dent has identified six strategic objectives, the first of which is a
transition to Iraqi security forces, self-reliance.
In other words, that the Iraqi security forces will be capable of
ensuring that the insurgents are no longer able to prevent the es-
tablishment of a representative Iraqi government or the establish-
ment of basic services. The Department of Defense has the lead re-
sponsibility for that goal, which is the primary topic of the hearing
today.
We have five other objectives, however. These include first estab-
lishing a political process that leads to a free and democratic Iraq.
Second, the restoration of essential services for the Iraqi people.
Third, the establishment of foundations for a strong economy.
Fourth, establishing the rule of law. And fifth, increased inter-
national engagement and support.
As every Defense Department witness before this committee has
reminded us, we can't achieve these goals solely by military means.
In fact, the State Department has the lead responsibility for each
of them. I have taken a little more time on this than usual, because
I want to stress the point.
In reviewing these goals, it is clear we have identified strategic
objectives and are in the middle of a war to achieve them. Nobody
in this Congress or in the Administration or on television can tell
us when these goals will be achieved any more than General Eisen-
hower could tell us on June 6th when the Germans would surren-
der. So instead of asking for arbitrary timelines, deadlines and
schedules, we need to focus on those things that will help us meet
these strategic objectives as soon as possible. That is the path to
victory, and that is the way to honor the sacrifices of our men and
women overseas.
Before we turn to our witnesses, I would like to recognize my
good partner on the committee, the gentleman from Missouri, Mr.
Skelton, for any remarks he would like to make. The gentleman is
recognized.
STATEMENT OF HON. IKE SKELTON. A REPRESENTATIVE
FROM MISSOURI, RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON
ARMED SERVICES
Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. And Mr. Sec-
retary, welcome back to our committee. And Generals, all, it is good
to see you, and we appreciate your service.
As a starting point, and it, of course, goes without saying that
every member of this committee wants America to succeed in Iraq.
The stakes for our country, for our own national security, its stabil-
ity in the region as well as our military are extraordinarily high,
and we simply must succeed. It is also beyond question that all of
s support our troops and want them to have that best training,
equipment and whatever else they need. That Congress is actually
approving supplemental appropriations for Iraq and Afghanistan
speaks in support of our troops.
Mr. Secretary, I must tell you that, as much as we want to suc-
ceed in Iraq and as much as we support our troops, I am deeply
troubled by the recent trends in Iraq. We are told we are making
important progress in turning over to Iraqi security forces, but as
has been reported in the open press, we only have three Iraqi secu-


rity battalions that are capable of operating independently in a
combat environment. We have an awful long way to go before we
have a number of sufficiently fully-trained Iraqi forces and police
who can provide security for their own country on a self-sustaining
basis.
It is not just about increasing total numbers going through basic
training. It is also about increasing the quality and competence of
the individuals and capability of the units so they feel confident
they can provide for their own security. Embedding transition
training teams within Iraqi units was a very smart decision. But
I question whether we have enough of these teams and whether
they are moving fast enough.
We may need to shift more of our forces from other tasks and
urge our NATO and Arab partners—I will say it again—urge our
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and Arab partners to
help in every way that they can. It is certainly not prudent to with-
draw American forces until Iraqis get to the point of where they
are capable of meeting the challenges before them.
What is particularly troubling to me is that, despite the claims
of progress and the training of Iraqi forces, you only have to read
the newspaper to know the number of attacks against our forces
and against the Iraqis is increasing. If we had more trained Iraqi
troops and if the insurgency is in the last throws, as the Vice Presi-
dent has said, why aren't the number and the lethality of the at-
tacks decreasing? It is hard to understand how we are winning in
the face of those facts What other measures are there more than
security? That is the bottom line.
We need answers to the questions of what is happening on the
ground and with Iraqi security forces. Though it gives me no pleas-
ure to see it, we need to make more progress, and we need to make
it soon. If not, one of two things is going to happen. We are going
to lose the American people, or you are going to break the Army.
Which comes first? Success in transferring control over to the Iraqi
forces or losing the support of the American people or the United
States Army becomes broken.
While the Army has been under strain of sustained operations
tempo for some time, I worry that we are on the verge of meeting
its breaking point. The Army has not reached its recruiting goal for
the last four consecutive months. We are approaching the point
where the shortfall in recruits will equal the strength of an Army
division. I am equally troubled that the Army has dropped its qual-
ity of standards, accepting more recruits without high school diplo-
mas or lower mental capacities, keeping problematic soldiers on ac-
tive duty when they might have been separated in the past. Last,
and this is very troubling, relaxing officer commission standards.
These seem to me to be measures of last resort.
Our retention is currently exceeding goals, which is good. That
is not stopping the widespread use of stop-loss authority. Prevent-
ing servicemembers from leaving active duty by using stop-loss au-
thority may be a stop-gap measure, but something needs to be done
now to address the looming crisis in the United States Army. Some
soldiers are on their third rotation to Iraq. As a matter of fact, I
know of two Special Operations soldiers on their way for a fifth
turn in the area.


