COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
RICHARD G.
CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska
LINCOLN CHAFEE, Rhode Island
GEORGE ALLEN, Virginia
SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas
MICHAEL B. ENZI, Wyoming
GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio
LAMAR ALEXANDER, Tennessee
NORM COLEMAN, Minnesota
JOHN E. SUNUNU, New Hampshire
LUGAR, Indiana, Chairman
JOSEPH R. BIDEN, Jr., Delaware
PAUL S. SARBANES, Maryland
CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut
JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts
RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin
BARBARA BOXER, California
BILL NELSON, Florida
JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER rv, West Virginia
JON S. CORZINE, New Jersey
Kenneth A. Myers, Jr., Staff Director
Antony J. Blinken, Democratic Staff Director
an
i


4
sor at Lehman Brothers. Dr. Schlesinger recently served as co-chair
of a Council on Foreign Relations Task Force that published a com-
prehensive report entitled "Iraq: One Year After." We also welcome
Mr. Sandy Berger, the former National Security Advisory for Presi-
dent Clinton, and currently chairman of Stonebridge International.
On our second panel, we will welcome Dr. Richard Perle, of the
American Enterprise Institute, Dr. Toby Dodge, of the Inter-
national Institute for Strategic Studies, and Dr. Juan Cole, of the
University of Michigan.
We look forward to the assessments and recommendations of our
witnesses. We appreciate their presence this morning.
I turn now to the distinguished ranking member of our com-
mittee, Senator Biden.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR.,
RANKING MEMBER
Senator BlDEN. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. As they say
in this business, I'd like to associate myself with your opening
statement, and I'll try not to repeat some of the specific questions
that you acknowledge at the front end, that we need answered to
determine whether or not there is a policy.
But it's difficult. Over the last 31 years, we've both experienced
being in the majority and the minority. We've experienced being in
the majority when we've had a President of our own party. We've
been in the minority with a President of our own party. And I just
want to compliment you on not just holding these hearings, but the
way in which you have been steadfast and frank and straight-
forward in sharing your considerable—considerable—knowledge
and experience with the Senate and the American people.
And you are, to state the obvious, more diplomatic than I am. I
think it's outrageous the administration has not provided every
witness we've asked for. I do not find it acceptable that there is a
single witness that is unavailable to us that we've asked. Not a sin-
gle one. This administration has taken this committee and this
Congress for granted.
Someone should have them read the Constitution of the United
States of America and understand that, Article II, there is a legis-
lative body. We do not work for the President. I serve with the
President. I served before him, and I'll serve after him. And it is
outrageous that they're making the same arrogant mistake they
made when we held hearings the first time, and that is not pro-
viding every witness we ask for.
You know, there was a famous member of this committee years
ago who said, "If the President wants us in on the landing, he'd
better have us in on the takeoff." Well, this administration, and
every administration, including the previous one, makes mistakes.
It is virtually impossible not to make mistakes, and, in some cases,
make serious mistakes. I've been here for seven Presidents.
The fact of the matter is that if they had had witnesses show up
at our first hearings, they might have actually had to answer ques-
tions that would have caused them to think about the premises
upon which they were responding and which they based their pol-
icy.


5
This committee, when I was Chair, and then, when you took over
as Chair, immediately thereafter, has been consistent. People say
to me, Mr. Chairman, "I wish Washington weren't so partisan."
Take a look at this committee. I don't see any partisanship in this
committee. There hasn't been any partisanship on this committee.
You and I both voted for giving the President the authority to go
to war. We've tried to be constructive. The fact of the matter is,
they're making it very difficult. And here we go again, at this crit-
ical juncture.
And, you know, we've been in this business a long time, and
there's a tendency—and the press probably tunes it out, and I don't
blame them—to say, this is the most important moment. The truth
of the matter is, this may be the last best chance to get this right
for a generation. For a generation.
This June 30 date is going to be one, I say to the witnesses, that
historians are going to look to like they did 9/11, and 3/11 in Ma-
drid. And they're going to look at June 30 to figure out whether we
got it right. And this warrants not a partisan disagreement, but an
honest engagement with the outfits that have to come up with the
money, the outfit that has to sign the American people onto this,
the U.S. Senate and the House of Representative and the adminis-
tration. And the fact that they're not prepared to send a witness
either means they are totally incompetent and they don't have any-
thing to tell us, which would constitute incompetence, or they're re-
fusing to allow us to fulfill our constitutional responsibility. And
there's always a price to pay for that. Not a price to pay that's vin-
dictiveness; a price to pay. When you shut out a bipartisan group
of United States Senators from asking hopefully intelligent ques-
tions and probing a policy, you're doing yourself and the Nation a
significant disservice.
Mr. Chairman, after that statement, you may not like my next
statement. I am proud to serve under you, as chairman of this com-
mittee. I am proud that you are the chairman, and I'm proud to
be a part of it.
Many of the challenges identified in the hearings that you and
I held as the transfer of congressional power took place, many of
those things we identified have turned out to be absolutely accu-
rate, on the button, not because we did it, but because we had wit-
nesses like the men before us, and the women who will come before
us. The best minds in the country sat here, and they said that
every basic premise upon which we were told—and Mr. Perle will
testify next—he's not part of the administration—was going to hap-
pen was not likely to happen. We'd be greeted with open arms,
there would be enough oil revenues to pay for everything, there
would be an Iraqi army to stand up immediately, there would be
an Iraqi police force to be able to maintain peace and security, and
there would be a civil service that would be stood up immediately
to be able to keep every function of government operating very
quickly. The result is that we may soon be confronted with an un-
tenable situation—American forces caught between an increasingly
hostile Iraqi population, notwithstanding the Secretary of Defense's
reference in private and public meetings—with me, anyway—to
quote, "flare-ups"—flare-ups—implying that this is something
that's going to pass very quickly, like a brush fire—that these


6
forces are caught between hostile Iraqi populations that they were
sent to liberate, and an increasingly skeptical American public,
whose support we badly, badly, badly need.
I'll editorialize by saying, I think there's virtually little compari-
son to Vietnam here, in terms of what's at stake. When I ran for
office in 1972, I disagreed with that war, and I said, "Even if I win,
if it turns out the Russian fleets end up in Cam Ranh Bay, I'll re-
sign," because I was so certain that was not what it was about.
But I am certain the President's right about how important it is
to succeed. This is a seminal event in the Middle East. This is a
seminal event. This is of incredible consequence. Walking away
from this is not an option, in terms of our security.
And I'm convinced, though, we can still succeed if we level with
the American people about the costs and the risks. I know this is,
sort of, getting it backward, I say to my colleagues that are about
to testify, but I think we've got to make sure we've got American
support first. First. We've got to go shore it up. No foreign policy
can be sustained in this country without the informed consent of
the American people, and it has not been an informed consent yet,
because we have not leveled with them that it's going to cost sev-
eral hundred-billion more before this is over; it's going to take tens
of thousands, if not a hundred-thousand or more, troops for an ex-
tended period of time, even if we get help from other folks; that
we're going to be there even if things go very well, which they're
not going now, for the next 3 to 5 years, and maybe longer.
And the second thing we have to do is, we have to bring along
the Iraqi people. I know Jim Schlesinger knows better than any-
body—he's been around a long time, and he's a brilliant guy aca-
demically, he was brilliant in terms of his service to the country,
and continues to be—I know he understands the simple propo-
sition—even though sometimes he and I have disagreed in the
past, in the last 15 years, on some specific items relating to our na-
tional security—that if we can't find an Iraqi middle, if we can't
find a bulk of the Iraqi people who are willing to fight and die for
their own democracy, then this doesn't matter. This doesn't matter.
We cannot do it.
So, Mr. Chairman, we need to create an environment where the
American people think this is doable and worthwhile, and the Iraqi
people think—if the polling data is correct, and I believe it is—that
fewer than 15 percent of the Iraqi people want a religious theoc-
racy, like exists in Iran, which means 85 percent of the people
want something else. We've got to convince them that there's a pos-
sibility of that happening, that we've got a plan, that there's a
plan. Because absent that, they're not going to stick their heads up,
and we're going to lose—without them investing in their own fu-
ture.
It's the President's responsibility to do both those things—level
with the American people and provide a plan. He needs to explain
the hard road ahead and the commitment we have to make, in
terms of times, troops, and treasure; and he must convince the
American people, the Iraqi people, and the international commu-
nity that he has a strategy for success.
I've used this joke so long to make a serious point; now I find
other people using it. I had a baseball coach who used to tell that


