COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
JESSE HELMS, North Carolina, Chairman
RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana
JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR., Delaware
CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska
PAUL S. SARBANES, Maryland
GORDON H. SMITH, Oregon
CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut
CRAIG THOMAS, Wyoming
JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts
BILL FRIST, Tennessee
RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin
LINCOLN D. CHAFEE, Rhode Island
PAUL D. WELLSTONE, Minnesota
GEORGE ALLEN, Virginia
BARBARA BOXER, California
SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas
ROBERT G. TORRICELLI, New Jersey
BILL NELSON, Florida
STEPHEN E. BIEGUN, Staff Director
EDWIN K. HALL, Democratic Staff Director
SUBCOMMITTEE ON NEAR EASTERN AND SOUTH ASIAN AFFAIRS
SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas, Chairman
GORDON H. SMITH, Oregon
PAUL D. WELLSTONE, Minnesota
CRAIG THOMAS, Wyoming
ROBERT G. TORRICELLI, New Jersey
BILL FRIST, Tennessee
BARBARA BOXER, California
PAUL S. SARBANES, Maryland
(II)


CONTENTS
Page
3
14
17
22
25
Brownback, Hon. Sam, U.S. Senator from Kansas, news release from March
1, 2001, entitled “Brownback Chairs Hearing on U.S. Policy Toward Iraq.”
Cordesman, Anthony H., Arleigh A. Burke Chair_for Strategy, Center for
Strategic and International Studies, Washington, DC
Prepared statement
Halperin, Dr. Morton H., senior fellow, Council on Foreign Relations, Wash-
ington, DC .......
Prepared statement
Kerrey, Hon. Robert J., former U.S. Senator from Nebraska, and president,
New School University, New York, NY
Prepared statement
Perle, Hon. Richard N., former Assistant Secretary of Defense for Internatioal
Security, Washington, DC ....
Prepared statement
Wellstone, Hon. Paul, U.S. Senator from Minnesota:
Prepared statement
Letter to President Clinton regarding existing sanctions regime
9
12
28
33
8
4
(III)


UNITED STATES POLICY TOWARD IRAQ
THURSDAY, MARCH 1, 2001
U.S. SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON NEAR EASTERN AND
SOUTH ASIAN AFFAIRS,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:30 p.m. in room
SD_419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Sam Brownback
(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Present: Senators Brownback, Thomas, and Wellstone.
Senator BROWNBACK. The hearing will come to order. In keeping
with the new mode of doing things on time, we are going to start
this hearing on time. I am delighted to have the panel we have to
day to testify on the issue of U.S. policy toward Iraq. This sub-
committee has held a number of hearings on this topic, but this is
a new administration. I think it is a chance for us to discuss some
of the policy options that are presented before the United States
today, this being the third President to confront Saddam Hussein,
hopefully we will get a chance this time to address the root cause
of the problem, that being Saddam Hussein himself.
Senator Kerrey, welcome back. We are delighted to have you
here. Congratulations on your wedding and new job. We are glad
to have you here with your new colleagues. Mr. Perle, delighted to
have you here again, and Dr. Halperin and Mr. Cordesman, de-
lighted to have both you gentlemen join us as well.
As we all know, this hearing will provide an opportunity to dis-
cuss the future of U.S. policy toward Iraq. Allow me to pose a ques-
tion that I hope you will help us answer, and that is, is Saddam
Hussein better off today than he was 10 years ago at the end of
the gulf war? To my mind, the clear answer is yes, Saddam Hus-
sein is better off today than he was at the end of the gulf war.
The evidence is piling up that Saddam has reconstituted his ille-
gal weapons programs. Two defectors from the regime have told
British press that Saddam has a small nuclear weapon. I have not
been able to independently verify that charge, but the straws are
in the wind.
Further, there is ample evidence, both public and otherwise, that
Saddam is using the cover of a legally allowed missile program to
work on longer range missiles that could eventually deliver weap-
ons of mass destruction, and of course officials at UNSCOM were
never willing to consider Saddam's assertion that he has these
chemical and biological weapons programs. It certainly is logical to
(1)


3
Second, we should stop spending money on conferences for the
opposition and begin to train them, when necessary, even to arm
them. We unilaterally should declare the southern no-fly zone will
be a no-drive zone as well, and we should expand our rules of en-
gagement, including to target WMD sites and potentially other tar-
gets as well.
