Y 4.AR 5/2 A: 999-2000/ 10 [HAS.C. No. 106-10] UNITED STATES POLICY TOWARD IRAQ HEARING BEFORE THE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ONE HUNDRED SIXTH CONGRESS FIRST SESSION HEARING HELD MARCH 10, 1999 Pennsylvania State University Libraries MAY 2 0 1999 Documents Collection U.S. Depository Copy U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 55-722CC WASHINGTON : 1999 For sale by the U.S. Government Printing Office Superintendent of Documents, Congressional Sales Office, Washington, DC 20402 ISBN 0-16-058334-9 HOUSE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES One Hundred Sdcth Congress FLOYD D. SPENCE, South Carolina, Chairman BOB STUMP, Arizona DUNCAN HUNTER, California JOHN R. KASICH, Ohio HERBERT H. BATEMAN, Virginia JAMES V. HANSEN, Utah CURT WELDON, Pennsylvania JOEL HEFLEY, Colorado JIM SAXTON, New Jersey STEVE BUYER, Indiana TILLIE K. FOWLER, Florida JOHN M. McHUGH, New York JAMES TALENT, Missouri TERRY EVERETT, Alabama ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland HOWARD "BUCK" McKEON, California J.C. WATTS, JR., Oklahoma MAC THORNBERRY, Texas JOHN N. HOSTETTLER, Indiana SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia VAN HILLEARY, Tennessee JOE SCARBOROUGH, Florida WALTER B. JONES, Jr., North Carolina LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina JIM RYUN, Kansas BOB RILEY, Alabama JIM GIBBONS, Nevada MARY BONO, California JOSEPH PITTS, Pennsylvania ROBIN HAYES, North Carolina STEVEN KUYKENDALL, California DONALD SHERWOOD, Pennsylvania Andrew K. Ellis, Staff Director Thomas Donnelly, Professional Staff Member Michelle Spencer, Research Assistant IKE SKELTON, Missouri NORMAN SISISKY, Virginia JOHN M. SPRATT, Jr., South Carolina SOLOMON P. ORTIZ, Texas OWEN PICKETT, Virginia LANE EVANS, Illinois GENE TAYLOR, Mississippi NEIL ABERCROMBIE, Hawaii MARTIN T. MEEHAN, Massachusetts ROBERT A. UNDERWOOD, Guam PATRICK J. KENNEDY, Rhode Island ROD R. BLAGOJEVICH, Illinois SILVESTRE REYES, Texas TOM ALLEN, Maine VIC SNYDER, Arkansas JIM TURNER, Texas ADAM SMITH, Washington LORETTA SANCHEZ, California JAMES H. MALONEY, Connecticut MIKE McINTYRE, North Carolina CIRO D. RODRIGUEZ, Texas CYNTHIA A. McKINNEY, Georgia ELLEN O. TAUSCHER, California ROBERT BRADY, Pennsylvania ROBERT E. ANDREWS, New Jersey BARON P. HILL, Indiana MIKE THOMPSON, California JOHN B. LARSON, Connecticut (II) CONTENTS CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS 1999 Page Hearing: Wednesday, March 10, 1999, United States Policy Toward Iraq 1 Appendix: Wednesday, March 10, 1999 31 WEDNESDAY, MARCH 10, 1999 UNITED STATES POLICY TOWARD IRAQ STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS Skelton, Hon. Ike, a Representative from Missouri, Ranking Member, Com- mittee on Armed Services 2 Spence, Hon. Floyd D., a Representative from South Carolina, Chairman, Committee on Armed Services 1 WITNESSES Hillen, Dr. John, Senior Fellow in Political-Military Studies Center for Stra- tegic and International Studies 10 Keaney, Dr. Thomas A., Executive Director, Foreign Policy Institute, Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins Univer- sity 6 Woolsey Hon. R. James, Former Director of Central Intelligence 3 APPENDIX Prepared Statements: Hillen, Dr. John 46 Keaney, Dr. Thomas A 42 Spence, Hon. Floyd D 32 Woolsey, Hon. R. James 37 (III) UNITED STATES POLICY TOWARD IRAQ House of Representatives, Committee on Armed Services, Washington, DC, Wednesday, March 10, 1999. The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10 a.m. in room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Floyd D. Spence (chairman of the committee) presiding. OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. FLOYD D. SPENCE, A REP- RESENTATIVE FROM SOUTH CAROLINA, CHAIRMAN, COM- MITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES The Chairman. The meeting will please be in order. Today the committee begins 2 days of hearings on the security challenges fac- ing the United States and the Persian Gulf and, in particular, rel- ative to Iraq. Tomorrow, we will hear from administration wit- nesses, but today we have a panel of outside witnesses to help us sort through the confusion that characterizes our United States policy toward Iraq. Joining us this morning are the Honorable James Woolsey, the Clinton administration's first Director of Central Intelligence; Dr. Thomas Keaney, Director of the Foreign Policy Institute at Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies and Co-director of the Air Force's Gulf War Air Power Survey; and John Hillen, an analyst with the Center for Strategic and International Studies and a decorated United States Army veteran of the Gulf War. And I can't believe how young they are these days. Gentlemen, we welcome you. Many of us are deeply troubled by the course of our policy and the pattern of United States military operations in the Persian Gulf. Iraq and Iran are clearly deter- mined to develop long-term ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction. Yet we seem to shy away from the kinds of resolute actions required to deter and defend against these threats or to ef- fect change to political ambitions and calculations which underlie them. The lack of a clear and consistent Iraq policy deprives increasing United States military operations of a guiding purpose or rationale. Operation Desert Fox and the ongoing skirmishes in