8
Third, the President should ask the U.N. to bless the agree-
ment—not be in charge, but bless the agreement with a new reso-
lution. None of us has any illusions about the United Nations. But
its central involvement would, to quote George Will, of all people,
"usefully blur the clarity of U.S. primacy."
The President and everybody says we've got to get an American
face off of this. We're not asking, like some of my right-wing friends
in my home state, say, "Well, Biden wants to give power to the
United Nations, one world government." This is about allowing
other nations to do what is difficult to do. They opposed the war.
Ninety percent of their populations don't want any part of pro-
viding for the peace, and they need some excuse to be able to give
them some cover to do what they know they have to do in their
own interest. Foreign leaders need this political cover.
The Iraqis are more likely to listen to a partner who speaks for
the world than to heed an American ambassador hunkered down
in a new super embassy. And I have great respect for Mr.
Negroponte. I really do. But as one of my staff sitting behind me
said, "Going from Paul Bremer, with a CPA, that at least has inter-
national involvement in it, to a super Ambassador, is like going
from Clark Kent to being Superman." Talk about taking an Amer-
ican face off it, we're saying, here we are. All us, all alone.
If the President does these three things, I believe several major
benefits will follow. First, other countries will be much more likely
to contribute resources to reconstruction. Second, NATO is more
likely to get engaged, spreading the security risk and freeing up as
many as 20,000 American troops to focus on the hot spots. We're
not going to get 20,000 NATO forces immediately. But in my trav-
els, which are now 3 months old, throughout the capitals of Europe,
every major power said they would vote to allow this to be a NATO
operation. Probably wouldn't get more than 5,000 to 7,000 thou-
sand troops to begin with, but speaking with General Jones, the
Supreme Allied Commander, that would free up the ability of the
Americans to not do border patrol, and allow NATO troops to sup-
port the Poles in the south and/or the Kurds in the north, thereby
freeing up significant American forces and building on this NATO
operation, and, by the way, convincing the American people we're
not in this alone. If NATO's in the deal, they know everybody else
has a stake in it, as well.
The President should immediately convene, in my view, a sum-
mit of our traditional allies in Europe, and our friends in the Arab
world and Asia, to talk about what they think is needed.
You know, I've found it fascinating, Mr. Secretary and National
Security Advisory Berger—I've found it fascinating—I was making
the case several months ago to President Chirac that, look, the
President of the United States has made serious concessions here.
He's moved up the date to June 30, he says we'll transfer power
then, and he's backed off the insistence—that I initially agreed
with, by the way; I think I was wrong—of saying that there had
to be a constitution before there were elections, and there had to
be—and so on and so forth. And he sat there politely and lis-
tened—and he is no box of chocolates, in terms of the problems he's
caused us and how he's taken advantage of us—but he looked, and
he said, "Senator, it would have been nice had the administration


9
told us they were going to do this. We read it in the paper." That's
a good way to win friends and influence people.
And throughout Europe, to the best of my knowledge, from
Javier Solano on, no one, based on what I was told, was told, before
they read it, that we had made this change in policy.
It's time we start talking to people. We should tell them that we
need their help. We should acknowledge that success in Iraq re-
quires centrist Iraqis to step up, the world to step in, and the Mid-
dle East countries to take a chance on a representative government
in Iraq, or they're likely to be gone. Then the President should ask
each of them what they need in order to participate. He should
work with them to forge a common plan in Iraq that they can sup-
port.
And, Mr. Chairman, let me conclude with something I talked
about in a speech I made last week on this subject, which is the
most critical speech I've openly made of this administration thus
far. I come from Delaware. I have been to Dover Air Force Base
many times. The men and women there, who receive our soldiers
and their families in that last long flight home from the battlefield
know what this is all about.
When those planes fly over Dover in the middle of the night,
press not allowed to be there when they land, they remind us that
this is not about politics. This is not about whether with every fiber
in our being, we think we're right, or that someone else is dan-
gerously wrong. It's not about that. This is about something bigger.
It's not about assigning blame, it's not about partisanship. It's
about that last long journey to the Dover Air Force Base. It's about
those brave Americans who are doing everything in their power to
get it right. They're doing everything in their power to get it right
over there. And we owe them no less than to do everything in our
power to get it right here, to acknowledge—not publicly, just pri-
vately, by policy—what's not working, acknowledge that we went
with too little power and too little legitimacy. And the only way to
get this right, for their sake, is to give them enough power and
enough legitimacy. Because if we don't do that, those flights home
to the only mortuary on the East Coast are going to be places
where there are going to be a lot of not just sullen people, but sul-
len, angry people, that we were unwilling to try to get it right,
knowing what's not working.
I apologize for the length of the statement, Mr. Chairman, but
I have not attended a hearing in my 31 years that I think is more
consequential than what we're attempting to get right here.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Senator Biden follows:]
Prepared Statement of Senator Joseph R. Biden, Jr.
Mr. Chairman, I commend your leadership in calling these hearings. They come
at a critical time in Iraq and for our interests in the region.
I am proud of the partnership we've forged on Iraq, starting with the hearings
we held in the summer of 2002.
Many of the challenges identified in those hearings have been borne out. Now, I
am deeply concerned that time is rapidly running out on our ability to get it right
in Iraq.
The result is that we may soon confront an untenable situation: American forces
caught between an increasingly hostile Iraqi population that they were sent to lib-


