S. Hrg. 108-645
IRAQ'S TRANSITION-THE WAY AHEAD
[PART II]
HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
MAY 19, 2004
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations
Pennsylvania State University
Libraries

Documents Collection
U S. Depi - tcry Copy
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/senate
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
96-372 PDF WASHINGTON : 2004
For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office
Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512-1800; DC area (202) 512-1800
Fax: (202) 512-2250 Mail: Stop SSOP, Washington, DC 20402-0001


3
thoughts of outsiders. Yesterday our hearing was with insiders
within our government. Today it is with scholars, people who have
been witnessing this situation and who are not a part of the CPA
or our government. And this is all now a quote from Arnaud de
Borchgrave's column in the Washington Times of today.
He says: "One former low-intensity warfare specialist at the Pen-
tagon described his visit to the Coalition Provisional Authority in
Baghdad's Green Zone as 'Alice in Wonderland.' 'It's hard to get out
of it, let alone get into it,' he told an audience of strategic experts.
Some of them have never met an Iraqi outside the Green Zone and
yet they draft proclamations they have no way of implementing.
CPA is part of the problem, not part of the solution.
"Some of the other observations from recent visitors"—and this
is Arnaud de Borchgrave speaking—"who have had experience in
previous conflicts in the developing world:
First,"We have outworn our welcome and we now find ourselves
in a hell of a pickle."
Second, "If you don't know where you're going, you're likely to
wind up where you don't want to be. Forget about installing a lib-
eral democracy in Baghdad. Such constructs need a lot of fertilizer
to take root. We don't have the time."
Third, "There is no way to put a good face on the strategic with-
drawal. Civilian heads must roll; generals are tired of taking the
fall."
Fourth, "The transition government that takes over July 1 must
be inclusive, even with people who don't like us. It can't be a little
bit sovereign. Colin Powell said we would leave if asked to by a
sovereign Iraqi government. That is the only posture that will re-
store U.S. credibility."
Fifth, "The civilian contractors hired to train a new Iraqi Army
cost the U.S. taxpayer a lot of money and got it all wrong. The tar-
get of 27 battalions meant quantity, not quality. They were de-
signed as an external protection force, unable to deal with urban
warfare."
Sixth, "There is an urgent need for a national force capable of
protecting the core functions of government. The immediate need
is for five or six Iraqi battalions to protect the new government,
which will be challenged almost immediately after July 1."
Seventh, "There are no genuine Iraqi leaders on the horizon."
Eight, "A strongman is needed, one that will understand that the
Shi'ites, for the first time in hundreds of years, have a chance to
escape the role of low man on the totem pole."
And finally, "The Swiss cantonal system for Iraq's three or more
component parts is probably the best bet for a new constitution.
The alternative could be Lebanon-and civil war."
Then Arnaud concludes: "The U.S. has given top priority to a
new U.N. resolution that would confer legitimacy on a U.S. military
presence in Iraq after July 1. The coalition is splintering as its
members with boots on the ground—Britain, Italy, Denmark, Po-
land and Hungary—face growing domestic opposition. And Mr.
Rumsfeld's 'old' Europeans—France and Germany—and Russia are
negotiating among themselves what demands will be made on
President Bush in return for a favorable vote on a new U.N. resolu-


6
underestimated the amount of force that was needed, if they had
leveled a little bit, we would be moving along a little more here.
And getting them to level is not getting them to level in order
to say, "We told you so, you are wrong." You have got to figure out
what mistakes were made, whether you say them publicly or not,
in order to figure out what we do from here.
It seems to me two of the mistakes that were made, Mr. Chair-
man—and I know I am a broken record on this—is we went into
Iraq with two towering deficits, a security deficit and a legitimacy
deficit. As a result, I think we are losing the Iraqi people, and
without their support, we have little chance of succeeding.
As I have said time and again, the Iraqi people have to want to
have a government that is representative more than we want them
to have it or it is not going to work. At least as much as we want
them, they have to want it.
We also risk losing the support of the American people. They too
sense that our policy is adrift and that we do not have a plan for
success.
There was a report that came out at the request of the Secretary
of Defense last year, a commission led by John Hamre goes over
and comes back and says we have a window of opportunity, but it
is closing in Iraq. We all in one form or another sent out a report
saying the window of opportunity is closing in America. We only
have a window that is only open so long for the American people
to say let us get this done, we are willing to make the sacrifices
to get it done.
