COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS RICHARD G. CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska LINCOLN CHAFEE, Rhode Island GEORGE ALLEN, Virginia SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas MICHAEL B. ENZI, Wyoming GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio LAMAR ALEXANDER, Tennessee NORM COLEMAN, Minnesota JOHN E. SUNUNU, New Hampshire LUGAR, Indiana, Chairman JOSEPH R. BIDEN, Jr., Delaware PAUL S. SARBANES, Maryland CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin BARBARA BOXER. California BILL NELSON, Florida JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, West Virginia JON S. CORZINE, New Jersey Kenneth A. Myers, Jr., Staff Director Antony J. Blinken, Democratic Staff Director (ID CONTENTS Page Biden, Hon. Joseph R., Jr., U.S. Senator from Delaware, opening statement ... 4 Grossman, Hon. Marc, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs; accom- panied by: Hon. Francis J. Ricciardone, Jr., Coordinator, Iraq Transition Team, U.S. Department of State, Washington, DC 10 Prepared statement 18 Response to Senator Lugar's request to supply a copy of the Transitional Administrative Law [TAL] and charts displayed during the hearing 84 Response to an additional question for the record from Senator Dodd 107 Response to an additional question for the record from Senator Feingold .. 108 Responses to additional questions for the record from Senator Corzine 108 Lugar, Hon. Richard G., US. Senator from Indiana, opening statement 1 Natsios, Hon. Andrew S., Administrator, United States Agency for Inter- national Development [USAID], Washington, DC 23 Prepared statement 25 "Iraq Reconstruction and Humanitarian Relief," USAID's accomplish- ments in reconstruction efforts in Iraq 27 Responses to additional questions for the record from Senator Lugar 102 Rodman, Hon. Peter W., Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs; accompanied by: Lt. Gen. Claude M. Kicklighter, U.S. Army (Ret.), Transition Chief, Coalition Provisional Authority, U.S. Depart- ment of Defense, Washington, DC 47 Responses to additional questions for the record from Senator Lugar 104 (ni) 2 However, expert witnesses cannot speak for the U.S. Govern- ment. That is the duty that falls to our witnesses today. Our expe- riences with inadequate planning and communication related to Iraq contribute to the determination of this committee to impose a very high standard on the information provided about Iraq. Yester- day I noted the lack of information about the transition plan in Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz's testimony on Tuesday before the Sen- ate Armed Services Committee. We're clearly hoping for more de- tails today. I would stress that what we are attempting to do here is not an academic exercise. Within the substantial bounds of Congress' over- sight capacity, we're attempting to illuminate the United States' plans, actions, and options with respect to Iraq, both for the benefit of the American people and to inform our own policymaking role. I am convinced that the confidence and commitment demonstrated by the pronouncement of a flexible but detailed plan for Iraq is nec- essary for our success in Iraq. With lives being lost and billions of dollars being spent in Iraq, the American people must be assured that we have carefully thought through an Iraq policy that will op- timize our prospects for success. Moreover, a detailed plan is necessary to prove to our allies and to Iraqis that we have a strategy and that we are committed to making it work. If we cannot provide this clarity, we risk the loss of support of the American people, the loss of potential contribu- tions from our allies, and the disillusionment of Iraqis. We may determine after this hearing that more hearings on Iraq are required to generate answers and to provide the confidence that we seek. At yesterday's hearing, I urged the administration to prepare quickly for a hearing on the nomination of Ambassador John Negroponte to be our Ambassador to Iraq. We would like to hold that hearing next Tuesday. It is critical that Ambassador Negroponte and his team be put in place at the earliest possible moment. During the first 2 days of hearings, I posed a set of six questions as a way of fleshing out our plan for Iraq. I believe that clear an- swers to all of these questions would constitute a coherent transi- tion strategy for Iraq. First, what are the details of Ambassador Lakhdar Brahimi's plan for an Interim Iraqi Government to which a transfer of sov- ereignty is planned on June 30, 2004? Specifically, what executive and legislative positions will be established in the interim govern- ment, and how will these positions be filled? Are we confident that Iraqis will support the United Nations' formula for a new govern- ment, and what will the United States do if Iraqis reject the Brahimi plan? What is our fallback strategy at that point? Our expert witnesses expressed confidence in Ambassador Brahimi and his ability to find credible Iraqis to serve in the in- terim government. But some concern was voiced that the United States must better synchronize its military and diplomatic actions to Ambassador Brahimi's efforts to build an interim government. We must think creatively about how the Coalition and the inter- national community can facilitate the emergence of national lead- ers in Iraq who are viewed as legitimate and prepared to govern. 3 Second, what should be contained in a status of forces agreement so that the United States and Coalition Armed Forces will have clear and effective roles in providing internal and external security for the new Iraqi Government, and will that agreement make clear the chain or chains of command, and the relationship of Iraqi po- lice, reserves and Army personnel with United States and Coalition forces? We heard yesterday from a witness that as many as three chains of command might be required. All of our expert witnesses agreed that achieving security was the key to success in Iraq. They underscored that we have to deter- mine who our partner is in the status of forces agreement. They also generally believed that the current level of U.S. forces could not achieve the degree of security that is necessary or a successful political outcome. In the short run, this may require more U.S. forces and more patrols that secure streets and neighborhoods. It will also require us to find other sources of competent troops from willing nations. Our ability to find these troops will depend on our flexibility in including the United Nations in decisionmaking and the ability of our own troops to diminish violence in the short run. We heard many views on how to establish and improve Iraqi security forces, but generally our experts believed that an effective Iraqi army and police force would require much more time, equipment, and re- sources than we have thus far dedicated to bringing these units to fruition. Third, will United Nations Security Council resolutions under- gird the international legitimacy of the new Iraqi Government and all of the security arrangements that it will require? How will the United States pursue such resolutions and what will they contain? Our experts stress that United Nations involvement is necessary if we are to generate greater international participation, improve the political legitimacy of the Interim Iraqi Government, and take the American face off of the occupation of Iraq. They also underscored that we know how to operate under the auspices of U.N. Security Council resolutions, and we can do so without sacrificing command of our troops or the intent of our mis- sion. Fourth, will elections for the transitional and permanent Iraqi Government, scheduled for tentatively January 2005 and December 2005, respectively, be held under the auspices of the United Na- tions or under some other authority? How will that authority pro- vide security for the elections and assemble a registration list or otherwise determine who is eligible to vote? How will we deal with elections that are postponed or deemed to be fraudulent? Will the Transitional National Assembly that is to be elected in January 2005 have full authority to write a constitution and construct the framework of a permanent government? Our experts spoke to the importance of going forward with elec- tions in Iraq, even if security and registration procedures are im- perfect. They noted that elections would force Iraqi factions to enunciate policy choices and would stimulate dialog between polit- ical leaders and the Iraqi populace. In the absence of elections, fac- tions will continue to bid for influence through violence, cronyism, or anti-American demonstrations. 4 Fifth, beyond Ambassador Negroponte, what will be the composi- tion of the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad, and what is the schedule for the arrival of all embassy personnel? Given security concerns, our witnesses noted that some system must be worked out to allow em- bassy personnel to travel throughout Iraq. They emphasized that we should attempt to get as many personnel as possible in place before June 30. Sixth, will the costs associated with the new diplomatic presence be covered by a transfer of funds under the umbrella of the $87 bil- lion appropriation enacted by Congress last year? If not, what is the plan for providing necessary funding? There was general consensus that some transfer of sovereignty will occur on June 30, but that U.S. forces would be required to provide security in Iraq for at least several more years. We should develop cost estimates that assume an extensive United States in- volvement. Another important point generated by yesterday's hearing was that the Interim Iraqi Government will require funding as well. What part of oil reserves or the $18 billion appropriated for recon- struction will be controlled by the interim government? What other sources of revenue will be available to them? The Foreign Relations Committee will be persistent in asking these questions and many others because Americans should have the opportunity to understand the administration's plan and to carefully monitor its progress. We welcome today Mr. Marc Gross- man, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs; Mr. Peter Rod- man, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Af- fairs; Mr. Andrew Natsios, Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development; Mr. Frank Ricciardone, our Ambassador to the Republic of the Philippines and State Depart- ment Coordinator for the Iraq Transition Team; and Lieutenant General Claude Kicklighter, the Transition Chief for the Coalition Provision Authority. We welcome these witnesses. We thank you for coming to the hearing this morning. Before I recognize you, I want to recognize first of all my colleague and distinguished ranking member, Sen- ator Biden. OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR., RANKING MEMBER Senator BlDEN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and thanks to our witnesses for being here today. We have serious and prominent witnesses, and I hope before this hearing process ends, we will have their bosses before us as well, the Secretary of De- fense and the Secretary of State. Let me begin by explaining, I noticed a number of people looked when I walked in with my new staff person. My new foreign policy adviser is my granddaughter. For those of you who may not know, today is Bring Your Daughter to Work Day, and I brought my granddaughter in the hope that someone may mistake her for my daughter, so I just wanted to explain that. I realize it's a bit un- usual but I can see from the looks on some of your faces, it's a seri- ous hearing and what's he bringing a fourth-grader in for. This is Bring Your Daughter to Work Day. 5 Let me, rather than do my whole statement, Mr. Chairman, be- cause I'm anxious to hear the witnesses and because you have laid out such a thorough road map here, start by saying, I, as we say in our business, associate myself with your remarks. I think the questions you asked are the ones that have to be answered.. I would just like to say that it seems to me we really have no option but to invest in the success of this undertaking in Iraq, but the thing that I hope we keep our eye on is that, to oversimplify it in one sense and understate it in another, cannot want a rep- resentative government for the Iraqis more than they want it. We cannot want a representative government for the Iraqis more than the Iraqis want it. And the premise upon which I continue to support this, which hopefully history will judge as a noble undertaking, is that I be- lieve that the vast majority of the Iraqi people want a representa- tive government. I might note for the record, and from the begin- ning I think my friend from Nebraska shared this view as well, and possibly my chairman and my friend from Rhode Island—I'm not certain, I don't want to associate them with me if I am mis- taken—but I have never believed from the outset, do not believe now we are going to have a liberal democracy established in Iraq in the near term, a liberal democracy in the sense that we mean understand the term in this country. But I do think it's fully within our capacity to have a representative government within the exist- ing borders that the vast majority of the people of Iraq feel that they have a voice in. Now, whatever form that takes, I'm not certain. But if we think we're going to have a replication of what we have here in the United States or European capitals, I think that is somewhat naive. And so I want to make it clear again that because we're going to come back and be judged based upon whether or not we succeed or fail in this undertaking based on what we state our ob- jective is. Mine personally is a representative government that is probably a loosely federated republic of some nature that has the ability to grow over generations into what we call a liberal democ- racy, but again, we can't want that government more than they want it. I know all the witnesses well, respect them all, I think I probably know Marc better than most with him having to deal with me for so long. And I'd say, Secretary Grossman, that one of the reasons why we continue to focus so much on the security piece of this is we, or I, have come to the conclusion that there is no reasonable prospect that the silent majority of Iraqis who want a representa- tive government there's no way after 30 years of being battered and beaten by a dictator that they're going to raise their heads in any environment other than a secure environment. And I say to Secretary Rodman, we have an inordinately high re- gard for the bravery, the decency, and the idealism, and I say idealism, of our troops who are fighting over there. But the pri- mary focus, and it should be first and foremost, is providing secu- rity for our troops, not security for the Iraqi people in the way in which we would think about it here. We have over 100 missions that go through the neighborhoods every day, but they usually go through in a Humvee about 30 to 40 miles an hour, and I don't 7 And by the way, Marc, I have no illusions, or Mr. Secretary Rod- man, I have no illusions that NATO can send 50,000 troops. I don't suggest that at all. But they can send 3,000, 5,000, 7,000 now, they can take over border patrol now, they can do significant things now, they can free up 15,000 to 20,000 American forces now, they can do a lot. But most of all what they can do is convince the American people we're not in this alone, because for NATO to be involved means major powers said their prestige is at risk as well in the success or failure of Iraq. There are important questions I hope this hearing will address, some of them overlapping. Who's going to decide in the future when we set up this embassy how to handle Fallujahs and the al- Sadrs? Is it going to be an Iraqi caretaker government? Is it going to be the American military? Is it going to be some senior inter- national figure? When we claim that our commanders on the ground say that they have enough forces to carry out their mission, what's their mission? Does that include more than force protection? Does it in- clude civil protection? Does it include policing? Does it include re- construction? What's the mission? And what are the private secu- rity contractors, the second largest armed group in Iraq after American Armed Forces, estimated 20,000, what is our policy to- ward them? How are they handling morale problems there likely to be created for our regular soldiers who are paid considerable less, in some cases 10, 12, 15 times less? Are they under an effec- tive command and control? Are they coordinating with our uniform military? How do we plan to reestablish the security? What's the plan for training the Iraqi police? I know, Secretary Grossman, you know. You're going to tell me you don't, but I know you know, that no one that you've worked with in the last 10 years thought we could train up an Iraqi police force in less than 3 to 5 years, and no one thought we could train up an Iraqi military of more than 40,000 forces in less than about 3 years, and yet we put 200,000 people in uniform. Why has only $3 billion of the $18.6 billion that Congress appropriated last year been obligated on urgent requests, the urgent request the President made? Is it something you need help from us in breaking through a bureaucratic Gordian knot here, because we want to help. And I can't speak for anybody else, but if there's a rational way to do this, we want to do it, or what's the explanation? After June 30, who's going to be in charge in deciding how the money is spent? When the Pentagon decides or the State Depart- ment decides they're going to put a road here or there or a project here or take care of this electrical grid, does this Iraqi sovereign government have a right to say, hey, no, no, no, we don't want the money spent there, we want you to go over here and build x, y, or zl Who makes those decisions, and what's the current burn rate? I think we were told, I think that came out yesterday about $4.6 billion per month for our military, and what are the range of the estimates of cost for Iraqi stabilization and reconstruction for next year? How are we going to pay for it? Now, I'll conclude by saying I know that some of these figures are, to use the Secretary of Defense's favorite word last year, un- knowable with any precision. I know some things are unknowable. 10 ministration talks and visits even as we speak, today and in the days ahead. He might not be able to give us extensive details today, We invite you, Mr. Secretary, as you hear Secretary Gross- man, and you've heard the questions of Senator Biden and myself to give us as much detail as you can, and to be responsive to our questions. I would like now to call upon Secretary Grossman for his testimony. STATEMENT OF HON. MARC GROSSMAN, UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS; ACCOMPANIED BY: HON. FRANCIS J. RICCIARDONE, JR., COORDINATOR, IRAQ TRAN- SITION TEAM, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE Mr. GROSSMAN. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much, Senator Biden, thank you very much. I appreciate the opportunity to be here to report to you on progress we are making regarding the 30th June transition in Iraq. Senator Biden, I also wanted to just wel- come your granddaughter. It's a good thing to bring your daughter to work. My daughter was going to come with me but she kept hearing I was such a low-ranking State Department official, she said, the hell with it, I'm not coming. Senator Biden. If you'd brought her here, we would have ele- vated you, and maybe in one way you could have gotten more re- spect. Mr. Grossman. Perhaps. I'll certainly take your invitation to the Secretary back, but just for the record, the letter of invitation was to me, and I'm very glad to be here. Like you, and I think all of us here on this side in the committee, let me also start by paying tribute to the men and women who are serving the United States of America today, military and civilian in Iraq, in Afghanistan, around the world. They demonstrate the highest degree of dedication, determination, and courage as they try to bring security, democracy, and prosperity to Iraq, and I also think it's worthwhile to thank our coalition partners, who have also sacrificed, both military and civilian. And if I could, as I have done on many times before this committee, thank you for your support of the State Department, and particularly today as I go through some of the details of the new embassy for the support of the Diplo- matic Readiness Initiative, so we have the people and the where- withal we need to carry out this country's diplomacy. And I also ap- preciate the statements that you have made in support of John Negroponte's nomination by the President to be our Ambassador to Iraq and we appreciate the rapidity that you want to go ahead and get this confirmation hearing done and we will work with you to get this done as quickly as possible, because I agree with you com- pletely, we need that finished so that he also can join us and make sure we are going forward as quickly as we possibly can. As I said, I read the letter of invitation that you sent to me very carefully, I've listened to the questions that you and Senator Biden have proposed, not just today, but I looked at the ones for the past couple of days, and it seems to me that your focus on the prepara- tions that we're doing to get ready for 30 June, 1st of July, are the right ones, and that you ought to keep asking us these questions, we ought to keep doing these hearings, because as you both said, they are absolutely crucial to the success of the United States. 11 I report to you today on the tremendous amount of work that has been done. As you say, we don't have all the issues settled, but we look forward to close consultations and further hearings or any other way that this committee would like to have interaction on these issues. We have, I believe, the guidance that we need, the di- rection that we need, and also I hope to convince you that we have a plan for going forward between now and the 30th of June. Our guidance comes from President Bush and he repeated it last week. He said the central commitment is to transfer sovereignty back to the Iraqi people on a deadline of June 30, and went on to describe that day, and I think it's important to put it out, which is to say on June 30 when the flag of a free Iraq is raised, Iraqi officials will assume full responsibility to the ministries of govern- ment. On that day the Transitional Administrative Law [TAL], in- cluding a bill of rights that is unprecedented in the Arab world, will take full effect. The United States and all nations of the Coali- tion will establish normal diplomatic relations with an Iraqi Gov- ernment, an American Embassy will open, an American Ambas- sador, obviously subject to the confirmation of the committee and the Senate, will be posted. The specific direction that we take with this guidance comes from Secretary Powell, who says that it is our goal to support the Presi- dent's direction. As I reported to you one other time, Senator, after CPA and the Iraqi Governing Council signed the November 15 agreement and established the June 30 transition date, Secretary Powell asked Ambassador Frank Ricciardone to come back from Manila to head our transition team, and in his first day on the job he went to the Pentagon to meet his counterpart, Lieutenant Gen- eral Kicklighter, and they are today one interagency team, and I just would ask them both to stand up so that the committee knows who they are and what they are accomplishing, and I think they've done a tremendous amount in the weeks that they have worked to- gether. We thank them. We've also established an interagency team in Baghdad under the leadership of Ambassador John Holzman. He works on transi- tion planning and implementation in immediate consultation with Ambassador Bremer and General Sanchez. I can tell you that the Secretaries involved in our transition planning continues daily. We send to the Secretary each night a table of what got accomplished today and what needs to be done in the next day, and these notes I think demonstrate the broad range of interagency, bilateral, mul- tilateral things that we have to get done. We're also following the President's guidance and the Secretary's direction. We have developed a plan which I have put there, and I know it's far away from people, but we will leave one for every- body about how to get to and through the 30th of June. We set our- selves some broad deadlines and some specific ones as well, and to execute that plan we have and continue to work closely with our interagency colleagues and consult regularly with Congress, Coali- tion partners, Baghdad, and Washington. Mr. Chairman, among the questions that you asked, and the one I'd like to deal with first with your permission, is how to transition from the Coalition Provisional Authority to an Embassy of the United States of America. The first job that we undertook here, a 12 very good idea of General Kicklighter's, was to send teams to Iraq, assessment teams, to consider what the basic requirements were to make this transition successful, and we identified 15 key sectors that we thought were crucial to success. We've identified those 15 broad areas and we're working now to make sure that each of them, that the requirements there are accomplished. Each of these sectors is broken down into individual tasks and milestones, and again, I'll just show what we've got, which is about 500 or 550 of these tasks broken down. Somebody's responsible, there's a date for each one of them, and as you can see, some are green, some are red, some are yellow. The objective is obviously to turn them all to green. And I would invite the committee and com- mittee staff to come to the State Department at any time where we have this on the Web and it's a living document and all of you are certainly welcome to take a look at it at any time so that you can get updated as you wish. The Chairman. Is the document classified? Mr. Grossman. It is not, sir, but it's on our Intranet and we want to keep it that way, but you're welcome to come to the De- partment and you or staff and look at it any time, because it changes all the time. The CHAIRMAN. I thank you for that invitation. Mr. Grossman. And I think it would be useful as we go forward. As I say, each of these are broken down into milestones, individual tasks, and our objective obviously is to get them all done. As I said, there were 15 of these large tasks to accomplish. I won't, even with your invitation to be detailed, go into all of them, but I'd like to talk about four