S. HRG. 106–735 Y 4.F 76/2:S.HRG.106-735 SADDAM'S IRAQ: SANCTIONS AND U.S. POLICY HEARING BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON NEAR EASTERN AND SOUTH ASIAN AFFAIRS OF THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS UNITED STATES SENATE ONE HUNDRED SIXTH CONGRESS SECOND SESSION MARCH 22, 2000 Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations Pennsylvania State University Libraries JANI 7 2001 Documents Collection U.S. Depository Copy Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/senate U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE WASHINGTON : 2000 67-659 CC COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS JESSE HELMS, North Carolina, Chairman RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR., Delaware CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska PAUL S. SARBANES, Maryland GORDON H. SMITH, Oregon CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut ROD GRAMS, Minnesota JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin CRAIG THOMAS, Wyoming PAUL D. WELLSTONE, Minnesota JOHN ASHCROFT, Missouri BARBARA BOXER, California BILL FRIST, Tennessee ROBERT G. TORRICELLI, New Jersey LINCOLN D. CHAFEE, Rhode Island STEPHEN E. BIEGUN, Staff Director EDWIN K. HALL, Minority Staff Director SUBCOMMITTEE ON NEAR EASTERN AND SOUTH ASIAN AFFAIRS SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas, Chairman JOHN ASHCROFT, Missouri PAUL D. WELLSTONE, Minnesota GORDON H. SMITH, Oregon ROBERT G. TORRICELLI, New Jersey ROD GRAMS, Minnesota PAUL S. SARBANES, Maryland CRAIG THOMAS, Wyoming CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut - - - -- SADDAM’S IRAQ: SANCTIONS AND U.S. POLICY WEDNESDAY, MARCH 22, 2000 U.S. SENATE, SUBCOMMITTEE ON NEAR EASTERN AND SOUTH ASIAN AFFAIRS, COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, Washington, DC. The subcommittee met at 10:22 a.m., in room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Sam Brownback (chairman of the sub- committee) presiding. Present: Senators Brownback, Biden and Wellstone. Senator BROWNBACK. The hearing will be called to order. Thank you all for joining us today. Ambassador Walker, in par- ticular, I want to thank you for being here. This will be your first appearance in front of the committee since your confirmation hear- ing. So, I am delighted to have you here. Senator Wellstone will be joining us. He has another meeting but will be joining us in the hearing. I hope some other members will as well. Before we get started, I hope, Ambassador Walker, that you have a chance and will take the opportunity to address a broad range of issues, although the hearing today is about Iraq. If I had my druthers, we would be discussing a wide range of issues here today and not just the question of Iraq, particularly issues like what is taking place in the peace process, specifically the discussions re- garding the Syrian track. Congress, I would note to you, clearly wants to be consulted be- fore any agreement is reached that will involve significant U.S. dol- lars and/or the use of U.S. troops or observers in any sort of peace agreement. This is something that the Congress wants to know about before any fait accompli occurs. Also, I hope you feel free to take the opportunity to discuss sanc- tions concessions on Iran, potentially on Libya. But today's hearing is about Iraq, and we will stay to that topic, but feel free to com- ment on these others because they are very pressing issues of in- terest and concern. It has long been my belief that policy toward Iraq should be real- ly a rather simple matter. One, Iraq must be disarmed completely. Two, failing total disarmament, Saddam Hussein should be re- moved from power. This administration has embraced to, a greater or lesser degree, both of these goals, and in both cases, I wonder really if the administration has lost sight of its objectives. On the question of disarmament, there have been no weapons in- spectors in Iraq for well over a year. We have no idea what Sad- (1) 5 We contain Saddam through U.N. sanctions which deny him the resources needed to reconstitute weapons of mass destruction, by enforcing no-fly zones in the north and south, and by maintaining a military presence in the region and a readiness to use force if necessary. An effective disarmament and monitoring regime inside Iraq would strengthen containment by further limiting Iraq's efforts to rearm. Resolution 1284 reaffirms that Iraq has not fulfilled its obli- gations under previous Security Council resolutions to declare and destroy its weapons of mass destruction. The resolution establishes a new arms control organization, the United Nations Monitoring, Inspection and Verification Commission, or UNMOVIC, to replace UNSCOM. UNMOVIC retains UNSCOM's broad mandate and au- thorities. It has the right to conduct intrusive inspections into Iraq's past weapons of mass destruction programs, as well as to monitor and to prevent future developments of weapons of mass de- struction. It has the right to immediate, unconditional, and unre- stricted access to any and all sites, records, and facilities. The United Nations is moving ahead with implementation of the Resolution 1284. The Secretary General has appointed Hans Blix of Sweden, a former director general of the International Atomic Energy Agency, as executive chairman of UNMOVIC, and he took up his duties on March 1. We have met several times with Dr. Blix since his appointment, and he has made clear that he is committed to putting in place a robust, technically proficient body which will accept nothing less than full Iraqi cooperation. Sanctions are the most critical element of containment. In the absence of the sanctions regime and a comprehensive international system of controls, Saddam Hussein would have sole control over Iraq's oil revenues, estimated at $20 billion over the coming year. In the absence of comprehensive international controls, even if a ilitary embargo remained in place, it is inevitable that Saddam would once again threaten the region and ignore the needs of the Iraqi people. But it is also essential that we address the humanitarian needs of the Iraqi people. Not only is it right for the international com- munity to do all it can to assist the Iraqi people who are the pawns of Saddam Hussein, but doing so minimizes the risk of sanctions erosion and alleviates international pressures to ease or lift the controls which keep Iraq's revenue out of the hands of Saddam Hussein. U.N. sanctions have never targeted the Iraqi people and have never limited the important food and medicine for the Iraqi people. In fact, it was the United States that pressed for the creation of the first oil-for-food program adopted in 1991. Baghdad rejected this program, and it was not until 1996 that it finally accepted oil- for-food. Since the first oil-for-food supplies arrived in Iraq in 1997, the program has brought tremendous improvements in living condi- tions. Iraqi per capita intake has risen from 1,300 calories before the program began to over 2,000 calories now provided by a U.N. ration basket which is augmented by locally grown produce. its are now at about prewar levels. In the year before the program began, Iraq imported about $50 million worth of medi- 7 Using congressionally appropriated funds, the State Department and the INC will sign an initial grant worth over a quarter a mil- lion dollars this week. The grant will enable the Iraqi National Congress [INC] to continue its efforts to reach out to constituents and to establish the infrastructure necessary to accomplish its ob- jectives and to take advantage of other congressionally mandated programs. As a government, we are also stepping up our efforts to gather evidence to support the indictment of the top Iraqi leadership for crimes against humanity, genocide, and war crimes. We are gath- ering evidence from U.S. Government files and we are supporting the work of NGO's that make important contributions to this effort. We expect the Iraqi opposition to make a major contribution to the campaign to bring the Baghdad regime to justice. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I welcome any questions that you may have. [The prepared statement of Ambassador Walker follows:] PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. EDWARD S. WALKER, JR. Mr. Chairman: I am pleased to appear before you today to discuss U.S. policy to- wards Iraq, a key foreign policy issue. Iraq under Saddam Hussein remains dangerous, unreconstructed and defiant. Saddam's record makes clear that he will remain a threat to regional peace and se- curity as long as he remains in power. He will not relinquish what remains of his WMD arsenal. He will not live in peace with his neighbors. He will not cease the repression of the Iraqi people. The regime of Saddam Hussein can not be rehabili- tated or reintegrated as a responsible member of the community of nations. Experi- ence makes this conclusion manifest. That is why the United States is committed to containing Saddam Hussein as long as he remains in power. But at the same time, we are also committed to working to alleviate the suffering of the Iraqi people who are forced to live under a regime they did not choose and do not want, and to supporting Iraqis who seek a new government and a better future for Iraq. The first two elements of our poiicy, containment and the effort to alleviate condi- tions for the Iraqi people were strengthened considerably by the Security Council's adoption of resolution 1284 in December of last year. Let me begin by reviewing the elements of containment. We contain Saddam through UN sanctions which deny him the resources needed to reconstitute weapons of mass destruction, by enforcing no-fly zones in the North and South, and by maintaining a military presence in the region and a readiness to use force if necessary. We have enforced a no-fly zone over northern Iraq since 1991, and over southern Iraq since 1992. These zones were established to prevent Saddam Hussein from using his air force against the civilian populations of these areas, as he has done so brutally in the past. We have been highly successful in this effort. The zones also provide critical buffer zones to detect any Iraqi troop movements north or south. Iraqi propaganda denounces the no-fly zones as a pretext for ongoing military action against Iraqi forces, a charge which some others have repeated. Let me just state, once again, that the no-fly zones are protective, not offensive, in nature. Since De- cember 1998, following Operation Desert Fox, Saddam Hussein has mounted a sus- tained challenge to our patrols. Iraqi forces have violated the no-fly zones over 600 times in 1999. Our forces are fully prepared and authorized to defend themselves and we have responded to these challenges with strikes on Iraq's integrated air de- fense system. Saddam Hussein will not deter us from our commitment to maintain- ing these zones which are a key element of containment. An effective disarmament and monitoring regime inside Iraq would strengthen containment by further limiting Iraq's efforts to rearm. In the absence of inspectors on the ground, we must rely on national technical means which cannot provide the same level of assurance as monitoring on the ground. Resolution 1284 re-affirms that Iraq has not fulfilled its obligations under previous Security Council resolutions to declare and destroy its WMD. The resolution establishes a new arms-control orga- nization, the UN Monitoring, Inspection and Verification Commission, or UNMOVIC, to replace UNSCOM. UNMOVIC retains UNSCOM's broad mandate and authorities. It has the right to conduct intrusive inspections into Iraq's past once again, qi, forces, bounces the detecta 12 mation program, television, radio, magazines, which would reach inside Iraq and also be available outside Iraq; and finally, collect such other information as might be useful. This is an immediate program that we hope will be able to help the INC develop its infrastructure and establish the foundation that could be then used for other things later on. Senator BROWNBACK. And you do not mention lethal assistance to the INC in that listing. Is that correct? Ambassador WALKER. I do not mention lethal assistance, nor am I discounting the possibility in the future. But it has been our expe- rience that with several unfortunate situations in 1991 and 1996, that you need to have the foundation solidly built in order to move forward in any campaign that would have a hope of unseating Sad- dam Hussein. Senator BROWNBACK. Any notions of how much time it will take to build that solid foundation? You have had the authorization and the approval from Congress for-what-a year and a half, 2 years now with the INC? Ambassador WALKER. Right. Senator BROWNBACK. It looks like you have not even got the foot- ings. Ambassador WALKER. Well, actually a lot has been done, Sen- ator. It is not easy to set up a new organization from the ground up and to make it credit worthy or grant worthy in the U.Š. Gov- ernmental terminology. We have a number of requirements of transparency, contracting capabilities, and so on that have to be met under congressional guidance that take time for any organiza- tion to develop. When I was Ambassador in Egypt, we tried to get several NGO's grant worthy under the AID programs and found that it was extremely difficult to do so, and it took time. Now, the very process of doing this, however, assists them in de- veloping their infrastructure, their capabilities so that they will be able, our expectation and hope is, to move quicker with our help in trying to develop the kind of program that I have outlined here before you. Senator BROWNBACK. Mr. Ambassador, it strikes me that what is taking place is the thing that a number of us feared and that is that Saddam-and the administration is in complicity with this, is just waiting you out, that there is not a serious effort on the part of the administration to remove Saddam from power, that we have lost our inspection regime within Iraq. There has not been a seri- ous inspection regime in place for a year within Iraq. And every- body is virtually satisfied with that situation presently and that there is no serious effort within the administration to do anything differently, to find a different group than the INC if you do not think that they can do that, to find a different means to really get at Saddam, to find a different sort of inspection regime. And