But the American people I think are still with us because they
know if we fail in Iraq, it could take a generation to recover from
the damage. But without a new plan—not staying the course—a
new plan to succeed that overcomes the security deficit and the le-
gitimacy deficit, I am concerned that we are headed for serious
trouble in Iraq and at home.
This includes the plan, which I hope we will get to talk about,
for successfully dealing with the militias and the mutations off of
these Iraqi militias that we asked about yesterday and I did not
seem to get an answer.
To change the dynamic, I believe the President has to articulate
a single, overreaching goal, and I think we should take this June
30, as badly as it has been planned, as badly as it has been han-
dled, and turn it from a liability into an asset. We should use that
date as the rationale for our continued and increased presence and
international presence or major power presence in Iraq, and that
is that our purpose is to hold successful elections in 2005 in Decem-
ber. That is the rationale for our being there. That is the rationale
for why we are going to stay there because that is the vehicle
through which the Iraqis ultimately get control of a stable, God
willing, government that can be held together. I think he should
use those elections as a rallying point within and beyond Iraq to
build more security and more legitimacy.
Putting the focus on elections in my view would provide a ration-
ale for Europeans and Arab leaders to join the effort. It would pro-
vide a reason for an Iraqi caretaker government to be able to be
seen as cooperating with the "occupiers" and would give the Amer-


11
Prepared Statement of Dr. Anthony H. Cordesman
The "Post Conflict" Lessons of Iraq and Afghanistan
executive summary
The current situation in Iraq and Afghanistan has exposed the fact that there is
a serious danger in the very term "post conflict:" It reflects critical failures in Amer-
ican understanding of the world it faces in the 21st Century, and in the nature of
asymmetric warfare and defense transformation:
• First, the US faces a generational period of tension and crisis in the Middle East
and much of the developing world. There is no post conflict; there is rather a
very different type of sustained "cold war." The "war on terrorism" is only part
of a period of continuing tension and episodic crises in dealing with hostile ex-
tremist movements and regimes. At a minimum, the US faces decades of polit-
ical and ideological conflict. More probably, the US and its allies will deal with
constantly evolving and mutating threats. These will involve steadily more so-
phisticated political, psychological, and ideological attacks on the West. They
will be sustained by massive economic problems and demographic pressures
that create a virtual "youth explosion," and by the regional failures of secu-
larism at both the political and ideological level. The "wars" in Iraq and Afghan-
istan are actually "battles," and the keys to victory lie in a sustained US cam-
paign to help our allies in the region carry out political, economic, and social
reform; in supporting efforts to create regional security and fight terrorism, and
in checkmating and containing hostile movements and nations.
• Second, defeat or victory in this struggle will be shaped largely by the success
of American diplomacy, deterrence, and efforts to create and sustain alliances
that occur long before military action. They will also be shaped by US ability
to reach out to the UN, international organizations, and moderates in the Is-
lamic world and other challenged areas. US efforts to create favorable strategic
outcomes in asymmetric conflicts and in conflicts involving any form of nation
building must be conducted in a political environment shape by information op-
erations on a continuing and global basis. Victory can only come through the
equivalent of a constant program of political, psychological, and ideological
"warfare" that is design to win a peace more than to aid in the military phases
of a conflict. A climate of trust and cooperation must be established before any
given clash or war takes place.
• Third, no matter how well the US adapts to these realities, it will have to make
hard strategic choices which should be made well before it uses military force.
The present contest between neoconservatives and neoliberals to see who can
be the most self-deluded, intellectually ingenuous—and use the most naive and
moralistic rhetoric—is not a valid basis for either war or dealing with its after-
math. Iraq and Afghanistan are both warnings of the complexity, cost, and time
required to even attempt to change national political systems, economies, and
social practices. Long before one considers any form of "nation building," one
must decide whether such activity is practical and what the strategic cost-bene-
fits really are. In many cases, it will not be worth the cost of trying to deal with
the aftermath of overthrowing a regime and carrying out any form of occupa-
tion. When the objective is worth the cost, both the executive branch and Con-
gress must honestly face the fact that the results will still be uncertain, that
5-10 years of effort may be required, and that the end result will often be years
of occupation and low intensity conflict, as well as years of massive economic
aid.