Those are several policy suggestions that I would put forward as
we seek a more expanded and robust policy toward Iraq, and we
seek to deal with the root problem, which is Saddam Hussein.
That is a start. I look forward to what our panelists have to say,
and their comments about what we should be doing toward a new
U.S. policy toward Iraq.
With that, I will turn to the ranking member, Senator Wellstone.
We are delighted to have you join us here.
[The prepared statement of Senator Brownback follows:]
[News Release March 1, 2001]
BROWNBACK CHAIRS HEARING ON U.S. POLICY TOWARD IRAQ
WASHINGTON, DC.-U.S. Senator Sam Brownback chaired a Senate Foreign Rela-
tions subcommittee hearing today on U.S. policy toward Iraq. A portion of Senator
Brownback's remarks from the hearing follow.
“This hearing provides an opportunity to discuss the future of U.S. policy toward
Iraq,” Brownback said. “Allow me to pose a question that I hope you will help us
answer: Is Saddam Hussein better off today than he was ten years ago, at the end
of the Gulf War?” To my mind, the clear answer is: “Yes, Saddam Hussein is better
off.”
“The evidence is overwhelming that Saddam is reconstituting his illegal weapons
programs. Defectors from the regime have told the British press that Saddam actu-
ally has two small nuclear weapons. I have not been able to independently verify
that charge, but the very possibility is alarming.
“Further, there is ample evidence, both public and otherwise, that Saddam is
using the cover of a legally allowed missile program to work on longer range mis-
siles that could eventually threaten those far beyond his borders with weapons of
mass destruction. And of course, officials at UNSCOM have never believed Saddam's
assertion that he had destroyed his chemical and biological weapons programs.
“It is certainly logical to assume that in the absence of inspectors for over two
years, he has seized the opportunity to improve his WMD programs.
“For our part, according to press reports about Secretary Powell's trip to the Mid-
dle East, the administration now supports easing the existing sanctions and insti-
tuting so-called “smarter sanctions.' I look forward to discussing this proposal with
Secretary Powell next week.
"As we listen to all this talk about 'smarter sanctions,' I wonder whether we can
put the horse back in the barn. The sanctions regime and the international coalition
against Iraq have completely unraveled. Since August, a steady_stream of inter-
national flights-kicked-off by Russia and France—have landed in Baghdad, without
monitoring or inspection. The Chinese are working illegally in Baghdad without fear
of repercussions, and press reports indicate that oil is once again flowing through
the Iraqi-Syrian pipeline, at a rate of 150,000 barrels per day. The profits from
those illegal transfers of oil go straight into Saddam's pocket.
"To top this all off, U.S.-British strikes on Iraqi air defense targets two weeks ago,
intended to protect allied pilots from increasing Iraqi threats, drew fire, not only
from the usual suspects, but also from the Arab states we are ostensibly protecting
and from our partners on the Security Council.
“We must face it, Saddam has won the propaganda war. He is a ruthless despot
who refuses to spend all that he is allowed to for his people's well-being. Neverthe-
less, the United States is blamed for the suffering of the Iraqi people.
“What can we do in response? Will we return our inspectors to Iraq? What sac-
rifices on sanctions must we make to get them in? And will any such inspections
be worth those sacrifices? I doubt it.
“We are going to have to face the fact that after ten years, sanctions have not
achieved their intended goal of denying Iraq weapons of mass destruction. If that
remains our goal today—and I certainly hope it does—then we need to ask whether


5
As the UN Security Council continues to press to ensure Iraq's compliance with
its international inspection obligations, and officials of your administration actively
review policy options on Iraq, we are writing to express our deep concern about the
ongoing humanitarian crisis there, and to urge greater US efforts at the United Na-
tions to address it.
We have been heartened by recent press reports that you are considering ways
to ease the devastating effects of the sanctions on the Iraqi people. Although the
current oil-for-food program (expanded under Security Council Resolution 1284,
adopted in December, 1999) provides for some infrastructure repairs, as a temporary
relief program it cannot adequately provide the longer-term planning and invest-
ment required to restore Iraq's civilian infrastructure to a level necessary to meet
even the most basic civilian necessities. Those longer-term infrastructure improve-
ments, coupled with expanded and accelerated humanitarian relief, are key to ad-
dressing the ongoing crisis.
