THE IMMINENT TRANSFER OF SOVEREIGNTY
IN IRAQ
HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
HOUSE OP REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
MAY 13, 2004
Serial No. 108-130
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CONTENTS
Page
WITNESSES
The Honorable Marc Grossman, Under Secretary for Political Affairs, U.S.
Department of State 7
The Honorable Peter W. Rodman, Assistant Secretary for International Secu-
rity Affairs, U.S. Department of Defense 17
Lieutenant General Walter L. Sharp, U.S. Army, Director for Strategic Plans
and Policy, The Joint Staff, U.S. Department of Defense 19
LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING
The Honorable Henry J. Hyde, a Representative in Congress from the State
of Illinois, and Chairman, Committee on International Relations: Prepared
statement 2
The Honorable Marc Grossman: Prepared statement 13
Lieutenant General Walter L. Sharp: Prepared statement 20
APPENDIX
The Honorable Dan Burton, a Representative in Congress from the State
of Indiana: Prepared statement 47
The Honorable Nick Smith, a Representative in Congress from the State
of Michigan: Prepared statement 48
The Honorable Robert Wexler, a Representative in Congress from the State
of Florida: Prepared statement 49
The Honorable Earl Blumenauer, a Representative in Congress from the
State of Oregon: Prepared statement 50
The Honorable Marc Grossman:
Responses to questions submitted for the record by the Honorable Henry
J. Hyde 50
Responses to questions submitted for the record by the Honorable Tom
Lantos, a Representative in Congress from the State of California 58
Responses to questions submitted for the record by the Honorable Earl
Blumenauer 60
Responses to questions submitted for the record by the Honorable Thaddeus
McCotter, a Representative in Congress from the State of Michigan and
the Honorable Diane Watson, a Representative in Congress from the
State of California 62
(ill)


2
us that, once the shackles were suddenly broken, a brutally sup-
pressed population would react to sudden freedom with dis-
organization, dissension, and the unleashing of passions and rival-
ries nurtured in the long darkness.
It would be foolish, not to say ruinously arrogant, to believe that
we can determine the future of Iraq. All of our energies, all of our
talents cannot substitute for the Iraqi people's assumption of re-
sponsibility for their own fate. However convinced we may be of our
faith to do so, we cannot reinvent their country for them. If there
is to be democracy, harmony, and stability in Iraq, it will be be-
cause the Iraqi people have chosen that course for themselves and
have successfully constructed and upheld the institutions, commit-
ments, and web of social contracts that infuse with life the sweep-
ing pronouncements that otherwise would shrivel into desiccated
phrases on forgotten documents.
Let us understand what is possible. We can assist them in that
immense effort. We have already dramatically altered their uni-
verse of choices by providing them with the opportunity to choose
their own government and their country's future path. But foolish
or not, the choice is theirs.
We are fortunate to be aided in this task by the United Nations,
whose involvement will hopefully induce our tireless critics to
transmute a portion of their boundless outrage into a modicum of
assistance for the people of Iraq. I pray that I may yet be surprised
by their generosity.
And so, imperfectly, we must begin, forever mindful of Bis-
marck's caution that "politics is the art of the possible."
I now yield to my colleague, the Ranking Democratic Member,
Tom Lantos, for any opening remarks he may wish to make. I will
announce now that because of the gravity of our subject and the
interest in it, that all opening statements other than Mr. Lantos'
will be made a part of the record. We will not have any oral state-
ments. We will go immediately to the witnesses. But I wanted to
make that announcement.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Hyde follows:]
Prepared Statement of the Honorable Henry J. Hyde, a Representative in
Congress from the State of Illinois, and Chairman, Committee on Inter-
national Relations
The Committee will come to order.
I would like to welcome everyone to today's hearing on "The Imminent Transfer
of Sovereignty in Iraq."
Let me begin by stating the obvious: Our efforts to craft an indigenous adminis-
tration in Iraq capable of exercising responsibility for that country's future are en-
tering their final stage. Among many unknowns, we can state with certainty that
the pressures for success are likely to increase enormously even as the obstacles we
face multiply even faster.
It serves no purpose to pretend that this transition will be a smooth and orderly
process for it could hardly be expected to be other than difficult even in ideal cir-
cumstances. History presents few parallels of such an ambitious and complex effort
being implemented in so short a time and within such constraints. To quickly estab-
lish a modern, enlightened, and self-sustaining order in a country ruined by decades
of dictatorship and deprivation and fragmented into a multiplicity of ancient identi-
ties and contending allegiances is all but unprecedented. I need hardly add that le-
gions of enemies stand ready to strangle this infant in its crib. In such a setting,
Wisdom advises matching our determination with the humility of limits and a sus-
tained respect for daily victories.


