oil revenues to the regime. This is a tough, credible package that
deserves Council support.
On our regime change policy, if it is to be successful, change
must come from within, from the Iraqis themselves. In particular,
the security forces and the people must stand on the same side.
The support of Iraqi exiles, including the politically active opposi-
tion, along with neighboring states, is indispensable. The captive
Iraqis need a voice. And, in particular, the internal Iraqi resistance
needs a voice, through the Iraqi opposition living in freedom, to
make clear to all Iraqis and to the world its aims. The Iraqi Na-
tional Congress has described these resistance aims to us as: first,
to bring the security forces to the side of the people in changing
the regime; and second, after the current regime passes, to stand
with all Iraqis in promoting reconciliation and reconstruction.
Free Iraqis, those in exile and those who live in relative freedom
in northern Iraq, bear a special responsibility to develop a coherent
vision for a brighter future. They must take the lead in developing
and promoting an alternative vision based on the restoration of
civil society, the rebuilding of the economy, and the promotion of
a new role for Iraq as a force for peace and reconciliation in the
region. They can also play an effective role in delegitimizing Sad-
dam Hussein, in helping to build the case for his prosecution as a
war criminal, and in getting the truth into and out of Iraq. And,
as Iraqis committed to a future vision of Iraq that appeals to Iraqis
inside and to Iraq's neighbors, they can best build the case for the
support of regional states to channel more material assistance to
the Iraqi people and their resistance elements.
Congress has provided the administration with a number of im-
portant tools to support Iraqis who are working toward a better fu-
ture for Iraq. These include earmarks of $8 million in existing eco-
nomic support funds. We are using these funds to strengthen oppo-
sition political unity, to support the Iraq war crimes initiative, to
support humanitarian programs and the development of civil soci-
ety, and for activities inside Iraq.
We have also established and recently stepped up broadcasting
hours for Radio Free Iraq, which operates independently and
broadcasts daily in Arabic uncensored news and information to the
Iraqi people.
Our Special Coordinator for Transition in Iraq, Frank
Ricciardone, is managing the overall effort. Mr. Ricciardone has al-
ready had considerable success in helping disparate opposition
groups work together and elect a new interim leadership that right
now is preparing the way for an Iraqi opposition conference aimed
at achieving a broader participation and a more effective program
of activity. Last month, as you mentioned, Secretary Albright met
with an Iraqi delegation, including the INC interim leadership and
prominent ind
t. independents, to underscore the administration's sup-
port for their efforts. And we are very grateful that they were very
warmly received on the Hill as well, as you mentioned.
Finally, there is the Iraq Liberation Act which provides discre-
tionary authority to the President to direct up to $97 million in De-
Department drawdown and training for designated Iraqi op-
position groups. We are in the process now of drawing down this
fense Depar


[The prepared statement of Senator Wellstone follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR PAUL WELLSTONE
Thank you for holding this hearing on the Iraqi opposition movement, Senator
Brownback. I want to welcome our witnesses, Deputy Assistant Secretary Beth
Jones, Mr. Ahmed Chalabi, Ms. Rend Rahim Francke, and Dr. Patrick Clawson.
One of the toughest foreign policy challenges which falls within the subcommit-
tee's purview is Iraq. I think we all agree that under the leadership of Saddam Hus-
sein, Iraq is a threat to our interests, our allies in the region, and to those most
directly affected—the Iraqi people themselves.
Having said that, I do not believe that there are any magic strategies to managing
Saddam Hussein, parrying his threats against neighboring countries and blocking
his efforts to develop weapons of mass destruction. That will take patient contain-
ment and vigorous diplomatic efforts. I also believe we must act responsibly and
carefully in giving any support to Iraqi opposition groups intent on overthrowing
Saddam Hussein. I am deeply concerned about statements made by our military
leaders about the lack of support in the region for arming external opposition groups
and that arming the Iraqi opposition might just amount to "rolling the dice” in an
explosive region.
I'd like to take just a minute to focus on the plight of the Iraqi people. We know
that Saddam Hussein is the primary cause of the suffering of ordinary Iraqis. But
we also know that the toughest sanctions ever applied to any country are having
we ahintended, but doeda program has what, the repalnourished; infant and sanitatiety
While the oil-for-food program has brought badly-needed humanitarian goods into
Iraq and improved conditions somewhat, the reports we receive are still very dis-
turbing. As many as 30% of Iraq's children are malnourished; infant mortality rates
are soaring; much of the population lacks access to clean water and sanitation.