12
In June 2002, bin Laden's spokesman, Suleiman Abu Gheith,
placed this statement on the al-Qaeda Web site, "We have the right
to kill four million Americans—two million of them children—and
to exile twice as many, and wound and cripple hundreds of thou-
sands."
They may be fanatics, but they are deadly serious and thor-
oughly persistent. We must anticipate, therefore, a conflict that
will continue for many years. Osama himself has opined that,
"When the people see a strong horse and a weak horse, they natu-
rally gravitate toward the strong horse." Consequently, this nation
must conclusively demonstrate that we are not the weak horse.
Withdrawal from—before we have successfully stabilized Iraq is,
therefore, not an option. It would be dramatically more visible
throughout the Middle East and elsewhere than were those earlier
retreats cited by Osama.
I recognize that inevitably debate will continue regarding at least
the timing of our move into Iraq. Nonetheless, we must not allow
the political contentions of an election year to create any impres-
sion that we are anything but united in our determination to per-
severe and to prevail in Iraq. Success is the only acceptable course
of action.
How, then, are we to be successful in sustaining order and sta-
bility in Iraq? Only by embracing certain fundamental realities.
First and foremost, establishing reasonable security is the pre-
requisite for achieving the goals of political stability. In principle,
we have come to accept that reality; but, in practice, we have been
too slow, effectively, to act upon it. Second, neither the American
nor the Coalition forces can, by themselves, impose security on
Iraq. Iraqis themselves must provide indispensable support. Only
Iraqis can gather the intelligence to identify the regime remnants
and the foreign terrorists who must be largely neutralized before
adequate security can be ensured. Moreover, it will be essential for
Iraq's security forces to be the principal element in rooting out ter-
rorists and destroying their cells, with the Coalition military in-
creasingly in a supporting role. "We will stay the course" may be
a necessary guideline or an exhortation, but it is not a strategy. We
will stay the course until we have an Iraqi force capable of pro-
viding reasonable security for the people of Iraq is a strategy. But
that implies a viable plan to create such a force. It also implies
that we should not expect the level of security in, say, Denmark or
Japan.
Regrettably, we have allowed almost a year to pass without cre-
ating an effective Iraqi security force. While we have recruited sev-
eral hundred-thousand Iraqis into the security force, those forces
have tended to melt away in times of difficulty. It may be that this
behavior reflects a problem of morale, though that was not the
judgment of those who had observed at least the CDC as it was
being organized. Possibly, it reflects a deep unwillingness to use
force on recalcitrant fellow Iraqis. But the most obvious answer is
our own failure properly to train and properly to equip these secu-
rity forces.
On the equipping issue, all too many months have gone by with-
out appropriately vetted forces being appropriately equipped with
weapons, protective gear, and communications. That is a reflection,


13
in part, of our own cumbersome budgetary and procurement proce-
dures, which have imposed a high long-run cost on our operations.
On the question of training, we have not allowed sufficient time
for the training of individuals and the organizing of units with a
high degree of cohesion; nor, by the way, have we had, to this
point, an Iraqi chain of command, because Iraqis like to be ordered
into battle by Iraqis rather than Americans. The task of training
Iraqi security forces should be a principal obligation of American
and Coalition forces in country. Other nations, such as India, even
if they have not contributed military forces, may be prepared to
participate in training these security forces.
Second, we must focus more effectively on economic problems.
There is a correlation between the high prevailing unemployment
in Iraq and the restlessness and low morale spreading among the
populace. Admittedly, initial expectations regarding an immediate
magical boost in living conditions were unrealistic. Yet months
have gone by without the improvement in living conditions that
might realistically have been expected. The $18.4 billion that the
Congress appropriated for reconstruction should have already
begun to alleviate the problem—improving living conditions and ex-
panding employment. It is a shame that so little of that $18.4 bil-
lion has been obligated to this point, and even significantly less has
been spent. We must get that money flowing. Delay makes the
problem worse.
Yet, once again, it is our procurement procedures that have im-
posed these costs upon us. We cannot afford normal peacetime pro-
curement procedures, with 60 days to submit responses to requests
for proposals, and another 60 days to assess them, et cetera. Con-
gress can act quickly. It should assess whether existing require-
ments result in a penny-wise/pound-foolish outcome, and help ease
self-defeating restraints.
Now let me turn to the political transition, while bearing in mind
that effectively dealing with the security and economic conditions
will necessarily remain the foundation for a successful political
transition.
As this committee well knows, since November of last year we
have committed to transferring of sovereignty to the Iraqis after 30
June. The President has firmly reiterated that he intends to stick
to that date. The administration has indicated that it is inclined to
accept Ambassador Brahimi's proposals for the new Iraqi regime.
Both Chairman Lugar and Senator Biden have noted that we
would pay a high cost if we fail to abide by that date. That does
not mean, by the way, that we cannot wait an extra 10 days or 2
weeks, but we cannot wait an extra 10 weeks or 2 months.
While nothing is ever set in concrete, especially if the conditions
within the country were to deteriorate substantially, I would expect
that the date for transferring sovereignty to the Iraqis will be met.
At that point, the Iraqis themselves will be making decisions re-
garding the civil order.
Yet, once again, time's a-wastin'. There are only some 10 weeks
left before the transfer is to be made. The new American ambas-
sador was announced just yesterday, John Negroponte. I think
John Negroponte is a superb choice. I have known him for the last
30 years. But, still, the embassy team reportedly amounting to


16
matically more visible throughout the Middle East and elsewhere than were those
earlier retreats cited by Usama. I recognize that inevitably debate will continue re-
garding at least the timing of our move into Iraq. Nonetheless, we must not allow
the political contentions of an election year to create any impression that we are
anything but united in our determination to persevere and to prevail in Iraq. Suc-
cess is the only acceptable course of action.
How then are we to be successful in sustaining order and stability in Iraq?—only
by embracing certain fundamental realities. First and foremost, establishing reason-
able security is the prerequisite for achieving the goals of political stability. In prin-
ciple, we have come to accept this reality, but in practice we have been too slow
effectively to act upon it. Second, neither the American nor the coalition forces can,
by themselves, impose security on Iraq. Iraqis themselves must provide indispen-
sable support. Only Iraqis can gather the intelligence to identify the regime rem-
nants and foreign terrorists who must be largely neutralized before adequate secu-
rity can be insured. Moreover, it will be essential for Iraqi security forces to be the
principal element in rooting out terrorists and destroying their cells—with the coali-
tion military increasingly in a supporting role.
"We will stay the course" may be a necessary guideline or exhortation, but it is
not a strategy.
"We will stay the course until we have an Iraqi force capable of providing reason-
able security for the people of Iraq"—is a strategy. But that implies a viable plan
to create such a force. It also implies that we should not expect the level of security
in, say, Denmark or Japan.
Regrettably, we have allowed almost a year to pass without creating an effective
Iraqi security force. While we have recruited several hundred thousand Iraqis into
the security force, those forces have tended to melt away in times of difficulty. It
may be that this behavior reflects a problem of morale—thought that was not the
judgment of those who observed at least the CDC, as it was organized. Possibly it
reflects a deeper unwillingness to use force on the recalcitrant fellow Iraqis. But the
most obvious answer is our own failure properly to train and properly to equip these
security forces.
On the equipping issue, all too many months have gone by without appropriately
vetted forces being appropriately equipped with weapons, protective gear, and com-
munications. That is a reflection of our own cumbersome budgetary and procure-
ment procedures, which have imposed a high, long run cost on our operations. On
the question of training, we have not allowed sufficient time for the training of indi-
viduals and the organizing of units with a high degree of cohesion. The task of
training Iraqi security forces should be a principal obligation of American and coali-
tion forces in country. Other nations, such as India, even if they have not contrib-
uted military forces, may be prepared to participate in training these security forces.
Second, we must focus more effectively on economic problems. There is a correla-
tion between the high prevailing unemployment in Iraq and the restlessness and
low morale spreading among the populace. Admittedly, initial expectations regard-
ing an immediate and magical boost in living conditions were unrealistic. Yet,
months have gone by without the improvement in living conditions that might real-
istically have been expected. The $18.4 billion that the Congress appropriated for
reconstruction should have already begun to alleviate the problem—improving living
conditions and expanding employment. It is a shame that so little of that $18.4 bil-
lion has been obligated to this point—and even significantly less has been spent. We
must get that money flowing. Delay makes the problem worst. Yet, once again, it
is our procurement procedures that have imposed these costs upon us. We cannot
afford normal peace time procurement procedures—with 60 days to submit re-
sponses to Requests For Proposals and another 60 days to assess them, etc. Con-
gress can act—quickly. It should assess whether existing requirements result in a
penny-wise, pound-foolish outcome—and help ease self-defeating restraints.
Now let me turn to the political transition, while bearing in mind that effectively
dealing with the security and economic conditions will necessarily remain the foun-
dation for a successful transition.
As this Committee well knows, since November of last year we have been com-
mitted to transferring sovereignty to the Iraqis after 30 June. The President has
firmly reiterated that he intends to stick to that date. The Administration has indi-
cated that it is inclined to accept Ambassador Brahimi's proposals for the new Iraqi
regime. Both Chairman Lugar and Senator Biden have noted that we would pay a
high cost, if we fail to abide by that date. While nothing is ever set in concrete, espe-
cially if the conditions within the country were to deteriorate substantially, I would
expect that the date for transferring sovereignty to the Iraqis will be met. At that
point, the Iraqis themselves will be making decisions regarding the civil order.


