son; Todd Rosenblum, assistant to Senator Bayh; Andrew Shapiro,
assistant to Senator Clinton; and Terri Glaze, assistant to Senator
Pryor.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN WARNER,
CHAIRMAN
Chairman WARNER. The committee meets today to review a fur-
ther report, and I stress a further report, from Dr. David Kay on
his efforts and the efforts of the team which he was privileged to
work with, known as the Iraq Survey Group (ISG). He served as
the special advisor to the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) in
determining the status of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and
related programs in Iraq.
After assuming this position last July, Dr. Kay made his initial
interim official report to this committee on October 3. As members
of the committee are aware, Dr. Kay has stepped down from this
position and has been succeeded by Charles A. Duelfer, a former
colleague and member of the U.N. Special Commission with Dr.
Kay, who has been appointed by Director Tenet to continue this
important mission. I met with Mr. Duelfer the day before yesterday
and we just momentarily met with him in the Intelligence Commit-
tee room.
Dr. Kay volunteered, and I emphasize that, volunteered to re-
sume his public service, worked diligently for 6 months in Iraq
under difficult and often dangerous conditions, and just concluded
his work last week and reported to the DCI. I thank you and I
thank your wife for your public service.
Working with General Dayton and the ISG, your mission was to
for all facts, I repeat all facts, relevant to the many issues
about Iraqi weapons of mass destruction and related programs. You
initiated what was and continues, I emphasize continues, to be a
very difficult, complex mission, that in your own words is yet to be
completed.
As you cautioned us when you took up this post in July, patience
is required to ensure we complete a thorough assessment of this
important issue. In this hearing today, we hope to receive your as-
sessment of what has been accomplished to date, I repeat to date,
and what, in your professional judgment remains to be done by the
ISG. It is far too early to reach any final judgments or conclusions.
In recent days, I mentioned I met with General Dayton, I met
ensively with Dr. Kay over the recess period, and Mr. Duelfer,
and have received the assurances of General Dayton and Mr.
Duelfer that they will be prepared to present to Congress a second
official interim report of the ISG in the timeframe of late March.
It is crucial that the important work of the ISG go on. Thus far,
the findings have been significant. Dr. Kay has stated that al-
though we've not found evidence of large stockpiles of WMD or for-
ward-deployed weapons, the ISG has made the following evidence
as a part of their record that will be forthcoming: first, evidence of
Saddam Hussein's intent to pursue WMD programs on a large
scale; actual, ongoing chemical and biological research programs;
an active program to use the deadly chemical ricin as a weapon,
a program that was interrupted only by the start of the war in
March; evidence of long-range missile programs that, in all prob-


18
Senator KENNEDY. Can you give us any explanation of why these
agencies in retrospect appear to have had it right, and the informa-
tion that the administration used appeared to have it wrong? What
weight was given to these reports when you look at them in retro-
spect, and when you have a number of those that were involved in
the reports believing that the information reports were used selec-
tively to justify a policy decision to take the country to war?
Dr. Kay. Senator Kennedy, it's impossible in the short time I
have to reply to take you fully through that, and in fact, that's my
hope that Senator Roberts and his committee will have done that,
but let me just say that there's a selective process that goes on
both ways. There were people in the DOE who believe that those
aluminum tubes were indeed for a centrifuge program.
It's a lot easier after the fact and after you know the truth to be
selective that you were right. I've gone through this a lot in my ca-
reer. All I can say is if you read the total body of intelligence in
the last 12 to 15 years that flowed on Iraq, I quite frankly think
it would be hard to come to a conclusion other than Iraq was a
gathering serious threat to the world with regard to WMD.
I remind you, it was Secretary Cohen who stood, I think in this
very committee room, with 5 pounds of flour and talked about an-
thrax.
Senator KENNEDY. Just to come back because we have limited
time-gathering serious threat, you really think that that is—those
are the words that brought us to war, those were the words that
justified us going into war, a gathering serious threat?
Dr. KAY. Senator, that's probably far more in your r
our realm than in
my realm. I'll take Senator McCain's defense of I being a knave in
the world of politics.
Senator KENNEDY. Well, no, I appreciate your response and I ap-
preciate your appearance here and I think that when we look at
who has the responsibility, I think it's fair enough to look not only
what the intelligence, but all the intelligence agencies, and as Sen-
evin said how that intelligence was used. I think that is
going to be the key to find out just what representations were
made and the reasons why they were made, because I think on the
basis of the information we have now, I think it's difficult to draw
a conclusion that it was used selectively and in many instances ma-
nipulated to carry on a policy decision. Thank you.
Chairman WARNER. Thank you, Senator Kennedy. Colleagues,
just an administrative announcement. We had scheduled this
morning a 9:30 hearing on three nominations for the Department
of Defense. It was my judgment, given the uncertainty of the
weather, that we could not hold it at 9:30. This committee will
meet at 4:00 for the purpose of considering the following nominees:
Mr. Di Rita, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs; Mr.
Harvey, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Networks and Informa-
tion Integration; and Mr. Chatfield, Director of Selective Service. I
do hope as many as possible can attend. Thank you very much.
Senator Inhofe.
Senator INHOFE. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Dr. Kay,
I would repeat everything that has been said about you and your
ind I appreciate it. I appreciate also the private conversa-
tions we've had and your being very straightforward.