• Fourth, preparation and training for the security and nation building phases of
a conflict require that planning, and the creation of specialized combat units and
civilian teams with suitable resources and regional expertise to carry out the se-
curity and nation building missions, take place long before the combat phase be-
gins. Success requires the battle plan and US military operations to be shaped
to aid nation building and create security after the enemy's regime and armed
forces are defeated. It requires the ability to make a transition to security and
nation building activity as US forces advance during the combat phase and long
and before "victory." It requires political campaigns designed to win hearts and
minds of the peoples in the nation to begin before combat starts.
• Fifth, in more cases than not, the aftermath of conventional conflict is going to
be low intensity conflict and armed nation building that will last months or
years after a conventional struggle is over. As Iraq and Afghanistan show that


16
Accept the fact that a universal, nation-wide "security first" policy is stupid and
impractical, and that the US needs to isolate and bypass islands of resistance,
and focus on creating a legitimate Iraqi government that can unify Iraqis and
allow nation building to work. This means relying on containment in the case
of truly troubled and high insurgent areas, and focusing on security in friendly
areas.
Accept the fact there is no way to "drain the swamp." At this point, there simply
is no way to eliminate cadres of insurgents or to disarm the most threatening
areas. Fallujah and similar areas have too much popular support for the insur-
gents; there are too many arms that can be hidden, and too many points of vul-
nerability. This does not mean the US should give up fighting the insurgents
or its efforts to disarm them. It does mean the US must accept that it cannot
win in the sense of eliminating them or turning hostile areas into secure and
disarmed areas.
Rush aid to the Iraqi security forces and military seeking more friendly Arab aid
in training and support, and provide as broad a base of Iraqi command as pos-
sible. Forget contract regulations on buying equipment. Deliver everything nec-
essary and worry about the details later.
Continue expanding the role of the Iraqi security forces. Understand that their
loyalties will be divided, that putting them in charge of hostile areas does not
mean they can be expected to do more than work out a modus vivendi with the
insurgents, and that the end result will often be to create "no go" or limited
access areas for Americans. The US cannot afford to repeat the Israeli mistake
of assuming that any Iraqi authority in hostile areas can be counted on to pro-
vide security for Americans.
Walk firmly and openly away from the losers in the IGC like Chalabi. Open up
the political structure and deal with Shi'ite oppositionists, Sunni insurgents, ex-
Ba'athists to the maximum degree possible. Drag in as many non-IGC leaders
as possible, and give Ibrahimi's council idea the strongest possible support.
Lower the US profile in shaping the political future of Iraq as much as possible
and bring in as broad a UN international team as possible.
Focus on all of the Shi'ites, not just the friendly ones. Make this a critical aspect
of US diplomatic efforts. Let the Iraqi Shi'ites deal with Sadr and stay out of
internal Shi'ite disputes, except to help insure security. Quietly reach out to
Iran to create whatever kind of dialogue is possible.
Push Sunni Arab states into helping Iraq's Sunnis and in helping to deal with
the political issues involved by quietly making it clear that they will have to
live with the aftermath of failure and that the US presence and commitment
is not open-ended.
Zero-base the failed contracting effort for FY2004 US aid to put Iraqi Ministries
and officials in charge of the aid process as soon as possible, with Iraqis going
into the field and not foreign contractors.
Reprogram funds for a massive new CERP program to enable US military com-
manders to use dollars instead of bullets at every opportunity. Make the focus
of US control over aid whether Iraqis spend the money honestly and effectively,
and not on US control, plans, and objectives.
Zero-base the US embassy plan to create the smallest staff practical of proven
area experts, with the clear message to the Iraqis that not only are they going
to be in charge, but non-performance means no US money and no continuation
of US troops and support. End the image of a US end of an occupation after
the occupation.
Develop a long-term economic and military aid program as leverage to try to in-
fluence Iraqi decision making over time. Have the ministries manage the proc-
ess, not USA1D or contractors. Focus on whether the Iraqi efforts are honest
and produce real results. Do not try to use aid to force Iraq into US modes and
methods.
Accept the near total failure of US information operations. Stop giving all CPA/
CJTF-7 press conferences, and put an Iraqi on the stage with the US spokes-
men. Stop all procounsel-like press conferences where the US seems to be dic-
tating. Make an Iraqi spokesman part of all dialogue, and give them the lead
as soon as possible. Subordinate US and Coalition spokesmen as soon as pos-
sible to Iraqis in press conferences and briefings that are held in Arabic.