19
in the world could defeat their armed forces in 3 weeks and still
have trouble getting the lights on.
And despite the uncertain situation on the ground, we set an ar-
bitrary date for transferring sovereignty before we knew to whom,
and before we had broad agreement on a formula for multi-ethnic
rule.
Mr. Chairman, what I find most disconcerting is the administra-
tion's jarring certainty about June 30, and this jarring uncertainty
about July 1. We have been told where we want to go—Iraqi sov-
ereignty, American-led security, and, eventually, Iraqi elections.
We haven't been told how we plan to get there. The American peo-
ple need to know we have a confident and workable plan. There is
too much at stake in Iraq to lose the American people.
As I see it, we have three basic options: apply more force, hunker
down, or make a serious effort to internationalize this enterprise.
First, applying more force. This may be necessary in some cases.
If our military commanders say they need more troops, they will
have them, they should have them. But we also must recognize the
risks of military solutions in the absence of a clear political strat-
egy. Attempting to crush the opposition can create its own dan-
gerous backlash. Our military strategy will be no better than our
political strategy; and our political strategy, while allaying the con-
cerns of the Sunnis and the Kurds, must empower legitimate and
respected Shia moderates. If we lose the Shia population's support,
then we will lose Iraq.
Our second option is to hunker down—to replace the CPA sign
with one that says "U.S. Embassy," turn sovereignty over to as-yet
undetermined group of Iraqis, and try to stay out of harm's way.
I continue to fear the temptation of this option, Mr. Chairman,
it is a prescription for chaos. It is unrealistic to think a new Iraqi
leadership will be equipped to govern on July 1, much less pre-
pared to send troops to this or the next Fallujah. As Lieutenant
General Sanchez has said, "We know that it's going to take us a
while to stand up reliable forces that can accept responsibility."
A third option is one that many of us have been advocating all
along. It would have been easier to implement a year ago, 6
months ago, last month. That is a genuine, non-grudging effort to
internationalize the enterprise in Iraq, both military and civilian.
I welcome the fact the administration is finally coming to that
view, inch by inch—painful inch by inch. By last week's press con-
ference, the President was deferring critical decisions on Iraqi's fu-
ture government to U.N. representative Lakhdar Brahimi.
Mr. Brahimi has proposed a caretaker government and a consult-
ative assembly. These make sense to me. But, as Senator Biden
has noted, there's a gap in what Mr. Brahimi is suggesting. On the
civilian side, there will be some new Iraqi authority, hopefully
broad-based and more widely supported than the current one we
selected. There will be a large U.S. Embassy presence. But in the
absence of some sort of an international high commissioner sup-
ported by a consortium of key countries—not only the United
States, but also European and Arab and Asian—this newly formed
Iraqi government will not have the capacity to act strongly, and
they will be reluctant to cooperate too openly with our behemoth
American Embassy, even in the hands of someone as capable as


20
Ambassador Negroponte. There needs to be an international mech-
anism that reinforces the exercise of Iraqi executive authority and,
quite honestly, facilitates the ability of the United States to func-
tion more effectively with the new Iraqi leadership.
We also need a troop presence in Iraq that is genuinely inter-
national. Some have concluded that it's too late to obtain help from
the allies. I disagree. Like us, our partners in Europe and the Arab
world will bear the full brunt of an Iraq in turmoil. The fact that
they did not participate in the invasion will provide them, in the
end, no comfort.
Senator Biden, I support your proposal that President Bush call
for an immediate summit with our European and Arab and Asian
friends, representatives of the U.N. and NATO. Say, we need your
help, and ask what their meaningful engagement would take. So
far, we've said, in effect, we welcome your troops and your money,
but largely on our terms. We've got to be prepared to give up our
hammerlock on decisionmaking in exchange for genuine burden-
sharing.
To conclude, Mr. Chairman, let me say that we will not meet any
of our goals in Iraq if we lose the public at home. Today, the ques-
tion on the public mind is, what is our strategy for success in Iraq,
and is it achievable? Too often today, it seems to be improvised.
And while, yes, we are willing to stay the course if we know what
that course is. My fear, to borrow Yogi Berra's famous words, is,
"If we don't know where we're going, we will wind up somewhere
else."
More troops and more money is not a strategy. Steadfastness is
an imperative, but it is not a strategy. Americans need to hear a
plan to stem the insurgency, disarm the militia, hasten reconstruc-
tion, and, most important, enable Iraqis themselves to forge con-
sensus on the future of their country.
Sitting here today, Mr. Chairman, I still believe we can do this.
I still believe the Iraqi people can do it. But success requires inter-
national support, and we don't have a moment to waste.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Berger follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Samuel R. Berger
Chairman Lugar, Senator Biden, Members of the Committee:
Thank you for inviting me to be a part of these important hearings, at this very
important time. Much is riding on the next few months—for Iraq, for America and
for the world.
It was one year ago that Saddam Hussein's statue crashed to the ground in Bagh-
dad; four months ago that he was captured hiding in a hole. Yet, since the start
of this month, 105 U.S. troops and over 1,000 Iraqis have been killed. Civilians from
the United States, Japan, China, the Czech Republic, Russia, Ukraine and more
have been taken hostage. Suicide attacks, roadside ambushes and heavy fighting
have dominated the news. Even before what President Bush called these "tough
weeks," coalition troops were facing down dozens of attacks each day.
That is not to say that many good people in Iraq—American and Iraqi—are not
accomplishing good things in many parts of the country. Under the most trying cir-
cumstances, our troops have shown truly inspiring skill and courage. The Coalition
Provisional Authority has worked tirelessly to move reconstruction forward. The
Iraqi people have shown impressive resilience. They have high hopes and expecta-
tions for their future. We should have nothing less.
But we'll never be able to meet those high hopes if we don't get security and gov-
ernance right. And I think it's clear that pressures in Iraq have reached the boiling
point.


