COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS HENRY J. HYDE, Illinois, Chairman TOM LANTOS, California HOWARD L. BERMAN, California GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American Samoa DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey SHERROD BROWN, Ohio BRAD SHERMAN, California ROBERT WEXLER, Florida ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York WILLIAM D. DELAHUNT, Massachusetts GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York BARBARA LEE, California JOSEPH CROWLEY, New York JOSEPH M. HOEFFEL, Pennsylvania EARL BLUMENAUER, Oregon SHELLEY BERKLEY, Nevada GRACE F. NAPOLITANO, California ADAM B. SCHIFF, California DIANE E. WATSON, California ADAM SMITH, Washington BETTY McCOLLUM, Minnesota CHRIS BELL, Texas JAMES A. LEACH, Iowa DOUG BEREUTER, Nebraska CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey, Vice Chairman DAN BURTON, Indiana ELTON GALLEGLY, California ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida CASS BALLENGER, North Carolina DANA ROHRABACHER, California EDWARD R. ROYCE, California PETER T. KING, New York STEVE CHABOT, Ohio AMO HOUGHTON, New York JOHN M. McHUGH, New York THOMAS G. TANCREDO, Colorado RON PAUL, Texas NICK SMITH, Michigan JOSEPH R. PITTS, Pennsylvania JEFF FLAKE, Arizona JO ANN DAVIS, Virginia MARK GREEN, Wisconsin JERRY WELLER, Illinois MIKE PENCE, Indiana THADDEUS G. McCOTTER, Michigan WILLIAM J. JANKLOW, South Dakota KATHERINE HARRIS, Florida Thomas E. Mooney, Sr., Staff Director I General Counsel Robert R. King, Democratic Staff Director Hillel Weinberg, Senior Professional Staff Member and Counsel Marilyn C. Owen, Staff Associate (II) 3 your plans to accomplish that? Can we demonstrate to Iraqis that we will not be helping the well-off first? What will happen when people's hoarded food from the saved Oil for Food rations begins to run out? What will be the basis of Iraq's economy for the next several years? Do you plan to entrench the Iraqi oil ministry within the Iraqi state, or will you urge either its privatization or its revenues be placed in the hands of the people rather than the hands of the government? The transition to democracy in a nation such as Iraq, where civil society has perverted for so many years, will take time. I share the President's faith that it can be accomplished. It is perhaps worth considering how hard a job this will be. To build a democracy in Iraq, for example, means much more than ar- ranging to count the ballots on a one-time basis, handling over power to the winner, and slamming the door shut our way out. Democracy implies stable institutions that bind a whole people together and respect for everyone's right. It involves a willingness to work things out over time, with the expectation that sometimes you will win and sometimes you will lose. Often neglected groups—Assyrians, Turkomens, Yazidis—main- tain their traditions and deserve to have their interests taken fully into account. And Iraqis in exile worked tirelessly to free their com- patriots. On April 7, Deputy Secretary of State Armitage properly said that the United States should not put a "thumb on the scales" of Iraqi politics. I agree. He made that statement 1 day after the De- fense Department, apparently without coordination with the State Department, flew one of the Iraqi exile leaders and 700 American- armed fighters to An Nasiriyah. That is a pretty heavy "thumb." I hope you will address the issue of how to include all of the rel- evant, responsible, and democratic groupings and provide them with a voice commensurate with the support they command in Iraq. Yours is a tremendous challenge. Despite some bumps in the road, I have ever confidence that individuals with your talents, and the talented people working with you, will make our nation proud, and we want to offer you every possible support. Let me now recognize Mr. Tom Lantos, the senior Democrat on the Committee, and after I do so, I will introduce the witnesses and ask them to summarize their statements, and then the Members will be recognized under the 5-minute rule. Mr. Lantos. Mr. Lantos. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I want to express my appreciation for your calling today's impor- tant and timely hearing, the first on Iraq since the collapse of Sad- dam Hussein's regime. Iraq's transformation from a police state to a free society is the focus of international attention, and rightly, the focus of our Com- mittee's attention as well. In Iraq, the United States and our allies have much to be proud of. Our fighting men and women fought with honor, valor, and 6 Ambassador Chamberlin, who has appeared before our Com- mittee numerous times throughout her service, has served as prin- cipal Deputy Assistant Secretary in the Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement at the Department of State. She has also served as United