COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, New York, Chairman
WILLIAM F. GOODLING, Pennsylvania SAM GEJDENSON, Connecticut
JAMES A. LEACH, Iowa
TOM LANTOS, California
HENRY J. HYDE, Illinois
HOWARD L. BERMAN, California
DOUG BEREUTER, Nebraska
GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York
CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American
DAN BURTON, Indiana
Samoa
ELTON GALLEGLY, California
DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida
ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey
CASS BALLENGER, North Carolina
SHERROD BROWN, Ohio
DANA ROHRABACHER, California
CYNTHIA A. MCKINNEY, Georgia
DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois
ALCEE L. HASTINGS, Florida
EDWARD R. ROYCE, California
PAT DANNER, Missouri
PETER T. KING, New York
EARL F. HILLIARD, Alabama
STEVE CHABOT, Ohio
BRAD SHERMAN, California
MARSHALL “MARK” SANFORD, South ROBERT WEXLER, Florida
Carolina
STEVEN R. ROTHMAN, New Jersey
MATT SALMON, Arizona
JIM DAVIS, Florida
AMO HOUGHTON, New York
EARL POMEROY, North Dakota
TOM CAMPBELL, California
WILLIAM D. DELAHUNT, Massachusetts
JOHN M. MCHUGH, New York
GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York
KEVIN BRADY, Texas
BARBARA LEE, California
RICHARD BURR, North Carolina
JOSEPH CROWLEY, New York
PAUL E. GILLMOR, Ohio
JOSEPH M. HOEFFEL, Pennsylvania
GEORGE RADANOVICH, California
(VACANCY]
JOHN COOKSEY, Louisiana
THOMAS G. TANCREDO, Colorado
RICHARD J. GARON, Chief of Staff
KATHLEEN BERTELSEN MOAZED, Democratic Chief of Staff
STEPHEN G. RADEMAKER, Chief Counsel
SHENNEL A. NAGIA, Staff Associate
(II)





U.N. INSPECTIONS OF IRAQ'S WEAPONS OF
MASS DESTRUCTION PROGRAMS: HAS SAD-
DAM WON?
TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 26, 2000
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.
The Committee met, pursuant to call, at 10 a.m. in Room 2167,
Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Benjamin A. Gilman (Chair-
man of the Committee) presiding.
Chairman GILMAN. The Committee on International Relations
meets today to receive testimony from two very distinguished wit-
nesses about the serious problems our nation continues to face in
dealing with Iraq. I understand Mr. Solarz is tied up in traffic but
is on his way, and he should be here shortly.
Upon the conclusion of this morning's hearing, our Committee
will move directly to mark up a bill that a number of my colleagues
and I introduced yesterday regarding the possibility of a unilateral
declaration of statehood by the Palestinians. That bill, the Peace
Through Negotiations Act of 2000, is intended to underscore our
very strong conviction that such a unilateral declaration would un-
dermine the Middle East peace process and threaten U.S. national
interests in the region.
But before we go to that issue, we are going to hear about an-
other serious threat to U.S. interests in the Middle East, and that
is the threat posed by Saddam Hussein and his continued efforts
to thwart international inspections of his weapons-of-mass-destruc-
tion programs. The gravity of the threat posed by Saddam and the
inadequacy of our nation's response to that threat has been high-
lighted by three articles that appeared recently in The Washington
Post.
The first article appeared on August 30th, and in that article it
was reported that in late-August our nation joined with Russia and
France and the U.N. Security Council to block the new U.N. weap-
ons inspection agency for Iraq, UNMOVIC-I hope I have the cor-
rect pronunciation of that from declaring it was ready to begin in-
spections inside Iraq. The story quotes an unnamed U.N. diplomat
as stating: “The United States and Russia agreed that it was not
appropriate to give the impression that UNMOVIC was ready to
get back into Iraq. They cautioned that this might create a climate
of confrontation at an inappropriate time.”
If this story is true, the effort to avoid confronting Saddam over
his weapons-of-mass-destruction programs has to be a low point in
(1)


3
United States will not allow Saddam Hussein to make any mili-
tarily aggressive actions in the region.
