we are indeed a United Nations body and we draw our expertise from the member nations. Mr. Pappas. Did you while you were there, and how long were you there personally? Mr. RiTTER. Seven years. Mr. Pappas. Did you ever sense a concern for your safety, or did any members of the team ever sense any concern for their safety? Mr. Ritter. The vast majority of the time we actually felt secure, and we felt that Iraq was carrying out its obligations to ensure the security and the safety and welfare of inspection teams. There were some occasions in which an inspection of a particularly sensitive area, because these are no-notice inspections, and we arrive with- out notice, soldiers who are trained to protect these facilities, felt threatened by our arrival and there were periods of time where it was very close as to whether or not they would open fire on the inspection teams. There were other situations where the Iraqis themselves have acknowledged they have stopped drive-by shoot- ings or other acts of violence that were being threatened against the inspection teams. Whether or not these were real and the Iraqi authorities were merely trying to intimidate us is one thing. But I can say that, especially recently, there has been more con- cern about the physical safety of the inspectors operating in Iraq, especially inspectors that were carrying out confrontational inspec- tions designed to expose the concealment mechanism. Mr. PAPPAS. The times that you felt that your safety was not an issue and maybe especially the times that you were, could you briefly describe how the U.N. provided for your safety? Mr. RiTTEr. Our safety lays in the strength of our mandate, the fact that the Security Council passed a resolution under Chapter 7, meaning that they would back us up, meaning that we could go forward into Iraq and carry out our tasks, and Iraq had obligated itself to allow us to do this. And Iraq had agreed to ensure our physical safety. So the United Nations did not provide for our phys- ical security. It's Iraq who has that responsibility. And, again, we believe that as long as we stayed within the framework of the man- date given to us by the Security Council, we should not be put at risk. 55-060 99 - 3 30 Mr. Pappas. Those members of the team that were not from the United States or Great Britain, did you ever discuss with them what their sense of the situation was? You did mention in respond- ing to a question earlier that as the U.S. representative to the Se- curity Council dealing with this and we've seen a diminished influ- ence, what appears to be a diminished influence in our ability to ensure more for adequate inspections, what was the sense or the discussion or the banter with folks from other countries? Did they share that? And why do you think they may have, if they did? Mr. RittEr. The vast majority of the inspectors who were in Iraq with me or I was associated with fully understood the reality of the situation, the role that the United States played in making inspec- tions a viable regime. They were there when the technical expertise from the United States was brought to bear. They were there when they saw the financial resources of the United States brought to bear. Every inspector knows the important role that the United States plays in getting inspections done in Iraq. And they're all very supportive of that role. They also know that our mandate, our security is dependent upon the will of the Security Council to back us up if we get into a bind with Iraq, and there was concern on several inspections that I was involved in that Iraq faced with less than solid resolve by the Security Council may undertake a precipitous act that could put our safety at risk. And a lot of people were concerned that that was because of a lessening of resolve by the Security Council which is reflective of maybe a lessening of leadership by the United States. Mr. Pappas. I guess what I was getting to, maybe I wasn't clear, Mr. Chairman, just one other question or clarification. Of those people that you served with that still understood that they were under the Security Council's resolution and had the authority to act as you were, did you sense any trepidation that if these—did they feel that the Security Council wasn't serious? Maybe that's the easy way to put it or the most direct way to put it. Did you feel or did they feel that the Security Council wasn't serious and were just words on a piece of paper? Mr. RittEr. Most inspectors that we have are very experienced inspectors who have done this over the course of years, and they've seen resolution after resolution after resolution after resolution being passed on Iraq for Iraq's obstruction. They've seen no mean- ingful actions undertaken by the Security Council to hold Iraq in compliance. And so they did—everybody feels that the Security Council no longer has the teeth to back up its words. Mr. Pappas. Thank you, Mr. Ritter. And, Mr. Chairman, I just wanted to emphasize for Mr. Ritter's benefit, that last month I had introduced Resolution 519, which deals with the threat of Iraq, and I'd like to provide a copy of it to you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. RittEr. Thank you. Mr. Chairman. Mr. Talent? Mr. Talent. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Ritter, I want to fol- low up a little bit on some questions that were asked you before. And you indicated that you did not believe it was the Americans responsibility to unilaterally support UNSCOM. It seems to me that the case you're making is really the contrary of that, that offi- cials of our Government have been unilaterally interfering with the 31 work of that agency. Now, I've read your statement and a lot of the newspaper reports, I wonder if you could tell us, with as much de- tail as possible, the specific incidents in which you believe that somebody from our Government interfered with the operation of the agency or with you? And where you have firsthand knowledge of that, that would be useful. Some of it may be secondhand, I don't know but some level of detail would be helpful to me. Mr. RittEr. Yes, sir. As I indicated I believe earlier, in May of 1997 there was a coordination meeting between the Special Com- mission and the United States and the United Kingdom in which a specific course of action was agreed upon, that is to conduct in- spections designed to expose how Iraq conceals its weapons of mass destruction. And in September we carried out inspections towards this goal. And then in September we also deployed full-time into Iraq a team under my control, again, under the control of the Exec- utive Chairman but I was tasked with controlling this team and tasking it to do concealment oriented inspections. There was a con- frontation with Iraq. There was a diplomatic solution reached. The teams were expelled. The teams were brought back in. Once the teams were brought back in, we tried to get back on with the task of doing our job. And yet throughout November and December we were specifically advised by the United States not to let this team carry out inspections of Iraq's concealment mechanism which would lead to confrontation. Mr. Talent. OK, who from the Government specifically advised? And were you directly advised of this or was Mr. Butler advised of it? Mr. RittEr. Mr. Butler was advised directly of this. I know on at least one occasion it was done by the Secretary of State. On other occasions it may have been her instructions passed through the U.S. mission in New York. It occurred on several occasions. Mr. Talent. And then Mr. Butler advised you of this, so that's how you know about it? Mr. RiTter. Mr. Butler—I had briefed him on a course of action. He had signed the appropriate documentation. We had forwarded the documentation via secure means to our team in-country. They were prepared to go and do this inspection. And he came to me and said, "Have them stand-down," and he gave me the reasons. The reasons primarily being the U.S. would not support this confrontational inspection. Mr. Talent. Did he give you any indication of why he was told they would not support this? Mr. RiTTEr. That basically the U.S. was trying to build a diplo- matic consensus, and felt that by carrying out these inspections, we would get ahead of their ability to back them up in the Security Council. We were respective of that. We thought that if we can't be backed up, there's no need in going forward with these inspec- tions at that time. The same thing occurred in December. We were told to put together a major concealment oriented inspection head- ed by myself. We had hard information about concealment activity taking place at several sites. Once we got into Iraq, again, the U.S. intervened, advised Mr. Butler that several sites they felt that we were going to inspect were too confrontational and they asked that they be dropped from the list. This is after the team was deployed 33 Mr. McHale. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Ritter, I want to join my colleagues in expressing to you my deep respect for your extraordinary moral courage and what I think is your exceptional professional judgment in all of the areas where you have testified. You have been given ample opportunity, principally in the other body, to respond in a way that would have diminished the sub- stance of your testimony. You have avoided a response when you were baited. You have carried yourself with great dignity. You have spoken very thoughtfully, and I think we as a Nation owe you a great deal. I want to acknowledge that at the beginning of my questioning. I also want to say that I think more than any other official that I can identify either at the United Nations or within our Govern- ment, you have kept faith with the men and women who fought the Gulf War, and I thank you. Back in August 1990, I was on active-duty. And when I deployed to the Gulf from the perspective from someone also who was at a very junior paygrade at that point, I felt there were three strategic reasons why we fought or were about to fight the Gulf War: The first was the physical removal of forces from the territory of Ku- wait. We achieved that. Second, I thought we needed to guarantee international access to the Gulf oil supplies that were then being threatened by Saddam Hussein, and through our military action I think we achieved that as well. But, frankly, what motivated me more than anything else and I remember vividly looking at the photos at the time of Kurdish women and children who were slaughtered by the chemical muni- tions of Saddam Hussein. I felt that ultimately protecting that re- gion of the world from weapons of mass destruction under the con- trol of Saddam Hussein was the principal reason justifying military conflict under those circumstances. From your testimony earlier, I gather that we have not yet achieved that third strategic goal. You made reference to the chem- bio capabilities possessed by the Iraqi government, with specific reference to VX. Seven years after the Gulf War does Iraq, under the command of Saddam Hussein, possess an operational chem-bio capability? Mr. RittEr. The answer to that question is right now no in terms of could Iraq today load a missile warhead onto a missile and fire it. The assessment that we have is no because part of their conceal- ment activities were to dismantle these weapons into the various components and move them around the country making it very dif- ficult for us to find them. It's also part of the Iraqi strategy to chal- lenge us today to find a weapon. They say there are no weapons in Iraq. And I might have to agree with them. There are weapons components that put together would constitute a weapon. There are agents if loaded on to those weapons would then be used. Mr. McHale. You indicated in your judgment to assemble a nu- clear capability, assuming access to the appropriate fissile mate- rial, would take approximately 3 years. And you fully qualified that in terms of the admission that perhaps others with qualifications equal to or superior to your own might come up with a different timeframe, but your estimate is 3 years for a nuclear threat, an operational nuclear threat? 35 goal that we defined, the elimination of Saddam Hussein's strategic WMD threat will, in fact, be achieved. We break faith with those dead Americans if we do any less than that. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The Chairman. Thank you very much. We're going to proceed now to the other panel. Mr. Ritter, before we leave you, I again want to tell you how much we appreciate your appearance today and what you've done for us in this committee in helping us to understand the problem we're faced with. We owe you a debt of gratitude. I think that his- tory will reflect that what you've done was a defining moment in the events that led us to the realization that our foreign policy rel- ative to Saddam Hussein and Iraq and the weapons of mass de- struction and the things that we've been working on, the defining moment has been what you've done in bringing us to the realiza- tion that it has been failed. And we've got to go on from here now and try to pick up the pieces and pursue it. People are suggesting that maybe that this will set the stage for an October Surprise, and the administration will be forced to bring some kind of action now because of it. But in any event, you've contributed greatly to what this is all about. Thank you very much for your help. Mr. Ritter. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The Chairman. Now if we can proceed to the second panel, and if they'll just take their seats at the table. It's a pleasure to welcome all three of you gentlemen, and I look forward to your testimony. All of you are well-respected by this committee and the American people, I think, for your views. I was just reminded today that I first met General Kelly back in about 1979. Secretary Wolfowitz has been before us before and performed greatly for us. Mr. Eisenstadt, you're well respected. We're looking forward to the testimony of all of you. As I said earlier, without objection, your prepared materials can be included for the record, and we can start from there. Secretary, why don't you go ahead and start off? STATEMENT OF PAUL WOLFOWITZ, FORMER UNDER SEC- RETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY, DEPARTMENT OF DE- FENSE Mr. WoLFowitz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I hope you have my statement. I know it arrived very late. And I apologize for that, but I wasn't on the list here until quite late. First of all, I'd just like to say that it's an honor in any cir- cumstances to appear before this committee; and I consider it real- ly a special honor to appear on the same day that Scott Ritter ap- peared. I think he's a public servant with exceptional integrity and moral courage. I know during the Gulf War when he was an intel- ligence officer at CENTCOM, some superior officers tried to get him to state that missile launches had been destroyed that he be- lieved—I think it turned out correctly—had not been destroyed, and he refused to sign the report in spite of quite a bit of pressure to do so. That pressure it turns out is nothing compared to the pressure that this administration is subjecting him to for I think much more important statements of fact. And I really admire his 36 courage, and also, as was said, his coolness under fire. I think he would be entitled to react a good deal more angrily than he has. If you'll permit me, I'd just like to make a few points that are not in my prepared statement but seem to me very important as I listen to the discussion preceding this. And the first has to do with why has the coalition against Saddam Hussein collapsed? Why are we in such bad shape? Why are France and Russia oppos- ing us in the Security Council, and no Arab government seems to be willing to support us in serious action against Saddam? And I think this is an issue that is incredibly important and wildly mis- understood, and I think the administration contributes to the mis- understanding by suggesting that it somehow has to do with fa- tigue or it has to do with unhappiness with the Netanyahu govern- ment or some other unrelated issues. I think to put it in its simplest terms it has to do with the fact that in politics in the Middle East, as in most other places in the world, people like to be on the winning side, and they don't like to be on the losing side. And if that's true in an American election, and I think it's true, but American elections are relatively safe to lose. Imagine how much serious it is in the Middle East where the price of being on the losing side can be your life and the survival of your country. And so when we ask relatively weak governments of the Middle East to support us in a military action against Sad- dam Hussein that will not make any fundamental difference in the situation, but will further inflame his anger against them, I don't think it should be any surprise at all that they decide to opt out. And if you want to understand the behavior of France and Rus- sia, I think what you need to get is a good briefing on what the French and Russian oil companies are doing with the Iraqi govern- ment and the contracts that they are signing and the money they expect to make when Saddam Hussein is finally back in business. And I submit that if they were convinced that Saddam Hussein will not be back in business, and the fabulous, and they are fabulous, oil resources of Iraq, probably greater ultimately than Saudi Ara- bia, will be ultimately in the control of a government of free Iraq, I believe you'll find the French and Russians beating down the door to find those people and to curry favor with them for the future. The second point I want to make is that we aren't kidding any- one in the Middle East with the various pretenses that we go through. And while it may have taken a Scott Ritter to get the American people to understand what was going on, I submit that most important decisionmakers in the Middle East have under- stood for quite a while that our policy is collapsing. And to pretend that it's not collapsing when it is collapsing only reinforces their contempt for us. Honesty doesn't get you out of a hole all by itself, but I think it's the essential ingredients© getting out of the hole. And when we say that a defeat as we suffered a very clear defeat in northern Iraq in 1996, and we step out and proclaim it a great victory, then people have even more contempt for us than if we at least admitted that we had suffered a defeat. And the consequences of where we're going are enormously im- portant. I almost don't need to say more about this given what Congressman McHale said. We are talking about one of the most dangerous leaders in the world with access already to some of the 37 most dangerous weapons and a determination to get access to more. It's not just a matter of whether the U.N. Security Council will be respected in some abstract way. It is a question of whether a man who is committed to state supported terrorism, who is com- mitted to building ballistic missiles and has weapons of mass de- struction can be lived with. And it seems to me the record by now is very clear that the world can't live with him. I thought it was very clear in fact by the end of the Gulf War that we could not live with him. And let me say in fairness I was an official in the Bush administration, and I think in fairness one has to say that the greatest opportunity to deal with Saddam Hus- sein decisively was in March 1991, the month after the Gulf War. And some might even say, and I think I would sympathize with this view, that perhaps if we had delayed the cease-fire by a few more days, we might have been rid of him. And certainly I think it was unconscionable and I said so at the time, and a strategic mistake to allow him a free hand to use his armed helicopters to suppress the rebellions against him in March 1991. And I think it was a mistake to turn back the territory that we captured from Iraq at the end of that war. Territory, which by the way, had we controlled it today, we would be controlling the largest oil field in Iraq; and I will come back to that. So the Bush administration made some mistakes in those critical 4 weeks. But in defense of President Bush, let me remind everyone, if it's necessary, that he could barely get the support of this body and of its sister body in the Congress for the limited action to get Saddam Hussein out of Kuwait. If he had ever come up here and said, "Our goal is to remove Saddam Hussein," I'm quite sure we would have lost those votes. That doesn't mean that when the war was over, one couldn't reevaluate the situation. And I was present with Secretary Baker when the most senior officials in the Saudi government urged us at the end of the war to remember that as long as Saddam Hussein is still in power, this isn't over. And sometimes you get people saying the Saudis are what stopped us. I can categorically assert the opposite is true. I think we should have reevaluated more quickly, and I felt and argued at the time that we should have supported the rebellions in southern Iraq. But it's saying a lot to hastily reevaluate your en- tire objectives just because a victory has turned out to be a lot easi- er than you expected it to be. Douglas McArthur did that, I remind you, after Inchon, and the results were disastrous as a matter of fact. In fact, within about 4 weeks of the end of the war, George Bush had reevaluated his whole policy. He had instituted Operation Pro- vide Comfort which kicked the Iraqi army out of essentially the northern third of the country. And I think it's an object lesson for where we are today that the United States, with the authority and military prestige that we had acquired from the Gulf War, was able to kick the Iraqi army out of northern Iraq not with three divisions or two corps, but with an American battalion, part of an inter- national force that consisted—Tom Kelly can correct me—I think it was eight battalions. A pretty motley bunch. Only the French and the British offered real combat forces to join us; and a very 38 substantial American air capability, and, of course, the sheer terror of the Iraqi army. We had enormous prestige then and we used it. And we also used it to back up UNSCOM. I would add to Congressman McHale's list of people who have given their lives for their country in this cause people who were killed in Khobar Towers, let me re- mind you, were there for one and only one reason and that was to enforce the inspections regime on Iraq. President Bush deployed the Air Force to Saudi Arabia, and redeployed it—Tom, again, might correct me—I think in July of 1991 after the famous parking lot confrontation at the Agriculture Ministry with Saddam when it became clear that the only way to get inspectors in was to have im- mediate and credible threat of force, and he maintained that threat and got inspectors in throughout the end of his administration. And both of those policies are not collapsing. And if Scott Ritter can be accused of not having a clue about American policy in Iraq, he could also be forgiven because frankly I don't know what it is either. And I don't know anyone in the Middle East who thinks they know what it is. Apparently the administration makes a dis- tinction between going to Ambassador Butler and saying, "This isn't an opportune time for a confrontation with Iraq." And saying, "We couldn't back you up militarily if you get into a confrontation." That that's somehow different from telling him not to do an inspec- tion. Well, I think that kind of hair-splitting just, again, loses credibility for us. And I think, I have to say I think we're doing it around the world. We're now engaged in a hair-splitting exercise to explain that North Korea didn't really violate the framework agreement. I'm not sure what we'd do about the fact that they're violating it. It's a very weighty question, but you have to start from recognizing fact. And when you deny facts about North Korea, don't think that Saddam Hussein isn't listening. And when you make threats about how if he violates the framework agreement, then by golly we'll stop building reactors for him. I didn't notice that we're doing that now. When we make threats to Milosevic if he keeps slaughtering people in Kosovo, by golly we'll get tough. Don't think that your friends in the Middle East don't notice that American threats and warnings just don't seem to get followed through on. So I think to say that Saddam Hussein remains within a stra- tegic box, as the administration likes to say, and to say that if he tries to break out, our response will be swift and strong, those sort of statements are frankly met with ridicule. The fact is that it's not been 42 days since there have been any weapons inspections in Iraq. And the swift and strong response that the administration threatened at the time of the Kofi Annan agreement earlier this year is nowhere to be seen. I recently heard from a very senior official in a friendly Arab gov- ernment who complained to me that the administration spends a lot of effort trying to collect votes in the non-align movement to support the no-fly zone. He said the non-align movement doesn't matter and the no-fly zone doesn't matter either. But the adminis- tration is doing nothing about what really matters which is