Y 4.AR 5/2 A: 2003-2004/28 [H.A.S.C. No. 108–28] OPERATIONS AND RECONSTRUCTION EFFORTS IN IRAQ COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS SECOND SESSION HEARINGS HELD JANUARY 28, APRIL 21, MAY 7, 21, JUNE 16, 17, 22, JULY 7, SEPTEMBER 8, 9, 9, 2004 Pennsylvania State University Libraries Documents Collection U.SORG Sony [H.A.S.C. No. 108–28] OPERATIONS AND RECONSTRUCTION EFFORTS IN IRAQ COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS SECOND SESSION HEARINGS HELD JANUARY 28, APRIL 21, MAY 7, 21, JUNE 16, 17, 22, JULY 7, SEPTEMBER 8, 9, 9, 2004 U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE WASHINGTON : 2006 20–129 For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512–1800; DC area (202) 512–1800 Fax: (202) 512–2250 Mail: Stop SSOP, Washington, DC 20402-0001 HOUSE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS DUNCAN HUNTER, California, Chairman CURT WELDON, Pennsylvania IKE SKELTON, Missouri JOEL HEFLEY, Colorado JOHN SPRATT, South Carolina JIM SAXTON, New Jersey SOLOMON P. ORTIZ, Texas JOHN M. MCHUGH, New York LANE EVANS, Illinois TERRY EVERETT, Alabama GENE TAYLOR, Mississippi ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland NEIL ABERCROMBIE, Hawaii HOWARD P. “BUCK” MCKEON, California MARTY MEEHAN, Massachusetts MAC THORNBERRY. Texas SILVESTRE REYES, Texas JOHN N. HOSTETTLER, Indiana VIC SNYDER, Arkansas WALTER B. JONES, North Carolina JIM TURNER, Texas JIM RYUN, Kansas ADAM SMITH, Washington JIM GIBBONS, Nevada LORETTA SANCHEZ, California ROBIN HAYES, North Carolina MIKE MCINTYRE, North Carolina HEATHER WILSON, New Mexico CIRO D. RODRIGUEZ, Texas KEN CALVERT, California ELLEN O. TAUSCHER, California ROB SIMMONS, Connecticut ROBERT A. BRADY, Pennsylvania JO ANN DAVIS, Virginia BARON P. HILL, Indiana ED SCHROCK, Virginia JOHN B. LARSON, Connecticut W. TODD AKIN, Missouri SUSAN A. DAVIS, California J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island JEFF MILLER, Florida STEVE ISRAEL, New York JOE WILSON, South Carolina RICK LARSEN, Washington FRANK A. LOBIONDO, New Jersey JIM COOPER, Tennessee TOM COLE, Oklahoma JIM MARSHALL, Georgia JEB BRADLEY, New Hampshire KENDRICK B. MEEK, Florida ROB BISHOP, Utah MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, Guam MICHAEL TURNER, Ohio RODNEY ALEXANDER, Louisiana 1 JOHN KLINE, Minnesota TIM RYAN, Ohio CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan CHARLES W. STENHOLM, Texas 2 PHIL GINGREY, Georgia MIKE ROGERS, Alabama TRENT FRANKS, Arizona ROBERT S. RANGEL, Staff Director ERIC R. STERNER, Professional Staff Member JUSTIN BERNIER, Staff Assistant 1 Mr. Alexander left the Committee on Aug. 9, 2004. 2 Mr. Stenholm was assigned to the Committee on Sept. 8, 2004. (II) CONTENTS CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS 2004 Page 285 363 435 535 585 701 819 HEARINGS: Wednesday, January 28, 2004, The Operation Iraqi Freedom Force Rotation Plan .............................. Wednesday, April 21, 2004, Iraq's Transition to Sovereignty. Friday, May 7, 2004, The Ongoing Investigation into the Abuse of Prisoners Within the Central Command Area of Responsibility ......... Friday, May 21, 2004, Conduct and Support of Operation Iraqi Freedom ......... Wednesday, June 16, 2004, Status of U.S. Forces in Iraq After June 30, 2004 .... Thursday, June 17, 2004, Training of Iraqi Security Forces ............................. Tuesday, June 22, 2004, Progress in Iraq ..... Wednesday, July 7, 2004, Army and Marine Corps Troop Rotations for Oper- ation Iraqi Freedom 3 and Operation Enduring Freedom 6 and the Mobili- zation of the Individual Ready Reserve ... ....... Wednesday, September 8, 2004, The Performance of U.S. Military Servicemembers in Iraq and Afghanistan ............... Thursday, September 9, 2004, The Final Report of the Independent Panel to Review Department of Defense Detention Operations .... Thursday, September 9, 2004, Investigation of Military Intelligence Activities at Abu Ghraib Prison Facility ... APPENDIXES: Wednesday, January 28, 2004 Wednesday, April 21, 2004 ................. Friday, May 7, 2004 Friday, May 21, 2004 ....................... Wednesday, June 16, 2004 ........ Thursday, June 17, 2004 ........ Tuesday, June 22, 2004 ................. Wednesday, July 7, 2004 .......... Wednesday, September 8, 2004 ... Thursday, September 9, 2004 ........ Thursday, September 9, 2004 883 955 43 183 341 419 487 573 647 765 867 923 1001 ...... ... WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 28, 2004 THE OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM FORCE ROTATION PLAN STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS Saxton, Hon. Jim, a Representative from New Jersey. Skelton, Hon. Iké, a Representative from Missouri, Ranking Member, Com- mittee on Armed Services WITNESSES Cartwright, Lt. Gen. James E., Director for Force Structure, Resources, and Assessment, J-8 Joint Staff, U.S. Marine Corps .... Hagee, Gen. Michael W., Commandant, U.S. Marine Corps .................. (III) IV Page 00 Schoomaker, Gen. Peter J., Chief of Staff, U.S. Army Schwartz, Lt. Gen. Norton A., Director for Operations, J–3 Joint Staff, U.S. Air Force ....... co APPENDIX PREPARED STATEMENTS: Hagee, Gen. Michael W. Saxton, Hon. Jim ........ Schoomaker, Gen. Peter J. .................... Skelton, Hon. Ike ........ DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: [There were no Documents submitted.] QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: Mr. Calvert ................................. Ms. Sanchez ....... Ms. Tauscher Mr. Taylor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . WEDNESDAY, APRIL 21, 2004 IRAQ’S TRANSITION TO SOVEREIGNTY STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS Hunter, Hon. Duncan, a Representative from California, Chairman, Commit- tee on Armed Services ... ....................... Skelton, Hon. Ike, a Representative from Missouri, Ranking Member, Com- mittee on Armed Services 71 WITNESSES 157 85 155 Baram, Dr. Amatzia, Senior Fellow, United States Institute of Peace ............... Grossman, Hon. Marc, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs . Keane, Gen. John, USA (Ret.), Former Vice Chief of Staff, U.S. Army ............... Myers, Gen. Richard B., Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, U.S. Air Force .......... Wolfowitz, Hon. Paul, Deputy Secretary of Defense ....... Yaphe, Dr. Judith S., Senior Fellow, National Defense University 90 160 ••••••••••••••• APPENDIX 221 187 193 198 PREPARED STATEMENTS: Grossman, Hon. Marc Hunter, Hon. Duncan ......... Skelton, Hon. Ike ........... Wolfowitz, Hon. Paul DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: Iraq: The Road Ahead submitted by Dr. Judith S. Yaphe ........ ...................... Iraqi Polls Bring Secular Success submitted by Jonathan Steele ................ Special Envoy Brahimi's Statement of April 14 submitted by Hon. Marc Grossman ... The Iraqi Shi'i Community Between Sistani, Muqtada, the IGC and the CPA presented by Dr. Amatzia Baram ............ QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: Ms. Davis of California ........... Mr. Hunter ......... Mr. Langevin ... Ms. Sanchez Dr. Snyder .......... 235 256 258 246 283 281 284 283 281 Page QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD—CONTINUED Mr. Spratt ..... ............. 281 ................................ . . . . . . . . . . ••••••••• FRIDAY, MAY 7, 2004 THE ONGOING INVESTIGATION INTO THE ABUSE OF PRISONERS WITHIN THE CENTRAL COMMAND AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS Hunter, Hon. Duncan, a Representative from California, Chairman, Commit- tee on Armed Services ..... 285 Skelton, Hon. Ike, a Representative from Missouri, Ranking Member, Com- mittee on Armed Services .......... 287 WITNESSES Brownlee, Hon. Les, Acting Secretary of the Army ..... Myers, Gen. Richard B., Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, U.S. Air Force ...... Rumsfeld, Hon. Donald H., Secretary of Defense .... Schoomaker, Gen. Peter J., Chief of Staff, U.S. Army ............... 295 291 289 296 APPENDIX 345 355 350 PREPARED STATEMENTS: Hunter, Hon. Duncan Rumsfeld, Hon. Donald H. ......... Skelton, Hon. Ike ............... DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: [There were no Documents submitted.] QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: [There were no Questions submitted.] FRIDAY, MAY 21, 2004 CONDUCT AND SUPPORT OF OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS Hunter, Hon. Duncan, a Representative from California, Chairman, Commit- tee on Armed Services Skelton, Hon. Ike, a Representative from Missouri, Ranking Member, Com- mittee on Armed Services ........... 363 364 WITNESSES Hagee, Gen. Michael W., Commandant, U.S. Marine Corps Myers, Gen. Richard B., Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, U.S. Air Force ........ Schoomaker, Gen. Peter J., Chief of Staff, U.S. Army 368 365 ....... 367 APPENDIX PREPARED STATEMENTS: Hunter, Hon. Duncan ..... Skelton, Hon. Ike .............. DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: [There were no Documents submitted.] QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: Mr. Calvert ........ Mr. Reyes .......... Mr. Ryan of Ohio ............... Mr. Skelton ....... Dr. Snyder ......... 432 431 433 431 432 . . . . . . . V Page QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD–CONTINUED Mr. Taylor ......... ............ 431 435 436 LIAIS ...... WEDNESDAY, JUNE 16, 2004 STATUS OF U.S. FORCES IN IRAQ AFTER JUNE 30, 2004 STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS Hunter, Hon. Duncan, a Representative from California, Chairman, Commit- tee on Armed Services ..... Skelton, Hon. Ike, a Representative from Missouri, Ranking Member, Com- mittee on Armed Services ........... WITNESSES Ricciardone, Hon. Francis J., Coordinator for Iraq Transition, U.S. Depart- ment of State ....... Rodman, Hon. Peter W., Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs. .................... Sharp, Lt. Gen. Walter L., Director, Strategic Plans and Policy, the Joint Staff ............. APPENDIX PREPARED STATEMENTS: Hunter, Hon. Duncan Ricciardone, Hon. Francis J. Rodman, Hon. Peter W. ........ Sharp, Lt. Gen. Walter L. .......... Skelton, Hon. Ike .......... DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: Security Council, Resolution 1546 (2004) .. QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: Mr. Ryan of Ohio ........... Ms. Tauscher .............. Mr. Taylor ...... 491 510 498 507 495 519 533 533 533 THURSDAY, JUNE 17, 2004 TRAINING OF IRAQI SECURITY FORCES 535 STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS Hunter, Hon. Duncan, a Representative from California, Chairman, Commit- tee on Armed Services .............. Skelton, Hon. Ike, a Representative from Missouri, Ranking Member, Com- mittee on Armed Services ...... WITNESSES Petraeus, Lt. Gen. David H., [Delivered Via Teleconference), Chief, Office of Security Transition 536 ........ 537 APPENDIX PREPARED STATEMENTS: Hunter, Hon. Duncan Skelton, Hon. Ike . 577 581 VII Page DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: [There were no Documents submitted.] QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: [There were no Questions submitted.] TUESDAY, JUNE 22, 2004 PROGRESS IN IRAQ STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS Hunter, Hon. Duncan, a Representative from California, Chairman, Commit- tee on Armed Services ............... Skelton, Hon. Ike, a Representative from Missouri, Ranking Member, Com- mittee on Armed Services 585 587 ••••••• 594 589 ...................... WITNESSES Pace, Gen. Peter, Vice Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff Wolfowitz, Hon. Paul, Deputy Secretary of Defense ..... APPENDIX PREPARED STATEMENTS: Hunter, Hon. Duncan ....... Skelton, Hon. Ike .............................. Wolfowitz, Hon. Paul ......................... DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: An Article from the New York Times, dated June 20, 2004. ....... QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: Mr. Calvert ..... Ms. Davis of California .......... Mr. Israel ......... Mr. Larsen ........ Mr. Skelton ....... Mr. Spratt 651 656 662 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 689 699 700 700 700 695 695 WEDNESDAY, JULY 7, 2004 ARMY AND MARINE CORPS TROOP ROTATIONS FOR OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM 3 AND OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM 6 AND THE MOBILIZATION OF THE INDIVIDUAL READY RESERVE STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS Hunter, Hon. Duncan, a Representative from California, Chairman, Commit- tee on Armed Services ......... Skelton, Hon. Ike, a Representative from Missouri, Ranking Member, Com- mittee on Armed Services .. 701 ......... 703 706 710 WITNESSES Chu, Hon. David S.C., Under Secretary of Defense (Personnel and Readiness). Cody, Gen. Richard A., Vice Chief of Staff, U.S. Army Huly, Lt. Gen. Jan C., Deputy Commandant Plans, Policies and Operations, U.S. Marine Corps ...... Schwartz, Lt. Gen. Norton A., Director of Operations (J–3), Joint Chiefs of Staff, U.S. Air Force 710 707 APPENDIX PREPARED STATEMENTS: Chu, Hon. David S.C. Cody, Gen. Richard A. ..... 779 787 VIII Page 794 769 774 803 .... 804 PREPARED STATEMENTS CONTINUED Huly, Lt. Gen. Jan C. .... Hunter, Hon. Duncan ... Skelton, Hon. Ike ..... DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: OIF 2-OIF 3 US Force Disposition Ground Troop Rotation Plan .......... OIF 3 & OEF VI Force Flow .......... QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: Mr. Israel Mr. Meehan .... Mr. Rodriguez Ms. Sanchez .............. Mr. Skelton ...... Mr. Taylor ........... 806 817 809 810 ........ mais 810 809 810 WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 8, 2004 THE PERFORMANCE OF U.S. MILITARY SERVICEMEMBERS IN IRAQ AND AFGHANISTAN STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS Hefley, Hon. Joel, a Representative from Colorado ... 819 Hunter, Hon. Duncan, a Representative from California, Chairman, Commit- tee on Armed Services ......... 866 Skelton, Hon. Ike, a Representative from Missouri, Ranking Member, Com- mittee on Armed Services 820 . . . . 830 822 WITNESSES Costello, Capt. Patrick, Former ADA, 101st Airborne Division, U.S. Army ....... Linnington, Col. Michael, Former Brigade Commander, 101st Airborne Divi- sion, U.S. Army ........ McCoy, Lt. Col. Bryan, P., Former Commander, Third Battalion, Fourth Ma- rine Regiment, U.S. Marine Corps ............ Savage, Capt. Morgan, Former Company Commander, Third Battalion, Fourth Marine Regiment, U.S. Marine Corps .......... Springman, Lt. Col. Jeffery, A., Former Commander, 3–29 Field Artillery Battalion, Fourth Infantry Division, U.S. Army ........ 824 828 827 APPENDIX 871 881 877 PREPARED STATEMENTS: Hunter, Hon. Duncan Miller, Hon. Jeff, a Representative from Florida ......... Skelton, Hon. Ike DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: [There were no Documents submitted.] QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: [There were no Questions submitted.] THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 9, 2004 THE FINAL REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT PANEL TO REVIEW DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE DETENTION OPERATIONS STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS Hunter, Hon. Duncan, a Representative from California, Chairman, Commit- tee on Armed Services ......... Skelton, Hon. Ike, a Representative from Missouri, Ranking Member, Com- mittee on Armed Services ... 883 884 IX Page 889 886 WITNESSES Brown, Dr. Harold, Panel Member, Independent Panel to Review Department of Defense Detention Operations Schlesinger, James R., Chairman, Independent Panel to Review Department of Defense Detention Operations APPENDIX PREPARED STATEMENTS: Brown, Dr. Harold .................... Hunter, Hon. Duncan ......... Schlesinger, James R. Skelton, Hon. Ike .............................................. DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: Letter to the President dated September 8, 2004 ......... QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: [There were no Questions submitted.] 942 927 937 932 ......... 949 THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 9, 2004 INVESTIGATION OF MILITARY INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES AT ABU GHRAIB PRISON FACILITY STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS Hunter, Hon. Duncan, a Representative from California, Chairman, Commit- tee on Armed Services .... ..................... Skelton, Hon. Ike, a Representative from Missouri, Ranking Member, Com- mittee on Armed Servives 955 957 ••••••••••••••••••• WITNESSES Kern, Gen. Paul J., Commanding General, U.S. Army Materiel Command, Procedure 15 Appointing Authority; Lt. Gen. Anthony R. Jones, Additional Procedure 15 Investigating Officer; and Maj. Gen. George R. Fay, Inves- tigating Officer ...... 958 ........ ..... APPENDIX PREPARED STATEMENTS: Hunter, Hon. Duncan 1005 Kern, Gen. Paul J. 1014 Skelton, Hon. Ike ........................ 1010 DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: VADM Church Report: Overall Review of DOD Detention Ops (The Schlesinger Report: “A Comprehensive Look”) .. 1029 Procedure 15 (Intelligence) Investigation of the Abu Ghraib Prison and 205th Military Intelligence Brigade .............. ........... 1038 QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: [There were no Questions submitted.] THE OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM FORCE ROTATION PLAN HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, Washington, DC, Wednesday, January 28, 2004. The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:10 a.m., in room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Jim Saxton, (member of the committee) presiding. OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JIM SAXTON, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM NEW JERSEY Mr. SAXTON. The committee will come to order. This morning, the committee kicks off the new year with an opportunity to learn about the most significant large-scale rotation in American military forces since World War II. Chairman Hunter has asked me to fill in for him today as he was unable to make the necessary travel connections last night. He sends his regrets and also wishes to thank our distinguished panel of witnesses for agreeing to appear today on this important topic. It is a pleasure to welcome our wit- nesses today. General Peter J. Schoomaker, Chief of Staff of the Army, will be with us shortly just for everybody's information. The General is at the White House and he will be here as soon as he possibly can. General Michael Hagee, Commandant of the Marine Corps. Lieutenant General Norton Schwartz, Director of Operations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Lieutenant General James Cart- wright, Director for Force Structure, Resources and Assessment of the Joint Staff. Gentlemen, we look forward to your testimony. As Washington prepares to consider the President's budget de- fense proposal for the coming fiscal year, it is critically important that Congress gain a better understanding of one of the most cru- cial national security issues we face, the Global War on Terrorism, and how the U.S. military will accommodate its growing require- ments. How the Department of Defense and each of the military services as force providers choose to meet this challenge will, in many respects, shape the U.S. military for many years to come. De- cisions on active/reserve mix, mobilization and rotation rates, force protection, personnel tempo and other key issues are already, and will continue to have, a lasting impact on all our all-volunteer force. On the other hand, this situation also provides an unprecedented opportunity to examine long-standing personnel and organization policy since most of the underlying assumptions used to build to- day's force decades ago are about to be put to severe tests. [The prepared statement of Mr. Saxton can be found in the Ap- pendix on page 47.] (1) Mr. SAXTON. Let me recognize the Ranking Member for his state- ment, my friend, Ike Skelton. STATEMENT OF HON. IKE SKELTON, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM MISSOURI, RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES Mr. SKELTON. Thanks, so much, Mr. Chairman. I enjoy you wel- coming our witnesses. We look forward to having General Schoomaker being here with us in a few minutes. General Hagee, thank you for joining us today. And General Cartwright and Gen- eral Schwartz, we thank you also for sharing your insights with us. The activities with which we are engaged in Iraq subduing the guerrilla conflict—and we should not mistake what it is; it is truly a guerrilla war as opposed to what some may call terrorists—sub- duing this guerrilla conflict and rebuilding the government, are un- precedented since the days of the Second World War. And we now face a troop rotation on a scale of also unseen proportion. I want to commend all of our witnesses for the care in which this rotation is being handled. It gives one pause to consider the logistical feat that is involved. The force taking over in Iraq is smaller than the force that is leaving. Now, while I understand the argument that a smaller force can have greater capability, it must stiĩl cover the same amount of ground and deal with the same size Iraqi population. Moreover, while the numbers of Iraqi security forces continue to grow, their training and capability remain un- even at best, and our forces have exceptional training and are un- doubtedly up to the task, but all of this is particularly important in the next six months as we transfer sovereignty to the Iraqis. It is critically important that this transfer happen in a stable and se- cure environment. Beyond Iraq, I am concerned that the ongoing need for substan- tial troop numbers in Iraq and Afghanistan will continue to strain our overall force, particularly the reserve element. This does not mean we should pull back from our commitments. We can't unring the bell. We are there. We have got to win. We have got to stabilize that country. We cannot afford that to evolve into a Civil War. And recently the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), in an article that was recently published, is evidently concerned about that issue. We must increase our Active Duty strength so we don't break our cur- rent force. Lieutenant General John Riggs, who is currently examining this issue for the Army, agrees and recently says that the Army likely needs substantially more than the 10,000 soldier increase. This me- dium to long-term solution is one we must begin now. And when General Schoomaker gets here, I will be interested in asking him questions about that. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. [The prepared statement of Mr. Skelton can be found in the Ap- pendix on page 52.] Mr. SAXTON. Thank you Mr. Skelton. Before turning to our wit- nesses, let me briefly cover two administrative items. First, both General Schoomaker and General Hagee have commitments that they have to be back at the Pentagon at 1:00, and so we have a back door on our time here, and so I would urge everyone to ask concise questions so we can move through the entire committee. Second, it is entirely likely that elements of today's discussion can only be discussed in classified session. So we may need to shift into executive session at some point if it becomes necessary to fully explore classified details. I hope that doesn't happen. I think we are going to get a sweep across the big picture here today. How- ever, if it does become necessary, we will have to go up to 2212, which has been swept and is ready to accommodate our needs should we need to go classified. With that, we will hear from our witnesses. Thank you, gentlemen, for being with us this morning. We appre- ciate this. And we will start with General Schwartz. STATEMENT OF LT. GEN. NORTON A. SCHWARTZ, DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS, J-3 JOINT STAFF, U.S. AIR FORCE General SCHWARTZ. Mr. Chairman, good morning. Thank you for having us before the committee, and with your permission, I will make a few introductory comments to put the rotation plan that we are currently executing in perspective. The slides which you have at your table and which are shown to my left and right reflect at a macro level what we are undertaking at this point. The current set in what we are calling Operation Iraqi Freedom 1 is four divisions and about 17 brigade equivalents. Those divi- sions are the 82nd, the 1st Armored—the 82nd being in the west; the 1st Armored, which is in the Baghdad area-4th Infantry in the more central sector of Iraq, and 101st in the north. The transi- tion will occur, and in fact, it is now underway. We have completed the deployment of some 13,000 personnel so far of the 100-plus that will occur over the next few months. Those divisions will tran- sition to a three-division set with about 14 brigade equivalents led by the 1st Marine Expeditionary Force in the western sector, the 1st Cavalry Division in Baghdad, and the 1st Infantry Division in the north central sector. In addition, there are additional elements providing for security of both lines of communications and fixed facilities, that currently being performed by two elements from the Florida and Indiana Na- tional Guard being succeeded by the 81st enhanced separate bri- gade from Washington and California. In addition, of course, there is a logistical set that is associated with the major combat units. That theater support command will remain in Iraq while some of its personnel will transition. And of course, all of the combat support, combat service support units that range from company to brigade size transition, as well. These per- sonnel for the Army will be on tours for up to 12 months, and in the case of the Marines, approximately 7 months. The overall numbers of combat support and combat service sup- port personnel will diminish between the first and the second rota- tion. That is achieved primarily by contracting initiatives which have occurred since we deployed the initial personnel last year at this time and also whether efficiencies which were gained. And those numbers go from about 66,000 on the support side to about 50,000. It is an important point to make that an imperative for us in working the plans which were ultimately vetted by the joint chiefs and recommended to the Secretary was to maintain com- petency on the ground for those units that naturally have a year's experience in the area of operation now, and those that will suc- ceed them. And so we worked to maintain this competency in a number of s. And a couple of points. The staff of Combined Joint Task Force-7 (CJTF-7), that is General Sanchez's organization—the key staff and leadership will not transition when the 5th Corps, which comprises most of that headquarters, transitions to Three Corps here in the next couple months. The key personnel will remain. In addition, we did our best to assure that at least one brigade was either deployed early to a division sector or remained in the divi- sion sector in order to provide stability and continuity during the transition in that sector. The case in point would be the 1st Bri- gade of the 1st Infantry Division, which is remaining in the west- ern sector as the Marines come on board. In addition, this transition plan is not a spike. It is actually one that started in December and will continue through May. It ugh May. It is four, five months. And that was a deliberate effort, again, to assure that we maintain a sufficient level of continuity in each of the sectors. Of note as well is the effort that it took to prepare the force for deployment. That preparation began as long ago as the summer and August of last year. Typically, leaders made visits to the theater, certainly at the di- vision level, and in many cases, at the brigade level. Those leaders went to Iraq and visited with the folks that they were going to suc- ceed and exchanged face-to-face information. So that the training plans that were implemented and accomplished in the intervening period were specific to the needs of their location. The inbound units will come into theater and will spend about two weeks or so in Kuwait first linking up with their equipment, and then preparing for the environmental aspects of the thea and preparing to move to their battle stations in Iraq. Once they move into Iraq, there will be at least a two-week handoff between the unit that is currently there and the one that will be succeeding it. The terminology typically used is “left seat, right seat” to make sure that the new personnel gain the benefit of the experiences of the earlier and der So that is the major features of the game plan to maintain con- tinuity at the unit level. At the leadership level, there was a simi- lar effort made. As I mentioned earlier, the Three Corps is succeed- ing 5th Corps from Europe as the Corps of the Combined Joint Task Force-7 headquarters. The first visits from Lieutenant Gen- eral Tom Metz, the Three Corps commander two theater began last September and continued through November. He and General Sanchez interacted and so did his principal staff members. In November, there was a major training iteration, which in- cluded mission rehearsals for the headquarters. That involved both Metz's Three Corps and Sanchez's CJTF-7, which concluded in De- cember with a certification exercise which was orchestrated and evaluated by the Joint Forces Command, Admiral Giambastiani and company, which certified Three Corps as ready to assume the leadership of the mission in Iraq. And that deployment began ear- lier this month and will continue through April. So, once again, the transition of the headquarters will occur over several months rath- er than over a very tight period. unit. One other subject to address before I conclude, Mr. Chairman, re- lates to the tour lengths of personnel in Iraq. You will recall that the leadership of the department on numerous occasions has ar- ticulated that the standard is up to 12 months boots on the ground. In working the transition plan, we—there are roughly 1,250 units which are redeploying from Iraq as a part of this rotation. Initially, in November of last year, we identified some 267 units, about 20,000 personnel all together, who we were looking at per- haps being in a situation where we might have to extend certain people beyond that 12 months boots on the ground in order to en- sure that we had overlap between the outgoing and the incoming unit. We worked this very hard, implemented a number of mitiga- tion measures, and I will address those in a second. But ultimately, we reduced that 267 units to 12. It turned out to be 1,567 personnel specifically. Nine units of the 12 were of greater than 60 days. The longest extension is-I should say 9 of the 12 were more than 15 days. The longest will be 60 days. And 3 were less or equal to 15. Of those 12 units, 2 were reserves, 1 unit from the Illinois National Guard and 1 unit from the Washing- ton State Guard. Now, some of the things we did to try to minimize these exten- sions included increasing throughput through the ports, both air and sea, in order to maximize the flow of personnel in the theater. We also used some amphibious shipping in order to optimize the use of the Ashwaba commercial port as well as the other ports available in Kuwait. Very importantly, we implemented a strategy of using stay-behind equipment. So, in many cases, units simply would fall in on the equipment that the previous organization used, and we only had to transport the personnel and not their accom- panying equipment. We compressed both the mobilization and training times on the front end and did our best to compress the what we call reception staging and onward movement as well as the handoff that I had talked about earlier on the back end. And finally, we do something called joint sourcing. About 5,000 or so Navy and Air Force personnel will be performing ground force functions in this rotation because there were shortfalls in the force. For example, the Air Force is providing truck drivers and the Navy, as well, and engineers and the like. So, those elements were the major features of our effort, number one; to maintain continuity on the ground between units. Number two, maintain that continu- ity in the leadership cadre, and then finally to assure that we were as loyal to our commitment on up to 365 days boots on the ground as we could possibly be and still sustain the mission. Mr. Chairman, those are my introductory remarks, sir. And after our colleagues make additional comments, I will be happy to take your questions. Thank you, sir. Mr. SAXTON. General Schwartz, thank you very much. General Cartwright. STATEMENT OF LT. GEN. JAMES E. CARTWRIGHT, DIRECTOR FOR FORCE STRUCTURE, RESOURCES, AND ASSESSMENT, J- 8 JOINT STAFF, U.S. MARINE CORPS General CARTWRIGHT. Rather than do any introductory remarks, Mr. Chairman, I am happy to be here and willing and ready to take your questions and I will pass my time to the service chiefs. Mr. SAXTON. Thank you very much. General Hagee. STATEMENT OF GEN. MICHAEL W. HAGEE, COMMANDANT, U.S. MARINE CORPS General HAGEE. Congressman Saxton and Congressman Skelton and distinguished members of this committee, it is truly my pleas- ure to report on your Marine Corps and our participation in oper- ations in support of the Global War on Terrorism. I thank the members of this committee for your continued support of your Ma- rines. Let me assure that the Marine Corps' first priority is and will continue to be war-fighting readiness and excellence in support of our Nation's security. I have had the opportunity to talk with Marines after major combat operations, and I also had the oppor- tunity to talk with them before they crossed the line of departure last year. And what they continue to tell me is that your support, the sup- port of the Congress and the support of the American people are the two most important things to them. And your support in fund- ing, your support when you articulate how much you respect what they are doing over there and your trips over there mean a great deal to the servicemen and women who are deployed throughout the world. During this past year, the Marine Corps, both active and reserve, was engaged in operations from Afghanistan to the Arabian Gulf, the Horn of Africa, Liberia, Georgia Republic, Colombia, Guanta- namo Bay and the Philippines. Most prominent in highlighting the value and power of the Nation's naval expeditionary capability was the Marine Corps' participation in Operation Iraqi Freedom. The First Marine Expeditionary Force deployed a combat ready force of about 70,000 Marines and sailors in less than 60 days. Exploiting the operational speed, reach and inherent flexibility of sea power, the Navy and the Marine Corps closely integrated with joint coalition and Special Operations Forces engaged in 26 days of sustained combat operations and fought 10 major engagements de- stroying 8 Iraqi divisions before stopping in Tikrit almost 500 miles land. Following major combat operations. First Marine Expedi- tionary Force assumed responsibility for security and stability oper- ations in five central Iraqi provinces until they were relieved of the last province by coalition forces just last September. Since the end of major combat operations, the Marine Corps has been setting the force in order to enhance and maintain warfighting readiness for future contingencies. Reloading of combat equipment and material on maritime prepositioned force shipping is nearly complete. We are using provided funding to repair, refur- bish and, where necessary, replace equipment. During this period, Marines have continued to forward deploy and Marine Corps units have continued to support numerous operations to include Oper- ation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan and operations in the Horn of Africa. We have conducted a major program to identify and analyze lessons learned from this campaign. We have also begun to assimilate these lessons and determine where and how our force should be rebalanced. The Marine Corps is currently preparing to deploy forces to re- lieve the Third Cavalry Regiment and the 82nd Airborne in west- ern Iraq in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom II. These forces will be deployed in two rotations of approximately seven months each. This rotation policy will result in the least disruption for the long- term health of your Marine Corps. Precluding stop-loss, stop-move and unnecessary interruptions in recruit training, career progres- sion and development, professional military education and other deployment requirements. The first rotation from March until ap- proximately September of this year will include 25,000 Marines and their equipment, and this includes almost 3,000 Reserve Com- ponent Marines. | A second rotation of approximately the same size and composi- tion will overlap the first and ensure a smooth and stable transi- tion. In preparation for Operation Iraqi Freedom II, First Marine Expeditionary Force has analyzed lessons learned from their expe- riences in conducting security and stability operations from March to September of last year and recent Army lessons learned. As they did last year, First Marine Expeditionary Force is already working closely with U.S. Army forces in Iraq. They have conducted a num- ber of liaison visits with the Army units that they will relieve. They have drawn from procedures used by the Los Angeles Police Department for neighborhood patrolling in gang-dominated areas, the tactics of the British in Iraq, which reflect years of experience in low-intensity conflicts, and peace-keeping operations as well as our own extensive small war knowledge. We have assimilated these lessons through a comprehensive training package that includes tactics, techniques, procedures for stability and counterinsurgency operations. We have conducted rigorous urban operations and exercises. Over 400 Marines are receiving Arabic language courses and all de- Marines and sailors are receiving extensive cultural edu- cation. Our supporting establishment is focused on the equipage, logistical and training requirements of the force, paying particular attention to individual protective equipment, enhanced vehicle and aircraft hardening and aviation survival equipment and proce- dures. While the operational tempo remains high, recruiting and retention continue to exceed our goals. During this next year, Marine Expeditionary units will still de- ploy. Units will still rotate to Japan. Some of these forces will de- ploy from Japan in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom II. We are diligently ensuring that the Marine Corps remains ready for all of our current and future responsibilities. I look forward to presenting a more detailed statement on the current posture of your Marine Corps when I return before this committee on the 12 of February. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I look forward to your questions. [The prepared statement of General Hagee can be found in the Appendix on page 60.] Mr. SAXTON. General Hagee, thank you very much. We have been joined by Chief of Staff of the Army, General Schoomaker. Welcome aboard, sir, and we are ready to hear your statement. STATEMENT OF GEN. PETER J. SCHOOMAKER, CHIEF OF STAFF, U.S. ARMY General SCHOOMAKER. I apologize for being late. I think you know why, and I have submitted a statement for the record. I would just like to make a very brief opening comment here, and that is, I appreciate the opportunity to be here today. You know this is an exciting time to be in the Army. Tough time in many ways, but in many ways, it is very fulfilling and I appreciate the opportunity to be back with the men and women in uniform. And every day I continue to be reinforced by their courage and their dedication and their selfless service. I just returned from Christ- mas from the theater, both in Afghanistan and Iraq. A member of the committee here, Congressman Jim Marshall, accompanied me on that. Appreciated his counsel and his company. But again, tre- mendously reinforced by what I saw there and encouraged by where we are going in the future. So I will stand by for your ques- tions. Mr. SAXTON. Thank you, General. [The prepared statement of General Schoomaker can be found in the Appendix on page 55.] Mr. SAXTON. Why don't we start our questioning with the rank- ing member, Mr. Skelton, for whatever thoughts or questions you may have. Nr. SKELTON. General, let me welcome you and thank you for being with us today. I hear the phrase from time to time “breaking the Army.” So let me tell you, I am concerned with the depth or the challenges that now face the Army. They have reached such a level that we are starting to see folks who previously did not speak publicly discussing the serious problems in the press. First, Jeff Record of the U.Š. Army War College published a piece arguing that the administration has dangerously confused the war in Iraq with the Global War on Terrorism, undertaking a strategic error on the first order with the result of an unnecessary preventative war on choice against a deterred Iraq that had created a new fund in the Middle East for Islamic terrorism and diverted attention and resources away from securing the American homeland against fur- ther assault by a terrible al Qaeda. The ongoing conflict and reconstruction efforts in Iraq have put continuing demands on our force; this has led Lieutenant General John Riggs to conclude and say publicly that the Army likely needs substantially more than a 10,000-soldier increase. My own view is that the solution lies more in the neighborhood of 40,000, based on testimony going back to 1995. If we don't fix this problem soon, we are in danger of seeing more of the problem identified and again cited publicly by Lieutenant General James Hemley, head of the Army Reserve. He told the Washington Post last week that the Re- serves faced a potential retention crisis once stop-loss is lifted. With these problems now prominently discussed by senior offi- cers in the media, how is the Army addressing issues of retention and of rightsizing our force by increasing end strength? General SCHOOMAKER. Sir, I would like to approach it from the front end of your statement to the rear. First of all, there are lots of opinions, and I encourage as we go forward here that, you know, that people have their opinions. I would hope that they would dis- cuss them with me before they are discussed in the press, but nev- ertheless, everyone has their right to express themselves as they see fit. There is no question the Army is stressed and that the de- gree to which we are engaged today in what is a very important endeavor, in my opinion, can't be debated. I mean, it is clear that we are committed to that. What we are doing is trying to transform the Army simultaneous with meeting the security commitments of the Nation. The retention last year, 2003, as I have testified before and spo- ken in the press, we met our goals 100 percent across the board, with one exception, and that was in the Army Reserve, mid-career- ist, which we missed by 6 percent. And this was at a time when their primary source of people that come into the Reserve, with their primary source with people leaving active duty, was cut off as a result of stop-loss, stop-move. So I think that is pretty laudible. So far this year, indications are that we are on track right now, that we are at 100 percent of goal across all components: Active, Guard and Reserve. There is no question that as we continue to op- erate at the level that we are, and if we don't make some signifi- cant moves, which we are in the process of doing to increase the predictability and stability not only in the lives of our soldiers, but their families, that this is something that is clearly on our mind and we are working on. Right now I have been given the authority by the Secretary of Defense to grow the Army by 30,000 people within the authority he has under the emergency powers that he has under the law, Title 10, and to do that, to buy the opportunity to restructure the Army, which is what we are doing. And we are in very serious moves looking at modulizing the Army, standardizing it and devel- oping an Army that is more lethal, more agile and more capable of meeting the current and future environmental tasks, and that is what we are going to do right now. This has been ongoing. And you and I have had private conversations on this and other members have, as well. But what I stress again is that we should not make a commitment to permanent end strength increase at this time with the cost of that incurred and placed upon us in the future years, because we will drive ourselves back into the kind of army that I joined in the late Vietnam era, early 1970s, which was an army of a lot of people that was hollow, couldn't train, couldn't move, couldn't fly, couldn't do the kind of things the Army re- quired. It cost $1.2 billion for every 10,000 people we had in the Army. And the worst thing in the world we should get is legislated end strength increase that we are forced to meet within our current level of budget and incur that in the outyears. And I am adamant that that is not the way to go. That if we can structure the Army in a way through this temporary growth and that we look for inter- nal efficiencies, we think we can get 10,000 spaces through military and civilian conversions. We think by stabilizing the Army where 10 in we don't move the Army every two to three years on an individual basis, but we keep people in place and develop cohesive stable units, where spouses can work, where kids can go to school, where people can invest in homes and develop equity, stabilize this force; it is better for the fighting force, better for the families and it will increase our retention. By stabilizing that rotational base—we have 63 constant rotation. 40 percent of those moves are discretionary moves, happen to do with Korea because of the individual place- ment system. And these efficiencies have to be taken. And we also believe we are going to get significant efficiencies as we reposture and restructure our overseas overhead and headquarters in a way that will also give us people. As we get our temporary bump-up where we can take these effi- ciencies, I believe we can bring it back down within the current targets, operate more effectively with a better Army more capable of what it needs to do within our current level of resourcing. So I hope this addresses your question. Mr. SKELTON. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Mr. SAXTON. We are going to go to Mr. McHugh, but before we do, General, you spoke in general terms about restructuring the Army. Could you be a little more specific and say what it is more precisely you intend to do. General SCHOOMAKER. Yes, sir, I can. On the active side of the Army, we are currently authorized ten divisions in the active force. Our intention is to retain the ten division headquarters, battle command headquarters, but take much of the enabling resources, the air defense, the signal and all of the enablers that are in the division base and push them down to brigade level and increase the number of brigades under each one of those divisions. Tentatively, we think we can go from three brigades to four under each. That takes us from 30 brigades within the division structure to 40 bri- gades. We also, as you know, have made the decision to go forward with Stryker. That gives us five Stryker brigades within the active structure. It also gives us two airborne brigades and an armored cavalry regiment. One of the armored cavalry regiments, the sec- ond, is designated to become one of the Strykers, so it is included imbers. That moves us from 33 current active brigades under 10 division headquarters to a force of 48 active brigades, more lethal, more capable, more agile, more modular, that will allow us to be much more strategically agile than we are today. Today we have six heavy divisions in the active force; all of them are different. Today we have two light divisions in the active force. Each of them are different. We have the 82nd airborne division and 101st, and of course they are different. This, we need to fix during this time. On the Reserve side, in the active Guard, currently we have 8 active Guard division headquarters which we will retain, but we want to go to 15 enhanced brigades that we have today to 22; increase their level of readiness and equip them along the lines of what we are doing today with the 30th, the 39th and 81st with the very best equipment available as they go forth and increase their capability to become part of a greater rotation base to meet the future strategy. 11 And then below all of that, combat service support, combat sup- port, over 100,000 structural changes to be made. We are going to convert 36 artillery battalions to 149 military police (MP) units. We are going to increase the amount of transportation assets, medical, aviation restructuring. This is the biggest internal Army-kind of re- structuring we have done in 50 years, but it must be done to make us relevant and ready to meet the strategy, and the real threat to the United States, as we know it today, as opposed to the Cold War, or World War II—level threat. Mr. SAXTON. And what will it do to your plan if you get a legis- lated increase in end strength. General SCHOOMAKER. If we get a legislated increase in end strength without the money and, by the way, on that 2004 author- ization bill that just came into effect, we will raise 2,400 spaces, e was no money that came with them. If that happens at a major level and we are caused to eat that money at the tune of $1.2 billion per 10,000 people, and one division costs 30,000 people, will take us 2 years to generate, my view is it puts our readiness at risk, puts training at risk, puts modernization at risk and puts transformation at risk, and that is why I am resisting it. The Secretary of Defense—I presented him with the plan. He has given me the authority to do—he has given me the head room under his current authorities to grow the Army; not raise the end strength, but grow the Army to give me the bump that I need to be able to do these internal structures, and I believe we can deliver that kind of Army over the next four years that we need. Mr. SAXTON. Thank you very much. Mr. McHugh. Mr. McHUGH. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. General Schoomaker, thank you to all of you for being here and thank you for the service and the magnificent you make available to the serv- ice of this country. I have been in Iraq twice now and am going to take a flip over to Afghanistan in a few weeks. And I am very proud of them and proud of you for providing the leadership to make sure that happens. General Schoomaker, I want to make sure I understand some of your comments here today. The Secretary has given you the option of going to 30,000 additional troops, saying that he has waived under the emergency declaration provisions the statutory cap on end strength. General SCHOOMAKER. That is correct. Mr. McHUGH. How long does the secretary intend to declare that emergency to waive that limit? General SCHOOMAKER. Well, sir, I am not sure we can see into the future, but I have asked him to do that for the duration of the emergency, or to four years. I think I need four years to do this. Mr. McHUGH. And therein you use the word "temporary” and you were gracious to drop by my office when you came out of what I thought you described as a pretty peaceful and happy retirement to take up this. I admire you—well, I am going to keep out of your way, because I question your stability and by that I mean simply why anybody would want to take this challenge can only be de- scribed as a love for the Army, and I have a deep respect for that. But you are new to this challenge in that position. 12 But 90 percent of what has been said here this morning, with all due respect, is something we have all been hearing for years: that the Secretary of Defense comes up here and talks about rebal- ancing the Reserve Component and the Active Component. They talk about taking military uniform out of civilian positions and moving them into the Army and into military positions. And yet in all of that time, we have not seen one cent to achieve any of that. And that is the frustration for many of us and ranking member and others who have been concerned about this end strength be- cause we are dealing now with a three to four-year period in retro- spect, and you are talking about a four-year period on the other end. And I trust that is probably your best guess, but probably a best-case scenario, as well. We are talking about a lot of time and peoples' lives. · As I understand it, you respect that effect on those lives, as well. As I understand your transition with increasing the modular capa- bilities of your two divisions as you bring them back and increasing the combat brigades, which makes a lot of sense, that requires 10,000 more support personnel, is that not true? General SCHOOMAKER. I am not quite sure I am following. Mr. McHUGH. To look at what you are looking to create, it is a greater need of about 10,000 people in uniform to provide the sup- port for those brigades. General SCHOOMAKER. I am not sure that that number is accu- rate. If you want to create a division in the way that we created divisions in the past, it takes about 30,000 people across the force to generate a 15- to 17,000-person division. We are creating a dif- ferent kind of force. I don't differ with you on the sanity check. You have to get in line behind my wife. But the but I do differ with you—if you take a look, number one, we achieved approximately 5,000 savings on the conversion this last year. And we think we can do that again this year. If you take a look and see that we have created two Stryker bri- gades. We are creating the third and posturing for the fourth, I think that is significant restructuring and transformation that is taking place there. If you take a look at some of the things we have already done, Third Infantry Division as it is resetting right now is going through major experimentation in terms of what things should look like. I think we are making some progress. I would caution everybody here. One of the reasons it is so difficult to transform outside of the context of the current kind of emergency is that the amount of energy it takes to develop momentum within a stable force is huge. What we have now is a force in motion and under stress and highly motivated to transform itself. We should take advantage both for fiscal reasons and for national security reasons. We should take advantage of this movement that we currently have that is reset and transformed during this emergency. And that is what gives me the encouragement that, in fact, we can do this. Mr. McHUGH. I appreciate that. We have got internal informa- tion, and by internal, that the committee possesses that suggests that you are going to need additional troop strength or personnel to create those resets. But that is something we need to keep an eye on. 13 General SCHOOMAKER. Could I address something, because I am not sure I am making myself clear. If you take a look at the delta between what we can generate within our current end strength, which could be from 20,000 to 30,000 people, that is stabilization so that we garner some people, that is conversions, that is restruc- turing as a result of the headquarters overhead that we got right now in places like Korea, Germany and elsewhere that we will gar- ner some savings out of, so that is within our current authoriza- tion. And then you take a look at the temporary hump, you are talking about a delta between 40 and 60,000 people we've got to use that we have already paid for, and we have the authority to use and that is the opportunity here. That is the window of opportunity here that we haven't had that we are trying to take advantage of. I think it is prudent for the tax- payer and the Army that we take advantage of this opportunity and do this now, which is what we are trying to do. I really counsel against incurring permanent end strength increases within the pro- gram because it can only be paid one way, modernization, training, resetting. Mr. MCHUGH. If I may, to the extent that we don't provide the money—and let me just close because we are not operating the lights here, but I don't want to be hoggish about the time. Close on two points. All of us support the initiative you have outlined, and I don't want to make it sound like it is cold gruel because it is not. You have brought your own design and I compliment you for it, and I think it definitely deserves to be pursued and holds a great deal of promise. Speaking for myself, I look forward to help- ing you and supporting you on that to the extent that is helpful. Second of all, I could not agree more. The last thing we want to do is recreate the scenarios of the 1970s where you had the hollow force, and certainly I know, I have spoken to the chairman of the committee in the last 24 hours and he feels very strongly that should end increases be there, they would have to be funded be- cause no one is looking for you to have to find out that would be I agree again devastating. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. SAXTON. Thank you very much. Mr. Taylor. Mr. TAYLOR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank all of you gentleman for what you do and what the troops you lead do. Two things I would like you to address. Number one, several soldiers brought it to my attention that they were getting ready to perma- nent change of station (PCS), and that the unit they were PCS to was going to bring them right back to Iraq. Now I don't know if I happened to see a blurb, but I would be curious, General, if the Army is tracking how often that is going to happen as a percentage of the total force. Because again, I could imagine the toughest place for a soldier would be not necessarily the correct order, Korea, Af- ghanistan, Iraq, and I would be curious if the Army is tracking just how often these same solders are asked to do these back to back. Second thing I wish you would touch on. General Sanchez and I had a brief conversation at which time he said, off the top of his head, he thought that more than half of the casualties were being caused by IEDs, improvised explosive devices. He has not had a chance to get back to me. I have noticed my fellow Mississippians 14 who have been seriously wounded or killed, and almost every one of them was because of IEDs. I am concerned that we are making, as a Nation—and I use the word “we”—the same mistake with tak- ing steps to prevent attacks from the IEDs as we did with the body armor. That we did not fully recognize the threat to every soldier, that we have the resources to address, and not in every instance, but in a heck of a lot of instances and that we are not devoting the resources. Now the administration is going to come back and say, well, that is a classified number. So, with all due respect to folks who have said that to me, the Iraqis have figured out if they hit that deto- nator enough times, maybe it is only going to work 9 out of 10,000 times, 8 out of 10,000 times or 7 out of 10,000 times, but they have figured out that more often than not, because of the lack of re- sources, they are going to hit that detonator and they are going to kill or maim an American. What are we doing with the units rotating to provide a greater level of protection for them. It is the protection I got when I went to Iraq. Doggone it, I am told that some of these units are down to $10,000 to protect a vehicle which is chump change when it comes to the lives of young Americans. What are we going to do to see to it that the units rotating in are going to have a higher level of protection than the units that are there now? General SCHOOMAKER. Great question, and I share your concern on it. Let me answer your first question, which had to do with are we tracking with people that are going in back-to-back deploy- ments. We absolutely are and this is what is so imperative about us changing from an individual replacement system to one of unit cohesion and stability, where we rotate units, not individuals. And this is also the point at which we achieve great personnel savings within that by stabilizing. You are exactly right. Somebody could be coming out of Iraq and be stationed in Korea or coming from Korea and being sent to a unit that is going to de- ploy to Iraq or Afghanistan. This is precisely why we must stabilize this force. Mr. TAYLOR. Could you get that number for me. General SCHOOMAKER. Yes. The second point is one which we share your concern. A year ago, less than 15 percent, I think the number is 12 percent of the force in the theater over there, had the improved body armor. And as I have testified to, and as I have said publicly in the press, today, we have 100 percent of the people that are deployed in Iraq and Afghanistan and now Kuwait, that have the improved body armor. That meant we had to go from a single provider of this to six vendors I believe we now have and we are now maximizing the capacity to produce this level of protection. And I will be glad to talk to you about what that level is in closed session. Likewise, on the up-armored Humvees as an example, a year ago we had very few over there, today we approaching 2,000. They have increased the requirement to over 4,000. Mr. TAYLOR. Isn't the total number of vehicles in the 17,000 range. General SCHOOMAKER. Yes, sir. We are not going to be able to up-armor every vehicle that is over there. But the Humvees that 15 we are using for patrols—and I am talking about now building up- armored Humvees. Mr. TAYLOR. If I may, I would hope that you would address the jamming devices for the IEDs without getting too technical, be- cause that is what I think we desperately need. The technology is there. And again, half the casualties—according to General Sanchez, every Mississippian has been a victim of that. General SCHOOMAKER. There is a difference between building up- armored Humvees from scratch, which we are doing. We have in- creased production from 80 to 120 a month. But we are producing armored kits that provide armor doors and panels. We are meeting the Marine Corps' requirement. But we are on track right now to increase the number of up-armored Humvees across the Army to 7,000. And we have moved over $4 billion inside of our program to provide not only this level of protection, but other initiatives to im- prove the equipment of the soldier. So that is big. We also have a local initiative taking place over there, and I think you have been over there and I think you have seen some of the local initiatives. Our concern is that some of the local initia- tive we need to test to make sure they are not increasing their vul- nerability by putting soft armor on that becomes part of the projec- tile. We have teams over there to ensure the quality of that local work is such that it is given the level of protection we desire on this. So we are doing that. I would like to talk to you about the IED initiatives and would be better to do that in closed session than in open session, but we have taken major moves there that are paying off in my view right now. Mr. TAYLOR. General, and I understand the concern, I don't quite understand—I really feel that the reason the number is classified is not so the Iraqi insurgents don't know, but so the American peo- ple don't know. The Iraqis have figured out that if they hit that detonator enough times, they are going to kill a vehicle that does not have a jammer. General SCHOOMAKER. Which number are you concerned is clas- sified. Mr. TAYLOR. The percentage of vehicles that have some form of an electronic jammer. It is miniscule, and I know it, you know it and the Iraqi insurgents know it. And $10,000 per vehicle, that is absolutely chump change. General SCHOOMAKER. I will be glad to get you the figures of what we got in that regard, but I don't think it is appropriate here to discuss it. I also think that you understand that every vehicle doesn't have to be equipped. You have to have groups of vehicles that have that kind of capability under an umbrella, and I think that is left best to- Mr. TAYLOR. I would like the opportunity to discuss it with you. Mr. SAXTON. Mr. Hayes. Mr. HAYES. Thank you, sir. And gentlemen, thank you for being here today and the men and women that are doing such a magnifi- cent job. General Schoomaker, just comment briefly on how you are working with big Army and Special Operations Command (SOCOM) to create the proper synergy, as force structure and transformation occurs, coordination between soft and big Army 16 General SCHOOMAKER. As you know, I commanded Special Oper- ations Command before retiring in 2000. I was the Commander in Chief at the U.S. Special Operations Command. The current com- mander general, Doug Brown, and I have had a long relationship going back to the Iran rescue mission, when we were both union officers on that mission. I would tell you that I have never seen better integration of special operations and conventional forces than I have seen today. And that is a recurring theme we are getting from the field. If you take a look at some of the most high profile operations that are taking place over there, that would bear that out. Part of our re- structuring is providing significantly increased capacity to SOCOM of Army forces, and the number of special forces, civil affairs, psy- chological operations, special operations, aviation, that is all part of our restructuring. Those are already taking place and already reaping the benefits of that movement going back to Congressman McHugh's point as in terms of what kind of progress we are mak- ing: mean, I mean, I am very optimistic and very encouraged. And you know, over my long career in special operations, I have never seen this level of integration and synergy being achieved between those two components as I have today, and this includes across the whole force, Marine Corps, Air Force and Navy. As you know, U.S. SOCOM is a joint command and they are a very, very capable joint at is operating across the joint force in a way that I believe was envisioned by many of us who were involved in the transformation of that capability from the dark old days post-Viet- nam. Mr. HAYES. I would agree with your observation, and unless we give all the credit to General Brown, General Kensinger when you answer my second question. Talk a little bit more about why—and I agree being so successful. And the second question, what changes are we advocating within the Army to better work with Special Op- erations Forces (SOF), and are we adapting new organizational models to complement lighter, more mobile, more agile transformed Army? General SCHOOMAKER. This past week, I was at both the Joint National Training Center, the new national training center con- struct that we have with the Marine Corps, the Army, SOF. The Air Force out of Nellis are all coming together in line in virtual and constructive wargaming. We have built-if you go out to the Na- tional Training Center today and take a look at the six to eight Iraqi and Afghan villages we have built out there, the hundreds of civilians on the battlefield, the insurgents that are on the battle- field, and look at the joint work that is being done across the serv- ices and SOCOM with the units right now, the Third Infantry Divi- sion, Third Brigade is out there going through this, it will water your eyes. I talked to a young company commander that was in- volved in an operation out there last week that had just returned from Iraq, and I asked him what he thought, and he said this brings back some really bad memories of what is going on. He said this is demanding. It is exactly the kind of thing we need to be doing. If you go to the Joint—the Joint Reserve Training Cen- ter (JRTC) down at Ft. Polk and take a look at what now is on the 17 battlefield there, we have over 600 Arab speakers, both contract and uniform, that we now have on that battlefield that are creating precisely the kind of operational environment that we are facing. gone from kind of 12th grade work to Master's Degree on the path towards Ph.D.-level work in terms of new integration and bringing the current battlefield construct, strategic construct to our training base. So I think we are exactly on the kind of path that we need to be on and it is borne out by—and by the way, the unit that is going through Ft. Polk now in that environment. Mr. HAYES. Old Hickory. General SCHOOMAKER. Old Hickory. That is exactly right. And I spent some time with them last week through their trainings from the mobilization Fort Bragg and all the way through this, and I think they are giving very, very high marks in terms of how they are being prepared and expected to go and do what they are going to do. Those three National Guard brigades are getting the best train- ing that we have ever given anybody and they are getting the best equipment that we have ever put on soldiers. Over $3,000 per sol- dier in the very newest equipment, body armor. That is part of the $4 billion that we programmed in our resources this year. Mr. HAYES. Thank you. I have been to the National Training Center (NTC), look forward to Polk, and I was there with Old Hick- ory. Appreciate all of you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. SAXTON. Mr. Snyder. Dr. SNYDER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I wanted to ask General Schoomaker just a couple of practical questions in terms of bring- ing in a unit and replacing and swapping out a unit. You are going to have an overlap period. In terms of housing, how do you respond to that challenge? I assume we are not going to double up in bunks for a week or two or three. How do you handle the housing needs as you have two units in the same geographic location? General SCHOOMAKER. I was not here for the Jy's piece of this as he laid it down. I don't know how much he explained. The spe- cifics we probably ought to do in closed session. But you know there are some changes that are taking place in the way bound- aries are laid and where units are going and all of that. And right now that is not an issue to the best of my knowledge. That is some- thing I have asked about. I have been assured by General Sanchez and the others over there that we have done that. As you know, take the Old Hickory, they have had already three or four econnaissance trips in there with their leadership looking and organizing and coordinating with the units they are replacing, looking at the terrain they are going to take over and integrating that construct, and all that is all part of what they are doing. And nothing has been brought to my attention right now that is prob- lematic in that regard. Dr. SNYDER. Good. I wanted to ask, too—with regard to equip- ment, you talked in some detail in Mr. Taylor's question about the up-armored Humvees and the number that are there and those that are coming in. At what point do the number that are there are having to be brought back because they are worn out or need major repair or overhaul. What is the life expectancy of an up-armored Humvee in Iraq these days? 18 General SCHOOMAKER. Not unlike any other. But we are bringing none of those back. Everything is staying that we have invested over there. We are bringing no up-armored vehicles back. Dr. SNYDER. So they will be able to be maintained and over- hauled there? General SCHOOMAKER. Army Materiel Command has put forward depot level contact teams forward. We are doing maintenance and refurbishment in the field. As you know, the 3rd Infantry Division, when it went in on the initial war phase, fell in on prej equipment, over 9,000 pieces of that equipment. That is being reset and refurbished in theater. But there are no up-armored Humvees, no body armor or anything else like that is coming out of theater. It is remaining and will be passed on to units that are coming in. Dr. SNYDER. General Hagee, in your opening statement you talked in detail about experience with small wars and contacts with the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) and looked at the work in neighborhoods and communities in a different way and there were some press reports that I think tried to draw some dis- tinction between that approach and what has been done in Iraq so far. I am sure you saw those articles, too. But the kinds of things that you are drawing on, the years of experience in the past, the Marine Corps knowledge of small wars, contacts with LAPD, that is information that has been out there for years. Is this part of this discussion that has been going on about, could we have approached this differently from the beginning after Baghdad fell? Is that part of that discussion that we perhaps could have been done better with a different approach from the get go? General HAGEE. In my opinion, no, sir. I believe that the forces that are over there, when they started the current operation sev- eral months ago, the battlefield was different at that time than it is today. They have done a tremendous job preparing that particu- lar battlefield, and it has changed. And we as I mentioned in my opening statement, we have worked very closely with the Army units that are over there so that we truly understand how that bat- tlefield has changed. In fact, the scenarios that we are using to train our forces are the same scenarios that the Army forces over there recommended that we use. So all of us are changing as the situation on the ground changes in trying to respond to that situation on the ground. In the past, no surprise, especially over the last 18 months, we have spent a lot of time on major combat operations, and we have not forgotten how to do that. But what we want to do now is focus on and refresh some of those capabilities that we have to have done for the different type of operation that we are facing on the ground there now. Dr. SNYDER. My last question, General Schoomaker, a National Public Radio (NPR) story I heard talking about there were close to 10,000 medical evacuations from Iraq of wounded or injured or some other medical condition. As you are planning for bringing back substantial numbers of people simultaneously back to the States, is the system prepared for the kinds of medical evaluations and screenings to handle those kinds of numbers? General SCHOOMAKER. Sir, this is a real success story in the way that medical care has been brought to soldiers, sailors, airmen, and 19 Marines on this battlefield—and civilians by the way. We have had extraordinary success because of the improvements and because of the organizations and everything that we have got there. I think you know, and I don't want to get into the exact figures but I think you know that not everybody that is wounded, injured or falls ill is a result of enemy action. And there are some historical trends that are consistent with what we are seeing right now. But I will tell you that every soldier—and this is one of the les- sons learned from the first Gulf War-every soldier that comes back from theater goes through thorough medical examination and it is now documented in the database and tracked, regardless of whether it is a combat wound or a noncombat injury or whether it is an illness. Dr. SNYDER. And you are confident that the system will be able to handle the increased numbers that are all coming back at the same time? General SCHOOMAKER. Sir, we have mobilized our mobilization and demobilization stations in a way that it is handling this ade- quately now. And I see, we have really gone to school on this. I think we are going to do very well. Dr. SNYDER. Thank you, gentlemen. Mr. SAXTON. Mr. Simmons. Mr. SIMMONS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. To General Hagee, ear- lier you made the remark about congressional support of our troops in the field. I believe I see from your ribbons, General, that you are a Vietnam vet, and I would say that one of the saddest parts of that war, and I served in Vietnam myself, was that troops in the field did not feel we had support. And I certainly commit myself, as I am sure most MEMBERS of this committee do, to providing that support to our troops in the field. And that leads me to my question for General Schoomaker, a couple of questions. I had the privilege of going to Iraq last October on a Congressional delegation (CODĚL) from this committee. I met with four different Guard and Reserve units. And one of the issues that came up repeatedly was the fact that Guard and Reserve units, many of them MP units—are doing MP or security assign- ments, do not have up-armored Humvees. And I wrote to the Sec- retary of the Army and he wrote me back in November saying that the movement of these vehicles into the Central Command area of operations has been a top priority. Top priority. I think we know from previous comments that there continue to be numerous Guard and Reserve units that do not have up-ar- mored Humvees and the adapter kits that are being produced by Rock Island Arsenal and other commercial vendors are sim getting over there fast enough. And when I look at the testimony, General, your testimony on page 4 where we read that 18 component field artillery batteries are going to be converted to MP military occupational specialty (MOS), my guess is that they do not have up-armored Humvees be- cause their traditional mission did not require it, and yet they are going to be out there operating on what is essentially a country without a frontline. So these vehicles, these non-up-armored Humvees, some of which have Eisenglas windows and canvas doors—to which I could take 20 this pen and jam it through the door-doors that are no more se- cure than the doors on my CJ7 Jeep, these units are converting to a task where they are running essentially combat operations in ve- hicles that simply are not up to standard. I have been in touch with commercial vendors who have kits available, some are slap-on kits with various types of p Dus types of plastic mate- rial. I have been in touch with Rock Island Arsenal on their doors, which can be converted in two hours, and one of those doors actu- ally saved the life of a Connecticut guardsman. The on a day before the ambush and saved his life. The family called me and were crying on the phone. This to me is a top priority, but I am not satisfied. I hear that the kits are being shipped over by ship, not air. I think that is inadequate. Some of the vendors are not operating at full capacity. They are waiting for more orders and it seems to me this is such an obvious thing for us to focus on. And so I would also like to say that it is a real morale buster for the Guard and the Reserve. Many of them get put into an Ac- tive Component command, their equipment is inadequate because in the Guard and the Reserve you do not get the up-armor, and yet they are over there operating, doing the same things, going on the same streets, securing the same areas. And when they get caught in an IAD, they are wounded and killed and the Active Component folks are adequately protected. I would like to hear what you personally are doing to implement what the Secretary of the Army told me—the Acting Secretary told me was a top priority so that we can get these kits out to our men and women in the field and make sure that these converting Re- serve units are fully and completely equipped before they go over. General SCHOOMAKER. Sir, I think you know I cosigned this with the Acting Secretary, and I am very close on this. It is our highest priority. If you know of anybody that we have not talked to, we will take that and talk to them and do everything we can to make sure that we are using the full capacity of this Nation to protect our people. I do differ with you, however, in that the Reserve Component is not the only component that did not have up-armored Humvees. The Active Component did. Really, a year ago up-armored Humvees were limited to very few units, Active or Reserve. And the distribution of up-armored Humvees in theater has nothing to do with whether it is an Active or Reserve component. It has to do with where the commander considers his priorities of protection to be. And there are lots of MP units that have to do with detention, for instance, other kinds of things that they do not patrol, that ob- viously some of these 149 units that I am talking about are not all going to be over there at one time. And many of them are not going to have patrol functions that require that level of protection. They have other jobs, other military police jobs. So I guess, just to kind of tie it all together, if you know some- a't know and there is something we can do, I will take that and we will act on it. The distribution of what is available over there, which is an increasing inventory—I said that we had very few over there initially. We are now approaching 2,000 in just 4 months. And we at the same time are putting add-on kits to all 21 kinds of vehicles, Humvees, all kinds of vehicles that you can imag- ine to include the local fabrication of things over there. I think we pulled all the stops out. If there is something we missed, we will address it. Mr. SIMMONS. General, I plan to visit some of these factories in the next couple of weeks. I look forward to going back to Iraq in a month or so. I think we can speed the process up. I think it is a no-brainer. I think up-armored Humvees save lives. I don't want to go to the funeral of one of my constituents who is caught in an ambush in an non-up-armored Humvee and tell those parents that I did everything that I could and the country did everything it could when a little bit of glass and hardened steel could have saved that soldier's life. And the Connecticut Army Guard has no up-ar- mored Humvees in all of its units, five units in Iraq and some ro- tating back. When they deploy they do not deploy with any of that stuff. And I am sure that is true of other Guard and Reserve units, especially those who are taking on MP tasks out there every day, all the time. And this is a low cost thing to do and I think it is a no-brainer. So I will be happy to join with your staff on these visits to these companies and arsenals to make sure that they are into max pro- duction to get these kits over there, because they do save lives. And I take it very seriously, as I am sure you do. I thank you. General SCHOOMAKER. We share your concerns in every regard. Mr. SIMMONS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to submit some ques- tions for the record on that. Mr. SAXTON. Without objection. Thank you very much, Mr. Sim- mons. Mrs. Tauscher. Ms. TAUSCHER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Gentlemen, thank you for being here. I think many of us have been committed to trans- formation for a very long time. And I think that clearly the sponta- neous utterances by others in the military over the last few weeks about the end strength needs have led to frustration by many of us who for a long time have tried to work with the Pentagon to get a sense of reality for what we now know is a very labor intensive environment, especially in Iraq and Afghanistan. I believe our military is overstretched. I am deeply concerned about the stop loss orders, which I consider to be masking serious retention problems, leading to potentially very serious morale prob- lems. I have introduced legislation to temporarily increase the mili- tary by 8 percent across the board, specifically the Army, Air Force and the Marines. I stress the term "temporary” because I am not interested, nor is anybody, in bulging out a military that is not going to deliver us in the short term or midterm what we need and then causing you problems in the long-term. But let's be really honest about what this is about. This is about priorities. We have appropriated on an emergency basis $166 bil- lion. And we are sitting here, ladies and gentlemen, hearing about not having up-armored Humvees, not having the right kind of Kevlar vests, and the truth is we do not have enough troops to do all the things we have to do at once. My favorite show growing up was the Ed Sullivan Show and my favorite people on that show were the plate spinners. Remember 22 the plate spinners? They started spinning plates and by the time they get over to number seven or eight, number one started going wobbly on them. We cannot go wobbly. We need to know that we have a temporary ability to increase the size of our end strength, do all the things we need to do, including transform. But what I am deeply concerned about is that we have a Penta- gon civilian leadership that is more interested in getting what they wanted for a long time, which is transformation, than making sure we have the right amount of troops. And then also making sure they get all the toys they have wanted for a long time. We could reprogram this budget tomorrow and have a temporary increase in the end strength and maybe slow down national missile defense for an hour and a half and not have to worry about the money. We know what the problem is. The problem is the money. General Hagee and General Schoomaker, if I was able to deliver you both the money and the troops, it would be easier, wouldn't it, to do all the things we have got to do? The answer has to be yes, does it not? So if it is about the money, what we need to do on this commit- tee, I believe, is to make the decision to really get the civilian mas- ters in the Pentagon to face the facts. We cannot put the strain on our military and on our American people just because we insist ideologically to keep the budget the way it is and to keep our in- vestments going on things like national missile defense and other things that should not and cannot be a priority right now. So let me ask you, General Schoomaker and General Hagee, if the money came along and you had a temporary increase in the troops, would it make it easier for you and would it make it better for you in the short term? General HAGEE. I am not sure that one can answer that question with a very succinct statement, either yes or no. It is not really about end strength; it is about the capabilities that the force has. It would take some time, if we received an end strength increase and if the money came, to stand up those capabilities. And my sense is that three or four years from now, that the situation is not be the same now. So we get an eight percent, which is a significant increase for the Marine Corps, a significant increase for the Marine Corps. And so four years from now, we would have eight percent-I am an infantryman, so slow on the numbers, but several thousand individuals out there that we would have re- cruited, trained, equipped, found housing for, with some indication that there is a career for you here. And so four or five years from now, we have those brigades and divisions ready to go. Do we need them at that time? My sense is right now, Ma'am, that we do not. And so my sense is that at least from the Marine Corps' stand- point, and really when you talk about, does the Marine Corps need an end strength, does the Army need an end strength increase, we really need to look at it from a joint standpoint, and that is what we have been doing in Iraq and not looking at it from a service standpoint. But as the Commandant of the Marine Corps, my sense right now is we do not need an end strength increase, that we can do what we need to do, at least over this next year, and this is some- thing that we have to watch. There is no doubt about that. And we 23 have to watch all of the indicators to ensure that we are not break- ing this unbelievable magnificent force that we have right now. But my sense is that we do not A couple of numbers that support that: for fiscal year 2004 we are at 3 months, almost 4 months into fiscal year 2004, our recruit- ing is over 100 percent. Our retention on the regular side and the reserve side-on the reserve side it is over 100 percent. On the reg- ular side, we have achieved in the first 3 months of this fiscal year at we need for the entire year. That is how the young Marines out there are voting. Could that change? Absolutely. And we want to watch that. But what I do not want to do is mortgage the future for a situation that we have right now that I believe that we can handle with the capa- bilities that we have in the Marine Corps. Ms. TAUSCHER. General Schoomaker, what is the difference be- tween what the Secretary we now understand is going to do, which is an emergency order to basically lift the end strength numbers specifically for the Army by 30,000—what is the difference between what he is going to do and what we have suggested that he do? General SCHOOMAKER. First of all, he is doing what I asked him to do. This is the plan I gave him and he has approved it, and it is my best judgment. This is not a one-dimensional game here. This is a Rubik's cube. We have to do all the things we have on our plate all the time. And I tried to explain earlier that I think we need to take advantage of both the momentum and the level of re- sources we currently have under this emergency condition to do not only our operational tasks, but to do the kinds of transformational things internally that we need to. We must achieve the kind of effi- ciencies and effectiveness within the force. Right now, especially in the Reserve Component, we are severely overstructured—too much structure for the level of authorization. And that structure is inappropriate for not only the current oper- ational environment we are in, but the future operational environ- ment. And so we must do these things concurrently, which is bring that structure down, form that structure correctly, make that structure correctly across the Active and Reserve Components, properly train and equip and man, and then stabilize this force so that it can- the fallacy in end strength is that pouring more money and people in that single dimension on top of this current construct is like pouring a canteen in the sand. It will not achieve the end that we want. What we must do is have a sound structure with some integ- rity in it that is appropriate and relevant to what we are doing. And that is why I chose the plan I did. You know, I have got a lane. I do not have an ideology. I have looked at this. I have used my judgment. I have come up with what I consider to be the most prudent plan for the Nation and for the circumstances that we are in. And I will tell you, I think it is a unique opportunity right now to use these emergency authorities and emergency funding that we have got to get the head space that we need to do these kinds of things and allow ourselves to take a look at what our level of effort is over the next couple of years. And be informed—I am with General Hagee here in that our in- dicators are we are not only recruiting adequately—there are more 24 people lining up to come in than we have ever had and the quality of those people is higher than it has ever been. And there is no in- dication right now that that is not going to continue. But what I can predict is if we do not take advantage and trans- form and develop a broader rotational base of relevant force so that we can elongate the rotations and provide some predictability in the force, that we will have a problem if we do not do that. So, you know, this is not just numbers, it is content that is important. And I believe that what we have got here is a very prudent plan for the Nation and one that we can execute now. If you are talking about- Ms. TAUSCHER. General, with all due respect, it does not sound any different from what we have suggested, except it is not being done by the Congress, it is being done by the Pentagon.. General SCHOOMAKER. Wouldn't you expect-right now when I reach down inside the force I can't touch all the force because it is inappropriately designed and not accessible to us. Do not you ex- pect us to be prudent? Ms. TAUSCHER. I do. I just worry whether you are spinning too many plates, General. General SCHOOMAKER. That is what we are trying to do. We can do this faster and better and in the long-term it will be better for the Nation. And then, if what we have is not a spike and not a butte, but it is a new plateau, then I think we have a legitimate question about whether or not we need to grow a force that has in- tegrity to a larger size. But right now just dealing in a single di- mension is not only wasteful but it will not solve our immediate problem. We have to do this internal stuff. And I agree with you. There are many cases in the past there have been, you know, transformational talk that perhaps did not look for transformation. But I can tell you that it is very difficult without the focus and emphasis and motion that we have today, if this force is allowed to come back to rest as it was pre- viously, it will be impossible again to get the level of trans- formation that we want. Ms. TAUSCHER. Mr. Chairman, I just want to say one thing. I do not disagree with you. I am wholeheartedly supportive of all the things that you are doing. My concern is that the Constitution says the Congress is the one that puts up the military. We need to be fully involved in this. We have, I think, been moving and trying to get this moved ahead for years and now, all the sudden, it looks like it is going to happen kind of not with us, but certainly in a way that I am concerned in the end does not provide us with the kind of military force that we are going to need in the next three or four years. And we are doing it on the backs of these men and women. We could do it by reprogramming some of the budget and get more people in the short-term and have the money there and cer- tainly have the equipment that we know we need to protect in this field of battle. And I just worry about the priorities that the admin- istration is making. General SCHOOMAKER. As you know, right now the United States Army has 11,000 more people over end strength. Ms. TAUSCHER. That is the bubble. 25 General SCHOOMAKER. That is part of the bubble. And part of what we have permission to do is target that growth in the way that makes sense. Recruit, train, place, form this force. We can do that. And my view is it is prudent to do it that way. Mr. SAXTON. Thank you very much. We are going to go to Mr. Wilson next, but before we do that, General, may I make an obser- vation probably in the form of a question. It seems to me that the structure that we have now currently in the forces, in the services, and many of the strategies and tactics that we still employ, were developed during the Cold War for a much different type of a sce- nario. We basically were on guard because we had a foe known as the Soviet Union who had certain capability which is fought in a certain way which we knew all about and we designed our force and sized our force over time to take care of that perceived threat. It would go without saying that the threat we face today is dif- ferent and therefore isn't what you are saying that we need to change our force because we have a much different threat than the current structure was designed to defend against? General SCHOOMAKER. Absolutely. When the wall fell in 1992, of course there were indications in 1989 that things were changing, and—I am sorry; when the wall came down in 1989, it was a big indicator that things were going to happen, and by 1992 with the demise of the former Soviet Union it changed everything. We spent decade since transforming in what people thought would be a strategic pause. And what we now have is a whole new threat at a strategic level that is very, very serious to this Nation. And what we have done is we have adapted and we are moving out to ad- dress this threat. But the force structure lags. That it is more dif- ficult to make the physical moves. It is easier to train to, and to change your tactics, techniques and procedures, which we have done, but we need to formalize that and bring the force along to meet the things that we are adapting. And that is what we are doing. This, in my opinion, is not a threat that is going to go away any time soon. I think we are in a new era. That we are going to live with a level of threat in this world that is going to cause our Armed Forces to have to look, think and do things differently than we have in the past. So I agree with you. But it is not simple, it is not linear. Mr. SAXTON. Thank you. Mr. Wilson. Mr. WILSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And, Generals, thank you very much for being here today. I have really been looking for- ward to this hearing for several reasons, for different perspectives that I have. In July, I concluded 31 years of service in the Army National Guard and I am grateful for the service that I had. And, ironically, I spent 25 years on premobilization legal counseling, and so I am seeing it all come to fruition and indeed our Guard people and Reserves are proud to be serving. Additionally, I am honored to be here as a member of the Armed Services Committee and, in particular, I have had the opportunity to travel around the world to visit our troops, and I am constantly reminded of the dedication of our troops and competition of our military leaders and the equipment that you provide. I am very, very pleased about that. 26 But very important right now is that I am a proud dad of a son who is at Ft. Stewart, and he is being retrained from field artillery into light infantry. And so seeing the extraordinary changes of No- vember 9th, 1989, we are evolving. It has been extraordinary to me to learn from him the movement from Multiple Launch Rocket Sys- tem (MLRS) to recovery of ordnance. And I want to congratulate you on that. And I have another son who will be joining the Signal Corps this summer. I look forward to him having an Army career. As I point this out, I want to be reassured one more time, Gen- eral Schoomaker. You said that the equipment is being left during the rotation. I believe that the equipment has been tested; the highest quality is right there. But, and I share the concerns of Con- gresswoman Tauscher and Congressman Rob Simmons about the armored Humvees and additionally the flack jackets and body armor. Are we on schedule for persons on patrol to have the proper equipment? General SCHOOMAKER. Sir, in my opinion, we are. And what I said I will stand by. We are not retrograding any of this equip- ment. We have up-armored and specifically designed and deployed for the purpose of providing that protection. What we are rotating out is standard equipment, tanks, artillery pieces, things that went over there and fought the war. What we are not rotating is body armor, up-armored Humvees, any up-armor kits or any of that stuff. I appreciate—first of all, I should have started out, I appreciate your service. My father was in the service for 32 years, World War II, Korea and Vietnam. I have spent a fair amount of time in the ; and I have a 19-year-old daughter, soon to be 20 next month, who did jump school in August and is going to air assault school in the summer and will be commissioned through Army Re- serve Officer Training School (ROTC) at the University of Wyo- ming. So I have a personal investment here. I surveyed our 307 active duty Army general officers; 92 of them have at least one child that is serving today in the uniform. I would ask what other portion of society can claim that level of per- commitment to that? We take this personally. This is not something that is being taken lightly or frivolously. And I would just like to throw that in. We share your commitment. Mr. WILSON. I defended our general staff. Persons have indi- cated, how could they not provide the equipment? I said there is no question that they are, because it is their family members at risk, and whether by adoption or by actual birth. And so you adopt our young people and want the best for them. Another question I have—I was grateful to serve on a delegation led by Congressman Skelton and we visited Iraq, and of all the things that impressed me was the one-on-one relationship of our troops to establish human intelligence. I had envisioned that the patrols were in speeding Humvees, but they are not. These young people are walking the streets. They get to know the local citizens. They establish a good relationship. And then as we have seen over and over again, this has provided the human intelligence to protect our other troops. But in a rotation what is being done to maintain this human relationship? 27 General SCHOOMAKER. Well, you are getting on a very important point and that is precisely—you know, this transition of authority as units rotate in there is not like a solid line. It is phased in and there is a handoff of all of these contacts. There is right-hand seat rides with your counterparts. Most of these transitions take weeks. We are very sensitive to the fact that the great progress that we have made has an awful lot to do with the relationships that have been established at the local levels and the integration of all kind of interagency capabilities and those relationships. It is an impor- tant point. Mr. WILSON. It was really very inspiring to me. That is where the ranking member Mr. Skelton and I found out that 70 to 90 per- cent of the people in the country were very supportive of the coali- tion forces. A final question, of course, is our concern about recruiting and retention. And from what I have seen, I have had many more peo- ple contact me about joining the Guard and Reserves, about being sent from one unit to the next so they can be deployed. I haven't had an body contact me to the reverse. And you indicated that re- cruiting and retention are doing well. If you have those figures and if you could provide them by State, I would be interested. General SCHOOMAKER. We will be glad to provide with you all of that. And I will reinforce what you just said. When I visited Old ry at Ft. Polk, one of the conversations we had with the whole group of soldiers was that they really would have been dis- appointed if they hadn't been included in what is going on. They served, they trained, they feel that they are being prepared. You know, to the best of my knowledge, we have had no problem in peo- ple showing up for mobilization. This is hugely encouraging, the commitment of these young folks. And again, I will tell you that one thing that the Nation is blessed with is some very, very brave and committed young people. It makes me enormously proud. Mr. WILSON. Thank you. God bless our troops. Mr. SAXTON. If you folks would keep your eye on the little lights, I would appreciate it. We need to give everybody a chance to ask a questions. Ms. Davis. Ms. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. Thank you. Thank you, gentlemen, for being here. We appreciate your commitment. As I sit here and we talk about the need for equipment, I can imagine how difficult it is for you because, in fact, we have sent young people into harm's way without proper equipment, and that is a difficult thing for all of us. I wonder if we could just go back a little bit through the chal- lenges that we face in terms of the rebalancing of the Reserve and the Active Component. And I know that obviously we are relying, as you have said in your statements, as well, so much greater on the Reserves. And I am having a little difficulty understanding from your statements and our questions of how we are really less- ening the impact on the Reserves by what we are doing and by our actions. 28 And part of it is the concern for equipment, making certain that it is equal among the Reserves and the Active forces. And we know that we have all heard some stories regarding that. The other is in medical follow-up. My concern is partly in the mental health area, that it is one thing for the Active units when they come back because we can follow them a little bit easier. It is harder to follow a number of our Reserve units that go back and they are really dispersed into communities and may not have some of those follow-up services. Could you help me out with that, what are we doing? And finally, I appreciate the concerns of my colleagues, as well I think that we were not as geared for civil defense as we needed to be. I appreciate your discussion in terms of the simulation exer- cises that we have been having. But once again, could you give me a better sense of comfort that we have made leaps in terms of our ability to deal effectively in the country and save lives as well in that regard. Thank you. General SCHOOMAKER. I would—the medical piece of your ques- tion, I will reemphasize. 100 percent of the people returning, espe- cially the Reserve Components—the Active force of course is com- ing back home and going and staying at Ft. Stewart or Ft. Bragg or Ft. Campbell or wherever they came from, and we have a dif- ferent handle on that. The Reserve Component people that we a demobilizing are being documented through the medical detach- ments at their demobilization station. That is part of their outprocessing. They are being treated, tracked, or the data is being collected from them, where they were, being compared against the mobilization medical evaluation and that is all going into a data- base so that we can retain this. The Veterans Administration (VA) is working with us on this at these places. I am very, very confident that we have learned from our experience from the first Gulf War and that we are addressing the kinds of issues that arose out of that. I think we are doing very well in that regard and I am encouraged as I go around. In fact, as you visit these installations, one of the places you might want to visit is places where we are demobilizing soldiers and look at how that takes place. It is a very formal process and well docu- mented and I am confident that it is going to do what you On the other question, that is I can't talk to the broader home- land security interagency piece. I will stay in my lane on this, but one of the most useful components to homeland defense and secu- rity are our Reserve components, especially the National Guard and the Army Reserve. That is because they are distributed throughout the communities and the National Guard in particular operates under Title 32, which is a non-Federal status for the adju- tant generals and the governors of their States. And part of our structuring of the Reserve Component is to not only take the com- ponent and make it more relative on the Active side, but also things that are more relevant to homeland security like transpor- tation, engineering, signal, MPs, and things like this that will be useful in terms of emergency at home. And those very serious capa- bilities are useful to us when we get in the stability and support operations that we are in right now and contingency operations. 29 My view is, one of the biggest benefits we will get out of Reserve Component restructuring is not only reinforcing the Active force but improving what their contribution can be. Ms. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. I certainly can appreciate that, sir, be- cause in San Diego, of course, we realize how important it was to have more firefighting capability for wildfires, actually in the Na- tional Guard. And we hope to- General SCHOOMAKER. It is hard to fight wildfires with artillery tanks and tactical helicopters. General SCHWARTZ. That was a mix of forces, both Active duty and Reserve. Ms. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. If I may, Mr. Chairman, one of the things that is obviously in terms of the questions that have come today is when we think of the quality as well among the services is having the officers from the Reserve Components available at the same time would also be helpful. Mr. SAXTON. Thank you very much. We are going to go to Ms. Wilson next, but Mr. Skelton has a quick question. Mr. SKELTON. From what I have seen in the planning and the caliber of people in uniform, I think you are probably going to have a first class rotation, and I compliment you ahead of time. But just from what I see, I think it will go well. But I have a tougher observation or question for each of you and it is very short. And I know you thought about this. In your opin- ion, how many more rotations like this will we have? This is not a one-time operation. General? General? General Hagee? General SCHWARTZ. Sir, let me start with that. We are looking at, as we speak— Mr. SKELTON. Where did you come from? General SCHWARTZ. I'm sorry, sir. Forgive me. Mr. SKELTON. Let me ask them, and then maybe you can chime in. General Hagee? Because their services are the two that are- go ahead. General HAGEE. We do not know. I don't know how many rota- tions we will have. Probably more importantly, I don't know what the size of those rotations are going to be. There is no surprise that we planned for a large rotation, which is worst case- Mr. SKELTON. But you have given it thought, I hope. General HAGEE. We most certainly have given thought, yes, sir. General SCHOOMAKER. I have given instructions to the Army that we should plan—this is not a prediction, but it is a planning fac- tor—I have said I want to plan rotation three and rotation four to be sized like rotation two for planning purposes. Mr. SKELTON. Thank you. Thank you very much. Mr. SAXTON. Ms. Wilson. Mrs. WILSON OF NEW MEXICO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, I also wanted to thank those of you who are serving and the people that you represent for all that you do for this country. I also want to say that I think we may have had a breakthrough here this morning. This is the first time we have had someone from the Defense Department come up and actually say that we are going to need to increase the size of the Army. The question is for how long and which positions and so on. And I wanted to let you know that I am grateful for that. 30 There have been a lot of us here on this committee, Mr. Cooper and myself, Mr. Skelton, Mr. Hunter, and-in fact, the large bipar- tisan majority of this committee are very concerned that the Army is overstretched and that we needed to get beyond the talking points and into the budget, the plans, the time lines, the training, the things that are required to not only improve the capability of the Army to meet the threats of the 21st century, but to make sure that we have enough forces to do the job. I look forward and I know that you know, General, I have asked for a rather detailed briefing on this plan and on retention issues and recruitment issues, because I think—and Mr. Cooper and I have also sent not only a letter to the Secretary of Defense, but to the President, saying this is an issue we must address in fiscal year 2005. There is no more putting this off. We have to fig- ure out what we are going to do and how we are going to do it and to put the money there to make that happen. And I look forward to working with you and with the Army and the Defense Depart- ment on figuring out what are the scope and details of that plan and asking tough questions about it, too, to make sure we get this right. And also to know what are the risks that we are taking- any plan has risks associated with it, and I think we need to un- derstand those risks and what the trade-offs are that we are rec- ommending. I would ask you to comment on two things. One is the issue of what units in the Reserve and Guard and what units are on active duty. I wonder if you could elaborate a little more for us. I know there is—you call them buttes. We call them mesas in New Mex- ico—and spikes and all kinds of plateaus people are talking about. But all of us accept that there is a very high rate of mobilization at the moment associated with Iraq. But if you look even pre-Iraq, the rate of mobilization of Guard and Reserve forces has been much higher since September 11th. And that is for all of us a con- cern about what continues in the outyears, particularly for folks who are Reserve and Guard units associated with security, civil af- fairs and so forth. What are you planning to do with those kinds of capabilities and are you looking at bringing more of those on to active duty? General SCHOOMAKER. You want to talk about your—I can talk from the Army perspective and I know that General Hagee has done some things in particular with his Anglico. He is bringing more Anglico capability on the Active side. What we are doing on the Army, the restructuring of the force is a total Army force, Active, Guard, Reserve. You are exactly right. We are using the Reserve Component forces for the purpose that we have them and that is to mobilize and support in times of emer- gency the Active force. And I think there are two strategic ques- tions that we really are going to have to answer in the coming years. One of them is what is the proper volunteer force and how do you incentivize that force for the future? With the current oper- ating environment, if it is indicative of the future and the effort that is required, what kind of volunteer force do we need in active duty? The second question, is the current Active-Reserve construct cor- rect? It was designed in a time of draft and we mobil 31 and we filled these units out and we went to major war. When your Reserve Component costs start approaching your Active Component costs for maintenance—I am talking about now training, equipage and all the rest of it-it starts to beg the question whether or not there shouldn't be a ladies and gentlemen Active force, and I think that is a question for the future in terms of what the availability of the Reserve Component is going to be and the rest of it. On the other hand, in our current environment and what I think vironment there is going to be increased need for National Guard in particular capabilities in the homeland to deal with potential terrorist attacks, to deal with national disaster, to deal with the kinds of things that we have, and they need to be relevant to the local authorities because that is where the problems were dealt with initially at the local level before they were federal- ized. That is our system, the way it works. Having said that, as I look at restructuring this Army right now, we are moving capability, not people, but capability from the Re- serve Component to the Active. For instance, port opening units, so that we can move much more rapidly in an expeditionary sense to open ports and airfields and seaports and those kinds of things. We are moving more civil affairs capability into the Active force struc- ture. We are moving more Special Forces, more Special Forces aviation. We are moving more MP structure into the Active force structure. On the Reserve side, we are taking down excess combat capabil- ity, excess field capability, airplane defense capability and other things and converting them to more usable force structure that will not only support us in an expeditionary sense, but in longer term campaigns and major war and also be useful in the homeland secu- rity arena. So again, it is more like a Rubik's cube. There are things moving sideways, back and forth, up and down. The structure is changing so it can be maintained at a more ready level. And we are looking at what is the availability. Right now, much of the Reserve construct is not reachable be- cause of what it is, and what we need to do is bring more of that into play to relieve the stress both on the Active and the Reserve side as we go in the future. We have over a million people in the Army, Active and Reserves. 555,000 people comprise the Reserve Component, and 482,400 comprise the Active, and we are not touching that million people. Mrs. WILSON OF NEW MEXICO. Thank you, General. I understand the concept. I think we are at the point where we are going to need to get into some of the details of your plans, programs and budgets, and that is not something maybe we can do here. But I look for- ward to seeing that. I am one of those people that does not buy a car until I have read all the Consumer Reports. And we have got to get beyond the talking points. I sense from your testimony today that you now have a plan and we are going to need to test that plan from a variety of angles and probably make some revisions to that and some suggestions to that. And I look forward to engaging on that, because I think this frankly is going to be the biggest issue of this year's defense authorization bill and how do we make sure the Army stays healthy and is ready for 21st century combat. 32 I appreciate your time, sir. Mr. SAXTON. Thank you very much. Just to take a little break here and just ask you, I know that General Hagee and General Schoomaker, you have 1 o'clock appointments at the Pentagon so you have to leave here at 20 of? Will that be satisfactory? General HAGEE. That will be fine, sir. Mr. SAXTON. Mr. Meehan. Mr. MEEHAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General Schoomaker, it is obvious that many of us are concerned about the effect of the massive troop rotation in Iraq on the National Guard and Resery- ists. After the rotation it is my understanding that 45 percent of the personnel in Iraq will be activated Guard and Reserve units. Obviously this places a huge burden on individual members of the Guard and the Reserves and their families, and it also makes it to most of us seem likely that it will affect recruiting and retention. As I see it, part of the problem is that we have such a large por- tion of missions related to stabilization and reconstruction oper- ations that are concentrated in the Guard and the Reserve. For ex- ample, the United States needs troops with military police training to maintain order in Iraq, but only has 37,000 MPs. According to the Wall Street Journal, about 12.000 of those MPs are i Only about 15,000 MPs are Active duty soldiers, so the rest pre- sumably are Reservists and National Guard. Many of these people are pulled from civilian law enforcement and the call-up has put obviously serious strain on police departments. To use another example, Brigadier General David Blackledge, Commander of the 352nd Civil Affairs Command, said that 80 per- cent of the Army civil affairs forces have been activated during Op- eration Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom and be- cause of this shortage we are only capable of replacing 70 percent of the 1,600 civil affairs soldiers currently in Iraq. How do you plan to compensate for the loss of these personnel during this new troop rotation? And I understand the need to make sure that civilians have a stake in any major conflict we ask profes- sional soldiers to undertake, but should we not be taking steps to make sure that the Guard and the Reserve forces do not have to bear such a large portion of the burden of long-term stabilization and reconstruction operations in the future? And I am curious as to what you think of the idea of shifting some of the military police, civil affairs, engineering and intel- ligence capabilities used for stabilization and reconstruction efforts to full-time Active duty force. General SCHOOMAKER. That is exactly what we are doing. The OIF 1, the first that we are terminating now and fixing to rotate out-figures I got here—76 percent Active Component and 34 per- cent Reserve Component. OÏF 2, figures I have here—63 percent Active, 37 percent Reserve. Now the way our Army Reserve is structured, the combat capa- bility, in the main, about a decade ago, was moved on the Reserve Component side out of the Army Reserve and into the National Guard. The majority of the combat support and combat service sup- port that is not associated with divisional structure was in the Army Reserve. And it is in the Army Reserve where you find the majority of your civil affairs capability. 33 And one of the areas that I talked to—and again, civil affairs are owned by U.S. SOCOM and the Army provides structure based upon their requirement and then they manage and rotate and de- ploy. But one of the areas in which we are significantly increasing U.Š. SOCOM's capability is in the civil affairs area by moving more civil affairs from the Reserve Component, Army Reserve, to the Ac- tive side. In the past, we had 25 battalions of civil affairs and 24 of those battalions were in the Army Reserve. Today, we are moving toward a number where we are increasing the number, but we are still going to be largely dependent upon the Reserve Component in civil affairs because that is where the expertise resides to do the kinds of things we do in civil reconstruction. That is, the strength of the system is that we bring that kind of expertise to bear when nec- essary. Mr. MEEHAN. Thank you, General. I know that there has been discussion about—this is a question for General Hagee. There had been question about adequate body armor protecting troops. And I apologize, I had to spend an hour in Judiciary, but I know this was discussed. It is my understanding that 20 percent of the HUMVEES currently being used by Guard and Reservist units in Iraq have been strengthened to protect against enemy fire or roadside bombs. I know the Army is working hard to up-armor 3,500 additional HUMVEES and get them to our soldiers as quick- ly as possible, but production is expected to take until 2005. This leaves our soldiers in many instances poorly equipped and poorly protected for nearly two years. As the Marines are prepared to deploy to Iraq again, it is my hope they will take some of the lessons learned from the Army in terms of providing adequate equipment to our troops. And I think there are signs that they are doing that. Just last week the Marine Corps signed a contract purchase for $7 million for add-on armor for ground vehicles from Foster-Miller, which is a Massachusetts- based company that I toured recently. And these lightweight inex- pensive kits can be attached in the field within one hour instead of the half day it takes for the Army to outfit HUMVEES with metal armor here. It is my understanding that the Marine Corps made this decision to purchase these kits after reviewing the Army's test results of Foster-Miller's products, which I believe were completed at Aber- deen Proving Ground. General, can you elaborate on how and why the military made its decision to purchase this add-on armor, and is it applicable to the other services for ground vehicles? General HAGEE. First, I would say, Mr. Congressman, that we have worked very closely with the Army, especially those soldiers and units that are over in Iraq right now, as to what is the best protection that we can get. And our decisions have been based upon those discussions. This is not a—this is not an easy problem, if I could talk for a few minutes about that. There is the requirement for personal armor, and we are—as the Army, we are 100 percent. Every single Marine who goes over there will have the so-called “Sappy" armor. Then there is the 34 question of how our vehicles—not just the HUMVEES, but how our other vehicles are protected. For example, one of the things we are doing with our seven-ton truck, we are taking the seats off of the side of the truck and mov- ing those seats to where the Marines sit back-to-back in the middle of the truck. We are putting armor up along the side of the truck. The truck was not designed for that; we are doing that. The Army is leaving behind-as General Schoomaker has said, 82nd Airborne is leaving behind some of their up-armored HUMVEES. They are leaving some of the kits they brought in, and we will continue modifying our HUMVEES. In those areas where we don't have the kits, we are using expeditionary ways, whether they are ballistic blankets or actually cutting steel. We are doing everything we can to ensure that our vehicles and that our Marines and our soldiers get the best protection we can give them. In addition, and I think this is important, because here we have just talked about protecting the vehicles, there are other things that we are doing. We need to integrate and we are doing this in our technical and human intelligence. The Congressman talked about what our soldiers are doing on the ground interacting with the Iraqis and getting information from them. We will continue doing that. We are using technological means to locate where these and I can't go very far in this in open session, but we are using technological means to protect the Marines and soldiers against the IEDs. And we are developing tactics, techniques and procedures. So it is a combination of all of these events, tactics, techniques and procedures, human intelligence, technical intelligence and arm- ing both individual-wise and our equipment that will provide the best protection that we can for the men and women who are over there. I have to tell you, sir, it is still going to be a dangerous place. Mr. MEEHAN. Thank you very much. Mr. SAXTON. Thank you very much. Mr. Kline. General SCHOOMAKER. Could I add something to this to clarify, because I think your question indicated or would kind of lead one to believe that the Army and Marine Corps are doing things dif- ferently. Mr. MEEHAN. Not necessarily. The testing that the Army had done at Aberdeen, I think, resulted in the Marines' purchasing a contract for $7 million worth of these kits. And I guess what I am getting at—I am curious as to whether there will be more of that going on. General SCHOOMAKER. Let me give you a figure here, because our requirement went from 3,500 to over 4,000 to meet the Marine Corps requirement. And all of those things that have been pro- duced and shipped are staying there. They will get them all. I just got some figures here. We are procuring 6,310 HUMVEE kits with $129 million. This will be completed by August of 2004. We have installed over 250 of these in-theater now and doing 182 Hemet kits for the bigger trucks, 19 Pulletized Loading System (PLS) kits and others. And I can give you these numbers. 35 It goes on forever here, but the answer is, this is a huge invest- ment and one that is very aggressive and one that takes the Ma- rine Corps-everybody, Marines, Army, Air Force, everybody in- theater is benefiting from this. Mr. SAXTON. Mr. Kline. Mr. KLINE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you, gentlemen, for being here today. Thanks for standing in the trenches for us all. I am very pleased with the presentation that we got today about the movement of troops out of theater and into theater. I think it is probably a very good plan. I am not surprised a bit, but I find myself delighted again to hear that we are paying attention to lessons learned. We got language immersion going into the Marine Corps, modify- ing tactics and procedures to adjust to the new situation. And I trust, General Schoomaker, that the Army is also doing some in- tensive language training. I am proud of my Active service in the Marines and very proud of my son's Active service in the Army. He has been in the Army for ten years and he, too, is proud of his service in the Army. But I want to share my concern, along with my colleagues, about the Guard and Reserve. General Schoomaker, you said the proper mix of Active and Reserve and Guard forces was a question for the future, I think you said, and I think you are sensing that. From our perspective, it is a question for today. Looking at the force mix in-theater at the end of the troop rotation, we have now had dif- ferent numbers. I guess it depends upon whether you are talking Army total force or service, but around 40 percent of the force in- theater will be from the Reserve and Guard component. Let me cut to a straightforward question. If you are successful in your transformation, moving from three brigades to four and so forth in the Active Army, and if we complete the movement from artillery units to military police that we see going on in the Re- serve Component and upgrading some of the Guard components to make them more deployable, what would you guess that mix would be in-theater? General SCHOOMAKER. I think it would reflect—well, you know, it is hard to tell the future. Mr. KLINE. If you had it in place today, if the tactical situation was in Iraq what it is today, if you had that force mix, what would the Active and Reserve Component mix be. General SCHOOMAKER. I think there would clearly be heavier weighting on the Active Component than the Reserve Component. Mr. KLINE. Even though you are increasing the number of mili- tary police in the Reserve Component and increasing combat bri- gades in the Guard component. Sounds to me like your plan, which I am not critical of at all because we do need the change, is still putting a pretty heavy reliance on being able to call up to mobilize and activate Guard and Reserve forces, and I am wondering if I am misreading that. General SCHOOMAKER. I think there is no backing off the fact that the Reserve Component exists to give a surge capability and reinforcing capability in times of emergency. But part of the re- structuring of the Active side is to increase the percentage of civil affairs, MPs, transportation, to aviation; all the rest of it that right 36 now is in heavy demand. As I said, the Rubik's cube includes Ac- tive, Guard and Reserve, in terms of restructuring both within it and across those boundaries in terms of capabilities within the force structure. Mr. KLINE. I don't know how to solve a Rubik's cube myself, but I understand the complexity that you are talking about. My point is that I hope at the end of this restructuring plan that you are working on that in the current circumstances, we would not be re- lying as heavily on the Guard and Reserve because I am heartened to hear that the retention and recruitment numbers are high in the Marine Corps and in the Army for Guard, Reserve and Active forces. But the other side of this, which I think some of us are frus- trated about here, that we are getting a little bit of a tin ear from the Pentagon, is that we have employers who are losing valuable employees to Active duty-being called up to Active duty. And we have a reliance in our communities on firemen and police and so forth who are no longer there; they have been called up to go over and serve in Iraq. And this reliance and I am afraid that this war on terrorism is going to last awhile. This heavy reliance on the Guard and Reserve has had an impact in our communities and our businesses and our districts that I think we need to—as a Nation, as a committee here and members of the Armed Forces, we need to put the whole picture in there. So I am heartened to hear that you think there would be less re- liance on the Guard and Reserve. I hope so. I am eagerly looking forward to working with all the services. . General Hagee is getting a little bit of a break here today. It won't always be so, General, but I am looking forward to working with you on that, and hope we are moving in that direction quickly. Mr. SAXTON. Thank you very much. Mr. Larsen. Mr. LARSEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for your patience today and thank you for your service. I have a lot of ques- tions to ask, and I want to be sure that we are exercising our ap- propriate oversight role. The first question is to General Schwartz, and this goes back to two hours ago and your comment on the Washington State Na- tional Guard who are in California training and getting ready to head out. Are you saying that the 81st would be one of those bri- gades that will be there longer than 12 months? General SCHWARTZ. No, it is succeeding units. And, therefore, the contract is up to 12 months boots on the ground for the 81st. Mr. LARSEN. They will be happy to hear that. Thanks. I appre- ciate that. Second set of questions is for General Hagee and General Schoomaker, and this has to do with the troop rotation obviously, but the focus is less on our troops and more on Iraqi security forces. One of the assumptions of being able to move from having 130,000 U.S. troops on the ground to 105,000 troops on the ground is having an increased Iraqi security capability. I don't want to simplify this too much, but we are decreasing the U.S. presence by about 25,000 through this troop rotation and the Iraqi security 37 Schooma footprint will be right now-in October, it was 115,000, but it is certainly higher than that now. But it seems to me, what kind of confidence can we have in the capability of the Iraqi security force made up of police, civil defense and civil protection and the very few numbers that are in the Army, where it takes 115,000-plus Iraqi security forces to com- pensate for a drop in 25,000 U.S. security forces? The question I have directly for you, General Hagee and General pomaker, is your assessment of the capability of the Iraqi secu- rity forces, especially in the face of a seemingly increasingly sophis- ticated and stubborn insurgency. Can you provide some comment on that and provide some comment with regards to your planning a troop rotation, and any thinking you have about it in the future? General HAGEE. Sir, this is probably really outside of our lane. This is something that General Abizaid, who is the combatant com- mander over there, and General Sanchez, soon to be General Metz, are working on a day-to-day basis and providing us information back. So, really, that question needs to go to them, sir. Mr. LARSEN. General Schoomaker. General SCHOOMAKER. It is outside of our lane, but we have had visibility of what the plan is and the progress there, and I think there has been substantial progress. We are trying to stand up to a sovereign Nation. And if you talk to General Abizaid about his concept of going from local control to regional control to more of a strategic oversight, I think he is well on track for that plan. And I don't think you can make a one-to-one relationship. I think it is complex standing a Nation up and dealing with all of the com- plexities they have got there across all of the kinds of demo- graphics and configurations they have got. It appears to us from the briefings we have received, we are making significant progress and we are on track to well over 200,000. Mr. LARSEN. Those are numbers. But I am talking capabilities. And the concern I am expressing has to do with the fact that it takes 200,000—212 is the total number for civilian defense force, civil protection and police. But it will take 200,000 then to replace the 25,000 fewer U.S. troops it will have in terms of capabilities. I am trying to get a feeling of the competence and capabilities of the Iraqi security force. Even in November when this troop rota- tion was originally planned, it was conditioned based upon the abil- ity not just to throw in Iraqi bodies, but to have the capability for Iraqi security, capability within the Iraqi security. General SCHOOMAKER. Their capability as a nation is increas- ingly becoming better, and they bring many attributes that in the long run will be beneficial because they speak the language, they are local and know all of the things there. And I am encouraged by the fact that we are making the progress we are. I think it is very, very difficult and incorrect to compare, on a one-to-one basis, the finest military in the world. Mr. LARSEN. I am on board with that. There is no way we can make a one-to-one relationship between one of our military and one of their security. The issue I have is that we see an increasingly sophisticated insurgency, and their work continues. And they are targeting Iraqis as much as they are targeting us. If we are trying to eventually work our way towards Iraqi civilian government and 38 work our way out of there, at some point, we need to be sure that Iraqi security can fill that gap so we don't have a bigger problem later. Mr. SAXTON. We have to move on. Dr. Gingrey. Dr. GINGREY. Thank you, General Hagee and General Schoomaker. My question is going to pertain—and I hate to keep taking you back to the issue of the HUMVEES and the improvised explosive devices, but when I was in Iraq with maybe the last CODEL that has been there from this committee, December 19 through 23, one of the soldiers that I met and talked with, Com- mand Sergeant Major Eric Cooke, whose uncle lives in my district, was killed two days later by an improvised explosive device while on patrol in a HUMVEE. So I am real concerned about the issue of getting these vehicles up-armored. And General Schoomaker, earlier in the testimony, you said in regard to body armor that we have gone now to up to six vendors who are producing the body armor. And it is my understanding that we only have—and certainly correct me if I am wrong on only have one vendor who actually does it in the factory at $50,000 per unit. I think you mentioned we are going from 80 a month to 220 a month of those that are armored in the factory. We need many more, and you talked about the kits. My question would be, first of all, do the after-factory kits that we are purchasing and spending a lot of money on to give the same protection to those vehicles, those HUMVEES, as the ones that are actually up-armored in the factory? And if they don't, then maybe we should-and why aren't we getting additional vendors to do that work if we only have one and we could go to six vendors for the body armor? My other question is in regard—and I understand this might not be something you can talk about, but maybe you can hint at it. These improvised explosive devices, if there were some way, if there were some way that we could detect them without having a HUMVEE with four soldiers ride by; and as Representative Taylor was talking about earlier, you can't have cottonwoods on every pa- trol and jam the signals from these remote devices of setting these things off. There has got to be some way that we can find out and seek out and identify these things and so our bomb squad can come in and detonate them or whatever, inactivate. I am talking about dogs. General Hagee, you hinted at this, tech- nological means that you may or may not be able to talk about. But those are my two questions. General SCHOOMAKER. We have deployed what we call “task forces” into the theater, and further discussion of the particulars we ought to have in closed session. But we are making progress. And there are capabilities that are being brought to bear that I be- lieve have demonstrated significant progress along these lines. adaptive foe, and we have to be able to adapt faster than he can. I don't think it would be useful in open session to talk about the particulars of it, but we would be glad to discuss that. I am a little confused, because as I listen to your questions on body armor and HUMVEES, we are making 25,000 sets of body 39 armor a month from six vendors. We went from one vendor to six vendors. We are building 25,000 sets of Sappy plates a month. Dr. GINGREY. My question is, can't we transfer that same effort to speeding up the armor of the HUMVEES at the factory level. General SCHOOMAKER. That is a fair question. The Acting Secretary is in a meeting at the Chief Executive Offi- cer (CEO) level with those folks and visiting the factory on how this happens. And we are addressing that, taking a look at what the possibilities are here. It is very interesting how these are built. The issue of whether the add-on kits are as effective as an up- armored HUMVEE—the add-on kits protect only certain portions of the HUMVEE. One of the things we made a decision on is that all future HUMVEES we make in the future will have the capability of accepting the additional weight because we are going to buy the bigger engine, transmission and suspension. In the past, many of these HUMVEES were not designed to carry that kind of weigh and that limits our ability to up-armor them. I think we are taking a pretty comprehensive approach as to what the future will hold. Mr. SAXTON. We have ten minutes left and we have three mem- bers who haven't had an opportunity to ask questions. If we could save a minute here or there, it would be appreciated. Mr. COOPER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am grateful for the service to the Nation of each of the panelists. Three quick questions: Number one, General Hagee, you were quoted by Richard Halloran, a former New York Times correspond- ent, as saying, quote, “Have we arrived at the point where we are going to have to have forces spread throughout the world—the Sinai, Bosnia, Kosovo, Iraq, Afghanistan? If we are,” you appar- ently concluded, “then I think the answer might be that we do, in fact, need an end strength increase.” this is in a December Wash- ington conference. Is that an accurate quotation. General HAGEE. Partially. I think I have talked about whether we are at a spike or whether we are at a new plateau. And if we are, in fact, at a new plateau, then I think we need to look seri- ously at an end strength increase because the time it takes to build these divisions—three or four years from now, we will have those divisions ready to go. If, in fact, this is a spike, a year or so, then to spend the money, to spend the resources to build those divisions that in four years we are not going to need because we are coming back down, I think is the wrong way. Mr. COOPER. Second question: General Schoomaker, apparently there will be an emergency order to increase end strength by some 30,000 thousand troops. How will that be paid for. General SCHOOMAKER. We are not increasing the end strength. We are growing using the emergency authorities in the current level of funding to include supplemental to do that. Mr. COOPER. The supplemental we have already passed. General SCHOOMAKER. That is correct. And the fact is that, as I said, because of stop loss, stop move and things we have done to stabilize the forces, that is not blanket across the whole force. Be- 40 cause of what we have stabilized, we have that bubble. What we it to do is target that growth in a way that facilitates this transformation that we are talking about. The sooner we can bring that down, because we find these things to offset it, that will work. But I agree, again, with what General Hagee just said. If this is a new level of stress that is going to be forever not for the future, but for the long term. Then I think we have a different problem and that is not what we see right now. Before we grow that force, I want to make sure that it has a solid foundation, and we have got it set the way it should be for the future; and that is what we are doing in this emergency authority. Mr. COOPER. In a leaked memo this fall to Secretary Rumsfeld, he said he did not have the proper metrics to determine whether we are winning or losing the war on terrorism. Do you gentlemen have any ideas on the proper metrics So the Secretary can have better measures to determine whether we are winning or losing this war. General HAGEE. I would suggest there is no one metric, that there are a whole series of metrics. General Schoomaker has talked about helping the Iraqis stand up a new society. We are not only talking about security, but we are talking about economics, we are talking about schools opening, we are talking producing electricity, we are talking about kerosene. There is a whole range of metrics we need to look at and we are in fact looking at. Mr. COOPER. Those are not traditional military measures. General HAGEE. This is not only a military problem. It goes across all elements of national power. Mr. COOPER. What are some more traditional military measures that we could be looking at, measures that are within your lane. General HAGEE. Security, obviously: the number of attacks on our forces, the number of IEDs. Those are all metrics we are look- ing at and tracking. Mr. COOPER. The Secretary has said those were apparently insuf- ficient because he has had access to those for some time. I see my time is waning, and out of respect for my colleagues, I defer. Mr. SAXTON. Thank you very much, Mr. Cooper. Mr. Marshall. Mr. MARSHALL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am probably going to ask both of you to think a little bit outside your lane as well, but I want to begin by thanking General Schoomaker for a privi- leged trip. And I don't think you benefited at all from my counsel. I certainly benefited from yours. Just a quick observation before I ask my question. Ms. Wilson's approach to this is entirely reasonable. There is a sense on this committee that end strength may be low. The fact that there is an emergency order that is going to increase the end strength by some 30,000 suggests that that may be the case. And you gentlemen are both saying that if we are at a plateau, then we need to rethink the end strength. But we don't know that we are and you are quite reasonable about increasing the end strength and not being given the resources you need in order to train or to do things you would like to do to have a quality Marine Corps and Army. 41 This committee's history and the Congress' history is not good when it comes to this, and we can talk to you about providing you the resources and money as much as we would like to right now, but then hard choices are made two, three, five years from now, you don't get the money or the quality force you want. It is reason- able for you to take the position that you are taking. Ms. Wilson is quite right that the details behind the talking points would be very helpful to this committee, and I expect you will be forthcoming with those and, frankly, I think you are headed in exactly the right direction and we ought not to be part of the bureaucracy that gets in your way, but part of the bureaucracy that helps you move in that direction. Out of your lanes, if you could order—suppose you could order any kinds of individuals, not just in the United States, but I spe- cifically have in mind the interagency folks. But if you were in a position to order individuals within the United States and outside The United States to move to a war theater like Iraq and perform certain functions to assist in the overall objective here, which is se- curing security and building a nation, which, by the way, our his- tory is not good at-17 efforts in the 20th century, three successful, and those were South Korea, Japan and Germany; the rest were not successful. So our history isn't good with regard to this. It is a long-term strategic interest of ours to be in a position to do this, so how do we do it. Mr. Larsen's observation, one-to-one, can you transfer one Iraqi into a U.S. military role and expect you have the same capabilities? In some senses, they would greatly exceed our capability. I mean, they are there; they are the ones who have to police that country. An alien army, no matter how proficient it is, is going to really struggle to police a foreign country. So we are going to have the Iraqis stepping in. There is a process that we go through institutionally in order to make it happen. Who do you need there now that is not there now, that you would like to be able to order to get over there and do something that would help you out? I wouldn't limit myself to Americans. I suspect there are others around the world who have comparative advantages over us that we simply can't match. General SCHOOMAKER. Well, without going into a war college lec- ture here, within our own capability, we need to think across all the elements of national power, diplomatic information, military, economic; and of course there are things in between, but those are the major muscle movements. Our job is to provide the military element of national power which are principally security-based. And our job is to provide a se- cure environment and an environment in which other kinds of things can happen, the kinds of things—by the way I think that this coalition effort which there is, that there is a wider under- standing that this effort in Iraq is a very, very important effort for the future of not only the United States, but the world. And it is in our best interest to have a coherent country where its populace is brought into a process that they understand and can live with, where we have electrification in the country, we have proper secu- 42 rity and proper water, have effective markets, we have all of the kinds of great potential that is resident within Iraq coming bear. You know, I think those are the kinds of capabilities that need to be focused and fine-tuned to make this occur. Our job is to help create a secure environment for those kinds of things to happen. That includes not only our presence, but the efforts that we have in standing up security forces within the country so they can do much of this for themselves. Mr. SAXTON. Thank you very much. Mr. Thornberry. Mr. THORNBERRY. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I am concerned that this end strength debate masks some deeper, in ys more difficult, issues which we need to confront to- gether. General Schoomaker, you mentioned earlier the Guard and Re- serve issues, not just how many, but who does what job and how they fit together. Another one which we debated quite a bit last year are personnel policies within the services. We had a big de- bate about what greater flexibility is needed with the civilian work force so they can take over some of the jobs that we have military folks doing. But within the military services themselves we have issues like mandatory retirement age, a requirement that if you don't get pro- moted on a certain schedule, then you have to leave the service, a two-year rotation where you spend several months learning your job, do it for about a year and then you have to rotate out. Aren't there a lot of issues within our personnel policies that require a certain number of people which, if we look at it and, I would say, update a little bit, it may play into what we can do with a certain end strength. General SCHOOMAKER. The short answer is, transforming our personnel policies is at the center of transformation. If we don't transform our personnel policies, we won't be able to transform the force. That is why we are going to get out of individual replace- ment, take a look at things like retention control points, take a look at keeping people in cohesive units for longer periods of time, reducing the turbulence that is self-induced. And you are putting your finger on one of the most important transformation points. General HAGEE. I would like to align myself with the Chief of Staff of the Army. He is absolutely right, sir. Mr. THORNBERRY. I think we are, all together-services and the committee are going to have to get into those things on this end strength issue. Mr. SAXTON. Mr. Thornberry, thank you very much. Listen, somehow we have run out of questioners here. We thank you for your forbearance and thank you for your generosity with your time and the straightforward answers that you were able to provide us this morning. We will let you go about your business now. And we look forward to working with you on those issues as we move forward together. [Whereupon, at 12:45 p.m., the committee was adjourned.] APPENDIX JANUARY 28, 2004 PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD JANUARY 28, 2004 OPENING REMARKS OF CHAIRMAN JIM SAXTON Hearing on Operation Iraqi Freedom Force Rotation Plan January 28, 2004 The committee will come to order. This morning the committee kicks off the New Year with an opportunity to learn about the most significant large-scale rotation of American military forces since World War II. Chairman Hunter asked me to fill in for him today as he was unable to make the necessary travel connections last night. He sends his regrets and also wishes to thank our distinguished panel of witnesses for agreeing to appear today on this important topic. It is a pleasure to welcome our witnesses today: (47) • General Peter J. Schoomaker, Chief of Staff of the Army; • General Michael Hagee, Commandant of the Marine Corps; • Lt. General Norton Schwartz, Director for Operations on the Joint Staff; and • Lt. General James Cartwright, Director for Force Structure, Resources and Assessment on the Joint Staff. Gentlemen, we look forward to your testimony. As Washington prepares to consider the President's budget defense proposal for the coming fiscal year, it is critically important that the Congress gain a better understanding of one of the most critical national security issue we face – the global war on terrorism and how the U.S. military will accommodate its growing requirements. How the Department of Defense and each of the military services, as force providers, choose to meet this challenge will in many respects shape the U.S. military for years to come. Decisions on active/reserve mix, mobilization and rotation rates, force protection, personnel tempo and other key issues are already and will continue to have a lasting impact on our all-volunteer force. On the other hand, this situation also provides an unprecedented opportunity to examine long-standing personnel and organization policy since most of the underlying assumptions used to build today's force decades ago are about to be put to a severe test. Let me now recognize the committee's ranking Democrat, Mr. Skelton, for any remarks he may wish to make. [Following Mr. Skelton's remarks) 50 Before turning to our witnesses, let me first briefly cover two administrative items. First, both General Schoomaker and General Hagee have a hard commitment that they must make at the Pentagon at 1:00 PM. Thus, all members should be advised that we only have a fixed period of time in which to cover this important topic and thus I urge their patience and cooperation in keeping questions and remarks brief. Second, it is entirely likely that elements of today's discussion can only be discussed in a classified session, so we may need to shift into executive session at some point to fully explore the issue. If this step becomes necessary, we will briefly adjourn and move the hearing to Room 2212 upstairs which has been set up for this purpose. 51 With those items out of the way, let me now recognize General Schwartz who I understand will lead off followed by Generals Cartwright, Hagee and Schoomaker. 52 Opening Statement for The Honorable Ike Skelton (D-MO), Ranking Member, Committee on Armed Services, U.S. House of Representatives Full Committee Hearing on Operation Iraqi Freedom Force Rotation Plan January 28, 2004 Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I join you in welcoming our witnesses. General Schoomaker and General Hagee, thank you for joining us today. We appreciate it, particularly since you will be here again shortly to testify about the President's upcoming budget request. We also thank General Schwartz and General Cartwright for being here to share their insights with the committee. The activities with which we are engaged in Iraq-subduing this guerilla conflict and rebuilding a government and a society are unprecedented in scope since the days of the second World War. And we now face a troop rotation on a scale also unseen since those days. I want to commend all of our witnesses for the care with which this rotation is being handled. It truly gives one pause to 53 consider the logistical feat involved here. But this effort raises some serious policy questions. The force taking over in Iraq is smaller than the force that is leaving. While I understand the argument that a smaller force can have greater capability, they must still cover the same amount of ground and deal with same size population. Moreover, while the numbers of Iraqi security forces continues to grow, their training and capability remain uneven at best. Our forces have exceptional training and are undoubtedly up to the task. But all of this is particularly important in the next six months as we transfer sovereignty to Iraqis. It is critically important that this transfer happen in a stable security environment. Beyond Iraq, I am concerned that the ongoing need for substantial troop numbers in Iraq and Afghanistan will continue to strain our overall force-particularly the Reserve element. This does not mean we should pull back from our commitments there, 54 however. We can't unring that bell. We've now got to win. Instead we must increase our active duty end strength so that we don't break our current force. Lieutenant General John Riggs who is currently examining this issue for the Army, agrees and recently said that the Army likely needs substantially more than a 10,000 soldier increase. This is a medium- to long-term solution, but it's one we must begin now. I look forward to the witnesses' testimony. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 55 VERSION 1.3 REMARKS BY GENERAL PETER J. SCHOOMAKER CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE ARMY BEFORE THE UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES SECOND SESSION, 108TH CONGRESS JANUARY 28, 2004 NOT FOR PUBLICATION UNTIL RELEASED BY THE UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 56 Our Nation and our Army are at war. It is a different kind of war, fought against a global terrorist network and not likely to end in the foreseeable future. In the days following the attacks on September 11, 2001, President Bush spoke candidly to the Nation. These terrorists kill not merely to end lives, but to disrupt nd a way of life." He added: "The only way to defeat terrorism as a threat to our way of life is to stop it, eliminate it and destroy it where it grows." Our Army exists to fight and win our Nation's wars. We are an integral member of the Joint Team committed to winning this war in fulfillme responsibilities to National Security. We are fighting to preserve the American way of life and to safeguard the many freedoms our citizens enjoy. Our Soldiers and their families have not forgotten the events of September 11th, which launched us to action in Afghanistan and Iraq. They are reminded daily of the through separation, concern for forward-deployed loved ones and, most regrettably, news of casualties. Our Ary continues the mission and remains committed to defeating our enemy. As our Army fights the current war and remains dedicated to transforming, we are focused on our two core competencies: (1) Training and equipping Soldiers and growing leaders; (2) Providing relevant and ready land power to Combatant Commanders as part of the Joint Force. Our Amy must be an agile and capable force with a Joint and Expeditionary Mindset. This mindset is the lens through which we view our service. We must be mobile, strategically deployable and prepared for decisive operations whenever and wherever required. We must be lethal and fully interoperable with other components and our allies; as well as flexible, informed, proactive, responsive and totally integrated into the joint, interagency and multinational context. Our management and support processes must reflect and support these same characteristics. At the end of the Cold War, the United States had no peer competitor. Our Amy was much larger and was built around heavy, mechanized and armored formations. Because America stood as the lone superpower during this time of global realignment, we were able to downsize our force structure. Today, the future is uncertain and presents many challenges. The emerging challenges manifest themselves as new adaptive threats, employing a mix of new and old technologies that necessitate changes to the ways in which the elements of our national power are applied. The 21“ century security environment today is marked by new actors, a noteworthy proliferation of dangerous weapons, technologies and military capabilities, while threats from potentially hostile regional powers remain. Increasingly, non-state actors, operating autonomously or with state-sponsorship, also are able to endanger regional and global security. These forces - 57 insurgents, paramilitaries, terrorists, narco-traffickers and organized crime - are a growing concern. They are frequently networked and enabled by the same tools and information systems used by state actors. Our adversaries will rely more i frequently on indirect and asymmetric methods, such as anti-access and area- denial strategies, unrestricted wartare and terrorism, to mitigate their relative disadvantage. The most dangerous of these threats is the development and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) - including biological or chemical agents, or radiological "dirty bombs” – for conducting attacks in the United States. This security environment requires that the Army have the capability to dominate throughout the spectrum of conflict and to plan for multiple future contingencies. As a result of this adaptive enemy and our active worldwide commitments, current organizations, systems and facilities are and will be stressed. We now rely on our Reserve Component to support our commitments to a degree not seen since World War II. As of January 14, 2004, there were more than 164,000 reserve component Soldiers mobilized with over 139,000 of them serving overseas. In addition, the Institutional Amy is being asked to do more, applying lessons leamed from current operations. These lessons are critical to our organizations and individual Soldiers as they prepare for worldwide missions. Today our Army is executing operations in defense of the homeland (Operation Noble Eagle), stability and support operations in the Balkans (Stabilization Force/Kosovo Force), peacekeeping in the Sinai as part of the Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) and combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan (Operation Enduring Freedomi Operation Iraqi Freedom (OEF/OIF) while being forward stationed in Korea and elsewhere. Approximately two thirds of our active and reserve combat formations were deployed in FY03 and will be deployed in FY04. Globally, over 322K Soldiers are deployed or forward stationed in over 120 countries fighting the War on Terrorism. During the ongoing transition of forces in Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF} and Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), eight out of the Army's 10 active divisions and more than 120,000 Reserve component forces (approximately 250,000 total active and reserve component personnel) will be moving in and out of Iraq and Afghanistan. This massive transition depends upon seamless coordination with our Joint partners at CENTCOM, various other combatant commands, TRANSCOM, USMC, USAF, USN, and a host of supporting agencies and organizations. All 15 CONUS based Power Projection Platforms and 12 Power Support Platforms are operating at optimum capacity with no critical problems. Reserve Component Soldiers and DA civilians are performing magnificently to support operations at these projection and support platforms. These deployments of our Army forces have highlighted stress to our force that has existed for some time. To mitigate risk, the Army is embarking on a series of initiatives. The first initiative is resetting forces returning from OIF and 58 OEF to a higher standard than before deployment. Secondly, the Army is internally rebalancing Active and Reserve Component forces to better posture our existing force structure to meet global commitments. A third establishes force ilization measures to reduce turbulence amongst Soldiers, units and their families. And lastly, we are beginning to increase the number of available combat brigades through improved force management and modular reorganization. This increase allows the Army to improve strategic flexibility, sustain a predictable rotation cycle and permit the Reserve Component to reset. Quickly resetting our forces upon their redeployment from current operations is a strategic imperative. The reset program incorporates lessons learned from OIF and OEF, retrains essential tasks, adjusts pre-positioned stocks of equipment and ammunition, and brings unit equipment readiness back to standard. Units redeploying from theater will reset through a series of actions to regenerate personnel, equipment, and retrain for future combat, Stability and Support Operations (SASO) or other missions. The Reset program will involve over 1000 helicopters systems, 5,700 tracked combat vehicles, and 46,000. . wheeled vehicles. The Army will further reset its Army Pre-positioned Sets (APS) worldwide to ensure these fleets are quickly retumed to a high state of readiness. Units must recover quickly in order to provide the Combatant Commanders with land-power capabilities for future requirements. We will face challenges as we rotate troops from deployment to home-station, while simultaneously maintaining vigilance and readiness. Continued congressional support and adequate resources are needed to accomplish our reset tasks and to mitigate the risk we have incurred to our Current and Future forces. The FY 2004 defense legislation and supplemental appropriation delivered substantial assistance toward covering the cost of current operations and initiating the reset process. We fully appreciate the exceptional support Members and their staffs have provided this year. But, the job is not complete. In fact, it has only just begun. Ongoing efforts to rebalance our force will restructure over 100K spaces in our active and Reserve Components to provide more ready and capable forces to our regional combatant commanders and relieve stress on high demand forces. We have already trained or are in the process of transforming 18 Reserve Component Field Artillery Batteries in military police occupational specialties. This reduces the high Operation Tempo placed on military police units since the beginning of the Global War on Terrorism. These initiatives, some already in motion and others taking effect between FY05 and FY08 will move select early deploying capabilities into the active force, achieve improved manning and readiness for both active and reserve units, and build increased high demand capabilities such as military police, civil affairs, and special operations forces. Recent operations have underscored the value of cohesive, high performing units. Stability will increase readiness and make better units. Force stabilization (unit manning) initiatives are beginning now to provide predictability 59 and stability for our Soldiers and their families, while enhancing unit cohesion, We are also working to increase the number of available combat brigades through improved force management and modular reorganization. This increase allows the Army to improve strategic flexibility, sustain a predictable rotation cycle and permit the reserve component to reset. These redesign initiatives have been weighed carefully to account for the best interests of our Soldiers, their families and communities. Our Nation and our Amy are at war. We remain ever relevant and ready to meet today's challenges. There is much more to do. We are prioritizing wartime requirements, Incorporating next-generation capabilities into current systems where appropriate, and preserving essential Investments in the Future Force. We also are becoming more joint and expeditionary. We do not move forward alone, but as part of the Joint Team. We need the support of the American people and the U.S. Congress. With this backing, we will continue to carry the fight to our enemies to provide security here at home. The dedicated service of the Amy's Total Force has been invaluable. The steady progress in the War on Terror has been possible because our Active, Amy Reserve, and Army National Guard units have fought together, along with our sister services, to win decisively on battlefields where terrorism once flourished. Now we are engaged in bringing peace to these regions and creating an environment where democracy can take root. Our Amy remains committed to sustaining the necessary readiness the requirements of our National Security. 60 NOT FOR PUBLICATION UNTIL RELEASED BY THE HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE OPENING STATEMENT OF GENERAL MICHAEL W. HAGEE COMMANDANT OF THE MARINE CORPS UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS BEFORE THE HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE JANUARY 28, 2004 NOT FOR PUBLICATION UNTIL RELEASED BY THE HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE 61 Chairman Hunter, Congressman Skelton, distinguished members of the Committee, it is my privilege to report on your Marine Corps and our participation in operations in support of the Global War on Terrorism. I thank the members of the Committee for their continued support of our Marines. Let me assure you that the Marine Corps' first priority is, and will continue to be, warfighting readiness and excellence in support of our Nation's security. Operation IRAQI FREEDOM During this past year, the Marine Corps, both active and reserve, was engaged in operations from Afghanistan, to the Arabian Gulf, the Horn of Africa, Liberia, the Georgian Republic, Colombia, Guantanamo Bay, and the Philippines. Most prominent in highlighting the value and power of the Nation's naval expeditionary capability was the Marine Corps' participation in Operation IRAQI FREEDOM. The I Marine Expeditionary Force deployed a combat ready force of almost 70,000 Marines and Sailors in less than 60 days. Exploiting the operational speed, reach, and inherent flexibility of seapower, the Navy and Marine Corps, closely integrated with joint and coalition partners and Special Operations Forces, engaged in 26 days of sustained combat operations and fought 10 major engagements, destroying eight Iraqi divisions, before stopping in Tikrit - almost 500 miles inland. Following major combat operations, I Marine Expeditionary Force assumed responsibility for security and stability in five central Iraq provinces until they were relieved of the last province by coalition forces this past September. Setting the Force Since the end of major combat operations, the Marine Corps has been setting the force in order to enhance and maintain warfighting readiness for future contingencies. Reloading of combat equipment and material on Maritime Preposition Force shipping is nearly complete. We are using provided funding to repair, refurbish, and where necessary, replace equipment. During this period, Marines have continued to forward deploy, and Marine Corps units have continued to support numerous operations to include Operation ENDURING FREEDOM in Afghanistan 62 and operations in the Horn of Africa. We have conducted a major program to identify and analyze lessons learned from the campaign. We have also begun to assimilate these lessons and determine where and how our force should be rebalanced. 2 Operation IRAQI FREEDOM II The Marine Corps is currently preparing to deploy forces to relieve the 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment and the 82d Airbome Division in western Iraq in support of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM II. These forces will be deployed in two rotations of seven months each. This rotation policy will result in the least disruption for the long-term health of the Marine Corps, precluding stop-loss/stop-move and unnecessary interruptions in recruit training, career precluding stop-loss/stop-m progression and development, professional military education, and other deployment requirements. The first rotation, from March until September 2004, will include 25,000 Marines and their equipment and includes almost 3,000 reserve component Marines. A second rotation - of like size and composition - will overlap the first and ensure a smooth and stable transition. In preparation for Operation IRAQI FREEDOM II, I Marine Expeditionary Force has analyzed lessons learned from their experiences in conducting security and stability operations from March to September 2003 and recent Army lessons learned. As they did last year, I Marine Expeditionary Force is already working closely with the Army forces in Iraq; they have conducted a number of liaison visits with the Army units they will relieve. They have drawn from procedures used by the Los Angeles Police Department for neighborhood patrolling in gang dominated areas, the tactics of the British in Iraq, which reflect years of experience in low intensity conflicts and peacekeeping operations, as well as our extensive "Small Wars" knowledge. We have assimilated these lessons through a comprehensive training package that includes tactics, techniques, procedures for stability and counter-insurgency operation. We have conducted rigorous urban operations training and exercises. Over 400 Marines are receiving Arabic language immersion training, and all deploying Marines and Sailors are receiving extensive cultural education. Our supporting establishment is focused on the equipage, logistical, and training requirements of this force - paying particular attention to individual protective equipment, enhanced vehicle and aircraft hardening, and aviation survival equipment and procedures. While the operational tempo remains high, recruiting and retention continue to exceed our goals. -- 63 During this next year Marine Expeditionary Units will still deploy, units will rotate to Japan, and some of those forces will further deploy in support of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM II. We are diligently ensuring that the Marine Corps remains ready for all our current and future responsibilities. I look forward to presenting a more detailed statement on the current posture of the Marine Corps when I return before this committee on the 12th of February. QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD JANUARY 28, 2004 QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. TAYLOR Mr. TAYLOR. How many US Army vehicles have been attacked with improvised explosive devices in Iraq? General SCHOOMAKER. I cannot address that data in an open forum, but will be glad to arrange a classified briefing for you on this subject. Mr. TAYLOR. What percentage of US Army vehicles attacked with IEDs in Iraq were equipped with radio frequency jamming counter-measure equipment? General SCHOOMAKER. I cannot address that data in an open forum, but will be glad to arrange a classified briefing for you on this subject. Mr. TAYLOR. What percentage of US Army vehicles attacked in Iraq with IEDs were not equipped with radio frequency jamming counter-measure equipment? General SCHOOMAKER. I cannot address that data in an open forum, but will be glad to arrange a classified briefing for you on this subject. Mr. TAYLOR. Of the US Army vehicles attacked with IEDs in Iraq, how many were up-armored HMMWVs? General SCHOOMAKER. I cannot address that data in an open forum, but will be glad to arrange a classified briefing for you on this subject. Mr. TAYLOR. What percentage of vehicles attacked with IEDs in Iraq are not up- armored HMMWVs? General SCHOOMAKER. I cannot address that data in an open forum, but will be glad to arrange a classified briefing for you on this subject. Mr. TAYLOR. How many U.S. military casualties in Iraq are directly attributable to IEDs? General SCHOOMAKER. Based on information contained in casualty reports submit- ted to the Army through January 28, 2004, we estimate that a total of 1,067 out of 2,537 Army Soldiers who were killed or wounded in action in Iraq involved inci- dents that are directly attributable to Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs). Of those killed in action, we estimate that 100 out of 292 Army Soldiers' deaths are directly attributable to IEDs. Mr. TAYLOR. What is the percentage of total U.S. military casualties in Iraq that are attributable to IED incidents? General SCHOOMAKER. Based on information contained in casualty reports submit- ted to the Army through January 28, 2004, we estimate that 42 percent of the cas- ualties sustained by those Army Soldiers who were killed or wounded in action in Iraq are attributable to Improvised Explosive Device (IED) incidents. Of those Army Soldiers who were killed in action, we estimate that 34. percent of the deaths are attributable to IED incidents. QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. TAUSCHER Ms. TAUSCHER. Drawing on his Title 10 authority, the Secretary of Defense has authorized an increase of 30,000 personnel over the authorized end-strength for ap- proximately four years. Where are these men and women coming from? Are they new troops that need to be recruited, trained and equipped? Are they drawn from existing forces? How many are guard and reserve and how many are active duty? General SCHOOMAKER. The Army is still analyzing the plan to grow this new structure. However, taking into account anticipated military-to-civilian conversions and other restructuring efficiencies, the Army strength should peak in fiscal year 2006. The temporary additional strength that the Army does require will come from additional accessions and increased retention. The Army currently has no plans to use the Army National Guard or the Army Reserve as a source for these Soldiers. Ms. TAUSCHER. General Schoomaker, How will DOD pay for the additional troops over four years? General SCHOOMAKER. This requirement is directly related to the Global War on Terrorism and is being made under emergency authority. Because the increases are above authorized strength, we believe the supplemental appropriations are a proper way to fund them. Ms. TAUSCHER. If the Army is currently about 20,000 troops over authorized end- strength and the plan is to increase the force by 30,000 leaving 10,000 troops that (67) 68 thority toate 30,000"hat is the need to yet be recruited from outside (as reported in The Washington Post (January 30, page A19)), how long will it take for them to be trained and available? How much will these new troops cost? General SCHOOMAKER. The increase in strength is temporary and the Army is still analyzing the plan to grow this new strength. However, taking into account antici- pated military-to-civilian conversions and other restructuring efficiencies, the Army strength should peak in fiscal year 2006. Ms. TAUSCHER. What is the difference between the Secretary's use of his authority to generate 30,000 additional troops and a legislative increase in end-strength au- thority to do the same? General SCHOOMAKER. The authority of both the Secretary and the President with respect to end-strength was granted by legislation and is contained in title 10, United States Code (Sections 115 and 123, respectively). The difference between using these authorities to temporarily exceed statutory end-strength and a legis- lated increase in statutory end-strength is the impact on the Army's Future Years Defense (FYDP). Use of Section 115 and 123 authority does not require any change in the allocation of money in the Army's FYDP. A legislated increase in statutory end-strength, however, would trigger provisions of Section 691 of title 10 that re- quire the Army to program funds for statutory end-strength. Therefore, a legislated increase in end-strength will force decrements to a significant number of programs essential to future Army readiness and capabilities, unless it is accompanied by a significant increase in Army Total Obligation Authority. Given the options of enact- ing new legislation with serious negative side effects or using authorities provided under existing legislation without those side effects, the latter course of action makes the most sense. QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. SANCHEZ Ms. SANCHEZ. Recent media reports have continued to highlight a pattern of mis- handling sexual assault allegations within the United States Armed Forces. I am particularly concerned that some of these cases involved service members deployed in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom. As it relates to Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom, please provide an overview of current procedures for responding to and investigating sexual assault allegations, What victim care and support programs are currently in place? Is our system for handling sexual assault adequate? If not, how can it be improved? General SCHOOMAKER. The Army remains committed to taking care of every Sol- dier, to include dealing expeditiously with any Soldier's complaint or allegation of misconduct. When a Soldier reports a possible criminal act, including a sexual as- sault, the Army is resolved to investigate the allegations thoroughly and promptly and to provide immediate care and support to the victim. We encourage victims to seek immediate medical attention and ensure early involvement by the entire chain of command. This allows the chain of command to maintain a dual focus on support to the victim and on supervision of a rigorous, impartial investigation of the possible criminal conduct. The Army has law enforcement personnel who deploy to the bat- tlefield to assure timely investigative support. When the evidence warrants, our Army takes a tough and aggressive stance on prosecuting sexual assault cases. As in any criminal case, an accused Soldier is entitled to the Constitutional presump- tion of innocence. The system that you have given us—the Uniform Code of Military Justice provides Commanders with all of the tools necessary to ensure good order and discipline in our force. By protecting the rights of the accused and victims alike, we ensure the integrity of our military justice system. The Army is committed to ensuring that the victims of sexual assault receive proper care and treatment and that their medical and psychological needs are prop- erly met. Currently, we are assessing our Army's policies and programs to deter- mine whether they provide appropriate support services to victims both in garrison and in a deployed environment. To ensure that our current policies and programs are effective, the Acting Secretary of the Army has directed the establishment of a Task Force to conduct a detailed review of the effectiveness of our Army's policies on reporting and properly addressing allegations of sexual assault. This review will examine our policies, programs, procedures, and training with regard to the preven- tion of sexual assault. The task force will further review the processes in place to foster a climate in which victims feel free to report allegations and leaders at every level understand their responsibilities to support those victims. This task force will render its report by the end of May. Ms. SANCHEZ. In a hearing before the House Armed Services Committee on Octo- ber 21, 2003, Army Deputy Chief of Staff Lt. General Richard Cody stated that all 69 troops in Iraq, Afghanistan, Kuwait, and Korea were to be equipped with Kevlar body armor by the end of November. In early November, the Armed Services Com- mittee was told troops were to be equipped by the end of December. And now, at the end of January, I understand that some of troops are still waiting for this life- saving equipment. What is the current shortfall? General SCHOOMAKER. As of January 24, 2004, the Coalition Forces Land Compo- nent Command (CFLCC) reported there is now enough Interceptor Body Armor (IBA) on the ground for every Soldier in Iraq. Afghanistan still requires a limited amount of IBA that is being addressed as a special situation, and should be resolved by this March. Some Soldiers in Kuwait also still require IBA, but in coordination with the CFLCC commander, it was decided Kuwait would receive its remaining IBA only after Iraq was taken care of. Now that the IBA requirement for Iraq is met, we are starting to focus on Kuwait and that requirement should also be met by the end of March 2004. Following Kuwait, we will expand fielding of IBA to the entire Army, prioritizing critical regions like Korea. Ms. SANCHEZ. I also understand that troops are being forced to share equipment. For example, troops heading out on patrol or combat missions are borrowing Kevlar Armor from troops staying behind? Is this the case? General SCHOOMAKER. Yes, until recently, some units were cross-leveling their IBA among their Soldiers. The cross-leveling of equipment is not that uncommon in the Army, depending on the mission. Unit commanders in Iraq were doing the right thing by ensuring a Soldier who was about to begin a mission was properly equipped with IBA prior to him or her departing the relative safety of their canton- ment area. Ms. SANCHEZ. Does the military have enough body armor for the new rotation of troops that is heading overseas? Is the Department of Defense planning to have de- mobilized troops hand-off their body armor to new troops? I understand that there will be some overlap during the transition. Is there a time when half of our troops won't have body armor? General SCHOOMAKER. Yes, the Army plans to have enough IBA for every Soldier deployed to Operation Iraqi Freedom 2 (OIF 2). The first units redeploying home will leave all their Interceptor Body Armor (IBA), to include both their Outer Tac- tical Vest (OTV) and their Small Arms Protective Inserts (SAPI), in the theater for OIF 2 arriving units. As the ongoing unit rotations continue over the next weeks, we will assess whether the last units to redeploy home can return with their OTV and/or SAPI, but only if there are enough OTVs and SAPIs in Iraq. No, there will be no time when one-half of our Soldiers in Iraq will be without IBA during the transition from OIF 1 to OIF 2, because we plan to phase-in rotations over a few months. Ms. SANCHEZ. General Schoomaker, recently, the head of the Army Reserve, Lieu- tenant General James R. Helmly, announced an initiative to overhaul the Reserve aimed, in part, at being more honest with soldiers about how long they're likely to be deployed. The plan outlines an objective in which reserves would know, upon joining, that they will be called up to active duty for between nine and 12 months every four to five years. Has DOD commissioned a study to examine what impact such a plan would have on troop recruitment and retention? If not, is a study being, planned? Is it possible that this could have an adverse effect? For example, would employers be deterred from hiring reservists if they anticipated a one-year absence every 48 months? General SCHOOMAKER. The policy that Lieutenant General Helmly referred to is intended to provide an enhanced level of predictability to Reserve Soldiers, their families, and their employers so that they may anticipate and plan for calls to active duty for a known period of time at given intervals during a normal career in the Reserve forces. The Army recognizes that such absences are by their nature disrup- tive and place strains upon Reserve Soldiers' personal, professional, and economic lives and those of their families and employers. One of the reasons the Army opted to make this policy change was to help alleviate this stress and to accommodate as much as possible the stated desires of employers of Reserve Soldiers, who in the past have indicated that being able to predict their employees' absences would be of significant help to them as they schedule their workloads. While the Army under- stands that this policy could, in some cases, have adverse effects upon Reserve Sol- diers' employability, it must rely upon employers' desires and obligation to abide by federal law, which forbids hiring discrimination based upon applicants' Reserve sta- tus. The Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs has a fiscal year 2004 research and studies project in progress regarding “Activation Capability" that will also consider the issue of predictability. tou make this point their Familiceserve Soldierch absencering a normal 70 QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. CALVERT Mr. CALVERT. As the Secretary of Defense continues to transform America's Armed Forces through a variety of means. and given the Navy's shift towards their Flexible Deployment Concept emphasizing Presence with a Purpose rather than the current Presence as a Purpose, and the Administration's policy of pre-emptive strike, do you think that the Marine Corps will ever go back to Okinawa and the Unit Deployment Program (UDP) as we now know it, or will Marine forces assigned to Pacific contingencies reside primarily in the continental United States following the OIF II force rotation? General HAGEE. The Navy's Flexible Deployment Concept will primarily effect the Marine Expeditionary Unit deployments and their ability to react to rapidly emerg- ing contingencies. The concept does not affect UDP forces. The Marine Corps Unit Deployment Program serves as a vehicle to meet the majority of USMC require- ments for Commander, USPACOM OPLANS. Following the conclusion of Operation Iraqi Freedom it is our intent to fully resume the Unit Deployment Program to Oki- nawa and Iwakuni, Japan. IRAQ’S TRANSITION TO SOVEREIGNTY HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, Washington, DC, Wednesday, April 21, 2004. The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:05 a.m., in room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Duncan Hunter (chair- man of tắe committee) presiding. OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. DUNCAN HUNTER, A REP- RESENTATIVE FROM CALIFORNIA, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES The CHAIRMAN. The hearing will come to order. Our guests this morning are the Honorable Paul Wolfowitz, Deputy Secretary of Defense, General Richard Myers, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Honorable Marc Grossman, Under Secretary of State. Welcome to the committee, gentlemen. We look forward to your testimony. We appreciate your appearance before the commit- tee this morning. We are going to have a second panel following, and we will intro- duce those witnesses at that point in the hearing. At the beginning of the war on terror, the President called on America to drain the swamp that breeds intolerance, hatred and extremism. Nobody can seriously doubt that Saddam Hussein's Iraq was part of that swamp. We all agree he was a mass murderer who had committed multiple acts of aggression against his neigh- bors, used weapons of mass destruction, defied the United Nations (UN), continually attacked Coalition aircraft enforcing U.N. ap- proved no-fly zones, financially rewarded homicide bombers in Israel, and harbored terrorists who had killed Americans, including Abu Nidal, Abu Abbas, and Abdul Rahman Yasin, who was impli- cated in the 1993 attack on the World Trade Center. Our long-term victory in the Global War on Terrorism will re- quire changing the behavior of such regimes or eliminating them. After more than a decade of diplomacy failed to change Saddam Hussein's behavior, a coalition of nations invaded Iraq and deposed the regime, eliminating one major part of the swamp that fosters terror. It has cost us blood and treasure. Americans have opened their wallets to drain the swamp, but more importantly we have offered up our sons and our daughters, some of whom have paid the ulti- mate price to make us safer. As painful as those lessons are, there should be no doubt that their willingness to carry that burden has eliminated the threat that was clearly aimed at the United States. The question before this country now is how to move forward. But we have to do more than eliminate state sponsors of terror in (71) 72 order to win the war that started on September 11th; we have to create new states that represent their citizens, respect their neigh- bors, reject terrorism and seek a constructive role in the world. This will be a long and difficult process. It took decades upon dec- ades of false starts, poor policies and a civil war before American democracy reached its current state. With that in mind, it would be foolish to expect the process in Iraq to unfold perfectly according to some preconceived plan. In fact, building democracy in Iraq will be harder because there are dedicated enemies of the process throughout that region. But we must remain committed to the task. Maintaining that commitment means giving the troops the re- sources they need when the Commander in Chief says he needs them. It means honoring our promise to transfer sovereignty to the Iraqi people on June 30th. It means respecting those countries who join us in Iraq rather than demeaning their efforts because their troops don't speak French or German. It means respecting the role of religion in Iraq while resisting those who use to it justify their own selfish pursuit of power. It means keeping our eye on the future, ten years down the road, and not making new policy every time the 24-hour news cycle preaches panic. It means having enough wisdom and patience to accept this as a long-term commitment to the American people. So, gentlemen, we look forward to your testimony and to the en- suing scussions. Thank you again for being with us. And let me recognize my partner on the committee, the ranking Democrat, the gentleman from Missouri, Mr. Skelton, for any remarks he might wish to make. [The prepared statement of Mr. Hunter can be found in the Ap- pendix on page 187.] STATEMENT OF HON. IKE SKELTON, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM MISSOURI, RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. I join you in welcoming our witnesses, Secretary Wolfowitz, General Myers, Sec- retary Grossman, and I look forward also to the second panel, Mr. Chairman. Our old friend General Jack Keane will be with us then, as I understand it. Mr. Chairman, thank you for holding this hearing. It is impor- tant, both because of the impending political transition on June the 30th and because we are in the midst of the most deadly month for American troops since the beginning of Operation Iraqi Free- dom. This is our constitutional duty—to raise, maintain the military. It is our duty to have oversight into the very serious questions we have in front of us. These issues deeply affect the American people, and they should be fully discussed. I hope that we will continue to hold hearings. I know we will. I understand there is one scheduled for Afghanistan in the very near future. Gentlemen, I saw this coming. I don't like the phrase Deja Vu, but it is there. Just as the period leading up to the war, we knew that we had to have plans for the aftermath. We now know that we have to plan carefully for the turnover on June 30th. I raised 73 concerns about the post-war period beginning on September the 4th, 2002, in a letter to the President, and I sent the rest of the Pentagon copies of it, the same March the 18th; and sadly most of my worst outcomes have come in about true, sadly, for the last sev- eral months. It was Sun Tzu who said, “To win victory is easy, to preserve its fruits difficult,” and that was the genesis of my two letters of warn- ing. Some of the insurgencies are because insurgents are seeking to take advantage of the upcoming political deadline, June 30. Some of this is because of mistakes made in the immediate postwar We did not have sufficient troops to bring stability or to stop the looting. . The absence strengthened local clerics like Sadr, providing a base of support for his challenges to us. The decision to disband the Army also created legions of unemployed. These errors cannot be undone, you can't unring those bells, but we must not go on mak- ing a transition without sufficient planning. We have just 70 days before the next big event occurs, and major questions need to be answered. Mr. Chairman, I do not revel in highlighting these concerns. I feel it is my constitutional duty as a member of this committee. And I don't blame all of the current violence on the poor planning. But lives of American troops and many Iraqis who are trying to build a better country for themselves depend on getting it right. It seems to me there must be answers to questions outstanding in three major areas. Let me go over those. First, everything else is dependent upon establishing security throughout Iraq. American forces will provide security after June the 30th, the same as now. The next two months are still important. There is storage and reconstruction projects that shut down food convoys, unable to reach towns and bases, of violence to both Sunni and Shia areas. I support the decision to increase the number of troops. We have to. What else will it take to get the situation under control? How can we stem the exodus of allies like Spain, Hon- duras, Dominican Republic? And I understand that Thailand is now talking that way. . How we ensure that our forces can continue to act is a must to bring security after June the 30th. And just as important, how do we get back in track of restoring trust with the ordinary Iraqis to winning their hearts and minds? Second, the question of transferring political sovereignty. I sup- port the decision to involve the United Nations. This interim gov- ernment is critical, even if it is to only be short lived, building credibility for Iraq and reassuring the Iraqi people that America is not bent on long-term occupation. Mr. Brahimi's concept is a sound one, but we still do not know who will make up the interim govern- ment. Third, we must deal with the question of how to build profes- sional Iraqi security forces able to provide for their own nation. Ex- amples in the last few weeks have been mixed, and General Abizaid mentioned this on the news. For every example like the 36th Battalion of the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps (ICDC), who I un- derstand performed well in the Fallujah area, I am disturbed by 74 the example of police and armed units who refused to fight or changed sides or folded. I am pleased that Major General David Petraeus will be taking over the efforts to train those forces. You could haven't a better man than him to do this. And have we systematically been taking stock of the problems to date and correcting them before Americans and Iraqis die as sult? Are we building a sense of investment on the part of the Iraqis? I raise these questions. I am very committed, as I know every member of this committee is committed, to success in Iraq. We must do it. We must face up to these questions. We must do it. We must do it right. I would like to mention some other things. Reports in the news of some $700 million being used for Iraqi preparation without congressional approval coming from the Af- ghanistan funds, as I understand it, at least according to the news media and Robert Woodward. If there was a memo that was sent to Chairman Hunter and me, I would like to see that, or a letter. I know of no such notification. I, also, Mr. Secretary—and Mr. Chairman knows—I request in- formation on the report of 20,000 private security contractors, and I have yet to receive an answer to my letter of some two and a half weeks ago. I get the feeling that we in Congress are not being fully informed as we should be ahead of time. We are a partner in this process. The constitution says so and we have come through with the resolution, we have come through with the money, we have come through with our support and we have come through with our advice, and I hope that we will be considered a full partner in this effort. Second place in this effort doesn't count. We have to bring about a stable and successful Iraq. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. [The prepared statement of Mr. Skelton can be found in the Ap- pendix on page 193.] The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman. And, Mr. Secretary, a point that Mr. Skelton made referring to the political handoff that is going to be made, the transfer of power to the interim govern- ment on June 30th is part of the equation, but he also mentioned the military handoff. Obviously, a lot of people are under a misapprehension that somehow there is going to be a military, total military handoff to the Iraqi military on June 30th. That is not the case. But at some point down the road, as we stand up the Iraqi military and it takes on more and more responsibility, it will assume the security role in Iraq. And, of course, we want you to describe to us in this ses- sion, and General Myers, the status of this process, how the Iraqi military is forming up right now in your professional opinion, with respect to all elements—leadership, field grade officers, non-com- missioned officer (NCO) corps, and going also to training and to equipment and how that process is proceeding. And you might give us your evaluation, your candid evaluation of what we might call good spots and bad spots in terms of their performance in this last upswell of violence in Iraq. So I think that is an important aspect to mention, to bring into this discussion. 75 But now that we have talked to you a little bit, Mr. Secretary, thank you for being with us this morning, and we look forward to your comments. The floor is yours, sir. STATEMENT OF HON. PAUL WOLFOWITZ, DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE Secretary WOLFOWITZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. This is such an important committee and such an important subject, and we welcome the opportunity to air these issues in public. If I might just comment on two things that you and Congress- man Skelton just said that I think are extremely important. First of all, I hope everyone in Iraq, and especially our enemies, heard what Congressman Skelton said about the fact that we are united on the need for victory. And people shouldn't get confused when we debate how best to do that, that there is any lack of resolve. I think that is very impor- tant. I appreciate it. I think the troops appreciate it. And, second, I appreciate your comment, Mr. Chairman, that the political transition on July 1st does not mean a major change in how the military security operation is conducted. General Myers and I will be able to discuss that in much more detail, but it is so easy, especially when you are 8,000 miles away and your sources of information aren't great, for some Iraqi battalion commander to think that he is going to be on his own on July 1st. T are defi- nitely not going to be. I think it is very important. We will get into all of those. But I just wanted to stress those two points. Mr. Chairman, I have a long statement, about 23 pages, that I submitted for the record. The CHAIRMAN. Without objection, Mr. Secretary, all statements will be taken into the record. Secretary WOLFOWITZ. I beg the indulgence of the committee to let me read some excerpts from it, because we have put a lot of thought into it. I think there are some important things to be said, but I will try to shorten. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, as he prepared to lead his troops into action in Fallujah earlier this month, a Marine company commander took time to write to his father, a retired Ma- rine: This battle is going to have far reaching effects, on not only the war here, he wrote, but in the overall war on terrorism. We have to be very precise in our implication of combat power. We cannot kill a lot of innocent folks. There will be no shock and awe. But, he said, this battle is the Marine Corps Belleau Wood for this war. A lot of terrorists and foreign fighters are holed up in Fallujah. It has been a sanctuary for them. The Marine Corps will either reaffirm its place in history as one of the greatest fighting organizations in the world or we will die trying. The Marines are fired up, he said. I am nervous for them, because I know how much is riding on this fight. However, every time I have been nervous during my career about the outcome of the events when young Marines were involved, they have also ex- ceeded my expectations. God bless these great Americans, he concluded, who are ensuring that we continue to fight an 'away schedule. 76 Let me join with that blessing and say that our prayers are with him and with all of our people currently serving in Iraq and in Af- ghanistan. They are making America and the world more secure by helping the Iraqi and Afghan people to build free and prosperous democracies in the heart of the Middle East and Southeast Asia. Whether members of the Active Duty, Reserve or National Guard units, or civilians, these heroes embody the best ideals of our Na- tion, serving so that others may be free, so that our children and grandchildren can be safer, and we thank them all for the sac- rifices they endure. We also owe a sincere debt of gratitude to the roughly 19,000 men and women from our 35 Coalition partners who are also sery- ing the cause of freedom in Iraq, and their civilian heroes and hero- ines, as well, from the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) and from a wide assortment of nongovernmental organizations (NGO) in Iraq who have recently become a particular target of terrorist at- tacks, civilians like Fern Holland who quit practicing law in the United States in order to go to Iraq and help improve the lives of women there. Fern Holland was brutally murdered because of the work she was doing, and although it is a small consolation to her family and friends, she died doing what she believed in.. And finally, let me thank the members of this committee and the Congress for their continued strong support to our men and women in uniform. Mr. Chairman, a little over a year ago, we all watched the statue of Saddam Hussein fall in the heart of Baghdad. On that day, 25 million of some of the most talented people in the Muslim and Arab world were liberated from one of the worst tyrannies of the last hundred years. According to a somewhat popular theme these days, the world is full of bad guys, and Saddam Hussein is just another bad guy. And any time I hear Saddam Hussein described that way, I know that the speaker doesn't really know about Saddam Hussein. If I might say, Mr. Chairman, in my career I have known some bad guys up close and personal. People like the former dictator of the Phil- ippines, Ferdinand Marcos, or the former dictator of Indonesia, Suharto. To paraphrase someone else, I knew Ferdinand Marcos, and Ferdinand Marcos was no Saddam Hussein. Saddam Hussein was more than just a bad guy. He institutional- ized and sanctioned brutality on a scale that is simply unimagina- ble to most Americans. Saddam Hussein ruled by fear, creating a society in which the ideal citizen was an informer. Let me make it clear, because I understand that some people didn't get this when I testified yesterday. I am not trying to go back and debate the causes and justifica- tions for this war. We can do that in another session. We are here to talk about the way ahead. But it is very important if we are going to talk about the way ahead to understand the nature of the enemy. The enemy that is out there fighting us today is still largely or- ganized around the killers and torturers and murderers that sus- tained Saddam and the Baath Party in power for 35 years. Saddam did not kill hundreds of thousands of Iraqis single handled. He had 77 an apparatus to do that, and that apparatus, while severely weak- ened, is still out there fighting us now. And the fear that they generated is still out there affecting Iraqis who are on the fence deciding whether or not to cooperate with the Coalition. A smothering blanket of fear woven by 35 years of re- pression, where even the smallest mistake could mean torture or death or punishments worse than death, like the death of your chil- dren, is not a fear that will be cast off in just a few weeks or even a few months' time. Saddam began weaving this blanket of fear from the very begin- ning. In 1979, one of his first acts as president was a sweeping purge of top Baathist leaders. At a meeting of the Iraqi National Assembly, with tears in his eyes, Saddam talked about how a sen- ior party member had confessed his disloyalty, and then he co ued to name other guilty colleagues. Guards then dragged these people out of the meeting. And then Saddam asked his ministers and top party leaders for their first test of loyalty. He called on them to form the firing squads to execute their comrades who had just been identified. Then he had videos of the whole event distrib- uted to leaders throughout the Middle East, so that his neighbors would know what kind of leader they were dealing with. In doing this, and implicating members of his regime in his worst crimes, and in ensuring that his potential victims understood how seriously to take his threats, Saddam Hussein was applying the techniques of a most brutal gangland boss, but on a national scale and as the head of an internationally recognized government. One of the most heartbreaking stories to come out of Iraq almost defies belief. Scott Ritter, the former United Nations Special Com- mission on Iraq (UNSCOM) inspector and an opponent of the war, described prisons whose stench he said was unreal, an amalgam of urine, feces, vomit and sweat, unquote, a hellhole where prisoners were howling and dying of thirst. In this prison, the oldest inmates were 12, the youngest mere toddlers. Their crime was to be chil- dren of the political enemies of the regime. As I said, I am recounting these stories not to go into history, but to describe what one writer has called the density of evil that permeated Iraq. Its effects are like a torture that doesn't end. It is so alien to our own American experience that I think we need to talk about it to understand where Iraqis are today psycho- logically, and so that we can confront one of the most formidable challenges that we face. Mr. Chairman, a significant part of the anti-democratic, anti-Co- alition forces in Fallujah and elsewhere in Iraq today are members of the old Fedaheen Saddam, the old Iraqi Intelligence Service (IIS), the old Special Security Organization, and in some cases the old Republican Guards. I would like to submit for the classified record an analysis from the Defense Intelligence Agency that goes into some detail about two of the directorates of the old Iraqi Intelligence Service. O them is the M-14 Directorate, the so called anti-terrorism direc- torate. The anti-terrorism is an Orwellian phrase. It, in fact, was a terrorist unit that specialized in hijackings, assassinations, and explosives. 78 [The information referred to is classified and retained in the com- mittee files.] Secretary WOLFOWITZ. Former Iraqi Intelligence—this is an un- classified sentence from that report—former Iraqi Intelligence Service operatives from the Directorate of the Special Operations and Anti-Terrorism, called M-14, have been currently involved in planning and conducting numerous improvised explosive devices, vehicle borne improvised explosive devices (IED), and radio con- trolled improvised explosive devices for anti-Coalition attacks throughout Iraq. If you want to understand why we are dealing with some fairly sophisticated explosives in the attacks against us, yo t us, you can read the classified portion of this report. Cells of former M-14 personnel are organizing and conducting a terrorist IED campaign against Coali- tion forces. The explosive section of M-14 prepared for the invasion by con- structing hundreds of suicide vests and belts for use by Saddam Fedaheen against Coalition forces. The IIS established a campaign that was purposefully decentral- ized so attacks could be carried out in the event that cell leaders were captured and killed. When Iraqis know that those people are in the field, when they get warning letters and death threats, when they get notices that they should do nothing to celebrate the fall of Saddam Hussein a year ago, they have to consider the penalties that these people can inflict on them against the much more, in- deed, rewarding behavior that the United States can conduct. And it creates a certain imbalance. But I think it is an imbalance that we can win and that we are winning. A few months ago in the town of Samara, a town roughly the size of Fallujah where this similar kind of sanctuary problem was developing, the 4th Infantry Division conducted a cordon and search operation. The special forces told me that they cleaned up 200 people. General Ordierno, who was the commander of the division, thinks it is closer to 500 or 700. But the bottom line is that several hundreds of people were able to hold a city of 250,000 in their grip. Because that grip was loos- ened, we saw a very different result in Samara in the last few weeks. Jim Spiel, who is a retired Army colonel and the police adviser in Baghdad, reported on an earlier visit to Samara after that clean- up operation that Samara is a different place from what it was dur- ing my visit in December. The number of active police stations has more than doubled. The attitude toward the Coalition forces was much improved, as well. That was then borne out, Mr. Chairman, in the reports of the situation in Samara during the recent action, which are very different from the problems we have encountered further west. General John Batiste, Major General John Batiste, who commands the 1st Infantry Division that took over from Gen- eral Ordierno's division, stood up a security working group in Sam- ara in anticipation of the pilgrimages of earlier this month. As a result and with the close cooperation of Iraqi Security Forces, who, as he said, were part of the solution, the limited vio- lence was contained. He suggests that the Samara model can be used throughout the region. I emphasize that because we are deal- 79 ing, as we have been dealing from the beginning, with a very com- plicated picture throughout Iraq. That is not uniform. Fallujah is a serious problem, and we are very concerned to deal with it and to keep it from spreading. But it is not necessarily reflective of the whole country. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, a year after Iraq's liberation, it is important to pause and consider what we have ac- complished together with the Iraqi people. For 35 years the Iraqi people were ruled by terror and by Saddam's personal fiat. Baathists engaged in murder, torture and arbitrary imprisonment. Iraqis had no real rights and were subject to the whims of Saddam and his sadistic sons. Today, as the chart on my right shows, Iraqis have an interim constitution that is the most liberal basic governance document in the Arab world. The so-called Transitional Administrative Law, or TAL, contains assurances of freedom of religion, freedom of expres- sion, freedom of the press, freedom of assembly, freedom of move- ment. Through 35 years of tyranny, money earmarked for lifesaving medicines were used by Saddam's regime to buy the end of life. Money marked for hospitals went to rebuild palaces and torture chambers. Today, health care spending in Iraq has increased 30 times, 30 times over the prewar levels, and children are receiving crucial vaccines for the first time in years. After 35 years of tyranny, Iraq's economy was moribund due to state control, rampant corruption, and Saddam's misallocation of resources to palaces and weapons and to his cronies. Today the Iraqi economy is on the path of recovery and prosperity, even though the full effect of the $18.4 billion in reconstruction grants that the Congress provided is only just starting to be felt. This is still, I would emphasize, an area of great concern to us. Unemployment is a source of insecurity in that country. But we are making progress in the face of years of neglect. It is that progress which the enemy seeks to stop today and which we must make increased efforts to accelerate. For 35 years, Mr. Chairman, Iraq's oil revenues went to build Saddam Hussein's palaces and to line the pockets of him and his cronies. Saddam corrupted the Oil for Food Program and diverted the oil wells from the Iraqi people for his own power and comfort. Today Iraqi oil revenue goes to the Development Fund for Iraq, where it helps build a new infrastructure and a new future for the Iraqi people. At two and a half million barrels per day, Iraqi oil production has reached its prewar levels, and oil proceeds in the last 12 months exceed $7 and a half billion and are projected to be $14 bil- lion for this calendar year. For 35 years, Iraqi schools were propaganda factories for Saddam Hussein's cult of personality and Baath Party fascism. Today, that fanaticism no longer pervades the schools and textbooks, and Coali- tion forces have rehabilitated more than 2,500 schools. After 35 years of genocidal repression of the Marsh Arabs, the historical people that inhabited the southland of Iraq for millennia, a lush ecosystem the size of New Jersey had been turned into a barren desert by Saddam's vindictive attempt to destroy this people 80 and to make them an example to warn anyone who would chal- lenge his rule. Today, the marshlands are being restored and an ancient culture is being revived. For 35 years, the Iraqi people's only link with the outside world was the poisonous propaganda of Saddam's state run media. Today, Iraq ave a wealth of independent news sources, including 170 newspapers, 170 newspapers currently published in Iraq. For 35 years Iraqis had no voice in their government. Today, more than half of the Iraqi population is active in community af- fairs and one in five belongs to a nongovernmental organization. Perhaps most importantly, in the years since Iraq has been liber- ated, no new mass graves have been filled with the bodies of inno- cent Iraqi men, women and children, capriciously murdered by a brutal regime, and the torture rooms and execution chambers have been shut down. Despite all of the violence and uncertainty caused by the enemies of a free Iraq, it is clear that Iraqis sense dramatic improvement in their everyday lives and anticipate more. According to a recent independent poll conducted by Oxford Research International, de- spite the difficulties that are there and that we read about every day, 56 and a half percent of Iraqis still say their lives are much better or somewhat better than a year ago, and a full 71 percent expect that their lives will be much or somewhat better a year from now. This, Mr. Chairman, though, is an area we have got to work on even harder. It confronts us not only with the problems of unem- ployment in a population that is dissatisfied; it raises fundamental suspicions about the United States. .. General Petraeus, who I think Congressman Skelton referred to, who is great leader, did a fantastic job in his year in northern Iraq, described it to me as what he called man on the moon effect-as in, “You Americans could put a man on the moon, h can't fix my electricity, how come you can't fix my water, how come you can't do this and that?” The expectations about us are literally on the moon. It is impos- sible to live up to what people think that we can do overnight, but the longer we take about it or let me put it in a positive way- the faster we can realize expectations, the more we will build con- fidence that we are there to help them and to counter the evil prop- nda of Al Jazeera and other izations that claim that we came there to take their oil. Mr. Chairman, our strategy to achieve victory involves three t lines of operations. The first element involves building capable Iraqi security forces to maintain stability. It is a key issue, as you referred to in your opening comments. We can talk in much more detail. The second element involves nurturing Iraq's capacity for rep- resentative self-government, with the aim of creating a government that the Iraqi people will feel is theirs and that moves us out of the position of being an occupying power. The third element of the strategy involves the reconstruction of Iraq's infrastructure, the restoration of essential services and put- ting people back to work. Mr. Chairman, no one can sit here—I cer- agamua OL 1 va ind can't-and predict the exact form of the permanent govern- tail 81 ment that will emerge in Iraq. I could put up the other charts. By the way, we will come back to this in more detail later. But I want to emphasize that what is going to take place on July 1st is not the permanent government, it is the interim government. There is yet another temporary government, the transitional government that will be elected as opposed to appointed in January. And finally, there is a permanent government that will be elected under a ratified constitution, if we can keep to this timetable, that has been negotiated with the help of the United Nations, that will be elected at the end of 2005. We are talking about a process, not a single step, and no one can predict the end of that kind of proc- ess. Americans of all people, I think, should understand that de- mocracy does not guarantee specific outcomes. It opens ideas for debate. We should not expect Iraqis to achieve immediately what we or our British friends have labored to accomplish over the course of centuries. Throughout the world, particularly in Eastern Europe and East Asia, new democracies have emerged in the last 10 or 20 years. They are all different, and none are perfect; neither is ours for that matter. But even an imperfect Iraqi democracy will be light years ahead of the horrors that that country has emerged from. I think it is wrong to assume that Iraqi Arabs and Kurds, some of the most intelligent people in the world, cannot achieve what Lithuania or Korea or other newly emerging democracies throughout Eastern Europe and East Asia have accomplished in the past couple of decades. Since the liberation of Iraq a short year ago, Iraqis have dem- onstrated their capacity for compromise and to build a country, a new Iraq after Saddam's unique tyranny. One of the challenges we are focusing on intently, the issue that you raised, Mr. Chairman, is Iraqi security forces. Their performance during the recent spike in combative activity has been mixed. At least half of the security forces did stand their ground. And even in Fallujah, where the fighting was most intense, some Iraqi Civil Defense Corp units fought bravely and well for a period of time. Other units did not face the enemy, some avoided contact alto- gether, and a small proportion that we are most concerned about actually cooperated with the enemy. Our disappointment with the security forces has to be tempered with realism. Recent events pro- vide lessons that we must apply to increase the impact of what we are doing. The first lesson is the need for strong leaders in the se- curity forces. Second, it is clear that the members of the security forces need an Iraqi rallying point. They need to understand that they operate under an Iraqi chain of command, that the top of that chain of com- mand is a lawfully constituted Iraqi government. We have been in the process for months of recruiting officers from the old Iraqi Army to bring them into the new Iraqi security structures. That is a process I believe that we need to accelerate, but also the process of political transition that we are working with Ambassador Brahimi is key to that element. But third, Mr. Chairman—and this is our responsibility, and I say ours, the U.S. Government–I think it is jointly the executive branch with the Congress—is that the Iraqi security forces need more and better equipment. We knew that they weren't fully 82 equipped yet. But some of our ICDC units and police were badly outgunned in recent action. We are relooking at their equipment requirements. There have also been delays in equipping Iraqi security forces. Some of those delays have been caused by challenges in the con- tracting process. We hope we have fixed those problems. Some of those delays, I believe, could have been avoided if we had suc- ceeded in getting some of the authorities that we asked from Con- gress last year. And I, at the end of my statement, will repeat some of the we have actually raised our ambitions in this regard, but I hope we can work with you and members of this committee to give our forces that kind of flexibility. We have all of the flexibility that we need when it comes to using ammunition. We don't have all of the flexibility that we need on things that are the equivalent of ammunition, which is money for the commanders. Every time we get more, and the Congress has been very helpful, we find that the need outstrips what we have done. We need to work together to fix that. Mr. Chairman, while it is important not to view the accomplish- ments in Iraq through rose colored glasses, it seems to me that some people have given themselves over completely to the darkest of pessimism. To some people, all progress in Iraq is illusory, and every silver lining has a cloud. I think the American people should know what their forces are accomplishing in Iraq, how the efforts of our servicemen and women are transforming the lives of 25 million predominately Mus- lims for the better, and transforming a region that for too long has accommodated despotism and bred terrorists. For example, some say that the June 30th date for the transfer of sovereignty is completely arbitrary, driven more by the demands of U.S. electoral politics than by actual conditions in Iraq, and that therefore the deadline should be extended. Let me emphasize the choice of an early date as opposed to a later date was not arbitrary at all. If you will recall, our original plan envisioned a sovereign Iraqi government only at the end of a multi-step process of drafting a new constitution and holding elections by the end of next year. We decided to shorten this time line for two key reasons. First, a shorter timetable was seen as a necessary incentive to prepare Iraqis for sovereignty. Without a sense of urgency and ac- countability, Iraqi leaders have been unable to resolve some of the difficult issues needed to conduct elections and shape a new gov- ernment. But second—this was particularly a concern of our military lead- ership—an early end to the occupation is essential to our political strategy to defeat the terrorists. As the infamous letter from that al-Qaeda associated terrorist Zarqawi demonstrates, and if mem- bers haven't seen it, I would urge-I will put this in for the record, it is a long and dramatic letter. The CHAIRMAN. Without objection that will be taken in the record, as well as the document that you referred to earlier. Secretary WOLFOWITZ. Thank you. His letter demonstrates that a democratic transformation is what the terrorists fear most. It is the worst possible scenario for those who oppose the emergence of 83 a new Iraq. They fear it. That is why they are trying so hard to derail it. Moving ahead is important to inspire Iraqi confidence that the transition is progressing, that their country will not be oc- cupied indefinitely. But it is also important to make clear, as you did, Mr. Chairman, that Coalition forces are not leaving on July 1st. There will still be threats to security in Iraq, but on July 1st Iraq will be governed by an Iraqi government. Some say that we are in Iraq with an illegitimate coalition that is just window dressing. I beg to differ. Thirty-four nations have troops that are bravely fighting alongside us in Iraq and have given their lives. Perhaps most significantly, it seems to come as a surprise to many Americans, more than 250 Iraqis by our count-and I think our count probably underestimates seriously, more than 250 Iraqis in the police, civil defense corps, and other security forces have died in the line of duty fighting for a free Iraq alongside our troops since June 1st. Some say that just as we should have waited for the United Na- tions permission to go to war, we have waited too long to bring the United Nations into Iraq today. That is a seriously misleading statement. The United Nations has been heavily involved in the re- construction of Iraq, and we have been urging a larger UN role from the beginning. The Administration has worked closely with the U.N. Secretary General for the past year. But for his tragic murder by terrorists, U.N. envoy Sergio Vieira de Mello was instrumental in establishing the Iraqi Governing Council (IGC). Since then, we have welcomed the proposals of his successor, the new U.N. envoy, Ambassador Brahimi, regarding the creation of the Iraqi government. Some say the recent attacks against Coali- tion forces by Muqtar al-Sadr's militia signal the start of a major Shia uprising that will pit Iraq's Shia, a majority of the population, against the Coalition. Everything we see, however, suggests that Sadr does not have widespread support in the Iraqi Shia community. A recent ABC News poll showed that only one percent of Iraqis named Sadr as a national leader that they trust most. He does not represent a le- gitimate voice in Iraq, but rather a threat to the legitimate rule of law. Some say we have no plan for this scheduled transition to Iraqi sovereignty on July 1st. I think, as the charts sketch—and we can describe in more detail—there is a plan. U.N. envoy Ambassador Brahimi just announced on April 14th his general concept for the first of those three phases for the Iraqi interim government that will govern for six months, from July 1st to early 2005. As for the shape of the U.S. presence, the command and control relationships are in the process of being finalized. On Monday the President made a very important announcement that our distin- guished ambassador to the United Nations, John Negroponte, a man I have known and admired for 25 years—I think one of the most distinguished members of our Foreign Service—will be nomi- nated as the new American Ambassador to Iraq. We have had a team, led by the State Department Ambassador Frank Ricciardone, who is here with us today, and retired Lieuten- 84 ant General Mick Kicklighter, who have been looking at how to manage the transition from a Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) to an embassy. With your permission, I would like them to stand just so they can get a little bit of well deserved they do. I can almost never find General Kicklighter without Am- bassador Ricciardone being right next to him. Also, the very important announcement that Major General Dave Petraeus will be going to Iraq to coordinate the full range of efforts to train and equip and organize Iraqi security forces. This is a key element of success in Iraq. We have been making progress on it. Every time we look around, though, we see the need to move faster and better. I can't imagine a better individual to lead that effort than General Petraeus. Mr. Chairman, I am near the end here. Some say the new Iraq will be dominated by the Shia majority that will inevitably estab- lish an Iranian-style theocracy in Iraq. Although it is too early to predict the eventual shape of a permanent Iraqi government, that will be something Iraqis themselves will have to decide. I think that thus far events on the ground are cause for cautious optimism. One could point to the restraint with which these massive Shia pilgrimages have been conducted. I would point to an article that appeared recently in the Guardian of London, headlined, “Iraqi Polls Bring Secular Success.” And with your permission, I will sub- mit that for the record, also. According to that report over the past 2 months, 17 local elec- tions have been held in overwhelmingly Shia provinces in southern Iraq using the ration cards as voting card. In almost every case it is reported independents and representatives of nonreligious par- ties did better than the Islamists. Mr. Chairman, at the end of my testimony, I have listed four areas where we would hope to get some additional help from the Congress, in the area of authorities, principally authorities, not ac- tual funding, so that we could more easily move money from some of our military accounts into these areas such as training and equipping indigenous forces. I know it is an issue. I know there are jurisdictional issues be- tween committees here. But as I said earlier, that kind of money is as important or, in some cases, more important than ammuni- tion for our troops. And General Abizaid has commented that he has billions of dollars a month thanks to the support of the Con- gress to support the troops, but when it comes, for example, to sup- porting Iraqi security forces, we find ourselves sometimes tangled up in red tape. Some of that red tape is our own doing; some of that is in the laws. I look forward to working with the Congress to try to give the Commander the flexibility that he properly needs. Finally, Mr. Chairman, some say there are no good options in Iraq. I don't think that is true. In fact, there is only one option in Iraq. It is the option Congressman Skelton referred to, to continue moving ahead and helping the Iraqi people build a free and pros- perous democracy. It will not be easy. Only the most naive person would think that, and it will be a long road. After the abuse it has suffered it will take time for Iraq to catch up even with the new democracies of Europe and Asia, much less 85 long established ones like our own. But Iraqis recognize these chal- lenges and embrace them as a revolutionary opportunity to build a free nation and to better their lives. Recently, Nasreen Barwari, the woman serving as the Iraqi Min- ister of Municipalities and Public Works—Ph.D. in engineering, by the way, I believe—said, quote, “On April 9th, 2003, the Iraqis were offered the opportunity to begin to dream their future. Before that date we were not allowed to dream. We could not imagine life with the kinds of positive challenges we face today.” Last October in his farewell speech as Vice Chief of Staff of the Army, General Jack Keane, who I think you will be hearing from later, aptly described the American character in the face of chal- lenges such as those we face today. General Keane said the foreign terrorists, the Baath Party sympathizers, the Islamic extremists who wantonly kill Americans and innocent people from many na- tions have no idea what they are up against. They think they know us because they have heard of Lebanon in 1983 or Somalia in 1994 or the USS Cole in 2000. They think we are morally weak and we will lose our resolve, but their knowledge is superficial, their understanding is shallow. To understand Amer- ica and Americans, General Keane said, they need to understand the Marne in 1918, Tarawa in 1943, Omaha Beach in 1944, or the Chosin Reservoir in 1950. They need to understand that a nation that produces Alvin York, Audie Murphy, John Pershing and George Marshall, Chesty Puller and George Patton, Randy Shughart and Gary Gordon produces he- roes in every generation. They are out there now performing every day. Our enemies, he said, are cunning, but they are ignorant, and their ignorance will be their undoing. They do not know our will, our courage or our character. Last summer, a colonel in the 101st Air Assault Division told me that he explained the job in Iraq to his soldiers like this: He told them that what they are doing in Iraq is every bit as important as what their grandfathers did in Germany or Japan in World War II or what their fathers did in Europe and Asia during the Cold War. Those soldiers are helping to reshape history in a way that will make our country and the world safer. Like the joint effort to pull down Saddam's statue a little over a year ago, our troops are sup- porting the Iraqi people in their effort to overcome a tyrannical past and build a better, more peaceful future. We look forward, Mr. Chairman, to working with Members of the Congress to support those magnificent men and women throughout the world who are doing their part to make America and our people more secure. Thank you. [The prepared statement of Secretary Wolfowitz can be found in the Appendix on page 198.] The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Secretary, thank you very much. Secretary Grossman. STATEMENT OF HON. MARC GROSSMAN, UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS Secretary GROSSMAN. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much, and I want to tell you how much I appreciate the invitation to join Dep- uty Secretary Wolfowitz and General Myers before this committee, 86 and I also appreciate, Mr. Chairman, the offer to put my entire statement in the record, and I would with your permission summa- rize it here for you. Before I begin, let me join Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz, and I know all of the members of this committee, in also paying tribute to the men and women who are serving their country in the cause of freedom in Iraq. That is military and civilians alike. Secretary Powell, Deputy Secretary Armitage, all of us are very proud of the people that we have sent abroad and that are serving the United States all around the world today.. I also want to thank, as Paul did, our many Coalition partners for their steadfast support, and like Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz did, I thank all of you also for your support of the Department, and particularly for your support of Secretary Powell's request for more people at the State Department. Without more people that the Con- gress has given us over the past two and three years we would not have been able to meet the obligations that the President and the Congress have given us, and we thank you for that, Mr. Chairman, and all of the members of the committee. I also know that you saw the President's announcement yester- day of Ambassador Negroponte to be the first Ambassador to the new Iraq. Like Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz, we are delighted and we look forward to his confirmation hearings and his rapid con- firmation. Mr. Chairman, you and the ranking member talked a little bit about the questions that are out there, particularly on the question of a transfer on June 30th, what are we going to look like in Iraq, what kind of embassies will we have; how much will it be, how much will it cost, what kind of government will we be talking to, and I would like just for a moment or two to give you a report on where we stand in making sure that that transfer goes success- fully. I would report to you that we have the guidance we need. We have the direction we need, and we have a plan for a successful transition on the 30th of June, 1st of July, and we are doing all that we can to establish an effective American representation in Iraq and in support of the goals that the Deputy Secretary of De- fense just outlined. Our obvious guidance comes from the President, who repeated last Tuesday night that the goal is to transfer authority on the 30th of June and that there will be a United States embassy and a United States Ambassador in Iraq at that time. The President said, and I think it is important to repeat, that we have set this deadline of June 30th. It is important that we meet it. As a proud and independent people, Iraqis, like Americans, do not support an indefinite occupation, and neither does America. Our specific direction obviously comes from Secretary Powell, and the Secretary has set the Department in motion to support the President's goal of a smooth transition on the 30th of June. And I also thank General Kicklighter and Ambassador Ricciardone for the work that they and their team, both in Washington and in Iraq, are doing to make this a reality. I can report to you that the Secretary's involvement in getting us ready for this transition continues every day. We are involved with him every day, and I know that he and the Deputy Secretary will continue to guide us in this regard and to execute the plan. We are obviously consulting with the Congress, with our allies, with our colleagues in other agencies, Coalition partners in Bagh- dad and Washington. If I might, Mr. Chairman, just talk for the one moment about the transition from CPA to an embassy of the United States of America. General Kicklighter, I think, had the very good idea early in this process to send immediately to Iraq 15 teams to try to identify the main tasks that needed to be done to accomplish this transition, and those assessment teams went to Iraq and reported back to Am- bassador Ricciardoni and General Kicklighter. We are now pursu- ing our efforts in all of these sectors. They are broken down into individual tasks and milestones that need to be completed, and the sectors actually represent about 500 individual tasks that are all being accomplished as we speak. Responsibility for each task has been assigned to an agency, to an office, and we have target dates for their completion. If I might just offer, Mr. Chairman, to you or any member of your staff, if you would like to come down to the Department and look at this, we have got it computerized on the website, on our Intranet. It would be available to members or to staff, as you wish, to see what kind of progress we are making as we go along. There are 17 or 15 or 16 of these particular sectors, as I say. I would like to talk today just briefly about four of them: People, se- curity, buildings, money. First, people. State Department officers and Foreign Service people, civil service people, low-ranking people, high-ranking people have been involved in Iraq from the very be- ginning. As you know, Mr. Chairman, they went there alongside Jay Gar- ner and the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA) and Jerry Bremer and the CPA. We have 170 people cur- rently in Iraq. We are very proud of all of them. How big will our embassy be on the 30th of June? There is a story going around that we will have 3,000 Americans assigned to this embassy, and I want to just say as clearly as I possibly can today that our planning fig- ure is for approximately 1,000, State Department and others in that embassy, not 3,000, and about 700 Foreign Service national employees. Here is how I get to this number. The State Department, we, have announced positions of 142 ployees and 155 locally engaged staff. In January of this year, Secretary Powell sent a letter to all of his cabinet col- leagues asking them how they would like to be represented in the new Iraq at this embassy, and ten of his cabinet colleagues have so far responded, for a total of 254 Americans and 280 locally hired personnel for fiscal year 2005. Now, since we have not heard from everybody, we are estimating between 350 and 400 non-State Department Americans; i.e., from those 12 to 15 other agencies, will serve under the Chief of Mission. And finally, we believe that the group of people who are currently at CPA will also transfer to the embassy. And so that is how I get to the number that I report to you today. I can also report that we have had outstanding response from State Department people to fill these approximately 142 positions. We have many more bidders than we have positions, and we are 88 very proud of the fact that the people are willing to go where there is a big opportunity and where there is obviously something hap- pening. We have also begun to hire some of our locally employed staff. We have also heard, Mr. Chairman, conversation about what the role of the Ambassador will be after the 1st of July. And let me just say that the American Ambassador, and we hope it will be Ambassador Negroponte upon confirmation, will carry with him a letter from the President just like all of the rest of our Ambassadors have that spells out clearly his resp Iraq. In Iraq, and it will say that he is the Chief of Mission; and the personal representative of the President, reporting through the Secretary of State, will have full responsibility for the direction, co- ordination, and supervision of all United States Government execu- tive branch employees in Iraq, except those under the command of the U.S. area military commander or on the staff of an inter- national organization. That is how we do it around the world. And, of course, the American ambassador and the military commander will have to work closely together to ensure that their respective operations are fully coordinated and best serve the interest of the United States in Iraq. Security: Our top priority obviously is to keep our people safe. Nobody should make any bones here that we aren't sending people on a dangerous mission. And we have already begun the security upgrade of some of the facilities that we want to use in Iraq. We currently have 51 armored vehicles in Iraq, another 98 are on order. Thirty-two members of the diplomatic security service staff are already in Iraq working to get ready for the 30th of June. There are still some difficult questions to answer, and as you know, Dep- uty Secretary Armitaqe was in Iraq over the past couple of days working on precisely these issues. Buildings: The Office of Overseas Buildings director—former Di- rector Chuck Williams traveled to Baghdad in February to com- plete plans for our interim and potential permanent mission facili- ties. We have identified the facilities we would like to use there both on a temporary and a permanent basis, and again, Deputy Secretary Armitaqe had a chance a couple of days ago to review all of those sites, and we are well on the way to making sure that they are ready for us on the 1st of July and we have a plan for going forward permanently. Finally, money: I would just like to give you a snapshot on where we stand in terms of funding this new mission. And I emphasize that the costs I report to you today are only a snapshot as they are today. Obviously, in order to open this embassy, we are going to face some substantial costs in security, in technology, and in protecting our people. Congress has already provided $97 million in fiscal year 2004 for an interim embassy facility and for interim o addition, we expect to have available in the fourth quarter of the operating expense budget appropriated—I am sorry. We expect to have available in the fourth quarter a portion of the operating ex- pense budget appropriated for CPA, which will be about $196 mil- lion, and pursuant to the 2004 supplemental, up to 1 percent of the 89 Iraq relief and reconstruction fund available for transfer, about $184 million. Our estimate of costs is that to get this thing going and open we will face costs of between $500 million and $600 million for the bal- ance of fiscal year 2004, and we are working on allocating those costs among agencies. And, in addition, we estimate that the costs in fiscal year 2005 to operate the U.S. mission could exceed a bil- lion dollars. And we are working with CPA, with the Department of Defense (DOD), and the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) to refine these estimates, and we will provide you estimates as quickly as we can and we will consult with the Congress before anything is finalized. Mr. Chairman, I think Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz has talked about the things in my statement in terms of Iraq's transition to sovereignty, and I recognize they will all be in the record, so let me skip over them now. He also, I think, did a very good job talking about the transitional administrative law, but obviously I would be glad to answer any questions. And also, how we are supporting the efforts of Ambassador Brahimi to put forward an Iraqi interim gov- ernment. If I might just make one addition to the points that Paul made, and that is to say how important it is that the United Nations also continue to work on the question of elections. And Ambassador Brahimi talked about this and about how important elections are. We agree with that. In fact, a call for national elections in early 2005 was a key part, as you will recall, of the November 15th agreement. And in this regard, I just wanted to get on the record thanks to the United Nations elections team, headed by Carina Perelli, who was in Baghdad, did a tremendous amount of work, is going back to Baghdad to help the interim government move for- ward on the election process. U.N.: The ranking member, Mr. Skelton, talked about the United Nations. I can also report to you that President Bush and Secretary Powell, as you know, have both discussed our desire for a new U.N. Security Council resolution on Iraq. The exact drafting of that and when we might go for it is a question that we all still need to de- cide, but I can report to you the kinds of elements that we think ought to be in that resolution. The new resolution would clearly offer a hand to the new Iraqi Government. It could deal with reconstruction activities, including the future of the development front for Iraq, and continue to help establish security to enable the Iraqi people to complete their polit- ical process. It should encourage other nations to get involved in both security and reconstruction efforts, and could structure a role for the United Nations in the new political framework, particularly in supporting the process toward elections. So, Mr. Chairman, my report to you is, we have the guidance and direction we need; we have a plan on the State Department side to move forward to standing up an embassy of the United States of America on the 1st of July. And as the Deputy Secretary said, we are supporting the efforts of the Iraqis and of the United Na- tions to produce that interim government. And I thank you very much for taking the time to listen to me. The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Secretary, thank you very much. 90 [The prepared statement of Secretary Grossman can be found in the Appendix on page 221.] The CHAIRMAN. General Myers. STATEMENT OF GEN. RICHARD B. MYERS, CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, U.S. AIR FORCE General MYERS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Congressman Skel- ton, members of the committee. Once again, thanks to all of you for your unwavering support of our men and women in the Armed Forces and, more specifically, our men and women in uniform as they fight this all-important war on terrorism. I just returned from visiting Iraq and Afghanistan. Make no mis- take about it, the spike in violence that we have seen in central Iraq over the last week and a half is indeed a challenge, to be sure. And we mourn every Coalition soldier we lose. But I can assure you today that we are as firm as ever in our resolve to help create a free and prosperous and democratic Iraq. The violent minority, a small marginal minority, cannot be allowed to defeat the hopes of the majority of the Iraqi people. There is no popular uprising going on in Iraq right now. This vio- lence, in my view, is a desperate attempt by frustrated, isolated groups such as the insurgents in Fallujah and Sadr's thugs in Najaf to derail the progress that we have been making. As Secretary Wolfowitz said, recent polls have shown the major- ity of Iraqi people want Iraq to succeed, and they are positive about what the future holds, thanks in large part to the efforts of our servicemen and women. I know you are as proud of them as I am of how well they are performing. They are tremendously dedicated, they understand their mission very well, and they understand v a huge difference they are making in Iraq. The contrast between our troops and the anti-Coalition forces that are fighting couldn't be greater. In Fallujah, we have seen the enemy unload weapons from ambulances, use mosques as operating bases, deliberately put children in the line of fire as human shields, and attack innocent civilians indiscriminately by firing mortars at marketplaces. Our servicemen and women, at the other extreme, are going to extraordinary lengths to conduct the most humane op- eration they can. That means, at times, we accept greater risk in order to achieve and limit-avoid civilian casualties. Make no mistake about it, we are hitting the enemy very hard and we are devastating them, but our troops are also very compas- sionate. Their strength of character in the end will be a major fac- tor in determining Iraq's future. e close by sharing a letter from a Marine Private 1st Class that he wrote to his parents. By the way, this young man enlisted in the Marine Corps after 1 year of college—he was on a Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) scholarship-because after 9/11 he wanted an opportunity to make a difference. He is now serving in one of the more dangerous areas of central Iraq. He describes how he went on a mission to look at the structural integrity of some bridges, and in the course of the patrol, they talked to many Iraqis, especially the children, and they had their medical corpsman treat some of the civilians that had medical 91 problems. By the time they drove off, everyone in town was smiling and waving at them. And here is what he wrote, quote: "What I am trying to say to you guys”—and “you guys” are his parents—“is this: We are making a difference here. An area smack dab in the infamous-Sunni I gradually, patrol by patrol, becoming safe and free.” And that ends his quote. “Patrol by patrol.” That means we still have a long way to go in this war, well beyond the transfer of sovereignty in Iraq. But our troops are making a difference every day and they know it. We are truly blessed with amazing men and women, with the support of their families, and for the Reserve Component, the support of their employers, to do this important work. And I would add that while I am talking about our men and women in uniform primarily, we do have, it has been said by Sec- retary Wolfowitz and Secretary Grossman, really dedicated, great Americans and other members of the Coalition who are over there as well and, in many cases, risking their lives to bring about the same thing that our Armed Forces are trying to bring about. An : you, Mr. Chairman, Congressman Skelton, and members of the committee for your strong support of our Armed Forces. The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, General. And Secretary Grossman and Secretary Wolfowitz, thanks for your opening statements. General Myers, we have completed most of this big troop rotation that we have been undertaking for the last couple of months. You have got the 1st Infantry up where the 4th Armored or the 4th In- fantry Division was. You have got—the 1st Marines have come in and taken the place of the 82nd Airborne. The Stryker Brigade is now up north where the 101st was. And the 1st Armored in Bagh- dad has been supplemented, because it hasn't rotated out, by the 1st Cavalry Division. I think you have got one brigade of 1st Ar- mored has gone back to Germany, but the bulk of the 1st Armored Division is in place. It is my understanding that you are going to keep the 1st Ar- mored Division in place so that we keep essentially double division strength in the Baghdad area of operation (AO); is that right? airman, it is mostly right. I think the way that General Sanchez and General Abizaid are looking at the 1st Armored Division is that they will be the force they will use where they are needed in the center, center south region. They have had elements of the 1st Armored Division and the 2nd Ar- mored Cavalry Regiment (ACR), which was also held over in the Najaf-Karbala area. Concern about the Spanish troop withdrawal. I mean, it is not just the number of troops, it is also the fact that the Spanish were the headquarters for some of the other forces, and to bolster those forces in the center south they used elements of the 1st Armored Division. They are also using the 1st Armored Division for lines of communication, security in that center, center south region, and they have used elements of the second ACR, I believe it was over in Al Kut when Sadr's thugs conducted their activities over there. But, basically you are right. 92 The CHAIRMAN. 1st Armored is staying on? General MYERS. 1st Armored is going to stay on, and we have said for up to 90 days. The CHAIRMAN. Now, looking at this in your professional opin- ion, looking at the profile, the American presence now, manifested by those groups and the other military units that are there, do you think we need more people? General MYERS. I think what General Abizaid would say if he was sitting here, or General Sanchez—and I was just there, and I talked to them about this. I think they feel they have what they need for the military situation right now, that it is not a matter of more troops. They have the capability they need. Depending on how the situation continues to develop, we have to be flexible. In that regard, we are doing some planning for follow- on forces. The CHAIRMAN. Okay. When you brought the 1st Cav in initially to displace the 1st Armored Division, as I understand it, some of atforms weren't moved with the 1st essentially a lighter Cav than you would otherwise have. Is there a thought about bringing the armor that you left behind for 1st Cav, moving that into theater? General MYERS. Mr. Chairman, there is thought about that going on right now. The CHAIRMAN. Could you let the committee know when you have an outcome on that particular area? General MYERS. We will do that. [The information referred to can be found in the Appendix begin- ning on page 281.] The CHAIRMAN. So, in your opinion, you think that you're keep- ing the 1st Armored in place there, notwithstanding the brigade that was brought back to Germany, but keeping the 1st Armored elements, that we have enough people in place, enough forces in place to do the job? General MYERS. I think that is my judgment; that is also General Abizaid's judgment. That is General Abizaid' judgment and that is General Sanchez's judgment. It was the judgment of the division commanders that I met with in the area. I met with the 1st Cav Division Commander, I met with Marty Dempsey, the Armored Di- vision Commander. Let me just say that this is necessary to do the job. It obviously has an impact on families back in Germany, part of the 1st Ar- mored Division, and families back here in the United States for some of those support units and the 2nd ACR. And this is—it is serious. It is obviously serious business inside Iraq; it is also a seri- ous issue with the families. We recognize that, and we are going to try to do everything we can do to minimize any impact on them. The CHAIRMAN. Okay. Now—and we are going to be paying—the 1st Armored personnel that are staying over are going to be paid an additional stipend per month, a bonus per month for staying over, that is fairly substantial, isn't it? General MYERS. Yes, within the Department of Defense authori- ties, we can increase—we can provide financial--not incentives, but financial help to those that have been held over for the additional time. And we are going to do that like we did the last time when 93 we held—I think it was 2,000 that had to be held after the last ro- tation. The CHAIRMAN. Okay. Doing that, General, I am sure you have been looking at funding issues as we keep that force in place. We are now going to keep essentially an extra division in place as a result of this upswell in violence. We are going to have to spend more money; there are going to be larger personnel costs as well as operational costs in theater. We are getting close to the end of the year, at least to start thinking about the end of the year. Do you have enough money, or would you like to see some more money to keep this force in place? General MYERS. Mr. Chairman, you are absolutely right that the increased operations tempo, keeping what is going to turn out to be a force of around 20,000, which includes the 1st Armored Divi- sion—and that is the bulk of it-additional time in Iraq is going to cost us more money. We estimate right now—we are working those estimates right now, let me say that, and we have got to take a look and see if we have the wherewithal inside the DOD budget, because we do have some flexibility, as you know, inside the budget to address those additional costs, acquisition programs that aren't executing timely and so forth. We are in the middle of that analysis right now. And I know that when the service chiefs last talked about this, that there was, I think, a $4 billion shortfall. We thought we could get through all of August. We would have to figure how to do September. We worked inside the Department and thought we could cover those costs. We will have to see how these new costs stack up and whether we can cover it or not The CHAIRMAN. Okay. Well, let me just say, I think that one thing worth thinking about is helping you out with this funding problem. As you know, we have got the old balancing act that will now take place as you get that net down to the bottom of the year. We are going to see operational costs in theater and we are going to end up with those costs competing against the necessary expend- itures to ready up the equipment and the forces that we have taken out of theater, so you will see reprogramming that will keep us from upgrading or from repairing armored platforms, humvees (HMMWV), weapons, et cetera, replenishing munitions accounts; and we will start sucking money out of those important accounts to keep the operations going. I think that should not be the path that we follow this year because, again, we have fairly small forces that aren't committed. We have got most of the Army brigades committed now, if you count Afghanistan and Iraq and our other commitments. One thing we have got to do. I think, is keep the stuff that is the units that are not deployed, to ready them up as quickly as possible, and that means all the platforms, all the equipment, all the weapons. That is going to take money. And so, we don't want to get into this competition for maintenance, for operations and maintenance to ready up the units that aren't in use and have that compete against operational requirements. So the committee, I think, General, is inclined to help you per- haps more than has been suggested by the Pentagon at this point. 94 We want to work closely with you over the next week or two to see what your real requirements are. And let us make sure, if we have got that additional division in country, that it is well supplied and that that money doesn't have to come out of hide. I know when the Marines had not planned to come over, they needed an additional 300 million for night vision equipment and lots of stuff, like lots of operational stuff, and they ended up having to take a fairly substantial portion of that out of hide, meaning they pulled it away from maintenance accounts, meaning that the Marines that may have to respond to another part of the world may not have the dollars to do it. So we want to make sure that we have both ends of this equation covered, both the readiness requirements back here as well as oper- ational requirements in theater. I am afraid the answer to that, the only answer to that may be money and money soon. General MYERS. Mr. Chairman, you make a very good point. And I would only add to your list aviation assets, helicopters in particu- lar. We have worked all this equipment very, very hard, and we have to keep up with refurbishments so that we are ready to go back either to Iraq, Afghanistan, or other contingencies. And it is a key point. Secretary WOLFOWITZ. Mr. Chairman, I would add to the list, if we could have more flexibility in shifting money between accounts because, as General Myers said, there are accounts that are under- executing, and the more we can move money into those that you correctly identify are spending faster than planned, there may be more flexibility inside the budget.. We are conducting the midyear execution review right now, and last week Secretary Rumsfeld directed that we speed it up by at least a week so that we can get these answers. The CHAIRMAN. Let us get those. And just very quickly, General, your professional opinion of the status of the Iraqi military at this point in terms of development of an officer corps, NCO corps, and the equipment issue, where do you put them? General MYERS. You are talking about the Iraqi— The CHAIRMAN. Military. General MYERS. Their military, not the police? The CHAIRMAN. Basically, where do you place them right now in terms of this military that we basically had to build from scratch. Where do you put them right now? What do you see as a maturity date for this program that is going to field an efficient, effective force? General MYERS. We expect to have a 40,000 new Iraqi army on line by this fall, properly equipped and trained, and that part of it is coming along pretty well. We have prioritized; we have taken some money from their effort and put it toward police, border secu- rity, facilities protection corps, and the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps because we think there is more payoff in the near term, because they can be used for internal security. That is not how the new Iraqi army is envisioned as being used, although they could play some role that is still being debated. But we want to be careful; we don't want to go back to the old ways of the Ira qi army, where they were used for internal security and 95 some of the atrocities that Secretary Wolfowitz talked about. But in terms of the training of their officers and their NCOs, that is progressing apace. I think we are exactly right to laud the fact that General Petraeus is going to go back and be responsible for all Iraqi secu- rity force training and equipping. And he is in country now, he has been there now, I think, for maybe 24 hours, 36 hours. He has got the right background obviously to do this, and we think it will en- hance our capability. The CHAIRMAN. Okay. Thank you, gentlemen. Thanks for being here and for your service to our country. And I think you are right, this is going to be a long, tough road, but I think it is one that we must stay committed to. Thanks for your testimony. The gentleman from Missouri, Mr. Skelton. Mr. ŠKELTON. Mr. Chairman, thank you and thank you again for calling this hearing. As you know, we are writing history today. What we have done is already in the history books. And if we fast forward 50 to 100 years, what is done today and the decisions that are made and the answer to my very one question I am going to ask, and only one, will be the centerpiece of what the historians will write. So, Mr. Secretary, Secretary Wolfowitz, let me ask you the one question that will determine the outcome of this very important ef- fort: Are we winning the hearts and minds of the Iraqi people? Secretary WOLFOWITZ. Mr. Skelton, I think you are right; that is the key question. It is what General Abizaid refers to as consent, which is a little maybe less than winning hearts and minds, but it is having the support of the Iraqi people. And it is complicated in several ways. It is complicated, first of all, because we are talking about a fair- ly diverse group of people. They have not been at their throats over the years; I think that is important, to be clear. In fact, it is ex- traordinary to me that we have seen so little ethnic violence even in places where we might see it, like Kirkuk where there are large Arab and Turkish-Arab and Turkish and Kurdish populations liv- ing side by side. I think there is no question that polling data indicates, as many other things indicate, that most Iraqis are happy to be rid of Sad- dam Hussein. But it is sort of a "what have you done for question. And there we run into, I think, two issues. One is the issue that I referred to earlier of fear. There is still enormous fear of the enemy: The enemy can kill your children. The Americans at most might detain you, sometimes for a few days, sometimes longer, but we don't go around doing—inflicting that kind of punishment. So the other hard part where we can win hearts and minds is, we can bring about an Iraq that is prosperous, where people have jobs, where people are voting for their elected representatives. We have got to continue to make that progress. I think we have got to make it faster. And we are aware of one particularly acute problem which arises, very much connected now to the crucial fighting going on in Fallujah, and that is to convince the Sunni Arab community of Iraq that, in fact, they do have a future in the new Iraq, that they are ne for me lately" 96 not going to be oppressed by some new government the way the Shia were oppressed under the old government. I don't think it is that most Sunni Arabs long for the return of Saddam Hussein, but this is a country that for much longer than Saddam Hussein was a winner-take-all situation, and whoever ruled in Baghdad ruled everybody. And, I think, the more we can ssure Shia and Sunni, Kurds and Arabs that there will be a large measure of controlling their own destinies through local gov- ernment and local elections, I think that, combined with the estab- lishment of legitimate government at a national level and progress on the economic front, can be crucial. But no one should make the mistake of thinking there is a sim- ple military solution here. The military is important. We have got to defeat this enemy; it is a murderous enemy. But if that is all we do, then we will lose. We have got to proceed on the political and economic fronts, as well General MYERS. Congressman Skelton, if I could add to that, I absolutely agree with the Secretary's remarks, particularly the part about there not being a military solution alone. Nobody under- stands that better, fortunately, than General Abizaid. He under- stands that question, he understands the impact probably as well as anybody in our government, in my estimation. Therefore, our military actions are done very, very carefully. But people ought to understand that, just because we are careful doesn't mean that we are weak or that we don't—that we lack re- is sometimes interpreted, particularly in the region as that—that we lack resolve or that we can't be strong. In fact, our strength is that we can be careful and still accomplish the mission. And General Abizaid understands that; he works that every day with General Sanchez. And General Sanchez, of course, under- stands that; and our tactical commanders, they know that. Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Chairman, thank you. The CHAIRMAN. Thank the gentleman. The gentleman from Pennsylvania, Mr. Weldon. Mr. WELDON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I thank our distin- guished panel for coming in and for their service to the country. Mr. Chairman, before I get into questioning on this issue, I want to put in the record two items as a follow-on to the 9/11 Commis- sion hearings, while we were on our district work period, that re- late to this committee. They are very important. The first was the debate over whether or not the Predator should be armed, which Clark said in his book he mandated and which the Administration came back and refuted. I want to remind my colleagues, it was this committee in 1996, at the objection of the Defense Department and the Air Force, that mandated the Army of the Predator with the Hellfire missile. It was this committee that put language in the defense bill that year mandating it. So let the record show, loud and clear, it wasn't Rich- ard Clarke, it wasn't anyone else, it was this committee that man- dated that the Hellfire be a part of Predator. I was the chairman of the research and development (R&D) committee when we fought that battle, and the Pentagon fought us every step of the way. The second issue, the debate of 9/11 was over information, intel- ligence sharing. Again, it was this committee in 1999 and 2000 97 that put language in both defense bills calling for the creation of a national collaborative center. Here is the brief that was presented in my office as requested by the Deputy Secretary of Defense at that time, John Hamre, to his counterparts at the Central Intel- ligence Agency (CIA) and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) on November the 4th in 1999, where we proposed then establishing a national collaborative center of all 33 classified systems. The CIA and the FBI on November the 4th of 1999 said, we don't need it. This committee then put language in the 2000 defense bill and the 2001 defense bill. I would like to make it a part of the record, Mr. Chairman, which calls for the establishment for the establishment of a national col- laborative center. The CHAIRMAN. Without objection. Mr. WELDON. It took us until 2003 to finally get that capability established in the Terrorist Threat Intelligence Center (TTIC). I thought both of those items, which this committee was out front on, should be a part of the record. Mr. Chairman, all of us have been impacted personally by this war. I have three nephews, you have sons that are serving in and ut of the theater. I was over with General Odierno in a delegation several months ago, and he was describing for us, up in the Tikrit region, the casualties he had suffered and talked about a young 24- year-old lieutenant. As I listened to him, I asked him the name of the person. I said, It couldn't be Bernste Bernstein, could it? His eyes opened up, and he said, Yes, Congressman; how did you know that? I said, Because I nomi- nated Lieutenant Bernstein to West Point when he was in high school, and I am carrying a three-page letter from his parents, which I then gave to General Odierno. As he read the letter, we both talked about the kind of quality of our young people serving this country. They are the best that we have in this country, and that is why this committee works tire- lessly to make sure that our military personnel are properly equipped and trained even when, from time to time, we have to fight the Administrations about the level of defense funding, as we did in the 1990's and as we are doing today. Mr. Chairman, I have got to tell you and our friends out here be- fore us, I am not happy with the defense budget request. We talk a good game when we talk about numbers. The Army came in, and your request for the Army this year is a six percent net decrease over the appropriated funding level for modernization in R&D as it was last year. The Air Force receives about a two percent in- crease, but the net Army request is six percent lower. And that doesn't even consider the fact that the Army has the largest un- funded priority list of any of the services. I have a list here that I have to deal with in my subcommittee of almost $6 billion of unfunded priorities. And what do those un- funded priorities include? $705 million for up-armored HMMWVs, $295 million for body armor, $315 million for munitions, $424 mil- lion for trucks, $879 million for clothing, $1.2 billion for delayed depo and depo maintenance, and $114 million for unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV). 98 Now, this committee is always going to look out for the welfare of the soldier, as I know you all do. It is an impossible situation you have put us in where the Army says that, based on the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) funding request, they want six percent less and, oh, by the way, we have $6 billion of unfunded priorities, almost all of which relates to the protection of the soldier on the ground in Iraq or Afghanistan or the soldiers that may be deployed from other units both here and throughout Europe and other locations around the world. So my request is, along with our chairman, who has come out publicly on this, that we work toward a supplemental and not wait until the election is over, but that we be serious about what is needed. I want to give the Army the equipment they want. If we don't take this step, then you are going to force us into the position where we have to raid other accounts to take care of these un- funded priorities. So it comes down to a question, do we allow for the trans- formation of the Army, the Future Combat System that the Army desperately wants, which has a price tag of $3 billion this year; or do we take from that program money and pay for up-armored HMMWVs and the other—the Bradleys and the other equipment that needs to be replacing those materials and platforms that we are currently losing in theater? So I would ask for your support. I would plead with the Pentagon leadership. This is at the Pentagon level. I don't-I think this is where it has to start. And again, I think the budget request that has been provided to us is shortsighted and that—in the case of the Army, I think it is outrageous. We had a hearing on April the 1st with the Army. We asked them to rectify the difference between their need to modern- ize and the need for transformation, and they just can't get to there from here with the funding that you have requested for them. How can we justify a two percent increase for the Air Force, net that increase, at the same time we are justifying a six percent de- crease for the service providing the bulk of the warfighters in thea- ter whose platforms and equipment are being so heavily used and need to be replaced and upgraded? That is the question we have to answer. And you have to help us, or we are going to take action on our own and provide leadership to make sure this funding is ailable to deal with the needs that the Army itself has identified. These aren't our lists; these aren't pork barrel projects. This is the unfunded priority list of the Army, $5.97 billion. Thank you. The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman. Mr. Secretary, General Myers, any comments? Secretary WOLFOWITZ. We will look at all of that in the context of this midyear execution review. We heard your comments earlier. Mr. Chairman. I think you heard General Myers' comments. I think there—we took a very hard look earlier this year at what could be done, whether more funding could get up-armored HMMWVs and other force protection measures out there more quickly. 99 What we ran into were not funding shortfalls, but production ca- pacity problems. But we will look at all of those things again. The CHAIRMAN. But, obviously, you have got cash funding short- falls now, at least cash-included burdens with this additional 1st red Division presence now, above and beyond what was con- templated a few months ago. So you do have operational costs that are going to be fast spendouts. Secretary WOLFOWITZ. But again I agree with you. But we also have to look at where we have things that are not spending as fast as anticipated. There is a balance. Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Will Mr. Weldon yield to me? Mr. WELDON. That is up to the Chairman, because I technically.' have used my time. Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Is the gentleman's time up. Mr. Chairman? The CHAIRMAN. I would just say to my friend, we have got lots of folks here. We will try to move down the line here and get to you very quickly. ABERCROMBIE. No, it is not me. I just wanted a clarification. The CHAIRMAN. Certainly. Go right ahead. Mr. ABERCROMBIE. I just wanted to make sure. Are you referring to Mr. Wolfowitz's testimony on 22 and 23 on the special authori- ties that are being requested because the money isn't in the 2005 budget? Is that what you are referring to? Mr. WELDON. The gentleman–I thank the gentleman. Mr. ABERCROMBIE. It says the Commander's Emergency Re- sponse Program, $500 million to train and equip military and secu- rity forces for Iraq, increase drawdown authority for the Afghani- stan Freedom Support Act. And it says that this money is not re- quested in 2005, but they want general transfer authority up to $4 billion. It doesn't say $6 billion; it says up to $4 billion. Mr. WELDON. My comments are not specifically to that item, but they are to the Army's list that they gave to us. And the Army un- derstands what our industrial base capability is. They are not stu- pid. Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Well, then this may be added to this then, Mr. Weldon. Mr. WELDON. The Army's unfunded priority list is almost $6 bil- lion, the largest of any service. They are being asked to do most of these occupations or these operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, which we all support; and my contention is, we need to give them the money. Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Well, my point-and I thank you Mr. Chair- man for it—is, this may be even higher than the number you are citing, because all of this is in Mr. Wolfowitz's testimony as not presently funded and would have to be transferred from somewhere in the existing budgets. The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman. And Mr. Wolfowitz, if you want to comment on that, and then we are going to ask—the ranking member has a brief comment, and then we will go to Mr. Spratt. Secretary WOLFOWITZ. First of all, a quick comment to Mr. Weldon. As you know, a large portion of the $65 billion in the sup- plemental does go to the Army, and it is a recognition of the fact 100 that they are the most stressed service now. And we have got to look at that all in total. The flexibility I talked about requesting in our statement was to be able—where there is an account that has money available in it, that we can shift that money flexibly, particularly to those areas that could make a huge difference in the security of our troops, which is letting Iraqis fight for Iraq or Afghans fight for Afghani- stan. And we have not had sufficient flexibility for that in the past. The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Secretary, let us stipulate that we are gen- erally in accord with you, that items that are less pressing can nec- essarily be transplanted by items that are very pressing, which is the immediacy of the warfight. The one thing that we don't want to see, that this committee has seen over the years, is a shifting of money when you take, you bring back a Marine division or an Army division and you have got lots of platforms you have got to repair to get them ready to be the 9/11 force for a new callout, and you are not able to—you say, I am not going to repair those Bradleys, I am not going to repair those tanks; I am going to use that money for operational money. Then you are not taking money away from less important items, you are taking money away from very important items. And it is not the kind of competition we want to see. We want to see the dollars for both the-because we have such a small standing force today, for readying up the nondeployed forces as quickly as possible, as well as ensuring we have all the operational dollars that we need in theater. That is the situation we want to see. When you have—with respect to giving you flexibil- ity to move monies that aren't being spent or can't be spent, it is my position to be in total accord with you and, I think, most mem- bers of the committee. The gentleman from Missouri. Mr. SKELTON. Yes, Mr. Chairman. Thank you. In reference to Mr. Weldon's comments, I ask unanimous consent that the four letters that came from the service chiefs in response to my inquiry regarding a listing of the unfunded requirement be placed in the record at this point. The CHAIRMAN. Without objection. And the gentleman from South Carolina, Mr. Spratt. Mr. SPRATT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Wolfowitz, we appropriated $87 billion of supplemental fund- ing last October for Iraq and Afghanistan, 51.5 billion of which was earmarked to military operations in Iraq. The burn rate we under- stand to be between $4 and $5.5 billion for that amount of money, but that was a number that was derived really before the operating tempo (OPSTEMPO) picked up significantly. Can you tell us, first of all, what is the monthly burn rate or ex- penditure rate of those funds? And what is, as of April the 1st, the unobligated balance on the $87 billion appropriated for Iraq and Afghanistan in October? Secretary WOLFOWITZ. Mr. Spratt, I can't tell you—I think even if the Comptroller were here, they couldn't tell you yet. That is what we are trying to get clarity on through the midyear execution review. And we are trying, as I said, to speed up that process so can get those answers as fast as possible, because if there are 101 going to have to be some major shifts between accounts or, even more, if there would have to be requests for more money, Mr. SPRATT. Can you give us roughly what the burn rate is, what the rate of monthly expenditure is? Secretary WOLFOWITZ. Sir, I will get it for you for the record, but I don't know what it is. [The information referred to can be found in the Appendix begin- ning on page 281.] Mr. SPRATT. The budget request that the Administration sent up included nothing for Iraq and Afghanistan after 2004. It was our understanding, and is our understanding, that that will come sepa- rately as a supplemental request. Consequently, we have a budget with about $50 billion, which is Mr. Bolton's number for the ex- pected request. That is probably out of date because OPSTEMPO has picked up. It doesn't include the 20,000 troops additional that General Abizaid is requesting. And the resolutions that both Houses have passed are totally out of synch with reality. For example, Mr. Grossman says he needs a billion dollars to stand up the embassy office in Baghdad. The House resolution cuts international affairs by $4.6 billion below the President's request. And that is before factoring in the billion dol- lars that you say you need in the supplemental. In addition to the $50 billion we don't have, the Nickles budget, the Senate's budget after 2005 also cuts the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP). There is a provision in the House budget resolution which says by May the 15th this committee is supposed to come up with $2 billion in savings in various defense accounts and transfer the money from those defense accounts to other accounts. So we have got a situation, a budget situation, here that is totally out of synch with reality, and it begins with the omission of a critical item, $50 billion at least in supplemental funding. Can you tell us when you are going to send us a supplemental? Do you have any anticipation of when that supplemental is coming and what its likely size is going to be, particularly in light of OPSTEMPO increases and General Abizaid's request for additional forces? Secretary WOLFOWITZ. Excuse me. I am told, by the way, Mr. Spratt, that based on the figures, the most current figures we have, which are unfortunately three months old, the burn rate for Iraq would be about $4.7 billion. That actually may be distorted on the high end for that period because there were a number of front-end procurement costs that are factored in that. On the other hand, we have had an increase in OPSTEMPO. We have got 20,000 more troops extending, so there may be a bump-up. Mr. SPRATT. What is the cost of 20,000 more troops? Secretary WOLFOWITZ. I can't give you that number right now. We will work on it. With–I am sorry. Did you want - Mr. SPRATT. No. Go ahead, sir. Secretary WOLFOWITZ. With respect to the question of fiscal year 2005 funding, we have made it clear there will have to be a supple- mental. But it will come after we have a better fix on what we think the actual—and we are predicting here. I mean, we made ns, and one of them, we thought the 1st Armored Division could be coming home now; that turned out to be wrong. 102 Mr. SPRATT. We have heard predictions of late fall, which I would take to be November, which I would infer to be after the elections. But if it comes in late fall, are you going to have to do what Mr. Zakheim suggested to the press last week, and that is cash flow, which means borrow from the third and fourth quarters to fund the first and second quarters? Secretary WOLFOWITZ. Mr. Spratt, that is what we have done in the past. In fact, we tried, I think it was in the first year of Oper- ation Enduring Freedom, to have a $20 billion supplemental at the front end for unspecified costs. And I think it may have been the other body, but as you remember, people said, this is a slush fund, you can't specify what is in it. So we thought- Mr. SPRATT. When you do that, don't you find yourself deferring maintenance, delaying training, and losing ground in important areas for the nondeployed troops? Secretary WOLFOWITZ. It shouldn't happen that way. We will try to make sure that it doesn't. Mr. SPRATT. Let me ask you about Mr. Woodward's allegation- General MYERS. Mr. Spratt, I can give you— Mr. SPRATT. General Myers. General MYERS. I can give you a rough order of magnitude esti- mate of the additional cost for keeping the forces, the 20,000 that we talked about of which the 1st Armored is part. Mr. SPRATT. We would appreciate that. General MYERS. We think the rough order of magnitude—this is the first look by our folksis around 700 million additional cost, total. Mr. SPRATT. For 20,000 troops? General MYERS. Of where we are right now for three months, right. Secretary GROSSMAN. May I also make a point before you move on, Mr. Spratt? Mr. SPRATT. Sure. Secretary GROSSMAN. And that is, just to be clear, I gave you an estimate of what I think it will cost us. We have identified just over $500 million that is already available to us to get us through the calendar year. Mr. SPRATT. The incremental cost is about $500 million? Secretary GROSSMAN. Yes, sir. And the billion dollars is what we estimate for 2005. Mr. SPRATT. But that assumes, of course, that the President's re- quest won't be cut by $4.6 billion. Secretary GROSSMAN. Yes, sir. But I want to be clear that we have about $523 million now, which we think will help us get through the end of the year. Mr. SPRATT. Carryover money? Secretary GROSSMAN. Yes, sir. Mr. SPRATT. Okay. The final question. Mr. Woodward alleges in his book that $750 million for war mobilization was spent before the war powers reso- lution was passed, and it was drawn from various accounts without proper notification and documentation or specification to the Con- gress. 103 Would you respond to that, please, sir. Secretary WOLFOWITZ. Happy to. It is important to clear up the record on this because that is wrong. And our acting comptroller, Mr. Lanzillotta, I think gave a briefing on this two days ago. Congress appropriated, I believe it was $31.2 billion in 2001 and 2002 to finance the response to the terrorist attacks on the United States and to provide support to counter domestic or international terrorism. During July of 2002, the Senate comp staff identified over 700 million. And I think that is where Mr. Woodward gets his 750 million figure from. It actually grew beyond. As they looked at them in potential preparatory tasks, the comptroller went through that very carefully to scrub out those things that were specifically for Iraq, and came down with $178 million that was Global War on Terrorism, general application, that was made available in Au- gust and September 2002 to finance activities that were consistent with the authorities included in the enacted supplemental. We did not want to assume anything about whether those au- thorities might extend to Iraq. We understood there was a debate; we understood very likely there would be a congressional resolu- tion. All investments recommended at that time were designed to strengthen our capabilities in the region or to support ongoing op- erations. After Congress approved the Iraq resolution on October 11th, 2002, additional funds were made available to U.S. Central Com- mand (CENTCOM) and to other components over the following months to support Iraq preparatory tasks, including many of those that have been identified in July 2002. These plans were all con- sistent with the supplemental appropriation authorities and with the Iraq resolution. Mr. SPRATT. Thank you very much. Mr. Skelton and I have writ- ten you a letter and we would appreciate a response to it. Secretary WOLFOWITZ. On that issue? Mr. SPRATT. Yes, sir, and the supplemental. Secretary WOLFOWITZ. And the supplemental. I might add, too, Mr. Skelton, I know we owe you an answer on this question of private security forces in Iraq. It is, as you can ap- preciate, an extremely complicated issue, and we have policy—we are relooking at it, given the importance of the issue, and we will get back to you, but it is not an easy letter to answer. The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman. The gentleman from New York, Mr. McHugh. Mr. McHUGH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Gentlemen, welcome. I want to start by associating myself with a number of comments made by my colleagues, particularly those of the ranking member and the distinguished chairman with re- spect to the great admiration and faith and trust and really just high regard we hold for our men and women in uniform. I have had the chance to visit with the chairman and others in Iraq twice, I have been to Afghanistan about two months ago, and in both those theaters there is no question in my mind those soldiers, sailors, air- men, and Marines are more than up to the challenge. But I do think there is another problem from the American side of this equation. 104 Mr. Secretary, you spoke about the “man on the moon” syn- drome, and I agree with that. We heard that in our visits to Iraq, that that was what was wrong with the United States. Clearly, they could fix these easy problems in a matter of hours if they real- ly wanted to. But I am not so sure it is an indigenous disease only found in the Middle East or Iraq. I think it is found on the streets of Amer- ica. I am absolutely stunned when I read and hear of some of the comments and stories about quagmires and what has gone wrong and why are we not out of there already, and what is our exit strategy when we are trying to reform not just a nation that has been under the boot of oppression for 3–1/2 decades but really to set a stage for an entire region; and as the President put it, I thought very adequately, to say the least, in his press conference not so very long ago, change the way of the world. And I worry about the American people not staying the course. There is that old Pogo cartoon, “We have met the enemy and he is us." I sometimes wonder at times if we are not our own worst enemy. We need to stay this course. I think the ranking member put it very, very appropriately: Losing here, failure, is simply not an op- tion. The ramifications go far beyond the borders of Iraq or the Middle East. And I just wanted to underscore my feelings in that regard because, as you said, Mr. Secretary, I think that message is impor- tant to those who are not wishing us particularly well in that re- gion, that we are going to stay this course and make a difference. That having been said, I would like to just lay out about three questions and then just allow you gentlemen to reply. I guess I can start with Secretary Grossman. Mr. Secretary, I don't know, you probably haven't had a chance to see it. But in the next panel we have Dr. Amatzia Baram, who comments, and I will quote from page eight of his testimony: “Giv- ing the U.N. a greater political role in Iraq will not end attacks by insurgents or terrorists. The U.N. is not popular with many Iraqis, who blame it for implementing U.S.-imposed sanctions.” With respect to Ambassador Brahimi, we have put a lot of faith in this gentleman, and I don't take exception with that. But I am concerned about some of the things that I am hearing coming out of the Middle East that, like the U.N., Ambassador Brahimi may not be held in the highest regard by a number of influential and probably important Iraqis, particularly given his service in the Arab League when Saddam Hussein was at his worst, when Sad- dam Hussein was probably doing more to exterminate the Shia population than any other time in his three-plus decades, including in the northern sectors, of course, the gas attacks on the Iraqi Kurds. I was wondering what the State Department's impression is of Ambassador Brahimi and, to whatever extent you can give us, an update on where you think his proposals might lead they might be received by the Iraqis in general. Second, I would say to either Secretary Wolfowitz or General Myers—whichever, or perhaps both–I understand that Secretary Rumsfeld recently made the comment that, at 135,000 troops now 105 with the extensions, if the commanders need more, all they have to do is ask. I would ask, is that an accurate quote? And if they were to ask for more troops—and General Myers alluded to this, but didn't really detail it—how would we provide more troops beyond the ex- tensions that we have just heard about? And last, Fallujah. Validity, I think, and faith in the Americans sticking to it is important. We have got a “cease-fire agreement,” for lack of a better description, in Fallujah based on a number of assumptions, not the least of which is that the insurgents would turn in their major weapons. My understanding is that at this mo- ment not a single major weapon has been turned in. What is the plan of approach in Fallujah? How long do we wait to see if the terms of agreement that were brought to us and ac- cepted by us are upheld? And if not, what do we do next? So with those three questions Mr. Secretary Grossman I guess we could start with you and Ambassador Brahimi. Secretary GROSSMAN. Yes. Thank you very much for the ques- tion. Let me try to answer it as directly as I can. rst, I apologize. I did not see the testimony for the people who follow. But I recognize that that opinion is out there; it is in edi- torials, for example, in some of the newspapers today in the United States. What I would say to you is a couple things. First, when we look at what Ambassador Brahimi has accomplished over the past cou- ple of years, especially in Afghanistan, we have confidence that he is working not just for the United Nations, but also for the inter- ests of the United States and for, in that case, the Afghan people and for the Iraqis, as well. I think the process that he put through in Afghanistan has cre- ated great results, and the fact that we are where we are in Af- ghanistan-not perfect, not done, but that we are where we are in Afghanistan, generally positive-Brahimi gets some of the credit there. And so we are prepared to move with him in this regard. The second thing I would say to you, Mr. McHugh, is that, of course, that Mr. Brahimi is not out there by himself. He knows what it is that we are interested in and, I think, what Iraqis are interested in in terms of their future. You know that Ambassador Blackwell from the National Security Council (NSC) spent time in Iraq at the same time as Ambassador Brahimi, and we have said in public and in private that any outcome here has got to meet cer- tain criteria. It should represent the diversity of Iraq; it shouldn't be a law-making body; it shouldn't be too big, it shouldn't be a leg- islature; it should have the necessary authorities to get the job done, but recognizing that, as the chairman did, this is a govern- ment of six months. And so, I think Ambassador Brahimi and others who are working on this know what our criteria are. And when I look at the pro- posal, as I understand it, that Ambassador Brahimi has put to us, it meets, I think generally, our criteria. President Bush said last Friday, you know, that he welcomed the efforts that Brahimi had made, welcomed the effort that—the plan that has been put out there. And so we are going to, I think, stick with this and see if we can't bring it to a good result. 106 In terms of what happens next, Mr. McHugh, as I understand it, Ambassador Brahimi will go to New York and he will report to the Secretary General. It then will, I think, I hope, become a matter of conversation with the Secretary General of the United Nations. Ambassador Brahimi will go back to Iraq around the 1st of May, and his program is to try to identify this interim government by the middle of May so that it can get on its feet and be ready for the 1st of July. Mr. McHUGH. Thank you. Mr. Secretary, any truth to the rumor that Secretary Rumsfeld said, if they need more troops, we will get them? If so, how do we get them? Secretary WOLFOWITZ. Certainly, every time the commanders have asked for more, though it is not a rubber stamp or blank check; but these commanders are making daily judgments very carefully and we have always found them to be correct. And they need to have—they should have the troops they need to have. You are absolutely right in the implication in your question that we are going to have to dig very deep if we have to add more. But, as General Myers said earlier--and he can elaborate a bit-we are looking at what that might mean. Very difficult answers, but there are answers. If I may pile on your appeal for patience at the beginning, I think it is extremely well stated and I think sometimes it is worth re- membering if one thinks back to 1995 and the Dayton Accords. Some people said we would be out in a year. Of course, it is now nine years later. But we have made consistent, steady progress in Bosnia, and we are almost down to zero U.S. troops in Bosnia. And the place hasn't fallen apart. It is a long way from perfect, but it is a mprovement over what it was ten years ago. We did that in Bosnia. The stakes in Bosnia were tiny compared to the stakes in Iraq. And I think we need even more patience. It is obviously going to take more resources; and as I mentioned in my statement, Iraq has a lot of resources, as well, that makes it different from Bosnia and different from Afghanistan. It doesn't mean that they can do it on their own, however—it doesn't mean that they can provide security on their own after July 1st. But I do think if one takes a longer-term perspective and doesn't expect instant results—I mean, I like your point that we have the “man on the moon” effect here in the United States. With respect to Fallujah, I don't think anyone goes into this with illusions about the nature of the hard-core enemy there. But what we are hoping to do is at least to find those people in the town who are prepared to help us get rid of that enemy, to mitigate civilian casualties, should it be necessary. And it is important to remember, civilian casualties are a key part of the enemy's information oper- ations campaign. This is as much an information war over Fallujah as it is—it is both an information war and a military war. And, un- fortunately, since they have the benefit of the lies that are broad- cast by Al Jazeera, we need to work very hard with the truth to counter that kind of garbage. General Myers, I think, might want to say more about both those last two questions. General MYERS. The way the request for troops comes is from the field commanders, I think as people know-it comes up usually 107 first at the Joint Staff. We look at our ability to source that, given other worldwide requirements. Generally, we run that through the Joint Chiefs of Staff and then provide a recommendation to the Secretary of Defense. Sometimes it is an iterative process where we have dialogue—the Deputy Secretary and the Secretary—as we are going through this deliberation. I don't know why, but it seems that we hear almost weekly that the Secretary is somehow constraining our combatant commanders from getting the resources they need, troops, and that has not been my experience while I have been the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff or when I was the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. There are serious issues with this, but I have never known the Secretary to constrain or put a cap on troops for major combat op- erations or others. But we still see the articles. They come out all the time. They are absolutely wrong; they don't understand the facts. And looking, as I answered Chairman Hunter earlier in looking at the forces, that we may need additional in Iraq, it is not known yet. But General Abizaid is thinking about that. Some of it will have to do with how we handle ourselves in Fallujah. If more forces are required, we have forces identified. Some of them would have to go back to Iraq, breaking some of our administrative guidelines for use of these forces. In other words, they might not have all the time back at their home station that we hoped they would have. They will certainly go over ready and well equipped, but they may not have had as much time at home as we were hoping to provide them. General Myers, as Secretary Wolfowitz said, and Secretary Grossman, this is a serious situation. We are at war. We have a lot at stake against these extremists in Iraq. And so that is what your Armed Forces are for, both Reserve Component and Active. We will make the forces available if required. Mr. McHUGH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman. The gentleman from Texas, Mr. Ortiz. And. Mr. Ortiz, before you start here, I wanted to recognize that-I looked out in the audience and I saw a gen- tleman who looks a lot like the distinguished ranking member, Mr. Skelton. That is his son, Wade Skelton, right here. Thank you for being with us today s today, sir. You have got a great dad. Mr. ORTIZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. We see very often the acti- vation of more and more National Guard and Reserve troops being activated. Now, I am just wondering what preparations are being made to minimize the burden now on the National Guard and Re- serve troops who have already served more than 12 months on the deployment in Iraq? And also what effect is the removal of troops from Spain, Honduras, and now the Dominican Republic going to have on the U.S. deployments and security efforts? What is the im- pact once we do that? Secretary WOLFOWITZ. First part of your question. We have been concerned for some time, even before this latest problem, about the particular stress on particular Reserve units where, for example, we depend almost entirely on Reserves for civil affairs functions, 108 D . for military police. As a result, we are going back to that well much more often than we like. One of the military police units that is being extended in Iraq had spent a year in Bosnia just a few years ago. Although that is, I think, more the exception than the rule, it is a very painful excep- tion. And the Army has been has a plan now in this year's budget e 100.000 positions, rebalancing between the Active force and the Reserve force, so that we are not in the situation that every time we deploy, we need to call on the Reserves for certain key specialties; that we have a better balance, better mix between the two. Also, as I think you know, General Schoomaker has come up with a plan, that Secretary Rumsfeld has approved, to temporarily increase the size of the Army by approximately—I am sorry I don't have the precise numbers in my head—approximately 30,000 peo- ple, with the idea that he is going to use that head room and has already begun using that headroom to create 10 additional combat brigades on top of the 33 that we have now. And if at the point we complete that effort, decide we need an- other additional 5, he can get that within the 30,000 increase. So we don't need the additional; the plan is to eventually work those numbers down. The difficulty in simply increasing the size of the Army is the results take time to deliver, and if you delivered the results long after the need has gone away, then you have a burden that makes it harder to manage the force. So I think the Army plan now is a good plan. But, finally, we need to—we are doing a great deal. We need to figure out everything we can do with special programs for families, with incentive pay for the troops that have been extended beyond 12 months, with other things to mitigate what is definitely a hard- ship. I am sorry; the second part of your question? Mr. ORTIZ. The perception or the signal that it might send to the rest of the coalition. Secretary WOLFOWITZ. It is a real concern. And it has caused us, I think General Myers said earlier, to readjust how we deploy our forces. I must say, many of our allies have done extremely well. It is worth mentioning the Salvadoreans have been particularly com- mended by our people for their toughness in the last couple of weeks. And most of our allies seem to be sticking with us. But this is very tough duty. It is not peacekeeping. And we really appreciate the many countries that do have troops on the line. Mr. ORTIZ. See, when I was in Iraq with the committee, we saw a lot of National Guard and Reserves coming in to relieve the Ac- tive Duty Reserves-I mean Active Duty troops by the Reserves. And they were very concerned with the time that they were going to be there. They said there is a lot of uncertainty, we don't know we are going to be there 6 months, 8 months, 12 months. If we only knew how long we were going to be there, it would help us with our families. So I hope that something can be worked out. Like you say, it is not peacekeeping; this is war. General MYERS. Mr. Ortiz, if I can—that is the number one thing that we try to work. And we have said, up to a year in Iraq. For 109 Reserves, that doesn't mean a year activated. And what we are try- ing to do, and we get better fidelity as we go along here in the mo- bilization process—which, by the way, when we started all of this, the mobilization process was a product of essentially World War II, and it had changed some, but not a lot. I think we give a lot of credit to the Army for trying to change that mobilization process to make it shorter on the front end and shorter on the back end, when they mobilize and demobilize. They know that they are subject to recall under the presidential authori- ties we have right now for up to two years. Most units-most-will be less than that. One of the issues we had that Secretary Wolfowitz talked about was this rebalance. Most of our military police (MP) capability is, guess where? In the Reserve Component. What do we need a lot of in Iraq and Afghanistan? MPs. General Schoomaker is very ag- gressively attacking that, both putting more MPs in the Active Component, and changing out air defense battalions, artillery bat- talions in the National Guard, and making MP companies out of them, because that is what we needed: civil affairs and psycho- logical operations and transporters and all of these other capabili- ties that we know we are going to be in short supply in this secu- rity environment that we find ourselves in as far as we can see. So all of that is going on. You are absolutely right. We are asking a lot of Reservists, Guard and Reserve, of their employers, of their families. We have worked very hard, the Reserve components have worked very hard to try to keep their families very well informed there with our Web- based quick answers to their questions today, because they are not always located on posts, camps and stations, and bases. They are spread out through States. And they have worked that very hard to work the communication piece, which has improved dramatically over the last year. Mr. ORTIZ. See, and the problem will be later on, the impact that it might have on reenlistment, on retention. General MYERS. Absolu Mr. ORTIZ. This is a huge, huge problem. General MYERS. It is. It is one that I personally track. As you know, I have a two-star Guard and two-star Reserve adviser. And their main task is to work these issues for me, to make sure that I am aware of what is going on out there in the communities and the units so we can try to be ahead to lead turn with these issues. These are very serious issues that we take very seriously on the Joint Chiefs of Staff, that the Secretary and the Deputy Secretary and Dr. Chu and everybody that works these issues takes very, very seriously. Absolutely. Mr. ORTIZ. Thank you. Secretary GROSSMAN. Just simply to say, Mr. Ortiz, just to follow up on the point that Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz made on this coa- lition, it is very important that we recognize what they are doing. And I just wanted to report to you that last night Secretary Powell finished a round of telephone calls to the leaders and his counter- parts and all of the members of the coalition; one, to appreciate what they are doing and, two, to tell them to stay strong because we need them there. 110 Mr. RODRIGUEZ. Can I ask for just a little time? Mr. Secretary, I want to ask you for kind of an unusual request. I just got a call. I just lost one of our soldiers, Lance Corporal Rubin Valdez, Jr. He comes from a little community of San Diego, Texas, where we have already lost two young people. And that young person who was lost is also a neighbor. aldez, Mrs. Sylvia Valdez, the mother—and I just had a talk with her. And as I talked with her, I asked if she had anything for me to do? And I let her know that I was just talking to you, Mr. Secretary. And she asked me just to ask you if you could re- spond to just one question. You don't have to respond to it now. But I would ask you, maybe in writing to her if you could, and that is: her son is a Marine, had already been in Iraq last year, and he was asked to go back. And she just wanted to know why. Secretary WOLFOWITZ. I will send her an answer, sir. Mr. RODRIGUEZ. Thank you. The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Virginia, Mr. Schrock. Mr. SCHROCK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Secretary, Mr. Secretary, and General, thank you for endur- ing a second day of these hearings on a topic that is, I think, very, very important to every single one of us. In the past I have been repeatedly commenting on the disconnect between the Iraq we see every day on television and the news- papers, and the real Iraq. And I have been to Iraq twice and be- lieve there is far more progress that is being made there than we are being led to believe on the nightly news programs. But, however, I think we would be remiss in not considering the implications of the recent events in planning for the transfer of sov- ereignty in Iraq. I am greatly concerned about the poor perform- ance of Iraqi-some of the Iraqi security forces in the recent battles with the insurgents. I believe the CPA must carefully consider the root causes of their rather poor performance and what it shows about the resolve of the Iraqi people to be governed by themselves and not by a dictator or by the most powerful zealot at the particu- lar time. And I believe that the U.S. military will be responsible for secu- rity in Iraq for the foreseeable future. I hope that we can have that honest debate. We have had a lot of it today. We need to have it in the halls of the Pentagon, the State Department, and the U.N. To ensure that the Iraqi government that emerges is one that is truly committed to the sovereignty of the Iraqi people over them- selves, due to the stability and the security of our country and the entire Middle East. Of all of the things that were said in the testimony today, I was struck by two words that you said, General Myers, and that is "hu- mane treatment.” And we do engage in humane treatment. And maybe it is just Ed Schrock's perception, but I perceive, because we do that, we are probably taking casualties and losing people more so than if we just go in and try to get it over with at one time. And, of course, this constant drip, drip, drip every night of the news media banging on us. And I am just wondering maybe—this is a tough one to ask—but at what point do we just say, enough is enough, give these folks, 24, 48 hours to do what we have asked them to do, and then we go in, and whatever force is needed, go 111 in and get it over with. Are innocent people going to be killed? No doubt. But is that better than dripping it out over a period of months, where they are going to get killed anyhow, and putting up with the dissension that we are not only going to hear from some of the people overseas, but people here at home. I dread getting up every morning. This morning was a particu- larly rough one when we heard how many folks were killed over there. Maybe that is something that you don't want to discuss. But I am curious; what is your feeling about that? General MYERS. I think we have to be careful on how far we go because we get into operational matters. But in general, if you are referring to basically the situation in Fallujah, we have a very seri- ous situation in Iraq that developed over the last couple of weeks, particularly exemplified in Fallujah. We have got to realize that there is—that the Sunni population has a lot of fence-sitters, people waiting to see how Iraq develops, to see if they are going to be made part of the new Iraq, that some feel disenfranchised, some inflamed by the—and this is going to sound harsh, but it is absolutely true in my mind, the outright lies that media outlets like Al Jazeera make about our actions in Iraq. And we have at least 30 instances where they have made a state- ment. It is just exactly wrong, and portraying the U.S. as the ones that are not concerned about humane treatment. So I can guarantee you that General Abizaid, since events in Fallujah started unfolding when we went in there to find the per- petrators of the killing of the Blackwater contractors, and then burning them and then displaying their bodies as everybody is well aware, between that and trying to make sure that we don't lose the consent of the Iraqi people, importantly; also the Sunni and Shi’a populations. In the end, we will do militarily what we have to do. I will just assure you of that. And I think we will get support up and down our government for those actions. But in the meantime it is a care- ful balance. It is a tightrope that has been walked by some great Marines. But we don't think we have put them in additional jeop- ardy by these actions. But the cease-fire, by the way, was only obeyed by our Marines, as you expect. They still take sniper fire and, for that matter, assaults on them. They have been real suc- cessful in repelling those. At the same time, we have taken some losses. But, you are right. This is combat. It is war. Mistakes will be made. In terms of our best efforts to protect innocent civilians, there will still be some caught in the crossfire. In most cases, it will be our adversary who has no regard for their lives anyway, who—look at the mortar rounds that the former Baathist and regime elements put into Abu Gharib prison. They went in there and they killed—I think the number is 20 detainees, and injured, I think, 100-and-some others. They were Iraqis. They were attacking their people. The same thing we saw in Basra the day when we heard about the vehicle-borne explosives that blew up police stations, and oh, by the way, a van that was going by that had children in it. These is killing Iraqis. We don't know who perpetrated those events in Basra. At least I don't at this point. Quite likely it could 112 be Zarqawi and his folks, who want to foment Sunni on Shi’a un- rest as a last-ditch effort to keep us from being successful in Iraq. Mr. SCHROCK. During the two years that I lived in Vietnam, as a young naval officer, I was greatly puzzled and bothered by the limited war game we played there and by—you know, whenever the Vietnamese had a holiday, we always observed that by kind of a cease-fire, so to speak. That is when they got ready for the next engagement. I am just hoping and praying we don't get into that, or we don't start doing that in Iraq, because I think that is just a blueprint for disaster. But I guess we I don't want to seem like the horrible hawk, but we've got to get this our kids' lives are real important. General MYERS. Sir, I agree with you absolutely. I remember those days, too. As you remember, they would do it on the ground. In Vietnam, they would do it in the air e air. The pauses, the so called bombing pauses, allowed the enemy to restock antiaircraft ammu- nition. Mr. SCHROCK. Ho Chi Minh Trail was full of that stuff. General MYERS. That is not the intention or the direction we are under right now. Secretary WOLFOWITZ. Mr. Chairman, if I could just take a minute to answer the first part of Mr. Shrock's question, because it was also yours at the beginning. It is crucial, about the perform- ance of Iraqi security forces. I have got to emphasize, it is too early to make an assessment, even—we have got too many things on our hands right now even to know what happened in the last couple of weeks. It will take some time to collect the facts. again, it is a complicated picture. I want to mention just two anecdotes that came to us from former Army Colonel Jim Steel, who I mentioned earlier, who had been in Iraq for most of the last year doing really heroic duty with the police. He has made a big difference. He has been extremely candid over the course of 12 months about problems that he has identified. But he sent this with some good news for a change. He said, in Sadr City, which is a big Shi'a slum in Baghdad, we made a surprise visit to the main police sta- tion. To our surprise, despite the late hour, ten o'clock at night, the chief was at the station. He explained that he had stayed full time at the station during the recent crisis. He provided a detailed ac- at of what had occurred. He described how the five stations had been taken over by Sadr's army, but subsequently recaptured with- in 4 hours. He was proud of the performance of his policemen and grateful to the coalition forces who responded decisively. He has one police- man missing at this time, only one. Of the 140 AK-47s that were seized from his people, all but 62 have been recovered. He correctly pointed out—and this is part of our problem—that his 500 police- men are not only outnumbered, but outgunned. He has only one BKC, actually a PKM, medium machine gun, while his enemy has mortars, rocket-propelled grenades (RPG), BKCs and grenades. He has a point. He also reported that he has only 32 vests. Then he goes on to say, Mr. Skelton, to your comments about hearts and minds; he said, in addition to his request for additional 113 police and equipment, he asked that we expedite the reconstruction effort, particularly regarding sewer and water. We had to drive through raw sewage before arriving at the sta- tion. Those are problems we can fix. I mean, we put a man on the Moon, we can get weapons and vests, and we can fix the sewage. We need to do it faster. Then there was an upper-class neighborhood of Baghdad, and ac- tually this is one that has a lot of former regime people in it. He said—again, we were surprised to see the chief at work despite the late hour. He explained that either he or his deputy was usually always present. This police station was a disaster three months ago. I visited the station immediately after 40 prisoners had es- caped. A new commander—and Colonel Steel emphasized the im- portance of leadership in the police force-a new commander was subsequently assigned, and within two weeks it was a different place. We went back tonight to see if the positive changes were still in place. The station was even better than during the previous visit. I don't want to suggest that that is representative. That is what we need to aim at. There is a mixture of some and I–I guess I don't even want to guess the percentage, because it would be a guess. I think the majority have performed reasonably, unless faced with really overwhelming force. Some significant fraction just took off and didn't turn up. And the worst part, and I think it is done in, I hope it is in the five percent or lower range, actually d the enemy. That part is important also, I think, to empha- size in the context of thinking that somehow it was a failure of planning that led, with respect to the Army, that led to our prob- lems. · The fact is, our plan was to use the Iraqi Army. We overesti- mated the Iraqi Army before the war. We thought that it would be there in disciplined units that could help to provide security. As Ambassador Bremer and Walt Slocombe, who is the defense ad- viser in Baghdad, have said repeatedly, the army disbanded itself. It was mostly a conscript force, conscripts who were basically mili- tary slaves. They were barely paid. Many of them I remember during the scenes of some of them walking home from northern Iraq with their soles falling off their shoes. What you were left with was an officer corps that was deep- ly penetrated by all of Saddam's security services. And if you think we have five percent that are helping the enemy with the forces that we have reconstructed, I think in the old army it would be worse. So no one is being doctrinaire here. We are bringing back officers from the old army. They are our key to success. But it is also im- portant to bring back the right officers from the old army. Mr. SCHROCK. Mr. Secretary, and Mr. Chairman, that is the good news. But, sadly, good news appears to be no news here at home. That is a very sad commentary on what our people are fed every night on the news. That is very sad. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Secretary WOLFOWITZ. I appreciate the chance to at least say it here. Thank you. 114 The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman. The gentleman from Mis- sissippi, Mr. Taylor. Mr. TAYLOR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank our very distinguished panel and the people that they represent, the Armed Forces, for being here today. Secretary Wolfowitz, my memory is very far from perfect, but I think I remember you coming before this committee prior to, and shortly into, the Bosnia conflict. And I think I remember you as being one of the folks who said, this could go wrong, this could go wrong, this could go wrong. This could end up in a quagmire. This could go wrong. And, quite honestly, I think I remember agreeing with you on al- most every one of those points. My memory is not perfect. I have not taken the time to dig up the transcripts. My observation is, as someone who agreed with you on ho agreed with you on the poten- tial pitfalls in Bosnia, in remembering you in that matter, I am constantly amazed at what I see as a flip-flop now, in that I am constantly being told by you, things are okay, we don't need to change. And I—as someone who was very concerned about Bosnia, and very, very concerned about Bosnia, I can tell you every time I went to Bosnia it looked a little bit better than the time before. But, again, I voted—I was against it. Every time I went to Bosnia, we had a few more allies than the time before. I remember going to places like Brcko, which was an extremely contentious place, and absolutely being overwhelmed at the generosity of the international community to provide building materials so that those folks could rebuild their own homes. I mean, just-I only made two trips to Iraq, so I am far from an expert. I am pretty well at the mercy of what you tell us, what I read in the paper, what I see on television, and what the folks at home tell me when they come home from it. But I didn't think it was safer in December than it was in September. My observation. I saw more people more concerned, more alert in their positions, in my trip in December than I saw in September. And I hear con- flicting statements. I want to give you an opportunity to respond. But the quote was, either from you or from General Myers—and again I have immense respect for General Myers—and the quote was—and exactly like that fast—“They have what they need, they have the people that they need.” And then I see a day-long orgy of violence in Fallujah, in a town that I knew was dangerous, because the 890th unit from the Mis- sissippi National Guard was there, and when I repeatedly asked if I could go visit them, I was told no, it is too dangerous. Heck, we knew Fallujah was dangerous. So how do you have a day-long orgy. of violence when we have the people that we need, and we have all of the things we need? That troubles me. And, again, I want to give you the opportunity. You talked about some of the things we may have missed. And I personally men- tioned to the President I thought this was going to be a ten-year endeavor, based on conversations by people I considered to be smart people, including Wes Clark. 115 And I very much was amazed at the response of this administra- tion when people who I have immense respect for—people like Eric Shinseki, who said we are going to need 200- to 300,000 people to maintain order after the war—at the disrespect that was shown to m, not necessarily by the Commander in Chief, but certainly by people who work with the Commander in Chief. Now I am hearing we are going to be there for a long time, which again I was prepared for. We are going to need a bigger force, which I was prepared for. But among the many things that we have missed—and again I am asking this as a question; I hope someone can inform me—did we miss the reaction of the average Joe in Iraq? I don't ever recall someone explaining to me very well, that this was basic-certainly there was the fear and intimidation, and there—Saddam had no redeeming characteristics, none. I think one of the things that we missed was this almost Socialist-type econ- omy where, okay, if you kept your head down and you didn't make trouble, you got your food, you got your electricity, you got your water, you got your two- or three-cent gasoline. Did we miss as a nation the huge responsibility that we would be undertaking, in effect, maintaining that Socialist state, and keeping those folks happy? Are we—as I explained to the folks in Mississippi, while they are paying 1.80 for a gallon of gasoline, that we ar going to buy it in Kuwait and ship it down to Baghdad so it can continue to be sold for three cents. Obviously, that is a huge political problem of trying to get these folks from, in effect, being paid to sit at home into some sort of a market economy. Did we anticipate that? And how do we respond to that? Because that is going to be a hard sell. If a guy is—and correct me if I am wrong—but if a guy is used to getting his electricity for free, he is not going to be real anxious to pay for it. If a guy is used to getting his water and his gasoline for virtually free, he is not going to be real excited about that. If a guy is in effect getting food to sit at home, I don't see where he is going to be real excited to go to work. I mean, we have had our own troubles with those types of pro- grams here in the States. How do you overcome that, in addition to the obvious? Our religions are different. We look different. As I have said to you privately, if you sent 120,000 Pakistanis to Mississippi, and even if they were perfect gentlemen, even if they didn't rape anyone, if they didn't torture anyone or kill any- one, at some point the folks in Mississippi would be saying it is time for you guys to go home. How do we overcome that? Because, again, I know that you are someone who used to look at all of the potential pitfalls and to try to isolate them and cure them up front. Tell me how we respond to these pitfalls now, since we are definitely in this. As I have told you privately, I want our Nation to succeed as much as you want our Nation to succeed. But these are things we are obviously going to have to overcome in order for our Nation to succeed. Secretary WOLFOWITZ. Let me start, though my memory isn't great either, and my 16-year-old loves catching me in what she calls “senior moments.” But I am very clear about one thing. I re- member very clearly, right after the Dayton Agreement, meeting with-at Senator Dole's request, as the majority leader on the 116 other side at that time, myself, and Ambassador Kirkpatrick, Gen- eral Scowcroft, a couple of other people, to come and talk with his Republican colleagues about the Dayton Accords. And I remember very clearly that many of them were in a mood to say President Clinton is taking us into a disaster. I think some of the outside ad- visers were saying the same thing. I don't want to put any words in anyone else's mouth. I remember very clearly saying myself, “I think you are wrong. I think they are ready for a cease-fire in Bos- nia. I think the United States has an interest in supporting this agreement.” You can criticize how we got there. My own view, strongly, was that both the Clinton Administration and its predecessor had made a major mistake in failing to arm the Bosnians so that they ulti- mately were not able to defend themselves, had to have outside intervention, but I was strongly in favor of coming out to support the President at that time. I testified in support of it. And I remember Senator Dole, as the Senate majority leader, supported President Clinton. I am proud to be associated with that. I may, in fact, imprudently have supported the idea of the one-year timetable. But I think we everyone at the time recognized that it would take longer. There is an essential difference, though, between Bosnia and Af- ghanistan and Bosnia and Iraq. Which is to say, Bosnia is peace- keeping. No one really wanted to fight any longer, and certainly no one wanted to fight Americans. In both Afghanistan and Iraq, we are dealing with people who were fighting Americans from before September 11th, and are eager to kill and fight Americans today. They view this as a central battle in the war on terrorism. Just read this letter from Mr. Zarqawi if you have any doubts about what he was up to. We thought, General Abizaid thought, there may be only a couple of dozen Zarqawi people in Iraq. It looks as though we have al- ready captured, I think, well over 50, I don't want to give an exact number. We have captured some more now in Jordan. This is a network that now fights us in Iraq. It is a network that pulled off bombings in Casablanca, attempted bombings, or terrorist inci- dents, rather, in London and in Paris. It is a network that was op- erating in northern Iraq before the war. It is a determined enemy. It is war. And it is difficult. I think two points. Number one, I think we are making real progress in this war. You are right that Fallujah has been a prob- lem for some time. We can debate whether we should have taken on the problem earlier. If we decided to take it on earlier, maybe we would have asked for more forces to do it. But the inhibition all along has been the problem that General Myers described quite well, which is the balance between taking on these enemies in pop- ulated cities and the potential civilian casualties that can occur at the same time. I described an operation in Sumara the 4th Infantry Division did some months ago. I think it was quite successful. So, to come back to what General Abizaid says, what we need most, in most cases, is more intelligence, not more forces. And without better intel- ligence and more intelligence, more forces simply end up, as I think you alluded to, alienating the population. 117 Did we miss anything? I don't think what we missed was mainly on the economic side. I think we were all a little bit shocked at just how stunning the damage Saddam Hussein had done to the Iraqi infrastructure, though frankly we anticipated much more damage being done by the war itself. If anything was a surprise, it was the virulence and tenacity of these killers that I described earlier, the Iraqi Intelligence Service, the M-14 so-called antiterrorism squads that were preparing sui- cide belts before the war, that had been training assassins and bombers for literally a couple of decades, and that these people would continue fighting. I remember on April 2nd of last year, a retired Marine named Gary Anderson wrote a piece in the Post, which may overstate it a little bit, but it is truly prophetic–I remember reading it at the time and thinking, hey, he is probably right and these guys are very determined—but I think that is also, to end on a positive note, the two huge advantages that we have here. Killers do not win the hearts and minds of people. They may intimidate them, but these people have nothing positive to offer. They are a cult of death-wor- shipers, whether it is the Saddam people or the foreign terrorists or the Zarqawi types. And, second, there isn't a Ho Chi Minh Trail. There is a trail of money from outside. There is a trail of some foreign fighters from outside. But these people are not basically supported form outside. And I think the key—to go back to Mr. Skelton's question—the key is keeping the Iraqi people with us; in fact, doing better to get them with us. It is their war. It is their country. They have got to stand up on their feet and fight it. Mr. TAYLOR. Mr. Secretary, how far off the mark am I? I wel- come your memory on the Bosnia situation, and I will take you at your word. But how far off am I on what we would refer to as these pocketbook issues if-if it were domestic politics? The CHAIRMAN. Just let me announce to folks that don't know, we've got about five minutes left. But, Mr. Cole, it is your question when we come back. After Mr. Taylor's question, we will come back at 15 after the hour. We have a string of votes. But I think we still have some Members who have some very important questions. Mr. TAYLOR. But on things as basic as electricity, food, water, the price of a gallon of gasoline purchased in Iraq, I mean, was that indeed some sort of a socialized economy? Was it a free market economy? I am having trouble visualizing how you can have 60 per- cent unemployment and yet people still had electricity; 60 percent unemployment, yet they still ate; 60 percent unemployment, but a substantial number of them had vehicles. And the only way I fig- ured that you could do that is that if the state is giving everyone some sort of stipend. Was that the case? And what happens now? Secretary WOLFOWITZ. First of all, I think to a considerable ex- tent, it was the case. It was funded with Iraq's own revenues, which, as I said, Mr. TAYLOR. So what happens now? Secretary WOLFOWITZ. There are considerable revenues. But sec- ond, we, as I think you know, on a weekly basis provide these un- classified statistics on the situation in Iraq. The numbers we have suggest that unemployment has come down from 60 percent a year HAU 118 ago to 25 percent ago today. It is still too high. In places like Fallujah, it is much higher because these killers have made it vir- tually impossible to do reconstruction in that area. You get a very mixed picture. But you get reports of booming economies in the north and parts of Baghdad. In the south, people doing better than they have ever done before. And these are people with a lot of commercial talent. Even though it was a socialized economy for years, they seem to have enormously creative ways of working around—we have seen that in some other countries where we have a whole underground economy. I think they had a lot of that in Iraq. So I think once they can have secure conditions and basic infra- structures repaired—I don't want to get overly optimistic here, but I think they—it has got to be their job to repair the damage. The country managed economically before. It can manage once it has stability. The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Reyes said he wanted to give you the award for the longest question. And I want to second that. But good ques- tions, Mr. Taylor. We will fire back up at 15 after. [Recess.] The CHAIRMAN. We finished with Mr. Taylor. Mr. Wilson will be our next-have the next set of questions here. Mr. Wilson. Mr. WILSON OF SOUTH CAROLINA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you, Mr. Secretary. And in particular, both Secretaries and General, thank you for your service, and I certainly have ap- preciated from the beginning your candidness and the information that you provided over the past year, year and a half of where we are, where we are going. And in particular, I was just mentioning to Secretary Wolfowitz that I returned just ten days ago from a visit to Baghdad. I had the opportunity—in particular, I was with Congressman Mike Rogers of Michigan who is a former FBI agent, and his keen interest in background of course was law enforce- ment. And it was a trip that we took to Qatar where we visited with the Iraqi Survey Group. We also visited Iraq for two days and we had the opportunity to visit with the FBI command post at the airport, which was very in- teresting as to their operations. Additionally, we had the oppor- tunity to visit with troops of the North Carolina Army National Guard; Congressman Bob Etheridge was with us in Kirkuk. And then we had the opportunity to visit with the munitions dump where they are detonating 250 tons of captured explosives every day. It was a phenomenal opportunity. But there was so much that I was encouraged about and I am giving you an op-ed in the State newspaper from Columbia, South Carolina, which was published last Saturday. But what impressed me was when we visited Jordan, there were two particular events that were extraordinarily impressive to me. First, we visited the international police training facility there at Amman, and we saw firsthand the training of a class of 500 Iraqi police and we also had the opportunity in a very impromptu, spontaneous manner to visit with four of the trainees, and through an interpreter, of course, and it was enlightening and encouraging about their determination to receive training and provide security in their home country. 119 Additionally I was encouraged visiting with the Chairman of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce there in Amman, to find out that they have had investors conferences, they have had two, which have al- ready identified the potential of contracts for developing of enter- prises in Iraq which could produce a million jobs. And I had never heard of any of this before, but it was very encouraging. And one side pointed on that, while we were in Amman, it had been announced that 3 days before that 20 al Qaeda possibly-relat- ed terrorists had been arrested and in their custody they had an 18-wheeler filled with explosives that could have done extraor- dinary damage to the country of Jordan. And so progress is being made, but it is not a conflict just in Iraq. And so I am really grate- ful for what I saw. But I am interested in your point of view as to the level of Iraqi security forces, if you could restate that because it is just not pub- lished enough. And then maybe identify Iraqi units that did perform well and possibly explain further, and you mentioned about General Petraeus, who I was very impressed with, and I am excited to hear of his role. But what is being done with the Iraqi security forces, to include the army, the police, the border police and civil defense police. Secretary WOLFOWITZ. Thank you. And that observation made about Jordan, I think it may be the incident I saw reported just the last few days. So it was terrorists connected to Mr. Zarqawi, and as I said this morning, maybe when you were not here, Zarqawi is not just a local Iraqi problem. A lot of people do not know he was based in Afghanistan for a lot of years running a camp there. This extraordinary letter of his we got because he was communicating with his colleagues in Afghanistan. And he is a global terrorist. He has organized attacks, unsuccessful ones, in London and Paris, a successful one in Morocco we believe, success- ful ones in Jordan, including one that killed our diplomat, Mr. Foley, and some unsuccessful ones, fortunately, recently in Jordan. The notion that these people only emerged after the liberation of Iraq is simply wrong, and the notion that they are only a threat in Iraq is simply wrong. Again, I may be repeating some things that I have said earlier, but there is no question that one of the three key ingredients to success here is having Iraqis take over responsibility for their own security, and we need to push as fast as we can so that that can happen as quickly as it can. That does not necessarily mean that our forces disappear, by the way. We may be needed, but pref- erably in a backup role where you make sure that the highest level of violence can be contained and that one security force cannot at- tack another security force that ever became a fear. In fact, we knew that there were a lot of problems still to be fixed. And it is not a surprise, it may be a little bit of a disappoint- ment, but it is not a surprise the performance of Iraqi security forces in the current circumstances has been uneven at best. The fighting in Fallujah is much more; it is way beyond anything that police are equipped or trained to handle. It is small scale in- fantry tactics and the enemy appear to be people who have exten- sive training and experience in the old Iraqi security forces fighting 120 for the old regime and some of their terrorist allies. There was one civil defense battalion corps that fought quite well in Fallujah. It is called the 36th Battalion. It was specifically named-most are lo- cally recruited, live at home at night. They are—for that reason, there are some advantages to that. But also, it means in an area like Fallujah they are very easily intimidated if the enemy has the capability like they have got in Fallujah. The 36th Battalion is different. It was recruited nationally and recruited from a mixture of political parties, the two Kurdish par- ties, the two Shi’a groups, Mr. Chalabi's Iraqi National Congress (INC) and the Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI) Badr Corps people and from Mr. Alawi's Iraqi National Ac- cord (INA). But they are an integrated unit. They fight together. They fought with a fair amount of bravery. It has been difficult, frankly, getting them back into that fight, but I think it is still a promising model for the future. I mentioned earlier cases where police stations in places like Sadr City, which is the big Shi’a slum in Baghdad, or Adhamiyah district, which is the upper class Sunni Arab section in Baghdad, where the police leadership was changed out a couple of months ago, and in both cases the police are performing quite well. In the case of Sadr City, they had been initially outgunned by the Sadr militia, and that is again a problem I think that can be fixed. It can be fixed by equipping the Iraqi police better. It can also be fixed as we were in the process of doing by demobilizin disarming the Sadr militias. That is a problem that needed to be faced up to and it is being faced up to. There are plenty of Iraqis, I think, who are prepared to fight and die for the future of their country. By statistics, and statistics can be misleading, but more than 250 by our count have died in the line of duty, mostly police and Civil Defense Corps. They are a major target of the enemy. We know that. We know that from Zarqawi's letter. My guess is that we underestimate our casualties. We are not systematic in tracking Iraqi casualties. We think that in addition to better equipment that the two things that are essen- tial for success are a leadership that is Iraqi so that they are under Iraqi commanders and not simply adjuncts to American forces, and a government that they can feel some loyalty to and not continue ry this label of being the collaborators of the occupation au- thority. In that connection, they are up against some evil propaganda that is portrayed as news by outlets like Al Jazeera. Al Jazeera had one person on camera who claimed that U.S. forces were tak- ing children to a juice plant that was turned into a big prison and a place of torturing the children of Fallujah. I mean, just total lies. I hesitate to repeat that because it is so outrageous and so obvi- ously wrong. But it is not obvious to an ordinary Iraqi if it is put on television. So we can help them by winning the propaganda war; however, we are up against people who have no scruples about the truth in that regard. General MYERS. Let me add the total number on duty training is a little over 205,000. And as the Secretary said, they vary in how well trained they are in their equipping and so forth. Having just visited there, meeting with our folks in the Coalition Provisional 121 Authority and General Sanchez's organization, we now have great- er clarity on what they need. We have got contracting devices in place and we have got the funding, and I think in fairly short order we are going to start equipping these forces whether they are police or Civil Defense Corps or whatever in the way they need to be equipped. So that is in hand at this point, and it had not been for the last several months. As the Secretary said, we are slow to this. I will give you one other example of where Iraqi forces performed very well. In the City of Mosul, it too, had demonstrations based on what was hap- pening in Fallujah and by Sadr's thugs, and there were big dem- onstrations in Mosul, but they were handled by the government and the police and the Civil Defense Corps in Mosul. TH total responsibility for the situation and handled it and defused it and it was over, and so it is clearly uneven performance. I would mention that 90 percent of the police, and I think it per- tains to the ICDC, as well; I think it pertains, that 90 pe them are back on duty. While some of them left their stations dur- ing the height of this for the reasons the secretary said, most of them have returned. And we have got to make sure they are equipped, trained and have the right leadership and tr I they are con- nected up the chain to the Iraqi political leadership. Mr. WILSON OF SOUTH CAROLINA. And I appreciate you recogniz- ing that. The final point, as we visit on congressional delegations, one of the real highlights, too, believe me, is troops from our own home states; and in meeting with troops from my home state of South Carolina they were telling me that in fact the local Iraqi se- curity forces, the police they were working with indeed were capa- ble, were competent. And they identified, Mr. Secretary, what you said, that as evidence of their effectiveness, they themselves, the Iraqi police, are targets. Secretary WOLFOWITZ. Absolutely. Mr. WILSON OF SOUTH CAROLINA. That is a negative indication, but certainly one that I think reflects well on your efforts, and I wish you well, thank you very much. General MYERS. Thank you for visiting our troops. They are com- mitted. The effort to go a long way from them means a lot. Secretary GROSSMAN. May I add something to the point Mr. Wil- son made, and that is to say the government-wide nature of this, that training facility in Jordan that you visited is funded through a State Department program that the Congress has very well sup- ported and we are proud to make that contribution and we are proud of that and we are proud that you visited it, sir. The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Texas, Mr. Reyes. Mr. REYES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And gentlemen, thank you for being here with us, especially much longer than anyone had anticipated. Mr. Chairman, as you and I discussed the last time we were in Iraq about a month and a half ago or so, when we have the Sec- retary come before us and ask for flexibility in terms of being able to move money around, we had a discussion about running the De- partment of Defense by supplemental funding. I think, as I ex- pressed to you—and I just want to make sure that I do so here on the record-I think that short-circuits our ability to do oversight as 122 a Congress. And I think before we take any kind of action that would give the Secretary-Secretary Wolfowitz what he wants in terms of what he terms "flexibility,” I would ask that we think long and hard about that, because I think it is important that we keep ourselves in the loop in terms of oversight. The CHAIRMAN. Let me just say to my colleague, I think you have got a balancing factor here. One factor is to allow the troops who are in engagement right now enough flexibility to get things that they immediately need that can't wait for a congressional vote. On the other hand, we do not want to lose our oversight prerogatives, and I think we have to keep them in balance and I would be happy to work with the gentleman to do that. I think when you do have forces in contact and you have got to move resources quickly. I tell you we are going to have another hearing in about an hour and we are going to have a few stiff words for the Army, which has been camping on—their bureaucracy has been camping on steel that we are trying to get over into country to armor-up vehicles. So, to some degree, giving them the ability and the will to expedite items that they need is important. On the other hand, we do not want to hand big chunks of prerogative over to the unelected branch either. So I will work with the gentleman on that. Mr. REYES. And I agree, Mr. Chairman, as we discussed. But when we have a report in this morning's Washington Post where Secretary Wolfowitz denies the Woodward accounting of how money was moved around to prepare for the Iraqi conflict, and then in the last paragraph it says, for example, a quarterly report to Congress detailing Pentagon expenditures from September 18th, 2001 to June 30, 2002 contained line items such as, quote/unguote, increased situational awareness: $5.1 billion, enhanced force pro- tection, $1.5 billion, an increased worldwide posture, $4.8 billion; you know, that is a lot of flexibility in terms of what we expect back on reporting in supplementals. The CHAIRMAN. I would reiterate I would be happy to work with the gentleman. I think one mistake that I saw in Mr. Woodward's reporting is that Iraq and Afghanistan are both in CENTCOM, and it appeared to me that he did not discriminate or he did not under- stand that, because a lot of money that was sent to CENTCOM was not fenced for one or the other. I will be happy to work that in some detail, but I know that Secretary Wolfowitz gave an answer here a couple of questions ago to that question. And Mr. Secretary, if you wanted to reanswer that for Mr. Reyes. Mr. REYES. No, I would rather go to another question. tary WOLFOWITZ. Could I make one comment; not to go back over what I said before, we have a great deal of flexibility in many accounts. I am not offering—I mean, I believe, by the way, but I want to check for the record. I just saw this newspaper story now when you called attention to it. I am sure there are some reports that use broad general categories. I also know there is a great deal of detailed reporting, particularly to oversight committees. But the real point I wanted to make is wethe Congress, I think appropriately give commanders enormous flexibility in, for exam- ple, how they expend ammunition. You will look at the total ac- count, but you do not try to account for it tank round by tank round. We have heard this—Members of Congress and particularly 123 this committee have been the main sources for bringing it back from the commanders. I have heard it every time I have been in the field with commanders. We have all of this flexibility in mili- tary operations and maintenance (O&M) accounts and almost no flexibility when it comes to fixing a local sewage plant, and fixing that sewage plant might actually do more for our force protection by winning the goodwill of the population. And when we examine it, we find that some of the red tape is in CPA and some is in the Federal Acquisition Regulations, but some is in authorities that we lack or that we sought to get from Congress and did not get. And, basically, we are fighting a war by peacetime rules not with respect to the military, but with the nonmilitary adjuncts of this war. And not throwing stones or saying—or pointing fingers, think we all can do things to clean things up without taking away any legitimate oversight by the Congress, but to make sure, as I think I hear over and over again from Members who visit, the troops are the ones who are best judges in the detail of what they need to have. And we need to get that judgment out to the field and made in the field. Mr. REYES. And I think, if anything, this committee has proven by the number of times we have been in theater, the things that we have appropriated, and the things that we have supported that we have that support for the troops. And I, as a veteran, want to make sure that everybody understands that. Let me ask you a couple of things that are of a concern to me. When you talk about Iraqis embracing the opportunity and the challenge of democracy, it seems to me that what we are expecting them to do is taking somebody that has never even seen a car an put them in the Indianapolis 500 in terms of expectation of democ- racy. That is number one. Number two, when you talk about-and you and General Myers both said, you know, commanders on the ground say th need any more troops, yet we constantly hear the reports about for- eign fighters, about how porous the border is between Syria and Iraq. Common sense to me dictates we need—if nothing else, we need to put more of our troops, additional troops on the Syrian bor- der and perhaps in the Jordanian border to make sure that we know who and what is coming in and stop that from occurring. And the last thing I want you to comment on is do we have a contingency plan once we transfer leadership and government con- trol July 1st. Is there a contingency plan to take back control? And I ask that question because of the very disturbing observations and now experiences that we have had with the nonsuccess of the Iraqi security forces. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Secretary WOLFOWITZ. I am sorry, Mr. Reyes, remind me of your first question, I should have made a note. Mr. REYES. The first question was it seems to me like we are ex- pecting the Iraqis— Secretary WOLFOWITZ. Yes, I am sorry, absolutely. First of all, the premise of your question is a very good one. We should not expect these people to go to the Olympics or the Indian- apolis 500. We need to move in stages. And we are moving in stages. And if someone could put that chart back up about the po- 124 litical transition you will see that there is a temporary government with quite limited powers for six months that will lead to elections. Those elections are still for a temporary government called the transitional government that if we keep on schedule will lead to a constitution at the end of next year and elections based on the con- stitution. If you think back to Afghanistan in December of 2001, when the same U.N. representative, Mr. Brahimi, launched this thing called the Bonn process, believe me, nobody thought the Afghans could do anything, and very few people had heard of Hamid Karzai, who had been in exile for years and had little political base in Afghani- stan. We are starting with a little more in Iraq than in Afghani- stan. It is a much more developed country; it is a sophisticated pop- ulation. There are four million Iraqis who were driven into exile who—I mean, who have reached considerable levels of accomplish- ment in the United Kingdom (UK) and in this country. Some of whom are going back. But most importantly, the people who have been in Iraq, the millions of Kurds up north who had a form of self- government now for many years. But I mentioned earlier, and I think you were not here Mr. Reyes, but I learned this from the Guardian in London, but there were elections held in 15 towns in southern Iraq in the Shi'a heartlands. They used the primitive system of ration cards because they are not ready for a sophisticated voter registration thing. And the people who won these elections are the people who we think will contribute to a more stable Iraq in the future. That is those who favor nonreligious government. The Islamists parties were largely defeated. So they are not going to go to the Olympics, but I think they are ready for the next event, and if we do not keep moving down a process like this one, they will never learn how to assume responsibility. With respect to the question of taking back, sovereignty is not something that we can or would take back. But let me be very clear—and the chairman was clear in his opening comment-for some time to come under the U.N. Security Council resolution, and probably longer by invitation of the Iraqi government, the security in Iraq will be the responsibility of a multinational force under Se- curity Council Resolution 1511 and, presumably, if there is a subse- quent resolution, it would repeat that under U.S. command. And that includes Iraqi security forces within that umbrella. Finally, with respect to border security, we wrestle with this a lot. There is a significant part of the security forces we are training that are border guards. But the biggest problem on the Iraqi bor- ders is not-it is not that we cannot seal the 600-kilometer border in the middle of a desert. That is a problem. But, frankly, it is the people that come across through legal transit points by hiding things. We just had people smuggling weapons into Fallujah. How did they do it? They put the weapons in an ambulance. It is a law enforcement proposition, like the alert customs agent in 2000 who caught the millennium bomber coming into Seattle. The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Secretary, on that point. You just mentioned the ambulances; if the gentleman would indulge me. The one thing we hear from the Marines, and you saw this on CNN. There have been ambulances pulled up where two Iraqis were wounded. Two 125 insurgents. They left the wounded guys on the ground, they picked up their guns and took off. And I think this is a rule that we have made as a government or a negotiator in this situation that ambu- lances are allowed free travel. And basically by painting a crescent and another symbol on any vehicle, they are able to turn these into ambulances. I think that should require some focus on our part. I would hope you would look at that. Because that has given a transportation ca- pability to the insurgents that they did not have a few days ago. Secretary WOLFOWITZ. It is a violation of the law of war to do that. Just to tag on to that, the ambulances, mosques that are used for military purposes lose their protected status under inter- national law. The CHAIRMAN. But my point is if you have an ambulance now. you are allowed to come close to a Marine position. At some point you are going to see IEDs carried in those ambulances. It is not only a violation of rule of law, but a loss of life for our personnel. So anybody can now paint a symbol on the side of a vehicle and call it an ambulance. And I think you need to revisit that permis- sion that you have given to the Fallujah authorities. General MYERS. What I was going to say is they do lose their protection and then they can be engaged based on what the tactical men at the scene thinks is appropriate. We are not restricting them in any way. They use their common sense. If I could tag on to the issue of border security. In this rotation, we call it Operation Iraqi Freedom II, we have sent additional forces, more than planned, to address the border issue. And we have it both on the Iranian bor- der and the Syrian border. If you look at the forces we have now out west, we put Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF), the Marines out there, in larger strength to deal with exactly that issue. Same thing on the Syrian border. I think we feel, and the Jordanians feel, the last time I talked to my Jordanian counterpart, that we are in pretty good shape on the Jordanian border and Saudi border. But the borders we worry about are Syria and Iran. And we have taken steps to bolster that security, and I agree with the Secretary that we have to continue equipping and training the border force. Mr. REYES. That is still within the cap of the number of troops- General MYERS. There is no cap. That was—when General Abizaid initially requested forces and as events changed and so forth, that number went up from our original planning figure. And it went up and where those forces are mainly with the Marines in the west and with the U.S. forces that are up in the northeast, I guess I would say on the Syrian border. The CHAIRMAN. So the border forces are within the 135,000 force level that is presently in theater. General MYERS. Right, and what I am saying is that six months ago we thought we were going to have less force inside Iraq. Some- where along the line, General Abizaid said, I need more force, not counting the 136,000 that we have in now. I am just saying, in the process they asked for more brigades, and that is where they put them. 126 Secretary WOLFOWITZ. I hope the bad guys out there are noticing that we are debating in this country whether to have our current forces or more force, not abandoning Iraq. This is a healthy debate, and I hope they notice it is not a sign of weakness, but a sign of seriousness. The CHAIRMAN. Thank the gentleman and thank him for his many trips to Iraq. The gentleman from Georgia, Mr. Gingrey. Dr. GINGREY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Secretary Wolfowitz, General Myers, Secretary Grossman, thank you for taking your val- uable time to be here today to discuss what is obviously one the most important issues in the world consciousness today. As it usu- ally happens in these hearings, I sit here waiting two hours to ask my questions and then the members right before me ask my ques- tion. And Mr. Reyes did that today, and Mr. Wilson, but I have an- other one. And it is sort of along the same line. You talked about the Iraqi civilian defense force. We talked a lit- tle bit about the border guard. But when I was in Iraq in Decem- ber, I met with General Paul Eaton, whose responsibility was standing up the new Iraqi army. Ambassador Bremer-one of the first things he did when he was appointed authority over CPA was just disband the Iraqi army for good reason. I do not question that. But it seems to me that the timeline that General Eaton de- scribed to us in regard to retraining, vetting out the right people, the young Iraqis in their late twenties, early thirties, to go through officer training. And I understand a lot of that was actually done in Jordan with the Jordanian help. But it seems to me that that effort has moved very slowly. And so, my question is, how are we progressing there? And you talk about what Mr. Reyes and Mr. Wilson talk about in regard to the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps in some instance not standing up very strong and doing their job. You mentioned some instance where they did a good job, but not in every instance. But where are we in regard to standing up the new Iraqi army? And we talk about Iraqis doing border patrol. It would seem to me that border patrol in this situation should be done by regular army, military. I mean, if we—we have a Border Patrol in our country to keep people from entering our country illegally. It is an immigration issue. But if they were crossing the borders with rocket-propelled grenades and SA-7 rockets and everything else, weapons, it wouldn't be our Border Patrol that would be guarding, it would be our military. Because we would be invaded by another power. Where are we, and where are these guys, and how long is it going to take for us to finally stand up this new Iraqi army? And t talking about the Civil Defense Corps or the police. Secretary WOLFOWITZ. One of the things that we started observ- ing middle of last year or last fall was that the plan for the new Iraqi army was way too slow given the fact that we have an ongo- ing insurgency; that it was designed for a more peaceful cir- cumstance. It had to be accelerated and has been accelerated. But for many of the tasks that we need—and we will have to look at the estimate in light of the recent fighting—but I still think it is basically valid that for a lot of internal security missions, you did 127 not need a force as sophisticated or as well trained as the Iraqi army. That was the concept of the Civil Defense Corps. I still think, as I say, it is the right concept. Maybe it is more training. I think particularly, frankly, we have been so slow in get- ting them equipped that it is impossible to make a good judgment at this point about how they performed. The target was to have some 36 battalions, 40,000 Civil Defense Corps fully equipped and trained by this fall. I am sorry I am losing the number here. I think it is 27,000 Iraqi army trained and equipped by the end of this year. We have 70,000 police, many of whom are not well- trained. nd it is worth mentioning, when we mention numbers like Gen- eral Myers did earlier, 200,000, we are not trying to pretend that these are 200,000 effectives. In some cases, the most I can say is it is better having them employed than unemployed. But the range of tasks that is required is, in some cases, quite serious. You are correct, I think, in identifying the border guarding issue in Iraq as something that goes way beyond police work. To some extent, it is being done, as General Myers said, by U.S. forces. In the wide open spaces, it can be done from the air and then only by us. But I think the equipment level for the border guards needs to be of a regular military force. Much more than po- lice. The goal was—still is—by the end of this year, to have roughly that 200,000 in different categories trained and equipped and able to do the ob. And I think we also now say, which we might not have said a few months ago, to make sure that there is an Iraqi chain of command that they report to so that they have a sense of loyalty to somebody who is not an American. Dr. GINGREY. Mr. Secretary, I do not disagree with that and I do not question the June 30th date. I think it is a commitment that we have made to the Iraqi people and we should stand by that commitment. But, General Myers, I might ask you just to kind of follow up on this issue of the professional Iraqi army, their soldiers, if you will. And if we have a goal of having 27,000 of them by De- cember the 30th, where are we today? How close are we to that goal? Because, you know, clearly they are going to—they are not going to need border patrol, they are going to need professional soldiers guarding the borders, and we are turning over that power to the Iraqi Governing Council or whatever they come up with. I realize that we will have a military presence there, but it seems like we are going painfully slow in standing up their professional army. General MYERS. The overall goal for this new increment of the Iraqi army, and this will probably be enlarged by the Iraqi govern- ment, but it is 40,000 and I think the Secretary Wolfowitz said 27,000 trained and ready by the end of the year. We currently have roughly 4,000 trained and another 2,000 in training, and we are working to change methods a little bit where we can train the trainer, train Iraqis to train their own folks. Focus on the NCO corps and have them train their younger recruits, many of whom have military service and want a job and want to come back. That is where we are. That is the first increment. 128 We think that after 1 July, as the Minister of Defense gets a staff under him and looks at his needs, that they will probably want to enlarge that 40,000 number to something else, and that is fair. We thought for the first increment that was a good number as we are balancing our resources with the current needs in the country. Dr. ĜINGREY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, gentlemen. The CHAIRMAN. Thank the gentleman. The gentleman from Mas- sachusetts, Mr. Meehan. Mr. MEEHAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I would say to my friend from Georgia, Mr. Gingrey, as frustrated as you are down in the bottom row after two hours, can you imagine having 12 years and finally making it up to the top row and waiting four hours to ask a question? So I share your frustration. Mr. Secretary, in light of the deteriorating security situation in Iraq, Secretary Rumsfeld has authorized General Abizaid to extend the deployment of certain combat, combat support, and combat service support units for up to 90 days. Nearly 6,000 of them are National Guard and Reservists units that have already served in Iraq up to 12 months. I am getting calls from families of the 94th MP companies, whose members had just begun their return home from Kuwait when their bus was turned around to say they had to stay. The 94th MP company has been activated for 2–1/2 of the past 4 years. That is 2–1/2 of the past 4 years. There is a young man from Massachu- setts who has a two-year old daughter who he has seen once for a couple of days. That is considerably longer than the majority of most Reserve units. I am getting calls from the families of the 439th quarter- master company and the 912th forward surgical team, as well. When this Administration laid out the 12 months boots-on-the- ground policy last September—I might add I was in Iraq when that policy first came down and I was with the 804th Medical Brigade, who has been—they were supposed to be there for 6 months and first got the word that now it was going to be a year. We are al- ready asking our Reservists and National Guardsmen to make enormous sacrifices, and it seems in some instances it is unfair to keep the 94th MP there for yet another 3 months. How are we going to relieve the burden on the Guard and reservist units in Iraq, and some in Afghanistan, as well? Secretary WOLFOWITZ. It is a very painful situation, Mr. Meehan, and particularly for that particular unit, which I think deployed for a year in Bosnia and then got deployed to Iraq. Mr. MEEHAN. Right. Secretary WOLFOWITZ. I had encountered some Air National Guard units on my trip to Iraq last fall who had similar experi- ences. They asked me to look into why their unit, and in that case I think it was because they were—flew a particular model of C-130 that was in the high demand. In the case of the military police units, unfortunately the decision was made to put most of the mili- tary police capability in the reserves, and we need military police on a large scale in any of these deployments. And this is not any solace for the Massachusetts people that are you talking about. It does not deal with the immediate problem, 129 but we have recognized, since before this situation arose, that we need to do something reasonably quickly to begin rebalancing the Active and Reserve force and the army has a proposal, some of it already underway, some of it in fiscal year 2005, to begin moving 100,000 positions—rebalancing between the Guard and the Reserve so that, for example, we do not have all of our military police, or most of our military police, in the Reserve Component; so that we do not have virtually all of our civil affairs in the Reserve Compo- nent; so that we can mobilize for a situation without drawing so heavily on certain of these Guard and Reserve units. And in the meantime, I guess the most we can offer is some addi- tional compensation and incentives for the people who have been involuntarily extended. I can assure you it was a very painful deci- sion for General Abizaid and for the Secretary. Not something that we are happy to do. General Myers, do you want to add? General MYERS. We are asking a lot of the Reserve Component. And as you pointed out rightly, not just the folks who are deployed and have to stay over there longer, but their families. And we know that. And also their employers. It is a huge, huge issue. What we are doing is that in this rotation in many instances, we took active Army units and trained them in the kind of skills that our MPs and infantry had—non-infantry and trained them in those skills so they could do those jobs when they got to Iraq. That is one of the solutions. Second, we are asking other services where they have similar capability to fill these positions. And services—other es do have some capability to fill some of these requirements. So we are working that. The Secretary mentioned the rebalancing issue, which will take us longer, but not a whole lot of time. We will be able to convert National Guard artillery units to MP units fairly, fairly quickly or to transporter units or to fuel and water distribution units. Those sorts of things that General Schoomaker is trying to work. So we have a series of things that we are trying to do to relieve the burden. Again, we are at war, and when we are at count on our Reserve force. We do not have enough folks in Active Duty. We have to count on them. In my recent trip, as in all past trips, when you see the way the military teamworks in country, it is seamless. You cannot tell if they are Active Duty, Guard or Re- serve. They all work together. I think despite the hardship, they understand the importance of the job. And we will continue to try the best we can, given that there are going to be events that we cannot forecast, to put as much predictability in their lives as we can. And we have been say- ing that, and sometimes we fulfill our promises and sometimes we do not. Mr. MEEHAN. Let me on this whole question of the Woodward book, I just want to make a couple of points. One, that there were extensive interviews that Woodward was granted by the President and others in the Administration. And the book basically lays out the theory that we were going to war in Iraq almost since the be- ginning of the Administration, and much of that has been much of that confirmed other books written by former Secretary O'Neill, the sworn testimony of Richard Clarke, the former chief of counter- intelligence. And what the book really says is, by the end of July, 130 and I will quote from the book—quote: "By the end of July, Bush had approved some 30 projects that will eventually cost $700 mil- lion. He discussed it with Nicholas E. Calio, the head of White House congressional relations. Congress, which is supposed to control the purse strings, had no real knowledge or involvement and had not been notified that the Pentagon wanted to reprogram the money.” So I understand, Mr. Secretary, what you said was that there was $700 million, but somebody, one of the accountants, went through-the controller went through and found $178 million that had been used, but you guys felt that legally it was part of the war against terrorism. So even though it was setting up for Iraq, that it was still legal. I guess the point is what Woodward really outlines— retary WOLFOWITZ. If I could just make it clear, it wasn't the way you said it. It was that these were things that CENTCOM needed, regardless of Iraq. They had application to Iraq if we did Iraq, but they were needed elsewhere. What we took off of that list were those things that were exclusively Iraq preparatory. Mr. MEEHAN. But reading what Woodward has laid out, it seems to me—he quotes the Administration. Isn't it fair to say that the Administration was planning for the possibility of war in Iraq long before the resolution was approved? I mean, wouldn't you say that was a fair statement? Secretary WOLFOWITZ. You know, I welcome an opportunity actu- ally to try to correct the record on a number of falsehoods that are out there. There are so many, it is hard to do it without keeping everybody here to five o'clock. Mr. Clarke has put quotes in my mouth that are simply not true. It has been said that I was for war in Iraq for years. That is not true. In fact, for me, September 11th was a crucial change. For years it is true that I believed that the United States should have done more to arm, equip and train Iraqi rebels so that the Iraqis could have fought for their country, could have brought down this regime. We wouldn't be having Americans in Iraq today if it had been done that way. We can debate whether it could have been suc- cessful. I think it could have been. September 11th changed that, in my mind, and many other peo- ple's minds because this guy now seemed too dangerous. I shared the view of Senator Levin, who said in his opposition to the war that the most dangerous time for Saddam Hussein's use of weapons of mass destruction will be when we go to war with him. And I thought that was right. I thought that was why you could no longer afford a kind of—the parallel of a Northern Alliance strategy, if you know what I mean by that. In other words, dealing with the Talibån by fighting a proxy war in northern Afghanistan. We were past the point of a proxy war by September 11th. With respect to the main question that you asked, and it is fun- damental, and I think if you will give me a minute or two to ex- plain it. I am astonished sometimes, though I shouldn't be any longer, at how difficult some people find it to understand that f and diplomacy go hand in hand. You can't have one without the II. 131 other. As someone said, diplomacy without force is merely prayer. Force without diplomacy is simply a headlong rush into war. We were not in a headlong rush to war. We were trying to make sure that if we went to the United Nations and said, comply with resolution 1441 or all necessary means will be used, which means war, to enforce it, that we were sure that the President was sure that he could make that threat and carry it out. Because the worst thing you can do is make a threat and then discover you do not have a plan to do it or the plan is too costly or the plan is some- thing you do not think has a reasonable chance of success. It is hardly a secret. It was hardly a secret in early 2002 that we were looking at military options for Iraq. That is not anywhere close to the same thing as a decision to go to war, which was not made until two days before we actually went in. Frankly, there were people who sincerely believed—and I guess I simply prayed—I thought there was one percent chance maybe this S.O.B, since it turns out he did have a survival instinct. I never believed this was a man who wanted to go down fighting. Maybe he would take the option of a comfortable exile like Idi Amin. But there was no prayer of his complying with 1441 if there was no threat of force. Gaddafi today would not be complying with the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty if there were not a threat of force. I think Mr. O'Neill is a fine man and knows a lot about finances. I think he completely misunderstood the discussions he was hear- ing about Iraq in 2001. General MYERS. If I could talk about planning for a minute, and from a military standpoint. When the Secretary of Defense, Sec- retary Rumsfeld came into office, one of the things he asked the military—and I was the vice chairman at the time he wanted to review all military plans. So we had, I don't recall how many Sat- urday sessions, but two or three when we brought up our plans ex- pert on the Joint Staff and went through the plans. And the one thing that he very quickly noticed was that given the current cycle of refreshing these plans, that they were almost out of date by the time they were on the shelf because it took us around two years or more to develop these plans; which meant that the assumption you made two years before and you get a plan three or four years later and some of them live for a couple of years beyond that, they are quickly not relevant. You do military planning for a couple of reasons. One is if you are going to have this deterrent effect, people have to believe your military is credible and if it is going to be credible, you have to have plans for contingencies so you know how to use it. The second reason, different from the first, is that people need to understand what the military can do, and you only know that when you have done the appropriate planning. So we were in the process of reworking most of our plans. We still are—I won't go into the detail of how we are trying to revamp our process where we can have plans refreshed, if you will, in a quicker interval than we are doing today. Which means that the assumptions and the planning will be much tighter and they will be much more relevant giving us credibility and telling our na- tional leaders what is in the art of the possible if you turn to the 132 military instrument of national power. And this can be for humani- tarian assistance or combat, because we have plans for all sorts of contingencies. Certainly, the Iraq war plan was one of the major plans that we had on the shelf as a contingency for the last decade or more. And it was one of the plans that was way out of date. And General Franks, at the time being the commander, when asked directly by the Secretary, do you think this plan is suitable to be on the shelf? He said no, we have to revise it. And we did. That is a little bit about military planning and why we do it. Secretary WOLFOWITZ. Could I make a point of personal privilege not on Mr. Meehan's time, since Mr. Clarke was mentioned. Mr. Clarke has a fabulous, creative memory. He has Secretary Rums- feld attending the critical September 4th meeting where the Sec- retary was absent. He has the Secretary in the Pentagon on the se- cure video conference at the moment the building was hit, a rather crucial moment. Claims he saw him at that moment, when Rums- feld did not arrive for an hour later. He put quotes in my mouth that are the opposite of what I think. I can't deal with it all. But the thing I would really like to say clearly for the record, he claims that I was dismissive of the threat posed by al Qaeda. That is sim- ply, simply wrong. Where he and I disagreed is he was dismissive of the possibility that Iraq had anything to do with terrorism against the United States. And I, to this day, do not understand why Mr. Clarke, dur- ing his 8 years under President Clinton or his 2 years under Presi- dent Bush was so uncurious about why Mr. Abdul Rahman Yasin, the only man still at large from the 1993 World Trade Center bombing—and let's be clear, the mastermind of 1993 World Trade Center bombing, Ramzi Yousef, was the nephew of the mastermind of September 11th. The 1993 World Trade Center bombing prior to September 11th was the most serious foreign terrorism attack on American territory. Mr. Yasin was harbored in Baghdad for ten years. Mr. Clarke showed no interest in the discussions I had with him as to why this man was being harbored in Iraq. No interest in getting him handed over. We had a real disagreement about issues connecting Iraq to ter- rorism. But, believe me, I have never been dismissive of al Qaeda. In fact, as early of 1998, when I was on the Rumsfeld Commission looking at ballistic missile threats against the United States, I spe- cifically asked to be briefed on the 1993 World Trade Center, be- cause it seemed to me this was an example of how terrorists might attack the United States without ballistic missiles. And I appre- ciate the opportunity to at least partially set the record straight. Mr. MEEHAN. Mr. Secretary, I was more interested in the Wood- ward—it seems to me from my reading of the excerpts that I have read of the Woodward book that maybe the interpretation of what it all means is what gets discombobulated. Because I have not heard anything at this hearing that is not consistent with at least those sections of the Woodward book that I have read. That was the only point that I was making. It seems the interruption. 133 Secretary WOLFOWITZ. You were not citing Clarke, but you men- tioned him and it was a chance—because the record is real mud- dled by him. Mr. MEEHAN. Maybe I shouldn't have mentioned Clarke. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman. Dr. Snyder. Dr. SNYDER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, gentlemen, for being here. It has been very helpful. Mr. Grossman you have not been forgotten here. I thought your written statement was ex- cellent. It was candid. You asked the questions I think on the minds of both policymakers and the American people and we look forward to a lot of these questions being answered over the next year, if not longer. Secretary GROSSMAN. Thank you, sir. Dr. SNYDER. Secretary Wolfowitz, going back hours ago to where we began the hearing—General Myers, I hope you took to heart what Chairman Hunter and others said. It is right there in front of you, the words about providing for the common defense. That is our job. We have two or three ways we do that, the most important one being funding. And I think the committee is begging you: Please send us a supplemental request to deal with that so that good programs down the line don't get raided so that you all can support our men and women in uniform. You can't always choose to fight a war in a nonelection year. We are all having to deal with that. But if you think we need a supple- mental, we hope you will ask for a supplemental, because we be- lieve the committee and the Congress and the American people will be very supportive. I wanted to touch on several topics. One is the 12-month rotation that has been discussed about here. We are conduits of informa- tion. I go back home and when it was announced that there was e a 12-months boots-on-the-ground policy, we talked to folks back home and said—I think Secretary Rumsfeld's exact words were, it will be no longer than 12 months; it may well be less than 12 months. And we had to change the extension. But in your written statement, you say on page ten: The timing of the current violence was not entirely unexpected. President Bush warned that we could expect increased violence in the months lead- ing up to the transition to Iraqi sovereignty. If we expected that there was going to be these kinds of violent gyrations, maybe the mistake was making the promise of 12 months on the ground. But just be aware that we all take your in- formation and go back home, and we offered this to the American people and troops back home as a very firm policy. I know you are pained about this, but it was a difficult thing for families. And it obviously is still a difficult thing. I wanted to ask, on page nine of your statement, you give a very thoughtful list of things that could have gone wrong, Secretary Wolfowitz. But this is what you list. You talk about the Iraqi oil fields were not burned on that list of things that could have gone wrong, but for the success and speed of the war. One area I would like you to talk about is the weapons of mass om this perspective. We have not been able to account for the weapons of mass destruction. 134 Mr. Baradei of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) says he now has evidence, apparently, that nuclear materials—not materials, but equipment, has been discovered in Europe that they think has come from Iraq. We have had the issue ongoing whether we had the personnel to guard all the ammo dumps in terms of what could be hidden there. Where are we at with regard to safeguarding nuclear materials or equipment, safeguarding ammo dumps where weapons of mass destruction could still be hidden, according to Mr. Rumsfeld, and safeguarding Iraqi nuclear scientists? Secretary WOLFOWITZ. Especially on the last point, I need to get back to you in maybe more detail on the record and perhaps classi- fied. [The information referred to is classified and retained in the com- mittee files.] Secretary WOLFOWITZ. My sense is that, with respect to things that we know of as v of as potential nuclear waste sites or having hazard- ous materials around, that we have taken provision to secure them. I want to make sure of that. With respect to ammunition, it is staggering, the quantity that exists in Iraq and the difficulty of securing all of it. A lot of effort goes into locating it; when it is located, securing it; and then, blow- ing it up. This is something that Iraqis can do and can be helpful with, but the magnitude of it is just enormous. With respect to Iraqi scientists, I know of efforts, active efforts to try to reemploy them in constructive tasks. I am also aware that at least some have been threatened, and I think one or two pos- sibly assassinated. And we are not sure whether that is because somebody feared they might have something to tell us. It is striking to me that for a regime that had nothing to hide, they did an awful lot to hide things and to threaten people to keep them from talking. All I can tell you on the general point is we all had the same intelligence. We are still trying to figure out the dif- ference between the intelligence we had and what we are finding there. Dr. SNYDER. Another question I wanted to ask was, over the last year, we have had different descriptions of who we think our en- emies are, whether it is foreign fighters, leftover Baathists, or Sad- dam loyalists. Deadenders was Mr. Rumsfeld's statement. I think General Myers said today a “small marginal minority” in today's Times. I think it is General Batiste—this is just reading from this. It says, “Some of the fighters—talking about the violence in Fallujah and other areas—some of the fighters were followers of Al-Sadder, but many others were young Iraqi men who did not see a place for themselves in the new Iraq,” General Batiste said, vowing his goal was to try to change that. “They don't see a future yet. There is not any hope politically or economically. I am convinced the secret here is a good political eco- nomic solution.” I mean, he is clearly making a statement that we have, in addi- tion to leftover Baathists and Saddam loyalists and foreign fight- ers, the unfortunate circumstance, in his view, of hopeless young 135 men who do not see an alternative and are maybe vulnerable to getting lured into this fighting. Do you agree with that statement? Secretary WOLFOWITZ. I do, although all the briefings I have had, including one recently from him by secure video, fit a picture that these unemployed young men do it for money, and the money comes from I mean this is the first guerilla warfare I have heard of where the main mode of attack was killings for hire. And they get a certain amount of money for taking a shot at us or for placing an improvised explosive device. So the way of going after that enemy militarily is not to get the young men who are being paid as much as get their pay masters and get the people who are providing the explosive expertise. And those people, to a stunning degree, still seem to be majority former Iraqi intelligence or former Fedayeen Saddam or former special se- curity organizations. Dr. SNYDER. Who take advantage of- Secretary WOLFOWITZ. I do not know if you were here, Mr. Sny- der, when I referred and will submit for the record the classified version of this report on the M14 directorate, which was the terror- ism directorate of the Iraqi intelligence. [The information referred to is classified and retained in the com- mittee files.] Secretary WOLFOWITZ. Those people are out there doing this work. Now, getting them is one thing, but General Batiste is also right. The more we can dry up their low-level recruits and give them de- cent jobs, that is a big part of it. And giving people decent jobs is also part of getting the population more generally to cooperate, be- cause when the population feels that they have a stake in the fu- ture, when they feel that we are doing good things for them, they are much more likely to turn in the crucial bad guys. And this is a war mostly of intelligence. And if we argue about how many troops we need, it is because General Abizaid will say, “Unless I have more intelligence, I do not need more troops.” Now, there are exceptions. Fallujah is clearly an exception. But for the most part, what we need is for people to cooperate with us. And dealing with the unemployment problem is a big part of that. The CHAIRMAN. Would the gentleman suspend for just a minute? I know that-General Myers, I am told you have a hard stop and you need to leave very soon. General MYERS. My Greek counterpart is here at my invitation, and he is coming to my office. In fact, he may be in my office. But at your pleasure. The CHAIRMAN. Absolutely. Thank you for being with us. General MYERS. Can I make one comment, Dr. Snyder? A couple of issues on the weapons caches. We said this before, but there is an estimated 600,000 short tons of ammunition in Iraq. Every time I go over there, the military commander said we have never seen a place that has more weapons available. We have discovered 8,756 caches so far. We have cleared 8,684. There are 72 then that are remaining. None unsecured, although some do not have full-time guards, but they are the type of munitions that are not easily taken out. 136 To give you an idea of the problem now, we are going to switch to Afghanistan. That was Iraq. Switch to Afghanistan. Yesterday, on 20 April, two caches seized, 83,503 mortar artillery and rocket rounds, 83,000—this is in Afghanistan—75 mines, 20 anti-tank missiles, 14 cruise-served weapons. That could just as well be a new cache in Iraq, because that is the sort of thing we are dealing with. I know of no site where there is anything that could be associ- ated with nuclear devices that has not been even cleared or secured or being, as we speak, worked on right now. And we will check for the record, but I do not know of any. Dr. SNYDER. Mr. Chairman, may I ask one point of clarification on a separate issue? Mr. Gingrey asked about civil defense forces, and you and I had an exchange in a classified setting with Mr. Rumsfeld about the Iraqi army and the civil defense forces. And I was referred to these charts. My question is, I do not know if it is a typo or if I do not under- stand it, but on the one as of April 9, it shows us—this is unclassi- fied—that we have on duty 32,451 Iraqi civil defense forces. One week later, that number goes to 23.000, a drop of about 9.000 or 10,000. I do not know if you all know what the reason for that is or if we could get a clarification. General MYERS. We will get you the reason for the record. [The information referred to can be found in the Appendix begin- ning on page 281.] Dr. SNYDER. It may be a typographical problem. General MYERS. It is possible it is typographical. Dr. SNYDER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General MYERS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, General. Thanks for hanging in. I know we promised Secretary Wolfowitz he would be out of here at two. But, you know, Mr. Secretary, you were given some pretty deep, thoughtful questions, and you have been answering with deep, thoughtful answers. And it takes awhile. We do appreciate your in- dulgence. The most serious thing that we do, I think, is looking at this theater and what is happening. So we really do appreciate your time. Ms. Sanchez. Ms. SANCHEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am sorry General Myers is leaving, because I actually had some questions for him, but I will put them in the record. General MYERS. I will stay for your questions. Ms. SANCHEZ. Well, let me give it to you and maybe you can think about it, because I know that, as of last night, the Pentagon told me we had 3,928 on-duty Iraqi Army troops and that there were 2,082 in training. I did the math, and that is like 6,000. And you had mentioned earlier that it was going to go to 40,000 in the fall. And now, Mr. Wolfowitz is saying, well, maybe 27,000 by De- cember. General MYERS. I stand corrected. I think it is 27,000 by the end of the year. And one of the ways we are going to hasten that is training the Iraqis and have the Iraqis start training their own. 137 Ms. SANCHEZ. That is a big increase, even to the 27,000. There will be 22,000 in the next 4 or 5 months, so I mean I would like to get a better detailed accounting of how you get to that. That was the question that I had for you. General MYERS. We will get that for you for the record, you bet. [The information referred to can be found in the Appendix begin- ning on page 283.] Ms. SANCHEZ. Thank you all, gentlemen, for being before us today. I was kind of laughing when—well, let me just say that I firmly believe that the success of our mission in Iraq is essential for our national security, and that I understand that the President has de- clared his commitment to Iraq. I am actually happy about that. what I am looking for on this Committee, and I think what most Americans are looking for, is some assurance that suc- cess remains feasible and that you actually have a clear strategy to achieve it. Because over and over, in the last two years that we have been debating these issues with respect to Iraq in particular, I still have not seen the grand plan that works for us to democ- ratize and get out of Iraq in any foreseeable future. I was kind of laughing at the dismissive quote from, I guess, Mr. Clarke. I have not read any of that information. I was kind of laughing that you said that you were not dismissive in that stance, because I remember back in February of last year, Mr. Wolfowitz, you being very dismissive, for example, of General Shinseki's testi- mony that he thought that we would need about 200,000 troops in postwar Iraq. In fact, on February 28 of 2003, you testified here in this Com- mittee that General Shinseki's estimate was wildly off the mark. Well, here we are. We are getting closer to that 200,000 number. We probably should have put them in first and then drawn down as we needed to, rather than trying to back up what we really have, which is a big problem on our hands. Most Americans are beginning to realize that this is a big prob- lem. I know the Administration does not believe this is a big prob- lem. It is pretty apparent from some of your testimony this morn- ing that you do not get the sense that most of us have had on this committee and that America is beginning to realize. But I really want to talk back to one of the issues that was going back and forth here, this whole issue of the key—you came before our Committee in September, and you testified that the key to fu- ture security operations in Iraq was the training and the fielding of Iraqi security forces. You said that American commanders did ; any more American soldiers, but wanted more Iragi. And I will quote you: “Iraqi security forces who are prepared to fight and die in defense of a free Iraq.” And in the month that followed, this policy of Iraqification was vigorously promoted by everybody in the Administration. In fact, it was laughable from my standpoint, because I was look- ing at it, and every ten days or every five days, there was a dif- ferent number being thrown out about how many people were in the civil defense and how many were going to be in the Army. And this was the way: We were not going to put our troops in, and, ac- 138 tually, there was talk about bringing the troops home in time for the election, of course. So just this past month, the DOD boasted that there were over 200,000 Iraqi security troops in the field, and you were projecting three divisions of new Iraqi Army by the fall. And, obviously, this just is not true. They are poorly trained. They are not well equipped. We have few battalions in that Army, and worst of all, we have seen defec- tions, corruption, disloyalty, refusal to fight alongside in Fallujah when we really needed it two weeks ago. So what went wrong with that policy? How are you going to change it? When are you going to make up for that? How are we going to get this back on track? What are you doing to screen, to train, to equip correctly? I missed part of this hearing because I was in Homeland on an- other issue, Homeland Committee, and maybe this was answered. But this is a big issue, of how many troops we need in there, of getting stability underway, and how we get the Iraqis to actually help us to do this. Because, you know, these numbers, and maybe that 10,000 drawdown that Mr. Snyder just talked about maybe that is the way you throw numbers around, because that is the way you were adding them up leading to this point. So what is the real plan with the number of troops and the Iraqi side of this equation? Secretary WOLFOWITZ. We have said over and over again that the numbers can be misleading, that the quality of training and equip- ping of these troops is uneven. A lot of the equipment problems, frankly, are an embarrassment to the United States of America, our red tape, our regulations, our slowness. We can get tank ammunition in the field. We cannot get-for our troops—we cannot get radios or weapons into the hands of the Iraqi police. We are fixing that. It has taken a lot longer to fix than I am happy with, but I think we have made some real progress. I think the most important piece of progress we have made on our side was to get all of the training and equipping of Iraqi secu- rity forces organized, with a unified command under CENTCOM. And now we have Major Patraeus out there to do it, and he is as capable a leader as we could find. I think we are behind schedule, but our schedule never envi- sioned that these people would be fully capable of taking care of themselves by this April, nowhere close. And nobody ever talked about pulling the troops out this summer, our troops out. What we have talked about, and I think it is still the right strat- egy, is getting Iraqis in the front lines; 250 of them have died for their country alongside Americans. They are fighting. There are many examples. I think you may have missed some of the ones we talked about earlier. Let me just mention another one that General Myers alluded to up in Mosul, where there were demonstrations against the local government. General Ham reports, “We kept coalition forces away, relying in- stead on Iraqi police. They did a great job. They did not forcefully confront the demonstrators, but did keep them from taking to pub- 139 lic streets. The demonstrations ended peacefully as group enthu- siasm waned.” There is an important point here, too—that a confrontation be- tween Iraqis and Iraqis has a different quality in the country and throughout the region than a confrontation between Americans and Iraqis. So even though they may not be capable of—at least at the moment-of taking on a really heavy fight like Fallujah, they can do a lot of things that we do not have to do. I think it is the right strategy. If anything, the real problem is that we need to speed it up. But let us be clear. No one is saying that we can leave Iraq in July or leave Iraq next July. We will keep the forces that we need to have. We will bring them down only when we can. But the Iraqis want their country back eventually, and they are going to have to fight for it. Ms. SANCHEZ. Mr. Secretary, with all due respect, I do not think you are reading it right out there. I mean they are not—they are deserting. They are not fighting side-by-side with our guys. My Ma- rines are going street-by-street in Fallujah, and they are dying over that. And we control 25 percent of that city. And there may be a cease-fire, but the cease-fire is not because we are waiting around for something to happen. We are waiting around to get gas so our guys can move in that city. Secretary WOLFOWITZ. Fallujah is unquestionably the hardest place in the country. There is no Iraqi force that can handle Fallujah today. We know that. The 36th Civil Defense Battalion for a while did fight quite bravely in Fallujah. And it is something we want to look at, stand- ing up more battalions like that. But we have got to get rid of organized pockets of enemy like Fallujah, and we have to train much more capable Ira Tragi forces if those pockets are still around. We are nowhere close to that. But that is not the whole country. It is a small fraction of the country. There are large chunks of the country—Mosul is a much, much larger city than Fallujah and much more important, and that is largely—by the way, there are Americans there. We are there to back them up, but we are in a back-up position. That is where we would like to be six months from now; not gone, but having Iraqis predominantly in the front lines. Are we there today? I am not here to say we are there today. We have problems today, but not all Iraqis have deserted. Ms. SANCHEZ. Just to say once again, Mr. Secretary, I do not be- lieve we are going to be out in six months, and I am not advocating being out in six months. My fear is we are going to be there for 50 years, the way we are in Korea today, because we did not plan correctly for this. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentlewoman. Mr. Langevin. Mr. LANGEVIN. Gentlemen, thank you for giving us so much of your time. The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, General Myers. See you later. 140 Mr. LANGEVIN. If I could, on a couple of topics, I had the oppor- tunity to go to Iraq in January and it certainly was a great fact- finding mission. A few of the things that came up on the trip—first of all, the mo- rale of the troops is incredibly high. They are performing with, as you know, a great deal of professionalism and dedication to the mission. I was very, very impressed with that. I had the oppor- tunity to meet with some of my troops who are there from Rhode Island. We had the opportunity also to meet with Dick Jones. Ambas- sador Bremmer had just left for the U.N. to meet with Mr. Annan, and a couple of the things that came up there and with some of the generals that we met with, the June 30 deadline, in terms of the hand-over. I thought then and I think now that it is far too premature to be handing over control. I understand that we are going to go ahead with it. But I would like to know, because we really did not have much of an answer then. I am not sure if you covered it; I was at the White House earlier, so I may have missed it. But can you clarify to whom we are going to be transferring power to in June? The second thing that I would like you to discuss is, in standing up the Iraqi Army, I know that originally when we went in there, the President of the Iraqi Army had been fired. And I understand you want to get rid of the top level people, but for the rank-and- file soldiers, I do not believe that was a good move in terms of fir- ing those soldiers and that it only puts people on the streets who were formerly trained soldiers to cause mischief. I know that there was an attempt and has been some attempts to rehire some of those; that decision had been rethought. When I was in Iraq, we covered that question, and the general with whom we spoke said, “Well, we started rehiring, and then the process is in flux right now. We are not really sure if we are going to proceed with that or how we are proceeding with that.” So I would like to get an update on where that is, and are we trying to rehire some of those former Iraqi soldiers? Again, I am not advocating at all rehiring some of the top Sad- dam loyalists. It would be a mistake. But where are we in terms of the rank-and-file soldiers, because I do not want to see them running around causing mischief and causing problems for our soldiers, putting them in harm's way? On Fallujah, you just talked about it a minute ago and maybe you cannot go into it in an open session, but I understand that our Marines right now have Fallujah surrounded, that there is a tem- porary cease-fire. But I would like to get a more direct answer on what the next steps will be within the next couple of weeks. Are we ready to go in there, and what will happen? Have you thought out all of the contingencies of going in and how that is going to turn out? The final thing I wanted to talk about is Muqtada al Sadr held up in Najaf. I heard General Myers over the weekend on CNN where he made it very clear that, yes, there are dangers to going into Najaf since it is one of the Shi'a holy cities, but that there may be more benefit to going in and getting him and taking him out. 141 I wanted to know if there is any progress in the Iraqi police going in and arresting al Sadr, and how close are we to acting in the event that they are not able to arrest him? If you could address those, I would appreciate it. Secretary WOLFOWITZ. Okay. Ambassador Grossman will prob- ably be able to add more on the government that will be in office in July. Let me emphasize, it is the first of three stages and the very first. And it is an interim government with somewhat limited pow- ers to be replaced by an elected government next year. He can give you more detail. I would make a general point, which is, there is no course of ac- tion here that is free of risks. There are risks that way. I think our military commanders would all tell you there are much greater risks than hanging on to the title of occupying power indefinitely and thinking that we can control a country we cannot control. With respect to the Army, I think it is important to understand that when we went into Iraq, we actually thought that we could keep whole Iraqi Army units as part of the security force post-Sad- dam. The Army just melted away. Ambassador Bremmer got there, Walt Slocombe, who was the Under Secretary of Defense in the Clinton Administration, was his adviser on defense matters. They looked at the situation, and they said the Army is gone and that it will be healthier for the future of the country if we send a message to people that we are rebuild- ing a new Army. The regular soldiers that you are asking about were slaves. They were not paid. I do not know what I mean they were literally not paid. I think it was on the order of $2 a month. It was a conscript army of several hundred thousand conscripts, and conscripting them back into the old Army was certainly—was not going to be a source of great political satisfaction in that country. What we are working on at two levels—those people that you are asking about in considerable numbers are being recruited into these new security forces. The Civil Defense Corps, which is tar- geted at 40,000 people—I would guess over half of those are people who are regular soldiers, conscript soldiers in the old Army. But now they are getting a decent salary. Similarly for the new Iraqi Army. And probably, if you look at these other, at least the Facilities Protection Service and the mortar guards, I am guessing, but I think you would find a lot of young men going back in service in that form, but getting paid for it now. The real issue has been the officer corps, and we are—there are problems in the officer corps because, obviously, some of the worst elements of that regime were promoted to command positions in the officer corps. On the other hand, we need capable leaders. And a lot of capable military leaders, through no fault of their own, rose on merit in that system. When I visited Mosul at the end of January, probably shortly after you were in Iraq, General Patraeus took me to the new Iraqi training center they had set up there. And the deputy commander was a former officer, I believe, in the Republican Guards. And 142 Hi Patraeus had an application in to get him an exemption from the de-Baathification policy, because the judgment was this guy was clean and was a valuable leader. It is happening on an individual basis. We think we probably need to do some of it a little faster. That is one of the lessons learned in the last few weeks. On Fallujah, the Marines and General Abizaid more generally are thinking through very carefully all of the military options, not only with respect to Fallujah, but with respect to things that might happen in the rest of the country if there is additional, heavier fighting in Fallujah. One of the reasons we are trying to see what can be accomplished in negotiations is that to clean out the mess in Fallujah will unquestionably involve some unavoidable civilian casualties. And that has a destabilizing effect elsewhere, especially with Al Jazeera's propaganda at work. Mr. Al Sadr is a different kind of matter. The problem there is Najaf, as I think you know, is not a city in which we think it is healthy, at least in the heart of the city, at the very least where the shrines are. It is something that it is good to have Coalition forces in there. On the other hand, he and his gang are not the kind of formidable military capability that we are facing among the old intelligence service and other people that seem to be—and the terrorists that are the core in Fallujah. So it can go on a different timetable and a more gradual applica- tion of pressure; not even necessarily overt force. And we are trying to manage those two in some balance between them. Mr. LANGEVIN. Mr. Secretary, General Myers, over the weekend, seemed to be on the verge of giving an order to go in and get al Sadr. Did I misinterpret how quickly we are ready to move there? Secretary WOLFOWITZ. I do not remember his exact comments, but I think because of the sensitivity—I mean we are talking about the two holy cities of Shi'a Islam, second only to Mecca and Medina for the Shi'a, and that is Najaf and Karbala. And it is important that we move very carefully for that reason. And, I think because of the different character of the enemy, we have the time to be careful. Secretary GROSSMAN. Sir, let me just follow up on the beginning that the Deputy Secretary made in answer to your question. First, we will turn over on the 30th of June, 1st of July, to an interim government. And I think it is important to emphasize, as the deputy Secretary did, that that interim government will last, as the chart shows you, for about six months. And its job is to have elections in December or January of next year, so that the transi- tional government can then come along and write a real constitu- tion and then get a fully legitimate government. Mr. LANGEVIN. But who is this transitional government? Secretary GROSSMAN. I will come to that. I just wanted to set the stage, because I think it is important. The transitional—the government that is the interim government is being worked by Ambassador Brahimi of the United Nations. And you will remember after the Transitional Administrative Law was put into effect, the Iraqi government, the governing council and the CPA asked the United Nations for help in two areas: One, 143 can you help us get together an interim government; and two, can you help us with elections? Brahimi is helping them with the interim government. He was in Iraq over the past couple of weeks, had broad consultations. He made a statement, and with the Chairman's permission, I think it would be interesting to put into the record. [The information referred to can be found in the Appendix begin- ning on page 284.] The CHAIRMAN. Without objection. Secretary GROSSMAN. On the 13th of April, which lays out a very detailed plan, sir, about how to go forward. He left Iraq on that day, but he left behind some homework for people to do, which is to try in CPA groups of jurists, NGOs, the other kinds of civil soci- ety that the Deputy Secretary has talked about, to find names who might be possible to be part of this interim government. Mr. Brahimi's plan, as I understand it, is to go back to Iraq early in May, have another round of consultations. And he is actually, as he says in his press conference, optimistic that he can have an interim government named and stood up for Iraqis to judge some- time in the middle of the month, so that they have a chance to get going before the first of May. I think it is fair to say, and I think we ought to be honest about this, and we have tried to be honest all day here, and I do not think Iraqis are going to welcome this as the saviour of all sav- iours, because it is still not an elected government, it is still ap- pointed by somebody, it is still of limited duration. But since it is of limited duration and its job is to have elections, we think it will do the job. I think, as I said in my testimony and others, President Bush has very warmly welcomed the effort that Brahimi has made and the plan that he has put forward. Secretary WOLFOWITZ. Mr. Langevin, somebody just gave me the statistics, which I think tell you something about the problem of keeping the Iraqi army. It had 450,000 conscripts, mostly Shi’a; 65,000 uncommissioned officers: 12.000 generals. enerals. I mean, the conscripts went home. You had an army of generals, some of them really evil people, many of them probably just incompetent. There are some capable people there. I am not denying there is a problem, and especially the capable people need to find some con- structive employment. But I think that the idea that there was an Army there to be kept together and it would have been healthy to do it-it was Ambassador Bremmer's judgment and Mr. Slocombe's judgment and, it seems to me, the right judgment that we had to start over. Mr. LANGEVIN. I think my time has more than expired. I could go on and on about this, but thank you for your answers. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman. Mr. Larsen. Mr. LARSEN OF WASHINGTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you both for being here. I have a set of questions that I will put in for the record. Perhaps they may be more appropriate for General Myers to answer, but on security and the specific steps that we plan to take to train Iraqi 144 security forces in ICDC and facility protection, army and police and border patrol, but the specific steps that we are going to plan to take. And I will put those questions in writing for General Myers. But a point I wanted to make about that is, the discussion about, obviously, what we saw happen in Fallujah is not what we wanted to see happen in Fallujah with the Iraqi security. There was some success there, but obviously, there was not some success. It is a big problem. And my—the main point I want to make about this is that I hope that we, if we have to choose between quickly standing up security forces or making sure that we have capable Iraqi security forces, that we are on the side of capability first. And that takes a little more time than we want. I think we are better off in the long-run for making sure they are capable first rather than trying to find ways to quicken the training process. If those ways result in a ca- pable security force, we can check all of the boxes and at the bot- say, they are ready to go, then that is fine. But let us make sure they are capable first. Secretary WOLFOWITZ. We agree. Mr. LARSEN OF WASHINGTON. Thanks. Mr. Grossman, a question for you. Maybe in the bottom row you are going to get all the questions here. I do not know. But the language we are using with regards to Mr. Brahimi's plan is missing one word I was waiting to hear, and that is “en- dorse." And I have not-I have heard that you are certainly encour- aging the plan, encouraging him to go forward. You like the ele- ments in it. You mentioned in your testimony there is some criteria you would like to see, but there has not been any formal endorse- ment from the Administration yet. My question is, will there be? Should there be? And is it possible that the Administration would not endorse this plan? There is nothing else on the table. Secretary GROSSMAN. No, sir, I am afraid I am stuck giving you sort of a diplomatic technicality here. Secretary Powell has been clear that Mr. Brahimi's first requirement is to report to the Sec- retary General, and he has not done that yet. Until he does, it is not really the United Nations' plan. It is not the Secretary General's plan. So the way I see this is, Ambassador Brahimi will report to the Secretary General. And the Secretary General, I am sure, will adopt this plan. He will then make it, and then we will be able to formally endorse it. As I said in my testimony, if you read what President Bush and Prime Minister Blair said last week about this plan, we are for it. And if we are missing the word “endorsement,” it is purely because it has not yet come from Kofi Annan. Mr. LARSEN OF WASHINGTON. All the language is there. I see it, but obviously it is going to take- Secretary WOLFOWITZ. You broke into the State Department code. Mr. LARSEN OF WASHINGTON. Well. That was easy. I am still working on the Department of Defense code. Secretary WOLFOWITZ. We are tougher. 145 Mr. LARSEN OF WASHINGTON. I also would like, certainly from the staff, if I could just get a copy of the Transitional Administra- tive Law (TAL). I have read a synopsis of it. And one issue that is not as well described in the synopsis is the status of forces agree- ment (SOFA)-like provisions. In your testimony, someone's testimony, as well as in the synop- sis, it talks about SOFA-like provisions, but it does not lay those out. I was wondering if you could describe for us how the interim constitution does lay out—at least envisions—the status of forces within the context of the interim constitution and then, second, how that might differ from where we might end up going on an ac- tual status of forces agreement. Secretary WOLFOWITZ. We will give you the documents. There are really three. There is the U.N. Security Council Resolution 1511, which may be supplemented by an additional resolution. But it provides for the security of Iraq up through the permanent gov- ernment under the constitution to be provided by a multinational force. Mr. LARSEN OF WASHINGTON. Which would be the December 2005, January 2006 time frame? Secretary WOLFOWITZ. Right, time frame, correct. There is the Transitional Administrative Law, which has provisions that specifi- cally commit Iraqi security forces to be part of that multinational force during that interim period. Then there is Provisional Authority Order Number 17, I believe it is called, which spells out in SOFA-like detail the privileges and immunities—although I do not think it uses those words of for- eign forces in Iraq. It is those three things taken together that pro- vide the basic position of our forces and other forces going forward. The interim government actually does not have the authority to negotiate anything pro or con. After the transitional government is elected early next year, it is authorized to negotiate with foreign countries about longer-term security arrangements. It is worth recalling, by the way, in Korea, I do not think we even had a SOFA until 1967. I am not saying we should go that long without a formal SOFA Mr. LARSEN OF WASHINGTON. I agree with you on that. If I could follow up on that, having to do—having to do with the interim gov- ernment. You say you do not want them to have that negotiating authority. We saw in April, earlier this month, where some mem- bers of the IGC were critical—if not critical, at least expressed their individual views about the U.S. actions in Iraq. How would that be handled in the interim, post-June 30? Be- cause it sort of gets to Mr. Langevin's question: Who is it we are handing it over to and what authorities do they have? The reason I am asking these questions is because it is still our women and men who really will have the primary responsibility for security. It is clear Iraqi security forces will not be stood up. We are having some problem with coalition members, obviously. It has been in the news. It is still our women and men who will be responsible for the security. How are we going to respond to this new interim government with regards to the safety of our women and men in Iraq? 146 Secretary WOLFOWITZ. Well, it will be this tri-presidency, which at least is a much more—with a prime minister, which is the focus of executive decision-making, we do not have now. I mean, we have the situation in Afghanistan where President Karzai sometimes wants us to do things with our forces that we are not willing to do because we say, “That is an Afghan problem. We are not going to get in the middle of it.” We sometimes do things with our forces that cause him political problems, and the answer is, you work it out, you negotiate. One of the things that we believe is valuable about this step for- ward is you begin to have Iraqis who have to have some respon- sibility for their actions and for what they say, and it is not a free ride anymore. And that will come even more so when you actually have elected representatives next year. But you know, democracy is a messy business. It is just better, as Churchill said, than the alternatives. Mr. LARSEN OF WASHINGTON. Did you have a comment? Secretary GROSSMAN. Just simply to say, Congressman, that I think part of what we will be seeing here is, it seems to me any- way, that Iraqis have a vision of their society. And they know that they cannot achieve that vision without security, and they cannot achieve that security without the help of us and the multinational force. And that is why I think the Transitional Administrative Law, as the Deputy Secretary said, is clear about responsibilities here. And we want to be absolutely clear that the responsibility for our forces remains with us. And in that way, also, we are trying to help the Iraqis make this transition to democracy. Mr. LARSEN OF WASHINGTON. Well, I appreciate that. And those are probably the three things from here on out that I will be look- ing at: Iraqi security and standing up; the SOFA provisions and how that is being implemented; and then, finally, exactly when the endorsement comes when there is something to move forward on, forward to. I appreciate it. Secretary WOLFOWITZ. Three central things—maybe the three central things. The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman. Mr. Marshall. Mr. MARSHALL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It has been a marathon session here. I appreciate you staying as long as you have. I do not know whether this is going to be televised or not, but assuming that it is, I think those who are watching should know how to find the Zarqawi letter. We actually, in my office, took a look at all the different translations; tried to determine which translation was the most accurate. We actually vetted this with Arab scholars and concluded that the CPA translation is the most accurate. I do not know, Mr. Secretary, you mentioned earlier you are going to put one in the record. Is it the CPA translation? Secretary WOLFOWITZ. It is. In fact, I believe you are absolutely right. There was a translation that circulated, and we asked Am- bassador Chris Ross, our former ambassador to Syria CPA now and is one of the best Arabic linguists in the Foreign 147 Service, to take a look at the translation. And he said it is not very good, and he did his own, and that, I believe, is the one. So I think it is CPA. Mr. MARSHALL. It is on the CPA website. And if you google, the way to find it is simply CPA, Iraq and then Zarqawi, and Zarqawi is Ž ARQ AW I. It is a fascinating read. I would like to talk about that. But before I do that, just as an aside, you were asked about what led to your thinking about Iraq and what was your earlier thinking about Iraq, and it reminded me that I had been down in Powell Moore's country in October or No- vember of 2001, within a month or so after the 9/11 attack a reception being held in Wilkinson County. I gave remarks to about 30 or 40 people. They asked me what was going to happen in Afghanistan. We had just gone into Afghanistan, if I recall cor- rectly, and I responded as to what I thought would happen there. Then somebody said, what did I think was the biggest threat that we face from the Middle East, and my response was Iraq. It is not because I am some great scholar. It is just because of the dynamics here. I mean, the Arab world was the place where the phrase “the enemy of my enemy is my ally” was first invented. And you would have to be extremely thick-headed if you are Saddam Hussein not to realize that he now has a delivery mechanism for whatever weapons he has, and he certainly has the motive to at- tack us. He just has to make a connection. Whether it is al Qaeda or some other terrorist group, they would be delighted to anony- mously deliver what he has got to the United States, and his inter- est is in flattening our economy, because it is very expensive for us to continue to maintain the no-fly zones, et cetera. It is a very obvious threat. What to do is another question. We can debate that forever, how we got there, whether we got there appropriately, whether we have acted appropriately. But we are where we are, and the Zarqawi letter, it seems to me, is extremely interesting and informative. In December, I paid—I was along with a surprise visit to a police chief in Ramadi in the heart of Sunni triangle. I cannot remember that guy's name. It was ten o'clock at night. He thought he was going to meet with a colonel. You mentioned a colonel making sur- prise visits to police chiefs. This police chief, I think, was the one who was quoted in the Atlantic Monthly after I got back to the United States as having said, “It is not my job to protect the Amer- icans or to deter attacks against the Americans or to pursue those who are attacking Americans; I am worried about Iraqis.” And this is somebody we had installed, whose force we presumably had trained and somebody who we were definitely paying. So it is not the kind of help that we need. Zarqawi in his letter speaks from a Sunni perspective. It is clear to me he is Sunni-born in Jordan, mid-30's, and he talks with a great deal of hatred about the Shi'a. And what he says in his letter, three different locations, is that the Americans are not the problem here. The Americans from our perspective are just targets. Eve ally, they will figure it out, and they will withdraw to their bases. But if they are successful in creating the institution that we are trying to create right now, then we are in trouble. We will not sur- 148 vive. And Zarqawi says that in his letter, and he makes reference to the Shi'a being the key. He is worried that the Shi'a will populate the police forces that we are trying to establish and the military that we are trying to establish and that, then, they will hunt down him and his buddies. I guess I would like some comments about that. I thought that, you know, the Shi'a might have a bit of difficulty hunting down people in the heart of the Sunni triangle, and I also thought that we were going to have a difficult time it was going to take an aw- fully long time before you could get folks within the Sunni triangle who would be of a better stripe than this provincial police chief that they had. Yes, they will take our pay, but they are sure not going to help us. They will tell us they are helping us, but they are sure not going to help us. So, institutionally, building the kind of help we need in the Sunni triangle with Sunnis might be very difficult, but Zarqawi is worried about Shi’as and the Shi’as being the institution that hunts them down. Comments about that? It seems to me it could be leading toward Civil War. I do not know. Secretary WOLFOWITZ. It is a remarkable letter. I must say, I think one of the things that I found encouraging about it was that he complains that he obviously thought we were made of weaker stuff. He complains the Americans are not going to leave, no matter how many wounds they suffer. Mr. MARSHALL. Absolutely. He says, we will withdraw to our bases, but we are not going to leave, and we are determined to see this through. Secretary WOLFOWITZ. And that eventually—and he thinks soon- er rather than later—he is going to face an Iraqi government, and then I think he uses the word "suffocation” when there is a democ- racy here. I read the Shi'a comments slightly differently. I read it—remem- ber, he talks about, I think it is four different targets: The Ameri- cans; the Iraqi security forces; the Kurds, whom he has been kill- ing—we do not know for sure, but I would guess that those two ter- rible bombings in Irbil and Karbala were his doing; and the Shi'a. And what he is hoping to stimulate actually is a Shi'a-Sunni civil war, and that he believes if he can kill enough Shi'a, the Shi'a will get so angry at the Sunni that they will go after the Sunni. And then they will have this destabilizing civil war. ink one of the encouraging things of the last couple of months is how totally unsuccessful that has been so far. It may be partly, I think, getting that letter out actually helped to counter his pur- poses, but the fact is the Shi'a have taken a lot of serious hits. And they have not gone after the Sunnis as a whole. They have not blamed this other Arab population for their ills. They tended to blame Zarqawi, and I think getting that letter out was a big thing. In fact, I might offer, if Mark will go along with me, to make it available on the DOD website and the State website in addition to CPA, so people will have more access. 