We recognize that Iraq poses a series of complex problems. On the one hand, we
are confronted with the Iraqi government's persistent refusal to meet its inter-
national obligations with regard to Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), as well
as its record of wholesale human rights abuses. On the other, the comprehensive
UN sanctions regime has contributed to a humanitarian crisis that has seriously af-
fected the health and well-being of millions of innocent Iraqis. It is clear that the
policies of the Iraqi government have greatly compounded and magnified the hu-
manitarian crisis, and that the government does not intend to make the welfare of
its civilian population its priority. While the Iraqi government bears the lion's share
of responsibility for the unnecessary civilian suffering due to its refusal to comply
with the UN weapons inspection program-a refusal underscored by recent wide-
spread, though largely speculative, media reports about its possible efforts to rebuild
certain of its WMD capacities—this does not excuse the international community
from its own humanitarian obligations.
As one distinguished international human rights monitoring group recently ob-
served, "The Iraqi government's callous and manipulative disregard for its humani-
tarian obligations is not something the Security Council can reasonably expect will
change. Rather, it is a reality the Council must take into account in deciding the
appropriate means of securing the government's compliance with its disarmament
demands.
The Iraqi government has proven indifferent to the suffering of its own people;
we cannot afford to be similarly indifferent. Thus we believe that the administration
should take urgent steps to better reconcile enforcement of its disarmament objec-
tives in Iraq with its obligation to minimize harm to innocent Iraqi civilians and
to ensure protection of their most basic rights.
The Security Council's own report last year on the deteriorating humanitarian sit-
uation; the comprehensive UNICEF survey on child health; and reports from other
relief agencies in the field, including the International Committee of the Red Cross
(ICRC), make clear that a public health emergency persists in many areas of the
country, and that efforts under the oil-for-food program to alleviate these conditions
have been woefully inadequate. Indeed, a senior ICRC official recently warned that
the increasingly precarious situation in the public infrastructure posed an imminent
threat to the survival of those hospitals still functioning.
We believe it is critical that we do what we can now to address directly this public
health emergency. This requires restoring Iraq's civilian economic infrastructure in
order to bring child mortality rates and other public health indicators back as close
as possible to the levels that existed prior to the embargo. With this in mind, we
strongly urge your administration to take the following initiatives:
First, in the Security Council and the Sanctions Committee, push to implement
immediately the recommendations of the report of the Council's humanitarian panel
last March. Many of these recommendations, such as pre-approval of humanitarian
items and using oil-for-food funds to purchase local Iraqi products and to hire and
train Iraqi workers and professionals to undertake civilian infrastructure repairs
and maintenance, are in Resolution 1284, but are conditioned on further steps by
the Council or the Committee. We are pleased to note that the Sanctions Committee
has begun the preapproval process for humanitarian items and urge you to take
steps to ensure that these measures are implemented without further delay.
Second, take all necessary steps to persuade the Security Council and its Sanc-
tions Committee to take more seriously its acknowledged obligation to monitor the
humanitarian impact of the sanctions, especially on vulnerable sectors of the popu-
lation such as children and the elderly. If necessary, we believe you should press
for an independent monitor such as a Special UN Rapporteur to assess the impact
of the sanctions and the effectiveness of the oil-for-food program in addressing that
impact, and to scrutinize the practices of the Iraqi government with respect to dis-


7
urge you to adopt the recommendations we have made in this letter, which in our
view strike a better balance between legitimate non-proliferation concerns and those
involving our humanitarian obligations to the people of Iraq-and may even be more
effective in securing Iraq's eventual compliance than the current arrangement.
Thank you for your consideration.
Sincerely,
PAUL D. WELLSTONE,
United States Senator.
RUSSELL FEINGOLD,
United States Senator.
Senator WELLSTONE. Secretary Powell last week I think has
raised some important questions, and his idea, as I understand it,
of a stronger international effort to block Iraqi imports of arms and
other military items, coupled with an easing of nonmilitary items
and a more flexible approach to items that serve civilian needs I
think could form the basis of a new international consensus on Iraq
sanctions, and I hope, Mr. Chairman, that we will get into a discus-
sion of what I think is a very important question.
Look, first of all, I am not the expert, and second of all, this is
far from simple, and you have got a government that has not been
willing to comply with, at least for 2 years, plus now, any arms in-
spection, you have got a government that is involved in widespread
and brutal human rights abuses, and there is no question that this
is a real challenge.
But I do think that there are questions that can be raised about
the sanctions regime, and I also want to just pose two other ques-
tions as we engage in some hopefully hard thinking about Iraq.