all along, the clock is ticking and the rest of the world and others are starting to reengage Saddam. Ambassador WALKER. Right. Senator BROWNBACK. So, at the end of the day, we are left with him still in power, still in Baghdad, more oil revenues flowing than he had even prior to the war, and our neighbors and our allies in the region saying, well, we did not think you were going to get rid 14 needs and saying that the U.N.'s efforts to ease the suffering of 20 million people in the country “has suffered considerably as a result of the "holds” placed by the United States and Britain on contracts in the oil-for-food program, something I would like to talk to you about. Saddam Hussein is also criticized in the report for spending too little money from oil sales on food for the population. No question about it. The point is this. While Saddam has proven indifferent to Iraq's people, I do not think we can be similarly indifferent. I strongly be- lieve that the administration should take some steps to better rec- oncile the enforcement of our disarmament objectives in Iraq with our obligation to minimize the harm to innocent Iraqi civilians and to ensure their most basic rights. Now, the Secretary General's recent report to the Security Coun- cil-I know what you have said in your testimony, but just a little bit of contradictory testimony. The Security Council's own report last year on the deteriorating humanitarian situation, the com- prehensive UNICEF survey on child health-some of this is dev- astating to read-and other relief agencies that are out in the field, the International Committee of the Red Cross, have all made it clear that a public health emergency exists in many areas of the country and that efforts under the oil-for-food program to alleviate these conditions have been woefully inadequate. I think it is critical that we do something to address this public health emergency, and I think this requires restoring Iraq's civilian economic infrastructure-I did not say military-in order to bring child mortality rates and other public health indicators back as close as possible to the levels that existed before the embargo. So, let me just mention three initiatives, and I want to get your reac- tion. First, that the Security Council and the Sanctions Committee push to implement immediately the recommendations of the report of the Council's humanitarian panel last March. In particular, I think what was important there was the preapproval of humani- tarian items. I think that is critically important. Otherwise, this drags on and on and on. I would like to see that process expedited. Second, to take all necessary steps to persuade the Security Council and the Sanctions Committee to take more seriously its ob- ligation to monitor the humanitarian impact of the sanctions, espe- cially on those people that are most vulnerable, and I have in mind the children and the elderly. We have made a commitment to do so. The Security Council and the Sanctions Committee ought to live up to that. Then finally, to press the Security Council to establish an inter- national criminal tribunal, which is mandated to investigate, in- dict, and prosecute Iraqi leaders and former officials against whom credible evidence exists of war crimes against humanity and geno- cide. That to me is the kind of targeted sanctions that make a great deal of sense, that go after the people who should be held ac- countable, as opposed to innocent people who are paying the price. Now, finally, I just want to say that I want us to make every ef- fort to continue and even tighten where possible the restrictions 17 inspection concept, and ability under the parameters established by the Security Council in the resolution to do what UNSCOM did. Now, Hans Blix is in the process of putting together procedures that will implement that. As everybody knows, procedures have a lot to do with the effectiveness of an organization. We have had a number of conversations with Blix. We believe he is moving in the right direction. We want to see the results of his consultations and his decisions, and he will be reporting shortly to the Secretary Gen- eral. We will be able to evaluate at that time whether the proce- dures are everything that we think they should be. There is nothing in the resolution that takes away the authori- ties available to the previous organization. So, if Iraq accepts this inspection regime, I think we will be far ahead of the game. With regard to the sanctions themselves, 1284 does not change the sanctions regime. Senator BIDEN. No, I know that. My point is- let us get right to it. Had we voted the other way, what would have happened in terms of the maintenance of sanctions? Was there any deal? Was there any tradeoff here implicit that if you did not support what is 1284, which is not as robust-it has all the same verbiage, but know it is not nearly as robust as UNSCOM was. Was it anticipated that that would allow us to maintain support for the sanctions? Or had we not supported it, did we conclude it would make it more difficult to maintain consensus on sanctions? Ambassador WALKER. I do not see the linkage there, Senator. I think the linkage comes in the question that Senator Wellstone raised. Where we are having a problem in maintaining the sanc- tions regime and we are having erosion is in the perception that it is sanctions that is responsible for the problems that the Iraqi people face. That is a perception that is widely held throughout the entire region. That is much more of a problem for us, and it is an unwarranted assumption. Senator BIDEN. I understand. I guess maybe that is what is wrong with the U.N. We do not think about things. It seems to me, having been up there recently, that you have a real problem maintaining sanctions. I assume you all were-were I in that position, I would be conniving enough to hope that I would come up with an inspection policy that was not as good as before, but a hell of a lot better than anything we have, anticipating he will not go along with it. And if he does go along with it initially, he will breach it again, which then gives us the moral credibility to argue that this guy is a bad guy. He is showing it time and again, and he is making weapons of mass destruction. He is trying to hide from us, and you cannot lift sanctions. I realize there is no direct relationship, but I do not know why the hell you guys in the State Department do not speak English. I do not know why you do not speak frankly. But I am not going to try to help you anymore. You are on your own. Ambassador WALKER. Senator, I think your conclusions are prob- ably well placed. They are accurate. There is a very strong likeli- hood he will not accept this system. I would argue that if he did accept it, that he would be at a very severe disadvantage trying to 18 reconstruct his weapons of mass destruction program and we would be ahead of the game. Senator BIDEN. I agree with that. Ambassador WALKER. So, either way, I think there are advan- tages that can be derived from this. Senator BIDEN. My closing question is this. If the Security Coun- cil members try to weaken 1284, in an attempt to gain his acquies- cence, will the administration permit and vote for further com- promises, or