20.
programs. You're quoted as saying, “whatever was left in an effec-
tive weapons capability was largely subsumed into corrupt money-
raising schemes by scientists skilled in the art of lying in a police
state."
Well, some have said there is some inconsistency there. Which of
those do you think is the case, that he thought he had them or that
he knew he didn't have them and was bluffing?
Dr. KAY. Saddam being deceived was a common phenomenon
after 1998 and crossed all areas, not just WMD, as it became a
more corrupt society. I remember the New York Times editorial
which sees an inconsistency being doing that. I actually don't see
it. He knew he had the capability, he wanted to enjoy the benefits
of others thinking he had it. The deception related to more ad-
vanced programs and that's where it continued up until the time
of Operation Iraqi Freedom.
Senator INHOFE. I appreciate that very much and thank you for
your responses.
Chairman WARNER. Thank you very much, Senator. Senator Rob-
ert Byrd just informed me that he is required to be on the floor for
the vote and other reasons. I will put into the record his questions
and I thank you very much.
Senator Clinton.
Senator CLINTON. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and Dr.
Kay, I join with my colleagues in thanking you for your public serv-
ice, and it's with great admiration that I have followed your service
over a number of years and I thank you greatly.
I just wanted to clarify a few other comments that had been re-
ported in the press just to get the record clear in my own mind.
There were some references to your decision to leave the effort due
to the failure to have the full complement of analysts, translators,
interrogators, and others to work with you. I know that that was
a concern that had been expressed to this committee and others be-
cause of the movement of people out of the group into counter-
insurgency efforts. Was that a factor in either impacting the qual-
ity and substance of the search or your decision to step down?
Dr. Kay. Senator Clinton, there were two factors that led me to
decide it was the appropriate time to return to private life. When
I agreed to take on this job, I had only two conditions. When you
negotiate with the Federal Government, salary is not one of the
things you can negotiate. I said there were two things that were
important to me. One is that the instrument we were going to use,
the Iraqi Survey Group, be totally focused on elimination of WMD
as long as we carried out that mission.
That was based on two facts. One, my experience with the Fed-
eral Government is that when you have multiple masters and mul-
tiple tasks, you get the typical interagency mush and you don't get
directive action and I didn't think we had the time to do that.
The second was, and I told Georg
was, and I told George Tenet directly this, my under-
taking this task from the President of investigating and trying to
determine reality compared to your estimates, you are going to run
a moral hazard, the moral hazard of self-investigation, and that the
only way I was willing to be a party to that is that I had the inde-
pendence to choose the instrument that was going to be doing it


they be large, small, or programs, whether it's information that
Iraqi scientists might be willing to sell or work in cooperation with
rogue organizations or even nations, but do you consider that to
have been a real risk in terms of Saddam's activities and these pro-
grams, the risk of proliferation?
Dr. Kay. Actually, I consider it a bigger risk than the and that's
why I paused on the preceding question I consider that a bigger
risk than the restart of his programs being successful. I think the
way the society was going and the number of willing buyers in the
market, that probably was a risk that if we did avoid, we barely
avoided.
Senator CORNYN. Indeed that continues to be a concern we have
today in the old Soviet Union and other places where
Dr. Kay. Pakistan.
Senator CORNYN. Pakistan, other nations where they've had offi-
cial weapons programs, biological, chemical, and nuclear, the risk
of proliferation into the hands of terrorists like al Qaeda and oth-
ers. Is that correct, sir?
Dr. KAY. That's correct.
Senator CORNYN. Indeed, the deception that you've talked about
of Saddam's own military and scientists and others who perhaps
led him to believe that they were following through on his orders
to develop these weapons of mass destruction, would you say that
that deception not only convinced perhaps Saddam to some extent,
but indeed that contributed to his intransigence before the world
community and defiance of the United Nations and particularly fi-
nally of U.N. Resolution 1441?
Dr. Kay. I think that probably did. I'm just hesitant because ana-
lyzing the mind of someone who would end up in a spider hole like
Saddam requires a skill that I suspect I was not equipped for, but
yes, I think that's a reasonable interpretation.
Senator CORNYN. Thank you very much, Dr. Kay, I appreciate it.
Chairman WARNER. Thank you, Senator, very much.
Senator Bill Nelson.
Senator BILL NELSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Dr. Kay, in the
interview with the New York Times a few days ago, you had said,
“I think that the system should have a way for an analyst to say,
'I don't have enough information to make a judgment. There is
really not a way to do that under the current system.”
The New York Times article goes on and this is what I want to
ask you about. “He added,” meaning you, “that while the analysts
included caveats on their reports, those passages tended to drop off
as the reports would go up the food chain inside the government.”
Tell me about that. How is that possible that in the Intelligence
Community specifically when caveats are there about intelligence,
that they get dropped off as it goes up the pecking order?
Dr. Kay. Senator, when Jim Risen asked me about that, I gave
him an example which he did not include in the article. I said writ-
ing caveats has about the same intellectual enjoyment as being a
writer for the National Geographic. I look at the pictures, I look at
the captions. I confess, although I think we have in the basement
probably a 20-year collection of National Geographics, I would be
hard-pressed on a polygraph to say that I've ever read more than
five of them.