tional tempo.
If something is not done to balance the rotations in the theater,
attention will suffer. I just don't believe that throwing money to the
problem is a solution. The substantial enlistment bonus we have
authorized will only go so far. I look forward to hearing how the
witnesses will keep from breaking under the sustained high oper-
This is not just an Army problem, gentlemen, it is a national, it
is a national problem.
So, Mr. Chairman, the bottom line is, we are in a race against
time. The public support for war against Iraq declining, sadly, by
any polls. We have to show the American people tangible progress
in the training of Iraqi security forces. The American people are
smart. They know that before we can bring the troops home, the
Iraqis have to be able to provide security for their own country.
What is causing distress is that the American people can't see
that we are making enough progress. The only method that really
matters is the casualty figures keep mounting, sadly. But beyond
training Iraqi forces, our own Armed Forces can only take so much
strain before they break.
We must never get to that point. What is missing—what I hope
to hear from our witnesses today, Mr. Chairman, what is our strat-
egy for winning in Iraq while simultaneously beating the race
against time? What can we tell the people back home when they
ask what is being done to ensure that our guards and our reserv-
ists can come home as soon as possible? That question is being
asked of us. It is not enough to say that we are going to increase
the number of Iraqi forces or hope that the Iraqis can write a con-
stitution or hold elections, which I certainly hope happens and hap-
pens on time, as well as the election following the constitution.
We and the American people need assurances that we are mak-
ing progress. We need details of the strategy for success.
Mr. Chairman, I think we are close to the tipping point in Iraq.
But I certainly hope our witnesses will share their thoughts and
provide with us the assurances that we need and that the Amer-
ican people understand how we are moving forward in Iraq. I have
got to tell you, gentlemen, I am in trouble, and I look forward to
your testimony today. Thank you.
The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentlemen. Mr. Secretary, thank you
for being with us, and, gentlemen, thank you for the service that
you perform for your country over many years. Mr. Secretary, the
floor is yours.
STATEMENT OF THE HON. DONALD H. RUMSFELD, SECRETARY
OF DEFENSE
Secretary RUMSFELD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, members of the
committee. I am pleased to be here today with these truly out-
standing general officers. Our country is fortunate to have their
service, their professionalism, their decency and their enormous
talent.
One year after World War II ended, a leading news magazine
published an article about post-war reconstruction efforts in Ger-
many. It was entitled, “Americans are Losing the Victory in Eu-
rope.” The author despairingly wrote, “Never has American pres-
tige in Europe been lower. People never tire of telling you of the


ignorance and the rowdyism of American troops and of our mis-
understanding of European conditions.”
The year was 1946, but consider how different 1946 looks today.
In retrospect, it was not a time to despair, but a time to build, and
they did. It has now been one year since the turnover of sov-
ereignty to the liberated Iraqi people.
Just as Europe was a central battlefield, ideological and military,
in the war against communist aggression, so too the Middle East
and Central Asia are centers of gravity in today's struggle against
violent extremism.
I know the American people still have the same determination
and resolve. They know today as then that struggles are not won
on defense; they are won on offense. Violent extremists have made
clear their intentions. It is to kill as many Westerners and mod-
erate Muslims as they can to achieve their goals. They have money.
They have weapons. They are seeking even more dangerous weap-
ons, let there be no doubt.
They are surveying and targeting landmarks in our country. Ter-
rorists have to be stopped, and the world must find ways to encour-
age would-be recruits to terrorism to choose a better
Our nation's actions to liberate Afghanistan and Iraq have elimi-
nated two state sponsors of terrorism, most certainly contributed to
Libya's decision to open its nuclear weapons programs to inter-
national inspection and to renounce terrorism, and encourage
democratic movements in regions that have long been breeding
grounds for violent, anti-Western extremism. It is not surprising
that there are questions about the situation in Iraq today. That has
always been the case in the time of war.
Today, the questions I hear are something like this: Is the effort
under way in Iraq worth the cost, the sacrifice? How are the Coali-
tion and the new Iraqi Government really doing? When will Iraqi
security forces be able to assume full responsibilities for securing
their country? What ensues next, and should the Congress set a
timetable for withdrawal?
First, I must say that it is important to note what success will
mean. Specifically, a free democratic and peaceful Iraq will not pro-
vide aid to violent extremists. It will not plot the assassination of
American presidents. It will not invade or fire missiles at its neigh-
bors. And it will not use chemical weapons on its neighbors or its
own people.
If the Coalition were to leave before the Iraqi security forces are
able to assume responsibility, we would one day again have to con-
front another Iraqi regime, perhaps even more dangerous than the
last, in a region plunged into darkness rather than liberated and
free.
The President's strategy is clear: To empower a democratically
elected Iraqi government to aggressively go after the insurgents
and terrorists, and that is exactly what their forces are doing with
some success; to pursue an inclusive constitutional political proc-
ess; and to improve public services with the help of the inter-
national community and the quality of life for the Iraqi people; and
to enable Iraqi security forces to take charge of their own country.
Each of these strategies depends on the others. Success will not
be easy and will require patience and progress on each of the three.