Sad- dam Hussein's continued hold on power, and the growth on his power. And, as I've said, the best opportunity to deal with that was 39 in March 1991, but the opportunities haven't gone away and, in- deed, I think from a political point of view he has now offered us opportunity after opportunity to mobilize support against him. And the heart of the problem is that we, for reasons I don't en- tirely grasp, are unable or unwilling to pursue a serious policy, one that would aim at liberating the Iraqi people from Saddam's tyran- nical grasp, and freeing Iraq's neighbors from his murderous threats. Administration officials continue to claim, as Assistant Secretary of State Martin Indyk indicated in testimony at the Senate last week, that the only alternative to maintaining the unity of the Se- curity Council is to send U.S. forces to Baghdad. Wrong. That is not the only alternative. It is a straw man which they keep throw- ing up to justify inaction. As has been said repeatedly in letters to the Congress and to the President and in testimony in the House and in the Senate by my- self and other former Defense officials, including two Secretaries of Defense, Rumsfeld and Carlucci, and one former Director of Cen- tral Intelligence, Mr. Woolsey, the key lays not in marching U.S. soldiers to Baghdad but in helping the Iraqi people to liberate themselves. And believe me I think there are plenty of Iraqis who would do it if they thought they had a fighting chance because Saddam's main strength, which is the sheer terror in which he holds his people, is also his greatest vulnerability. If you haven't read it, you should read the account that appeared in the New York Times about a month ago about an Iraqi nuclear scientist who had managed to defect to the West. And one of the reasons he did so was because even trying his best to build nuclear weapons for Saddam, he was subject to torture and threats of death, and his family was tortured. There is no safety anywhere in Iraq except for Saddam himself. And that means there are enor- mous numbers of people, of course, particularly the Shia in the south and the Kurds in the north, but also enormous numbers of Sunnis who would be happy to be rid of this man if they thought they could safely do so. And so I think a strategy for dealing with Saddam is to find a way to support that opposition, not to send in American troops to do the job all by ourselves. That requires a strategy and a strategy is not a single action, it's not a few cruise missile attacks. It's a combination of political, and economic, and military steps coordi- nated in a coherent way. And perhaps that's more complicated than this administration can manage, but I believe it's imminently pos- sible for a country that has the overwhelming power that the United States still has in the Gulf. The heart of such action, and I have hesitated in the past to be as specific as I'm going to be here because I thought maybe we shouldn't be telling too much to Saddam, but it seems unless you say it very specifically, the administration continues to ignore it. And we have been saying it. The heart of it is to create a liberated zone in southern Iraq comparable to what the United States had in northern Iraq in 1991. I say in the south because there are a lot of political reasons why it's easier to operate in the south. Ku- wait is easier to work with than Turkey. Shia Arabs are a less dis- ruptive force than the Kurds in the north. 40 But the fact is the ultimate goal is liberating the whole country. I think by creating a protected zone in southern Iraq, and this it seems to me, we're talking about an area within dozens of kilo- meters of the Kuwaiti border. It should not be a formidable task. We would make it possible for a provisional government of free Iraq to organize, to gain international recognition, and to begin to publicize a political program for the future of the country. We would put in the hands of that government control of the largest oil field in Iraq, the Rvmaila oil field, which, in fact, was part of the reason for Saddam invading Kuwait in the first place. And I think that with some kind of appropriate international supervision over those resources, you would have enormous financial resources for political, humanitarian, and military purposes. And last, but by no means least, it would now be possible to es- tablish a safe area to which Iraqi units could defect, could rally in opposition to Saddam. I guess I didn't say this in my testimony, but my preferred course of action would be to say those who come over in a timely way will be exempt from war crimes trials, and those who don't are on their own. I think if we're serious about it, although it's a formidable under- taking and it's certainly not one that will achieve a consensus in the Security Council, but I do believe if we start down that road and commit ourselves to it and convince people we're committed to it, it will begin to change fundamentally the calculations of both Saddam's opponents and his supporters, like the French and the Russians. One Arab official in the Gulf told me that such a strategy would have a devastating effect, his words, inside Iraq. But the effect out- side would be powerful as well. Our friends in the Gulf who fear Saddam, but also fear ineffective American action against him would see this as a very different policy, one that could rid them of the danger of Saddam. And as I explained earlier, his main sup- porters in the Security Council, France and Russia, I think could be expected to follow their commercial noses when they saw, for- give the mixed metaphors, which way the oil wind was blowing. We repeatedly hear excuses from the administration for its own weakness by arguing that this coalition against Saddam is not what it was 7 years ago. That's true. But, in fact, if we go back seven and half years to August 1990, that coalition didn't exist at all. The United States, under George Bush's leadership, put that coalition together not just by making phone calls, but by dem- onstrating that we had the strength and the seriousness of purpose to carry through to an effective conclusion. As a matter of fact, if I can digress for a moment, I was with Dick Cheney on that first trip to Saudi Arabia on August 6 of 1990, and after King Fahd had agreed to this unprecedented deployment of American forces in Saudi Arabia, several Saudi officials took sev- eral of us aside to make it clear that they would never have put the fate of their country and their own lives in the hands of the American President if they believed that he wouldn't carry through. And I remember they specifically said, "If we thought this was the United States of Jimmy Carter that left helicopters in the desert, we would have never made this decision." And then I think maybe just to make sure this wasn't any partisan smugness on 41 their part, they said, "If this were the United States of Ronald Reagan that bailed out of Beirut after 250 Americans were killed, we wouldn't have done it." "It's because you manage to stick it out in the Gulf, even after the U.S.S. Stark was attacked, it's because we think this is a different United States and above all because we trust the President and we have confidence in what he says he'll do that we're essentially putting our lives in your hands." President Bush made good on the commitments he undertook de- spite, as many of you personally witnessed, powerful opposition in the U.S. Congress. I think in many ways the situation today is far easier. Iraq is weaker militarily. American strength is much more evident to ev- eryone, including ourselves and we are there in the Gulf. We don't have to deploy from 12,000 miles away. And I think the Congress would be far more supportive of decisive action. If this administra- tion could muster the strength of purpose, it would be possible I believe to liberate ourselves, our friends and allies in the region, and the Iraqi people from the menace of Saddam Hussein. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. [The prepared statement of Mr. Wolfowitz can be found in the appendix on page 74.] The Chairman. General Kelly, we would be pleased to hear from you? STATEMENT OF THOMAS KELLY, PRESIDENT, THE WING GROUP General KELLY. Yes, sir. I'll be somewhat more brief. I agree with everything he said. And I would point out that if you have a stomach ache, don't go to see a surgeon because he's probably going to recommend something that you're not going to like. But you got a surgeon here. The question is what should we do about Saddam Hussein and his weapons of mass destruction? What are our goals? And what strategy should be developed to achieve them? And that raises a couple of questions? Do we believe or know whether or not Iraq possesses these weapons of mass destruction? And I'm talking about biological, chemical, and nuclear. The answer is abundantly clear. It's yes. Scott pointed that out today, and I think there's a lot more that he doesn't know about. Intelligence shows that in the open press, and I don't have any clearances left. And I'm very proud of that. And I don't have any- thing to do with DOD, and I'm very proud of that. Thirty-five years was enough. But the open press shows that Saddam Hussein pos- sesses these weapons in abundance, especially biological and chem- ical and they're the ones that scare me much more than anything else. It's asserted that he has a sufficient number of them to kill ev- erybody on earth. And no delivery system is necessary. We keep talking about putting one together. You know, an envelope in your pocket dumped in the Washington water supply could conceivably wipe this city out. Some chemicals smuggled into Mexico and brought north in a truck that's half full of cocaine and half full of some nerve agent could wreak havoc in the United States. And all of us have a responsibility to try to make sure that that doesn't happen. 42 And it's not only the U.S. Take a look at Israel. That's a nice ripe plum sitting on a tree ready for something like this. And western Europe, which is a sieve, is also very vulnerable. Second question is, given that we have the information that Sad- dam Hussein possesses these weapons and that he has used them against his enemies both in and out of Iraq, and that he is not com- plying with the U.N. sanctions to which he agreed, which would have allowed some comfort, what should we do? And by the way, I'll give you an opinion. I think Scott Ritter is a great American. I think the U.N. team has done a wonderful job, but give me the State of Pennsylvania to hide some biological weapons in and I'm just telling you I ain't going to find them. So I don't think that that can do the job fully. So I think we need to be prepared to act when Saddam Hussein gives us the next opportunity, which could be very, very soon. And our actions should be prioritized and focused on his threat to the U.S. and to the world. To do this, I see three separate, distinct, and prioritized steps to ensure our own safety, and the safety of the rest of the world. And they follow: First, I would announce—if I was the king—that if Iraq or any other nation uses these weapons of mass destruction causing severe casualties that the United States will destroy Iraq or that nation. And I'm not talking about killing people in Kenya. That requires specific responses and severe responses, but I'm talk- ing about killing a million people in Israel, or five million people in the U.S. The country has got to be responsible for what that country does. I'm old enough to remember World War II. We took the gloves off when we went over to Germany. We won that war and the Germans haven't attacked anybody in the past 50 or so years. Second, I would initiate all legal actions, both unilaterally and in conjunction with other nations to assist Saddam Hussein in meet- ing Allah. Subsequently, endeavor to integrate Iraq into the family of nations which I think would be pretty possible. You know they're potentially a very wealthy nation. What we're doing right now is killing the middle class, and we're not hurting Saddam Hussein or his buds. And, third, attack and bomb Iraq severely and sequentially to force it to accept the U.S. position if that becomes necessary. And that's the position they agreed to in 1991. You know Russia and France and China come into this equation. France is totally mercantile. They're just looking for commercial deals. And incidentally their Comset Company, I believe was one of the companies that integrated Iraq's air defense system prior to the Gulf War. Russia, for the reasons that I think Mr. Ritter men- tioned also, is involved in it. And I reckon we don't have to pay at- tention to either one of them. Russia can ruin itself. Well, they still have 20,000 nuclear weapons. Well, we've got a few and mutual as- sured destruction worked for a long time, and if it has to work again, it can. And it's a much diminished nation. China comes into the equation. I've been to China, the next time I go at the end of this month will be my tenth time since 1992, all in my business which is building power plants. Having nothing to do with the Department of Defense. And the Chinese like money. 