Look at the broader failures of US policy in the region. Revitalize the Road Map
and the Quartet in the light of Sharon's problems. Deal with the reality that


20
was not prepared for nation building or the escalation of resistance once the
enemy was "defeated."
The Quadrennial Defense Review was right in stressing the risk asymmetric
warfare posed to the US in spite of its conventional strength. It failed, however,
to look beyond the narrow definition of the problems of direct combat to the
problems of containment and deterrence, conflict termination, and armed nation
building. Much of today's problems in Iraq stem from the fact that the Defense
Department and the Bush Administration were as badly prepared for conflict
termination, nation building, and low intensity threats after the defeat of
Saddam's regular military forces, as they were well prepared to carry out that
defeat.
The price tag also involves more than dollars and includes some share of re-
sponsibility for every US body bag being flown out of Iraq. To a lesser degree,
the same is true of the situation in Afghanistan, and the problem is scarcely
new.
The US failed in both nation building and Vietnamization in Vietnam. It
failed in Lebanon in the early 1980s. It failed in Haiti, and it failed in Somalia.
The stakes, level of involvement, and the costs to the US may have been far
lower in some of these cases, but the fact remains that the US failed.
• Force transformation cannot be dominated by technology; manpower skills, not
technology, are the key. The Afghan War led to an emphasis on a method of
using airpower that could not secure the country or deal with Taliban and Al
Qaida forces that quickly mutated and dispersed. The Iraq War began with
heavy conventional land forces and soon became a heavy air-land battle. It was
all airpower, armored, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (IS&R)
and precision through late April. As such, it showed that high technology forces
could decisively defeat lower technology conventional forces almost regardless of
force numbers and the kinds of force ratios that were critical in past conflicts.
Yet, the US has since been forced to virtually reinvent the way in which it uses
its forces since the fall of Saddam's regime. Technology and netcentric war—
and an emphasis on destroying enemy hard targets and major weapons sys-
tems—failed when the problem became conflict termination, armed nation
building, and low intensity warfare.
The military missions of low intensity combat, economic aid, civil-military re-
lations, security, and information campaigns are manpower dominated and re-
quire skilled military manpower as well as new forms civil expertise in other
Departments. Human intelligence can still be more important than technical
collection, local experience and language skills are critical, and the ability to use
aid dollars can be more important than the ability to use bullets.
This requires a fundamental reexamination of US force plans and force trans-
formation concepts. For decades, the US has sought to use technology to sub-
stitute for defense spending, for force numbers, and for manpower numbers.
During the conventional phases of both the Afghan and Iraq conflicts, sugges-
tions were made for further force and manpower cuts and further efforts to
achieve savings in defense spending by acquiring transformational technology.
Technology has been, is, and will be critical to American power and military
success. It is extremely questionable, however, that the US has any credible
way of using technology to make further force and manpower cuts without tak-
ing unacceptable risks. Creating the proper mix of capabilities for asymmetric
warfare, low-intensity conflict, security and Phase IV operations, and nation
building requires large numbers of skilled and experience personnel. It is man-
power intensive, and technology is at best an aid to—not a substitute for—force
size and manpower numbers.
This problem is further compounded by the fact that the US does not have
a single major transformational weapons system or technology under develop-
ment which now seems likely to be delivered on time, with the promised effec-
tiveness, and at even half of the unit life cycle cost originally promised. The US
has made little meaningful progress in the effective planning and management
of the development and procurement of advanced military technology in the last
quarter century—at least in the sense of being able to integrate it into realistic
budgets and force plans. While the US has shown it can transform, it has not
shown it can plan and manage transformation.
For at least the next half decade, the US must also deal with the backlog of
maintenance and service requirements created by its operations in Iraq and Af-
ghanistan, and with the fact it must retain and modernize far more of its so-
called legacy systems that it now plans.


25
this may require a far better integration of military and civil efforts in both intel-
ligence and operations than has occurred in either Iraq or Afghanistan.
THE NEAR TERM SITUATION IN IRAQ
It may not be as apparent in the US as it is in the Arab world, but several weeks
of travel in the region indicate that the course of the fighting in Fallujah and Najaf
are perceived in much of Iraq and the Arab world as a serious US defeat. This is
not simply a matter of shattering an aura of US military invincibility; it is a grow-
ing shift in political attitudes and in the prospects for political change in Iraq.