But consider what has been accomplished in Iraq in the 12
months since sovereignty was passed, almost 1 year ago. More than
eight million people defied terrorist threats and voted in the Janu-
ary election. Duly-elected Iraqi leaders, with input from the Sunni
minority, are drafting a new constitution to be voted on by the
Iraqi people by October 15th. .
Inder that new constitution, a permanent government will be
elected on December 15th. Iraqis are building an economy, and it
is growing. The insurgency remains dangerous, to be sure, in many
parts of Iraq, but terrorists no longer can take advantage of sanc-
tuaries like Fallujah. The Coalition of Iraqi and U.S. forces are cap-
turing and killing hundreds of violent extremists on a weekly basis
and confiscating literally mountains of weapons.
The general officers here today are leading the troops that are
contributing to these achievements, and they are prepared to pro-
vide a detailed report on the progress of Iraq's security forces. The
number of U.S. troops in Iraq has moved from an Iraqi election pe-
riod high of 160,000 to something less than 140,000 today. But
their priorities have shifted, from conducting security operations to
a heavier focus on training, equipping and assisting the Iraqi
forces.
In the past, the performance of the Iraqi security forces has been
criticized and characterized as mixed. Fair enough. But consider
that, two years ago, fewer Iraqi forces had critical equipment such
as radios, vehicles or body armor. Today, the vast majority of the
security forces have this equipment.
The Iraqis have been—had an inexperienced military chain of
command and weak ministries of defense and interior. Today, both
are being improved, but they have a good distance to go. They had
weak unit cohesion and insufficient mid-level leadership. Today,
leaders at all levels are stepping forward and doing better. A year
ago, six Iraqi Army battalions were in training. Today, dozens of
trained battalions are cable of conducting anti-insurgent oper-
ations, albeit with Coalition support. Sections of the country are
relatively peaceful and essentially under the control of Iraqi secu-
rity forces today.
Finally, the question asked is, when can the Coalition leave, and
should we have a deadline? Some in Congress have suggested that
deadlines be set for withdrawal. That would be a mistake. It would
throw a lifeline to terrorists who in recent months have suffered
significant losses and casualties, been denied havens and suffered
weakened popular support in Iraq. Timing in war is never predict-
able. There are certainly no guarantees. Any who say we have lost
or are losing this war, however, are wrong. We are not.
Coalition military personnel are in Iraq at the request of the
Iraqi Government. They are under United Nations (U.N.) Security
Council Resolution 1546. The objectives of the overwhelming major-
ity of the Iraqi people and the Coalition are the same, a peaceful
and prosperous Iraq with a representative government.
Even today, that is a radical notion in the Middle East, and the
fact that it is a new approach is going to result in occasional confu-
sion and resistance and difficulties. We understand that. Iraq was
a violent place long before liberation, and there will undoubtedly
be some violence in Iraq after Coalition forces depart. But success


captain from Pennsylvania currently on his second deployment to
Iraq, wrote home in an e-mail “when I am really tired, I occasion-
ally think that I am giving a little more than my share. But then
I think back to World War II and Korea when soldiers deployed of-
tentimes not knowing when they were coming home. That gets me
back in the correct frame of mind.”
Like the Secretary, I am very proud of all our servicemen and
women, and I know you are as well, proud of their tremendous de-
termination, tremendous courage and their compassion under very,
very challenging conditions.
You know, here shortly in just a few days, we are going to cele-
brate the 4th of July, the day when our Nation's first leaders told
the world what it is Americă stands for. On the 4th, we are also
reminded that the pathway to an open and free society is a hard
one, and that often is a long one, but that it also is the most noble
cause you can be about; that we should be grateful, I think, for our
freedoms and for the men and women who have and who are fight-
ing for our freedoms today.
We thank you for your support of our men and women in uni-
form, and look forward to your questions.
The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, General Myers.
General Abizaid, thank you for being with us. Do you have a
statement?
STATEMENT OF GEN. JOHN ABIZAID, COMMANDER, CENTRAL
COMMAND, U.S. ARMY
General ABIZAID. Yes, I do, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, Con-
gressman Skelton and members of the committee, thank you for
the opportunity to join you here today. I just returned from the re-
gion and spent time in Iraq, Afghanistan and Djibouti.
Our troops and their commanders remain confident. They are
very competent, and you all know how courageous they all are. We
all honor their dedication and sacrifice.
Discussions with Afghan and Iraqi force leaders and visits to
their units in the field showed growing confidence, increased capa-
bility and increasingly better organized chains of command. As you
know, the keystone to our theater strategy is to build effective local
forces. While they have made much progress, they are not yet
ready to stand alone and operate alone.
I know we are here today to talk primarily about Iraq, but we
must not lose sight of the broader struggle under way. The same
enemy that brought us 9/11 fights us in Afghanistan and in Iraq.
They challenge our partners in Saudi Arabia and Pakistan. They
attack friends in Turkey, Spain and Morocco. They organize to de-
velop or acquire weapons of mass destruction, and connect their
hateful ideology and recruitment through the tools of the connected
world.
While we do not exclusively fight al Qaeda and their associated
movements in our region, they represent the main enemy to peace
and stability.
Their vision of the future is best seen in the example of the
Taliban's rule in Afghanistan, no music, sequestered women, execu-
tions in soccer stadiums and destruction of treasured art. Like the
ideologies of fascists and economists before them, al Qaeda seeks