149 their own cou Mr. MARSHALL. I have sent it out to any number of people, and I have put it on my website, as well. What we are looking for here are Iraqis to police and to secure wn country. We are just not in a position to do that. You have made reference to 250, roughly, Iraqi security officers that have died in the course of their duties. From my perspective, the real question is, do we have Iraqi secu- rity officers who are going out of their way to hunt, find, capture, kill guerillas and, in the process, risk their lives doing it? That is the key. Merely doing it in a defensive posture or there is a gaggle of po- lice officers and somebody blows up a vehicle next to them and kills 20, something like that, or a police station is overrun, where they are constantly on the defensive is not the kind of sign that people are being offensive and actively going out there. That is the kind of sign that I think that we really need to see, and stories—I do not want to take any more of your time. Secretary WOLFOWITZ. Could I just read this one thing? Mr. MARSHALL. Yes, sir. Secretary WOLFOWITZ. When the enemy attacked—I do not know, maybe this is too offensive for your taste, but I thought it was pret- ty impressive. When the enemy attacked the government building n Mosul on April 10th, he said, the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps fought back under great personal leadership of their commanders. They are poorly equipped and, by the way, that is something we have to fix. They not only stood their ground, but counter-attacked, presery- ing the government building. The newly-elected governor also stood fast. He remained with the security forces, his presence assuring them that they had the backing of the government. The police did not fare well initially. In the vicinity of the Mosul government building, they essentially withdrew to their stations. The initial attack was defeated, but several more smaller attacks continued throughout the late afternoon. The Civil Defense Corps and the governor remained on site throughout. The governor conducted a press conference stating his appreciation for the work of the Iraqi security forces, which helped keep the city calm. Privately, he worked with the police leadership and got the police back out on the streets. His personal efforts in this regard bol- stered the police when they needed it most, and they have been quite active since the attack. I mean, that is what we need to see, I think, on a nationwide scale. Mr. MARSHALL. And I think it has to go beyond that. It has to be a situation where those who want to attack us or those who want to attack police stations in Mosul know that there is no sanc- tuary, that if they are going to behave like that, eventually they are going to be hunted down, captured, and killed. Secretary WOLFOWITZ. I agree with you. Mr. MARSHALL. They are going to be put in jail. And what would be helpful from my perspective, and I think from the perspective of Americans who are wondering what is going to happen in Iraq, is stories that show our allies in Iraq on 150 the offensive tactically. Whether their objectives are precisely the same as ours does not matter at this point, that tactically they are out there trying to find these guys and put them in jail so that then we know that the enemy knows that there is somebody there who can actually find them and who is after them. Americans can- not find them. Secretary WOLFOWITZ. I agree with you, Mr. Marshall. Mr. MARSHALL. Thank you. Secretary WOLFOWITZ. Thank you. Mr. SAXTON (presiding). Our last questioner is Mrs. Davis. It is your turn for five minutes, ma'am. Ms. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate the fact that you have all been here for a long mara- thon. I started it and then had to leave for some time. So I hope that I will not be repetitive. Secretary WOLFOWITZ. We answered all your questions already. Ms. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. You probably answered the same question many times. One of the things that I think we all acknowledge and recognize is how brilliantly the troops have performed, but I think the other piece of that that saddens me and causes me great concern is that we may have tested them unnecessarily at times and that it is im- portant for us to be certain that we have what—that they have what they need and that our policies are representative of the work that they are doing on our behalf. And I think that is where, you know, there are areas, and I would hope that you would think through, as well, where we have these cases and be sure that we are learning from all that. I wanted to turn—and I know that my colleague, Mr. Larsen, had asked somewhat this question about the changeover to sov- ereignty and the chain of command between the Iraqi troops and the American troops. I am anticipating that there will be those times in which there may be a conflict in terms of who has the upperhand in wanting to do some action. And I am wondering, how are we thinking through those deci- sions now? Will there be some kind of a sign-off in terms of who is in charge? And what role will the independent contractors play in that, as well? Secretary WOLFOWITZ. With respect to regular forces, the lines are clear legally in terms of command structure that all military forces in the country, Iraqi forces as well—Iraqi forces under the terms of the Transition Administrative Law are part of the coali- tion, will be under American command. That is actually a clearer line of authority, I believe, than we have in Afghanistan, where the Afghan National Army, at least nominally, has a different chain of command. I just mention that because it is not a brand new situation where we have American forces with an American commander in a sovereign country. We have seen that in many places; each one is different. I think, though, in addition to the sort of legal chain of authority, legal line of authority, the Iraqi security forces have every interest in coordinating with us at a practical level. It does not mean there 151 will not sometimes be problems, but I think that part is reasonably clear. I wish I could give you as clean an answer with respect to the private security forces which have attracted a lot of attention, par- ticularly since the tragedy in Fallujah involved four of them. There is no way to dispense with private security forces anywhere that I know of, including some private contractors we have who provide force protection for us at our own bases around the world. They are not to replace the military. They are not to be a private They are guard forces. They help make it possible for contractors in a situation like Iraq to do reconstruction activi- ties. There are some very clear policies that the CPA has laid out. We need to look at them in the light of the recent events and see whether those policies are adequate. What we would hope to have is policies and CPA orders that would carry through under the new government that would apply to those people. Ms. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. Are we working to get those in place then? Secretary WOLFOWITZ. We are. Ms. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. Prior to July 1? And is there a lot of thinking about, rethinking about that? I am not sure whether you are suggesting that we need to understand under what situations we, perhaps, may not be well served by— Secretary WOLFOWITZ. No, we need to understand. Mr. Skelton has written us a thoughtful letter asking us—I told him earlier the reason he has not gotten a response yet is because it is a hard question. But I mean, things like, to what extent do they need to coordi- nate their movements with U.S. military? I mean, that is an issue that I think we need to rethink in light of what happened in Fallujah, for example Ms. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. You mentioned just a few minutes ago the issue of the Iraqis being poorly equipped. Surely, we would have expected that. I do not know that we would have anticipated that they would have had what they need to be as strong a force against the insurgents as we would like. Who is going to equip them, and where do we fit into that, and should we not have antici- pated that much earlier? Secretary WOLFOWITZ. It is our responsibility, I think, including with Iraqi funds as well as appropriated funds. We have known it has been a problem. I am tempted to quote Pogo at this point, but I mean, we have red tape and bureaucracy that has gotten in the way. We have had in some cases a lack of the right legal authori- ties. I think most of these log-jams have broken, I am assured, and that there is a lot of equipment starting to flow, and I hope it- it has to flow fast. If we find out that there are still other log jams, I think we will come back here, Mr. Saxton, and look for maybe some emergency authorities or waivers on contracting provisions. The delays are terrible. They have literally cost lives. And as I said earlier, I think we are trying to fight a war with some peacetime rules, not with respect to ammunition where we have good wartime provisions, but 152 with respect to these adjuncts to our forces that are every bit as valuable as tank rounds. Ms. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. Thank you. If I may, just one question that I have been asked repeatedly in my district is whether or not we are starting to reach out and fill positions on our draft boards that have been sitting vacant for some time. That is a cause of concern to some people. I wonder if you can respond to that. Secretary WOLFOWITZ. I will get you an answer for the record. I do not know. [The information referred to can be found in the Appendix begin- ning on page 283.] Ms. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. Thank you. Thank you very much for being here. The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Mrs. Davis. Mr. Turner. Mr. TURNER OF TEXAS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Secretary, thank you for being here. You have been quite generous with your time today with this committee. I know we all share our concern about our troops. I have had five young men in my district lose their lives so far in Iraq. I think one of the self-evident things that we all agree on is that failure is not an option in Iraq. I think we all have concerns about our initial action there, and I think there are a lot of parents who want to be reassured that their sons and daughters are serving for a good cause. And those who lost sons and daughters and husbands in my district want to know that their sacrifice is not in vain. k at where we are today, we find ourselves in a posi- tion that, I know when you and the President went into the White House, the President repeatedly said that we should not be en- gaged in nation-building. Yet, today, we clearly find ourselves as the nation-builder in chief, and with no option but to see it through successfully. . Having observed, as we all have, the conflict in Israel for so many years, it is pretty clear that when we are dealing with terror- ism, that military power alone cannot succeed, and we are seeing that in many ways played out, I guess, in Iraq today. I know that prior to your service in the Administration, you have broad experience in international affairs. I think, in closing today, I would like to give you an opportunity to share with us what you believe are the other elements that we are going to have to pursue as a Nation in addition to the use of military power to ensure that we can truly some day say we won this war against the terrorists. Secretary WOLFOWITZ. Thank you for the opportunity, and my colleague from the State Department may want to critique my an- swer or add to it. But I agree emphatically. If you go all the way back to the Presi- dent's State of the Union message in 2002 that got so much atten- tion because of the axis of evil portion, there was an equally impor- tant portion, in my view, where he talked about the need to build- I think the phrase was—“a just and peaceful world beyond the war on terror" and talked about the importance of reaching out to mod- erate Muslims. 153 I was the American ambassador for three years in Indonesia which has the largest Muslim population of any country in the world. They are overwhelmingly moderate in their attitudes toward religious minorities. There is a large Christian minority there and sizable Hindu and Buddhist minorities, overwhelmingly moderate in their attitude toward us and toward the West. But there is a growing element there of fanatics, some of whom believe in terrorism, some of whom carried out that horrible bomb- ing in Bali. You are right that it is important to kill and capture terrorists. And that, by the way, is not only a military task or even nec- essarily primarily a military task; it involves law enforcement and intelligence and military. But I think it is also very important to work the other side of the equation. One piece of that is clearly the Arab-Israeli dilemma. And as soon as you get me on anything complicated here, I will turn to the State Department that, lucky for me, has that tough assignment. But I do agree with what the President said, that the Israeli with- draw from Gaza is a step forward, but it is only a step. I think the sad thing is everyone knows generally what the shape of the solution is. The President has said it very clearly. It has to be two States living side-by-side. We need to get there. But we need to do many other things, as well. And I would say of the two that strike me as most important, that are way beyond the Defense Department, one is to help coun- tries. Pakistan comes to mind as one of the first and foremost, but it is a problem and Indonesia has the same problem, to strengthen modern progressive education so that young people, especially poor young people, in a place like Pakistan do not find themselves going to these madrassa schools where they do not teach much except certain distorted theology and a lot of hatred and do not equip their students to succeed in the modern world. But parents send their kids there because it is the only school that is free. I think President Musharraf has done some remark- able things in Pakistan. We are lucky to have a leader who has stood up as bravely as he has. But the paths in front of Pakistan are enormous. I think they are—in an economic and educational, area-Pakistan is one of the most important countries in this re- gard. But there are many others. And, second, I think the broader effort at reform in the Muslim world, particularly in the Middle East, that the President spoke about very eloquently at the National Endowment for Democracy last year, and then again in London—we have for reasons of realpolitic or reasons of state or whatever it is, accepted, in my view for way too long, that there wasn't much we could do about the miserable Arab governments, some of which are allies and some of which are enemies. But over the course of 20 years, most of my last 20 years in government, I actually concentrated on East Asia until September 11th. And I have seen a remarkable change. When I became Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia in 1982, Japan was the only democracy in East Asia. It has now been joined by Korea, by Taiwan, by Indonesia, by the Philippines, by Thai- land. And even in big countries like China, there has been a move- 154 ment. I wouldn't want to exaggerate it, but certainly China is a much more liberal country than it was 20 years ago. I think the same kind of evolution in the Middle East and the Muslim world is a major part of the answer to people like Zarqawi, who Mr. Marshall correctly identified as a man who believes in death and only offers death. And I guess I would say the one thing that we have going for us is that the terrorist enemy doesn't seem to have any positive agenda at all. But they prey on the sense of failure in the Muslim world, and the sense of desperation that goes with that. It is not going to happen overnight, in case you hadn't noticed. The task I have laid out is a big one. But I think the threat to our country is a big one, too, and we need to recognize it is going to take a while to turn things around. It took, unfortunately, several decades to get things as bad as they are. Mr. TURNER OF TEXAS. Thank you, Mr. Secretary, for those com- ments. It is reassuring that you share those views. I think that what I would hope that we would all commit to is to carrying out that kind of policy, which I think is the ultimate answer to the threats that we face. And I think we all need to be talking much more about that side of the equation to ensure that we can achieve victory. Thank you. Secretary WOLFOWITZ. Thank you. Mr. SAXTON (presiding]. Mr. Secretary, and Secretary Grossman, thank you very much for being with us today. You have been very generous with your time, and your answers have been great. We appreciate your participation. And we look forward to working with you as we go forward. We have a second panel that we are going to move on to now. So thank you very much. Secretary WOLFOWITZ. Thank you. Mr. SAXTON. Okay. If we can get everybody in their place. If members would come back and take your seats. We started this hearing at ten o'clock this morning, so we are well into it. We have got our second panel with us, including Dr. Judith Yaphe, Senior Fellow at the National Defense University; Dr. Baram, Senior Fellow, United States Institute of Peace; and an old friend, General John Keane, U.S. Army, Retired, former Vice Chief of Staff to the U.S. Army. Welcome, folks. General Keane. Mr. SKELTON. May I say something? Mr. SAXTON. You certainly may. Mr. SKELTON. I just wanted to say thanks for being with us. We understand it is difficult getting everybody together on this. It is really a sacrifice. It is especially good of you to be here. And, Gen- eral Keane, what a thrill to see you again. General KEANE. Good seeing you, sir. Dr. YAPHE. If I can say, it is a pleasure to see you. I pass your picture every morning in Marshall Hall where we have an exhibit up to you and your past with us. Mr. SKELTON. That is embarrassing. But thank you. Mr. SAXTON. We apologize for making you folks wait so long. So, General Keane, why don't we kick this right off here. 155 STATEMENT OF GEN. JOHN KEANE, USA (RET.), FORMER VICE CHIEF OF STAFF, U.S. ARMY General KEANE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, mem- bers of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to share some thoughts with you today. I sat in this historic room many times in the last 4-1/2 years and always found this committee to be very supportive, with a genuine desire to understand our military operations and our preparedness to be successful. The events in Iraq the last few weeks have raised concerns about the security situation, and, even more importantly, our future di- rection in Iraq. I must say at the outset, while I no longer speak officially for our troops, they have consistently responded to these attacks with courage and an aggressive determination to get the job done. Their day-in, day-out performance, far from the comforts of home, dust everywhere, long fatigue-inducing hours, working through cultural barriers, supporting at times an unappreciative Iraqi population, facing danger every day and sometimes terror, and all of the time maintaining the genuine optimism that what they are doing is worthwhile, is nothing short of remarkable. Our troops do not want to die, but they are willing to, and they are willing to risk everything they care about in life. That is some- thing I have been in awe of for all of my 37-plus years in uniform. We, the American people, are blessed to have such citizens who are so willing to protect our interests, our way of life, and expect so little in return. General Abizaid, General Sanchez, and their leaders also deserve much credit for their bold, rapid response to the events of the weekend of April 5th, and their political and dip- lomatic skills in reducing the crisis. The current rise in the security challenges in Iraq is driven pri- marily by one overriding fact: Iraq, however clumsily at times, is moving toward a fledgling democracy, where Iraqis will control their 26 ministries and be responsible to safeguard and enhance the quality of life for all Iraqis. This political fact, while given some of its inherent ambiguities, is forcing the extremists and the for- eign terrorists to increase the frequency and the scale of attacks. Al Zarqawi, the Jordanian terrorist. who is orchestrating many operations in Iraq, forecasted such events in his revealing memo- randum. It is our many successes over the past year, from freeing Iraqis from the shackles of Saddam's 35 years of repression and fear, to the rebuilding of Iraq, schools opened, hospitals function, industries is growing, the economy is improving, unemployment lowering, local governments are up and running; these realities, coupled with the political transition that, beginning this summer, is forcing what I believe are acts of desperation by the extremists and foreign terrorists. These attacks are likely to continue through the summer, past the political transition of power to an interim government, and well into the elections in the December-January time frame. In war, we must always be prepared to deal with the unexpected. No military campaign can possibly predict all of our enemies' inten- tions. The real issue is, do we have sufficient combat power and the requisite flexibility to respond and counter their moves while main- 156 taining aggressive offensive operations. It is apparent that we can and do. Our enemies will do other things in the future that may surprise us. I am confident we will respond. In regards to the extremists in Fallujah and the al Sadr situa- tion, it is encouraging that the Iraqis are attempting to resolve both crises. Fallujah has been an enemy stronghold for the last year. And what makes it unique is that so many of the people in Fallujah are sympathetic to the insurgents, and some directly sup- port them. The Iraqi initiative to disarm the insurgents and bring to justice those who killed and mutilated our fellow Americans deserves all of our support. If this initiative fails—and it may have based on to- day's events—we have no choice except to forcibly disarm the in- surgents and to kill or capture the murderers. In regard to al Sadr and Najaf, the only good solution is a Shiite one where the moderate Shiite leaders modify and control Sadr's behavior. Using military force to crush Sadr's militia, while oper- ationally very feasible, is a political nightmare to so antagonize the Shi'a majority who have all to gain from a free Iraq. The major security concern, I believe, that has arisen from this latest crisis which, deserves all of our attention, is the effectiveness of the Iraqi security forces and their capability to protect the Iraqi people. After all, we will not be able to leave Iraq until this force is capable of standing alone. We are probably guilty of expecting too much too soon from this force, given it's less than a year, in some cases only a number of months, since they were organized. It is unreasonable to expect policemen manning a police station to defend effectively in the face of a planned assault by 30 to 40 insurgents armed with assault rifles and RPGs. Any police station in the United States or Europe where policemen are properly trained would be challenged by such a reality. Equally true are the challenges facing the Iraqi civil defense forces, as we know, where some of the forces did not perform well. This is understandable. Organizations that can face the fear and terror of very stressful combat do so because they are cohesive, well-trained, properly equipped and well-led organizations, where each individual is willing to submit to something larger than self; otherwise we are expecting extraordinary acts of individual bravery in the face of stressful combat. The Iraqi security forces need to be properly equipped, provided the very best rigorous and realistic training, and, most importantly, competent leadership. This is a tough task. It has to be started from scratch, and it will take not days and weeks, but months and years. We must be aggressive in providing equipment and thorough in providing tough, realistic training. Assigning Major General Dave Petraeus, one of America's most innovative and competent leaders, to assist with this task is very encouraging. Another key security issue is removed from tactical and oper- ational considerations, but has consequences which impact both. It is the strategic issue concerning Iraq and its neighbors, all of whom have a common interest in a new Iraq. Two of these neighbors, Syria and Iran, harbor extremists who are facilitating and support- 157 ing operations in Iraq. The other neighbors are assuming what ap- pears to be a wait-and-see approach to a developing Iraq. These six countries who border Iraq and the neighboring Gulf States have a vested interest in the future of Iraq. We should do everything we can to garner their interest, incentivize them, gain their assistance in protecting the borders to deny the entry of for- eign terrorists, and to welcome their advice and counsel about the future of a new Iraq. At some point, a regional summit should be called to facilitate these discussions. In conclusion, let me just add that our success in Iraq—and noth- ing else is acceptable is directly tied to our character as a Nation. The insurgents and the foreign terrorists believe we are morally weak, and that with rising casualties and a prolonged war we will lose resolve. In the war of ideas, and the clash of values, which bin Laden and the Iraqi extremists are waging, it is not sufficient for an army to be courageous. We as a people and as a Nation must also be steadfast in the face of uncertainty and persevere when challenge and adversity comes. Our people have every right to know the facts, to understand our leaders' concerns and intentions, and every right to question them. Our leaders, both military and civilian, are competent and know what they are doing. But they will make mistakes, and they will face unexpected challenges. But that is not grounds for a lack of resolve. This feat will test our perseverance, our stamina, and our resolve. But I am confident that we will not be found wanting. Our enemies don't really know what they are up against. They believe they know, but their knowledge is superficial and their understand- ing is shallow. They don't know the courage it took to form this Nation and the many sacrifices we made over the past 100 years to help others to be free. Our enemies are cunning but they are ignorant, and their ignorance will be their undoing. They do not know our will, our courage, or our character. We are a Nation that understands our values and our way of life. e no mistake, they are being challenged today, and I am con- fident our people and our forces are up to the challenge. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I look forward to the committee's questions. Mr. SAXTON. General Keane, thank you very, very much. Dr. Baram. STATEMENT OF DR. AMATZIA BARAM, SENIOR FELLOW, UNITED STATES INSTITUTE OF PEACE Dr. BARAM. I would like to speak, very briefly of course, about the U.S. or the CPA between two forces now in Iraq; on the one hand side, Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani; on the other hand, Muqtada Sadr. First of all, a paradox. I don't think we are facing today a Shi’a mass revolt. Far from that. But already there are the signs that the situation may get worse. And one has to be aware of it in order to avoid such a development. Hopefully this will never happen. But the historical paradox is that in 1920, the Shi’a revolt was a horrendous revolt against the Brits. They paid very dearly for it. The Shiites paid even much more dearly for it. Eventually, the 158 Brits gave the country to the Sunnis, a lesson which only one mem- ber of the Governing Council (GC) had enough knowledge or cour- age to tell his people. The resolve of 1920 erupted as a result of a number of develop- ments. But the most important, what really made the difference, were taxes. The British decided to tax the poor Shi’a peasants 30 times, 32 times more than the Ottomans had taxed them, over 30 times as much. This was total madness. And the peasants simply rose up in revolt. Of course it had some religious coloring, it had some national harmony, a little bit, but it was really about taxes. Today if there is such a revolt, a Shi’a revolt, which we are not witnessing now, it will not be because you are taxing them 30 times more than Sad- dam Hussein did; it is because you are not pouring on top of them 30 times more greenbacks than Saddam Hussein did. It is a historical paradox. It doesn't show a great deal of political maturity. But after 35 years of Baath rule, I wouldn't expect a lot of political maturity. I will just tell you that a very interesting interview, which is very typical to my mind, carried in Basra a few weeks ago, produced a fantastic dialogue. The journalist was from Baath TV, the interviewee was a vendor, a street vendor. How do you feel about the British now here in Basra? And he said, look, I am going to give them a few more months to fix our infrastructure and to find me a job. If they don't do that, I shoot them. Again, no great maturity, but that is a problem which must be addressed. It is reality. So we heard here in the pre- vious session the needs for jobs and for reconstruction is huge. With your permission, I will move very quickly to Muqtada al Sadr as opposed to Sistani. These are two totally different styles of leadership. Sistani is nonconfrontative; he is a nonextremist, al- ways aiming for the happy medium, obviously nonviolent. Muqtada is confrontative, hard violence. He is a tough and very violent person. And he is also Messianic, which Sistani is not, and which for the occupation forces means—could mean trouble. How much Sistani influences people and where does Muqtada come into the equation? The interesting thing is this. My colleague, Dr. Yaphe, will talk about it. I think we share the same view. But the Shia of Iraq are not one group, like one monolith. You have tribes, you have fami- lies, you have towns, you have town neighborhoods, you have re- gions, you have parties, you have, yes, I follow this Ayatollah, I fol- low that Ayatollah, I am secular, I am an atheist; it is a whole world. But I could say one thing. Again, I don't know how Judith will look at it, but my view is that Sistani's influence does permeate through much of the Shi'a constituency in Iraq. You can belong to a Dawa, you can belong to SCIRI, a supreme assembly, a supreme council, Hakim. You can belong to another party. There are about five Shi'a par- ties now, at least. You cannot belong to anybody. You can be in a small village not knowing about all of those organizations. But un- less—until a few weeks ago, unless you belonged to the hard core around Muqtada al Sadr-I will mention him briefly in a few sec- onds—unless you belonged to these 3,000 people, 5,000, maybe 159 2,000 people immediately around him, the hard core, you would usually say, yes, I admire Sistani; I accept him. Sistani in Iraq in the Shi'a community is like a state of mind, which reminds me a little bit of Frank Sinatra, a New York state of mind. What does it mean? It is not very clear. But it is very important. Because as long as Sistani was not at odds, obviously, clearly, and in a consultative way at odds with the CPA and the IGC, Muqtada's people, who didn't ascribe to Sistani in any way, wouldn't believe in Sistani, were very, very isolated. And Muqtada was not very dangerous. The moment Sistani started opposing the CPA and the IGC, over the TAL as it is called today, the danger that more and more peo- ple beyond Muqtada's immediate circle will start wavering is there. Some of them have already moved into Muqtada's sphere of influ- ence. Still, the vast majority of them didn't. He is still despised in Najaf; he is despised in Karbala; even in Baghdad, in the holy part of Baghdad, he is—people don't admire him. In certain parts, yes, but not in those middle-class, upper middle-class learned circles, not at all. But the fact that Muqtada al Sadr today can say, which he does, he says, “I am the striking arm of Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani.” That is a direct quotation, a literal quotation. That is very dan- gerous. Because Sistani on the one hand is criticizing the Americans ex- plicitly for what they did in Fallujah and in other places. And too much military force, too much bloodshed. Explicitly. On the other hand, he criticizes Muqtada al Sadr implicitly. He said, I am al- most also against A, B, C, D, E, F, G things Muqtada is doing. But Muqtada's name is not mentioned. People simply don't get it. And when they get it, they sometimes ignore it. Now, I often ask myself, is Sistani an expression of public opin- ion, or is he a formulator of public opinion? He is both. But at least, as long as he was against any action against Americans or the coalition, and as long as there was no clear-cut bridge between him and the CPA and the IGC, people could say—people said it in interviews many; many people said it in interviews, yeah, you know, the Sunnis are attacking us, and we are collaborators, and al-Jazerra is criticizing them for being collaborators. Al-Jazerra is very anti-American. And al-Arabia, they feel under pressure, the Shiites of Iraq, those of them who did not want to fight you at all. They could say, and they said, the moment Sistani tells me to kill Americans, I will kill Americans. But the typical case wasn't- one of the journalists had insights to ask this guy, oh, so the mo- ment he tells you to do it, you do it? Yes, of course, I will kill Amer- icans. Sure. And do you think he is going to ask you to do it? So the interviewee said, Are you crazy? In other words, he provided many Shiites who felt that their honor was at stake because they were supposed to fight a Christian enemy and they are not, occupier, because you are occupiers offi- cially speaking. It is another problem. But why I don't fight the oc- cupier? The answer is Sistani does not want me to do that. So it provided them an alibi. This alibi is eroding now. That is where I see the danger. Thank you. Mr. SAXTON. Thank you very much. 160 STATEMENT OF DR. JUDITH S. YAPHE, SENIOR FELLOW, NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY Dr. YAPHE. I will try to be brief, but I want to hit on a few key points of things that I have heard since I have been sitting here for a while. In the year that Saddam has been removed, we have won the war with surprising ease, only to be confronted, as has been no- ticed here, with a growing and violent opposition to our continuing military presence and political role. I don't think anyone is arguing that removing Saddam was wrong, nor that his removal has meant a higher risk of terrorist attacks against us. I would make this point: that anyone who thought this transition from a brutal 35-year reign of terror to de- mocracy, the rule of law would be easy, was living in a dream world. I think, sadly, neither Iraqis nor Americans seem to have much patience or tolerance for the time and effort it takes to rebuild civil society and reconstruct the country damaged by long years of war, neglect, and repression. Now let's be honest, as I think everyone has said they have been. Expectations were high a year ago. High on the part of Iraqis. We would come in, we would get rid of Saddam, and we would go home. Liberation is fine for the first day or two. But then, like I think—what is the expression? Like garbage, visitors are like garbage. After three days they start to smell. You will pardon me. But after three days it is not liberation anymore. So I think that we need to understand that there was a lot—the situation we were dealing with is a lot more complicated, and we made mistakes. Too much demobilization, too deep a de-Baathification and too deep a dependency on some favorite exiles who looked a popular base in their country. The problem here, I think Iraqis do want de- mocracy and economic reconstruction. They acknowledge that they need our assistance, but they need security and economic stability more. Without safe streets and jobs, democracy could have little meaning. Now, just a few points to make. I also agree with some things Amatzia says and others I don't. I do want to say that will, elec- tions assure democracy and a pro-U.S. Government? No. There are no assurances. You can have democracy, you can have elections. One doesn t guarantee the other. It doesn't guarantee you will have the end results you like. Yes, you could have a government, interim or permanent, that may not agree with everything you want. But I think the overall point I want to make is that we are going to have to abide by our decision to empower the Iraqis and to live with the decisions they make. It is their country. So that, I think, is a very important point. Or we will be bound to repeat the mis- takes that the British made in the 1920's. I think there is an Iraqi nationalism. I want to say this. We as- sume that because Iraq is an amalgam of Shi'a Arabs, 60 percent of the population Sunni, Arabs 20 percent, and about 20 to 25 per- cent Kurds, who are Sunni and Shi'a, that Iraq can be defined and divided mathematically. It can't. And Iraq cannot be divided either as an easy solution to a difficult problem. 161 2 ond in my idoment is not Identity is more than religion and ethnic origin. And an Iraqi is more than the sum total of his or her parts. I don't think we are seeing—and I agree with Amatzia here we are not seeing the out- break of sectarian warfare. It is not Sunni versus Shi'a. I don't think the Shi'a are wedded to an Iranian-style cleric-dominated re- gime which Iran has. The thing that I think is important here is what we don't hear. It is almost like Sherlock Holmes, the dog that didn't bark in the night. My point is that we are not hearing much about the negotiations that are going on all of time that are criti- cal; the negotiations with Sadr, not entering militarily and wreak- ing havoc in Najaf, negotiations in Fallujah. They are going to be a step forward and maybe two steps back. The negotiations are critical. I would point out that despite the ef- forts of some in Iraq to disrupt, to create community warfare, Sunni versus Shi'a, Arab versus Kurd, it hasn't worked. Despite these attacks, civil war has not erupted, and in m likely to do so. Now, I could be wrong. Some terrible event could rvene. But in my view, the likelihood of civil war is higher be- tween extremists and everybody else, than it is between Sunni and Shi’a, and even between Arab and Kurd. Generally speaking, as I said, Sunni and Arabs, Shi'a Arabs share a belief in Iraqi nationalism and in maintaining the political and territorial integrity of Iraq. And I think that is in the direction that they are going. I won't talk any more about al Sadr, since my colleague has. I do want to make one point. The question has been raised about Iranian influence in Iraq. I think it-in my opinion, it is exagger- ated. Iran tends to overstate its ability to influence people and events there, just as it did in the early days of its eight-year war, and they were wrong. The Shi’a overestimated that over 80 percent of the Iraqi regu- lar army was Shi'a. They did not run over to support their breth- ren, the Shi'a brethren in Iran. They saw them as Persians. They stood with the state and the Government of Iraq. They didn't like Saddam Hussein, but they did stay local to the state. I think that is an important point to keep in mind. I also think that regardless of expectation, rules in Tehran, con- servative, reformist, it doesn't matter. It is in the Iranians' interest to see a stable Iran. I think they are trying to capitalize on their influence, but I think they have lost one of their greatest pillars of support, and that was the clerics that were murdered last year. I don't think they care too much for Sadr. He is an unguided mis- sile; that is a good expression to use for the Iranians. And they need stability there. They want to be consulted. They want a role. We should not be surprised if there are a lot of Iranians in Iraq. They have been spying on, living there, watching Iraqis, try- ing to gain influence, and have been present in the religious estab- lishment for hundreds of years. Why should it be so different now? I don't think that Iran's Islamic revolution is a model for Iraq. Most Iraqis, especially the majority of the Shi'a, do not think that Iraq can be Iran. It shouldn't be. They don't want it. I think it is true of Sistani, who is apolitical in the sense that he does not see a clerical regime, clerics running Iraq the way that Iran should be. 162 Well, we all know that we are faced with several options. In con- clusion, we could continue to support the current governing council or expand it. I think that it is a possibility. And we have heard talking about turning power over to over to the President, two dep- uties, and a Prime Minister. I don't know who they are. I notice that every one that you asked that question to skirted the issue. I will do the same, because it is not clear. I think what I would say is that we need to be careful what we do, that the success of the next stage, of the post-June 30 govern- ment, will depend on our willingness to empower the new Iraqi Au- thority, that we do need to stay the course and maintain an effec- tive presence; that we are not going to be out of here after the 30th. We will need to maintain an effective security presence, while the new government, interim and permanent, stabilizes and ac- quires the capability to protect themselves and the nation. And we need to support an international effort to rebuild Iraq economically and psychically. We cannot appoint advisers. Once the Iraqi Gov- ernment takes over, they need to make those decisions. We can't write their legislation for them or their constitution. We can encourage secular government, the rule of law, and opportuni- ties for all Iraqis. But we shouldn't favor one party or politician at the expense of the others. At some point-I raised teenagers—at some point you've got to let them drive the car. At some point the Iraqis will drive their country. Three concluding points. Very brief. There is an Iraqi nation and a deep sense of Iraqi nationalism and pride. Iraq does not just nat- urally divide historically, ethnically, or religiously into three sepa- rate parts. The insurgency of the past couple of weeks suggests a different division, extremists, religious Sunni and Shi'a, because Sunni ex- tremism has been on the rise, as well. And my last point. Cultive personality is not part of Iraq's histor- ical political tradition. Saddam fostered it, used it to rule. I would hope that whatever we do, we don't create the circumstances for another such dear leader to arise. Thank you. Mr. SAXTON. Dr. Yaphe, thank you very much. We are going to move to Mr. Skelton for his questions. But before we do, I would just like to say that we have been here for six hours. We have a force protection hearing after this hearing. And so, Mr. Skelton and I have agreed that we are going to go strictly by the five-minute rule on this set of questions, which means that I will give a little tap, tap, tap when the five minutes is up. And if everybody would just cooperate so we can move through this, we would all appreciate it. I am sure our witnesses would. Mr. SKELTON. Let me give each of you a question to speed the matter up, and then answer as we go along. General, first, thank you very much. Good to see you again, sir. You are in a rather unique position, having been deeply involved in the planning of the war and its aftermath. What lesson or les- sons can you derive from the problems we have had in the after- is, after the victory that we had in April of last year, or 2003 to today? 163 Dr. Baram, what prospects, in your opinion, are there for a true civil war in Iraq? Dr. Yaphe, I have been concerned about the transferring of sov- ereignty at the end of June and what, if any, effects that would have on the Iraqi people and on our military presence there, in- cluding limitations, rules of engagement, and the like. Thank you. General, you are first. General KEANE. Sure. Thank you, Mr. Congressman. It is great seeing you again, sir. For me, it is clearly the level of violence that took place after we toppled the regime. And I think most of us—I speak for myself- certainly never expected the level of violence that would be sus- tained as long as it is. One of the things I really missed when I looked at the regime is what 35 years of repression by Saddam Hussein meant on the psychosis and psyche of the Iraqi people themselves, and the passivity that it created and the genuine skep- ticism and fear of us as so-called liberators. So the challenges that we are facing today, and I know that I did not anticipate those challenges that we are currently facing, though I believe what our forces have is tremendous adaptability and flexi- bility. They are demonstrating that every single day, to be able to make those adjustments. They are doing remarkably well with it. I hope that answers your question. Mr. SKELTON. Thank you. Doctor. Dr. BARAM. In my view, civil war is not feasible. It is possible, but it is not probable. I will put it this way. Certainly not between the Shi'a Arab masses of Baghdad in the south, and the Sunni Arab masses of Baghdad in the Sunni Triangle. I don't see hundreds of thousands of Shi’as streaming into Fallujah to smother the Fallujah people. No way. No way. And not the other way around. I do see growing hostility between all Arabs, Sunni, and Shi'a Arabs, and the Kurds, estrangement and hostility. I cannot tell which way this will go. Hopefully, not very far. But I don't see this kind of Sunni-Shi'a clash. I do see and this is happening every day, by the way—individ- ual cases of assassinations on both sides. And that is a part of the security and stability in-especially in Baghdad today. But I will say what worries me most. What worries me most is not Sunni-Shi'a. You know, a huge clash, won't happen, to my mind. I am worried about Sunni radicals and Shi'a radicals making common calls, purely tactical, but common calls to kill Americans. About that I am worried, yes. Mr. SKELTON. Thank you. Doctor. Dr. YAPHE. Briefly, the first part of your question, effects of Iraqis of the turnover. It depends on who power is turned over to. If the people who receive power want to perpetuate the rule, change the rules of the game, decide they don't want to go along with the limitations put on an interim government. And I think it will also depend on how quickly the provisional—this interim gov- ernment moves toward elections, because I think they have to be held within the time allotted. If there is not movement on that, the Iragis are going to be very cynical and say we installed our puppets and we had no real inten- 164 tion of bringing Iraqi government. There has to be an investment of power and there has to be a move toward these, or I think we are in deep trouble. On your second part, on the impact on our military. The danger to us is not going to disappear with the 30th of June. Come the 1st of July, there won't be any more terrorist attacks or insurgents? I don't think so. I think that the risk will remain high. It will be against us. If the U.N. Is back there, it will be against the U.N. It could continue against any foreign forces, just as we are seeing that, we saw the pressure get them out. On the rules of engagement, I think we need to be very clear on what our rules of engagement are, and where U.S. forces will act; when, under what conditions they will act, and under what condi- tions and what the role is for the Iraqi forces. Those things are crit- ical and could have an impact on how easy or how difficult that second—that next stage will be. Mr. SKELTON. Thank you so much. Mr. SAXTON. Thank you. Mr. Spratt. Mr. SPRATT. In your view, and I put this question to the whole panel, could today's chaotic situation have been foreseeable and avoidable? Would more troops have made a difference in establish- ing security immediately, preventing the looting in the immediate aftermath of the war? Did we put too much reliance on the assurance of the expatriates that this would be a cake-walk, an easy objective? Was our prewar planning for the post-war period adequate? And had it been, could we have avoided this, or would this have likely happened in any event? I would ask our Iraqi expert first. Dr. YAPHE. Well, I think I have been present at most of the things that you have mentioned. So let me simply say, I don't know how many forces were needed or would be needed. I leave that up to the military planners, although it seems to me just as a simple observer, there wasn't enough. But I think the reasons for the dif- ficulties are much more complicated than simply saying, not just a question of not enough. I think there were a lot of other problems involved. And that takes me to your second point. I think there was too much reliance on bad sources, bad intel- ligence. You don't want to get into the intelligence part of this issue here, I am sure. But I think that part of that was a willingness to take, as articles of faith, that the war would be simple, the war would be quick. We would be welcomed as liberators, with rose pet- als. But there wasn't, if you had that assumption. Then the last part of your question, postwar planning. If you be- lieve the first part of that, then postwar planning, how much would you need, because it was going to be over so quickly and so easily, and we would take over, things would progress, ministries that were there, bureaucrats that were there. Nothing worked out like that. So I would have to say that there was not sufficient attention given. I don't think sufficient attention was paid to advice that was available on problems that could be gotten into. Whether it was how to plan or what you would face, I don't fault-this is a much longer conversation than we have time for here. The fault was not 165 y were necessarily in Jay Garner, who planned for crisis that didn't hap- pen. That wasn't the point. But I think much more, in terms of all that needed to be done and how you coordinate it, we don't do that in less than two months. Mr. SPRATT. Dr. Baram. Dr. BARAM. There were certain things that could have been seen before the war and in fact were seen. I think there was no doubt in this administration that the Sunnis will try to kill American sol- diers. I had no doubt. I gave public lectures about it. It is all in writing. And for the Sunnis, I mean mainly Saddam's people, ex-Saddam intelligence services, all of these units that were discussed here be- fore, and many others. What maybe may have been still unknown was to what extent they would be successful; how much of it you will be seeing. But the units that you will be seeing, there was no doubt. Because you only needed to listen to Saddam's speeches; and the couple of times at least I found him mentioning Mogadishu, you kill 18, you kill enough American soldiers, they pack up and go home. And so, yes, that could be expected. But a question is, so what do you do about it? That is another question. I-my feeling was that the Shi'a will not throw candies and rice on the American tanks for a variety of reasons suspicious about it. They didn't know what you were there. In 1991 they wanted your help. You didn't give them any help. So they didn't know. And anyway, you are foreigners. You are speaking a different language; you are Christians. It is a different world. So, yes. But at the same time again, it was agreed, I think, that the Shi'as were not going to shoot at you, to try and kill you. And it r for a whole year. It did. even now I am not-I think only a small minority are trying to kill Americans. It is trouble- some enough, because it is in Najaf and Karbala and Kufa. But we are not yet at the point where, God forbid, there is a Shi'a massive resolve against the coalition. So that was basically correct. The issue of the army, it is debat- able. We don't have to go into—basically, I would say my advice would have been, without being involved in all of this, my advice would have been pay them a salary, pay everybody a small sa They get a few dollars a month from the government, three, four, five, which was really a pittance. But you pay them $20, $25 for the conscripts every month and—the professional army officers or nonenlisted officers, pay them $100 a month. That would have been my-had I been asked. This way, they come to you; they bring you their documentation, because you don't pay without documentation. You know where they are. You know everything about their military history. Every- thing is computerized. You have good computers. You know every- body, 450,000 people. Why not have them all on your computers? In exchange, $100 a month as an officer, $50 a month for a ser- geant, and $20 or $30 a month for a conscript. And keep them for a year like that. Very cheap. That was done, but belatedly. So, yeah, it should have been done earlier. But, at least-so you can argue—but on the whole, I would 166 say you are in a country which is basically Islamic. There is a growing—there has been a growing Islamization of Iraq. Or Iraqi society, not just the regime, became all of a sudden Muslim, even though Saddam was a secular leader. All of a sudden he is becom- ing a born-again Muslim. But in Iraqi society, you had a growing- a process of Islamization the last 20 years or so. And Iraqis are more interested in that than they used to be, because you are a for- eign power. And you should have expected difficulties, obviously. Mr. SPRATT. Thank you very much. General KEANE. Yes. Thank you. In terms of the level of violence that we encountered, I don't think that anything we possibly could have done would have prevented that level of violence. I do believe that the prewar planning to deal with post-regime, you know, the depth of that planning, was nowhere in comparison to what it was to take the regime down. I mean, that is the simple truth of it. So in that sense, we could probably conclude more could have been done in the prewar planning for post-regime operations. And, again, you have to understand, intellectually I think where most of us were, we were not anticipating that level of violence. So that is fair criticism. In terms of troop size, I mean it is so conventional to talk about more troops every time we have another violent act in Iraq. And I don't think there is a person in Washington who—or anybody else country that can really make that reasoned judgment, whether they be military or civilian. And when I was the Acting Chief of Staff during the summer, the first thing I asked John Abizaid when he took over from Franks was, John, do you have enough troops to do the mission? And I said, if you need more troops, don't even think about where the Administration is or what your perception is on this; put it on the table, and I am absolutely convinced Secretary Rumsfeld and others will give you the troops you have, and don't think about what the impact will be on the stress of the Army. John had looked at it very closely himself. He is a thoughtful person. He came to the same conclusion that General Franks did; that they really had enough troops to deal with the actions they had. What they were desperately in need of was more targeted, fo- cused intelligence upon which to use those troops against. It becomes a balance here. You know, the more troops you put into Iraq, the more targets you actually create, the more you have to take care of them logistically and move convoys up the road. And what these commanders are doing is drawing that balance. So where I come out on this thing, unless we collectively have lost confidence in Abizaid and Sanchez and their leaders, I think we should support the conclusions that they are coming to, because they have the facts and they have the capacity to make that analy- sis. And it can't be done here. That is the reality of it. And there is no easy solutions to the challenges we are facing Mr. SPRATT. Thank you. If I could have the General's opinion on whether or not we made a mistake in not keeping more or less in- tact the lower grades of the Iraqi army.. General KEANE. Well, I think in hindsight, Jay Garner had talked about using the Iraqi army, at least initially, as a labor 167 force. And that probably made some sense. And as Secretary Wolfowitz said this morning, the Iraqi army disbanded on us. In hindsight, when we look back on it, it probably made some sense, you know, to put that organization back to some effective use as quickly as we could have. Mr. SAXTON. Thank you. Mr. Ortiz. Mr. ORTIZ. Thank you. General, good to see you again. My ques- tion has been, would be, how should we view the not only the armed contractors, but the other contractors who are ther to rebuild Iraq? And from what I read in the news media, some of them are com- ing back because they don't have the military protection so that they can do their work. Can you elaborate a little bit on that? General KEANE. You are talking about the other countries that are there? Mr. ORTIZ. No, I am talking about the contractors, the civilian contractors, both the ones that provide security and the ones who are supposed to be rebuilding Iraq. General KEANE. Well, clearly there is risk involved for contrac- tors going to Iraq. That is obvious. I know that—I don't know the ins and outs of all of things that contractors are doing. But I am very much aware of what Halliburton, Kellogg Brown & Root (KBR) is doing in terms of a week-long training program to prepare their people to go. I know they are actually trying to talk them out of going, to make certain that they have the commitment and re- solve to do it. And other companies, as well, do similar prepara- tions, but probably not on the scale that they are doing. And also, they provide security for themselves and for some con- tracting operations, dependent on the nature of it. The United States military provides security. It is a reasonable question. The challenge we face is the contractors; many of them are there doing things that United States military forces would have to do if they weren't present. And that would increase the stress on our forces. And you can remember when we started to depend on contractors more. It goes back to the Bosnia-Kosovo operation, a little of it in Somalia, when we first started to do this, and reduce our logistics footprint in the country, and therefore require less deployments on the part of our soldiers, because we started on the treadmill of de- ployments in 1989. It was with that thought in mind that we moved to this contract- ing operation. It is also a fact that no place but Iraq have we ever dealt with the level of violence we are dealing with. It is unprece- dented to have as many contractors in the middle of a combat zone as we currently have in Iraq. And that is what is driving their se- curity requirements that the United States has provided in some cases, and they are providing for themselves. But there is no hiding the risk that they are taking in doing it. The risk is essentially the same that our soldiers are facing. Dr. YAPHE. I think General Keane has given you an excellent an- swer. I have nothing to add to this. Mr. ORTIZ. If I can recall the budget figures correctly, the con- tractors and the security personnel, civilian, that are there, make about $18.5 billion, beside the military budget that we provide. So I am just wondering, wouldn't it be better-I mean, if we look at 168 the cost, how much it costs to provide the security, and how much it costs to provide the contractors, wouldn't it be better to train our soldiers so we have a well-rounded individual that can provide this, because this is going to cost-in fact, I read in the newspaper that some of the contractors are being paid as much as $1,000 to $1,500 a day. Dr. YAPHE. I will defer to General Keane. But I don't think you can have enough soldiers to provide the kind of security that the private security guards are doing. You are quite correct that money spent for security-and it is only going to increase—means there is less that can be put to actual reconstruction. Fewer schools, fewer hospitals, fewer roads, less development, if you have to pay more for security guards. But I do not see that we could just say let us just turn that over to the military and save that money. You will not be. General KEANE. I do not know what the cost-benefit analysis would be, and some people in the Pentagon could do that for you, Mr. Congressman. But just intuitively, the costs for soldiers is very expensive, because it takes years to properly train them to do their—the full plethora of their skill sets, and these personnel costs creep as a soldier stays on active duty, and then also you are also paying for that cost into retirement. So soldiers are expensive, and that is one reality. The second reality is, as the doctor mentioned, it is a case of numbers of soldiers that we have. And there was a willingness to make a trade-off, particularly in the logistics arena, to have con- tractors do things that soldiers in the past were doing, so that we could maintain the combat fighting strength of the numbers we wanted to have. And that is what those decisions culminated in. It is a reasonable question to ask, and I think those decisions were sound when they were made at the time. Dr. BARAM. If I may make only one brief comment on a different aspect of the same question, I was shocked to see the contractors could get-four contractors could get into Fallujah without coordi- nating it with the military base, which is about two miles out of Fallujah. Fallujah is a hotbed of murder and mayhem, and I just do not understand how this would happen. So I hope from now on, at least, such-every movement should be coordinated. That is my only conclusion from this tragedy which happened. Mr. SAXTON (presiding). Thank you. Dr. Snyder. Dr. SNYDER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you all for being here. I know it has been a long day. General Keane, I wanted to ask you, do you have any comments on this. We talk a lot about hindsight and foresight and those kind of issues. One of the issues that we have been talking about over the last year intermittently has been who is controlling reconstruc- tion in Iraq. Predominantly the State Department or predomi- nantly it has been DOD, and I think they are now, with the June 30th date, if we stick with that, and I think we will, that we will see more reconstruction efforts and control turned over to the State Department. 169 Do you have any thoughts about that or lessons learned from the last year or directions we should go versus those issues of State Department versus DOD? Ĝeneral KEANE. Are you talking about infrastructure? Dr. SNYDER. Infrastructure, yes. General KEANE. Yes. Well, I bring biases to the table here be- cause of my association with the Corps of Engineers and their ca- pacity to operate in overseas countries and to be able to oversee the management of that. So I have great confidence in their capacity to do that kind of work. Dr. SNYDER. I do not know how long, General Keane, you were here when Secretary Wolfowitz was here. Perhaps a long time, but several times today—and this is an unrelated question to what you are talking about—but calling on your experience, several times today he talked about Ansar al Islam and Zarqawi and the prob- lems that he has caused for us in Jordan and in Iraq. There have been press discussions over the last few months, and several Members of Congress have been frustrated with our inabil- ity to find out why we did not take out that camp, the Ansar al Islam camp, which was in the Kurdish-controlled area of Iraq. I think Secretary Powell had photographs of it, I believe, at the United Nations when he made his presentation of why we did not take that camp out, and there were even-I think NBC news did a report that they had where they said they had sources both with- in the Administration and within the military that they actually had occasion where they thought Zarqawi was at the camp, and then the Security Council made a decision not to take out that camp. Do you have any idea why? Since we certainly discussed for a year or so before we began the operation against Saddam Hussein, and Saddam Hussein did not control that area that that camp was in. General KEANE. No, I cannot help you. I know this. I know we were looking at it as early as the 4th of July weekend before we commenced activities against Iraq in the following February- March time frame, and I do not know what the decision, I do not know what was the basis for not taking the camp out. Dr. SNYDER. So you say you recollect that we were looking at it in January? General KEANE. No, around the 4th of July. Dr. SNYDER. Around the 4th of July. General KEANE. Because it was the 4th of July weekend, the summer prior. Dr. SNYDER. So eight or nine months before? General KEANE. Right. I am not privy to what the basis for the decision was. Dr. SNYDER. Well, that is more information that we have had about that, so I appreciate that. Dr. Yaphe, I wanted to ask you. On page seven of your written statement, you say, “Who can argue that removing Saddam Hus- sein was wrong. I can't. Anyone who has studied Iraq as I have for more than 30 years, and who knows Iraqis who have suffered at his hands cannot say it was wrong to remove him from power, or that his removal increased the risk of terrorist attacks against us.” 170 That last part is what I wanted to ask you about. I think it was yesterday or the day before, President Mubarak of Egypt in a speech stated he thought the hatred his words were hatred of the United States was the greatest that he had ever seen it. And I think The New York Times over the weekend had an arti- cle about terrorism, regional terrorism in places other than the Middle East and how it is spreading and that our actions in Iraq has been used as a recruiting tool for terrorism. Without regard to how one feels about removing Saddam Hus- sein or not and all of those kinds of issues, I would like you to am- plify on that statement, because I think there are some people who are concerned about the rising anti-Americanism, the hatred, in President Mubarak's words, the fact that the decapitation of al Qaeda may, in fact, mean that we have cut loose other groups out there that are thriving because of this hatred. What are your thoughts about that? Dr. YAPHE. I do not think the removal of Saddam affected the terrorism against us. Let me say why I think that. There is a theory that says Saddam kept such a tight control on Iraq, he did not permit these kinds of groups to operate there. Al Qaeda could never have had a foothold there. I know that there is a small number of people who say that Saddam was working coop- eratively with al Qaeda and Osama bin Laden. I do not believe that. The intelligence is not there. That is not of issue here. But what my point would be is that hatred of the United States—Iraq has given people perhaps more reason, but you know, initially nobody said anything. Initially there was relief that Sad- dam was gone. Now, what happens is, well, why are you still there? So a resentment that we are still there, a resentment at some of the changes we have imposed, and fear, because most of Iraq's neighbors, with the exception of Iran, are Sunni, and fear that we intend to hand power over either to the Shi'a, and they worry about the impact that will have on their own minority populations; the Turks believe we have sold out to the Kurds, and think that will be a division. In other words, we have—it has created a lot of questions so that the hatred or the resentment—a lot of it comes out of concern because they do not know where Iraq is going. They assume that we control everything and we are moving in a certain direction. But I would like to say one other thing. Hatred of the U.S. I saw President Mubarak's statement. It is not just because of Iraq. The flare-up in anger against us, especially in the past week, and it is systemic, but the flames were fanned by the Administration's announcement of support for Sharon and his plan for getting out of Gaza, for denying the right of return for Palestinians. Palestin- ians, anti-Arabs feel very strongly about this. And then for the as- sassination of Rantisi, the second Hamas leader to be murdered. Now, I am not saying that the Hamas are nice people or Rantisi, and what was his name, Shekiesine, I am sorry, these are nice peo- ple, no. They headed a terrorist organization, and we all know the activity they were involved in. But again, it looks like Sharon was given a blank check by the United States to pull out on his terms and to do this kind of operation. Whether it is true or not, the per- 171 ception in the region is there, and that is what has contributed greatly to this anti-Americanism. I have no theory which is a longer-term one. There has been a lot of what, anti-Americanism, if you will, for a long time, and I think it has less to do with our direct policies, our policies with Israel and our support for a lot of these issues, but the fact that we were once very trusted, a trusted presence in the Middle East. We were never a colonial power. We never coveted land. Iraq, to many, seems to belie that. Did we get into Iraq just for the oil? We know that is not true, but it is part of the conspiracy mythology in the region. But I think the greater point is that we represented certain val- ues. We represented democracy, rule of law, constitutionalism, building of civil society, all of the things that many of the govern- ments we supported did not represent, and in a sense, the longer- term disgruntlement—and I will say disgruntlement rather than hatred with the United States—is you did not live up to the image that we had of you to what we thought you really represented. Well, I put that out there as a thesis for a longer-term problem that we have had, but when you add the recent violence in Iraq and the stories, and I cannot just blame Al Jazeera. Many of the Arabs believe that is the only true source of information. But cer- tainly they are going to take a more sympathetic look at what the impact is on the Iraqi people, and we need to ask ourselves the question, and I do not know what the answer is, what is the extent of collateral damage. You know, just what is going on and how many Iraqis have been hurt. The Arab world will resonate with that concern and with what they see our recent turn in Palestinian policy is. The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Dr. Yaphe. Dr. BARAM. Can I add one sentence. I see it a bit differently, Judy and I look at it differently, which is okay. At least I would say this: in my view, almost all Arabs that I know-almost, not ev- erybody—and all of the newspapers I read of the Arab world were ferociously against removing Saddam Hussein. I am saying it very clearly. I am not saying that there was a love affair between every single Arab in the Arab world or Muslims and Saddam Hussein. I am not saying that. But removing Saddam Hussein was seen as evil from the start, not a year after, and I can understand it. It means you are entering into the heart of darkness, into the heart of the Middle East, which, I believe, is today very dark. Philosophically Í would say this: both of us are historians. At least the way I look at it, something went very, very wrong with the Middle East after the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire, and I mean it; after World War I, from bad to worse to much worse. Something very wrong. So now, you are there, you are in the middle of it, and you are trying to fix something. That is some- thing which most people, most Arabs see as intervention that can- not be supported. About-I will not go into the Palestinian-Israeli, Sharon-Bush issue, because that is not my field, at least that is not what I was asked to come here today, but I will say this: if you succeed in Iraq, I am not talking about Jeffersonian democracy; actually, maybe you will have in Iraq eventually something like a Jeffersonian de- 172 mocracy, like under Jefferson, which is on the way to American de- mocracy 2004, but Jefferson democracy is not what you have today. So maybe you will have an imperfect democracy in Iraq, a more representative system, certainly a much more peaceful one, if you are successful, and Iraq will be much more affluent and thriving than it has ever been. Then, people will look at it differently, but it is a matter of years; it is not a matter of weeks. People, because they have already seen success. Success has something that buys off people, and today, by the way, you will remember perhaps, you are all a little younger than myself or my age, but you remember, I am sure, the era of Joseph Stalin and later, you know, the Sputnik, when the Soviet Union looked like being very successful. In the Arab world, you had tre- mendous admiration for the Soviet system and that is the begin- ning of the Nassirist regime, of the Ba'ath regime, and so on. Today we all know this did not work and the Middle East people know it, as well. Today, paradoxically, what everybody will talk about is democracy. All of a sudden democracy is what you really want to reach. So I think that the American example of success is working. Of course, many things that America is doing is sometimes rubbing the Arab people the wrong way, which is obvious; it is natural. But if you succeed in Iraq, I am not pessimistic at all. Then the Iraqis will tell everybody, look, it worked. The Americans can go home. They will not be very grateful to you; they will send you home, but you will see something happening. If not, that is a different story. Mr. SAXTON. Dr. Baram, thank you very much. Unfortunately, that question took us about 15 minutes, so we need to move along herfr. Rodriquez, Thank you, and ask ma Mr. RODRIQUEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me make a little comment and ask maybe some feedback, be- cause one of the things that I feel, and I think Dr. Yaphe, one of the things that I think we have failed to do is that when we look at terrorism, we have failed to recognize that—at least we have, I think, responded appropriately to it, that terror is usually based on a philosophy that the other side is evil, that the other side is the devil, and it is an ideology that I know the terrorists in South America, especially in Chile—the key is to reach out and show and be able to—if you want to stop future terrorism, you got to act in a certain way that is construed as being ethical. And to some way, we have kind of played into the evil empire of going in there and taking over and doing things that they have said that we were and now we are exactly, at least able to picture us as being evil. And I think that we have not really gone as to how do we—and when you look at the number of people that we have in Cuba right now without giving them due process and those kind of things, and all of that kind of plays into the terrorists' hands in terms of not doing to them the right thing. From a democracy perspective also—and there was a lot of dia- logue about democracy—that dialogue has stopped. If you look at what the President has said, he did not mention it one single time in the last speech he gave. And I am concerned that even the Saudis and the Kuwaitis would be even against any effort at that, 173 and that is why we even have to move even further to making sure that we try to take it in that direction. Because even the President in his dialogue did not even mention that in his last speech, and that concerns me. I wanted to get some feedback from you from that perspective in terms of how do we move it into a little more democratic, knowing full well that the Saudis and Kuwait and the others would not be supportive of that system, because that would be counter to what they have now. But knowing full well also that terrorists also play up on picturing a certain ideology, how do we present ourselves in the more, you know, more truthful manner than just being there for the oil, just being there to, you know, get rid of Saddam and cut out without doing the right thing. Dr. YAPHE. You have asked two extremely difficult and impor- tant questions. To the first part, you are right. Why does terrorism recruit so easily, it seems, extremism, religious ideology or political ideology? Yes, we are evil. We are Satan. They are good. We are bad. Black and white. There is a belief in that. There are other root causes, as well. I do not know which ones are more important any- more. I know what the ideology is. Some people will say it is jobs and economy and poverty gains recruits. But when I look at the people who are doing these acts of terrorism, who are running these movements, they are all educated, middle class, educated in western schools, doctors and engineers. They have not gone with- out. In other words, the real heart of this does not come from the uneducated, unemployed layers. I think what is important is there is a sense of victimization going along with the ideology, victimization. Why are we weak? Why are we suffering? Why can't we defend ourselves? Why do we need Americans to come in here and protect us or defeat our en- emies? Why can't we do this ourselves? So I think there are a lot of complicated reasons. When I look at, for example, the religious extremists in particu- lar, victimization and a fear that we want to take them over; that our culture is so overwhelming, and that they need to go back to the past or to whatever to preserve—I do not know how to answer that. I think the real answer is there is no answer; that in many ways, what you are asking is, if we were to do a certain thing or behave in a certain way, or follow through on certain things, then could we avoid or would we take away the reason for them hating us? I do not think so. That is a dark answer. On the dialogue of democracy, here we have a real dilemma. We have never really pushed hard for many of the governments we support to adopt true democratic values, real elections instead of cosmetic elections, for example, where President Mubarak would win by 96 percent of the vote, and he has a parliament. Well, are there reasons why? Sure. They have to do with real politik, they do not have to do with principles of American foreign policy and Wilsonian democracy. I get asked this by my students every semester and that is the answer I give, that the theories of democracy are fine and we should be moving in that direction, but the reality of real politik, either whether it is oil, or I think a more key issue is the pace of change. 174 If we push for change quickly, we may create situations that will be much more dangerous and pose much more risk to our national security. If we push for dramatic change in Saudi and you get reli- gious extremists as a result, it is not going to be good to live with, or worse, and the answer is not that they will have to sell their oil, it will not make any difference who runs Saudi Arabia; it does make a difference. Because I do not think the majority of the peo- ple would want that, but it is up to the Saudis to decide. I do not mean to give a long answer. I would leave it at that. Yes, there are inconsistencies in our approach to the dialogue of democracy, but a lot of that has to do with not intervening in these governments which are making some progress, although it is at a glacial pace, and glacial almost to be imperceptible. A pressures are building, and if you look at it, probably the greatest in Saudi Arabia now where there has been the least, the least movement and the greatest resistance. The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman. We have I would like to, but we have the other panel that has been waiting 40 minutes, so they may go home if we do not wrap up soon. I apologize to my colleagues and to the panel. You folks all day have been asking great questions and getting great, long answers. It has been good, but it takes some time. Ms. Davis. Ms. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I thank you all for being here. As I sit here and at other opportunities where I have heard you make presentations, I always want to ask the question, is anybody listening? In fact, we seem to have perhaps, at least initially, had a limited circle of confidantes that we went to to try and learn more about what we might expect after we owned it, essentially. And I am wondering now, are you seeing that broadened? Is the obviously the Iraqi Governing Council, I think, would be providing different perspectives, I would hope, but I am concerned as I hear you speak, and I wonder to the extent you can be open and up front about that, have we broadened that? Í think about the fact that I know that Chalabi's nephew is taking over the tribunal. Without being judgmental about that, I do not know how that is read among Iraqis. Could you comment on that? Dr. YAPHE. I would make a guess. Ms. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. Are we still being fairly insular? Dr. YAPHE. My guess is that there is a lot of concern in Iraq, and I have heard this from Iraqis of all different stripes, kinds, that there is great concern about attempts to control large parts of gov- ernment. For example, Chalabi's nephew, who is taking over the tribu- nal—that there is a concern that a number of governing council members may have used their posts to improve their status or posi- tion; that there is a concern about trying to keep from positions in the different ministries those who would oppose, for exar rection that Chalabi may want to take, or the others. There is a lot of concern, and that is why I said in my testimony, it would be a grave, grave mistake for us to impose leaders that we based on what, I am not sure, would be the best for Iraq, without 175 considering who has a popular base of support, to whom can the people of Iraq identify, because the better we do that, the less ag- gravation we might have. It is not going to be perfect. There is not going to be great ap- plause for whatever comes on the 1st of July. We should not expect that. But I think the point is to try to move this in a direction which covers a broader political spectrum than I think is currently represented by some of these vested interests. Ms. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. What sign should we look for that, in fact, that is happening? Dr. YAPHE. The proliferation of political parties. It is happening. There are a number of secular and some are religious-based, but there are a lot of people now coming out, slowly. It is taking time, but my guess is they are beginning to feel more secure about being able to come out, start to form NGO-type organizations, what makes up civil society. Think tanks, research groups, unions, pro- fessional organizations, and people are beginning to come forth who will be willing to take responsibility. Can I identify them now? No. That is probably just as well. But I think that that takes time and this does not happen in a month or six months, and it does not happen while you have say a gang of four or five who are very strong in opposition and in exile, have gone back to Iraq, but have not built up bases of popular support there. We should have seen some movement in that direction, and I do not think we have. So we need to consider what does that mean and who you vest power and authority in. Ms. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. Dr. Barak. Dr. BARAM. Well, what Lakhdar Brahimi is going to do now when he goes back to Baghdad, is he is going to meet with a num- ber of groups? He is going to meet with Sistani's son, Sistani does not want to see him. Dr. YAPHE. He does not see anybody. Dr. BARAM. No, no, he does, but not him. He wrote a very strong letter to him: I am not going to see you personally unless you would disown the provisional Constitution, which he cannot do, of course. But he will talk to his son. So through him, he can get to Sistani. He will talk to at least three other grand Ayatollahs, a few more Ayatollahs, moderate, working usually with Sistani. He will talk to a body called the Council of Islamic Scholars. This is a new body, probably the most important now amongst the Sunni Arab community, probably, and he will talk to them. And he will talk to the GC, obviously, and he will talk to the CPA, and to perhaps some others, and he will have to use a lot of creative thinking, and he will have to try and suggest a government that holds water. He will have to, I do not know about-Judith talked about, discussed this issue of deputies, I do not know if that is going to happen, I hope not, because who needs that? You need a prime minister, a government for six, eight months, and then run to elections. Dr. YAPHE. It is in the interim constitution, or the TAL, the pro- vision law and Brahimi has said it as well, that there will be a president, but it seems with weak powers; two deputy presidents, and then a prime minister appointed by the president. So the the- ory you can have someone like I am making this up-Pachachi as a President; this great George Washington-like grandfather figure, 176 P and say your two vice presidents or deputy presidents-one from the Kurdish community, one from the, say, Shi'a religious who have been in opposition to Saddam for such a long time and are now on the governing council, and they would appoint the prime minister. I am not so sure this is all a good idea. Dr. BARAM. Let me just take it from you. We do not kn from you. We do not know exactly how it is going to happen. But, basically, I believe he will do that. He will consult with people and he will make sure that the people who are going to fill the various jobs are representative of a mini- mal segment of Iraqi society and are truly representative of such a segment. So the government will be representative. By the way, I personally think that the IGC is reasonably rep- resentative. There are too many exiles who came back there, but it does not matter. This will not be the same, it will be a different one. And if it is done right and if it is done in consultation, I am not so pessimistic. I think it can work. And the only thing that will need to be done after that will be to define their authorities, the new government's authorities. It is only for a few months. And those authorities will be probably limited. But they will be suffi- cient authorities to prepare the country for elections and to run the reconstruction and to run everything as it should be done. All I can say is that everything depends now on Brahimi, and hopefully he will do it well. It is true that the Shiites have some reservations about him, it is true, but it is also true that the Sunnis are very happy about him. So, whatever. But even Sistani accepted him, and Sistani is much more ready to listen to any U.N. representative than to an American one, because at least the U.N. is not an occupying force. The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentlewoman. Mr. Hill. Mr. HILL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. My question will be brief and should not take very long. Last fall I believe I was in Iraq and we did various things, but one of the things that we did was visit a school; all young girls in the school. And they sang a song to us and they really put on a performance and tried to brighten our day. But I took the opportunity to ask the teacher what religion these young girls were and, to my surprise, she told me both Sunni and Shi'a. And I thought at the time that I did not think the Sunni and the Shi'a got along very well. Dr. BARAM. It was in Baghdad? Mr. HILL. It was in Baghdad. Dr. BARAM. Yes, yes, of course. Dr. YAPHE. Here I disagree with my colleague. Sunni and Shi'a have gotten along well in Iraq. Intermarriage rates were always, I think, relatively high. I think there was less difference than is seen from the outside between Sunni and Shi'a, which is one of the reasons I do not think there is going to be civil war between the two. I think there has been long years of living together, many tribes and families, including Saddam's, as my colleague often points out to me, have Sunni and Shi'a members within that fam- ily, the same family. Mr. HILL. Well, as we put a structure together that is going to govern in Iraq, how do the Kurds fall into this? What is going to be the relationship in all of this? 177 Dr. YAPHE. That is very interesting, because the difficulties with the Kurds are one of the things that will bring the Sunni and Shi'a Arabs closer together. They do not—in my experience, they do not mind if the Kurds want to rule themselves somewhere up in the north, that is fine, but they do not get Arab territory, Arab lar they do not get control of the oil. That is part of Iraq. Mr. HILL. Will the Kurds be able to tolerate that? Dr. YAPHE. That is a good question and I think it depends on what kind of commitments, and they may have to. I do not see that we have ever had a policy which supports a separate, independent Kurdish state. Dr. BARAM. Maybe I could just say that I met and heard of few Arabs—there are some, of course, but few who really agree to a meaningful Kurdish autonomy, let alone a federation in which the Kurds would be like totally something different—not even a state. Because this is an old tradition in Iraq. Usually, Arabs objected fe- rociously to Kurdish independence—not independence, to Kurdish autonomy. And for the first time, in March of 1970, Saddam Hus- sein, of all people—he was then vice president, but he was the strong man already in Baghdad he came to an agreement with Mustafa Barzani, the father of the present Barzani, on an auton- omy. It was deeply controversial in the party, in the ruling party, deeply controversial, but very quickly it became very clear that this was not real autonomy. Today, the main reason why Sistani and the Shi'a grand Aya- tollahs are opposed to the provisional constitution is this issue: be- cause they feel that this is going to split Iraq-if the Kurds can- article 60—C—if the Kurds can veto the permanent constitution that gives them only 20 percent maybe. Dr. YAPHE. The actual language of the interim constitution- Dr. BARAM. No Kurds, yes. Dr. YAPHE [continuing). Does not say Kurds. It says that if two- thirds of three governance—and the Kurds are in three governance, you see—two-third reject the constitution of national law, then it will not become law. Now, that has been interpreted to mean that it gives the Kurds a veto power over national legislation. But if you think about it, that could be any three provinces in Iraq, not just the Kurds. That is the way Sistani and many have interpreted it. Dr. BARAM. No, no, no. Sistani and everybody else in Iraq inter- preted that this is a Kurdish item. It is a Kurdish item of the con- stitution and we cannot accept it. And the Kurds were those who demanded on it and who insisted on it and who threatened to leave the IGC if it is not accepted. So this is seen as “a Kurdish item,” 60–C. Of course, Judith is right, it does not mention Kurds at all, but that is how it is interpreted. And what I am saying is, Arabs find it extremely difficult to swallow this kind of thing, that the Kurds would like to be semi-dependent, autonomous and so on. to my mind, is going to be very difficult. In addition, I will just say that we have seen that area and a little adjacent to it there is also the area of Kirkuk where you have many Turkimans. And that is a problem that the Kurds have. The Kurds demand au- tonomy, which I believe rightfully, inside Iraq, but they would not like to give the Turkimans any special rights within the area of 178 which they control. So this is a problem, and it is going to be a major one. Ďr. YAPHE. More generally put, one sentence, democracy offers two things and we recognize them: rule of the majority, democracy means two things, rule of the majority and protection of minorities. It has taken us 225 years to get to where we understand what that means today. It has taken Britain 900 years from Magna Carta to get to that point. We expect the Iraqis to be there the day after to- morrow. It is not going to happen. I think you really become a de- mocracy when you understand that both of these things have to have a place in governance. General KEANE. I think it is an open question whether the Iraqis will be able to share power effectively among the Kurds, the Sunnis, and the Shi’as. I think so many—when fledgling democ- racies form, they see elections as really a central form of democ- racy, which it is. But as the doctor mentioned, the true subtlety and sophistication of democracy is the majority rules and protects individual rights and protects the minority, and that question has to be answered and it will take years for us to determine whether that will be done or not. The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman. Mr. Marshall, did you have a last question? Mr. MARSHALL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you all for being here, and General Keane, thank you very much for your sery- ice. You must be wondering why you did not become a professor and engage in these kinds of debates on some faculty somewhere. General KEANE. I gave that thought up a long time ago. My pro- fessors convinced me of it. Mr. MARSHALL. I am sure the two professors here would tell us if we did not have clothes on. I can get away with that since I am an ex-law professor. My inquiry has to do with how do we find Iraqis willing to assist us in our tactical objective of searching out, capturing, killing, jailing, you name it, insurgents. If you look at what motivates peo- ple to assist affirmatively as opposed to passively, okay, I will take your check and I will stand around and get shot at or blown up, but affirmatively assist in hunting, capturing, killing, et cetera, de- terring guerillas. It could be fear for themselves, the possibility of great reward, leadership that is exceptional, religious fanaticism, or just trying to protect your religion, protect your family. I mean, there are a number of things that motivate people to do that.. Democracy, it seems to me, is a concept. The prospect of democ- is a concept that is pretty abstract for these folks. It is un- likely that the mere prospect of having that is enough. The pros- pect of just having a civil service job does not sound too inviting. So have you all given any thought to how do we-institutionally, we can do it, but that takes a long time. Is there a way to do it to shortcut this; to actually get some folks out there who are enthu- siastically going after these folks and appearing to be on our side, because tactically, that is effectively what they are doing. . General KEANE. I think we have had a fair amount of success, despite the obvious violence we have had in the last number of weeks, in doing what we call local source networking, and this takes time. Because you are fundamentally working with a culture 179 up thurken back to-you.. neighborhood, at somenin drug lord in that has inherent barriers to our own, and you are trying to build up trust and confidence of a people. I harken back to—you go into a drug neighborhood in America and to be effective in that neighborhood, at some point you have to get Sara to turn in Mary's son, who is the kingpin drug lord in that neighborhood and terrorizing everybody. And to be able to get Sara to do that, she has to believe in a larger construct, that by eliminating this evilness that is in the neighborhood, the neighbor- hood is going to be better. But that is not enough. She has to actu- ally trust the system that begins to operate. And that trust is real- ly important, and it takes time. That is why the relationships that we have with the Iraqis on the street is very important, and why it is so important to have ef- fective Iraqi police and an effective Iraqi civil defense core who can interact with these people and build the trust themselves. e have certain cultural limitations that we are bound to have, and I recognize that, but it is taking time and I think we have made some progress. We have a long way to go in this area, be- cause you put your finger on the most challenging aspect of what we are d aling with. The terrorists are living in the neighborhoods literally with normal people, and we have to get the average Iraqi citizen not to want that to continue, because the level of violence in that neighborhood, the fear in that neighborhood will continue as long as they are there. And they have to trust us that not only will we eliminate it, but we will make things better for them, and that is challenging. Dr. BARAM. Counterterrorism is not my field, so I accept what you said. It makes a lot of sense. But you also moved into the area of counterinsurgency, of course. And to my mind, this is not as im- portant. First of all, what not to do. I think it was a mistake to bring the two battalions to fight in Fallujah; a mistake for two different rea- sons. That is my view, although I am sure that the intention was the best. If you bring Sunni Arabs who are born in that area to fight against their own, it does not make much sense. It will not work, not at this particular stage. If you bring Kurds and Shiites who are supporting you all the way, but you let them fight against Sunnis in Fallujah, you get good results. I am not saying you did not. You did. But in the long-term, I would say, again, as an histo- rian, I would think maybe it is not a good idea, because you create cleavages you do not want to create. So for this stage I would say, sadly enough, it has to be the Marines. But let us talk about counterinsurgency. Already, the CPA, as far as I know, and the IGC, but mostly the CPA is doing a lot of work on the Sunni Arabs. They started a few months ago and they are trying to get them to buy into the new system. They have to be told what is there for them. If you manage to do that, then what will happen is what you just mentioned, that Mary or Sara-Sara will report on Mary's son, or whatever. Exactly. That is the moment. When they realize that it is going to serve the purpose to get into the system, to integrate themselves, rather than to fight it and try to destroy it, this is counterinsurgency. That is in the Sunni Arab area, and that now is being done. And I believe Lakhdar Brahimi will contribute to that. 180 When it comes to the Shi'a community, who are those who are supporting this, I think it is slightly deranged—do not quote me because he might be angry to hear that, but this guy, Mukda Dafaderi is very strange. And yet he reminds me in many, many ways of Saddam Hussein; the similarities are uncanny. How do you stop this guy in terms of counterinsurgence? Well, you provide people with services, with jobs, and with infrastruc- ture. That is what you do. You show that it works, and you do not hire Americans or even Chinese to work for the reconstruction. You hire local Iraqis—as many as you can. Even if it means wasting a little bit of money, it is worth it. You need to get them to fight something, to have self-respect, which they do not have now. The only self-respect now that they have is joining this kind of gang that has also this kind of crazy messianic idea. They think the Messiah is coming, the Mahadi is coming, and they know why you are there. They know that you are there not because you know something they do not know; namely, you know the Messiah is coming, the Mahadi, and your idea is to conquer Iraq and kill him now before he becomes really influential. So you are there for a scatological reason. This is amazing, but people, some people, believe it. Those people who are very low on the social economic ladder, the lowest rung, and who have no fu- ture. So you have to target these guys, and I think you are trying to do it now. The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman. Thank you so much to our guests for bearing with us here. I know our hearing has extended far beyond the call of duty here. The ranking member has a comment. Mr. SKELTON. I cannot help but close out this hearing with num- ber one, a thank you to each of the panel members and also with a history lesson from the State of Missouri. The general made ref- erence to these insurgents in Iraq living with the population, obvi- ously protected by the population, either directly or indirectly. You will recall that Frank and Jesse James in the State of Missouri were first with the Quantrell gang and then with “Bloody Bill” An- derson. The War Between the States ended in 1865, and they con- tinued bank-robbing and train-robbing all up and down the Mid- west, mostly in Missouri, until 1886, protected by the local popu- lation. So we should not be too surprised with this very same thing happening over there. Dr. YAPHE. Tip O'Neill had it right: “all politics is local,” and Saddam Hussein knew that, as well, and I think it is a lesson we have to learn. The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman. General Keane, just one last question for you. And I apologize to my colleagues and our guests for stepping out here for a little bit during the hearing. Our military leadership—and I think, you know, one thing I am proud of about this committee, Republicans and Democrats, is al- most every single one has gone to the theater, some of them several times. And we watched, and most of us went up to Kirkuk early on; I know I did on the first visit, and General Orderno went up there with the 4th and put together this city council with six Kurds, six Turks, six Syrians, six Arabs, and six independents, 181 whoever they were. In fact, I think CNN actually ran a viewing of their—a filming of one of their first council meetings, and people were shrieking and yelling at each other and the media acted like that was bad. Actually, it was probably good. It looked like a lot of our city council meetings in the United States. But my point is, these military leaders who I think are great peo- ple—and I think one of the underestimations we make in this city is that somehow the guys with the bow ties, we politicians are going to do the diplomatic work and the military leaders do not know anything about politics and they are going to stick to war- fighting-is a big mistake. Because I think many of our military leaders, including guys like you, have a lot of wisdom. You are trained in leadership; you know how to develop leadership and how to pick leadership and how to nurture it. So the upshot of what I am getting to is that we have created community governments in the number of, I believe, about 300, per my last briefing with the Pentagon. I would compare these to city governments, city councils like the one in Kirkuk and, in some cases, maybe county board of supervisors in other areas. Now, we are putting together this interim government under the advice of the representative from the United Nations and, as I un- derstand it, the trend now is to pick technocrats who are not out of the political system, but who are objective technocrats without political stake, obviously different from this governing council that is there right now, and that they are going to be the caretaker until we pick the national assembly at the beginning of the year. But we already have these little governments in place throughout Iraq. What would be wrong with having a league of governments that exist right now, these little community governments, and have them represented in some way in this interim system? That would develop them; it would utilize people who had actually been picked through a form of representative process, and would allow them to have some say in this interim government. And I think it would perhaps dampen some of what I think should be anticipated Iraqi resentment, that while we were supposed to get our government June 30 and there they go again, the United Nations has imposed a bunch of outside technocrats as the governing body. What do you think? General KEANE. Well, I think it makes compelling sense. The more participation you are going to get in this fledgling democracy, particularly in its early stages, I think the better it will work in the long-term. Although it may appear chaotic at first, it will be so much healthier for them in the long-run to gain that participa- tion. I also agree with you, with the capacity of our senior leaders and our junior leaders to deal with the local situation. Our American generals and our American leaders out there grew up in the great- est democracy on earth, and they have internalized all of that and they understand how it works and they are products of small neighborhoods and small politics themselves. So it is a culmination of years of being an American, having advanced degrees, and being skilled at leadership to be that effective in a foreign land. 182 The CHAIRMAN. Let me tell you, we walked out of General Orderno's briefing, and of course he had given a lot of them—he would probably know how to handle us—we walked out of that briefing at Kirkuk and one of our congressional delegation said, I hope he does not run against me, and we all laughed. But it was an acknowledgment of the skill with which this gentleman had been handling this setup of all of these disparate interests. And we went through at the briefing on how he had sat down with the cler- ics, asked them what they wanted, how he worked with the various organizations and the various groups. He even set up this land res- olution office for the Kurds and the Arabs who had competing pink slips on pieces of property. And I said, now, how are you going to handle that one? He said, I didn't say I was going to resolve it. I said we set up the office to take their information, so that people could come in and give whatever piece of paper or document or deed that they had to make their claim, and at least they felt they were making a step. But I was very impressed. I think most of us, Democrat and Re- publican, have been extremely impressed in this war with the ex- traordinary professionalism of the military leadership. So these little governments, to some degree, are a product of that leadership. So my partner here, the ranking member from Mis- souri, Ike Skelton, who has got a lot of great intellect in this area- we are going to talk about this. We would like to continue to talk o vou about these prospects. I think that is a resource we should use in this interim government. General KEANE. One of the things I have always resented is the criticism that is levied against a military in not being prepared and trained properly to fight this kind of a war; in other words, the post-regime war, and I think nothing could be further from the truth. The sophistication that our leaders have and the skill sets that they developed through the years, they are very adaptable to deal with essentially a war that is being fought in and among the people. Thank you. Mr. Chairman The CHAIRMAN. I thank you. And Doctor, thank you very much, and Dr. Baram, thank you, sir, for everything you have contributed here. We are glad we have got good intellects who can walk us through this, this very difficult and kind of a very, very com- plicated area right now. I think we have—there are lots of pitfalls that you have outlined, but also I think some extraordinary oppor- tunities. So we hope to continue to hear from you and please, send us any further ideas or thoughts that you might have in this area. With that, we have a force protection hearing coming up in about five minutes, so thank you very much for being with us, and the hearing is adjourned. [Whereupon, at 5:23 p.m., the committee was adjourned.] APPENDIX APRIL 21, 2004 PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD APRIL 21, 2004 OPENING REMARKS OF CHAIRMAN HUNTER Hearing on Transition to Iraqi Sovereignty April 21, 2004 The hearing will come to order. Our guests this morning are: The Honorable Paul Wolfowitz Deputy Secretary of Defense General Richard Myers Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff The Honorable Marc Grossman Undersecretary of State Welcome to the Committee gentlemen. We all look forward to your testimony and appreciate your appearance before the committee this morning. We have a second panel to follow, and I will introduce our outside witnesses at that point in the hearing. At the beginning of the war on terror, the President called on America to drain the swamp that breeds intolerance, hatred, and (187) 188 extremism. Nobody can seriously doubt that Saddam Hussein's Iraq was part of that swamp. We all agree he was a mass murderer who had: • committed multiple acts of aggression against his neighbors; • used weapons of mass destruction; • defied the United Nations; • continually attacked coalition aircraft enforcing UN- approved no-fly zones; • financially rewarded homicide bombers in Israel; and, • harbored terrorists who had killed Americans, including Abu Nidal, Abu Abbas, and Abdul Rahman Yasin, who was implicated in the 1993 attack on the World Trade Center. Our long-term victory in the global war on terror will require changing the behavior of such regimes or eliminating them. After more than a decade of diplomacy failed to change Saddam's 189 behavior, a coalition of nations invaded Iraq and deposed the regime, eliminating one major part of the swamp that fosters terror. It has cost us blood and treasure. Americans have opened their wallets to drain the swamp. But, more importantly, we have offered up our sons and our daughters, some of whom have paid the ultimate price to make us safer. As painful as those losses are : there should be no doubt that their willingness to carry that burden has eliminated a threat that was clearly aimed at the United States.. The question before this country now is how to move forward. We have to do more than eliminate state sponsors of terror in order to win the war that started on September 11th. We have to create new states that represent their citizens, respect their neighbors, reject terrorism, and seek a constructive role in the world. This will be a long and difficult process. It took decades upon decades of false starts, poor policies, and a civil war before American democracy reached its current state. 