43 I tell you what. They really like money. You scratch one of them, you got an entrepreneur and a commercial person. And they've got a $40 billion a year favorable balance of payments with the United States. They cannot do without that. That economy would crash and burn. They'd have to devalue the yen. They'd lose everything that they've achieved over the last few years. And Jiang Zemin I think is sincerely interested in improving the lot of the Chinese people. So I think that they would listen to reason and support what it is we would like them to support. And, incidentally, I think they know what's right. Now if we go bombing Saddam Hussein, it should be intense. And all I'm saying here is 44 TLAMS won't get it done. All that does is make people a little bit mad, but they know there's nothing coming behind it. So we have to prepare for an extensive bombing campaign. We can afford to do it. Incidentally, bombs that come out of airplanes cost maybe 5 to 1,500 bucks a piece, and those TLAMS cost a million bucks a piece. It doesn't take me very long to figure out which one you want to use. And in my first phase, I would hit all suspected special weapon sites. You're not going to get them all. That's not the point. I would hit the Presidential palaces, which I think is a contradiction in terms, that are suspected of being involved in the process. And I would suspect every single one of them was involved in the process. Heavy strikes on the Republican Guard. That would weaken Sad- dam Hussein. Heavy strikes on the Iraqi Air Force. Take out their ammo dumps, resupply depots, and things of that nature to seri- ously weaken their ability to reconstitute force. I would initially not attack the Iraq regular army hoping with a weakened Republican Guard and an Iraqi army relatively in shape, they'd go and take Saddam Hussein out. Incidentally, their army is in disastrous shape. They have not been able to do much since the Gulf War, so they ain't going to attack anybody except with these special weapons. If these efforts fail to bring agreement from Saddam Hussein, then we escalate by striking the infrastructure to include roads, bridges, ports, and other choke points, the electrical grid, their oil refining capability, which is as far as we went during the Gulf War. But then start taking out their oil wells, you know they took out 600 Kuwaiti oil wells. We didn't take any of their's out, so we could do that. And that begins to bleed him. He can't use the smug- gling which is going on there which is an art form in that part of the world by the way. They know how to do that stuff, and they do it all the time. Within each of the categories I talked about, there would be a host of targets that need to be analyzed. And the Pentagon knows how to do that. They're exceptionally good at that. There will be casualties on both sides. The United States seems extremely con- cerned about taking casualties in combat, yet we countenance 40,000 deaths on the highway every year and 20,000 murders every year. And I can't figure that out. If statistically, you try to get a norm, we can take quite a few casualties. And attacking them by air means you don't get a lot, you know, 20, 30, 40 people. And that's a shame for those 20, 30, or 40, but I recall briefing Presi- dent Bush just prior to the invasion of Panama, and the chairman 44 said to him at the time, "War is messy and you're going to get some people killed down there, but it's the right thing to do." And Presi- dent Bush, who was a man of towering integrity in my view, said we're going to go. That's how we knew that we got the mission to do it, just those few words. We got some problems. I think air power can do this job, frankly. I think it folds right in with what Paul would like to do and can be very supportive of what he would like to do. But if we got to the point where we had to put ground troops in there or anywhere else, we got a problem. You know I'm in the Army and I read the newspaper and the Army was 780 roughly thousand persons in 1991, now it's 495,000. We had 17 divisions and we have 10 divi- sions now. We had seven Army divisions to reinforce and two Ma- rine divisions to reinforce in the Persian Gulf War, and my point is we couldn't do Desert Storm today as we did it in 1991. We couldn't do it. And the funny thing is this has happened with almost no pub- licity, and that's been alluded to before. Every time I mention that to one of my civilian friends, I don't have very many, but they're surprised. They didn't know that. Nothing has come out in the press to make the American people aware of what we're doing through the military. And I remember we were getting ready for the draw-down after the Gulf War, Secretary Cheney, who is a man I also have towering respect for, said, "We screwed up the draw- down after every war in this century. Let's try and do it right this time." I don't think we did it right, and I don't think we're doing it right. All the services have been similarly reduced. Let's just consider the Army again, I'm a little bit biased, they've got forces in Korea, NATO, Hawaii, the Pacific, Bosnia, and Mac- edonia, and all around the world. We're taking on more missions. There's more deployments today than there ever has been before. It's affecting morale. It's affecting re-enlistment. And it's affecting recruiting. So my question is where will the ground troops come from to support any ground contingency? We've got a problem. And I submit to you that we have to be more effective in helping the active establishment and telling the Nation the story, and it's not all their fault, they are perforce muted. When I worked for Uncle Sam, there was very little I could say. There's still a lot of things I can't say because there are regu- lations about what tired old generals can say in public. There's lit- tle or no national publicity. Americans are unaware of how limited our capabilities are. This should be a major issue with the United States. We go out and buy $2 billion bombers and submarines that are really job programs, and we're not buying the sinews of war that we need to defend our own country. And let me tell you something bombing can do a lot but they can't win a war. You've got to have grunts to do that. You've got to have people willing to go in and God bless us, and P.X. Kelly said, "Where do we get such men?" And he's dead right. We got them and they can do the job. But they've got to be supported, and at the moment I don't think that they are. And I'm done. [The prepared statement of General Kelly can be found in the ap- pendix on page 83.] 45 The Chairman. Thank you, General. Mr. Eisenstadt, we'd like to hear from you. STATEMENT OF MICHAEL EISENSTADT, SENIOR FELLOW, WASHINGTON INSTITUTE FOR NEAR EAST POLICY Mr. Eisenstadt. Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, it is an honor to be here today before you to discuss this important issue. And I thank you for your invitation. I also want to say it's an honor to appear in a forum where Scott Ritter appeared. And to appear on a panel with General Kelly and Dr. Wolfowitz. U.S. policy toward Iraq is at a turning point. Decisions made in the coming weeks and months will affect American interests in the Middle East and the fate of the region for years to come. Unfortu- nately, there is no clear, obvious solutions to the dilemma Wash- ington faces in Iraq; rather, the United States faces the unenviable problem of choosing between bad and worse options. America's containment policy toward Iraq over the past 7 years has, despite repeated challenges, been reasonably successful at achieving minimal U.S. objectives. Specifically, limiting Baghdad's ability to threaten its neighbors or key U.S. interests. However, during the last crisis with Iraq that ended in February 1998, the U.S. apparently took two decisions that marked a major shift in American policy and that have effectively transformed the tradi- tional containment regime. First, it seems that the administration that it would cease, at least for the time being, employing the threat or use of force to compel Iraq to cease obstructing weapons inspections. Previously, Iraq had permitted weapons inspections only grudgingly and under duress, and they continued only so long, the weapons inspections continued only so long as Saddam believed that obstruction could lead to military retaliation by the United States. Without a credible threat of force, there will be no effective weapons inspections or weapons monitoring regime in Iraq period. Now the situation now prevailing following Baghdad's decision of August 5 to prevent any new inspections is reminiscent of the pe- riod prior to the 1991 Gulf War, when nuclear inspectors visited only declared nuclear sites, where of course nothing untoward was occurring. Iraq was thus able to hide a massive nuclear weapons program under the nose of blissfully ignorant inspectors. The ces- sation of inspections provides Iraq with greatly increased latitude for proscribed weapons development and production activities. Second, the creation of the "oil for food" program has trans- formed the sanctions regime. Prior to "oil for food," the United States denied Saddam income by preventing Iraq from exporting oil, although small quantities were permitted in a concession to Jordan and Turkey, who benefited from the limited transit trade through their territories. Now under "oil for food" Iraq is allowed to export nearly as much oil as it did before the 1991 Gulf War. Although I should mention it currently lacks the means to do so. But under these changed circumstances, the United States is rely- ing on the U.S. control of Iraqi oil revenues as the main means to keep Baghdad from rebuilding its military capabilities and regain- ing its former political influence. 46 However, controlling Iraq's oil revenues is only half the problem. The U.S. also needs to control the flow of imports into Iraq. In this regard, Washington's ability to prevent the smuggling of equipment and technology that Iraq could use to rebuild its surviving conven- tional and WMD infrastructure is limited, and will become more so as the amount of Iraqi imports grows under the "oil for food" pro- gram. Because of these loopholes in the sanctions regime, it is cru- cial that U.N. weapons inspectors be able to do their job so that smuggled items relevant to WMD programs might be discovered after they have entered the country. I think the best example of this was the discovery several years ago of gyroscopes from Russian missile systems that had made their way into Iraq via Jordan. If we didn't have U.N. weapons in- spectors in Iraq, we wouldn't have been able to recover those gyro- scopes once they were in the country. So the U.N. inspection re- gime is a backstop, if you will, for a leaky sanctions regime. And that's why it's so important that it continue. Now, some have claimed that Saddam cannot be compelled to cease obstructing weapons inspections. This just isn't true. In fact, experience over the past 7 years in Iraq shows that the threat or use of force has in fact been reasonably effective in achieving a va- riety of objectives: deterring Iraq from again invading Kuwait in October 1994; possibly continuing its thrust into northern Iraq be- yond the city of Irbil in September 1996; and compelling Iraq to cease obstructing U.N. weapons inspections on several occasions. Experience has shown, moreover, that Saddam does not take risks when the stability of his regime is at stake. Air and missile strikes targeting the organizations that constitute the pillars of his regime, and by the way, that are responsible for safeguarding Iraq's retained weapons of mass destruction capabilities would like- ly succeed, at least temporarily, in compelling Saddam to cease ob- structing weapons inspections. The strongest argument against a military option in Iraq is not that force will not succeed, but that this option is not politically sustainable, either domestically or internationally. According to this line of thinking, neither the American people nor our Arab Gulf allies will support military action, while the use of force could prompt Iraq to expel the weapons inspectors. It could produce a