24
the country. He's had to deal in Baghdad. He is going to other
countries. Now he'll come back to the United Nations. But time is
passing, and, ultimately, as you pointed out, this is going to be a
pretty fledgling group of folks.
Just to play the devil's advocate, what if Iraqis decide they don't
like these people? What if the basic parties—the Shi'ites, the
Kurds, and the Sunnis—decide that they are not adequately rep-
resented? For example, the Ayatollah al-Sistani had reservations
with regard to the Transitional Administrative Law that the Gov-
erning Council passed. They may or may not have all been fulfilled
at this point. As I understand it, Brahimi has talked to al-Sistani's
son—not al-Sistani, at this point. But a Sunni of comparable stat-
ure to al-Sistani has yet to be found, as I understand it, to give
some blessing to this proposal.
What would you suggest as a fallback position in the event that
we get close to the 30th and, as a matter of fact, these people ap-
pear to be unacceptable to each other or to the parties? What
should the United States do at such a hypothetical juncture in his-
tory? Does anyone have a thought about that?
Mr. Berger. One of the reasons why I think it's so important for
us to stand up what we called the PIC in Bosnia, the international
friends of Bosnia, so to speak—same thing in Kosovo—is that it
may be—even if they are able to agree, Ayatollah al-Sistani has
made it very clear that he expects the powers of this caretaker gov-
ernment to be rather limited until there's an election. He's read
about majority rule, believes actually that the Shias should domi-
nate the new government, wants to make sure that happens.
So I think we're either going to have your situation, which is no
consensus, or one step beyond that, which is a very weak govern-
ment. And I think standing up a international enterprise, an inter-
national board of directors that—to use Senator Biden's word, an
international group—could take the edge off the June 30 deadline,
to some degree, because we would be relinquishing sovereignty. It
would reside with some incipient Iraqi authority, but bolstered, re-
inforced, and strengthened by an international body that was
present, that was not dominated by the United States and did not
have an American high commissioner.
The Chairman. Dr. Schlesinger, do you have a comment?
Dr. Schlesinger. Well, my comment goes to the question of the
various groups within Iraq. Happily to this point, Ayatollah al-
Sistani has demonstrated a high degree of responsibility. He has
not necessarily agreed with everything that the Americans pro-
posed. But he has been responsible. And that is true for a bulk of
the Shi'ites. Sandy mentioned earlier the need to make sure that
the moderate Shia continue with the hopes for a future Iraq. I
think they are there. Al-Sadr and his units have not been success-
ful. He continues to be a marginal element. And his units, which
are made up of the dispossessed from Baghdad, have looted in al
Kut, in Kufa, and in Najaf, and that has not increased their popu-
larity. So I think that the Shia will continue to see their stake in
seeing a successful transition.
The Kurds are reasonably protected, Mr. Chairman—or feel
themselves to be reasonably protected. The long-run problem, of
course, is the Sunni, who now feel politically dispossessed with the


25
departure of Saddam. That is part of the reason that we have not
been able to discover a senior Sunni. Many of the senior Sunnis
were part of the Ba'athist regime, and there were few that were
outside of it. We hope that sooner or later, we will find an Ade-
nauer in the Sunni community, but, as yet, he has not appeared.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Senator Biden.
Senator Biden. Thank you both very much.
Let me say, Secretary Schlesinger, you coauthored two very im-
portant reports—one, "Iraq: The Day After," March 2003, and then
one entitled, "Iraq: One Year After," March 2004—along with Am-
bassador Thomas Pickering. And the project consultant was Eric P.
Schwartz. I'd like to read a portion of the last page of the 2004 re-
port.
It says, "The task force believes that sustaining this public con-
sensus is essential, especially as the political will of the United
States will continue to be tested in months and years to come in
Iraq. These tests, which would include more high-profile attacks on
U.S. troops, could come at a time of heightened political debate in
the United States as we enter the final phase of the 2004 cam-
paign. Iraq will unavoidably be the subject of debate during the
U.S. Presidential campaign. This debate will almost certainly en-
compass the original decision to go to war, as well as the postwar
political transition and reconstruction efforts. Nonetheless, the
task-force members, who represent broadly diverse political per-
spectives, are united in their position the United States has a crit-
ical interest in a stable Iraq, whose leadership represents the will
of its people. Civil conflict in Iraq, the alternative to peaceful polit-
ical competition, would risk intervention by, and competing for, in-
fluence among Iraqis' neighbors," et cetera.
Last paragraph, "Although U.S. engagement cannot guarantee
success, a diminished U.S. commitment to Iraq during the transfer
of sovereignty would increase the likelihood of political failure. In
fact, in the months ahead U.S. Government will have to sharpen
its approach and increase its commitment of resources in several
critical areas. As one analyst has written, the U.S. Government
must recognize that the future of Iraq and, through it, the future
of the entire Middle East is very much in our hands. If the United
States is unwilling to shoulder the burden of leading the recon-
struction economically, politically, and militarily for years to come,
it will fail."
Preceding that conclusion, you call for, as you did in your first
report in March 2003, the need for international involvement, the
need for training of Iraqi forces that will take a lot longer, and you
point out that the failure to provide funding in the 2005 budget—
that is the budget we're voting on this year—and the administra-
tion's assertion that we don't know what we'll need, but we'll know
it when we see it—we'll provide a supplemental—you point out on
page 12 of the report that this has a very negative consequence.
You said, "At the same time, the absence of any clear projection of
anticipated medium-term military or economic commitments cre-
ates uncertainty and enables officials to defer the process of build-
ing public consensus in support of continue U.S. engagement."


26
Could you elaborate very briefly on what you mean by that? It's
not just that—the money. But you're arguing that the failure to say
what we'll need for fiscal year 2005 creates a sense of uncertainty.
What's the consequence of that uncertainty?
Dr. Schlesinger. The report, which was a year ago, points, I
think, primarily to the issue that unless we clearly indicate to the
American people how substantial a commitment this is and how
large the financial costs are likely to be, and, although we have un-
certainties about the troop levels, that those will continue to be
very large, that unless we convey this to the American people, we
could lose the American public, as we have previously; and, there-
fore, clarity with regard to the degree of commitment, the costs,
and so forth, would be helpful, and we urge the President to make
that clear.
Senator BlDEN. You also make that point in this year's report,
which was published March 4, just this last month, 2004. I wanted
you to reiterate that point because I think, again, we take for
granted that the American people are automatically, by the exhor-
tation of the President, going to be there, without either an expla-
nation of what the cost will be to stay or what the price of leaving
would be. The President's finally laid out the price of leaving. I no-
ticed, in his press conference, he did not use that same trite expres-
sion, if we don't—I'm paraphrasing—if we don't fight 'em in Bagh-
dad, we'll have to fight 'em in Boston, as the rationale for being
there. He laid out a much more coherent and straightforward rea-
son why we had to succeed.
Both of you have referenced the fact that it is possible that we
would be able to get assistance from other countries in training
Iraqis. My recollection—and it was pointed out to me in my meet-
ing with European leaders several months ago—immediately after
Saddam's statue came down in that square, that rotary that we all
saw and cheered—immediately after that occurred, the French and
the Germans stepped forward and said, "We are ready to partici-
pate, in a major way, and we are prepared to train Iraqi forces, but
we need a U.N. resolution. Sanction this."
And, as usual, Mr. Berger, you succinctly say things that I mean
to say and can't say as well. You said we need "an American-led,
NATO-backed, and U.N.-blessed"—not U.N.-run; U.N.-blessed.
Is there any reasons why the administration, in either of your
views, would not be able to get a U.N.-blessed—a U.N.-blessed—
resolution that would allow—whether it's France and Germany,
still, or India and others, who are capable of the training—to get
them in and do the training?
Mr. Berger. I think if we demonstrated clearly the political will
to make this an international enterprise, which I don't really think
we've done to this—notwithstanding saying, well, we'll do what
Brahimi says—I've not seen this administration say to our allies,
what will it take to get you guys here? How can I help your poli-
tics? Because I understand your politics makes this very, very dif-
ficult. That's why your idea of going to Europe as a gesture, I
think, makes a great deal of sense.
I talk to Europeans all the time, European officials, and if we put
this question right—we've made it very easy for them to say no—
but if we basically say, listen, we need your help, we cannot fail,