190 With that in mind, it would be foolish to expect the process in Iraq to unfold perfectly according to some preconceived plan. In fact, building democracy in Iraq will be harder because there are dedicated enemies of the process throughout the region. But, we must remain committed to the task. Maintaining that commitment means giving the troops the resources they need when the Commander in Chief says he needs them. It means honoring our promise to transfer sovereignty to the Iraqi people on June 30th. It means respecting those countries who join us in Iraq, rather than demeaning their efforts because their troops don't speak French or German. It means respecting the role of religion in Iraq while resisting those who use it to justify their own selfish pursuit of power. It means keeping our eye on the future ten years down the road and not making new policy every time the 24-hour news cycle preaches panic. It means having 191 enough wisdom-and patience to accept that this is a long term commitment for the American people. Gentlemen, we look forward to your testimony and to the ensuing discussion. But first, let me recognize the committee's ranking Democrat, Mr. Skelton, for any remarks he may wish to make. The entirety of our witnesses' prepared statements will be entered into the record. Mr. Secretary, the floor is yours. We are fortunate to have several distinguished witnesses on our second panel. They are: General John Keane, USA (Ret.) Former Vice Chief of Staff United States Army 192 Dr. Judith Yaphe Senior Fellow National Defense University Dr. Amatzia Baram Senior Fellow United States Institute of Peace General, I'm sure you didn't expect to come back and see us so soon after retiring. But, we do appreciate it, as we appreciate the time all of our witnesses are taking to walk through these issues this afternoon. 193 Opening Statement for The Honorable Ike Skelton (D-MO), Ranking Member, Committee on Armed Services, U.S. House of Representatives Full Committee Hearing on the Transition to Iraqi Sovereignty April 21, 2004 Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I join you in welcoming our witnesses on this first panel: Secretary Wolfowitz, General Myers, and Secretary Grossman. And I look forward to the second panel as well when, among others, our old friend General Jack Keane will be with us. Mr. Chairman, I'd like to thank you for holding this hearing. It is important both because of the impending political transition on June 30th and because we are in the midst of the most deadly month for American troops since the beginning of Operation Iraqi Freedom. These issues deeply affect the American people and should be discussed in an open way. I hope that we will continue to hold hearings on this subject to help inform our constituents. Gentlemen, I am feeling a profound sense of déjà vu. Just as in the period leading up to the war when we knew we had to plan for the aftermath of that conflict, we now know we have to plan carefully for 194 the turn-over of political power to Iraqis on June 30h. I raised a lot of concerns about the post-war period before last March, and sadly many of the worst outcomes have come about in the last several months. Some of this certainly is because the insurgents are seeking to take advantage of the upcoming political deadline. But some of this is because of mistakes made in the immediate post-war period. We did not have sufficient troops to bring stability and stop the looting. This absence strengthened local clerics like al Sadr, providing a base of support for his challenges to us. The decision to disband the Army also created legions more unemployed and created a situation where all security services had to be built from scratch. These errors cannot be undone, but we must avoid making a transition without sufficient planning. We have just 70 days before the next big event occurs, and major questions are still unanswered. I do not revel in highlighting these concerns, and I certainly do not blame all of the current violence on the poor planning that preceded the post-war, but the lives of American troops and of the many Iraqis who are trying to build a better country for themselves depend on getting this right. 195 It seems to me there must be answers to questions outstanding in three major areas. First, everything else is dependent upon re- establishing security throughout Iraq. U.S. forces will provide security after June 304, the same as now but the next two months are still important. There are stories of reconstruction projects shut down, of food convoys unable to reach towns and bases, and of violence throughout both Sunni and Shi’a areas. I support the decision to increase the number of troops in Iraq; it is needed. What else will it take to get the situation back under control? How do we stem the exodus of allies like Spain, Honduras, the Dominican Republic and perhaps Thailand—with the dangerous message that sends? How do we ensure that our forces can continue to act as they must to bring security after er June 30th even if there are political disagreements with Iraqi political leaders? And just as importantly, how do we get back on track of restoring trust with ordinary Iraqis—of winning hearts and minds? Second is the question of transferring political sovereignty. I support the decision to involve the United Nations in this process; it is. . overdue. This interim government is critical—even if it will be short- 196 lived-in building credibility for Iraq and in reassuring the Iraqi people that the United States is not bent on long term occupation. Mr. Brahimi's concept is a sound one, but we still do not know who will make up the interim government. It is not clear after all the disagreements since November that the parties will reach agreement by June 30th. If they fail to do so, what happens then—what is plan B? Third, we must deal with the question of how to build professional Iraqi security forces able to provide for their own nation. The examples of the last few weeks have been mixed at best. For every example like the 36th battalion of the Civil Defense Corps which we hear performed well in Fallujah, there are disturbing examples of police and Army units who refused to fight, changed sides, or folded. I am pleased that Major General David Petraeus will be taking over the effort to train these forces; he is an outstanding officer with great knowledge of Iraq. How are we systematically taking stock of the problems to date and correcting them, before more Americans and Iraqis die as a result? And how are we building a sense of investment on the part of the Iraqis in the outcome of these forces? That will be crucial for long-term success. 197 Gentlemen, while I raise questions, it is because I am so committed to our success in Iraq. Every death there—particularly our American troops, but of each Iraqi too—is deeply felt. We stand with our troops and will support them until the mission is successfully completed. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 198 Statement for Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz House Armed Services Committee April 21, 2004 Introduction Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee: As he prepared to lead his troops into action in Fallujah, a Marine Company Commander took time to write his father, a retired Marine. “This battle is going to have far reaching effects on not only the war here,” he wrote: "But in the overall war on terrorism. We have to be very precise in our application of combat power. We cannot kill a lot of innocent folks.... There will be no shock and awe.... This battle is the Marine Corps Belleau Wood for this war. ... A lot of terrorists and foreign fighters are holed up in Fallujah. It has been a sanctuary for them. The Marine Corps will either reaffirm its place in history as one of the greatest fighting organizations in the world or we will die trying. The Marines are fired up. I'm nervous for them though because I know how much is riding on this fight. However, every time I've been nervous during my career about the outcome of events when young Marines were involved they have ALWAYS exceeded my expectations. God bless these great Americans who are ensuring we continue to fight an "away" schedule." Our prayers are with him and all of our people currently serving in Iraq and Afghanistan. They are making America - and the world - more secure by helping the Iraqi and Afghan people build free and prosperous democracies in the heart of the Middle East. Whether members of Active Duty, Reserve, or National Guard units, or civilians, these heroes embody the best ideals of our nation -- serving so that others may be free -- and we thank them all for the sacrifices they endure. We also owe a sincere debt of gratitude to the roughly 19,000 men and women from our 34 Coalition partners, who are also serving the cause of freedom in Iraq. We would be remiss if we did not acknowledge the contributions made by civilians from a wide assortment of NGOs in Iraq who have recently become the target of terrorist attacks, such as Fern Holland, who quit practicing law in the United States in order to go to Iraq and help improve the lives of Iraqi women. 199 Ms. Holland was brutally murdered for the work she was doing, and although it is small consolation to her family and friends, died doing what she believed in. And finally, I'd like to thank the members of this Committee for their continued support to the members of our Armed Forces. Iraq: Thirty-Five Years Of Unimaginable Tyranny, One Year of Progress A little over a year ago, we all watched the statue of Saddam Hussein fall in the heart of Baghdad. I remember watching the live coverage of that historic moment. Iraqis, eager to start a new page in their national history, enthusiastically tried to pull the statue down with the limited resources available to them - a length of rope that did not even reach all the way to the ground. Eventually, a group of U.S. Marines saw what was happening, and aided the Iraqi effort. Working together, the Marines and Iraqis brought down that symbol of oppression and provided an image that will be etched in our collective memory forever. On that day, 25 million of some of the most talented people in the Muslim and Arab world were liberated from one of the worst tyrannies of the last 100 years. According to a somewhat popular theme these days, the world is full of bad guys, and that Saddam Hussein is just another bad guy. When I hear Saddam Hussein referred to that way, I can only conclude that there still exists a lack of real understanding of Saddam Hussein. In my career, I've known some bad guys up close and personal, people like former Philippine dictator Ferdinand Marcos and former Indonesian dictator Suharto. To paraphrase a famous vice-presidential debate, I knew these men, and Ferdinand Marcos was no Saddam Hussein; Suharto was no Saddam Hussein. Saddam Hussein was more than just another bad guy. He institutionalized and sanctioned brutality on a scale that is simply unimaginable to most Americans. Hussein ruled by fear, creating a society in which the ideal citizen was an informer. The superintendent of the Baghdad policy academy told me that he had spent a year in jail for having made a disparaging comment about Saddam--to this best friend. In such a Republic of Fear, friendship itself became a weapon. I have traveled to Iraq several times. I have spoken to hundreds of Iraqis, both in Iraq and here in the United States. And one of my strongest impressions is that fear of the old regime still pervades Iraq. But, a smothering blanket of apprehension woven by 35 years of repression where even the smallest mistake could bring torture or death-won't be cast off in a few weeks' time. Saddam Hussein began weaving this blanket of fear from the very beginning. In 1979, one of his first acts as President was a sweeping purge of top 200 Baathist leaders. At a meeting of the Iraqi national assembly, Saddam tearfully talked about a coerced “confession” of disloyalty from a top party member, and then continued to name other guilty colleagues. Guards then dragged these people out of the meeting. Then, Saddam asked top ministers and leaders of the party for their first loyalty test-he called on them to form the firing squads that executed those he'd identified. Saddam had videos of the whole event distributed throughout the Middle East, so people would know what sort of leader he was. Implicating members of his regime in his worst crimes and ensuring that his potential victims understood how seriously to take his threats, Saddam Hussein applied the techniques brutal gangland boss, but on a national scale and as the head of an internationally recognized government. One of the most heartbreaking stories to come out of Iraq almost defies belief. Scott Ritter - the former UNSCOM inspector and an opponent of the war – has described a prison in Baghad, whose stench, he said, "was unreal," an amalgam of urine, feces, vomit and sweat"; a hellhole where prisoners were "howling and dying of thirst.” In this prison, the oldest inmates were 12, the youngest mere toddlers. Their crime—being children of the regime's political enemies. General Richard Myers, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, was recently returning from a trip to Iraq, and stopped at Ramstein AB, where he was told about some Iraqi businessmen who had recently passed through on their way to the United States, to the Texas Medical Center in Houston, where they were to undergo surgery to repair some of the damage inflicted on them some ten years ago. When Iraq's economy was falling into shambles, Saddam's way of placing blame was this: he ordered that a few merchants be rounded up. With flimsy evidence, they were found guilty of destabilizing the Iraqi economy and were sentenced to lose their right hands. Black Xs tattooed on their foreheads branded them as criminals. The amputations were filmed, and the video as well as the hands were sent to Saddam. In a Houston doctor's office, one man was quoted as saying: “You spend your whole life doing and saying the right things. Then someone comes and cuts your hands off for no reason at all. It's a torture that never ends." I recount these stories to illustrate what one writer has called the "density of evil" that permeated Iraq. In very many ways, its effects are also like a torture that doesn't end. Such evil and fear is so alien to our own American experience that I think it's necessary to talk about it to understand the plight of Iraqis today, if we are to have a proper understanding of one of the most formidable challenges facing us right now. Even though Saddam's regime is gone and he himself has 201 been captured, the fear of Saddam and his henchmen is still alive in the minds of Iraqis facing the difficult choice of whether to cooperate with us and with other brave Iraqis to build what they call “the New Iraq.” Until Iraqis are convinced that Saddam's old regime has been permanently and irreversibly removed, and until a long and ghastly part of their history is put to rest and overcome, it is only natural that that fear will remain. That history of atrocities and the punishment of those responsible are directly linked to our success in helping the Iraqi people build a free, secure and democratic future. The people of Iraq have much valuable information that can help us root out the remaining Baathists and help Iraqis find justice. To the extent that people of Iraq are willing to take part in the civic and political institutions that will constitute a new Iraq is linked to their understanding that the Saddamists are finished, and will never again return to power in Iraq. Convincing them of this truth that Saddam and the Saddamists are finished will continue to require investments in our time and our resources to continue to build trust among the Iraqi people. Iraq has been a free country for a single year after decades of systematic abuse by a regime of murderers and torturers. A year after Iraq's liberation, it is important to pause and consider what we have accomplished together with the Iraqi people. For amidst the episodes of violence and tragedy of the loss of innocent life in suicide bombings, the good news of what is happening in Iraq often gets obscured or ignored. As one soldier recently wrote to the Houston Chronicle, “The reality is we are accomplishing a tremendous amount here, and the Iraqi people are not only benefiting greatly, but are enthusiastically supportive." The indisputable fact is that after 35 years of enduring unimaginable horrors, in the year since its liberation Iraq has seen the beginnings of a tremendous transformation for the better: For 35 years, the Iraqi people were ruled by terror and Saddam's personal fiat. Ba'athists suppressed dissent through murder, torture, and arbitrary imprisonment. They tortured children in order to coerce their parents, and raped women to punish their families. Iraqis had no real rights, only temporary privileges subject to the whims of Saddam and his sadistic sons. Today, Iraqis have an interim Iraqi constitution that is the most liberal basic governance document in the Arab world. The Transitional Administrative Law, or TAL, contains assurances of: 202 • Freedom of Religion; • Freedom of Expression; • Freedom of the Press; • Freedom of Assembly; • Freedom of Movement; The TAL guarantees equal rights for all citizens of Iraq regardless of ethnicity, denomination, or sex. It acknowledges the Islamic character of the majority of Iraqi society and, at the same time, affirms the right to freedom of religious belief and practice for every Iraqi. It provides for other fundamental pillars of true democracy, including separation of powers and an independent judiciary, rule of law, fundamental civil rights, and civilian control of the military. This constitution emerged from an often heated, but ultimately healthy, political debate, one that would have been impossible a year ago - and one that is still impossible in many areas of the world. Through 35 years of tyranny, money earmarked for life-saving medicines were used by Saddam's regime to buy means to end life. Money marked for hospitals went to rebuild palaces. Many of Iraq's hospitals and clinics that remained open to the public also served as ammunition or command bunkers. Today, health care spending in Iraq has increased 30 times over its pre-war levels, and children receive crucial vaccinations for the first time in years. After 35 years of tyranny, Iraq's economy was moribund due to state control, rampant corruption, and Saddam's misallocation of resources to palaces and weapons and to the favorites of his regime. Today, the Iraqi economy is on the path of recovery and prosperity. Unemployment has fallen, inflation is a quarter of what it was before the war, and the New Iraqi Dinar has become the most heavily traded currency in the Middle East. And this is before the full effect of the $18.4 billion in reconstruction grants you helped provide the Iraqi people is felt. This is still an area of great concern to us, but we are making progress despite years of neglect. It is that progress which the enemy seeks to stop today and which we must make increased efforts to accelerate. For 35 years, Iraq's oil revenues helped build Saddam Hussein's palaces and lined the pockets of Saddam and his cronies. Today, Iraqi oil revenue goes to the Development Fund for Iraq, where it helps build a new infrastructure and a new future for the Iraqi people. At 2.5 million barrels per day, Iraqi oil production as reached its pre-war levels, and oil proceeds to date exceed $7.5 billion and are projected to be $14 billion this year. After 35 years of tyranny, Iraq's dilapidated power plants were in a sate of unimaginable disrepair. What electricity was produced was diverted to Baghdad 203 in order to reward Saddam's cronies and punish the people whom Saddam despised. Today, power generation has surpassed prewar levels and is more evenly distributed, and new, modern power plants are being built. For 35 years, Iraqi schools were propaganda factories for Saddam's cult of personality and Ba'ath party fascism. Today, that fanaticism no longer pervades the national education system and its teaching materials. 64,000 secondary teachers and 5,000 school principals and administrators have been retrained in modern teaching methods, and 72 million new textbooks will be distributed before the end of the school year. To date, Coalition forces have rehabilitated more than 2,500 schools. The Iraqi people have clearly demonstrated their preference for the new educational system, as school attendance this year has surpassed pre-conflict levels. After 35 years of genocidal repression of Iraq's Marsh Arabs, the historical marshlands of southern Iraq were close to extinction. A lush ecosystem the size of New Jersey had been turned into a barren desert by Saddam's vindictive attempt to destroy a people whose history goes back thousands of years and make of them an example to warn anyone who would challenge his rule. Today, the marshlands are gradually being restored, and that ancient culture is being revived. For 35 years, the Iraqi people's only link with the outside world was the poisonous propaganda of Saddam's state-run media. Today, Iraqis have a wealth of independent news sources. 170 newspapers are currently published in Iraq, and the Iraqi Media Network reaches more than 80 percent of the Iraqi population. The market in satellite dishes is booming. For 35 years, Iraqis had no voice in their government or their nation's future. Today, more than half of the Iraqi population is active in community affairs and one in five belongs to a non-governmental organization. Ninety percent of Iraqi towns and provinces have local councils, which we think is a pretty good sign that the Iraqi polity is moving in the right direction. Recently, in the overwhelmingly Shia province of Diyala in southern Iraq, seventeen towns have held local elections - their first genuine elections ever - and in almost every one secular independents and non-religious parties did better than the Islamists. Perhaps most importantly, in the year since Iraq has been liberated, no new mass graves have been filled with the bodies of innocent Iraqi men, women, and children capriciously murdered by a brutal regime, and the torture rooms and execution chambers have been shut down. Despite all the violence and uncertainty caused by the enemies of a free Iraq, it is clear that Iraqis sense dramatic improvement in their everyday lives and 204 anticipate much more. According to a recent Oxford Research International poll, despite the difficulties we all read about 56.5 percent of Iraqis said their lives were much better or somewhat better than a year ago. Despite the prevalence of alarmist quotes depicting some Iraqi "man-on-the-street" lamenting the good old days under Saddam Hussein, only 18.6 percent of those polled said they were much or somewhat worse off than a year ago. And a full 71 percent expect their lives will be much or somewhat better a year from now. Moreover, the Iraqi people are expressing their optimism with their feet. Despite the continued threat of violence in Iraq, and the horrific terrorist attacks against Iraqi civilians intended to derail progress in Iraq, as several thousands of Iraqi refugees are returning to their homeland. The Coalition's Strategy to Achieve Victory in Iraq: Capacity Building Despite the violence of recent weeks, we need to continue to move forward on all fronts implementing the coalition's strategy to set conditions that will ensure a free Iraq that is stable and at peace with its neighbors. Events of the past month have taught us several lessons learned that have influenced our policy decisions. These lessons include: • The importance of local initiative for fast action: local commanders should get a special allocation of reconstruction funds. • The importance of Iraqi leadership and the need to intensify our efforts to train and develop Iraqi leaders - We need to cross-attach Coalition and Iraqi liaison officers, and more heavily embed Coalition trainers and mentors. - We need to continue to recruit vetted former senior (Colonel - Brigadier) Iraqi officers for the Iraqi Armed Forces and Ministry of Defense. - We need to speed police advisors and specialized trainers to police stations and academies. • The importance of having an Iraqi rallying point and looking for ways to shorten the process by which Iraqis quickly create a government that embodies Iraqi nationality and sovereignty. - We need to continue to install and highlight an Iraqi chain of command: new defense minister, commander of the Armed Forces, chief of staff. New Interior Minister 205 - We need to carry out de-Baathification process in a way that is non- punitive to those with clean records. - We need to strengthen the legitimacy of an Iraqi interim government and the constitutional process. - We need to focus the Iraqi media spotlight on political activities of leading Iraqis, including Governing Council members. - We need to continue to encourage local elections. The importance of equipment and support and the need to accelerate the equipping of Iraqi security forces. - We need to rush delivery of critical items (weapons, ammunition, vehicles, radios) - We need to upgrade required items in light of current experience. - We need to enhance protection for security forces and police fixed sites. Our strategy involves three interdependent lines of operations to build indigenous Iraq capacity and transition responsibilities from the coalition to Iraq rapidly, but not hastily. While these lessons to be learned from the violent events of the past few weeks affect the way we pursue these three lines of operation, these are still the three key elements that will bring success in Iraq. The first element involves building capable Iraqi security forces to achieve stability. Accordingly, we have redoubled our efforts to recruit, train, equip and, most importantly, mentor Iraqi security forces - Police, Iraqi Civil Defense Corps, Army, Border Police, and the Facilities Protection Service. Over the next few months our aim is to certify the ability of these forces, that they are ready to assume greater responsibilities from coalition forces. Similarly, through technical assistance and mentoring by U.S. prosecutors and judges of their Iraqi counterparts, we have been helping to build the capacity of the Iraqi criminal justice sector: the Judicial Review Commission has reviewed and vetted all currently sitting judges and prosecutors; the Central Criminal Court of Iraq, established to deal with those who have committed the most notorious crimes in Iraq, is investigating and trying cases, and every pre-war local criminal court in Baghdad is open, fully functional, and every week more cases are set for trial or tried as compared to the week before. The second element involves nurturing Iraq's capacity for representative, self-government with the aim of creating a government that the Iraqi people will feel is theirs and that moves us out of the position of being an occupying power. While many think that July 1 will be a magical date on which CPA will suddenly transition all of its responsibilities to a new Iraq government, it is actually just one step in a process. Already, free Iraqis have been gradually assuming responsibility 206 for governmental functions for quite some time. Many Iraqi ministries report to the Governing Council rather than the CPA. Iraq now has a functioning judiciary to provide equal justice for all. At the local and provincial levels, elected assemblies are up and running. When the Interim Government assumes office on July 1, its most important task will be to prepare the way for elections to establish the Transitional Government in January of 2005. That government in turn will be replaced by elections for a fully constitutional government at the end of 2005. The last element of the strategy involves the reconstruction of Iraq's infrastructure and the restoration of essential services that are providing better lives for Iraqis and putting people back to work. Iraq has tremendous potential. It has well-educated and industrious people. It has fertile land and water resources and it has abundant natural resources. Our strategy aims to put Iraq on course to realizing that potential and to setting conditions for Iraqis to reap greater prosperity in the future. Lessons Learned and Challenges Ahead Although the progress the Iraqi people have made in their climb up from tyranny has been both encouraging and impressive, significant challenges still remain. Security in Iraq When planning the military campaign to liberate Iraq, this Administration and the combatant commanders chose to launch a campaign that emphas speed rather than mass. The astonishing speed of this military campaign enabled us to avoid many of the nightmare scenarios that were predicted before the war. Lest anybody forget, in part thanks to this war plan we managed to avoid most of the horror scenarios we feared going into this war: • Iraq's oil fields were not turned into an ecological and economic disaster; • Massive destruction of dams and bridges was prevented; • Large-scale refugee flows were not generated; There was no humanitarian crisis from food or medical shortages; • No friendly governments in the region collapsed because of the pressures of a protracted war. Iraq's neighbors did not intervene, nor did Israel;.' Ethnic conflict did not break out in mixed populations in northern Iraq or elsewhere; and There was no “Fortress Baghdad” with street-to-street fighting and heavy civilian casualties. 207 The avoidance of these calamities was not by accident, but rather the result of careful planning Because we did not wait to mass half a million forces in theater before launching Operation Iraqi Freedom, Saddam was not able to organize the large- scale urban warfare campaign about which so many military analysts warned. The historically unprecedented speed of the campaign may have led many Iraqi forces, such as the Fedayeen Saddam and Mukhabarrat, to disperse throughout the country rather than stand and fight in the streets as anticipated. In order to destroy the last vestiges of Saddam's tyranny, it was always necessary that we defeat these forces. The current violence is not an issue of reconstruction planning, nor is it due to a lack of forces. Overall, the decision to : emphasize speed rather than mass was a deliberate choice, recommended by the Combatant Commander, General Franks, but approved by the President and the Secretary of Defense and concurred in by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Like all choices it involved necessary tradeoffs, but overall it has saved lives and helped to avoid terrible humanitarian and environmental disasters. The timing of the current violence was not entirely unexpected. President Bush warned that we could expect increased violence in the months leading up to the transition to Iraqi sovereignty. We knew that the enemies of democracy in Iraq would do everything they could to disrupt the transition to sovereignty. This expectation was confirmed when we intercepted a letter from Abu Musab Zarqawi to his Al Qaeda colleagues in Afghanistan. In this letter, Zarqawi expressed disappointment that previous mass attacks were failing to shatter the unity of the Iraqi people. He advocated stepping up attacks to kill large numbers of Shi'a in order to provoke a sectarian civil war in Iraq. And some of the recent violence, including the attacks on Shi'ite worshippers in Karbala and Baghdad during the Ashoura holiday in early March which killed 140 Iraqis, bear Zarqawi's hallmark. However, the same political situation that is driving such attacks also is a source of optimism for the Iraqi people and their Coalition partners. Zarqawi recognized that the fast-approaching turnover of sovereignty would further weaken his cause, saying: "With the spread of the (Iraqi) army and the police, our future is becoming frightening. The problem is you end up having an army and police connected by lineage, blood and appearance to the people of the region. How can we kill their cousins and sons and under what pretext, after the Americans start withdrawing? This is the democracy ... we will have no pretext.” 10 208 Zarqawi's letter strongly suggests that we are seeing an upsurge in violence precisely because the terrorists and extremists in Iraq believe we are winning and that their time to derail democracy in Iraq is running out. U.S. Government Transition after CPA . We face another daunting challenge as we execute the transition from the Coalition Provisional Authority to a sovereign Iraqi government bolstered by a U.S. embassy less than 90 days from now. Fortunately, planning for this transition is well underway within the Defense and State Departments. LTG (USA, Ret.) Mick Kicklighter and Ambassador Frank Ricciardone lead Transition Teams for the two Departments, and they have worked hand in glove with the CPA and Defense and Army staffs since early January to make the transition a success. * They have formed an Interagency Transition Planning Team (ITPT) and provide the State and Defense leadership for drafting an Operations Plan for the transition: Experts from 16 subject matter sectors (such as Security, Human Resources and Personnel, Facilities, Finance, Medical and Health Services, etc.) from State and Defense coordinate closely to draft the highly detailed, time-phased plan. The ITPT as a whole meets almost daily, with sector leads meeting with their teams more often as required. General Kicklighter and Ambassador Ricciardone meet several times each week to ensure that planning and implementation of the plan are on track. Transitional Administrative Law While the ITPT sets the course for the U.S. Government transition, the TAL establishes a clear way forward for drafting and ratifying a permanent constitution for Iraq and the election of a government in accordance with its terms. This political transition is scheduled to evolve over three phases: • Phase I (June 30, 2004) - Iraqi Interim Government • Phase II (January 2005) - Iraqi Transitional Government • Phase III (January 2006) - Iraqi Government under Permanent Constitution According to the timeline laid out in the TAL, the Iraqi Interim Government will take power on June 30. This Interim Government will be selected by procedures being developed through intensive consultations among Iragis, led by Ambassador Brahimi, the UN Secretary General's Special Advisor on Iraq. We believe the ideas put forth by Mr. Brahimi are promising and we look forward to more details from the UN. CPA officials will remain in close contact with Mr. Brahimi, members of the Iraqi Governing Council and other Iraqis as 209 these procedures are completed in May. The Interim Government will serve until the Transitional National Assembly, or TNA, is elected in either December 2004 or January 2005. The TNA will then elect a three-person Presidency Council comprised of a President and two Deputies, who will appoint by unanimous vote the Prime Minister and, on the Prime Minister's recommendation, a Council of Ministers. The Prime Minister and Council of Ministers must obtain a vote of confidence from the TNA before taking office. Together, the TNA, the Presidency Council and the Council of Ministers will comprise the Iraqi Transitional Government. In addition to being the legislature, the TNA will also draft a permanent constitution for Iraq, which will be submitted for popular ratification by October 15, 2005. Elections under this new constitution are to be held by December 15, 2005, and the newly elected government, operating under the permanent constitution, will take office by December 31, 2005. The TAL provisions relevant to security arrangements also provide the appropriate framework for implementing our security strategy in Iraq. Article 59(B) of the TAL states that Iraqi armed forces will be “a principal partner in the multinational force operating in Iraq under unified command pursuant to” UNSCR 1511. Article 59(C) states that the elected Iraqi Transitional Government “shall have the authority to conclude binding international agreements regarding the activities of the multinational force," and that “nothing in this Law shall affect rights and obligations ... under UNSCR 1511... which will govern the multinational force's activities pending entry into force of those agreements.” And perhaps most importantly, Article 26 (C) ensures that CPA orders and regulations “shall remain in force until rescinded or amended by legislation duly enacted and having the force of law." This includes CPA Order #17, which provides SOFA-like protections for Coalition Forces, and will stay in effect until an international agreement is negotiated with the sovereign Iraqi government. Now, I cannot sit here today and predict the exact form of the permanent government. Iraqis will decide to establish the exact provisions of their permanent Iraqi constitution, or who will emerge as the leaders of the new Iraq. After 35 years of totalitarian dictatorship, it is a complicated task to build new political institutions and it cannot happen overnight. Americans of all people should understand that democracy does not guarantee specific outcomes, it opens ideas up for debate. One need only look back at our own Constitutional Convention to be reminded that with any attempt to establish rule for the people by the people, there is always a great deal of uncertainty and controversy, right up until the ink has dried and even afterwards. 12 210 We should not expect Iraqis to achieve immediately what we and the British, for example, have labored to accomplish over the course of centuries. Throughout the world, particularly in Eastern Europe and in East Asia, new democracies have emerged in the last 10 or 20 years. They are all different and none are perfect. Neither is ours. But even an imperfect Iraqi democracy will be an improvement light years beyond what that country has endured for the past 35 years. And let me say one more thing here. I believe it is wrong to assume that Iraqi Arabs and Kurds, some of the most intelligent people in the world, can not achieve what Lithuania, Korea, and other newly emerging democracies throughout Eastern Europe and East Asia have accomplished in the past twenty years. Since the liberation of Iraq a year ago, Iraqis have conducted themselves extraordinarily well for a nation so long exposed to Saddam Hussein's unique level of sadism. In a remarkably short period of time, Iraqi leaders, for all their diversity, have shown they are learning the arts of political compromise and that they are dedicated to their country's unity. Iraqi Security Forces One institution we are focusing intently on is the Iraqi Security Forces, whose performance during the spike in combat activity over the past three weeks has been mixed. At least half of the security forces stood their ground and in Fallujah some ICDC units fought bravely and well. Other units did not face the enemy, avoided contact altogether, and a small proportion cooperated with the enemy. Our disappointment with the security forces has to be tempered with realism. Overall, they were not capable by themselves of deterring or withstanding the recent attacks, and that fact should not surprise us. We have been fielding Iraqi security forces as fast as we could, but we never intended for Iraqi security forces to take over responsibility for Iraq's security on June 30th, much less April 5th. Our plan was and is for Iraqi forces to develop strength, capability, and experience under the security umbrella of the Coalition, while the Coalition retained overall security responsibilities. Recent events provide lessons we can apply to increase the impact of what we are doing. The first lesson is the need for stronger leaders in the security forces. We will build on the leaders whose units fought and we will replace those whose units did not. We will integrate Iraqi officers with Coalition forces and we will embed Coalition officers with the Iraqi security forces. This cross-attachment provides liaison, which produces mutual confidence, and it also helps us develop Iraqi leadership. Similarly, we need police advisors and specialized trainers to get down to police stations around the country to provide confidence and set the example. 13 211 Second, it is clear that the members of the security forces, most of whom are Iraqi patriots, need an Iraqi rallying point. They need to understand they operate under an Iraqi chain of command, and that at the top of that chain of command is a lawfully constituted Iraqi government. The chain of command is being put in place now. A defense minister has been named, along with a commander in chief of the armed forces and a chief of staff. A new interior minister has also taken office. We need to fill in the rest of the chain, but Iraqis in the security forces can see today that there are Iraqis at the top. The other and harder part of creating a national rallying point for the security forces is the creation of an Iraqi government. This is one of the important reasons to maintain the momentum of the governance process, including not only the June 30 transition but the important steps beyond. Third, the Iraqi security forces need more and better equipment. We had not planned for them to be fully equipped at this point, but some of our ICDC units were outgunned in recent action, so we are relooking the equipment requirements. We have also incurred some delays in equipping the Iraqi security forces. Part of the delay has been caused by challenges in the contracting process and we hope those problems have been fixed. We need to make up some of our lost time, but any delay is unacceptable. The greatest factor in the mixed performance of the security forces was an intangible: fear. The fear of becoming a casualty is doubtless ever-present; almost 300 members of the Iraqi security forces have been killed and almost 700 wounded. But fear of the future is a much greater factor. The enemies of a democratic future for Iraq have so terrorized the cities of central Iraq that many members of the security forces doubt that they or their families can be protected from the retribution that may follow their participation in operations alongside the Coalition. The intimidation is crude but often effective, especially in a society in which keeping your head down was an essential survival technique for over 30 years. That fear takes time to overcome. The enthusiasm of Iraqis to go into combat alongside the Coalition is also colored by their perception of our commitment to the new Iraq. If they sense that we will not see them through to a new constitution, an election, and strong Iraqi institutions, we should not be surprised to see them melt away or even work a deal with those who would shoot their way to power. That is why it is so important in this time of stress to show that our commitment to their freedom is rock-solid. 14 212 Afghanistan We also confront challenges in Afghanistan where the United States, its Coalition partners, and NATO have committed to helping the Afghans build a moderate, democratic, and representative government. Despite some setbacks, Afghanistan has made enormous progress on several fronts. In January of this year, the Afghan people reached a critical milestone when they adopted a constitution laying the foundation for strong democratic institutions and guaranteeing civil liberties such as freedom of religion and equality between men and women. The Afghans have made steady progress in disarmament, with 40% of the heavy weapons around Kabul secured. A nation-wide heavy weapons survey is identifying all remaining heavy weapons in the country for removal by June 2004. The Afghan Ministry of Defense will likely meet its goal of 9,500 Afghan National Army troops by the summer. The 7,646-strong force has already contributed to the success of Coalition stability operations in the South and East.. The army allowed the central government to respond effectively to the recent unrest and factional fighting in Herat and Meymaneh. With the more than $2 billion that you helped provide, the President was able to commit personally to accelerate progress in Afghanistan's reconstruction and security. This commitment has allowed us to increase the number of Provincial Reconstruction Teams throughout Afghanistan. The coalition recently established its 13th team in the southern province of Oruzgan. We hope to set up three more in the South and East by June of this year. Countries leading PRT's include the UK, New Zealand, and Germany. These teams play an active role in defusing regional tensions among rival warlords, engage in public works projects, and help provide security for reconstruction activities through presence patrols and assistance to local police and security forces, among other things. Operation Mountain Storm is underway in the South and East, where al- Qaeda networks and the Taliban continue to threaten stability and reconstruction. We are following up these combat operations with focused reconstruction and humanitarian assistance. One vehicle for this focused reconstruction and humanitarian assistance will be the Regional Development Zone, which will be rolled out in the less developed and more insecure regions. We are improving relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan and enhancing cooperation in counterinsurgency operations along the Afghan border with Pakistan. In 2003, we established a Tripartite Commission made up of U.S., Afghan, and Pakistani authorities that meets regularly to share military intelligence and address common security concerns. 15 213 We are actively engaging NATO countries to expand their security presence in Afghanistan. NATO recently completed an operations plan for expanding the International Security Assistance Force beyond Kabul and Konduz. We are lobbying NATO countries to contribute the resources necessary for this expansion False Pessimism About The Iraqi Transition But while it is important not to view the accomplishments in Iraq and Afghanistan through rose-colored glasses, some critics seem to have given themselves over completely to the darkest of pessimism. To some, all progress in Iraq is illusory, every silver lining has a cloud. It is important to address and correct the misperceptions about developments in Iraq. The American people need to know what their forces are accomplishing in Iraq, how the efforts of our servicemen and women are transforming the lives of 25 million Iraqis for the better, and transforming a region that has for too long accommodated despotism to the detriment of its freedom starved populations. And both our friends and our enemies, in Iraq and Afghanistan, need to know that we have the will and resolve to accomplish our objectives. For example, some say the June 30 date for the transfer of sovereignty is completely arbitrary, driven more by the demands of U.S. electoral politics than by actual conditions in Iraq, and that therefore the deadline should be extended. The choice of an early date as opposed to a later date was not arbitrary at all. If you will recall, our original plan envisaged a sovereign Iraqi government only at the end of a multi-step process of drafting a new constitution and holding elections by the end of 2005. The President decided to shorten this timetable, for two key reasons having to do with our strategy in Iraq. First, the Iraqis seemed to hold back from taking responsibility as long as the CPA was in total charge. A shorter timetable was seen as a necessary incentive to prepare the Iraqis for sovereignty. For without the sense of urgency and accountability that a fixed deadline imposes, Iraqi leaders have been unable to resolve the difficult issues required to conduct elections and shape a new government. Second, an early end to the occupation is essential to our political strategy to defeat the terrorists. A sovereign Iraqi government will be better able to , marginalize its extremist opponents politically while Coalition forces defeat them militarily. As the letter from Zarqawi demonstrates, such a transformation is the 16 . 214 worst possible scenario for those who oppose the emergence of democracy in Iraq. They fear it, and that's why they are trying so hard to derail it. Moving ahead is important to inspire Iraqi confidence that the transition is moving forward and that their country will not be occupied indefinitely. But it is important also to make clear that coalition forces will not leave on July 1- there will still be threats to security in Iraq. But, on July 1, Iraq will be governed by an Iraqi government. This is in accordance with the expressed wishes of the Iraqi people. In a recent public opinion survey, 60% of Iraqis said that U.S. and other Coalition forces should remain in Iraq for more than one year, until security is restored, or until an Iraqi government is in place. Some say the transfer of authority to Iraqis will not be genuine, that it will only be symbolic. This is also not true. On July 1, an Iraqi government will be given responsibility for day-to-day governing of Iraqi state affairs. - Iraqis will control all 26 ministries with strong U.S. support. The Iraqi Police, Border Patrol, and Facilities Protection Forces - 80 percent of the Iraqi Security Forces - will be under the new Iraqi Interior Ministry. The Iraqi Civil Defense Corps and Iraqi Army will, for purposes of operational control, be under the unified command of the Multi-National Force Iraq, commanded by General Sanchez. However, administratively they will be under the command of the Ministry of Defense. These arrangements are similar to those utilized in Germany and Korea during the Cold War, put real power into the hands of our Iraqi partners, and go beyond any token symbolism. Some say that we are in Iraq with an “illegitimate" coalition that is just window dressing for this Administration's unilateralism. However, the Coalition's mission to reconstruct Iraq has been an international effort from the start. Thirty-four nations besides the United States have forces on the ground in Iraq, spearheaded by the two multinational divisions led by the British and the Poles. These 34 nations include Britain, Japan, and Italy – three G-7 countries - plus Poland, South Korea, and many others. Jordan and the United Arab Emirates » are training Iraqi police forces. Over seventy nations participated in the Madrid Donors' Conference, pledging between $14-19 billion dollars for Iraqi reconstruction, including significant pledges from the World Bank and IMF. Thirty-four of our closest friends have troops that are bravely fighting alongside us in Iraq. British, Italians, Bulgarians. Thais, Poles. Dane Ukrainians, and Spanish have been killed while trying to advance freedom and democracy in Iraq and it is wrong to denigrate their efforts. Perhaps most significantly, more than 250 Iraqis have died in the line of duty fighting for a free Iraq since June 1. 215 Some say that just as we should have waited for the United Nation's permission to go to war, we should bring the United Nations into Iraq today. This is a misleading statement, as this Administration has made a significant effort to involve the United Nations in the reconstruction of Iraq. The Coalition's ongoing efforts in Iraq have repeatedly received the endorsement of the UN. UN Security Council Resolution 1483 - passed May 22, 2003 - supports the formation of the CPA and an Iraqi Interim Administration. UNSCR 1500 - passed August 14, 2003 – welcomed the establishment of the Governing Council. UNSCR 1511 - passed October 16, 2003 - authorizes a multinational force under U.S. command. All three of these resolutions were unanimously endorsed by the UN Security Council. The Administration has worked closely with the United Nations Secretary General throughout the past year. Before his tragic murder by terrorists, UN envoy Sergio Viera de Mello was instrumental in establishing the Iraqi Governing Council. Since then we have welcomed the proposals of the new UN envoy, Lakdar Brahimi, regarding the creation of the Iraqi Interim Government. Since the tragic bombing of the UN Headquarters in Baghdad last August – which Zarqawi boasts was his doing and which was clearly aimed at driving out the UN - security for the UN has been a major challenge. However, the UN representative for Security Coordination's Office has been in Baghdad since mid-January. A UN Election Commission headed by Carina Perelli has in Iraq this month. And Ambassador Brahimi has already conducted two important missions to Iraq and we look forward to his return next month. Some say the recent attacks against Coalition forces by Muqtada al-Sadr's militia signal the start of a major Shi'a uprising that would pit Iraq's Shi’a - who are a majority of the population - against the coalition. In reality, however, Sadr does not have widespread support in the Iraq Shi'a community. A recent ABC News poll showed that only one percent of Iraqis named al-Sadr as the national leader they trust most. Last week in Najaf, Iraqi residents of that city distributed leaflets against Sadr that said: “We don't want anyone, whoever he is, to surround himself with armed bodyguards and return us to an era of slavery for the Iraqi people.” And immediately after al-Sadr urged his followers to attack U.S. forces, the Shiite clerical establishment issued a statement calling for Sadr to stop “resorting to violence, occupying public buildings, and other actions” that make him an outlaw. And that is what Muqtada al-Sadr is, an outlaw. He does not represent a "legitimate voice” in Iraq, but rather a threat to the legitimate rule of law in Iraq. Immediately after the liberation of Iraq he ordered his followers to begin taking over the mosques of moderate Shiites. He has been indicted by an Iraqi judge for 216 complicity in the assassination of a prominent moderate Shi'a cleric, Ayatollah Abdel Majid al-Khoei, in April 2003. Muqtada al-Sadr’s reliance on armed gangs to deny Iraqi men and women their basic freedoms, his use of intimidation and possibly murder against his political rivals, and his imposition of vigilante law and illegal courts are incompatible with the New Iraq that most Iraqis want. Some say we have no plan for the scheduled transition to Iraqi sovereignty on July 1". Such statements ignore the progress made in our discussions with the United Nations over the last two months. UN envoy Ambassador Brahimi just announced on April 14 his general concept for the Iraqi Interim Government that will govern from July 1 to early 2005. That concept is the product of weeks of consultation by UN and Coalition officials with Iraqis. Ambassador Brahimi remains confident that the process of setting up an Interim Government could be completed in a relatively short period of time. It is worth recalling that some permanent members of the UN Security Council complained that CPA's plan was moving too slowly to sovereignty. As for the shape of the US presence, the Command and Control relationships are in the process of being finalized. DoD will create the Office of. Security Cooperation (OSC) that will be headed by General David Petraeus. OSC will consist of the Coalition Military Assistance Training Team (CMATT) and the Civilian Police Advisory Training Team (CPATT). General Petraeus will have authority and responsibility for effectively using available resources and for recruiting, equipping, training and positioning the Iraqi Security Forces. Some say the new Iraq will be dominated by the Shi'a majority that will inevitably establish an Iranian-style theocracy in Iraq. Although the eventual shape of the permanent Iraqi government will be for the Iraqis themselves to determine, thus far events on the ground are cause for cautious optimism. Over the past two months, 17 local elections have been held in overwhelmingly Shiite provinces in Southern Iraq. And in almost every case independents and representatives of non-religious parties did better than the Islamists. In addition, certain key provisions of the TAL suggest Iraqis have already chosen a more tolerant course. First, the TAL reflects a unanimous consensus of the Governing Council that includes Shi'ite representatives, Sunni Iraqis, Kurdish Iraqis and others. These Iraqis embraced a democratic form of government that reflects the principle that there shall be neither the tyranny of the majority nor tyranny of the minority. The rights, beliefs and practices of all Iraqis are protected. 217 The TAL also achieves a reasonable balance with regard to the role of Islam in Iraq, combining clear guarantees of religious and other freedoms with recognition of Islam's role in Iraqi society. Article 13(F) states that “Each Iraqi has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religious belief and practice. Coercion in such matters shall be prohibited.” Article 7(A) states that “Islam is the official religion ... and is to be considered a source of legislation.” No law may contradict "the universally agreed tenets of Islam, the principles of democracy, or the (individual] rights” granted in the TAL. The exact meaning of this will of course have to be worked out in practice. But it incorporates the view that the “universally agreed tenets of Islam" are compatible with democracy and individual rights. Some say this Administration is leading the American people into another Vietnam-like quagmire that can never be won. As Senator McCain, former Senator Fred Thompson, and many others have pointed out, that comparison is more emotion than analysis. In Vietnam, the Communists were an entrenched movement, with a strong nationalist credential, external support from two major Communist powers, and a friendly population in many parts of the country. In Iraq, the extremism in the Sunni triangle represents a small minority of the Iraqi population seeking to restore the regime of terror that gripped Iraq for more than three decades - plus an admixture of foreign jihadists and Iraqi extremists, some of them associated with Al Qaeda. While we do not know how much these groups work together -- and while their long term goals may diverge - they are united in the common purpose of defeating us and preventing a free Iraq from emerging. They offer no positive vision to Iraqis but only visions of death and terror. One possible resemblance with the Vietnam experience, however, is the enemy's hope that it can shape perceptions here -- demoralizing the American people as well as our servicemen and women in the field. That was a decisive factor in the outcome in Vietnam. That is why Senator Kerry's strong statement that America must stay the course in Iraq is so important. That is the message we in Washington must convey on a bipartisan basis not only to our own people, not only to our servicemen and women, but also to the Iraqis, both friend and foe. It seems that this message is starting to get through to Bin Laden's associate Zarqawi. In the same letter I quoted previously, he lamented that .. America would not be pushed out “no matter how numerous its wounds become :- and how much of its blood is spilled.” That is an accurate description of this country's courage and staying power in a just cause. Conveying that message can shorten the conflict. 20 218 Conclusion: Only One Option – To Win Finally, some say there are no good options in Iraq. This is not true. In fact, there is only one option in Iraq - to continue moving ahead and helping the Iraqi people build a free and prosperous democracy. This will not be easy. Only the most naïve person would think that. And it will be a long road. After the abuse it has suffered, it will take time for Iraq to catch up even with the new democracies of Europe and Asia, much less long-established ones like our own. But Iraqis recognize these challenges and embrace them as a revolutionary opportunity to build a free nation and to better their lives. Recently, Nesreen Berwari, the woman serving as the Iraqi Minister of Municipalities and Public Works said: “On April 9, 2003, Iraqis were offered the opportunity to begin to dream their future. Before April 9, 2003, we were not allowed to dream. We could not imagine life with the kinds of positive challenges we face today.” Minister Berwari's optimism persists even though she recently survived a second assassination attempt on her life which killed her bodyguard. From the start of the Global War on Terror it has been clear that we would have to face many difficult challenges and endure many sacrifices in order to ensure the safety of our citizens and our way of life. But as Minister Berwari suggests, these should be seen as positive challenges not as excuses for inaction or retreat. When has it ever been the American way to back down from such a challenge? Last October, in his farewell speech, General John Keane aptly described the American character in the face of challenges such as we face today in Iraq. General Keane said: "I want to tell you something about this war against terror we are fighting in Iraq and around the world. The foreign terrorists, the Baath Party sympathizers, the Islamic extremists who wantonly kill Americans and innocent people from many nations, have no idea what they are up against. Their strategic objective is the political and moral will of the American people. They want to destroy our confidence. They think they know us because they have heard of Lebanon in ‘83, or Somalia in ‘94, or the USS Cole in 2000. They think we are morally weak and we will lose our resolve. But their knowledge is superficial and their understanding is shallow. To understand America and Americans, they need to understand the Marne in 1918, or Tarawa in ‘43, Omaha Beach in '44 or the Chosin Reservoir in 1950. They need to understand that a nation that produces Alvin York and 21 219 Audie Murphy; John Pershing and George Marshall; Chesty Puller and George Patton; Randy Shugart and Gary Gordon; produces heroes in every generation. They are out there now... performing every day. Our enemies are cunning, but they are ignorant and their ignorance will be their undoing. They do not know our will, our courage, or our character." Last summer, a colonel in the 101st Air Assault Division told me that he explained the job in Iraq to his soldiers like this: He told them that what they're doing in Iraq is every bit as important as what their grandfathers did in Germany or Japan in World War II or what their fathers did in Europe and Asia during the Cold War. Those soldiers are helping to reshape history in a way that will make. America and the world safer. Like the joint effort to pull down Saddam's statue a little over a year ago, our troops are supporting the Iraqi people in their effort to overcome their tyrannical past and build a better, more peaceful future. Needed Enhance Authorities One of the most important ways in which Congress can support the global war on terrorism is to support four special authorities we have requested: (1) $500 million to train and equip military and security forces in Iraq, Afghanistan, and friendly nearby regional nations to enhance their capability to combat terrorism and support U.S. operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. It is critical that this authority include security forces because the terrorism threat in Iraq is inside its borders. Security forces - not the New Iraqi Army -play the primary role in confronting this threat. (2) The Commanders Emergency Response Program ($300 million) to enable military leaders in Iraq and Afghanistan to respond to urgent humanitarian relief and reconstruction needs. This has been a remarkably successful program. With quick turnaround projects averaging about $7,000 each, commanders not only help people in their operations area, but also gain their support in defeating terrorists and building themselves a better future. As we have already done in FY 2004, we propose to expand CERP to Afghanistan, as well as to continue the program in Iraq. (3) Increased drawdown authority ($200 million) under the Afghanistan Freedom Support Act, to provide additional help for the Afghan National Army. During this pivotal year, this authority is critical for advancing democracy and stability in Afghanistan. During my visit to Afghanistan, everyone I met gave very high marks to the professionalism and competence of the ANA. 220 (4) The President's FY 2005 budget does not request specific appropriations for these three authorities, and therefore the Department would need to reprogram funding to use them. This underscores the importance of Congress increasing the Department's General Transfer Authority (GTA) to $4 billion - which would still represent just one percent of total DoD funding. Higher GTA also would give us a greater ability to shift funds from less pressing needs to fund must-pay bills and emerging requirements. As we have seen in the past three years, such requirements have become a constant feature of our military programs. This Administration looks forward to continuing to work with the members of Congress to help support our Armed Forces throughout the world who are doing their part to make American and her people more secure. Thank you. 23 221 Testimony by the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Marc Grossman Iraq House Armed Services Committee . April 21, 2004 Mr. Chairman, Mr. Skelton, Members of the Committee, I appreciate the opportunity to report to you today on the progress we are making regarding the June 30 transition in Iraq. Before I begin, I would like to pay tribute to the men and women who are serving their country and the cause of freedom in Iraq. Secretary Powell, Deputy Secretary Armitage and I are immensely proud of the Americans - civilian and military - who demonstrate the highest degree of dedication, determination and courage as they work to bring security, democracy and prosperity to Iraq. I also want to thank our many Coalition partners for their steadfast support. Thank you also for your support of the State Department. I know that you saw the President's announcement on Monday of his nomination of Ambassador John Negroponte to be the first Ambassador to the new Iraq. We are delighted There are a number of questions which we continue to be asked regarding the transition in Iraq on June 30: How are we going to ensure a smooth transition from CPA to an Embassy? How are we going to put in place the right people, resources and organizational structure to do the work of the American people, without interruption, on July 1? To what kind of Iraqi Government will the American ambassador be accredited? What powers will that government have and how will it be formed? And what is the role of our Coalition partners, the United Nations and the international community in the weeks and months ahead? These are the right questions. They are the questions that we are working through. We do not yet have all the answers. As Secretary Powell said earlier this month to 222 - 2- your colleagues here in Congress, “Creating a democratic government in Iraq will be an enormous challenge, but Ambassador Bremer -- with the Iraqi Governing Council, the United Nations and our coalition partners -- is committed to success." And what did the Secretary say next? “When the State Department assumes the lead role this summer in representing and managing U.S. interests in Iraq, we will carry on that commitment. We're already thoroughly involved, and we will succeed.” We have the guidance we need, the direction required, and a plan for a successful transition in Iraq. I am pleased to report today on what we are doing to establish effective American representation in, and support for, the new Iraq. GUIDANCE, DIRECTION, PLAN Our guidance comes from President Bush. He repeated it last week. “One central commitment” the President said of our mission to liberate Iraq, “is the transfer of sovereignty back to the Iraqi people. We have set a deadline of June 30th. It is important that we meet that deadline. As a proud and independent people, Iraqis do not support an indefinite occupation - and neither does America.” The President went on to describe that day: "On June 30th, when the flag of free Iraq is raised, Iraqi officials will assume full responsibility for the ministries of government. On that day, the Transitional Administrative Law, including a bill of rights that is unprecedented in the Arab world, will take full effect. The United States, and all the nations of our coalition, will establish normal diplomatic relations with the Iraqi government. An American embassy will open, and an American ambassador will be posted.” Our specific direction comes from Secretary Powell. The Secretary has set the State Department in motion to support the President's goal of a smooth transition on June 30. After the CPA and the Iraqi Governing Council signed the November 15 Agreement and established the June 30 transition date, the Secretary called Ambassador Francis (Frank) Ricciardone back to Washington to head our transition team. In his first day on the job, Ricciardone went to the Pentagon to meet with his counterpart as the Iraq Transition Team leader for the Department of Defense, LTG (ret.) Mick Kicklighter. Ricciardone and Kicklighter head one interagency team. 223 - 3 - Our interagency team has established a cell in Baghdad under Ambassador John Holzman. Ambassador Holzman works on transition planning and implementation in immediate consultation with CPA Administrator Bremer and CJTF-7 Commander General Sanchez. The Secretary's involvement in our transition planning continues daily. Each evening we send the Secretary a consolidated summary of the Department's transition-related activities for the day. The notes demonstrate a broad range of interagency, bilateral and multilateral requirements, and highlight issues to solve and those resolved. We also provide the Secretary a more in-depth weekly report that highlights key challenges and the steps we are taking to address them. And so, following the President's guidance and Secretary Powell's direction, we have developed a plan to get us to - and through – June 30. To execute our plan, we have and continue to work closely with our interagency colleagues, and we consult regularly with Congress and Coalition partners. in: Baghdad, in Washington, and in capitals. TRANSITION FROM CPA TO EMBASSY We are proceeding in close coordination with our interagency colleagues and with CPA. As an early step, the transition planning team established teams in key sectors - which we thought critical to ensuring a successful transition on June 30. We also sent assessment teams to Iraq to examine the situation on the ground and report their findings. Each of these sectors is broken down into individual tasks or milestones that need to be accomplished. The sectors actually represent more than 500 milestones. Behind these milestones are individual tasks. Responsibility for each task has been assigned to a particular agency or office, and target completion dates have been established. In the personnel sector, for example, there are twenty-six individual milestones that have been identified to date. All but four are "green,” indicating that they are either completed or on schedule. 224 We at the State Department are glad to brief you or your staff on any of the tasks we have identified. And let me offer full access to our Transition Planning Team intranet website to any of your staff willing to visit us in the Department of State and use computers with access to our intranet. * * * * * Today, I would like to spend a few minutes going into some detail on our planning and progress in four key sectors of transition planning: people, security, buildings and money. PEOPLE State Department officers have been in Iraq from the beginning, alongside Jay Garner and ORHA and under Jerry Bremer and CPA. We have more than 170 people in Iraq today. These men and women have come from Washington and dozens of missions overseas, Foreign Service and Civil Service, from our newest Junior Officers to sitting Ambassadors. We are proud of their professionalism and sense of service. How big will our new Embassy in Baghdad be? The State Department has announced positions for 142 American employees and 155 locally engaged staff. In addition, in January of this year, the Secretary asked his Cabinet colleagues to identify contributions their agencies might offer in Iraq. To date, 10 agencies have requested a presence in Embassy Baghdad for a total of 254 American and 280 locally hired personnel for FY 2005. Long term, we estimate a total of 350-400 permanently assigned Americans from some 12-15 agencies, other than State, will serve under the Chief of Mission in Iraq. And a number of CPA staff will continue after July 1 in a temporary capacity under Chief of Mission authority to ensure the continuity of the transition process and support Iraq reconstruction efforts. The transition team, working closely with CPA, is currently identifying the number of staff that will carryover. Thanks to the eagerness of so many State Department people to volunteer for service in Iraq, we have made excellent progress in assigning them to the future Embassy. More than 200 people have requested to be assigned to the new 225 -5- Embassy. Of the 142 Foreign Service positions announced to date for Embassy Baghdad, we have formally assigned 97 people. Thirty-two more assignments are pending. We have also already begun interviewing for the local hire positions, and have hired our first employees. These first hires are undergoing training here in Washington in order to prepare to help us hire others for service in the Embassy. In the short run, however, pending the Embassy's ability to bring on all the direct- hire Iraqi personnel that we ultimately will need, the Embassy will rely on Iraqi and third country staff now under the U.S. Army's "Logcap" contract to provide many basic support services. We have heard questions about the role of the American ambassador, given the large military presence that will remain in Iraq after July 1. The American ambassador, once confirmed by the Senate, will carry with him to Iraq a letter from the President - as all our Ambassadors do - that spells out clearly his authority in Iraq. It will say that he, as the Chief of Mission and personal representative of the President, reporting through the Secretary of State, will have full responsibility for the direction, coordination, and supervision of all United States Government executive branch employees in Iraq, regardless of their employment categories or location, except those under command of a U.S. area military commander or on the staff of an international organization. Of course, the Ambassador and the military commander will have to work closely together to ensure that their respective operations are fully coordinated and best serve the interests of the United States in Iraq. One last comment on State personnel. The response from the professional men and women in the State Department has been exemplary. Many of those who have asked to serve in the new Embassy have already served in Iraq over the past year. Without the additional personnel made possible through Congressional support for the Diplomatic Readiness Initiative, we would have been unable to provide this kind of support to CPA, or be in such good shape heading for June 30. We look for your continued support to ensure that new requirements like Iraq are permanently funded to ensure the personnel resources remain available to respond to crises. 226 -6- SECURITY Our top priority is to keep our people safe. This is a dangerous mission. We have already begun the security upgrade of the planned interim Embassy buildings, and have selected a site for a future new embassy compound based largely on its security features. We have 51 armored vehicles in Iraq and another 98 are on order. These vehicles have already saved American and Iraqi lives. Thirty-two Diplomatic Security (DS) staff are already in Iraq to define the Mission's security requirements and to begin to meet them -- as well as to help protect CPA officers and visitors. There are difficult questions related to security still to be answered. Deputy Secretary Armitage and Assistant Secretary for Diplomatic Security Frank Taylor were just in Baghdad to keep working through these questions in close coordination with people on the ground. Iraq is, and for some time will remain, a dangerous place to live and work. Protecting our people in a wartime environment is difficult and expensive, but we must spare no effort or expense to meet this challenge. BUILDINGS Director of Overseas Building Operations Chuck Williams traveled to Baghdad in February to complete plans for interim and potential permanent mission facilities. We have identified a building in the green zone to serve as the Embassy from July 1 until a more permanent facility can be established. This building, which we refer to as the temporary Chancery, is already under renovation and will be ready for occupancy in advance of the transition. The temporary Chancery will serve as the office of the Ambassador and a limited number of staff. In addition, until we build a new Embassy compound, we will continue to use the former Republican Palace, where CPA is currently located, for most non-public operations, and we will continue to use the current residence that is being occupied by Administrator Bremer Most embassy employees will be housed in trailers currently being occupied by CPA personnel. We have already contracted for an additional 75 trailer units to accommodate 150 personnel to ensure that we have adequate and appropriate space to house our staff until permanent facilities can be established. We have also begun the planning process to develop a new American Embassy facility. A site, chosen largely for security reasons, has been selected for the new Embassy facility. FINANCIAL OUTLOOK Finally, I would like to share our current thinking on the fiscal resources needed to ensure a smooth transition to Embassy Baghdad, and the continued operation of the mission thereafter. I need to emphasize that the costs I report to you today are only a snapshot. In order to open an Embassy on July 1, we must meet basic security needs and must make an investment in technology and communications equipment. Congress has provided in FY 2004 $97 million for an interim embassy facility and interim operations. In addition, we expect to have available the fourth quarter portion of the operating expense budget appropriated for the CPA ($195.8 million), and, pursuant to the FY 2004 Supplemental, up to 1% of the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund, available for transfer ($184 million). The State Department must be prepared to cover both its initial start-up and operating expenses, as well as follow-on costs from the CPA to assure continuity of operations. There are significant challenges in the funding demands that we are working are way through, and it is clear that we will need to make sure that all agencies cover their respective share of joint costs. We estimate that those joint mission costs may be in the range of $500-$600 million for the balance of FY 2004 and we are working on how those costs will be allocated among agencies. In addition, we estimate that the costs in FY 2005. to operate the U.S. mission could exceed $1 billion. We are working closely with CPA, DOD, and OMB to refine these estimates and will provide you as much accurate information as quickly as we can. We will consult with you and your colleagues before anything is finalized. 228 -8. IRAQ'S TRANSITION TO SOVEREIGNTY Let me speak briefly about the political process in Iraq, and the restoration of Iraqi self-government on June 30h. Here, too, our guidance and direction is clear. The President, on the night he announced the start of Operation Iraqi Freedom, March 19, 2003 said: “We come to Iraq with respect for its citizens, for their great civilization and for the religious faiths they practice. We have no ambition in Iraq, except to remove a threat and restore control of that country to its own people.” The plan for restoring Iraqi sovereignty is laid out in the November 15 agreement. That agreement, signed by CPA and the Iraqi Governing Council, called for a Transitional Administrative Law, encompassing a basic bill of rights for all Iraqis. The agreement called for the selection of an interim Iraqi government to oversee the preparation of national elections, and the transfer of governing auth interim government by June 30, 2004. And the agreement established a timeline for national elections, the drafting and ratification of a new constitution and the election of a government under that constitution by December 31, 2005. There have been changes since November 15. But the basic framework and timeline still holds. TRANSITIONAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW The first step was the Governing Council's unanimous agreement on the Transitional Administrative Law, or TAL, nearly two months ago. This marked an important achievement. As Secretary Powell said on March 8, “Just imagine the impact that this document is going to have, not only in Iraq but in that part of the world. The rights of all citizens, to include women, committing this Arab nation to democracy; a free and independent judiciary; the military firmly under civilian controls." The TAL provides for equal rights for all Iraqis, without regard to gender, sect, opinion, belief, nationality, religion or origin. It confirms Iraq as a single state with federal structures, affirms civilian control of the Iraqi security services and the independence of the judiciary. Finally, the TAL establishes the general framework for national elections by January 31, 2005, the drafting of a permanent constitution by August 15, 2005 and the transition to a constitutionally-based post-transition Iraqi government by December 31, 2005. 229 THE IRAQI INTERIM GOVERNMENT Following the UN Secretary General's February 23 report and the signing of the TAL on March 8, the Governing Council on March 17 asked the UN to return to Iraq to advise and assist on forming the Iraqi Interim Government and preparing for elections for the Transitional National Assembly. On April 5, Ambassador Brahimi returned to Iraq to resume intensive consultations with Iraqis for this purpose. As President Bush said last Friday, “We welcome the proposals presented by the U.N. Special Envoy Brahimi. He's identified a way forward to establishing an interim government that is broadly acceptable to the Iraqi people... We thank the U.N. and Secretary General Annan for helping Iraqis secure a future of freedom. We're grateful that Mr. Brahimi will soon return to Iraq to continue his important work.” In our consultations with the UN and Iraqis, we have made clear that while Ambassador Brahimi and Iraqis will chose the specific formula for the interim government, there are fundamental criteria that must be met. First, the interim government should represent the diversity of Iraq. Second, it should not have a law-making body. The structure of the government should be effective, simple and, in order to avoid deadlock in the interim period, should not be overly large. Third, the process of selecting the government should be as simple as possible. And fourth, the interim government should have the necessary authorities to lead Iraq into the community of nations, undertake agreements to push forward economic reconstruction, and prepare the country for elections. We were pleased by the sketch Ambassador Brahimi provided of his proposed way forward and believe his idea fits well with our vision. Ambassador Brahimi envisions establishing by mid-May an interim government led by a Prime Minister that also includes a President and two deputy presidents. A council of ministers would report to the Prime Minister. An Advisory Body, 230 - 10- selected in July by a National Conference, would serve alongside the Executive but have no legislative authority, We look forward to further discussions with Iraqis and in New York with the Secretary General as we consider the way forward. We also look forward to Ambassador Brahimi's return to Iraq in the weeks ahead to continue consultations. with Iraqis countrywide. I would also highlight Ambassador Brahimi's statement regarding the central importance of elections. We agree. In fact, the call for national elections in early 2005 was a key part of the November 15 agreement. In this regard, we are grateful for the continued work of the UN election team, headed by Carina Perelli. The team has been in Baghdad since late March an working closely with our officials and experts to accelerate election preparations. As Ms. Perelli has said, the timeline for elections by January 2005 is very tight. A top priority remains establishing an independent Election Commission as soon as possible. We look forward to further discussions with the UN on the way ahead. UNSCR President Bush and Secretary Powell have both discussed a new UN Security Council resolution on Iraq. We are considering what kind of resolution might be appropriate and are looking at possible elements that would be in the resolution. For example, a new resolution could extend a hand to a new Iraqi government. It could deal with reconstruction activities, including the future of the Development Fund for Iraq and with the continuing need for security to enable the Iraqi people to complete the political process. It could encourage other nations to get involved on both the security and reconstruction efforts. And a new resolution could structure a role for the United Nations in the new political framework, particularly in supporting the process towards elections. JULY 1 So, as I sit before you on April 20, what do I think Iraq will look like on July 1? There will be an American ambassador, running a large but recognizable Embassy. His highly experienced deputy chief of mission and country team will include representatives from a broad range of USG agencies. There will still be more than 100,000 U.S. troops on the ground, helping provide security and train Iraqi army 231 -11- and police forces. And when the Ambassador drives off to call on Iraqis, he will be meeting with the Prime Minister and the President of a sovereign Iraq. But our work will not be complete. Iraq will still be in transition; elections will need to be held; a permanent constitution will need to be drafted; economic reconstruction will remain unfinished. The United States is committed until we reach our objective - a democratic, prosperous Iraq governed by a duly-elected, representative government, at peace with itself and its neighbors. We have guidance; we have direction; we have a plan. And we are already executing that plan. With that I will be pleased to take your questions. Thank you. * * * * DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD APRIL 21, 2004 Iraq: The Road Ahead Draft Testimony before the House Armed Services Committee, 21 April 2004 Judith S. Yaphe, PhD." I would like to begin by listing some questions and assumptions that I find very troubling: 1. Why aren't the Iraqis grateful for their liberation from Saddam's oppression? They are, but gratitude is a short-lived commodity at best. Joy at liberation lasts a day or so. After that, it is occupation. Our aim was not to defeat Iraq as we did Germany and Japan in a total war; the aim was to liberate it from Saddam Husayn's regime. We did that. So, ask many Iraqis, why are you still here? 2. Do elections assure democracy and a pro-US government that views regional security, economic, and political issues as we do? They don't and we should not assume they do. We assume that institutions and constitutions confer legitimacy, establish the rule of law, create checks and balances in government, and guarantee equal rights and protections for all. They don't. Parliaments are buildings and constitutions are written on paper. It takes more than that to create a free people and an open society. It takes time and trust. In 1920, the British created institutions of government (parliament), imported a foreign Arab and had him "elected” by a plebiscite of hand-picked “natural leaders” known to favor pro-British rule, and selected a rainbow coalition drawn from all the communities of Iraq (including a Christian and a Jew) as Cabinet ministers. Now, I am a fan of King Faysal I, and the majority of Iraqis-Sunni and Shia-welcomed him as their choice. The government established by Britain—the king, the parliament, municipal and regional councils, and the so-called natural leaders lacked power and authority to rule Iraq. Not only did the British rule indirectly and closely through political commissioners and officers chosen in Whitehall, they wrote the constitution and the treaties the Iraqis had to sign to gain independence. Even after the League of Nations recognized an independent Iraq in 1932, the British retained their control over security and military decision making until the 1958 revolution. There is a danger that we will repeat the errors of the British in Iraq if we do not pass decisionmaking power to them. 3. Is democracy compatible with Iraqis' views of the role of Islam and governance? Yes. This is not to say that Iraqis are not and cannot be "democrats” or that they cannot be governed by democratically elected representatives. They can be. Many have lived in democratic countries, but more importantly, in my view, many Iraqis have an idea of what democracy can be and they know how fragile their country is now. The question is, “How do we get from here to there, from where we are now to where we would like to be and do it by ourselves.” Democracy 'Dr. Judith S. Yaphe is a senior research fellow in the Institute of National Strategic Studies, the National Defense University, Ft. McNair, and a professorial lecturer at the Elliot School of International Affairs, George Washington University. The analysis and comments in this testimony are her personal views, and do not reflect the views of the NDU, the Department of Defense, or any government agency. (235) 236 represents two values: majority rule and protection of the rights of minorities. It took Britain nearly 900 years and a civil war (from the time of Magna Carta in 1215) to evolve into a truly representative government; it has taken us more than 225 years and a civil war to achieve our current state of democracy. How can we expect the Iraqis to achieve this in one year? 4. Is there an Iraqi nationalism: Two assumptions about Iraqi nationalism are commonly and mistakenly made:: a. We assume that because Iraq was "invented by the British and French after World War, it must be an artificial state. It isn't and they didn't. Modern Iraq incorporates the historical provinces that were the historical Land Between the 2 Rivers—Mesopotamia (Basra and Baghdad provinces) and Mosul. Iraq is as legitimate a state as Syria, Lebanon, Turkey, and Iran-all of whom were affected by post-World War reinvention. b. We assume that because Iraq is an amalgam of Shi'a Arab (approximately 60 percent), Sunni Arab (20 percent) and Kurd (Sunni and Shia, approximately 20 percent), then Iraq can be defined and divided mathematically. Some people go further and say Iraq is ungovernable as it is, so split it up into 3 parts. They aren't and it can't. The numbers of representatives in parliament, the appointments to ministry posts, the composition of military units-all are being allocated according to ethnic-sectarian identity. But identity is more than your religion and ethnic origin, and an Iraqi is more than the sum total of his/her parts. 5. Are we seeing the outbreak of sectarian warfare-Sunni versus Shi'a-and are the Shi'a wedded to an Iranian-style cleric-dominated regime as Iran has? No and no. In my judgment, the confrontations in Fallujah and Najaf do not yet constitute a civil war or a rebellion. They do, however, reflect carefully planned and coordinated attacks on our forces and on civilians working on Iraq's reconstruction. What is important is what is not being heard, to paraphrase Sherlock Holmes referring to "the dog that did not bark in the night." We are not hearing about the rounds of negotiations between Muqtada al-Sadr and representatives of the Ayatollahs of Najaf, including the son of Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani. We are not hearing about the negotiations in Fallujah. And no cleric has yet issued a decree (fatwa) sanctioning rebellion against the foreign occupier. Despite the murders of Iraqis cooperating with the CPA, including a minister on the Governing Council, clerics in the Sunni and Shi'a communities over the past year, and the attacks on the offices of both Kurdish factions in northern Iraq, civil war—meaning between Iraqi Arabs and Kurds, or Sunni and Shi'a-has not erupted and in my judgment is not likely to do so. a. Sunni-Shi'a strife is not the same historical pattern in Iraq as it is in Iran and the Gulf, especially in Saudi Arabia. Iran's tribes were Shi'a for generations before the Shah of that period made Shi'a Islam the official religion of the state in the 16th century. Most of Iraq's tribes in southern Iraq converted to Shi'a Islam in the 18th and 19th centuries, with many families, tribes, and clans—including Saddam Husayn's—having Sunni and Shi'a members. Iraq's Sunni and Shi'a communities have intermarried and live intermingled in many cities and towns, including Baghdad and Tikrit, Sadddam's home region. Iraq's Shi'a were excluded from participation in the Sunni Ottoman Establishment that ruled the Iraqi provinces for 4 centuries, but they also chose to 237 separate themselves from Sunni schools, Sunni academies, and Sunni governance. Nevertheless, Shi'a Arabs served in government under the monarchy, including several prime ministers, joined the Communist and Ba'thist parties beginning in the 1950s, and served as loyalists to Saddam Husayn through the 1990s. They saw these secular movements as offering a more level playing field than the Arab nationalist parties that had dominated the state since independence and favored Arab Sunni nationalist causes. In my view, the likelihood of civil war in Iraq is higher between religious extremists (Sunni and Shi'a) against everyone else, than it is between Sunni and Shi'a. Generally speaking, Sunni and Shi'a Arabs share a belief in Iraqi nationalism and in maintaining the political and territorial integrity of the country as defined by the 1922 San Remo treaty and the 1932 treaty of independence. They have cooperated in the past and lived together for hundreds of years. b. What do the Shia want? Iraq's Shi'a are not one monolithic community sharing a common vision of Iraq's political future. They are multiple communities, with multiple goals and visions of a new Iraq. 1. Secular Shi'a. tend not to be religious; they favor a secular state and joined secular parties—the Communist Party of Iraq and the Ba'th Party, one of whose founders was an Iraqi Shia Arab. Sadun Hamadi, for example, served as head of the National Assembly by order of Saddam; another example was a long-time party loyalist and Cabinet member who Saddam ordered executed for his failure to quell the 1991 Shi'a revolt. 2. Traditional Shi'a tend to be more village and tribal centered and more pious and observant. Many follow Grand Ayatollah Sistani as their guide (marja al- taqlid); they probably favor some sort of Islamic governance, with Islam as "a" source of state law, but do not support an Islamic republic styled after the principles of Ayatollah Khomeini and the Iranian Islamic revolution. They provided most of the recruits for Saddam's army and were loyal to the state, if not Saddam, during the 8 long years of war with the Persians. Sistani, who is portrayed as anti-U.S., is more accurately described as pro-Iraqi, in my view. He opposed non-Iraqis writing a constitution for Iraq and demands direct elections for the new government and parliament. Some observers believe his insistence on elections reflects his belief that the majority Shi'a population would naturally choose Shi'a candidates and thereby create a Shi'a-dominated state. I am not so sure. 3. Extremist Shi'a. Iraq has several extremist factions. They share a vision of an Islamic republic governed by Islam as "the" source of all law, and have little tolerance for western values or practices, including the emancipation of women. a) SCIRI: The Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq was established by Iran in the early 1980s as an umbrella group to tie together anti-regime Iraqis in exile in Iran. Its leader was Ayatollah Muhammad Baqr al-Hakim, who was assassinated in August 2003 after returning from more than 20 years in exile in Iran; his brother 238 Over Abd al-Aziz al-Hakim serves on the Governing Council and heads the Badr Brigade, the SCIRI militia. b) Dawa Party: A clandestine Iraqi Shi'a faction founded in Najaf in the 1960s by Ayatollah Muhammad Baqr Sadr, who was martyred by Saddam's regime in 1980. He was a companion of Khomeini during the latter's 15-year exile in Iraq, and he wrote a political treatise advocating a role for clerics in governance (this became Khomeini's principle of vilayati faqih, or rule by religious jurisprudent). Dawa members were involved in anti-U.S. and anti-western terrorism with the Lebanese Hizballah terrorist infrastructure in Kuwait during the 1980s. They have never been comfortable in their alliance with SCIRI and indicators suggest the 2 have split. They also have a representative on the Governing Council. c) Muqtada al-Sadr. A 30-something junior cleric who seems to appeal primarily to disgruntled young unemployed males with a taste for sacrifice and violence. His Mahdi militia and rhetoric portray the struggle against U.S. forces as a holy war (jihad, against the infidel; he wraps himself in a white shroud to show he is ready for death. He is implicated in the murder of Ayatollah Abd al-Majid al-Khoie, moderate leader of a popular and prominent foundation who had returned to Iraq and was trying to reconcile factions in Najaf when he was brutally murdered in April 2003. Sadr follows an Iraqi exile in Iran as his marja (source of emulation or guide)-Ayatollah Ha'iri, who resides in Qom. It is not clear that Sadr finds much favor with Iran's clerical leaders--in my view, they find him a dangerous source of instability and civil strife where they would prefer quiet manipulation and a more subtle exercise of their assumed influence. Sadr's father, Sadiq Sadr, was an important ayatollah appointed by Saddam to head a major mosque in Baghdad; when Sadiq Sadr tried : to restore practices banned by Saddam, Saddam had him and 2 of his sons murdered in 1999. This Sadr clan is related to a very important clerical family in Iraq that has figured in Shi'a political activism. Muqtada seems not to have his father's brilliance or leadership skills, but he plays on the family's Arabism and loyalty to Iraq, saying they stayed and suffered under Saddam while "others” (the al-Hakims and SCIRI) fled to safety in Iran. d) Iranian clerics. Many of the senior and mid-level Shi'a clerics in Iraq have been and still are Iranian in origin. Sistani came to Iraq to study more than 50 years ago; the Khoies were Iranian in origin as were the Sadrs. Their contact with the Iraqi Shi’a community is apparently limited, but in times of strife they could play a more important role, Who are the Sunnis of Iraq? Attention historically has focused on the secular Iraq created by the British and continued by the monarchy and the several revolutionary regimes that ruled Iraq between 1920 and 2003. Saddam Husayn long feared a resurgence of Islamic extremism as the most serious threat to his regime. He supported 239 the Sunni extremist Syrian Muslim Brotherhood because of their common antipathy to Syrian president Hafiz al-Asad, but Saddam suppressed all religious activism inside Iraq that he could not control. Saddam reinvented Iraq and himself in the 1980s, during the Iran Iraq war, to demonstrate his personal piety. He built new mosques, refurbished old ones, had his genealogy traced back to the family of the Prophet Muhammad, and allegedly donated blood to be used as ink to write a Quran. He permitted more public observance of Islam, wearing of beards and veils by students at university, and proclaimed himself a hero of Islam in removing the corrupt and un-Islamic regime of the Al Sabah in Kuwait. 