S. HRG. 108–282
4.F 76/2:S.HRG.108-282
IRAQ: NEXT STEPS HOW CAN DEMOCRATIC
INSTITUTIONS SUCCEED IN IRAQ AND
THE MIDDLE EAST? **
HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
SEPTEMBER 24, 2003
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations
Pennsylvania State University
Libraries
MAR 03 2004
Documents Collection
U.S. Depository Copy
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/senate
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
- WASHINGTON : 2004
91-493 PDF
For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office
Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512-1800; DC area (202) 512-1800
Fax: (202) 512-2250 Mail: Stop SSOP, Washington, DC 20402-0001


2
exist in Iraqi society between victims of the Hussein regime and
the Ba'athist supporters.
The dilemma of allowing Iragis to freely choose their own form
of government is that elections may produce an Iranian-style theoc-
racy or some other type of government that is inimical to the stable
development of Iraq, to efforts against terrorism, or to other United
States interests. Yet the legitimacy of any new government re-
quires some degree of electoral involvement, clearly by the Iraqi
people.
The Coalition Provisional Authority cannot simply dictate the re-
sults, and Ambassador Bremer said as much today in another hear-
ing in response to questions from Senators. The more control the
CPA asserts, the less legitimate the process will be viewed by the
Iraqis and perhaps by other Arab nations. We have asked our wit-
nesses today to consider this challenge and to give us their guid-
ance on how democratic institutions can succeed in Trag, and more
broadly, in the Middle East. We intend to explore what kind of de-
mocracy is possible in Iraq and what constitutional ideas are likely
to be the most relevant. If democracy succeeds in Iraq, what effect
will this success have on Iraq's neighbors and the prospects for
democratic liberalization throughout the region?
Our committee is pleased to welcome Dr. Noah Feldman, an as-
sistant professor at New York University School of Law; and Dr.
Phebe Marr, former senior fellow of the National Defense Univer-
sity and author of the recently published book. “The History of
Iraq.” We are grateful for copies of the book. I've read the reviews
and look forward to reading this volume. Dr. Rami Khouri, execu-
tive editor of The Daily Star in Beirut, Lebanon, is with us, as is
Dr. Isam al-Khafaji, a professor at the University of Amsterdam,
and former member of the State Department's Future of Iraq
Project and Iraq Reconstruction and Development Council. These
experts have a broad range of experience to draw on to assess pros-
pects for the development of democracy in Iraq and the Middle
East. We deeply appreciate their joining with us today.
This hearing is the third in a series of hearings in the last 2 days
that are designed to frame the issues that Congress must address
as it considers President Bush's $87 billion supplemental funding
request for Iraq. This request, as we heard from Ambassador
Bremer this morning, includes assistance to reach out to the grass-
roots in Iraq and educate Iraqis on their historic opportunity to de-
velop a new constitution and governance system.
The stakes are clearly high. Ensuring that democratic institu-
tions succeed in Iraq must be one of the highest priorities of United
States policy in Iraq reconstruction. We look forward to discussing
these issues with each one of you. I would like to call upon the wit-
nesses in this order. First of all, Dr. Feldman, then Dr. al-Khafaji,
then Mr. Khouri, and finally Dr. Marr, and I will ask you to pro-
ceed for a reasonable time. We will not have stringent time limits
because our purpose is to hear you today to get the full benefit of
your ideas.
I will be joined in due course by colleagues, who may still be oc-
cupied at lunch or in the debate on the Appropriations bill, and
when Senator Biden appears, he will be recognized to give an open-


be a body hand-picked by the coalition. To that end, it's absolutely
essential that the coalition be open to whatever suggestions are put
forward by the constitutional preparatory committee, including, for
example, the possibility of a national referendum, as opposed to an
election, to approve or disapprove an entire slate of nominated
ers to the convention, or alternatively, some combination of
selection and election relying upon local councils throughout Iraq.
The reason to be open to those suggestions is simply that, in
their entire absence there is a significant chance that the constitu-
tional convention could be seen as illegitimate the very moment
that it came into place. I'm confident, however, that the members
of the preparatory committee will come up with a suggestion that
is plausible and acceptable to the coalition, and when that hap-
pens, we end up turning to the core question of what a constitution
for a new federal Iraq will look like. I will address that question
extremely briefly and then would be very happy to talk about it
further should anyone wish to.
First, federalism. The Iraqi constitution will be federal. On that
much nearly everybody in Iraq at this point agrees, but as we know
in the United States, to call something federalism tells you very lit-
tle about what the actual content will be. Federalism conceals a
thousand sins and there are many different possibilities.
Many in Iraq would prefer to see a country composed of 18 dif-
ferent governorates corresponding roughly to the governorates that
presently exist, all federated as states in a federal union, but it is
very difficult to find anyone in the Kurdish regions who will agree
with that proposition. The position of almost all Kurds whom I've
spoken to and whom anyone else I know has spoken to is that
Kurdistan must be a unified region, and as for the other regions
it is up to them, the Kurds will often tell you. They can choose for
themselves how many regions they want to have or how many
provinces they want to have.
And the Kurds are in a position to enforce this demand to some
degree simply because they have an operating regional government
in the area that they controlled prior to the most recent war in
Iraq. And in a worst-case scenario, the Kurds have the capacity
simply to retreat back to their area, say they're participating in the
constitutional process while actually vetoing any deal, and essen-
tially continue with the state of affairs that they already had, and
that's a very, very powerful stick for them to use. It would be dras-
tic for them to use that, and I don't think the leadership has any
intention of doing so, but that of course is something that exists in
the background.
So as a consequence I think it's increasingly likely that we're
going to see a Kurdish region as its own region in a federal Iraq
with the other regions divided accordingly. And if one Kurdish re-
gion is large, it is unlikely that others will want to have smaller
states. That increases the likelihood of us seeing an Iraq that's di-
vided into three or four or five parts, not an Iraq divided into 18
parts.
The next issue that will be contentious and important will be the
question of religion and government in Iraq and I will close with
this issue. The overwhelming majority of Iraqis with whom I have
spoken, and this is especially true of Shi’i Iraqis, want the constitu-