10
to be the vanguard of an extremist movement and an oppressor of
free-thinking people.
Our campaign since 9/11 has put them on the defensive. The
enemy is under pressure, but still dangerous, seeking to hit us
again at home. I share the view of many of our troops in the field
that fighting this enemy abroad makes it more difficult for them
to strike us at home. We can decisively weaken the ideological ex-
tremists led by bin Laden, Zarqawi and Zawahiri and by stabilizing
Iraq and Afghanistan and helping regional nations help them-
selves.
The great sense of confidence I gain from Iraqi and U.S. and Af-
ghan troops in the field often stands in stark contrast to those who
seek obvious progress on the battlefield. I can understand the con-
fusion. This is no longer a war of mass fires and easily traced ma-
neuvers, but rather a war of subtle intelligence actions, position,
precise strikes and the painstaking work on institution-building.
The enemy does not seek to defeat us militarily, but to wait us
out, sap our confidence and break our will. We must not let their
success by grabbing headlines confuse us about our ability to help
the people of the region build better futures.
Militarily, our forces are strong. They provide the shield behind
which legitimate institutions form. They gain time for the political
rocess in Iraq and Afghanistan to mature. Elsewhere in the re-
gion, their presence and assistance helped shape capabilities that
allow our friends in the region to resist extremism.
For those of us who spent many months in the field, we see good
progress in both Afghanistan and Iraq. We sense progress against
the extremism that once seemed so pervasive in the region, but we
are realistic and know that great change is almost always accom-
panied by violence, it is not our intention today to paint a picture
of rosy tasks easily accomplished. We have sacrificed much, and
there is much more work ahead. Progress in counter-insurgency
and counterterrorism work is not easily recognized.
Setbacks, casualties and difficult problems undoubtedly remain
ahead, but with your support and the support of the American peo-
ple, success is undoubtedly ahead as well. We will need patience
and strength to achieve this success, our men and women in uni-
form have both.
Thank you.
The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, General Abizaid. General
Casey, do you have a statement, sir?
General CASEY. I do, Mr. Chairman.
The CHAIRMAN. Go right ahead.
STATEMENT OF GEN. GEORGE W. CASEY, JR., COMMANDER,
MULTI-NATIONAL FORCES-IRAQ, U.S. ARMY
General CASEY. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and I
thank all of you on the Armed Services Committee here for the
great support that you provide the men and women of the Armed
Forces in Iraq over the past years here. It has been truly outstand-
ing.
I would also like to thank those of you who have taken the time
to come over and see us on the ground there. I look around here,
I see more than a dozen members who have made the trip over


12
Congressman Skelton mentioned. While this concept is only
months old, it has already enabled the Iraqis to begin moving for-
ward to reassuming the lead in their counter-insurgency effort.
Insurgents have also not sparked sectarian violence—although
they work at it every day—and they are unable to do this because
of the strong commitment of the Iraqis to do something better.
Last, and perhaps most importantly, the insurgents have not
stopped political and economic development in Iraq. The well-
known January 30th elections where 8.5 million Iraqis defied in-
timidation and terror to take a stake in their future, the formation
of the first democratically electe
emocratically elected government in decades and the
beginnings of the development of an Iraqi constitution all indicate
that, in Iraq, the momentum is in favor of democracy and not ter-
ror.
What is perhaps less well-known is the progress in the economic
sector, progress that only begins to meet Iraqi needs, but it is
progress nonetheless. In the last year, through the hard work of
İraqis, the U.S. embassy and Coalition forces, we have started over
2,500 of the 3,100 reconstruction projects funded by our govern-
ment, and we have completed over 1,300 of them.
Even more heartening is the private construction of homes and
businesses that we witness on a daily basis and attribute to Iraq's
growing economy and public confidence. Iraq slowly gets better
every day.
Unfortunately, the tough part about counter-insurgencies is that
the insurgents don't have to win. They just have to not lose. This
is a battle of wills, and the terrorists and insurgents are out to
shake ours. They will continue to contest the Iraqi political, eco-
nomic and social advances and continue to attack the innocent
men, women and children, symbols of government and Coalition
force, but they will not succeed.
The stark reality is that insurgencies don't do well against demo-
cratically-elected governments, particularly insurgencies with no
positive vision. Recent polls confirm that Iraqis are confident in
their government, confident in their security forces. They are opti-
mistic about their future, and they intend to vote in large numbers
in the upcoming constitutional referendum and December elections.
The Iraqi people are committed to something better than the tyr-
anny they have known for the last three decades and are fighting
every day for the dream of a better future.
Last year was one of progress and a first for Iraq, but it was also
one impacted by terror and violence. Yet the Iraqi people per-
severed to their greatest accomplishment in decades, the January
elections.
Six months before this year's constitutional elections, I will tell
you that we are well positioned for another Iraqi success. To be
sure, there are long-term development challenges in Iraq, and
there is much to be done. And Iraq's steady progress will be con-
tested. But this insurgency and these terrorists will ultimately be
defeated as Iraqis elect a government based on an Iraqi constitu-
tion that respects the human rights of all Iraqis, as they build Iraqi
security forces that could maintain domestic order and deny Iraq
as a safe haven for terrorists and as they continue the economic de-
velopment programs that help Iraq recover from decades of neglect.


