76/2:S.HRG.108-645/pr/ S. Hrg. 108-645 IRAQ'S TRANSITION-THE WAY AHEAD [PART I] HEARING BEFORE THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS UNITED STATES SENATE ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS SECOND SESSION MAY 18, 2004 Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations Pennsylvania State University Libraries MAR i 200 Documents Collection Mailable via the World Wide Web: http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/senate U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE WASHINGTON : 2005 For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512-1800; DC area (202) 512-1800 Fax: (202) 512-2250 Mail: Stop SSOP, Washington, DC 20402-0001 COMmiTTEE ON foREIGN RELATIONS RICHARD G. CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska LINCOLN CHAFEE, Rhode Island GEORGE ALLEN, Virginia SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas MICHAEL B. ENZI, Wyoming GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio LAMAR ALEXANDER, Tennessee NORM COLEMAN, Minnesota JOHN E. SUNUNU, New Hampshire LUGAR, Indiana, Chairman JOSEPH R. BIDEN, Jr., Delaware PAUL S. SARBANES, Maryland CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin BARBARA BOXER, California BILL NELSON, Florida JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, West Virginia JON S. CORZINE, New Jersey Kenneth A. Myers, Jr., Staff Director Antony J. Blinken, Democratic Staff Director (II) 3 We are hopeful that Ambassador Lakhdar Brahimi will be suc- cessful in his work to construct an Interim Iraqi Government. The Iraqis themselves must reach internal political consensus and bal- ance among competing Sunni, Shia, and Kurdish factions and their thoughts. Once the new government is named, the transition to sovereignty should begin immediately. If possible, in my judgment, we should establish the United States Embassy before the June 30 transfer, and bring Ambassador Negroponte in early. Ambassador Bremer has provided extraordinary service, but, at this stage, he will begin to take on lame-duck status. Under Secretary Grossman testified, on April 22, about the im- portance of engaging an Interim Iraqi Government as soon as it is selected. We cannot simply turn on the lights in the embassy on June 30 and expect everything to go well. We must be rehearsing, with Iraqi authorities and our Coalition partners, how decision- making and administrative power will be distributed and exercised. It is critical, therefore, that Ambassador Negroponte and his team be put in place at the earliest possible moment. We also should be accelerating negotiations to complete a United Nations Security Council resolution to give international legitimacy to the new Iraqi government and to define new security arrangements. In addition, the United Nations and the new interim government should con- sider accelerating the elections scheduled for January 2005 and De- cember 2005 for the Transitional and Permanent Iraqi govern- ments. We are especially appreciative to have our witnesses with us today. Now, let me just say, as a point of personal privilege and, likewise, history, that about 19 years ago, in 1985, when I was a newly anointed Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, on the first occasion, Paul Wolfowitz and Rich Armitage came before the committee on that occasion to talk about the Philippines. Their testimony was farsighted and courageous. In a chapter in a book that I wrote about the situation, I stated my admiration for their testimony, for whatever it's worth, because it was remarkably pre- scient with regard to events that occurred throughout 1985 and the elections in February 1986 and subsequently. My admiration for these two gentlemen has remained unabated ever since. I appre- ciate especially your coming today at this important time for our committee, and for our colleagues, and for the American people who will witness this hearing. Senator Biden has been delayed by train difficulties, pure and simple. He will be here, and when he arrives, I will call upon him, of course, for his opening statement and comment. And, at some stage, we will have, the committee knows, a rollcall vote at ap- proximately 11:15. We will try to continue the hearing throughout that time. I will slip over to the floor and vote as rapidly as pos- sible, and call upon one of my colleagues to chair the meeting so we may continue with our deliberations. We thank the witnesses for coming. We look forward to hearing from them, first of all, in the order in which they are listed in our agenda, which would be Secretary Wolfowitz, then Secretary Armitage. Secretary Wolfowitz, we're delighted that you are here and we would be pleased to hear your testimony. 4 STATEMENT OF HON. PAUL WOLFOWITZ, DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE; ACCOM- PANIED BY: LT. GEN. WALTER L. SHARP, DIRECTOR, STRA- TEGIC PLANS AND POLICY, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, U.S. DE- PARTMENT OF DEFENSE, THE PENTAGON Mr. WOLFOWITZ. Mr. Chairman, I'm delighted to have the oppor- tunity to come here to talk about the very important questions that you've outlined in your opening statement. I want to thank you for the kind words that you just spoke about the role that Rich Armitage and I played some 20 years ago, not quite 20 years ago, but you were unduly modest, because you yourself played a more important role and with considerable courage, both in taking on an assignment that nobody else wanted to do, and then carrying it for- ward in the face of a great deal of pressure. And I think our coun- try and the Philippine people have a lot to thank you for that great leadership. Mr. Chairman, I have a somewhat long statement, which you can read and I would like to put in the record. I would just like to put it aside and make a few brief comments about the overall situation in Iraq. The Chairman. Your statement will appear in the record in full, and, likewise, that of Secretary Armitage. Mr. WOLFOWITZ. Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, the great men and women who wear the uniform of the United States have already accomplished amazing things in Iraq. They have re- moved a regime that was a threat to the United States and to the entire Middle East, a regime that sponsored terrorism and then de- veloped and used weapons of mass destruction. In the process, they have also liberated a nation of 25 million talented people, most of them Muslims, from the grip of one of the most cruel and sadistic tyrants in modern history. But their work is not done. The enemy that was defeated in major combat a year ago continues to sow death and destruction in the effort to prevent the emergence of a new Iraq. They and their terrorist allies from inside and outside Iraq understand that real defeat for them will come when Iraqis achieve the ability to govern themselves in freedom and to provide for the security of their own country. That is why the enemy real- izes that the next year or year and a half will be so critical, be- cause that is the time it will take to stand up Iraqi security forces that are fully trained, equipped, and organized, and to elect a rep- resentative Iraqi government after 40 years of tyranny and abuse. Already more than 775 American military have died in this noble cause, and many more have suffered grievous wounds. Brave civil- ians have been killed, as well. More than a hundred of our Coali- tion partners have given their lives for this cause. And by our own count, which is probably far from complete, 350 Iraqi policemen, civil defense fighters, and other security forces have given their lives for the cause of a new Iraq in the last year, and that doesn't count the thousands of Iraqis who have died fighting that evil re- gime for the last several decades, nor does it count the many brave Iraqi civilians who have stepped up to lead Iraq into the future and who were gunned down and murdered for that reason alone. Just this week, a second members of the Iraqi Governing Council, Izzedine Salim, was brutally assassinated, the second member of 5 the Iraqi Governing Council, along with that brave woman, Akila al-Hashimi, to give their lives for the cause of Iraqi freedom. We owe it to these noble Americans, to the Iraqi and Coalition part- ners, and, indeed, to ourselves and to the world, to finish the work that they have so nobly advanced. Today's hearing, like many other hearings in this distinguished body, will be listened to by the entire world. In recent weeks, we have been sending many messages to the world about our shock and horror at the abuse of Iraqi prisoners, messages of regret and remorse, messages of outrage and horror, messages of American commitment to correct our mistakes, to find the truth, and to pun- ish the guilty. It is entirely proper that we should do so. Most of all, we are sending the message that in democracies abuses are not tolerated or covered up, but revealed and punished. That is a very important message for the Iraqi people and a lesson, as well, as they seek to build a government that would be the first of this kind in the Arab world. But it is even more important that the Iraqi people hear an addi- tional message from this great body and from the American people, the message that we will win in Iraq, and that we are determined to win, and that we understand that winning means giving their country back to them, but also sticking with them until they have a reasonable chance to establish a government that represents them and creates security forces that can protect them. Mr. Chairman, the enemies of a free Iraq are tough and deter- mined killers and terrorists, but they have nothing positive to offer the Iraqi people—only fear and death and destruction. Our weapon is not fear, but hope. But it is a hope that is shared by millions of Iraqis. In the coming months, they and we will be the targets of the killers who hope to block the progress to Iraqi self-govern- ment and Iraqi self-defense. They need to know that we will stand with them as they stand up for a free Iraq. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. [The prepared statement of Mr. Wolfowitz follows:] Prepared Statement of Hon. Paul Wolfowitz introduction Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee: I thank you for the opportunity to come and brief you today on the Defense De- partment's role in the upcoming transition to Iraqi sovereignty. I am heartened by the numerous statements from members of this Committee recognizing the impor- tance of Operation Iraqi Freedom and the ongoing reconstruction mission in Iraq to our nation's security. Such statements send a strong message of America's resolve to those who oppose our efforts to help the Iraqi people rehabilitate their nation after 35 years of unimaginable tyranny under Saddam Hussein. I would also like to thank the members of this Committee for their continued sup- port to the men and women of our Armed Forces. Our prayers are with all our peo- ple currently serving in Iraq and Afghanistan. Whether members of Active Duty, Reserve, or National Guard units, these heroes embody the best ideals of our na- tion—serving so that others may be free—and we thank them all for the sacrifices they make. I would also like to pay tribute to the hard work and sacrifices of all the civilians and Foreign Service officers in the Coalition Provisional Authority and various NGOs. Their tireless efforts and heroism have been vital to our mission in Iraq, and they have been as fine a group of ambassadors for this nation as we have ever sent abroad. Finally, we also owe a sincere debt of gratitude as well to the roughly 25,000 men and women from our Coalition partners, who are serving the cause of freedom in 6 Iraq. This coalition is neither "illegitimate" nor "window dressing." Thirty-four of our closest friends have troops that are bravely fighting alongside us in Iraq, spear- headed by the two multinational divisions led by the British and the Poles. British, Italians, Bulgarians, Thais, Poles, Danes, Estonians, Ukrainians, and Spanish have been killed while trying to advance freedom and democracy in Iraq. Just recently, one of our smallest allies, El Salvador, has been singled out for the valor of its troops in countering the recent violence in Iraq. Most significantly, the largest part- ner of this Coalition is the Iraqis themselves, tens of thousands of whom are already fighting for a new Iraq. The number of Iraqi Security Forces may exaggerate their capability at this time, but not their determination to rebuild their country, as more than 300 Iraqi Security Forces have been killed in action, and close to 700 wounded. The horrible abuses at Abu Ghraib prison have been, as Secretary Rumsfeld char- acterized it, a body blow for all of us. These actions are a betrayal of what thou- sands of Americans have risked their lives to achieve in Iraq. But these actions do not represent America, nor do they represent American values. We will uncover the truth. We will punish the guilty. And we will act to prevent such abuses from recur- ring in the future. The Iraqi people will see that a free democratic system functions and operates transparently. Americans are human and we make mistakes, but when we do, we work to correct them. And it was not a mistake to free the Iraqi people and the world from one of the most abusive dictators in history. THE COALITION'S STRATEGY TO ACHIEVE VICTORY IN IRAQ: CAPACITY BUILDING We need to continue to move forward on all fronts implementing the coalition's strategy to set conditions that will ensure a free Iraq that is stable and at peace with its neighbors. Our strategy involves three interdependent lines of operations to build indigenous Iraqi capacity and transition responsibilities from the Coalition to Iraq rapidly, but not hastily. While the lessons to be learned from the violent events of the past few weeks affect the way we pursue these three lines of operation, these are still the three key elements that will bring success in Iraq. The first element involves building capable Iraqi security forces to achieve sta- bility. Accordingly, we have redoubled our efforts to recruit, train, equip and, most importantly, mentor Iraqi security forces—Police, Iraqi Civil Defense Corps, Army, Border Police, and the Facilities Protection Service. Over the next few months our aim is to be able to certify the ability of these forces, as they become ready to as- sume greater responsibilities from coalition forces. Also, through technical assist- ance and mentoring by U.S. prosecutors, we are helping to build the capacity of the Iraqi criminal justice sector. The second element involves nurturing Iraq's capacity for representative self-gov- ernment, with the aim of creating a government that can assume sovereignty on be- half of the Iraqi people. June 30 is not a magical date on which the Coalition Provi- sional Authority (CPA) will suddenly transition all of its responsibilities to a new Iraq government. It is actually just one step, albeit a very important one, in a proc- ess. Free Iraqis have been gradually assuming responsibility for governmental func- tions for quite some time. Eleven Iraqi ministries already report to the Governing Council rather than the CPA. Iraq now has a functioning judiciary to provide equal justice for all. At the local and provincial levels, elected assemblies are up and run- ning. When the Interim Government assumes sovereign authority on June 30, its most important task will be to prepare the way for elections to establish the Transi- tional Government in January of 2005. That government in turn facilitate the draft- ing of a permanent Iraqi Constitution which will pave the way for the election of a fully constitutional government at the end of 2005. The third element of the strategy involves the reconstruction of Iraq's infrastruc- ture and the restoration of essential services that are providing better lives for Iraqis and putting people back to work. Iraq has tremendous potential. Iraq has well-educated and industrious people. It has fertile land and water resources and it has abundant natural resources. Our strategy aims to put Iraq on course to real- izing that potential and to setting conditions for Iraqis to prosper in the future. IRAQ'S PROGRESS SINCE LIBERATION The recent violence in Iraq is aimed at obstructing the progress that is being made toward building a new Iraq and to create chaos that will permit the return of the old tyranny or the imposition of a new one. Despite this assault, after 35 years of living through the nightmare of Saddam's cruelty and misrule, Iraq is slow- ly beginning to realize its long-suppressed potential. Given its talented people, fer- tile land, and natural resources, Iraq should have been a wealthy nation. Yet Iraq's economy was moribund due to state control, rampant corruption, and Saddam's misallocation of resources. Money earmarked for life-saving medicines was used to 7 buy means to end life. Money available to maintain Iraq's infrastructure instead maintained Saddam's palaces. Schools that should have been centers of learning be- came command centers and ammunition bunkers. Today, the Iraqi economy is on the path to recovery and prosperity. Unemploy- ment has fallen by nearly one-half over the past year. Inflation is a quarter of what it was before the war. Iraqi marketplaces are filled with consumer goods for the first time in decades. All of this is occurring despite ongoing security concerns, and be- fore the full effect of the $18.4 billion in reconstruction grants and more than $15 billion in international aid is felt. Iraqi essential services have also seen significant improvement in the past year. Electricity generation has surpassed prewar levels and is more evenly distributed. Iraqi schools are no longer propaganda factories for Saddam's cult of personality and Ba'ath party fascism. Health care spending in Iraq is 30 times greater than its pre- war levels. Iraqis are also experiencing unprecedented political freedoms as well. The Transi- tional Administrative Law, the document that will govern Iraq's transition period beginning June 30 and which was signed by all members of the Iraqi Governing Council, is the most liberal basic governance document in the Arab world, with as- surances that include: • Freedom of Religion; • Freedom of Expression; • Freedom of the Press; and • Freedom of Assembly. The TAL calls for equal rights for all citizens of Iraq regardless of ethnicity, de- nomination, or sex. Over ninety percent of Iraqi towns and provinces have local councils. More than half of the Iraqi population is active in community affairs, and one in five belongs to a non-governmental organization. SECURITY IN IRAQ Although these achievements are far from trivial, they take place against the background of continuing violence. The past month has been as costly to us as any since the liberation of Iraq a year ago. We are facing a pivotal moment in the battle for Iraq's future, making sober reflection on where we stand and where we are head- ing in Iraq critical. This reflection begins with recognizing who the enemy is in Iraq. Among the groups in Fallujah the U.S. Marines have been fighting are the murderers and tor- turers of the Fedayeen Saddam and Mukhabarat who melted away without engag- ing our forces a year ago. Reports indicate that Iraqi officers of the so-called "Special Operations and Antiterrorism Branch,"—a truly Orwellian designation—also known as M-14, are responsible for planning roadway improvised explosive devices and some of the larger car bombs that have killed Iraqis, Americans, and other for- eigners. Their campaign of terror and intimidation springs not from frustration with the Coalition's occupation of Iraq, but from their desire to dominate and brutalize their fellow Iraqis. Captured documents reveal that these members of Saddam's se- cret service were making plans for urban guerrilla warfare even before the fall of Baghdad, and took steps such as preparing explosives-laden vests for suicide attacks before the war. In order to destroy the last vestiges of Saddam's tyranny, it was always necessary that we defeat these forces. They are joined by domestic and for- eign terrorists, including the notorious Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, who moved to Iraq after the fall of Afghanistan and who claims credit for personally beheading Nich- olas Berg and is responsible for conducting many of the worst terrorist bombings in Iraq, and he is connected to a number of plots in Europe and possibly elsewhere. In the Shi'a community, Muqtada al Sadr's power grab has not succeeded. A Feb- ruary poll by Oxford Research International showed that only one percent of Iraqis name al Sadr as the national leader they trust most. This number seems to be de- clining as the Shi'a clerical establishment influences their community against him. U.S. and Iraqi forces have launched numerous attacks against Sadr's gang of thugs in the past week, further limiting his efforts to intimidate his way into power. LESSONS LEARNED AND CHALLENGES AHEAD It is well known that no pre-war prediction will unfold perfectly, and that there will be setbacks that require adjustments in both objectives and courses of action. In war, plans are at best the basis for future changes. This Coalition has repeatedly demonstrated that it can be flexible when necessary. Examples of this flexibility in- clude: 10 posals of the new UN envoy, Lakhdar Brahimi, regarding the creation of the Iraqi Interim Government. The Interim Government will serve until the Transitional National Assembly, or TNA, is elected in either December 2004 or January 2005. The TNA will then elect a three-person Presidency Council consisting of a President and two Deputies, who will appoint by unanimous vote the Prime Minister and, on the Prime Minister's recommendation, a Council of Ministers. The Prime Minister and Council of Min- isters must obtain a vote of confidence from the TNA before taking office. Together, the TNA, the Presidency Council and the Council of Ministers will comprise the Iraqi Transitional Government. In addition to being the legislature, the TNA will also draft a permanent constitu- tion for Iraq, which will be submitted for popular ratification by October 15, 2005. Elections under this new constitution are to be held by December 15, 2005, and the newly elected government, operating under the permanent constitution, will take of- fice by December 31, 2005. Now, I cannot sit here today and predict the exact form of the permanent govern- ment. Iraqis will decide the exact provisions of their permanent Iraqi constitution, and who will emerge as the leaders of the new Iraq. After 35 years of totalitarian dictatorship, it is a complicated task to build new political institutions and it cannot happen overnight. Since the liberation of Iraq a year ago, Iraqis have conducted themselves extraor- dinarily well for a nation so long exposed to Saddam Hussein's unique level of sa- dism. In a remarkably short period of time, Iraqi leaders have overcome many dif- ferences to demonstrate the arts of political compromise and their commitment to the goal of a new Iraq. Americans of all people should understand that democracy does not guarantee specific outcomes, it opens ideas up for debate. One need only look back at our own Constitutional Convention to be reminded that with any attempt to establish rule for the people by the people, there is always a great deal of uncertainty and con- troversy, even after the ink has dried. We should not expect Iraqis to achieve imme- diately what we and the British, for example, have labored to accomplish over the course of centuries. But even an imperfect Iraqi democracy will be an enormous im- provement for a country that has suffered so much over the past 35 years. An early end to the occupation is essential to our political strategy to defeat the terrorists. A sovereign Iraqi government will be better able to marginalize its ex- tremist opponents politically while Coalition forces defeat them militarily. As the letter from Zarqawi demonstrates, such a transformation is the worst possible sce- nario for those who oppose the emergence of democracy in Iraq. They fear it, and that's why they are trying so hard to derail it. Moving ahead is important to inspire Iraqi confidence that the transition is mov- ing forward and that their country will not be occupied indefinitely. The transfer of sovereignty will also help to create the national rallying point for the Iraqi Secu- rity Forces I alluded to earlier. But it is important also to make clear that we be- lieve that there will continue to be an urgent need for coalition forces to remain in Iraq after June 30, as there will still be serious threats to security in Iraq. But, on July 1, Iraq will be governed by an Iraqi government. This is in accordance with the expressed wishes of the Iraqi people. We will have a legal basis for continued MNF operations in Iraq. The TAL provi- sions relevant to security arrangements provide the appropriate framework for im- plementing our security strategy in Iraq after this transition. Article 59(B) of the TAL states that Iraqi armed forces will be "a principal partner in the multinational force operating in Iraq under unified command pursuant to" UNSCR 1511. Article 59(C) states that the elected Iraqi Transitional Government "shall have the author- ity to conclude binding international agreements regarding the activities of the mul- tinational force," and that "nothing in this Law shall affect rights and obligations . . . under UNSCR 1511 . . . which will govern the multinational force's activities pending entry into force of those agreements." And perhaps most importantly, Article 26(C) ensures that CPA orders and regulations "shall remain in force until rescinded or amended by legislation duly enacted and having the force of law." While it is important not to view the accomplishments in Iraq through rose-col- ored glasses, it is also harmful to give way to excessive pessimism. The American people need to know what their forces are accomplishing in Iraq, how the efforts of our servicemen and women are transforming the lives of 25 million Iraqis for the better, and transforming a region that has for too long accommodated despotism to the detriment of its freedom starved populations. And both our friends and our en- emies in Iraq need to know that we have the will and resolve to accomplish our ob- jectives. 