the Arab anon of our interve life for themse and tyranny; for leaving the
tion. I returned this past Friday from Bahrain, where I met with senior Iraqi offi-
cials including the Minister of Justice, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and
Judge Dara Nur al-Din of the Governing Council, and discussed the progress of the
constitutional process with them. I also addressed the question of promoting democ-
racy in the Muslim world at some length in my recently published book, After
Jihad: America and the Struggle for Islamic Democracy. My testimony today reflects
the views I developed in the course of researching and writing that book, revised
in the light of our experiences thus far in Iraq.
There is a general question that looms over any discussion of democracy in the
Muslim or Arab world, namely the question whether Islam and democracy are com-
patible. I believe that the answer to this general question is yes, and in my book
I explain why this is so. But my answer matters much less than the fact that the
United States of America, by leading the Coalition for the liberation of Iraq, has
now also answered this question in the affirmative. By removing Saddam Hussein
and declaring our commitment to ensuring freedom and self-government for Iraqis,
the government of the United States has committed itself to the viability of democ-
racy in Iraq, a country which is predominantly Arab and overwhelmingly Muslim.
It is now in the vital national self-interest of the United States to prove that de-
mocracy can succeed in Iraq. If democracy does not succeed there, our liberation will
come to be perceived as imperial occupation, and the deep skepticism throughout
the Arab and Muslim worlds about our motives will turn into increasingly explicit
condemnation of our intervention in the region. We also have a pressing moral duty
to enable Iraqis to create a life for themselves that is better than the one they suf-
fered under thirty-five years of oppression and tyranny. By taking the reins of gov-
ernment in Baghdad, we also took on the responsibility for leaving the Iraqi people
better off than we found them.
Today, then, it would be academic in the worst sense of the word to ask whether
democracy can succeed in the Arab world. Democracy must succeed in Iraq, and
eventually elsewhere. Whether we supported going to war in Iraq or not—and there
were reasonable arguments to be made on both sides of the question—we now must
recognize the necessity of finishing the job that we started. I would like therefore
to address my comments to the particularities of our efforts thus far to create last-
ing, stable, democratic institutions in Iraq, and to recommend the course of action
most likely to succeed there.
The basic state of affairs in Iraq today, I believe, can be summed up relatively
straightforwardly. The Coalition is operating along two equally important tracks in
Iraq: the security track and the political track. The security track is facing major
challenges, while the political track is going to remarkably well. The setbacks we
have faced on the security track have the capacity to undercut our progress on the
political track. It is therefore of the utmost importance to achieve stability and secu-
rity in Iraq: the future of democracy in that country depends upon it. The over-
whelming majority of Iraqis have already begun to show themselves to be interested
in democracy. But a small number of insurgents are capable of spoiling the possi-
bility of law and order by disrupting the peace.
Daily reports of shootings and bombings in Iraq reflect the hard reality that the
Coalition led by the United States does not yet exercise a monopoly on the use of
force there. Assassination attempts, like the one against Governing Council member
Dr. Aqila al-Hashemi last week, threaten the democratic project itself. Life for ordi-
nary Iraqis cannot return to normal so long as sabotage impedes reconstruction.
But the Coalition's lack of progress on the security front in the last four months
must not obscure the successes of the political process in that same time. The estab-
lishment of an Iraqi Governing Council; its takeover of the government ministries
that deliver basic services; and its commencement of the constitutional process have
proceeded apace despite significant security setbacks. Only by looking at the sur-
prisingly smooth political track alongside the problematic security track can we
shape a policy that will allow rapid transfer of sovereignty to an Iraqi government
to a destrable, democratic there.
Irag today, I beling two equally rack is facin.chs we
strahe basis to succratic in to thehing the
shape an actually rule the court the securityksitus were happy to be enten
An accurate assessment of the security situation must begin with the fact that
essentially all Iraq's 60% Shi'is and 20% Kurds were happy to see Saddam go, and
want the Coalition to remain long enough to prevent the Ba'Ba'ath party from re-
emerging. The Sunni Arabs, on the other hand, who comprise another 15% or so
of the population (the rest are Turkomans and miscellaneous Christian and other
religious minorities), are the inevitable losers in any even quasi-democratic realloca-
tion of power, since they took a grossly disproportionate share of the country's re-
sources under Saddam. Of these Sunnis, many want the U.S. out, but only a few
are presently willing to take up arms-otherwise we would be seeing thousands, not
dozens of incidents each week. Sunnis do not necessarily want Saddam back, but
many think they can only benefit from the failure of democracy and the rebirth of


fece rench to an enor erim po an inteispensairaq the 40
brnment. Actualits disposal avernment. Worsming from Irauiglikely to pr
some kind of autocratic Sunni state that would restore their privileges. Some have
begun to frame their opposition in terms shaped by Islamic radicalism.
It is also possible that some of the bombing attacks on targets like the United
Nations headquarters have come not from disaffected Sunnis but from terrorists
who have infiltrated easily over Iraq's long and unguarded borders. Iran has an in-
terest in keeping the U.S. presence costly to discourage it from trying to replicate
regime change next door. Al Qaeda, for its part, needs no excuse to attack the West,
and would like nothing better than to make Iraq into the site of a new, Afghan-
style jihad against foreign occupation of Muslim lands.
The realities of anti-Coalition violence, both known and unknown, suggest a strat-
egy for reducing the violence to a level compatible with exercising ordinary govern-
ment in Iraq. Only Iraqi police and soldiers, knowledgeable about local conditions
and populations, and with access to high-quality local intelligence, stand a chance
of breaking Sunni resistance cells and identifying out-of-towners who might be Ira-
nian or Al Qaeda agents. The call to internationalize the Coalition forces is an excel-
lent idea for reasons of American foreign policy and cost-reduction. International
help could speed up reconstruction and take some of the security load off hard-
pressed U.S. troops. But Indian troops would likely have no better luck than U.S.
troops in combating terrorism. Broadening the Coalition will have no measurable ef-
fect on violence in Iraq, be it local or foreign-bred.
French and German suggestions to speed up the process of transferring sov-
ereignty to an Iraqi interim government would be just as unlikely to produce secu-
rity gains. The tenor and resistance is not coming from Iraqis who would be sympa-
thetic to such an interim government. Worse, without a re-constituted police force
and military at its disposal, an interim body would be a travesty of a sovereign gov-
ernment. Actual control is the indispensable hallmark of sovereignty. Nothing could
be worse for the future of democracy in Iraq than the creation of a puppet govern-
ment unable to keep the peace and susceptible to the charge that it was sovereign
in name only.
The easily overlooked progress of the political process thus far points the way to
a legitimate, elected Iraqi government that can actually rule. Since the fall of
Saddam's regime in May, those Iraqis participating in organized politics have shown
a maturity and unity of purpose that pre-war critics would scarcely have credited.
The two most important Kurdish parties, the KDP and the PUK, have subordinated
their historical rivalry and have acted in concert, casting a steadying light over the
rest of the political scene and often taking the lead in coordinating policy among
the members of the Governing Council. Far from insisting on secession and Kurdish
independence, as some in the region feared, the Kurdish leaders are sticking to the
vision of a federal Iraq, and urging their sometimes impatient community not to fal-
ter so close to achieving long-awaited freedom from autocratic Arab rule.
More importantly for Iraq's democratic future, the Shi'i religious elites, and the
political parties loosely associated with them, have consistently eschewed divisive
rhetoric in favor of calls for Sunni-Shi'i unity. Emerging as Islamic democrats, they
have repeatedly asserted their desire for democratic government respectful of Is-
lamic values, rather than government by mullahs on the failed Iranian model. As
a result, they have been largely successful in marginalizing younger radicals like
the rejectionist Muqtada Sadr, whose late-spring play for leadership of the national
Shi'i community seems to have faded over the course of the summer. When Sadr
wanted to organize an anti-Coalition protest in the holy city of Najaf, he was forced
to bus in supporters from Baghdad, three dusty hours away. The Coalition has wise-
ly declined to arrest Sack, and, his hopes for a living martyrdom denied, he increas-
ingly looks more like a small-time annoyance than the catalyst of a popular move-
ment of Shi'i anti-Americanism.
The emergence of democratic attitudes among religiously committed Shi'is was
underscored on Saturday in Detroit, where Da'wa Party leader Dr. Ibrahim Ja'fari,
the immediate past Governing Council president, addressed the second annual
Iraqi-American Conference. The largely Christian audience of Iraqi-Americans spent
the morning fretting about the dangers of a constitution declaring Islam the official
religion of Iraq, but treated Ja'fari to a standing ovation after he argued for a plu-
ralistic, tolerant Iraq, in which full rights of citizenship would be exercised by Mus-
lims and non-Muslims, men and women. The same proud insistence on the compat-
ibility of a democratic, pluralist Iraq with Islamic values was sounded by forty Sh'is
from southern Iraqi cities at a session on religious liberty I conducted last week in
Bahrain as part of an ABA-sponsored program on constitutional values. Skeptical
of arguments for strong separation of religion and state, they nonetheless took as
a given that a country as religiously diverse as Iraq must ensure religious free-
dom-mandated, they said, by the Qur'an-and equality for all citizens regardless
of religion.