po- litical backlash in the Arab world that would further strain our re- lationship with our Arab Gulf allies; and perhaps even lead to the collapse of the sanctions regime. Now, I believe that this argument must be taken seriously, even if some of the assumptions it is based on are in my mind question- able. However, a U.S. military that eschews the use of force in sup- port of weapons inspections entails I believe even greater risks. The weapons inspections and monitoring regime will rapidly col- lapse. Iraq will be able to rebuild its military capabilities beyond current levels; and Saddam will be emboldened by his success in undermining the weapons inspection regime to seek ways to fur- ther undermine sanctions. Now, thus far the administration can point to one achievement that its current diplomatic approach that it has been pursuing since February has produced, and that's the passing of the U.N. Se- curity Council Resolution 1194, which freezes further sanctions re- 47 views until Baghdad allows UNSCOM to resume inspections. This resolution, however, will have no practical impact on efforts to con- tain Iraq, since there was no chance anyhow that sanctions would be lifted any time soon. The price paid for this modest achievement has been the suspension of weapons inspections. Now, I want to re- call that one of the reasons that some people offered in February for not using force against Iraq is that Baghdad would respond by expelling U.N. weapons inspectors. Here we are six, eight months later and this has come to pass anyhow, without Baghdad paying a price, and without Washington gaining any major benefit. In sum, we know from the past seven years, that containing Iraq requires an effective weapons inspection and sanctions regime. En- suring the effectiveness of these measures is difficult and exas- perating work, and entails certain costs. It requires the constant attention of senior policy-makers, the expenditure of large amounts of political capital, and the maintenance of a large, expensive for- ward military presence, which discomfits our allies and which must occasionally be used with or without their support. However, with all its drawbacks and contradictions, there is no other way to con- tain Iraq but by the approach that America has pursued in the past seven years: that is the reliance on both force and diplomacy to support weapons inspections and sanctions, combined with sup- port for opposition efforts to overthrow Saddam Hussein and his re- gime. The new approach that the administration has apparently adopt- ed is simply not a viable long-term approach for containing Iraq, since it denies weapons inspectors the military backing needed for them to be effective, and emphasizes the control of Iraqi revenues without addressing the difficult problem of monitoring rapidly in- creasing quantities of Iraqi imports. This approach will lead to the marginalization of UNSCOM and a further weakening of the con- tainment regime, inviting further challenges by an emboldened Saddam, and setting the stage for a new confrontation with Iraq, perhaps under less favorable circumstances for the United States. Thank you. [The prepared statement of Mr. Eisenstadt can be found in the appendix on page 79.] Mr. CHAIrMAN. Thank you. Any questions? Mr. Pickett? Mr. Pickett. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank our wit- nesses for their presentation today. I think it has been extremely helpful. I'm not sure that I feel comfortable about what direction we should take. And Dr. Wolfowitz, I wonder if you could comment on how important you believe that U.N. cooperation, or, at the very least, multilateral support among other nations, how important that is to what action the United States might take? Or do you be- lieve that the threat to the security of our country by Iraq is so im- minent that the United States should take unilateral action? Mr. WoLFowitz. I think that the degree of support we're going to get from other countries is very much a function of how serious they see us as being. And I think to some degree you have to lead, you have to take some degree of unilateral action if you want peo- ple to follow. And simply saying well, what do we all agree to and how can we compromise and water down here and there in order to get you on board leads to the kind of, I think, toothless resolu- 48 tion that we just got from the Security Council. It is consensus, but it's not a meaningful consensus. I think that the truth is in the beginning there really are only a handful of countries that we absolutely need to have. As a matter of fact, you can do an enormous amount just with the support of Kuwait alone. But I believe that if we begin to act in a serious way, for the reasons that I laid out, you would find a lot of countries wanting us to succeed who would begin to support us. And some other countries, like France and Russia, who would see the con- sequences to them if they oppose us, and would come on board. I think that's how the process would work. I think it's important to stress that it seems to me, and I don't know why this isn't said more often, that we have enormous au- thority from the United Nations to take action here because Sad- dam Hussein is unquestionably in material breech of the U.N. Se- curity Council Resolution 987 that ended the Gulf War. It brought a cease-fire to the Gulf War. By his actions, he has in effect rein- stated the resolution that called for achieving these objectives, as Congressman McHale said, by all necessary means. And I think people should be reminded that that is what he has done. He has re-instituted the state of war, and a state of war that was in effect created by U.N. resolution. I think, frankly, with all the respect, the enormous respect I have for Scott Ritter, and there's no question that people like him will in as determined as possible way pursue inspections, I think it's proven that even successful inspections are not the answer here. As a matter of fact, the original resolution in April 1991 didn't envision solving this problem through a continued game of hide-and-seek. Iraq was supposed to declare all of its programs, and the inspectors were supposed to go in and destroy them. And it seems to me it's been absolutely clear for the last six years that Iraq is in material violation of that provision as well. And I think if we keep on playing this game of hide-and-seek, of find this or that narrow violation, and fail to realize the magnitude of the problem, I think we're always going to be in a position where he has the initiative and we're on the retreat. Mr. Pickett. Just a final question, Mr. Chairman, I was one of those that was in Congress when we voted to give President Bush the authority to proceed in Iraq; and I voted to give him that au- thority. So I'm very much concerned about where we are now as a Nation. And my final question to you, Dr. Wolfowitz, is that do you think that the American public believes that the threat to our Nation's security by Iraq is sufficiently imminent that they would support unilateral action by our country at this time to move toward using force toward Iraq? Mr. WolfOWITz. I'm really hesitant—you're the expert much more than I am about what people think, but let me tell you how it comes across to me. What comes across to me is first of all, if one looks at that, I guess one would say that disastrous town meet- ing that was held in Columbus back in February, the comment that got the overwhelming applause, if that's a measure, from the audi- ence was that old veteran who said, "If we're going to do it this time, let's not go it half-ass, let's go in and finish the job." It was 49 very striking to me that at least in that gathering, and I think in a lot of opinion polls what the American people were hesitant about was indecisive action, that they would actually be more supportive, as would many of our friends in Middle East of decisive action. That's number one. Number two, I was really struck back at the time of the Gulf War by the extent to which the thinking that Congressman McHale presented was thinking that you could read in the opinion polls and you could hear from troops in the field. I went, as Under Sec- retary of Defense, paid a visit to the Gulf in October 1990. And we hadn't yet made a decision to use force. Every time you visited a unit, you realized you were talking to people, some of whom would be killed if force was used, it was a very, very emotionally loaded time. And I remember trying informally to ask soldiers and officers what their view was of the use of force against Kuwait. A totally unscientific poll, maybe got a dozen different opinions, but what really struck me was the ones who said this is about enforcing international law, or supporting the resolutions of the United Na- tions, would tend to say that's not worth American lives. But the ones who believed it was worth American lives are the ones who said, and some of them very simple soldiers, "If we don't do this job today, our buddies are going to have to do a much bigger job some time in the future." And there was a poll taken in November 1990 in which the American public basically made it clear if the war was about Iraqi nuclear weapons, they were overwhelmingly in favor. If the war was, in Baker's infamous words, about "Jobs, jobs, jobs," that wasn't something to go to war for. I thought they showed enormous common sense because I agree with Congressman McHale, what you go to war for is to prevent a bigger threat in the future. And I guess that's my final point. I think if the administration would do a little more public education of the kind that Secretary Cohen did for a little while on television, and just bring out the fact we can't prove it, but there is all kind of reasons to suspect connec- tions between the Iraqis and this Osama Bin Laden fellow. You don't have to wait for Iraq to have ballistic missiles for this to be a threat to the United States, to our own people. And it takes some explaining, but I guess what impresses me, sorry, one last comment. It was referred to that we're "casualty sensitive." Well, yes, when people were killed in Somalia in a situa- tion where the American people thought we had gone there to feed starving people, and they wake up a few months later, and find these supposedly starving people are dragging Americans through the street, they're "casualty sensitive." But when people were killed in the Gulf War, when people were killed in Khobar Towers, there was no outcry of saying why are we there? I think when its under- stood what the purpose is, I think the American people have an enormous ability to support serious action at serious cost. But, as I say, I'm speaking to the experts. You people know that better than I. And by the way, I realize you're on the Democratic side of the aisle, I applaud you for supporting the President back then. I hope in nothing I said did I imply—the Congress did sup- port the President Mr. Pickett. Two hundred and fifty-two votes, as I recall. 50 Mr. WolfowITZ. It was a very near run thing. And, in fact, I think it's a matter of record that my boss, who I admire enor- mously, Dick Cheney, who was a former Congressman, thought it's too risky a vote to take. And I think one of many decisions where Bush decided it was better to take the risk and have the support of the Congress behind him and it was decisive. But I think the mood up here is more supportive of decisive action now than it was then. Mr. Pickett. I suppose what just troubles me is back when the Gulf War was going to be taking place, the invasion of Kuwait was a tangible, objective, international incident that you could focus on, and it was an obvious violation of borders and it propelled a lot of emotion. But I sense in talking with people today, it's hard to get them to think that Iraq is just the U.S.'s problem. They see it as one where it's a long way from the United States to Iraq, and there are a lot of other people in between that should be more concerned about this than we are. And I don't know how deep that goes, but I don't sense that the feeling is as strong today as it was back in 1990. Thank you very much. I appreciate so much your being here. Mr. Wolfowitz. Thank you. Mr. Chairman. Mr. McHale? Mr. McHale. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. As I was listening to the earlier dialogue, I thought of the story that President Kennedy used to tell of the French general who looked out the window and said, "There go my people. I must follow them. I am their leader." I can't imagine that Harry Truman would have sent George Mar- shall out to conduct a town meeting prior to potential military ac- tion. These are not the kinds of issues where you take a poll, and are guided inevitably by the outcome of the data that you compile. These are the kinds of issues that require leadership. These are the kinds of issues that require we who are elective office to step for- ward and say to our constituents, "You may not realize that we have a problem, but there's one out there. This is why it's impor- tant to you and your family. And this is the action that we need to take to address it." It's very different from a focus group, poll- driven kind of policy that simply says, "There go my people. I must follow them. I am their leader." While we as a Nation are absorbed in domestic political matters, I think the world has become far, far more dangerous than it was just a year ago. I can remember listening to the President say, sev- eral years ago, that we as a Nation would not tolerate a North Ko- rean nuclear capability. We took steps to avoid that. It appears at this stage that those steps were not effective. We face an imminent problem in Kosovo in terms of Milosevic's continuing brutality in that part of the world. And we face the question of whether or not we will be sufficiently firm in our resolve to accomplish at least one of the three strategic goals that I saw as a purpose of the Gulf War for which Americans fought and died. I, too, have enormous respect for Scott Ritter. I think you heard me express that while he was in the room. But I was dubious about his answer concerning the continuing utility of inspections. I be- lieve that no matter how many Scott Ritters, men and women of extraordinary integrity and confidence we might have in Iraq con- 51 ducting inspections and attempting to rein in that regime, until we are rid of Saddam Hussein we will have a continuing problem. It is the nature of his brutality. It is the nature of his terror. I believe it has to be the publicly stated policy of the United States that we will do what we have to do to remove that threat from the world scene. I think the specific tactical measures that you have proposed have merit, and I think we should move in that direction. But it will require leadership from both the executive and legislative branches of government to educate and convince the world that weapons of mass destruction in the hands of Saddam Hussein pose a continuing threat, perhaps on a 6-month fuse, as Scott Ritter de- scribed it to the entire world and certainly to the Middle East. The last thing we ought to do is simply take a poll and follow the outcome. Gentleman, I'd welcome your comments. Forgive the speech that I inflicted upon you but I feel very strongly about this. The world is extremely dangerous. There are conflicts on the horizon. There are threats to our national security, and in at least three different regions, in my judgment, we are failing to respond. General Kelly. If I could add just one reason to that. I think the most dangerous place on earth is South Asia. We just had two na- tions there detonate atomic weapons. It is possible for them to go to war with each other. If they did and we wanted to intervene just to get Americans out, I don't think we've got the force structure to do it. And, incidentally, I think the American people are ahead of the Government many, many times. I think that the threat of ter- rorism around the world is understood clearly by them, and I don't know where they take these polls but I suspect that a lot of them are in Beverly Hills. Mr. WolfowITz. I would just say, "Amen." And just as I believe that weakness in one area affects another, if we think that Saddam Hussein and the North Koreans aren't talking to one another, I think we're dreaming. But strength in one area sets an example elsewhere. If you go back and look at the history of our dealings with North Korea, one of the few concessions they ever made to us were in late 1991 and early 1992 when they first agreed to inspec- tions. And there are different theories about why this happened be- cause there were multiple causes, but I was convinced that one of the reasons was because they saw what we were doing in terms of dismantling Iraqi weapons of mass destruction capability, and they were trying to wriggle out from under that. Unfortunately, now they can see that even the Iraqis don't have to worry too much. I think if we could get serious, and I believe the public would sup- port it, in one place, it would begin to have possible ripple effects elsewhere. Mr. McHale. And I agree with that completely. I think strength shown in one area has deterrent effect in others. And I think we hit a low point in terms of the formulation of modern American pol- icy when we conducted a town meeting in Columbus. And that's not a criticism of those who participated in that town meeting. I have an extremely high regard for the individuals who were on that stage. They should never have been on that stage. We should 53 Maybe that's why they're backing down when they have these problems with the inspection teams because they realize they can't carry through with the type action that would be required if they tried to meet the bluff. And that concerned me a great deal too. And I agree with what you've said, gentlemen, that we should do something. And as I suggested earlier, some people are thinking that we will be done now because of what Scott Ritter has done and brought this whole thing into focus, and it's going to be called the October Surprise. The administration is going to have to do something now. And they might save it for the October timeframe and go from there. Who knows? But in any event, we appreciate your contribution in our delib- erations, and thank you again on behalf of the rest of the com- mittee. Thank you. General Kelly. Thank you. Mr. Wolfowitz. Thank you. Mr. Eisenstadt. Thank you. General Kelly. Not all generals look out the window and get be- hind the people. [Laughter.] [Whereupon, at 1:10 p.m., the committee adjourned subject to the call of the Chair.] APPENDIX September 16, 1998 59 reformers, to form a new government under former Foreign Minister Primakov ("PREE-ma-kov"), a man best known for his ardent nationalism and warm relations with America's adversaries in the Middle East. Russia's economic collapse raises the specter of increased chaos or dictatorship - and in a country that still possesses thousands of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles. • And in Iraq, Saddam Hussein is as close to slipping out of his "box" as he has been since the Gulf War ended in 1991. Saddam may be only months away from developing the chemical and biological weapons of mass destruction that we have sought to keep out of his hands. And, as we will hear shortly, the viability of the United Nations inspection regime is very much in doubt. These events ought to be disconcerting to all Americans. For years I have argued that while we no longer face the world-wide threat posed by the former Soviet Union, the post-Cold War world was proving to be a complex, chaotic and violent place. When you further consider the force reductions and budget cuts that the 3 Department of Defense has had to absorb over the past decade, our ability to protect our global national security interests is increasingly open to question. In light of these recent events, it is certainly appropriate to begin the committee's end-of-session review by discussing our strategy and policy toward Iraq. Coming on the heels of the collapse of the Soviet empire, the coalition victory over Iraq in the 1991 Gulf War seemed to hold the promise of a new era. Our crushing defeat of the Iraqi army seemed to codify America's standing as the world's "sole superpower." Eight years later, the promise of those heady days has not been fulfilled, and our troubles with Saddam Hussein seem to reflect our troubles elsewhere in the world. The past eight years have seen Saddam increasingly able to claw his way out of his diplomatic, economic, military and strategic isolation. Despite the devastation it suffered during Desert Storm, the Iraqi military still maintains significant capabilities. And if Saddam finally succeeds 61 in creating and fielding an arsenal of chemical or biological weapons - in perhaps as little as six months — he will pose an even larger threat to the region and to American interests. In recent weeks, the Administration has tried to make the case that Saddam remains boxed in and isolated. Beyond such rhetoric, I find myself more interested in (and certainly more concerned with) the fact that the Saudis and our other allies in the region have distanced themselves from us over the years. I am also concerned with the fact that we have drawn down our force levels in recent months - not in reaction to Saddam's improved behavior, but because of the serious strain that constant deployments is having on an already overextended U.S. military. A reduced military presence and allies who have begun to hedge their bets - these are neither encouraging signs, nor signs of strength. It would appear that Saddam with a lot of patience and persistence, may be slowly but surely gaining the upper hand in this seven year standoff. 5 63 Following Mr. Ritter's testimony and members' questions, we will hear from a second panel of experts to help us understand the broader strategic context of America's policy in Iraq. Our second panel of witnesses will be: • Paul Wolfowitz, former Undersecretary of Defense for Policy; •Lieutenant General Thomas Kelly (retired, U.S. Army), director of operations for the Joint Staff during Desert Storm; • Michael Eisenstadt ("EYES-en-stat"), an analyst with the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. Altogether, our two panels bring great experience and perspective to our discussion today. 7 64 Before we begin, let me call upon the Committee's Ranking Democrat, Mr. Skelton, for any remarks he may have. [Skelton remarks] Without objection, the prepared materials of all our witnesses will be included for the record. Mr. Ritter, welcome, and please begin. [Ritter testimony] We will now hear from our second panel of experts. It's a pleasure to welcome all three of you gentlemen and I look forward to your testimony. Secretary Wolfowitz, let's begin with you, then General Kelly and Mr. Eisenstadt. 8 65 OPENING STATEMENT HON. IKE SKELTON, MC RANKING DEMOCRAT, HOUSE NATIONAL SECURITY COMMITTEE U.S.-IRAQ POLICY September 16,1998 MR. CHAIRMAN, I JOIN YOU IN WELCOMING OUR WITNESSES TODAY: MR. SCOTT RITTER, RETIRED LTG TOM KELLY, AMBASSADOR PAUL WOLFOWITZ, AND MR. MICHAEL EISENSTADT. WE ARE HERE TODAY TO EXAMINE UNITED STATES POLICY TOWARDS IRAQ. THERE ARE TWO LEVELS TO THE HEARING TODAY, TACTICAL AND STRATEGIC. AT THE TACTICAL LEVEL, WE WILL EXAMINE THE SPECIFIC ISSUE OF WHETHER THE ADMINISTRATION HAS BEEN PROVIDING ADEQUATE SUPPORT TO THE UNITED NATIONS SPECIAL COMMISSION ON IRAQ (UNSCOM) THAT IS NEEDED FOR IT TO ACCOMPLISH ITS MISSION. THIS EXAMINATION COMES AS A RESULT OF THE DECISION MR. RITTER TOOK ON AUGUST 26 TO RESIGN AS THE CHIEF WEAPONS INSPECTOR FOR UNSCOM TO PROTEST WHAT HE DESCRIBED AS THE ADMINISTRATION'S FAILURE TO SUPPORT UNSCOM. AT THE STRATEGIC LEVEL, WE HAVE GENERAL KELLY, AMBASSADOR WOLFOWITZ, AND MR. EISENSTADT TO HELP US ON THE BROADER ISSUE OF OUR POLICY TOWARD IRAQ - DIPLOMATIC, ECONOMIC, MILITARY, AND COVERT. I WILL BE INTERESTED TO SEE 1 66 WHAT RECOMMENDATIONS THEY WOULD MAKE TO IMPROVE OUR CURRENT POLICY. IF OUR CURRENT POLICY CAN BE DESCRIBED AS ONE OF CONTAINMENT, WHAT RECOMMENDATIONS WOULD THEY PROPOSE TO SHORE IT UP? IF THEY WOULD PROPOSE AN ALTERNATE POLICY OF REMOVAL - OUSTING SADDAM HUSSEIN AND HIS REGIME FROM POWER - WHAT ARE THE ELEMENTS ASSOCIATED WITH THAT POLICY? I KNOW AMBASSADOR WOLFOWITZ WAS PART OF A GROUP WHICH PROPOSED SUCH A COURSE EARLIER THIS YEAR. I HOPE HE CAN EXPLAIN HOW WE COULD REMOVE SADDAM HUSSEIN FROM POWER TODAY CONSIDERING THAT WE WERE UNABLE TO DO SO AFTER HAVING FOUGHT A MAJOR WAR AGAINST HIM SEVEN YEARS AGO. SINCE THE END OF THE GULF WAR U.S. POLICY HAS BEEN TO WORK THROUGH THE UNITED NATIONS TO CONTAIN IRAQ THROUGH: 1. INSPECTIONS BY UNSCOM TO DISARM IRAQ OF ITS CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL, AND BALLISTIC MISSILE WEAPONS; 2. INSPECTIONS BY THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY (IAEA) TO ACCOMPLISH THE SAME TASKS WITH RESPECT TO NUCLEAR WEAPONS; AND 3. ECONOMIC SANCTIONS TO FORCE IRAQI COMPLIANCE WITH THE TWO INSPECTION EFFORTS. AT BOTH THE TACTICAL AND THE STRATEGIC LEVELS, THE POLICY TOWARDS IRAQ HAS ENCOUNTERED DIFFICULTIES. AT THE TACTICAL LEVEL, WHERE MR. RITTER AND HIS COLLEAGUES HAVE 2 67 FOUND THEMSELVES, WE KNOW ABOUT THE EFFORTS OF THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT TO INTERFERE WITH AND STOP UNSCOM