It is also all too clear that any idea the US is engaging in "post-conflict oper-
ations" is little more than a farce. The shock of Saddam's fall produced a brief pe-
riod of near paralysis in the Iraqi opposition to the US and the Coalition. By August
2003, however, a state of low intensity conflict clearly existed in Iraq, and the level
of this conflict has escalated ever since January of 2004.
In fact, this follows a pattern that makes the very term "post-conflict operations"
a stupid and intellectually dishonest oxymoron. As we have seen in Afghanistan, So-
malia, Lebanon, Cambodia, and many other cases, asymmetric wars do not really
end. Nation building must take place on an armed basis without security and in the
face of adaptive and innovative threats. The reality is that this is a far more dif-
ficult aspect of "transformation" than defeating organized military resistance, and
one for which the US is not yet prepared.
Senior US officials have been in a continuing state of denial about the depth of
support for this conflict. They have misused public opinion polls like the Zogby and
ABC polls and they have ignored the fact that the ABC poll conducted in February
found that roughly two thirds of Sunnis and one third of Shi'ites opposed the US
and British invasion and found it to be humiliating to Iraq. Senior US officials have
ignored the fact that roughly one-third of Sunnis and two-thirds of Shi'ites support
violence against the Coalition and want the Coalition forces to leave Iraq imme-
diately. They talk about a small minority of Iraqis because only a small minority
have so far been actively violent—a reality in virtually every insurgent campaign
and one that in no way is a measure of support for violence.
A year into the "war after the war," far too many US officials are still in a state
of denial as to the political realities in the Middle East. They do not see just how
much the perceived US tilt towards Israel and Sharon alienates Iraqis and Arabs
in general. They do not admit the near total failure of US information operations,
and the fact that Iraqis watch hostile Arab satellite TV stations and rely on papers
filled with misinformation and conspiracy theories.
They talk about "success" in aid programs measured in terms of contracts signed,
fiscal obligations, and gross measures of performance like megawatts; not about ac-
tual progress on the ground the kind that can really win hearts and minds. They
cannot understand that US calls for "liberty," "democracy," and "reform" have be-
come coupled to images of US interference in Arab regimes, the broad resentment
of careless negative US references to Islam and Arab culture, and conspiracy theo-
ries about control of Iraqi oil, "neoimperialism," and serving "Zionist" interests.
The fact these perceptions are not fair is as irrelevant as US tactical military vic-
tories that are often political defeats. The present mix of armed nation building and
low intensity conflict takes place in a region shaped by such perceptions. This is
why the photographic evidence of US mistreatment of Iraqi prisoners is so dev-
astating. For many in the region, it validates every criticism of the US, and vastly
strengthens the hand of Islamic extremists, Sunni insurgents, Shi'ite insurgents,
and hostile media and intellectuals in both the Arab world and Europe.
The time has come to face this reality. There was never a time when
neoconservative fantasies about the Middle East were anything but dangerous illu-
sions. Those fantasies have killed and wounded thousands of American and Coali-
tion allies, and now threaten the US with a serious strategic defeat. It may not be
possible to avoid some form of defeat, but the US must make every effort to do so,
and this means junking the neoconservatism within the Office of the Secretary of
Defense, the Vice President's office, and the NSC and coming firmly to grips with
reality.
WHY THE US HAS ALREADY "LOST" SOME ASPECTS OF ITS BATTLES IN FALLUJAH AND
WITH SADR
The US is scarcely defeated in either a military or a political sense, but it is suf-
fering serious reversals. The Iraqi insurgents do not have to win battles in a tactical
sense; they merely have to put up a determined enough resistance, with enough
skill and courage, to show their fellow Iraqis and the Arab world that they are capa-
ble of a determined, strong and well-organized effort. Many of their fellow Iraqis


31
My remarks this morning can be divided into three broad areas:
first, a brief review of the events of the past year as a means of
setting the stage for my second topic, which is what needs to be
done, and finally, a discussion about the region, what is going on
in the Arab and Muslim world and what are our options.
In the past year, we have seen enormous successes and abysmal
failures in Iraq. The offensive campaign conducted to overthrow
Saddam Hussein was a brilliant military success carried out by the
finest armed forces in the world. The young men and women who
captured Baghdad did a masterful job. However, even as that su-
perbly conducted operation was unfolding, it became apparent that
there were not enough troops on the ground to perform all the nec-
essary tasks. Not only were we not capable of adequately securing
supply lines, but when we reached Baghdad, there were no re-
serves to exploit the great success that had been achieved by the
3rd Infantry Division and the 1st Marine Division. The resulting
looting, the destruction, and the failure to protect property and to
secure Iraqi weapons and ammunition have had profound con-
sequences in the past year.