10
wide, the constinci?. Witho approve
particimuthored would hat of publice of cand i reject su
opyentiontinipation in tye moderaternas illegirmation, the
a soin its work on imagine electind perhaps lauf the provinces finding,
The next step in the constitutional process is for the Constitutional Preparatory
Committee, named by the Governing Council, to complete its canvass of the country
and propose a mechanism for naming the members of an Iraqi constitutional con-
vention. The Committee needs to find a workable solution, short of a general elec-
tion, to choose a legitimate and representative body. It is considering proposals such
as a mixed election/selection procedure or a national referendum to approve or dis-
approve a complete slate nominated by the Governing Council.
The Coalition is right to be wary of a national election to select the delegates to
a constitutional convention. Iraq is not yet ready for such a national election. Polit-
ical parties have not yet had enough time to develop. Organizing voter rolls would
take time. To make matters even more complicated, voting districts would require
deciding even before the election what districting would be fair. This would be very
difficult to accomplish in the absence of a recent census. What is more, one of the
main issues for a constitutional convention to discuss will be the creation of just
rules for drawing districts, so it would be putting the cart before the horse to use
existing districts, gerrymandered by Saddam to disenfranchise the Kurds, to select
a constitutional convention.
On the other hand, the Coalition should not automatically reject suggestions for
a national referendum to approve or vote down a slate of candidates selected by the
Governing Council. Without some component of public affirmation, there is the risk
that the constitutional convention would be seen as illegitimate from day one. A
widely distributed fatwa, authored by moderate Shi'i cleric 'Ali Sistani, demanded
some sort of public participation in the process of selecting the convention, and as-
serted that a convention handpicked by the Coalition would not represent the values
of the Iraqi people. Although it is not certain that Sistani would actively condemn
a convention selected by the Iraqi members of the Governing Council, a general
sense among Iraqi elites is that some sort of public affirmation process would do
much to enhance the legitimacy of the constitutional process. I am confident that
a solution can be reached, and that the constitutional convention, once named, can
begin its work of drafting a constitution for ratification by the Iraqi people.
It is difficult to imagine elections being held under a new constitution before next
autumn at the very soonest-and perhaps later still. The constitution will have to
resolve complex questions of the boundaries of the provinces in a new, federal Iraq,
not to mention ensuring religious liberty and equality and finding the right form
of government to manage Iraq's distinctive ethno-religious mix. Getting the wrong
answers to these questions quickly would be much worse than taking some time to
get the right answers. But rushing would be a mistake in any event, because an
elected Iraqi government would come too soon if it predated effective control of the
country.
Let me speak briefly to the constitutional structure and the difficulties it must
resolve to establish stable and democratic institutions. Iraqis are coming to the real-
ization that their government will have to be federal in order to accommodate the
various regional ethnic and religious differences in their country. Many Iraqis would
like to see eighteen federal states, corresponding to the currently existing eighteen
governorates. It is difficult, however, to find even a single Kurd who is prepared to
accept the division of the Kurdish region into several distinct states or provinces.
Kurds are more likely to say that the Kurdish region must be a unified province.
As for the rest of Iraq, the Kurds are prepared to leave it to Arab Iraqis to decide
whether they want to have a single Arab region, separate central and southern re-
gions, or a dozen different provinces. It will be extremely difficult to convince Kurds
to accept the division of the Kurdish region. At present, the Kurdish region is gov-
erned by a centralized Kurdish Regional Government, and the Kurds can realisti-
cally boast at least 40,000 men at arms. It is therefore increasingly likely that con-
stitutional negotiations will yield a unified Kurdish federal region. In any event, the
shape of Iraq's federalism will be the single greatest and most complicated issue to
be addressed in constitutional negotiations. It will take time to reach a workable
consensus, and all parties will have to compromise. But the federal arrangement is
far and away the most important for achieving the long-term goal of keeping Iraq
is a single, unified country.
It will be relatively easy for Iraqis to agree that their constitution should guar-
antee basic rights of liberty and equality for all citizens, regardless of religion or
sex. The Islamic democrats who increasingly represent the Shi'i community believe
that Islam guarantees such liberty and equality. The constitution will certainly
guarantee religious liberty for everyone in Iraq. At the same time, it is unlikely that
the majority of Iraqis would agree to the omission from their constitution of a provi-
sion describing Islam as the official religion of the state. Every Arab constitution
has such a provision. The hundreds of Iraqis I have spoken to about this issue in
Iraq, both Sunnis and Shi'is, balk at the idea that their constitution would declare
ke to see anal ethnic angent will hastic
whether theest of Iraq, thesay that then into severaingle
erned by a ce division of the Kurdish It will becoext
stitipoast at least 404 Kurdish Regionegion. At pr