today if I could. I'd like to talk about people, secu- rity, buildings, and money, and I think all of those were encom- passed in questions that you asked. The State Department, of course, as you know, and as we have talked about from time to time, has been in Iraq from the very be- ginning, from Jay Garner's operation, ORHA, to Jerry Bremer's op- eration, CPA, and we currently have 170 people in Iraq of whom we are immensely proud and they come from many parts of our Washington operation and around the world, senior officers, junior officers, and I say we're proud of them and of their service. How big will this embassy be? It's not going to be a 3,000 Amer- ican person embassy as I have seen places in the press. Our plan- ning is for about 1,000 Americans and about 700 Iraqi employees. So exactly how do I get to that figure? I get to that figure in this way. First, the State Department has announced positions of 142 American employees and 155 locally engaged staff, Iraqis. In addi- tion, in January of this year, Secretary Powell asked his Cabinet colleagues to identify contributions that other agencies might make to the mission in Iraq, as we have contributions from missions, in missions all around the world from other agencies. To date, 10 Cabinet agencies have come back to us and requested a presence in Embassy Baghdad for a total of 254 Americans and about 300 locally hired personnel. Long term, because we haven't heard back from everybody, we estimate that there will be about 350 to 400 Americans other than the State Department from some 12 to 15 agencies and then a reasonable number also of Foreign Service national staff. A number of CPA staff who have specific and 14 believe that Iraqis who have this vision for their own society recog- nize that they can't meet that vision without security, and they can't create that security without the support of the United States of America. And so with General Myers' vision of a partnership with the Iraqi forces and with Ambassador Negroponte on the ground, I'm confident that turning sovereignty over to Iraqis with this security arrangement will be successful for us. Second area, and that is security. Our top priority obviously is to keep people safe. Everybody here should understand that this is not just a dangerous mission for our military forces and coalition military forces that are out in Iraq. This is a dangerous mission for our people as well. We've already begun the security upgrade of the planned interim embassy buildings and we've selected a site for a future new embassy compound based largely on its security fea- tures. We have 51 armored vehicles already in Iraq, another 98 are on order, and I can tell you these vehicles have already saved Iraqi and American lives. You asked whether we had security agents already on the ground. The answer to that question is yes. We have 32 diplomatic security staff already in Iraq to define the mission security require- ments and begin to meet them. Difficult questions in the security area are left to be answered, but as you know, Deputy Secretary Armitage and our Assistant Secretary for Diplomatic Security, Frank Taylor, were in Iraq earlier this week and now will come back and I think help us define further questions in the security area. But I repeat that this is going to be for us, as well as for our military colleagues, a dangerous place to live and work for some time. Facilities. Our director of overseas buildings operations, Ambas- sador Chuck Williams, traveled to Baghdad in February. We've identified a building to serve as the embassy from the 1st of July until a more permanent facility can be established. We're referring to that as the temporary chancery. It's already under renovation, and, Senator, you asked, we believe will be absolutely ready to go on the 1st of July. In that temporary chancery will be the Ambassador and a lim- ited number of staff. In addition, until we build a new embassy compound, we'll continue to use some of the buildings that the CPA is currently using, mostly for non-public operations, and we'll con- tinue to use the residence that is currently used by Ambassador Bremer. We've got some housing issues. CPA people are currently housed in trailers. That's where our people will be temporarily. We've got some more trailers on order, but in the facilities area as well, I think we've got a plan in process, and again, Rich Armitage, who was in Baghdad on Tuesday, walked all of the sites of the tem- porary facility, walked the site of a possible new embassy com- pound, and reported to me by phone yesterday that he was con- fident that in this area we can get this job done. Finally, you asked about money, and here, Senator Nelson, when I was before the committee the last time, asked me about the money, and I have been trying to get him an answer ever since, and I am finally able to give you, I hope, Senator, a complete an- swer about where the finances go. And here's how this works as far 18 in supporting the process toward elections, which was another of your questions, who runs these elections. So, Senators, I sit before you here on the 22nd of April, I have a vision of Iraq on the 1st of July where there will be, subject to Senate confirmation, an American Ambassador. There will be a large but recognizable American Embassy. The Ambassador's team, including a highly experienced Deputy Chief of Mission, will in- clude representatives from a broad range of U.S. Government agen- cies. There will still be a very large number of American troops on the ground helping to provide security and train Iraqi army and police forces, and when the Ambassador goes to call on Iraqis in government, he will be calling on the President and the Prime Min- ister of a sovereign Iraq, but clearly, the work we have to do will not be complete. Iraq will still be in transition, and I think it's im- portant to recognize, as the chart does, and as we will do, I'm sure, during the question and answer period, that this is an interim gov- ernment that lasts from the 1st of July till December, and its job is to get elections going and help us and participate as a partner in security. Security will still be an issue. Elections will need to be held. A permanent constitution will need to be drafted. Economic recon- struction will remain unfinished. And the United States is com- mitted until we reach our objective, a democratic, prosperous Iraq governed by a duly represented government at peace with itself and its neighbors. I hope, Mr. Chairman, that we've moved this conversation along from the last time I was here and we have a lot more detail on both ends of this plan. I recognize that we don't have every answer, but I believe we have a plan and we are well on our way to car- rying it out, and I thank you for offering me the chance to give this statement in detail and I hope it has been of some use to you. [The prepared statement of Mr. Grossman follows:] Prepared Statement of Hon. Marc Grossman Mr. Chairman, Senator Biden, Members of the Committee, I appreciate the oppor- tunity to report to you today on the progress we are making regarding the June 30 transition in Iraq. Before I begin, I would like to pay tribute to the men and women who are serving their country and the cause of freedom in Iraq. Secretary Powell, Deputy Secretary Armitage and I are immensely proud of the Americans—civilian and military—who demonstrate the highest degree of dedication, determination and courage as they work to bring security, democracy and prosperity to Iraq. I also want to thank our many Coalition partners for their steadfast support. Thank you also for your support of the State Department. I know that you saw the President's announcement on Monday of his nomination of Ambassador John Negroponte to be the first Ambassador to the new Iraq. We are delighted. I read your letter of invitation to me carefully. Your focus on the plans and prepa- ration for a successful transition on June 30, our coordination with Coalition part- ners, Iraqis and the United Nations, and the importance of a smooth transition from the CPA to a U.S. Embassy in Baghdad is the right focus. We too are focused on the need to ensure enough resources, the right people and the right organizational structure to do the job. While I will report to you today on the tremendous amount of work we have al- ready done on these issues, we do not yet have all the answers. As Secretary Powell said earlier this month to your colleagues here in Congress, "Creating a democratic government in Iraq will be an enormous challenge, but Ambassador Bremer—with the Iraqi Governing Council, the United Nations and our coalition partners—is com- mitted to success." And what did the Secretary say next? "When the State Depart- 21 Thirty-two Diplomatic Security (DS) staff are already in Iraq to define the Mis- sion's security requirements and to begin to meet them—as well as to help protect CPA officers and visitors. There are difficult questions related to security still to be answered. Deputy Sec- retary Armitage and Assistant Secretary for Diplomatic Security Frank Taylor were just in Baghdad to keep working through these questions in close coordination with people on the ground. Iraq is, and for some time will remain, a dangerous place to live and work. Pro- tecting our people in a wartime environment is difficult and expensive, but we must spare no effort or expense to meet this challenge. BUILDINGS Director of Overseas Building Operations Chuck Williams traveled to Baghdad in February to complete plans for interim and potential permanent mission facilities. We have identified a building in the green zone to serve as the Embassy from July 1 until a more permanent facility can be established. This building, which we refer to as the temporary Chancery, is already under renovation and will be ready for oc- cupancy in advance of the transition. The temporary Chancery will serve as the office of the Ambassador and a limited number of staff. In addition, until we build a new Embassy compound, we will con- tinue to use the former Republican Palace, where CPA is currently located, for most non-public operations, and we will continue to use the current residence that is being occupied by Administrator Bremer. Most embassy employees will be housed in trailers currently being occupied by CPA personnel. We have already contracted for an additional 75 trailer units to ac- commodate 150 personnel to ensure that we have adequate and appropriate space to house our staff until permanent facilities can be established. We also have begun the planning process to develop a new American Embassy facility. A site, chosen largely for security reasons, has been selected for the new Embassy facility. FINANCIAL OUTLOOK Finally, I would like to share our current thinking on the fiscal resources needed to ensure a smooth transition to Embassy Baghdad, and the continued operation of the mission thereafter. I need to emphasize that the costs I report to you today are only a snapshot. In order to open an Embassy on July 1, we must meet basic security needs and must make an investment in technology and communications equipment. Congress has provided in FY 2004 $97 million for an interim embassy facility and interim operations. In addition, we expect to have available the fourth quarter portion of the oper- ating expense budget appropriated for the CPA ($195.8 million), and, pursuant to the FY 2004 Supplemental, up to 1% of the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund, available for transfer ($184 million). The State Department must be prepared to cover both its initial start-up and op- erating expenses, as well as follow-on costs from the CPA to assure continuity of operations. There are significant challenges in the funding demands that we are working are way through, and it is clear that we will need to make sure that all agencies cover their respective share of joint costs. We estimate that those joint mission costs may be in the range of $500-$600 mil- lion for the balance of FY 2004 and we are working on how those costs will be allo- cated among agencies. In addition, we estimate that the costs in FY 2005 to operate the U.S. mission could exceed $1 billion. We are working closely with CPA, DOD, and OMB to refine these estimates and will provide you as much accurate informa- tion as quickly as we can. We will consult with you and your colleagues before any- thing is finalized. IRAQ'S TRANSITION TO SOVEREIGNTY About the political process in Iraq, and the restoration of Iraqi self-government on June 30th. Here, too, our guidance and direction is clear. The President, on the night he announced the start of Operation Iraqi Freedom, March 19, 2003 said: "We come to Iraq with respect for its citizens, for their great civilization and for the religious faiths they practice. We have no ambition in Iraq, except to remove a threat and restore control of that country to its own people." The plan for restoring Iraqi sovereignty is laid out in the November 15 agreement. That agreement, signed by CPA and the Iraqi Governing Council, called for a Tran- sitional Administrative Law, encompassing a basic bill of rights for all Iraqis. The 22 agreement called for the selection of an Interim Iraqi Government to oversee the preparation of national elections, and the transfer of governing authority to the in- terim government by June 30, 2004. And the agreement established a timeline for national elections, the drafting and ratification of a new constitution and the elec- tion of a government under that constitution by December 31, 2005. There have been changes since November 15. But the basic framework and timeline still holds. The first step was the Governing Council's unanimous agreement on the Transi- tional Administrative Law, or TAL, nearly two months ago. This marked an impor- tant achievement. As Secretary Powell said on March 8, "Just imagine the impact that this document is going to have, not only in Iraq but in that part of the world. The rights of all citizens, to include women, committing this Arab nation to democ- racy; a free and independent judiciary; the military firmly under civilian controls." The TAL provides for equal rights for all Iraqis, without regard to gender, sect, opinion, belief, nationality, religion or origin. It confirms Iraq as a single state with federal structures, affirms civilian control of the Iraqi security services and the inde- pendence of the judiciary. Finally, the TAL establishes the general framework for national elections by January 31, 2005, the drafting of a permanent constitution by August 15, 2005 and the transition to a constitutionally-based post-transition Iraqi government by December 31, 2005. Following the UN Secretary General's February 23 report and the signing of the TAL on March 8, the Governing Council on March 17 asked the UN to return to Iraq to advise and assist on forming the Iraqi Interim Government and preparing for elections for the Transitional National Assembly. On April 5, Ambassador Brahimi returned to Iraq to resume intensive consultations with Iraqis for this pur- pose. As President Bush said last Friday, "We welcome the proposals presented by the U.N. Special Envoy Brahimi. He's identified a way forward to establishing an in- terim government that is broadly acceptable to the Iraqi people . . . We thank the U.N. and Secretary General Annan for helping Iraqis secure a future of freedom. We're grateful that Mr. Brahimi will soon return to Iraq to continue his important work." In our consultations with the UN and Iraqis, we have made clear that while Am- bassador Brahimi and Iraqis will chose the specific formula for the interim govern- ment, there are fundamental criteria that must be met. First, the interim government should represent the diversity of Iraq. Second, it should not have a law-making body. The structure of the government should be effective, simple and, in order to avoid deadlock in the interim period, should not be overly large. Third, the process of selecting the government should be as simple as possible. And fourth, the interim government should have the necessary authorities to lead Iraq into the community of nations, undertake agreements to push forward eco- nomic reconstruction, and prepare the country for elections. We were pleased by the sketch Ambassador Brahimi provided of his proposed way forward and believe his idea fits well with our vision. Ambassador Brahimi envisions establishing by mid-May an interim government led by a Prime Minister that also includes a President and two Deputy Presidents. A council of ministers would report to the Prime Minister. An Advisory Body, se- lected in July by a National Conference, would serve alongside the Executive but have no legislative authority. We look forward to further discussions with Iraqis and in New York with the Sec- retary General as we consider the way forward. We also look forward to Ambassador Brahimi's return to Iraq in the weeks ahead to continue consultations with Iraqis countrywide. I would also highlight Ambassador Brahimi's statement regarding the central im- portance of elections. We agree. In fact, the call for national elections in early 2005 was a key part of the November 15 agreement. In this regard, we are grateful for the continued work of the UN election team, headed by Carina Perelli. The team has been in Baghdad since late March and is working closely with our officials and experts to accelerate election preparations. As Ms. Perelli has said, the timeline for elections by January 2005 is very tight. A top priority remains establishing an independent Election Commission as soon as pos- sible. We look forward to further discussions with the UN on the way ahead. TRANSITIONAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW THE IRAQI INTERIM GOVERNMENT 25 that's what will happen July 1. But we rebid all the contracts. Ten of the 11 contracts we started with before the war, we rebid re- cently and they're 3-year contracts. So in terms of our time horizon, our planning horizon now is 3 years. The NGO contracts, I believe, or grants, are about 2 years, but they can be annually renewed without any difficulty. They don't have to be rebid because of the nature of these contracts. We will simply continue these projects. If Ambassador Negroponte decides he wants us to undertake other activities, we will do that. There are four new activities we were given the last few weeks by Ambassador Bremer. We're out to bid now on these projects. One of them is a very innovative thing in civic education to prepare the country for a democratic transition at the national level. In any case, we will do as we're asked to do and we will revert to our traditional mission structure and report- ing relationships to the Ambassador. Thank you. [The prepared statement of Mr. Natsios follows:] Prepared Statement of Hon. Andrew S. Natsios Chairman Lugar, Senator Biden, Members of the Committee: I am pleased to be here today, with my State and Defense Department colleagues, to report on what the U.S. Agency for International Development has accomplished since our formal mission began in Iraq May 2, 2003. In February of 2003 we submitted documentation to the Office of Management and Budget and to the Congress outlining Agency plans in the event of combat in Iraq. We had two jobs to do, as we saw it: humanitarian relief and reconstruction. Relief usually follows war at a distance, but our goal was to reduce that distance to a minimum. We planned carefully, worked the Inter-Agency process, and gath- ered enough food and supplies to ensure no humanitarian crisis took place. Thus we moved almost immediately to reconstruction. Our first priorities were water, sanitation, public health, essential services and infrastructure. Vast swathes of the country—particularly in the largely Shi'a south—were destitute. No new in- frastructure had been built for more than a decade in the south, and very little basic maintenance was done. The draining of the southern Marshlands was an ecological and human catastrophe, killing and sending hundreds of thousands into exile and destroying an immense and unique natural water filtration system. Every statistical measurement of individual well-being dropped sharply during this decade. All the data on infant mortality and maternal death rates, in female literacy and family income, in life expectancy, caloric intake, all point down. Worse still, may be the legacy of Saddam's reign of mass terror. Together, the statistics are dramatic. Many hundreds of thousands, it appears, died from the deliberate ne- glect of Iraq's basic infrastructure. Traditionally, it takes months to move from the humanitarian to the reconstruc- tion phases of an intervention. Our goal was to do the two at once. Careful planning and close inter-Agency coordination paid off. Among other things, USAID grants en- abled the U.N.'s World Food Program to carry out the largest mobilization operation in their history. We worked closely with the military's civil affairs units and several key contractors and NGOs, and the humanitarian crisis that many had predicted did not take place. That meant we could move to reconstruction in record time. Given the conditions on the ground, there were four broad areas of priority we worked out with ORHA and the CPA. They were: • essential infrastructure • health and education • economic opportunity • democracy and governance Since May 2 of last year, USAID has obligated approximately $3.3 billion for our Iraq programs. We have worked with the CPA at every step of the way and with 42 different implementing partners: private companies, non-profits, NGOs, PVOs, and certain U.N. specialized agencies like the WFP. I would like to call the Commit- tee's attention to the work these organizations have performed. It has been accom- 27 of all kinds, training local administrators, furnishing essential equipment through our Ministry in a Box work, bringing women's groups together, and helping human rights organizations like the Free Prisoners Association safeguard the millions of records they've amassed. Today, USAID democracy programs operate in every Iraqi governorate. We have helped create councils in 16 governorates, 78 districts, 192 city and sub-districts, and 392 neighborhoods and worked with the CPA and the military's civil affairs units to set up many others. These councils have become a kind of incubator of Iraqi democracy. Many of the men and women who have served on them and have dem- onstrated their abilities are likely to be elected to higher office and serve their com- munities when national elections take place next year. Because government decisionmaking was so tightly controlled during Saddam's regime, few local officials have had much experience planning, budgeting, or making decisions. So we have focused on training local authorities and helping them gain the experience they need if they are going to provide essential public services. Parallel to this, we are actively funding Community Action Groups. The men and women who make up these groups have shown an aptitude for self-government. Al- ready they agreed upon, funded, and completed some 845 local and community projects ranging from a youth center in Halabja to water systems in Tikrit, to a major roads, sewage, water, schools and sports program in An Najaf and Karbala, and water, public health and girls education projects in Basrah. That is just the briefest of outlines, Mr. Chairman. USAID has been so deeply involved in the reconstruction of Iraq that a detailed accounting of our work over the past 12 months could take hundreds of pages. We recognize that there may be some who wish to know more about USAID has done, how we proceeded, and what we hope to accomplish in Iraq in these uncertain times. To this end, we have posted hundreds of documents on our Web site for any one to see. We are confident that those who examine our record closely will find the Agency has been a good steward of the public trust. This concludes my testimony, Mr. Chairman. I will be happy to answer your ques- tions and the Committee's. UNITED STATES AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION AND HUMANITARIAN RELIEF (April 20, 2004—Weekly Update #28, Fiscal Year (FY) 2004) This fact sheet highlights overall accomplishments and some weekly activities from USAID's reconstruction efforts in Iraq. For more information on USAID's pro- grams in Iraq please see: www.usaid.gov/iraq Program Overview USAID assists Iraqis in reconstructing their country by working within the Coali- tion Provisional Authority (CPA). USAID programs are implemented in coordination with the United Nations, World Bank, International Monetary Fund (IMF), Coali- tion country partners, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and private sector partners. The USAID Mission in Iraq carries out programs in education, health care, food security, infrastructure reconstruction, airport and seaport management, economic growth, community development, local governance, and transition initia- tives. The USAID Mission in Iraq implements programs in four strategic areas: 1. Restoring Essential Infrastructure. 2. Supporting Essential Health and Education. 3. Expanding Economic Opportunity. 4. Improving Efficiency and Accountability of Government. Program Descriptions and Accomplishments i. restoring essential infrastructure Electricity—Objectives include the emergency repair or rehabilitation of power, generation facilities and electrical grids. Teams of engineers from the Ministry of Electricity, USAID, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, and the CPA have been work- ing since May to restore capacity to Iraq's power system, which was dilapidated from decades of neglect, mismanagement, and looting. 