INSPECTIONS. THE LATEST SUCH EVENT OCCURRED ON AUGUST 3rd WHEN DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER TARIQ AZIZ ANNOUNCED THAT IRAQ WOULD CEASE COOPERATING WITH UNSCOM. AT THE STRATEGIC LEVEL, WHERE THE PRESIDENT, THE SECRETARY OF STATE, AND OTHER SENIOR POLICY MAKERS OPERATE, THE DIFFICULTIES ENCOUNTERED ARE OF A GREATER MAGNITUDE. SINCE THE END OF THE GULF WAR, WE KNOW THAT THE PERMANENT MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL HAVE BEEN DIVIDED ABOUT THE PROPER COURSE TO PURSUE WITH REGARD TO IRAQ. THE UNITED STATES AND BRITAIN, STAUNCHLY SUPPORTED THE WORK OF UNSCOM AND PROMOTED A TOUGH POLICY ON MAINTAINING ECONOMIC SANCTIONS. FRANCE, RUSSIA, AND CHINA, HAVE BEEN LESS SUPPORTIVE OF THOSE EFFORTS. SOME OF OUR ARAB FRIENDS RELIEVE THERE IS AN INCONSISTENCY BETWEEN OUR TOUGH POSITION TOWARDS IRAQ AND OUR CAUTIOUS EFFORTS TO PROMOTE THE PEACE PROCESS BETWEEN ISREAL AND THE PALESTINIANS. SIMPLY PUT, WE SIMPLY DO NOT HAVE THE ALLIES, THE INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT, THAT WE HAD SEVEN YEARS AGO. SANCTIONS FATIGUE HAS SET IN. I BELIEVE THAT WHAT WE HAVE SEEN OVER THE PAST FEW MONTHS IS AN EFFORT TO TRY TO REBUILD THAT UNITY. THAT HAS 3 68 MANIFESTED ITSELF IN A WILLINGNESS TO TAKE ONE STEP BACK ON THE INSPECTIONS EFFORT IN ORDER TO GET GREATER UNITY ON THE SECURITY COUNCIL. AS A RESULT OF THAT SHIFT IN COURSE, LAST WEDNESDAY THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL VOTED 15-0 TO SUSPEND PERIODIC REVIEWS OF THE SANCTIONS PLACED UPON IRAQ AFTER THE 1991 WAR. THOSE REVIEWS WILL NOT OCCUR UNTIL IRAQ RESUMES COOPERATION WITH U.N. ARMS INSPECTORS. THIS IS AN IMPORTANT STEP IN THE EFFORT TO RE-BUILD SUPPORT WITHIN THE SECURITY COUNCIL. BUT IT IS ONLY ONE STEP IN A SERIES OF ACTIONS THAT WILL BE REQUIRED TO GET FULL COMPLIANCE BY IRAQ. HOWEVER, NO ONE IN THIS ROOM SHOULD BE UNDER ANY ILLUSION THAT THE GOAL OF DISARMING IRAQ WILL EITHER BE EASY OR QUICK. WE HAVE ALREADY HAD SEVEN YEARS EXPERIENCE IN THIS EFFORT. THE PROBLEM THAT WE HAVE IS THAT THERE ARE NO GOOD OPTIONS. MR. RITTER SERVED AS AN ARMS INSPECTOR FOR UNSCOM OVER THE PAST SEVEN YEARS UNTIL HIS RESIGNATION IN LATE AUGUST. DURING THAT PERIOD, HE AND HIS COLLEAGUES SOUGHT TO CARRY OUT THE UNITED NATION'S MANDATE TO RID IRAQ OF ITS WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION. THEY SERVED THAT GOAL WITH SKILL, DETERMINATION, DEDICATION, AND PERSONAL VALOR. THEIR JOB 4 69 HAS BEEN A VERY TOUGH ONE, AND THEY HAVE ATTEMPTED TO FULFILL IT UNDER THE MOST DIFFICULT CIRCUMSTANCES. UNSCOM AND THE IAEA HAVE FORCED THE DESTRUCTION OF MORE IRAQI WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION CAPABILITY THAN WAS DESTROYED DURING THE GULF WAR. MR. RITTER, WE SALUTE THE WORK YOU AND YOUR FORMER COLLEAGUES HAVE DONE OVER THE PAST SEVEN YEARS. BY YOUR DECISION TO RESIGN FROM UNSCOM, ONE THAT I KNOW YOU DID NOT TAKE LIGHTLY, YOU HAVE INDEED PRECIPITATED A GENERAL DEBATE CONCERNING OUR POLICY TOWARD IRAQ. WE WILL LISTEN CAREFULLY TO YOU AND THOSE WHO FOLLOW YOU TODAY. OUR COLLECTIVE EFFORT MUST ENSURE THAT IRAQ NOT BE ABLE TO MENACE ITS NEIGHBORS, NOT BE ABLE TO REBUILD ITS MILITARY CAPABILITIES, AND NOT BE ABLE TO THREATEN VITAL U.S. INTERESTS IN THE REGION. GENTLEMEN WE LOOK FORWARD TO YOUR TESTIMONY. 71 government and the Clinton Administration may be sending mixed messages to Iraq, and for that matter the world, by directing U.N. weapons inspectors not to follow through on inspections is to say the least very troubling. The bottom line is this, the United States must immediately take steps to demonstrate our resolve to have Iraq comply with U.N. weapons inspections. Mr. Chairman, on August 6, 1998 I introduced H.Res. 519 which states the sense of the Congress that the United States Representative to the United Nations vehemently oppose any efforts to weaken the inspections in Iraq as long as there is evidence that the government of Iraq is seeking to develop or acquire weapons of mass destruction and is seeking the means of delivering them. H.Res. 519 also insists that Iraq comply with missile inspections by calling for the international agencies charged with inspections in Iraq—the International Atomic Energy Agency and the United Nations Special Commission to continue to maintain complete inspections, including surprise inspections, within Iraq. Mr. Ritter has stated, "the illusion of arms control is more dangerous then no arms control at all." I could not agree more. This is a critical national defense and foreign policy issue. If the administration will not pay attention we in Congress must make them pay attention. 72 News Release September 16, 1998 Statement of Scott Ritter September 16, 1998 at For Information: Matthew L. Lifflander 29* Floor, 30 Rockefeller Plaza New York, New York 10112 Telephone: (212) 698 - 7777 Facsimile: (212) 698 - 7825 e-mail: mll@rubinbaum.com United States House of Representatives Hearing of the Committee on National Security Room 2118 Rayburn House Office Building, Washington, DC Thank you very much for inviting me to appear before you to discuss important issues pertaining to U.S. policy toward Iraq. I chose to resign from my position with the Special Commission in hope that in so doing I would precipitate a general debate concerning the direction of U.S. foreign policy toward Iraq, whether this stated policy furthered the goals of disarming Iraq in accordance with Security Council resolutions, and whether the policy toward Iraq as practiced matched those stated objectives. Recendy the U.S. policy goal toward Iraq was stated as seeking to deny Iraq the capacity ever again to threaten international peace and security. To achieve this end, the U.S. supported a two-pronged approach, with one prong seeking to support inspections by the United Nations Special Commission and the International Atomic Energy Agency to carry out disarmament, monitoring and verification inspections in Iraq, and the other prong seeking to maintain economic sanctions, because such sanctions "create an incentive for Iraq to comply with weapons inspection and monitoring activities." This policy of the U.S. is praiseworthy — its implementation is inconsistent and ineffective. As I speak to you today, Iraq has suspended cooperation with the inspectors of the Special Commission and the International Atomic Energy Agency. As a result, there are today no meaningful inspections taking place in Iraq. Iraq is not being disarmed as required by the U.N. at the end of the Persian Gulf War. over... 75 Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the invitation to testify before this distinguished committee on the important subject of U.S. policy toward Iraq. It is always an honor to appear before this committee, but it is particularly an honor to appear as part of a hearing in which Scott Ritter testifies. Scott Ritter is a public servant of exceptional integrity and moral courage, one of those individuals who is not afraid to speak the truth, even if powerful people are offended. As an intelligence officer at CENTCOM during the Gulf War, he refused to submit reports that would have substantiated claims made by senior officers in briefings, even though he was pressured to do so, because he knew those claims to be untrue. Now he is speaking the truth about the failures of the U.N. inspection regime in Iraq, even though those truths are embarrassing to senior officials in the Clinton Administration. And the pressures he is being subjected to arc far worse. After first trying to smear his character with anonymous leaks, the Administration then took to charging that Mr. Ritter doesn't "have a clue" about U.S. policy toward Iraq and saying that his criticisms were playing into Saddam Hussein's hands by impugning UNSCOM's independence. In fact, it is hard to know what U.S. policy is toward Iraq because it is such a muddle of confusion and pretense. Apparently, the Administration makes a distinction between telling Ambassador Butler not to conduct an inspection and telling him that the time is inopportune for a confrontation with Iraq and that the United States is not in a position to back up UNSCOM. That kind of hair-splitting only further convinces both our friends and adversaries in the Middle East that we are not serious and that our policy is collapsing. It is only reinforced when they sec us going through semantic contortions to explain that North Korea is not in violation of the Framework Agreement or when they see us failing to act on the warnings that we have given to North Korea or to Milosevic or to Saddam Hussein. The problem with American policy toward Iraq is not that Scott Ritter has made clear what everyone knew all along, that UNSCOM could not function without strong American backing, but that the Administration is engaged in a game of pretending that everything is fine, that Saddam Hussein remains within a "strategic box" and if he tries to break out "our response will be swift and strong." The fact is that it has now been 42 days since there have been any weapons inspections in Iraq and the swift and strong response that the Administration threatened at the time of the Kofi Annan agreement earlier this year is nowhere to be seen. Recently a senior official in a friendly Arab government complained to me that the United States attaches great store to symbolic votes by the Non-Aligned Movement 76 on the "no fly zone" in Southern Iraq, while doing nothing at all to deal with the heart of the problem which is Saddam Hussein himself. To be fair, the best opportunity to deal with Saddam Hussein was in the immediate aftermath of the U.S. victory in the Gulf War. As an official in the Bush Administration, 1 believed then and I believe now that it was a mistake not to have paid more attention to the Saudis and other friends in the region who told us at the time that it was important to deal with Saddam Hussein. However, to be fair to President Bush, he had enormous difficulty convincing Congress to go to war for the more limited goal of forcing Iraqi forces out of Kuwait and it is difficult, and sometimes dangerous, to hastily change your military goals in the wake of an unexpected success. Moreover, it was wrong but not unreasonable to suppose that Saddam Hussein would not last long after a military defeat of the magnitude that Iraq suffered. To President Bush's credit, American policy stiffened substantially within a month after the end of the war. Major opportunities were lost during that month, during which Saddam crushed the uprisings in Northern and Southern Iraq. But win tin a few weeks the United States did undertake Operation Provide Comfort, which drove Iraqi forces out of Northern Iraq and kept them out for five years until the collapse of Clinton Administration policy in 1996. And President Bush undertook to support UNSCOM inspections with die threat of U.S. force, including the deployment of U.S. aircraft to the Gulf, a policy which has now collapsed also. To pretend in the midst of all of this that the decision of the Security Council to suspend periodic review of the sanctions on Iraq constitutes a serious setback for Saddam Hussein, who now finds himself free to reconstitute his prohibited weapons capabilities without fear of intrusive inspections, simply exposes US policy to further contempt and ridicule. The heart of the problem is that the United States is unable or unwilling to pursue a serious policy in Iraq, one that would aim at liberating the Iraqi people from Saddam's tyrannical grasp and free Iraq's neighbors from Saddam's murderous threats. Such a policy, but only such a policy, would gain real support from our friends in the region. And it might eventually even gain the respect of many of our critics who are able to see that Saddam inflicts horrendous suffering on the Iraqi people, but who see U.S. policy making that suffering worse through sanctions while doing nothing about Saddam. Administration officials continue to claim, as Assistant Secretary Martin Indyk did in testimony to the Senate last week, that the only alternative to maintaining the unity of the UN Security Council is to send U.S. forces to Baghdad. This is wrong. As has been said repeatedly in letters and testimony to the President and the Congress by myself and other former defense officials, including two former Secretaries of Defense, and a former Director of Central Intelligence, the key lies not in marching U.S. soldiers to Baghdad, but in helping the Iraqi people to liberate themselves from Saddam. Saddam's main strength - his ability to control his people through extreme terror - is also his greatest vulnerability. The overwhelming majority of his people, 77 3 including some of his closest