16
ather intended to ao Tragis. And once it before or along,
ers, with Arab Shi'ites composing around 50-52 percent of the population, Sunni
Kurds 20-22 percent, Arab Sunnis around 20 percent, Turkoman Shi'ites and Sunnis
some 5 percent and Christian Chaldeans, Assyrians, Armenians and Arabs around
3 percent.
To this must be added the fact that unlike the religiously polarized Lebanon, no
single religious or secular ethnic/sectarian authority can claim to be the representa-
tive of the majority of the members of “their” respective communities, because be-
sides ethnicity and religion, loyalties in a complex and highly urbanized society like
Iraq are formed along regional, professional and ideological lines.
Rather than viewing this situation as disruptive, this state of affairs means that
unlike Iran or Saudi Arabia, no single community or ideology in Iraq can impose
its tyranny in the name of representing the majority.
DESCRIBING THE PROBLEM
The above description is not intended to draw a rosy picture of a situation that
is far from ideal. It is rather intended to direct your attention to what I think is
the sources of the lack of a consensus among Iraqis. And once again, it is from the
US experience, as well as from those of others, that we learn that before or along-
side the establishment of diversity and pluralism, no democracy can survive without
a social contract which stipulates what unites the diversity and from which common
rules and laws can be drawn.
The Ba'athist regime has forcibly imposed a destructive concept of unity among
Iraqis which sought, and succeeded to a certain extent to atomize the population
and linking the individuals directly to the state. During the rising days of that re-
gime, until circa the mid 1980s, this concept tried to impose homogeneity on the
population by marginalizing and suppressing entire communities and regions. This
could not have been made possible without the tremendous resources that accrued
to the Iraqi state thanks to the oil extraction sector whose revenue yielding poten-
tial had very little to do with the productive capacity of the people. A welfare state
made of huge numbers of civil and military and paramilitary servants and a large
stratum of wealthy businessmen living on state contracts that was handed according
to political, family and clannish cronyism deprived Iraqis from any autonomy and
enhanced a perception among them that the state does not owe anything to the peo-
ple. Rather it was they who owed their living to the state. Only after the Ba'athist
state drained Iraq's resources and had to withdraw from providing the basic social
and economic services did atomized individuals turn back to revive their sub-na-
tional loyalties in search of protection and basic services.
REMEDYING THE PROBLEM
Iraqis cannot hope to reach a modern social contract without a long-term modern-
izing project aimed at engaging them in rebuilding their devastated economy and
society. With the huge demands on the oil-revenue, the days of the parasitic welfare
state are over, and it is would be very misleading and dangerous to revive any illu-
sions among them on "oil funds” that would bring them toast and honey without
hard work.
But before this reconstruction project can effectively roll on, security and the rule
of law must be firmly established. And the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA)
is in a unique position to help us in establishing this complicated project by seri-
ously revising some of its policies that sent a wrong message to the Iraqis and left
them to question the sincerity of the claims to liberate them and putting their fates
into their own hands.
A quick and systematic, but not hasty, process to “Iraqize” the functions that the
CPA is performing now must begin by admitting that not only implementation of
security policy should be handed to the Iraqis themselves, but also thawing and de-
signing that policy, with the intensive help and advise of the Coalition forces. For-
eign armed forces, no matter how technologically advanced, can never bring secu-
rity. Rather, their wellbeing and safety will become a security problem and a huge
drain on the US budget which can only escalate with time.
The justifiable fears among US policymakers as well as among Iraqis that relying
on militias and tribal chiefs in building and reorganizing a modern police and secu-
rity force can lead to disruptive results can be overcome by empowering the already
functioning provincial councils. These councils can draw from a huge pool of unem-
ployed ex-soldiers and policemen by announcing a crash plan to recruit members of
a national police force proportionate to the rough population of each governorate as
a first step to merge these provincial police forces into one national police force. The
names of the new applicants must be made public and citizens must be encouraged


greater opportunities to oppose the government in public and more
robust media, a larger role for the private sector, and an expansion
in the number and the nature of non-governmental institutions
that form civil society.
There has been great enthusiasm throughout the region for peo-
ple to try to forge credible, effective, useful civil society institutions,
non-governmental organizations, PVO's, private voluntary organi-
zations. You've had tens of thousands of new, non-governmental or-
ganizations established in the Arab world in the last 15 years. The
number went up from around 30,000 to around 80,000 in the last
15 years. Societies for the care of handicapped children to teach
people literacy, to help provide educational facilities, promote de-
mocracy, human rights, women's rights, children's rights, any kind
of organization you can think of, there's been an explosion of these
societies, showing you the enthusiasm and thirst for democracy in
the region.
We've also seen in the elections that have taken place and the
liberalizations that have taken place since the late 1980s dozens
and dozens of political parties, new press publications created, so
there is a tremendous thirst in the region to participate in demo-
cratic institutions. And what's happened since the late 1980s has
diffused some of the tensions and the frustrations and the pres-
sures that had been building up in Arab society.
But in no cases did this political liberalization lead to fully de-
mocratization. The small elites that ruled most of these countries
since independence continued to dominate decisionmaking and con-
tinued to dominate the political, military, fiscal, and even the intel-
lectual resources of the country.
The forces that drive people in the Middle East to try to create
better societies are the forces that I think are important for you to
address if you want to connect with the people who are already
working for democracy in that region. And I would say that the sin-
gle most important driving force for political activism and change
in the Middle East has been domestic indignity. It's not Israel, it's
not the United States, it's not British colonialism, it's not historical
anxiety, it's domestic indignities hoisted on the people by their own
regimes and societies. People are angry about not having a suffi-
cient voice in their countries, about corruption, about exploitation
of power, about lack of equality, about mediocrity in public service,
and this goes on for decade after decade, and people fight against
this but they can't get very far.
The second reason is the humiliations and the dangers that peo-
ple have suffered in the Arab world particularly as a result of the
Arab/Israeli conflict. This has huge impact throughout the region,
so solving the Arab/Israeli conflict fairly will have a significant im-
pact on domestic trends in the Arab countries, but by itself will not
completely solve the problems of the region.
And the third problem that people suffer from is the legacy of
foreign intervention in the area. People still remember what the
Europeans did, we still talk about it, it still impacts on the medioc-
rity of many of our institutions, and in some cases the incoherence
of some of our states. So if you look around the Middle East, we
have a series of rather incoherent states in some cases that have
fallen apart from civil wars or occupations or whatever, and many


24
also to the conduct of the USA and other foreign powers. Most of these constraints
are man-made, and they can be removed if we forge appropriate policies and work
diligently and consistently. I would like to offer some observations and suggestions
based on my analysis of sentiments throughout the Arab World, the region I know
best, though some of these thoughts are also relevant to Turkey, Iran, Israel, and
other non-Arab parts of the Middle East.
This is a critical time in the Middle East, when its own citizens and many friends
around the world are exploring why this region remains the least democratic part
of the globe. If the United States in particular truly seeks to promote democracy
in Iraq and the wider region, it would do well to start by correctly analyzing three
critical factors: Why has democracy not spread throughout this region? What has
been the United States' role in this matter in modern history? And what do the peo-
ple of the region feel about democracy, and what are they doing to achieve it?
There are tens of millions of people for you to work with on this goal throughout
the Middle East, but they have mostly been silenced by their own governments, and
ignored by the American government and others around the world. I would suggest
the following main reasons why the Middle East remains a region largely devoid
of democratic governments:
1. The legacy of autocratic, sometimes authoritarian, rule in our region, al-
most always with the explicit, sustained support of foreign governments, includ-
ing the US government. Arab democrats have never had a chance, and they are
understandably skeptical to hear the USA suddenly promoting a policy of rapid
democratization in the Middle East. Washington's credibility on this, like its
track record, is very thin.
2. The many years of the Cold War reinforced the static, non-democratic na-
ture of the Middle Eastern political order, as the two superpowers provided eco-
nomic, political, and military support for their clients in the area.
3. The Arab-Israeli conflict provided a means for autocratic rulers to avoid
democratic transformations and instead to promote security-minded regimes, by
arguing that the regional conflict made defense a greater priority than democ-
racy.
4. The post-WWI colonial legacy made it virtually impossible for Arab public
opinion to manifest itself for democratic governance, given that colonial authori-
ties usually transferred political and military power in most countries to hand-
picked local elites, who quickly consolidated their grip on power or were over-
thrown by military coups whose leaders consolidated their power.
5. State-building issues, security, and taking care of one's own family usually
were seen by most people and governments as more urgent priorities than pro-
moting democracy.
The net result of these and other trends has been that security-minded govern-
ments and states dominated most aspects of life in Middle Eastern countries, exter-
nal powers usually helped to perpetuate this autocracy and lack of democracy, and
civil society and the private sector were largely contained and controlled by the
state. Middle Eastern democrats have struggled unsuccessfully against these odds
for many decades, just as their counterparts had done in the former Soviet bloc. But
some improvements have occurred since the mid-1980s, when fiscal pressures forces
most Arab regimes to loosen their grip on society; this trend continued in the early
1990s, after the collapse of communism impacted on the region.
The result has been an appreciable liberalization of political life in many coun-
tries, including legalization of new political parties, holding parliamentary elections,
providing greater opportunities to oppose government positions, a more robust
press, a larger role for the private sector, and expansion in the number and nature
of non-governmental organizations and other civil society actors. The enthusiasm
with which ordinary people throughout the region embraced the opportunities pro-
vided by the recent political liberalization indicates the strong thirst for more demo-
cratic and participatory governance systems in the region. Tens of thousands of new
non-governmental organizations have been established in the region in the past two
decades, along with hundreds of political parties and publications.
This has defused some of the tensions, frustrations, and pressures that had been
building up within Arab countries, but in no case did it move any society towards
a truly democratic system. The Arab region since the late-1980s has experienced a
measurable improvement in freedom of expression and association, but political lib-
eralization has not continued on the path towards full democratization. The ruling
elites that have dominated Middle Eastern political life for the past half century
continue to do so, with only superficial changes to their control of political, security,
intellectual, cultural, and economic assets.
anizations political parustration and it move an has experitical lib-
mea on the path towards full demnanti?
and ecosuperficial changPolitical life for thatization. The rulino