15
Are they accepting this kind of a premise, or is this something
that you are trying to encourage over there? How far are we get-
ting on that?
Secretary RUMSFELD. We have tried to encourage it. Progress is
being made. During the governing council, that was the principle.
During the interim government-or, correction, the transition—I
guess it is the interim government and the transitional govern-
ment, administrative law all provide for that. We won't know the
answer until the constitution is written, as it is now being written,
and then whether or not the referendum approves that constitu-
tion. But I think it is very clear that that principle will be in that
constitution. I think it is safe to say that.
General CASEY. If I might just add to that.
Mr. HEFLEY. Yes.
General CASEY. Watching the recent transition from one minister
of defense to another as they form the new government, the mili-
tary accepted the civilian leader as the one to give them direction.
So it was fairly positive.
Mr. HEFLEY. Thank you.
Mr. Spratt.
Mr. SPRATT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And all of our witnesses, thank you for your testimony. Let me
say, echoing what Mr. Skelton has said, that we want you to suc-
ceed. We want our country to succeed. We want, however, to be
candid with ourselves about what the conditions are and what the
chances are. We have had a hearing here within the last couple of
weeks which unfortunately was closed. There were things said that
were, I think, not classified but nevertheless I have to be careful
how I repeat.
But the impression I took away from that hearing was that there
has been a substantial increase in the number of insurgent attacks
over the last several months. The number, of course, is classified.
If that is correct, is that an indication that, as the Vice President
said, is the situation, the insurgency, in its last throes? Or, has it
just become more determined, more sophisticated, more coordi-
nated, using more sophisticated ammunition and things of this na-
ture?
What is happening? Has the challenge become more difficult in
recent months rather than less?
General CASEY. It has not, Congressman. There seems to be a
misperception because of the number of car bombs that people are
seeing on intelligence that the number—on television, that the
number of attacks are going up. That is just-in being, it is not
true. For the last seven weeks, the number of attacks have been
relatively stable.
I will tell you that what has happened is that from a high of over
800 attacks in January, on the elections, it did drop off over a cou-
ple of weeks down to some of the lowest levels we had.
Mr. SPRATT. We saw just the opposite. I guess it could have con-
cluded single episodic things that you are talking about that
weren't major attacks, but the numbers are running up signifi-
cantly over the last several months.
General CASEY. Congressman, the attacks, the number of attacks
per week that we are seeing today is almost the same as they were


16
last April. We saw attacks that were as high as 800 or 900 in Au-
gust, during the Najaf and Sadr City conflicts; in November,
around Fallujah; and during the elections as I mentioned.
Today, they are right around between 400 and 500 attacks per
week, and it has been like that for the last 7 weeks. So what hap-
pened was that, after the election, there was a dip, and they did
increase slightly after that. But they never got above where we
were last year at this time. So there is not a huge spike in violence
in Iraq.
Mr. SPRATT. We will show you the chart and let you comment in
classified form as a response for the record if you would please.
Clearly, one of the keys to our success and one of our tickets for
getting out of there sooner rather than later is to train the Iraqi
security forces so that they can take the place and assume respon-
sibilities for the security of their own country. I understand that
their objective is somewhere around between 300,000 in the total
Iraqi security forces.
If you look at the present state of the Army, according to the in-
formation provided us by the committee staff today, the Army has
75,110 as of today, our latest number, in more or less operational
troops. But I understand that number was attained partly by de-
cree, by fiat, by the president of the country simply saying that the
national guard which had been a territorial force was part of the
national forces, so we have got kind of a mixed bag; 75,000 is also
about half of what we have got in Coalition forces, our own forces
and Coalition forces.
Two questions, how far are we from having a sufficient ground
force to secure the situation, sufficiently trained so we can turn
over to them the responsibility? And can we get there by next sum-
mer? Can we get there within a year's time, when as I understand
it, we may have a hard time replenishing our own troops if we
abide by the rule that the national guard and reserve components
won't be called up more than one time every 24 months?
General CASEY. Let me take a look at the front part of that.
Mr. SPRATT. Either one of you.
General CASEY. What I think you are referring to was, on the
sixth of January, which was Iraqi Army Day, the Iraqi army, by
decree, activated the 10 divisions of the Iraqi army. The units that
were called the national guard prior to that time were incorporated
into the army.
Mr. SPRATT. That takes the total today to 75,000; is that correct?
General CASEY. If that is the right number, yes that sounds
right.
Mr. SPRATT. Something like that.
General CASEY. So the second thing that happened was the first
of March, these Iraqi divisions then were assigned areas of Iraq
that they will ultimately be responsible for. May, as we started off,
we didn't have any battalions. We didn't have any battalions in the
Iraqi army. So after the elections—excuse me, more than 100 bat-
talions, excuse me, Congressman, hundreds of battalions in the
Iraqi army and special police.
So we built a readiness report much like our own unit status re-
port and where we measure the personnel, the logistics, the equip-