For the future, it is a more complicated situation. I think, one,
we have to have a policy based in reality and it is highly unlikely,
from my perspective, that people who spend their days in the ho-
tels of London and France are going to lead a revolution to over-
throw Saddam militarily. It is also clear that the West will not pro-
vide the military force to replace Saddam at this time, just as the
Bush Administration decided at the end of the Gulf War not to try
to remove him militarily.
I think also we have to understand that particularly the French
and the Russians, sitting on a tremendous debt that the Iraqis owe
them, tens of billions of dollars, have an additional incentive for en-
gagement with Iraq. Iraq's Arab neighbors, even though I think
most of them understand that Saddam manipulates the food sup-
plies for his own political benefit, find themselves in a difficult situ-
ation as Iraqi children and others are affected by his policies,
which he blames on the embargo. It is my understanding that Iraq
has somewhere in the range of $10 billion in its humanitarian ac-
count that it could spend for food, but we know the games that he
is up to.
And I think for us in the United States, what we have to do is,
one, figure out a policy that we can get broad international support
for, that we cannot lose sight of the fact that this is an individual
who would still like to have nuclear, chemical, and biological weap-
ons and the missiles to deliver them to neighbors and others
around the world. And so it is not a simple task, but it is one that
is going to take coordination with our allies and a sustained effort,
and I thank the Chairman for holding this important hearing and
look forward to hearing from both of our panelists.
Chairman GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Gejdenson. Any other_Mem-
bers seeking recognition? If not, Mr. Butler, Ambassador Butler,
please proceed.
STATEMENT OF AMBASSADOR RICHARD BUTLER, DIPLOMAT
IN RESIDENCE, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, EXECU-
TIVE CHAIRMAN OF THE UNITED NATIONS SPECIAL COM-
MISSION ON IRAQ (UNSCOM]
Ambassador BUTLER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am honored
and grateful to you for inviting me to be here today to address
what you and Mr. Gejdenson have just recognized as a serious and
continuing problem.
In my opening remarks I would propose to deal relatively briefly
with three. The first of those is, what is the present situation, and
how did we get there; the second is, what are its visible con-
sequences; and, thirdly, what we might do to correct this situation.
First, the present situation and how did we get there. On the
present situation, the simplest way of putting it is this: Saddam
Hussein is still there. He remains determined to retain and develop
a weapons-of-mass- destruction capability. He has been without the
presence in his country of United Nations or international weapons
inspectors, and the effort to disarm him of the weapons he created
in the past has ended. That has been the situation for 2 years, and
all of the evidence at our disposal, although that evidence, because


8
of the authority of the council as the key body in this field, and
with respect to the maintenance of the credibility of the treaties on
nonproliferation.
This must mean, first and foremost, that the Administration
must make clear to Russia that its newly embarked-upon policy,
redolent of the Cold War period of client statism, its newly em-
barked-upon policy of giving support and comfort to regimes such
as the Saddam regime, is simply not acceptable, not acceptable to
the United States as a nation and not acceptable as behavior fit-
ting to a permanent member of the security council.
This is a tough call, but I believe deeply it is one that must be
made. The Administration has said there are red lines with respect
to Saddam Hussein. Madeleine Albright, Secretary Albright, said
recently the United States would the not use force to bring about
a restoration under UNMOVIC of arms-control inspection and mon-
itoring. Now, she said, however, there are red lines which may
change position. If Iraq reinvaded Kuwait or made a move on a
neighbor, if Iraq threatened the Kurds, or if Iraq was seen to be
developing serious weapons of mass destruction, could I say, as an
aside, I wonder how we are going to know that without inspec-
tions? Are they going to send us a telegram saying we are devel-
oping weapons of mass destruction?
But leaving that aside, there are three stated United States red
lines. Mr. Chairman, where is the fourth red line? Where is the red
line that says we will not tolerate from permanent members of the
security council a departure from their responsibility to enforce
their own law to maintain nonproliferation of weapons of mass de-
struction, and instead to pursue what they consider to be their nar-
row and national interests, whether, as you pointed out, it is based
on the money they think Iraq owes them or some notion of wanting
to twist the United States' tail, now that it is the sole superpower,
or whatever reasoning? It seems to me this should be another red
line, that it should be made clear to permanent members of the se-
curity council that there is a duty that all share to see that the law
is obeyed. I do not think that task has been adequately pursued,
and that is
my first recommendation.