25
and hopes, rather than transplant que vayan
The tensions and concerns that drive the sentiments and actions of ordinary peo-
ple throughout the Middle East have not changed very significantly in the past few
decades. I would define these, in their order of importance, as:
1. Domestic indignities, reflecting political, economic, cultural and environ-
mental pressures on the ordinary citizen, who feels that his or her voice is not
heard in a society where power is unjustly exploited by a small, non-accountable
elite.
2. The humiliations and dangers suffered as a result of the Arab-Israeli con-
flict, which are widely felt emotionally and politically throughout the region.
3. The legacy of foreign interventions in the area, whether by Europeans a
century ago or by the USA today.
All three of these issues have caused tens of millions of people throughout the re-
gion to agitate for a better, more responsive and more equitable order. Ordinary
men and women have had few if any opportunities to express themselves, let alone
to work for better governance. Most people have expressed their wishes in the lan-
guage of religion or culture, speaking of their right to justice and dignity, rather
than in the language of democratic republicanism. Dissatisfied Arabs whose citizen-
ship rights have been routinely degraded have most often found refuge and hope
in their religion or in their collective tribal and family identities, which have pro-
vided the sense of identity and the security and services that the modern state has
not been able to provide.
The election results throughout the Middle East since the late 1980s, along with
public opinion polls and the media, indicate clearly a strong desire for change
among the publics of the region. The landscape for change and democracy in the
Middle East is deep, rich and fertile, but it has never been cultivated by indigenous
authorities or foreign powers.
Any effort to promote democracy in the Arab and wider Middle Eastern region
must take these facts into consideration, acknowledge the mistakes of the past, un-
derstand the grievances and aspirations of the people of the region, and respond to
indigenous concerns and hopes, rather than transplant foreign notions of what is
right or what is needed. The US policy in Iraq today unfortunately dampens indige-
nous Arab activism for democracy in the short run, given the strong anti-American
sentiments in much of the Middle East. Local activists who seek to promote democ-
racy face the new obstacle of being seen by some of their peers as unwitting agents
of the United States. This is a terrible and bitter irony, given that Middle Eastern
democracy activists have long wished to work with like-minded partners from the
US and the West as a whole.
To achieve legitimate democratic orders in the Middle East, we must acknowledge
several key realities and act accordingly, rather than forge policies that are driven
either by extreme ideology or naïve romanticism. The single most important point
that we must acknowledge is that the people of the United States and the Middle
East share very common values and goals on issues such as a just society and good
governance—but they express them very differently. Four key differences should be
kept in mind as we collectively seek to promote democracy in our region:
1. Americans probably value freedom above all other attributes, while most
Arab societies stress the dignity of the individual more than his or her liberty.
Dignity is defined and perceived as comprising the same range of values and
rights that define democracy in the US and the Western world-participation
in political life and decision-making, a sense of social and economic justice, ini-
tial equal opportunities for all young people in their education and careers, and
the rule of law applied equally and fairly to all in society.
2. Americans organize their society and governance primarily on the basis of
the rights of the individual, while Arabs define themselves and their societies
primarily through collective identities, such as family, tribe, ethnic group, or re-
ligion. Americans tend to stress society's obligation to ensure the individual's
rights to do as he or she pleases, within the limits of the law; Arabs tend to
focus more on the obligation of the individual to fulfill his or her responsibilities
to the family and wider community.
3. The USA is a secular society, while religion plays an important public role
in most Arab and Middle Eastern societies.
4. The United States is predominantly an immigrant society with a short col-
lective historical memory, while Middle Eastern cultures are deeply defined by
their historical memories and past experiences.
These four key differences between American and Arab culture have a major im-
pact on how democracy could spread throughout our region. The term “democracy


27
yond the constitutional system and address some of the problems
I see the Iraqis facing today, but I would also like to touch on the
constitutional process as well.
It seems to me that even before the occupation of Iraq there was
considerable debate in policy circles here on what regime change in
Iraq would mean. Without oversimplifying, some envisioned a mod-
est change, removal of the head, Saddam, and some of his support
system, but leaving much of the apparatus intact. In retrospect,
that would have made a smoother transition if it could have been
accomplished. It probably would have been less costly, but the dif-
ficulty with it, of course, is that you wouldn't have gotten much
change, and we all worried about the emergence a new authori-
tarian leader later on.
The second choice, the one that we've ultimately followed, was to
opt for more radical change, a rather thorough dismantling of the
system, the better to create something new in its place. This obvi-
ously has the virtue of clearing the field for new construction, but
it does come with a high price tag. This radical change has created
a political, military, and psychological vacuum, that now has to be
filled by us or by others that we can hastily assemble from abroad
or from inside Iraq.
I would like to focus on a couple of unintended consequences that
have resulted from this. I see two of these as the most important,
and would like to focus on them today. One is the destruction of
the central government in a country that was previously over-
whelmingly dependent on it. As a counterbalance, and this is a
very welcome one, there has been a very significant decentraliza-
tion of administration in Iraq; the establishment of municipal coun-
cils, provincial-level appointments, and so on.
But this cannot substitute for the role of a central government,
and if there is too much decentralization left unchecked, we could
get a lot more unintended consequences we don't want, such as re-
newed factionalism, the development of party militias, which we
see, and increased control by local potentates. I believe that a bal-
ance has to be re-established and soon for several reasons. I've
gone into in more detail on this in the paper than I will here.
First is demographics in Iraq. I don't think this is widely appre-
ciated, but because of internal migration in Iraq over the past cou-
ple of decades, there has been a considerable shift in population
from the northern and southern provinces into the central prov-
inces and particularly Baghdad. One should always distrust statis-
tics in Iraq, but the trends I think are clear.
By my calculation today, about half of Iraq's population lives in
its five central provinces, and something like a third live in Bagh-
dad, the capital. Only about 13 percent live in the three northern
Kurdish provinces, and in all those southern provinces we lump to-
gether as Shi'ah, only about 32 percent live there. The north and
the south up to this point have been relatively quiet, but I would
point out that it's the center with the bulk of Iraq's population that
is giving us the most trouble, including a persistent guerrilla insur-
gency.
A second point, and you are probably familiar with this: Under
Saddam, a large percentage of the population, especially its edu-
cated middle class, worked for the government directly or indi-