associates, would like to be free of his grasp if only they could safely do so. As the recent account of a defector from Saddam's nuclear program makes clear, even Iraqis who help Saddam build nuclear weapons can't escape from the constant threat of torture and death, for their families as well as themselves. A strategy for supporting this enormous latent opposition to Saddam requires political and economic as well as military components. It is admittedly more complicated than launching a few cruise missile attacks. Perhaps it is more complicated than this Administration can manage, but it is eminently possible for a country that possesses the overwhelming power that the United States has in the Qulf. The heart of such action would be to create a liberated zone in Southern Iraq comparable to what the United States and its partners did so successfully in the North in Operation Provide Comfort in 1991. Establishing a safe protected zone in the South where opposition to Saddam could rally and organize, would make it possible: • For a provisional government of free Iraq to organize, begin to gain international recognition and begin to publicize a political program for the future of Iraq; • For that provisional government to control the largest oil field in Iraq and make available to it, under some kind of appropriate international supervision, enormous financial resources for political, humanitarian and eventually military purposes; • Provide a safe area to which Iraqi army units could rally in opposition to Saddam, leading to the liberation of more and more of the country and the unraveling of the regime. This would be a formidable undertaking, and certainly not one which will work if we insist on maintaining the unity of the U.N. Security Council. But once it began it would begin to change the calculations of Saddam's opponents and supporters - both inside and outside the country - in decisive ways. One Arab official in the Gulf told me that the effect inside Iraq of such a strategy would be "devastating" to Saddam. But the effect outside would be powerful as well. Our friends in the Gulf, who fear Saddam but who also fear ineffective American action against him, would see that this is a very different American policy, one that can rid them of the danger that Saddam poses. And Saddam's supporters in the Security Council - in particular France and Russia - would suddenly see a different prospect before them. Instead of lucrative oil production contracts with the Saddam Hussein regime, they would now have to calculate the economic and commercial opportunities that would come from ingratiating themselves with the future government of Iraq. The Administration repeatedly makes excuses for its own weakness by arguing that the coalition against Saddam is not what it was seven years ago. But in fact, that coalition didn't exist at all when Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait. The United States, under George Bush's leadership, put that coalition together by demonstrating that we had the strength and the seriousness of purpose to carry through to an effective conclusion. President Bush made good on those commitments despite powerful 80 First, it seems that the Administration decided that it would cease, at least for the time being, employing the threat or use of force to compel Iraq to cease obstructing weapons inspections. This became clear from the lack of an American military response (not even a modest force buildup) to Baghdad's August 5 decision to halt all further weapons inspections and to permit monitoring only at declared facilities in Iraq — despite the fact that last February U.S. officials warned that such obstruction would be met with firmness. Iraq has permitted weapons inspections only grudgingly, and under duress, and they continued only so long as Saddam believed that obstruction could lead to military retaliation by the United States. Without a credible threat of force, there will be no effective weapons inspection or weapons monitoring regime in Iraq. The situation now prevailing following Baghdad's decision of August 5 is reminiscent of the period prior to the 1991 Gulf War, when nuclear inspectors visited only declared nuclear sites — where of course nothing untoward was occurring. Iraq was thus able to hide a massive nuclear weapons program under the nose of blissfully ignorant inspectors. The cessation of inspections provides Iraq with greatly increased latitude for proscribed weapons development and production activities. Meanwhile, if UNSCOM remains inactive for a protracted period, the best people working for that organization will leave and it will gradually lose its effectiveness. Second, the creation of the "oil for food" program has transformed the sanctions regime. Prior to "oil for food," the United States denied Saddam income by preventing Iraq from exporting oil (in fact small quantities were permitted in a concession to Jordan and Turkey, who benefitted from this limited trade). Under "oil for food," Iraq is allowed to export nearly as much oil as it did before the 1991 Gulf War (though it lacks the means to do so at this point) and to import equipment for its oil, telecommunications, and transport infrastructure to enable it to meet its new export ceilings. Under these changed circumstances, the United States is relying on the UN's control of Iraqi oil revenues as the main means to keep Baghdad from rebuilding its military capabilities and regaining its former political influence. However, controlling Iraq's revenues addresses only half the problem; the U.S. also needs to control the flow of imports into Iraq. While Iraq cannot smuggle in major military items such as tanks and aircraft, Washington's ability to prevent the smuggling of equipment and technology that Iraq could use to rebuild its surviving conventional military and WMD infrastructure is limited, and will become more so as the amount of Iraqi imports grow under the "oil for food" program. The small number of overworked and inadequately trained and equipped inspectors now on the Jordan-Iraq border cannot effectively screen hundreds of trucks carrying thousands of items into Iraq daily, nor can they be expected to distinguish banned tank parts from permitted truck parts, or to identify mislabeled crates. And what about the borders with Syria and Turkey, where there are no inspectors? Because of these loopholes in the sanctions regime, it is crucial that UN Special Commission (UNSCOM) weapons inspectors be able to do their job, so that smuggled it;ms relevant to WMD programs might l e ,1'scovered after they have entered the country. 2 82 reviews until Baghdad allows UNSCOM to resume inspections. This resolution, however, will have no practical impact on efforts to contain Iraq, since there was no chance that sanctions would be lifted anytime soon. (Though if this resolution succeeds in provoking Saddam to take some rash step to unites the international community behind the United States, and provides Washington with greater latitude to pursue its diplomatic and military options, the policy shift will merit a more favorable judgement). Moreover, the price paid has been the suspension weapons inspections regime. A major reason offered in February for not using force against Iraq was that Baghdad would respond by expelling UN weapons inspectors. This has now come to pass anyway, without Baghdad paying a price, and without Washington garnering any major benefits. Some have suggested that the U.S. could conduct periodic limited military strikes to prevent the reconstitution of Iraq's WMD capabilities. However, in light of past experience, the U.S. is unlikely to have sufficiently detailed intelligence to do so effectively; there is no reason to believe that there will be greater political support for these kinds of military operations in the future than there have been in the past; and the possibility that attacks on WMD facilities could produce massive civilian casualties resulting from the release of chemical or biological agents into the atmosphere, are likely to cause the U.S. to eschew such a course of action, in favor of a policy of deterring Iraq. However, as past experience has shown, deterring Saddam is an uncertain proposition. Saddam has twice plunged the region into war through miscalculation — and it seems very likely that if allowed to rebuild his capabilities even partially, he will do so again. In sum, we know from the past seven years, that containing Iraq requires an effective weapons inspection and sanctions regime. Ensuring the effectiveness of these measures is difficult and exasperating work, and entails certain costs. It requires the constant attention of senior policy makers, the expenditure of large amounts of political capital, and the maintenance of a large, expensive forward military presence which discomfits our allies and which must occasionally be used — with or without their support. However, with all its drawbacks and contradictions, there is no other way to contain Iraq but by the approach that America has pursued the past seven years: the reliance on both force and diplomacy to support weapons inspections and sanctions, combined with support for opposition efforts to overthrow Saddam and his regime. The new approach that the Administration has apparently adopted is simply not a viable long-term approach for containing Iraq, since it denies weapons inspectors the military backing needed to be effective, and emphasizes the control of Iraqi revenues without addressing the difficult problem of monitoring rapidly increasing quantities of Iraqi imports. This approach will lead to the marginalization of UNSCOM and a further weakening of the containment regime, inviting further challenges by an emboldened Saddam, and setting the stage for a new confrontation with Iraq — perhaps under less favorable circumstances for the United States. 4 83 Testimony before The House Nat. Security Comm. 16 Sept. 1998 IRAQ and WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION What should the U.S. do? (What are our GOALS and what STRATEGY should we use to achieve them?) Question: Do we believe / know whether Iraq possesses these weapons of mass destruction (Biological, Chemical & Nuclear)? A: YES. Intelligence shows (as gleaned from the open press) that Saddam Hussain possesses these weapons in abundance, especially biological and chemical. IT IS ASSERTED THAT HE HAS SUFFICIENT OF THEM TO KILL EVERYONE ON EARTH. & NO delivery system needed - - SCARY! Question: Given that we have information that Saddam Hussain possesses these weapons and that he has used them against his enemies, both in Iraq and in other nations, and that Iraq is not complying with the U.N. sanctions {to which they agreed in 1991} 84 which would allow the world to have some comfort with regard to this threat, WHAT SHOULD WE DO? NOTE: What can the UN inspectors do? Not very much so we should be prepared to ACT. (These weapons are VERY easy to hide). ACT: When Saddam gives us our next opportunity. Our actions should be prioritized and focused on his threat to the US and the world. To do this, I see, three separate, distinct and prioritized steps to insure our own safety and the safety of the rest of the world. They follow: 1. ANNOUNCE that if Iraq, or any other nation, uses these weapons of mass destruction causing severe casualties then the U.S. will destroy Iraq or that nation. 2. INITIATE all legal actions both unilaterally and in conjunction with other nations to remove Saddam Hussain from power. Subsequently, endeavor to integrate Iraq into the family of nations, {i.e., the Iraqi. Nat Congress, etc.} 3. ATTACK - Bomb Iraq severely and sequentially to force it to accept the U.S. position ~ one which they agreed to accept in 1991. 86 and other choke points. g. The national ELECTRICAL GRID. h. The IRAQI OIL REFINING capability. i. Then, Iraqi OIL WELLS one by one, or more if necessary (These wells are his only source of wealth to feed his ambitions). Within each category there would be a host of targets to be analyzed and for which strike decisions would be made. These actions would be situational and based on the latest intelligence. There will be casualties on both sides, both military and civilian. War is messy. Efforts should be made to minimize civilian casualties. NOTE: Colin on Panama to Bush. NOTE: Ground troops to Iraq.? Army in 1991 ~ 780,000 - 1998 ~ 495,000 = -285,000 = a reduction of 37% for the Army, - THE HEAVIEST REDUCTION OF ANY SERVICE NOTE: In The Gulf War, 542K troops (80% of USMC) -IMPACT IS SEVERE AND INDICATES THAT WE COULDN'T DO DESERT STORM TODAY. QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD September 16, 1998 A000043020UCJ