Now, secondly, with respect to sanctions, as I said earlier, they
clearly do not work or get the job done in their present form. Let
us be clear, Mr. Chairman, as we discuss sanctions, who is respon-
sible for them. There is a lot of talk of goodwill, well-intentioned
people that say the security council is responsible for them, that we
in the West are somehow using sanctions as our own weapons of
mass destruction against the ordinary Iraqi people.
I reject that contention because it ignores the functional respon-
sibility that is held for sanctions, and that is held by none other
than Saddam Hussein. He has always had the ability to see sanc-
tions relieved by simply handing over the weapons as the law re-
quired. Had that been done, it would have been my duty to say im-
mediately to the security council it is over, and the council is
pledged under its own law to then remove sanctions.
So let us be clear about whose responsibility it is. And when it
gets down to the actual impact of sanctions on ordinary Iraqis, let
us be clear, too, that portion of that impact derives from
Saddam's own manipulation of the food and medicines that are


11
with any officials of the Turkish government, nor did I have any
intention of doing so. I speak today solely for myself.
Ambassador Butler has explained at length how we got where we
are. I want to focus my testimony on what we should do about it.
I think that the continued existence of an unrepented and
unreconstructed Baathist regime in Iraq, which is presumptively
reconstituting its inventory of weapons of mass destruction, poses
two fundamental questions for American policy. First, to what ex-
tent does this constitute an unacceptable threat to vital American
interests; and secondly, what should we do about it?
The answer to the first question, I think, is very clear. The
butcher of Baghdad, who remains in power 10 years after Desert
Storm, long after George Bush and Margaret Thatcher are out of
power, and Francois Mitterrand and Hafiz Al-Assad are dead, is
clearly biding his time, waiting for an opportune moment to wreak
vengeance against those who were responsible for thwarting his
hegemonic ambitions in the past and who are presumably prepared
to thwart them in the future.
Indeed, as we meet, threats are emanating almost daily from
Baghdad against Kuwait and other countries in the region, strik-
ingly reminiscent of the threats which the Mesopotamian megalo-
maniac was hurling a decade ago before the invasion of Kuwait. We
must not forget that this is a man who has gone to war twice in
the last decade, first against Iran and then against Kuwait, and
who has used weapons of mass destruction not only against his en-
emies, but against his own people as well.
To believe under these circumstances that Saddam Hussein does
not pose a very serious threat to vital American interests, it seems
to me, would be the height of naivety. The more difficult question
is, what realistically can be done about it?
Recognizing the extent to which Saddam does pose a serious
threat to the United States, both the Congress and the executive
branch of our government have embraced the Iraq Liberation Act,
which was passed to a large extent due to your leadership, Mr.
Chairman, and which is based on the notion that the best way to
protect our interests vis-a-vis Iraq is to work for the destabilization
and eventual overthrow of the regime.
The Iraq Liberation Act, as you know, calls for the disbursement
of up to $97 million in excess military equipment to the Iraqi oppo-
sition, and it is premised on the incontestable proposition that a
peaceful transition from a malign dictatorship to a benign democ-
racy in a country like Iraq is a political oxymoron. And it was also
based on the assumption that to wait for a military coup in a coun-
try whose military is riddled by several secret services, where you
have a leader who does not hesitate to tortue and execute anyone
he even suspects of conspiring against him is to put our faith in
miracles.
Yet 2 years after the passage of this historic legislation not a sin-
gle bullet has been transferred to the Iraqi opposition. It is true,
to be sure, that we have provided fax machines and computers to
the Iraqi National Congress, but I would suggest that the transfer
of office equipment, no matter how sophisticated it may be, is un-
likely to either discomfort or depose Mr. Hussein. I think it is fairly
clear that, despite his rhetorical embrace of the Iraq Liberation


14
move the regime that is producing them, because it is obvious they
have no intention of permitting U.N. inspectors back in under cir-
cumstances where they can really do their job, then in order to
achieve that objective, we have to understand that it cannot be
done on the cheap.
The Iraq Liberation Act, which I strongly support and which I
commend you for adopting, can only be effectively implemented
with the cooperation of other countries in the region, and that co-
operation can only be obtained if we are prepared to put our mili-
tary where our mouth is. Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Solarz is available in the appen-
dix.]