will it hold firm to the text as it now stands? Ambassador WALKER. Senator, the position that we took before was a weak sanctions inspection regime is worse than no inspection regime, and I believe that we would take the same position now. Senator BIDEN. That means we would not-- Ambassador WALKER. We would not support it. Senator BIDEN. Thank you very much. Senator BROWNBACK. Well, let me ask some questions along this line because I am very troubled about where we are with this. One of the main reasons UNSCOM had any successes at all, it seems to me, was its willingness to go to the mat, to be very confrontational and very direct and go where Saddam did not want them to go. Now we have got Mr. Blix, the new head of UNMOVIC, who has said he would like to work more cooperatively with Iraq. Now, really, is it the administration's view that UNMOVIC can conduct effective inspections if cooperation with Saddam is a pri- mary goal of inspections? Ambassador WALKER. Senator, I do not think that if you are in a position where you are required to cooperate with Saddam that you are going to have an effective system. I think there has to be tension in that relationship for it to work. Otherwise, Saddam would simply walk away from any inspection regime. But we have yet to see what this regime will look like, how it will be structured or, for that matter, how Hans Blix will organize and run it. It can be effective under the terms of the Security Council resolu- tion. It can be effective. From our initial discussions with Blix, we think that he has the intention to make it effective. To say that he can do that by simply caving in to Saddam Hussein is not true. He cannot do that. It cannot be effective under those terms. So, yes, there has to be a confrontational aspect to this inspection regime. Senator BROWNBACK. Well, Saddam Hussein has shown time and time again that he is going to confront and he is going to try to confuse and misdirect and not comply. Period. Ambassador WALKER. Then we get in the situation, Mr. Chair- man, that Senator Biden was talking about. First he has to accept the regime, which is not clear at this point. Senator BROWNBACK. Let us say that we do and we confront. And one of the reasons we justified Operation Desert Fox was by saying that Iraq was not complying with U.N. weapons inspections. Are we going to be willing to use military action to force Iraq to allow inspectors to return? Ambassador WALKER. Senator, I am not able to make a decision like that and I am not able to tell you one way or another what ilitary actions the United States might or might not be under those circumstances. It is certainly one of our options. 23 have seen it as an ambassador and as I see it now. We will con- tinue the vigorous discussion. Thank you very much. Ambassador WALKER. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Senator BROWNBACK. The second panel is Mr. Gary Milhollin. He is the director of the Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control. Mr. Paul Leventhal, president, Nuclear Control Institute in Wash- ington, DC, and the final panel member, Mr. Charles Duelfer, former deputy executive chairman of UNSCOM out of New York. We will have the panelists seated and we will ask you to make your presentations in the order that we announced. Gentlemen, we can accept your full transcript into the record. If you can make your presentations within a 5 minute or so area so that we could have plenty of time, ample time for questions, I think that would be the best to go by. So, we will run a 5-minute clock here to give you some idea. We will take ahead of time all of your full statements in the record, so we will have those as well. Mr. Milhollin. STATEMENT OF GARY MILHOLLIN, DIRECTOR, WISCONSIN PROJECT ON NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL, WASHINGTON, DC Mr. MILHOLLIN. Thank you very much. Senator BROWNBACK. Thank you for being here today. Mr. MILHOLLIN. I am pleased to testify before this distinguished subcommittee on Iraq. I would like to submit three items for the record. I have already given them to your staff. The first one is an article I recently published in the New Yorker magazine detailing Iraq's use of the oil-for-food program to buy components that can trigger a nuclear weapon. The second is a table that my organization prepared after the in- spectors left Iraq in 1998. It lists what remains unaccounted for in Saddam Hussein's mass destruction weapons programs. I can show you copies of it. It is a full page in the New York Times Week in Review section. The other thing I would like to submit for the record is a chart 1 that my organization did back in 1993, also in the New York Times Week in Review, which showed Saddam's procurement network, and I will refer to it in my testimony. Senator BROWNBACK. Those will be accepted in the record, with- out objection. Mr. MILHOLLIN. As has already been stated, a year has now passed since inspectors have been in Iraq, and the questio che question I think the world is looking at is what is going on. In many ways, we are back in the situation we were in before the Gulf war. I remember myself, I am beginning to feel old-I was tracking centrifuge com- ponents into Iraq before the Gulf war and testified many times be- fore Congress on what Iraq had in the early 1990's. I find myself back here doing it again, and without inspectors, we are back in the same mode of discovery. That is, we are looking at procurement efforts. We are using national technical means. We are debriefing 1 The chart referred to entitled, “Who Armed Iraq? Answers the West Didn't Want to Hear,” July 18, 1993, would be illegible, because of its size, if reproduced in this hearing format. The chart is retained in the committee's files and could possibly be viewed by accessing the New York Times Website. 26 I will begin by describing a recent Iraqi procurement attempt, and then try to as- sess the inspection system created under U.N. Resolution 1284. I will also try to provide an overview of the threat posed by Iraq to international security. I would like to submit three items for the record. The first is an article I recently published in the New Yorker detailing Iraq's use of the oil-for-food program to buy components that can trigger nuclear weapons. The second is a table my organization prepared after the inspectors left Iraq in 1998, which lists what remains unac- counted for in Iraq's mass destruction weapon programs. The third is a chart on Saddam Hussein's procurement network that my organization prepared a few years ago but which is still relevant to the issues we face today. WHAT HAS SADDAM HUSSEIN BEEN DOING RECENTLY? More than one year has passed since U.N. inspectors left Iraq, and the world is wondering what Saddam Hussein is up to. The short answer is: he has been shop- ping for A-bomb components in Europe. Iraq is allowed to import medical equipment as an exception to the U.N. embargo, so in 1998 Iraq ordered a half-dozen "lithotripter" machines, ostensibly to rid its citizens of kidney stones, which the lithotripter pulverizes inside the body without surgery. But each machine requires a high-precision electronic switch that has a second use: it triggers atomic bombs. Iraq wanted to