27
you're not going to be immune from the consequences of failure,
what do you need to—in the way of U.N. support or otherwise, to
make this possible, I believe, to this day, that our European allies
and the Arab neighbors would participate in some fashion.
Senator BlDEN. Jim, what do you think would happen if we made
a genuine effort?
Dr. SCHLESINGER. Well, I think that pursuit of international sup-
port is desirable, particularly on the training side. I believe that,
at one point, the Indians, India, suggested that they would be pre-
pared to train Iraqi forces. Now, India is, of course, the largest
Muslim country in the world, 100-million-plus Muslims, and they
have had great experience in the training of Muslims. And, there-
fore, that is something that, at least at this point, should be reex-
amined.
Senator BlDEN. Let me close, Mr. Chairman, by saying that
many of you saw Monday's New York Times. On the front page, it
says, "Security Companies Shadow Soldiers in Iraq." I imagine it
came as a shock to a number of Americans to realize that we have
a private army in Iraq. Larger than any other force beyond ours—
larger than the Brits, larger than any other country; a 20,000
strong private army. And this private army is providing security.
These are armies hired by contractors, funded by the $18 billion
we're talking about, of which 15 percent was going to go to the
Iraqi police; now it's estimated as much as 25 percent of the $18
billion will go to pay companies—I'm not criticizing, I'm just ob-
serving it—to pay companies to hire essentially the equivalent of
the French Foreign Legion. We're paying, for example, former Navy
SEALs somewhere between $500 and $1,500 a day, out of that
money that we have appropriated, for a private army, which is
needed for security, when we have young Navy SEALs who are ac-
tually employed by the Federal Government making that much a
month, and National Guard kids over there, and people who are
trained and competent and capable, who are making 30 to 50 per-
cent less than they'd be making at home, and still have the same
mortgage payment, still have the same tuition payment, still have
the same car payment. And this is a prescription for disaster here
if we don't get some additional help.
I would offer this as evidence that even the administration ac-
knowledges we need more force. This is the force they're prepared
to pay for, though—private security forces. And it's guarding, by
the way, Bremer, guarding the consulate—I mean, this is amazing.
We'd better get to the business of figuring out how we get more
forces in there.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Biden.
Senator Hagel.
Senator Hagel. Mr. Chairman, thank you.
Gentlemen, thank you for your testimony. It has been noted this
morning that you each have contributed so many years to this
country, its security interests as well as other interests, and we are
grateful for your continuation of wise counsel, thank you.
I actually would like to pick up on where Senator Biden left off,
on the troop issue. We have before us, as has been noted, a former
National Security Advisor, a former Secretary of Defense, CIA Di-


28
rector. And here is my question, because I think you two are emi-
nently qualified to answer this question. To continue with what
Senator Biden has noted that was included in the New York Times
article, and what I have heard this morning from each of you—and
I think this is a fair assessment of where you believe our future
force-structure needs are going to be—we're going to be in Afghani-
stan, we're going to be in Iraq, we are still in the Balkans, we're
going to be in Korea. We're all over the globe with new commit-
ments that we are taking on constantly. Now over 40 percent of our
force structure in Iraq is represented by National Guard and Re-
serve units. We are going to face, as we already are, a retention/
recruitment issue with the National Guard, Reserves, active Army
and—at least it's this Senator's assessment that our continued
commitments over the next few years are probably not going to be
any less, if we all believe what you've stated and I certainly know
that you do believe it; I think everyone on this panel—that the
threat of terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction,
and all that goes with that are going to require a tremendous
amount of resources and intense leadership and focus. Now if that
is the premise, and I assume you agree with, generally, what I
have said, my question to you both is, where, then, do we continue
to get those forces? How are we going to meet the obligations and
commitments that we are making not only to American citizens, to
the future of this country, but to our allies?
Now, certainly one option, which, a year ago, a year and a half
ago, I didn't think was much of an option, for a couple of reasons,
was a draft. And I think you all understand why that probably isn't
an option, but I'm not so sure. Now, here's why. I'm not so sure
that isn't a bad idea—societal, sociologically, defense-wise—that we
shouldn't be requiring our citizens to understand the intensity and
depth of the challenges that this country faces. The President calls
himself a "war president." We're having hearings in the Armed
Services Committee in the Senate, and the Foreign Relations Com-
mittee today, on Iraq. There's not an American, unless he or she
has been asleep for the last few years, that doesn't understand
what we are engaged in today, and what the prospects are for the
future. So if that's the case, why shouldn't we ask all of our citizens
to bear some responsibility and pay some price?
Now, the other sociological issue is—and it was noted in a Atlan-
tic Constitution editorial this weekend—not unlike Vietnam, that
those who are serving today and dying today in Iraq are the middle
class, lower-middle class. I think the only Member of the U.S. Sen-
ate who has a child in the Armed Forces who was in Iraq—Afghan-
istan—was Senator Johnson, from South Dakota. So why shouldn't
we, then, have some responsibility, as our children should have
some responsibility?
So I've given you a broad canvas here to paint on, but it's, I
think, a legitimate question that we haven't even come close to an-
swering. Arid the real focus is—and Senator Biden brought it up—
are we going to continue to pay mercenaries, essentially? And what
we're doing—and this is the point—is that these kids aren't stupid,
so if they can make this kind of money as private-protection people,
versus having a hard time making the car payments and the house


30
No. 2, I think we have to reassess—and the Congress can play
an important role here—the Reserve/Guard role and its—I worry
very much about retention rates. People are getting something very
different than they signed up for.
With respect to the draft, I think that the extraordinary profes-
sionalism of our military today is inextricably bound up in the fact
that we have a volunteer force. Now, you're saying it may be that
we can't afford that anymore. I guess my pragmatic answer to that,
Senator Hagel, is, it's not an issue I'd like to raise right now, in
the middle of Iraq, because it seems to me if you entangle the issue
of draft to the issue of Iraq, you have a good chance the American
people will say no to both. But I think you raise a very, very—a
question that's not going to go away simply by virtue of my prag-
matic judgment that this is not the right time to debate it.
Dr. SCHLESINGER. Experience has shown, by the way, that re-
cruitment into the active-duty forces has held up very well. There
is the question mark that you discerned with regard to the Reserve
and the Guard.
Senator Hagel. Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Hagel.
Senator Feingold.
Senator Feingold. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Senator
Biden, for calling this set of important hearings this week. Many
Members of Congress and many of my constituents continue to be
dismayed that the administration went to war in Iraq with what
is obviously only a half-baked plan for the post-conflict phase of the
operations. Today, over a year after the war began, our headlines
speak of the deadliest month for U.S. troops in Iraq yet. Today, we
are trying to comfort the families of troops whose service has been
extended in Iraq beyond the anticipated 1 year.
Today, this country continues to spend about $3.7 billion a
month on military operations in Iraq, and we find the billions ap-
propriated for reconstruction activities are not likely to be as effec-
tive as we had hoped because of the high cost of security are actu-
ally siphoning off the resources. Today, we know that the Coalition
Provisional Authority will cease to exist on June 30, but it will give
way to a massive embassy operation, and Iraq will still be depend-
ing on U.S. troops for security.
Mr. Chairman, it's high time to put this half-baked plan back in
the oven and come up with something viable and clear, a plan to
stabilize Iraq that also prioritizes easing the burden borne by
American service members and taxpayers. A date for the nominal
transfer of sovereignty is not a plan. Wishful thinking about how
the U.S. presence in Iraq is perceived is not a plan. Acknowledging
that the current situation is difficult, and resolving to simply
"tough it out" is not a plan. We owe it to this country, and espe-
cially to the U.S. military, to insist on something more.
So I have appreciated hearing the perspectives so far, Mr. Chair-
man, and looking forward to the further testimony. Let me use my
time to ask a couple of questions.
Without saying that we should simply "cut and run," I do believe
that we need to be frank about the hard truths before the United
States. And given the course we're on to date, I'd ask each of you,
what should the American people anticipate, in terms of how many