Chairman GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Solarz, and thank you, Am-
bassador Butler, for your extensive analysis of this very critical
issue.
Let us proceed now with some of the questions. Ambassador But-
ler, do you believe that Saddam has used the nearly 2 years that
the U.N. weapons inspectors have been out of Iraq to begin recon-
stituting the weapons of mass destruction, and which of those
weapons programs should we be especially concerned about?
Ambassador BUTLER. Mr. Chairman, I do believe that he has
used this 2 years to that effect. In thinking about this, I must say
I am reminded of the classic test that is put when someone is al-
leged to have committed a crime such as murder: Did the person
have the motive, the means, and the opportunity? Well, Mr. Chair-
man, the motives of Saddam Hussein have always been abundantly
plain, and they have not changed.
May I say, I strongly support for this reason the moves that are
now afoot to have him indicted as a person who has committed
crimes against humanity?
Secondly, the means. The means are well established. They know
very well how to make an atomic bomb. They know very well how
to make their missiles breach the limit and fly longer. In the last
technical conversation I had in Baghdad it was about precisely
that. I asked the minister in charge of missiles to stop illegal work
that they were then commencing to create virtually new Scuds, and
he said, we will not.
And there is evidence that they have been about that business
in these 2 years, and the United States Administration has itself
put into the public arena that it has observed from the sky the re-
construction of Iraq's chemical and biological weapons plants. You
cannot know exactly what is happening inside those buildings un-
less you can be on the ground. Again, that is the logic of inspec-
tions.
So, the third condition, motive, means, and now opportunity, has
been deliciously filled for him by 2 years' freedom from inspection
or monitoring and finally, given his track record of use of these
weapons, there is a saying that says Saddam has never had a
weapon that he did not use, including on his own people. I deeply
believe, Mr. Chairman, the answer to your question is yes, and it
would be utter folly for us to assume anything else.
Chairman GILMAN. Ambassador Butler, you recall that in 1998
there were suspicions here in the Congress that the Administration
was urging UNSCOM to proceed cautiously in dealing with Iraq


15
and was counseling you to avoid confrontations with Saddam over
his obstruction of UNSCOM inspections. Were those suspicions well
founded, and were you being restrained at all by our own nation?
Ambassador BUTLER. No. They were not well founded, and I was
not so restrained. As Executive Chairman of the commission, it was
my responsibility to determine what objects should be inspected
when and by what teams and using what methods. I occasionally
sought counsel from a number of members of the security council.
Bear in mind, I worked for the council, not for Kofi Annan, not
for the secretary general of the U.N. I was the head of a suborgan
of the security council, a unique position, so I sought counsel from
a number of members of the security council on an informal basis
as I did my work, and very often I found their advice and views
helpful.
Sometimes I profoundly disagreed with them, including with
views put forward by the United States. But I want to say this on
the record: At no stage did I ever feel that the United States' rep-
resentatives crossed the line that they should not have crossed be-
tween having the right to put their views to me and, on the other
hand, accepting my unique responsibility for making the oper-
ational decisions, and those are the facts.
Chairman GILMAN. Do you see any parallels between your expe-
riences with the Administration in 1998 and what the press tells
us the Administration is now doing to UNMOVIC?
Ambassador BUTLER. Mr. Chairman, that question lacks a little
bit of specificity. When you say “what the press tells us,” there
have been various press reports, but I mean that respectfully. We
could talk at great length about this.
Chairman ĞILMAN. Well, the contention is that they are holding
back UNMOVIC's movements forward.
Ambassador BUTLER. I have been concerned about a number of
aspects of UNMOVIC. First, it has been given the right mandate,
that is, to—UNMOVIC has the right mandate. It has been told to
bring to final account the weapons of the past and to construct a
new, comprehensive monitoring system.
By the way, Mr. Chairman, that bringing to account the weapons
of the past is exactly the same list as the one I gave to Iraq in June
1998. It is still there. Now, but that is where the similarities be-
tween UNMOVIC and the operation I led end. It has the same
mandate, but nothing else is the same. It has a different political
responsibility. The head of UNMOVIC works for the secretary gen-
eral. I did not. I worked under the security council. He has less
independence. He is not able to recruit staff in an independent way
as I did. He is much more subject to continual riding of shotgun
on him, political direction, by members of the security council, and
in that context I call attention to this.