28 Accomplishments to Date: • Generated 4,518 MW on October 6—surpassing the pre-war level of 4,400 MW. Average production over the last seven days was 3,751 MW. • Generated 98,917 MW hours on February 14—the highest since reconstruction began. • Installed independent sources of power at Baghdad International Airport and Umm Qasr seaport. • Collaborating with Bechtel, CPA, and Task Force Restore Iraqi Electricity on projects to repair thermal units, replace and repair turbines, rehabilitate the trans- mission network, and install and restore generators. This collaboration is expected to produce 2,152 MW of incremental capacity. • USAID is adding 827 MW of capacity through maintenance, rehabilitation, and new generation projects. • USAID's portion of the work includes: • Rehabilitating units 5 and 6 at Doura thermal power plant. • Rehabilitating units 1, 2, 3, 4, and 6 at Bayji thermal power plant. • Continuing reconstruction of the country's 400-kv transmission network by rebuilding 220 kilometers of Khor Az Zubayr-Nasiriyah 400-kv line. • Installing new generating capacity at Kirkuk and South Baghdad power plants. Highlights this Week: • Peak generation has been gradually decreasing due to scheduled spring mainte- nance outages. The spring maintenance outages began in late March and will con- tinue through May. These planned shutdowns will allow power teams to perform substantial maintenance for power generation units in preparation for increased generation during summer. Regular maintenance is expected to mitigate unsched- uled outages, the biggest obstacle to dependable generation during the high sum- mer-time demand. This is the third round of scheduled maintenance being per- formed by the CPA, USAID, and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. Similar mainte- nance outages occurred in the summer and fall of 2003. • Work is progressing at Doura thermal power plant. Iraqi subcontractors to USAID partner Bechtel are continuing with the disassembly, repair, and restoration of valves. To date, they are 45 percent complete with the valve work and 8 percent with the pump work. • The restoration of the Khor az Zubayr-An Nasiriyah 400kv transmission line is progressing and the scope of work being implemented by USAID partner Bechtel has been expanded to include additional conductor and shield wire that was dam- aged or missing. The 205 km transmission line runs through southern Iraq from Khor az Zubayr power plant in Al Basrah Governorate to An Nasiriyah power plant in Dhi Qar Governorate. Once it is completed, it will aid in the provision of reliable power from generation plants in southern Iraq to the national grid, helping to meet the great demand for power in Baghdad. Airports—Objectives include: providing material and personnel for the timely re- pair of damaged airport facilities, rehabilitating airport terminals, facilitating hu- manitarian and commercial flights, and preparing the eventual handover of airport operations to the Iraq Airport Commission Authority. Accomplishments to Date: • Processing an average of 20 non-military arrivals and departures a day at Baghdad International Airport. • More than 5,000 military and NGO flights have arrived and departed at Baghdad International Airport since July 2003. • Completed infrastructure work to prepare Baghdad International Airport for commercial air operations. • Repaired Terminal C and administration offices. • Installed three X-ray machines. • Installed very small aperture terminal (VSAT) communications systems and new diesel powered generators, allowing Iraqi airport control centers to communicate. • Rehabilitated Iraqi customs office in the arrival hall. • Rehabilitated Baghdad International Airport's East Fire Station; airport fire protection training for a team of more than 80 Iraqis is ongoing. • Preparing Al Basrah International Airport for commercial operations. Ongoing projects include: • Repairing runway, taxiway, and apron striping. • Installing two baggage X-ray units. 30 Accomplishments to Date: • Handed over the Al Mamoun Telecommunications site to the Ministry of Com- munications on February 26. Twelve new telephone switches and an International Satellite Gateway have been integrated with fourteen Iraqi Telephone and Postal Company (ITPC) switches. • Purchased tools, equipment, and parts to enable Iraqi engineers to restore the network. • Audited over 1,200 km of the fiber optic backbone network. • Repairing the national fiber optic network from Mosul to Umm Qasr, con- necting 20 cities to Baghdad. • Reconstituted Baghdad area phone service by installing switches with 240,000 lines of capacity. Installed new switches and main distribution frames at 12 sites. • Baghdad's largest exchange, Al Mamoun, opened on December 13. More than 140,000 individual subscriber lines are now active; work to allow final acti- vation for all subscribers is underway. • Completed installation of a satellite gateway system at Al Mamoun and re- stored international calling service to Iraq on December 30. • Al Mamoun was handed over to the Ministry of Communications on Feb- ruary 26. • Training Iraqi Telephone and Postal Company operators and engineers at Al Mamoun on telecommunications site operations, maintenance, and repairs. Water and Sanitation—Objectives include rehabilitating and repairing essential water infrastructure to provide potable water and sanitation to communities and im- prove irrigation. Accomplishments to Date: • Nationwide: Rehabilitating sewage and water treatment plants that are cur- rently by-passing untreated sewage generated by millions of people into the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers. • Repairing and rehabilitating water systems throughout Iraq. • Repaired hundreds of breaks in Iraq's critical and long neglected water net- work, significantly increasing water flow. • Baghdad: Expanding one water plant and rehabilitating three sewage plants. • Rehabilitating and adding 45 percent capacity to Baghdad's Sharkh Dijlah water plant (previously named Saba Nissan water plant), adding an additional 225,000 cubic meters a day to the water supply by July 2004, mostly in the overpopulated eastern sections. • Installing back-up electrical generators at 41 Baghdad water facilities and pumping stations to ensure continuous water supply. • Rehabilitating Baghdad's sewage treatment plants—Rustimiyah North, Rustimiyah South, and Kerkh to benefit 3.8 million people by October 2004. • Rehabilitated 70 of Baghdad's non-functioning waste lift and pumping sta- tions. • South Central: Rehabilitating two water plants and four sewage plants. • Rehabilitating An Najaf and Karbala' water treatment plants. The projects will be complete in August and November 2004, respectively. • Rehabilitating Ad Diwaniyah and Karbala' sewage treatment plants, which serve 200,000 residents and currently discharge untreated waste into the Eu- phrates River. These projects are expected to be complete by August 2004 and October 2004, respectively. • Rehabilitating An Najaf and Al Hillah sewage treatment plants to serve 194,000 residents. These projects are expected to be completed by December 2004 and August 2004, respectively. • South: Rehabilitating the entire Sweet Water Canal system, including the canal and its reservoir, 14 water treatment plants and pumping stations, and the Safwan water system. • The system provides drinking water to 1.75 million residents of Basrah City. It had been operating at less than half capacity. • Rehabilitated and removed 34,000 cubic meters of sand and silt from the west lobe of the settling reservoir of the Canal, allowing it to be refilled with clean water. • Began work on Basrah's 14 water treatment plants in January. By summer 2004, water quality and volume will surpass prewar levels. • Completed the restoration of the Safwan water system. All 40,000 residents now have access to potable drinking water. • North: Rehabilitating two water plants and one sewage plant. 33 • Jackson State University/MCID has partnered with University of Mosul, University of Dahuk, and the Nursing Institute (Dahuk) for public health and sanitation. • The University of Oklahoma and consortia has partnered with the Technology University/Baghdad, Al Anbar University, Basrah University, University of Babil, and the University of Salah ad Din in higher education initiatives. Highlights this Week: • In support of Iraqi Ministry of Education and Coalition Provisional Authority priorities, on March 30, 2004, USAID completed the initiatives established as part of its year one education program, which began in May 2003. In response to the education sector's urgent, post-conflict education needs, one of the most important accomplishments during USAID's first year in Iraq was the rehabilitation of 2,358 schools through the Emergency School Rehabilitation Program. With the objective of ensuring that schools were safe and conducive to learning, USAID, the United Nations and local Education Director Generals throughout Iraq agreed on basic re- habilitation standards in early July 2003. Construction contractors, NGOs, and UN agencies were responsible for the rehabilitation which was implemented through local Iraqi contractors. Approximately 50,000 Iraqis were employed during this $70 million program. The project began with a goal of rehabilitating 1,000 schools by October 1, 2003, the start of the fall school term in Iraq. By the beginning of the school year, more than 1,500 schools had been rehabilitated. • Through USAID's Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance, USAID partner CARE has rehabilitated 13 schools for the deaf. Work included repairs to latrines, piping, sanitation and sewage systems, tiles, floors, sinks, lighting, doors and windows. The first set of eight schools was completed in November and the second set of five was completed in mid-March. As a result of the repairs, more than 1,200 deaf children will be able to return to school. Economic Growth—Substantive areas include: currency conversion, development of economic statistics, rationalizing small business credit drafting commercial legis- lation, supporting a national employment program, strengthening micro-finance pro- grams creating a bank-to-bank payment system, implementing a computerized finan- cial management information system, developing a tax policy and administration budget planning, insurance reform, telecommunications reform, and electricity re- form. 3. EXPAND ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY Accomplishments to Date: • With the Ministry of Finance, introduced the new national currency, the Iraqi dinar. • The currency exchange began on October 15, 2003, and was completed on January 15, 2004. • An estimated 6.36 trillion new Iraqi dinars are now in Iraq, and 4.62 tril- lion Iraqi dinars are circulating—106 percent of the original demand estimate of 4.36 trillion. • Conducting regular currency auctions for banks to exchange dinars and dollars. • Created more than 77,000 public works jobs through the National Employment Program. • Provided technical assistance on the implementation of a bank-to-bank payment system that allows 80 banks to send and receive payment instructions. • In support of the Iraqi Treasury's goal to improve Iraq's commercial banking system, USAID is working with the CPA to reconcile and close the year-end 2003 financial statements of Iraq's two largest banks—the state-owned Rasheed and Rafidain—to ensure that the statements are consistent with international account- ing standards. • Assisting in developing, installing, and training staff to use the Financial Man- agement Information System, a new accounting and reporting system that will even- tually be used by all Iraqi treasury offices and ministries. • Assisting CPA in managing a $21-million micro-credit program. • Supporting CPA's Oil for Food (OFF) Program in planning, program manage- ment, logistics, database applications, and communications to support the CPA OFF Coordination Centers in the north and south. • Evaluating and updating commercial laws pertaining to private sector and for- eign investment; assisted in the development of the new company law. 36 Accomplishments to Date: • Implementing local governance activities in 18 governorates. More than 20 mil- lion Iraqis engage in policy discourse through local government entities and civil so- ciety organizations to: • Enhance transparency and participation in local decision-making processes. • Restore basic services. • Improve the effectiveness of local service delivery. • Establish, develop, and expand the number of civil society organizations that can interact with local government entities. • Established 16 governorate councils, 78 district councils, 192 city or sub-district councils, and 392 neighborhood councils, creating local representation for over 80 percent of the Iraqi population. • Awarded $13.4 million to government agencies and civil society organizations to enable municipal authorities to deliver core municipal services. • Committed $2.4 million to support the CPA's nationwide Civic Education Cam- paign, which facilitates dialogue and increases democracy awareness. • Supporting preparation of 2004 city council budgets in Mosul, Al Hillah, Babil, and An Najaf. • Recruited more than 400 democracy facilitators to help Iraqis prepare for the upcoming transition. Highlights this Week: • The Baghdad Mayoralty has completed its 2004 budget and re-organized its fi- nancial records in an effort to improve financial transparency and accountability. As part of the financial re-organization, Mayoralty staff is also working to computerize personnel and salary information. The Mayoralty also developed a new chart of ac- counts system and began work on a computerized property management system. USAID's Local Governance Program (LGP) contributed to the success of this activ- ity. • The Najaf Electrical Distribution Department will rehabilitate the lighting of the Najaf Cemetery with support from a $190,308 grant from USAID's Iraq Transi- tion Initiatives program. The project was identified as a priority by citizens of Najaf and will support the local government's efforts to respond to community safety con- cerns. • The Baghdad City Water Authority has developed a new draft of the city's Water Law, which governs water use for residences, power production, plant oper- ations, and economic and agricultural activities. The law will provide legal param- eters for the development of waterways, the construction of harbors and water plants, fish production for economic development, the usage of public water re- sources in the economy and recreation. The Baghdad Water Authority receives as- sistance from USAID's Local Governance Program (LGP). • The Salah ad Din Governorate Treasury Department is working with the LGP to build its capacity to manage Tikrit's financial resources, specifically for processing the payrolls of local teachers and council members. LGP also met with the Deputy Governor to discuss changes to the Finance and Administration Department that would improve its financial operations. • The LGP has helped local government in Najaf rebuild its city hall and four major fire stations, rehabilitate the Najaf college arts building, repaired two rup- tured water mains, helped develop the city's Chamber of Commerce and provided security lights and telephones for schools within the city. Neighborhood groups, trib- al groups, and communities in and around Najaf city are now actively participating and demand services from their selected governorate officials. • In support of the Coalition Provisional Authority, USAID is facilitating the im- plementation of the Civic Dialogue Program to engage Iraqis in democracy through a variety of events including Democracy Dialogue Activities. Ultimately, the pro- gram supports greater understanding of democratic societies and stimulates civic participation by reaching out to all segments of the population to help everyone un- derstand, support, and join in the political process. Last month, facilitators nation- wide held more than 2,600 democracy dialogues. • Iraqi engineers working with USAID's Local Governance Program (LGP) are providing technical assistance for infrastructure projects being implemented by local governments in Al Basrah Governorate. These engineers have assisted with project design, scopes of work, and implementation for projects that are then conducted in coordination with other organizations. Transition Initiatives—Objectives include: building and sustaining Iraqi con- fidence in the transition to a participatory, stable, and democratic Iraq and working closely with the CPA, USAID's Iraq Transition Initiative assists Iraqi NGOs, na- 38 Accomplishments to Date: • Established more than 650 Community Action Groups in 16 governorates. The projects undertaken by these groups are part of a campaign targeting grassroots democratic development. • CAP has committed $48.4 million for 1,364 community projects across Iraq; 845 projects have already been completed. • Iraqi communities have contributed $15.3 million to community projects. Con- tributions have included labor, land, buildings, and other in-kind assistance. • ACDI/VOCA focuses on the conflict prone areas of Mosul, Kirkuk, the area northwest of Baghdad, and the Iran-Iraq border. Their work bringing communities together has resulted in 146 completed projects and another 135 are in development. These include establishing a youth center in Halabja and establishing a new local water supply in Tikrit. • CHF has established a strong presence in the communities of the Shi'a holy cit- ies of Najaf and Karbala, as well as Hillah by establishing very active community associations. An emphasis on critical infrastructure has provided these communities with access roads, sewage and water rehabilitation, school repairs, and swamp clean-up in addition to vital social infrastructure such as community centers and sports clubs. They have completed 105 projects. • IRD has completed 234 projects with another 72 projects in development. IRD's projects are increasingly focused on income and employment generation to address these critical needs around Baghdad. • Mercy Corps has completed 89 projects and has 93 more in development. These projects focus on water, sewage, community clean-up, and school rehabilitation. • Save the Children has completed 271 projects in the south, which include about 40 percent female membership. Projects have focused primarily on immediate com- munity needs such as sewage clean up, water treatment and distribution, public health, and girls' access to education. Highlights this Week: • USAID's Community Action Program works through implementing partners with communities that have come to a consensus through action groups on their de- velopment priorities. The residents of Najaf city held civil reconstruction as a high priority. From September to March, residents contributed $23,000 to supplement Cooperative Housing Foundation grants worth $1.06 million for the rehabilitation of city roads, lighting and rain water drainage and sanitation systems. CAP project contributions to the city reached $1.8 million in total while residents' contributions reached $44,000. • Community members of Baghdad'a Karada and 9 Nissan districts have rehabili- tated sewerage systems and roads in their communities with assistance from USAID Community Action Program partner International Relief and Development (IRD). In the 9 Nissan district, new pipes were supplied to replace damaged pipes. In Karada, the project included unclogging the pipelines, paving the street, and re- moving accumulated trash. This project alleviated the problems with raw sewage and stagnant water that flooded the streets and deteriorated the health and sanita- tion conditions in those communities. The projects, which cost $43,100, will benefit 66,500 people by allowing them to live in a healthier environment. 43 IRAQ - IMPROVING LOCAL GOVERNANCE AND COMMUNITY INSTITUTIONS TURKEY ""V REHABILITATION ACTIVITIES ^ Cixnmunity Act ton NogTM fflj loc*l Governance '^"W^rni jf it/] AK3IL NlHAiVA \ XL ES S3 IRAN fttf/1 ,« / 1— SAUDI ARABIA HM if i/l v**" j^t^MH Slaw1- 33* l SAUD: AftAftA 45 IRAQ - RESTORING TRANSPORTATION INFRASTRUCTURE AND PORTS OF ENTRY SAUDI ARABIA /S.V HAJAf ..if s-..,iH. !..r.I-_5..J SUM | Up-y ! X » 901 SAUDI ARABIA A2 Ii■t>»wrO mmQ.Hrji | KUWAIT '.^.a, 46 IRAQ - REBUILDING WATER AND SANITATION INFRASTRUCTURE 47 The CHAIRMAN. Well, thank you very much, Administrator Natsios. The extent of that work really does need to be illuminated. You have done a good job in outlining that today. All of your testi- mony will be a part of the record for each one of us to study, to enable us to understand both how much is already proceeding, and the relationship with the new government. Secretary Rodman. STATEMENT OF HON. PETER W. RODMAN, ASSISTANT SEC- RETARY OF DEFENSE FOR INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AF- FAIRS; ACCOMPANIED BY: LT. GEN. CLAUDE M. KICKLIGHTER, U.S. ARMY (RET.), TRANSITION CHIEF, COALI- TION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DE- FENSE Mr. RODMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to commend the chairman, the ranking member, and the committee, on the timeli- ness of this hearing and on the importance of the subject matter. I also should take the opportunity to commend my colleagues at the State Department and my Defense Department colleagues for what I do believe is a very smooth transition. We're working to- gether. There are always bureaucratic issues to resolve, but this is an unusually successful example of cooperation. Senator Biden was hoping to stimulate some fireworks between State and Defense, and I guess I should try to accommodate him. But on this, I have to say it won't be as easy to do as he may believe. The point I did want to stress, if I may, Mr. Chairman, is why the June 30 transfer of sovereign authority is so important. First of all, it shows that we're keeping our promise. It symbolizes that we came there as liberators, not as occupiers. It is important, as I think everyone recognizes, to end the occupation as such as soon as possible. In addition, it adds to the incentive for the Iraqis to step up to their responsibilities. As long as CPA is in charge of everything, we see the Iraqis hanging back a little bit. But we see the value of this deadline, because it has brought Iraqis forward. It has increased our ability to find good people and give them responsibility when the day comes. But more than that, it's really at the heart of our strategy, be- cause our strategy is not just a military strategy, it's a political strategy. The collapse of the old regime left a vacuum, and the es- sence of our strategy is to fill that vacuum with Iraqi institutions, to help the Iraqis build their own new institutions—political, eco- nomic, and security institutions. It empowers the moderates, and getting the Iraqi moderates in charge to the maximum degree is precisely the way you marginalize the extremists politically while the Coalition is out there trying to hunt down the extremists militarily. So it really is at the heart of what we're doing. And the validity of it I would say is confirmed by the famous Zarqawi letter that you're familiar with. This is the message sent by Mr. Zarqawi that we intercepted a number of weeks ago, a mes- sage he was sending to his al-Qaeda colleagues. One of the things he dwelt on in that message was how big a problem June 30 was for him. He said: "Once democracy is there, we have no pretext. 50 have a chance to learn their roles and do what they're supposed to do. And, you know, Mr. Brahimi in his press conference said as clearly as he could that he was confident that it will be possible to form such a government in a timely manner during the month of May, 2004. And so I have seen nothing since he gave this press conference on the 14th of April to lead me to believe that that isn't true. So we ought to be able, Mr. Chairman, to bring some of these lines together in the way that you wish. Let me try to answer each of the questions as specifically as I can. First, what happens, what about this interim government in relationship to the Transitional Administrative Law? When Brahimi gave his press conference, he said that he had been in Iraq a few weeks, he had consulted widely, and he'd come to cer- tain conclusions. And among the conclusions that he had come to was that it was possible under the Transitional Administrative Law as it calls for was to create an interim government. So I believe that the answer to your question is yes, is that this interim government, which will serve from the 1st of July to the end of December of this year, I think there's a high degree of con- fidence that they will accept the Transitional Administrative Law. And why do I say that? Because I would bet you, and he'll have to speak for himself, that as Mr. Brahimi went around to his con- sultations and starts to make his list of people who are going to and that he would recommend be on this government, I would imagine among the questions he would ask them would be, do you believe in the Transitional Administrative Law? Do you believe in the bill of rights? Do you believe in this time line? And I think that would be a prudent thing for him to do, and we'll see when he re- ports to the Security Council on Tuesday The Chairman. And hopefully Mr. Brahimi will listen to your testimony. Mr. Grossman. I hope so. But I think of the things that you have asked me, I think there's a high degree of confidence that that an- swer is yes. Second, when Ambassador Brahimi left Iraq on the 13th of April, he left behind some homework, and that homework was to Iraqis and to the CPA and to others, which was to start generating more lists of people, start talking to people, jurists for example, people in the NGOs, people who are working with Andrews' people, others, the Iraqi Governing Council, so that when he arrives back in Iraq in the first week of May, there will have been generated a big con- versation about who these Iraqis are that will fill these jobs. And again, I think it's very interesting to read in his press conference that he believes, he's optimistic about getting this job done in May for all the reasons that you say. Second, in terms of the SOFA, here's where we've come to on the SOFA. We believe that for now, and certainly for the period until there is a transitional government, three documents really serve as a status of forces agreement. First is the Transitional Administra- tive Law, and you've already been good enough to put that in the record, but article 59 of the transitional law talks about the rela- tionship of the Iraqi Armed Forces to our Armed Forces, and says specifically in subparagraph C that the elected transitional govern- ment shall have the authority to conclude a binding international 51 agreement regarding the activities of the multinational force. And so part of this SOFA question is dealt with in the TAL. The second part of the issues that are around the SOFA are from U.N. Security Council Resolution 1511, and we believe any subse- quent U.N. Security Council Resolution. I won't quote you from there, but there's a paragraph number 13 out of 1511 which we be- lieve helps us in terms of status of forces, and then finally is what's called CPA Order 17, which lays out how our forces are operating in Iraq, whether their privileges and their immunities and their jobs. And we believe that the Transitional Administrative Law, Resolution 1511 and any subsequent resolutions, and CPA 17 will take us through the period until the end of this year. You asked me what happens, how do you work with this new government. And these are obviously questions that we are consid- ering as well. I think I'd go back to a couple of basic points, which is that we are going to turn sovereignty over to Iraqis on the 1st of July. In the security area, there's obviously going to be an arrange- ment that has to be made so that we are able to continue to pro- vide security for Iraq. And the reason I say that is that Iraqis want to have a certain kind of society and they can't get there without security and they can't create that security on their own. So all through the Transition Administrative Law and all through the other things that were doing is this recognition that we are going to have to provide for security in Iraq for some time to come for Iraqi success. And I believe that with General Myers' view of partnership, with Ambassador Negroponte on the ground, with the work that we are doing with the new Iraqi army, the security forces, the police, the civil defense corps, and the border security patrol, and the border security forces, that we are very confident that this can work out. Now, is it perfect every time? Absolutely not. But we've done this before. We did this in Afghanistan, we did it in Bosnia, we do it around the world where we're dealing with places where there's an arrangement on security. And in a sense it comes after the 1st of July to a question of diplomacy indeed, which is the Ambassador of the United States of America, the commander of U.S. military forces, and the people who are in charge of the sovereign Govern- ment of Iraq. Finally, to the question of the Security Council Resolution, I ap- preciate what you say about the testimony. I've tried to lay out some of the elements in there. The reason we haven't made a deci- sion about timing, Mr. Chairman, I guess part of the reason is, goes back to your first question, which is, it seems to me anyway, it makes more sense for a Security Council Resolution to come after Ambassador Brahimi has finished his consultations and made some kind of decision or announcement, and since I don't know what day that is, I can't give you a date for the Security Council Resolution. But I think you can see, given the kind of elements that I said would be in there where it might most logically fall, because again, none of us, and certainly I don't, we don't want to be running around at midnight in New York on the 30th of June trying to get a Security Council Resolution. That's something that ought to have been done to support this effort well before. 