10
He has also identified a place for a future permanent Embassy
of the United States of America in Iraq.
The fourth major category here obviously is the money, because
if you have this large Embassy in this challenging place, it is going
to take some money to deal with and I would like to share our cur-
rent thinking on the funds that are going to be required. Again, a
little bit like the people, I ask you to recognize that the numbers
I give you today are a snapshot of where we stand, but this is our
best estimate at the moment.
We believe, we estimate that it is going to cost us about $483
million to run this mission between now and the end of Fiscal
2005. Here is how we are going to cover those costs. First, Congress
has already provided in supplemental about $97 million for an in-
terim Embassy facility and interim operations. We also expect to
have available in the fourth quarter the portion of the operating
expense budget that now goes to the coalition provisional authority
and that is about $196 million. And pursuant to the fiscal year
2004 supplemental, 1 percent of the Iraq reconstruction end, I am
sorry, Relief and Reconstruction Fund, is also available for trans-
fer. That is about $184 million. And so those total $477 million.
Our estimate is about $483 million and we believe that the balance
can be found either through contributions from other government
agencies, unobligated balances for the CPA. So, we believe we can
manage in this area to the end of the fiscal year.
Looking ahead toward 2005, we believe that the costs of running
our mission in 2005 will be about $1 billion. We expect, obviously,
it has been said before, that there will be a supplemental appro-
priation and the timing and the size of that to be determined by
the President. We will fund salaries and expenses and other costs
that we have out of our budget, until a supplemental is approved.
And the Department of Defense will continue to support the logis-
tics contract, security requirements for our mission until Ambas-
sador Negroponte and his senior team can figure out where we
want to go and make an estimate to be included in a supplemental
request.
And I can tell Members of this Committee that we are working
hard with OMB, with CPA and we will certainly be consulting with
the Congress before any final decisions are made.
Mr. Chairman, second, you asked in your letter, if I could talk
a little about the transition to sovereignty before the first of July,
and I would be glad to do that. The plan, of course, that got estab-
lished for the assumption of full sovereignty by the Iraqi govern-
ment is laid out in the agreement from the 15th of November of
last year. That was an agreement signed by CPA and the Iraqi
Governing Council. It called for a transitional administrative law
encompassing a bill of rights for all Iraqis and it also called for the
selection of an interim Iraqi government to oversee the preparation
of national elections and the transfer of sovereignty to this interim
government by June 30, 2004.
I have miscalculated slightly and have a chart back there which
no one can see, but I hope you would allow me to just submit one
for the record, Mr. Chairman, and I think it lays out graphically
where we are headed. I apologize that that one is not big enough.
The agreement establishes a timeline for national elections


12
that Iraqis want to make sure that long term decisions for Iraq,
long term commitments for Iraq are made by an elected govern-
ment. And I think it is very important to recognize that this in-
terim government, fully sovereign, will, by Iraqi design, have limi-
tations on its authority between the first of July and the end of De-
cember. Because the long term decisions are best left to an elected
Iraqi government.
And I might also say that from my perspective, it is up to Iraqis
to decide what those limitations might be as part of the consulta-
tion process with Ambassador Brahimi.
One very important piece is yet undone and that is the annex to
the transitional administrative law. And it has yet to be written,
but it will be written, I believe, as Ambassador Brahimi and others
are forming this government. And once the government is formed,
then they will write this annex to show what authorities this Iraqi
interim government will have. Very important point. The transi-
tional administrative law provides in article 59 for the multi-
national force in Iraq to continue to operate under the provisions
of U.N. Security Council Resolution 1511 and any subsequent U.N.
Security Council Resolution until such time as an elected govern-
ment concludes appropriate security arrangements.
Iraqis say that the only truly legitimate government will be one
that comes through elections and we agree with that. And here I
pay tribute to the effort the United Nations is making under the
leadership of Ms. Perelli in Iraq to bring about elections. The cre-
ation of an independent election commission, work she is already
doing to look for nomination papers, to organize elections. And she
believes that we can have an election in Iraq or that Iraqis can
have an election in Iraq in December or January and move forward
as laid out in the transitional administrative law.
Both you, Mr. Chairman, and the Ranking Member talked about
a U.N. Security Council Resolution. You know that we are talking
to our Security Council partners about one. We have already had
some consultations. We are not consulting yet on a text, but we are
talking to people about what the main elements are. Tomorrow,
Secretary Powell has a number of his colleagues in Washington
and will continue that conversation.
Let me just list for you what we would expect a new Security
Council resolution would deal with. It first of all, as you both said,
would express support for this Iraqi interim government. It would
address the end of occupation. It would support the political transi-
tion, structure a role for the United Nations in the new political
framework, particularly in supporting elections and addressing the
continuing need for security to enable the Iraqi people to complete
the political process.
And while Resolution 1511 provides a legal authority for contin-
ued multinational force operations after June 30, we expect a new
resolution would further address the role of this force.
And finally, Mr. Chairman, just as you and the Ranking Member
said, we also believe that a new resolution should encourage other
nations to get involved, both in terms of security and also in terms
of reconstruction activities in Iraq.
Mr. Chairman, you and the Ranking Member both said that
there are challenges ahead, that this is a question of will, but I