One of them is, we have been doing this—the policy of overflying
Iraq has been in place now for years. It puts our pilots in danger
on a daily basis, but I do not think it has changed the Government
of Iraq's behavior at all, and I know that Senator Kerrey has been
outspoken, as you have, Mr. Chairman, in support of the Iraq Lib-
eration Act, but I think we ought to think very carefully about
whether or not we want to provide lethal military weapons to the
Iraqi opposition.
I mean, if we do so, we risk overcommitting ourselves and lead-
ing the opposition to believe that the United States military will
intervene if its fledgling efforts should falter, and I think the ques-
tion we have got to deal with—and Senator Kerrey is always very
direct. He is known for that, but are we prepared to rescue the
Iraqi opposition-I mean, I think we need to deal with that ques-
tion in this hearing—or are we prepared to let it die again?
Now, if the current Government of Iraq should implode, we
should be ready to move ahead with a generous assistance package
to help Iraq develop a vibrant and democratic society, but by most
informed accounts the opposition appears to be splintered, and
weak, and may have little realistic chance of removing Saddam
Hussein from power.
I welcome again Senator Kerrey, Mort
Mort Halperin, Tony
Cordesman, and Richard Perle to the hearing, and I look forward
to your views, and I think really this committee, this is very time-
ly, very important, and I really look forward to the discussion we
are going to have.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Senator Wellstone follows:)


8
PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR PAUL WELLSTONE
I welcome this hearing on our policy toward Iraq as the Administration initiates
a comprehensive review that could have far-reaching consequences for U.S. relations
with the Arab world. The beginning of a new Administration is an appropriate time
to review our policies and, where necessary, to recraft them in a way that meets
the changing political and humanitarian concerns in the Middle East. A year ago,
in the midst of the Clinton Administration's own Iraq policy review, I posed several
ideas about how to apply the existing sanctions regime more flexibly while pre-
serving strict monitoring of any weapons-related activity. I would like to insert into
the Committee record a copy of the letter I wrote to the President outlining those
ideas.
In this regard, Secretary Powell's trip last week to consult with our friends and
allies in the Middle East was an extremely important initiative. The ideas that he
discussed-a stronger international effort to block Iraqi imports of arms and mili-
tary-related items coupled with an easing of non-military items and a more flexible
approach to items that serve essential civilian needs—could form the basis of a new
international consensus on Iraq sanctions. I hope that this hearing will help us put
these ideas into perspective.
Iraq poses a series of complex questions for policy makers. On the one hand, we
are confronted with the Iraqi government's persistent refusal to meet its obligations
with regard to Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), as well as its record of whole-
sale human rights abuses. At the same time, the comprehensive UN sanctions re-
gime has contributed to a longstanding humanitarian crisis that has seriously af-
fected the health and well-being of millions of innocent Iraqis. It is clear that the
policies of the Iraqi government have greatly compounded and magnified the hu-
manitarian crisis, and that the government has not made the welfare of its civilian
population a priority. Even so, it has long seemed to me that a new approach on
sanctions which allows much greater flexibility in the sanctions regime for obviously
humanitarian goods and for certain dual use goods makes a lot of sense.
It is true that the Iraqi government bears the lion's share of responsibility for un-
necessary civilian suffering due to its persistent refusal to comply with the UN
weapons inspection program. This refusal is underscored by widespread media re-
ports about Iraq's possible effort to rebuild certain of its WMD capacities. However,
the callous behavior of the Iraqi government does not excuse the international com-
munity from its own humanitarian obligations.
I believe that we ought to explore further Secretary Powell's initiative, refine it,
and see if constructive alternative approaches can be developed in place of the cur-
rent stalemate. We need some hard thinking on Iraq. Our policy of overlying Iraq
has been in place for years and puts our pilots in danger on a daily basis but has
not changed the government of Iraq's behavior. I know that Senator Kerrey has
been outspoken in his support for the Iraq Liberation Act, but we need to think
carefully whether to support providing lethal military weapons to the Iraqi opposi-
tion. We risk overcommiting ourselves and leading the opposition to believe that the
United States military will intervene if its fledgling efforts should falter. Are we
prepared to rescue the Iraqi opposition? Are we prepared to let it die again?
If the current government in Iraq should implode, certainly we should be prepared
to move ahead with a generous assistance package to help Iraq develop a vibrant
and democratic society. But, by most informed accounts, the opposition appears
splintered and weak and may have little realistic chance of removing Saddam Hus-
sein from power.
I welcome Senator Kerrey, Mort Halpern, Richard Perle, and Tony Cordesman
the hearing today and look forward to hearing their views.