States Ambassador to the Republic if Pakistan, and to the Lao People's Democratic Republic. She has been Director for Counter-Terrorism at the National Security Council, and principal Deputy Assistant Secretary in the Inter- national Narcotics and Law Enforcement Programs Bureau. A former teacher, Ambassador Chamberlin is fluent in Lao and French, and holds a B.S. from Northwestern University and a Mas- ter's Degree in Education from Boston University. We welcome you again today, Ambassador. Finally, our fourth witness, who will not make a statement but will be here to answer questions, is Lieutenant General Norton Schwartz, Director of Operations of the Joint Staff in Washington. He serves as Principal Assistant to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and assists the Chairman in his duties as the prin- cipal military and anti-terrorism and force protection advisor to the Secretary of Defense and the President. General Schwartz is responsible for coordinating continuous glob- al contingency and operational plans. He leads staff supervision and cognizance over the war on terrorism and joint operational matters, planning and execution of conventional, nuclear reconnais- sance and electronic warfare operations, communications counter- measures, counterproliferation, and counterterrorism operations, military support of drug interdiction, operation of the National Military Command Center and the readiness of the Armed Forces. General Schwartz was graduated from the U.S. Air Force Acad- emy and is an Alumnus of the National War College, a member of the Council on Foreign Relations and a fellow of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Seminar 11. He has been Commander of the Alaskan Command, the North American Aerospace Defense Command Region and the 11th Air Force. We appreciate your appearing and making yourself available, General. If you will begin, Secretary Feith, with a summary of your state- ment. We hope, not overly optimistically, that you can hold it down to about 5 minutes, giving us a summary, give or take, and we then will have time for questioning by the Members. Under Secretary Feith. STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE DOUGLAS J. FEITH, UNDER SECRETARY FOR POLICY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE Mr. FEITh. I am pleased to have this opportunity to talk with you about the work of the Defense Department and the United States Government, to put a free Iraq on its feet headed toward stable democratic government. Combat operations to liberate Iraq moved speedily from their start to the fall of Baghdad was a period of 3 weeks. Less than 5 weeks have elapsed since Baghdad fell. Stability operations are un- derway through Iraq. Much work remains to be done before the coalition's military victory can be confirmed as a strategic victory. 9 struction and Humanitarian Assistance invited the General Ac- counting Office to send people to the theater to work in ORHA. Apparently, we had a similar thought to your own, Mr. Chair- man, that it will be useful and important to provide the Congress with that visibility into ORHA's operations. Now I would like to turn for a moment to the work that the Coa- lition Provisional Authority has just begun as Iraq emerges from its long period of tyranny. Humanitarian problems exist primarily in the areas of electricity and water supply, but the overall situation is not desperate. The war caused much less damage than many expected. The major problems derived from the sad state of the prewar infrastructure and from post-war violence by Baathists and ordinary criminals. The coalition has managed to advert the humanitarian crisis through a combination of unprecedented interagency planning and preparation and the skill of our combat forces. In recent press re- marks, the President of the International Committee of the Red Cross just back from Iraq confirmed that there is not now a hu- manitarian crisis in Iraq. Its useful to put our recovery efforts in Iraq in perspective. Iraq is a country that had been run into the ground by decades of sys- tematic oppression and misrule. Even before the war, only 60 per- cent of Iraqis had reliable access to safe drinking water; 70 percent of sewage treatment plants were in urgent need of repair; 23 per- cent of children under five suffered from malnutrition. Iraq's elec- trical power system, which is critical to its water system, was oper- ating at half of its capacity. Eighty percent of 25,000 schools were in poor condition with an average of one book per six students. Sixty percent of the popu- lation is wholly dependent on the U.N. Oil-for-Food Program for subsistence. Now, I will quickly review the current situation. Security, as Representative Lantos said, is the sine qua non for relief and recov- ery efforts. It is the coalition's highest priority. There has already been