chance to be a political majority for the first time in Iraq's modern
history. However, the Shi'ah community is hardly homogenous, and
even the minority of the Shi'ah, who want to see a more religious
state, are divided among themselves on what role religion should
play.
· Much of the Shi'ah community is uncomfortable with the U.S. oc-
cupation and wants an earlier rather than a later departure. The
Shi'ah, however, risk a political split over this issue, particularly
from militants like Muqtada-l-Sadr, the radical young cleric who
has mobilized a lot of people in the poor district of Baghdad, Sadr
City. A further decline in the security situation, more killing of
Shi'ah clerics, could split the community, erode support for the
Governing Council, and exacerbate community tensions. These
eventualities should be avoided at all costs.
The Kurds also represent another future fault line in the system,
and I take on board to a considerable extent what Dr. Feldman has
said. Though the north has been very quiet and the Kurds are very
supportive of the coalition, one reason for this is that the Kurdish
parties have made substantial gains in achieving their future goals.
They are obviously very anxious to preserve these in the new con-
stitution, and I agree that they're likely to drive a very hard bar-
gain for self-government in the north.
As the constitutional process proceeds, I think there will be two
issues that have to be resolved. These will require very difficult
bargaining among the Iraqis; they are not going to be technical
constitutional questions, although that will be involved. These are
political questions. I have actually identified the same issues that
Dr. Feldman did, although my take on them may be
ferent. These issues incidentally are very real, and in my view we
can opine on them, but the Iraqis are the ones that have to resolve
them. If the Iraqis in any way can resolve them, that should be ac-
ceptable to us.
The first is the role of the Shi'ah in the state. This is a key issue
for several important Shi'ah parties and for secularists as well.
There is little doubt that these Shi'ah politicans and not only the
Shi'ah but the Sunnis as well will want a greater role for religion.
The folks who do want a greater role for religion are going to face
a number of secularists in Iraq as well as moderately religious peo-
ple who want a limited role. In my view, we're going to see more
religion in Iraq than we have in the past, but the question is how
to draw the boundaries, how much religion, what kind of religion,
and so on. This is going to be one of the key questions in the con-
stitutional discussion.
The second issue is the role of the Kurds in the state and how
much self-government for the Kurds under the constitution. There
is little doubt that the Kurds want federalism. This issue boils
down into a discussion between those who are talking about ethnic
federalism and those who are talking about administrative fed-
eralism, based on 18 provinces. Administrative federalism would
not be a bad idea, because those provinces which are distinctly
Kurdish or Shi'ah or Arab Sunni would of course have Kurdish,
Shi'ah, and Arab Sunni governments, and those which are mixed,
like Kirkuk, Mosul, Baghdad, even Basra, Diyala, and so on, would
have mixed governments.


31
A word of caution here about federalism that divides Iraq into
two or three big areas. Disentangling these areas is going to be no
small task if that's what people have in mind with this federalism.
It may be easy in Dahuk. It may be easy or not too easy even in
Najaf, but when you get to these mixed areas where the bulk of
the population in Iraq lives, it's going to be extremely difficult.
I agree that the Kurdish parties, who are in control of the north
of Iraq, are pretty determined to have federalism on an ethnic
basis. As I've heard it defined wherever a province has 50 percent
Kurdish speakers it is going to be a Kurdish province. This really
has to be looked at carefully, although it is an issue for the Iraqis
to decide, because if there is an ethnically defined Kurdistan, does
that not open the door to self-governing units in other area, such
as the Shi'ah south or the Sunni triangle? What happens to Bagh-
dad and other mixed areas in the center? And what happens to the
cohesion of Iraq as a country?
Constitutional deliberations, however they come about, and the
drawing up of an electoral law on which representation will be
based, will open all of these issues. I believe they're going to be dif-
ficult to resolve and that the Iraqis need a reasonable time period
in a relatively secure environment to resolve them. They do need
some deadlines, however, to work toward the process so that they'll
be able to move to a conclusion. I recognize the difficulties of hold-
ing an election, which would produce a huge group of people to sit
down and look at the constitution. Actually dozens of Iraqi exiles,
including my colleague, Dr. al-Khafaji, have looked at constitutions
and drawn up models. I would be a little uneasy myself to have a
constitution promulgated in Iraq without some kind of an electoral
body to ratify it, because that would raise the whole i
imacy. The constitution, after all, is going to determine much of the
future of Iraq.
I'd like to conclude with a few suggestions on what the United
States needs to do in a broad sense, where we need to go from here
to address a couple of these issues. The first I'm sure you've heard
over and over. We must reduce and neutralize the insurgency. Ev-
erything else depends on getting a degree of stability and quiet.
That of course is going to be easier said than done.
I would certainly second the suggestions that have been made
here to turn that task over as rapidly as possible to Iraqis. Iraqis
know the environment, they know the people, they're much better
equipped to deal with security than we are. And incidentally, there
have been a number of suggestions for security, some of which are
short-term but not, I think, too good for the long-term, such as
using local militias placed under the authority of the central gov-
ernment. It is better to rapidly develop new forces for the Iraqis.
I would be very careful about decentralizing security and putting
it in the hands of these militias, because we need to strengthen the
central government while we're making it democratic.
The second point that I would make here is that it is time to
strengthen the central government and the center. This may be
somewhat controversial, but the gap left by the collapse of the cen-
tral government and the decline and weakening of Baghdad and
the center as a whole is part of this problem of restoring law and
order. While decentralization is necessary, I think the process