31
years U.S. troops will be responsible for the security of Iraq? And
how many years can we anticipate spending multiple billions of
dollars on reconstruction projects in Iraq?
Mr. Berger.
Mr. Berger. Senator, I would say quite a number. Obviously, the
ultimate exit strategy is training an Iraqi police, an Iraqi security
capability that is able—has both the will and the ability to take
over this responsibility, under a government that has the will and
the ability to exercise that authority.
My own experience, from Bosnia, from Kosovo, from Haiti, is that
it takes a great deal of time to build an army or to build a police
force—3 to 4 to 5 years—and I think that we need to be thinking
of that time horizon, at least, in which we will have a heavy share
of responsibility, No. 1.
Now, in terms of money, I suspect the administration will come
back to the Congress for a supplemental, perhaps at the end of the
year, which I would believe would be in the neighborhood of $50
to $70 billion. I don't see why the delta for next year should be
much less. So I think we're talking about, you know, another $200
billion, at least, in the next 3 years. Again, there's not going to
be—hopefully, over time we can ramp this down, we can bring in
others, there'll be a greater degree of political stability.
But I do believe—to answer your question, and Senator Biden's—
why not level with the American people? I think, you know, the
American people are a bit like an elastic band, and at some point
they're going to snap. And I remember the "sticker-shock" when the
President said $87 billion. You remember that speech? And he said
$87 billion, and it took people's breath away because he'd never
used a number before.
Well, you know, we just can't wait until the very last moment,
when we're running out of ammunition, and, say, $70 billion more,
without running a real risk that we're going to have "sticker-shock"
in the American people, and a tremendous pressure to move out of
there prematurely.
Senator Feingold. Let me follow with a question relating to, sort
of, the emerging Iraqi leadership. What should be the standard of
legitimacy for emerging Iraqi leadership? From the beginning, I
and others have been concerned about the likelihood that our de-
mocratization efforts will succeed in Iraq, not because I don't be-
lieve that Iraqis desire and deserve the same basic civil and polit-
ical rights enjoyed in democratic states, but I've wondered from the
beginning how a political culture in which ideas about humiliation
are so prominent could accept any model that is proposed by a for-
eign occupier. How likely is it that resistance to the United States
presence in Iraq will, sort of, become the new standard—ideological
standard of legitimacy for Iraqi leaders who seek to appeal to con-
stituents on other than religious or ethnic grounds?
Dr. Schlesinger.
Dr. Schlesinger. Let me talk a little bit about the resistance.
I think that it would be premature to leap to conclusions about the
duration of that resistance. This may be a flare-up similar to a
small Tet in 1968. What we have seen is an explosion of activities,
particularly in the Sunni area, that have been well organized. And
what may have been the case, and we suspect may be the case, is


56
sand, I think. Now, clearly, the United States isn't and can't be in
a position to supply that number of troops. Also, I'm afraid NATO
can't. The basic estimates of spare troops for NATO to deliver is
about 10,000, as far as I understand it. So it has to be a much
broader coalition of the international community that would deliver
a great deal more troops to fill what is at the moment what is
today a security vacuum.
So that's why I say there hasn't been a spike in violence. What
this has been is a cumulative thing toward a tipping point that we
saw over the last 2 weeks, where Iraqis are growing cynical and
alienated from the occupation. And those who choose to resort to
violence—and let's not forget that Iraq is a highly armed society,
with nearly most men of military age having done some form of
military service, and a lot of them seek military action. So, there-
fore, these individuals move toward violence because there is a se-
curity vacuum. And that security vacuum, as Professor Cole has al-
luded to, has produced something much more worrying in Iraq
today, and that's the growth of militias. It doesn't take much to get
a group of armed men together and dominate your neighborhood
because the occupation can't do it for you. Those militias are now
increasingly organizing along sectarian lines, and are claiming to
deploy order on the basis of political—the repaying in political af-
filiation.
I think that's one of the most dangerous long-term dynamics that
we face in Iraq today, and the only way you can circumvent that
is by building sustainable democratic links between the Iraqi popu-
lation and government. That's going to take a lot of time. And be-
fore you do that, as the first desperate thing you need to do, estab-
lish security across the whole of the country.
Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Dodge follows:]
Prepared Statement of Dr. Benjamin T. Dodge 1
INTRODUCTION
The current wave of violence that has swept Iraq, killing over 80 US soldiers and
hundreds of Iraqis this month, is not merely a one off "spike" in attacks on the coali-
tion's forces. It is also not the main cause of the coalition's problems in the country.
It is instead a symptom of three longer-term dynamics that have dogged the occupa-
tion since the liberation of Baghdad on April 9 2003. The first of these problems,
the legacy of Saddam Hussein's rule, could have been anticipated but could not have
been avoided. The other two problems; the nature of the Coalition Provisional
Authority's interaction with Iraqi society and the character of the violence faced by
coalition forces are partly the result of decisions taken since the liberation of Bagh-
dad. A different long-term strategy and short-term tactics could have avoided these
problems. Overall these three problems, the legacy of Saddam Hussein, the basis
of the CPA's interaction with Iraqi society and the violence coalition forces are fac-
ing means that the occupation, either on a de facto or de jure basis, will have to
last a great deal longer than June 30. The continued presence of large numbers of
foreign troops is essential to the successful creation of order. International oversight
is also key to the stability of Iraq; its role would be to manage the Iraqi polity while
the Iraqi population negotiates the terms of a national pact. Both these are crucial
if the medium-term stability of the country is to be secured.
With this in mind, given the scale of the problems faced, the rising resentment
directed at US forces and the US domestic electoral cycle, a rapid internationaliza-
tion of the occupation is called for. This would involve a transfer of both political
and military oversight to a multilateral body, preferably the United Nations. This
would allow for a rapid increase in the numbers of troops the occupation could de-
ploy while also reducing the visibility of American forces. It would have the advan-
tage of giving the occupation access to a much larger pool of technical expertise in