Senator BROWNBACK. Thank you, Senator Wellstone.
Senator Thomas.
Senator THOMAS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will look forward
to it also. Therefore, I will pass to let the panelists begin. Thank
you.
Senator BROWNBACK. Thank you. I think this is your first time
back to the Senate, Bob. The first witness up will be Hon. Bob
Kerrey, former Senator from the great State of Nebraska, second
best basketball team in the states between Kansas and Nebraska,
and current president of the New School University in New York.
Bob, welcome back. We are delighted to have you here.


10
Third, we have sustained a military effort to contain Iraq, and
that military effort has cost us lives. U.S. and British pilots fly al-
most daily, as Senator Wellstone observed, to enforce the no-fly
zones in the north and in the south, but Mr. Chairman, members
of the committee, we have also maintained a presence at the
Dahran military installation in Saudi Arabia, and the significance
of that is that this installation, part of our containment policy, was
the target of a truck bomb attack on 25 June, 1996, that killed 19
U.S. airmen. It was cited by Osama bin Laden as a reason for at-
tacking U.S. Embassies in Africa on August 17, 1998, that killed
11 Americans and over 200 others. Our military presence was cited
again when the USS Cole was attacked on October 12, 2000 in the
Port of Aden, Yemen, killing 17 American sailors.
I point this out, Mr. Chairman, because when the debate occurs
as to whether or not military force is needed, do not forget that we
already have a very expensive military operation in place today.
The question is not, should we have a military operation. The ques-
tion is, how should that military operation be deployed?
Fourth, when he signed the Iraq Liberation Act into law on Octo-
ber 31, 1998, President Clinton began the process of shifting away
from the failed policy of using military force to contain Iraq to sup-
porting military force to replace the military dictatorship of Sad-
dam Hussein with a democratically elected government and, al-
though our support for opposition forces has been uneven at best,
this new policy is still current law.
Fifth, Mr. hairman, opponents of establishing our policy objec-
tive as liberation of the people of Iraq use a number of effective ar-
guments, and I would like to cite them, because I would like to also
refute them. They say, we would never get the support for a mili-
tary operation. They say that democracy will not work in Iraq, that
Arabs are not capable of governing themselves. They say finally
that the opposition forces lacks the legitimacy and capability and
in particular the most visible organization, the Iraq National Con-
gress, lacks the coherency and ability to get the job done.
Well, Mr. Chairman, I am very much aware that these argu-
ments gather force when they are not answered, so I would like to
answer all three. First, these arguments are little more than ex-
cuses, in my view, designed to keep us from doing what we know
we should do, and we know what we can do if our will is strong.
The argument against military force encourages us to ignore the
hundreds of millions that we spend every single year to contain
Iraq, and the 47 American lives that have already been lost to en-
force this containment policy.
The argument that Arabs cannot govern themselves is racist. It
encourages us to ignore a million Arab-Americans who exercise
their rights when those rights are protected by a constitution and
law, and the argument against the Iraq National Congress [INC]
is little more than a parroting of Saddam Hussein's propaganda.
Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, I am very much
aware that domestic and international support has been steadily
eroding for continuing sanctions against Iraq, let alone a new mili-
tary strategy to end the nightmare of this dictatorship. I have
watched with growing sadness as Iraq has exploited the public's


14
Mr. Cordesman, let us hear your testimony next if we could.
Thank you for joining us.
STATEMENT OF ANTHONY H. CORDESMAN, ARLEIGH A. BURKE
CHAIR FOR STRATEGY, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND
INTERNATIONAL STUDIES, WASHINGTON, DC
Mr. CORDESMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to
thank you and the subcommittee for the opportunity to testify this
afternoon. I do have a formal statement which I would appreciate
it if it could be incorporated into the record, but I would make only
a brief statement.
Senator BROWNBACK. It will be included in the record.
Mr. CORDESMAN. I think I should preface my remarks with the
fact that you cannot have an Iraq policy that works without a new
policy in dealing with the Arab-Israeli peace issue, without rethink-
ing your policy toward Iran, and without broadening our diplo-
macy, which has focused in the last 2 years almost exclusively on
the peace process to consider how you can buildup a stronger basis
of support in the southern gulf.
But if I may address your question, is Saddam better off today,
the answer is yes, in some ways. There is one area where he is
clearly not better off. If you look back at the rate of arms imports
that he had until the embargo in mid-1990, by now he would have
spent anywhere from $22 to $45 billion on arms imports. He has
not had any major imports of arms since mid-1990, although there
has been smuggling, and some technology transfer.