13
hope that I have been able in some small way to let you know what
the plan is at the State Department, both for creating a United
States mission with an Ambassador to Iraq on the first of July and
where we stand in supporting Ambassador Brahimi and the United
Nations as he goes forward to try to create this interim government
and I thank you very much, sir.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Grossman follows:]
Prepared Statement of the Honorable Marc Grossman, Under Secretary for
Political Affairs, U.S. Department of State
Mr. Chairman, Congressman Lantos, Members of the Committee, I appreciate the
opportunity to report to you today on the progress we are making as we meet six
weeks before the June 30 transfer of sovereignty in Iraq.
Before I begin, I want to pay tribute to the men and women who are serving our
country in Iraq. I know you are immensely proud of the Americans—civilian and
military—who demonstrate the highest degree of dedication, determination and
courage as they work to bring security, democracy and prosperity to Iraq. I also
want to thank our many Coalition partners—civilian and military—for their stead-
fast support and sacrifices.
Thank you also for your support of the State Department.
I will report to you today:
• That we are carrying out a plan to get to June 30 and beyond based on guid-
ance and direction set by the President and Secretary Powell;
• That we are focused on the need to get enough resources, the right people
and the right organization so that we can do the job we have been assigned,
and finally;
• That we are focused on achieving a successful transition to an Iraqi Interim
Government, working closely with Iraqis, our Coalition partners, and the
United Nations.
TRANSITION TO A U.S. MISSION
Mr. Chairman, allow me to review the status of our efforts to transition on June
30 from the Coalition Provisional Authority to a U.S. Mission.
Last month, Secretary Powell told some of your colleagues, "When the State De-
partment assumes the lead role this summer in representing and managing U.S. in-
terests in Iraq, we will carry on that commitment. We're already thoroughly in-
volved, and we will succeed." The Secretary has set the State Department in motion
to support the President's goal of a smooth transition on June 30.
We are pleased by the Senate's prompt confirmation of Ambassador Negroponte.
He will do a fantastic job as the first U.S. Ambassador to a free Iraq. He has al-
ready recruited an excellent team of senior officers to support him.
After the CPA and the Iraqi Governing Council signed the November 15 Agree-
ment and established the June 30 transition date, the Secretary called Ambassador
Frank Ricciardone back to Washington to head our transition team. In his first day
on the job, Frank Ricciardone went to the Pentagon to meet with his counterpart
as the Iraq Transition Team leader for the Department of Defense, LTG (ret.) Mick
Kicklighter. Ricciardone and Kicklighter head one interagency transition team.
Our interagency team has established a cell in Baghdad under Ambassador John
Holzman. Ambassador Holzman works on transition planning and implementation
in consultation with CPA Administrator Bremer and CJTF-7 Commander Lieuten-
ant General Sanchez.
The Secretary's involvement in our transition planning continues daily. Each
evening we send the Secretary a consolidated summary of the Department's transi-
tion-related activities for the day. The notes demonstrate a broad range of inter-
agency, bilateral and multilateral requirements, and highlight issues to solve and
those resolved. We also provide the Secretary a more in-depth weekly report that
highlights key challenges and the steps we are taking to address them.
As an early step, the transition planning team established teams in key sectors
critical to a successful transition on June 30. We sent interagency assessment teams
to Iraq to examine the situation on the ground.
Each of these sectors has broken down their work into milestones. The sectors col-
lectively have set more than 500 milestones. And behind these milestones are thou-
sands of individual tasks. Responsibility for each task has been assigned to a par-
ticular agency or office, and there are target completion dates.
-662 D-2


14
We at the State Department are glad to brief you or your staff on any of the tasks
we have identified. And let me offer full access to our Transition Planning Team
intranet website to any of your staff willing to visit us in the Department of State
and use computers with access to our intranet.
I would like to spend a few minutes today on our planning and progress in four
key sectors of transition planning: people, security, buildings and money.
PEOPLE
With Ambassador Negroponte's confirmation, we have filled most senior Mission
positions. Ambassador Jim Jeffrey, our current ambassador to Albania, has been se-
lected to be the Deputy Chief of Mission.
We currently anticipate a total of around 1,000 direct-hire American positions and
700 Foreign Service Nationals (FSNs) for a total Mission size of 1,700. Let me ex-
plain how we get to these numbers.
First, the State Department has announced positions for 140 American employees.
More than 200 people have requested to be assigned to the new Embassy. Thanks
to the eagerness of so many State Department people to volunteer for service, of the
140 positions announced, we have formally assigned 122 people.
The State Department has also announced positions for 155 locally engaged staff,
interviewed more than 90 Iraqi applicants for the local hire positions, and have
hired our first Iraqi employees. These first hires are undergoing training here in
Washington in order to prepare to help us hire others for service in the Embassy.
In the short run, however, pending the Embassy's ability to bring on all the direct-
hire Iraqi personnel that we ultimately will need, the Embassy will rely on Iraqi
and third country staff now under the U.S. Army's "Logcap" contract to provide
many basic support services.
Second, in addition to the State Department officers noted above, approximately
620 CPA staff will continue after July 1 in a temporary capacity under Chief of Mis-
sion authority to ensure the continuity of the transition process and to support Iraq
reconstruction efforts. These personnel will be located in either Department of State
or Department of Defense offices, and will include 155 ministry liaison positions, the
CPA Inspector General, the Iraqi Reconstruction Management Office and the Project
and Contracting Office. We estimate that around 350 Iraqi staff will support these
various offices.
Third, in January, the Secretary asked his Cabinet colleagues to identify Mission
positions their agencies want in Embassy Baghdad. As of May 10, 11 agencies, other
than the State Department, have requested a total of 253 American and 182 locally
hired personnel for FY 2005. These numbers may increase slightly agencies provide
further refinements.
We will also be represented in Iraq's provinces. The Secretary of State will deter-
mine an appropriate level of representation outside of Baghdad to ensure that we
can best fulfill the mission given to us by the President.
Ambassador Negroponte will carry with him to Iraq a letter from the President—
as all our Ambassadors do—that spells out his authority in Iraq. It will say that
he—like our Ambassadors around the world—as the Chief of Mission and personal
representative of the President, reporting through the Secretary of State, will have
full responsibility for the direction, coordination, and supervision of all United
States Government executive branch employees in Iraq, regardless of their employ-
ment categories or location, except those under command of a U.S. area military
commander or on the staff of an international organization.
Of course, the Ambassador and the military commander will have to work closely
together to ensure that their respective operations are fully coordinated and best
serve the interests of the United States in Iraq.
After June 30, U.S. forces in Iraq will report to the U.S. commander of the Multi-
national Force—Iraq (MNF-I) through the military chain of command. We will con-
sult closely with the Interim Iraqi Government and, as General Myers has said, we
will build a partnership with Iraqi security forces and the Iraqi Interim Govern-
ment.
SECURITY
This is a dangerous mission. Our top priority is to keep our people safe. We have
already begun the security upgrade of the planned interim Embassy buildings, and
have selected a site for a future new Embassy compound based largely on security.
We already have 51 armored vehicles in Iraq and another 90 are on order. A thor-
ough inventory of CPA vehicle assets will determine what additional assets will
transfer on July 1.