17
ment, readiness, the leadership, the training of the Iraqi units. We
are now measuring those Iraqi units against those standards.
And so we are starting to see—we just got the first baseline re-
port the first of June. We are now starting to get some sense of
when they may be ready. But we are only into one report, Con-
gressman, and I wouldn't want to give you a specific number. But
my message to you is that we do have the capability now to start
seeing how that can work out here down the road.
Mr. SPRATT. Are you hopeful that they will be able to take a
hand-off, say, in a year's time, at a time when our sustainment of
18 brigades is going to become ever more difficult?
General CASEY. I am hopeful. But in Iraq, everything is hard,
and we can't work on hope there, so we are going to—I will tell
you, though, that the strategy that Congressman Skelton men-
tioned, putting the transition teams with the Iraqi units, has al-
ready served to increase their competence and their efficiency, so
we have adopted a strategy that is going to help accelerate their
readiness.
Mr. SPRATT. Thank you, sir.
Mr. HEFLEY (presiding). Mr. Saxton.
Mr. SAXTON. Secretary and Generals, thank you for being with
us today. We appreciate the opportunity to chat with you.
Each of you, in your opening statements and in answers to ques-
tions, have been very careful to point out what progress is taking
place, what progress is taking place in standing up the Iraqi gov-
ernment, what progress is taking place in training military and se-
curity forces, what progress is taking place, as the chart shows, in
the growing confidence that the Iraqis apparently have in their
government, and that is good news.
Within that context, some have recently suggested that we ought
to have either a public disengagement plan from Iraq or even a
date certain when we are going to leave Iraq, which I think would
be a tremendous mistake. And I don't say that just because I hap-
pen to think it. If you look at some incidents from recent history,
we can see, for example, that in Afghanistan some years ago the
Russians were made so uncomfortable in their situation in Afghani-
stan that they left, and the response to that action was that it
opened the door for the Taliban to set up shop and for al Qaeda
eventually to become a resident organization in Afghanistan.
Now I have been a student of other Middle Eastern events for
many years, and I remember when Israel was attacked by its Arab
neighbors and was successful in expelling them and in taking much
of the Sinai, and world opinion was that Israel should give the
Sinai back in order to ensure peace. And so Israel gave the Sinai
back, but it didn't ensure peace. We all know what the history was.
And eventually it led to an intifada and violence and terrorist acts
against Israel. And then Israel was encouraged to give up Jericho
and Gaza, as I guess an appeasement, to pull out. And so Israeli
security forces turned over Jericho and turned over Gaza looking
for peace, but it spurred more violence.
And then some time later the Israelis grew tired of supporting
their forces in southern Lebanon, and they pulled out, and it cre-
ated a situation in which we saw an intifada and violence, which
continues to some extent to this very day.


24
line to withdraw U.S. troops, and that is different from my under-
standing of the report that you are citing.
Mr. ABERCROMBIE. And different from our resolution.
Secretary RUMSFELD. Yes.
Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Thank you.
Mr. HEFLEY. Mr. Thornberry.
Mr. THORNBERRY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Gentlemen, there have been several news articles in the past
several weeks talking about the influence of foreign fighters on the
insurgency in Iraq. Clearly part of what is going on in Iraq is a
struggle for power within the country, and then you have also
these folks coming in from the outside to exploit the situation, to
attack America or our interests. And regardless of the numbers,
there is some opinion that these are committed extremists, terror-
ist killers that we are going to have to fight somewhere, and maybe
fighting them there is something we need to do with our best folks
at the forefront.
I would be interested in any of you who have an opinion about
this argument, that at least some of what we face in Iraq are these
committed killers, and it is better to fight them over there than
maybe at home or somewhere else.
General ABIZAID. Congressman, I will certainly try that one. It
is very clear that many of the foreign fighters who have come into
Iraq to fight are sponsored by al Qaeda, they are committed ideo-
logically to bin Laden, Zawahiri and Zarqawi, and they come spe-
cifically for the purpose not necessarily of killing Americans but to
disrupt the political process inside of Iraq so that Iraq fails in the
establishment of some sort of a representational democracy. They
are more afraid about people having the right to choose than they
are about the United States of America being there. So they will
contest the election.
We should understand that these people are small in number,
they are absolutely committed to attacking whatever they need to
attack to disrupt the situation, to create a media sensation, not
necessarily to gain a military victory, and as such they are very,
very dangerous to us.
On the other hand, there are young people in the region that are
lured into the so-called jihad by propaganda on the internet con-
trolled by bin Laden, Zawahiri and Zarqawi. They move into this
network of smuggled people that find their way into Damascus,
and they soon find themselves strapped into a suicide bomb and
sent against a target that doesn't include Americans, but Iraqi
women and children.
So not only is this movement dangerous, but it is extraordinarily
cynical, and it is very important that all the nations around Iraq
do whatever they can do control the movement of these types so
that they don't interfere in the legitimate process of establishing a
free society inside Iraq.
Mr. THORNBERRY. Thank you.
Mr. Secretary, let me ask you one other question. Any military
engagement gives us an opportunity to identify proble
roblems and im-
prove things. We have been around and around with various dis-
cussions about how long it takes to get armor and jammers into the
theater, calling into question, I guess, to some extent acquisition