progress, as over half of Iraq's provinces, including Baghdad, have been declared permissive. Throughout Iraq the coalition is screening and paying local police officers and often participating in joint patrols to address security concerns. There is no food crisis in Iraq. The water system in Baghdad is operating at 60 percent of prewar levels, and efforts continue to im- prove on this. The electrical power system throughout Iraq was di- lapidated and unreliable before the war. The north and south have more reliable electric service now than before the war, and in Baghdad progress is being made every day. There is no health crisis in Iraq. Coalition partners initially pro- vided support through field hospitals. We are now moving toward an adopt a hospital approach. ORHA is working to reestablish the ministry of health, and there is active cooperation on health issues among ORHA, the World Health Organization, and the reemerging Iraqi ministry of health. There have been no widespread human rights abuses since the war. There have been some property disputes and forced evictions in the north. There is an international fact-finding team in the re- 17 There have been public pledges from the international community of over $1.2 bil- lion. The donations are for the food, health, agriculture, and security sectors. We anticipate additional contributions as well. Finally, Congress has also appropriated approximately $2.5 billion for reconstruc- tion efforts. There are also additional authorities that we can draw from if needed, such as the Natural Resources Risk Remediation Fund, which can be used for re- pairing damage to the oil facilities in Iraq. The Coalition to Win the Peace We have won the war in Iraq. We are committed to winning the peace. The United States is not acting alone. We have worked with a coalition in pros- ecuting the war and we have a broad coalition that is contributing to stability oper- ations and reconstruction. We are working also with the United Nations and various non-governmental organizations. And, of paramount importance, we are working with Iraqis who are eager to create for themselves a government that will secure their freedom, build democratic institutions and threaten neither the Iraqi people, their neighbors or others with tyranny, terrorism, weapons of mass destruction or aggression. Chairman Hyde. Thank you, Secretary Feith. Just one parenthetical comment about cooperation with the GAO. We understand one person of the GAO got permission to go for 3 to 4 weeks after he completes a bio-chemical training course, which is 3 weeks. We hope for a more robust cooperation. Mr. Feith. We are certainly open to more robust cooperation. Chairman Hyde. Thank you. Secretary Larson. STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE ALAN P. LARSON, UNDER SECRETARY, OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY FOR ECO- NOMIC, BUSINESS AND AGRICULTURAL AFFAIRS, U.S. DE- PARTMENT OF STATE Mr. Larson. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Lantos, and distinguished Mem- bers of the Committee. I would like to begin by thanking the Chair- man for his remarks about the men and women in uniform as well as in the foreign services and civil service who serve our country overseas, sometimes in assignments that are difficult and dan- gerous. Thank you. I welcome the opportunity to join colleagues from the Depart- ment of Defense and USAID to update the Committee on our plans to help the Iraqi people reclaim their country. As President Bush has said, rebuilding Iraq will require a sustained commitment from many nations, including our own. The United States is committed to supporting the establishment of an Iraq united within its bor- ders with a representative government, free of weapons of mass de- struction, at peace with its neighbors, and in which the rule of law and human rights are respected. Only 8 weeks have passed since the commencement of military operations, and there is much good news to report. As indicated, there is no famine, no shortage of food, no refugee crisis. Working closely with the World Food Program the coalition is reestablishing food distribution throughout Iraq. Getting Iraqis back to work is now a key objective. Emergency payments have been made to over 500,000 Iraqi civil servants to facilitate their return to work. In the vital oral sector initial pro- duction is being restored by more than 12,000 workers, and 16,000 people will benefit from a U.S. public works program in Baghdad. 