11 They also need to know that the Defense and State Departments share the same objectives in Iraq. Today as we face the challenge of executing the transition from the Coalition Provisional Authority to a sovereign Iraqi government 45 days from now, we must also plan for U.S. representation in Iraq to be conducted by a U.S. Embassy. Fortunately, planning for this transition has been well underway within the Defense and State Departments for some time. LTG (USA, Ret.) Mick Kicklighter and Ambassador Frank Ricciardone lead Transition Teams for the two Departments, and they have worked hand in glove with the CPA and Defense and Army staffs since early January to make the transition a success. They have formed an Interagency Transition Planning Team (ITPT) and provide the State and Defense leadership for drafting an Operations Plan for the transition. Experts from 16 sub- ject matter sectors (such as Security, Human Resources and Personnel, Facilities, Finance, Medical and Health Services, etc.) from State and Defense coordinate close- ly to draft the highly detailed, time-phased plan. The ITPT as a whole meets almost daily, with sector leads meeting with their teams more often as required. General Kicklighter and Ambassador Ricciardone meet several times each week to ensure that planning and implementation of the plan are on track. CONCLUSION When the President declared the end of major combat operations last year, he noted that "We have difficult work to do in Iraq. . . . The transition from dictator- ship to democracy will take time." This prediction has turned out to be correct, al- though the specific nature of some of the challenges we have encountered could not have been foreseen a year ago. But it is important to remember how large the stakes are and that fortitude and steadfastness are essential for success. Iraqis seem to understand this and are less prone to pessimism in the face of set- backs than we are half a world away. Despite all the violence and uncertainty caused by the enemies of a free Iraq, Iraqis sense dramatic improvement in their everyday lives and anticipate much more. Iraqis recognize the challenges they face and embrace them as a revolutionary op- portunity to build a free nation and to better their lives. Recently, Nesreen Berwari, the woman serving as the Iraqi Minister of Municipalities and Public Works said: "On April 9, 2003, Iraqis were offered the opportunity to begin to dream their fu- ture. Before April 9, 2003, we were not allowed to dream. We could not imagine life with the kinds of positive challenges we face today." Minister Berwari's optimism f)ersists even though she recently survived a second assassination attempt on her ife which killed her bodyguard. There is an old Chinese saying, "May you live in interesting times." This saying is intended as a curse not a blessing. There are some days when it is tempting to view events in Iraq this way. But overall, I think we are in fact blessed with the opportunity and the capability to help the Iraqi people to realize their goal of a stable and representative govern- ment. And with this Committee's help, we will begin to make this a reality with the transition to Iraqi sovereignty next month. Recently in Houston, seven Iraqi businessmen were fitted for artificial hands. Saddam had ordered their hands am- putated, to make them scapegoats for Iraq's economic failure. As one of those busi- nessmen said, "The age of tyrants is over, the age of good remains. God willing. Good is coming in Iraq." The CHAIRMAN. Well, thank you very much, Secretary Wolfowitz. Secretary Armitage. STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD L. ARMITAGE, DEPUTY SECRETARY OF STATE, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE Mr. Armitage. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members. I'll try to respond, rather than going through my opening statement, which you've kindly submitted for the record, to the individual items you brought up, Mr. Chairman, and I'll do it very briefly. I want to echo Paul's comments about your kind comments re- garding us. It's been a pleasure to serve with you and in front of you many times, through the Philippines and other different for- eign policy activities. And we're proud again to be here today. You mentioned that you want to see things move to autonomy as rapidly as possible. Eleven of the Iraqi ministries right now are au- 12 tonomous, and two more this week will become autonomous. And that means their ministers make all the decisions, prepare the budgets, are responsible for all of the programs, et cetera. And the CPA folks who have been in those ministries revert to the position of senior advisor, and we will attrit these away when the ministers themselves tell us that they feel that they no longer need senior advisors. That's a story, I think, that has been untold—13 of the 25 ministries this week are autonomous. You talked about John Negroponte. Thank you very much, and your other Senate colleagues, for being so rapid in conducting a hearing, and confirming the nomination. Now, I understand the desire to have John out in Iraq as soon as possible, but let me explain our reason. We want to make sure that there's a clean break between Ambassador Bremer and Am- bassador Negroponte. Ambassador Negroponte is not Mr. Bremer's successor. He is the first U.S. Ambassador to a sovereign Iraq, and we're trying to make that point dramatically. We also want John's expertise as we move forward to another U.N. Security Council Resolution, which I will get to. But we've tried to meet you half- way, sir. We chose, as the DCM, our ambassador to Albania, who is a decorated Vietnam combat officer. We chose him for that rea- son, as well as his overall leadership skills, because we wanted to send him out early. And he's there now. He's arranging the embas- sies. He's putting together the different political shops, governance shops, et cetera, right now. We thought it was very helpful to have someone who, frankly, spoke the same language as our military col- leagues and one who has walked the walk, as well as talking the talk. Jim Jeffrey is there now. He is getting the job done for us. You mentioned funding. We're going to need about $483 million for the fourth quarter of the fiscal year, and that is from July until September. Right now, I can lay my hands on $477 million. The $6 million that I don't quite have, I plan to get by charging other agencies for their billeting, et cetera, with the State Department. We have these cross-servicing agreements, so that's not a par- ticular problem. We do estimate, as Marc Grossman told you, that it will be a little over a billion dollars to run an embassy for fiscal year 2005, and this money, I'm pleased to say, will be coming for- ward, requesting, at the beginning of the year in a supplemental, an administration-wide supplemental, a State and foreign oper- ations supplemental. I do want to be clear, however, the President has very kindly re- quested, and DOD has acceded, to continue to supply to the U.S. Embassy what we call the LOGCAP, the Logistics Civilian Aug- mentation Program, and security. And this, over a year, amounts to about $800 million. So when I finally come forward to you with a supplemental, then it will be, I think, somewhat less than a bil- lion dollars to operate the embassy. We've got three properties that are in the process of renovation. They will be completed by the 15th of June. One is a residence, which will serve as a chancery. It's inside the Green Zone. The pal- ace, which Ambassador Bremer is in now, will be an annex. And Ambassador Negroponte will move into the residence which Am- bassador Bremer now occupies. 15 to help construct local, regional, and national governing structures. Indeed, as of our last count, there are 18 governorate councils, 90 district councils, 194 city councils, and 445 neighborhood councils. At the national level, there are 11 Ministries al- ready under direct Iraqi control; and more will be transferred in the coming weeks leading up to June 30. We will, however, continue to provide some 155 liaison offi- cers to these Ministries after the transition. We also supported Iraqis as they draft- ed and adopted clearly defined principles and targets for the national government in the Transitional Administrative Law (TAL), which will be in effect as of July 1st and will stay in effect until a constitutionally-based, elected government takes office. The Interim Iraqi Government is taking shape. At the invitation of the Iraqi Gov- erning Council and with full U.S. support, the United Nations has played a leading role in advising and assisting Iraqis in forming this interim government and pre- paring for elections. Ambassador Lakhdar Brahimi, who successfully helped steer the Bonn process and political transition in Afghanistan, is continuing his broad consultations with Iraqi leaders across the country. We welcome his proposal to es- tablish by early June an interim government led by a Prime Minister, along with a President, and two Deputy Presidents. A Council of Ministers would report to the Prime Minister. An Advisory Body, selected in July by a National Conference, would serve alongside the Executive, but with no legislative authority. We have full con- fidence in Ambassador Brahimi, and not just because of his demonstrated com- petency in this area. We also have confidence because we are working in cooperation for the same ends. The Iraqi Interim Government (IIG) will have full sovereignty, but as spelled out in the TAL, it will serve for a limited term. The main focus of this interim govern- ment will be to take the country to an elected government in early 2005. The IIG will also take charge of the daily administration of the country, including the secu- rity and safety of the Iraqi people and continued progress in the economic recovery. As for the economy, the Coalition Provisional Authority reports important progress. Electric power production has exceeded pre-war levels, and more to the point, is now being distributed more widely and equitably across the country. Under the previous regime, much of the distribution had been concentrated on the Bagh- dad and Tikrit areas. Less than half of the population had access to potable water before the war; now two-thirds has access. Wheat production in the fertile Central- South region is up by 60 percent. Oil production has surpassed prewar levels. More than 5 million children are back in school, many of them vaccinated for the first time. The port and airport are fully functional for the first time in years and the Central Bank is fully operational. Of particular significance in a country where un- employment and underemployment together may be as high as 50 percent, the CPA has helped create nearly half a million jobs. The foundation for a healthy economy is in place and our efforts will continue. The Secretary of State, through the Chief of Mission, will assume ultimate authority for all of the projects and contracts as of 1 July. As we saw yesterday with the assassination of Iraqi Governing Council President Izzedin Saleem, security will continue to be the seminal challenge for a sovereign Iraqi government. For that reason, the TAL spells out an Iraqi desire to keep the Multi-National Force (MNF) in place, with an Iraqi security force at its core. Both the TAL and UN Security Council Resolution 1511 provide the legal framework for that ongoing presence. In addition, the TAL gives the elected transitional govern- ment the authority to conclude additional, binding international agreements rel- evant to the MNF. We have already begun consultations on a new UN Security Council resolution, as well, but want to be careful not to get ahead of the political process within Iraq. Wc will continue to recruit and train Iraqi forces to eventually take responsibility for security, and all security assistance will continue to be under DOD authority after June 30th with the policy guidance of the Chief of Mission. I would like to express our high level of confidence in Major General David Petraeus, who will be leading the effort to train and equip the Iraqi military. He has already dem- onstrated, in his command of the 101st Airborne, a high degree of success and skill in this environment, and we look forward to working with him. In addition, Ambassador Bremer, Ambassador Blackwill and their colleagues, as well as Mr. Brahimi, are also consulting widely with Iraqis on security issues, a pat- tern that Ambassador Negroponte and the coalition military commanders in theater will strengthen and deepen. Indeed, dialogue and cooperation with Iraqi leaders about the situations in Fallujah and Najaf has been essential in moving toward res- olution in both places. In both situations, a sovereign Iraqi government would stand to inherit the same security challenges with which we are now confronted. Antip- athy to the occupation may have generated some popular sympathy, but I believe IE! SELECTED POWERS AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE IRAQI INTERIM GOVERNMENT • Organize and run an election for a national legislature. • Provide for the welfare and security of the Iraqi people. • Formulate foreign policy and diplomatic representation. • Make fiscal policy, issue currency, draw budget • Formulate, and, with Coalition support, execute national security policy, including creating and maintaining armed forces. • Regulate commerce and communications. Other Important Powers are Enumerated in the Transitional Administrative Law The Chairman. On the point of elections, there would be some virtue, I would think, in having elections for somebody even prior to December. By that, I mean, a constitutional assembly. It might be persons with some regional powers. But it appears to me, at this point, that the legitimizing of Iraqi leadership through people vot- ing for it—we have some votes on the board here—may be very im- portant, despite the formality that we've been talking about, in De- cember and January and then the following December and what have you, so that, in fact, there is a sense of sharing. If there are insurgents, if there are terrorists who don't like this situation, they're going to be shooting at Iraqis as well as Americans. There are going to be some Iraqi people up front with the supporting cast of Americans and the security and the governance situations, as opposed to the other way around. And it seems to me, without knowing precisely who the new leaders are going to be, what kind of responsibilities they have contemplated, how we could use the U.N. food rolls that the press may be more rough and ready than the fastidious work that we would like to see later on. Have either of you thought about that? And what comment do you have? Mr. Armitage. Mr. Chairman, the U.N. Representative for Elec- toral Processes, Carina Perelli, has been in Iraq since April, and she has been trying to set the atmosphere for these elections. The first task that she has undertaken is, again, garnering nominations from Iraqis themselves for the post of what we call Federal Elec- tion Commissioner, they would call Iraqi Election Commissioners, seven of them. And there will eventually be seven. She's winnowing down those names. They will be chosen by an international group 19 of experts in electoral law. There will also be three Directors Gen- eral, for a total of ten people. This is the first step in getting to where you want to be and where we all want to be in late Decem- ber, early January 2004/2005. She has noted, as you have noted, that there's something con- tradictory about the ballot and the bullet, but she's also noted that in the spirit that she sees among the Iraqi people, that when they see that they actually are going to have a buy-in and—that means a vote, a say—that their desire for this becomes much greater than the ability of enemies to defeat them. And she has noted past U.N. experiences in Timor and other places where elections took place in an atmosphere of some violence. There are many municipal elections and neighborhood council elections which are being held with stunning regularity, and I've got the number in this book, and I can't memorize the whole book—I think it's about 60,000 Iraqis hold some sort of elected po- sition, some sort of position or another, not just in the Kurdish area, where you'd expect it, but throughout Iraq. And it's not a po- sition that comes without some danger, because some of them have been assassinated, because they look like they might be leaders who could stand on a larger stage. So some of what you suggest is ongoing. The Chairman. Let me intrude before my time is up. To what extent will the Transitional Administrative Law that has been pro- mulgated by the Governing Council now—that suggests 25 percent participation by Iraqi women, as a minimum, the freedom-of-speech and the freedom-of-religion clauses, as well as other things that are very important, we hope, to Iraqis, and very important to us— what's going to happen to that? Is this the law as we proceed? Mr. Armitage. The so-called TAL, the Transitional Administra- tive Law, will be the law of the land, and it embodies a stunning array of rights never before held by the Iraqis, and it will last and cannot be amended except by a Transitional Government, which would be in place with the election of a 275-person National As- sembly in January. They have the ability to amend laws. Now, I'm not going to say that it's perfect and I can guarantee you that wom- en's rights and religious rights will be respected as we'd want them. But we've faced this in Afghanistan, we've faced it earlier this year, and we prevailed. And I believe we prevailed not because of the wisdom and the strength of our arguments, but because Iraqis hold their religion very dear, but they also hold the idea of secular government to be something very worthy. So I have some optimism we'll prevail. Mr. Wolfowitz. Mr. Chairman, if I might emphasize a point you made at the end of your question, that this is a key part of winning the military battle, as well. And, in fact, page 7 of my statement, I got this quote from that notorious letter from that notorious ter- rorist, Mr. Zarqawi, where he says, "The problem is, you end up having an army and police connected to the people. How can we kill their cousins and sons after the Americans start withdrawing? This is the democracy. We will have no pretext." And then else- where he refers to that as "suffocation." It's winning for us, it's los- ing for them. 20 And, if I might add, too, the point Secretary Armitage made about elections, it was a very interesting report recently in the Guardian of London, that in some, I believe it was, 15 local elec- tions in southern Iraq, in most of those the Islamists lost the elec- tion, and I think that tells you something, also, about what Rich said, that these are very religious people, but that doesn't mean they want a religious tyranny imposed on them. The Chairman. Good point. Senator Feingold. [The prepared statement of Senator Feingold follows:] Prepared Statement of Senator Russell D. Feingold First I want to thank the chairman and the ranking member for holding this im- portant hearing, and to thank our witnesses for being here today. It is vitally important that this committee seek out and insist on answers from the administration about just where the path of current U.S. policy is leading us in Iraq, about what additional commitments of American resources will be made to this endeavor, and about whether we have a viable political strategy in Iraq and a plan for increasing burden-sharing. I want to hear about all of these issues today. I want to hear about the implications of the sarin-filled artillery shell found over the weekend, and the murder of the President of the Iraqi Governing Council yester- day. I want to hear about where we stand in getting a transitional government in place in time for next month's transition. Most importantly, I want to hear about how U.S. policy in Iraq is affecting our capacity to protect our national security and pursue our national interests overall. So in many senses I eagerly await the testi- mony of our witnesses. But there are a few things I don't want to hear today. I don't want to hear that attacks on our troops and terrible instability in Iraq are actually somehow positive indicators that we are on the right track. And I don't want to hear that reasonable estimates of the scope and scale of the U.S. commitment in terms of troops, timelines, and taxpayer dollars are utterly unknowable. We have heard all of that before, and the American people—especially the brave men and women in uniform who are making great sacrifices on the ground—deserve so much better than obfus- cation or misguided, wishful thinking. The stakes are terribly high, the current indi- cators are deeply troubling. Getting our policy right must start with honesty about what is wrong. We cannot afford to wait another day. Senator Feingold. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me first thank all of you, and especially Secretary Armitage and Secretary Wolfowitz, for being before us today. It has always been important for you to appear before this committee as often as possible, but let me suggest that I hope this is the beginning of a pattern. The American people, as you know, are extremely irate and concerned about what is happening in Iraq, and I think I can honestly say it goes all the way across the political spectrum. There has never been a time when we need your answers and your guid- ance more, and I am hoping this is the beginning of a very regular opportunity to have contact with you and ask these kinds of ques- tions. Secretary Wolfowitz, I want to ask you again how long we can reasonably anticipate needing a substantial U.S. troop presence in Iraq. I know that you can't give me an exact timeframe. We've been through this before. But since our forces are on the ground training Iraqi security forces and, therefore, we are in an excellent position to judge their capacities and to estimate how long it will be before they can provide for their own security, I would think you would be able to give me at least a reasonable estimate. We've seen that slap-dash efforts to train and deploy Iraqi security forces can lead to dangerous failures and instability. So I guess what I want to 21 know is, how long will it take to properly train Iraqis such that they'll be able to provide for their own country's security? And for how long will security be primarily the responsibility of U.S. forces? Mr. WOLFOWITZ. Senator, you know, because you've said it in your question, the course of war is simply not something one can determine. We can say, I think, with reasonable confidence, that we have a plan underway to train and equip and organize very substantial Iraqi security forces by the end of this year. We finally have the various obstacles to funding, I think, unblocked. I hope that's true. There have been some critical delays that have done harm. We have unity of command for doing this, all the five Iraqi security forces will be—training and equipping and organizing of them—will be the responsibility of a single lieutenant general, who happens to be the general who commanded for a year up in Mosul in Northern Iraq, with Iraqi security forces. In fact, it performed impressively in the fighting in the last month. So I think we're on a course to substantial Iraqi security forces by the end of this year. But I can't tell you how strong the enemy will be. I can't tell you— predict exactly how things will go. But our goal is to put responsi- bility in their hands as quickly as we can, and not too rapidly to create problems. Senator Feingold. So if I were to look at a memo where you're planning your goals, and the goal was stated that by the end of this year the United States will no longer be primarily responsible for the security, is that a realistic goal? Mr. Wolfowitz. Senator, that's more than what I just said. What I said is, there will be substantial capable Iraqi security forces by the end of this year, we believe. That's our plan. How much they will still need help from the United States, I can't pre- dict. We want it to be as little as possible. And I'll give you, sort of, real examples. In some of the fighting in recent weeks, Iraqi se- curity forces have performed well, have been able to do things like going into mosques to seize weapons supplies. That's something that we would always prefer be done by Iraqis and not by Ameri- cans. In the fighting I referred to up in Mosul, where the enemy attacked the government house, the Governor, who, by the way, is a Sunni Arab, stayed there through the night, through the fighting. The police initially left, because they were outgunned. The Iraqi Civil Defense Corps stayed and fought, fought off the enemy. The police came back. Through all of it, they were in touch with Gen- eral Ham, who commanded the American forces there. And I'm quite sure that the knowledge that General Ham was there to back them up if needed probably emboldened them and gave them cour- age. And that's the kind of arrangement we need to have. We're in this to win, as I think you agree, and winning means having the Iraqis take as much responsibility as they possibly can, but also not putting them too far, so far out in front that they fail. Senator Feingold. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. Let me ask a question about the transition. Let me start with Secretary Armitage. When the CPA ceases to exist, what authority will take over the implementation of the $20 billion reconstruction program that has been financed by the U.S. taxpayer? Who's going to be in charge of that? And I'd like to also hear Secretary Wolfowitz's feelings on it. 22 Mr. Armitage. All appropriated U.S. moneys, sir, the Chief of Mission, John Negroponte, will have the responsibility for it. For Iraqi money, which will be theirs, and they'll have responsibility, and they can contract with whomever they like. Senator Feingold. So the Ambassador will be in charge of the entire $20 billion? Mr. Armitage. Correct. Senator FEINGOLD. Secretary Wolfowitz, do you concur with that? Mr. Wolfowitz. I do. I'd point out that Iraqi funds are very sub- stantial. Senator Feingold. So the State Department will now have au- thority over the reconstruction funds. That's correct, isn't it? Mr. Armitage. That's correct. Senator Feingold. Secretary Armitage, when do we expect to see a new Security Council Resolution on Iraq, and what will be, in your view, the substance of the resolution? Mr. ARMITAGE. We and our friends on the Security Council are desirous of moving forward shortly after we find the shape and the names of a new Iraqi government. We think it would be very im- portant to have as one of the elements of the U.N. Security Council Resolution support for that Iraqi Interim Government [IIG]. Other elements which may very well find themselves in this will be end of occupation, make a declaration of sovereignty for Iraq, make it clear that Iraqi assets, particularly oil assets, belong to Iraqis and would be managed by them, discuss security, though we don't feel we need more, if you'll allow me to use the term, "international cover," and we think it's a very good thing and it'll be very helpful for many of the other Security Council Members to have a specific reference to security arrangements in Iraq during the time of the Interim Iraqi Government. Those are some of the things. There might be other elements. Everyone's got different ideas. But I'm pleased to say in the consultations informally in New York, and more recently that Secretary Powell had with the G-8, there was a pretty good comity of views. So I find everybody's within a certain box, and I think we'll be able to do this pretty well. Senator Feingold. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. Followup to Secretary Wolfowitz, there are reports that Iraq, our troop strength in Iraq, will remain at about 135,000 troops until the end of 2005. Is that report inaccurate? Mr. Wolfowitz. We don't know what it'll be. We've had changes, as you know, month by month, we have several different plans to be able to deal with the different levels that might be required. Our current level is higher than we had planned for at this time this year. I have no idea what it'll Senator Feingold. So it could well be accurate, then. Mr. Wolfowitz. It could be. It could be more, it could be less, Senator. Senator Feingold. Thank you. Secretary Armitage, I've served, as you know, on this committee and on the Subcommittee on African Affairs for almost 12 years. One name that keeps coming up and is very familiar is the name of Victor Bout, because he appears at the center of illicit arms traf- ficking that has fueled devastating conflicts in Angola, Sierra Leone, Liberia, and elsewhere. Is Victor Bout, or any firm associate 25 number of people that were planned to do it. A lot of thought went into it. It may not have been perfect, but there was a lot of work done on it. Senator Feingold. Well, I wish that we had been told about these plans, because whenever we made an effort to ask about it, we were just told to trust you, and we didn't get the assurance that we needed. But I would like to receive those materials. [The following information was subsequently provided:] The material provided was classified. [Deleted] Senator Feingold. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator Feingold. Senator Hagel. Senator HAGEL. Mr. Chairman, thank you. Gentlemen, welcome. Secretary Armitage, going back to the question Senator Feingold asked regarding a new U.N. resolution, how necessary is a new U.N. resolution as we move toward June 30? Mr. Armitage. It's very desirable. It's not exactly necessary, ex- cept in political terms. I think politically this will find great favor with our major Security Council partners, both the P5 and the elected ten, and I think it makes a rather dramatic point to the Iraqi people, sir. Senator Hagel. Well, politically speaking, as we all know, that's the essence of the effort here. If we lose the Iraqi people, we've lost. Mr. Armitage. Exactly. Senator Hagel. So I would hope that there is serious work being done now on working with our allies on getting a new U.N. resolu- tion. You can assure this committee that's being done. Mr. Armitage. I'll assure the committee, I'll assure you person- ally it is being done, and it's being done almost on a daily basis. Senator Hagel. Thank you. What additional resources could we expect from our partners, those not now participating in the effort in Iraq, if, in fact, we were able to get a new U.N. resolution? Resources, meaning troops, meaning money, meaning training. Are we anticipating that? Mr. Armitage. Let me parse it, if I may, Senator. We would be desirous of getting greater NATO involvement, although 17 of the 26 NATO countries are on the ground with us in Iraq. There aren't large numbers of ground forces in NATO. Only the French have large ground forces. I think it's very unlikely that they may be in- volved. One possible involvement for them on the ground might be if the U.N. Security Council resolution there's a call to provide forces to protect the U.N. as they go about their business of elections, et cetera, and that might be something that might find some favor. We would be desirous of engaging NATO in greater talks, par- ticularly about providing headquarters, perhaps where the Polish division has been, something of that nature. But I think, in candor, it's a little premature. A new U.N. Security Council resolution could possibly encourage some of the South Asian nations to step up a little more, and that would certainly be a target of opportunity. Senator HAgeL. What about Middle Eastern countries? 26 Mr. Armitage. I think it's unlikely. We've had discussions re- cently with King Abdullah, and I went around to the gulf, who didn't specifically ask for forces, but there's a lot of neuralgia that exists in Iraq evolving around the neighbors, and I think it might be a little premature. Senator Hagel. Thank you. Mr. Wolfowttz. Senator, I might add that we've been asking NATO for help, actually going back to December 2002—I did when I was in Brussels—and specifically said even those countries that may not support the war could contribute afterwards to reconstruc- tion. But as Secretary Armitage said, their capacity has, unfortu- nately, declined substantially over the last 10 years, and even in Afghanistan, where NATO has an important role and has made a lot of commitments, they're having some trouble meeting some of their commitments, even in Afghanistan. Senator Hagel. Thank you. Let me take that point, Mr. Sec- retary, and ask about the reports, which I understand are accurate, that we will be moving 3,600 American troops from Korea into a brigade, the second division, into Iraq. Was that planned? Mr. Wolfowitz. It was—let me put it this way, we have been discussing for some time with our Asian colleagues, with the Con- gress, the whole restructuring of the U.S. global footprint. We have already made some adjustments to our posture in Korea, in both directions. We've moved troops off of the DMZ, where, frankly, they were performing nothing except a kind of useless and, indeed, I would say, counterproductive trip-wire function. We are investing a great deal in increasing our capability to reinforce Korea, to the tune of, I believe the number is—well, it's over $10 billion of var- ious force improvements. But it was concluded, over a year ago, that it was long overdue to reduce the strain on our Army that comes from having these continuous 1-year unaccompanied tours in Korea. So we had planned on some reductions. We need a brigade, an extra brigade, in Iraq, and, in fact, the brigade in Korea is ideally suited for that. Senator Hagel. My understanding is that this will mean that, for this brigade moving to Iraq from Korea, it's an additional 12- month commitment in addition to the unaccompanied 12-month commitment they have just finished. Is that right? Mr. Wolfowitz. Do you know, General Sharp? General Sharp. It will be a 12-month commitment, sir. As you know, we rotate troops into Korea on a continuous basis, so about half of them will have been in Korea already 6 months. So some of the tours will be very short, they will be 12 months; others will go up to a maximum of 23 months. Senator Hagel. Thank you. So this was discussed with the Congress, the possibility of mov- ing a combat brigade from Korea into Iraq. Is that what you just said, Mr. Secretary? Mr. Wolfowitz. With the leadership of the committees, yes. Senator Hagel. So Senator Warner and Senator Levin were con- sulted on this, and they knew about it. Mr. Wolfowitz. Either they or their staffs were, yes. Senator Hagel. They or their staffs knew about it? 27 Mr. Wolfowitz. I have been told that, yes, sir. And I consulted with several Senators. Senator Hagel. Thank you. Mr. Wolfowitz, how will prisoners, detainees, be handled after the transition of government in Iraq? Mr. Armitage. May I, Senator? Senator Hagel. Secretary Armitage. Mr. Armitage. Right now, two classes. There are prisoners of war, and there are criminals. Criminals are handled right now by Iraqis. The management of the military prisons is that the U.S. military is working with the Ministry of Justice and, after the turn- over, it is my understanding that we want, as rapidly as possible, to put those into the hands of Iraqis. Senator Hagel. As rapidly as possible. Do we have any idea what that means? Mr. Armitage. I don't have that, sir. Senator Hagel. Does anybody? Mr. Wolfowitz. I don't. Senator Hagel. It's a fairly significant issue, as we all know. There's been a little attention brought to this issue the last few weeks, and I would have thought that this government would put some time into this, especially what we've just been through the last 2 weeks. Can someone get back to the committee with some plan? Mr. Wolfowitz. We absolutely will. We agree with you on the importance of it, Senator. [The following information was subsequently provided:] United States Department of State, Washington, DC 20520, June 18, 2004. The Honorable Chuck Hagel, Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate. Dear Senator Hagel: I would like to follow up on an exchange between you and Deputy Secretary Armitage at the May 18 SFRC hearing on Iraq. You asked for more information on how detainees will be handled after the June 30 transition. There are several categories of detainees currently under Coalition control, the most important of which are High-Value Detainees (HVD's) and security internees. HVD's number less than 100 and are comprised primarily of former regime officials, including Saddam Hussein. A small number of foreign fighters have also been cap- tured. Security internees are individuals detained by coalition forces in the course of counter-insurgency operations. There are currently several thousand security in- ternees; they comprise the majority of detainees in Iraq. The Multinational Force (MNF-I) will have sufficient legal authority under inter- national law to detain suspected insurgents after the June 30 transition. However, we believe that, as a matter of principle, the incarceration of Iraqis on Iraqi soil is a matter for which Iraqi government authorities should assume responsibility. Therefore, as Mr. Armitage told you in the hearing, we are working to develop a process for the orderly transfer of authority over detainees to the Iraqi government. Both the CPA and Major General Miller are working hard in Iraq to build Iraq's capability to manage detainees, including training guard forces and putting in place judicial mechanisms to ensure internees are subject to due process. For Saddam and other senior Iraqi implicated in atrocities against the Iraqi people, we are working with the JIG to identify a suitable holding facility or, if necessary, construct one. Our approach to working through these complexities is based on three principles. First, we need to respect Iraq's sovereignty and the inherent responsibility for its citizens. Second, those who have committed crimes against the Iraqi people or the 30 hearing, and I appreciate you calling it and our witnesses being here. May I have permission to make my opening statement and then to save my questions until the next round so I do not use my time for a statement at this point? The Chairman. Please proceed. Senator Biden. And I apologize, gentlemen, for not hearing your statements. You, as well, general. OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR., RANKING MEMBER Senator BlDEN. From my point of view, notwithstanding the meeting last week with the President, which I truly appreciated, I don't think things are going all that well in Iraq, notwithstanding that our people have performed miracles opening schools and hos- pitals and restoring some oil production and setting up local coun- cils. But these successes, I think, have been dwarfed by two tow- ering deficits that the administration created—a security deficit and a legitimacy deficit. And the result, I think we're losing sup- port, as Senator Hagel suggested, although I'm not associating him with my remarks—I don't want to get him in trouble. But we're los- ing the support of the Iraqi people. When I get a round of questioning, have an opportunity, I'd like to know what our strategy is to erase those deficits, the deficits in security and legitimacy, because I think both are needed to be erased in order to build a successful plan. Success, in my judgment, and this is what I told the President, would be a stable Iraq—secure within its borders, with a represent- ative government that doesn't threaten its neighbors or threaten us. I'm convinced that we can defeat the insurgent forces. But while military superiority is essential, I don't think, quite frankly— and I don't think you all do either—it's enough. We also need an effective political strategy. And based on a very brief briefing I got from my staff on your opening statements, although I'm sure they were necessarily truncated, my chief concern is, first, whether we have one, and my second concern is, we appear to have lost the Iraqi people. As Senator Hagel said, 82 percent of the Iraqi people oppose our presence, although some pockets may very much want us to stay. They're in a conundrum, as the President said in a different con- text. He can understand why they'd chafe at occupation. They know they have to have these forces in order to prevent a civil war from occurring, but they don't like the forces being there. And only 23 percent support the Iraqi Governing Council. At the same time, as Senator Hagel pointed out, al-Sadr gets alarmingly high marks at least in two major cities. And I would suggest these numbers would be worse if this poll had been taken after the debacle at the prison. So my question is, how do we reverse this downward dynamic? I think we have to go back to first principles. The first is, and I'm sure we agree, we can't want freedom for the Iraqi people more than the Iraqi people want it, and that's what the silent majority in Iraq seeks, I believe—freedom. I believe the polls all show, as well, that they neither want an Iranian-style theocracy, nor do they 33 izes you to hammer it out at the NAC—we can get a NATO-led mission. It's only going to be 3,000 to 7,000 forces over the next several months, but a NATO-led mission. That's an important, symbolic, and substantive change, in my view. So I believe that the President should ensure this new U.N. reso- lution you all talked about authorizes a NATO-led security force, supports the Brahimi plan for a caretaker government and elec- tions, endorses a senior rep to be Iraq's primary international ref- eree in what are going to be serious disputes between July 1 and the end of January 2005, when these elections are supposed to be held. Were this to occur, I believe we might find participation with countries such as Pakistan, Morocco, India—maybe even India, al- though I don't know now, in light of recent election results. And, once named, the incoming government should be invited to participate in drafting this resolution, in my humble opinion. Iraqis should see its members, not new ambassadors. And I have great re- spect—don't anybody in the press translate this as a knock on Am- bassador Negroponte; it's not—but I don't want to see Negroponte's face, I don't want to see General Kimmitt, who's a great Amer- ican—I don't want to see their faces ever again on Iraqi television. Let's see Iraqis' faces speaking the language without an accent on television. And I think we have to spare no effort to help the Iraqis field an effective security force. I notice you said, Mr. Secretary Wolfowitz, that the Iraqi forces are gaining some confidence. Even though it's water under the bridge, I don't know why we don't have a massive effort to train Iraqis using the officers that were originally made by the French and the Germans and others. We're already doing it in Jordan— American-trained Arab forces training the Iraqis, because I think you're right, this is an essential, overwhelming need. And I think we have to spare, as I said, no effort to help the Iraqis field this force. And we should be inviting European and American-trained Arab officers to participate in that training, beyond what we've done. And the last thing, Mr. Chairman, and I will end, the President, I think, also has to make a gesture as dramatic and consequential as the symbolic damage done when, in fact, the prison scandal broke. Mr. Chairman, I know you've heard me say this before but I believe the President should go to both these Secretaries and say, find me the remaining 100 or 200 most qualified men and women we have in the government that have any background in quasi- military-police work. Go vet every one of the 8,000 prisoners, re- lease every damn one that's not a security risk, if there's a doubt. Be seen to be releasing them. Sit down with the interim govern- ment, ask them what plan—for permission, because we want to ask their permission, to bulldoze down that damn prison, bulldoze it to the ground. That will cause us big problems, finding room for 2,000 people somewhere. And ask them what they want to do with this symbol of tyranny. Do they want a new institution of their choice on that spot? The biggest school? A university? A hospital? What do they want? I think our gestures have to be as grand as the dam- age done. And I think we should state clearly that we're willing to bring American forces home once Iraqis—and you have—can han- dle their own security and there's a legitimate government. 34 So, folks, despite the fact I am very, very concerned about the state of affairs, I still think, quote, "this is winnable." But I do think it is not "staying the course." It is "changing the course" in order to be able to stay to be successful. I apologize to my colleagues for not being here in time to make that at the beginning, and I'll hold my questions until the end. I thank you, appreciate you listening. The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Biden. Senator Chafee. Senator Chafee. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Welcome, gentle- men. Despite some of the progress we are making there and some of the positive signs, some of the generals on the ground have ex- pressed great concern. And, in particular, an Army general who was posted in western Iraq, when asked whether he believes the United States is losing there, he said, "I think strategically we are." And an Army colonel who was based in Baghdad, said, "Unless we ensure that we have coherency in our policy, we will lose strate- gically." And he went on to say, "We don't understand the war we're in." And then a senior general went on to say, "I do not believe we had a clearly denned war strategy, end state, and exit strategy be- fore we commenced our invasion," and that, he said, "It is doubtful we can go on much longer like this. The American people may not stand for it, and they should not." So maybe somewhere in between what you're portraying and what they're portraying is the truth, but, nonetheless, there's cause for alarm, which I certainly hear from my constituents back in Rhode Island. But what I'd like to ask is that—just yesterday, King Abdullah of Jordan was asked the question, "Do you see a link between the war in Iraq and the Palestinian/Israeli peace process?" And he an- swered, "They sort of feed off each other." The core issue in the hearts of everybody in the Middle East is the Israeli/Palestinian one. The core issue. They feed off one anther. They are related. And what I'd like to go back to is what the President said on February 28, 2003 in a speech before the American Enterprise In- stitute, where he said, "Success in Iraq could also begin a new stage for Middle Eastern peace and set in motion progress toward a truly democratic Palestinian state." And he went on to say, "America will seize every opportunity in pursuit of peace, and the end of the present regime in Iraq would create such an oppor- tunity." He said it: the end of the present regime in Iraq would cre- ate this opportunity. And then, Secretary Wolfowitz, I'll also say, I gave you a shot in May 2003, right after the end of the war, when things were going very, very well, and I asked at a hearing, from the transcript, "It seems to me that we have thrown a rock into the pool that is the Middle East. And, just for the sake of my question, if all goes well in restoring order in Iraq, what is our strategic vision of the ripples now going out from that rock we have thrown into the pool? What is the strategic vision in the Middle East now?" And you answered, "A clean piece of canvas." You said, "I would say several things. I 35 think some of them hopefully will happen even perhaps before some of the other results are achieved inside Iraq. I think one of the ripples is a positive impact on the Arab/Israeli peace process, and clearly we need it. We need to move that process forward. I think we have credibility, enormous credibility, not that we did not have it before. We have it more than we did before." Those are you words from May 2003, when things were going well. So my question is, why the paralysis—if this is so important, by your own words—why the paralysis on this important issue? As King Abdullah said, "the core issue." Mr. Wolfowitz. Let me ask Rich Senator Chafee. I'll ask Secretary Wolfowitz, since I quoted him, if I could. Mr. Wolfowitz. OK, but I'm going to turn to my colleague in the State Department on this issue of what you call paralysis. But I would say this. I think that, in fact, part of our problem, as we said, as those quotes make clear, I think success in Iraq will have these effects. We are not—we're not at success, to put it mildly, and we need to get there. I agree very strongly with what both the chairman and Senator Biden said on that point. I think, if you go back to last year, when there was a bit of eu- phoria, I believe, in the sense that we really were getting success, I know I heard from Arab democrats that there was some sense of exhilaration in the Arab world about the prospects of change. And I don't claim to be expert enough to say it's cause and effect, but I think we—in the meeting in Sharm el Sheikh, we saw some signs of Egyptians and the Saudis stepping up to responsibilities to sup- port the peace process. And, again, I can't say it's cause and effect, but I don't think it's helped the peace process that the enemy in Iraq has proved as resilient as it has. And, let's be clear, that enemy includes Saddam Hussein, who was out there funding attacks on Coalition forces right up until he was captured in December. It includes No. 6 on. the black list, Izzat Ibrahim al-Duri, who is still at large and still funding attacks on American and Coalition forces with money that he's salted in banks in neighboring countries. It includes the former killers, as I men- tioned in my opening statement, from the so-called—the M-14 branch of the Iraqi intelligence, the so-called anti-terrorism branch. George Orwell would have used that phrase. Anti-terrorism meant that they specialized in killings, hijackings, assassinations, and bombings. Those people are still out there, they're still killing peo- ple, killing Iraqis, killing Americans. Their goal is to prevent ex- actly that process that, I agree with Senator Biden, we need to move forward. If I could just Senator Chafee. If you could, I'm talking about the paralysis. And there have been so many opportunities. After Akaba, in June, there was the long 7-week cease-fire. Abu Mazen came here to the Foreign Relations Committee and begged—and he met with the President—begged us to help him on the settlements, the wall, the prisoners held without charges, "Please empower me with my peo- ple." He went back empty-handed. These are the missed opportuni- ties. When the Geneva Accords came, in October of last year, there was a cold shoulder given to those. I believe this is what's hurting 37 it every time. Only the Americans. And sadly, we're not exercising that power. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator Chafee. Senator Boxer. Senator Boxer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Gentlemen, I know how hard you are working, and I know that the burdens that you bear are very heavy, but I have to say I was very disappointed in your opening statements, to be honest with you. Listening to you, one would never know what is happening in America, how people are so distraught over this. And I think if you looked at the faces of my colleagues, I've never seen us quite look this way. It's not partisanship. And I didn't get, as Senator Biden pointed out, where are you changing course? I don't hear it. And if there's one thing I want to say, it is to agree with my ranking member here, that this is the moment to do it, if ever there was a moment. Now, the essence of our country has taken an enormous hit in the world, to the point where American business people, Mr. Secre- taries, are telling me and telling us that they've never seen such a negative view of America in many, many, many years. As they put it, one put it, one very successful businessman, the American brand is being pummeled. Now, some of it, I believe, is due to a go-it-alone policy that's been perceived as arrogant, and I won't go through it all, but we've seen it over and over. And then there's the prison scandal, which has really seared the soul of America. Now, some of the things that we saw, we have seen even worse by the terrorists, but our strength is that we're not like them, and they repel us because they have no respect for human rights. But all of us who have seen the original photos and then moving pic- tures, frankly, of torture—I need to ask you, Secretary Wolfowitz, in Newsday yesterday, Pentagon officials adamantly deny charges. In a New Yorker magazine article, the Defense Secretary Rumsfeld and other key officials had approved a plan to expand from Afghan- istan to Iraq, a secret interrogation program that included rough treatment and sexual humiliation. Do you stand by that? Do you deny? Mr. Wolfowitz. Senator Boxer, we're trying to find out what, if any, possible truth led to that story. I'm aware of nothing that would substantiate that. Senator Boxer. So you don't deny it. You're saying you're still looking into it? Mr. WOLFOWITZ. No, we stand by our denials. When something comes out like that, and people claim that they have sources inside that reveal something, you have to try to find out. Senator Boxer. OK. Do you agree with Pentagon officials who basically said that those charges are wrong, that there was never a plan that was approved to expand from Afghanistan to Iraq a se- cret interrogation program that included rough treatment and sex- ual humiliation? Mr. Wolfowitz. To the best of our knowledge, yes, Senator. Senator Boxer. OK. Mr. Wolfowitz, you spoke eloquently about your desire to help the good people of Iraq. We were all stunned by those pictures of 38 Abu Ghraib. And one of those pictures—I'll never forget any of them, but one of them that is haunting me is that of a beautiful Iraqi woman who is staring into the camera with dead eyes, and then, in the next shot, she is lifting her blouse, and she is exposing her nudity to the camera with the same dead eyes. Have you seen this photo, Mr. Wolfowitz? Mr. Wolfowitz. No, I haven't, Senator. I've seen some of the photos. Let me explain. Secretary Rumsfeld, when this thing began, put together a considerable task force to dig into the facts to find out what had happened to make sure that we get to the bot- tom of this. And I would underscore that the Army had already— the reason Senator Boxer. Sir, if I might, I don't have time. Mr. Wolfowitz. Can I just Senator BOXER. I only have 5 minutes left, and I would—I under- stand that you're looking into it, but I want to find out what you personally know. So if I might just continue to Mr. Wolfowitz. I know enough Senator BOXER. Mr. Chairman Mr. Wolfowitz [continuing]. To be horrified at what has hap- pened. I have not spent the 2-hours that Secretary Rumsfeld did looking at all the photos. I will look at the one you mentioned. Senator Boxer. Thank you. Given the Islamic rules for modest dress, even the removal of a head scarf is a major violation of faith for many Iraqi women. So the abuse that was inflicted upon these female Iraqi prisoners is not only physical abuse, but it is mental abuse. According to a recent article written by Tracy Wilkinson, a Polk Award-winning journalist for the Los Angeles Times, quote, "One woman told her attorney she was forced to disrobe in front of male prison guards. After much coaxing, another woman described how she was raped by U.S. soldiers. Then she fainted," unquote. Secretary Wolfowitz, have you looked into this particular claim that Iraqi women were actually raped by our soldiers? Mr. Wolfowitz. Senator Boxer, we're looking into all of this. And the behavior you've described is absolutely appalling, to treat any woman that way, Muslim or otherwise, and I share your horror at it. I very strongly do. It's absolutely contrary to everything we're trying to accomplish in Iraq. Senator Boxer. Well, I know you don't have the answers, but I would appreciate, in writing, if you could let us know how many Iraqi women have been raped in U.S. prisons. [The following