the Northern Watch and Southern Watch no-fly zones illustrate my point. From a technical standpoint, they are being executed almost flawlessly. We attack with precision and skill. There have been more than 100,000 soldiers flown over Iraq since the end of the Gulf War without loss, a record that would be remarkable in the simplistic training environment let alone over hostile territory. Yet despite aggressive military action, there appears to be no sustainable im- pact on Saddam Hussein. (1) 7 I would like to talk about a very specific aspect of the United States strategy against Iraq, specifically the series of air strikes that have been going on since December almost on a daily basis. I want to talk about them in terms of what they have in mind, be- cause they have been—many things have been claimed, whether they represent some new departure in strategy or whether they are a continuation of the Desert Fox campaign, those 4 days in Decem- ber, when the air strikes took place against Baghdad and sur- rounding areas, or whether they are simply retaliation to Saddam Hussein's encouragement to the no-fly zones. And for any of these aspects, I want to look at them in terms of how effective they have been, how effective in attaining the objectives that have been set forth and what the risks that are entailed. First of all, I want to say that I have had no access to any bomb damage assessment of the strikes that have taken place and also no direct knowledge of the planning that Central Command has put in place to prosecute these strikes. My perspective is of some- one who is reading the open sources on what the effects have been and what the administration has been saying about them and also looking at them from the perspective of the work I have done just after the Gulf War looking at the effectiveness of air power in that war. Therefore, rather than conclusions about what the administra- tion ought to do, my remarks are more aimed at giving you some perspective on what issues you ought to address and things you ought to ask later on when you talk to the people in the adminis- tration and the military who are in charge of the strategy. First of all, from my background in the Gulf War assessment, the United States Air Force just after the Gulf War commissioned an independent study of the effectiveness of the bombing and of the employment of air power in the Gulf War, and I was a part of that study. And as a part of that study, I looked at specifically how ef- fective the bombing was against a variety of targets that were at- tacked in that war from the leadership's—the command and control to the SCUDs, to the nuclear, biological and chemical development programs, to the Iraqi army in the Kuwait theatre and to the lines of communication to that theatre; also to look at each one of those individual sets of targets and determine what the effectiveness was versus what the objectives set for those strikes. Well, that was then and this is now, because the attacks and the operations that are going on are really quite different than the Desert Storm bombing campaign of 1991. There really are very dif- ferent endeavors, different in scope and coalition support, in focus, and I think in desired results, just to name a few. For instance, the most—I think the greatest difference is that in 1991 air operations were aimed at getting the Iraqi army out of Kuwait, destroying the Iraqi army in the Kuwait theatre. There were other operations against a range of Iraqi targets, but that was a specific focus. As a point of reference, first of all, in terms of precision versus nonprecision weapons. Laser guided bombs were about 5 percent of the total of the unguided bombs that were dropped. Most of the at- tacks that occured, took place in the Kuwait theatre. The attacks against the Iraqi leadership and command and control represented around 5 percent of the effort at that time, something considerably different in this war. 9 line of inquiry in terms of assessing what the United States strat- egy is now and where to go next. For instance, the signs of unrest that were there in December 1998, are they still there? Have they gone away? In other words, are the effects still lingering? The degradation of the weapons of mass destruction production and delivery program, how much? Are they really measurable and significant? More important now, I might add, not at the inspection regime, the one way we had of monitoring that program is no longer in place. And finally what takes the place of the inspections? And that in part is a U.N. ques- tion, but since the United States has seemingly come to believe that the United Nations, the UNSCOM inspectors have not been effective, they have got to have some way, they have got to have some strategy for putting some substitute in their place. Now, the present series of attacks on the Iraqi air defense sys- tem, first of all, they do not appear to be any way related to the Desert Fox campaign of December, nor do I think they can be meaningful in that way. If they represent a new departure in strat- egy, as some people have suggested or posited, I frankly am at a loss to explain what that is. And viewing these retaliations through Saddam Hussein incursions as a new strategy simply calls into question the elements of what a strategy ought to be. Now, first let me state though that the continued attacks on the