This reconstruction phase that began after the seizure of Bagh-
dad has been characterized by poor planning and frequently poor
execution. Indicative of this is the amateurish way in which the
CPA dealt with the Iraqi Army. First, we dismissed them. Then we
hired them back and then sent them home. And now we have come
full circle and are about to embark on hiring former members of
the Iraqi Army to return and go to work.
The progress on the development of the country has been poor.
Political issues have been handled with characteristic lack of sensi-
tivity, and we find continued reliance on people like Mr. Chalabi
who, from the start, has been untrustworthy, who has continued to
demonstrate his inability to contribute to our success. Until re-
cently, we continued to pay him and his people over $300,000 a
month. Incidentally, I read on the Internet this morning that there
is a new group emerging in Baghdad today which has aligned Mr.
Chalabi with the Iraqi Hezbollah representative. We have come
that far.
This month, unfortunately, has been capped by the tragedy of the
Abu Ghraib prison. Faced with these difficulties, the questions we
must deal with are how serious is this and what can be done. My
answer to these questions is that it is gravely serious but not nec-
essarily terminal. But we need a fast turnaround and we need to
begin right away.
My concerns are that the policy people in both Washington and
Baghdad have demonstrated their inability to do the job on a day-
to-day basis this past year. It seems to me that a year is more than
enough to give people an opportunity to show how well they per-
form. I believe we are absolutely on the brink of failure. We are
looking into the abyss. We cannot start soon enough to begin the
turnaround.
The first step is to designate the Department of State as the lead
agency. Since the end of offensive combat, the emphasis should
have shifted to political concerns in Iraq. What is required of the
military is to support the political objectives. Success in a counter-
insurgency operation is based on three elements: security, political


36
however, that none of these communities—Kurds, Arab Sunnis or
Shi'a—is homogeneous. The pattern in Iraq is of a mosaic of
groups, not clear-cut ethic and sectarian fragmentation.
Given these circumstances, what outcomes can we expect in Iraq
over the next 5 years or so? Let me deal with the worst case sce-
nario, the breakdown of the state to a point beyond which we could
not reconstitute it. This process is underway, but it is by no means
irreparable, and we want to prevent it from reaching such a point.
A number of pundits and analysts have advanced the notion that
Iraq might break up into three component parts: a Kurdish north,
and Arab Sunni or mixed center, and a Shi'a south. They pose a
potential civil war between and among these groups, Kurds versus
Arabs, Shi'a versus Sunnis. Some are even asking whether the
Iraqi state or Iraqi identity has already disappeared and we should
be thinking about managing a separation as in the former Yugo-
slavia.
The answer to this question should be a resounding no. Our gov-
ernment is officially on record as supporting the territorial integ-
rity of Iraq. The overwhelming majority of Iraqis do not want their
state divided. Moreover, Iraq is not likely to break up into three
distinct ethnic and sectarian parts with clear boundaries between
them. There are too many demographic frontiers which would be
very difficult to separate. Unscrambling these areas in any divide
would be a nightmare.
Nor is there any evidence yet of ethnic and sectarian warfare on
the ground. Kurds are not fighting Arabs. Shi'a are not fighting
Sunnis. On the contrary, in the face of increasing violence and ex-
traordinary provocation, including attempts to incite civil war,
Iraq's communal leaders have shown a clear awareness of the
threat, a firm commitment to avoid it, and so far considerable dis-
cipline in reining in their constituents.
The more plausible scenario we face for a failed state is the
breakdown of a weak and fragile central government unable to ex-
ercise control over the country, with something of a vacuum at the
center. Without a cohesive Iraqi Army or police force, local militias
are taking root. This is not yet warlordism, but it could begin to
resemble it. In any ensuing struggle for power, it is these groups
led by extremists who may engage in fighting several different civil
wars. These could destroy the potential for a buildup of the new
government at the center. That is the bad scenario.
What would be a good scenario that is realistic and achievable?
That is more difficult to predict. It depends on Iraqi desires and a
willingness to compromise and their ability to surmount the zero
sum political game. Any such scenario will take 5 to 10 years to
produce. It will not be achieved on June 30 or even next year.