buy 120 extra switches as “spare parts.” Iraq placed the order with the Siemens company in Germany, which sup- plied the machines but forwarded the switches order to its supplier, Thomson- C.S.F., a French military-electronics company. The French government promptly barred the sale. Stephen Cooney, a Siemens spokesman, claims that Siemens pro- vided only eight switches, one in each machine and two spares. Sources at the United Nations and in the U.S. government believe that the number supplied is higher. The lesson from this episode is that Iraq is still trying to import what it needs to fuel its nuclear weapon program. And Iraq is closer to getting the bomb than most people think. The U.N. inspec- tors have learned that Iraq's first bomb design, which weighed a ton and was a full meter in diameter, has been replaced by a smaller, more efficient model. From dis- cussions with the Iraqis, the inspectors deduced that the new design weighs only about 600 kilograms and measures only 600 to 650 millimeters in diameter. That makes it small enough to fit on a 680 millimeter Scud-type missile. The inspectors believe that Iraq may still have nine Scuds hidden somewhere. The inspectors have also determined that Iraq's bomb design will work. Iraq has mastered the key technique of creating an implosive shock wave, which squeezes a bomb's nuclear material enough to trigger a chain reaction. The inspectors have learned that the new Iraqi design also uses a "flying tamper,” a refinement that "hammers” the nuclear material to squeeze it even harder, so bombs can be made smaller without diminishing their explosive force. How did Iraq progress so far so quickly? The inspectors found an Iraqi document describing an offer of design help from an agent of Pakistan. Iraq says it didn't ac- cept the offer, but the inspectors think it did. Pakistan's latest design also uses a flying tamper. Regardless of how the Iraqis managed to do it, Saddam Hussein now possesses an efficient nuclear bomb design. The only thing he lacks is enough weap- on-grade uranium to fuel it-about sixteen kilograms per warhead. RESOLUTION 1284 AND THE NEW INSPECTION SYSTEM The lithotripter episode exposes one of the key weaknesses of the U.N. oil-for-food program. While its humanitarian objectives are laudable, the truth is that oil-for- food is really “oil-for-arms” as viewed from the Iraqi side. Iraq has been allowed to purchase humanitarian items such as medical equipment with money earned from oil exports so long as the funds were administered by the U.N. sanctions committee. But Iraq was able to disguise its purchase of the nuclear weapon triggers as medical equipment and the sanctions committee approved the export. The sale was re- stricted only by the national export controls applied by the supplier countries. Under U.N. Resolution 1284, the sanctions committee loophole will now be ex- panded. The resolution lifts the ceiling on Iraqi oil exports, and it authorizes the committee to draw up lists of items including food, medical equipment, medical sup- plies, and agricultural equipment that will not have to go through the sanctions committee for approval. In January, the U.N. Secretary General was able to report that these lists had already been drawn up. In addition, the resolution sets up a group of experts charged with speedily approving contracts for parts and equipment necessary to enable Iraq to increase its oil exports. smaller without progress so far so from an agentais possesses an effice Pardless of how the Is it did. Pakistan an: Iraq says it didniment 29 sites damaged or destroyed by American and British air strikes in December 1998. Of those targets, 12 were reportedly missile factories or industrial sites involved in Iraq's weapons of mass destruction programs, at which officials said significant re- construction had been seen-including the Al Taji missile complex. For the moment, our government seems content to live with inaction. The present U.S. policy is to isolate Saddam diplomatically, maintain the existing trade sanc- tions, and give at least some help to Iraqi opposition forces-a strategy known as "containment plus.” Unless U.S. foreign policy makers once again place a high priority on disarming Iraq and lead the international community in that direction, Saddam Hussein will achieve his mass destruction weapon aspirations in the relatively short-term. De- spite a seven-year international effort to rid Iraq of these weapons, Iraq today re- tains a great potential for producing them. Experts have estimated that Iraq could resume manufacture of chemical and biological agents within months of a decision to do so. Similarly, Iraq could probably assemble a nuclear weapon within weeks of importing the fissile material necessary to fuel it. Five years is a reasonable esti- mate if Iraq itself is obliged to produce the fissile material. By refusing to cooperate with U.N. inspectors, and by foregoing billions of dollars in oil revenue rather than choosing to disarm, Iraq has shown that building mass destruction weapons remains one of its primary goals. Therefore, the United States should revisit its own Iraq policy before it is too late. [From The New Yorker, “The Talk of the Town,” Dec. 13, 1999] DEPT. OF MASS DESTRUCTION SADDAM'S NUCLEAR SHOPPING SPREE. Ever since the United Nations weapons inspectors were shut out of Iraq, a year ago, the world has been left to wonder what Saddam Hussein is up to. Well, now it can be told: he has been secretly trying to transform his desert dictatorship into a world-class center for the treatment of kidney stones. Or so it would seem, to judge from his latest purchases on the international med- ical-equipment market. Although Iraq remains under a strict United Nations em- bargo, the embargo does not cover medical supplies. Last year, the Iraqi government ordered half a dozen lithotripters, which are state-of-the-art machines for getting rid of kidney stones. (The word "lithotripter" comes from the Greek for "stone breaker.") A lithotripter uses a shock wave to pulverize these painful objects without surgery. Machines like the ones Iraq bought require a high-precision electronic switch that triggers a powerful burst of electricity. In addition to the lithotripters, Iraq wanted to buy a hundred and twenty extra switches. That is at least a hundred more than the machines would ever need. Iraq's strange hankering for this particular “spare part” becomes less mysterious when one reflects that the switch in question has another use: it can trigger an atomic bomb. According to a knowledgeable U.N. inspector, each bomb of the type that Iraq is tying to build requires thirty-two switches. Thus, a hundred of them would outfit three bombs. It is hardly a coincidence that, as the former U.N. inspec- tor Scott Ritter testified at a Senate hearing last year, the inspectors had “intel- ligence information which indicates that components necessary for three nuclear weapons exist” in Iraq. Saddam Hussein has been shopping for what he needs to make sure they work. Iraq went to Siemens, the German electronics giant, to place the order. Before the Gulf War, Iraq acquired Siemens computers and other equipment useful for proc- essing uranium to nuclear-weapons grade, and