20 WHERE WE ARE TODAY President Bush initiated military operations against Iraq eight weeks ago to the day. In that relatively short period of time, a great deal has already been accom- plished, not only militarily. In a seven-month interagency planning process for Iraq relief and reconstruction, the Administration worked very hard to ensure that we did not create an artificial distinction between "humanitarian relief and "recon- struction" efforts. The transition from relief to reconstruction is a misnomer—recon- struction and post-conflict activities began on day one working hand in hand with humanitarian response. As a result of the planning and execution of a superb military plan, extensive hu- manitarian contingency planning and the remarkable efforts of numbers of Iraqis, there was remarkably little new damage to Iraq's civilian infrastructure as a result either of coalition military action or the deliberate actions of Saddam's regime on its way out the door. There is no famine; no shortage of food. Working closely with the World Food Pro- gram, the coalition is reestablishing the public distribution system (PDS) through- out Iraq as areas become permissive. The coalition is also using the PDS to deliver needed goods, like liquid propane gas (LPG), and will restart delivery of rations through the system as food arrives and the security situation further stabilizes. Today, our primary concern remains the establishment of a secure and stable en- vironment, ending the continued looting and the restoration of basic infrastructure. We are providing both military and civilian resources to make this a reality. Ten thousand Iraqi police officers have been put back on the street, and Iraq's Criminal Court resumed legal proceedings last Thursday. A Department of Justice-led inter- national team of senior level criminal justice sector experts is about to begin a pro- gram of assistance that will include at the outset a comprehensive assessment of the courts, prosecution, police, and prison systems. The assessment will help a col- laborative effort among experts from Iraq, the Departments of Justice and State and other nations to determine the level and kinds of assistance the Iraqi people will need to reconstitute an effective and fair criminal justice system, and to design and implement programs toward that end. We, and the international community, are prepared to send into Iraq as many advisers, technicians, and other specialists as necessary in this endeavor. Getting Iraqis back to work has also been a key objective. Emergency payments have been approved for over one million Iraqi civil servants to facilitate their return to work, and the coalition has already made those payments to more than 500,000. In the vital oil sector, initial production has been restored by more than 12,000 workers who have returned to work. There are a number of factors that have been important in achieving our imme- diate objectives, but I would like to focus briefly on two. • First, as a result of Congressional action on the President's wartime supple- mental request, we are quickly providing needed services through contracts. The work done to restore Um Qasr port, including paying local staff, hiring and importing needed equipment, is just one example; but the improvements to the port will be critical in allowing the continuing flow of food and other needed commodities into Iraq. Ambassador Chamberlin will speak in more de- tail to this and USAID's other extensive activities in support of Iraqi recon- struction. • Second, we must also recognize the important contributions of our coalition partners, international organizations and non-governmental organizations. The U.S. has provided over $600 million in humanitarian and reconstruction assistance already, including some $500 million to the United Nations, pri- marily for the World Food Programme (WFP). LEGACY OF MISRULE There is no certain way to predict the total cost of Iraq's reconstruction and, though we expect that Iraq will be able to fund the majority of its reconstruction efforts, there is a clear requirement for international assistance to meet Iraq's ur- gent, short-term needs. Iraq is a potentially wealthy country, in both human and natural resources, but Saddam's misrule has left a terrible legacy for Iraqis. Under Saddam, the Iraqi economy declined dramatically over the past 25 years. In 1978, Iraq had a per capita Gross Domestic Product (GDP) equivalent to that of New Zea- land, and greater than that of Hong Kong and Argentina. In 2002, Iraq's per capita GDP was half that of Argentina, less than a quarter than that of New Zealand, and about one-eighth that of Hong Kong. Over the past 25 years, economies around the world have benefited from innovation and entrepreneurship driven by the market 24 Another challenge for Iraqis is to transition from the ration distribution system. This system provides all Iraqis a basic food basket every month, but it has deci- mated local agricultural production and the market for food products. It will take time to convert this centrally controlled economy to a free market. During the tran- sition, we will support food distribution through a public distribution system. We also need to help Iraqis