52 So we're working on these things, but I think Brahimi's effort has to be complete before there can be a Security Council Resolu- tion. The Chairman. I thank you very much for those responses. Let me just say that when Ambassador Negroponte was nominated by the President, Secretary Powell asked our committee for help in doing our job. I want to acknowledge Senator Biden, as well as staff on both sides of the aisle in our committee, for their work in preparation for a nomination hearing next Tuesday. Likewise, I would like to thank the State Department for moving ahead with the paperwork that is required. This is clearly an abnormal situation. I think we all recognize that. Therefore, routines and processes that we always take for granted are accelerated. This seems to most of us to be warranted. My prayer is that, with help from my distinguished friend from Delaware, we'll have a quorum next Thursday for a business meet- ing. It may be held somewhere in the Capitol, wherever we can find a quorum, so that the committee might in fact, by the 1st of May, and perhaps even by the 29th of April, confirm the nominee. Then we will move to the floor of the Senate. And appeal to our colleagues in this special instance to confirm this Ambassador. I spell all of this out, because we in the Senate have some obliga- tions too. We've been calling upon you for timetables and so forth, but it's reciprocal, and we are in this together. I appreciate your cooperation as well as that of the Secretary. Mr. Grossman. I appreciate that. We certainly are doing every- thing we can to meet your timetable on Ambassador Negroponte's confirmation hearings. Secretary Powell told the senior staff today to get this done as quickly as possible, and so we want to do our part. The Chairman. Thank you. Senator Biden. Senator Biden. Thank you very much. Let me pick up where you left off with the status of forces agreement. And Secretary Gross- man, I understand the three documents you referred to as the basis for this agreement, and you made analogy to Afghanistan and Bos- nia when there are loose ends. There's a big difference. In Afghani- stan and Bosnia, we have international involvement in a big way. We had U.N. resolutions, we had an international legitimacy that hung over, we had an interim government there that we, you, helped put together in Germany, but it had the major powers all buying into it. There is an international security force, NATO is in Afghanistan and in Bosnia. The situation in Iraq is not even comparable in my humble opin- ion for the following reason. What happens on September 7 when the Prime Minister and the President and two Vice Presidents, et cetera, what happens when there's another Najaf, or in Karbala there is another major, major undertaking, one of the militias goes off the wall, and our U.S. commander says we're going to go in take out Sadr and take out whomever? I predict to you what will happen with this government if there's any legitimacy, they'll say, do not go in there. Just like al-Sistani has said, don't, don't go in and take out al-Sadr, because he can't afford to be seen as siding with an American force. Does the gov- 54 Now, how does that translate to the Iraqi people as they wake up in the morning thinking there's any transition? How does that reflect this notion that there is going to be some meaningful change in their circumstances, the average Iraqi? How does that take the American face off of this? You know what it reminds me of, at least with the CPA we had Bremer and we had Greenstock and we had other international diplomats in a room and they all played some part. This is kind of like going from Clark Kent to Superman, you know? Clark Kent at least was dressed in a suit when he was in the CPA. Everybody knew Bremer called the shots, but there was Greenstock and there were others. Now it's like Clark Kent taking off the suit and say- ing, now I'm the new super Ambassador, I'm the pro council. I'm not being facetious. I'm very, very concerned about how this changes what the President acknowledges is the Iraqis chafing under occupation. What has changed in this June 30 arrangement? Mr. Grossman. I believe that a lot will change under the June 30 arrangement, and maybe we make a mistake, Senator, and maybe I make a mistake in focusing solely, although very impor- tant, but let's just stop focusing for just a moment on the security question. I'm not trying to put it aside. Senator Biden. No, I agree. Let's do that. Mr. Grossman. What will Iraqis see on the 1st of July that's dif- ferent from today? They will see a Minister of Health, they will see a Minister of Transportation, they will see a Minister of Recon- struction. They will see all of these ministries. Senator Biden. All of whom will get in their car and drive the Ambassador and ask, what can I do? Mr. Grossman. Well, no, sir, I don't think—look Senator Biden. Tell me how that's not going to happen. Mr. Grossman. I'll give you a good example. We've already transferred, CPA has already transferred the Ministry of Health over to Iraqis a couple of weeks ago, one of those things it doesn't get reported anywhere in the news. Saddam Hussein in his last year spent $16 or $17 million on health and they're now spending about $1 billion on health. The Iraqi Ministry of Health is now run by Iraqis, period, that's all. Jerry Bremer doesn't go there and tell them what to do. And on the 1st of July, all of those ministries will be run by Iraqis. Iraqis will take care of the development fund for Iraq. It'll be their money. Iraqis will take control of the oil revenues. It'll be their money. So I don't debate you in the security area, but what I say to you is that in many, many, many other parts of Iraqi life, there will be a very important Iraqi face on an Iraqi government. And I'd say one more thing, and that is that there will also be an Iraqi/U.N. face on elections. One of your questions was, who runs the elec- tions? The TAL says that the transitional authority will run the elections. They're going to need a lot of help from the United Na- tions. But that's another place where I think the Iraqis and the international community will do a lot. And finally, I know that people say, oh, they're only little num- bers and they're from odd countries, but I don't think we ought to denigrate the contribution that the Coalition makes. 55 Senator BlDEN. I wish you guys would stop this. We're not—no one's denigrating their contribution—just—this always happens. We talk about, we say there's no real Coalition, you guys always say, well, you're denigrating the Hondurans or you're denigrating— I'm not denigrating. They're wonderful, brave soldiers. But let's get something straight. They are hardly a blip on the screen of secu- rity. We have Great Britain there with, what, 6,500 troops? The people in my state think Great Britain has 20, 30, 40, 50, 60,000 people. They got 6,500 troops there. We got 140,000 Americans, 6,500 Brits, no Spaniards, the Polish Minister on the way out says, whether it happens or not, we have to consider whether we pull out the Polish division, hopefully that will not happen. We have a minor little hemorrhage going on right now. So come on. I mean, a coalition is a coalition is a coalition. That's like me saying I'm going to have a baseball team where I'm going to play center field and I've got eight other Little Leaguers on the team with me, their average age is 8 years old. They're wonderful, brave kids, they'll turn out to be brave athletes. But my goodness, I'm not denigrating any of these other nations. But I am putting in perspective the physical contribution they provide, and it is de minimis. It is brave, honorable, and noble where it is provided, but it is de minimis. It's like this little game we play here. It's like when we had the hearings before, we're going into Iraq, and Secretary Wolfowitz said to me when I said there's going to be no Iraqi civil service to stand up. Remember that? We were going to stand up this—this Iraqi civil service was going to be stood up. Remember that? And I was presumptuous enough to say there was no possibility of that, and oh no, are you suggesting, Senator, the Iraqi people aren't bright and competent and capable? Give me a break. All I'm trying to figure out is, how do we get in a circumstance where the Iraqi people look out there on a day-to-day basis and say, you know, something happened on June 30 here and this is no longer a U.S. occupation. That's all I'm trying to get at. Mr. Grossman. And I appreciate that and all I can say is that I believe that in ministry after ministry and relationship after rela- tionship with this interim government, Iraqis will see an Iraqi face. And further, I do hope, as I have testified, that there will be a new U.N. Security Council Resolution, and as I said in my testimony, that that Security Council Resolution will invite other countries to participate. Senator Biden. Who's going to be the referee? Who's going to be the referee when there is significant internal dispute? Right now in Afghanistan what did we do? You under your leadership, State Department, got everybody together and said, boys, go back to the tent, this ain't going to work. Who's going to send them back to the tent? Us? It wasn't us in Afghanistan, it was the international com- munity. Who's going to say, no, no, no, when Chalabi, if he's still around, cuts a deal with al-Sistani, which he will, he's going to eat you guys alive, by the way, cuts a deal that women no longer have the rights we thought they should have under the transitional agreement, who's going to say, hey guys, now wait a minute, you got to go back in the tent and work this one out or go back to the 56 meeting house? I wasn't being derogatory in saying go back to the tent. Literally that's what happened in, you know—who's going to say that? The American Ambassador? Mr. Grossman. I think it would be some combination of the American Ambassador, and as I say, once we have a new U.N. Se- curity Council Resolution, which talks about an increasing role for the United Nations—I don't mean to stick a name on it, because I don't know if it will be Ambassador Brahimi, but we hope Senator BlDEN. So you envision there will be a U.N. figure, a prominent U.N. figure, not Brahimi, whoever, a prominent U.N. figure that's going to have a prominent, visible role in Iraq? Is that what you're thinking? Mr. GROSSMAN. I don't know the answer to that question yet, be- cause the Iraqis haven't asked for it and Kofi Annan hasn't asked for it, as Secretary Powell has said on a couple of occasions. I know that in your speech Senator BlDEN. Kofi Annan didn't ask for anything in Bosnia, he didn't ask for anything in Afghanistan. Let's get off this, OK? They're not going to ask for anything. We're the ones who have suggested it, when we sit down with the other major powers and say, how do we work this out? I'll end, Mr. Chairman, but the idea we're going to invite—I as- sume Mr. Rodman's going to tell me we're going to invite NATO to participate, right? That's what we're going to do? We're going to invite them? Mr. Rodman. We've already been talking to our allies about the future, about the next phase, about the multinational force after sovereignty, after the U.N. comes back in. Senator BlDEN. Have we sat down with them and said, look, NATO, we need your help and this is what we would propose, which we did in Bosnia, we did in Kosovo, we ultimately did in Af- ghanistan? We said this is what we need and this is what we pro- pose, because we've been doing this for 50 years with you guys and this is how it works, because you all know, but the public doesn't know in this little kabuki dance we're having here, that's how it gets done. The way it gets done is the President of the United States au- thorizes the Secretary of Defense to pick up the phone and call General Jones, and say, general, as supreme allied commander, we'd like to see if you can put together a NATO force. The general sitting behind you knows exactly how this works. We'd like you to put together a NATO force according to the following lines. Over here at DOD we've figured out this is the best way to do this, and it would be best if we had the following number of boom boom boom boom boom. We can only provide the following nine heli- copters because we had a fight over Afghanistan in providing four other helicopters and we're going to do this, and it's an American who does that. And we then go in and we have a plan. Do we have a plan like that or are we going to go sit down like Secretary Christopher did when I was part of a group convincing the President of the United States that we should lift the arms embargo in Bosnia. And what did Secretary Christopher do? He went over to Europe and he said, you know, I think we should lift the arms embargo, what do you 58 Second would be to speak out, because I think it's very important that these countries speak out in favor of the Iraqi interim author- ity once it's established. We would also look, as I say, I think quite important, and I don't want to put it aside, for them to speak to the various communities. For example, if the countries in the region who had impact on the Sunni community inside of Iraq were to reach out to them and to say, you have a future here and you ought to get yourself organized politically and you have to leave aside the people who are leading you to violence. All of those things would be extremely important. So it's sort of physical resources, it's political resources, and then I'll leave it to Peter to see whether there are any military things that could be done. Senator Hagel. Do you expect that in fact Arab allies, Iraq's neighbors, will in fact do that, will in fact speak out and be helpful in the areas that you just noted? Mr. Grossman. Certainly from what I could get from Rich's trip, the answer to that question is yes. And there's one other point that I did forget to mention, although I mentioned the Madrid pledges that were made. Also very importantly is debt reduction in those countries that hold a lot of Iraqi debt that they respond positively to Secretary Baker's response that that debt be dealt with. Senator Hagel. Is Secretary Baker still involved in that project? Mr. Grossman. Yes, sir. Senator Hagel. Active? Mr. Grossman. Yes. Senator Hagel. Thank you. Secretary Rodman. Mr. Rodman. I just wanted to add that the Jordanians are doing police training. The Egyptians want to get into the same game and we, of course, encourage that. I endorse everything Marc said. In all of our conversations with our foreign military colleagues or with Arab governments, we encourage them to do anything they can do, including in the political side, giving political support to the Iraqi political process that we have going. And a lot of them have hu- manitarian projects or economic projects in the country. All of us are working on the Arab neighbors to support it. Now, obviously there are sensitivities. It's not self-evident that Iraqis want a lot of other Arab countries there; there are some sen- sitivities within the Arab world, and there are delicacies that have to be respected. But we're encouraged by the attitude of most of these countries because they feel the same stake in the success of Iraq that we do, if not more. Senator Hagel. Thank you. Let me ask you each, from Armitage's reports, which you're picking up, have our efforts that you have each been talking about in response to my questions with our Arab allies and Iraqi neighbors been in any way impaired or inhibited as a result of Prime Minister Sharon's visit here last week and the President's new position on the Palestinian-Israeli issues? For example, wasn't the King of Jordan supposed to be here this week? So you can tell this panel, has that had an impact at all on our relationship with the Arab world? Secretary Grossman. 59 Mr. GROSSMAN. I'm going to answer the specific question you asked me, which is, from the reports I'm getting, has it impacted on the requests Rich was making to help out in Iraq? I think the answer to that question, as near as I can tell, is no. For example, you're right, the King of Jordan was supposed to be here this week. He decided not to come but he'll be back on the 4th of May. But the very important police training program that Peter talked about continues in Iraq. And so in that sense I think the answer is no. Senator Hagel. So there has been no static or no problems as a result of this? Mr. GROSSMAN. In terms of the requests we've made from them on Iraq, no, sir. Senator HAGEL. Secretary Rodman. Mr. Rodman. I agree. Senator Hagel. Secretary Grossman, could you explain in your opinion, and I would welcome Secretary Rodman's thoughts on this as well, if in fact there is a rise of Islamic nationalism in both cen- tral and southern Iraq, and what then is the possibility of an Is- lamic fundamentalism taking hold in these areas? Obviously we have seen some disturbing dynamics occur over the last few weeks, and I guess the real political question that we get to is, is this lead- ing toward a Shia/Sunni domination of the political process in Iraq? So if you would unwind that for me, Secretary Grossman, I'd ap- preciate it. Mr. GROSSMAN. I'll do my best. I think the most important thing, Senator, is to try to convey to Iraqis through the Transitional Ad- ministrative Law, through the timetable that we have, that Iraq has to stop being a winner-take-all state. It was a winner-take-all state in Saddam's time, it was a winner-take-all state probably be- fore that as well. And somehow we have to continue to work to make sure that the Shia, who were, of course, dominated by the Sunnis in the past, feel that the reverse won't happen to them and that everybody has a stake in this new Iraq, and that's why I think the Transitional Administrative Law is an important thing, and I also think this change on the 30th of June to Iraqi sovereignty is important. It's a commitment not just to get sovereignty there but to let these Iraqis work some of these things out themselves. In terms of Islamic fundamentalism and Islamic nationalism, all I can tell you is that from things that I see and reports that I get and polls that I see or local elections for local councils that we see, this is not something that Iraqis want, that Iraqis want a secular society, and like Senator Biden, I don't say that they have to have a democracy like ours or like anybody else's, but a representative government and a free government in a place where they are able to do things on their own. And so, near as I can tell, this is not a question of rising fun- damentalism. It is a question of having Iraqis understand that this can't be anymore a winner-take-all society. Senator Hagel. Let me ask this as a followup, and I know you wanted to add something as well, Mr. Secretary, which we'll get to you. Is the United States prepared to accept whatever government the Iraqi people want? I think as we all understand, nations are built from the inside out, they're not built from the outside in. 60 We've made some dramatic foreign policy mistakes in this country, as all countries have, thinking that we could do just the opposite. So, as the elections stay on track, which we all want that to hap- pen in January, and by the way, I strongly support the President's position on this handover on June 30 with all the questions and all the problems, for all the reasons you mentioned it's important we do that, as well as keeping on track with that January election timeframe. So we are prepared then to accept whatever comes. Mr. Grossman. In the end, Iraqis have to govern themselves. But what we are trying to do with us, the international community, and others through the TAL, through the transition, is to try to say to Iraqis, there is a way to live in this modern world with rep- resentative government and there's a way to live in this world with a bill of rights and Senator Hagel. But if they choose another way? Mr. Grossman. That is their Senator Hagel. That's their decision? Mr. GROSSMAN. Iraqis in the end have to choose their own form of government, yes, sir. Senator Hagel. And any efforts to impose any kind of govern- ment aside from that would not be made by this country? Mr. GROSSMAN. Well, what we're trying to do through the kind of work that Andrew's doing and the Defense Department is doing and we're doing is try to open the window for Iraqis on a new kind of way of life. Senator Biden said, think of what their life must be like after these 35 years that they've had, and that we've got to open some windows on the way that they can live in the future, windows on a free economic life, windows on a rule of law, windows on things that they don't have much experience with. So what I'm confident of is if we give people a chance here and we're patient and we're prepared to help out and we can open these windows, that they will choose to become part of the modern world and choose some kind of representative government. I believe that. Senator Hagel. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. May I indulge the committee to ask if the other two witnesses wanted to answer that? And I apologize, my time's up. Mr. Secretary, Secretary Rodman. Mr. Rodman. It's a very good question, but we have confidence that there will be a moderate outcome. It's really the essence of our strategy—to strengthen the moderates, to empower the moderates. You asked about Islamic fundamentalism, and I would say two things. One is, there is a province in southern Iraq called Diyala province that has held 17 local elections in the last month, and the Islamists lost in almost every single case. The Shia in Iraq are not radical. They come out of a secular tradition. The second point is the al-Sadr rebellion, the al-Sadr putsch at- tempt, was an attempt to tip the balance among the Shia in the direction of his brand of radicalism. He was a marginal figure among the Shia and he attempted to remedy that by radicalizing the community, making himself by intimidation the dominant fig- ure. He failed. The moderates among the Shia have rolled him back, and particularly when we started rolling him back militarily, the moderate leaders of the Shia found the courage to put political pressure on him, and he failed at his attempt to become the domi- nant figure among the Shia. 61 The Iraqis are a common-sense people. We think the over- whelming majority of the people are moderate. They want a mod- ern, moderate kind of government, and our influence, as long as it's there, can have a great effect in helping the moderates who are a majority. Senator Hagel. Thank you. Mr. Natsios. Mr. Natsios. Just from a ground perspective, a little different perspective, to reinforce what both my colleagues just mentioned, we've been looking at the structure of Iraqi society, the value sys- tems developing, and it's very interesting what's going on. Early on last fall, our democracy officers were going with one of our contrac- tors to these local councils that had been elected, and the agree- ment is they form themselves into a council, we teach them how you run a meeting, how you take a vote, how you make decisions, how you have a public hearing. And at one of the hearings, one of the first early ones, one of our democracy officers was sitting there and they were yelling at each other, literally screaming, no fist fights, but for 3 hours on how to spend a small grant, because we set the thing up and then we say, decide how to spend $20,000, we'll help you spend the money, but you decide what the project is and where it is and what it is in the village. And after this yelling for 3 or 4 hours, our Deputy Mission Direc- tor Chris Milligan said, I got to go to the next town, you can't make a decision here. And the chairman of the council said, do not leave, they'll kill us. And Chris said, who is going to kill you? He said, the people in the village know you're here with this money to do this project, we just can't decide what it is. If you leave, they're going to kill us, isn't that what democracy is? And Chris started laughing and said, no, that is not what democracy is. It means you might get defeated in the next election, but we don't kill our public officials because we don't like what they do, we just take them out of office by an election. And we thought he was kidding. They have no conception of what this is. I've been there twice. For a week I met with delega- tions of people. One was a delegation of 11 graduate students from the best universities in Baghdad. It was fascinating to talk with them; they're all in their late 20s or early 30s. One of them said to me something extraordinary. He said, you started the operation, we're on the table, you opened us up, complete the operation, please do not leave until you finish. We want you to finish. We were under the psychopath all these years. We want you to finish. We just don't understand what this means. These are young stu- dents now. They said, we like democracy because we like America and Western Europe, but we don't know what that means. So we're about to run a huge public education campaign that was designed by Larry Diamond, one of our two greatest democracy scholars from the Hoover Institute, a good friend of mine from Stanford University. And he went over there for weeks inter- viewing people, and asking, what don't you understand? We've de- signed a curriculum with papers explaining what does minority rights mean, what is an election, what's a political party supposed to be, what is freedom of the press, what do these things mean. It's going to be radio, TV, it's going to be interviews, and it will be done on a mass basis. So they will understand what this thing is that 62 we talk about, because we're all assuming people want democracy when they really don't know what that means. Another thing that hasn't happened, we were expecting large scale atrocities against the people who committed the atrocities against the Shia and the Kurds, and it has not happened. We had teams sent out last year, a year ago, to stop the atrocities. They haven't happened. So I sent an expert of human rights in and he went to police station after police station, he went to mullahs, he went to imams, and he said, how many people have been killed in revenge killings for what happened in the 1990s and 1980s by Sad- dam. Maybe 40 or 50 people in a year. We couldn't understand why. You know why? Because the imams and the mullahs and the mosques, every Friday they get up all over the country and they say, the Americans have come and the British have come, there's a thing called rule of law. If you think someone committed an atrocity, we have to go to the courts, we have to prosecute them, no revenge killings. And guess what? The people are listening to them. We had an incident down in Umm Qasr when we first arrived where a schoolteacher, an English teacher got up before a crowd of men who was going to burn half the Ba'athist party houses down and kill all the Ba'athists because of what they had done, because it was a Shia city. And the guy got up alone in front of 300 men who were saying I'm going to kill them all now, the Americans have arrived, I'm going to kill them. He said, the Americans have told us, the British have told us, the rule of law means you pros- ecute people through a court. We never had courts except to exe- cute people, it was a joke. You have to present evidence. We cannot use retribution to run this country. And guess what happened? They put their torches out and they went home and they never burned one house down. So what I'm suggesting to support my colleagues here, you know, they want a change after what they've been through. One last story. An NGO told me this story. It was a sheik who supports the more radical fundamentalists but he was talking to one of the NGO guys from the United States who's an American. And he said, I shouldn't admit this to you in front of the other sheiks, but my mother, who's an elderly lady, prays for the health of George Bush every night. And he smiled, this guy's a Democrat, he's not a Republican, but he told me the story, he said, I know why you're going to tell me, but tell me why. He said, because he got rid of Saddam, this lunacy that has governed this country and he's at least given us some hope for the future. That's the mother of a sheik who's on the more radical side, and he smiled and he said, and we do appreciate it even if we're having trouble with this transition. So the impression you get in the media is a little different than you get at the grassroots level. Senator Hagel. Thank you. The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator Hagel. Thank you, Senator Dodd, for your patience. Senator Dodd. I began to think I was listening to some col- leagues in the Senate here, a bit of a filibuster. 1231 Sometimes I wonder if we're living on the same planet, However, when you say some of these things, and I appreciate your com- ments. But let me first of all, Mr. Chairman, thank you again for these hearings, you and Senator Biden. This is the historic and proper role of this committee and you are fulfilling it with these hearings. And while it's uncomfortable to be witnesses and to have to face a barrage of questions, I think it's a tremendously impor- tant function you're performing here, and I for one deeply appre- ciate it. I've said that before but it's been very, very helpful. I'm going to ask unanimous consent that an opening comment and statements be included in the record, and I know Senator Biden has expressed this, but I said it yesterday, I'll repeat it again today, whatever the differences I've had years ago with John Negroponte, I happen to feel he's a very fine Foreign Service offi- cer, done a tremendous job in many places, and I second your com- ments and hopes that we'll be able to move expeditiously through this committee and on the floor of the Senate. Whatever else one's feelings may be, I think it's critically important that we get an am- bassador there. So you have my support in trying to get that done. I'm sure my colleagues will as well and hopefully it can move along. Let me if I can go back, Secretary Grossman and others, and I want to follow sort of two lines of questions, and I'll start with one I think may be a little easier to address first, and that is the role of the U.S. Embassy that's going to emerge here and how the lines of authority are going to develop under this new embassy. And then I want to quickly get to the June 30 issue and how we're going to deal with some of these questions. It's unclear to me how authority lines are going to develop with— putting aside now the June 30 date—but just what is the role of the U.S. Ambassador going to be here in the reconstruction effort? Will he be head of mission in Iraq with all that that means specifi- cally? Will the Department of Defense maintain control over the purse strings, or is that going to now shift to the U.S. Ambassador in terms of those efforts? Mr. GROSSMAN. Yes, sir. Senator, in my testimony I said that Ambassador Negroponte, if he's confirmed, and I hope he will be confirmed, like you, will go to Iraq with a letter from the President like all of our Ambassadors has that says that he will be respon- sible for all of the activities in the United States of America, the executive branch, except for those that are in command of an area military commander. So we certainly expect that all of those ques- tions of the money and the priorities and the reconstruction will be his responsibility. Just to be clear, it's not to say that we won't take advantage of the extremely important structures that are in the Department of Defense, for example, using Army contracting or using some of the other structures that are there. But the person responsible will be the Ambassador and then the Secretary of State. Senator Dodd. But there will be no unique lines that are devel- oped here in terms of the purse strings and dollars beyond what you've just described? All of that will fall under the auspices of the U.S. Ambassador? Mr. Grossman. Yes, sir. 64 Senator Dodd. So I don't expect any—I won't be looking at some different chart here in a few weeks that shows some different lines of authority in terms of how that operates? Mr. Grossman. That's correct. On the questions you've asked me, that's correct. Senator DODD. All right. Let me just, Mr. Natsios, quickly point out to you here, in terms of the reconstruction, some of the efforts that are going on, there was a very devastating report from Na- tional Public Radio yesterday about the Iraqi Health Ministry sell- ing equipment and medicine for personal profits. I don't know if you saw that. Did you see that report? Mr. Natsios. I did not see it, Senator. Senator Dodd. Well, you ought to take a look at it. It's the kind of thing that worries us in terms of these transitional issues. I'm also wondering if you have any comments to make about the report that GE and Siemens has pretty much pulled out of their oper- ations because of the security problem. Mr. Natsios. Siemens and GE are not our contractors. Bechtel is our big infrastructure contractor and they have not pulled out. Senator Dodd. Do you know about GE and Siemens? Mr. Natsios. I read it in the newspaper. Senator Dodd. You know nothing more about it than that? Mr. NATSIOS. They report through the Defense Department and they do Defense Department contracting. Senator Dodd. Mr. Secretary, I apologize then. Secretary Rod- man, do you have a comment to make on that? Mr. Rodman. I am not familiar with it. I can get an answer for the record certainly. [At the time of publication a response had not been received. 1 Senator Dodd. All right. Let me move in time here to this issue. We've heard from witnesses including ones yesterday I thought were very, very helpful and described two or three issues, and there may be more, and you might want to add to them, but I think all of them were very different by the way. We had witnesses from the political, the military, economic, and human rights side I guess you might add. Yet they all had a common theme as they talked, and they listed them, and Chairman Lugar asked them, I think, to prioritize what the top issues were, all of them came back and said security was the No. 1 issue, and I see a nodding affirmatively that you would agree with that, Secretary Grossman, that getting not only the security of our own people and forces there, but obviously as importantly for the Iraqi people. The second issue raised was a stabilization plan in place, one that would really offer some clear pattern of how we are going to bring some order, so that these ministries we're talking about could actually function and operate and at least to some degree of success so that civil society would begin to function with some degree of normalcy. Third, there was the discussion of to what extent can we truly internationalize this effort through the reconstruction phases, addi- tional security questions. I no longer hear the kind of debate that occurred, at least I don't hear it as loudly as I did before, about 65 the exclusion of the international community, but more impor- tantly, how can we get them more involved in all of this. Here's my concern, and I know my colleagues and others—and I'm not, I understand the significance, having made this commit- ment last, I guess it was November, on a June 30 date. My concern is of the bureaucratic rigidity to that date, and realizing that if you let it slip you cause problems. And I accept that. I'm not suggesting this is not without difficulty if you do this. But it seems to me to rigidly hold onto that date when the issues of security, stabiliza- tion, and internationalizing our efforts over there may be put in jeopardy if we hold too rigidly to that date is a far greater long- term loss in Iraq than whatever short-term problems we may face if in fact we allow that date to move, because we don't have these issues in place. To pick up your point, Secretary Grossman, the idea of running around at midnight on the night of June 29, trying to get a U.N. resolution adopted, and I'm very worried as I look at this. Chair- man Lugar raised it, I think at least, if I heard him correctly, in talking about, for instance, the security forces. What happens if after June 30, if I read this, as I think I do, "the Law of Adminis- tration for the State of Iraq, the Transitional Period,"and "The first phase shall begin with the formation of a fully sovereign Iraq In- terim Government," a fully sovereign government. You've talked about limited sovereignty, Secretary Grossman, in some public statements, but if they decide for whatever reason that they want some different configuration on the security issue after June 30, thus making it far more difficult for us to achieve the job we need to get done there, whichever one seems to agree must be the case, then don't we find ourselves in a situation having em- braced that date so rigidly that we make it far more difficult to get the security job done or the stabilization plan or, in fact, if they make decisions that make it far more difficult for us to get inter- national cooperation? Haven't we in a sense made it, our job, that much more difficult if we hold on? That's sort of the question I get, and I want to know in that con- I read in this law. I gather nothing's been developed, but that law goes on here, the provisions of the transitional period talks about the Governing Council, "the Coalition Provisional Authority and possibly in consultation with the United Nations. This government shall exercise authority in accordance with this Law, including the fundamental principles and rights specified herein, and with an annex that shall be agreed upon and issued before the beginning of the transitional period and that shall be an integral part of this Law." Is there an annex? And I want to address that as well. But get to this question of June 30 if you can and my worry is that we're painting ourselves into a corner on this, and we're so de- termined to hold on to that date that we're sacrificing some of these other critical issues that will determine ultimately whether or not we're able to do exactly that which I think all of us want, and that is a stable, peaceful Iraq with a chance to determine its own future. Mr. Grossman. Senator, thank you very much. If I could just go back to the comment you made in your opening comments, I just 67 as we've got these 70 days, more and more Iraqis will be employed, more Iraqis will be a part of this economy, and I think that will also be part of the stabilization plan. And finally, in terms of the international effort, again, from my perspective, Brahimi says, I'm confident I can do this in May. So I have no reason to think anything other than let's help him make that true. If he can accomplish that task, and then you can have a Security Council Resolution, as Senator Lugar said, kind of in ad- vance of the first—to support what Brahimi has said, then why wait? Why not take the opportunity of that 30th of June date? Be- cause you've got then government, you've got people, you've got structure, you've got a plan. And as Senator Biden said, let's put a more Iraqi face on this. I think that the 30th of June date is an important one, not just for us, and maybe even less for us, but it is really important for Iraqis. Senator Dodd. Would you get to the annex question? I know my time is up. Mr. Grossman. I apologize. Can I come back to you on the record or here in a minute? I don't know the answer to that question. I just don't want to get it wrong. Senator Dodd. Do you know what I'm talking about though? Mr. Grossman. I do. Senator Dodd. Because that spells out an awful lot of the au- thorities. Mr. Grossman. Right. Senator DODD. And I think it's going to be very, very clear, there's that difference between that and obviously the Iraqi transi- tional government, which is 8 months later, and this period, this annex, is not an insignificant document, and to my understanding, do you have it ready? Is there an annex document ready yet? Mr. GROSSMAN. Well, I'm told no, there is not one now. It's being drafted by the Iraqi Governing Council. But let me, so I don't goof this up, let me come back to you with a more complete answer. Mr. Natsios. Could I just answer your question about civil soci- ety, which I think is a very important insight into the preparation of the country for the transition. We engaged five major American NGOs last summer in setting up a set of community action pro- grams at the village and neighborhood level in the cities across the country, huge programs, and we're now in our second phase of that. There were $7 million grants each, $50 million, and there's another 50 that's going out to them now because it's an extraordinary pro- gram. I met with many of the local groups that have been formed by these NGOs to make decisions. These are not town councils, they're just community groups. And they make decisions on shall we repair the water system or the electric lights or do we want to redo the school, and they have—and we require them to put some of their own money—they actually engage the community to put some of their resources in in addition to ours. So it's their projects, not our projects, which is very important because they provide the protec- tion so that the looting that took place last year does not happen again. They protect it because it's their projects. 68 The effect of this is to get a new generation of political leaders at the local level who people can look to for leadership, and some- times they don't do it very well and they get defeated in the next election. Senator Dodd. Well, very good. Mr. Chairman, I'll just conclude on that. I, for one, and I believe most of my colleagues are anxious to see this work succeed. This is not a hostile environment where some people maybe wish to see this fail somehow. I don't believe that's the case. But I am very, very worried, and I'm not suggesting you change the date today at all, obviously 70 days allows a little time. But if there isn't some real progress fairly soon on this, my simple rec- ommendation is to be careful. I realize there's a problem by moving away from a date, but by holding on to that date and not having the questions answered about security, stabilization, and how we develop the kind of longer term international commitment involve- ment here, putting that at risk with an interim government that may have a very different set of political calculations than we do. My experience sitting on this side of the dais is, politicians and politics, it's always local, and they're always going to be deter- mining their futures based on what they think is in their local best interest. We may find ourselves in direct conflict here at a time when we may decide that we need more security or we need more international involvement, and it may be that much harder for us to achieve it and look back and regret deeply that while we knew there was a price to pay by moving the date of June 30, we caused ourselves untold problems by sticking with it and turning over au- thority prematurely when it was not ripe yet. So I urge you during these coming weeks to assess that, knowing full well you'll pay a price if you change it. But the price you pay may be a lot less than the larger price if you hold on to it, and dis- cover we're really all alone in this effort, we don't have the security forces we need to protect our own troops, let alone the Iraqis, and there's no way in the world you're going to get a stabilization plan with chaos reigning in that country. So I just urge you to be care- ful. Think carefully about this. Thank you. The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Dodd. Senator Chafee. Mr. Grossman. I'm sorry, may I answer the Senator's question on the annex? The Chairman. Yes. Mr. Grossman. And I apologize I didn't know off-hand. I'm told that there is a drafting committee for that annex, that Adnan Pachachi of the Iraqi Governing Council is chairing that committee, that the CPAs involved, and that their objective is to try to incor- porate into the annex kind of Brahimi's ideas for the interim gov- ernment. And if there's more than that I'd be glad to submit it for the record. Senator Dodd. That's fine. Mr. Chairman, I would just urge that you and Senator Biden could be kept informed as to how this is progressing so we know what's in that. It's a very important docu- ment. A lot of the authorities are going to be in that annex. Mr. Grossman. I'll be glad to commit to that. Senator Dodd. Thanks. The Chairman. Good advice and we will attempt to follow through. Senator Chafee. Senator Chafee. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. One of the things I think we've learned in the last few days and weeks is that there's a culture of denial in the administration and that cer- tainly in the buildup to the war we're seeing that the existence of weapons of mass destruction and the threat of Saddam Hussein to us has been pretty much debunked. And even Andy Card, I think, was quoted recently as saying "there's no threat there" when he re- ceived a briefing on the weapons of mass destruction. In fact, I, before voting on the war, went out to Langley, to the CIA by myself, had about 15 people there to give me a briefing, what do you have. And after that briefing I was underwhelmed enough to tell my local paper, the Providence Journal, we're not going to find any weapons of mass destruction, and that was a year ago. But now we're there, we've lost 700 young men and women, or nearly 700, we're spending over $1 billion a week, but nonetheless, now we're there, but what's very, very alarming to me is that this culture of denial now exists on the relationship between what we're doing in the Israeli-Palestinian issue and in Iraq. And President Mubarak was in Crawford, Texas, saying to the President, his quote was the centrality of the Arab-Israeli conflict to our problems there. And from hearing you answer Senator Hagel's question, you're saying, no, there's no connection. When I was in Baghdad and Mosul in October, the graffiti, the Arab graffiti was all about the Palestinian cause, and that's what the Americans were telling me. And certainly if you read the Dirijian report, which the Bush ad- ministration commissioned, their own people, who studied the Arab world, the finding was that the Arab world looks at U.S. foreign policy through the prism of the Arab-Israeli conflict. And now you're saying here, testifying, no, there's no connection between the rise of an Intifada in April and the Intifada between the Israelis and Palestinians. And that's what's going to get us in trouble. That same denial that we had back in the WMD question and now we have here, we're not going to win in Iraq. I want to win. I join my colleagues. We want to prevail there. We want a stable Iraq. But we're not going to do it as long as we continue, in my opinion, to inflame the Arab world by not participating more fairly in—this is a change, what the President did with the Sharon plan is a change from six previous administrations. Ever since the Six-Day War of 1967, the American administrations, Republicans, Democrats, have had a policy. That just changed. And for you to say that's not going to ad- versely affect us in Iraq is why we're not going to prevail. We have to address some of the Palestinian issues if we're going to prevail in Iraq. And I don't really know what kind of questions to ask as long as this culture of denial exists. Maybe the only ques- tion I have is, are you told not to make any connection between the two? 71 and deploy Iraqi security forces can lead to dangerous failures and instabilities. So I'd like you to tell me how long it will take to properly train Iraqis such as they are able to provide for their country's security? And as a part of that, for how long will security be primarily the responsibility of U.S. forces? Mr. Rodman. Thank you, Senator. Let me first of all address the point about private security contractors. This is an opportunity you've given me to address something which is much discussed. I've heard that there's an army of 20,000 private security people, which is the second biggest military force in the country. Our figures are different, and our figures are that there are about 15,000 civilian contractors in Iraq, of which no more than 2,000 are armed and doing security functions. Maybe my figures are wrong, but that's what we've heard, and we are at the same time trying to tighten the rules by which these people operate. We're developing policy guidance to make sure that any people who are fulfilling that role, protecting some private company, are accountable to our military people so that they limit themselves to what they are properly there for, which is the protec- tion function. They don't do military operations. Senator Feingold. I appreciate that point, but I have limited time, so I'll hope you'll get to my question. Mr. RODMAN. The big point is the performance of the Iraqis, and we all admit that the performance in the recent period was dis- appointing. A lot of the units did well; a lot of them didn't do well. No one expected that by April 2004 they would be substituting for the American military; even by June 30 they're not expected to substitute for the America military. We've learned some lessons from what has just happened. We've learned that we've got to work harder to find Iraqi leadership, good quality Iraqi commanders. We've got to move faster to equip them. Some of the units, as I say, did do well. Some of them didn't show up for work, although now they're back at work. So we learned something from this. But after June 30, the Coalition will still be there. All of the Iraqi political leadership knows that. It's reflected in the TAL that we will still be there to help continue the job of training them to the job of maintaining security. Now as for the police, what happened in the last few weeks would have overwhelmed any police department, so what we count more on is what we call the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps, which is a more heavily equipped force, plus the Iraqi army which is being trained. This is a work in progress and we have to accelerate it. But again, June 30 isn't the deadline. You asked how long we're going to be there. Senator Feingold. That's what I need to know. I realize that the President said we'll stay as long as we need to and not a day more, but I tell you, some more reasonable estimate about what we're in for in terms of time when they take over would be very helpful. Mr. Rodman. It's the natural question to ask, but you know I can't give a firm prediction. We hope that we've overcome the chal- lenges of the last couple of weeks—the al-Sadr rebellion, which I think has been pushed back, and the Fallujah problem, which we 72 think we have a plan to deal with. We will deal with these military problems, and if we can restore a sense of stability, then whatever violence is going on will lose its strategic significance. Senator Feingold. Let me suggest Mr. Rodman. And that over time stability Senator Feingold. My time is limited. I need as specific a re- sponse as I can get and I know it's hard. But, you know, you're on the ground there, people are on the ground there, and you have an idea of what the capacities are. We announced to the world that we were going to turn over authority on June 30. We announced that time not as an estimate, but as a date certain. I'm just looking for some kind of a timeframe, just as we gave the American people a timeframe in turning over the authority, a timeframe that the American people can look at that would be a reasonable estimate for turning over the security primarily to the Iraqis as opposed to the United States. What can I tell them is a reasonable estimate of time? Mr. Rodman. Unfortunately, I'm not in a position to give you a number of years or months. I think it's going to be a gradual proc- ess. As security conditions improve, we can reduce the number of Americans. We are still hoping to bring in more international con- tributors, particularly after the U.N. comes back and sovereignty is turned over. Senator Feingold. How about a goal? What's your goal? Mr. Rodman. Well, it's not really up to me to set a number of years. That's Senator Feingold. Well, I would ask the administration to come up with at least a timeframe, a goal that we could point to so I could tell my constituents what might happen or what might be hoped for. Let me turn to Mr. Grossman. At the same time that Congress passed an $87 billion supplemental spending bill requested by the administration, primarily for Iraq last year, Congress also created an Inspector General for the Coalition Provisional Authority to en- sure that massive sums of U.S. taxpayer dollars were not lost to waste or fraud or abuse. As of the end of February this year, only $900 million of the $18.4 billion appropriated for reconstruction programs in Iraq had been obligated, less than 5 percent. When Congress created the IG for the CPA, we did so because we recognized that the amount of money involved in reconstruction was so great that we needed an IG on the ground in Baghdad, not an office in Washington that viewed Iraq as one operation among hundreds that needed oversight. What will become of the CPA IG given the fact that the funds he was supposed to oversee have barely begun to be obligated? The law says that the IG's office will terminate 6 months after the au- thorities and duties of the Coalition Provisional Authority cease to exist. It seems to me that the authorities and duties in terms of the reconstruction effort don't end on June 30, so will the CPA IG be subsumed into the State Department's IG office, or is some other arrangement under consideration? 