25
policies and things like that. I guess I am interested, from your
perspective, what areas of improvement in a DOD-wide manage-
ment policy sense, has our involvement in Iraq highlighted prob-
lems that the Administration and Congress need to work on to-
gether to make things better for future engagements?
Secretary RUMSFELD. Well, well before the conflict we knew that
the acquisition process in the Department of Defense has prac-
tically doubled in the last 30 years. At a time when the pace of
technology advancements has been doubling the power of a chip
every 18 months, it is going in exactly the wrong direction. I will
say that the legislation passed by Congress to provide an acceler-
ated route is making a difference. We are beginning to use it. It
is needed. There have to be ways to set aside peacetime constraints
in wartime and be able to function and move on something. We are
trying to figure out how to use the new capabilities and new au-
thorities, but it is a help and we appreciate it.
Mr. SAXTON. Thank you. The gentleman from Massachusetts, Mr.
Meehan.
Mr. MEEHAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you, mem-
bers of the panel, for your testimony.
There is, I guess, good news in terms of confidence in polling
with the new Iraqi national government. But every poll that I have
read, either our State Department polls or Zogby polls, says that
the Iraqi people overwhelmingly view us as an occupying power
and a pretty unpopular occupying power at that, and it seems to
me that that is the essence of the challenge that we face.
How does an occupying power defeat an insurgency when we are
killing or capturing 1,000 to 3,000 insurgents a month for a period
of 16 to 17 months, yet the insurgency in that period of time has
quadrupled? That essentially is the reason why many believe that
if we could get the message across to the Iraqi people that we are
there temporarily—we are pouring concrete all over the country.
And it just seems to me we need to change the dynamic a little bit,
and I think it seems that way to people in the Administration. I
know we are getting ready—in Brussels, on Wednesday, there is
going to be a postwar reconstruction meeting set. And General
Vines was over and made a statement that as many as five bri-
gades, 20,000 troops, could be withdrawn by the time the constitu-
tion is set up. That obviously sends a good message. It is not
etched in stone, but obviously if we meet the timetable that is in
effect with the drafting of a constitution, a referendum vote, and
December 30th another vote, and then we are going to have a new
government, that it is reasonable to expect that we are going to be
able to withdraw troops. Isn't what General Vines is saying, as the
United States gets ready in Brussels, basically the same thing that
many of us are saying, let's send a message that the United States
doesn't intend to permit occupation here, and that will help us win
over the insurgents, which, by the way, is clearly a native insur-
gency.
I think sometimes many of us feel that many in the Administra-
tion are not candid, are not upfront. The Vice President on Memo-
rial Day said that we were in the last throes of the insurgency. Not
true, not true. There are more foreign fighters coming in today into
Iraq than there were six months ago. And I think, General Abizaid,


29
Force are, and that the Marines I believe are, and that retention
in the Army has been good.
It is also true that there is stress on the force. You don't do what
has been done since September 11th and not have there be stress
on the force. And apparently from your quote of him, he is con-
cerned about it, as all of us are.
The idea that the Army is broken or will be broken I think is an
overstatement. I don't think it is going to happen. I think we have
got a lot of things going. We are increasing the size of the Army
by 30,000, we are shifting Army members out of civilian jobs into
military jobs, tens of thousands. We are rebalancing between the
e force and the guard and the reserve. We still have only
called up 40 to 45 percent of the guard and reserve at all in this
Operation Enduring Freedom or Operation Iraqi Freedom.
So on the one hand there are stresses, on the other hand there
is a lot of steps being taken to relieve that stress.
Dr. SNYDER. I received a letter last week to join the Army Re-
serves, so I am sure things are going to go in the right direction
now.
Secretary RUMSFELD. We hope you do.
Dr. SNYDER. I want to ask you about another quote of General
McCaffrey, and it may be that General Casey or General Abizaid
will respond to this, talking about—this is a quote in the article.
General McCaffrey said he concluded that of the hundreds of thou-
sands of Sunnis who don't see a role for themselves in the new
Iraq, about 20,000 are adamant fighters, and they are the ones
that will have to be dealt with. And then quoting General McCaf-
frey, there are about 20,000 who we will have to kill before this is
done with, he said in a telephone interview, and maybe 1,000 to
2,000 foreign fighters. Is that number, Generals Casey and Abizaid,
20,000 to 25,000, is that in the ball park of numbers?
General CASEY. It is in the—where I would differ with General
McCaffrey is the fact that there are 20,000 fighters. I believe that
there is a smaller core, and there may be some supporters, that
when you take the core plus some supporters, supporters are usu-
ally at a ratio of 4:1 or 6:1, somewhere in that range, you get into
a number like that. I do not believe there are 20,000 fighters.
Dr. SNYDER. General Myers.
General MYERS. I would disagree with General McCaffrey on the
point that you would have to kill 20—I don't think there are 20,000
hard core fighters in Iraq. I think the political process will bring
the majority of those folks out of the insurgency.
I do believe there is some number, which I don't know, I just
don't think it is 20,000, I think it is way less, of people who are
going to be dealt with with violence, either captured or killed. That
is a fact, but I don't believe it is 20,000.
Dr. SNYDER. General Myers, the President made, I thought, a
very eloquent statement in response to a question about Guanta-
namo from I think it was a foreign press reporter in which he said,
Come on down. We want you to visit so you can see for yourself
what is going on in Guantanamo. What kind of limits are there on
press access to visiting Guantanamo? Are there limits on frequency
of visits, or how difficult is the range? Is there a waiting list? Is
it readily available to respond to the President's request to come