But one can speculate on the outlines. It would provide a mecha-
nism—a constitution, elections—to create and strengthen a central
government that would be representative of most, but not all
Iraqis; and second, and most important in my opinion, be able to
govern. This is going to involve wrenching compromises between
Kurds and Arabs and among those who want more and those who
want less religion in their lives.
To reach this state, we should be encouraging negotiations and
alliances between and among various factions and an open political


42
other form of civil war. I think Dr. Marr has spoken and written
very insightfully about this. If the current situation persists, we
will continue fighting one form of Iraqi insurgency after another
with too little legitimacy, too little will, and too few resources.
There is only one word for a situation in which you cannot win and
you cannot withdraw: quagmire. We are not there yet but we are
close.
The only way out of this mess is a combination of robust, precise,
and determined military action to defeat the most threatening anti-
democratic insurgency led by Muqtada al-Sadr and his al-Mahdi
army—unfortunately, we are close to doing that—combined with
the political strategy to fill the legitimacy vacuum as rapidly as
possible.
The Bush administration has taken two vital steps in the latter
regard.
First, it has sought to improve the international legitimacy of our
mission and our ability to find a transitional solution that will be
credible and acceptable to most Iraqis by giving the U.N. Special
Envoy, Lakhdar Brahimi, a leading role in the process. Ambas-
sador Brahimi is an extraordinarily able, imaginative, and fair-
minded mediator. I could not imagine a better candidate for this
arduous task.
The second essential correct decision of the administration is to
hold to the June 30 deadline for transferring power to an Iraqi In-
terim Government. One of the few positive things that has been
suppressing Iraqi frustration and even rage over the occupation
has been the prospect of a return to Iraqi sovereignty on June 30
and the promise of elections for a transitional government within
7 months after that. It is vital that we adhere to the June 30 dead-
line. There is no solution to the dilemma we face that does not put
Iraqis forward to take political leadership responsibility for the
enormous challenges of governance in that country.
We need to embrace a number of other steps that will advance
three key principles: building legitimacy for the transitional pro-
gram, increasing the efficacy of emergent Iraqi control, and improv-
ing the security situation in a more lasting way. I would actually
say, first and foremost, "It's security, stupid," because you cannot
get economic development unless you have security. All three of
these goals require an intensive effort at rebuilding the now deci-
mated, fragmented, and demoralized Iraqi state.
Here briefly are my recommendations.
First, disavow any long-term military aspirations in Iraq. We
should declare unambiguously that we will not seek permanent
military bases in Iraq. We are not going to get a treaty from the
Iraqis to approve them anyway.
Second, establish a clear date for the end to military occupation.
We should set a target date for the full withdrawal of American
forces. This may be 3 or 4 years in the future, but setting such a
date will convince Iraqis that we are serious about leaving once the
country is secure.
Third, respond to the concerns about Iraqi detainees which we
have been hearing for months and months now. This is not new.
We need an independent investigation of the treatment of Iraqi de-
tainees with international participation. And we should release as


44
promises that were reached. We should emphatically acknowledge
at a minimum that this is only a temporary document and that
Iraqis will be fully free and sovereign to write a new permanent
constitution. Even more negotiations may be necessary over the
annex.
Twelfth, we should invest in supporting moderate secular Shi'a
who draw support from parties, movements, and associations that
do not have muscular militias. Hopefully, a fair process of selection
of national conference participants will put many of these new
faces forward.
Finally, we urgently need to level the political playing field with
respect to political party funding. More independent and demo-
cratic political parties, again that do not have militias, that are not
getting massive funding from Iran and Saudi Arabia, are begging
us for support. As soon as an Iraqi independent electoral adminis-
tration is established, we should help it create a transparent fund
for the support in equal amounts of all political parties that pass
a certain threshold of demonstrated popular support.