3 3 See Response to an Additional Question for the Record on page 107. 73 Mr. GROSSMAN. I don't know the answer to your question, but I'll be glad to get back to you for the record. [At the time of publication a response had not been received.] Senator Feingold. Can you speculate on what's going on? Mr. GROSSMAN. No, sir. I truly don't know the answer to your question. Senator Feingold. Let me ask both Mr. Grossman and Mr. Natsios, the Inspector General for the Coalition Provisional Author- ity has indicated that potentially billions of taxpayer dollars in- tended for reconstruction are being spent instead on security and insurance. It seems to me that this means that we must either re- sign ourselves to accomplishing less or we must spend more. Which is it? If we're planning to accomplish less, which priorities don't make the cut? If the administration has simply decided to ask for more money, when do you plan to make that request and how do you suggest the country pay for it? Let me start with Mr. Grossman. Mr. Grossman. I apologize. I was being talked to over my ear. Senator Feingold. I do understand. Do you want me to repeat the question? Mr. Grossman. I apologize. I'm really sorry. Senator FEINGOLD. Should I repeat the question? Mr. Grossman. Would you be kind enough? Senator Feingold. I'd be happy to. I indicated that obviously the IG's report shows that the reconstruction money is not being spent on just reconstruction. Instead, it's having to be spent significantly on security and insurance because of the problems that have oc- curred. And so what I was saying was we have to either resign our- selves to accomplishing less or spending more. Which is it going to be? If we're planning to accomplish less, which priorities will not make the cut? If we're going to be spending more, when will you ask for it and how much will it be? Mr. Natsios. Do you want me to answer? Mr. Grossman. Yes, why don't you. Mr. Natsios. OK. I can just tell you, Senator, for our portion of it, we've been allotted $3.8 billion. We have obligated $3.3 billion. I've asked what the average set-aside, because we did allow last fall when there was an increase in violence where our contractors and NGOs and partners needed help, and the average at this point is about 20 percent. It is not billions of dollars, but it is hundreds of millions of dollars of the amount that we were given. I cannot speak for the Defense Department contractors. I only can speak for the people who work for us. Mr. Grossman. I guess the simple answer I would give you is that we'll have to look at all these priorities, and as I testified ear- lier today, if there's a need for—we believe there will be a need for a supplemental, and the timing and amount of that is obviously up to the President. Senator FEINGOLD. Mr. Rodman, did you want to say something? Mr. Rodman. I just wanted to add that my understanding is that DOD contractors are required by law to provide workers' compensa- tion insurance for their employees overseas, and that's an allowable cost under the contract, so we may not have a lot of flexibility. 74 Senator Feingold. So it sounds like we're looking at a request for more money rather than scaling down the priorities, in all like- lihood? Mr. GROSSMAN. As I said, I happen to be referring to the needs for our embassy, but I said that if there was a requirement to fill that gap, it seemed to us that there would be a requirement for a supplemental. As I said, the timing and amount to be determined by the President. Senator Feingold. Let me ask one more question, Mr. Natsios. What is the standard of legitimacy for an emerging Iraqi leader- ship? From the beginning I've been concerned about whether or not our democratization efforts will succeed in Iraq, not because I do not believe the Iraqis desire and deserve the same basic political and civil rights enjoyed in democratic states, but because I won- dered about the political culture, in which ideas about humiliation are so prominent, and whether they could accept any model that is proposed by a foreign occupier. How likely is it that resistance to the United States' presence in Iraq will become, in effect, the new standard of legitimacy for Iraqi leaders who seek to appeal to constituents on other than the sort of more traditional religious or ethnic grounds? Mr. Natsios. The polling data does not seem to indicate that that sort of rage is manifesting itself at this point, or that there is a distorted or sort of predatory value system developing as a re- sult of this transition. In fact, the opposite is the case, and Oxford Analytica did a very detailed analysis with, I think it was reported on ABC or NBC News. We study these things, because we did our own polling last fall, because it does tell us something about how people see public services and if they're improving. Last fall, we didn't have good polls in terms of public service. We do now. The poll that Oxford did, which we had nothing to do with, did not pay for, we were not involved, we didn't know it was being done until after it was finished, said 58 percent of the people said things have improved since before the war, 19 percent said they had not, and the rest were undecided. Eighty percent though had sort of hope for the future. So in a broad sense there is a perception that things are improv- ing, which makes it harder—now, this was a month ago admit- tedly—that a demagogue will come by and say nothing's hap- pening, nothing's improving. There is a visible sense in the polling data, and if you go around the country, that things are changing in terms of public services. That's all I'm speaking about now, my area. In terms of the legitimacy of the government, it will be deter- mined by two central issues: can the government deliver services, and that's one of our central goals. We're doing capacity building in the ministry so they can manage services better. There was no central budgeting system. Even Saddam didn't know how people spent the money in the ministries. You know how they controlled people's behavior? They had a prison in each ministry and if the minister got upset at a bureaucrat, they simply put them in jail, literally we found jails in all the ministries. We thought it very odd. 75 We have a contract. I think it's the most important thing we're doing, not the infrastructure, not the services, and that is our local governments contract. What we're doing is setting up councils with the civil affairs officers and our staff across the country. Ninety- three percent of all the population now is under some elected coun- cil. Some of the people are doing pretty well. We're training them in how you design a project, how you run a personnel system, how you run a meeting, how you take a vote, all the things that a city council or a town council would learn in the United States. Some of them are getting defeated when they run for reelection. Some of them are getting much bigger votes because they're perceived to be doing well. In the United States, as you know, Senator, having been a state legislator, most of our senior officials are former state or local offi- cials. Two-thirds of the state legislatures are former local officials, and half of our Congress are former state official. In our experience in USAID around the world, in a country with no history of demo- cratic governance, the best way to democratize is at the village level, because they will choose candidates from those town councils to be their members of Parliament under the new government, whatever the structure is. And you will see emerge—we're going to do a study of it when it happens—that a huge portion of the people in the new Par- liament are likely to be from these town councils. And our view, our theory is, which has worked in many other countries, is that if we are legitimate in what we're doing locally, then that will in- crease the legitimacy of the national government, because they'll have confidence in their local legislators. The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Feingold. Senator Brownback. Senator Brownback. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and thank you, gentlemen, for coming before us. Secretary Grossman, last time I saw you was on a sad plane ride to Kansas City for you, I know for a family member that had died, and my regrets to you and your family and your wife for that. Mr. GROSSMAN. Thank you for recalling that. Senator Brownback. Let me—this may seem odd, because you guys are getting pushed a lot—I want to congratulate you on some of the things that are taking place. It is, to me, remarkable what's happened in Libya. It is past remarkable. We've been after Qadhafi for 30 years, and him giving up weapons of mass destruction, the move toward democracy that we're seeing in the Middle East is something that people have wanted for a long time. We've never put any effort into it previously and now we are and we're seeing results taking place of that democratization move. It's no wonder to me that a lot of the countries in the region would be—the country leadership in the region would be negatively responding, because you're going right at their power. When you democratize a monarchy or a dictatorship, you're going right at the guys that own the place, but that's something we shouldn't be afraid of and we haven't been afraid of in other regions of the world. We have been, I think, somewhat previous in the Middle East. 78 an additional hearing at the proper time, how security is to be ob- tained. How do we come to a point in which the Iraq people believe that in fact somebody is in control? I don't seek to go back over the traces of what happened the day after hostilities started, and how the police function did or did not work and the training and so forth, but rather I hope to focus on this interim period, the period prior to June 30, or let's even say the month after June 30, as the new government is there in place. Who will created the secure en- vironment? More U.S. Armed Forces? We've heard there are not many troops from other countries that might be available, and we hope that those who are still there will be retained. Can any of you offer any further assurances on the security ques- tion, which underlays the potential for political success? Mr. Rodman. Let me try my hand at that. We expected, and I think we're on record saying, that as June 30 approached we may well get a spike of people trying to derail it for the reasons I men- tioned at the very beginning. Zarqawi and company see this as a threat. The accomplishment of a turnover to Iraqis is a major threat to those who want to derail it. But look at it on the other side: That's what our strategy has to be, the political strategy of marginalizing the extremists, taking some of the wind out of their sails by putting an Iraqi face on what's happening. Second, let me give you our impression of what happened in the last few weeks, I know if you read the press you get a sense of ev- erything's going to hell and it's all metastasizing into some unified national uprising. Our commanders on the ground and CPA people, have a more precise sense of what it is. They see it as separable problems. There's a Fallujah problem which we've known about. These are the diehards of the old regime who represent a narrow, very narrow sliver of the population, with an admixture of foreign troublemakers who have no base in the population. I can tell you one anecdote. There was a town northeast of Fallujah where, when the Marines came back in and cleaned out or killed a few hundred bad guys, the townspeople came out and thanked the Marines. They said, "We've been held hostage by these people." So again, we think the Sunni problem is a manageable problem, and right now Fallujah is under siege by us. The Shia problem had the potential to be much more significant, because the Shia are the majority, and as I mentioned, al-Sadr was attempting to make himself the dominant figure among the Shia. But we think he failed, and the other Shia leaders who are part of the political process found their courage and seem to be back in the driver's seat. So we think, as to what we've been through in the last few weeks, the strategic significance of that violence is as I described. Now, we expect it to be messy for a while, and until we train up the Iraqis and give them the capability, we'll have to be there. But our strategy is a combination of political moves to empower the moderate Iraqis and a military strategy which we think has the upper hand; that's our commanders' sense, and I trust their judg- ment. So that's the strategy we're pursuing. 79 The Chairman. Are we confident at this point that we're going to be able to get supplies to the Iraqi police? Can we ensure the provision of arms and various things they need to be effective? A great deal has been written in the press about the delay of ship- ments, or difficulties with contracting. That's a very serious issue. Mr. Rodman. Well, you are right. We need to fix that. The Chairman. Are you working to fix that? Mr. RODMAN. Well, I think we're—I'm sharing a responsibility, but Marc, if you want to add something. Mr. Grossman. Yes, sir. Again, I've had the benefit of a couple of days of listening to my Defense Department JCS colleagues, and I think the answer to that question is, there is really a problem here, and in many cases, one of the challenges for the Iraqi police was they were outgunned, and that both General Myers and the Deputy Secretary of Defense said this is, as Peter said, something we have to fix and that we will fix and that we are fixing. And we certainly have some responsibility here as well through the INL programs. In fact, the program in Jordan that I was talking to Sen- ator Chafee about is a department program. And all of this needs to move forward. I know that the appointment of General Petraeus who did such a very good job up in the north of Iraq to now take over the train- ing of Iraqi security forces, police, border patrol, we believe is going to help us a lot. But I want to be clear here that this didn't go fast enough and we have some responsibility here, all of us, and we're committed to fixing it. The CHAIRMAN. As a part of our ongoing oversight, we'll continue to raise questions as to how that is coming. Likewise, we will ex- amine other elements of the training exercises, and the recruitment for the basic force, whether it be the army or the police. These are obviously elements of sovereignty and security. They involve suc- cessive Iraqis as they begin to take hold of their own responsibil- ities. Senator Corzine. Senator CORZINE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think you're aware we had to go vote, so I appreciate you holding the hearing open and I appreciate the panel's patience. It's always great to be the last guy on the line. First of all, I share the strong desire I sense from the testimony I observed this morning for the success of both the transition and the movement forward. I think all of us wish for nothing but the best here. And I must say I feel a little bit better, because I think some of the plans that I have seen get at some of the questions that I think a lot of my colleagues have raised. I must tell you I continue to be concerned that we seem to have this fixated view on this magic June 30 date and I don't really get it, because there's lots of reasons why it would really be good, but it might be actually worse if we actually don't deliver what was expected on June 30, the expectations of the Iraqi public is not met by that, and I think it could a very real, long-term setback. So I wonder whether we even have the flexibility enough to think about that at this stage. We seem to get harder and harder in the conversations that I hear and comments from the administration. And I must admit that I have some sympathy with Senator 82 the deciding force with regard to making a decision about those kinds of issues under this new arrangement? Mr. Grossman. The arrangement would be, I think as we are doing today, that we would do our very best to consult with that interim government and to take their views into account. But if you put the question to me that says, at the point where our com- manders believe that our men and women are threatened, will we have the right and the obligation to protect them, the answer to that question is yes. Senator Corzine. Let's use the circumstances we have today. Mr. Grossman. Well, as you see, what we're doing today is we are working with the Iraqi Governing Council on issues of Fallujah, on issues of Najaf, but when the question comes to, will we have the right and the power and the obligation to protect the men and women of the United States Army—I'm sorry, of the U.S. Armed Forces, yes is the answer to that question. Senator Corzine. Well, I hope that the kind of clarity that at least the answers are, your responses are, are the reality, because I hope that we sense that public diplomacy, as well as state diplo- macy, is important in the long-run success of what we encourage to happen or support in happening over this balance of transition from one point to another. And sometimes, I think Spain's a perfect example, sometimes where our public diplomacy doesn't match our state diplomacy and we may over read these situations, and I think these are the kinds of questions that are going to make or break the difference, and I think those need to be pretty certainly domi- nated. We might have—I don't want to be totally specific—we heard outside authorities say different things about some of these issues over the last several days. Mr. Grossman. Well, I'll be glad to take all of those questions and double check them, but what my message to everybody today is the one that we've been trying to get out and the President's given out, which is that on the 1st of July Iraqis will be in charge of Iraq and that Iraqis will run Iraq, and that's what we're trying to do. I will take every one of those questions and make sure I've answered them in the right way and as specifically as I possibly can. Senator Corzine. Good. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator Corzine. Can you make a comment about the budget of the new Iraqi Government? Obviously they will have that responsibility. They will formulate budget requirements. They have oil resources, and perhaps some transition moneys, although that's really just a supposition. Could you fill in the blanks a little bit on the budget of the Iraqi Govern- ment itself, its sources of revenue, and how that will be estab- lished? Mr. Grossman. They do have revenues, Senator, as you say, and as a number of Senators have pointed out, crude oil production has gone up, and Iraqis, interestingly enough, have now started to make a billion-dollar-a-month contribution to their own Develop- ment Fund for Iraq. 85 (B) The transitional period shall consist of two phases. (1) The first phase shall begin with the formation of a fully sovereign Iraqi Interim Government that takes power on 30 June 2004. This govern- ment shall be constituted in accordance with a process of extensive delib- erations and consultations with cross-sections of the Iraqi people conducted by the Governing Council and the Coalition Provisional Authority and pos- sibly in consultation with the United Nations. This government shall exer- cise authority in accordance with this Law, including the fundamental prin- ciples and rights specified herein, and with an annex that shall be agreed upon and issued before the beginning of the transitional period and that shall be an integral part of this Law. (2) The second phase shall begin after the formation of the Iraqi Transi- tional Government, which will take place after elections for the National Assembly have been held as stipulated in this Law, provided that, if pos- sible, these elections are not delayed beyond 31 December 2004, and, in any event, beyond 31 January 2005. This second phase shall end upon the for- mation of an Iraqi government pursuant to a permanent constitution. Article 3. (A) This Law is the Supreme Law of the land and shall be binding in all parts of Iraq without exception. No amendment to this Law may be made except by a three-fourths majority of the members of the National Assembly and the unanimous approval of the Presidency Council. Likewise, no amendment may be made that could abridge in any way the rights of the Iraqi people cited in Chapter Two; extend the transitional period beyond the timeframe cited in this Law; delay the holding of elections to a new assembly; reduce the powers of the regions or governorates; or affect Islam, or any other religions or sects and their rites. (B) Any legal provision that conflicts with this Law is null and void. (C) This Law shall cease to have effect upon the formation of an elected gov- ernment pursuant to a permanent constitution. Article 4. The system of government in Iraq shall be republican, federal, democratic, and pluralistic, and powers shall be shared between the federal government and the re- gional governments, governorates, municipalities, and local administrations. The federal system shall be based upon geographic and historical realities and the sepa- ration of powers, and not upon origin, race, ethnicity, nationality, or confession. Article 5. The Iraqi Armed Forces shall be subject to the civilian control of the Iraqi Transi- tional Government, in accordance with the contents of Chapters Three and Five of this Law. Article 6. The Iraqi Transitional Government shall take effective steps to end the vestiges of the oppressive acts of the previous regime arising from forced displacement, dep- rivation of citizenship, expropriation of financial assets and property, and dismissal from government employment for political, racial, or sectarian reasons. Article 7. (A) Islam is the official religion of the State and is to be considered a source of legislation. No law that contradicts the universally agreed tenets of Islam, the principles of democracy, or the rights cited in Chapter Two of this Law may be enacted during the transitional period. This Law respects the Islamic iden- tity of the majority of the Iraqi people and guarantees the full religious rights of all individuals to freedom of religious belief and practice. (B) Iraq is a country of many nationalities, and the Arab people in Iraq are an inseparable part of the Arab nation. Article 8. The flag, anthem, and emblem of the State shall be fixed by law. Article 9. The Arabic language and the Kurdish language are the two official languages of Iraq. The right of Iraqis to educate their children in their mother tongue, such as Turcoman, Syriac, or Armenian, in government educational institutions in accord- ance with educational guidelines, or in any other language in private educational 86 institutions, shall be guaranteed. The scope of the term "official language" and the means of applying the provisions of this Article shall be defined by law and shall include: (1) Publication of the official gazette, in the two languages; (2) Speech and expression in official settings, such as the National Assembly, the Council of Ministers, courts, and official conferences, in either of the two languages; (3) Recognition and publication of official documents and correspondence in the two languages; (4) Opening schools that teach in the two languages, in accordance with edu- cational guidelines; (5) Use of both languages in any other settings enjoined by the principle of equality (such as bank notes, passports, and stamps); (6) Use of both languages in the federal institutions and agencies in the Kurdistan region. CHAPTER TWO—FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS Article 10. As an expression of the free will and sovereignty of the Iraqi people, their rep- resentatives shall form the governmental structures of the State of Iraq. The Iraqi Transitional Government and the governments of the regions, governorates, munici- palities, and local administrations shall respect the rights of the Iraqi people, in- cluding those rights cited in this