the company provided electrical equipment for one of Iraq's main missile sites. (Siemens has denied helping Iraq ad- vance its nuclear program.) In this instance, Siemens forwarded the switches order to its supplier, Thomson-C.S.F., a French military-electronics company. The French government promptly barred the sale. Stephen Cooney, a Siemens spokesman, re- fuses to say whether Siemens nevertheless filled the switch order, or even whether the order was placed. If Siemens made the deal, Iraq got a powerful nuclear boost. The Clinton Administration has been relatively quiet on Iraq lately. Although it maintains that it remains suspicious of Saddam, it claims to have no specific evi- dence that he has resumed his efforts to build weapons of mass destruction. The kidney-stone affair suggests otherwise. The U.N. inspectors have learned that Iraq's first bomb design, which weighed a ton and was just over a yard in diameter, has been replaced by a smaller, more effi- 67-659 D-00--3 34 State Department, by the way, but this was later confirmed when Saddam's son-in-law-- Senator BIDEN. What year was this? Excuse me. What year was this you are talking about? Mr. LEVENTHAL. This was in 1990. Senator BIDEN. In 1990. That is what I thought. Thank you. Mr. LEVENTHAL. Before the Armed Services Committee, I sub- mitted testimony suggesting that Iraq could be, at that time, with- in weeks-- Senator BIDEN. In 1990 the State Department denied it as well. Mr. LEVENTHAL. That is right. It was not seen as credible that they would actually violate safeguards as a member of the NPT. Senator BIDEN. Thank you for the clarification. Mr. LEVENTHAL. In fact, when Saddam's son-in-law defected in 1995, he had been the head of what was disclosed to be a crash program where they actually had begun to saw off the ends of the fuel rods to remove the highly enriched uranium for the purpose of attempting to make at least one weapon, possibly two within the 6-month period between IAEA inspections." So, we have a situation today where Iraq has not been coopera- tive to say the least, where the IAEA has been prepared, after sey- eral attempts to try to elicit information-once that information is not forthcoming, they acknowledge discrepancies but they come to conclusions suggesting that everything, in fact, has been destroyed, removed, or rendered harmless, and that Iraq has no significant nuclear capabilities left. Because of the procurement activities described by Mr. Milhollin, because of the fact that Iraq's 200 nuclear Ph.D.'s are still there or are believed to be there-some of them may actually be traveling now, but the fact is that the entire human infrastructure of Iraq's nuclear weapons program has remained in place and the question is are there components-as Scott Ritter testified, they were being transported around the country at that time in an attempt to con- ceal them from the UNSCOM inspectors-if there is a basis, if there is a substantial basis to believe that those kinds of activities have taken place, that the weapons components have not been de- stroyed-and surely no evidence of their destruction, either docu- mentary or material, has been presented to the IAEA—then one has to assume that things are on a knife's edge, that if Iraq is ca- pable of clandestinely producing highly enriched uranium through a small centrifuge cascade or, perhaps more likely, attempting to smuggle plutonium or highly enriched uranium into the country from Russia or from safeguarded civilian facilities throughout the world which have IAEA safeguards attached to them, which are not very effective in an adversarial situation-in other words, a de- termined effort to remove material could well end up in Iraq. And the IAEA has acknowledged that they would have little chance of detecting the smuggling into Iraq of the kilogram quantities of ei- ther of those fissile materials which would be enough for several nuclear weapons. Now, our position is that it is important to hold Mr. Blix account- able. I would even suggest that this committee invite Mr. Blix to come and explain how he is going to operate and how differently he is going to operate as the head of UNMOVIC than he did as the 38 amount of plutonium or highly enriched uranium, he testified, it could have oper- able nuclear weapons in a matter of "days or weeks.” The IAEA promptly disputed the validity of Ritter's information. IAEA Director General Mohammed ElBaradei reported to the U.N. Security Council on October 13, 1998 that “all available, credible information ... provides no indication that Iraq has assembled nuclear weapons with or without fissile cores," adding that “Iraq's known nuclear weapons related assets have been destroyed, removed or rendered harmless.” IAEA NUCLEAR INSPECTIONS IN IRAQ: A CULTURAL PROBLEM As noted, there were sharp differences between UNSCOM and the IAEA on how to conduct inspections. UNSCOM was more confrontational, refusing to accept Iraqi obfuscations and demanding evidence of destroyed weapons—what former UNSCOM chief Rolf Ekeus once called "the arms-control equivalent of war.” The IAEA has been more accommodating, giving Iraqi nuclear officials the benefit of the doubt when they failed to provide evidence that all nuclear weapons components have been destroyed and all prohibited activities terminated. Ekeus has acknowledged “a certain culture problem” resulting from UNSCOM's “more aggressive approach, and the IAEA's more cooperative approach.” As noted, the result is a widespread and dangerous perception that Iraq's nuclear threat is history, while Iraq is generally perceived to be concealing other weapons of mass destruction because UNSCOM consistently refused to accept unverified claims of their elimination. Iraq learned early on that it could conceal a nuclear weapons program by cooper- ating with the IAEA. Khidhir Hamza, a senior Iraqi scientist who defected to the United States in 1994, wrote in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists that Saddam Hussein approved a deception-by-cooperation scheme in 1974. “Iraq was careful to avoid raising IAEA suspicions; an elaborate strategy was gradually developed to de- ceive and manipulate the agency,” Hamza said. The strategy worked. Iraq, as a signer of the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, was subject to IAEA inspections on all nuclear facilities. But IAEA's inspec- tors had failed to detect the Iraqi-style “Manhattan Project,” which was discovered after the Gulf War by IAEA teams at sites identified by UNSCOM. The IAEA's track record of missing evidence of Iraq's nuclear weapons program predates the Gulf War. In 1981, Israeli air strikes destroyed Iraq's nearly complete Osirak research reactor because Tel Aviv feared Iraq's plutonium-production capac- ity if the plant was allowed to start up. After the attack, IAEA inspector Roger Rich- ter resigned from the agency to defend Israel's action. He had helped negotiate the IAEA's "safeguards” arrangement for the reactor and later told Congress that the agency had failed to win sufficient access to detect plutonium production for weap- ons. In August 1990, only weeks after Iraq invaded Kuwait, IAEA safeguards director Jon Jennekens praised Iraqi cooperation with the IAEA as "exemplary,” and said Iraq's nuclear experts "have made every effort to demonstrate that Iraq is a solid citizen" under the Non-Proliferation Treaty. In 1991, after the Gulf War, the U.N. awarded the nuclear-inspection portfolio in Iraq to the IAEA rather than UNSCOM, following a concerted lobbying campaign by the IAEA, supported by the United States and France. The principal argument was political: With only a few years remaining before the Non-Proliferation Treaty had to be extended, it would be extremely damaging for the treaty's survival if the agency were downgraded in any way. Its turf battle won, the IAEA continued to see things Iraq's way. In September 1992, after destruction of the nuclear-weapons plants found in the war's aftermath, Mauricio Zifferero, head of the IAEA's “Action Team” in Iraq, declared Iraq's nuclear program to be “at zero now ... totally dormant.” Zifferero explained that the Iraqis "have stated many times to us that they have decided at the higher political levels to stop these activities. This we have verified.” But it eventually became clear that Iraq had concealed evidence of its continuing nuclear bomb program. In 1995, Saddam Hussein's son-in-law, Gen. Hussein Kamel, fled to Jordan and revealed that he had led a "crash program” just before the Gulf War to build a crude nuclear weapon out of IAEA-safeguarded, civilian nuclear fuel, as well as a program after the war to refine the design of nuclear warheads to fit Scud missiles. Iraqi officials insisted that Kamel's work was unauthorized, and they led IAEA officials to a large cache of documents at Kamel's farm that, the Iraqis said, proved Kamel had directed the projects without their knowledge. But the Kamel revelations refuted an IAEA claim, made by then-Director General Hans Blix in 1993, that “the Iraqis never touched the nuclear highly enriched ura- nium which was under our safeguards.” In fact, they had cut the ends off of some 41 • Reports on Iraqi nuclear team's interactions with IAEA inspectors are incom- plete, • It is not publicly known whether Iraq's report on their post-war concealment activities has been completed and reviewed. • Iraq has not enacted a criminal law to punish violations of UN resolutions. Post-war Nuclear Program Activities • Conversion of former weapons program facilities has not been fully documented. • Documentation of ongoing activities at former weapons facilities remains incom- plete. • Information is inconsistent on the date of termination of weapons activity at the Al Atheer weapons facility. • No evidence of any Iraqi decree to halt the nuclear weapons program. Extent of Iraq's post-war foreign procurement network has not been docu- mented. [Attachment 2] NCI WARNS THAT SADDAM MAY HAVE ACTIVE NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROGRAM WASHINGTON.- The Nuclear Control Institute (NCI) warned today that contrary to the widespread belief that Iraq's nuclear weapons program no longer poses an immediate threat, evidence collected by United Nations inspectors in fact points to an active, advanced program that poses a clear and present danger. “Any diplomatic solution to avert another war in Iraq should not bargain away nuclear inspections as the price of winning Saddam's cooperation with UN inspec- tions of suspected ballistic missile, chemical and biological weapons sites,” said NCI President Paul Leventhal. France, Russia and China have pressed such a proposal. "Nor should UN inspectors from the Vienna-based International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) be permitted to curtail their investigations because of 'diminishing returns' and switch to less aggressive monitoring efforts,” Leventhal said. "Instead of cutting back, the IAEA should be re-doubling its efforts.” In 1990, just prior to the Gulf War, NCI had warned that Iraq might be only weeks away from having a bomb because it could divert bomb-grade uranium fuel from its civilian research reactors between visits by IAEA inspectors. NCI's warning went unheeded at the time, only to be proven correct when Saddam's son-in-law de- fected in 1995 and disclosed he had ordered a “crash program” to produce a bomb by this means until allied bombing halted the effort. "It should be remembered,” Leventhal said, "that in 1990 Saddam successfully en- gaged in a grand deception to draw the world's attention away from his nuclear pro- gram by drawing attention to his chemical and biological weapons. After the Gulf War, a vast Iraqi Manhattan Project was unearthed, and most of it has been de- stroyed. Today, we must be concerned that Saddam is again trying to divert atten- tion from a small but deadly remnant of his nuclear program- the actual weapons components that never have been found and his scientists who remain in place.” In support of NCI's current concerns about Iraq's nuclear threat, the Institute held a press conference to release a report, “Iraq and the Bomb: The Nuclear Threat Continues,” prepared by NCI Research Director Steven Dolley. The NCI report finds that the IAEA's own detailed reporting to the UN Security Council should raise con- cerns that Iraqi nuclear scientists have continued to advance their earlier work on nuclear weapons and to lie about their activities to UN inspectors. The NCI report cites IAEA documents to show that Iraq's nuclear scientists are still in place, that key nuclear-weapon components remain unaccounted for, that major gaps still exist in the information Iraq has provided about its post-war nu- clear weapon design work, and that the clandestine procurement program for nu- clear equipment and materials has continued. According to the report, “After examining the evidence, it is prudent to assume that there is a small, well-concealed nuclear weapons program in Iraq, possibly with fully developed components suitable for rapid assembly into one or more workable weapons if the requisite fissile material (highly enriched uranium or plutonium) were acquired. If Iraq has been able to smuggle in the needed material from, say, Russia or another former Soviet Republic without being detected, the nuclear threat could be quite real and even eclipse the CBW threat." The report also noted major gaps in information available to UN inspectors about Iraq's program to enrich uranium to weapons grade with centrifuges, and concluded 45 IAEA. Since 1995, the Iraqis have repeatedly characterized Kamel as the rogue head of a covert weapons program, the details of which he had concealed from the Iraqi leadership. During two EAEA inspections in late 1995, Iraqi officials revealed further details of the crash program, which had been established in August 1990. The Iraqis planned to dissolve their research reactor fuel elements at a secret facility at the Tuwaitha site in order to separate the weapons-usable HEU. In January 1991, the facility was complete. Iraq later acknowledged that the technicians had begun cut- ting off the ends of fuel elements and were awaiting authorization from General Kamel to commence HEU separation when Gulf War bombing seriously damaged the facility. The HEU recovery equipment was covertly moved to another, secret nu- clear facility at Tarmiya. Significantly, the IAEA found that the most recent documents surrendered by Iraq on the crash program were dated June 1991, which "might indicate that the 'crash programme' was not abandoned until it became evident to Iraq that the reac- tor fuel was to be removed from the country (the first shipment took place in No- vember 1991).” 