information was subsequently provided:] Senator, we can not confirm that any women in Iraq that have been raped while in DOD custody. There have been multiple visits with the women in DOD custody by the Iraqi Governing Council and the ICRC and no allegations of rape have sur- faced. There is, however, a finding in the Taguba investigation indicating that a male MP guard had sex with a female detainee. That finding was based upon a statement of a witness who did not see the actual event and did not know the iden- tity of the woman. However, if the event is proven, given the position of authority of a guard over a detainee, a charge of rape could be sustained. The guard is cur- rently facing court-martial on a variety of charges. Additionally, the Taguba report states there was also a single photograph uncov- ered by CID where a female detainee is shown exposing her breast. The facts and circumstances surrounding that event are not known at this time. 40 From its inception in May 2003 to 28 June 2004, the total cash inflow for the De- velopment Fund for Iraq was $20.7 billion. The largest portion of this fund, $11.3 billion, has been drawn from Iraq's oil exports. The remaining $9.4 billion comes from repatriated Iraqi assets, Oil for Food money, and other Iraqi sources. $14.1 billion of this has already been spent by Iraqis towards the reconstruction of their country. Senator BOXER. So you don't think we need to put any more American dollars into Iraqi reconstruction. Mr. Wolfowitz. No, in fact, I think when we came up with the request for the supplemental, and I'm working from memory here, and I hope this doesn't—if my memory is wrong, we don't go back again and say I got it wrong—but it was—the estimate of Iraqi needs for reconstruction was something like $75 billion, based on the World Bank needs assessment and other requirements that the World Bank didn't take account of, and that we said in testimony that we considered that an American contribution would on the order of the $20 billion that we requested and that it would apply initially Senator Boxer. So just yes or no, will we have to put more American dollars into reconstruction in Iraq, in your opinion? Mr. Wolfowitz. We don't think that there will be any need for a supplemental of the enormous kind that we had last year. I would assume that there will probably be some kind of an Amer- ican economic assistance program in the future, but Iraqi revenues are running Senator Boxer. So you're asking us for $25 billion for the mili- tary, for the troops?, nothing for reconstruction, and that will be it until—we won't need any more. Is that correct? Mr. Wolfowitz. First of all Senator Boxer. You won't have to come back Mr. Wolfowitz [continuing]. The $25 billion for the troops is— it's more complicated than—that's not the amount for this year. It's the amount to get us into early next year, when we'll be able to request a supplemental. We have, thanks to the approval of Con- gress, some $18.6 billion, as you know, in appropriated funds avail- able for Iraqi reconstruction. In addition, as I had just mentioned, there's $20 billion just in the last 12 months in Iraqi funds—some of it for operating the government, some of it for reconstruction. There is some $15 billion or so from international sources that Sec- retary Powell raised at the Madrid Conference. And we anticipate, I think—I'm going to be careful with my numbers—very substan- tial Iraqi contributions Senator BOXER. OK. Mr. Wolfowitz [continuing]. In coming years for their recon- struction. Senator Boxer. Mr. Chairman, maybe you followed all this. I don't know exactly what they're going to ask us for. Thanks. The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator Boxer. Senator Brownback. Senator BROWNBACK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Gentlemen, glad to have you here. Secretary Wolfowitz or Armitage, just in following that line, is there a chance we're going to get some money back from the U.N. Oil-for-Food Program? There's been a huge controversy about the 41 number of dollars, and we were tracking that, the subcommittee I was on during the time period that that was operating for those years, the billions of dollars of oil revenues that were flowing out of Iraq then that were supposed to go into food that appears as if now there were billions that were skimmed off of that, either by Saddam or people on the other end of this. Do we know where that is in its investigation? I mean, is there a chance there's going to be some substantial resources that should come back to Iraq for its reconstruction from that program? Mr. ARMITAGE. Mr. Volcker, of course, is running the investiga- tion for the U.N. Just as a sidebar, we have provided to the mem- bers of the committee, in an appropriate fashion, those documents which we had that might in any way refer to this. I think there will be, at the end of the day—my view is, you will find wrongdoing, and you will find moneys. And I hope the people who were involved, as I said in the House side the other day, are hung. But, having said that, I don't think the moneys will be substan- tial, in terms of billions and billions of dollars. I don't think it runs that high. But, you know, follow the trail and follow the money. Senator Brownback. Let me ask you, on this sarin gas and mus- tard gas issue that's come up—and I'm looking off of two news sto- ries that I just want to quote to you of some individuals. This is the Reuters story yesterday, where David Kay is asked about this sarin-gas weapon. He says it appears to be—this is just his direct quote, "'It was probably just scavenged from one of the 125-plus ammunition storage points that still remain,' Kay said." And then the article goes on to say, "more forensic testing should determine with some confidence when it was produced." Now, he speculated that it was probably left over from the 1980's, produced either dur- ing the Iraq/Iran war or before the 1991 Gulf War. Now, that's David Kay's comments on this sarin gas that they found. Then this is General Mark Kimmitt. This is in a FOX News story on Monday. "The Iraq Survey Group confirmed today that a 155 millimeter artillery round," which, as I understand, is a pretty good-size shell, "containing sarin nerve agent had been found." This is another quote from him, "The round had been rigged as an IED, which was discovered by a U.S. Force convoy. The round detonated before it could be rendered inoperable, which caused a very small dispersal of the agent." Then in this same story, they're citing a senior Bush administra- tion official, which they do not give the name of, said, "Two weeks ago, U.S. military units discovered mustard gas that was used as part of an IED. Tests conducted by the Iraq Survey Group, U.S. or- ganizations searching for weapons of mass destruction, and others concluded the mustard gas was, 'stored improperly,' which made the gas, 'ineffective.'" Now, we know that Iraq used sarin gas during the Iraq/Iran War. However, now Kimmitt—I'm going back to him—said "the shell belonged to a class of ordnance that Saddam's government said was destroyed before the 1991 Gulf War. Experts believe both the sarin and mustard-gas weapons date back to that time." Here's, again, Kimmitt, "It was a weapon that we believe was stocked from the ex-regime time and thought to have been an ordi- 42 nary artillery shell set up to explode like an ordinary IED, and ba- sically from the detonation of that when it exploded, it indicated that it actually had some sarin in it. It was a binary type of shell in which two chemicals held in separate sections are mixed, after firing, to produce sarin gas." And then they, quote, "Later, a former Iraqi nuclear scientist, Gazi George, is saying that Saddam stored these around the country.' Can you react? You had this question a little bit earlier, but it appears as if there are people that are commenting on this to some extent, and I would appreciate it if you could comment on either the sarin gas or the mustard gas, to what we know has actually taken place or what's happened with those to date. Mr. WOLFOWITZ. Senator Brownback, with your permission, I'd really like to reply for the record. It's just very important that we be precise about what we know and what we don't know, and there are some things we are still trying to find out about exactly the ori- gin of those shells, whether it was a failure of the Iraqis to account for them or whether they were simply stray shells, and so forth. They're very key issues here, which I think would be important to give you a careful answer on. Senator BROWNBACK. Can you answer whether or not we know if sarin gas or mustard gas has been used in the Iraqi theater with- in the last 2 weeks? General Sharp. Sir, the tests that came back were field tests done by two different independent type of tests in the field. They have a good degree of reliability, but not near 100 percent. So right now, the shells and the substance are being sent back to the United States for conclusive tests back here. Senator Brownback. OK, and what did the field tests reveal? General Sharp. That they were sarin, sir. But, again, that's not 100 percent guaranteed. Senator Brownback. And then apparently in this one article, the two soldiers are showing signs of a reaction to a chemical weapon, that they're showing symptoms similar to a mild chemical-weapons exposure. Is that correct, as well? General Sharp. Yes, sir, that was correct. While they were trans- porting it back, they showed nausea and had some orientation problems. But they are well now, they have been treated, and they're back to duty. Senator Brownback. OK. Now, what about this mustard gas 2 weeks ago reported by the Iraqi Survey Group? General SHARP. Sir, the information I have is as you have laid out, that they found it and that it's also being tested. I don't have any further information on that round. Senator Brownback. OK. Was there a field test as to whether this was mustard gas? General SHARP. I do not know, sir. Senator Brownback. OK, now that's by the Iraqi Survey Group that was reporting that. All right, but you don't know anything fur- ther about the mustard-gas one? General Sharp. No, sir, not the earlier one. Senator Brownback. OK. Do we—and, Secretary Wolfowitz, I'm presuming you're going to say the same answer, but I do want to ask this—do we know any of the sources of these shells? Not nec- 43 essarily the gas, but the sources of these shells. Do we know any- thing about that yet? Mr. Wolfowitz. Not that I'm aware of, and that's one of the im- portant questions to be answered. Senator Brownback. OK. There's a speculation in this article, from the Iraqi nuclear scientist, Gazi George was saying that lots of them have gone west to Syria and have been brought back with the insurgencies. And he was speculating this was a stepping up of the insurgency against the United States and against the Coali- tion forces. Do you have any reaction to that thought, or any that you can put forward? Mr. Wolfowitz. I'd say, at the moment, that's a speculation. It's another—it's a hypothesis that certainly is something we're looking at very hard, because it would be a—if it's a systematic pattern, then it's something that would cause us very great concern, obvi- ously. Senator Brownback. And when you have a chance, I'm sure you will be issuing statements publicly about the full nature of whether this is sarin gas or mustard gas in this last instance. [The following information was subsequently provided:] The sarin nerve agent was found on 15 May in a 155 millimeter artillery round which had no particular markings. The round had been rigged as an improvised ex- plosive device (IED) along a roadside, when it was discovered prior to detonation by a U.S. military convoy. The round detonated before it was rendered inoperable, which caused a small dispersal of the agent. The other shell, found on 2 May in Baghdad, was also a 155 millimeter round configured as an IED, and it tested posi- tive for a sulphur mustard agent. Both shells are being returned to the United States for more extensive analysis and testing. Currently, there is no evidence link- ing the sarin IED with the mustard IED. These projectiles could be from a proving ground or a disposal site. The projectiles may have been deliberately not declared, or misplaced among conventional projectiles that were later looted. There is no indi- cation that the anti-Coalition forces knew these rounds were chemical projectiles or understood their proper functioning. In the 1990s, Iraq had declared sarin-filled ar- tillery shells, but said all were destroyed before the 1991 Gulf War. Some mustard shells were also declared, but UNSCOM was unable to locate or account for 550 of those projectiles. Senator Brownback. If I could ask Secretary Armitage, when do you anticipate that Saddam Hussein will be going on trial? Mr. Armitage. I saw speculation in the press from the Iraqis that it would happen before turnover. I think that's very unlikely. This is an Iraqi determination. They are having a small debate among themselves as to whether they ought to try Saddam Hus- sein first, or whether they should try him in some lesser lights first. We are in—the U.S. Government, the Department of Jus- tice—in an advisory role to them to help them get their house in order so this will stand up to international scrutiny. Beyond that, there is no time set. Senator Brownback. This year? Mr. Armitage. There is no time set. Senator Brownback. We just don't know that. Secretary Armitage, if I could, you mentioned that you've made the trip in the region recently, and I know Secretary Powell has been over at the World Economic Forum, and I applaud all of those connections and move into the region. I've made that trip before, as well. I'm wondering how much OPEC is putting pressure back on us through gas prices because we're pushing democracy and 45 Iraqi oil fields, for example. It may be a reason that we didn't face extensive urban fighting, as we had anticipated. Indeed, in antici- pation of it, we decided on a plan that would emphasize speed over mass. One can go back and look at many things that maybe we needed to do differently, and we are doing that. And I agree with the spirit of your question, that if we want to set the course, going forward, then it's important to figure out if we made some misjudgments in the past. And I would say one that we believe was done a bit too severely was the policy of de-Ba'athification. And that's, in fact, why Ambassador Bremer announced, just a couple of weeks ago, that we were going to look at modifying it. I must say that as soon as we talked about modifying it, we heard very, very strong expressions, particularly from the Kurds and the Shia, that we might be abandoning them and that we might be opening the door to bringing the Ba'athists back to power. So there's always a balance to be struck. I would say, of all the things that were underestimated, the one that almost no one that I know of predicted, with the exception of a retired Marine colonel named Gary Anderson, who wrote this in an op-ed in the Post, I believe it was April 2 of last year, was to properly estimate the resilience of the regime that had abused this country for 35 years, to properly estimate that Saddam Hussein would still be out there funding attacks on Americans until he was captured, that one of his principal deputies, Izzat Ibrahim al-Duri, would still be out there funding operations against us, that they would have hundreds of millions of dollars in bank accounts in neighboring countries to support those operations, that the old Iraqi intelligence service which had so much blood on its hands, which I believe is not reconcilable—we're not talking about an ordi- nary person who joined the Ba'ath Party in order to get a pro- motion as a teacher—those are the people we're trying to bring back in—but the real killers, who number in the thousands—were much tougher people, I think, than anyone imagined. And they are out there killing, and they are working with Mr. Zarqawi, who seems to have been associated with them from before the war. They're bringing in foreign fighters, as they did in the early stages of the war. And they may not be good in large-scale, open battle, but they seem to have a dangerous capability for urban guerrilla tactics, and that's what we're up against. I think the great strength we have against them remains the fact that the Iraqi people don't want these people back, and if they have confidence that they can stand up against those people, they do so. In fact, they do so even when they know they may be murdered for it, as the member of the Governing Council was, just yesterday, and as police chiefs are and as security officers are. The number of Iraqis that actually will stand up and fight for their country is considerable, and I think that is where success is going to lie for us, is empowering those people more rapidly. If anything, I would say we were slow in doing it maybe in part because we thought we'd have something like peacekeeping operations instead of a con- tinuing war. Senator Sarbanes. Secretary Armitage. 47 Mr. Wolfowitz. I think that Senator SARBANES. I see the King of Jordan said, just yesterday, that he thought Iraq needed a "strongman," as I understand it, and that that was what is now needed in the current situation, which, of course, is very much at odds, as I understand it, with what you're projecting to do. Mr. Wolfowitz. Well, I would say we're getting very excellent cooperation from Jordan. We may have—I mean, it's the kind of ally which whom you can have differences of view that lead you to better policies. I think we need a lot more cooperation from Syria. Mr. Armitage. The question of Iran is a more interesting one, in a way, because, during the time of the Arbayeen, where Zarqawi was threatening to bring about civil war—publicly he threatened it—the Iranians were actually quite helpful, because they kept many of their pilgrims home, and they made fewer targets and a much more manageable situation. At the same time, however, we find them, in the south particu- larly, trying to buy clerics with their money. So it's a mixed view. Kuwait has been extraordinarily helpful, as well. Senator SARBANES. What is the legal status of the U.S. contrac- tors operating in Iraq, the non-military people that are in there, some of them apparently doing military-type activities? Mr. WOLFOWITZ. I'm not aware that it's different from their sta- tus as contractors for us in Kosovo or Bosnia. We make extensive use of contractors everywhere, and we are doing so in Iraq, and they operate under—if they're working for the U.S. military, they operate according to U.S. military regulations. And, of course, the status of everything in Iraq is under the overall authority of the CPA. Senator Sarbanes. So the U.S. military, in effect, has the re- sponsibility for the conduct of the private contractors, is that cor- rect? Mr. Wolfowitz. No, those contractors that are working for us, I would—but there are many contractors that are working for CPA, or are working on their own, or working for the Iraqi Governing Council. There are contractors all over the country. Senator Sarbanes. Now, is it your view that you don't need an- other Status of Forces Agreement after June 30, when you transfer sovereignty, in order to ensure the legal status of American forces? Mr. Armitage. Senator Sarbanes, as a legal matter, that would be the case. As a political matter, it might be something else again. The Security Council Resolution 1511, combined with CPA Order 17 gives us the sufficient legal cover, if you will, for Status of Forces Agreements. However, it clearly—if we do move forward, as we're planning to, with a new U.N. Security Council resolution, we'd also want to put this in that resolution, as well, as an extra bit of protection. Our view of SCR 1511 is not universally shared by our allies, sir. Senator SARBANES. What will be the status of the private con- tractors after June 30, when sovereignty is transferred? Mr. Armitage. I've got to take it for the record, Senator Sar- banes. I don't know. [The following information was subsequently provided:! 48 United States Department of State, Washington, DC 20520, June 17, 2004. The Honorable Paul Sarbanes, Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate. Dear Senator Sarbanes, Deputy Secretary Armitage has asked that I respond to your question of May 18, 2004 regarding the status of private [military] contractors after June 30th, when sovereignty will be transferred to the Iraqi Interim Government. First, I would like to assure you that the State Department is well aware of the concerns that contrac- tors have for their security operations after June 30th. At present, Coalition Provisional Authority Order 17 (attached) regulates the sta- tus of contractors. This Order is currently being reviewed to determine how it should be revised to reflect the June 30 transfer of authority. The issue regarding the status of Americans who are working in Iraq, including contractors, is currently being discussed with Iraqi Prime Minister Allawi and the Iraqi Interim Govern- ment. In all of our discussions, we are examining how best to ensure the safety and security of Americans in Iraq now, and after June 30. When a decision has been made revising Order 17, I will be happy to convey it to you. Sincerely, Paul V. Kelly, Assistant Secretary, Legislative Affairs. Enclosure: As stated. COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY ORDER NUMBER 17 Status of the Coalition, Foreign Liaison Missions, Their Personnel and Contractors Pursuant to my authority as head of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), and under the laws and usages of war, and consistent with relevant U.N. Security Council resolutions, including Resolution 1483 (2003), Recalling that under international law occupying powers, including their forces, personnel, property and equipment, funds and assets, are not subject to the laws or jurisdiction of the occupied territory, Conscious that states are contributing personnel, equipment and other resources to the Coalition in order to contribute to the security and stability that will enable the relief, recovery and development of Iraq, Noting that states are sending Foreign Liaison Mission Personnel to Iraq, Conscious of the need to establish and confirm the status of such Coalition and Foreign Liaison Mission Personnel in respect of the CPA and the local courts, I hereby promulgate the following: SECTION 1—DEFINITIONS 1) "Coalition Personnel" means all non-Iraqi military and civilian personnel as- signed to or under the command of the Commander, Coalition Forces, or all forces employed by a Coalition State including attached civilians, as well as all non-Iraqi military and civilian personnel assigned to, or under the direction or control of the Administrator of the CPA. 2) "Foreign Liaison Mission Personnel" means those individuals who have been issued Foreign Liaison Mission personnel identification cards by the Iraqi Ministry of Foreign Affairs under the supervision of the CPA. 3) "Legal Process" means any arrest, detention or legal proceedings in the Iraqi courts or other Iraqi bodies, whether criminal, civil, administrative or other in na- ture. 4) "Parent State" means the state providing Coalition Personnel as part of the Co- alition in Iraq or the state providing Foreign Liaison Mission Personnel. 5) "Coalition contractors" means non-Iraqi business entities or individuals not nor- mally resident in Iraq supplying goods and/or services to or on behalf of the Coali- tion Forces or the CPA under contractual arrangements. 