Again, something that has been overlooked, and I want to put it
on the record: On the 14th of April, last year—sorry—14th of April
2000, the Russian ambassador wrote a letter to the security council
saying, we may have agreed to UNMOVIC getting under way, but
we tell you—this is in writing-look it up—we tell you that we will
not approve of any arms-control or monitoring arrangements of
which Iraq does not approve. That sounded to me awfully like a


17
military power and even of American ground forces, if that is nec-
essary. And if we are not prepared to do that, then I think there
is little hope of
Chairman GILMAN. And if that is demonstrated, do you think
that those countries, Kuwait, Jordan, Turkey, would agree to sup-
port this policy?
Mr. SOLARZ. I certainly think at least one of them would, Kuwait.
I would hope the others would also. I would put it this way. I think
that a demonstration of our resolve is an absolutely necessary con-
dition for securing their cooperation. I think there is a reasonably
good chance they would cooperate, but without that demonstration
of resolve, there is no hope whatsoever.
Chairman GILMAN. Well, I want to thank both of our panelists
for focusing attention on this critical issue. Mr. Gejdenson.
Mr. GEJDENSON. Thank you. Mr. Solarz, there is nobody in this
town or any other town that I respect more for their knowledge and
ability to articulate a message. There is no one whose knowledge
of foreign policy that I have greater respect for.
Mr. SOLARZ. I am getting nervous now.
Mr. GEJDENSON. No, no, no, but I think here, you know, we have
parted company. I do not know any country on this planet that has
demonstrated the resolve against Saddam Hussein that we have.
In the Security Council our closest friends and allies abandon us
regularly on this. You know, when you say there are countries in
the region who would join us in military action, virtually every
country in the region's major papers, often assumed to be arms of
the government, have editorials attacking us for sustaining the
present embargo. About the only place we do get some support is
for an indictment, which is a noble cause.
You know, it seems to me that the hope that people who spend
their days in the lobbies of the hotels in London and France are
going to lead a revolutionary effort in Iraq just absolutely argues
against everything we have seen in history, and the last time we
encouraged people to rise up, the Bush Administration let Saddam
Hussein slaughter them. So the history here is not good. The indi-
cation from the people in the region is they do not want to do any-
thing. Our Security Council members, two of them, now have sent
planes into Iraq-never mind about supporting armed resistance.
I come to the conclusion that Americans do not want to see their
boys in there with airplanes and tanks knocking out Iraqi ground
forces moving in on armed resistance. We are back to the Contras
here.
Mr. SOLARZ. Mr. Gejdenson, let me say at the outset that my af-
fection and respect for you, which is enormous, is in no way dimin-
ished by our disagreement on this issue. But we do have a genuine
disagreement on this issue, and let me tell you why.
First of all, with respect to the attitude of the countries in the
region, there is no doubt in my mind that without exception they
would all be delighted if Saddam were to vanish tomorrow. They
recognize that he is a serious threat. In a way, he is more of a
threat to them than he is to us simply because they are in his
neighborhood. But at the same time they do not want to poke a
stick into a hornet's nest unless they are convinced that by doing
so they are going to kill the hornets.


28
Mr. SOLARZ. Right. But I will tell you what would concern me,
and there is a good deal of technical merit to your line of argument,
and I have to confess, it is one I had not considered before, and I
will reflect on it. But I will tell you instinctively what concerns me
about it, and that is that if, in effect, we end up with a policy of
containment, which is more or less what in practice we have now,
doing something like eliminating the no-fly zone inevitably will di-
minish credibility
Mr. SANFORD. Let us not even call it that, though. Let us call it
the sometimes no-fly zone except for two times a day when we
breach it.
Mr. SOLARZ. It would be seen as a victory by Saddam. It would
be seen as a further diminution of American resolve, and given his
capacity for miscalculation
Mr. ŠANFORD. But the very logic that you have been using has
been if we are going to do something, let us really do it because
if we say we are going to do something and really do not do it, then
we really hurt our standing around the world and particularly in
that region of the world.
Mr. ŠOLARZ. Well, that has been the logic of my argument. That
is with respect to the stated objectives of the Iraq Liberation Act,
which calls for the destabilization and removal of the regime. The
stated purpose of the no-fly zone is not to bring down Saddam, but,
in effect, to deter him from the extension of his military power.