Chapter. Article 11. (A) Anyone who carries Iraqi nationality shall be deemed an Iraqi citizen. His citizenship shall grant him all the rights and duties stipulated in this Law and shall be the basis of his relation to the homeland and the State. (B) No Iraqi may have his Iraqi citizenship withdrawn or be exiled unless he is a naturalized citizen who, in his application for citizenship, as established in a court of law, made material falsifications on the basis of which citizenship was granted. (C) Each Iraqi shall have the right to carry more than one citizenship. Any Iraqi whose citizenship was withdrawn because he acquired another citizenship shall be deemed an Iraqi. (D) Any Iraqi whose Iraqi citizenship was withdrawn for political, religious, racial, or sectarian reasons has the right to reclaim his Iraqi citizenship. (E) Decision Number 666 (1980) of the dissolved Revolutionary Command Council is annulled, and anyone whose citizenship was withdrawn on the basis of this decree shall be deemed an Iraqi. (F) The National Assembly must issue laws pertaining to citizenship and nat- uralization consistent with the provisions of this Law (G) The Courts shall examine all disputes arising from the application of the provisions relating to citizenship. Article 12. All Iraqis are equal in their rights without regard to gender, sect, opinion, belief, nationality, religion, or origin, and they are equal before the law. Discrimination against an Iraqi citizen on the basis of his gender, nationality, religion, or origin is prohibited. Everyone has the right to life, liberty, and the security of his person. No one may be deprived of his life or liberty, except in accordance with legal proce- dures. All are equal before the courts. Article 13. (A) Public and private freedoms shall be protected. (B) The right of free expression shall be protected. (C) The right of free peaceable assembly and the right to join associations freely, as well as the right to form and join unions and political parties freely, in accordance with the law, shall be guaranteed. (D) Each Iraqi has the right of free movement in all parts of Iraq and the right to travel abroad and return freely. (E) Each Iraqi has the right to demonstrate and strike peaceably in accord- ance with the law. 87 (F) Each Iraqi has the right to freedom of thought, conscience, and religious belief and practice. Coercion in such matters shall be prohibited. (G) Slavery, the slave trade, forced labor, and involuntary servitude with or without pay, shall be forbidden. (H) Each Iraqi has the right to privacy. Article 14. The individual has the right to security, education, health care, and social secu- rity. The Iraqi State and its governmental units, including the federal government, the regions, governorates, municipalities, and local administrations, within the lim- its of their resources and with due regard to other vital needs, shall strive to provide prosperity and employment opportunities to the people. Article 15. (A) No civil law shall have retroactive effect unless the law so stipulates. There shall be neither a crime, nor punishment, except by law in effect at the time the crime is committed. (B) Police, investigators, or other governmental authorities may not violate the sanctity of private residences, whether these authorities belong to the fed- eral or regional governments, governorates, municipalities, or local administra- tions, unless a judge or investigating magistrate has issued a search warrant in accordance with applicable law on the basis of information provided by a sworn individual who knew that bearing false witness would render him liable to punishment. Extreme exigent circumstances, as determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, may justify a warrantless search, but such exigencies shall be narrowly construed. In the event that a warrantless search is carried out in the absence of an extreme exigent circumstance, the evidence so seized, and any other evidence found derivatively from such search, shall be inadmis- sible in connection with a criminal charge, unless the court determines that the person who carried out the warrantless search believed reasonably and in good faith that the search was in accordance with the law. (C) No one may be unlawfully arrested or detained, and no one may be de- tained by reason of political or religious beliefs. (D) All persons shall be guaranteed the right to a fair and public hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal, regardless of whether the proceeding is civil or criminal. Notice of the proceeding and its legal basis must be provided to the accused without delay. (E) The accused is innocent until proven guilty pursuant to law, and he like- wise has the right to engage independent and competent counsel, to remain si- lent in response to questions addressed to him with no compulsion to testify for any reason, to participate in preparing his defense, and to summon and exam- ine witnesses or to ask the judge to do so. At the time a person is arrested, he must be notified of these rights. (F) The right to a fair, speedy, and open trial shall be guaranteed. (G) Every person deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention shall have the right of recourse to a court to determine the legality of his arrest or detention without delay and to order his release if this occurred in an illegal manner. (H) After being found innocent of a charge, an accused may not be tried once again on the same charge. (I) Civilians may not be tried before a military tribunal. Special or exceptional courts may not be established. (J) Torture in all its forms, physical or mental, shall be prohibited under all circumstances, as shall be cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment. No confes- sion made under compulsion, torture, or threat thereof shall be relied upon or admitted into evidence for any reason in any proceeding, whether criminal or otherwise. Article 16. (A) Public property is sacrosanct, and its protection is the duty of every cit- izen. (B) The right to private property shall be protected, and no one may be pre- vented from disposing of his property except within the limits of law. No one shall be deprived of his property except by eminent domain, in circumstances and in the manner set forth in law, and on condition that he is paid just and timely compensation. 88 (C) Each Iraqi citizen shall have the full and unfettered right to own real property in all parts of Iraq without restriction. Article 17. It shall not be permitted to possess, bear, buy, or sell arms except on licensure issued in accordance with the law. Article 18. There shall be no taxation or fee except by law. Article 19. No political refugee who has been granted asylum pursuant to applicable law may be surrendered or returned forcibly to the country from which he fled. Article 20. (A) Every Iraqi who fulfills the conditions stipulated in the electoral law has the right to stand for election and cast his ballot secretly in free, open, fair, competitive, and periodic elections. (B) No Iraqi may be discriminated against for purposes of voting in elections on the basis of gender, religion, sect, race, belief, ethnic origin, language, wealth, or literacy. Article 21. Neither the Iraqi Transitional Government nor the governments and administra- tions of the regions, governorates, and municipalities, nor local administrations may interfere with the right of the Iraqi people to develop the institutions of civil society, whether in cooperation with international civil society organizations or otherwise. Article 22. If, in the course of his work, an official of any government office, whether in the federal government, the regional governments, the governorate and municipal ad- ministrations, or the local administrations, deprives an individual or a group of the rights guaranteed by this Law or any other Iraqi laws in force, this individual or group shall have the right to maintain a cause of action against that employee to seek compensation for the damages caused by such deprivation, to vindicate his rights, and to seek any other legal measure. If the court decides that the official had acted with a sufficient degree of good faith and in the belief that his actions were consistent with the law, then he is not required to pay compensation. Article 23. The enumeration of the foregoing rights must not be interpreted to mean that they are the only rights enjoyed by the Iraqi people. They enjoy all the rights that befit a free people possessed of their human dignity, including the rights stipulated in international treaties and agreements, other instruments of international law that Iraq has signed and to which it has acceded, and others that are deemed bind- ing upon it, and in the law of nations. Non-Iraqis within Iraq shall enjoy all human rights not inconsistent with their status as non-citizens. CHAPTER THREE—THE IRAQI TRANSITIONAL GOVERNMENT Article 24. (A) The Iraqi Transitional Government, which is also referred to in this Law as the federal government, shall consist of the National Assembly; the Presi- dency Council; the Council of Ministers, including the Prime Minister; and the judicial authority. (B) The three authorities, legislative, executive, and judicial, shall be separate and independent of one another. (C) No official or employee of the Iraqi Transitional Government shall enjoy immunity for criminal acts committed while in office. Article 25. The Iraqi Transitional Government shall have exclusive competence in the fol- lowing matters: (A) Formulating foreign policy and diplomatic representation; negotiating, signing, and ratifying international treaties and agreements; formulating for- eign economic and trade policy and sovereign debt policies; (B) Formulating and executing national security policy, including creating and maintaining armed forces to secure, protect, and guarantee the security of the country's borders and to defend Iraq; 89 (C) Formulating fiscal policy, issuing currency, regulating customs, regulating commercial policy across regional and governorate boundaries in Iraq, drawing up the national budget of the State, formulating monetary policy, and estab- lishing and administering a central bank; (D) Regulating weights and measures and formulating a general policy on wages; (E) Managing the natural resources of Iraq, which belongs to all the people of all the regions and governorates of Iraq, in consultation with the govern- ments of the regions and the administrations of the governorates, and distrib- uting the revenues resulting from their sale through the national budget in an equitable manner proportional to the distribution of population throughout the country, and with due regard for areas that were unjustly deprived of these rev- enues by the previous regime, for dealing with their situations in a positive way, for their needs, and for the degree of development of the different areas of the country; (F) Regulating Iraqi citizenship, immigration, and asylum; and (G) Regulating telecommunications policy. Article 26. (A) Except as otherwise provided in this Law, the laws in force in Iraq on 30 June 2004 shall remain in effect unless and until rescinded or amended by the Iraqi Transitional Government in accordance with this Law. (B) Legislation issued by the federal legislative authority shall supersede any other legislation issued by any other legislative authority in the event that they contradict each other, except as provided in Article 54(B). (C) The laws, regulations, orders, and directives issued by the Coalition Provi- sional Authority pursuant to its authority under international law shall remain in force until rescinded or amended by legislation duly enacted and having the force of law. Article 27. (A) The Iraqi Armed Forces shall consist of the active and reserve units, and elements thereof. The purpose of these forces is the defense of Iraq. (B) Armed forces and militias not under the command structure of the Iraqi Transitional Government are prohibited, except as provided by federal law. (C) The Iraqi Armed Forces and its personnel, including military personnel working in the Ministry of Defense or any offices or organizations subordinate to it, may not stand for election to political office, campaign for candidates, or participate in other activities forbidden by Ministry of Defense regulations. This ban encompasses the activities of the personnel mentioned above acting in their personal or official capacities. Nothing in this Article shall infringe upon the right of these personnel to vote in elections. (D) The Iraqi Intelligence Service shall collect information, assess threats to national security, and advise the Iraqi government. This Service shall be under civilian control, shall be subject to legislative oversight, and shall operate pur- suant to law and in accordance with recognized principles of human rights. (E) The Iraqi Transitional Government shall respect and implement Iraq's international obligations regarding the non-proliferation, non-development, non- production, and non-use of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, and asso- ciated equipment, materiel, technologies, and delivery systems for use in the de- velopment, manufacture, production, and use of such weapons. Article 28. (A) Members of the National Assembly; the Presidency Council; the Council of Ministers, including the Prime Minister; and judges and justices of the courts may not be appointed to any other position in or out of government. Any mem- ber of the National Assembly who becomes a member of the Presidency Council or Council of Ministers shall be deemed to have resigned his membership in the National Assembly. (B) In no event may a member of the armed forces be a member of the Na- tional Assembly, minister, Prime Minister, or member of the Presidency Council unless the individual has resigned his commission or rank, or retired from duty at least eighteen months prior to serving. 90 Article 29. Upon the assumption of full authority by the Iraqi Interim Government in accord- ance with Article 2(B)(1), above, the Coalition Provisional Authority shall be dis- solved and the work of the Governing Council shall come to an end. CHAPTER FOUR—THE TRANSITIONAL LEGISLATIVE AUTHORITY Article 30. (A) During the transitional period, the State of Iraq shall have a legislative authority known as the National Assembly. Its principal mission shall be to leg- islate and exercise oversight over the work of the executive authority. (B) Laws shall be issued in the name of the people of Iraq. Laws, regulations, and directives related to them shall be published in the official gazette and shall take effect as of the date of their publication, unless they stipulate other- wise. (C) The National Assembly shall be elected in accordance with an electoral law and a political parties law. The electoral law shall aim to achieve the goal of having women constitute no less than one-quarter of the members of the Na- tional Assembly and of having fair representation for all communities in Iraq, including the Turcomans, ChaldoAsSyrians, and others. (D) Elections for the National Assembly shall take place by 31 December 2004 if possible, and in any case no later than by 31 January 2005. Article 31. (A) The National Assembly shall consist of 275 members. It shall enact a law dealing with the replacement of its members in the event of resignation, re- moval, or death. (B) A nominee to the National Assembly must fulfill the following conditions: (1) He shall be an Iraqi no less than 30 years of age. (2) He shall not have been a member of the dissolved Ba'ath Party with the rank of Division Member or higher, unless exempted pursuant to the applicable legal rules. (3) If he was once a member of the dissolved Ba'ath Party with the rank of Full Member, he shall be required to sign a document renouncing the Ba'ath Party and disavowing all of his past links with it before becoming eligible to be a candidate, as well as to swear that he no longer has any dealings or connection with Ba'ath Party organizations. If it is established in court that he lied or fabricated on this score, he shall lose his seat in the National Assembly. (4) He shall not have been a member of the former agencies of repression and shall not have contributed to or participated in the persecution of citi- zens. (5) He shall not have enriched himself in an illegitimate manner at the expense of the homeland and public finance. (6) He shall not have been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude and shall have a good reputation. (7) He shall have at least a secondary school diploma, or equivalent (8) He shall not be a member of the armed forces at the time of his nomi- nation. Article 32. (A) The National Assembly shall draw up its own internal procedures, and it shall sit in public session unless circumstances require otherwise, consistent with its internal procedures. The first session of the Assembly shall be chaired by its oldest member. (B) The National Assembly shall elect, from its own members, a president and two deputy presidents of the National Assembly. The president of the National Assembly shall be the individual who receives the greatest number of votes for that office; the first deputy president the next highest; and the second deputy president the next. The president of the National Assembly may vote on an issue, but may not participate in the debates, unless he temporarily steps out of the chair immediately prior to addressing the issue. (C) A bill shall not be voted upon by the National Assembly unless it has been read twice at a regular session of the Assembly, on condition that at least two 91 days intervene between the two readings, and after the bill has been placed on the agenda of the session at least four days prior to the vote. Article 33. (A) Meetings of the National Assembly shall be public, and transcripts of its meetings shall be recorded and published. The vote of every member of the Na- tional Assembly shall be recorded and made public. Decisions in the National Assembly shall be taken by simple majority unless this Law stipulates other- wise. (B) The National Assembly must examine bills proposed by the Council of Ministers, including budget bills. (C) Only the Council of Ministers shall have the right to present a proposed national budget. The National Assembly has the right to reallocate proposed spending and to reduce the total amounts in the general budget. It also has the right to propose an increase in the overall amount of expenditures to the Coun- cil of Ministers if necessary. (D) Members of the National Assembly shall have the right to propose bills, consistent with the internal procedures that drawn up by the Assembly. (E) The Iraqi Armed Forces may not be dispatched outside Iraq even for the purpose of defending against foreign aggression except with the approval of the National Assembly and upon the request of the Presidency Council. (F) Only the National Assembly shall have the power to ratify international treaties and agreements. (G) The oversight function performed by the National Assembly and its com- mittees shall include the right of interpellation of executive officials, including members of the Presidency Council, the Council of Ministers, including the Prime Minister, and any less senior official of the executive authority. This shall encompass the right to investigate, request information, and issue sub- poenas for persons to appear before them. Article 34. Each member of the National Assembly shall enjoy immunity for statements made while the Assembly is in session, and the member may not be sued before the courts for such. A member may not be placed under arrest during a session of the National Assembly, unless the member is accused of a crime and the National As- sembly agrees to lift his immunity or if he is caught in flagrante delicto in the com- mission of a felony. CHAPTER FIVE—THE TRANSITIONAL EXECUTIVE AUTHORITY Article 35. The executive authority during the transitional period shall consist of the Presi- dency Council, the Council of Ministers, and its presiding Prime Minister. Article 36. (A) The National Assembly shall elect a President of the State and two Depu- ties. They shall form the Presidency Council, the function of which will be to represent the sovereignty of Iraq and oversee the higher affairs of the country. The election of the Presidency Council shall take place on the basis of a single list and by a two-thirds majority of the members' votes. The National Assembly has the power to remove any member of the Presidency Council of the State for incompetence or lack of integrity by a three-fourths majority of its members' votes. In the event of a vacancy in the Presidency Council, the National Assem- bly shall, by a vote of two-thirds of its members, elect a replacement to fill the vacancy. (B) It is a prerequisite for a member of the Presidency Council to fulfill the same conditions as the members of the National Assembly, with the following observations: (1) He must be at least forty years of age. (2) He must possess a good reputation, integrity, and rectitude. (3) If he was a member of the dissolved Ba'ath Party, he must have left the dissolved Party at least ten years before its fall. (4) He must not have participated in repressing the intifada of 1991 or the Anfal campaign and must not have committed a crime against the Iraqi people. 92 (C) The Presidency Council shall take its decisions unanimously, and its members may not deputize others as proxies. Article 37. The Presidency Council may veto any legislation passed by the National Assem- bly, on condition that this be done within fifteen days after the Presidency Council is notified by the president of the National Assembly of the passage of such legisla- tion. In the event of a veto, the legislation shall be returned to the National Assem- bly, which has the right to pass the legislation again by a two-thirds majority not subject to veto within a period not to exceed thirty days. Article 38. (A) The Presidency Council shall name a Prime Minister unanimously, as well as the members of the Council of Ministers upon the recommendation of the Prime Minister. The Prime Minister and Council of Ministers shall then seek to obtain a vote of confidence by simple majority from the National Assem- bly prior to commencing their work as a government. The Presidency Council must agree on a candidate for the post of Prime Minister within two weeks. In the event that it fails to do so, the responsibility of naming the Prime Minister reverts to the National Assembly. In that event, the National Assembly must confirm the nomination by a two-thirds majority. If the Prime Minister is un- able to nominate his Council of Ministers within one month, the Presidency Council shall name another Prime Minister. (B) The qualifications for Prime Minister must be the same as for the mem- bers of the Presidency Council except that his age must not be less than 35 years upon his taking office. Article 39. (A) The Council of Ministers shall, with the approval of the Presidency Coun- cil, appoint representatives to negotiate the conclusion of international treaties and agreements. The Presidency Council shall recommend passage of a law by the National Assembly to ratify such treaties and agreements. (B) The Presidency Council shall carry out the function of commander-in-chief of the Iraqi Armed Forces only for ceremonial and protocol purposes. It shall have no command authority. It shall have the right to be briefed, to inquire, and to advise. Operationally, national command authority on military matters shall flow from the Prime Minister to the Minister of Defense to the military chain of command of the Iraqi Armed Forces. (C) The Presidency Council shall, as more fully set forth in Chapter Six, below, appoint, upon recommendation of the Higher Juridical Council, the Pre- siding Judge and members of the Federal Supreme Court. (D) The Council of Ministers shall appoint the Director-General of the Iraqi National Intelligence Service, as well as officers of the Iraqi Armed Forces at the rank of general or above. Such appointments shall be subject to confirma- tion by the National Assembly by simple majority of those of its members present. Article 40. (A) The Prime Minister and the ministers shall be responsible before the Na- tional Assembly, and this Assembly shall have the right to withdraw its con- fidence either in the Prime Minister or in the ministers collectively or individ- ually. In the event that confidence in the Prime Minister is withdrawn, the en- tire Council of Ministers shall be dissolved, and Article 40(B), below, shall be- come operative. (B) In the event of a vote of no confidence with respect to the entire Council of Ministers, the Prime Minister and Council of Ministers shall remain in office to carry out their functions for a period not to exceed thirty days, until the for- mation of a new Council of Ministers, consistent with Article 38, above. Article 41. The Prime Minister shall have day-to-day responsibility for the management of the government, and he may dismiss ministers with the approval of an simple ma- jority of the National Assembly. The Presidency Council may, upon the rec- ommendation of the Commission on Public Integrity after the exercise of due proc- ess, dismiss the Prime Minister or the ministers. 