In conclusion, for a long time now, it has been clear that the
three great challenges of restoring security, reconstructing the
economy, and rebuilding the system of government are intricately
intertwined. We cannot revive the economy, generate jobs and elec-
tricity, and get a new Iraqi government up and functioning unless
we dramatically improve security. But we cannot improve security
unless we have a more credible and legitimate framework for Iraqi
governance. The U.N. mission, working with the CPA, holds out
some promise of progress in the latter regard. But we have a lot
of hard work to do on the security front as well, and we are not
going to get there unless we put some of the worst thugs and spoil-
ers out of business, beginning with the Mahdi army. On both the
security and political fronts, the choices we make and the actions
we take between now and June 30 will have diffuse and lasting
consequences for the future political order in Iraq.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Diamond follows:]
Prepared Statement of Dr. Larry Diamond
Chairman Lugar, Senator Biden, Distinguished Members, Ladies and Gentlemen:
As you all well understand, the United States now faces a perilous situation in
Iraq today. Because of a long catalogue of strategic and tactical blunders, we have
failed to come anywhere near meeting the post-war expectations of Iraqis for secu-
rity and post-conflict reconstruction. Although we have done many good things to
eliminate tyranny, to rebuild infrastructure, and to help construct a free society and
democratic political system, the overall ineptitude of our mission to date leaves us—
and Iraq—in a terrible bind. If we withdraw our military forces precipitously in this
security vacuum, we will leave the country at the mercy of a variety of power-hun-
gry militias and criminal gangs, and Iraq will risk a rapid descent into one or an-
other form of civil war. If the current situation persists, we will continue fighting
one form of Iraqi insurgency after another with too little legitimacy, too little will,
and too few resources. There is only one word for a situation in which you cannot
win and you cannot withdraw: quagmire. We are not there yet, but we are close.
The scope for a good outcome has been greatly reduced as a result of the two
insurgencies that we now confront in Iraq. One of these, in the Sunni heartland,
has been festering since the end of the war, but has picked up deadly momentum
in recent months and then took on a new ferocity with the grisly murder of the four
American contractors in Fallujah on March 31. The other, in the Shiite heartland,
broke out shortly thereafter when the radical young Shiite cleric, Muqtada al-Sadr,
launched a violent uprising after the Americans badly bungled the long-delayed im-


70
One more point I would like to make very briefly builds on what
Dr. Cordesman said. There is no reason why all of this reconstruc-
tion money has to go through, as it largely has been going through,
American corporations. I can tell you our regional coordinator in
the south central region, which is in the Shi'ite heartland, has got-
ten more done with a very small amount of money in terms of get-
ting buildings built and services going and schools up and running
just by going out there and finding Iraqi companies and getting
them to do it. And we have got to get over our obsession with pour-
ing money into American companies with all of the layers it goes
through and with all of the loss that we suffer and getting money
out to small Iraqi contractors, even if they cannot perfectly account
for it, pumping money into the local economy and getting stuff
done.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator Corzine.
Let me just follow on in this round with a question for Dr. Dia-
mond regarding the consultative group that you talked about, the
1,000 people. How could they be constituted and when? How does
that fit into the scheme of things at this particular moment?
Dr. Diamond. What I think can happen, but we are going to need
some improvement of security in order for this to move forward, is
that you say a certain number of members of a national conference,
which could be again a total body of 1,000 people or more.
The Chairman. Who selects them? How do they physically get
anywhere?
Dr. Diamond. Develop a structure for their selection, a plan that
is mutually negotiated among key Iraqis. Ambassador Brahimi is
well capable of doing this in his consultations. So we develop a mu-
tually agreed plan whereby, for example, 150 to 200 members will
be elected from the various provincial and regional councils around
the country, which already exist. As Dr. Marr indicated, those are
the constituent elements for emergent Iraqi federalism. A couple
hundred people will be elected from the different professional asso-
ciations of lawyers, educators, engineers, so on and so forth. Tribal
bodies might elect a certain number. The Iraqi women's associa-
tions, which I might add, you talked about the need for cross-cut-
ting affiliations to come together in new ways. Nowhere does it
happen more impressively than in the Iraqi Higher Women's Coun-
cil. So you designate them to select some members and you go to
the constituent elements that are identifiable and existing, political
and social, of the different pieces of Iraqi society. They each elect
from among their members some delegates to go to Baghdad to a
big national conference.
It debates national issues and then from among its members,
elects a smaller consultative assembly. That assembly might not
have legislative authority because it is not directly elected, but
again it could sit alongside the interim government, hold it ac-
countable in a variety of ways and be a forum for directing Iraq's
future in some respects and expressing its frustrations. It could be
an outlet for some of the rage and frustration that Iraqis feel and
a way of engaging both the Iraqi executive branch, helping to
shape the Iraqi judicial branch, and beginning to have a serious di-
alog about the country's future.