1. Islamic activism has been growing in Iraq, despite Saddam's efforts to contain it. He suspected, correctly, that "Wahhabi” influences (the name given to any Sunni extremism) from Saudi Arabia was infiltrating Iraq, and he was almost certainly correct.' Saudi Wahhabi clerics and the Saudi-sponsored Muslim Brotherhood were sent to northern Iraq and among the Sunni tribes of central and western Iraq to woo them back to a strict and observant Islam. They are building mosques in areas of northern and central Iraq. Iraq's Sunni clerics lacked the power and influence exercised by Shia clerics. Where the latter were more independent of the state in terms of wealth and status, Sunni clerics were state employees and hence very controllable by the government. 2. Sunni Arab activists have been joining Shi'a activists to protest the U.S. presence in Iraq. This may seem an unusual phenomenon but it is not a new one. In the 1920 revolt, Sunni and Shi'a clerics prayed and preached in each other's mosques; they denounced the British occupation and organized joint anti- British demonstrations. The Shi'a clerics worked with Sunnis and with secular Arab nationalists to oppose the British but ultimately, it was a Shi'a cleric who issued a decree (fatwa) authorizing rebellion against the British that led the Shi’a tribes of southern Iraq to revolt. We are witnessing similar joint meetings in mosques now, which raises the question: Are we seeing a replay of events exactly 84 years ago this month, when Sunni and Shi’a prayed together, and the arrest of angry Shi'a led to an anti-British decree and a rebellion? 3. Iraq's Kurds are predominantly Sunni as well. A small number belong to the Ansar al-Islam, which is linked to al-Qaida. I am not aware of their support for larger Sunni extremist activities. Some Kurds are also Shi'a, but many are Sufis (Islamic mystics). In any event, Iraq's Kurds are nationalists first (Iraqi as well as Kurdish?) and tend not to identify themselves by Muslim sect. They prefer a secular Iraq, opposed inserting Islam into the interim constitution, and appear to be watching the current battles for Fallujah and Najaf from afar. Attempts to take advantage of the turmoil in the south and Baghdad by occupying lands claimed by the Arab and Turkman communities in Kirkuk, for example, could result in Iraq's Arabs regrouping to battle them after the U.S. is gone from Iraq. 1 The Shi’a in particular remember that Wahhabis from Arabia sacked and bumed the Great Mosque in Najaf in the early 19th century. 240 Is Iranian Influence in Iraq Exaggerated? Iran tends to overstate its ability to influence people and events in Iraq. Just as it did in the early days of its war with Iraq, Iran looks at Iraq's Shi'a community in a somewhat condescending manner. The feelings are part religious (we are better Muslims) and part nationalist (Persians are better than Arabs). By the end of the 1991 war and abortive rebellions, Iran played host to nearly one million Iraqi refugees, some of whom were Kurds, most of whom were Arab Shi'a Muslims fleeing the wars or forced into exile by Saddam's ethnic cleansing operations. Moreover, Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei views himself as leader of the world Shi'a Muslim community. Iran tried to catch Washington's attention as it observed growing American interest in regime change in Iraq. Tehran had been one of the first governments to extend its sympathies to the victims of 9/11 and cooperated with the U.S. in the UN 6 plus 2 Committee that monitored Afghanistan and planned for regime change there. Iran signaled Washington that it wanted to be consulted about U.S. intentions in Iraq. Iran made clear it had no interest in intervening on behalf of Saddam Husayn; in fact, they were almost certainly grateful that we were eliminating the second of 2 major threats to their security (the Taliban in Afghanistan being the first). Regardless of which faction rules in Tehran-conservative or reformist-Iran's government will watch very closely for signs of unrest, rebellion, or potential spillover. Iran has long monitored events in Iraq; it has always had diplomats, scholars, clerics, pilgrims, intelligence agents, and networks of informants watching this dangerous neighbor. Iranians long dominated the religious schools and courts of Najaf and Karbala, and many clerical families have spent generations in the shrine cities, owning property and burial plots in the grounds near the mosques. Iran, however, seems unable to capitalize on its "influence.” It probably had the closest ties to Ayatollah Muhammad Baqr al-Hakim, but he was murdered last August. Their long supportsafe haven, training, arms, and political support—to his organization, SCIRI, and other Iraqi exiles has not paid off. One of the major reasons for the growing split within the SCIRI infrastructure appears to be the Dawa organization's complaints that SCIRI is tied too closely to Iran. Nor does Iran appear to have influence over Muqtada al-Sadr. Its efforts to negotiate with Sadr and the Sistani elements in Najaf last week failed, according to press reports. The Iranians were unable apparently to arrange a meeting with Ayatollah Sistani or his organization, while a senior Iranian diplomat was murdered in Baghdad. Is Iran's Islamic Revolution a model for Iraq? Most Iraqis, in my opinion, would you tell you that it is not a model for emulation. Iraq's hard-core Islamists-Shi'a and Sunni—seem insistent on an Islamic state under strict Islamic law, but the majority of Iraqis are not hard-core religious extremists. A great many will follow the decisions of Ayatollah Sistani on whether to comply with or oppose the plans for an interim government, elections, and a new constitution. Sistani has indicated he opposes a role for clerics in government. The decision will probably be made on the Iraqis' perception of how much power they will have after 30 June, progress on holding direct elections, and the role of the U.S. and the UN in determining the shape and authority of an interim government. The failure of Iran's experiment in democracy by theocratic rule will have little impact on Iraq. What lies ahead? 241 In the year since Saddam Husayn and his brutal regime were removed from power, we have won a war with surprising ease only to be confronted with a growing and violent opposition to our continuing military presence and political role. Certainly, anyone looking at the situation in Iraq in April 2004 would have to be troubled by the violence, political uncertainty, and economic instability that is Iraq today. But who can argue that removing Saddam was wrong? I can't. Anyone who has studied Iraq-as I have for more than 30 years—and who knows Iraqis who suffered at his hands cannot say that it was wrong to remove him from power or that his removal increased the risk of terrorist attacks against us. At the same time, anyone who thought the transition from a brutal 35-year reign of terror to democracy and the rule of law would be easy was living in a dream world. Sadly, neither Iraqis nor Americans seem to have much patience or tolerance for the time and effort it takes to rebuild civil society and reconstruct a country damaged by long years or war and repression.. One year ago, expectations for the future were high on both the Iraqi and American side. We found more damaged economic, social, and industrial infrastructure (damaged by years of neglect by Saddam) and more opposition to our efforts than we had anticipated. And we made mistakes, including a too sudden demobilization of all military and security services, a too deep de-Ba'thification process, and a too dependent relationship with a few favored exiles who lacked a popular base in country. We should not be surprised that Iraqis who welcomed us in 2003 now fear us and wish us gone. Yes, most Iraqis want democracy and economic reconstruction, and they acknowledge they need for our assistance. But they need security and economic stability more. Without safe streets and jobs, freedom will have little meaning for them. Most Iraqis acknowledge that these are dangerous times, that the U.S forces should leave, but many also say we should not leave until order and a new government have been established. That is their dilemma and ours. Ambassador Bremer speaking to a group of Iraqi women on 19 April 2004 put it best: We understand that security is the main problem facing most Iraqis - men, women, and children. We have a responsibility to ensure security, and we have 130,000 troops here to do that. But as the events of the last few weeks have shown, it is also the responsibility of the Iraqi people to provide security. And we've had some disappointments in the last few weeks with the police and the civil defense force, even the army. Because in the long run this is your country. It's not our country. It's your country. And we have to find ways to ensure that Iraqis are more and more involved in their security. We are faced with several difficult options. We could continue to support the current Governing Council of 25 that we appointed last year, and we could increase the number of Iraqis on the Council. Many of its members and the recent appointees to ministerial posts are professionals and technocrats who are honestly going about their jobs under threat of assassination. Yet, the most powerful members, including the Iraqi National Congress and the Iraqi National Accord lack a popular base and credibility, while SCIRI, and the 2 Kurdish factions led by Masud Barzani and Jalal Talabani, exercise virtual tribal-style control over their supporters. All have armed militias, allowed by the CPA, and they are fighting among themselves for greater control and influence. Ahmad Chalabi has enjoyed U.S. backing but is wooing the Shi'a of Najaf and the south, including Ayatollah Sistani, in hopes of gaining support by appearing to attack U.S. interests. He has the most to lose if the other options are chosen. 242 We could disband the Governing Council and appoint a president and 2 deputy presidents (one from each sector) as called for in the transitional administrative law (TAL). The president would, in turn, appoint the prime minister, who would then choose the new interim government. I doubt this option or the one above would satisfy the critics of U.S. policy, including Sistani. In my view, his reasons for opposing the TAL and calling for direct elections reflect his deep dislike of the current Governing Council and its control by predominantly exile elements who lack credibility with Iraqis. . We could accept the apparent recommendations to be made by UN emissary Lakhdar Brahimi to appoint an interim government that would serve only while the elections are being prepared. We could agree to work with the UN, especially if that brings old friends and former Coalition members to help us in Iraq. Appointing Mr. Negroponte as Ambassador to Baghdad would seem a step in this direction. The interim government should have real power, the right to make decisions without having to get permission from an American or UN minder. In turn, the UN should offer a resolution legitimizing the presence of a U.S./Coalition military and security presence in Iraq. Giving the UN a greater political role in Iraq will not end attacks by insurgents or terrorists; the - UN is not popular with many Iraqis, who blame it for implementing U.S.-imposed sanctions. A role for the UN as impartial mediator, however, could be critical to obtaining support from Sistani, Muqtada al-Sadr, and Iraqis seeking a moderate road to self-rule. The success of any next stage-of any post-30 June government-will depend on our willingness to empower the new Iraqi authority, to stay the course and maintain an effective presence while the new govemments (interim and permanent) stabilize and acquire the capability to protect themselves and the nation, and to support an international effort to rebuild Iraq economically and psychically. We cannot appoint advisers for multi-year terms in the Iraqi government, that is for the Iraqis to do. We cannot write their legislation or constitution although we can encourage secular government, the rule of law, and opportunities for all Iraqismen, women, Arabs, Kurds, Sunnis, Shias, Turkmen, and Christian. We should not favor one party or politician at the expense of others but should encourage the emergence of the middle class, professionals, technocrats, civil servants, and military officers to a new Iraq. I will conclude with 3 brief points: • There is an Iraqi nation and a deep sense of Iraqi nationalism and pride. Iraq does not naturally, historically, ethnically, or religiously divide into 3 separate parts--the insurgency/terrorism of the past few weeks suggests a different division: religious and political extremists versus everyone else. . Cult of Personality is definitely not part of Iraq's historical or political tradition. It was part of Saddam's methods of control patterned on the Dear Ones of History–Stalin, Hitler, and Kim Il Sung. My final thought is this: Saddam used fear and armed militias and personal loyalty to rule Iraq, balance and confuse his opponents real and imagined, and intimidate the people. Let us not create the circumstances for another Dear Leader to arise. 243 ANNEX: BASIC FACTS Estimated population from 14 million in 1984 to 19 million in 1990 to 25 million in 2003; 42 percent under the age of 14; mainly urban; 2.7% annual growth rate. Ethnic Iraq • Arabs: 75% (Sunni, Shia, Christian) Kurds: 20 percent (includes Christian, Jewish, and Fayli Kurdish tribes); modernization and urbanization have weakened traditional power of aghas (landbolding class) but tribal politics prevail-Kurdistani Democratic Party led by Masud Barzani; Patriotic Union of Kurdistan led by Jalal Talabani, and several Islamic Kurds groups, including the Ansar al-Islam. Others: 5-10 percent minorities, includes Turkmen (2-3% in Kirkuk and Irbil, are Sunni and Turkish speakers); Assyrian and Syriac Christians, Mandaens, Jews, Zoroastrians, etc.) and Iranian Shia with close ties to Iran (were 1-2% of population until mass expulsions 1980); concentrated in Najaf, Karbala, Kazimiyah Religious Iraq Sunni 30-35 percent (Arab and Kurd; Sunni Arabs are less than 20 percent). Sunni Arabs were the key to Saddam's political survival. Sunni Arabs from northern Tigris and Euphrates region and western Iraq have dominated Iraqi politics since Ottoman times. Historically, they were considered to be more cosmopolitan and less tribal than their Shi'a counterparts, but this not true today. . Shia60-65 percent (mostly Arab, some Iranian, few Kurds). Most are 12er Shia, as are the Iranians, some customs and practices differ. 3 communities: urban and secular; tribal, religious, and rural; and Iranian-origin clerics. Majority of Iraq Shi'a tend to reject Khomeini concept of vilayat-i faqih. Participated in early Bathist Party and governments but did not buy into Arab nationalism of Bathist ideology. Loyal to Baghdad in Iran Iraq war; majority of Iraq's army foot soldiers Shia. Some saw opportunity in Feb 1991 retreat from Kuwait and apparent encouragement from U.S. to stage revolt-revolt was incoherent, uncoordinated, Iran failed to back sufficiently, mullahs carrying portraits of Khomeini frightened many—rebellion failed. Role of clerics--most of whom are Iranian—not always central to lives of most Iraqi Shia, except in times of great stress, as in intifada and under occupation. Unlike Sunnis, Shi'a Muslims follow a living mujtahid (religious scholar such as Khomeini or Sistani) who can interpret Quran and issue fulws. Over centuries Iraq's Shi'a community acquired the characteristics of a persecuted minority alienation from the larger society, intense feeling of cohesion, and pervasive sense of oppression and injustice. Iraq's Shias see themselves, for the most part, as Arab, Iraqi, and Shia.. Non-Muslims are about 5-6 percent of population: include Christians (Mandaen, Assyrians, Chaldeans, Armenians, and all kinds Catholics), Jewish Yazdi: related to Kurds, near Mosul, religion derived from Zoroastrian dualism of devil and fire worshippers; Sabians 244 Historical Iraq Iraq is both 6,000 years old and 80 years old. Dates to ancient Mesopotamia; 1920 date of the mandate---British and French agreed on 3 provinces from Ottoman Empire of Mosul, Baghdad, and Basra; separated Kuwait, which had been govemed from Baghdad by Turks. Independence 1932. Borders artificial but also reflect ancient land between 2 rivers. Mesopotamian heritage. first agricultural settlement at Kirkuk 6500 BCE; invented the wheel, writing, ziggurat (temples); square roots in math; calendars, concept and structure of (ruthless) centralized, autocratic empire under Akkadians 2400 BCE then Babylonians; first lawgiver Hammurrabi. Islamic heritage: source of modern identity; home of the Abbasid Caliphate 650-1250 CE. Shrine cities of Shia IslamNajaf (Imam Husayn slain and buried here), Karbala (Imam Ali, father of Imam Husayn, slain and buried here), Kufah, Kazimiyah (Baghdad) sites of tombs of Ali, Husayn, and other Imams-umra pilgrimages important to Iranian Shia. Baghdad center of high civilization, culture under Islamic Abbasid Empire. Devastated by Mongol invasions of 13th and 15th centuries, destroyed irrigation systems and, hence, agriculture and civil society. Ottoman heritage, 1514-1918: Established civil government and military institution; Shia excluded from government, military, educational institutions. These practices led to Shia excluding themselves from Sunni schools and courts well into the 20th century—this mistake they acknowledge and vow not to repeat; Arab nationalism bom under Young Turks. Bloody and violent history of military coups, political violence, repression of minorities. Saddam did not invent the violence and oppression common in his Republic of Fear; he refined the methodology, increased the practices of violence, terror, recriminations used by Nuri al-Said, the evil Regent Abdillah, the 1940 pro-German coups, etc. Assyrian massacres of 1933, attempted and successful coups of 1936, 1941, 1958, 1963, 1966, 1968; hanging of Jews from Liberation Square 1970; gradual murder (consolidation of power) by Saddam of all real and imagined political opponents 1968-1979 to Great Declaration and Great Purge of 1979. History as a participatory republic? Not really. British included Sunnis, Christians, and a Jew in the 1920 government; Shi'as opted out of political power. Governments from King Faysal I (1920) through Nuri al-Sa'id (1958) manipulated, isolated and occasionally included democrats, communists, tribals, intellectuals and others in government. Saddam created the early Ba'thist Party to appeal to all Iraqis-Sunni and Shia, Arab and Kurdas the New Iraqi Man and Woman; Iraq was to be a new secular state in continuity with ancient Mesopotamia (proof is Saddam's name on all the bricks used to rebuild ancient Babylon). Ba'thism, however, was based on Arab unity as well as equality, economic and social justice. This held little appeal to Shi'a who saw Arabism as union with Sunni Syria; the Kurds were not interested. But Shi'a served in government, including several prime ministers and cabinet ministers, and Kurds served in the military. Tribal Irag Tribal legacy. Iraq's tribes lacked links to the land, settled villages until recent times; loyalty to family, clan, and tribe more important than loyalty to the land, village Phebe Marr, in her Modern History of Iraq (2nd edition 2003) notes that the legacies of tribalism in Iraq are personal honor, factionalism, loyalty, and an intense individualism that resists central authority. As cities, towns and political parties like the Ba’th (most of whose members were Sunni Arabs from the tribal towns of central Iraq) grew in power and as source of wealth, they transferred these tribal characteristics into the state. 10 245 Powerful tribal confederations: Sunni and Shi'a in same tribe; Dulaym, Jabur, Ubayd, Muntafiq Federations formed core of Iraq's security, military and intelligence service under Saddam; were also source of virtually all attempted coups against him. British policy had been to weaken confederations by establishing land ownership and catering to shaykhly class of new landowners. Saddam's policy was anti-tribal in 1970s but became pro-tribal in 1990s. Saddam reliance on his family, clan, and tribe: in 1980s eliminated tribal parts of name--al- Tikriti—from name to mask how many Tikritis in government, military, RG. Saddam re-instituted tribal leaders, customs after Gulf War when law and order and support of prominent tribal leaders important for his security. 246 The Iraqi Shi'i Community Between Sistani, Muqtada, the IGC and the CPA presented by: Dr. Amatzia Baram United States Institute of Peace to the: House Armed Services Committee, April 21, 2004 This presentation reflects the views of the author and not necessarily those of the USIP. 247 Dr. Amatzia Baram The Iraqi Shi'i Community Between Sistani, Muqtada, the IGC and the CPA a. Growing Religiosity in Post-Saddam Iraq At least when it came to the three large towns of Basra, Baghdad and Mosul, Iraq was traditionally a fairly secular society. Reports from the 1930s comparing Baghdad to Cairo conclude that Baghdad was, by then, far less religious than the Egyptian capital. Indeed, not only that the sale and consumption of alcoholic drinks were allowed and regulated by law, even brothels were tolerated and supervised, even though there was no legal framework under which they operated. Three out of the four holy Shi'i cities in Iraq, Najaf, Karbala, and Kazimayn (a suburb of Baghdad) were very religious. Fairly strict rules regarding the prohibition of alcoholic drinks, women's dress codes, etc. were observed there, but those places were the only exceptions to the rule. Even so, traditionally again, the Shi'i south was generally speaking more orthodox than the Sunni-Arab center and center north and the Kurdish north. This state of affairs existed until the 1970s, when a profound change started to gradually take hold. In 1968 the secular Ba'th regime came to power in Baghdad. Because it felt that it had to fully control all of the religious, social and educational institutions of the Shi'i community they soon afterwards adopted policies that were unprecedented in many ways in terms of mosque-state relations. These policies were especially coercive when it came to the Shi'i community. The regime made every effort to eliminate all vestiges of religious Shi'i autonomy that the community had managed to preserve for centuries. This brought about repeated confrontations between the regime and the more traditional Shi'is. In their own turn, these confrontations strengthened the Shi'i identity even of fairly secular Shi'is. As the result of the fact that all other cells of civil society were destroyed at the hands of the regime, the mosque became the only place where Shi'is could express their communal identity. Even though all mosque sermons were controlled by the government, there were many informal ways by which people could communicate their rejection of the regime when assembled in the mosques. In 1993, for its own reasons, the regime embarked on a Faith Campaign (al-Hamlah al- Imaniyyah), that sought to demonstrate that the Ba'th were no longer secular and that they were in fact "born again” Muslims. Part of that Campaign involved allowing both Sunni and Shi'i mosques somewhat more freedom in practicing their religious ceremonies and rites. In the Sunni areas this reduced substantially the opposition to the regime amongst Sunni Islamists. In the Shi'i areas there was no such decrease in anti-regime sentiments. If anything, animosity to the regime was on the rise: just two years earlier, in 1991, the regime had crushed a Shi'i revolt with great ferocity. Instead there was an increase in mosque attendance and in adherence to those Shi'i rites still allowed as an expression of Shi'i identity. Often Friday prayers, even though carefully monitored by regime agents, were used to preach against the regime through indirect inferences. It was very easy for an aggressive preacher to find Qur'anic verses or quotations from Medieval Shi'i sources that, when read out loud with great emphasis and anger, were universally understood by the participants as highly inflammatory anti-regime incitement. Indeed, this is precisely what the young and inexperienced Muqtada Sadr did in a few of his Friday sermons in the mosque of Kufah after his father's assassination. It is not clear why the Ba'th regime decided to refrain from action against him. During the last ten years of the Ba'th regime, the mosque became the only large meeting place where Shi'ites could assemble without too much harassment and express their rejection of the regime in a way that was not life threatening. Following the demise of the 248 Dr. Amatzia Baram Ba'th regime, in early April 2003, the Shi'i masses expressed their joy, relief and elation through mass demonstrations marking the Fortieth Day to the martyrdom of Imam Hussein. This purely religious ceremony turned into a powerful demonstration of Shi'i identity when tens of thousands of young men roared in one voice religious Shi'i slogans, beating their chests as one man (al-latm) and many injuring themselves with short swords, so as to identify with the suffering of the martyred Imam. The processions alarmed the Sunnis, but also shocked the American soldiers. They exposed the explosive potential of Shi'i Islam even though only in a few cases did demonstrators betray an anti-American sentiment. b. Anti-Western, Anti-Jewish Sentiments and the Political Culture of Rumors Since the beginning of the British Mandate in Iraq (1920-1932), under the semi- independent monarchy (1932-1958), and during much of the period until the Ba'th took over in 1968, anti-British, anti-Zionist and often anti-Jewish propaganda was conspicuous both in secular intellectual circles and, to a lesser extent, among Shi'i clergy. Whether as part of secular pan-Arab worldview or an Islamist fundamentalist inclination, attacking the British, and later the US and the West, was seen as a sure ticket to popular support. Attacking the Jews, too, was occasionally attractive to popular rabble-rousers, even after more than 90% of Iraq's Jews had left the country by 1951. The exception was the period under the rule of General Abd al-Karim Qassem (1958-1963). Hate mongering became particularly extensive under the Ba'th regime (1968-2003). It is impossible to assess, with any degree of accuracy, the impact of 80 years of anti-Western, anti-Zionist and anti-Jewish propaganda. However, it may be assumed that after such a long time -- especially after 35 years of Ba'th rule -- certain segments of the population are permeated with some kind of xenophobia. This conclusion has been derived from anti-Christian and anti-Jewish slogans raised by both Sunni and Shi'i fundamentalist extremists after the liberation. It seems that xenophobia became more pronounced under the Ba'th for two reasons: it was encouraged by the regime, and Iraq became more insulated than ever from the rest of the world. To this one ought to add another dimension: the susceptibility of many Iraqis to rumors of conspiracy. In a society where people could hardly speak openly with one another without risking their lives, and in which the media was fully controlled by an unpopular regime, people were seeking information from every possible source. The Ba'th regime itself often complained that people are spreading “harmful rumors.” Indeed, the regime even created a special intelligence branch to intercept rumors, to counter them, and to spread rumors of its own. This characteristic of Iraqi political life has not disappeared. People are listening to and sometimes believing the most bizarre rumors. So far the CPA and the IGC haven't found a way to effectively counter these rumors. Those who are benefiting from these rumors, and sometimes inventing them, are the most radical groups, be they ex-Saddam supporters or Sunni and Shi'i religious extremists. The traditional and very healthy mistrust of the average Iraqi of official propaganda is providing these rumors with a sharp cutting edge even now, when Saddam and his regime are gone. This is the case because even one year into the liberation of Iraq, many Iraqis, especially those with little education, do not trust the Coalition and doubt the idealistic motivation of the US. This, too, is the legacy of 35 years of Ba'th rule: no regime and no foreign power can be trusted. This combination of xenophobia, lack of trust of the powers that be and susceptibility to believe in unsubstantiated rumors, in addition to a growing messianic tendency in some social circles amongst the Shi'a is being taken full advantage of by the Shi'i young firebrand Muqtada Sadr. One example of such a rumor is the claim that the US could easily have resuscitated the Iraqi infrastructure within a few weeks, 249 Dr. Amatzia Baram and provided all Iraqis with lucrative jobs, but chose not to do this. This because the US is bent on punishing the Iraqi people for supporting Saddam and because it wants people to be over their heads in day to day troubles and tribulations so that they will have no time to prepare a revolt. Another, spread in mosques by radical Islamist preachers, is that the US initiated the most recent suicide bombings on Karbala and Baghdad. Another rumor that is touching the core of Shi'i faith and eschatology and spread by Muqtada's preachers, is that the US knows something that most Shi'is don't: they know that very soon, practically any day now, the Shi'i Mahdi, the equivalent of the Jewish and Christian Messiah, is about to appear. He is expected to appear in Iraq and the American Christians are bent on murdering him as soon as he appears. This is why the US conquered Iraq precisely now. The moderate Shi'ite religious leadership as well as the secular public are abhorred, but the way they chose to combat these rumors is by ignoring them. It would seem that the CPA and the IGC adopted the same method. It seems to this author that, once the present wave of armed violence is over, a new media policy should be adopted in Iraq, addressing all these conspiracy theories head-on and presenting them as absurd, offering the true explanation for various unfortunate developments. c. Between Khuruj and Qu'ud (Activism and Quietism) in Shi'i tradition there are two ways to become a respectable, even admired leader. One way is through the usual and well-traveled route of religious scholarly achievements. This is how most ayat allahs have reached prominence. Having published important religious tracts dealing with various aspects of jurisprudence, and sometimes also having published in addition some political writings, one attracts growing numbers of followers who are obliged not only to follow the cleric's advice but also to contribute one-fifth of their income to his treasury. In turn, the cleric is using the funds to expand his socio-economic support system and educational institutions and in this way is returning the money to the community. In the process such an ayat allah is becoming not only powerful but also a subject of admiration and emulation. An integral part of the myth surrounding grand ayat allahs is the belief that they are living a very modest, even ascetic life. In most part this myth is also very close to the truth. Another way of becoming a popular leader is through politics, but always confrontational and risk taking. To this very day the Shi'i community remembers with awe desperate Shi'i revolts against Sunni rulers, most of them ending with disaster. The fate of the third Shi'i Imam, Al Husayn Ibn Ali, who died in a hopeless battle in 680 AD on the plains of Karbala is the best example of this grandstanding. Imam Hussein fought with only 72 supporters against an Umayyad (Sunni) army of 10,000. To this day he is the most beloved and most highly admired of all Imams. Another Shi'i revolutionary, al-Mukhtar al-Thaqafi, started a better-prepared revolt against the Umayyad dynasty later, but he, too, was roundly defeated. Still, he is highly admired and much loved by the Shi'a. Two contemporary examples that illustrate that the admiration for lost causes has not evaporated throughout the ages are those of Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr, Muqtada's great uncle, and Muhammad Sadiq al-Sadr, Muqtada's father. In 1979 Muhammad Baqir, in a message that he sent to his followers while under house arrest in Najaf, cursed Saddam Husayn and the Ba'th in the most extreme language. In April 1980, after he turned down Saddam's demand that he denounce Khomeini, Saddam ordered his execution. In 1998-99 Muhammad Sadiq, for his part, started to attack the Ba'th regime in his Friday mosque sermons. In February 1999 he was assassinated by Saddam's henchmen. Both ayat allahs became great scholars before they started a better he is highly admadmiration 250 Dr. Amatzia Baram adopted a confrontational political line, but public admiration for them became overwhelming only when they decided to become martyrs, and openly attacked the regime. This confrontational posture, often desperate and without real hope of success, is called in Shill terminology “activism," or "coming out," if not with a sword, then at least with the tongue (al- khuruj). The difference, however, between Muqtada and his father is that "coming out" against Saddam guaranteed one's death, while "coming out" against the Coalition guaranteed wide public admiration at least in certain socio-economic circles, but involving very little risk if any. A very different tradition, often opposed to the khuruj is the qu'ud ("quietism," "passivity," or "sitting," or "staying put," or "inaction"). Throughout Sh'i history most Shi'i clerics chose the latter. The reason was simple: "coming out" against the Sunni regimes was always extremely dangerous, and could jeopardize not only the lives of the clergy, but, more importantly, the whole Shi'i community. In Shi'i theology such "inaction" is not only allowed but sometimes is even regarded as a duty in order to secure the very existence of the community. It is allowed under the theological term of taqiyyah (precautionary dissimulation). The believers are allowed to hide their political or religious views and sometimes even to hide their Shi'i identity, if this is unavoidable, in order to survive. While the Sadr cousins chose khuruj and death, most other clerics opted for qu'ud. Among them was the man who is regarded as the most influential marja' (Source of Emulation), Grand Ayat Allah Sistani. d. Sistani, His Style and Influence Under Saddam some Shi'a clergy actually served the regime in return for financial and other rewards. The two Sadrs confronted the regime head-on and were martyred. However, most clerics distanced themselves from politics as much as they could and made every possible effort not to confront the regime so as not to risk their and their community's lives. The latter belonged to what is usually termed as "the quietists" school. Grand Ayat Allah Sistani, the three other grand ayat allahs of Iraq, and a few less senior ayat allahs, all of whom are regarded today as the leadership of the Hawzah (the Shi'i University) of Najaf, adopted a "quietist" approach throughout Ba'th rule. But, "quietism" does not mean detachment from politics under all circumstances. When there is no danger, and when they know that their community expects them to provide political leadership, even quietist clergy are springing into action. The differences between them and the activist political clergy are essentially two: in the first place, usually a quietist clergy is also more moderate than an activist one. A moderate clergy will present more moderate demands in terms of the role of Islam in the state, though he, too, would certainly expect Islam to be a central component in political life. Secondly, a quietist usually tends to speak in vague terms in order to leave room for retreat or for creative compromises. Psychologically speaking, quietists are less inclined toward head on confrontations with the power that be or with their rival clergy, or with their own constituency - even when such a confrontation does not involve real danger. In other words: they are not looking for confrontations, if they can avoid them. However, when the issue is of great importance and/or when the community is demanding it, they will make their position sufficiently clear. This is precisely the way Grand Ayat Allah Sistani has been behaving towards the CPA since the demise of the Ba'th regime. When the American forces entered Najaf he instructed his community not to oppose the coalition forces. Having been criticized for it by Iran and by some Iraqi extremists, he issued a denial. Still, almost everyone understood his position to be that of implied support for the invading forces. His next political announcement rejected any draft for permanent 251 Dr. Amatzia Baram constitution unless it was composed by a constituent assembly elected through general elections. When in November 2003 the CPA and the IGC agreed on a caucus system to push forward the political process he again objected very clearly and demanded general elections again. His main objection to the caucus system seems to have resulted from the fact that he believed that it reserved too much control for the CPA and the IGC. When the IGC came up with an agreed text of a provisional constitution, following discussions with Shi'i members of the IGC, he allowed them to sign the text, but still voiced his objection. This is the moment when a deep crisis set in, a little later to become also a military standoff between Sistani's arch rival, the young Muqtada Sadr, and the Coalition forces. e. Sistani's Reach and Actual Influence Without a doubt, Sistani is the most revered Shi'i cleric in Iraq. Even though he was born in Mashhad, Iran (1930) and does not have Iraqi citizenship, he is nevertheless admired and followed by millions of Shi'ites also in Iran and other places. In every small village on the lower Tigris and lower Euphrates and in every farming town, let alone in large cities like Basra, Najaf and Karbala, almost every person knows of Sistani, and if that person is traditional, let alone very religious, accepts his authority. But this is not the full picture. Many people in the villages and Shi'i towns also support various political Shi'i religious factions. It is - quite common to come across a member of the Iraqi Hizballah in Amara, whose leader is an IGC member (now suspended), Abd al-Karim Mahud Muhammadawi, who will follow his · Chief's commands through thick and thin, but who also will readily define himself as a follower of Sistani. This, despite the fact that the chief, Muahammadawi, defines himself as a "follower" (Muqallid) of a rival Grand Ayat Allah, the Qomm based Kazim Ha'iri. In Basra or in Nasiriyya it is very common to come across militia men who belong to the Da'wa party, or to the Supreme Council of the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI) or even to the Mahdi Army under Muqtada Sadr, Sistani's arch-enemy, but who would also say that he is a follower of Sistani's. In many small places, where there are no organized religious militias or parties people would just say that they are Sistani's followers. Which means that more than a ** political leader, Sistani is a spiritual guide. As long as there is a clear contradiction between Sistani's instructions and those of the leader of a militia, the leader and his militia will be fairly isolated, and the members will have .. a certain difficulty in reconciling their general support for Sistani with their actual support for their leader. This was the case with the Mahdi Army under Muqtada until Sistani expressed his determined rejection of the draft provisional constitution. This is also the explanation for the relative isolation of Muqtada himself and his close supporters. Other militias and religious parties toed Sistani's line and tacitly or explicitly endorsed cooperation with the Coalition and the IGC. Indeed, some leaders who had their own militias, like SCIRI's Abd al-Aziz Hakim, who commanded the Badr Brigade, Dr. Ibrahim Ja'fari, a leader of the Da'wa, and Muhammadawi, Commander of the Iraqi Hizballah, even joined the IGC. Furthermore,many Shi'l men felt uneasy when they were criticized by the Sunni-Arab media for their passivity and collaboration with the US. Sistani served as their alibi. They used to declare that the minute he orders them to battle they would immediately start killing . Americans. But not until then. The situation changed dramatically the moment the breach between the CPA and the IGC on the one hand, and Sistani on the other, over the provisional constitution became unbridgeable. All of a sudden, Muqtada Sadr and his Mahdi Army were out of their isolation, while the other parties and militias came under siege. Muqtada could, and did present 252 Dr. Amatzia Baram himself from now on as the only one in Iraq who is fighting to implement Sistani's instructions. In his own words, he declared: "I am al-Sistani's striking arm". (FBIS, April 6, 2004) He attacked the IGC as base collaborators with the Christian infidels against the explicit instructions of the great Marja'(a "supreme source of emulation”). It is true that Sistani remained faithful to his tradition when he balanced his rejection of the provisional constitution by simultaneously instructing people not to demonstrate against it and to allow changes to be introduced through negotiations. However, Muqtada and his supporters ignored that part, and Sistani never criticized him explicitly for having done so. Following the closure of Muqtada's magazine, al-Hawzah al-Natiqah (The Outspoken Hawzah), Muqtada called on his supporters to stage massive demonstrations in front of the Green Zone. Very quickly what started as peaceful demonstrations turned to violence. Violence further escalated when the authorities arrested Muqtada's aide Ya'qubi and announced their intention to arrest Muqtada himself, charging them with responsibility for the murder of Ayat Allah Abd al-Majid Kho'i. Kho'i was a moderate clergy who supported the American liberation of Iraq and who came from London with the US forces. He was murdered in April, a few days after Najaf was liberated. A large number of armed clashes occurred in various parts of the Shi'i south between the Coalition forces and the Mahdi Army. In addition, the Marines were engaged in fierce battle in the Sunni-Arab town of Faluja west of Baghdad. Sistani's reaction was again typical. On the one hand he denounced the coalition forces explicitly. In his Fatwa he announced: "We condemn the methods used by the occupation forces in dealing with the incidents that are taking place". On the other hand he also denounced Muqtada and the Mahdi army, although he carefully refrained from mentioning them explicitly: "We also condemn attacks on public and private property and anything that may lead to disturbing the system and preventing the Iraqi officials from carrying out their duties in the service of the people". Furthermore, he criticized emphatically the armed struggle upon which Muqtada's Mahdi army embarked: "We call for matters to be treated with wisdom and through peaceful means, and refrainment from any escalatory step that may cause further chaos and bloodshed". But here, again, Sistani refrained from directing his call explicitly to Muqtada and his troops. The Grand Ayat Allah even recommended that the moderate political parties and leaders would engage in attempts to put an end to the confrontation (Foreign Broadcasts Intelligence Survey (FBIS), April 13, 2004), but his call was completely lost on the public. What the public understood was that Sistani rejected the provisional constitution and that he strongly protested the coalition's methods. Now, again, Muqtada presented himself as carrying out Sistani's instructions, and no protest was heard from Sistani's side. The last contribution Sistani made towards total confusion was when he warned the US against entering the holy city of Najaf. He used his contacts with members of the IGC to warn the Americans that Najaf was "a red line”. (FBIS, April 15, 2004.) This came at a time when the Coalition deployed more than 2,500 US and Spanish soldiers around Najaf. By stubbornly refusing requests on the part of members of the IGC to demand that Muqtada to leave town, or even to dismantle his Mahdi Army, and give himself up to the government authorities, Sistani created an impasse. Why? Sistani knows only too well that Muqtada tried to murder him in April 2003. Following the murder of Kho'i, Muqtada's thugs moved to surround Sistani's home, threatening to kill him if he didn't leave Iraq. Luckily, tribesmen loyal to Sistani were quickly summoned and chased them away. Sistani must also suspect that Muqtada was also involved in the murder of Kho'i as well as the assassination of Muhammad Baqir al-Hakim, and that he could have been involved in a later attempt on Sistani's own life that nearly succeeded. There may be no doubt at all that Sistani regards Muqtada as the most dangerous man in Iraq, but in addition 253 Dr. Amatzia Baram to his aversion to confrontations Sistani is also under tremendous pressures from within and without Iraq to avoid a confrontation. Muqtada's spiritual authority, Grand Ayat Allah Kazim Ha'iri in Qomm, and his close associate, the Iranian Supreme Leader (rahbar) Ayat Allah Ali Khamene'i, and many other ultra radicals at the top of the Iranian regime, are supportive of Muqtada. They have many subtle ways of delivering the message to Sistani "you cannot confront Muqtada”. Sistani, for his part, is far from being a docile follower of the Iranian leadership. In fact, he has opposed Khomeini's theory of the "rule of the jurist.” He does not want to see clerical rule (as different from general Islamic influence) in Iraq. He is a political rival of Khamene'l and his radical elite, and an ally of President Khataini and his moderate age supporters. However, he is not immune to Iranian pressures. In addition, more than a formulator of public opinion, Sistani is its expression. Before he issues a political Fatwa he carefully gauges public opinion in Iraq so as always to remain more or less in the middle. Sistani realizes now that public opinion among the Iraqi Shi'ah is shifting gradually towards Muqtada. Coming head on against it is something he has never done before. Will he do it now? Most likely not, even if his own life is under an immediate threat, which is probably the case now, in late April 2004. Issuing a highly controversial Fatwa is as far from his track record as clashing head on with the power that be. Sistani, however, may change his mind and issue such a daring and controversial Fatwa only if the City of Najaf and the very existence of the Shi'i community in Iraq will otherwise be under a credible threat. If he knows that a battle between the coalition forces and Muqtada's Mahdi Army is about to destroy Najaf, annihilate many of its citizens and destroy the great shrine of Imam Ali, then he might change his mind and face the slings and arrows of an enraged mob. But it is very doubtful that he will reach the conclusion that such destruction is forthcoming. f. Who is Muqtada Sadr? According to his own official biography (usually such biographies appear only post- humously or when they relate to a Marja) Muqtada was born in 1974 in Najaf. His detractors insist that he was born at least two, possibly five or six years later. That he is a scion of an ancient Arab scholarly Najaf and Lebanon based family is well known and agreed by all. According to his official biography his father married his first cousin, a widespread tradition in the Middle East. Muqtada himself married a cousin in 1993. He was the youngest of four brothers. In 1988, when he was 14 years old, he started his religious studies in the Hawzah (Religious School and University) of Najaf. His official biography claims that he was an outstanding student and that at a very early age, when his father was still alive (apparently in the mid-1990s) he assumed highly prestigious and important positions upon his father's insistence. For example, when he was still in his early twenties he became the Head of Madrasat al-Imam al-Mahdi and other sublime institutions. After his father was assassinated in February 1999 Muqtada was bequeathed the responsibility for all of his father's institutions and he developed them much further (http://mugtada.com/txt/muqtada/muqtada life.htm, April 14, 2004). Whatever the truth behind this biography, Muqtada has not published any meaningful study. As a rule, when they turn 30 or even in their late twenties, brilliant Hawzah students have already published at least one important dissertation. Nor does Muqtada's spoken language impress people: he speaks very simple colloquial Arabic, the street language of the low classes. He can certainly read well, but when he is reciting the Qur'an or the Tradition, he does it in a way that is less than impressive, even though he rarely makes mistakes. Still, the anger in his voice and his threatening fiery glances, may be regarded as charismatic. His 254 Dr. Amatzia Baram followers have recently elevated him to the very senior rank of hujjat al-Islam (a sign of Islam, or a Proof of islam, being the third rank from the top in the Shi'i clerical hierarchy). This promotion is clearly political because he has no publication record to show for it. Muqtada's rhetoric is extreme. He is using the same clichés against the West and the Jews that Saddam Husayn was using, and with the same sense of total conviction and of his own total innocence and dedication to Islam. Much like Saddam, but more convincingly, he is also building for himself an image of a Muslim reformist, one who came to purify Islam. His followers are calling him "Son of the Mahdi." It is not a coincidence that he chose for his militia's name the title, “The Mahdi Army." The idea is to connect himself with messianic expectations running high now in Shi'i Iraq. Like Saddam, he is a shrewd tactician. Both men started their ascent to the top in their late twenties, by building a loyal militia and a state within a state. Once Saddam reached power he destroyed all other social and political cells. Muqtada may be expected to do the same. Both men are ruthless, and power hungry in the extreme. Both are using ideology through which they indoctrinate their faithful and fortify their loyalty. In both cases the private militias were based on the lowest socio-economic stratum of society. Saddam based his himayah on poor, uneducated village boys. Muqtada is basing his Army on the poorest element in Saddam City (now Sadr City), the poverty-stricken Shi'i neighborhood in Northeast Baghdad. In both cases these are young men in their late teens and in their twenties, craving to belong to something greater than themselves, and to some kind of a tightly-knit social group, a gang. They are poor, with little education, and no hope for upward social mobility except through the gang. Both Saddam and Muqtada promised them that they would inherit the earth. Saddam managed to keep his promise, Muqtada is trying now. But Muqtada has one advantage over the young and secular Saddam: to those of them who will die in the struggle he is promising heaven, and they seem to believe him. ar hand, leaving host forbid them to an option, too, is the g. Can Muqtada be Stopped? Dammed if you do and dammed if you don't! Militarily speaking, Muqtada can be stopped very easily, but with more and more Shi'is joining his militia and the majority sitting on the fence this is a risky decision. This is doubly so because he is holed up in the holy city of Najaf, in his office, a hundred yards or so from Imam Ali's great shrine, Devastating Najaf could turn the majority of the Shi'a in Iraq, who are so far not supportive of him, against the coalition. Furthermore, if such an attack comes before Faluja is pacified, Sunni-Shi'i cooperation against the Coalition is assured, at least in so far as the radicals on both sides are concerned. On the other hand, leaving him in control of Najaf indefinitely, giving up the demand that he dismantle his militia or at least forbid them to carry arms in the street, and give himself up to be tried for the murder of Ayat Allah Kho'i, such an option, too, is extremely dangerous. It will further strengthen him, more people will support him, Sistani and the Hawzah will be further cowed, and one can expect Iraq to enter a chaotic period. Part of it will be higher coalition losses, because many more Shi'ites will resort to arms. What can be done then? What seems to this author to be the best course to be navigated in this dangerously turbulent situation is to first make every effort to pacify Faluja. If an arrangement can be achieved that all the heavy weapons would be delivered to Coalition hands, that the city elders will commit themselves to deliver those who murdered the four Americans and those who desecrated their bodies, and that coalition forces can go through town with impunity when necessary, the town can be pacified and the local police can take over. Under such circumstances there will be no need for US Marine presence in the center of town. Either through a compromise or through military action, the Faluja crisis must be 255 Dr. Amatzia Baram 10 resolved first. When only Najaf is left to deal with the Coalition should empower the IGC to reach a settlement with Muqtada and to do their best to convince Sistani to get more involved. In the IGC there are a few Shi'i politicians who are still quite popular: Dr. Ibrahim Ja'fari of the Da'wa, Ayat Allah Hakim of SCIRI and Muwaffaq Baqir al-Rubay'i, an independent with good contacts in the heart of the Shi'i south (Samawa, Shatra and environs). All three are also on good terms with Sistani. Psy-ops initiatives can help, and are highly recommended. Almost any compromise that the GC can arrive at could be acceptable to the Coalition. After all, the politicians of the GC will have to live in the Irag that they are creating now. If the compromise that they reach is too soft on Muqtada, they know as well as the Coalition does that this could be detrimental to their personal health. They know that Muqtada is ruthless and single minded enough to assassinate them all when in power, or even beforehand. Sistani knows that too. A compromise over the arrest warrant connected to the murder of Ayat Allah Kho'i is possible.. The Kho'i family itself agreed to postpone the trial "until the situation in Iraq returns to normal and an Iraqi authority assumes power in the country." (FBIS, April 12, 2004) The CPA and IGC need not be more Catholic than the Pope. If all fails, then a precision military operation that will avoid killing Muqtada may be the only way to resolve the standoff, but at least the GC will be the body that will request such an operation. In all this, Sistani's support is so valuable that it may be useful to offer him concessions on other fronts. After all, the United Nation's Lakhdar Brahimi is about to promote a solution to the whole question of the provisional government and the principles that will guide its activities. In Iraq, almost everything is connected, and here, too, Sistani's support is crucial. Until now the CPA hoped that Sistani would confront Muqtada, and Sistani was waiting for the CPA to do the same. This seems to be the time when both will have to do it: not together (Sistani cannot afford to be seen working with the US), but at the same time. tion to other from this, Sisilandoff 256 Iraqi Polls Bring Secular Success By Jonathan Steele April 5, 2004 The Guardian (London) Herded into lines by inexperienced police officers, hundreds of would-be Iraqi voters pushed into a sparsely equipped school at the weekend to cast their ballots for the local council of Tar, Deep in the marshlands of the Euphrates, the town of 15,000 people was the first to rise against Saddam Hussein in the abortive intifada of 1991. Now it was holding the first genuine election in its history. The poll was the latest in a series which this overwhelmingly Shia province has held in the past six weeks, and the results have been surprising, Seventeen towns have voted, and in almost every case secular independents and representatives of non- religious parties did better than the Islamists. This week sees the biggest event in the Shia calendar, the annual pilgrimage to the holy cities of Kerbala and Najaf, and thousands of people were making the 10-day walk along the main road west through Nassiriya and its surrounding province of Dhi Qar. But in the march to the polling booths the secular democrats were showing the greater strength. "This is a free election," said Jawad Khadum, a teacher in Tar. "We want more of them, for example in our teachers' union and for the mayor." Like many professionals, he was worried by the way some religious parties had been throwing their weight around, trying to close shops which sell alcohol and pressing every woman to wear a veil. He saw the vote as a chance to stop this, he said. The results will have delighted him. Neither of the two Islamist candidates was among the 10 elected. A woman teacher got in, the first female councillor in the province. Other winners included an agricultural engineer and three businessmen. In Shatra, a town of 250,000, the Communist party won four seats and independents seven. Partly because of their popularity for stopping the looting which followed the overthrow of the old regime, the Islamists had a majority in the former council which was appointed last summer. After the election they were cut back to four seats out of 15. "It was not a surprise," said Jalil Abed Jafar, a doctor, in the Communist party's upstairs offices along the waterfront. Shatra is where the party was founded 70 years ago, and the offices were still full of posters celebrating that event, along with photographs of dozens of members executed by the former regime. No other province has held as many elections as Dhi Qar. They have been organised largely by Tobin Bradley, an Arabic-speaking US state department official attached to the occupation authority in Nassiriya. Although the American government insisted that national elections could not be held in Iraq before the transfer of sovereignty on June 30, in Dhi Qar they went ahead using the ration card system - a method which could have been used nationally, according to many 257 Iraqis. The system of cheap basic rations still operates, and every Iraqi family received new cards this year, listing address and family size. In the Dhi Qar elections the card allowed a husband and wife to vote if they also brought their identity documents. The ration card was stamped in red or blue for each gender, making it possible for a wife to come earlier or later than her husband. "It's not universal suffrage," said Mr Bradley, as he watched local judges check voters' identities inside the school entrance in Tar. "The polling places are only in the town centre. Some families are larger than others and they all get two votes. But it's free and fair to a certain degree." Direct elections are not being held for the provincial council, but Mr Bradley has organised partial contests. A certain number of seats is set aside for various groups, which then elect people to fill them. The province has 22 Islamic parties, which will get six seats. The 15 secular parties get four. Seats are reserved for women, professional associations and trade unions. Seven seats are for 54 tribal leaders. The "refreshed council", as it is called, is claimed to be more democratic than the one appointed by the occupation authorities. "We chose people not very transparently before," Mr Bradley said. "This time we said, 'you provide the names'." The change cannot come soon enough, in the view of Sheikh Sabri Hamid al-Rumidh, Dhi Qar's governor, who has been battling to control the religious parties, particularly the half-dozen which have militias. Like the voters in the province's unprecedented elections, Mr Rumidh hopes the tide which flowed in favour of the religious parties in 2003 has begun to turn. 258 Under Secretary of State Marc Grossman House Armed Services Committee April 21, 2004 _ Representative Langevin Question: Provide a copy of Special Envoy Brahimi's statement of April 14, which includes detailed information regarding his consultations on and plans for developing an Iraqi Interim Government and the corresponding June 30 transition. Answer: We provide the following transcript of Mr. Brahimi's press conference in Baghdad on April 14. Copyright 2004 The Federal News Service, Inc. Federal News Service April 14, 2004 Wednesday HEADLINE: COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY BRIEFING WITH UNITED NATIONS SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE LAKHDAR BRAHIMI AND MASSOUD BARZANI, PRESIDENT, IRAQI GOVERNING COUNCIL LOCATION: BAGHDAD, IRAQ BODY: MODERATOR: Good evening, everybody. Thanks very much for coming. We know how difficult it is to move around Baghdad, so we appreciate it all the more that you're here. As you know by now, this press conference is a joint press 259 conference between the United Nations special advisor to the secretary general, Lakhdar Brahimi, and the president of the Governing Council, His Excellency Massoud Barzani. I will be handing over the reins of this affair to my friend from the Governing Council, the spokesman for the Governing Council, in a minute. But I just wanted to underline some of the ground rules. We have agree that this would be a 45-minute press conference. It may run over for a minute or two. We have simultaneous interpretation into Arabic. (Speaks Arabic.) I would also like to say that Mr. Brahimi will have an opening statement, and the president of the council will also have an opening statement. Mr. Brahimi's statement will be in English. He'll say a few words in Arabic at the beginning, but his statement will be in English, and it will be available as an English text and an Arabic text at the end of the press conference. (Speaks Arabic.) As usual, would you please identify yourself? And please do it slowly and clearly, because we're taping the press conference, and when we come to transcribe, sometimes we can't hear your names and your affiliations very clearly. So I would appreciate it if you could do it slowly and clearly. One last thing. Because time is so tight, when we finish the press conference, would you be kind enough to remain seated until both President Barzani and Mr. Brahimi leave the room? Thank you very much. MR.: (Through interpreter.) This press conference will continue for 45 minutes to perhaps an hour, until they answer all the questions in Arabic or English, because there is an interpreting service provided here. While we are awaiting Mr. Barzani and Mr. Brahimi. We prefer that there is one question for every journalist, because there are so many of you over here, and I believe that we cannot answer probably all the questions. We'll start with a word by Mr. Massoud Barzani, the president of the council. MR. BARZANI: (Through interpreter) In the name of God, the most merciful, the most compassionate, dear brothers and sisters, good afternoon. I would like to thank the secretary general for fulfilling our invitation and our request, the request of the Governing Council, by sending the special 260 representative. We have among us today Brother Lakhdar Brahimi, a dear friend of ours. And for the few last days he spent with us, he engaged in many consultations with varied sections, and he exerted efforts that we thank him for. And I believe that he reached results, good results in his consultations with all the parties. And undoubtedly the United Nations will have an effective and important role, and we will need the technical assistance from the United Nations now and in the future. I am going to allow Mr. Brahimi to address you and to present to you the results that he reached, and the remarks that he would like to express. And thank you very much. MR. BRAHIML (Through interpreter.) In the name of Allah, may peace be upon you. I shall speak in English, but I think those who are not speaking in English could understand through the interpretation. But in terms of the questions, we will answer both in English and in Arabic, and even in Indonesian if you like. (Without interpreter.) It's a real pleasure for me to be standing here before you with His Excellency Massoud Barzani, the president of the Governing Council and a very old-time friend. This visit of our team is taking place in particularly difficult security conditions. I would like to renew here the expression of my deep sorrow for the loss of life and the destruction that has befallen Fallujah, parts of Baghdad and other places up and down the country. The secretary general has expressed his anxiety and spoken to the U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell. We are hopeful that the cease-fire decreed in Fallujah and the talks engaged both in Fallujah and in the south will lead to peaceful resolutions. Because of the security situation then, our movements have been somewhat restricted. But we did manage to meet a large number of people representing various constituencies, including members of the Governing Council, starting with its president of course, ministers, political parties, trade unions, professional associations and other civil society organizations, women's groups, academics, intellectuals and artists. We were planning to visit a number of cities, but we were able to go only to Mosul, and we also hope to visit Basra during this trip. I will then be going to New York to brief the secretary general and seek his guidance on the way forward. I also expect to meet the president and 261 members of the Security Council. My recommendations to the secretary general will be finalized only after our return to Iraq and after we conduct more consultations with more people in Baghdad and elsewhere in the country. I can, however, share with you a few thoughts, a few preliminary observations, and a few still tentative ideas we are discussing. One, we believe that the present security situation makes it more important and more urgent for the political process to continue. And we expect all stakeholders to redouble their efforts to ensure that this process is successfully completed. Two, let me emphasize that in these political processes in Iraq, the elections scheduled to take place in January 2005 are the most important milestone. There is no doubt that there is no substitute for the legitimacy that comes from free and fair elections. Therefore, Iraq will have a genuinely representative government only after January 2005. Three, what the aim should be at present is to put in place a caretaker government that will be in charge from the first of July 2004 until those elections in January 2005. We are confident that it will be possible to form such a government in a timely manner; that is, during the month of May of 2004. We see it as a government led by a prime minister and comprising Iraqi men and women known for their honesty, integrity and competence. There will also be a president to act as head of state and two vice presidents. Four, according to both the 15th of November 2003 agreement and the transitional administration law, the Governing Council, along with the CPA, will cease to exist on the 30th of June 2004. Some of its members are already assuming other responsibilities. Other members will no doubt be called upon to participate in various state institutions. Five, during our consultations, a very large number of our interlocutors suggested that a large national conference should be convened. We se e merit in this suggestion. It would serve the all important aim of promoting national dialogue, consensus-building and national reconciliation in Iraq. A preparatory committee should be established soon to start the preparatory work, and the conference could take place soon after the restoration of sovereignty, say in July 2004. The national conference would elect the consultative assembly to serve alongside the government during the period leading to the election of the national assembly, which it is agreed, as we said earlier, will take place in 262 January 2005. Seven, to return to the subject of elections, a U.N. electoral team has been in Baghdad for some time now. They are working diligently to help with the preparatory work for the January 2005 elections. They have visited some cities in the north and in the south. Like us, their movements are somewhat restricted at present by the prevailing security situation. But they remain confident that they can help us. But it is important and urgent that on the Iraqi side the necessary steps are taken so that elections can take place at the appointed time in January 2005. Naturally, the security situation has to improve significantly for these elections to take place in an acceptable environment. Eight, last but not least, during our consultations in February, as well as at present, we heard of many grievances which need to be addressed. Detainees are held often without charge or trial. They should be either charged or released. And their families and lawyers must have access to them. The issue of the former military personnel also needs attention. Furthermore, it is difficult to understand that thousands upon thousands of teachers, university professors, medical doctors and hospital staffs, engineers and other professionals who are sorely needed in the country have been dismissed within the de- Ba'athification process, and far too many of those cases have yet to be reviewed. All these are ideas which will be submitted to the secretary general and further discussed, both during the wide consultations scheduled to be organized by the committee set up for this purpose by the Governing Council, and by our team. I believe that the political framework that I have outlined for the setting up of the interim government, the organization of the national dialogue conference, combined with a number of confidence- building measures addressing real concerns of the Iraqis should, I hope, help this country move forward towards recovery, peace and stability. Thank you very much indeed. MODERATOR: (Through interpreter.) Thank you, Mr. Ambassador Lakhdar Brahimi. And now we open the floor to questions. And you can ask either President Massoud al-Barzani or the U.N. special envoy. And you can use either Arabic or English -- or Kurdish, if we have a Kurdish translator we can take questions in Kurdish. (Without interpretation.) If you could identify yourself, please. f 263 • I just did. David Rice (ph), ABC News. The June 30th date is being discussed as a handover in sovereignty, and I wonder, what does the word "sovereignty" mean to your ears in the context of Iraq. And will this interim government have a veto over U.S. military operations such as are taking place now in Fallujah? MR. BRAHIMI: This is much too legalistic a question. I think "sovereignty" means for me the end of legal occupation. There will be a government that will be sovereign, that will exercise this sovereignty. Of course realities will have to be addressed. Sovereignty will be handed over, but the 150,000 soldiers that are here are not going to disappear on the 1st of July. • But to what extent will it be a handover of power, is what I'm asking. MR. BRAHIMI: I beg your pardon? ,: To what extent will it be a handover of power, or will it merely be a handover of some symbolism? MR. BRAHIMI: I think they will hand over power, since the CPA will be dissolved and Mr. Bremer will be gone. MODERATOR: Jane? • Thank you. Jane Arraf, CNN. Ambassador Brahimi, regarding the violence in Fallujah and the potential for violence in Najaf, I'm wondering if there are any measures you feel would be helpful in Fallujah? And in Najaf whether you've heard anything in the last couple of days that would make you optimistic there could be a political settlement there. MR. BRAHIMI: When you do the kind of work I do, you have got to be optimistic all the time. But I think I will -- this question can best be addressed by the president. MR. BARZANI: I think in Fallujah I understand that there are some negotiations taking place between the Americans and representatives of the people of Fallujah. This is something we welcome very, very much, and we hope that it will continue. 264 We hope that access to the hospitals will become open immediately, and that whatever needs are there -- there are a lot of people who want to send aid to the people of Fallujah. I think that should be helped to get there. In the south, I know that there are contacts. I know that discussions are taking place. There again it is imperative that a political solution is found. (Exchange in Arabic.) MR. BRAHIMI (?): (Through interpreter): There's consultation between the CPA and the IGC. Sometimes we have some disagreements, and that's what happened lately. Q Mr. Brahimi, Rajiv Chandrasekaran from the Washington Post. Could you elaborate a little bit more on the structure of the executive that you see taking over after June 30th? You said there would be a prime minister, a president and two vice presidents. A little bit more about the size of this -- and do you see this as sort of an expanded Governing Council or an entirely different entity? And the consultative body that would take shape after this large assembly or loya jirga type meeting, would that have any sort of a veto power or check-and-balance power over the executive? And also, were you able to meet with any representative of Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani? And the inability to travel to Najaf, how did that affect your work here? Thank you. MR. BRAHIMI: This is enough questions for a long conference, which I am not going to deliver. You know, as I said, this is a sketch. I am absolutely confident that most Iraqi people want a simple formula for this interim period of just six or seven months. They want a government of competent, honest and independent people as far as possible. They want them led by a prime minister who can really preside over the work of the government. And there are a lot of people in Iraq that can answer to these qualifications. You need a head of state, and I think realities here are such that the head of state should have also with him two vice presidents. The assembly that will -- the national conference that we are suggesting is 265 again -- I think I rarely met a group of people without two thirds of them saying that this is the way to go. I think this is indispensable in a country where for 30 years people, were afraid to talk in front of their children, that they get together -- you know, people from the south meet people from the north, east, west. I think that in itself will achieve a lot for the good of Iraq. And there you are going to have a consultative assembly. You don't need the legislative assembly for such a short period. And you are going to use this also to identify people that are going to participate in the preparation of elections. It is really a multi-purpose exercise. I think you had about five other questions. Perhaps we could leave them to later on. • (Through interpreter.) Ibrahim Hariri (ph). I would like to read a paragraph from the Daily Telegraph. The paragraph says: (In English.) "Senior British commanders have condemned American military tactics in Iraq as heavy-handed and disproportionate. One senior officer said that America's aggressive methods were causing friction among allied commanders and that there was a growing sense of unease and frustration among the British high commanders. The officer, speaking on condition of anonymity, said part of the problem -- okay? -- was that American troops viewed Iraqis as untermenschen." MR. BRAHIMI: As what? · "Untermenschen -- the Nazi expression of sub-humans." Okay. This is a British commander. (Through translator.) This is a question for both Lakhdar Brahimi and Mr. Massoud Barzani: Do you believe that this is the reality? And if that is the reality, what are the measures that you are going to be taking to stop what's happening? And, Lakhdar Brahimi, is this agreeable to the Conventions of Geneva that manage the relations between the occupants and the occupied? MR. BRAHIMI (Through interpreter.): The general has said in at least two statements that it is necessary under the current circumstances, an indication of what's happening to respect these conventions. But what a British officer -- I cannot comment on that -- you can ask a British. But I believe that what we have heard in Iraq from everybody, and from lots of 266 Americans themselves, that there is no military solution to the problems and that the use of force, especially of excessive use of force, makes matters worse and do not solve the problems. That is why the secretary general and lots of people have asked for the use or to resort to politics, to dialogue. And as I said earlier in my statement, we are looking forward that these discussions that are taking place in Fallujah will continue, and the situation in the south would be dealt with peacefully. MR. BARZANI (Through interpreter.): I do not know to what level one can be certain of the truth of such a statement by a British officer. But the picture must be clear that those terrorists who are coming in to obstruct the march of the Iraqis towards democracy, we do not want to use force against innocent civilians, and no one should look at Iraqis as if Iraqis do not deserve respect. We do not accept this from any state or any person dealing with this. • (Through interpreter.) Mr. Lakhdar Brahimi, there are some necessary measures that need to be taken on the Iraqi side to organize the elections. The simplest thing is to have a series of laws that need to be enacted so we can organize elections, elections law and other laws -- a national committee, presided by a judge for example, a known judge that's respected throughout the country, to supervise the operation of the election. We need a legal framework and then we have to have committees in each one of the governorates, and even in every village so that we can hold these elections. MR. BRAHIMI (?) (Through interpreter.): It is very easy to enact laws on the part of the forces present now. I do not think that Iraqis are not going to object to those laws. All of this need to be done before the June 30th date if you want elections to be held in January 2005. • (Through interpreter.) BBC Arabic. First question to Lakhdar Brahimi. You spoke about your frustration about the situation in Iraq, and then there are statements that the U.N. will not be sending any other delegations because of the security situation. The question is to Mr. Brahimi. The Iraqi citizen and the Arab citizen and all citizens of the world, they ask you, What is your role? What have you done for a whole year since the occupation of Iraq? What have you presented? We, as journalists, we are required to provide answers for the people. Provide us with some clarity as to what you have done. 267 The second question is to Mr. Massoud Barzani. There is talk and rumors that the coalition forces will not transfer authority and sovereignty to the Iraqis, and there are some people from the Pentagon and the White House have stated so, and others are saying that it will be delayed for a couple of months. MR. BRAHIMI (through interpreter): The U.N. have not done greatly, but I have to remind you of several number of markers during last August. The U.N. comes to every place in such conditions as a result of decisions and resolutions taken by the Security Council. The Security Council has issued one resolution that defined one limited role for the U.N. Now there is a request, a definite request from the Governing Council and from the occupation forces, and we have responded very much to come to help on the organization and to help in the establishment of a new government. Right now there is a requirement to define the role of the U.N. after sovereignty in consultation with the government of Iraq. We speak always about the security situation as an obstacle. It is -- of course it is an obstacle, and this is not a lie and exaggeration. I have stated, said to everyone, that this is a very difficult situation. We have presented markers. We spoke always that the U.N. has -- there was no other entity that considered the U.N. a target. In Lebanon nobody said that I will kill representatives of the U.N. In Lebanon there was random killing, and we accepted it. But here, I hear people saying, "If I see someone from the U.N., I will kill them." What would we do to that? What should we say? That there should be a minimum level of security so that we can achieve our mission. The people who are coming over here to help, those who will come to help in the elections, what will they do if they are locked up within the green zone and other areas? They have to go out. They have to go to hospitals to visit, to election boards to -- I don't know how long they will stay. I think there will be over 30 types of proposals. If the U.N. is to play its role properly, it should go and visit each one of those places -- or at least thousands of people. No, this is as if you are ignorant of what is happening in the country, This is just an explanation as to what is happening. MR. BARZANI: (Not translated.) Q (Through interpreter.) Sami Hassan (ph), El Ahalam (ph) satellite 268 station. I have two questions, one for Lakhdar Brahimi and one for the president of the IGC. Mr. Brahimi, do you deal with the interim government that will take over on the 30th of June as a legitimate representative government of the Iraqi people? The question for President Barzani: Would the sovereignty be complete on the 30th of June, or will it be lacking some because Powell has said that sovereignty is not going to be a complete sovereignty, and he has already -- Bremer has already started appointing some people, like the security national advisor? MR. BRAHIMI (Through interpreter): For sure the United Nations is going to engage and deal with the interim government that will, God willing, be formed after the 30th of June as a legitimate government of this country. MR. BARZANI (through interpreter): We hope that the sovereignty will not be incomplete. That doesn't mean that on the 30th of June, all -- that doesn't mean that all the forces will leave Iraq for sure. We're going to have agreements between the interim government, agreements to define the relationship between the interim government and the coalition. Mr. Bremer is the civilian administrator, according to the U.N. security decision 1483. And, as you know, Mr. Bremer, before he appointed the national security advisor, he talked to me, and he consulted with many other members of the Governing Council. So that was not the way as if the ambassador ignores completely the Governing Council. And we have people in the members that would not take it from Bremer or anybody else to be dealt with like that. MR. BRAHIMI: We won't be able to answer all the question. The lady here. • Dr. Brahimi, I'm Carol Rosenberg with the Miami Herald. You said the security situation would have to improve considerably for there to be able to be elections. Has there been any point since August, or even before 269 then, that the security situation was acceptable? I guess my question is: What is the bare minimum, sir? MR. BRAHIMI: And again the short answer is that I don't know. Definitely with the security situation that is prevailing -- that has been prevailing for the last few days -- I don't think you will find anybody who would tell you that elections can be held in such an atmosphere. But I think that there were moments when you had security. And it is hoped that once sovereignty is restored, if, as I hope will be the case, you will have a government that will enjoy the respect of the people of Iraq, and their support, if the conference I am talking about is carefully selected to be truly representative of the people of Iraq and that they all get together here, I think that will go a long way towards helping create the situation that will be conducive to organizing reasonably fair and fair elections. • (Through interpreter.) Zamin (ph) International. Peace be upon you. Mr. Lakdhar Brahimi, we have a question. You have said that the date of the 30th of June is going to be respected for the transfer of powers. Is there going to be any resolutions coming from the United Nations? Can you promise to the people of Iraq that such a decision is going to be taken? MR. BRAHIMI (Through interpreter): The resolutions come from the Security Council. The Security Council is made of 15 independent countries. These countries are going to decide if they will make a resolution. What I can say now -- and this is a personal opinion -- my . personal opinion, yes, I believe -- I'm almost sure that the Security Council will issue a resolution that would bless the end of the occupation and a transfer of power and restoration of sovereignty to the people of Iraq, and will hope all the best to the people of Iraq. But, as I said, I am not going to take that resolution. • Jonathan Steele from the Guardian. Mr. Brahimi, you've - MR. BRAHIMI: Where are you sitting? • Here. 270 MR. BRAHIMI: Ah, yes. • You've criticized the detention of people without charge or trial. Do you think that if there is a sovereign government of Iraq on July the 1st, they should take custody of these people out of the hands of the United States? And may I also ask, Mr. Barzani, Mr. Brahimi has suggested that the Governing Council cease its activity and existence by June the 30th. Do you and the rest of the Governing Council agree with your death on that day? MR. BRAHIMI: You know, what I said is that this -- I mean, this problem should be resolved now. You know, the first of July is three long months -- almost three long months away. So I think what I am saying is that this should be addressed now, not after the first of July. What happens, you know, how the Iraqi government and what will be then the former occupying powers, organize their relations is not up to me to say. MR. BARZANI (through interpreter): If you were thinking that our lives began as the start of the establishment of the Governing Council, I think you're wrong. Our lives began before and will continue before (sic) that. • (Through interpreter.) This is Beder (ph) from Ashur (ph) Television, an Iraqi television station. Mr. Lakhdar Brahimi, this government that the authority will be transferred to, was it elected, and who will be members of this government? Will there be people from the coalition, or is it going to be an Iraqi government? And what's the role of the U.N. in that? MR. BRAHIMI (through interpreter): Of course it's going to be first an Iraqi government, a hundred percent, and the role of the U.N. is just like what the Governing Council requested, is to help. That's why we have conducted such communications in consultation with the Governing Council and also with the CPA, because we should not forget that the country is under occupation, and the occupation is what is ruling the country, and the goal is to end the occupation. The Iraqi government will be formed under this consultation. This government will be a government that represents the people of Iraq, and will be elected in January in 2005. But the hope that this transitional government 271 will have a presence that is acceptable to the people of Iraq, because it is made up of Iraqis sons who will be wanting to serve their country. . (In Kurdish.) INTERPRETER: The language is in Kurdish and cannot be interpreted by this interpreted. (Exchange in Kurdish.) MR. BRAHIMI (through interpreter): Love to visit Kurdistan, even without elections. Of course there was a preparation so that I would go and visit, and I have received an invitation from my dear brothers, Massoud Barzani, head of the council, and Mr. Jalal Talabani, for next week, and I would love to do that. MR. BARZANI (through interpreter): The invitation is open to Mr. Lakhdar Brahimi, and for sure, Kurdistan will welcome him very warmly, and we hope to see him over there. • Mr. Brahimi, John Burns of the New York Times. You have spoken today frequently of the need to build confidence. That confidence presumably will also have to be built between the United Nations and the United States, which will lead the security forces which by any definition it seems will have to maintain security in this country after June the 30th. I think that many Americans listening to what you've said might have noted that you spoke critically a number of times, or implicitly critically, of American military actions. You said nothing -- at least nothing I heard -- about actions that have been taken by other parties to this conflict that have caused civilian casualties, including in August last year an attack on your organization that killed, as I recall, 23 people, including the chief United Nations representative. So my question is, first, in general, is there anything you would like to add to what you said about violence here that would perhaps build confidence on both sides of this issue and perhaps give confidence to Iraqis themselves who have been victims of actions from both sides? And a technical question: What preparations are you making for the security for United Nations personnel here if not from the United States military? MR. BRAHIMI: I think I didn't criticize the United States in connection with the violence. What I have said is that I expressed I think 272 sorrow to the loss of life, without specifying any side. And I thought you would have understood from that that I don't condone killing of innocent Iraqis by anybody. So if you misunderstood that, please stand corrected. To a specific question, I said that the secretary general -- and this is also a statement of fact -has called on all parties to respect the Geneva Convention. On the building of confidence between the United States and the United Nations, the United States is the most important, the most influential, most powerful member of the United Nations, and we talk to them all the time. We talk to them in New York; we talk to them in Washington; we talk to them here. I think that we disagree from time to time. We disagree, meaning the secretariat. Now, the United States disagrees also with other members of the United Nations, and I am sure you don't need to be reminded that some of those disagreements took place in relations to Iraq not very long ago. We -- in the secretariat, we are reasonably satisfied with the kind of relationship we have with the Americans, as we have with all our members. And we know that we will be working with them here. We are actually working with them here, and we will continue to do so. We hope that we will be working with more and more member states for the benefit of the people of Iraq. As to our security here, we are also talking to our Iraqi brothers. We are talking to the Americans. We are talking to a lot of other countries on how best to ensure our security now and in the future. For the moment, there are just a few of us; but later on, if we are going to do the so called vital role that everybody speaks of, there will be a lot of us here. And it is always the host government -- in this case the government of Iraq, with the support of those who are supporting it, that will have to provide the security. We are discussing all these issues. Q (Through interpreter.) To Mr. Barzani. What are the procedures that the Governing Council will provide for those who were injured in the cities of Fallujah and Najaf? Who will pay the state for all the losses? MR. BARZANI (Through interpreter): Let's stop the fighting now before we do that. Q Hamza Hashim (ph) from Al Ferat (ph) International. The (SCAL 273 ?), or the temporary interim constitution, something that the people of Iraq will depend on, such as also as well -inaudible.) Are there any studies that will delve into this? This is a question for Mr. Brahimi. MR. BRAHIMI (Through interpreter): This law, first of all, we had no role in establishing. I would like to state one or two comments here. One, this law, it's name is the law of the administration of the state, the transitional law. No one said it is a constitution, and it is clear it is a transitional. And of course there are articles stating that there will be election for a national assembly, and this assembly will have two roles: One, a legislative role just as everywhere, and then another one is a constitutional. This is a council that will achieve the writing, the drafting of the constitution that the state will fall underneath -- beneath it. And then we will have a law, a general law. But the committee that is responsible for writing this constitution should not be chained -- their hands are chained to do anything. They have to be independent so that they can write the constitution independently. But in Iraq, in the new Iraq that wants to gather together all aspects and all dimensions of Iraq, it is for sure all these people will participate in writing the constitution. There is no constitution that is ratified by a majority of 51 percent. It requires a consensus by all the people, because this will be for a long time. A written law can be passed by a majority. But the constitution shouldn't be changed every four years. That's why it is important first of all this transitional law is for this reason this period at all, and this council that will be elected should be encouraged to write the constitution that will be accepted by the people of Iraq. • (Through interpreter.) Mukran Mohammed Ani (ph) BBC. One has seen the absence of the U.N. during the occupation of Iraq for one year. How long did the -- since when did the U.N. work in normal circumstances? We're accustomed to seeing the U.N. work and perform under strenuous conditions. We have not seen the U.N. stand by the Iraqi people. What is your opinion in the criticism of the situation on the part of the Americans? Is it thinkable that they would cordon off the whole city and kill the population because of a crime against four civilians? MR. BRAHIMI (Through interpreter.): I believe that you forgot something in this issue. The maltreatment of the bodies of those who were killed and those scenes made the round of the screens of the world. And this 274 is unacceptable to Iraqis first, and it is not acceptable to Muslims before anybody else. You have to mention this. But the collective punishments are not acceptable -- cannot be acceptable, and to cordon off and besiege a city is not acceptable. But -- and what we have said now we have said it somewhere else. When you talk about the U.N., there is some misunderstanding. The U.N. has worked in Kurdistan, and they are still in the Kurdistan province, because we have freedom of movement. As I told you, we come here following an invitation of the government or the council. We were asked to come. We came. When we were not asked to come, we came, and some of us got killed -some of our brothers got killed. We are ready to play a role, and we recognize that we can give more than we are giving now. But once again, my brother, if there is not a minimum of security, how can you bring people from the outside? And you (must ?) agree that they would expose themselves to harm's way. And, as I told the New York Times reporter, we are talking to our brothers in Iraq, with foreign countries, to allow the U.N. to play a greater and bigger role than it is playing now. • (Off mike)? . MODERATOR (through interpreter): Can you identify yourself again please? • Anne Garrels from National Public Radio. Have you been able to speak to Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani and get any clarification from him on his views about your proposals, since his views were one of the reasons why this crisis over the transition emerged? MR. BARZANI: I haven't been able to speak to Ayatollah Sistani himself, but we are in touch with his office regularly. • And could you -- sir, could you be more specific, please, about their response, and if you feel that they are satisfied with the proposals you have offered? MR. BARZANI: You know, our proposals have been made public 275 only now. So you know we'll wait. I am sure you will hear from them. • (Off mike.) I mean, you brought -- you discussed proposals with him. I would imagine -or with his aides -- you would have some sense as to how they would react? MR. BARZANI: I would rather not go further into this at the moment. . Thank you. • (Through interpreter.) Hulud Azari (ph) from Abnel Balad (ph). According to the November agreement in 2003, that both the Governing Council and the CPA will stop, cease work, and you said that 150,000 soldiers, they will not disappear. Does that mean they will remain inside Iraqi cities, and which is known the people of Iraq do not accept to stay? MR. BRAHIMI: This is not my role. I cannot comment on it. MODERATOR: We have more one question. • (Through interpreter.) Mahra Rapori (ph). Mr. Brahimi, Mahra Rapori (ph), El Ken (ph) newspaper, Mr. Brahimi, two months ago we have sent you to the U.N. -- we sent you a memorandum from a university, an academic level. Have you received it? We sent you 15 days ago -- we sent you to the office of the U.N. in Baghdad. This is my question. Did you receive such memo? How about the academic union would form a government, an academic government? There are many students and professors who would do that. MR. BRAHIMI: I did not receive those papers, and I will be very happy to receive them. • (Through interpreter.) (Inaudible.) Mr. Brahimi, do you believe that there is enough time? How long? How much of time to the 31st of December? Is the time sufficient to complete the process for elections? And what is the next step in providing security by the U.N. in Iraq? MR. BRAHIMI (Through interpreter.); I understood you to say that the constitution would be completed before 31 December. No, sir. The constitution will be completed by the council, which will be elected by January 2005. Now, the constitution, we are still consulting with large 276 elements of the Iraqi society, and also with the committee that was formed by the Governing Council too, which will prepare us for conducting consultations among which in our view will form the government which we are talking about. These consultations will lead to the establishment of a preparatory committee for the conference, and that committee will deal with that. • (Through interpreter.) Mr. Brahimi, most of the notables of the Sunni cities that are inside the Sunni Triangle that have seen a lot of violence since the fall of the regime, the notables believe the cause of the resistance and the insurgency, that's because of the sidelining of their role in the government. I met tribal leaders and notables and high figures. And have you met those and what has happened in those meetings? MR. BRAHIMI (Through interpreter.): I have met notables and tribal leaders of all sections, and I met people that were Sunni or Shi'a. The injustices suffered by the people are different from one place to another, and I have said that we have some problems that need to be treated quickly, such as the issue of the detentions and that of the professionals and the professors that were sidelined and excluded, regardless of their sectarian background. . I imagine that if we could deal with these issues, if we could have the government I talked about, and if we could start organizing for that conference I talked about, so the Iraqis can meet among each other and their sovereignty, lots of the problems can be solved. MODERATOR (through interpreter): Go ahead. Q (Through interpreter.) Thank you, Mr. Lakhdar B rahimi, and you are a good guest, welcomed guest to Iraq. As a journalist, I know that you are qualified and you have a great experience and you are a great diplomat. My question: How can you assess the situation, the current situation in Iraq? And the U.N. will give sovereignty to the Iraqis on the 30th of June? MR. BRAHIMI (through interpreter): It's not the United Nations that took away sovereignty from the Iraqis. I believe, as brother President Mr. Barzani has said a few moments ago, there are some confirmations -- almost daily confirmations that the countries of the occupation will not change their opinion, will not change their opinion in giving back the 277 sovereignty to the Iraqis on the 30th of June. We work on this basis, and we wish the best to the people of Iraq. The situation in Iraq is not good, but there's hope. All of us are hopeful that there's going to be enhancement. MODERATOR (through interpreter). And we have a small question. Q(Off mike) -- Public Radio. The prime minister, the president and the vice president -- who will choose them? Do they have to come from the Governing Council? And is there any -- do they have to be Shi'a, Sunni? Is there any balance there in terms of -- and if they don't come from the Governing Council, how do you pick from 27 million Iraqis? MR. BRAHIMI: I'm sure that you know the answer to all those questions except the first one. Not necessarily from the Governing Council, in my vision. And I think that the agreement that exists between us and the Governing Council and the CPA is that all this will result from these consultations that we are taking with a large number of people in this country. MR. BARZANI (Through interpreter.): Once again I would like to thank Mr. Lakhdar Brahimi for his efforts, his great efforts that he exerted during this last period. And I would like to assure him of our cooperation to the maximum so in our way to restore sovereignty and to get out of this crisis. And I am sure that Iraq will get back his health, and we will build a federal Iraq. We are sorry if we could not answer all questions, because we didn't have enough time. QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD APRIL 21, 2004 QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. HUNTER The CHAIRMAN. When you brought the 1st Cav in initially to displace the 1st Ar- mored Division, as I understand it, some of the heavy platforms weren't moved with the 1st Cav. You have got essentially a lighter Cav than you would otherwise have. Is there a thought about bringing the armor that you left behind for 1st Cav, mov- ing that into theater? Could you let the committee know when you have an outcome on that particular area? General MEYERS. First Cavalry Division deployed to OIF II in accordance with the CJTF-7 OIF II Operational Needs Statement (ONS) dated 24 AUG 03 and signed by LTG McKiernan (See enclosure 1), Commander, Combined Forces Land Compo- nent Command (CFLCC). CFLCC, after coordination with his commanders, directed a lighter, more agile force to deploy. After deploying to the theater, the First Cav- alry Division re-evaluated the security situation and asked for additional equipment from the United States due to force protection considerations and changes in the anticipated operational environment. CENTCOM acknowledged the need for greater force protection and allowed 1st Cavalry Division to bring additional home station equipment to theater, increasing their armor platforms by approximately one half. The additional equipment includes: 50 x M1A2 (Abrams Tank), 20 x M2A3 (Bradley Infantry Fighting Vehicle), 12 x M109A6 (Paladin 155mm Howitzer) and 12 x M992AŽ (Field Artillery Support Vehicles) arrived in Kuwait on 15 JUN for move- ment into Iraq. QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. SPRATT Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Wolfowitz, we appropriated $87 billion of supplemental funding last October for Iraq and Afghanistan, 51.5 billion of which was earmarked to mili- tary operations in Iraq. The burn rate we understand to be between $4 and $5.5 billion for that amount of money, but that was a number that was derived really before the operating tempo (opstempo) picked up significantly. Can you tell us, first of all, what is the monthly burn rate or expenditure rate of those funds? And what is, as of April the 1st, the unobligated balance on the $87 billion appropriated for Iraq and Afghanistan in October? Can you give us roughly what the burn rate is, what the rate of monthly expendi- ture is? Secretary WOLFOWITZ. As of the March 2004 accounting reports, the military oper- ations in Iraq are costing $4.2 billion per month, including procurement. The recur- ring burn rate as of March is $4.0 billion (procurement is not a recurring cost). The average monthly cost for operations in Afghanistan is $751 million, including pro- curement. The burn rate (without procurement) is approximately $733 million. The $87 billion appropriated in the FY 2004 Emergency Supplemental provided funds for three major activities. Approximately $65.3 billion was provided to the De- partment of Defense primarily for military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. An- other $18.6 billion was appropriated for reconstruction activities and $983 million was provided for the operations of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA). With respect to the $65.3 billion appropriation for DOD: As of April 1, 2004, ap- proximately $30.7 billion was obligated leaving an unobligated amount of $34.6 bil- lion. However, those obligations do not reflect the approximately $5.3 billion that was appropriated for classified programs; the obligations for those funds are not shown in DOD accounting reports. Of the $18.6 billion appropriated in the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund (IRRF), approximately $2.3 billion was obligated as of April 6, 2004. The supple- mental also provided $983 million for CPA operating expenses including $75 million for the CPA-IG. As of March 31, 2004, $459 million was obligated. so Wetenee nimeni. Approximately $65.3 billion was nun QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY DR. SNYDER Dr. SNYDER. Where are we at with regard to safeguarding nuclear materials or equipment, safeguarding ammo dumps where weapons of mass destruction could (281) 282 still be hidden, according to Mr. Rumsfeld, and safeguarding Iraqi nuclear sci- entists? Secretary WOLFOWITZ, U.S. Forces consolidated and safeguarded all radiological sources found in Iraq at the Tuwaitha Nuclear Research Center (TNRC), Baghdad. In June 2004, all radiological sources with potential use as Radiological Dispersion Devices and 1.7 metric tons of low-enriched uranium were retrograded from the TNRC to Oak Ridge National Laboratories in Tennessee. Crudely processed ura- nium ore (554 metric tons of yellowcake) and radiological sources not suitable for use in nuclear devices remain at TRNC. On 4 August 2004, the International Atomic Energy Agency conducted a Physical Inventory Verification to formally document the remaining radiological material. Specially trained and equipped Iraqi Security Forces subordinate to the Ministry of Science and Technology assumed security of the TNRC from U.S. Forces. U.S. Forces maintain a Quick Reaction Force ready to augment as required. Iraq has no ammo dumps containing Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). The former Muthanna/Samarra Chemical Weapons Complex contains two sealed bunk- ers with disabled chemical weapon production equipment and unfilled chemical mu- nitions. An Iraq Survey Group (ISG) assessment concluded the materials do not pose a proliferation threat, but required safeguarding due to potential health and safety risks. In April 2004, the bunkers were re-enforced with barrier material. A perma- nent seal is planned to further enhance long term structural integrity. A plan is not in place to specifically safeguard Iraqi nuclear scientists. Dr. SNYDER. Mr. Gingrey asked about civil defense forces, and you and I had an exchange in a classified setting with Mr. Rumsfeld about the Iraqi army and the civil defense forces. And I was referred to these charts. My question is, I do not know if it is a typo or if I do not understand it, but on the one as of April 9, it shows us—this is unclassified—that we have on duty 32,451 Iraqi civil defense forces. One week later, that number goes to 23,000, a drop of about 9,000 or 10,000. I do not know if you all know what the reason for that is or if we could get a clarification. General MYERS. On 9 APR 04, ICDC reported 36 battalions manned at least 75% and 32,110 soldiers working with Coalition Forces in Iraq. In early April ACM con- ducted intensified combat operations against Coalition Forces and Iraqi Security Forces (including the ICDC and IPS) primarily in An Najaf, Karbala (MND-CS AO) and Fallujah (I MEF AO). Fighting and other activities by insurgents against the Iraqi Security Forces affected ICDC units in the 1ID (MND Central North) and 1st Cavalry Division (Baghdad) areas of operation, included those directly attacked in Najaf, Karbala and Fallujah. As a result, on 16 April, MNC-I reported that many ICDC units had totally col- lapsed. Only 20 operational battalions manned at 75% or higher remained. ICDC strength had diminished from 32,110 ICDC soldiers to 17,639. In May, MNC-I began the reconstitution of all ICDC units; starting by removing weak or ineffective leaders and soldiers. The most recent update (dated 17 June) reported 41 Battalions manned at 75% or higher and 36,766 ICDC soldiers working with Coalition Forces. 