In spite of demonstrations of prototypes, there has been no serial
production of a single major weapons system within Iraq. There
has been the assembly of some T-72 kits. I think we have only to
think what would happen in the United States if we froze the tech-
nology base for 10 years, if we could not have reacted to the lessons
of the gulf war, and if our military establishment consisted of worn
equipment that was used in the Iraq-Iran war, in large part, before
it was certainly worn in the gulf war.
In terms of weapons of mass destruction, it is an unfortunate re-
ality that during the gulf war we had only a limited number of suc-
cessful strikes on these facilities. Nevertheless, the gulf war forced
UNSCOM into Iraq, and we should not discount what happened.
Several billion dollars' worth of manufacturing facilities, weapons,
and technology, was physically destroyed.
As you pointed out, however, his technology base remains. It is
virtually certain that he has had a decade in which to improve that
technology base. Certain key aspects of that base, particularly the
production of centrifuges and advanced biological weapons, could
never be traced by UNSCOM, which raises further questions about
UNMOVIC. He has the stockpiles to probably create a significant
break-out capability, and rapidly deploy some of these weapons.
In economic terms, the benefits to him are clear. Since 1990 eco-
nomic sanctions have eroded to the point where Iraq has at least
$1 billion worth of uncontrolled income from smuggled petroleum
exports. Its legal oil revenues in 2000 are estimated at roughly $22
billion, which is about 90 percent higher than they were the pre-
vious year, and 170 percent higher than the year before that.


16
I wish, again, this situation was different. I recognize that at this
point in time the United States has major problems in generating
the kind of patient, systematic, covert effort to develop internal op-
position that might work. Unless we do this, however, I think we
will find ourselves legislating the funding of a forlorn hope.
Fourth, as has been previously mentioned, I think we made a
massive foreign policy mistake in not confronting Saddam and in
not refuting the lies that he told over a 10-year period. I can think
of only two statements from the State Department that ever sys-
tematically attempted to explain what was happening under oil for
food, and who the true cause of many of Iraq's problems were. One
was a glorified publicity release, and the other was a page-and-a-
half long.
In contrast, every day, Saddam has fought for the minds of the
Arab world. He has been able to capture the hardship issue. He
has been able to find, among people who do not understand Iraq,
many supporters that blame the United States and sanctions for
actions which are more those of Saddam than any impact of the
U.N. Unless we are willing, now, to try to recover smart sanctions
will simply be a step forward toward no sanctions, and the question
really is, can the State Department have that kind of effort.
Fifth, and I say this in my testimony, the United States must
think now about the future of Iraq's Kurds. I was in the U.S. Em-
bassy in Iran in the early 1970's. I watched the United States sup-
port the Shah of Iran in using the Kurds as a political tool. I
watched them abandoned after the Algiers Accord. I think we must
have a clear policy toward autonomy, clear demands as to what
Kurdish rights should be.
And to go back to the no-fly zones, I would absolutely agree that
if we withdrew from Turkey, we withdraw from any protection of
the Kurds, and whether the result is an immediate occupation and
slaughter, or the kind of more patient and systematic killing which
Saddam has used on other occasions, those are the only two alter-
natives.
Sixth, we talk about smart sanctions, but I have not heard any-
thing about energy. In our projections we say, in the Department
of Energy, we want Iraq's production capacity to increase from
roughly 2.8 million barrels a day today to 6.2 million in 2020, and
we see Iraq as a critical component of our future energy strategy.
It is far from clear that that makes sense, but somebody has got
to resolve the issue.
Finally, we need to revitalize the other aspects of military con-
tainment. One key goal is to improve and maintain the forward
presence rapid-deployment capabilities and war-fighting capability
we have today.
Another goal is to stop preaching. We have got to stop issuing
strong statements and then not following them up with decisive
military action. The best description I can give of military options
under the Clinton administration was that the President spoke
stickly and carried a big soft. I wish there were some better or
nicer way to put it, but we need a formal doctrine that states our
"red lines,” that states quite clearly what we demand in terms of
gulf security, that we will remain committed to military contain-


27
• We have gone from severely limiting what Iraq can buy with the funds that it
gains from its oil sales to permitting it to purchase a much larger—but still
very limited-range of items.
And at the same time, as President Bush has noted, the embargo is becoming less
and less effective as more oil is sold outside the proscribed UN sanctioned scheme.