These abysmal conditions are leading to the decimation of Iraq's once vibrant society
and culture. Families are breaking apart, crime is rampant, and Iraq's youth are
being radicalized.
I know that Saddam doesn't lose any sleep over the suffering of his people. But
we should care. We should care not only because of the awful humanitarian situa-
tion, but also because depravation in Iraq can harm our long-term interests.
Some day, and I hope that day is soon, Iraq will have a new leadership. If things
continue on their present course, that leadership may be as bad or worse than Sad-
dam Hussein. We may inadvertently contribute to such an outcome if we do not
take steps to tangibly improve the lives of ordinary Iraqis.
Right now, the Iraqi people don't believe that we are on their side. They feel that
they are made to pay for the sins of their leaders. We must change that perception.
I believe the time has come to devise new and creative ways to bring relief to ordi-
nary Iraqis with whom we have no quarrel, and indeed whose cause we support.
Iraq, with its rich history and its talented population, can be a force for positive
change in the Middle East. Unfortunately, today its people are denied that chance
by a tyrant.
Thank you.
Senator WELLSTONE. I am listening to the flow of discussion and
I will just sort of try and build on that.
First of all, to those of you who are part of the courageous opposi-
tion, I thank you for your courage.
It does strike me as being that this is a—there is a whole set of
difficult questions here, and I am not sure there are any magic
strategies. As much as I wish I could kind of will into existence
Saddam Hussein's being gone, I am not sure there are any magic
strategies or magic bullets. I think it is kind of a matter of patient
commitment and also diplomacy and responsible policy.
I came in when, Secretary Jones, you were discussing the Brit-
ish Dutch proposal, and I thought I might want to talk about that
for a moment because I know there was a question as to if Saddam
Hussein's gone, what is then the leadership that we are going to
be dealing with. I sometimes think-I have been pressing for some
time now about the need for us to consider the effect of the sanc-
tions on a lot of innocent people in Iraq and part of the reason that


16
stimulate that opposition in the north. We did not articulate much
vagueness in Kosovo, and it emboldened people regardless of how
one felt about that. I think the vagueness would limit me if I were
in the opposition, particularly a public vagueness. Even if privately
things are said differently, I would say I want to make sure that
that is a commitment that I can count on before I am going to put
my life, my family on the line.
Ms. JONES. I would argue that Saddam knows very clearly that
we are very committed to our redlines. He sees it every day or al-
most every day in terms of the redline related to the no-fly zones,
and he would see it were he to cross any of the other redlines.
Senator BROWNBACK. Well, good.
Secretary Jones, as always, I am impressed with your abilities
from first meeting you in Almaty, Kazakhstan. I was impressed
with you there and here.
I just got back from the Sudan about 2 weeks ago, and just north
of Yei in southern Sudan they have what they call Iraqi Hill where
a number of Iraqi troops were killed in Sudan fighting for the
northern government, the Khartoum Government, which is a ter-
rorist government seeking expansion. Now, I did not investigate
this, but that was what was noted to us, that this was actually
Iraqi Hill. And I found it very interesting at that point.
Thank you very much. Thank you for your skill and your diplo-
macy, and thank you for being here.
Ms. JONES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Senator
Wellstone.
Senator BROWNBACK. We will call up the next panel for presen-
tation, and included on that panel will be Mr. Ahmad Chalabi, the
member of the Executive Presidency of the Iraqi National Con-
gress; Dr. Patrick Clawson, director for research, Washington Insti-
tute for Near East Policy; and Ms. Rend Rahim Francke I prob-
ably mispronounced that-executive director of the Iraq Founda-
tion. They will be the next panel.
Thank you all very much for joining us, and Mr. Chalabi, we look
forward to your presentation.
STATEMENT OF AHMAD CHALABI, MEMBER, EXECUTIVE PRES-
IDENCY, IRAQI NATIONAL CONGRESS, LONDON, ENGLAND
Mr. CHALABI. Thank you, Senator. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I
am very pleased to be here today. It has been 15 months since I
last had the honor to testify before your committee. I am proud to
come before you again on behalf of the Iraqi National Congress, the
voice of the Iraqi people. The Iraqi National Congress represents
free Iraq and we are grateful for the help of the free people of the
United States. We are particularly grateful for the assistance of the
U.S. Senate and Congress. The Iraq Liberation Act, declaring
United States support for removing the Iraqi dictatorship, has been
a beacon to the Iraqi people, and we look forward to working with
you closely on its implementation.