34
Are they in the last of their throes? Are they at the end of their
rope? Is this the end of the thing, as Vice President Cheney sug-
gested, or do we have a hard road ahead of us?
General CASEY. I think I was quite open in what I said in my
opening statement, that there is a long way to go here. There are
some long-term challenges, particularly on the economic develop-
ment side. And then things in Iraq are hard.
But that said, the Iraqi people are committed to their future.
And we are making progress. They are making progress in Iraq
every day.
If I could go back to the last election, that was a step in the polit-
ical process. It did impact the insurgency, and I go back to the dis-
cussion I had with Congressman Spratt. Last year, we were talking
about-on occasion about levels of violence in the 800 to 900 a
week. Now this, quote, “post-election spike,” we are talking about
500, which is about average for the period.
So I think we have significantly affected the insurgency, and if
you recall my opening statement, again, about the five things that
they have not been able to do—they haven't reconstituted their safe
havens, they haven't been able to expand their base, they haven't
prevented the growth of the Iraqi security forces, they haven't been
able to promote sectarian violence and they haven't stopped politi-
cal and economic development in Iraq.
So I think we have affected the insurgency, Congresswoman.
Mr. SAXTON. Thank you.
General MYERS. If I may, just a couple of other points.
This committee has been so instrumental in helping us with this
problem. This is the problem of the improvised explosive devices,
whether they are vehicle-borne or stationary or planted in the
ground. And that is, you provided funding and a quicker acquisi-
tion method so that we could bring some of this technology and
force protection gear to our troops.
The results of that are that even though we have had more IEDs,
vehicle-borne in particular, in May and in June than we have had
before, the casualties per IED have gone down by—I think the
number is a 45 percent decrease since April of 2004. So while there
are more of them going off against our Coalition forces, the casual-
ties have gone down 45 percent. And we still find 30 to 40 percent
of these IEDs before they go off and disarm them and destroy
them.
General CASEY. I hate to pile on, but one other point, if I might.
Also, because of the protective equipment and vehicles that have
been provided, our return-to-duty rate is over 70 percent now. That
is an over 10 percent increase from what we were seeing in the
past, so the work of this committee is impacting on the safety of
our soldiers.
Mr. SAXTON. Thank you very much.
And I would just add to that, that in talking to General Yakovac
yesterday, I learned that there is some new technology that is not
in Iraq today that is going to be in Iraq very soon to help address
this IED problem.
Mr. Bartlett.
Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you very much. Thank you, gentlemen, for
your testimony, for your service. I was going to thank you and then


56
General ABIZAID. There are NATO troops coming in greater num-
bers in Afghanistan. A very large contingent-
Mr. SKELTON. No, no, no, no. I am talking about Iraq.
General CASEY. The only large contingent that I know of NATO
troops is a possible security force for the NATO training mission.
Mr. SKELTON. Could you urge them to get—to put more troops
in there, to get more training done quickly?
General CASEY. The NATO mission, Congressman, is working the
staff colleges. The Staff College, War College and the Training and
Doctrine Command. So those are, as you know, long-term institu-
tion-building activities. They are making a great impact on that,
but they are working a long-term proposition.
Mr. SKELTON. Okay.
Secretary RUMSFELD. But the United States has urged NATO to
participate fully in the training and equip—you are quite right,
large numbers of weapons are being donated both by NATO coun-
tries and by NATO Partnership For Peace countries to the Iraqi
armed forces, which is a positive thing.
The Secretary General of NATO has been urging that every
NATO country participate in one way or another in the effort.
Mr. SKELTON. At some point, will you be able to say how many
NATO trainers you will have there by September or October 1st?
General MYERS. You are right, Congressman Skelton. There is
going to be an expansion of the current NATO efforts, supposed to
happen in October of this year.
* Mr. SKELTON. Right.
General MYER going to require an additional 300 trainers.
On top of that, depending on whether they go with contract secu-
rity or military security, it could be more.
Mr. SKELTON. For all intents and purposes, that will help to
speed up the training; am I correct?
General MYERS. Absolutely, yes, sir. Part of that Phase Two-
that is called Phase Two Expansion. We are in Phase One right
now. Phase Two Expansion also includes additional training out of
country. And I am thinking of a couple of countries there. Norway
is one of them. Italy is another. Let me just check, yes, Italy and
Norway.
Mr. ŠKELTON. Thank you. I appreciate your being with us. Thank
you.
The CHAIRMAN. Gentlemen. Thank you, it has been a long and
fulsome hearing. We have lots of members on this panel and on
this committee. They care deeply about our troops. Most of them
have been over to theatre.
We thank you for your leadership, and may God bless you and
bless this country.
This hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 6:02 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]





DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
JUNE 23, 2005