16
erning Council, called for a Transitional Administrative Law, encompassing a basic
bill of rights for all Iraqis.
The agreement called for the selection of an interim Iraqi government to oversee
the preparation of national elections, and the transfer of sovereignty to this interim
government by June 30, 2004.
And the agreement established a timeline for national elections, the drafting and
ratification of a permanent constitution and the election of a government under that
constitution by December 31, 2005.
There have been changes since November 15. But the basic framework and
timeline has held.
TRANSITIONAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
The first step was the Governing Council's unanimous agreement on the Transi-
tional Administrative Law, or TAL, more than two months ago.
The TAL provides for equal rights for all Iraqis, without regard to gender, sect,
opinion, belief, nationality, religion or origin. It confirms Iraq as a single state with
federal structures, affirms civilian control of the Iraqi security services and the inde-
pendence of the judiciary. Finally, the TAL establishes the general framework for
national elections no later than January 31, 2005, the drafting of a permanent con-
stitution by August 15, 2005 and the transition to a constitutionally-based post-
transition Iraqi government by December 31, 2005.
THE IRAQI INTERIM GOVERNMENT
At the national level, our focus today is on forming the Iraqi Interim Government
(IIG). At the invitation of the Iraqi Governing Council, and with our full support,
the UN is playing a vital role in the formation of the Iraqi Interim Government by
June 30 and in preparing for national elections by January 2005.
In April, Ambassador Lakhdar Brahimi conducted extensive consultations with
Iraqis as part of this process. On April 27, Ambassador Brahimi briefed the UN Se-
curity Council on his preliminary ideas for the formation of the IIG.
Based on his consultations in Iraq, Ambassador Brahimi has proposed estab-
lishing by the end of May an interim government led by a Prime Minister that also
includes a President and two deputy presidents. A council of ministers would report
to the Prime Minister. An Advisory Body, selected in July by a National Conference,
would serve alongside the Executive but have no legislative authority.
The United States has welcomed Ambassador Brahimi's proposals. The Security
Council expressed strong support for Ambassador Brahimi's work.
Ambassador Brahimi is in Iraq today, with our full support, to continue his na-
tionwide consultations with Iraqis.
The Iraqi Interim Government will be the sovereign governing authority of Iraq
on June 30. But it will also be a temporary government. As Ambassador Brahimi
has noted on several occasions, the priorities of this government should be the day-
to-day administration of the country, the preparations of elections for the Transi-
tional National Assembly, providing for the security and safety of the Iraqi people,
and continuing economic reconstruction and development.
On June 30, Iraq will be fully sovereign. Iraqis have told us, however, of their
desire to have limits on the authorities of this government—an unelected, short-
term interim government. This reflects the view among Iraqis that there are some
issues best left for decision to an elected Iraqi government.
It is for Iraqis to decide what those limits might be, in the context of the consult-
ative process led by Ambassador Brahimi. Some limitations are already described
in the Transitional Administrative Law. For instance, the TAL states that the
boundaries of Iraq's governorates shall remain without change during the transi-
tional period.
In addition, the TAL calls for an Annex to describe the interim government, in-
cluding its structure and authorities. The Annex has not been drafted, but will re-
flect the results of Ambassador Brahimi's ongoing consultations with Iraqis.
The TAL also provides for the multinational force in Iraq to continue to operate
pursuant to the provisions of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1511, and
any subsequent relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions, until such
time as an elected government concludes appropriate security agreements.
Iraqis have told us that only a government chosen by democratic elections will be
viewed within Iraq as fully legitimate. We agree. The call for national elections in
early 2005 was a key part of the November 15 agreement.
The UN's involvement in helping Iraqis prepare for elections has been, and will
remain vital to Iraq's political transition. The UN election team, headed by Carina
Perelli, has a close, productive working relationship with Iraqi and CPA officials.


18
I want to commend my colleagues at the State Department and
my colleagues in the Defense Department for what I think is an-
other successful example of teamwork, the transition from the coa-
lition provisional authority under DoD to an American Embassy
under the Department of State. I think that transition is working
very well.
I know the headlines today are dominated by another issue, the
abuses at the prison. Those abuses are a disgrace and we in the
Department of Defense, especially we in the Department of De-
fense, have to deal with it. And we have heard the Secretary of De-
fense and Chairman Myers and other officials of the Department
who are familiar with this issue lay out in public what we are
doing about it, how our system of military justice is seeking to de-
termine the facts and insure accountability and to prevent, most of
all, to prevent this from ever happening again. So we have to deal
with that.
But in a way, that issue only confirms the importance of what
is the main topic of this hearing, namely the transfer of sovereign
authority to Iraqis on June 30. First of all, turning the country
back to Iraqis shows that we are keeping our promise. We came
there as liberators, we came there to be liberators, not to be occu-
piers and that is what we are doing and turning back authority to
them is the demonstration of that.
Second, as the Chairman mentioned, it adds to the incentive. It
provides incentive to Iraqis to step forward and take responsibility
for their own institutions and we see this happening.
But third, it is also at the heart of our overall strategy. Our
strategy is not just military, it is also political. The collapse of the
old regime left a vacuum and we want that vacuum to be filled by
Iraqis, by decent, moderate Iraqis filling that vacuum with their
own institutions, new institutions, decent institutions, political,
economic, security institutions, because our strategy is to empower
the moderates in Iraq and to marginalize the extremists politically,
even while the coalition is seeking to put them out of business mili-
tarily.
Now the validity of this strategy is confirmed by Mr. Zarqawi,
the terrorist leader, in the letter, the famous letter that we inter-
cepted a few months ago. Mr. Zarqawi was sending a message to
his al-Qaeda colleagues and one of the things he dwelt on at great
length was the fact that June 30 was a big problem for him. June
30 was going to make it harder for the terrorists to organize
against the coalition. He said:
"Democracy is coming and we will have no excuse."
That is a quote.
"How can we fight the Iraqis own cousins and sons and
under what pretext can we do this after the Americans have
stepped back?"
That is a quote.
So Mr. Zarqawi and his henchmen know what our strategy is
and they are doing everything they can to derail it. And I dare say
so far they are not succeeding in derailing it. And that is why the
political transition is crucial. That is why we have to pursue it and