Iraqi air defense system are perfectly understandable as retalia- tion. In fact, I think they are mandatory. But that doesn't make them a strategy or the makings of one. In fact, I don't see how the retaliations at this point can either be lessened, because of the im- pacts on allies in the region, or significantly escalated, because I think we are already seen by some of our allies in the region as having some problem with us. Several states, the Turks, just in the past few days have talked about their unwillingness to see these kind of attacks go on as they have in the past. Now, there has been some escalation from the direct missile sites or radars that have eradiated the aircraft to the surrounding air defense system. But I think the targets, that they have been esca- lated to and the probable effects really remain quite limited. The arguments that these attacks are going to dismember what is al- ready a dismembered air defense system, in that these attacks can contribute in any sort of significant way to the military regime in- stability, just doesn't seem persuasive. It is just not an important target or an important resource for Saddam Hussein. And before the escalation went any further, be- yond those sites that are directly related or indirectly related to the air defense system, I think you ought to want to know precisely where it was going and what sort of results are being sought. A troubling aspect of these current operations; Iraq maintains the initiative in these operations. And this situation can't be com- fortable for the United States. The Iraqis pick the time, the place, and to a great degree the extent of the operation. And despite losses, around 20 to 25 percent are the latest estimates, Iraqi has really been able to limit its exposure. Notice, for instance, that of this 20 percent attrition, there were no aircraft claimed, Iraqi air- craft claimed knocked down. Even though a great many of the air- craft are aircraft in the no-fly zone, they have been limited enough 11 Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for submitting my full statement for the record. I will make a short statement now and I would like to echo some of the important points of the previous two witnesses. As the committee is aware, since the end of Operation Desert Fox in December, the United States has undertaken a low key but very active campaign against Iraq and, as we heard, focused almost exclusively on challenges to the no-fly zones from Iraqi planes and anti-aircraft batteries. The public reports state that in over 3,000 combat sorties flown in the past 10 weeks, the United States has attacked over 100 different targets with almost 300 precision guid- ed munitions. The administration seems quite happy with these at- tacks; indeed happier still with the notion of these attacks as rep- resenting the centerpiece of the new United States strategy toward Iraq. As one senior military officer quoted in The Washington Post re- marked, it is a strategy we fell into. It is not one that was origi- nally planned, but it is working out very, very well for us. And sev- eral very high-ranking administration officials with whom I have spoken recently have reinforced this optimism about the success of the new policy. I would like to offer the committee a different view on this issue. To call any military strategy a success presupposes the coherent measure of that success. The current set of operations against Iraqi air defenses are deemed successful because by and large American and British planes are hitting their targets and slowly degrading Saddam's anti-aircraft capabilities. Of this there is no doubt and we should all greatly admire the skill and professionalism of the aircrews in carrying out these missions. Nonetheless, while these short-term military goals appear definable and achievable, they do not appear to be conclusively linked to an end game in Iraq. If the United States is only in the business of incrementally plinking 1970's era anti-aircraft batteries in Iraq, then the policy is indeed a success. If on the other hand, those military actions are supposed to be conclusively linked to a larger and more sustainable political objective in Iraq, I am not so sure. Using the destruction of anti-aircraft batteries in Iraq to measure the success of our over- all policy may be as irrelevant as using body counts to measure the success of America's strategy in Vietnam. The daily military actions in and of themselves are important tactical victories. But do they add up to a comprehensive policy? The question the President and his policy staff must answer is strategic to what end? The administration claims that containment is the official strat- egy and the United States wishes only to keep Saddam in his box, such that he lacks the military capability to threaten his neighbors, develop weapons of mass destruction or destabilize the Persian Gulf region in some way. American officials have even indicated that if Saddam ceases his challenges to the no-fly zones, then what has been described as a low grade war against Iraq will stop. In fact, members of the committee may have seen the story in today's papers that Secretary Cohen told the Qatari foreign minister that if Iraq stopped challenging the no-fly zone these American attacks will indeed cease. At the same time the President and his National Security Advisor have strongly