develop a social safety net to help those who are truly needy. But we will work with the emerging Iraqi political and economic leadership to lay the foundation for a system in which the market—not the bureaucrat—deter- mines the prices and supplies of basic commodities. STATE DEPARTMENT ON THE GROUND IN IRAQ Creating a stable environment means ensuring that Saddam's entire ruling infra- structure and security apparatus is dismantled and disarmed, including irregulars and paramilitary forces, locating and securing WMD, and eliminating any residual terrorist infrastructure. The situation on the ground in Iraq remains highly unsta- ble. We, along with our coalition partners, have created the Coalition Provisional Authority, which includes ORHA, to exercise powers of government temporarily in Iraq, including to provide security, allow the delivery of humanitarian aid, and eliminate WMD. The President's appointment of Ambassador L. Paul Bremer is an important step in our efforts to rebuild Iraq. Ambassador Bremer will report directly to Secretary Rumsfeld, and will oversee all U.S. assistance programs in Iraq, including ORHA. There are currently dozens of State Department employees working with ORHA, from a wide range of bureaus. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Ryan Crocker continues to support efforts to establish a new political dialogue and has supported ORHA's and Presidential Envoy Zalmay Khalilzad's efforts in the two regional polit- ical conferences that have started the process of establishing an inclusive, represent- ative Iraqi Interim Authority. In addition, the State Department's Bureaus of Near Eastern Affairs (NEA), International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL), Economic and Business Affairs (EB) and Democracy, Human Rights and Labor (DRL) have been actively in- volved with OKHA for some time in a wide range of efforts, including supporting Iraqi efforts in the reconstruction of the criminal justice sector, the development of a prosperous, market-based economy, the establishment of democratic processes and protection of human rights. In all of these areas, and many more, the Department of State works closely with other federal agencies in support of our overall objectives in Iraq. Along with USAID, the State Department's Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration (PRM) is heavily involved in assisting UN, other international organiza- tion, and NGO humanitarian efforts on behalf of the Iraqi people. Prior to the con- flict, PRM supported contingency planning and prepositioning for refugees, inter- nally displaced persons (IDPs) and other conflict victims through contributions to the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) and the International Organization for Migration (IOM). PRM has also circulated guidelines for individual NGO proposals, and will seek to fund a number of NGO programs that fill gaps in the efforts of the UN and other inter- national organizations, particularly in the area of refugee returns. The stakes are high. The men and women of the United States Armed Forces, and those of our coalition allies, performed magnificently and bravely in protecting America from a grave threat and liberating a people. Now it is necessary to estab- lish the foundation of a prosperous Iraq, built around transparent and open political and economic systems, and governed by the rule of law so that we can ensure that Iraq never again poses such a threat to the civilized world. Iraqis have an oppor- tunity to unleash a force for good in the region—inspiring political reforms, invig- orating markets and stimulating growth. Saddam's regime continually put political favoritism and personal enrichment above the needs of the Iraqi people. That way of doing business is now over. The U.S. and our coalition partners will put the Iraqi people first. We are confident that a new, representative Iraqi authority will do the same. Chairman Hyde. Thank you, Secretary Larson. Ambassador Chamberlin. 37 Ms. Chamberlin. This was decided earlier in interagency com- mittee established to do contingency plan that this would not be an AID lead. However, we certainly stand ready to support any tele- communications policy that ORHA may develop, and they do have a committee, a joint telecommunications committee established in Baghdad at ORHA that is developing a policy in conjunction with Ambassador David Gross at the State Department. We have a number of different contracting mechanisms that we could rely on to support any requests that might come out of this joint group. Mr. Bereuter. Thank you, Ambassador Chamberlin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chairman Hyde. Mr. Crowley. Mr. Crowley. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Secretary Larson, let me go back to the Oil for Food Program for just a moment. It is my understanding that after the establish- ment, after the 1991 Gulf War, a portion of the monies derived from the fund were set aside to pay reparations to Kuwait and other countries who were affected by Iraq's invasion during the 1991 campaign. Now that the Administration, in my understanding, is looking to have an Iraqi interim government, civilian government, how will those reparations be paid without putting undue stress on the new Iraqi government? Mr. Larson. The proposal that the United States and its part- ners has put forward in New York would suggest that 95 percent of the revenues from oil should go into a development fund that would be used for the rehabilitation and reconstruction of Iraq, and 5 percent into compensation fund of the type that you were talking about, which is a rather significant reduction from the amounts that were going into the compensation fund under the earlier Oil for Food Program. Mr. Crowley. How much was it again? Mr. Larson. Five percent. Mr. Crowley. Do you believe that is enough in order to cover the costs? Mr. Larson. We think it is a good compromise between two im- portant goals: One, making sure that the maximum amount of rev- enue possible is available to finance the reconstruction of Iraq, but at the same time make sure that there are funds available for indi- viduals, including private individuals, who suffered greatly from Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait in 1990. Mr. Ckowley. Thank you. I yield back. Chairman Hyde. Mr. Royce. Mr. ROYCE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The U.S. military has now discovered two of these trailers equipped with chemical vats and with compressors, and these are believed to be mobile biological weapons laboratories. I wanted to ask you a question in terms of what kinds of weapons do we think could have been produced in these labs, and what kind of damage could they do. Mr. Feith. Mr. Chairman, if I may before getting to that ques- tion, it occurs to me that I do not think that I requested on my own 40 Regarding the use of Baathists, we do not have excellent infor- mation about all of the party lists. We have databases but they are not perfect. There is a vetting processing underway for people with whom we are working in different capacities in different ministries and in different local governments. Part of the vetting process, as Secretary Rumsfeld has pointed out, is when you do not know terribly much about an individual and you put that individual forward in some capacity or another, you find out when a hue and cry is raised by colleagues that this is a bad person that you have just put in that position. You learn that this is a bad person, and then you remove them, and that is part of the trial and error process of vetting in a country of tens of millions of people where, as I said, our information about many of the individuals is less than perfect. As I noted in my opening remarks, our policy is clear on the sub- ject, however. Our policy is de-Baathification, and it includes the removal of Baath party leaders from public positions. And when you talk about the Baath party, the Baath party has somewhere between a million and two million members in the country, and we are not taking the position that anybody merely because he was a member of the Baath party has to have some disability attached to him or some punishment. But we are focusing on the leadership group in the neighborhood of 20 to 30 thousand people, and saying that those people should not be working on the Iraqi public payroll. Mr. SCHIFF. Well, may I interrupt for a quick question on the issue of the sniping at U.S. soldiers. This seems to present a par- ticular challenge in terms of not being removed from the people of Iraq, but nonetheless not exposing our troops to excessive risk when you have soldiers who are shot at point blank range at inter- sections. How are we going to deal with that problem? And would not our soldiers be more secure as part of a NATO force that looks less like the U.S. occupying force and more like an international force. General Schwartz. Sir, I think, first of all, let me make clear I have not traveled to Iraq, but the Chairman just returned last night, and it was his clear impression as expressed this morning that the morale is quite good notwithstanding the reports that we may have seen here in the states. Secondly, there is risk out there. There are criminal elements and there are recidivist elements that remain in certain areas. But it is important to make the point, sir, that while you have anec- dotes of hostilities toward Americans, that the north is relatively calm, the west is calm, and the south is generally calm, so that the troublesome areas are in the center, in Baghdad in particular, and I am not minimizing that. But the way to control the problem is to be aggressive and to get out and patrol, and