Mr. SANFORD. And, again, I would just say, and I just want to
say for the record, it strikes me, because we had an undersecretary
from the Administration testify a couple of months back, and I
said, what exactly is the policy? They said, well, basically as long
as Saddam is around, we are going to be around. And I said, that
is very unsettling for me because in my home state of South Caro-
lina Štrom is 2 years out, basically a year and a half out, from
making a hundred. If this guy has that kind of longevity, you are
looking at a billion, one, billion, two, a year over another 50 years
essentially, and $50 billion of taxpayer expense on something that
I think we would both agree has very, very limited
Chairman GILMAN. The gentleman's time has expired. Ms. Lee.
Ms. LEE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me thank our two wit-
nesses for your very insightful and thorough presentation. A couple
of questions I would just like to ask with regard to the whole issue
of delinking military and economic sanctions as we look at a reex-
amination of our policy.
We held hearings, I believe, earlier this year looking at what the
impact of economic sanctions has been with regard to food and
medicine, especially with regard to children, and the numbers are
staggering. The humanitarian concerns, of course, are equally as
important as our national-security concerns, and they should be.
And somehow there are many of us who believe that strengthening
military sanctions would make sense at the same time that we
delink the economic sanctions from the military sanctions.
What is your take on that, and how in our re-examination of our
policy toward Iraq should we view economic sanctions and its im-
pact on the people and what it is or is not doing?
Mr. SOLARZ. It is a very good question and a very thoughtful one,
and let me say that I do not believe we should wage war on chil-


30
Why does he refuse to do so? It is obvious. Because he believes
for his political and strategic and military purposes, he needs
chemical and biological and perhaps nuclear weapons as well. And
let me just say here in conclusion, if I might, that Mr. Sherman,
who I see is not here now, said that what would happen if he had
nuclear weapons in 15 years.
The fact of the matter is, and I think Mr. Butler would agree
with this, that if Saddam succeeded in obtaining fissile material on
the black market, which is certainly a possibility, given what is
happening in Russia, he has the know-how and the technical
means to make nuclear weapons now, not 15 years from now.
And lastly, with respect to how much faith we should have in the
efficacy of inspections, if he could be persuaded to let the inspectors
back in, it is important to remember that before the Gulf War the
International Atomic Energy Agency had inspectors in Iraq moni-
toring Iraq's nuclear program, and it turned out after the Gulf War
was over that Saddam had not one, but three separate nuclear-
weapons programs, of which the IAE inspectors were utterly obliv-
ious.
So I have absolutely no faith, even if inspectors were permitted
back in, that they could succeed in doing the job, and I come back
to the view that if we really believe that the acquisition of weapons
of mass destruction by Saddam Hussein poses an unacceptable
threat to us and our friends in the region, the only way to solve
the problem is to remove the regime that is intent on making them.
Ms. LEE. Thank you very much.
Chairman GILMAN. The gentlelady's time has expired. Mr. Lan-
tos.
Mr. LANTOS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I know we need to move
on to a markup. I want to express my admiration for Ambassador
Butler and my distinguished former colleague, Congressman So-
larz, for their steadfast leadership on this issue, and I yield back
the balance of my time.
Chairman GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Lantos. Any other comments
to be made? If not-Mr. Crowley. I am sorry.
Mr. CROWLEY. I am sorry that I missed your testimony, but in
going through your statement, Mr. Solarz, is it my understanding
that you believe—first, let me preface it by saying that there has
been a movement afoot here amongst many Members to pull back
on the sanctions, and myself and Congressman Sweeney, in a bi-
partisan effort, have reached out to our colleagues to ask them to
keep those sanctions imposed.
My question to you is, is it your belief that the sanctions alone
are not working and that more needs to be done?
Mr. SOLARZ. I think it is obvious on the face of it that the sanc-
tions alone are not working. The main purpose of the sanctions, the
primary justification, was to induce and pressure Iraq into com-
plying with relevant U.N. resolutions, originally not just those re-
quiring it to give up its weapons of mass destruction, but also to
pay reparations to Kuwait and other countries that suffered and to
disclose what happened to several hundred Kuwaitis who were
missing, who were presumably kidnaped by the Iraqis when they
departed from Kuwait. He has not complied with any of those reso-


36
cause of the threat of American military retaliation if he should once again invade
his neighbors or use his weapons of mass destruction.