22
ply 12,000 qualified people for duty in Iraq. For political reasons,
that is not now feasible.
I would like to see the Administration explore and I would like
you to respond to the idea of having Turkey take over a much
greater share of the responsibility in Afghanistan, so NATO forces
can be applied overwhelmingly to Iraq.
My final issue is, in a sense, a philosophical issue, but I think
it is the Achilles' heel of this Administration's approach to Iraq.
And I have seen zero indication so far that despite efforts by many
of us for over a year to emphasize this point, when a country is at
war, sharing sacrifice is the first rule. This Administration has op-
posed sharing sacrifice with its abominable tax policy favoring the
wealthy. And this Administration has opposed responsible legisla-
tion which would have provided reservists and National Guards-
men with some financial compensation when they are called to ac-
tive duty in Iraq.
Now I am not asking you to respond to the first issue. That is
above your pay grade. But the second issue is not. Our reserves
and our National Guardsmen are in grave danger of being under-
mined because these wonderful, patriotic men and women not only
go to Iraq to serve under very difficult circumstances, but their
families face financial disaster because the Administration is un-
willing to support bipartisan legislation that would provide a min-
imum of financial security to activated National Reserves and
Guardspeople. I would be grateful if you would respond.
Mr. Grossman. Yes, sir, Mr. Lantos, I will try to respond to the
first two and perhaps General Sharp can help me with the third.
First, on the question of NATO, I take your idea. I think the idea
of looking for someone to do election security is an extremely inter-
esting one. So let me take that idea.
But I think it is worth stepping back here, and I have testified
in this Committee in my various jobs for many, many years and
that is to recognize that in 1999 and 2000, we thought NATO was
going to go out of business. Because what was it going to do? And
at the Washington Summit that you all supported in 1999, NATO
did change the way it thought about its mission.
I think the fact that NATO has taken over ISAF security in Af-
ghanistan is something well worth celebrating and something well
worth working on. And I can tell you that we are trying to expand
NATO's role in Afghanistan, so that there are more of what we call
PRTs, provincial reconstruction teams. And so I think that the Sec-
retary General of NATO is right to say, we are proud of what we
are doing in Afghanistan and we ought to keep doing it.
On the question of NATO, you know, we were in many ways
among the first to talk to NATO about what it could do. And I
think the fact that NATO now does, as an alliance, the whole alli-
ance, support the Polish division is a good thing. But we are always
looking for more ways to think about more things that NATO can
do, ways that NATO can expand its position in Iraq. And as we
move forward, Congressman Lantos, to the 28th of June, which is
the NATO summit in Istanbul, I can tell you that many of us, and
we were at a meeting yesterday talking about just this, want to see
what more NATO can do.


23
So if you will let me take your idea on election security, I will
do that. But let me assure you that we are looking for ways that
we would like to possibly expand the role of the alliance.
One more point, if I could, on this question and that is that it
is very important as I analyze this issue of NATO, to make sure
that we keep going forward on the June 31 date because many of
our NATO partners, I think, will be more comfortable participating
if there is an interim Iraqi government that is sovereign.
And secondly, sir, as you said, it is very important that we get
the Security Council Resolution near simultaneously, because that
will also help us at NATO.
Second, on the question of having Turkey do more in Afghani-
stan, that is certainly on our agenda. One of the things, in fact,
that the Turks came to us some weeks ago, was to see if they could
take over or create, actually, a new PRT in Afghanistan and we are
certainly talking to them about that, about where it should be,
where it should be located. I thought they were very successful in
their 6 months as the ISAF commander. And I think countries like
Turkey could do more, and I would also say a country like Spain
might also find a way to do more in Afghanistan. I think that
would be a good thing. Because although we are here talking about
Iraq, as you said, Iraq, Afghanistan, these are really our ways now
of continuing to fight this global war on terrorism.
I apologize, but I will let General Sharp talk, if he can, about the
third.
Lt. General Sharp. Sir, let me answer also first on the question
of NATO. From a military perspective, we would love to have ei-
ther U.N. forces or NATO forces in doing specific missions, guard-
ing the U.N., guarding security sites as they go up around.
We must also, though, I think, recognize that NATO has done al-
ready helping the Polish division, plus the fact that there are many
NATO nations in Iraq right now. So as you know, NATO is made
up of countries and they are in part, a lot to do because of what
NATO has done.
I think that we have to be realistic, though. I like your idea
about Turkey potentially taking over a lot of responsibilities in Af-
ghanistan. As you know, in Afghanistan right now, NATO has en-
dorsed and is trying to expand their mission, their PRTs, beyond
Konduz and up to the north and to be able to move further out to
the west. But unfortunately, they have not been able to develop the
troops in order to be able to expand that presence out there.
So I think in order to be able to get that done and to go into Iraq
will be a challenge for countries that make up NATO. Not to say
that we should not try to go after them. I definitely think that we
should, but it will take all of us talking to other nations that be-
long to NATO to make sure that they understand that when they
sign up for this mission, they must be willing to commit their
troops to it also, and not repeat the troubles we are having in Af-
ghanistan right now.
On the Reserve and National Guard pay, I do not have the spe-
cifics, but the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman, General
Myers, are working very closely together to take a look at not only
pay, but also the benefits that we are giving and that we should
be giving to our Reserve components and our National Guard. They