While the changes that have been made move us closer to what other countries, es-
pecially France, Russia and our allies in the region want, there has not been a cor-
responding increase in support for our Iraqi policy. On the contrary, support con-
tinues to decline. Incremental changes simply erode our position without gaining
more support for what remains in place.
If we continue down this path Iraq will be able to buy more and more goods with-
in the sanction system, and will have more and more funds from sales conducted
in violation of the UN Security Council embargo. One day we will wake up and the
whole world will know that the sanctions are no longer working and many more
states will feel free to ignore them. The results will be disastrous not only for our
Iraq policy, but for our ability to employ UN sanctions in other situations and to
have states feel that they have an obligation to act consistent with UNSC resolu-
tions under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.
Despite these clear dangers, the pressures within the government to make only
incremental changes in policy are so strong that it will take an act of will with sub-
stantial Congressional and public support to move decisively.
Part of the task is to illuminate what the real options are. That is why these
hearings are so important and why I very much welcome this opportunity to lay out
the option which I believe is most consistent with American interests.
Our concerns about Iraq relate primarily to its effort to develop weapons of mass
destruction and to threaten the use of force against its neighbors. If we are to have
any chance of keeping the alliance against the current Iraqi regime together we
must focus on these concerns. In order to do that we should do the following:
• Drastically reduce the list of items which Iraq is prohibited from purchasing
only to weapons themselves and to real dual use items which would directly
contribute to development of weapons of mass destruction. In return seek UNSC
agreement to have the UN sanctions committee continue to control the revenue
Iraq receives for its oil sales so that it can prevent expenditures on these few
unauthorized items.
• Recognize that efforts to persuade Iraq to permit effective UN inspections on
its territory are very unlikely to succeed. Instead, focus on securing an agree-
ment among the P-5 that the controls on expenditures will remain in place until
Iraq either permits full inspection or finds some other affirmative means to per-
suade he UNSC that it has abandoned its effort to develop weapons of mass
destruction or to threaten its neighbors with conventional aggression.
• Without abandoning our claimed right to enforce no fly zones in the north and
the south, curtail routine flights while restating our red lines in a clear and un-
ambiguous manner, so that Iraq does not venture into the north, mobilize
against Kuwait or the population in the south of the country, or threaten any
other country in the region. Seek firm assurances from our friends and allies
in the region that bases would be available for military operations, should we
determine that Iraq is resuming its efforts to develop and deploy weapons of
mass destruction or is mounting military operations.
• In light of these changes, seek support from states in the region for efforts to
curtail the embargo-violating oil exports and to help curtail illegal smuggling
in and out of Iraq. We would be able to argue that these can no longer be justi-
fied on humanitarian grounds since the UN would now be permitting Iraq to
spend funds on all activities that might alleviate the current suffering of the
Iraqi people.
In order to increase the attractiveness of this package to Russia and France we
should consider permitting, or even requiring, that Iraq use some of its revenue
from the sale of oil, to pay its existing debts to other nations including these two
members of the UNSC. Our friends and allies in the region should find it easy to
support this package since it will be clear that the embargo cannot be responsible
for the continued suffering of the Iraqi people. Of course, that is the case now, since
the Iraqi regime has at its disposal sufficient resources, both from the authorized
sales and from the illegal sales, to do whatever is necessary to deal with the human-
itarian tragedy in that country. The leadership prefers instead to use the funds for
its own pleasures and for weapons. However, this new approach should reduce the
criticism that the embargo is responsible for the humanitarian crisis.


33
[The prepared statement of Mr. Perle follows:)
PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD N. PERLE
Mr. Chairman: Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today. I do
not have a prepared statement. For the convenience of the subcommittee I have list-
ed on this page the key issues which, in my view, must shape any American policy
toward Iraq. I will try to cover each of them in a short opening statement.
1. Does the regime of Saddam Hussein pose a threat to the interests of the
United States and its allies? How does the magnitude of that threat today com-
pare with what it was a decade ago at the end of Desert Storm? What about
this time two years ago? How about last year?
2. Does Saddam Hussein now possess weapons of mass destruction? How
much do we know about his programs with respect to chemical, biological and
nuclear weapons? Are any such programs proceeding?
3. How can we end Saddam's programs to obtain weapons of mass destruction
and the means to deliver them?
4. In the absence of U.N. inspectors, how much can we expect to learn about
these programs?
5. Would a return of U.N. inspectors give us confidence that Saddam's pro-
grams would be terminated and that any weapons of mass destruction he may
now have would be surrendered?