58
egy for survival resources were drained from government ministries. Civil servants,
teachers and medical staff had to manage as best they could; extracting resources
from the impoverished population that depended on their services. Over the 1990s
many professionals left public service either to take their chances in the private sec-
tor or flee into exile.
The legacy faced by the CPA
The legacy of Saddam Hussein's rule has made the task of the CPA that much
harder. The institutions of the Iraqi state that the US had hoped to inherit in April
2003 were by that time on the verge of collapse. During March they were targeted
by the third war in twenty years. This, in addition to thirteen years of sanctions
specifically designed to weaken them and three weeks of looting in the aftermath
of liberation, resulted in their disintegration. What had been planned as regime
change and then the speedy reform of state institutions was now going to be some-
thing much more costly and long-term. The legacy of Baathist rule, thirteen years
of sanctions and twenty years of war means that today the CPA is engaged in an
unforeseen process of building a new Iraqi state from the ground up. By its very
nature, this will take much more time, effort and expertise than was anticipated
in the run up to invasion.
However, the negative legacy of Saddam Hussein's rule on the Iraqi population,
is if anything, even more troublesome. For the Iraqi population, politics only began
on April 9 last year. The Iraqi political organizations that the CPA are trying to
liaise with have either been in existence for little over a year or have been imported
into the country in the aftermath of regime change. This means that they have had
a very short period of time to gain the attention of the population and more impor-
tantly win their trust or allegiance. With no indigenous civil society organizations
surviving Saddam's rule, Iraqi politics are today extremely fluid. The population
was largely atomized by thirty-five years of Baathist rule. Liberation has certainly
led to political mobilization but at the present juncture this process is tentative, un-
stable and highly fractured. No one individual or party has managed to rally any
significant amount of support from the population. This was starkly born out by the
largest opinion poll ever conducted in Iraq. In February 2004 Oxford Research Inter-
national interviewed 2737 people across Iraq. Although some of the results were
broadly positive for the CPA, others highlighted distinct problems for the medium-
term political stability of the country. When asked which organization they would
vote for in a national election, the Shia party, Al-Da'wa, received the highest polling
figure. But the support Al Da'wa registered was extremely low at only 10% of those
questioned. Other parties that also claim a national base registered even lower poll-
ing figures. The largest percentage of those polled, 39.2%, answered that they did
not know whom they would vote for. This was closely followed 34.5% who refused
to answer the question. A similar very low response resulted from the question:
"Which national leader in Iraq, if any, do you trust the most?" Again Al Da'wa's
leader Ibrahim Jaaferi got the highest rating but that was only 7.7% of those ques-
tioned. The more indicative results were 21.1% of those questioned who answered
"none" and the 36.7% of those who did not answer or were not sure.
In Iraq today the CPA faces a highly mobilized but largely atomized society that
is unrestrained by effective state institutions or by political parties. Nationwide
democratic elections, both at a local, regional and national level could result in the
structured political mobilization of the population. This would channel the hopes
and aspirations but also the alienation and anger of the Iraqi people into the polit-
ical process. It would tie the population in a transparent and consensual way to po-
litical parties who would be forced to develop a national network but also a national
platform. Political parties, in order to prosper, would be forced to both be responsive
to Iraqi public opinion but would also, to some extent, be responsible for shaping
it. This process would also link the population, through the parties, to state institu-
tions. Without such a process, discussions about handing sovereignty back to the
Iraqi people are extremely problematic. As the Oxford Research International opin-
ion poll indicated, "the Iraqi people" have not yet given their allegiance to any indi-
vidual or party. They feel unrepresented at a national level. They have little or no
affinity with the parties who claim to speak for Iraq. With this in mind handing
sovereignty back to Iraqis would be dangerous and could, if anything, further in-
crease the alienation of the Iraqi population from the CPA and the governing struc-
tures it is trying to build.


71
I think it was a mistake to cancel those elections. I think it made
a bad impression on al-Sistani and other Shi'ite leaders that the
United States was maybe not serious about democracy.
So I agree completely with Dr. Dodge that as soon as you can
have free and open municipal elections, that would be a good base
for the national scene. And John Burn, for instance, who is a Coali-
tion Provision Authority figure in the Nazariah area, has been
going around having open elections in the towns and villages
around Nazariah with great success. So in some parts of Iraq, it's
been done; in other parts, it's been the local lieutenant colonel who,
sort of, appointed a council. It's diverse. But the more local choice
can be there, the better.
Senator Biden. Dr. Dodge, what do you think?
Dr. Dodge. Just a brief point. The feedback from the local elec-
tions organized around Nazariah were quite intriguing and sur-
prising. They threw up a much larger secular vote than would have
been anticipated. The secular parties and independents got a larger
share of the vote than anyone would have predicted?
Senator BlDEN. Richard.
Mr. Perle. I don't think there is as much reason as some people
suggest to fear that the Shia vote is going to be for the establish-
ment of the theocracy. I don't think you would get a theocracy
voted in Iran today. So this may be significantly overblown.
But I just wanted to raise a question about the idea that the cur-
rent flare-up would not have taken place, or would have been miti-
gated had there been elections prior to this. The current flare-up
is the product of the activity of people who would not be impressed
or mollified or discouraged by elections. On the contrary, I believe
it's the imminent transfer of authority leading to elections that has
caused the al-Sadrs, who will not win an election, and the diehard
Ba'athists, and, needless to say, the jihadists, to intensify their ac-
tivity. They're fearful of precisely the kind of political development
that we are all urging, so they would not refrain from their attacks
if there had been an election.
Senator BlDEN. Well, then you'd have to have some additional se-
curity to deal with that, correct? With these flare-ups? They would
have occurred whether or not we have elections.
Mr. Perle. Well, I think the Ba'athists who were facing the gal-
lows would not be deterred by elections
Senator BlDEN. No, I'm not trying to be argumentative; I'm try-
ing to understand. I don't disagree with you—that the very people
who are the ones that conclude that they are not likely to succeed
in a democratic process of some sort are the people that are most
concerned about the transition taking place and ultimately having
elections. Not generically the Sunnis, but specifically some ele-
ments of the Sunni population, the former Ba'athists in particular.
I've read your statement and other things you've written, Dr. Cole,
with great interest; it's why you're here. There is this sense that
it is—the resistance among the Sunnis is pretty basic, even those
who don't take up arms themselves. They know that 80 years of—
on the "gravy train," for lack of a better and unfair way of phrasing
it, is over, that it's not going to happen, and they just figure, how
are we going to get a piece of their pie?


78
forth. So people in Iraq are very nervous about this process of how
you get people in power, who exactly they represent, and whether
they're going to misuse their position.
So the precise form that President Bush appears to me now to
have endorsed seems to be very wise, which is, you involve Mr.
Brahimi, you involve the United Nations in making that deter-
mination of who exactly is going to be the caretaker government—
the president, the vice president, the prime minister—on June 30.
And that United Nations involvement will give that caretaker gov-
ernment a kind of legitimacy that appointment by the U.S. Govern-
ment simply is never going to have. And I think we should under-
stand that the last 3 weeks have demonstrated there are very sub-
stantial problems with the legitimacy of the American enterprise in
Iraq. There are substantial—it's not just a couple of flare-ups—
there are substantial proportions of that population that are very
unhappy with the way things are going.
So I think this is the right time to involve the U.N. in that par-
ticular regard. I'm not saying, necessarily, bring in a lot of U.N.
troops or whatever. And I think Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani,
who is one of the most respected people in Iraq, has also endorsed
this kind of process.
The Chairman. Senator Corzine.
Senator Corzine. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I truly appre-
ciate your holding this set of hearings. I apologize for not being
here earlier this morning, with work on the floor. And some of the
questions may be repetitive.
But one of the things—the assumptions that I am hearing here,
which I'm actually quite troubled by, is that we have consistently
set out game plans—I'm not even sure how effective those plans
have been laid down—then had to change because circumstances
on the ground, pragmatically, led to different responses to the cur-
rent situation. We were supposed to have a status-of-force agree-
ment put in place, I don't know, 3 or 4 months ago. Given the fact
that there has been this enormous shift—different people can cat-
egorize it however they want—the fact is, is that American men
and women are losing their lives in this process, in untold numbers
in the last 3 weeks, and it certainly catches the public's attention,
it catches this Senator's attention, and, you know, it has a great
human element to it.
Why are we so committed to a timetable that apparently was
pulled out of the air more than—I've been involved in business
plans, and sometimes you work your way through, and then you
get to a point, and you say, well, we're not prepared to go. We don't
know what the status-of-forces are, we don't know who we're going
to transfer this to, we don't know what the civil sovereignty means,
versus military sovereignty is about. We have a rough justice view
of the direction of this. We're arguing about whether it should be
internationalized or shouldn't be internationalized. I think we are
not in a prepared state—it doesn't seem to me—now, I don't have
all the information that I'd like to be asking the administration
why they think we're in a period of preparation. We're still arguing
about whether we should have more forces on the ground or we
shouldn't have more forces on the ground. How do we create secu-
rity? No one would disagree with Mr. Perle's argument in the long