25
you make to take that prison down is a good one. I hope we give
that consideration.
Elections in Iraq are on track. Remember the discussion we all
had a few months ago. The Ayatollah Sistani wanted elections
right away and we and the United Nation's experts concluded as
a practical matter that it was hard to organize them right away.
But as you know, they are now scheduled for the end of the year,
next year, and that is a time table that I think we can meet and
for precisely the reasons that we have suggested. We need to give
this country back to the Iraqis. Legitimacy will come most of all
from an elected government and getting that process underway
whereby Iraqis take charge is the political strategy that is at the
core of what we are doing there.
You are right about humiliation. Again, there is no way to defend
this. It is counterproductive, to put it mildly. But, again, giving the
country back to Iraqis was our original plan and it is all the more
imperative that we do it.
Now I would add one caveat. You suggested that we then start
withdrawing troops right away. I think that the withdrawal of
troops should depend on the need. And we and the Iraqis already,
and this is reflected in the transitional administrative law, have al-
ready agreed that they will need us for a little longer. All the Iraqi
leaders tell us this. They know they will need the coalition to stay,
to help with external security and to help train them to the point
where they will be able to take on more and more responsibility.
So I think we owe them that and that is what they are telling us
what they want.
And this was, by the way, a completely uncontroversial part of
the TAL, if I recall. There were disputes about different provisions,
but the Iraqis seemed to agree on this.
So I think our mission is to train them in the security field, to
take responsibility, just as we are trying to turn over responsibility
right away in every other field of government.
Chairman Hyde. The gentleman's time has expired. Due to the
cooperation of Mr. Berman, next will be Mr. Ackerman.
Mr. ACKERMAN. I thank the Chair. Thank you, Mr. Berman.
First let me say congratulations. This is the first time since the be-
ginning of this war that I, and I believe anyone on this Committee
has heard anything that even vaguely resembles a plan, although
we have been asking what the plan is for a very long time. And
while there may be some questions about it, it is, at least, a well
thought out plan.
I am a little confused about the plan for the interim government
that is proposed by Special Envoy from the U.N. Brahimi. Who is
going to choose the members of this interim government? Will the
CPA choose it? Will the current Iraqi Governing Council choose,
will the U.N. choose, will someone else, will we choose? Secretary
Grossman?
Mr. Grossman. Yes, sir. First of all, I appreciate what you said.
We are trying to get this planned and meet our commitments on
the first of July.
If I could, Mr. Ackerman, since it is a perfectly fair question, I
put in a call this morning to Bob Blackwell, who is there rep-
resenting the United States along with Ambassador Bremer. And


35
There is one individual, though, I am interested in getting infor-
mation on, because it was mentioned in the report that he had a
significant role to play, and that is John Israel. All of a sudden, we
do not know where he is. We hear that he did not have a clearance
and that we do not know what nationality he is.
And I am wondering, Mr. Rodman, do you have the answers to
that?
Mr. RODMAN. No, I do not have the answer, but I can certainly
get you a response for the record. Are you referring to the fact that
private contractors were involved in some of the
Mr. Paul. Yes, in general, more so than ever before and they are
contractors and then subcontractors and individuals like this. The
fact that this one individual, they say he cannot be found and we
do not know exactly where he is, why did he not have a security
clearance? What is his nationality? I think that is pretty important.
Especially, Congress ought to know about this, so I would like to
get the answers on that.
Mr. Rodman. Okay, I will get you a response. I think the role
of contractors is one of the subjects being investigated as part of
this whole episode. So without any doubt.
Mr. PAUL. The other question I have is for Ambassador Gross-
man and it is a follow up on whether or not our troops stay and
also a follow up on Mr. Delahunt.
This has to do with the transition and what happens afterwards.
We are expecting a smooth transition or at least hoping for that,
but we yet do not know how long we are going to stay and who
is really in charge. The subject of whether Brahimi is going to have
the greatest influence or whether Chalabi will have the greatest in-
fluence, I do not think we can pass that over casually. That, to me,
seems to be the key. Chalabi is questionable, controversial. He has
not lived there for 15 years and yet he is our handpicked guy. I
think, you know, if we get him in the right place, sure enough, he
is not going to ask us to leave.
But what if Brahimi wins this battle and he has more to say
about it? Now that we are falling back to the U.N., depending on
the U.N., even hiding behind resolutions, not our own sovereignty
and our own interest, we hide behind decision making by a U.N.
resolution. I think it is outrageous. Here, I think the key to it is
who is going to win this battle between Brahimi and Chalabi, be-
cause sure enough, Chalabi will not ask us to leave.
So why is it that you tend to pass this dissension, this disagree-
ment, ever so lightly?
Mr. Grossman. Mr. Paul, first of all, let me just be clear that our
troops will stay in Iraq. That we have a shared vision with Iraqis
about the future of Iraq and just because there is a transition and
just because we are going to move from this election to that elec-
tion does not mean America will leave Iraq. We are not going to
leave this job undone and I just want to be clear about that.
Second, when you asked me, you know, who wins in this battle
or that battle, I think the object here, and it certainly is Ambas-
sador Bremer's object and Ambassador Blackwell's object and I
think it is Ambassador Brahimi's object, as well, is that Iraqis are
going to win this battle. This is not about one individual or another
individual and that the reason Brahimi is now in his second visit