36
Hino They should be to provide intelligibov to know ho
went through this process in the 1920s and it took two years). Once this task is
accomplished, a new election and the establishment of an assembly—and a govern-
ment-should not take too much longer. About eighteen months seems a reasonable
time frame to me to accomplish these processes. But any new government will need
support, especially in the security area, for a longer period of time, while Iraq's new
army and police take shape. Any foreign role after the new Iraqi government is set
up, however, should be low profile and subsidiary, and would be helped by the um-
brella of international support.
WHAT DOES THE US NEED TO DO?
What does the US need to do, both to address the consequences of the changes
that have taken place in Iraq since the fall of the regime, and to facilitate a sound
and effective constitutional process?
(1) Reduce and Neutralize the Insurgency. First, as all have noted, it needs to re-
duce and neutralize the insurgency, easier said than done. It seems likely, even
under optimal conditions, that some level of armed opposition will continue for some
time, and if other problems are not addressed (jobs, crime, electricity) it could grow
and spread. Dealing with the insurgency should be turned over to Iraqis as soon
as a capability can be developed, with due supervision exercised to make certain
vengeance is not enacted and old scores settled. The units of the army that were
disbanded, including some of its officer corps, can be hired back, with proper vet-
ting. They should be put under civilian control. Local tribal leaders can also be used,
judiciously, not only to provide intelligence but to keep order in their regions in re-
turn for benefits. Iraqis are far more likely to know how to identify insurgents, to
vet reliable Iraqis, and to deal with their own region than are Americans who do
not know Iraq or speak the language. Even the idea of using local militias, under
central government supervision could be tried. However, these should be regarded
as short term solutions, to deal with a problem that is seriously threatening Iraq's
reconstruction and its conslitutional future. They should not be allowed to derail the
development of a national army, a national intelligence service and a police force,
all under civilian control. Care must be taken that these solution do not empower
tribal leaders once again; legitimize party and private militias; empower the "out-
siders” in the Governing Council at the expense of the insiders and, in short, leave
the new central government weak and ineffective.
(2) Strengthen the Central Government and the "Center". The gap left by the col-
lapse of the central government and the decline and weakening of Baghdad and the
center as a whole is part of the problem of restoring law and order. While decen-
tralization is necessary, the process needs rebalancing, particularly in a country
used to “taking orders” from a central government. A restored, and healthy center,
will help prevent unraveling in the provinces. Staffing shortages need to be filled.
The new government needs to rehire Iraqis, including the military and the bureauc-
racy faster, and to streamline the vetting process. (This will also help put the popu-
lation back to work). If some unregenerated Ba'thists slip through the net, they can
be weeded out in the course of time and replaced by a new generation.
Better and closer links need to be established between the new provincial admin-
istrations, and the central government, which should, once again, begin to knit the
country together by providing services. However, these links should not simply func-
tion from the top down, but the bottom up. While central government representa-
tives need to get out of Baghdad to the provinces, the reverse is also true. Mecha-
nisms must be found to bring the new provincial administrators into contact with
the central government, making certain the central government understands their
priorities.
(3) Strengthen the Middle Class. The US should use its reconstruction money to
strengthen the middle class—both an independent business class free of government
control and an educated professional class—both of which are the backbone of any
democratic state. In Iraq, this class generally cuts across all ethnic and sectarian
boundaries and has, in the past, been the glue which has held Iraq together and
encouraged a common and more progressive Iraqi vision. That class and that vision
are still present in Iraq, but the middle class has been weakened through Saddam's
oppression and sanctions. Spurring economic activity and small and medium busi-
ness will help employment and develop an independent economic sector. We should
keep a level playing field while we privatize and prevent the emergence of a new
economic mafia. Opening the country to outside influences—in education, through
think tanks; through professional exchanges—will help the educated class which is
the backbone of government and civic society. The stronger this class becomes, the
less will be heard of ethnic and sectarian differences. Accompanying the trans-


38
Arab
Sunnis
Arab
Shi'a
Kurd
Turkmen
10ther/
Unknown
Total
30 (79%)
57 (46%)
87 (54%)
6(16%)
43 (35%)
49(30%)
2( 5%)
16 (13%)
18(11%)
8( 6%)
8( 5%)
10 (48%)
13 (52%)
26 (57%)
6(29%)
4(16%)
10 (22%)
6(24%)
6(13%)
5 (24%)
2( 8%)
7(15%)
Military Regimes 1958-68:
Upper level 4
Lower level 5
Both levels
The Ba'th Regime 1977-78:
Upper level 5
Lower level 6
Both levels
1986-1987:
Upper level
Lower level
Both levels
1998:
Upper level
Lower level
Both levels
9 (53%)
8 (38%)
17 (45%)
6 (35%)
4(19%)
10(26%)
1( 6%)
6 (29%)
7(18%)
1( 6%)
3(14%)
4(11%)
11(61%)
7 (26%)
18(40%)
5(28%)
8(30%)
13 (29%)
1( 6%)
3(11%)
41 9%)
1( 6%)
9(33%)
10(22%)
1 Includes Christians.
2 Includes the regent, prime ministers, deputy prime ministers, and the ministers of interior,
defense, finance and foreign affairs.
3 Includes all other miniosters.
4 Includes the president in place of the regent.
5 Includes the RCC and the Regional Command of the Party, (RL).
6 All ministers not on the RCC and the RL.
Sources: Phebe Marr, “Iraq's Leadership Dilemma,” Middle East Journal 24 (1970), p. 288;
Amatzia Baram, “The Ruling Political Elite in Ba'thi Iraq, 1968-1986,” IJMES, 21 (1989), ap-
pendix 1; unpublished data collected by the author.
Taken from Phebe Marr, The Modern Histroy of Iraq (2nd edition) (Boulder, Colo.; Westview,
2003), p. 309.
The CHAIRMAN. Thank you again, Dr. Marr, for your testimony.
We've appreciated it at each stage along the way as we've been vis-
iting as a committee.
Let me commence the questioning and suggest we have a 10-
minute round for Senators. I'll begin by indicating that as I heard
you, Mr. Khouri, you mentioned, probably accurately, that for 90
years many people in Iraq, and perhaps in other countries as
have been raising issues as to how life might change for the better.
As a matter of fact, they have not been able to make much of a
breakthrough in 90 years. Some of it may have been due to imposi-
tion by Europeans, some due to home-grown Iraqis, but neverthe-
less it is a rather dismal prospect.
As Dr. Marr has pointed out, it could be argued that the United
States came along without going into the rationale for whether war
should have occurred in Iraq or not in the first place. Nevertheless,
one did. One of the two alternatives that you suggested was a rath-
er limited outcome: namely the top leadership is removed, some-
body else continues on, and therefore this yields a fair degree of
stability. We don't have occupation, insurgency, because essentially
somebody's left to handle that. However, that probably would not
have met the point of the 90 years. It is not clear that that would
lead to many resolutions of those same questions.
What we decided to do was, as Dr. Marr said, more radical. Cen-
tral government is gone, civil servants are gone, a lot of things are