52 people about what we're into over there. And I think they would probably feel more comforted if maybe we leveled with them a little more than maybe what we're doing right now. And I would like you to react to that. Mr. WOLFOWITz. Senator, I think we are being candid. We try to be candid, and things change. We had a plan that anticipated, I think, that we could proceed with an occupation regime for much longer than it turned out the Iraqis would have patience for. We had a plan that assumed we would have basically more stable secu- rity conditions than we've encountered. In response to both of those changes, we have considerably speeded up the transition to sov- ereignty. And I share Senator Biden's comments that I think we should put a lot of focus on successful elections. I think that's going to be one of the keys to changing the way Iraqis view us. With respect to the security problem, we have enormously speed- ed up both the speed and the level of effort in equipping Iraqi secu- rity forces. I think it's—I don't remember the exact numbers, I could get them for you, some of those early polls were very striking, because they had overwhelming percentages of the Iraqis polled— I think in the neighborhood of 70-plus-percent—saying they wanted the Americans to leave, and equally large numbers wanted us to stay for at least 2 years. That's not a contradiction; it's people who genuinely welcomed us as liberators but did not want us owning their country or occupying their country. I think this label of occu- pying power is a very unfortunate one. It will be good, July 1, to be rid of it. Senator Voinovich. Actually, some people have exploited that, and that is why this transition to turn it over to them is very, very important. Do you believe that, because we're doing that, that that's going to lessen some of the ability of people like al-Sadr to ignite folks to be against us? Mr. Wolfowitz. Senator, you're absolutely right, although it is not going to be transformational on July 1. That is why Senator Biden is so correct when he says the key thing I think is going to be not when they have a sovereign appointed government, but when they have a sovereign elected government. The issue of Mr. al-Sadr, I think, is—everything that I see suggests this is a man who is very young, exploited, a very distinguished family name. Both his father and, I think, his great uncle were distinguished re- ligious clerics and martyrs, but he's basically intimated a large part of the country by putting together gangs of young people with heavy weapons and an ability to intimidate people. And as our op- eration has begun to shut down those operations, what we're also seeing is a lot of Iraqis in the south, who I think were intimidated by him previously, coming out and saying, we've had enough of this lawlessness. And I'm told that AP has reported that Ayatollah al- Sistani has actually now come out publicly and said al-Sadr's forces should get out of Najaf and Karbala. That's an early report. I would be careful with it. But certainly we're hearing many reports that as Iraqis see law and order being restored, they're coming out much more openly against al-Sadr. So I think, in that case, we're dealing with a fairly thuggish individual, who, with the power of the gun, was intimidating people. I think it is, by no means, as se- 53 rious a problem as the much more ruthless former elements of the old regime and terrorists that we're dealing with up north. Senator VOINOVICH. Is he getting any encouragement from Mus- lims in Iran? Mr. WOLFOWITZ. My impression is that the Iranians are finding him an embarrassment. I don't know, Rich, if you would want to comment. Mr. Armitage. If I may, you used a sports analogy about a jump- ball, and I know this is not a game, it is very serious business, but if you will allow me, we've got a game plan, but we are going to have to audible from time to time. Muqtada al-Sadr is a case of an audible. This is a thug, just as Paul described. He has been unable to garner popular support, Shia support, in the south. They are turning on him. And as I said earlier, Senator Voinovich, when our forces come in with wisdom and determination carefully there, they've been welcomed by people. The situation is very complex. It is not good, but there are some signs that we ought to look at, and that is one of them. The Iranians actually came to Baghdad, and they met with the British and they met with us to talk about Muqtada al-Sadr, be- cause, as Paul suggests, they find him an embarrassment, and he is getting in their way. Senator Voinovich. Well, has any thought been given to some type of effort to—instead of having a kind of a democracy that we're hoping for, that we'll end up with something like we have in Iran? Mr. ARMITAGE. We've been very leery of it, very watchful of it. And we're, thus far, quite satisfied that the most important cleric, Grand Ayatollah al-Sistani, has stated that he does not want a the- ocracy. If there's another surprise in this area, it was the more sec- ular nature of Iraqi society than I had initially understood, though that is in no way a suggestion they're not faithful to their beliefs. Mr. WOLFOWITZ. In fact, Senator, I think, before you came in, I mentioned that there was a report recently of some 17 local elec- tions in southern Iraq where the Islamists were defeated in most of those elections. Senator Voinovich. I heard that, and I was, quite frankly, sur- prised at that. So that you believe that there is enough support for some type of secular Western type of democracy there? Mr. WOLFOWITZ. I think, Senator, most Iraqis don't want to go back to a tyranny, even the ones who are deeply religious. And if there's a fair degree of local autonomy, it wouldn't surprise me that in some parts of Iraq you find very conservative governments with respect to issues like what kinds of images you can show on tele- vision, for example. But I don't think most Iraqis would—if they're free to vote their conscience, would want to see a government that imposes a kind of tyranny they see in Iran. They've been through 35 years of a different sort of tyranny. Senator VOINOVICH. Well, certainly what has happened in that prison has really been ammunition for those who talk about us de- filing their country. Mr. WOLFOWITZ. Terrible ammunition. But I hope that the way in which we deal with it will be an example, that this is a country that doesn't tolerate abuse and that punishes abuse, and that hope- 54 fully Iraq will be the first Arab country that has the same ap- proach to those things. Senator VoiNOVlCH. I would just like to also say—you say you need this resolution from the United Nations, but you're not cer- tain you're going to get it, and it just seems to me that one of the things—when we supported the $87 billion for Iraq, one of the con- ditions was that we would get support from other countries in terms of reconstruction, and we would get support from other coun- tries in terms of reducing their debt to the country. Are we getting any—we've got some help, but it seems to me that it is not very enthusiastic. Mr. Armitage. Perhaps I misspoke. We're going to get a U.N. Se- curity Council resolution. And the good news, from my point of view, is the consultations—the informal consultations, both in New York and, more recently, Secretary Powell's consultations with the G-8, indicate that all of our thinking is within certain acceptable bounds. So it's a matter of working out and accommodating every- one's views. So I'm absolutely positive we're going to get a U.N. Se- curity Council resolution, without question. Senator VoiNOVlCH. Again, can you repeat how much reconstruc- tion money have we got from other countries, and how many coun- tries have reduced their debts or eliminated them since we've made the $87 hjllion commitment? Mr. Armitage. The international donors, I believe came up with $13.8 billion dollars, of which about a billion has been disbursed. We are into it for $20 billion, as you've indicated, sir. All the major debtors, except for Russia, I believe, have indicated a willingness to engage in substantial debt reduction. It hasn't happened yet, but that's the status, as I know it. Senator VoiNOVlCH. The question I have is that when we passed that—authorized the $87 billion, there was a requirement in there for a report. Have we ever received a report back from you yet on where we stand, in terms of that request? The report? Mr. Armitage. I don't know, and I'll find out. Senator Voinovich. Well, I would like to see it, because I've asked this question several times, and I would like to see exactly how much money are we getting from our allies and how much are they cooperating with us. Because, again, you get back to the streets of Ohio, and people are saying, we are Uncle Sugar. We're over there and we're taking care of everything, and where are the rest of the people that should be interested in what happens in Iraq as we are interested in it? Where are they?" Mr. Armitage. That's the neighbors, you bet. I'll find out where it is, Senator. [The following information was subsequently provided:] United States Department of State, Washington, DC 20520, March 11, 2004. The Honorable George Voinovich Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate. Dear Senator Voinovich: 55 Pursuant to Section 2215(3)(b) of the FY 2004 Emergency Supplemental for Iraq and Afghanistan (P.L. 108-106), please find enclosed a report on Iraq and Afghani- stan. We hope you find this information useful. Please do not hesitate to contact us if we may be of assistance on this or any other issue. Sincerely, Paul V. Kelly, Assistant Secretary, Legislative Affairs. Enclosures: As stated. Report to Congress on Iraq and Afghanistan This report is submitted pursuant to Section 2215(3)(b) of the FY 2004 Emergency Supplemental for Iraq and Afghanistan (P.L. 108-106) ("the Act"). It details: 1. "The amount of debt incurred by the Government of Saddam Hussein in Iraq, the impact forgiveness of such debt would have on reconstruction and long-term prosperity in Iraq, and the estimated amount that Iraq will pay, or that will be paid on behalf of Iraq, to a foreign country to service such debt dur- ing fiscal year 2004." 2. "The efforts of the Government of the United States to increase resources contributed by foreign countries and international organizations, including the United Nations, to the reconstruction and rehabilitation of Iraq and to increase international participation in peacekeeping and security efforts in Iraq." 3. "The manner in which the needs of people with disabilities are being ad- dressed in the development and implementation of programs, projects and ac- tivities funded by the United States Government in Iraq and Afghanistan." 4. "The progress being made toward indicting and trying leaders of the former Iraqi regime for war crimes, genocide, and crimes against humanity." 5. "The efforts of relevant Iraqi officials and legal advisors to ensure that a new Iraqi constitution preserves religious freedom and tolerance of all faiths." Report I. IRAQ'S debt Although efforts to reconcile data numbers are ongoing, we estimate Iraq's exter- nal official debt to be approximately $120 billion, virtually all of which was incurred during the period of Saddam Hussein's regime. The IMF's Macroeconomic Assess- ment, done in October 2003 for the Madrid Donor's conference, noted that Iraq is one of the most heavily externally indebted countries in the world. The Macro- economic Assessment added that Iraq's fiscal situation would remain under strain for years even assuming increased oil production and domestic tax revenues and that Iraq would need "generous restructuring" of its external debt to achieve sus- tainability. The IMF is in the process of completing its Debt Sustainability Analysis for Iraq. The United States has been working to encourage the international community to forgive or at least substantially reduce the large amount of debt that Iraq accu- mulated under Saddam Hussein. On December 5, the President named former Sec- retary James A. Baker III as his Special Presidential Envoy to work with the world's governments at the highest levels in seeking to restructure Iraq's official debt. In December and January, Baker traveled to Europe (France, Germany, Italy, Russia, and the UK), Asia (Japan and China), and the Gulf (Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the UAE and Qatar), and successfully secured commitments from the leaders of these nations to provide at least substantial debt reduction for Iraq in 2004. The United States will continue to work toward the goal of debt reduction for Iraq in 2004. The exact percentage of reduction is subject to further agreement among par- ties. II. INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND PARTICIPATION IN PEACEKEEPING AND SECURITY A. International Support for Reconstruction The United States has been successful in raising support from the international community for the reconstruction and rehabilitation of Iraq. The U.S. played a major role in organizing the highly successful Madrid Donors' Conference in Octo- 56 ber. Representatives of 73 countries and 20 international organizations attended the meeting as well as members of the Iraqi Governing Council. The official tally of the Conference's results showed final pledges of at least $32 billion, including our own pledge of $18.4 billion in grants from the FY 04 supplemental; the highest ever ob- tained at an international pledging Conference. Non-U.S. pledges, around $13 billion, will be a mixture of grants and loans to be disbursed during 2004-2007. Not included in the pledge numbers for other donors are offers of trade credits, in-kind assistance, and technical assistance (including training). The World Bank and the United Nations Development Program have just estab- lished trust funds within an International Reconstruction Fund Facility for Iraq (IRFFI). Senior Iraqi officials, along with a U.S. Government team, will meet with other major donors in Abu Dhabi at the end of February to discuss the functioning of the trust funds and other aid coordination issues. B. International Participation in Peacekeeping and Security The United States has broadened international military participation in Iraq. There are now 34 countries contributing approximately 24,000 troops to the sta- bilization of Iraq, including two multinational divisions led by the United Kingdom and Poland. In addition, the Iraqis themselves now contribute to their own stabiliza- tion. There are over 200,000 Iraqi police, military, and civil defense forces on duty. In total, 65% of security forces in Iraq are non-U.S. We continue to seek additional international participation in the security and sta- bilization of Iraq. We anticipate new contributions, including pledges by the Korean and Japanese governments to increase their current contingents that will add a total of 4,000 troops. Armenia, Tonga, and Bosnia-Herzegovina have also recently made formal offers of forces, and we are continuing discussions with seven other na- tions on their informal contribution offers. Iraq iii. addressing the needs of people with disabilities Department officials met with organizations representing the rights of the dis- abled during the summer of 2003. Discussions addressed the opportunity presented by reconstruction to ensure that the needs of the disabled are met in the new Iraq, both legally and in terms of infrastructure and services. These organizations re- ported that they had approached the Polish government with a proposal to conduct a conference in Warsaw in late 2003 that would result in a set of recommendations for the CPA. The Department forwarded this information to CPA representatives in Baghdad. The Ministry of Human Rights in Iraq, established pursuant to CPA order and opened on February 14, 2004, is mandated to protect and promote human rights. Concerns regarding the rights of the disabled and steps necessary to safeguard them have been brought to the Minister's attention. The USAID/Mission in Iraq has adopted a formal, written policy on the rights of the disabled and has begun to im- plement that policy. USAlD is refurbishing the Kirkuk Rehabilitation Center, which principally serves Iraqi veterans and others who have lost limbs, and has worked to accommodate disabled travelers at the Baghdad and Basrah airports. Afghanistan Through the Leahy War Victims Fund (LWVF), the United States supports the United Nations Development Programme's Comprehensive Disabled Afghan's Pro- gram (CDAP). The program is constructing five community rehabilitation centers using ADA accessibility guidelines that will serve 1,000-1,500 persons. It also pro- vides technical assistance to the Government of Afghanistan to meet the needs of people with disabilities. The LWVF also supports international NGOs, such as Handicap International, which provides wheelchairs and wheelchair training to dis- abled persons in Kandahar. USAID is completing 92 handicap-accessible schools and 220 handicap-accessible clinics, expected to be operational by June 2004. IV. WAR CRIMES Our policy is to see Saddam Hussein and others who committed war crimes and crimes against humanity prosecuted by Iraqis. We are working closely with the Iraqis to help them create a fair, transparent and effective process, which will stand up to international scrutiny and conform to international standards of human rights and humanitarian law. The new Iraqi Government will decide how former regime 58 have been tremendously helpful, these hearings, and it's exactly what the Congress should be doing. In the absence of legislating, holding oversight hearings on critical issues, both domestic and for- eign, are absolutely essential, and these have been worthwhile hearings. And I want the chairman and the ranking member to know how much all of us appreciate it very, very much. Let me begin by just expressing to you what I think is obvious, but probably needs to be stated again, and that is, anybody who ever thought this was going to be easy was deluding themselves. This is a difficult task. And so you all know that as we raise ques- tions about these matters here, at least I think for all of us on this side of the dais, there is an appreciation of how complicated and difficult this mission is. Second, I think, without exception, all of us want you to succeed, want the administration to succeed, want this policy to succeed, that it's critically important that the present situation we find our- selves in—and the exact description, I think, that Senator Voinovich gave is one that is not narrowly held; there are a lot of people across this country who are very, very worried about how this is progressing, what the end game is, whether or not we're going to achieve even a part of our goals here, and the growing fear that we may even be, in some ways, in a worse situation if we're not careful at the end of all of this. So I raise that point with you. And to express what Senator Voinovich said, and it's my view, as well, one of the concerns I have is the lack of candor and trans- parency about what is going on. And let me, if I can, jump to this issue of the prison abuses, if I may for a minute. I'm very inter- ested in knowing whether or not the State Department was aware of the situation at the prison. We know now that General Myers had asked CBS to delay using those photographs for several weeks. Was the State Department aware of this, Mr. Armitage? Mr. Armitage. If I may, we were aware that there were some al- leged abuses, back in the January/February timetable, and Sec- retary Powell, as he said publicly, made this a subject of discus- sions with his colleagues, the principals, as well as the President. Senator DODD. Were you briefed on it, though? Were you actually briefed on the Taguba Report? Mr. ARMITAGE. No, we were not briefed on it, to my knowledge; we heard from the press that there were photos, about a week or so before they appeared. Senator Dodd. So were you aware that a request had been made to a major network to delay the release of those photographs? Mr. Armitage. I was aware, because the press person who told me worked for that network. Senator Dodd. The reason I raise it, we had Mr. Negroponte here, and all of us supported his nomination, and he appeared here on the 27th of April. The reports came out the following day. And I'm just curious as to why, in the interest of candor and trans- parency, that either in direct testimony or a response to questions, the designee to be the Ambassador to Iraq wouldn't have laid out to this committee a critical issue that was about to explode onto the public scene within 24 hours. Mr. Armitage. I don't think he knew anything about it. I don't think any of us in the Department of State had any idea what were 61 tained. I would emphasize that if we're talking about January 2002, we're in the context of post-September 11, and the issue of how you try to obtain information that could prevent a repetition of the September 11 attacks on the United States was not at all in anticipation of a war in Iraq. Senator Dodd. I appreciate that. But you can certainly appre- ciate the fact that this is unsettling. This wasn't a memo from some freshman law student who may have an ideological point of view; this is the counsel to the President of the United States in the White House. Were you aware of this memo? Mr. Wolfowitz. No, I wasn't. Senator Dodd. Did the Department of Defense receive a similar memo? Mr. Wolfowitz. I can't tell you. I can find out. Senator Dodd. I would appreciate it if you would. [At the time of publication no response had been received.] Senator Dodd. General, do you have any quick comments on this? General Sharp. Sir, we are 100 percent behind the Geneva Con- vention and the importance of it. Senator Dodd. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, thank you. The Chairman [presiding]. Thank you very much, Senator Dodd. On this issue, as well as in the earlier one, if you would clarify for the record any further research you have on the counsel's memo, it is an important point, and we would appreciate your un- derlining that. Senator Coleman. Senator Coleman. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And, gentlemen, thank you for being with us today. These are challenging times, and we appreciate your efforts. There has been a lot of discussion about the course we're on, changing courses. General Sharp, I think you described the ap- proach that I would like to see. It's not about changing course; we need to stay on course with the transition on June 30, we need to stay on course with elections at the end of the year and the start of the next year. But we have to continue—I think these are your words—continually reassess, based on the circumstances on the ground. Let me first just raise the issue of security. Obviously, the tragic killing of President Salim yesterday, can you talk to me a little bit about security, then, for folks on the Governing Council, American officials? Does that incident cause us to reassess circumstances on the ground and to change our course of conduct? Mr. WOLFOWITZ. Senator, Iraq is a dangerous place. I mean, I visited in late October, and was staying in the Al Rashid Hotel, and we were rocketed. One American was killed, and four Ameri- cans and one Brit were seriously wounded. It's going to keep hap- pening. I think this enemy we're up against believes that if Iraq gets its own government, its own security forces, they're finished, and so they're going to be doing everything they can in the coming months—not just until July 1, but at least up until elections—to try to destabilize the country sufficiently to prevent that progress from happening. ben on one side, Sunnis on the other. I don't see much of that. I mean, my sense is that we're killing al-Sadr's folks, and he is not replen- ishing. Give me a sense of the situation in Iraq, vis-a-vis, civil uprisings. Give me a sense of that. Mr. WOLFOWITZ. Let me make three points. No. 1, in al-Zarqawi's infamous letter, where he expresses a sense of desperation that if they can't destabilize the country before it gets its own govern- ment, they will suffer what he calls "suffocation," he identifies his principal target as being attacks on the Shia in an effort to create a Shia/Sunni civil war. And that would explain a number of the at- tacks we've seen, including the horrendous bombings in southern Iraq on the Ashura holiday, and they've been totally unsuccessful in creating a Sunni/Shia civil war. No. 2, with respect to al-Sadr, we think it's a very different situa- tion, that, in fact, as the Shia majority have come to understand, that there will be resolute action taken against him and his forces. Not only are we reducing his forces in number, but, equally impor- tantly, we're getting more and more of the population coming out and speaking against him. On the worrisome side, I guess I would have to put on the table that up north, particularly in Kirkuk, which is a mixed Kurdish Arab city, we have had remarkable good luck over the last year in preventing what we've always feared could be a source of real eth- nic violence. It's a little troubled right now, and it's one of the situ- ations we're looking at closely. You know, we always get—we come up here, we try to emphasize some of the positive things that are happening. We're not trying to suggest, by any means, that this is a rosy scenario, but we do think that Iraq is moving forward to- ward self-government and self-defense, and that's the key to win- ning. Senator Coleman. Do I have time for one more question, Mr. Chairman? The Chairman. Yes, you do. Senator COLEMAN. There was a statement by Ayatollah al- Sistani recently saying it would be permissible—and this is his the statement—"permissible to demand the withdrawal of all military vestiges from the two cities and allow the tribal forces to perform their role in preserving security and order." What do you make of that statement? Mr. Armitage. We see a lot of statements attributed to Ayatollah al-Sistani, and if he made that one, I'm not sure—but we've looked at it as a not-very-veiled reference that Muqtada al-Sadr ought to get out of Najaf and Karbala, himself, and particularly stop using holy places to store weapons and to foment violence. Senator Coleman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator Coleman. Senator Biden. Senator BlDEN. Thank you very much. The reason he's going to me, I didn't ask any questions yet. I apologize. General, let me ask you, if I may, to begin with, and this is a serious question, and I'll put it in context, because if I just ask it, it will sound strange. I remember when General Joulwan, in the Clinton administration, was put in charge of our effort in the Bal- kans. And I remember being in a meeting and he was asked, and 65 with families in Iraq who keep in touch with us. You know, I mean, all you've got to do is go to Detroit. And they say you still don't let your daughter out of the house, you're still not able to send her down to the corner store to get milk. You know, there is rampant crime. And all the evidence is, none of the Iraqis think that they have security. And it's not just insurgents. I mean, they're—every- body, like in Israel, is worried a bus is going to blow up. So I want to know for example, is disarming the militias part of the mission? General Sharp. Sir, let me Senator BiDEn. All militias? General Sharp [continuing]. Talk to a couple of things. First off, to be clear, we are not going to hand off security on 1 July, writ large, across the country to the Iraqi security forces. As you point out, those security forces will not be nearly trained by 1 July. In fact, by 1 July, we'll have approximately 10 percent of the total re- quired Iraqi police academy-trained, and another 20 percent trained by the shorter 3-week program that our military does throughout the country. We will continue the—and are continuing to accelerate the training both in Jordan and in Baghdad and in Irbil and than at the different academies across the country. There's been a recent change where we have really started focusing on training mid-level leadership, specialized training, so that Iraqis who want to take security responsibilities have the capability to be able to do that. There is a CPA regulation out that says that you are not allowed to carry weapons without a card—you know, a weapons card. That has to be issued by the CPA or the correct authority. And as sol- diers come and see people doing it, they are being arrested at doing it. Senator BlDEN. I believe you. If I could interrupt, in the interest of time, general. And by the way, I think you know, you're on the right track. I'm not being critical of what you're trying to do. What I'm trying to get at is, seeing someone with a weapon, and arrest- ing them, is very different than aggressively General SHARP. Yes, sir. Senator BlDEN [continuing]. Going and disarming the population. What about the militias? I don't mean just al-Sadr's militia. What about the other militias that exist within the country? Is it part of the mission—I'm not saying it should or shouldn't; I want to know, though, is it part of the mission? Does a commander in the various regions in Iraq have, as a mission, to disarm the militias? Is that part of it? General Sharp. Sir, the militias, if they are active—let me start with—we actively go out to try to find weapons caches, and work on every tip that we get from the Iraqis to be able to get at—not just if we see weapons on the street, but the number of cordons and searches, the number of raids that we do, consistently brings in a lot of different weapons across the board. We are actively trying to get at all of those different weapons out there. Senator BlDEN. Do you have enough forces for that, general? I mean, we had 850,000 tons of open ammunition dumps that we didn't have enough soldiers to guard. So we obviously didn't have enough for the mission. I think that's right, 850,000 tons, it may 66 have been 900,000. We had helicopters, guys with night-vision gog- gles watching people go in and out, but we didn't have enough forces. Do we have enough forces now to be certain that—if there's any ammunition dumps that are still there, that we can either con- trol them or destroy them? General Sharp. Sir, every time we find an ammunition dump out there, we assess, No. 1, how quickly can somebody take things out of that ammunition dump? If it looks like it's the type of ammuni- tion and weapons that could go against Coalition forces, we imme- diately secure them. Is that to say that they are all completely se- cured across the country? No, there are some that have been cov- ered up so that they could not be stolen. But we find ammunition caches every day, and they're using our forces to be able to try to destroy those and guard those. Senator BlDEN. Well, there are at least five major militias—the Da'wa Party, the Badr Brigade, the two Kurdish parties' militias al-Sadr's so-called army. Is it our policy, I'm not saying that we should or shouldn't, and part of the mission of Abizaid in Iraq to disarm the militias? That's my specific question for anyone to an- swer, including you, general. Is that part of the mission statement? General Sharp. Sir, the mission is to not allow any of the militia forces to be able to go against the rule of law in Iraq. Senator BlDEN. With all due respect, general, that's not an an- swer. The question is, do we specifically include in the mission statement the disarmament of the Da'wa Party's militia, roughly about 10,000 people, the Badr Brigade, roughly 10,000 militia—by your numbers; is that part of the mission? I'm not suggesting it has to be. Is that a mission? Is that part of the mission? Mr. Wolfowitz. Senator, I think the correct interpretation of the mission statement that General Sharp just gave you is, that is not part of the mission unless it is necessary to bring them under con- trol. And in the case of al-Sadr, it's proving to be necessary. In the case of the Kurdish militias, for example, it would give us—frankly, it would be a source of instability if we were to try to go out and forcibly disarm them. And, in fact, they have been a source of sta- bility in many parts of the country—not one you want to rely on long-term, but the approach to those militias is to try, over time, to integrate them into new Iraqi security forces. And the real an- swer to disarming militias is to create an alternative security insti- tution, and then the militias can go away. Senator BlDEN. Just a real quick adjunct to that. Are we using the Badr Brigade or the Da'wa militia, allowing them to independ- ently engage al-Sadr in Najaf? Now, it's one thing to integrate the militias into a U.S. command structure so that there is some co- operation. And it's another thing—and I'm not saying one's right or wrong; it's just a different thing—to essentially give a green light to one of the militias to take on another militia in Iraq. With re- gard to Najaf and al-Sadr, are any existing Iraqi militia engaged, given the green light, to take on al-Sadr? Mr. Wolfowitz. You say engaged or given a green light. En- gaged, they may do on their own. Green light means, I think, under our direction, our command, and Senator BlDEN. No, not command. Just say, go to it, guys, any way you want. Not our command. 