hinted at the need for a change of 13 8 years. Second, every indecisive round keeps pressure on Saddam, but also allows him time and breathing space to further develop weapons of mass destruction. This is especially so now that the U.N. inspections regime, imperfect though it was, has collapsed. Third, the continued sanctions on Iraq give Saddam Hussein le- gitimacy and strengthen his hold on power over the suffering Iraqi people. Fourth, the policy, as you well-know here on the Hill, is ex- pensive and demoralizing, costing the United States billions every year to rush troops to the Gulf back and forth and further taxing the much-stretched American military. Fifth, containment fatigue is setting in, with allies and other powers tiring of the routine and wanting to resume normal and business relations with Iraq. Finally, and, most importantly, the current containment policy leaves many parties other than the United States in charge. Dur- ing all of these crises over the past years, America has reacted with great gusto, but the prime determinant of the outcome has been Saddam Hussein. Occasionally, an interlocutor has been involved to give temporary direction, such as Russian Prime Minister Yvgeni Primakov last November, and U.N. Secretary Kofi Annan in February 1998. Given the amount of political and military cap- ital the United States is spending to keep Saddam under pressure, retaining the initiative action should be the foremost elements of a strategy for dealing with a dangerous bully. Now, Mr. Chairman, in my testimony, I describe many different policy options we should consider, and two of these policy options would require the United States to think very hard about using force. I would like to associate myself with the comments of Jim Woolsey in terms of supporting the opposition, and I would describe this as one scenario in which the United States could find itself using considerably more military force than it might have planned. I wish for the sake of our friends in the Iraqi opposition and the American public that Saddam Hussein could be removed with only a light American touch, air support, logistics, training and intel- ligence and the like. Having worked with the Shiites in the south and having studied the Kurds in the north a great deal, I am not as sanguine about their chances under these circumstances. More- over, if the United States does not prepare immediately to heavily reinforce an opposition in which we have invested our prestige, then America should think carefully about being involved at all. I think at some point in time, Iraqi opposition groups are likely to need more help than was expected, and I think it should be given to them. Needless to say, the more the United States is in- volved on the front end of these efforts, the more it can influence the manner and form in which American troops may be involved further down the road. It would be much easier for the United States to ensure success and maintain influence in an opposition movement if it is a key player from the beginning, rather than hav- ing to come in as a key player on the heels of an imminent disaster or a stalled effort. There are many questions contained in this policy, and the point I would like to make today is that these sorts of issues must be thought through, war-gamed and planned for, and I don't see evi- dence that the administration is prepared in this sense. 55-722 99-2 18 United States—and I assume this is the reason that the adminis- tration made the decision it did, is that Saddam Hussein said, OK, we agree, we will do it, whatever it was. At that point I think the administration, having risked so much or depended so much on the strong consensus, was afraid to see it disappear before its eyes, in other words, risk the at least tem- porary disapproval of the members or—the members of the U.N. and in the region that had approved this action; that is, that I think there was a lingering suspicion that the United States, alone, had its own agenda—certainly in the region had its own agenda for dealing with Saddam Hussein. And I think it must have been that the administration saw that this would make—in the eyes of many in the region would make this come true. So that at the time when Saddam Hussein said, OK, we give up or the U.N. Ambassador says, yes, we agree to ev- erything that we said, then, of course, it was only a matter of time because clearly it wasn't going to be the case. Mr. Bateman. Well, am I correct that it was never officially Sad- dam Hussein who communicated anything, it was the Iraqi Ambas- sador who communicated it and no one was ever able to get an offi- cial confirmation out of Baghdad as to their position yet notwith- standing the planes were in the air ready to execute the mission? Dr. Keaney. I think that is correct. I think that is correct. Mr. Bateman. It seems to me if any time military action were justified that would have been the time to do it, and it was an exer- cise in silliness not to proceed. Mr. Chairman, my time is expired. I had one other question I would like to slip in if I could. The Chairman. How about let's leave that for the second go round. These other people are waiting. Mr. Bateman. I don't think I will be here for the second go round. The Chairman. Mr. Taylor. Mr. Taylor. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Gentlemen, I am always struck by the irony that every time we seek to punish a one-man dictatorship that some Iraqi POC some- where gets blown up and the one man who violates the rules is ap- parently living pretty well, maybe in secrecy but still pretty well. Realize that Congress has a law against political assassinations but Congress can also undo what Congress does. So my question—I think it is actually an executive order—but would there be any value in this committee, this Congress passing a resolution, making it a part of the defense authorization bill that we expect Saddam Hussein, since he is the sole ruler of Iraq, to abide by the terms of the cease-fire and that if he does not, that he is personally responsible for the consequences, including the possible loss of his own life? Mr. Woolsey. Let me take that one on, Congressman, because I wrestled with that one for a couple years as DCI. I think there are two main reasons I would not advise that. The first is that the real problem is not just Saddam Hussein. He is a crafty, street tough hit man who became a dictator, but his regime is thoroughly rotten. If we ended up with either of his two sons, for example, if something should happen to him, we would end up with people who 20 Mr. Hefley. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. First of all, I appreciate so much your testimony today. I think it has been excellent. I apologize that I haven't been able to be in all of it, because of the interruption and trouble getting back. So you may have answered this question a dozen of times, and I apolo- gize. I have recently had the opportunity to be in that neighbor- hood and to visit with some of the neighbors over there, the Turks and the Greeks and Cyprus and so forth. When you press them, al- most to a person, you say are we accomplishing anything with what we are doing now, our policy in Iraq, and almost to a person the response was that, well, really we don't think you are, that we think you are solidifying his dictatorship, that here is the guy that is standing up to the big bully, the United States, and succeeding. He is going right along his way, and we are exploding things and so forth. But in reality, he is succeeding and standing up to us and they are proud of him and it solidifies his strength. Would each of you respond to that concept? Dr. HlLLEN. I agree with you entirely, Congressman, and much of my testimony went to that. They get actually quite giddy in the White House when our bombs hit their targets, and there is a lot of self congratulations. But nobody really seems to be asking to what end, to what does this lead, that this is not actually the end game, and I think that has been picked up by a lot of our allies in the region. I think the allies are willing to be led and our experience with the Persian Gulf allies has shown that if the United States is de- termined and has a realizable plan and an achievable and sustain- able objective, they will come on board. Nobody expected in August 1990 that the Gulf allies would fall in behind a huge United States led coalition that would involve over half a million troops in Saudi territory and an invasion. But as soon as then Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney showed King Fahd we had a real plan and we were going to exert real leadership and we were determined to see it through to a conclu- sive outcome, King Fahd gave the nod. And, similarly, in the late 1970's when President Carter sent a squadron of F-15s to reinforce Saudi Arabia, then it was leaked they were unarmed, the Saudis were very offended and turned around and sent them home. So I think a real key is a United States leadership. If there is a real plan I think our allies will support it. If we con- tinue to just kick, the can down the road and take these incremen- tal steps that may add up to nothing but may be therapeutic for us in the meantime, I think the allies will grow tired of it. Dr. Keaney. Yes, two points. One, it is my opinion that Saddam Hussein has started this—these incursions of the no-fly zone per- haps to try to knock down a United States aircraft, British aircraft. That would be fine, but that is not the real purpose. The real pur- pose—the real target of this strategy I believe is both—is primarily domestic but also international, domestic public opinion within Iraq, in other words setting himself up as the savior of the Iraqis, in other words that he is the only thing that is standing between them and further destruction by this Western coalition. To a lesser degree, I think it is international opinion, in other words, to the allies, making him wear out, making the United 35 Until the United States articulates a consistent policy that brings coherence to our military effort in the Gulf, we will find ourselves faced with small-scale tactical military victories within the broader context of strategic defeat. Nor do I believe, time is on our side. When Iraq or Iran fields ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction, (and it is only a matter of time) our position in the Gulf will be significantly complicated and more dangerous. In sum, the pattern I see in the Gulf - where our interests endure but our long-term influence is in question - is disconcerting. I hope that our witnesses today can help us better understand the challenges, problems and options for placing U.S. policy toward Iraq on firmer footing. Before