6. Would a return of inspectors justify the normalization of relations with
Saddam?
7. Beyond weapons of mass destruction, what should we think of the claim
that Saddam is "contained?"
8. Are the present sanctions working? Can they be made more effective?
9. Can we should we rebuild the coalition that opposed Saddam following
the invasion of Kuwait?
10. Can we have confidence in the U.N. administration of programs affecting
Iraq?
11. Can we secure ourselves, our forces in the field and our friends and allies
in the region as long as Saddam is in power?
12. What are the prospects for removing Saddam's regime from power?
13. How can we work with the INC to bring about a change in the Iraqi re-
gime?
Senator BROWNBACK. This is an excellent discussion, and a good
starting point. Let us run the clock here 10 minutes, and then we
can bounce back and forth in a couple of rounds.
One of my frustrations with what it seems like has taken place
at least the last 5 years in U.S. policy toward Iraq has been this
lack of resolve, this kind of drift, just, well, we would like to have
him out of there, but we are not really sure how we would do that,
nor are we willing to really take the steps to get Saddam Hussein
out of office.
You each are talking about some different steps, and I think all
of you expressed frustration with where we are today in our policy
toward Saddam Hussein, and I want to use this policy toward Sad-
dam Hussein rather than Iraq. I think that is a different issue.
All of you appear to support changing somewhat the rules of en-
gagement on our air targets, if I am hearing you each correctly.
You are being critical of, or several of you are being critical of the
targeting we have done to date, and all of you would support a
more robust rules of engagement on air, on our targets for our air,
our airplanes and the British airplanes. Is that a correct reading
of each of your positions? Mr. Cordesman.
Mr. CORDESMAN. Senator, I think it would not be mine. I think
you have to be very careful about saying rules of engagement for
aircraft. What you would then mean is the daily aircraft we fly


37
impact as we see in political elections, or even as we saw in politics
in Eastern Europe because of the nature of this regime.
I believe it is a pure totalitarian regime that remains in power
based on the worst kinds of terrorism, and therefore I think, while
a miracle can always happen, that if we go into this, we have to
go into it with the notion that there is going to have to be a sub-
stantial American military involvement, and that air power alone
is not likely to be enough, and whether it is a smaller land force,
as Richard suggests, or a bigger one that I suggest, at least some
of the people in this administration would want to be sure that it
succeeded. I think we have to assume that.
I would also have to say that while I think one should never rely
entirely on experts, it is not true that this administration—I mean,
the past administration and, I assume, the one before that, did not
look at the hard question of whether you get rid of Saddam Hus-
sein by supporting the opposition, and the people who get paid to
do that in various agencies of the government reached the conclu-
sion that you could not. Now, they may be wrong, but it is not the
case that people just dismissed it without taking a look at it.
Senator WELLSTONE. The other part of my question for you, and
each of you, is, I asked you whether or not you thought this could
be done without major American involvement, both air and ground,
and you said you would need that. Would you advocate such a pol-
icy?
Dr. HALPERIN. I do not advocate it, because I think the cost to
the United States and the cost to our relationships with other
countries, and the cost to our ability to use the Security Council for
other purposes, would outweigh the value. I would like to get rid
of this man, but I think that cost is not worth it.
Senator WELLSTONE. Senator Kerrey.
Senator KERREY. I would answer unequivocally yes, it is worth
it. It is worth the price, and by the way, the opposition forces are
not asking for the kind of American intervention that Mort is advo-
cating. I do think he is quite right that we have to make certain
that we are not going to start and then stop again. We have to un-
derstand, we have got to go the distance.
Senator WELLSTONE. But my question was whether or not you
think this opposition can undertake this effort without, in fact,
major involvement by us.
Senator KERREY. We have a major involvement. Nineteen Ameri-
cans were killed at Khobar Towers in June 1996. Why? They were
killed because we are in Saudi Arabia. Why are we in Saudi Ara-
bia? To contain Iraq.
In 1998, 11 more Americans were killed in West African Embas-
sies. Why? Because Osama bin Laden wants us out of Saudi Ara-
bia. And 17 more were killed—what I am saying, Senator, is, we
have a significant military operation in place right now, and we are
taking casualties.
The question is not, are we going to have a military operation.
The question is, what is the mission, what is the objective, and I
am saying with great respect that I believe the mission should
change from containment to replacement to liberate the people of
Iraq, and I believe it is entirely feasible for us to do it, and I think
the payoff is enormous, 20 million people of Iraq liberated.