68 as long as it takes to now that there's much of a focus on our forces leaving. And, specifically, the London Times is talking about that Blair and Bush are drawing up plans to speed the pullout. Mr. Secretary Wolfowitz, do you want to comment about that? Mr. Wolfowitz. I wouldn't believe everything I read in the Lon- don Times, or certainly not that one. We are looking at sustaining pretty high levels of U.S. forces, and certainly higher than we an- ticipated earlier, for some time. And I would add, we knew there were problems with the ICDC in Fallujah, the locally recruited one. The 36th Battalion of the ICDC, by the way, which was not a local battalion, did come to Fallujah, did do some pretty serious fighting. If you go up to Mosul, where General Petraeus' 101st Airborne Di- vision trained ICDC, I think, more effectively than anywhere else in the country, they stood their ground and fought successfully and defended the government house in Mosul. So it's a mixed picture. What we believe is very important is that we think we know how to improve the picture in places like Mosul, from good to excellent, and in places like Fallujah, from terrible to, hopefully, at least moderate. Senator NELSON. How did they perform in Ramadi? Mr. Wolfowitz. Probably not very well. Senator NELSON. They melted away. Mr. Wolfowitz. And, in some cases, they helped the enemy. That's one of our problems. Senator Nelson. Mr. Secretary Armitage, you know my Mr. Wolfowitz. Senator Nelson, if I might say, I mean, so every- one understands, Fallujah and Ramadi have been, since the begin- ning, the most difficult parts of the country with the most seriously embedded elements of the old regime there fighting us. Senator NELSON. Mr. Secretary, you know my personal affection and respect for you. I want to pick up on a question that Senator Dodd was asking, and follow that. The media has reported that Secretary Powell expressed concern about the prison abuses to Sec- retary Rumsfeld. Would you pick up on that and tell us what you know? Mr. Armitage. I don't think my job is to exactly say what Sec- retary Powell said to any of his Cabinet colleagues. However, since he himself has said that when he was informed of these by Mr. Kellenberger, of the ICRC, and laterally he actually received a re- port through CPA in February, he raised these with all the prin- cipals, not just Secretary Rumsfeld, as well as with the President. Senator NELSON. And that was when? Mr. Armitage. February. Senator NELSON. Let me ask you, regarding Iran, Iran has been making some noise regarding the U.S. presence specifically fighting the Shi'ites. What have we communicated to and with Iran on this subject? Mr. Armitage. I think yesterday or the day before, they made some very strong noises about this, opposed to any violence to any Shia. This was the loudest noise that they've made recently. We have communicated to them, in no uncertain terms, that the solu- tion to the question of Muqtada al-Sadr is one that doesn't need their active involvement in any way. We've also said that we are watching their activities in the south, particularly provision of 69 money to certain clerics who try to win favor, and we view it with disfavor, and they would be judged by their actions in the south. Senator Nelson. Would you feel comfortable, in this setting or closed setting, of sharing with us some of the specific communica- tions and how it's been received by Iran? Mr. ARMITAGE. We normally, except for the time—the recent event where the Iranians came to Baghdad and had a very busi- nesslike discussion with the British and our representative about the question of Muqtada al-Sadr. We normally communicate through the Swiss, and I'd be glad to come up and show you the tone and tenor. Senator Nelson. And would you also, at that time—and I would welcome that—also talk to us about to what degree are we getting through to Iran that they should be stopping their nuclear pro- gram? Mr. Armitage. I'll be glad to discuss that now. We, along with our European friends, have—we have been skeptical from the be- ginning about their willingness to stop the nuclear program. Our European friends have been somewhat less skeptical. But, in recent months, given the difficulty that the IAEA has had in getting Iran to do what they said they'd do, ratify the additional protocol and throw open to inspection those things which need to be thrown open for inspection, and say there's a gathering feeling in Europe, that they're hiding, and they're holding something out. Senator Nelson. You are going to be getting a letter that Sen- ator Ensign and I are now circulating for signatures on this sub- ject. It's addressed to the President, but I'm sure that you all will weigh in on it. And this is something that I would like to followup in detail, perhaps in a closed session. The concern of the interests of the United States being threatened by a nuclear Iran, of course, is enormous. Could you tell us something about, Mr. Secretary, the corruption in the ministries in Iraq? Mr. Armitage. There is a lot of speculation in the very free Iraqi press about this. Anyone who's seen participating in the Governing Council is, at one time or another, as far as I can see, accused of these matters. There are some investigations which are ongoing, which I would prefer not to mention here and would refer you to IGs and others. But I think there's a lot of speculation that makes it seem that it's a lot higher than it is. Having said that, there's no question, some people have used their positions to enrich them- selves or people around them have used their position to enrich themselves without, necessarily, reference to the principal. Senator Nelson. Either you or Secretary Wolfowitz, would you care to comment about the cutting off of the payments to Mr. Chalabi? Mr. Wolfowitz. That was a decision that was made in light of the process of transferring sovereignty to the Iraqi people. We felt it was no longer appropriate for us to continue funding in that fashion. There has been some very valuable intelligence that's been gathered through that process that's been very important for our forces, but we will seek to obtain that in the future through normal intelligence channels. Senator Nelson. Mr. Chairman, thank you. 73 democratic ally than having some American puppet that does ex- actly what we say. Senator Corzine. I would concur with the analysis with regard to Korea. I think it took, what, 50 years, 30 years? It took Mr. WOLFOWITZ. It's still in—very much in the Senator Corzine [continuing!. A very long time. Mr. Wolfowitz [continuing]. Walking stage, but you've got to walk at some point. The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator Corzine. Senator Biden and I have just a couple of questions each, and then we will conclude the hearing. Let me ask this basic question. Many scholars who have ap- peared before our committee have talked about the whole propo- sition of whether Iraqis feel like they want to be Iraqis, as opposed to Kurds or Sunnis or Shi'ites or members of Arab tribes. And this becomes a crucial question at the point that sovereignty passes on to the Iraqi people. As we turn over more authority, as we will be doing, to Iraq, what is your own basic assumption about the nation- hood status, as opposed to the worst-case scenario? In this worse- case scenario the Kurds or the Sunnis or others do not find the ar- rangements satisfactory, either in the interim period or in the con- stitutional formulation, and, as a result, want a carve-out, or want separatism, or want their own situation, and are prepared to fight about it and create if not a civil war, at least elements of instability purely by their desire to not be coopted? Mr. Armitage. This possibility certainly exists, and we're very alert to it. And during the whole discussion of federalism, we were alert to it—and federalism, which devolves power to more local communities, but one that's based not on ethnicity, but on location, is where we went. I think we're somewhat heartened that, thus far, even in the face of someone whose avowed intention was to bring about civil war—al-Zarqawi—that we haven't had it. And even in very troubled places where the Sunnis had displaced the Kurds in various cities and taken their lands under Saddam Hussein's rule, the violence that one would expect to occur after that has been somewhat lessened, partially because IOM and others have been in there working hard, but partially, I think, because most Iraqis are willing to give it a ride and see where it goes. Mr. Wolfowitz. Senator Lugar, I had a—actually, it was the same day that we were in the Al Rashid Hotel when it was at- tacked. That evening, we had dinner with Abdel Aziz al-Hakim, the head of the SCIRI organization, the younger brother of Mohammed Baqir al-Hakim, who was brutally assassinated in Najaf last Au- gust. This was late October. And I said to him that I thought there was a lot that Iraqis might profitably learn from our Constitution about the rule of law, separation of powers, and so forth; that I thought that they had two problems that are uniquely Iraqi that we probably couldn't help them much on—one was the issue that you're alluding to, of regional separation, and the other, I said, is the role of religion. And I was, frankly, surprised when he showed enormous knowledge of our Constitution. He said, "No, I think your Constitution has the answer to one and a half of our two prob- lems," and he proceeded to explain that the answer, in his view, to maintaining the unity of Iraq is what they call "regional fed- 75 doesn't—hopefully, there can be arrangements that avoid having to have a 400,000-man army to protect it from its neighbors. With respect to what you, I think, talked about as, sort of, covert influences from outside, which is one of the problems we're dealing with today, most of those ultimately have to take the shape of an internal security threat of some kind. And I think what we're counting on is that, as Iraqis develop the capacity to provide for their own internal security, very few of them, I think, want to see Syria influencing things, or Turkey influencing things, or Iran in- fluencing things, and certainly not doing it at the point of a gun. The Chairman. But we trust they will have the ability to repel that, I suspect. That's axiomatic, to make sure it doesn't happen. In the U.N. resolution that we're attempting to work with, should there perhaps be a clause that indicates that the inter- national community would come to the rescue of Iraq in the event that there was an external effort to terminate this country or to in- vade it? In other words, you've mentioned that the international community would not look kindly on this. Well, that's quite true. But isn't this the time, really, to formalize what the international community is prepared to do about that? And by that, I mean the whole community, not just the United States. Mr. Armitage. I think my initial impression of that idea, Mr. Chairman, is that somewhere in the hortatory language of the—or the preparatory paragraphs, if you will, of the U.N. Security Coun- cil resolution, you could express views about territorial integrity and all of that, and the need to respect it, and how we'd view with disfavor anything against that. But in the operative paragraphs, I think you'd find it very difficult to keep the Security Council on- board with some sort of ironclad, "We will do x if y happens." I think that would actually complicate matters if we put that in one of the operative paragraphs. The Chairman. Well, I agree it would. I'm just concerned about the fact that we have already had great difficulty with the Security Council, in terms of responsibility. And clearly if we are to attempt to move on to Iraqi sovereignty and a lesser United States role, and others have not stepped forward, despite all the invitations, it would be well to discuss this in advance. Mr. Armitage. Oh, indeed, it will be. I have no doubts that your comments will be viewed with great interest. I would note, Mr. Chairman, that, on Iraq particularly, we've had three 15-0 votes in the Security Council since our one failure prior to the war. So there's a great deal of comity of views out there on the need to get it right. Mr. Wolfowitz. Mr. Chairman, it strikes me that what you're suggesting certainly should be the goal, going forward. I'm not say- ing tactically. I can't judge whether this next resolution will bear that load or not. But it seems to me putting that idea forward and moving toward it over time is certainly something that we ought to be trying to accomplish. The Chairman. Perhaps Ambassador Negroponte, in both of his hats, as it turns out, might offer this counsel during the course of his work at the United Nations, prior to his going to Baghdad. Mr. Wolfowitz. I might add, we're very lucky to have him. The Chairman. I agree. 78 Senator BlDEN. What are you thinking about along those lines? Mr. Armitage. Well, I'm listening to you very carefully, and some of the things you mention we've discussed and others have discussed, such as a P5 plus the neighbors as a contact group, for openers. One of the difficulties we've had is, Lakhdar Brahimi is working night and day to fashion this interim government, and he's not able to turn his attention to that. We've had discussions with him. Iraqis have had discussions with him. This is even more im- portant. Or maybe you want it P5, plus neighbors, plus EU. Senator BlDEN. Yes. Mr. Armitage. We've recently had discussions with the EU on this. So I'm not sure that any of us are off the page. We're all on the same page. Whether we're going fast enough and are imagina- tive enough, I don't know. We've had discussions with de Hoop Scheffer, in NATO, about this. And I would characterize him as very interested—the Secretary General—in this matter. Not ready to take it on, doesn't think the body's ready yet. Senator BlDEN. But here's where I am. Mr. Armitage. But we don't let him walk away from it. Senator Biden. Well, look, and this is—I apologize, I'll finish this in a second, Mr. Chairman. A high-ranking and by definition, the Foreign Minister is high-ranking—a Foreign Minister of one of our major NATO allies was here in recent weeks. We had a private meeting with him, and I raised NATO Mr. Armitage. I'll do the investigative work and figure out who this was. Senator BlDEN. You know, I mean, it's pretty obvious, but I don't want to—well, he told me, "No, no, NATO, we can't do that, we can't do that." And I said, by the way, the President of the United States gets on a plane and went to your capital and said, Mr. Lead- er of this country, I want this. Could he say no? And he said, "Don't do that." The truth is, the only person that can do this now is the Presi- dent. Every single solitary person, from four-stars to Under Secre- taries to Secretaries, can't do it. They're going to get Mr. Wolfowitz. Not even Deputy Secretaries. Senator BlDEN. Deputy Secretaries can't even do it. And you are an incredibly competent person. You can't do it, be- cause they don't want to do this, they don't want to wear the jack- et, they don't want to get into the deal, but they know they're going to have to get into the deal. And so does the Defense Department support the notion of literally creating a contact group that actu- ally oversaw the political transition? Would you support that at De- fense? Or have you talked about it? Mr. Wolfowitz. It's a general—let me put it this way. I certainly agree with the spirit of what you're suggesting, and we have been eager to get a larger NATO role. We'd love to see a larger NATO role. I appreciate what you said earlier on, that it may only gen- erate three or four-thousand additional troops, but that it's sym- bolically important. I think it is important, by the way, on that point, for people to be realistic. I don't think anybody's going to want to put a lot of troops into Iraq and Senator BlDEN. Absolutely not. Mr. Wolfowitz [continuing]. Until the killing stops. 81 (b) Have you made a request for this funding to OMB? (c) Why has OMB not included this request for the U.S. Embassy operations in the President's request to Congress for additional funds? (d) I understand there are no reconstruction funds for agriculture costs and several other areas are short funds. Will any of the $25 billion contingency fund be available for such unfunded reconstruction costs? (e) I note that a recent NSPD signed by the President directed the Director of OMB to make requests for necessary funding and authorities for Iraq. Have such requests been made? (f) How is State determining the allocations to be charged to other agencies for operations in Baghdad, and how will that affect the expenditures by the U.S. Embassy Baghdad? Answer, (a) Yes, the current estimated requirements for U.S. Mission Baghdad in FY 2005 are in that range. However, cost estimates remain subject to change due to the uncertainty of conditions in Iraq. (b) The full estimated requirements were not included in the regular FY 2005 budget request that was submitted through OMB last February. (c) The Administration will pursue a full FY 2005 supplemental request after Am- bassador Negroponte and his team have had time to assess the actual needs and provide more precise cost estimates. (d) The President has requested the $25 billion contingency fund to meet DOD's requirements to continue operations in Iraq. None of the funding has been requested to provide further foreign assistance to Iraq. (e) No requests have been made by OMB for U.S. Mission funding and authorities in FY 2005 under the recent NSPD. (f) The Administration is not considering cost sharing at this time. It is believed that cost sharing should wait until all agencies have had an opportunity to budget for these costs. In the interim, the State Department will study how best to assign separate costs while paying for U.S. Mission activities and support. Question 2. Will Iraq continue to be a combat zone following the transition? If so, what will be our military objectives? How will this affect the role of the Ambassador and of the multinational force? Answer. Unfortunately, we expect that Iraq will continue to face serious security problems after the June 30, 2004 transition, and the Iraqis have said publicly that their security services are not adequately prepared to maintain security in Iraq. It is likely, if unfortunate, that violence will escalate in the short-term as transition nears as terrorists seek to derail the transfer of power and undermine the efforts of the Iraqi Government. The U.S. is committed to continuing our assistance, both military and otherwise, to support the Iraqi people as they work for an independent, united, democratic, prosperous and peaceful country. My colleagues at the Department of Defense would be better able to answer any questions regarding military objectives. The Ambassador (Chief of Mission) and the Commander of Multinational Force Iraq will work closely together, and with the Iraqis, on political-military issues. Joint State-DOD planning is underway which recognizes that the roles, missions, resources, responsibilities and authorities of our agencies are complementary, and must work jointly toward the goal of a stable and democratic Iraq. The security situation makes the closest partnership between the MNF-I and the Embassy all the more critical to our success. State and Defense personnel have for- mal joint teams in some 15 management sectors, including security, to establish the foundations of interagency teamwork at an operational level of detail. The Chief of Mission and the MNF-1 commander will ensure the closest cooperation and mutual support in all their activities, in accordance with standing instructions from the President. On July 1, the Chief of Mission will assume full responsibility for the direction, coordination, and supervision of all USG Executive Branch employees and programs in Iraq, except for those under the command of the U.S. area military commander, and those seconded to an International Organization. The Secretary of State will be responsible for the continuous supervision and gen- eral direction of all assistance for Iraq. The Chief of Mission will provide policy di- rection for reconstruction projects funded by the Iraq Reconstruction and Relief Fund (IRRF). CENTCOM will take the lead on security assistance with the policy guidance of the Chief of Mission. Question 3. Have you appointed someone to look over prisoner issues following the transition from CPA? What will be the scope of his or her authorities? 83 Question 6c. What will happen to contracts that have been let by CPA using other than U.S. appropriated funds, such as the DFI? Answer. U.N. Security Council Resolution 1546 (8 June 2004) states that DFI funds shall be utilized to satisfy outstanding obligations of the DFI after the transi- tion. From early July 2003 to May 2004, the CPA allocated approximately $4.8 billion from the DFI for contracts relating to relief and reconstruction services. The result- ing contracts will remain in full force and effect after the transition. Question 6d. Can you comment on the continuity and transparency of the over- sight mission—Inspector General functions, etc.? Who will have primary responsi- bility for Inspector General Oversight, how does the CPA-IG factor into the process? Answer. The State Department Office of Inspector General, along with the Inspec- tors General of the Department of Defense, U.S. Agency for International Develop- ment and the Coalition Provisional Authority have been working with each other on an administration position to ensure effective continued oversight of Iraq-related activities. The State Department OIG, consistent with legislation, is responsible for oversight of all State Department Iraq-related activities and is actively engaged in initiating a number of Iraq-related projects. The CPA IG, consistent with legislation, will remain in place for six months post-June 30. The State Department OIG, as well as the other agency Inspectors General, will coordinate with CPA IG and with each other in order to ensure vigorous oversight over all Iraq-related activities of their respective agencies. Question 6e. A key sentence in the NSPD states: "The Secretary of State shall be responsible for the continuous supervision and general direction of all assistance on Iraq." What approach will the State Department take to reviewing current recon- struction priorities and revising them as needed? How will they make decisions regarding updated priorities? Is there any truth to a rumor that State is holding up all new programming until it takes the reigns? Answer. The State Department will undertake a thorough review of all recon- struction programs and priorities and will revise them as needed in consultation with Congress. The review will involve consultations with the Iraqis and the inter- national donor community. The new Iraq Reconstruction Management Office (IRMO), one of the successors to the current Program Management Office, will play a key role in this review and will make recommendations to the Ambassador for re- vision of the, assistance program. The State Department is not holding up new pro- gramming. Programming has been following the spending plan revised and sub- mitted to Congress on a quarterly basis. Question 6f. How is the Department of State determining the allocations to be charged to other agencies for operations in Baghdad, and how will that affect the expenditures by the U.S. Embassy Baghdad? Answer. The Administration is not considering cost sharing at this time. It is be- lieved that cost sharing should wait until all agencies have had an opportunity to budget for these costs. In the interim, the State Department will study how best to assign separate costs while paying for U.S. Mission activities and support. Question 7. What setbacks have there been in planning for the transition? What do you attribute them to? What did you think went better than expected? What has surprised you in developments in Iraq? Answer. The security situation has affected our transition planning. It has raised the costs associated with many of our activities in Iraq, such as insurance, the airlift of goods and supplies due to road insecurity, and extra security measures for facili- ties and personnel. The interagency coordination, especially with DOD, has gone well. We are also pleased with the number of Foreign Service officers who heeded the call to service in Iraq. Question 8. How will differences of opinion between the new U.S. Embassy and the caretaker government be resolved? Answer. After June 30, the United States will interact with the Government of Iraq in the same way that we would with any sovereign government around the world. Ambassador Negroponte and his team at the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad will work closely with the Iraqi Government to pursue our shared goal of a stable, uni- fied, and democratic Iraq. Given the circumstances, it is clear that our engagement 84 will need to be broad-based and robust. It is in that spirit of partnership that dif- ferences of opinion, should they arise, will be discussed. Question 9. How confident are you that free and fair elections can be held for the 250 seat National Assembly by the end of January 2005, as planned? Answer. We expect that the elections timetable laid out in the Transitional Ad- ministrative Law (TAL) will be followed. Iraqis, working with the United Nations, have made good progress towards setting up an electoral, commission that will over- see preparations for the January 2005 elections. Of course, the security situation will present challenges. But MNF-I and Iraqi security forces are taking into account the requirement for election security so that Iraq can hold free and fair elections by January 2005. Question 10. Are Iraqi political moderate voices emerging to lead political groups? Answer. Iraqis of all political stripes are forming groups to advance their views. More than 200 political parties have been identified to the National Democratic In- stitute, the International Republican Institute, and the U.S. Government. Many of these parties have a secular, moderate outlook. There are also parties which espouse extreme views, some of which are well organized, but polling in Iraq suggests that most Iraqis do not support these groups. Question 11. A poll conducted last week for the CPA indicates that respondents in Hillah have vastly different views from the rest of the country with respect to democracy, the TAL, how are we working with those groups to ensure they are being heard? Answer. While we follow Iraqi public opinion polls closely, we are aware that the results of individual polls in Iraq can vary considerably. Comparisons of different polls, and comparisons of polls over time, give more confidence in our understanding of Iraqi public opinion. CPA officials, several of whom are seconded State officers, have been actively engaged with the range of political groups in Hillah to ensure that the TAL is understood and that they understand the path it lays out to rep- resentative government. We believe the people of Hiliah are committed to democ- racy. Following the transfer of authority by June 30 to an Iraqi Interim Government, we expect to maintain a State Department diplomatic presence in a number of Iraq's regional centers, including Hillah, to support the new government's efforts to build democracy, establish the rule of law, and conduct elections as called for in the TAL. Question 12. The same poll indicated that 80% of the people wanted more infor- mation about the TAL. What are we doing to address that? Are we paying attention to these polls? Answer. We pay close attention to Iraqi public opinion polls. With respect to the TAL, since it is an Iraqi document, we believe Iraqis should take the lead in dis- cussing its contents. We have been encouraging them to do so, and believe they are making good progress in a dialogue about their national governance. The National Conference of Iraqi leaders and other notables, which is set to meet in July 2004 to chose the members of an Interim National Council to advise the In- terim Iraqi Government, will also represent a forum in which Iraqis will discuss the TAL. Question 13. The President two weeks ago enacted stricter sanctions toward Syria. Will that help or hurt our Mission in Iraq? Answer. Syria has a mixed record in supporting stability and security in Iraq. While we appreciate Syrian efforts to improve border security, we believe the Syrian Government could do more. We remain deeply concerned about terrorists and other fighters entering Iraq from Syria. To date, Syria has not taken any measures in re- sponse to the sanctions. We have a very direct dialogue with the Syrian Government regarding our con- cerns with their behavior. We believe that implementation of the Syria Account- ability and Lebanese Sovereignty Restoration Act of 2003 has further demonstrated the depth of our concern to the Syrian Government. We believe that Syria can con- tribute to international efforts in Iraq and continue to urge the Syrian government to cooperate to tighten border controls and to comply with its obligations under UN Security Council resolutions 1483 (2003) and 1546 (2004) with regard to the return of frozen Iraqi assets to the Development Fund for Iraq for the benefit of the Iraqi people. 