to pick up those who are potential liabilities, and we are doing that. Mr. SCHIFF. Would not the use of Chairman HYDE. The gentleman's time as expired. There is a vote pending, and the Chair will recess the Committee for a reasonable period after the vote to give Members a chance to 47 Mr. Brown. Let me understand—with the 5-minute limit—I would add to that, excuse me, Ambassador Chamberlin, that we knew this war was going to end and whenever day one ended up being we should have been anticipating day one as this President planned for months and months to launch an attack on Iraq. Ms. CHAMBERLIN. That is right, and I was just going to explain the second constraint. That second constraint is that we could not begin too early in a full and open bidding process or we would, in effect, undermine Secretary Powell's efforts at the U.N. and the President's efforts to avoid war, because that was our policy up until about January of this year. We hoped very much to put enough pressure on Saddam Hussein that he would step down, that he would do what he needed to do on disarmament, that we could avoid war. We did not want to take any measures that would undercut those efforts. So we were in a very delicate position. How do you conduct a full and open competition that takes in AID's experience as long as 6 months, because we do it strictly according to the Fed- eral Acquisition Regulations, 6 months, maybe more in this case because the documents that would have to be reviewed would be a stack that thick, but be prepared on day one to go into the envi- ronment that had great trust in our American military would make it a very short war. The answer was to make that a limited competition based on some very precise qualifications. The companies that were invited to join had to be companies that had an open and transparent ac- counting system, had to have experience in the region, had to have the capability of deploying personnel on short notice, and the depth to do the job. There were only a few companies, frankly, in the world that met those qualifications. In the end, Haliburton was not one of them. It was not our selectee that was, and I will defer to Mr. Feith to answer the Haliburton part of this question, but I learned, as did Administrator Natzios, that Bechtel was selected by the senior level procurement officers in our procurement office because that is a blind process within AID on the day that they announced the winner of the bid. I think that this was a very tough competitive bid. It is one that we are proud of. It delivered on time. It delivered a good company. That good company is delivering real improvements on the ground for the Iraqi people, and that the American people can be very proud of that, and I will defer now to Under Secretary Feith. Mr. Leach. The time of the gentleman has expired, but this is an important question. I think Secretary Feith should respond. Mr. Feith. The contract with Brown & Root, which is a sub- sidiary of Haliburton, as I understand the situation the contract that they were operating under was to help with oil fires, because we had substantial intelligence that Saddam was planning to blow up the oil wells in Iraq in the event of war, so a contract was used to give Brown & Root the task to put contingency plans in place to put those fires out. It is my understanding that the contract with Brown & Root was in fact competed, and they were already in place as the contractor for what is called the Logistics Civil Augmentation Program with 64 Finally, with respect to the bill that Mr. Lantos has introduced, I did want to say that we believe that a properly structured NATO role would be very beneficial, very much in the interests of the United States, and we would be very pleased to work with Mr. Lantos and the Congress on that particular piece of legislation. Mr. LEACh. Thank you. Ambassador Chamberlin. Ms. Chamberlin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to correct two misstatements of mine for the record. One, my staff reminds me that we were never in the business of bringing into Iraq bottled water. In fact, as a point of clarification, in order to get drinking water to populations that did not have, it we were bringing water in in tankers with spigots, and they would come with their own bottles. Minor point but worth making that correction. And secondly, I do not want to leave the impression in something that I may have said earlier, that we had a policy of commence- ment of the war as early as January. It was still very much under discussion at that time. Thank you. Mr. Leach. Well, thank you very much, and let me thank you both for your testimony and service, and I appreciate your forbear- ance in extending extra time, particularly to the minority party. And so I thank you both. And the Committee is adjourned. [Whereupon, at 3:21 p.m., the Committee was adjourned.]