To say that this is a policy based on a foundation of shifting sands would be to
endow it with a solidity it manifestly lacks. There can be little doubt that Saddam
is already rebuilding his depleted stocks of chemical and biological weapons and is
trying to obtain the fissile material he needs for nuclear weapons as well. Why else
would he exclude UN weapons inspectors from Iraq when all he would have to do
to get the sanctions lifted is to let them back to do their job, if he has nothing to
hide from their determined eyes? Furthermore, the willingness of the international
community to maintain sanctions indefinitely, and of Saddam to refrain from re-
newed acts of aggression, including the use of weapons of mass destruction, are as-
sumptions of a highly dubious nature.
The sanctions regime has already been greatly weakened. Saddam is now earning
more money from the export of oil than he did before the Gulf War. And there is
every reason to believe, as the recent French and Russian flights to Baghdad sug-
gest, that it will continue to erode to the point of utter ineffectuality. As for the will-
ingness of Saddam to stay “in his box”, and to refrain from using his weapons of
mass destruction, I can only say, based on his prior record, that this would be an
exceedingly imprudent assumption to make. He has, after all, already used weapons
of mass destruction against not only his enemies but also his own people. In the
last two decades he has gone to war twice, once against Iran and once against Ku-
wait. And he also launched a full-scale assault against the Iraqi opposition in North-
ern Iraq, in spite of the fact that the Administration had provided assurances to the
leaders of the Iraqi National Congress that we would defend them against such an
attack. Our failure to defend the Iraqi opposition, as we said we would, has unques-
tionably diminished our credibility. But it also tells us something about the con-
tinuing deterrent value of our containment policy.
So we need as a nation to make a choice: should we try to change the regime in
Baghdad or should we merely try to contain it.
I believe we should try to change it. But if we are going to succeed in our effort
to do so we not only need to arm and train the Iraqi opposition, as called for by
the Iraq Liberation Act, we also need to be prepared to back them up with American
military power, including the use of ground forces if necessary, if we are going to
rebuild the coalition that enabled us to defeat Saddam a decade ago.
I would not preclude the possibility that a well armed Iraqi opposition backed up
by American air power, particularly if it can induce defections from Saddam's reg-
ular Army units, can succeed in bringing down the regime, without having to use
American ground forces to do so. Indeed, had we been willing to use our airpower
to ground Saddam's attack helicopters and to destroy his armor and artillery when
the uprising erupted in the immediate aftermath of Desert Storm, I have no doubt
that the Iraqi “intifadah” would have succeeded in sweeping the Baathist regime
into the dust bin of history. But unless we're prepared to “put our military where
our mouth is,” there will be little hope of securing the cooperation of the countries
without whose active assistance an indigenous insurrection has little chance of suc-
cess.
If we're not prepared to pay the price in blood and treasure such a strategy would
require (a price, I believe, that will ultimately cost us a lot less than a failed policy
of containment), we should change our declared policy and cease calling for the over-
throw of the regime and concentrate instead on trying to contain it. I have the
gravest doubts that such a policy will work. But it would at least enable us to avoid
the continuing loss of credibility which results from a manifest failure to bring
about a change in a regime to whose destruction we are publicly committed as a
matter of fundamental American policy.
Should the next Administration conclude that leaving Saddam in power would
pose an unacceptable threat to our most vital interests, as I hope it will, it will have
to convince the Congress and the country that the removal of this threat may well
require the renewed use of American military power, in conjunction with at least
some of our former coalition allies, if we are going to finally succeed in eliminating
the primary source of instability in the Persian Gulf and Middle East: the Baathist
regime in Baghdad.
This cannot, I fully recognize, be done in a vacuum. Under current circumstances,
an "out of the blue” presidential call for such a policy would probably be met by
apathy at best and incredulity at worst. But if the next President is prepared to
adopt a much more robust approach to bringing about a regime change in Iraq,
along the lines I have outlined, it shouldn't be hard to find a justification for doing
so.
The most likely, and probably the most convincing justification (in the absence of
another Iraqi invasion of Kuwait or a move by Saddam to reassert his military con-