43
I've
of Islam, but this is a Christian who wants to run for our Presi-
dent, would that do? And I think this is how we will build it. Eu-
into democracy on the first day that they established
democracy. Women got the rights in the 1920s, 1930s, and some
countries in the 1950s, and I think we are now, I wouldn't say in
a better place, but at least in an equal place, so just give us the
chance.
The CHAIRMAN. I'll return to my question later on, but I want to
recognize my colleague, Senator Biden.
Senator BIDEN. Thank you. These are among the best hearings
that we have. We have hearings for two purposes, one for oversight
and one to learn. In one sense, we're learning from oversight hear-
ings but we're demanding answers to determine whether or not
commitments made or requests being made makes sense and are
consistent with what the Congress wants to do and the American
people. These hearings are-I find them the most interesting be-
cause I learn the most with such competent and prominent people
with diverging views.
I'm going to resist what at least two of you know because
been kind enough to come to my office repeatedly and let me ques-
tion you and seek your input and knowledge. I'm going to refrain
from doing what I would intellectually enjoy the most, pursuing
some of these broader questions, and try to be a little bit pedantic,
maybe my constituents might say a little more practical for a mo-
ment, and I want to raise with you what the flashpoints of the mo-
ment are, the decisions that the President of the United States has
to make now, the decisions that the Congress has to make now,
and get your input. And in the interest of time I'd like you all to
be neither professorial or senatorial, and that is, try to give me a
yes/no answer or as close as you can get to it. I realize there is no
real clear yes or no, and I would, if we have time, come back and
have you fill in, back-fill, your rationale for why you would reach
the conclusion that you stated.
There are many of us who have been talking about international-
izing this effort. Now, none of that goes to any of the points that
any of you raised here. But right now we have a Secretary of State
at the United Nations trying to get a consensus from the Security
Council that may be totally irrelevant to what the people in Iraq
are concerned about. It may be relevant, it may impact positively,
it may impact negatively, but the point is, at this moment, the first
flashpoint, if you will, is whether or not the schools of thought and
they're divergent but I'm going to just broadly categorize them in
two camps. As Samuel Clemens once said, “all generalizations are
false, including this one.”
There are those who suggest that if the international community
via the United Nations were brought in in a meaningful way, they
would only be an impediment in moving toward self-rule for Iraqis,
getting the lights on, getting the wells dug, getting the canals
cleaned, getting the infrastructure up and running, and they would
be an impediment. There are others who argue that whether or not
they may slow it up is debatable but there's a need to take the U.S.
stamp off of Iraq, and that is that right now there's a need to
change the complexion, if you will, literally and figuratively, of the
occupying force so it's not a U.S. occupying force alone, and further,


50
ing, yeah, and we hate you for it or we don't like you for it or we
think you've got illicit motives for it and it does represent a con-
fusing set of stimuli involved in the process that you're presenting
to us. Nevertheless, as the good Senator from Indiana says, this is
where we are, and he's right.
And I would point out to those of you here and I've had Dr. Marr
testify in front of me on the subcommittee, we had it in the region
before this committee had considered it—for a long period of time-
the issue of Iraq. We had the Iraq Liberation Act before that period
of time. We were stewing and churning, how do we deal with Sad-
dam, we had all these defense forces positioned in Saudi Arabia,
maintaining no-fly zones, we had issues going on in the north.
We've been churning on this for a goodly period of time and if any
of you in going back to the region could communicate to people that
we have nothing but the most altruistic of motives involved here,
I hope you could convey that to people in your own personal experi-
ences and in the places that you speak of.
We don't want Iraq. That is I don't. You could poll a million Kan-
sans if you want to and I don't know if you'll find one that says
that we want that. That is not our desire, but we do desire to move
forward a set of ideals because that's been the nature of us as a
country. And at the root of it is our notion of liberty and that we
stand for liberty and it's a foundational principle for us and it's one
that we stand for for our people and we've stood for around the
world for other people and when we see others that don't have it
we desire it for them. We abhor chains, for us or for anybody else.
And that's really what motivates us more than anything else.
I want to go at a narrow issue and appeal to you. I heard your
testimony, I've read portions of it, I've read some of your writings,
and that's on the issue of religious freedom, religious liberty. I
think this is a central issue in the founding of a constitution in this
country. And I want to back up just a minute on this. I mentioned
this this morning, Senator Lugar mentioned it in is comments as
well, but I think this really deserves us looking at this “y” in the
road and determining which way we as the United States want to
proceed forward in pressing this issue. We go into Iraq on the issue
of terrorism. We pass the Iraq Liberation Act on dealing with Sad-
dam Hussein, we call for regime change in that, 1998, passed by
Congress. This is really an issue started by Congress, signed into
law by President Clinton.
So we're here where we are today. The President engages this
policy, engages it after September 11, it probably didn't have the
legs to move prior to September 11. After September 11, we
changed as a country. We decided we're not going to let the terror-
ists come to us, we're going to go to them, and we're going to deal
with regimes that allow terrorists to operate freely on their soil. So
we're involved and we're here.
We go into Iraq and one of the key issues of why we go into Iraq
is to say we want to spread democracy and open societies in the
region, saying that this region is the one apparently I haven't
quantified this—but one of the most resistant to democratization
and open societies in the world


54
Senator BROWNBACK. I will let you. I just want to get an answer
to this question.
Dr. AL-KHAFAJI [continuing]. To show how and where I totally
agree with you.
Senator BROWNBACK. And if you don't, that's fine. I'll let you
comment but I just want to get an answer to this question. Noah,
do you have a country that's a better model?
Dr. FELDMAN. Indonesia is a far better example than Turkey, as
is Malaysia, and in Malaysia, to take another-
Senator BROWNBACK. Indonesia has a secular constitution?
Dr. FELDMAN. It does, but its democratic process relied very
heavily on the full participation of Islamic parties and the first
democratically c
dent of the country and also the first
President to leave office voluntarily in the country, Abdurrahman
Wahid, was himself a cleric, a Muslim cleric, that's what he did for
a living-
Senator BROWNBACK. I have no problem with that.
Dr. FELDMAN [continuing]. And a member of the Islamic party.
So if I might, Senator-
Senator BROWNBACK. Let me ask you on Malaysia now, and you
assert-
Dr. FELDMAN. An even better example.
Senator BROWNBACK. Malaysia as a better, as a better-
Dr. FELDMAN. It's also a better example, and in Malaysia one
sees examples of the government very creatively drawing on Is-
lamic institutions to create democratic institutions. So for example,
the role of the traditional Islamic marketplace supervisor under Is-
lamic law has been used as a kind of ombudsman for purposes of
ensuring basic rights and economic liberties.
There's creativity in the Malaysian example. It's not that Malay-
sia is a perfect democracy by any stretch of the imagination. But,
of course, none of the governments in the region are perfect exam-
ples. I think the serious concern is that if we share-and I do
share, Senator, very deeply your commitment to creating religious
liberty and spreading it through the region in a region where it's
terribly lacking, the question is, what's the best strategy for pro-
ducing that? And it seems to me the best strategy is convincing
people, the 1.2 billion Muslims in the world, that democracy is not
something that stands in opposition to their values, but that stands
consistently with their values.
And many people in the Muslim world have the misconception
that somehow in the United States we don't take our religion seri-
ously. They think we're a secular society, which I think is inac-
curate. I think we're a society in which people take their religion
and their faith deeply personally and which it matters tremen-
dously to all of their important life decisions, but that our state
doesn't dictate religious outcomes. And in order to convince people
in the Muslim world of that, we need to make sure that symboli-
cally we show them that democracy is consistent with religion and
we need to emphasize religious liberty at all costs-
Senator BROWNBACK. Let's take that point.
Dr. FELDMAN [continuing]. And insist on strong religious liberty
while simultaneously allowing people, if they want some symbolic
recognition of their religion in the constitution-
-