5
most appreciated in these trying times. I would like to throw some
food for thought on the table, just quickly.
One of the concerns that I have had with reconstruction efforts
in Iraq has been while there have been some strides taken, it has
been the absence of a transactional benefit to the average Iraqi on
the street that would be accompanying the transformational
change to a democracy.
Now, I see that we have community action programs that we do
try to engage in, but it seems that the emphasis has been very
much on the political end, and not so much on the economic end,
and the empowerment of the individual Iraqi in the towns.
And my hope would have been that we would have had more con-
centration on the town councils to emulate what we did so success-
fully here, would have been to go from town halls to state govern-
ments, to a federated system.
Instead, we seem to have gone from a national system down to
a provincial system, down to a town council. For example, I think
in the numbers that we were presented in our packet, we had
about $860 million for private sector employment development in
Iraq, which also included $352 million for debt relief for Iraq,
which would leave about $500 million for private sector employ-
ment development.
It is my concern that if you ask someone to fight for freedom,
freedom is an abstract concept if they are hungry. If they have no
hope for the future for their families, for their employment, or sus-
tainability of their quality of life.
And I just am not certain that we have done enough with that,
and that it has not received the emphasis on the grassroots eco-
nomic level, or on the democracy-building level that is necessary.
I would also throw out as food for thought something that would
tie in with economic empowerment of the individual Iraqi, would
be an idea that I have stressed and others have stressed, would be
the potential to look at the utilization of Iraqi oil revenues into a
revolving fund, whereby portions of those revenues would go per
capita to adult Iraqis.
It would be very similar to what we have in Alaska. If one of the
problems that we have in rebuilding Iraq is the absence of a per
capita income level that could help lead to the development of an
economy and the sustaining of that economy, it would seem that
the utilization of those revenues would have a very beneficial effect
on the average Iraqi.
Those are just two ideas, and I look forward to your remarks,
and I would reserve any further questions that I have to the appro-
priate time.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you, and we appreciate that you actu-
ally read those documents, Mr. McCotter. You are setting a dan-
gerous precedent. Congresswoman Berkley.
Ms. Berkley. Madam Chairman, I appreciate your courtesy, but
I would like to get a feel for the hearing before I make any re-
marks. Would that be all right with you? Thank you.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you very much. Congressman
Fortenberry.
Mr. Fortenberry. Thank you, Madam Chairman. I would like to
pass at this time as well.


6
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you so much.
Ambassador Richard Jones was appointed Senior Advisor to the
Secretary and Coordinator for Iraq earlier this year. A career mem-
ber of the U.S. Foreign Service, Ambassador Jones previously
served as Ambassador to Kuwait from September 2001 to July
2004; and from November 2003 until June 2004, he served concur-
rently as the Chief Policy Officer and Deputy Administrator for the
Coalition Provisional Authority in Baghdad.
Ambassador Jones also served as the U.S. Ambassador to
Kazakhstan, and the U.S. Ambassador to Lebanon. You get all the
easy cases. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador.
STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE RICHARD JONES, SENIOR
ADVISOR TO THE SECRETARY AND COORDINATOR FOR
IRAQ, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Ambassador Jones. Thank you, Mr. Chairperson. And thank you
for your earlier remarks that you made on our policy, and for those
of Mr. Ackerman and Mr. McCotter. I have a longer statement for
the record, but I thought I would make a few brief remarks.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Without objection, we will have it entered.
Ambassador Jones. I am pleased to meet with you today and I
look forward to discussing Iraq's progress toward democracy with
you. Specifically, I propose to outline our approach to supporting
Iraq's democratic transition. In brief, our goal is to help Iraq be-
come a democratic, prosperous, and stable nation.
To achieve this goal, we have developed a comprehensive strat-
egy to provide the Iraqi's with the tools necessary to defeat the in-
surgency, complete the political transition, and create a solid foun-
dation for future economic growth. The key adjective to describe
our strategy is integrated.
We are working with the Iraqis to achieve forward progress in
three areas; the security, the political, and the economic dimen-
sions of Iraq's transition. These three areas are interdependent.
Progress in one area reinforces progress in the other areas.
We are moving actively to train, equip, and field the Iraqi secu-
rity forces. We are interjectionally promoting an inclusive political
process, respectful of human rights, and grounded in the rule of
law.
We are helping to restore Iraq's infrastructure in order to meet
demand for essential services, and providing counsel to facilitate
Iraq's re-integration into the international economy.
The Iraqi people are in the forefront of this effort, putting their
lives at risk each day to create a new Iraq. As you pointed out,
early this year, Secretary Rice appointed me to be her Senior Advi-
sor and Coordinator for Iraq Policy.
In that role, I have focused my efforts on two main tasks. First,
I have served as a coordinator within the United States Govern-
ment to ensure American support for Iraq effectively supports the
political transition and economic reconstruction.