93 Article 42. The Council of Ministers shall draw up rules of procedure for its work and issue the regulations and directives necessary to enforce the laws. It also has the right to propose bills to the National Assembly. Bach ministry has the right, within its competence, to nominate deputy ministers, ambassadors, and other employees of special grade. After the Council of Ministers approves these nominations, they shall be submitted to the Presidency Council for ratification. All decisions of the Council of Ministers shall be taken by simple majority of those of its members present. CHAPTER SIX—THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL AUTHORITY Article 43. (A) The judiciary is independent, and it shall in no way be administered by the executive authority, including the Ministry of Justice. The judiciary shall enjoy exclusive competence to determine the innocence or guilt of the accused pursuant to law, without interference from the legislative or executive authori- ties. (B) All judges sitting in their respective courts as of 1 July 2004 will continue in office thereafter, unless removed from office pursuant to this Law. (C) The National Assembly shall establish an independent and adequate budget for the judiciary. (D) Federal courts shall adjudicate matters that arise from the application of federal laws. The establishment of these courts shall be within the exclusive competence of the federal government. The establishment of these courts in the regions shall be in consultation with the presidents of the judicial councils in the regions, and priority in appointing or transferring judges to these courts shall be given to judges resident in the region. Article 44. (A) A court called the Federal Supreme Court shall be constituted by law in Iraq. (B) The jurisdiction of the Federal Supreme Court shall be as follows: (1) Original and exclusive jurisdiction in legal proceedings between the Iraqi Transitional Government and the regional governments, governorate and municipal administrations, and local administrations. (2) Original and exclusive jurisdiction, on the basis of a complaint from a claimant or a referral from another court, to review claims that a law, regulation, or directive issued by the federal or regional governments, the governorate or municipal administrations, or local administrations is incon- sistent with this Law. (3) Ordinary appellate jurisdiction of the Federal Supreme Court shall be defined by federal law. (C) Should the Federal Supreme Court rule that a challenged law, regulation, directive, or measure is inconsistent with this Law, it shall be deemed null and void. (D) The Federal Supreme Court shall create and publish regulations regard- ing the procedures required to bring claims and to permit attorneys to practice before it. It shall take its decisions by simple majority, except decisions with regard to the proceedings stipulated in Article 44(B)(1), which must be by a two- thirds majority. Decisions shall be binding. The Court shall have full powers to enforce its decisions, including the power to issue citations for contempt of court and the measures that flow from this. (E) The Federal Supreme Court shall consist of nine members. The Higher Juridical Council shall, in consultation with the regional judicial councils, ini- tially nominate no less than eighteen and up to twenty-seven individuals to fill the initial vacancies in the aforementioned Court. It will follow the same proce- dure thereafter, nominating three members for each subsequent vacancy that occurs by reason of death, resignation, or removal. The Presidency Council shall appoint the members of this Court and name one of them as its Presiding Judge. In the event an appointment is rejected, the Higher Juridical Council shall nominate a new group of three candidates. Article 45. A Higher Juridical Council shall be established and assume the role of the Coun- cil of Judges. The Higher Juridical Council shall supervise the federal judiciary and shall administer its budget. This Council shall be composed of the Presiding Judge 94 of the Federal Supreme Court, the presiding judge and deputy presiding judges of the federal Court of Cassation, the presiding judges of the federal Courts of Appeal, and the presiding judge and two deputy presiding judges of each regional court of cassation. The Presiding Judge of the Federal Supreme Court shall preside over the Higher Juridical Council. In his absence, the presiding judge of the federal Court of Cassation shall preside over the Council. Article 46. (A) The federal judicial branch shall include existing courts outside the Kurdistan region, including courts of first instance; the Central Criminal Court of Iraq; Courts of Appeal; and the Court of Cassation, which shall be the court of last resort except as provided in Article 44 of this Law. Additional federal courts may be established by law. The appointment of judges for these courts shall be made by the Higher Juridical Council. This Law preserves the quali- fications necessary for the appointment of judges, as defined by law. (B) The decisions of regional and local courts, including the courts of the Kurdistan region, shall be final, but shall be subject to review by the federal judiciary if they conflict with this Law or any federal law. Procedures for such review shall be defined by law. Article 47. No judge or member of the Higher Juridical Council may be removed unless he is convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude or corruption or suffers permanent incapacity. Removal shall be on the recommendation of the Higher Juridical Coun- cil, by a decision of the Council of Ministers, and with the approval of the Presi- dency Council. Removal shall be executed immediately after issuance of this ap- proval. A judge who has been accused of such a crime as cited above shall be sus- pended from his work in the judiciary until such time as the case arising from what is cited in this Article is adjudicated. No judge may have his salary reduced or sus- pended for any reason during his period of service. CHAPTER SEVEN—THE SPECIAL TRIBUNAL AND NATIONAL COMMISSIONS Article 48. (A) The statute establishing the Iraqi Special Tribunal issued on 10 December 2003 is confirmed. That statute exclusively defines its jurisdiction and proce- dures, notwithstanding the provisions of this Law. (B) No other court shall have jurisdiction to examine cases within the com- petence of the Iraqi Special Tribunal, except to the extent provided by its found- ing statute. (C) The judges of the Iraqi Special Tribunal shall be appointed in accordance with the provisions of its founding statute. Article 49. (A) The establishment of national commissions such as the Commission on Public Integrity, the Iraqi Property Claims Commission, and the Higher Na- tional DeBa'athification Commission is confirmed, as is the establishment of commissions formed after this Law has gone into effect. The members of these national commissions shall continue to serve after this Law has gone into effect, taking into account the contents of Article 51, below. (B) The method of appointment to the national commissions shall be in ac- cordance with law. Article 50. The Iraqi Transitional Government shall establish a National Commission for Human Rights for the purpose of executing the commitments relative to the rights set forth in this Law and to examine complaints pertaining to violations of human rights. The Commission shall be established in accordance with the Paris Principles issued by the United Nations on the responsibilities of national institutions. This Commission shall include an Office of the Ombudsman to inquire into complaints. This office shall have the power to investigate, on its own initiative or on the basis of a complaint submitted to it, any allegation that the conduct of the governmental authorities is arbitrary or contrary to law. Article 51. No member of the Iraqi Special Tribunal or of any commission established by the federal government may be employed in any other capacity in or out of government. 95 This prohibition is valid without limitation, whether it be within the executive, leg- islative, or judicial authority of the Iraqi Transitional Government. Members of the Special Tribunal may, however, suspend their employment in other agencies while they serve on the aforementioned Tribunal. CHAPTER EIGHT—REGIONS, GOVERNORATES, AND MUNICIPALITIES Article 52. The design of the federal system in Iraq shall be established in such a way as to prevent the concentration of power in the federal government that allowed the continuation of decades of tyranny and oppression under the previous regime. This system shall encourage the exercise of local authority by local officials in every re- gion and governorate, thereby creating a united Iraq in which every citizen actively participates in governmental affairs, secure in his rights and free of domination. Article 53. (A) The Kurdistan Regional Government is recognized as the official govern- ment of the territories that were administered by the that government on 19 March 2003 in the governorates of Dohuk, Arbil, Sulaimaniya, Kirkuk, Diyala and Neneveh. The term "Kurdistan Regional Government" shall refer to the Kurdistan National Assembly, the Kurdistan Council of Ministers, and the re- gional judicial authority in the Kurdistan region. (B) The boundaries of the eighteen governorates shall remain without change during the transitional period. (C) Any group of no more than three governorates outside the Kurdistan re- gion, with the exception of Baghdad and Kirkuk, shall have the right to form regions from amongst themselves. The mechanisms for forming such regions may be proposed by the Iraqi Interim Government, and shall be presented and considered by the elected National Assembly for enactment into law. In addition to being approved by the National Assembly, any legislation proposing the for- mation of a particular region must be approved in a referendum of the people of the relevant governorates. (D) This Law shall guarantee the administrative, cultural, and political rights of the Turcomans, ChaldoAssyrians, and all other citizens. Article 54. (A) The Kurdistan Regional Government shall continue to perform its current functions throughout the transitional period, except with regard to those issues which fall within the exclusive competence of the federal government as speci- fied in this Law. Financing for these functions shall come from the federal gov- ernment, consistent with current practice and in accordance with Article 25(E) of this Law. The Kurdistan Regional Government shall retain regional control over police forces and internal security, and it will have the right to impose taxes and fees within the Kurdistan region. (B) With regard to the application of federal laws in the Kurdistan region, the Kurdistan National Assembly shall be permitted to amend the application of any such law within the Kurdistan region, but only to the extent that this re- lates to matters that are not within the provisions of Articles 25 and 43(D) of this Law and that fall within the exclusive competence of the federal govern- ment. Article 55. (A) Each governorate shall have the right to form a Governorate Council, name a Governor, and form municipal and local councils. No member of any re- gional government, governor, or member of any governorate, municipal, or local council may be dismissed by the federal government or any official thereof, ex- cept upon conviction of a crime by a court of competent jurisdiction as provided by law. No regional government may dismiss a Governor or member or mem- bers of any governorate, municipal, or local council. No Governor or member of any Governorate, municipal, or local council shall be subject to the control of the federal government except to the extent that the matter relates to the competences set forth in Article 25 and 43(D), above. (B) Each Governor and member of each Governorate Council who holds office as of 1 July 2004, in accordance with the law on local government that shall be issued, shall remain in place until such time as free, direct, and full elec- tions, conducted pursuant to law, are held, or, unless, prior to that time, he vol- untarily gives up his position, is removed upon his conviction for a crime involv- 96 ing moral turpitude or related to corruption, or upon being stricken with perma- nent incapacity, or is dismissed in accordance with the law cited above. When a governor, mayor, or member of a council is dismissed, the relevant council may receive applications from any eligible resident of the governorate to fill the position. Eligibility requirements shall be the same as those set forth in Article 31 for membership in the National Assembly. The new candidate must receive a majority vote of the council to assume the vacant seat. Article 56. (A) The Governorate Councils shall assist the federal government in the co- ordination of federal ministry operations within the governorate, including the review of annual ministry plans and budgets with regard to activities in the governorate. Governorate Councils shall be funded from the general budget of the State, and these Councils shall also have the authority to increase their rev- enues independently by imposing taxes and fees; to organize the operations of the Governorate administration; to initiate and implement province-level projects alone or in partnership with international, and non-governmental orga- nizations; and to conduct other activities insofar as is consistent with federal laws. (B) The Qada' and Nahiya councils and other relevant councils shall assist in the performance of federal responsibilities and the delivery of public services by reviewing local ministry plans in the afore-mentioned places; ensuring that they respond properly to local needs and interests; identifying local budgetary requirements through the national budgeting procedures; and collecting and re- taining local revenues, taxes, and fees; organizing the operations of the local ad- ministration; initiating and implementing local projects alone or in conjunction with international, and non-governmental organizations; and conducting other activities consistent with applicable law. (C) Where practicable, the federal government shall take measures to devolve additional functions to local, governorate, and regional administrations, in a methodical way. Regional units and governorate administrations, including the Kurdistan Regional Government, shall be organized on the basis of the principle of de-centralization and the devolution of authorities to municipal and local gov- ernments. Article 57. (A) All authorities not exclusively reserved to the Iraqi Transitional Govern- ment may be exercised by the regional governments and governorates as soon as possible following the establishment of appropriate governmental institu- tions. (B) Elections for governorate councils throughout Iraq and for the Kurdistan National Assembly shall be held at the same time as the elections for the Na- tional Assembly, no later than 31 January 2005. Article 58. (A) The Iraqi Transitional Government, and especially the Iraqi Property Claims Commission and other relevant bodies, shall act expeditiously to take measures to remedy the injustice caused by the previous regime's practices in altering the demographic character of certain regions, including Kirkuk, by de- porting and expelling individuals from their places of residence, forcing migra- tion in and out of the region, settling individuals alien to the region, depriving the inhabitants of work, and correcting nationality. To remedy this injustice, the Iraqi Transitional Government shall take the following steps: (1) With regard to residents who were deported, expelled, or who emi- grated; it shall, in accordance with the statute of the Iraqi Property Claims Commission and other measures within the law, within a reasonable period of time, restore the residents to their homes and property, or, where this is unfeasible, shall provide just compensation. (2) With regard to the individuals newly introduced to specific regions and territories, it shall act in accordance with Article 10 of the Iraqi Prop- erty Claims Commission statute to ensure that such individuals may be re- settled, may receive compensation from the state, may receive new land from the state near their residence in the governorate from which they came, or may receive compensation for the cost of moving to such areas. (3) With regard to persons deprived of employment or other means of sup- port in order to force migration out of their regions and territories, it shall promote new employment opportunities in the regions and territories. 99 INTERNATIONAL PARTICIPATION IN THE RECONSTRUCTION OF IRAQ Top pledges of reconstruction assistance to Iraq for 2004-2007* Amount Donor $18.4 billion United States $ 4.9 billion Japan $500 million Kuwait $500 million Saudi Arabia $452 million United Kingdom $235 million European Commission $235 million Italy _ $220 million Spain $215 million United Arab Emirates $200 million South Korea $187 million Canada $100 million Qatar Lending from World Bank and IMF ■ at least $5.55 billion *Source: World Bank tally of Madrid Donors' Conference 104 to organize and implement the enormously complex reconstruction work in Iraq, and US AID will be an integral part of that coordination at all levels. At the same time, USAID has over 30 years experience in bilateral assistance pro- grams and in donor coordination. The transfer of sovereignty and the increased presence of international donors means that both of these traditional USAID skills will become increasingly critical. USAID will retain the flexibility under a tradi- tional relationship with the Chief of Mission and its coordination with IRMO to cap- italize on that experience as it moves the U.S. Government agenda for reconstruc- tion forward. Question 8. Of the more than $3 billion that USAID has spent on Iraq programs thus far, how much has IG audits called into question? Answer. The Office of the Inspector General (OIG) has audited the contracting procurement process for 11 contracts with a value of $3.3 billion. Additionally, the OIG has coordinated with the Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA) in the issuance of 38 audit reports covering $193 million in USAID funds. These 38 audits reviewed the various internal controls of contractors, rec- ommended corrective actions, where appropriate, and identified $14 million in ques- tioned costs. Those costs are currently being reviewed to see which will ultimately be allowed. Responses of Hon. Peter W. Rodman to Additional Questions for the Record Submitted by Senator Richard G. Lugar IRAQ TRANSITION III—OBSTACLES AND OPPORTUNITIES Question 1. Troops on the ground, diplomats and private U.S. citizens must have clear legal protections to work in any sovereign nation. It was indicated that a SOFA is not needed because of existing provisions under the TAL, UNSCR 1511 and CPA Order 17. Is this satisfactory to the Iraqis? Answer. The Iraqis, in developing the Transitional Administrative Law, decided they did not want their Interim Government to make long-term agreements such as SOFAs. However, the Prime Minister of the Iraqi Interim Government, Ayad Allawi, has endorsed UNSCR 1546, which specifically gives the Multinational Force the mandate "to take all necessary measures to contribute to the maintenance of security and stability in Iraq in accordance with the letters annexed to their resolu- tion." This indicates that the new Iraqi government believes this resolution, in conjunc- tion with the TAL, UNSCR 1511, and CPA Order #17, provides an appropriate legal framework for the presence of international forces within Iraq after June 30. TRANSITION IN IRAQ Question 2. Plans indicate the MNF-I will continue to provide security for the Green Zone and other mission activities. How will this and troop actions be coordi- nated with the Embassy? How about the rest of the Coalition? Answer. The 1st Cavalry Division has the security mission for the city of Bagh- dad. The 3rd Brigade Combat Team is responsible for security in the International Zone. The Joint Area Support Group (JASG) has the responsibility for U.S. Mission support. The 2-82 Field Artillery Battalion provides security for the U.S. Mission. A U.S. Marine Company and other U.S. State Department assets (under the super- vision of the Regional Security Officer) are responsible for the physical security of the Mission grounds and the movement of VIPs. Any movements that cannot be handled by 2-82 FA are forwarded to the JASG. The JASG then requests additional assets from MNC-I. These missions are usually outside Baghdad or are complex and require higher unit planning and coordination. Question 3. Will the MNF-I Headquarters be co-located with the Embassy or at a separate facility? Answer. Offices of MNF-I are currently split between Camp Victory at the Al Faw Palace and the U.S. Embassy Annex. The MNF-I Operations Center and the major- ity of the staff agencies will remain in the U.S. Embassy Annex. Question 4. General Joulwan suggested yesterday that the troop-to-task analysis was unclear. The mission of U.S. forces in Iraq needs to be clarified to include sta- bilization, and this will be an enormous task. Will the Multi-National Force provide security for elections? 105 Answer. Yes, the Multinational Force will provide security for elections. The Iraqi Interim Government (IIG) has committed to an aggressive plan that calls for the conduct of four iterations of national elections over the next 18 months. To imple- ment this plan, the IIG has agreed to an Iraqi electoral law and has sanctioned the selection of the Independent Electoral Commission of Iraq (IECI). This commission is empowered with exclusive authority for the conduct of all Iraqi elections and has initiated planning and coordination for the conduct of national elections to select the Transitional Legislative Assembly (TLA), scheduled to occur no later than 31 Janu- ary 2005. The United Nations Security Council adopted UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1546, 8 June 2004, which affirms the UN mandate set out in UNSCR 1483 (2003) and UNSCR 1511 (2003). This resolution further mandates that the Special Representative of the Secretary General and UN Assistance Mission of Iraq advise and provide technical support to the IECI and the IIG on the process for holding initial national elections for the selection of the TLA. UNSCR 1546 also authorizes the MNF-I commander to take "all necessary meas- ures" to contribute to the maintenance of security and stability, to include pre- venting and deterring terrorism. Support for the conduct of this initial iteration of national elections remains solely an IECI responsibility. In consideration of the MNF-I mandate set out in UNSCR 1546, IECI shortfalls may be identified and formal requests for support will be made to coalition, international, and interagency partners as IECI planning for conducting the national election proceeds. IIG requests for technical election assistance have al- ready been extended and agreed to by the United Nations. MNF-I expects that Iraqi requests for election support will materialize as identified. MNF-I is strictly in sup- port of the IECI and United Nations for this operation and must remain completely neutral with respect to all Iraqi election issues. Question 5. Every witness over the past two days of hearings indicated estab- lishing security on the street in Iraq was a prerequisite for the success of the polit- ical transition in Iraq. How can we accelerate police training and the delivery of equipment to the Iraqi police forces? Have we asked the Germans, the French and others to train and equip the police forces? How much of our assistance has gone to support police training and equipment? Do we have the right programs and ex- perts and enough resources? Answer. MNF-I continues to increase not only the number of police academies across the provinces of the nation, but also the capacity of existing police academies, both in Iraq and at the Jordan International Police Training Center. MNF-I can currently graduate over 3,000 police officers per month and will ex- pand that to 5,550. MNF-I is also conducting a series of specialty courses, for police forces, border security forces, emergency response units, SWAT teams, and diplo- matic protective services. Equipment deployment is being carefully prioritized and managed to ensure it is delivered as fast as it can be acquired to the right organization and location. Some acceleration could be facilitated by relaxing some of the applicable strict peacetime acquisition regulations. These regulations tend to hinder the ability to rapidly pro- cure some police-related items. These items are readily available at reasonable prices on the world market. The European Union (EU) recently sent a fact-finding team to Baghdad to study contributions they might make to police training in Iraq. This team has subse- quently briefed the EU Council and proposed providing some advanced police train- ing geared toward more senior Iraqi officers. A decision is pending by the Council. If they elect to go forward, training could begin as early as February 2005. In addition to the above mentioned academies and special courses that have been established, there are currently over 500 international police liaison officers and 85 international police trainers serving in Iraq, teaching, coaching, mentoring and pro- viding expertise. Programs are constantly reviewed to ensure they are providing op- timal output and relevancy to the constantly evolving security situation. Additional resources would certainly allow expansion and, to some degree, acceleration of the effort. Question 6. According to contracting experts, whom ever signs a contract (Army, PMO or USAID) must manage it to the end. Will the Army continue to oversee con- tracts given to USAID? If so, why? Answer. The Army has not awarded any contracts to USAID or on behalf of USAID. USAID is responsible for the execution and complete contract management, including all facets of contract administration, for all contracts they award as speci- fied in Federal Acquisition Regulations Part 42. 110 agreement for the development of Iraqi oil fields. Will they have the authority to be able to commit to those kinds of contracts? Answer. As we meet today, there has been no decision yet on possible limitations on the authority of the Iraqi Interim Government. In the context of the consultative process led by Mr. Brahimi, Iraqis are considering carefully whether the Iraqi In- terim Government should be limited in its ability to bind a future elected govern- ment by, for example, making long-term commitments regarding Iraq's oil reserves. Some in Iraq have expressed the view that these types of commitments must be re- served for an elected government. Any limitations on the authority of the Iraqi In- terim Government will be determined by Iraqis through the consultative process led by Mr. Brahimi and will be codified in the TAL Annex. Question 7. Can you make a comment about the budget of the Iraqi Interim Gov- ernment? Could you fill in the blanks about the budget of the Iraqi Government itself, its sources of revenue, and how that will be established? Answer. The Iraqi Interim Government will have the authority to disburse and receive funds while it governs Iraq. Oil sales will constitute its primary revenue source. Iraqi ministries are developing budgets and budgeting processes. Although the Iraqi Interim Government will clearly have to consider budget issues, the extent to which it will have the authority to make long-term financial commitments will be decided through the Brahimi-led consultative process. There have been public budgets for Iraq over the past year, established by the CPA in coordination with the individual ministries. In the 12 ministries that have transitioned to sovereignty, the relevant Iraqi minister already has full budgetary authority for funds allocated to that ministry. o