The Iraqi National Congress calls upon the United States and its
allies to recognize what is already fact: the United States and its
allies are at war with Saddam's regime.
Last summer it was proven that Saddam had ballistic missile
warheads loaded with deadly VX nerve gas, an active biological


27
Covert action (with an emphasis on psychological operations) could diminish
Saddam's image in the eyes of his supporters, exacerbate already strained relations
between Saddam Husayn's inner circle and the military, and stir up popular dis-
content against the regime. These could lay the ground-work for a coup or uprising.
At the very least, these efforts would keep Saddam on the defensive and force him
to divert assets to deal with internal security, leaving fewer resources available for
clandestine technology procurement or trouble-making elsewhere. This will also bol-
ster containment.
Reducing Iraq's unsupervised oil income amounting to several hundred million
dollars a year-cuts into Saddam's ability to buy loyalty. Financial hardship could
aggravate existing tensions among the various Sunni tribal groups that form the
bedrock of Saddam's power base and foment unrest among these elements. The flow
of unsupervised income could be cut by renewed efforts to halt illicit Iraqi oil sales
via Syria and Turkey, to wean Jordan off Iraqi oil, and to stop kickback schemes
under the "oil for food” program. Less unsupervised oil income also means less
money for illicit arms purchases, which reinforces containment.
Support for the opposition is the clearest expression of America's commitment to
regime change. Such support especially when given publicly and endorsed by top
officials-fosters the impression that the tide is turning against Saddam. It also un-
dercuts the conspiratorial view in parts of the Arab world that the United States
really wants a weakened Saddam Husayn to remain in power. Only when Washing-
ton demonstrates its high-level support for the opposition can it effectively lobby re-
gional governments to do the same. The more the United States supports the oppo-
sition, the more regional governments will be confident that Saddam will in fact go
and that therefore they can assist the opposition without facing eventual Iraqi retal-
iation. Plus, regional governments are more likely to support actions to tighten the
containment of Iraq if they need not worry that Saddam will be around to exact re-
venge.
Some who would strictly limit U.S. support for the opposition belittle its chances
of accomplishing much. To be sure, the opposition is unlikely to defeat Saddam's
forces in the field. But that is largely irrelevant. The issue is what must be done
to crack the aura of invincibility around Saddam and his repressive apparatus. If
Saddam's security organizations are spending their time worrying about the opposi-
tion, they will have fewer resources to repress outbreaks of the seething popular dis-
content. If emboldened protestors began to act on a wide scale, an active opposition
could catalyze and coordinate an uprising, making what otherwise would be a riot
into a regime-threatening rebellion. Similarly, the busier that Saddam's security or-
ganizations are chasing the organized opposition and spontaneous protestors, the
less they can do to detect and stop coup plotters. Plus containment is strengthened
when Saddam diverts time and resources from the regular military to deal with the
opposition-either because the opposition is successful or because the loud U.S. sup-
port for the opposition makes Saddam afraid.
SPECIFIC MEASURES TO INCREASE SUPPORT FOR THE OPPOSITION
Over the last six months, the United States has stepped up its support for the
opposition, but the support remains low key and a secondary aspect of U.S. Iraqi
policy. A good indicator of where opposition support fits into overall U.S. Iraqi policy
is how the opposition leaders were treated during their recent visit to Washington
compared to their reception in April 1993. Six years ago, the opposition leaders saw
the Vice-President in the White House. This time, when the opposition had been
broadened to include monarchists and prominent Sunnis like ex-Foreign Minister
Adnan Pacachi, the opposition leaders saw the Secretary of State-even though the
administration had for months been telling the opposition that the more broadly
they united, the higher the U.S. officials who would see them. These distinctions
matter to Saddam, to Middle East countries, and to the Arab public. It will be inter-
esting to see whether President Clinton sends greetings to the upcoming meeting
of the opposition Iraqi National Assembly, and if so how, warm will they be.
Similarly, on the operational front, the opposition has been unsuccessfully asking
the United States to publicly commit itself to strict enforcement of the existing UN
Security Council (UNSC) Resolutions, especially UNSC Resolution 949 which au-
thorizes use of force if Iraq “takes any action to enhance its military capacity in
southern Iraq”-the so-called "no-drive zone” resolution. In fact, the United States
has rarely used the authority granted by this resolution to hit at the tanks and
other equipment Saddam has added to his forces in the south for the purpose of hit-
ting the opposition.
In the north, the Kurdish groups want to know what President Clinton meant
when he said that we “remain ready to use [force) if Saddam moves against the