85 Question 14. There have been alarming reports of Syrian and Iranian cross-border influence in Iraq. Are these foreigners welcomed by Iraqis? Are they operating on their own or are they joining forces with other Iraqi elements? What plan do the Iraqis have to address this issue following sovereign transfer? Answer. While some Iraqis may have welcomed foreign fighters to Iraq, their presence is not welcomed by the vast majority of Iraqis. We are in contact with all of Iraq's neighbors to emphasize the need for stricter border controls to prevent the inflow of foreign fighters, terrorists and weapons and to combat smuggling. This is an important priority for the Iraqis, CPA, and Coalition forces. We have long been concerned about the activities of some Iranian officials in Iraq. Although we have seen reports, we have little credible evidence to date of direct Ira- nian support to insurgent or terrorist groups attacking Coalition forces. We have repeatedly warned the Iranian government, publicly and privately, against activities in Iraq that might be destabilizing. We will continue to ensure that the Iranian government is aware of our views and encourage it to support the establishment of a stable, free, democratic Iraq. We have also communicated our concerns about the inflow of fighters through Syria. We are working with the Syrians to increase the density of forces along and surveillance over that border. The Syrian government understands the importance we attach to this issue, and has taken steps to improve security along its border with Iraq. By its own admission, however, Syria acknowledges that measures to date have not been completely effective. We will continue to use Coalition military assets as appropriate to enforce border controls, while supporting the establishment of professional Iraqi security and bor- der forces. Improving border controls is a focus of our overall effort to train and equip Iraqi security forces. Question 15. What are we hearing through diplomatic channels from Iran and Syria with respect to their intentions as neighbors of Iraq? Answer. We would be happy to brief you or your staff in closed session on the substance of our contacts with Iran and Syria regarding Iraq. Some of Iran's public statements with respect to Iraq have been positive, but we remain concerned that the activities of some Iranian officials in Iraq are not con- sistent with statements from Tehran. We have repeatedly warned the Iranian gov- ernment, publicly and privately, against activities in Iraq that might be desta- bilizing. Iraqi officials, including several members of the Iraqi Governing Council, have vis- ited Syria and have had useful meetings with President Asad and other senior offi- cials. Syria, like Iran, maintains a diplomatic mission in Baghdad. We have encour- aged Syria to take a more constructive tone in its public statements about Iraq and have noted the unhelpful language on Iraq employed by the state-run media. We maintain an ongoing dialogue with Syria on a range of Iraq issues—from the return of frozen Iraqi assets to securing Syria's long and porous border with Iraq. We will continue to ensure that the Iranian and Syrian governments are aware of our views, understand the negative consequences of activities supporting the de- stabilization of Iraq, and encourage them to support the establishment of a stable, free, democratic Iraq. Question 16. Egypt, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia and others have language skills and resources which they have offered and which could be helpful to reconstruction in Iraq. Have we accepted such offers by neighbors to assist in Iraq? Answer. Regional governments and firms have not only language skills and re- sources, they also have lower overhead, lower potential security costs, and more in- valuable in-country experience than most European and American counterparts. In addition, they have cultural familiarity and local know-how. Kuwait has provided $200 million in in-kind humanitarian assistance to Iraq, such as a water pipeline that the Kuwaitis built to Basra. Kuwaiti firms are directly involved in reconstruc- tion, including local provision of services to contractors and others. They have also provided at least $2 billion in direct support for the U.S. military, other coalition forces, and key regional allies in Operation Iraqi Freedom, such as oil for Jordan. They are paying for 88% of the U.S. military's operational fuel needs, and have shown appreciation for the idea that reconstruction depends on security. They pledged $500 million for Iraqi reconstruction, and have deposited $10 million di- vided equally between the UN and World Bank trust funds. Saudi Arabia has also helped with oil for Jordan to replace Iraqi oil. For Iraq, they have provided refined petroleum products for humanitarian use. They con- structed and staffed a field hospital in Baghdad. They pledged $500 million at the 86 Madrid Donors' Conference for Iraqi reconstruction and have offered substantial debt reduction to Iraq. Egypt has provided diplomatic training to Iraqis and made a major investment in telecom infrastructure. In addition, they have made offers of training for Iraqi doctors, nurses, and other Iraqi civil servants, and are also exploring ways to train Iraqi police. Other regional countries have been actively engaged in reconstruction, including Jordan (police training), UAE ($215 million pledge), Qatar ($100 million), Turkey ($50 million), Oman ($3 million), and even Iran ($5 million). Iran has also pledged an economic package, which includes credit facilities, restoration of religious sites, tourism and pilgrimage, technical and advisory services, trade, investment, market transition from the current Cost Plus Award Fee (CPAF) contract to a Firm, Fixed Price (FFP) structure. The U.S. Mission Task Order will incorporate the ability to sever portions for local competitive award for construction, commodities, and other opportunities that will directly enable commerce with the people of Iraq. Question 17. As you know Kellogg, Brown, and Root is providing logistics support in Iraq to the Coalition Provisional Authority and to U.S. Forces via the LOGCAP III contract. The committee has been told you plan to also use KBR to support the logistical needs of the U.S. Mission in Iraq. How do you plan to control the costs? Answer. The CPA and Department of State have taken significant action to re- duce cost under the existing Task Order as well as the proposed U.S. Mission Task Order. The Department of State assigned a senior Program Manager to Baghdad responsible to work in real time with executive and management levels of the U.S. Mission to Iraq, Department of State contracting authority, and LOGCAP to ensure that only requirements of the Embassy become the responsibility of the U.S. Mission Task Order; • The Department of Defense dedicated a full-time Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA) office consisting of a senior military commander, senior civilian manager, an Administrative Contracting Officer (ACO), Property Manager, and Planner who are solely responsible to administer the current and follow-on Task Order; • The Department of Defense dedicated several full-time staff members from the Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA) to provide oversight; • The Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) developed and issued a vehicle iden- tification card that has stopped unauthorized users from obtaining fuel; • Oversight has reduced unauthorized users of the Dining facilities (DFAC); • The Department of Defense and the Department of State are cooperating in a proven logistics system consisting of a Requirements Review Board (RRB), Area Support Group (ASG), and Award Fee Board (AFB) that augment CONUS- based Department of State, DCMA and DCAA to continually monitor KBR per- formance, cost, and asset management. As the Department of State management and administrative team assume their assignments they will undertake additional oversight measures. Once stability in- creases in the area, the U.S. Mission Task Order can access, and humanitarian as- sistance. Overall, the U.S. government has encouraged offers of help from regional countries, and is actively soliciting further regional support in a variety of areas. Responses of Hon. Paul Wolfowitz to Additional Questions for the Record Submitted by Senator Richard G. Lugar Updated as of June 3, 2004 Question la. On November 19, 2003, Admiral Nash of the CPA Program Manage- ment Office announced at a contractors convention in Crystal City, that RFPs would be issued on January 1, bids would be received on February 1 and awards be made on March 1. He stated that contractors would be expected to mobilize in a short pe- riod of time following the award of the contracts. However, reports by USAID and CPA officials in Washington and Baghdad last week indicate that the only construc- tion work that has been done through these PMO-managed contracts were for bases to support the U.S. military. And further, that NO work has been done in the seven major reconstruction sectors through these PMO contracts. • Why was Congress led to believe that funds we appropriated on an urgent and emergency basis last Fall would have an impact this quickly? Answer. Reports regarding construction work being done only in bases to support the U.S. military are untrue. To date, under the major design/build contracts, we have 104 project sites where construction is occurring in the Public Works, Oil, 88 Answer. No. The people of Iraq face a vast array of pressing needs for infrastruc- ture and social development projects. In sectors such as oil, electricity, and agri- culture, the nation's needs clearly exceed the sector allocations of the Iraqi Relief and Reconstruction Fund (IRRF). The recent PRB allocation funded additional projects for the relief and reconstruction of Iraq and did not affect the status of indi- vidual projects funded by the IRRF. Question 2c. Is this an effort by CPA to avert normal developmental programming process and congressional notifications? Answer. No. The recent PRB allocation did not affect IRRF-funded projects. If it had, the Congress would have been notified, if required. Question 2d. What will CJTF-7 be using the $500 million for? CERP? Answer. CJTF-7 is still reviewing how this allocation will be used. Question 2e. How are these funds being accounted for and reported on? Could you please provide for the committee a full accounting of all the DFI expenses to date? Answer. These allocations are accounted for and reported on in the same manner as all other DFI funds. Both the PRB decisions and DFI expenditure information are available on CPA's Web site. Question 3. Regarding oversight of the $87 billion of appropriated funds support for Iraq, what are your views on the effectiveness of Department of Defense criminal investigative support of the expenditures of U.S. appropriated funds in Iraq? Will the Defense Criminal Investigative Service maintain a presence in Iraq? If not, why not? If so, how large will the office be? Answer. The criminal investigative support provided by the Department of De- fense Office of Inspector General (OIG) has been significant since the CPA was es- tablished. A rotating team of three Special Agents from the Defense Criminal Inves- tigative Service (DCIS), the criminal investigative arm of the OIG, is stationed in Baghdad coordinating investigative matters relating to allegations of bribery, con- tract irregularities, counterfeiting, embezzlement, and the sale and smuggling of il- legal weapons and explosive devices. This past year, DCIS agents, working with Military Police, Iraqi police, and the CPA Ministry of Finance, broke up an Iraqi dinar counterfeiting operation and seized counterfeit currency worth more than 100 billion dinars ($50 million). The OIG plans to maintain a presence in this area. Its current plan, contingent upon the availability of funding, is to establish a Resident Agency in Qatar or Bah- rain comprised of 10 investigative and support personnel. Question 4. What are the plans to turnover former Iraq regime non-cash assets; e.g., automobiles, boats, etc, to the Iraqi people? How and when will the Iraqi real estate that the Coalition Provisional Authority and U.S. forces have occupied be re- turned to the Iraqi people? Answer. The return of non-cash assets from the previous regime has been handled thus far by the Department of the Treasury, which leads an interagency working group on this issue. After the transition to Iraqi sovereignty, the Iraqi Interim Gov- ernment (IIG) will be responsible for arranging the return or sale of these assets in accordance with UN Security Council Resolution 1483. Once the IIG takes office, the United States will begin to negotiate the modalities of turning over property oc- cupied by the CPA or Coalition forces to the Iraqi people. Question 5. Were you aware that on March 26 this committee asked for a briefing on detainee treatment issues? Do you know why the Foreign Relations Committee was told repeatedly through the month of April that this issue could not yet be briefed? (a) Will MNF-I continue to hold Iraqi prisoners after we turn over sov- ereignty? Under what authorities? (6) Official reports from CPA indicate that 500 courts are operating in Iraq. Presumably if you have courts, you have jails in which to put the guilty parties. Are jails being run by Iraqis? Are we supervising or advising in any capacity? If so, is this a CPA or a military function, or a contractor? Answers, (a) MNF-I will continue to hold Iraqi security detainees following turn- over of sovereignty under the authority of UNSCR 1511, which is not affected by the transfer of sovereignty. These detainees have committed offenses against or pose imminent threats to Coalition forces. (b) The Iraqi penal system is being run by Iraqis with Coalition assistance, and is separate from the MNF detention facilities. CPA personnel, both civilian and mili- 89 tary, are advising Iraqi judicial and penal authorities. After 30 June, these advisors will become liaison officers and work for the U.S. Ambassador. They are not contrac- tors. Question 6. What is the administration doing to ensure that the Ba'ath Party is not organizing clandestinely to seize power again, as it did in the 1960s? Is there a focal point of the opposition? Are Iraqis, other than exile officials, engaged on this? Answer. It is highly unlikely that the Ba'ath Party will be able to organize clan- destinely and regain power in Iraq as it did in the 1960s for at least three reasons. First, de-Ba'athification only applies to one percent of the former Ba'athists. All oth- ers will have an opportunity to participate in a more prosperous and freer Iraq than that which existed under Saddam Hussein's tyranny. Second, of the remaining one percent of Ba'athists, we have captured or killed a majority of those who were complicit in the crimes of the previous regime. Those who have been captured will eventually be tried by Iraqi judges for their crimes against the Iraqi people. Without this leadership, it is improbable that the Ba'athists would be able to regain power. Finally, and most importantly, the Iraqi people have made clear that they do not want to return to the era of hopelessness and fear that the Ba'ath Party represents. This is true across denominational and ethnic lines. Even in the Sunni Triangle, Co- alition forces continue to receive useful intelligence from Iraqis that has enabled successful operations against the members of Saddam's intelligence and "Special Services" apparatus that continues its efforts to terrorize the Iraqi people and im- pose their tyranny upon them. Question 7. What setbacks have there been in planning for the transition? To what do you attribute them? What did you think went better than expected? What has surprised you in developments in Iraq? Answer. The security situation has hampered our ability to conduct site surveys for the proposed regional teams and impedes the facility with which we can visit the various Iraqi ministries outside the Green Zone. Ultimately, it hinders our un- derstanding of future requirements both at the regional team locations and within the various Iraqi ministries themselves, but we are confident we will overcome the challenges. • The level of interagency support and involvement has been exceptionally posi- tive. • In order to hammer out the details of the OPLAN, we have held a number of conferences and workshops in which DOD, DOS, Department of Justice (DOJ), Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), other U.S. depart- ments or agencies and troop-contributing nations have all participated. • Differences in institutional philosophy and vocabulary alone could have caused this effort to fail, not to mention the competing stakeholder equities involved, but the OPLAN and the Memoranda of Agreement and Understanding reflect the willingness of all the parties to roll up their sleeves, set aside parochial dif- ferences, and make sure no detail is overlooked in standing down the CPA and standing up the U.S. Mission. • DOD and DOS have set up transition planning teams, and particularly at the forward element in Iraq, team members are working seven days a week to make this transition as seamless as possible. • The loss of contracts for equipment for the Iraqi Security Force cost us some time. This is now getting back on track. • There have not been that many surprises with regard to planning for the tran- sition, just a lot of hard, demanding work. The Iraq Transition Planning Team is working diligently to ensure that the June 30 transition from CPA to U.S. Mission will involve as few moving parts as possible, that the U.S. Mission will have the best possible personnel, logistics, contracts, etc, in place when Iraq's sovereignty is restored on 30 June. Question 8. How confident are you that free and fair elections can be held for the 250 seat National Assembly by the end of January 2005, as planned? Answer. We are confident that the Iraqi Interim Government will be able to hold free and fair elections as planned by the end of January 2005. Iraq's leaders have thus far been able to meet the deadlines to establishing a representative Iraqi gov- ernment since the November 15 Agreement last fall, including the signing of the Transitional Administrative Law in March and the establishment of the IIG by June. 91 Answer. Moqtada Al-Sadr and his supporters have advocated violence against Co- alition Forces and moderate Iraqis since the liberation of Iraq. But Mr. Al-Sadr has never had more than a couple thousand armed followers, and his actions in and around Najaf cannot be considered an uprising. Over the weeks that he has oper- ated in the area, the local population has repudiated his positions and demanded his departure. There has been no Shi'a revolt in answer to his call. Moreover, many of his urban followers from Baghdad have returned home, thereby leaving him with a destructive but limited band of armed fighters. His utter lack of political and mili- tary success should be predictive of his ability to challenge the Interim Iraqi Gov- ernment when it takes office this July. We do not expect him to be a political factor after Transition. Question 16. No security arrangement or SOFA has been signed. What rights and protections will U.S. military and civilian personnel in Iraq have with respect to Iraqi laws? Answer. In fact, the security arrangement for Coalition forces operating in Iraq has already been instituted. Article 59 (C) of the Transitional Administrative Law states that the elected Iraqi Transitional Government "shall have the authority to conclude binding international agreements regarding the activities of the multi- national force," and that "nothing in this Law shall affect rights and obligations . . . under UNSCR 1511 . . . which will govern the multinational force's activities pending entry into force of those agreements." Article 26 (C) en- sures that CPA orders and regulations "shall remain in force until rescinded or amended by legislation duly enacted and having the force of law." This includes CPA Order #17, which provides SOFA-like protections for Coalition Forces, and will stay in effect until an international agreement is negotiated with the sovereign Iraqi government. If a civilian contractor is accused of criminal conduct in Iraq, such accusations would be handled through a complaint made to the local Iraqi Police. If the con- tractor was acting within the scope of his/her official employment under the terms and conditions of a contract with the Coalition forces or CCPA, then he/she would be immune from the Iraqi legal process under the terms of CPA Order #17, which remains in effect after June 30th. The parent country of the contractor maintains the right to waive this immunity, however, and if the civilian contractor outside the scope of his or her official employment, the individual would be subject to Iraqi law. Question 17. There have been alarming reports of Syrian and Iranian cross-border influence in Iraq. Are these foreigners welcomed by Iraqis? Are they operating on their own or are they joining forces with other Iraqi elements? What plan do the Iraqis have to address this issue following sovereign transfer? Answer. There is evidence to suggest that some of these foreign fighters have linked up with former regime elements to conduct terrorist attacks against Coalition forces and the Iraqi people. However, these foreigners are generally not welcomed by the Iraqi populace, and Coalition forces continue to receive useful intelligence re- garding the activities of these foreign terrorists. Although the Iraqi Interim Govern- ment (IIG) is too new to have developed a detailed plan addressing this issue, the incoming Prime Minister of the IIG, Ayad Allawi, has indicated that he will make combating these forces a priority after the transfer to sovereignty. Question 18. Egypt, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and others have language skills and resources which they have offered and which could be helpful to reconstruction in Iraq. Have we accepted such offers by Arab neighbors to assist in Iraq? Answer. We have accepted several offers of assistance from Iraq's neighbors. Jor- dan has been training Iraqi police for several months, and we have accepted a simi- lar offer from Egypt. The Germans have been conducting forensic training for Iraqi police in the United Arab Emirates, and Turkey has been helping to train border police. Additionally, employees of the Central Bank of Iraq have been taking classes on modern banking in Kuwait. Question 19. [Deleted.] Question 20. This committee remains greatly concerned regarding the corruption surrounding the implementation of the United Nation's Oil for Food Program. In our efforts to empower Iraq ministries and turn sovereignty over to the people of Iraq, why has the CPA refused to release funds to the Iraqi Governing Council so that they may employ the U.S.