19 In late 1990, the Nuclear Control Institute had warned of the possibility of a crash Iraqi program to divert its safeguarded civilian nuclear fuel for use in weap- ons-ironically, about three months after the Iraqi leadership decided to proceed down this path.20 Concerns about Iraq's safeguarded HEU stocks were dismissed at the time by many analysts, who estimated that Iraq was up to 15 years away from the bomb.21 In a study prepared for NCI in May 1991, Dr. J. Carson Mark, former head of the theoretical division at the Los Alamos National Laboratory concluded that, if Iraq had used only its declared, safeguarded HEU, fabrication of two “metal implosion systems” each with a yield “in the kiloton range would probably be pos- sible.” 22 Prior to the Gulf War, the IAEA was particularly cavalier about the Iraqi HEU risk. In August 1990, only weeks after the invasion of Kuwait, IAEA safeguards di- rector Jon Jennekens praised Iraq's cooperation with IAEA as “exemplary," and said “the IAEA is not concerned that, if Iraq were to be put under great military or diplo- matic pressure, the Iraqi leadership would seize its store of HEU and build a nu- clear device. "Such a calculation doesn't make practical sense,' Jennekens said." Jennekens extolled Iraq's nuclear experts, who, he said, "have made every effort to demonstrate that Iraq is a solid citizen" under the NPT.23 Even as late as 1993, IAEA Director-General Hans Blix made a point of empha- sizing that the Iraqis never touched the nuclear highly-enriched uranium which was under our safeguards, which in some ways indicate also that the safeguard had an effect. Had they touched anything—(inaudible)– immediately discov- ered, and these would have been reported, and they would have evoked a governmental opinion and governmental action. They didn't want to do that. So they never touched the material which was under safeguard ...24 NCI asked Blix to retract his statement because Iraq had been found to have se- cretly moved the HEU in January 1991 and not reported its location to IAEA for sce Such a calculadership would sei, be put under grexemplary, an 19 S/1997/779, p. 53. 20 Paul Leventhal, “Is Iraq Evading the Nuclear Police?," New York Times, December 28, 1990, op-ed page. See also “Present Assessments Understate Iraq's Nuclear Weapons Potential,” State- ment of Paul Leventhal, Nuclear Control Institute, presented to the Senate Armed Services Committee. November 30, 1990. 21 "How Long to Saddam's Bomb? Some Experts Say ...," Proliferation Watch, Volume 1, Number 5, November/December 1990, p. 19. A chart shows twenty different estimates of how long it would take Iraq to acquire a “nuclear device" or "nuclear weapon.” The estimate by NCI of less than six months was the shortest. The Bush Administration attempted to walk a fine line on the issue of Iraqi nuclear weapons. On the one hand, they tried to drum up support for Operation Desert Storm by emphasizing Iraq's nuclear-weapons aspirations. However, they did not want to undercut domestic support for sending U.S. forces into harm's way by suggesting that Iraq might be able to attack these troops with nuclear bombs. As a result, administration officials downplayed the risk of a "crude bomb” made from diverted HEU, but contended that the risk of Iraq acquiring nuclear weapons within one to five years was significant. Patrick Tyler, “Specialists See Iraq Unlikely to Build A-Bomb in Near Future,” Washington Post, November 8, 1990, p. A62. 22 Dr. J. Carson Mark, "Some Remarks on Iraq's Possible Nuclear Weapon Capability in Light of Some of the Known Facts Concerning Nuclear Weapons,” Nuclear Control Institute, May 16, 1991, p. 27. 23 Quoted in Mark Hibbs & Ann Maclachlan, “No Bomb-Quantity of HEU in Iraq, IAEA Safe- guards Report Indicates,” Nuclear Fuel, August 20, 1990, p. 8. 24 Hans Blix, press conference at the National Press Club, Washington, DC, May 20, 1993, transcript, p. 8. 69 utive chairman, and we have conceded on the standards in the new resolution. And we are losing the overall public debate on whether the sanctions are morally justified. It just seems to me that we do not have a clear game plan. We do not have a comprehensive view of where we want things to go, and we do not have a strategy for getting there. We just seem to be reacting to events and then cav- ing in when the pressure gets too great on one issue or the next. For me, this is a very disturbing thing, and I wish our Govern- ment were more dedicated and more effective in this area, and I think if we continue on this path, we will just see a slow diminu- tion of interest here and we will see less influence in the Security Council and we will see, if not a precipitous, at least a gradual ero- sion of the embargo. More stuff will be going in. We will pick it up now and then. We will complain about it, but nobody will really care. And the exporters will all get the message that nobody really cares. And so, it will all just pretty much fizzle out. That is what I am worried about. Senator BROWNBACK. Senator Biden. Senator BIDEN. What would you do? Mr. MILHOLLIN. Well, I think at a minimum we could try to win the public debate on the validity of the embargo. That is, we seem to be conceding that the suffering of the Iraqi people is the fault of the embargo. Senator BIDEN. Why do you say that? How do you reach that con- clusion? Mr. MILHOLLIN. Well, I do not see the United States coming out and saying, look-- Senator BIDEN. Every time the Secretary speaks, every time the President speaks they say that. Mr. MILHOLLIN. But where are the specific examples? Where is the data? Where is the evidence? I see the statements, yes. I see the statements. Senator BIDEN. I do not disagree with anything any of you said except none of you have a damn solution. You do not have any idea of what you are talking as to what to do from here. You are right in the criticism. I think the criticism is dead right. We made a fun- damental mistake that everybody underestimated when George Bush stopped us going into Baghdad. One of the things no one fig- ured was that it would be read as a conclusion that possession of or the possibility of possessing nuclear weapons would hold off the giant. And that is the reason why he did not occupy Baghdad is because we had these weapons, thereby emboldening them to hang onto them closer. So, a fundamental mistake. It is easy to M morning terback now and say it, but a fundamental mistake made. And we continue to make mistakes as we go along. But the bottom line to me is how do you hold this together. You say, for example, Mr. Leventhal, that we seem to conclude a fur- ther military confrontation is not worth it. How the hell do you draw that conclusion? If you conclude that, there is not a consensus in America or the Congress or the President can come and go uni- laterally into Iraq, you are right. But you make basically irresponsible statements in a very re- sponsible presentation. Every factual thing you have said I cannot