Second, I have engaged with many foreign governments in an ef-
fort to build international support for Iraq's Transitional Govern-
ment. As you also pointed out, I was present in Baghdad during
the Iraqi negotiations that led to the adoption of the Transitional
Administrative Law in March of last year.


9
Now, in addition to supporting the political transition and eco-
nomic reconstruction taking place inside Iraq, we have also been
working, as I mentioned, to build a renewed international partner-
ship to include those countries which did not support the war, but
are now willing to assist the democratically-elected government.
On June 22, more than 80 governments and institutions, includ-
ing the United Nations and NATO, met in Brussels to hear the
Iraqi Transitional Government discuss its vision, strategies, and
priorities for Iraq's transition. The transitional government sent a
large delegation, including key ministers, leaders of the Transi-
tional National Assembly, members of its judiciary, and figures
from civil society.
At Brussels, the international community sent Iraq a clear mes-
sage, and that was that we support your transition to a democracy.
This political message of unity from the international community
is a significant development for United States policy in Iraq.
The participants also committed to follow up on their pledges of
tangible support for Iraq. Many of them pledged in particular sup-
port for the constitutional drafting process. The next international
meeting will be in Amman, Jordan, on July 18 and 19.
This meeting will be an opportunity for donor countries and
international organizations to accelerate the work that was begun
at Brussels to improve their coordination with the Iraqi Govern-
ment based on the presentation of Iraq's priorities at Brussels.
Another goal for the meeting, or in fact the main goal for the
meeting will be to inaugurate an Iraqi-led donor coordination
mechanism. This improved coordination, coupled with a sharper
focus by the new government on Iraq's own priorities, will allow for
more rapid disbursement of international assistance.
In July, we will also hold the next in our series of bilateral eco-
nomic policy discussions. Our Joint Commission on Reconstruction
and Economic Development will take place at that time. The Iraqi
side will be led by the new minister of finance, Ali Allawi, accom-
panied by other key ministries and ministers.
The U.S. delegation will be led by Deputy Secretary of State Rob-
ert Zellick, and he will be supported by an interagency team, in-
cluding senior economic officials. We believe that this policy dia-
logue is an important compliment to our economic assistance.
Finally, the Administration remains committed to working with
our partners in the military coalition. The coalition is currently re-
viewing how best to support training for the Iraqi security forces,
and I personally have participated in several briefings and discus-
sions with coalition partners in this regard.
In closing, I would like to say that none of us who have worked
in Iraq or on Iraq policy in Washington are under any illusions
about the magnitude of the task before the Iraqi people and their
friends.
It is important that we remain united and coordinated in support
of Iraq's transition. We will continue to ensure that our diplomacy
and our financial resources are devoted to encouraging the political
process and economic development, and we depend on our heroic
compatriots in the military to pursue the vital task of developing
the self-sufficiency of the Iraqi security forces. Iraq is on the right


11
to identify key issues. This augurs for rapid progress once the constitutional com-
mittee becomes complete. Of course, in the end, the legitimacy of the constitution
will depend crucially upon the inclusion of a broad range of credible Iraqi voices.
These voices must be heard, because, once approved, the draft constitution will
be put to a national referendum on October 15. If approved, elections for a perma-
nent government under that constitution will be held on December 15, with the new
government scheduled to assume office no later than December 31. It is in Iraq's
best interest to honor the timeline contained in the TAL to maintain forward mo-
mentum in the political process. Against all odds, Iraqi leaders have consistently
met the deadlines first agreed to on November 15, 2003, beginning with the TAL
itself, the recovery of sovereignty, democratic elections on January 30, and the for-
mation of a transitional government. Our diplomacy is geared toward helping the
Iraqis continue to meet these deadlines.
Despite these significant accomplishments on the path toward political transition,
real challenges remain. Generally speaking, Iraq needs to move from ethnic to issue-
based politics. This evolution will require national political dialogue among Shi'a,
Sunni, and Kurdish groups and the involvement of other minority populations. Al-
though Iraqi officials have repeatedly stated they are committed to the TAL dead-
lines, several controversial areas may prove challenging for the committee charged
with drafting the constitution. These include: the role of Islam and other religions;
the nature of Iraqi federalism; the distribution of revenues from natural resources;
and the future status of the city of Kirkuk.
To support the constitutional process, we have been providing assistance to groups
such as the National Democratic Institute, the International Republican Institute,
IFES, and the U.S. Institute for Peace. These organizations are working with Iraqis
to provide technical assistance in all aspects of political development. At the recent
International Conference in Brussels, many countries indicated an interest in help-
ing to support this process. The UN has a key responsibility in this vein and has
already been providing significant support, as it did for the successful elections in
January. Nonetheless, as the summer goes on, the UN will need to accelerate its
activities and make good use of this international good will by coordinating the var-
ious proposed efforts. While it is up to the Iraqis to write their constitution, we have
urged them to rely heavily on the principles of the TAL related to human rights,
including the rights of women and religious minorities, in doing so.