they begin, I would like to recognize the committee's Ranking Democrat, Mr. Skelton, for any remarks he may wish to make. 4 37 U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Armed Services March 10,1999 U.S. Policy on Iraq Testimony of R. James Woolsey Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, it is an honor to be asked to testify before you on this important subject. Over a year ago I testified before Congress that I believed it was urgent to move toward a strategy - an overt, not a covert one - to replace the Ba'ath regime in Iraq. Not just Saddam, the regime. I did not, and do not, urge the deployment of American ground troops to bring this about, but rather a concerted effort over time that would include the following elements: - maintain the existing no-fly zones in the North and South for all Iraqi aircraft, including helicopters, and expand the zones' restrictions to create "no drive" rones for Iraqi military vehicles; - recognize an Iraqi government-in-exile, probably centered in the first instance on the Iraqi National Congress, and arm it with light weapons, including anti-armor; - when areas in the North and South of Iraq can be adequately protected from Iraqi ground force encroachments by a combination of indigenous (including defecting) forces and our use of air power, permit those areas to be free of the trade restrictions imposed on Iraq -- for example, let such regions pump and sell oil; - bring charges against Saddam in international tribunals and do everything possible to hinder his use of offshore assets; - broadcast into Iraq in the style and manner of Radio Free Europe; - utilize any opportunities to conduct air strikes, such as Saddam's current efforts to attack our aircraft maintaining the no-fly zones, to damage as severely as possible the instruments whereby Saddam maintains power the Special Republican Guard, the Special Security Organization, Iraqi Intelligence, etc. 1 39 Our role as a symbol of democracy is a powerful tool, if we will but use it. For example, both Lech Walesa and Vaclav Havel have said that Radio Free Europe was the most important thing the United States did during the Cold War. Getting to know members of Solidarity and the Czech Civic Forum ten years ago in Europe confirmed in my mind the practical importance of taking a clear stand for democratic values. Yes, culture and experience with democracy are both different in the Mid-East than they are in the West, but Asian democracies were also rare to non- existent until after World War II. Now we have India, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, the Philippines, Mongolia. And until rather recently Latin America was a dark forest of dictatorships, relieved by only a few flowering democracies such as Costa Rica; now change across the entire continent has left Fidel Castro virtually alone as the remaining dictator. Democracy is not a hot-house plant that can grow only in fifth century B.C. Athens or eighteenth century Virginia. Where are those experts who told us yesterday that democracy was incompatible with Asian culture or with Latin American culture? Telling us today that democracy won't work in the Middle East? When we stand for a people's right to govern themselves and to defeat tyranny, we add a lot of arrows to our quiver. Stalin once asked cynically "how many divisions does the Pope have?" John Paul n showed Stalin's heirs that he had quite a few in the struggle over Eastern Europe in the 1980's. If a more military reference is needed, skeptics might look up what Napoleon said about the relative importance of the moral and the physical in war. Finally, those who do not support moving to replace the Ba'athist regime with democracy stress that if the regime were overthrown, Iraq might come apart -- with Iraqi Kurds joining others from Turkey, Iran, and Syria to try to establish a Kurdish state, and with Iraqi Shia either falling under the sway of Iran or encouraging revolt among the Shia of Saudi Arabia and the rest of the Gulf. Those whose judgment I value the most in these matters suggest that the Iraqi Kurds would highly prize local autonomy with regard to language and education, within some sort of federal structure, but that they will likely prove willing to work within the structure of an Iraqi State. A little of the same approach that Spain has used with regard to its Basque minority would go a long way toward accommodating the Kurds in a post-Ba'athist Iraq or in democratic Turkey. Spain has granted a great deal of autonomy with respect to Basque culture and language and has thereby been able to split the majority of the Basque people away from the violent ETA. The capture of Ocalan by Turkey gives it the opportunity to do the same. If Turkey, our democratic ally, and a post-Ba'atlust Iraq can both be persuaded to adopt a Spanish-type model to deal with theii Kurdish regions, it is not our problem to save either Syria or Iran from the consequences of their oppression of their Kurdish minorities. Concerning the role of the Shia, both Iraqi and Iranian Shia have been unfairly tarred by the behavior of a powerful but small, and declining, faction within their division of Islam: those who support Khamenei and the rest of the Iranian wilayat al-faqih, often translated "rule of the jurisprudential", i.e. the theocratic and dictatorial portion of the Iranian government under first