41
administrative law put together by Iraqis, endorses our remaining
there to provide security and stability to Iraq.
Mr. MENENDEZ. But any sovereign government could change its
mind. Are you saying that this sovereign government is limited by
this transitional provision in a way that it could not say to you, we
no longer desire you? Which is the constant din of voices that we
hear from inside Iraq rising. You are saying that is not possible?
Mr. Grossman. No, sir, what I am saying is that it is slightly
different from my perspective, which is to say, I think what you are
laying on us, with all due respect, is that we have somehow put
this limitation on Iraqi authority. And as I testified and I will try
to answer your question, sir, it is Iraqis who have said, we have
a vision for our country, we cannot make that vision without secu-
rity, we cannot do security by ourselves, we need help. So it was
Iraqis who drafted the transitional administrative law, it was
Iraqis
Mr. MENENDEZ. But they have the right to change their mind,
do they not, Ambassador? Or are they restrained by that? Just give
me a simple yes or no, are they free to ask us to leave if they
choose to?
Mr. Grossman. I believe that during the period that we are talk-
ing about, from July 1 until there is an elected government
Mr. MENENDEZ. They are not allowed to ask us to leave?
Mr. Grossman. I am sorry, sir. 1511, the transitional adminis-
trative law are what is governing. I just have one other point and
that is to say that the idea, for example, that a country like Korea
is not sovereign and
Mr. Menendez. I am not talking about Korea, Ambassador, I am
talking about Iraq. My time is just about up. So
Chairman HYDe. Your time is up. Your time is up.
Mr. Menendez. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the courtesy.
Chairman Hyde. You are more than welcome. Thank you for
yours. Mr. Tancredo.
Mr. Tancredo. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, although this is per-
haps only tangentially related to the issue of the transition, I still
would like to know the answer and that is, can you tell me, gentle-
men, any of you, exactly what were the conditions and what was
the reason for Mr. Berg's detention. By the United States Forces?
Mr. Rodman. I do not know the answer to that and I will try to
get you a response for the record, sir.
Mr. TANCREDO. Do you have any information as to the situation
or the circumstances, I guess, that surrounded his presence in Iraq
and then exactly what happened that led to his eventual capture
by forces that eventually killed him?
Mr. RODMAN. I do not have the answer to that, but I think we
will get you a response.
Mr. Tancredo. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman HYDe. Thank you. Ms. Lee?
Ms. LEe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I want to thank our
panel of witnesses for being here today. This hearing, I think, is
entitled Iraq's Imminent Transfer of Sovereignty, but after listen-
ing to the testimony today, it is really very unclear that Iraq's sov-
ereignty is imminent. In fact, it may not be any more imminent


48
institutions to develop the capacity necessary to assume sovereignty, and I am not
convinced there is consensus among Iraq's ethnic and political factions.
The soldiers and guardsmen who are accused—not yet convicted—of abusing their
captives made questionable decisions. They will probably pay for them with their
military careers, and in some cases with time behind bars. They have already paid
with their reputations. It is important, though, not to judge all our servicemen and
women by what happened in Abu Ghraib or to judge what happened there by the
standards of behavior applied to civilian society.
One year after Coalition forces entered Iraq to depose Saddam Hussein, Iraqis are
engaged in the enormous challenge of rebuilding their country after decades of ne-
glect, and are working with the Coalition toward the creation of a secure, stable,
sovereign and peaceful nation. There is ample evidence that our Coalition forces are
helping the Iraqi people: Electricity is now more equitably distributed and more sta-
ble, instead of, as during Saddam Hussein's rule, being supplied to Baghdad at the
expense of the rest of the country; Water supply in many areas is now at pre-conflict
levels, Iraqi hospitals are up and running, and healthcare, previously available only
for Ba'athist elite, is now available to all Iraqis; Repairs and modernizations are
being made to the antiquated and neglected oil production and distribution systems;
repairs to roads, airports, bridges and other critical infrastructure such as the Port
at Umm Qasr have improved access and mobility for the Iraqi people.
This has not been an easy transition but we must remain committed to the task
at hand to deliver the Iraqi people from oppression and tyranny to the promise of
democracy and freedom. The successful transfer of sovereignty will create meaning-
ful equity for Iraqi citizens in the process of shaping their future, and hope for pros-
perity and democracy for them and their children.
Prepared Statement of the Honorable Nick Smith, a Representative in
Congress from the State of Michigan
I want to thank Chairman Hyde for holding this hearing today. And I would also
like to thank our distinguished witnesses for joining us. We are entering one of the
most difficult phases of the transformation of Iraq.
Fourteen months ago in March of last year, I told the Secretary of Defense that
there were two battlefields for this war: political and military. We were going to
have to win the support of the Sunni, the Shia, and the Kurds. We were going to
have to defeat an insurgency with some popular support in both Iraq and in Amer-
ica. We see today that the Iraqi people are going to have to work together in a way
that is completely alien to their previous experience. In the end, Iraqification will
have to cover all aspects of the Iraqi government. Iraqis will have to control the po-
litical apparatus, the security apparatus, and the economic apparatus.
We should recognize that there has been significant progress. Oil and power pro-
duction have been increasing. Half of the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps (ICDC) has been
trained and. Several of the functions of government have already been turned over
to the people of Iraq. Iraqis are beginning to experience participatory government
through local councils. Wages are rising, and prices are stabilizing. The architecture
of a normal life is coming together in Iraq.
While this progress is important, it does not address some of the largest problems
that must be overcome. The first problem is security, especially in the short-term.
Given all the other pressures on an Iraqi government, it must provide basic secu-
rity. The second problem is creating a constitution providing an Iraqi identity and
legitimacy and finding balance between Shia, Sunni, and Kurds. In successful de-
mocracies, multiple regional, ethnic, and ideological groups are held together be-
cause they all have an investment in the state. They recognize that only by playing
by the rules of the state can they collect on their investment. Eventually identifica-
tion with the state settles into enough of the constituencies that hopefully the coun-
try becomes stable. It is these intangibles that are less apparent in Iraq, and these
will threaten the stability and success in the long-term. Terrorism can continue
after transition. Selection and training Iraqi security forces is critical to long-range
success of a democratic Iraq.
Our responses to April's uprisings demonstrated a way of handling the situation.
These were limited actions by groups that did not feel like they were invested in
the future of Iraq. Sadr is an outcast Shia cleric who appeals to some of the poor
in Baghdad and other areas. We responded by rolling back the uprising and encour-
aging Sistani and other parts of the Shia establishment to reject the uprising. In
Fallujah, we followed a similar path. After our soldiers responded to a planned
slaughter on four civilian contractors, an uprising began. American troops contained
the uprising, and brought in Iraqi leadership and troops to put down the uprising.