Economic Reconstruction
To support Iraq's transition to democracy, the Congress generously appropriated
$2.5 billion in April 2003 and $18.4 billion in November 2004 for the Iraq Relief
and Reconstruction Fund (IRRF). These funds have been used to build a foundation
for a new Iraq. During the last two years, we have used the IRRF to support the
training and equipping of security forces; the renovation, construction, and equip-
ping of thousands of health clinics, hospitals, and schools; the reconstruction and
modernization of the energy, transportation, and other sectors fundamental to the
economic transformation of the economy; and many other democratic institution-
building and assistance programs. These funds represent a generous U.S. contribu-
tion to Iraq's reconstruction and the well-being of the Iraqi people, but they form
only a down payment on the support Iraq needs from the international community
and from its own resources to repair infrastructure and an economy devastated by
decades of mismanagement, tyranny and war.
We have adapted IRRF spending to the evolving needs of Iraq and in response
to changing external requirements and constraints. Initially, we emphasized the re-
construction of basic elements of Iraq's pre-war infrastructure, with the immediate
goal of restoring essential services such as electricity, water, health, oil production,
education, roads, and telecommunications. Beginning last fall, however, greater em-
phasis was placed on the urgent political priorities, such as technical support for
the January 2005 elections, the formation of the transitional government, the con-
stitutional referendum and subsequent national elections, and the standing up of
the security forces to enable Iraq to assume increasing responsibility for its own se-
curity. The use of IRRF funds in support of the self-sufficiency of Iraq's security
forces of course reinforces the successful completion of the political process. Lately,
we have begun transitioning the way we contract, in an effort to reduce the propor-
tion of our assistance going to overhead and security expenditures, and to ensure
sustainability of projects by coordinating more closely with Iraqi ministries and
making greater recourse to Iraqi contractors and expertise.
We have also begun using IRRF funds to strengthen Iraq's judicial system, includ-
ing funding the construction of courts, police stations and prison facilities; the provi-
sion of judicial security and training programs to increase prosecutorial capacity,
rule of law education, anti-corruption; support to the Central Criminal Court of


17
that has been utilized up to now is assistance that has been pro-
vided in a grant nature by countries that have the kind of aid ex-
pertise to deliver projects, to design and deliver projects.
A lot of these Arab states don't have that in-house expertise.
They really do need to rely on the international community to help
them mobilize their assistance, and that is what we are working
to do.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Because as you know, we ask our taxpayers
all the time to fund so many projects, it would be very good for
those folks who say that they are our allies and are the recipient
of great relationships with the U.S. to make good on the pledges.
Ambassador Jones. I agree with you.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. And we certainly have made good on our
pledges as well. So we hope that this happens. One more question,
and I will have the other Members follow up with these and other
questions.
With respect to the Shiite majority represented in Iraq's national
assembly, is there any concern that a future Iraqi Government
could pursue a course to align itself with Iran, and thereby alienate
itself from the United States?
We know that elements have been close to Iran in the past. What
strategies are we developing to address this possibility?
Ambassador Jones. I think that Prime Minister Ibrahim Al-
Jaafari was asked that same question when he was here in Wash-
ington, and he acknowledged that he has close ties with Iran. He
fled to Iran when he was forced out of Iraq by Saddam Hussein
many years ago, although he didn't live there for an extended pe-
riod.
He went on and took up residence in the United Kingdom. He
still has, I think, close ties with the Iranians, and he is not alone
in his government, and he certainly is not alone among members
of Parliament.
But what Jaafari said is, "Yes, I have close ties with Iran. Our
Government will have close ties with Iran. They are a neighbor.
However, we will not allow Iran or any other government to inter-
fere in our internal affairs. And it will not affect our close relation-
ship with the United States."
And I believe as one who has worked with many of these people,
both in Baghdad and now in my current capacity, that he was
speaking from the heart, and that in fact Iraq does want to have
good relations with Iran as a powerful neighbor, just like they want
to have good relations with Turkey, with Saudi Arabia, with Jor-
dan, and so on.
And as with any nation, there will be some members of their so-
ciety and their government that feel closer to one country than an-
other, but that the key is that we should look at them first and
foremost as Iraqi nationalists, and deal with them, and try and al-
ways get them to focus on what Iraqi national interests are.
And if they follow Iraqi national interests, I think they will have
a proper relationship with Iran and with all their other neighbors,
and they also will continue to have a close relationship with us.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Some neighbors are friendlier to our United
States national security interests than others, and some can be
trusted more than others, and I think you would agree that a close


23
Ambassador Jones. In effective units, but it doesn't mean that
they are not out there on the street doing their jobs.