-based accounting firm KPMG to conduct a local investiga- tion? In its stead, the committee has learned that the CPA has used Iraqi funds to hire another accounting firm (Ernst & Young) to do an investigation. Why? 92 Answer. In furtherance of its stewardship responsibilities on behalf of the Iraqi people under international law and United Nations Security Council Resolutions, the CPA is obligated to ensure that an Iraqi entity carries out a full and inde- pendent investigation of allegations of misconduct associated with the OFF Pro- gram. As the highest public audit organization in Iraq, the Iraqi Board of Supreme Audit (BSA) is uniquely placed to provide impartial oversight of such an investiga- tion. It is the only body under Iraqi law authorized to conduct audits of government- wide financial practice and in any event would have been obliged under its charter to investigate these matters. Under international good governance practice, such in- vestigations of misconduct should be conducted by an independent body. In addition, the BSA is a permanent institution staffed with qualified public servants who can provide continuity of oversight. The IGC is a political, not an investigative body. Moreover, the IGC will cease to exist after June 30 and therefore is not in a position to continue to oversee the investigation. With regard to the selection of Ernst & Young, the BSA conducted a full and open competition to select the firm. The BSA is serving as the Contracting Officer's Rep- resentative for this contract and will issue tasks to the contractor and monitor progress to ensure compliance with the terms of the contract. Responses of Hon. Richard L. Armitage to Additional Questions for the Record Submitted by Senator Joseph R. Biden, Jr. Question 1. Can you elaborate on what limitations in authority the interim gov- ernment will have? What powers will the interim government exercise? What pow- ers will it NOT hold? Who will hold them? Answer. The Iraqi Interim Government (IIG) will be the fully sovereign govern- ment of Iraq no later than June 30. Iraqis are discussing now, in the context of the Brahimi-led process, what the particular powers of the interim government will be. We expect that the Iraqi Interim Government's primary tasks will be to administer the country's day-to-day affairs, and prepare for and hold elections no later than January 31, 2005, as prescribed in the Transitional Administrative Law, for, the Transitional National Assembly. It is anticipated that the IIG will have the author- ity to conduct foreign relations, including establishing diplomatic relations. Indeed, the U.S. intends to re-establish diplomatic relations with Iraq soon after the transi- tion. Some Iraqis have said that decisions that have long-term implications should be reserved for an elected Iraqi government. Such limitations are for Iraqis to decide in the context of the ongoing consultations being led by Ambassador Brahimi. That said, we believe it is critical that economic reconstruction efforts continue and it will likely be important for the Iraqi Interim Government to have the ability to enter into at least some international agreements, including with respect to diplomatic re- lations, Iraq's sovereign debt, engagement with the International Financial Institu- tions, and international assistance. Iraq's independent central bank will manage monetary policy. Question 2. How important is the issue of sovereignty to other members of the UN Security Council as it relates to deliberation on a new UN resolution? What spe- cific agreements and disagreements do we have with other members on the Council on the question of sovereignty? Answer. The issue of sovereignty was a common theme among all Security Coun- cil members "wish lists" for a new resolution, as is clearly reflected in the unani- mously adopted Resolution 1546. "Sovereignty" (i.e., the new government's full gov- erning authority and responsibility for Iraq) is one of the themes of this resolution and is reflected throughout, including in addressing the Multinational Force (MNF). As stated in the resolution, the MNF's presence in Iraq is at the request of the In- terim Iraqi Government (IIG). The resolution also states that the MNF's mandate will terminate prior to the completion of the political process if requested by the Government of Iraq. Resolution 1546 reflects consultation and cooperation with Security Council mem- bers, the Iraqis—both in Baghdad and New York—as well as with Coalition mem- bers and countries in the region. Question 3. How likely do you think it is that Coalition forces will be asked to leave after June 30th? How certain are you of this? Answer. We are confident that the Iraqis will not request the Multinational Force (MNF) to leave after June 30. Iraqis remain committed to holding elections by no 93 later than January 31, 2005, and international security-related assistance will be important in making this goal achievable. They also realize, and have said so pub- licly, that their security services are not adequately prepared to maintain security in Iraq. Security is critical to the success of Iraq's political transition process. UNSCR 1546 both reaffirms the authorization for the MNF under unified command to, among other things, enable the Iraqi people to implement freely and without intimi- dation the timetable and program for the political process, and notes that the pres- ence of the MNF in Iraq is at the request of the incoming Iraqi Interim Government (IIG). Annexed to the resolution is a June 5 letter from Iraqi Prime Minister Ayad Allawi requesting a new UNSCR on the MNF mandate to contribute to maintaining security in Iraq. Both Allawi and Foreign Minister Hoshyar Zebari have publicly stated the need for the MNF remain in Iraq. In his June 3 address to the UN Security Council, Zebari said: "Since April] last year, we have been working very hard to re-establish Iraq's security, military, and police forces. However, we have yet to reach the stage of being able to maintain our own security and therefore the people of Iraq need and request the assistance of multinational forces to work closely with Iraqi forces to stabilize the situation. I stress that any premature departure of international troops would lead to chaos and the real possibility of a civil war in Iraq. This would cause a humanitarian crisis and provide a foothold for terrorists to launch their evil campaign in our country and beyond our borders. The continued presence of the multinational force will help preserve Iraq's unity, prevent regional intervention in our affairs and protect our borders at this critical stage of our reconstruction." In addition Allawi, as recently as June 20, said: "Until our forces restore their full capability, we will remain in need of the support and backing of the friendly multinational forces and also Arab and Islamic countries." In light of statements from Iraq's new leadership, and the continuing and increas- ing Iraqi-MNF security partnership, we do not foresee the Iraqis requesting the MNF to leave. Question 4. What is the CPA's current assessment of the Iraq ministries' capacity to assume political and economic responsibilities for governing Iraq by July 1, 2004? How is the CPA helping build Iraq's national ministries in such areas as ensuring accountability, transparency, and due process? Answer. The U.S. is confident in Iraq's ability to transition to a sovereign nation by June 30, 2004. Our advisors are working diligently with all Iraqi ministers and their staff in preparation for transition to the Iraqi Interim Government (IIG). Our programs include building financial market structures, developing trans- parent budgeting and accounting arrangements, and increasing the capacity of the Ministries of Finance and Planning to manage public resources. The U.S. assists the IGC and appointed ministries and plans to offer continuous support if desired by the IIG, both political and economic, after the June 30th transition. Questions 5 and 6. Senate Foreign Relations staff has been told that there are plans to keep roughly 200 American and coalition partner advisors in the various Iraqi ministries. Please describe these plans in detail. What ministries are involved? How many per ministry? What will their roles be in each ministry? Will they have oversight? Will they answer to Iraqi or American officials? Will the presence of these individuals diminish the sense of Iraqi sovereignty? Will this be seen as just one more example of any meaningful change on June 30th by ordinary Iraqis? Answer. Virtually all of Iraq's ministries have indicated to CPA that they will con- tinue to require the specific subject area expertise offered to them by some 200 of the foreign "advisors" now in Iraq. The role of these ministry liaisons will be to offer a wide-range of technical assistance to Iraq's ministries. The U.S. currently intends to offer 146 American experts to Iraq's ministries. It is our hope that other govern- ments and international organizations will plan to offer technical experts as well. The Iraqi Government alone will decide whether to avail itself of such international offers of development assistance. The ministry liaison officers will answer to Iraqi officials, who will choose to ac- cept or reject the assistance offered. Sovereign governments throughout the world welcome our offers of technical assistance. We expect Ministers of the Interim Iraqi Government to make clear to the Iraqi people that they will be running the affairs of their individual ministries. The substantial reduction in the number of advisors and the assumption of governing authority by the Iraqi Interim Government will signal a clear change to the Iraqi people on June 30. 94 Question 7. Senate Foreign Relations staff has been told that there are plans to keep roughly 200 American and coalition partner advisors in the various Iraqi min- istries. How will these advisors be able to help in areas such as ensuring account- ability, transparency, and due process? What oversight authority will these folks have, particularly with respect to American reconstruction funds? Answer. The State Department currently plans to provide approximately 200 ad- visors (from the U.S. Government and Coalition partners) to Iraqi ministries, at their request, to provide counsel and assistance during this interim period of gov- ernment. Each advisor will bring relevant experience to his or her assignment, and will work with their Iraqi counterparts to promote accountability, transparency, and due process, while helping the ministry identify and address critical priorities. The U.S. Government also provides support and advisory assistance to the Iraqi Com- mission on Public Integrity. Regarding oversight over the spending of U.S. Reconstruction funds, imple- menting agencies will have this responsibility, not, the advisors. Advisors will, how- ever, be consulted to ensure the appropriate prioritization of spending of U.S. recon- struction funds. Question 8. What is the CPA's current assessment of the Iraq ministries' capacity to assume political and economic responsibilities for governing Iraq by July 1, 2004? Answer. The U.S. is confident in Iraq's ability to transition to a sovereign nation by June 30, 2004. Our advisors are working diligently with all Iraqi ministers and their staff in preparation for transition to the Iraqi Interim Government (IIG). Our programs include building financial market structures, developing trans- parent budgeting and accounting arrangements, and increasing the capacity of the Ministries of Finance and Planning to manage public resources. The U.S. assists the IGC and appointed ministries and plans to offer continuous support if desired by the IIG, both political and economic, after the June 30th transition. basis will voter rolls be drawn—food ration cards [which were only given to male heads of households], a census, some other mechanism? Answer. Preparations for the January election will be carried out by an inde- pendent Iraqi electoral commission, which the United Nations is working to set up. We are working to ensure the commissions will have sufficient financial resources and will provide security assistance to that commission to help it carry out its work. The Iraqi electoral commission will have to decide the exact methods by which it will conduct the January 2005 elections after consultations with the Interim Iraqi Government and the United Nations. Although we are aware of various proposals to draw up voter rolls, we do not expect a census to be taken by January 2005. Question 10. Do you agree with Ms. Perelli's assessment that we are in danger of falling off track for elections in January 2005? Answer. As Ms. Perelli, the leader of the United Nations' electoral assistance mis- sion to Iraq, has stressed, security will be necessary to ensure the credibility of the election process, beginning with the establishment and staffing of election adminis- tration and continuing through polling day. In particular, security will be necessary to ensure that political parties and candidates can campaign effectively, and that election officials and voters are able to safely journey to polling places and to ensure that once votes are cast they are securely transported and reported. Ms. Perelli is currently working with Iraqi officials to help set up an Iraqi elec- toral commission that will prepare for the January 2005 elections. We believe that this commission will adhere to the timetable for elections laid out in the TAL. We are working to ensure the commission will have sufficient financial resources and will provide security assistance to ensure that the commission can carry out its mandate. Question 11. How do the continuing security problems impact on elections prepa- ration? How much improvement do we need in the security situation to permit elec- tions? How do you plan to achieve it? Answer. As Ms. Carina Perelli, the leader of the United Nations' electoral assist- ance mission to Iarq, has stressed, security will be necessary to ensure the validity of the election process, beginning with the establishment and staffing of election ad- ministration and continuing through polling day. In particular, security will be nec- essary to ensure that political parties and candidates can campaign effectively, and that election officials and voters are able to safely journey to polling places and to ensure that once votes are cast they are securely transported and reported. Question 9. What January elections? On what 97 Iraqi Ministries of Defense and Interior will be facilitated by the Ministerial Com- mittee on National Security and includes direct coordination between the MNF-I and Iraqi ministers and commanders. Iraqi military personnel will be integrated at all levels of the MNF-I and subordinate organizations. Tactical methods will evolve to place more and more responsibility on Iraqi forces and gradually transition to Iraqi responsibility for local and then regional control. Iraqi security forces under the Iraqi Ministry of the Interior (police, Department of Border Enforcement and Facilities Protective Service) will be under the control of the Iraqi Minister in con- cert with local MNF-I commanders. The Secretary of Defense has said we look for- ward to negotiating a security agreement with the Iraqis as soon as a duly-elected Iraqi Transitional Government is in place, which is foreseen for early next year. (The anticipated Iraqi Interim Government, to take authority not later than 30 June, will not have a legislature to ratify international agreements.) The agreement will likely resemble the many other security agreements we have with other coun- tries around the world. Question 2. Last month Secretary Wolfowitz told the House Armed Services Com- mittee that one of the fundamental elements for stabilizing Iraq is "building capable Iraqi security forces." You continued, "The picture there is mixed. We have lessons learned—important lessons learned from the last few weeks." • What are the "lessons learned" that you referred to? How are these "lessons learned" being implemented? Answer. Recent performance by Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) was mixed; some per- formed well and some did not. Common denominators among forces that did not perform well were: • Lack of proper equipment • Lack of an Iraqi leadership figure • Having to chose between tribal loyalty and loyalty to the immature Iraqi gov- ernment and security forces. • Incomplete training • Insufficient Coalition mentors Factors that successful Iraqi forces had in common were: • Completion of training programs • Equipped with appropriate vehicles, radios, weapons and individual gear • Close integration with Coalition forces • Effective chains of command and leadership • Unit cohesion developed from having worked together for some time. Since the dramatic increase in insurgent activity in early April, many of the secu- rity forces have begun to stabilize, and numbers are on the rise once again. In gen- eral ISF units, like any other security forces, need time to work together and de- velop confidence in their capabilities. Many ISF units have bad limited opportunity to do so. We have developed a series of actions designed to get the security forces on track as quickly as possible. Within the police (Iraqi Police Service (IPS)) and the border police (Department of Border Enforcement (DBE)) services we are re-training and replacing police that failed to perform and increasing the number of trained police by increasing training throughput of current training programs and opening addi- tional academies. Initiatives within the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps (ICDC) include creating a strike platoon within each battalion, mentoring ICDC battalions through Coalition augmentation and integrating ICDC more fully into Coalition operations. With respect to the Iraqi Armed Forces (IAF), we are completing training and de- ployment of the initial IAP battalions and the construction of their new garrison fa- cilities. We are employing former Iraqi officers as liaison officers to the Coalition to build a cadre of good Iraqi leadership and heavily embedding Coalition trainers as mentors. Our newest initiative is the fielding of a brigade-sized Iraqi National Task Force (INTF) in 30 days, expanding to division sized within 90 days. Initiatives across all of the security services include providing DFI funds to get ISF on line and reconstituted, increasing hazardous duty pay and other incentive pays for security sector and increasing emergency CERP funding. Overall training and equipping priority is to the INTF, IPS, ICDC and DBE in order. Question 3. Senators Lugar, Hagel and myself were told almost a year ago in Baghdad that it would take 5 years to train an Iraqi police force of 75,000, and 3 years to train an Iraqi army of 40,000. a. Specifically, what is the plan to recruit and train 75,000 police and 40,000 soldiers? Who will do the training? Where? How long are the training sessions and for how many trainees at a time? How long will it take to field fully trained 98 police and military forces? How many international police trainers are now working with the Iraqi security forces? Who is providing them? Answer. The endstate goal for police is 89,000, and for the Iraqi Armed Forces (IAP) it is 35,000. With respect to the IAF, there is no recruiting problem. Potential soldiers are recruited country-wide with the intent of gaining an ethnicity mix that approximates that of the four main constituencies (Shia, Sunni, Kurd, Turkoman). The first four battalions were trained at Kirkush Military Training Base and have been deployed to their garrison locations in Iraq. Training was conducted by Vinnell Corporation. Vinnell has completed training of NCO cadre, and the Jordanian Army has completed training of officer cadre; these cadre will then train the rest of the IAP under the guidance of the Office of Security Transition. The fifth battalion en- tered recruit training last week. These formally trained officers and NCOs then form the cadre for their new battalion and conduct basic training for new recruits at Kirkush. USCENTCOM will also employ 500 former Iraqi officers as liaisons to the Coalition to help build a cadre of good Iraqi leadership. We plan to field a total of 9 brigades (3 divisions) by early October 2004. Throughout the process, Coalition trainers will be embedded into LAF units and serve as mentors. Units are typically employed at the platoon and company level and are OPCON to the Coalition divi- sions in their region. Ten of these 27 battalions will become part of the Iraq Na- tional Task Force (INTF) and can be used for counter insurgency tasks, but focus is on external security. There is a possibility, with the recent emphasis on accel- erating training for the 10 battalions of the INTF, that the entire IAP may not be fully operational until on or about 1 December. With respect to the 89,000 member police force, the primary issue is not meeting this numerical goal, since there are currently 83,000 police on the rolls. Our chal- lenge is to fill the force with properly vetted and reliable police forces. We are cur- rently reviewing the police force. The Iraqi Ministry of the Interior has adopted poli- cies and procedures to dismiss Iraqi Police Service (IPS) personnel with unaccept- able performance records and to identify and reward those who have performed well. There is a three-tier training program consisting of a 3-week transition inte- gration program (TIP), an 8-week formal academy training and leadership training. TIP training is taught by the local Major Subordinate Command in the region. There are currently 15 locations where the training is conducted. TIP training throughput has been increased to 2825 every 3 weeks, and we are transitioning re- sponsibility for the conduct of much of this training to local Iraqis. Our goal is to train 43,000 by the end of December 2004. Academy training is currently conducted in Ahman, Jordan and in Baghdad. At the Jordan Academy training throughput is being increased from 1000 to 1500 per month (starts August). In Baghdad training throughput will increase from 500 to 1000 per month (starts June). We plan to have trained 36,000 trained by June 2005. Approximately 280 international police train- ers from various countries are providing instruction at the Jordan Academy, and the Baghdad Public Safety Academy has about 160 U.S. military and three civilian and two UK civilian instructors. A reconstitution plan is currently underway at Irbil Academy, where basic leader- ship is being taught to mid-level supervisors who will then conduct train-the-trainer classes for the remainder of police stations requiring reconstitution (Najaf, Kut, Falluja, Karbala). The first 171 leaders graduated from a 1-week course last week. (10 each will return to each police station in Karbala and Najaf). Two additional courses are scheduled. Following completion of this training, graduates will be re- quired to sign a code of conduct. 10,000 junior, mid level and senior level police offi- cers will be trained by December 2004 at a variety of locations based upon Irbil model. In addition, selected IPS will participate in a $200M specialized training program. Program consists of: • Basic Criminal Investigations—1200 IPS • Internal Controls—200 IPS • Intelligence—100 IPS • Counterterrorism (CT) Emergency Response Unit and National CT—250 IPS • CT Investigations—150 IPS • Post Blast Investigation—144 IPS • Drug Enforcement—200 IPS • Police Recruitment—20 IPS Courses are scheduled to begin at the Adnan Facility in Baghdad in mid-June. The IPS will also receive riot control training and the associated equipment for three 400-man riot control battalions. The International Police Advisor program will provide a critical mentorship and advisory function. We have deployed 276 of a planned 500 IPAs, to Iraq but, because 104 location has been identified and will be refurbished. This location will also be an emergency secondary base of operation in case of a destructive attack on the main site. Long term witness protection has been coordinated with the U.S. Marshals. We are attempting to purchase armored cars from neighboring countries to reduce the six-month minimum lag time between order and delivery. Regarding whether or not Annual Iraqi Financial Statements have yet been made public: they have not been made public because they have not been prepared. Question 9. In September 2003, Ambassador Bremer signed CPA Order number 30, which reformed employment conditions for state employees. According to the order, "Public Service Employees who fail to report to work for five consecutive days or ten days in a month, except as authorized by their senior supervisor or as a re- sult of verifiable medical incapacitation, may be dismissed from their employment." a. How many employees have been dismissed for reason of failure to report to work since the order was signed? Answer. To our knowledge, no employees were fired as a result of CPA Order #30. b. A May 13, 2004 Economist article entitled, "Without peace, reconstruction stalls" says that "the foreign ministry will not re-open until the autumn. Its 1,400 officials work for only two days a week, due to shortage of space." How is CPA order 30 reconciled with the foreign ministry's apparent two day work week? Answer. The Economist article is wrong. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs works six days a week and is fully engaged in the hard work of reopening and restaffing Iraq's embassies abroad and formulating and articulating a new foreign policy for a new, democratic Iraq. Foreign Minister Hoshyar Zebari has endorsed a new Cor- porate Management Plan jointly developed by CPA and the Ministry's senior staff that establishes sound, modern management principles for the Ministry. It is true that there are space problems at the Ministry due to the looting of the main Min- istry building following the liberation of Baghdad, but the renovated main head- quarters building will open in a few months. Some of the more junior staff do only work part-time while the renovation is underway, but the Ministry is very actively engaged in its important tasks. Responses of Hon. Richard L. Armitage to Additional Questions for the Record Submitted by Senator Russell D. Feinglod Question 1. At the same time that Congress passed an $87 billion supplemental spending bill requested by the administration, primarily for Iraq, last year, Con- gress also created an Inspector General for the Coalition Provisional Authority to ensure that massive sums of U.S. taxpayer dollars were not lost to waste, fraud, and abuse. But only a fraction of the billions appropriated for reconstruction pro- grams in Iraq has been obligated thus far. When Congress created the IG for the CPA, we did so because we recognized that the amount of money involved in recon- struction was so great that we needed an IG on the ground in Baghdad, not an of- fice in Washington that viewed Iraq as one operation among hundreds that needs oversight. What will become of the CPA IG given the fact that the funds he was suppose to oversee have barely begun to be obligated? The law says that the IG's office will terminate six months after the authorities and duties of the Coalition Pro- visional Authority cease to exist. It seems to me that the authorities and duties, in terms of the reconstruction effort, do not cease to exist on June [30, 2004.] Will the CPA IG be subsumed into the State Department's IG office or is some other ar- rangement under consideration? I asked this question of Secretary Grossman last month, but I still do not have an answer, so I am trying again. Answer. We expect the Coalition Provisional Authority's Inspector General (CPA/ IG) to remain in place for six-months following June 30, 2004, and to sunset on De- cember 31, 2004, in accordance with 3001(o) of Public Law 108-106. The State De- partment's Inspector General (DOS/IG) has detailed six people to the CPA/IG, both in Iraq and Washington, and is in the process of developing plans for work to be initiated after June 30, 2004, which is commensurate with expanded Iraq-related duties to be assumed by the Department. As to the oversight responsibility for Iraq reconstruction funds, it is our under- standing that each Inspector General (for the Department of State, U.S. Agency for International Development, Department of Defense and others) will acquire over- sight responsibility as each parent agency acquires responsibility for programs pre- viously under the purview of the Coalition Provisional Authority. The Secretary of