56
be in accordance with the regular notification procedures of the Committees on Ap-
propriations and section 634A of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 . . ."
Section 2208 of the Act further provides that the Coalition Provisional Authority
"shall be deemed to include any successor USG entity with the same or substan-
tially the same authorities and responsibilities . . ."
Accordingly, these funds are available for Department and Embassy operating ex-
penses and are available for expenditure in FY 2004. As recognized in the Con-
ference Report [p. 52]: "Since the CPA is less than a year old and it is possible that
the organization could require additional operational resources during this year, the
managers also have included bill language in the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction
Fund that provides authority, if needed, to transfer up to 1 percent for CPA's oper-
ating expenses."
Question:
What size would a normal Embassy in Baghdad be, taking into account that it
will be a relatively large Embassy with a large assistance program? The greatest cost
in an embassy is taken up in the offices in which classified work is undertaken. Inas-
much as the great bulk of the new Embassy to be constructed for a staff much larger
than will be using it relatively soon, is there a way to provide adequate, secure, tem-
porary chancery space alongside a permanent building? In other words, can we avoid
constructing a 'white elephant' that will quickly become much too large for any rea-
sonably-sized staff?
Response:
The size of Embassy Baghdad will be determined by the Chief of Mission in ac-
cordance with NSDD-38 procedures and in consultation with the Department of
State and other appropriate agencies. The determination of mission size will be
based on an assessment of the number of the personnel required to meet U.S. na-
tional objectives.
Agencies are requesting space in the Embassy through the NSDD-38 process now.
The NSDD-38 process is designed to facilitate long-term planning by all USG agen-
cies, including the Department of State, to ensure that we have the appropriate fa-
cilities in Iraq to serve and support U.S. interests effectively.
Temporary secure space in Baghdad is being created at the Embassy Annex, and
will be flexibly responsive to short-term requirements. The Annex will be used until
permanent, secure buildings are funded by Congress and built by the Department's
Office of Overseas Buildings Operations.
As we go forward, we will strive to lower the cost to the American taxpayer while
providing USG employees in Baghdad a safe and effective place to conduct USG af-
fairs.
Question:
What will be the fate of contracts made by CPA (Coalition Provisional Authority
or the IGC (Iraq Governing Council)?
Response:
United Nations Security Council resolution 1483 established that Iraq's oil export
revenues would be deposited in a special fund, the Development Fund for Iraq
(DFI).
Until the transfer of sovereignty, the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) has
signature authority over DFI, enters into contracts for goods and services for Iraq
using funds from DFI, and also uses U.S. funds for such purposes. An international
body called the International Advisory and Monitoring Board (IAMB) acts as an ex-
ternal audit committee for regular DFI audits.
We expect that full signature authority over the DFI will transfer to the proposed
Iraqi Interim Government (IIG) at the time governing authority is assumed by that
body. We also expect that the IAMB will continue to ensure that proper DFI audits
are carried out.
The CPA has also reconstituted the Iraqi Board of Supreme Audit and established
inspectors general for Iraqi ministries, which remain in operation under the IIG
comes into existence.
We expect that all contracts legally entered into by CPA or the Iraqi Governing
Council will be honored by the IIG. The Iraqi Minister of Finance agrees that the
Iraq Reconstruction Management Office, to be a part of the U.S. Embassy in Bagh-
dad, will provide management oversight, in coordination with relevant IIG officials,
on contracts that were awarded by the CPA before the transfer of sovereignty. This
arrangement will benefit the Iraqi people by facilitating the continuation of con-
tracts entered into by the CPA on behalf of Iraq.


63
The CPA has issued Order 71, Local Governmental Powers (available on the
CPA website, www.coalitioniraq.org), which gives governorate and local
councils the primary voice in the hiring and firing of governors and mayors
respectively. The Order further requires national ministries to coordinate
their activities with the councils of the communities their programs affect, and
gives the councils the right to oversee national ministries' local officials -
such as the Ministry of Interior's police chiefs.
The Transitional Administrative Law (TAL) gives each governorate the
exclusive voice in choosing its governor, forbids national officials from
dismissing local officials, and grants governates the right to review national
ministry operations and budgets for the governorate and levy taxes.
Mr. Brahimi has been working primarily on fashioning consensus for the
national-level Iraqi Interim Government. At the same time, the United
Nations Elections Assistance Team has taken the lead in working with the
Iraqis to prepare for elections, including nationwide elections for governorate
councils that the TAL requires to be held at the same time as the elections for
the National Assembly (no later than January 31, 2005).
To promote a vibrant civil society, CPA has also worked with Iraqis and
many nongovernmental agencies to open women's, human rights, and tribal
democracy centers across Iraq, supported professional and societal
associations, and organized or sponsored many town hall-style meetings to
discuss national and local issues.