Mr. Ackerman. No, I understand, but the question at hand is,
where is the goal post? How far do we have to kick this football?
How far do we have to run? I don't need the exact yardage, but are
we talking about that 30,000 that are well trained, well equipped,
and know what they are doing? Does that have to reach 200,000
because a million people went to summer camp for a week, and if
you have 2 million of them, it is not?
Ambassador Jones. Well, what I can say is that we clearly have
a plan, and we are exerting a great deal of effort, and a great deal
of resources.
Mr. Ackerman. And that is exactly what we are asking. If we
have a plan, it has to involve a number of troops. What is the tar-
get for the number of troops? And on top of that, there is no indica-
tion here that we are trying to get other countries to come in and
take the place of U.S. troops.
Ambassador Jones. We have an active dialogue with all the
members of the coalition. We continually discuss these issues with
the members of the coalition, and I mentioned that I am involved
in that.
Mr. Ackerman. And the coalition is anybody added rather than
subtracted?
Ambassador Jones. Well, it is current people and we are always
looking for new countries to come in.
Mr. Ackerman. I know that we are looking, but the question was
that I know a lot of countries, and I know Poland is in there. They
are stalworths. But there are a lot of countries that have taken
people out. Has any of the members of the coalition added one
troop?
Ambassador Jones. We have had countries that have come for-
ward to add forces, yes. The Australians recently did, for example.
Mr. Ackerman. How many?
Ambassador Jones. Several hundred that they added. I think
they have nearly 1,000 troops.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador. Mr. McCotter.
Mr. McCotter. Thank you, Madam Chair. It seems to me that
the discussion is properly based as you stated, that it is a political,
economic, and military endeavor at this point, because the effort to
stand up the Iraqi forces must never be viewed as a panacea for
what is occurring in that tortured country.
If the United States military itself cannot curb an insurgency, let
alone eradicate it, then standing up Iraqis while we are standing
down American forces will lead to a similar result. It will not lead
to an improvement of the situation. If anything, it might actually
embolden the insurgents, because I am sure that they are more
afraid of the United States military than they are of the Iraqi mili-
tary, that has just been stood up.
Secondly, the unconventional nature of the warfare, it is not as
if we are standing up forces to go face down the Weinbach in World
War II. We are trying to stand up forces that have to deal with sui-
cide bombers and political assassinations, incidents which are not
readily curbed by a conventional military in the broadest sense.


24
So there has to be a political element and an economic element
because as we have I think rightly identified, the Sunnis are the
domestic base of the insurgency. Absent the ability militarily to
eradicate that insurgency fully, it would seem that there must be
a political and economic way that must be bound to bring them
into the process.
Now, given the fact that the Sunnis are understandably very,
very concerned about their future in a Shiite-run Iraq, it would
seem to me that given the long history of a total disregard for the
rule of law, and legal protections of the individual, that simply
pointing at a written document that takes the Transitional Admin-
istrative Law and puts it in a Constitution, if I were a Sunni,
might not be the adequate protections that I would need to submit
and participate in a new democracy.
Now, what I would like to see if I were a Sunni is some tangible
benefit for me at the end of the road. That there is an economic
benefit to me. That there is a system in place that allows me not
only to have my economic benefit, but to make sure that this gov-
ernment, the national government, is weak enough that it cannot
come in and kill me when it wants to.
I think that those would be bases upon which the Sunnis might
be brought into the process. Now, I go back to my original concept
of Iraq, post-reconstruction, would have been a strong tribal com-
munity in many of these areas, and a strong town council, a pro-
vincial government housing the Kurds, the Sunnis, and the Shiite,
and a more weakly, more disparate power of the Federal Govern-
ment, because that would make it less intrusive into your home-
town.
You see, the building blocks of Iraqi society are the family and
the tribal relations. It is not the allegiance to the centralized Fed-
eral Government. And so I think that the more power that the Fed-
eral Government will have under this Constitution, the more en-
dangered the average Sunni, or in other areas, other Iraqis are
going to feel at the ground level, at the family level, at the tribal
level.
Which is why within that federation that I again go back to the
fact that I would have hoped that at some point that we would
have had a resolution, or at least a final decision on whether or not
this new government, under that type of a structure, could have
had something like an oil fund that would have provided a direct
tangible, palpable benefit to the adult Iraqis, because that would
have helped to curb the Sunnis' fears that there would be no eco-
nomic future for them in that country.
It would have helped with a census count to get the per capita
adult population. It would have protected the oil reserves because
no one in Iraq would want a foreign fighter coming in and blowing
up something that was going to put money in their pocket or their
family's pocket.
It would reduce, again, the Sunnis' fear and incentivize them
into participating in the government, less they be cut out, and it
would decentralize the greatest power base for any would-be tyrant
to arise again in Iraq, which is the control over that oil and the
revenues therein.