283 ICDC Manning Trends 00000000000000000000000000000 QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA Ms. DAVIS. “I have been asked repeatedly in the district if whether or not we are starting to reach out and fill positions on our draft boards that have been sitting vacant for sometime. That's a cause of concern to some people. I wondered if you can respond to that?” Secretary WOLFOWITZ. According to the Selective Service System (SSS), the draft boards—more properly called Local and District Appeal Boards—have not been “sit- ting vacant.” The SSS advises that they have been staffed with trained volunteers ever since President Carter brought the Agency out of “deep standby” status in 1980. However, those volunteers are subject to a 20-year term limit and many va- cancies occurred beginning in 2000. As Board vacancies occur, the Selective Service System routinely has appointed and trained replacement volunteers. This process is ongoing. Presently, the 10,600 positions for Board Members stand at 87 percent filled, which the SSS reports to be a typical vacancy rate for the uncompensated program; and it reflects normal attrition and turnover. Without a draft, the Boards remain in a standby status. cause I know that that there werearlier that he 27,000 by BeC22,000 in th of how you Army tand you had mentiosaying, well, 7040. There weitiailed accounting And now, Mris increase, evaa like to get ad for you. QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. SANCHEZ Ms. SANCHEZ. Well, let me give it to you and maybe you can think about it, be- cause I know that, as of last night, the Pentagon told me we had 3,928 on-duty Iraqi Army troops and that there were 2,082 in training. I did the math, and that is like 6,000. And you had mentioned earlier that it was going to go to 40,000 in the fall. And now, Mr. Wolfowitz is saying, well, maybe 27,000 by December. That is a big increase, even to the 27,000. There will be 22,000 in the next 4 or 5 months, so I mean I would like to get a better detailed accounting of how you get to that. That was the question that I had for you. General MYERS. Force generation is a phased process which includes individual training for officers, Staff NCOs, and Squad Leaders. These individuals are then formed into unit leadership cadres and undergo four weeks of collective integration training. This training prepares leaders to conduct individual basic training for their enlisted recruits. Once they receive their recruits they conduct an 8 week training program. The recruit training program consists of individual and collective training, culminating with initial operating capability for the respective battalion. Total Iraqi Army (IA) strength as of 20 JUN 04 is 7724 (4305 on-duty, 3419 in training). The table below depicts the planned number of forces on-duty and in training, by month, through the end of the current force generation plan in Feb- ruary 2005 (Note: These numbers do not include the training of specialty units and former for OPERS. Po the quesd like to 27,000be 27,080ing to culminm: The recruit trahey receive their conduct individus of collective i training). The Army. La se ating capabilinsists of integy conducasic trainingtegration 284 other echelons above division (EAD) structure which is still in the force design stage). Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec 1 Jan 1 Feb On Duty 8744 11180 13773 20105 20105 22658 27764 30317 In Training 2436 2593 2593 6332 6332 2553 5106 0 Total 11180 13773 16366 26437 26437 25211 32870 30317 It is important to point out that the cadres of all 27 battalions, nine brigades and three divisions will be actively training by early August 2004 and all recruits will be in training by the beginning of January 2005. In order to support this effort, it is critical that the entire Advisor Support Team and Base Support structure be in place. The original IA force generation plan for the completion of all 27 IA battalions by September 2004. The deadline changed to January 2005 due to the delay in sup- plemental funding coupled with contracting delays and deterioration of the security environment in April 2004. An additional one month delay, to February 2005, was caused by the decision to form Civil Intervention Forces (CIF) within the Ministry of the Interior (MOI). These CIF will be rained at facilities previously earmarked for IA force generation. QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LANGEVIN Mr. LANGEVIN. Provide a copy of Special Envoy Brahimi's statement of April 14, which includes detailed information regarding his consultations on and plans for de- veloping an Iraqi Interim Government and the corresponding June 30 transition. Secretary GROSSMAN. [The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on page 258.] THE ONGOING INVESTIGATION INTO THE ABUSE OF PRISONERS WITHIN THE CENTRAL COMMAND AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES. Washington, DC, Friday, May 7, 2004. The committee met, pursuant to call, at 3 p.m., in room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Duncan Hunter (chairman of the committee) presiding. OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. DUNCAN HUNTER, A REP- RESENTATIVE FROM CALIFORNIA, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order. We are here today for a simple reason. Last year, several members of the United States military disgraced the uniform. By abusing enemy detainees a handful of miscreants broke our laws, embarra country and created an international incident. Unlike Saddam, who practiced such abuse and much worse as a matter of state policy, the United States does not tolerate that kind of behavior. The mili- tary will bring the guilty to justice just as surely as Saddam could not escape accountability for his crime. I know that because I know this Secretary and the leadership team that he and the President have created for the Department of Defense (DOD). We are engaged in a complex and Global War on Terrorism and are operating against terrorists in two major theaters. We need to judge the Department's leadership on its performance in that war, not on its public relations skills or the frequency with which a few egos on Capitol Hill get bruised. And in that area the Secretary and his colleagues have consistently demonstrated excellent man- agement skills and superior military judgment. Today, some people with 20/20 hindsight ask why the Secretary didn't drop everything to personally investigate the abuses when they were first reported in January. That is bad and irresponsible advice. It is immensely more important that the Secretary of De- fense focus on defeating our enemies, particularly when investiga- tors in Iraq were already conducting a massive comprehensive and swift investigation that has already resulted in six people being charged with criminal offenses under the Code of Military Justice. Simply put, the wheels of military justice are already moving, and we all know they turn much faster than our civilian courts. Even as we condemn the brutal acts of a few, we must remember that their behavior is isolated. The vast majority of American sol- diers are serving their country honorably, professionally and in many cases heroically. Take for example, Gunnery Sergeant Jeffrey (285) 286 Bohr Jr., United States Marine Corps. While those abuses were taking place by a handful of people in that prison, Sergeant Bohr, Gunny Sargent Bohr, while serving in company A, first battalion fifth marine regiment in the First Marine division, volunteered to join an armored resupply convoy with its two soft skin vehicles. According to the Navy, while moving through narrow streets to- ward the objective, the convoy took intense small arms and rocket propelled grenade fire. Through his movement Gunny Sergeant Bohr delivered accurate effective fire on the enemy while encourag- ing his Marines and supplying critical information to his company commander. The upshot was that Gunnery Sergeant Bohr pro- tected his wounded Marines, laying down suppressive fire until he himself was mortally wounded by enemy fire. I offer that citation and the citation for the silver star, which was posthumously award- ed to Gunnery Sergeant Bohr, not because it is isolated, but be- cause that kind of heroism was and is widespread among the 135,000 Americans serving honorably in Iraq. And I wanted to just make sure in this wave of publicity that has attended this massive focus on the six individuals who so far have been identified as having possibly committed criminal acts, that the vast majority of honorable and courageous soldiers fighting in that theater are not getting the attention and not getting the pub- licity that these few are. And I think it is important for us to keep this in perspective. In fact, over 300,000 people have served in the theater since the war started last year. And altogether, they have earned more than 3,767 purple hearts, four distinguished service crosses, 127 silver stars and 16,000 bronze stars. But there is more to our soldiers than just courage in battle. To- day's military is also the most humane force in the history of the world. It is in Iraq to defeat tyranny, not to occupy another coun- try. And it is rebuilding that country while fighting terrorists. Al- ready in Iraq the coalition has completed over 20,000 reconstruc- tion projects, restored electricity production higher than pre-war levels, rebuilt an oil industry that will help Iraqis build a better future and increased public health spending by a factor of 30. In every one of those areas, the men and women of our Armed Forces have had a major hand. Now, some people want to ignore these facts and focus solely on the immoral and illegal acts of a few. That is exactly what our enemies want, to portray the United States as at Satan and to tar all of our soldiers with the reprehensible actions of a very few people. Some tried to do that in Vietnam. We must not let it happen today. To focus solely on the abuses while downplaying the incred- ible accomplishments would be to create an injustice against our people who are serving honorably with the distinction and profes- sionalism we have all come to expect from them. We are all out- raged by what happened. I am sure that nobody in this room is angrier than our witnesses. Gentlemen, we will look forward to hearing how the Department of Defense is ensuring that the guilty parties are identified and brought to justice. I have every con- fidence in your commitment to that outcome and your continued leadership of our war effort. The American people could not ask for a better team. 287 And Mr. Secretary, while we have been concentrating on these actions in this criminal investigation and prosecution of some six individuals, I am reminded that you have some 2.5 million individ- uals that you have oversight over. You have forces around the world on every continent. You have two major wars in which you have just completed the biggest redeployment of forces, I believe, since World War II. You have reformed and reshaped the 750,000- man civil service department of the United States, and you have a $400 billion plus defense budget that you are currently working with us on to try to make sure that the people in uniform have the very best in equipment. You have a very big job. You have the big- gest piece of the discretionary budget of the United States. And in my opinion, you are doing a very good job at managing our military in the war on terror.. So we look forward to your testimony. I know this is a difficult time, a painful time and a difficult issue. But I think we are going to work through it and out of this-out of this week and the work that you have been doing over the last several weeks and that the-this Congress and this Armed Services Committee, of which I am very proud have been working on and putting this new budget together, we are going to move forward in the next several months and make great strides, both in Iraq in Afghanistan and in the war on terror. So we look forward to your statement. And I would like to now turn to my colleague, my great partner in this committee, the gentleman from Missouri, Mr. Skelton, for any remarks he would like to make. [The prepared statement of Mr. Hunter can be found in the Ap- pendix on page 345.] STATEMENT OF HON. IKE SKELTON, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM MISSOURI, RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE . ON ARMED SERVICES Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Chairman, thank you. And thank you gentle- men for appearing before us. We have some very difficult questions because this is a very serious and very disturbing matter. And Mr. Chairman, let me thank you for holding this hearing. But I also want to express my strong conviction that this must be the first of many hearings on this subject. These appalling revelations have done incalculable damage to our Nation's representation and to our military, and one hearing, however important as it is, will not suf- fice. For that reason I believe strongly, and I say here at the out- set, that we must hold independent congressional investigations into these abuses and into the command atmosphere that per- mitted them to occur. Mr. Secretary, I have read your testimony. And I am pleased that you will be appointing senior former offi- cers to look into the sufficiency of the current ongoing investiga- tions. But this is not enough. Congress, having not been informed, must now be involved. Oversight of the Department of Defense, the military, is this committee's most important role. We must find out what happened and how far up it goes. To do this we need staff investigations. We need to get out into the field. Second-hand infor- mation is not sufficient. Mr. Chairman, I have never before been sadder or more disappointed. Each of us and every American have been horrified by the images we have seen and the stories we have 288 heard in the last week from the Abu Ghraib prison in Baghdad. The individuals who committed these shameful acts forgot that they were soldiers. They also forgot that the middle name of the American soldier is honor. We deplore and condemn the abuse of those in the custody of the United States in Iraq. I am reminded of my conversation with the late historian, Steven Ambrose at a small breakfast in my office a few years ago. When asked what America—what makes America so great and so unique, he said that while Russia had a hearty work- force and great natural resources, they did not have a George Washington, John Adams, a Thomas Jefferson, a James Madison or the values they established. The actions taken by the soldiers at Abu Ghraib do not reflect the values of Americans. And the Iraqi people must understand that. If they don't, this incident could well come the tipping point for our entire effort to bring security and reconstruction to Iraq. If we lose the trust of the Iraqi people, if we lose their hearts and minds, we cannot bring anything else effectively. We must win back this trust. The safety of our troops, Iraq's future depends on it. Abu Ghraib, once a chamber of horrors under Saddam Hussein, has become a chamber of indignities under the American military. It must be bulldozed to the ground to symbolize a break with the past and a new beginning with the Iraqi people. Many more steps are needed, but we must start with this symbol. We must also bring all responsible to justice. I support general Schoomaker's and the appropriate military authorities efforts to complete thorough investigations and to bring anyone who committed crimes to jus- tice. This must apply regardless of who committed the crimes, mili- tary personnel, personnel of other government agencies or private contractors. The Iraqi people must see us take swift strong fair action. We must also address the command and other systemic deficiencies that contribute to the abuse, and I believe that we will need some independent congressional investigation on that. But I have to say that there is another trust that sadly has been lost, and that is be- tween the Department of Defense and Congress. The investigation in this matter has been ongoing since January. Now neither this committee, nor myself, and I don't believe Mr. Hunter was in- formed, despite numerous meetings. . And I don't consider a passing reference in a central command press release, which I never saw, to be adequate notification of a matter that has such serious implications for our efforts in Iraq or our role in the world. The Secretary was here last Wednesday briefing us on the situation in Iraq. And that very day, that was the day the story aired on 60 Minutes II. And nothing was said. I believe in the words of President John Kennedy, that an error does not become a mistake until you refuse to correct it. Without debate, without criticism, no administration, and no country can succeed and no republic can survive. Mr. Chairman, these mistakes must be corrected for the sake of this Nation, for our standing in the world and for our success in Iraq, which all of us want. Mr. Secretary, I look forward to your statement as well as the other gentlemen. Thank you. 289 The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Secretary, again, thanks for being with us today. The floor is yours, sir. [The prepared statement of Mr. Skelton can be found in the Ap- pendix on page 350.] STATEMENT OF HON. DONALD H. RUMSFELD, SECRETARY OF DEFENSE Secretary RUMSFELD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for your state- ment. Members of the committee, Congressman Cunningham, I would request that my full statement be put in the record. The CHAIRMAN. Without objection. In fact, all statements will be accepted for the record. Secretary RUMSFELD. In recent days, there has been a good deal of discussion about who bears the responsibility for the terrible ac- tivities that took place at Abu Ghraib prison. These events oc- curred on my watch. As Secretary of Defense, I am accountable for them and I take full responsibility for them. It is my obligation to evaluate what happened, to make sure that those have committed wrongdoing are brought to justice, and to make changes as needed to see that it doesn't happen again. I feel terrible about what hap- pened to these Iraqi detainees. They are human beings. They were in U.S. custody. Our country had an obligation to treat them right, to treat them as human beings. We didn't do that. That was wrong. So to those Iraqis who were mistreated by the members of the U.S. Armed Forces, I offer my deepest apology. It was inconsistent with the val- ues of our nation. It was un-American. Further, I deeply regret the damage that has been done, first to the reputation of the honorable men and women in the Armed Forces who are courageously and professionally and responsibly defending our freedom across the globe. They are truly wonderful human beings, and their families and their loved ones can be enormously proud. Second, to the President, the Congress and the American people, I wish we had been able to convey to them the gravity of this mat- ter before we saw it in the media. And finally, to the reputation of our country. The photographic depictions of U.S. military person- nel that the public has seen have offended and outraged everyone in the Department of Defense. If you could have seen the an- guished faces and expressions on those in the Department upon seeing those photos, you would know how strongly and deeply we feel. We take this very seriously. It is important for the American ple and the world to know that while these terrible acts were perpetuated—perpetrated by a small number of the military, they were also brought to light by the honorable and very responsible actions of other military personnel. This was not some sort of a news media discovery. There are many who did their duty professionally, and we should mention that as well. First, Specialist Joseph Darby, who alerted the appro- priate authority that abuses were occurring. Second, those in the military chain of command who acted promptly upon learning of those activities by initiating a series of investigations, criminal and administrative, to assure that the abuses have stopped, and to as- sure that the responsible chain of command was relieved and re- placed. Having said that, all the facts that may be of interest are 290 not yet in hand. In addition to the Taguba report, are other inves- tigations underway and we will be discussing them today. Because all of the facts are not in hand, there will be corrections and clarifications to the record as more information is learned. From the witnesses here, you will be told the sequence of events and investigations that have taken place since the activities first came to light. I want to inform you of the measures underway to improve our performance for the future. Before I do that, let me say that each of us at this table is either in the chain of command or in positions of senior responsibility in the Department. This means that anything we say publicly could have an impact on the legal proceedings against those accused of wrongdoing in this mat- ter. So please understand that if some of our responses to questions are measured, it is to ensure that pending cases are not jeopard- ized by seeming to exert command influences and that the rights of any accused are properly protected Now, let me tell you the measures we are taking to deal with this issue. First, to ensure that we have a handle on the scope of the catastrophe I will be announcing today the appointment of sev- eral senior former officials who are being asked to examine the pace, the breadth, the scope, the thoroughness of the existing in- vestigations and to determine whether additional studies investiga- tions may be needed. They are being asked to report their findings within 45 days of taking up their duties. ** I am confident that these distinguished individuals will provide a full and fair assess- ment of what has been done thus far and recommend whether fur- ther steps may be appropriate. Second, we need to review our habits and procedures. One of the things we have tried to do since September 11 is to get the Depart- ment to adjust its procedures to fit a time of war and to fit the in- formation age, the 21st century. For the past 3 years, we have looked for areas where adjustments were needed. And regrettably we have now found still another area. Let me be clear. I failed to recognize how important it was to elevate a matter of such gravity to the highest levels, including the President and the leaders in Congress. Third, I am seeking a way to provide appropriate compensation to those detainees who suffered such grievous and brutal abuse and cruelty at the hands of a few members of the U.S. military. It is the right thing to do. I wish we had known more sooner and been able to tell you more sooner. But we didn't. Today we have a full discussion of those terrible acts. But first let's take a step back for a moment. Within the constraints imposed on those of us in the chain of command, I want to say a few additional words. First, beyond the abuse of prisoners, there are other photos, many other photos that depict incidents of physical violence toward pris- oners, acts that can only be described as blatantly sadistic, cruel and inhuman. And I am advised there also are videos of these ac- **Corrections submitted by the Secretary of Defense: Charter for Independent Panel to Review DOD Detention Operations was signed on May 12, 2004. It allots a time frame to pro- vide advice "preferably within 45 days” after beginning the review. The panel has announced that it will present its final report on 18 August 2004, with the caveat that it could be modified at a later date to reflect the results of reports or investigations completed after that date. Rio de advice presenteflec after bon Mayfense: 291 tions. Second, there are many more photos that have not yet come to light. Congress and the American people and the rest of the world need to know this. In addition, the photos give these inci- dents a vividness, indeed a horror in the eyes of the world. Mr. Chairman, that is why this hearing today his hearing today is important. And it is why the actions we take in the days and weeks ahead are so impor- tant. Because, however terrible the setback, this also is an occasion to demonstrate to the world the difference between those who believe in democracy and in human rights and those who believe in rule by terrorism. We value human life. We believe in individual free- dom and in the rule of law. And for those beliefs, we send men and women in the Armed Forces abroad to protect that right for our own people and to give millions of others who aren't Americans the hope of future freedom. Part of that mission, part of what we be- ieve in is making sure that when wrongdoing or scandals do in fact occur, that they are not covered up, that they are exposed and that the guilty are brought to justice. Mr. Chairman, I know you join me today in saying to the world, judge us by our actions. Watch how Americans—watch how democ- racy deals with wrongdoing and scandal, and the pain of acknowl- edging and correcting our own mistakes and indeed our own weak- nesses. And then, after they have seen America in action, then ask those who teach resentment, who teach terrorism, tred of America if our behavior doesn't give the lie to the falsehood and the slander that they speak about our people and our way of life. Ask them if the resolve of Americans' in crisis and difficulty, and yes, in the heartbreak of acknowledging the evil in our midst, doesn't have meaning far beyond their hatred. Above all, ask them if the willingness of Americans to acknowledge their own failures before humanity doesn't light the world as surely as the great ideas and beliefs that first made this nation a beacon of hope and liberty to all who strive to be free. We know what the terrorists will do. We know that they try to all that is bad and try to obscure all that is good. That is their nature. And this is the nature of those who think they can kill innocent men, women and children to gratify their own cruel will to power. We say to the world, we will strive to do our best, as imperfect as that may be. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. My colleagues have some comments that they would like to make. The CHAIRMAN. Certainly. [The prepared statement of Secretary Rumsfeld can be found in the Appendix on page 355.] The CHAIRMAN. And General Myers or Secretary Brownlee, who wants to go first. General Myers. STATEMENT OF GEN. RICHARD B. MYERS, CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, U.S. AIR FORCE General MYERS. Mr. Chairman, Congressman Skelton, I would like to express my very deep regrets at being here under these cir- cumstances. The incidents of prisoner abuse that occurred at Abu Ghraib prison are absolutely appalling. The actions of those in- volved are unconscionable and absolutely unacceptable. Since Brig- 292 adier General Kimmett's public announcement of the allegations back in January, the commander's response to the problems high- lighted in these investigations has been timely and thorough. And just as a backdrop, we must also realize that our commanders have been handling some enormous challenges in Iraq, including the in- creased fighting in Fallujah and al Najaf, and the temporary plus- up of troops, and the departure of the Spanish brigade at the same time that they were dealing with the conclusion of some of these reports. Despite these extraordinary events on the battlefield, our com- manders did exactly the right thing in a timely manner. I have great confidence in them, as should the American public and every Iraqi citizen. I have been receiving regular updates since the situa- tion developed. I have been involved in corrective actions and I have personally recommended specific steps. Again, I am confident that the commanders are doing the right things. You know, one of the U.S. military's greatest strengths comes from the fact that we hold our servicemen and women ac- countable for their actions. Our military justice system works very well. And I took an oath to support the Constitution, and with that comes the responsibility to ensure that all military members enjoy the full protections of our Constitution, to include the due process of a fair judicial system. After all, it is the respect for the rule of law that we are trying to instill in places like Afghanistan and Iraq. And as the Secretary said, we are now in the middle of a judicial process dealing with the detainee abuse. And because of my posi- tion, I have to be careful I don't say anything that can be inter- preted as direction or pressure for a certain outcome in any of these cases. Moreover, I think we have to understand that a fair judicial system takes time to work, as the chairman said. And I know you all understand that. No one is stalling or covering up information, but it is absolutely essential to protect the integrity of our system. I have complete confidence in the military justice system. The accused will receive due process and those found guilty will receive punishment based on their offenses. When I spoke to Dan Rather, with whom I al- ready had a professional association, concerning the 60 Minutes II story, I did so after talking with General Abizaid and out of con- cern, as was he, for the lives of our troops. The story about the abuse was already public. But we were concerned that broadcasting the actual pictures would further inflame the tense situation that existed then in Iraq and further endanger the lives of coalition soldiers and hostages. Again, it is useful to remember the context here. It was the heavi- est fighting since the end of major combat. Some 90 hostages taken. Very delicate situations we were trying to control in al Najaf, Alkut, Nasariyah and Fallujah. Since the story of the photo- graphs were already public, I thought we were on good ground ask- ing him to hold off airing the actual photos. As we are now seeing, the photos are having a very real and a very emotional worldwide impact. This situation, as has been said, is nothing less than tragic. The Iraqi people are trying to build a free and an open society. And 293 1 I regret that they saw such a flagrant violation of the very prin- ciples that are the cornerstone of such a society. I am also terribly saddened that the hundreds of thousands of service men and women who are serving or who have served so honorably in Iraq in Afghanistan and elsewhere would have their representation or our representations tarnished and their accom- plishments diminished by those few who don't uphold our military's values. I know our service men and women are all suffering un- fairly with the collective sense of shame over what happened. But their credibility will be restored day by day, as they interact with the Iraqi people. And I am confident that our dedicated service men and women will continue to prove worthy of the trust and re- spect of this nation and for that matter, the world. . continue to be very proud e to be very proud of them. And as always. I thank you on their behalf for your steadfast support. Now let me refer to a chart over here which will help explain why I am so confident in our military chain of command. I will do this quickly. But it is important to get the facts on the table. The commander, CJTF 7– you may not be able to read it, but the first part is an officer—but the commander of the CJTF-7, General Sanchez, back in August, said I want to look at our detention operations and our integration operations and he had a—the provost marshal of the Army ap- pointed to do that investigation. While that was going on, at the insistence of some of the folks here at the table, Major General Mil- ler, who was then assigned to Guantanamo and responsible for de- tainee operations there and interrogations, we asked him to go over and look at this as well, primarily concerned that we were getting the intelligence, and that we were doing the interrogations right, that we got the intelligence analyzed properly and into the field and into the hands of those where it could make a difference either in saving lives or in wrapping up the enemy. You can see his look lasted about 10 days. Then General Ryder, on November, submits his report. He talked about facilities needing some upgrading, meeting minimal standards but needing upgrad- ing; that we need Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) involve- ment because we have to have a court system in Iraq that can han- dle these detainees, with the civilian attorneys for the criminals, so they can be treated in an Iraqi court. That would need standardiza- tion of our practices and so forth. Actions were taken by General Sanchez on all of that. Somewhere between October and December this abuse occurred. On 13 January, it was reported by the individual that the Sec- retary talked about. One day later, the Army criminal investigative division initiates a criminal investigation into these allegations. On 16 January, that's when General Kimmett went to the public. I don't know how many people saw that report, but he pretty much said what it was. We have got reports of abuse. There supposedly are pictures, and gave a general description of that abuse, a very general description. On 18 January, based on what the Criminal Investigation Division (CID), the Army's police, essentially had found, the battalion leadership was suspended, the battalion that was responsible for the folks at Abu Ghraib. On 19 January, hav- ing had some of the reports out of the Army CID, General Sanchez 294 says we need an investigative officer to look at all our detention fa- cilities under the command of the 800 Military Police (MP) brigade. That turns out to be the Taguba report. You can see that he was appointed there on the 31 of January. At the same time, General Sanchez asked his inspector general (IG) to look at all detention fa- cilities in Iraq, be they divisional facilities that were temporary in nature, whether they were coalition facilities, to look at them all. Taguba did his work. At that time, as we started to learn some of what was coming out of the Taguba report, we in Washington, and through Secretary Brownlee, asked the Army, or the Army asked their IG to look at doing a broader assessment across the theater about all detention ops and about all interrogations from A to Z. And that report, that investigation is ongoing. On 12 March at the outbrief, this was the interim out brief to General Sanchez, when he learned of the issue between the mili- tary police and the detainees, and possible military intelligence in- volvement in their behavior, he asked for another investigation to start, and that is—that was appointed you will see down there on 15 April where Major General Fay, I think he is the Deputy Army G-2, was asked to look at the military intelligence piece of this to see if there was undue influence on the military police and to see how they were doing their job. That investigation is underway, and I think it is several weeks from completion if it stays on track. The Taguba outbrief on 12 March was to get General Sanchez briefed. Then they went to Gen- eral McKiernan, at 3rd Army or the combined forces, land compo- nent Commander, it says Coalition Forces Land Component Com- mand (CFLCC) there, four lines up from the bottom of the chart, who was responsible for the investigation. And we have to remem- ber that the Taguba investigation, the 15–6 investigation can re- sult in administrative actions against personnel who are found to be wrong. It can also result in people being relieved from duty and so forth. So it is a serious report. It can have serious repercussions on indi- viduals in the military, and therefore when it got to the General McKiernan level, there had to be time for people that were named in this report to offer rebuttal. And so it is again, it is the process that happens to make sure people have their—the judicial process works appropriately, and the investigative process. It was finally as you can see there on 1 May. And General Sanchez took actions against some individuals, administrative actions at that time. I don't know that there could be a better way to handle this situation, a quicker way to handle this situation or a more thorough way from the chain of command. I am very proud of what General Abizaid, General Sanchez and General McKiernan and others in this chain did to look at the situation. Some of those in- vestigations are still pending. Mr. Chairman, that completes my statement. The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, General. Mr. Secretary, do you have a statement? 295 STATEMENT OF HON. LES BROWNLEE, ACTING SECRETARY OF THE ARMY Secretary BROWNLEE. Chairman Hunter, Representative Skelton and distinguished members of the committee, I appreciate the op- portunity to be here today to offer testimony on actions taken by the Army in response to the appalling abuse of detainees at Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq. I join the Secretary of Defense in apologizing to those detainees who were so horribly abused there. Let me begin by outlining the range of investigations into detainee abuse. From December 2002 to present the criminal investigation command has conducted or is continuing to conduct investigations into 35 cases of abuse or death of detainees held in detention facilities in the central command theater. The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Secretary, can you pull the mike up a little bit. Thank you. Secretary BROWNLEE. Is that better? The CHAIRMAN. Yes. Secretary BROWNLEE. I am sorry, sir. 25 of these are death cases and 10 involve assaults. The CID investigates every death in our custody. Of the 25 death investigations, CID has determined that 12 deaths were due to natural or undetermined causes, one was justifiable homicide and two were homicides. The 10 remaining deaths are still under investigation. Additionally, 42 other potential cases of misconduct against civilians occurred outside detention fa- cilities and are currently under investigation by the Army CID or other responsible units. In coordination with the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs on 10 February 2004, I directed an inspector general of the Army to conduct a functional analysis of the Depart- ment's internment, enemy prisoners of war and detention policies practices and procedures. I directed this inspection to determine if there might be systemic problems relating to the planning doctrine or training in the detention facilities operating within the Central Command theater. Phase one of this assessment is oriented on cur- rent operations in the US Central Command (CENTCOM) area of responsibility with assessment team visits to 16 detention facilities. Phase two of the IG assessment will encompass visits to detainee facilities worldwide including previously visited facilities, to ensure compliance to establish standards. Preliminary findings indicate that leaders and soldiers are aware of the requirement and expec- tation to treat detainees humanly, and that it is their duty to re- port incidents of abuse. To date, the majority of abuse cases indi- cate the underlying cause has been twofold; an individual failure to adhere to basic standards of discipline, training and Army val- ues, and leadership failures to provide oversight and enforce stand- ards. To date, the Army has taken numerous actions to improve the training for military police and military intelligence soldiers. The Army is retraining select MP soldiers to serve as correctional specialists. We have incorporated detainee lessons learned from op- erations in both Iraq and Afghanistan into the MP school curricu- lum and have deployed MP training teams to our combat training centers. In response to a request from the Command, Joint Task Force (CJTF) seven commander, the Army deployed integrated multi-dis- 296 cipline mobile training teams to oversee and conduct comprehen- sive training in all aspects of detainee and confinement operations in theater. Additionally, the chief of the Army Reserves has di- rected his inspector general to conduct a special assessment of training for Reserve personnel on the law of war, detainee treat- ment ethics and leadership. All Reserve Component (RC) Military Intelligence (MI) soldiers are now required to mobilize at the intel- ligence school at Fort Wachuka, so they can receive the latest in- struction on tactical questioning before deployment. Finally, the Army is improving the training of military police and military in- telligence personnel at our combat training centers by incorporat- ing detainee holding situations into the tactical scenarios. These improvements were initiated for the later deploying Oper- ation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) two units and will be fully implemented for all OIF three deploying units. The reported acts of detainee abuse at Abu Ghraib are tragic and disappointing, and they stand in sharp contrast to the values of our Army and the Nation it serves. For these incidents to reflect negatively on the courage, sac- rifice and selfless service of the hundreds of thousands of dedicated men and women who have volunteered to serve our nation in uni- form, would be a tragedy as well. Our soldiers, over 300,000 of whom are deployed in over 120 countries around the world, most in Iraq and Afghanistan, have provided the opportunity for freedom and democracy for over 46 million people who have never experi- enced it before, while at the same time, providing protection to the American people. Mr. Chairman, we will find out how and why this happened and ensure that those individuals determined to be re- sponsible for these shameful and illegal acts of abuse are held ac- countable for their actions. I appreciate this opportunity to appear before you today. I thank you and the members of this distinguished committee for your con- tinuing support of the men and women in our Army and I will look forward to answering your questions. The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Secretary, thank you. General Smith, have a statement? General SMITH. No, sir, in the interest of time I will withhold. The CHAIRMAN. Okay. General Schoomaker. STATEMENT OF GEN. PETER J. SCHOOMAKER, CHIEF OF STAFF, U.S. ARMY General SCHOOMAKER. Yes, sir. Chairman Hunter, Representa- tive Skelton and distinguished members of the committee, as the Chief of Staff of the Army, I am the individual responsible for training and equipping soldiers and growing Army leaders. I am also responsible for providing ready and relevant land power capa- bilities to the combat commanders in the joint steam. Although not in the operational chain of command, I am responsible for our sol- diers, training and readiness therefore, I take it personally when any of them fall short of our standards. To put it in perspective, what we are dealing with are actions of a few, as has been men- tioned, conscious actions that are contrary to all that we stand for. This is not just a training issue. We have annual requirements for all soldiers to train to the legal, moral and ethical standards embodied in the Hague and Geneva convention and the laws of 297 land warfare. But this is an issue that involves character and val- ues. The seven values of the Army are: Loyalty, duty, respect, self- less service, honor, integrity and personal courage. These values are inculcated in our soldiers from the moment they enter the training base and go with them throughout. There is no question that the potential consequences of this situation are serious. But we must not forget that these are few among a great many others who are serving with great honor and sacrifice. And I would just remind you, I know many of you have been to Walter Reed. I was with a young Bradley Lieutenant, Bradley platoon leader, a couple of weeks ago, wounded in the first week of April, who, as we speak, is on his new leg, getting ready to go back to Iraq. That is his objective, to join his platoon. I mean, these are the kind of people this Army's made of, our soldiers, sailors and marines. We have got to remember that we are talking about very few people that made some conscious decisions to act contrary to the values of this Army. We must be careful how we proceed, as it will affect the morale and safety of the great majority of our soldiers who are meeting the standards and are daily placing themselves in harm's way. They too take this personally. I am reminded that in the report by major General Taguba he spoke of several soldiers and units who were challenged by the same set of demanding circumstances at the same places and they did what was right and did not partake in the kinds of acts that are being discussed. The inexcusable behav- ior of a few, is not representative of the courageous and compas- sionate performance of the overwhelming majority of our soldiers who serve with pride and honor. We are currently undergoing an extensive investigation of every allegation. The system works and will result in fairness and justice. We will also learn and we will adapt as we always have. Our Army has already taken corrective actions. Our soldiers are per- forming with distinction and I am proud of them all. I am proud to serve with them. We owe them our confidence. Our Army is tak- ing this very seriously, and we will meet the standards that our Nation expects, as we have for 229 years. Thank you very much, sir. The CHAIRMAN. General, thank you for your statement and gen- tlemen, thank you all for your opening statements here. And I think the first question that anyone would have is what have we done on the ground in the prison system in Iraq to change the situ- ation. When you have a problem like this, especially in a war thea- ter, the response has always been and must always be to send the right officers and non-commissioned officers (NCOs) into the trou- ble spot and get it taken care of. So first question, what is being done in theater on the ground? General SMITH. Sir, the first things that happened is, as was mentioned on the time board, immediately those in the leadership chain were suspended. And prior to that, those that were—the indi- viduals that were under investigation were also suspended and were not allowed to be around any of the detainees. All of that hap- pened within the first several days. Then the Taguba report, the investigation team was put together. And then as that was ongoing and they discovered things, they were fixed immediately on the 298 spot, when able. Things like the Geneva Convention not being post- ed in both languages. Those were fixed. And then the long-term so- lution was to appoint a single individual for detainee operations which was Major General Jeff Miller, who was the commander a Guantanamo Bay, Cuba (Gitmo) and to put both the military intel- ligence brigade and the MP brigade underneath him as a single or- ganization responsible for detainee operations. He has gone ir ne in, implemented most of the Taguba recommenda- tions and has taken many of the stuff he learned at Gitmo, many of the procedures, established standard operations procedures, and he is continuing with that effort today. The CHAIRMAN. So the Taguba report made a number of rec- ommendations. Are you satisfied that the key recommendations are being implemented right now? General SMITH. Sir, the—I would say 75 percent of the rec- ommendations have already been implemented. And the ones that have not are either in the process of being implemented or being evaluated as to whether that is the best course or another course might be better. The CHAIRMAN. Okay. Secretary RUMSFELD. Okay. Point of interest. That is the Taguba report right there. The CHAIRMAN. Yes. I have read it. But it has got a few basic recommendations. And the key recommendations I think, what this committee is concerned about, first of all, is where the prisoners come into contact with American military personnel, where the rubber meets the road, have our officers and seniors NCOs assured themselves that the proper treatment of those prisoners, basic treatment is being followed. Understanding that the Taguba report is complex and goes to training and a lot of things that will have to take place over a period of years. But with respect to the actual treatment of prisoners who are in those facilities right now, in country, are you satisfied, General Smith, that the-that those prisoners now are being treated appropriately? General SMITH. Absolutely sir. That was taken care of imme- diately, with the new leadership chain and then General Schoomaker and the Department of Army put together a 32-man mobile training team as was recommended that have already gone through a significant portion of the training process, and that is on- going as we speak. The CHAIRMAN. Okay. The second question, and since-gentle- men, gentlemen, since you are all here, this is an excellent oppor- tunity and one that we may not have for the next several weeks. I want to go to the 135,000 Americans who aren't the subject of this investigation, the troops who are performing. The situation on the ground in Iraq. Maybe General Myers, where do you place it right now. Where do you put us? cal MYERS. As you know, I think and as we talked about over the last week I think in this very room, the situation in Fallujah is calm but the situation is also not resolved at this point. There are Iraqis in a military formation, about a thousand of them, that are in the city. They have some tasks to perform, some of the things that we talked about last week. They have got to find the perpetrators of the Blackwater killings and desecration of the bod- 299 ies. They have got to find the foreign fighters. They have got to find the regime extremists that have not given up. They have got a lot of work to do. We are scheduled, but to be determined yet, if our Marines start joint patrolling with these individuals. And that is the situation right now. And we will have to see how it develops. We are ready. We have to meet those objectives that I outlined and we are going to do whatever it takes to do it. Hopefully it can be done with these Iraqis under the leadership of General Latef, if not the Marines and coalition forces are going to have to take care of it. And on to Najaf, we have just recently had some very successful operations there, against some of Sadr's thugs that attacked the first armored division forces that were conducting an operation. We killed a significant number of enemy. The Iraqis are still negotiat- ing with Sadr. He is losing influence, I think, everyday, is a fair way to say it. And we think we can continue to let the Iraqis work that problem. But he is eventually going to have a way. Today in Friday prayers, one of his lieutenants offered rewards for coalition soldiers and civilians that were killed in the south and that cer- tainly is not acceptable. And we will continue to watch that situa- tion very carefully. The rest of Iraq, Baghdad is still a place where there are bombs going off as we saw the other day, yesterday. So it is not fully se- cure yet. But the rest of the country is actually doing quite well. The CHAIRMAN. Okay. Thank you very much. The gentleman from Missouri. Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. General, in looking at your chart and the time line, it appears to me that on or about March the 12 would have been a suitable date to inform Congress as to the serious situation that was occurring. You know, we have a lot of wonderful troops, different services in Iraq. They know that at the end of the day that the hearts and minds of the Iraqi people must be won. There is fighting in Fallujah and Najaf, and the reason that they are there and they are involved in the fighting is the very reason we must win the hearts and minds of the Iraqi people. That is why this investigation, that is why the justice that comes from this investigation must be thorough and transparent to the Iraqi people, to the Middle East, as well as to America. Secretary Brownlee mentioned some deaths that have oc- curred. The Washington Post reflects that 25 have died in U.S. cus- tody in both Iraq and Afghanistan. Is there anything else that we ought to know that we won't be surprised with? Secretary BROWNLEE. Mr. Skelton. Mr. SKELTON. Yes. Secretary BROWNLEE. I am sorry. Mr. SKELTON. Yes. Secretary BROWNLEE. Sir, you should know that some of those in- vestigations are ongoing, as I indicated, and the cases are open and we will continue to watch them. One of the things that I would like to do is have our staff work with your staff and we would be happy to come up and brief you periodically or whenever is necessary and keep you apprised of those things if there is an interest here. We would like to do that. We do not think that that may be necessary, but we will respond to that if you like many otherwise, we will be 300 happy to keep you apprised of it. But there probable—there could be misconduct in some of these. We just don't know. They are being investigated. Secretary RUMSFELD. Congressman Skelton. Mr. SKELTON. I can't see you. Yes. Secretary RUMSFELD. The answer to your question is there is more. I indicated in my remarks, there are more photographs. There are videos. There are a series of investigations underway. There are criminal prosecutions. And just without any question there is going to be more coming out. And there will be surprises. I mean that is the nature of this. And you know, in the Depart- ment of Defense, there were 18,000 criminal investigations last year. There were 3,000 court-martials. At any given moment, anywhere in the world, there is some sort of an investigation. And as I indicated in my remarks, the tension is how do you not damage the integrity of the criminal justice sys- tem and the uniform code of military justice, how do you avoid damaging that and still extract from these various investigations things that are important and goodness knows this is important. How do you extract that, get it up so that people aren't going to be surprised? I mean, you were surprised. The President was sur- prised. I was surprised. You say January 6— Mr. SKELTON. March 12. Secretary RUMSFELD. March 12 would have been a good date. You are right. March the 20 Central Command went out and had a press conference and announced to the world and listed the kinds of abuses and charges that were being considered and criminal prosecutions. Mr. SKELTON. He may have announced to the world, but he cer- tainly didn't tell us. Secretary BROWNLEE. Could I comment on that, sir. Secretary RUMSFELD. Sure. Secretary BROWNLEE. Mr. Skelton, if I might because I appre- ciate the opportunity, if I could, to comment on this. If there is any- body on this panel who ought to realize the importance of notifying the committees, it is me; and I became aware of this the same as others did, when Central Command made their press release. I knew that there were reports out there. We had certain basic infor- mation. We had conversations with some of the members of your staff. But I wouldn't suggest that that rises to the level of congres- sional notification. I, quite frankly, was waiting for more and better information, a better report, so we could come and report it to you. The Secretary of Defense, I think, has every reason to expect that people like me will come over and tell you these things. I sincerely regret that I did not. I should have. General MYERS. Congressman Skelton, let me just pile on a little bit. Obviously, I think we have gone to extraordinary lengths in the last couple of years to try to keep this committee and the Congress in general informed. We have really tried hard. We could have done better in this case. We could have done better. The Secretary said that; I have said it; Secretary Brownlee said it. It's a fact. Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Chairman, I have other questions, but, in view of the time, I will reserve my questions. 301 The CHAIRMAN. And I will say to my friend from Missouri that we are going to take you up on your recommendation here, Sec- retary Brownlee. If you could have a point of contact who makes available a briefing to all members of the committee, maybe a morning briefing, just being available for us, and we will take one of the rooms here so that members have a status report as this thing walks down through the prosecutorial track and the inves- tigative track. Maybe one day a week have a team or an individual who is your point man who lets us know, and members who want to attend that briefing can do it. So why don't we set that up. I appreciate the gentleman. The gentleman from New Jersey, Mr. Saxton. Mr. SAXTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman; and thank you all for coming here today. As we all agree, the acts which this committee and the American people have read, seen, and spoken about are deplorable; and we all agree on that. As you have stated clearly, they are fundamen- tally against American values. What I would like to do, Mr. Secretary, is to refer to General Myers' chart and kind of walk through this and to note, first, that it appears that in the fall of 2003 that we were concerned enough about the detention system, prison system, if you will, in Iraq, to do what is referred to as an assessment of it; and during the last quarter, then, of 2003 prisoners that were the responsibility of 372nd Military Police Company were subjected to a series of humil- iations and abuses. Then, on January 13th of 2004, a soldier assigned to the 800th Military Police Brigade left a compact disc of photos of the abuse on the cot of an investigator assigned to the U. S. Army Criminal Investigations Division in Iraq. The next day, on January 14th, CID initiated a criminal investigation of those abuses, and appar- ently that investigation is still ongoing today. Then 2 days later, on January 16th, the United States Central Command issued a press release announcing that it was conducting a criminal investigation of reports of abuse at the Abu Ghraib pris- on. That same day, CENTCOM spokesman Brigadier General Mark Kimmitt briefed reporters covering CENTCOM's daily press beefing of such an investigation, that it was under way. Then, later in January, General Sanchez requested CENTCOM conduct an administrative investigation of the 800th Military Po- lice Brigade and systemic factors that may have contributed to the abuse. On the last day of the month, January 31st, Major Thomas Anto- nio Taguba, the Deputy Combined Forces Land Component Com- mander of CENTCOM, was assigned the task of conducting the ad- ministrative investigation. General Taguba completed his report in March, leading to recommendations for administration punishment, which General Sanchez acted upon in April. General Taguba's report is today here and has been available for Members for a week or so for the committee's review and here in the committee's offices. In February of 2004, Acting Secretary Brownlee ordered U.S. Army Inspector General Lieutenant General Mikolashek to assess the overall training and doctrine regarding detention operations. 302 That review is ongoing, and the review team plans to report back to the Inspector General by. May 21. In March, the Army Chief of Reserve Affairs instituted an assess- ment of the Army Reserve training, with an emphasis on military police and military intelligence operations related to prisoners. That review is ongoing. · Also in March, the CID criminal investigation resulted in formal charges against six individuals from the 800th Military Police Bri- gade. At this time, three of those individuals have been rec- ommended for a general court-martial, and the remaining three cases are still under review. The continuing authority of the court- martial has yet to be determined as to the details and how to pro- ceed. My question is this: When I look at this process, it looks like an orderly process. It looks like it was taken up in a timely fashion. I guess my question is: If you had it to do all over again, looking in today's rearview mirror, would you do anything different, and does the process need to be changed? Secretary RUMSFELD. It is an enormously difficult question, Con- gressman. As I indicated in my remarks, we are constantly finding that we have procedures and habits that have evolved over the years from the last century that don't really fit the 21st century. They do not fit the information age. They do not fit the time when people are running around with digital cameras. Second, with 24- hour news a and digital cameras, something like this can impact that is just enormous. Now we have rules against meddling in criminal prosecutions. As I said, we have got—what—18,000 criminal investigations opened every year. We have 3,000 court martials in a year. And when do you reach down in there and run the risk of affecting the integrity of that process because you believe there may be something in there that is so explosive, so damaging to our country that you are willing to break the pattern and pull it up? . In this case, our habits and our patterns were that we don't do that, that these things get handled in the military justice system. They get handled in the commands. They get handled in the sery- ices as appropriate. That big report over there hadn't even reached the Pentagon, to my knowledge, by the time someone took that secret report and gave it to the press. Now, it was inflammatory. If someone at this table had heard about it and gone in there and asked to get into it and do something with it or about it, they would have been wide- ly criticized. I guess when I say I failed, I mean the President was blind- sided, the Congress was blind-sided, everyone at this table was blind-sided, except for General Smith, who is in that command. We are trying to figure out how we do that better, and it isn't easy. We have to protect the rights of defendants. We have got to observe the proper handling of criminal investigations. And yet when something is radioactive like this, we have to find a way to get that up so we can look at it. I mean, that chart over there, as you suggested, suggests that they handled it darn well at the command level, and yet look where we are. In the normal order of things, one would look at that and 303 say, good job. And with the circumstance we are in, we have to say we apologize that it happened and that we did not have a system or a procedure where it would get pulled up and presented in a way that it could have been managed better. Mr. SAXTON. Thank you. The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman. The gentleman from South Carolina, Mr. Spratt. Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Secretary, General Myers, thank you for your testimony. There is no trust that we hold more sacred than the good name of America. I think you will all agree the good name of America has been hurt and hurt badly by these revelations. Just as the world is looking at those revolting photographs, they are now looking back at us to see what we are going to do. Not what we are going to say but what we are going to do. I think you will agree with me, it is not going to be enough just to make scapegoats of six or seven enlisted personnel. You have got to go up and down the chain of command and outside the chain of command, indeed, outside the uniformed military to look at the pri- vate contractors, among other places, to find out who knew of these practices, condoned these practices, encouraged and gave rise to these practices, assuming they weren't totally isolated actions. And I find it hard to believe that they were totally isolated actions. Brigadier General Karpinski has said that the policy of interro- gating prisoners and using the MPs to loosen them up, set them up, was set above her and has implied that, though these MPs may not have taken what they did as de rigueur, they could have re- garded it as within the penumbra of these policies that were “set- up or loosen-up policies.” You say that all these things are in investigation. I look at the chronology you give and I am concerned, because there was an in- vestigation, an initial investigation, which began in August, early September. General Miller apparently conducted it. He completed it in the first week of November. This was the same time period during which those abuses were taking place. How did the inves- tigation miss those abuses if it was adequate? Secretary RUMSFELD. I don't believe that I would characterize General Miller's activity as an investigation. He was the person who had been in charge of Guantanamo Bay. He had experience with the issues of detention and interrogation, and he was asked to go over there and make an assessment, and he did. And he came back and made a series of recommendations. But he did not go over there on an investigatory process, where he would be looking for wrongdoing or anything like that. He was looking at systems, procedures, approaches, and that type of thing. Mr. SPRATT. One of the recommendations he made was that the joint task force should create a guard team that “sets the condi- tions for the successful interrogation and exploitation of detainees.” Later on, General Taguba and General Ryder made an examina- tion or an assessment; and they said, according to the Taguba re- port, the recommendation of General Miller's team that the guard force be actively engaged in setting conditions for successful exploi- tation of the internees appears to be in conflict with the rec- ommendation of General Ryder's team and Army Regulation (AR) 304 190–8, that military police do not "participate in military intel- ligence supervised interrogation sessions. Moreover, military police should not be involved with setting favorable conditions for subse- quent interviews.” And they were implying that he had sanctioned this activity and that this activity is wrong for a reason. I think the reason is you may get your MPs involved in the wrong kind of activity, or they may, without adequate supervision, go beyond what is approved procedure. General Miller is now in charge of detainee operations in Iraq. Has any correction been issued to him, or has any exception been taken for sanctioning this kind of policy? Secretary RUMSFELD. I will let General Smith respond in a minute, but first let me—you used some correct quotes from the as- sessment by Miller and by the Taguba report that seem in conflict. What was found at Guantanamo was that the task was to do three things: One was to keep terrorists off the street so they do not go kill more innocent men, women, and children; and the second was to look at punishment and potential prosecution of people; and the third task was to interrogate and learn about additional terrorist acts that might be conducted so we could save the lives of Amer- ican people.. The tasks are different for the people who have the responsibility for the custody of the detainee. Their job is to have them safe and secure and off the street. The interrogator's job is to learn what they can learn from them to save other lives. It is quite proper, in my view and in my understanding of this- indeed, it is desirable to have the people who keep them safe and secure do it in a manner that allows the interrogation process to be the most effective. I can see where the words from one assessment report and the words from the Taguba report, being different, that one could raise that issue, and that is clearly something that we need to address and come to some conclusions on, but I don't think that necessarily, on the face of it, there's a problem. And do you know if there was any corrections issued, as the question was? Mr. SPRATT. Are you saying, then, that this policy of loosening up said that the MPs should be engaged in this procedure of loos- ening up, setting up, and preparing the prisoners for interrogation? Secretary RUMSFELD. Of course not. The things you are quoting about softening up-I saw that myself—of course not. That is not the policy or the procedure. Mr. SPRATT. But it appears in General Miller's assessment that “they should set the conditions for successful interrogation and ex- ploitation of internees.” Secretary RUMSFELD. That is a very different thing from soften- ing up, I would submit. Do you want to? General SMITH. Yes, sir. I talked to General Miller this morning about that, and his clear intent in this—and it was explained in his report—is that the two were related in one form or another because they were both in- volved in the same facilities and that the guards should be listen- 305 ing and watching to see who the detainees are talking to, should be part of the interrogation plan but not in the interrogation itself. But if there was—with the minimums of the Geneva Convention, if they are to be woken up on time, or at a particular time, or have a certain amount of sleep, that was all part of the interrogation plan that would be approved up through the chain of command. None of it inferred or intended to do anything against the Geneva Conventions or the fragmentary order that was on the street that governed interrogation and the methods of interrogating. So the idea of softening up was in no sense intended to do the sorts of things that we are talking about here or that we saw in the pictures but simply a matter of being part of the whole solu- tion. The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman. The gentleman from Texas, Mr. Thornberry. Mr. THORNBERRY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Secretary and gentlemen, I appreciate your being here. I can't help but reflect that this sort of oversight and tough but fair questioning, which for the most part I think you have received today, is an element of exactly the sort of self-government we are trying to help the Iraqis to accomplish, where they, too, can ask questions of their government and to hold those who engage in mis- conduct accountable or to find out how they are going to be held accountable. So I appreciate your being here. On Monday of this week I attended a funeral for 21-year-old Lance Corporal Aaron Austin in Amarillo, Texas, who was killed last week in Fallujah. He died trying to help the Iraqis develop a free and secure and stable country, and I guess the thing that both- ers me the most about this incident is the extent to which it makes it more difficult to accomplish the objectives that Corporal Austin gave his life for. It seems to me there are two aspects to this episode. One which you have set out in the chronology here relates to the conduct in the prisons. It is obviously deplorable, and we have investigations like we would have in a civilian context, if there were prison guards in a civilian prison or if there were police abuse. We have to be careful of the accused's rights. We have to focus on finding the facts. We have to get to the facts and engage in a systematic sort of prosecution. And I agree with you and with others who have nd any fault the way that has been done so far, at least since January in this case. The other aspect to this matter, it seems to me, are the photo- graphs, because they are being exploited by those people who want to try to keep the Iraqi people under oppression. They are humiliating. They incite people. They hit in some of the most sen- sitive cultural spots, and the damage they have done is tremen- dous. I guess what I am not quite as clear about is whether our gov- ernment is able to recognize and address that aspect of this prob- lem or those kinds of things that come up. Some people will talk about psychological aspects of warfare, some people talk about the war of ideas, and it may be that these photographs in a classified report came out of nowhere and appeared and there was nothing 306 that could have been done to diminish the psychological impact or the damage that they would do. That is a long way of saying I hope in our investigations we don't just look at the conduct but we get, Mr. Secretary, what you called the habits and procedures that it seems to me do relate to how we win the hearts and minds of the Iraqi people that are beyond just the bullets and the important things we are doing but relate to this war of ideas. I guess I would like to ask—and I am not sure these questions can be answered—General Smith, you seem to have the most knowledge and the longest stream of knowledge. Do you know how many sets of photographs there were? Do you know how they got out; how they were leaked to the media? And was it a complete surprise, to the best that you know, that they got out? Or did we have time to think about some sort of a strategy? Not to cover any- thing up but to try to limit the psychological impact that they would have. General SMITH. Sir, it was a surprise that it got out. I mean, it wasn't a huge surprise, because we knew—we had one disc that was given to us on the 13th, and in the subsequent investigation we got an additional disc that was back in the States, and to the best of our knowledge at that time that disc had not gone anyplace. It was one of the individuals. And we got the disc back, and it was our understanding that that was the limit of the pictures, and we thought that we had them all. But you know and I know it is a false hope, and we were wrong. Somebody put those pictures out in some form or another on the Internet, or however they got out. Who leaked them? How they got out? I mean, in my view, it had to be one of the people that was involved in all of this stuff. Those are the only people that we know that had the photos, except, obvi- ously, they gave them to the young sergeant that turned them in. He got hold of them. So, yes, sir, it was a surprise, but not that big a surprise. Mr. THORNBERRY. Thank you. The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman. Just one thing. One question the gentleman asked or he implied that I think is really important, in light of Mr. Spratt's questions, and we would like to have this made very clearly, is there any- thing, any official regulation with respect to the treatment of pris- oners that directs anything close to what we saw in terms of the activity manifested in those pictures? Secretary RUMSFELD. Absolutely not. Do you want to General MYERS. I was just going to say, any implication that this behavior was driven by direction of the chain of command or by any pressure to get interrogation results from Washington, D.C., is absolutely just not right. I mean, that is not how it works at all. Just to reiterate. The detainees in Iraq are covered under the Ge- neva Convention, article 4 for civilians and the other article for other folks. We still have a couple—a handful of enemy prisoners of war. I think it is 12 at last count. Most of them are in the civil- ian category. The Geneva Convention applies, and those are the in- structions that were issued. We can talk about troop strength, and we can talk about train- ing, and we can talk about leadership, and we can talk about all 307 those things. What you see on these photographs are people. They could have had the best training. This was sadistic activity, and this was not a troop-strength issue. These were people that had gone off on some tangent on their own, for whatever reason, and done what they have done. It certainly wasn't under any direction from any headquarters that I know of. General SMITH. Sir, could I also add that there were somewhere in the neighborhood of 7,000 to 8,000 prisoners there in three dif- ferent camps. At Abu Ghraib, in cell block 1-A, which is where this occurred, there were about 20 to 30 prisoners, and they were the ones involved. And most of this activity, as best we can tell, oc- curred between 2200 and 0400 in the morning. So the pattern seems to be focused on a small group, these six or seven folks, and a small group of detainees. The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman. The gentleman from Illinois, Mr. Evans. General SCHOOMAKER. Sir, could I interject here? The CHAIRMAN. Yes, certainly. General Schoomaker. General SCHOOMAKER. In all of my years of service, I have never seen anything like this. I have spent an awful lot of years of service engaged in special operations and in all kinds of things, and I have never seen anything like this. And I want to be very careful here, because I believe that from what I have seen and read that there is a confluence here of a leadership void, inadequate leadership and supervision, with some people that deliberately did things that were contrary to what they knew to be right. I think it is as simple as that, and I tried to address that in my statement very carefully. These soldiers have been exposed to the correct legal, moral and ethical standards and the values and the things that are there. I think this is a great example of the con- fluence of a leadership void and people that deliberately were par- ticipating in things they knew to be wrong; and I am convinced that this notion that there is somehow a systematic program to do this is incorrect. The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. The gentleman from Illinois, Mr. Evans. Mr. EVANS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Secretary, the Taguba report makes it clear that this was a failure in leadership. Secretary RUMSFELD. Sir, could you speak up a bit? I am having trouble hearing you. Mr. EVANS. I am sorry. The report makes it clear that this was a failure in leadership and training at the unit level from detach- ment to brigade level. Who is responsible when a brigade com- mander is found to have, in the words of the report, “complete un- willingness to either understand or accept that many of the prob- lems inherent in the 800th MP Brigade has been caused or exacer- bated by poor leadership and the refusal of her command to both establish and enforce basic standards and principles among the sol- diers? In other words, we see no officer implicated above Brigadier Gen- eral Karpinski, who is now being held responsible for her failures within her command. But who is responsible for this failure? Did 308 no one above her know what was going to happen and look at it another way? In other words, Mr. Secretary, do other deployed units suffer from poor leadership and training of this magnitude, and are spe- cific steps being taken to ensure units being caught up in the next rotation will not suffer from the same problems of poor leadership and training? Secretary RUMSFELD. I would like to start and then possibly oth- ers would comment. The responsibility for training falls to the Department of the Army. The responsibility for leadership in the command falls to the Central Command. And the Taguba report, as you indicated, points up deficiencies and important deficiencies. But that is the answer on the responsibility. Mr. EVANS. What are we doing now to prevent this from happen- ing again? It is of great interest to me, because I have a National Guard unit that has been moved from artillery to MP status, and I don't know if they are getting the leadership or the help that they de- serve. Can you comment about what we are doing immediately? Secretary RUMSFELD. General Schoomaker, you want to comment on that? General SCHOOMAKER. I apologize, but I cannot hear you at all. The CHAIRMAN. General Schoomaker, I think I could hear Lane fairly well, and it is his concern about what is being done now to ensure that there is not a repeat of what we have seen. Secretary RUMSFELD. Whether with respect to training or leader- ship. General SCHOOMAKER. Well, I think General Smith has ad- dressed the fact that there have been major changes in terms of the leadership change and responsibility in theater. I know that we have placed into country, out of the training base, experts that are now embedded in support of General Miller over there and doing training on the scene to ensure that we have the right expertise and the right training going on with the people now on the ground there. I believe General Smith mentioned this mobile training team that we have got in there. I also know that we have a variety of other looks going on. The Secretary of the Army, with the Depart- ment of the Army IG, is in there looking at this in a very holistic context. I think General Smith mentioned the chain of command has been established, cleaned up, and that we have General Miller now with responsibilities over the totality of the problem. So my view is we moved in a very, very positive way, very quick- ly, and have got a pretty good handle on it. We, as we mobilize sol- diers or deploy soldiers, are putting specific emphasis on the Gene- va Convention—the Hague and the Geneva Conventions, the law land warfare in our combat training centers. We are dealing spe- cifically with the proper procedures and treatment of detainees from the point of capture all the way through the system to the point of detention; and I can assure you this is receiving very, very strong attention. 309 So, outside of that—and I might not have been as comprehensive as I could be—but that is what I am thinking of off the top of my head. Maybe the Secretary of the Army has something. General MYERS. Let me just add a word here that training is im- portant, leadership is important, but in my 39 years in the service, I have been the victim of poor leadership, and you didn't need a leader standing over these individuals on those nights, October through December, to remind them that what they were doing was not only illegal but it is immoral and it is unethical. And, yes, we have things to fix, and, yes, leadership can help. But there was one soldier in that unit that, despite the leadership, despite whatever training deficiencies there might have been, fig- ured it out. My guess is there were many more, because this was a night shift operation that didn't know and, if they had known, would have done the right thing as well. This is a failure of individ- uals. General SCHOOMAKER. I might add that the definition if you un- derstand discipline, discipline is doing what is right when nobody is watching. This is a breakdown of discipline and a void in effec- tive leadership and supervision, in my opinion, from what I have read as I have gone through General Taguba's report. But we are going to be very aggressive in going through this sys- tem and making sure that we have got a handle on and are being proactive in terms of what we are doing to prepare our soldiers to operate in Central Command and elsewhere in the world. Secretary BROWNLEE. Well, I will just reiterate some of what General Schoomaker said. One of the things I want to emphasize is the Department of Army Inspector General teams that have gone over to Iraq and Afghanistan have done just what General Schoomaker said, they have started at point of capture and taken it all the way back to the detention facilities. So they have looked at some battalion level, they have looked at brigade level facilities, they have looked at the division levels and then the other detention facilities, the bigger ones. So this is a holistic look. It is comprehen- sive. But, in addition, a lot of the things I mentioned in my opening statement that have to do with sending mobile training teams to our training centers, our national training center and our Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC), where units train before they are deployed, we have emphasized these detention conditions also and training points there and our military intelligence people as well. All of our MI people now, before they deploy, go to Fort Huachuca first to get the latest in these things. Mr. EVANS. All right. Thank you very much, and I appreciate your continued efforts. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman. We are going to go to Mr. Ryun next, but I would like to ask unanimous consent of our members that any other Members of the House, who aren't members of the committee, get to ask questions at the end of our membership. So, without objection, we will allow that to happen. The gentleman from Kansas, Mr. Ryun. 310 Mr. RYUN OF KANSAS. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much for holding this hearing; and I would like to thank the Secretary, Gen- eral Myers, General Smith, Secretary Brownlee, General Schoomaker and all those that are in uniform for your service to this country; and those that might be watching that they should understand that this is unacceptable what has happened, but we are grateful for what they have done in helping Iraq get on its feet. Like others on this committee who serve in Congress, I have had the privilege of going out to the hospitals and visiting with those soldiers, some who have given their life, some who have given a limb, an arm or a leg. I wish we were shining a light on that today, because I think what it would really show is their determination. Though they have lost perhaps a body part, they have never given up on the hope for freedom and are still fighting in their hearts for those that are there in Iraq and want to see that country truly ex- perience what we in this country sometimes take for granted, that freedom is an everyday thing. But freedom has to be earned, and freedom is never really free. I would like to shine a little light on just one simple question, because there are others here with questions as well. There has en a lot of discussion about the prison, Abu Ghraib, and the hor- rific past it had under Saddam Hussein. It was a torture chamber. Unfortunately, now it has gained even further notoriety. Would it not be perhaps a symbolic or psychological end to a horrific past particular prison were torn down, sending a message to not only Iraqis but to the world that this is an aberration, that this is not typical of Americans, and that we need to bring an end to it? I would appreciate your thoughts on that. Secretary RUMSFELD. There are certainly compelling arguments for that. It does have a past of Saddam Hussein's torturing and murdering and rape rooms, and it is just a horrible, horrible past. And it might very well be a good thing. I wouldn't be surprised to see the Iraqi people make such a decision as they take over the management of their country in the weeks immediately ahead. Mr. RYUN OF KANSAS. Anyone else? General SMITH. Sir, right now it is just one of the wings that has the military in it. The Iraqi police and correctional folks have about five wings of that place. We are just using a very small part of it right now. But they should certainly have an interest in tearing that place down. There is, unfortunately, just not a lot of other places of that significant or that kind of thing right now to do it, and it is oing to take about 2 to 3 years to build the kind of facilities they need to house their criminal population. Mr. RYUN OF KANSAS. Thank you. The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman. The gentleman from Mississippi, Mr. Taylor. Mr. TAYLOR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman; and I want to thank our guests for being with us today. One of the great privileges of my life was getting to know Ste- phen Ambrose. One of the more profound things that he ever told me was in response to a question as to what was different about the American General Infantry (GI) in World War II. He said some- thing to the effect—and I wish I could remember it better—that 311 when a German soldier, or a Nazi, when a Japanese imperial sol- dier, when a Russian soldier showed up in a village, bad things were going to happen. Women were going to be raped, old people and kids were going to be tortured. Bad things were going to hap- pen. And the difference was that when a GI showed up, be it in Belgium, be it in Germany, be it in Italy, even though 10 minutes before they were our enemies, that wasn't going to happen. That really has been the history and the pride of the American service people, and I deeply regret the actions of a handful of peo- ple that have tarnished that. I more so regret that the actions of a handful of people have put their brothers and sisters in uniform at risk. I strongly suspect that their actions will be one of the best recruiting tools for al Qaeda and the Baathists and those who seek to hurt us anywhere in the world. Secretary Rumsfeld, I am troubled that it wasn't just this that happened. What I see is a persistent mention of a lack of man- power as one of the contributing factors. I have taken the time to read the report by Major General Ryder, which is on your time-line over there, was presented on the 6th of November but actually took place between the 13th and the 6th. If you read the second report by Major General Taguba and read the first one, you might think you are in two different countries. The first report does not mention escapes, it does not mention the assistance of Iraqi guards in those escapes, it does not mention that a weapon was smuggled to an Iraqi prisoner, and yet, check- ing the time lines, most of these things occurred while General Ryder's team was in Iraq. I say this because I see—as someone who believed the President when he said there were weapons of mass destruction and they were getting ready to be used against Americans and who voted for and shares in the responsibility for the death of over 700 Ameri- cans, I see a pattern here that I don't like. It was moms and dads from homes who had to write me and tell me that their kids weren't getting the proper body armor. It wasn't from one of these hearings. Then it was David Kay, a Bush appointee, who had to tell me in Baghdad that, because of a lack of manpower, huge am- munition caches were left unguarded in Iraq and were used by our enemies against our troops later on as people went and stole those weapons. As far as Improvised Explosive Device (IEDs), there was con- versations with troops in the field that told me that was their big- gest fear, not a hearing in this room, not a statement from the Sec- retary. It was troops in the field that told me that that is what they were afraid of, and they didn't think the proper measures were being taken to protect them. And, last, it was a National Guard unit from home, shortly be- fore Christmas, that showed me proudly their efforts to make their own up-armored Humvee, because apparently no one above was bothering to tell Congress, which writes the checks for these things, that they needed to be protected.. You are obviously a smart man. You are probably one of the smartest people I know. Just in this room last week you recalled a conversation we had 4 months ago, looked at me and made men- tion of it. Then you made mention of a conversation that you and 312 I didn't even have, but I had with someone several links down the chain of command from you. What is troubling is how is it that someone who is so smart and so detail oriented, why does it take from January to May for this committee now to find out about this in the wake of all those other things that this committee should have known about? I sent those kids off to get killed. I share in that responsibility. I also share in the responsibility to fix these things. But we can't fix these things if we are not told about them. And I would wel- come your response. Secretary RUMSFELD. You bet. If you have 18,000 criminal inves- tigations opened a year and you have a society that respects the rights of defendants and people that are subject to potential pros- ecution and you look at this situation here, that report that is sit- ting over there worked its way along very rapidly. It was not yet in the Pentagon, to my knowledge, when a copy of that secret re- port was given to the press. There were no secrets about what was happening. It was an- nounced by the Central Command in January that there were charges of abuse. It was announced on March 20th by Central Command, which I can't see it there, March 12th, and you knew what we knew at this level. Mr. TAYLOR. Mr. Secretary, at what time were you made aware of the photographs? Secretary RÚMSFELD. There were rumors of photographs in a criminal prosecution chain back some time after January 13th that were basically—I don't remember precisely when, but sometime in that period of January, February, March. Mr. TAYLOR. But if I may, Mr. Secretary, I think there was a uni- versal response in seeing those photographs, that we were all shocked, appalled, and probably 90 percent of us said what in the heck were they thinking. I've got to believe that, given the sensitiv- ity of this and the graphic nature of what was going on, that this would have been Secretary RUMSFELD. If you see the photographs, absolutely, I agree with you completely. Mr. TAYLOR. But I would have believed that this would have been forwarded to you, that somehow someone would have seen that it got to you, because I know you are a smart, detailed-ori- ented guy. Secretary RUMSFELD. It wasn't. It just wasn't. The photographs were not brought up out of the criminal prosecution chain, because, as I said in my opening statements, the habits, the procedures, the normal pattern of the way things are done. And here was this, what you properly say was just so stunning, so shocking, and the damage that has been done is enormous, and it breaks our hearts that in fact someone didn't say, wait, look, this is terrible, we need to do something. The legal part of it was proceeding along fine. What wasn't pro- ceeding along fine was the fact that the President didn't know, and you didn't know, and I didn't know, and, as a result, somebody just sent a secret report to the press and there they are. I don't know the answer. I tell you my nightmare today. I will bet you anything that the sensitivity throughout the chain of com- 313 mand today is great on this issue. I mean, everyone is stunned by it. My worry today is that there is some other procedure or some other habit that is 20th century, that is normal process, the way we have always done it, quote, unquote, a peacetime approach to the world, and there is some other process we haven't discovered yet that needs to be modernized to the 21st century, that needs to recognize the existence, in this case, for example, of digital cam- eras, and trying to figure out what that is before it, too, causes something like this, is my nightmare. Mr. TAYLOR. Mr. Secretary, the chairman has been incredibly generous with my time. If I may follow up with one last question, open to the panel. Were any of you aware of these photographs prior to the "60 Minutes” publication? General Myers has already made me aware that he was aware. I am curious if you other gentlemen would re- spond. General MYERS. Let me just respond. I did not see the pictures until last night with the Secretary. That is when I saw them. I think the Secretary and I, as he said, we were both aware there were the possibility of pictures in January, when this investigation started. That is when I was first aware. Secretary BROWNLEE. Sir, we certainly knew what General Kimmitt said on March the 20th, and he described what people had been charged with, and we had been told there were pictures. Now, one may visualize that someone may have sneaked a camera in and taken some pictures of someone doing something with one of the detainees. But I don't think anybody sitting here thought in their wildest dreams that there were posed pictures of this kind of debauchery in these numbers. And, for the record, I saw the pictures the first time on the Dan Rather video show, was the first pictures I had seen. Mr. TAYLOR. General Schoomaker, the same? I see you nodding your head. General SCHOOMAKER. I saw the pictures for the first time on tel- evision, and then I saw them with the Secretary last night on the disc, is the first time. Secretary RUMSFELD. The reality is we don't know what is going on in these other 3,000 court martials that are going on today. In other words, we do not have visibility from the Pentagon, from Washington, D.C., into the criminal prosecutions that are existing all across the world. And the question is, should we? How would one do that without jeopardizing the rights of the de- fendants? How would one do that without being charged with cre- ating a situation where no one gets convicted because of command influence? It is a very tough, complicated problem. Mr. TAYLOR. Again, thank you, gentlemen, for being here; and, Mr. Chairman, thank you for your generosity. General SCHOOMAKER. If I could, sir, I also think it is important to note that, aside from the pictures, the first time I know the Sec- retary and I saw the Taguba report was Monday. General MYERS. Same for me. Secretary RUMSFELD. We still haven't seen the videos. There is another disc that has videos on it. Mr. TAYLOR. Thank you, sir. 314 The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman. The gentlewoman from New Mexico, Mrs. Wilson. - Mrs. WILSON OF NEW MEXICO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General Schoomaker, you said with some passion that never in your career have you seen anything like this. Secretary RUMSFELD. I am sorry, maybe my ears have gone bad, but I am having a dickens of a time hearing folks. Mrs. WILSON OF NEW MEXICO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General Schoomaker, you said with some passion that never in your career have you seen anything like this, and it brought some- thing to mind, and the parallels are pretty striking. What it brought to mind for me was My Lai. That incident had a profound effect on your generation of people in the Army and on American support for the war and on the world's view of America, and I don't think we can underestimate the importance of this hearing today or of the military and the Defense Department's response to what has been uncovered or how America will be perceived for the next 20 years. I think it is very important for complete and full disclosure of all relevant information that the Defense Department has, irrespective of the way we have always done it. And I agree with you, Mr. Sec- retary, the way we have always done it, in compartmentalizing in- formation that has a huge impact on the way America is viewed, is no longer acceptable. You need to break through those walls and be able to stand in front of the world and tell everyone what you know. I would like to follow up a little on the line of questioning that Mr. Spratt began, and that has to do with command the lines of authority. It is my understanding that there was an order given on the 19th of November that effectively put the Abu Ghraib prison under the command of military intelligence. There is a section of that order that is quoted in General Taguba's report. I do not have the complete copy of the order, but the paragraph says, "effective immediately, Commander 201st Mili- tary Intelligence Brigade assumes responsibility for the Baghdad confinement facility and is appointed the forward operating base commander. Units currently at the Abu Ghraib are TAČCON, tactically controlled, to 205 Military Intelligence Brigade for secu- rity of detainees and Forward Operating Base (FOB) protection.” That order effectively put all the MPs in that unit under the command or under the control of military intelligence, which, as I understand it, is contrary to army regulation. Is that order still in effect or has it been rescinded? Secretary RUMSFELD. General Smith. General SMITH. It has been rescinded. The organization under General Miller right now is established so that he works for CJTF- 7 General Sanchez, and the MI Brigade and the MP Brigade both work directly for him. Mrs. WILSON OF NEW MEXICO. Who signed that order? General SMITH. The November Fragmentary Order (FRAGO)? Mrs. WILSON OF NEW MEXICO. Who signed the order? And did any of you here testifying today know of that change? General SMITH. I am not sure what you mean. The November order? 315 Mrs. WILSON OF NEW MEXICO. The 19 November, 2003, FRAGO order changing the lines of command. Who signed it? And did any of you here today know that it had been signed? General SMITH. General Sanchez signed the order as the CJTF- 7 commander. Secretary RUMSFELD. I did not know. General MYERS. I didn't know. Secretary RUMSFELD. It is not the kind of thing we would know. Secretary BROWNLEE. I did not know. General SCHOOMAKER. I did not. General SMITH. And I didn't know. I was just arriving at CENTCOM at the time. Mrs. WILSON OF NEW MEXICO. I think the order may be in this pile over here; and I believe that the committee should have access to that order, preferably by close of business today. eral SMITH. I might mention that the idea there really was to put-because there were multiple commanders out there at Abu Ghraib—to put the whole thing under one commander. More unity of command, unity of effort than it was to subordinate the MPs in the interrogation process. Secretary RUMSFELD. I would also add that I do not know wheth- er it is against Army regulations or not, or doctrine or procedures. I just simply don't know the answer to that, and I did not want to leave my silence to suggest agreement with your comment. General SCHOOMAKER. I am told back here, Congresswoman Wil- son, that that is a task organization issue, not a regulation. Mrs. WILSON OF NEW MEXICO. According to Major General Taguba's report, he found that this setting of conditions and the lack of separation of military intelligence from MPs was contrary to Army regulation 109–8 and was a contributing factor to the problems in Abu Ghraib. I think that is an important factor that warrants some further consideration that I haven't heard discus- sion of; and, Mr. Secretary, I would like your response and com- ment. Secretary RUMSFELD. I am sorry, did you just ask me a question? I couldn't hear a thing. General SCHOOMAKER. I heard what she said. I think we were addressing a different issue. You talked about tactical control, the MPs under it. Now you are talking about doctrinal mission busi- ness and Army regulation, and I think those are two things. You could have MPs under the tactical control of the MI to do the MP doctrinal role, which is to provide a safe and secure envi- ronment. When you step over the line and say you now have them setting conditions or participating in interrogation, that is a dif- ferent issue; and I think you are exactly correct, the Army regula- tion prohibits that. But I thought we were addressing a different issue when you first said that. I thought you were addressing the take on issue. Mrs. WILSON OF NEW MEXICO. Major General Taguba's report says that there was confusion over who was in authority in this prison, and that some of the guards may have been taking their di- rection from military intelligence interrogators on that unit, and that this order contributed to that confusion, particularly as there 316 were no written standard operating procedures as to how these sol- diers should act and what the limits of their authority were. That seems to me to be a major issue of command and control and something worthy of further analysis and thought. General SCHOOMAKER. And I think we would agree with that, ex- actly what you just said. The CHAIRMAN. And on the gentlelady's point, this question as to—and I think the implication, though, once again, that what we saw in those pictures may have been directed by the interrogation leadership, which had taken over the which now had a larger role in the prison. I think that is a question that has to be explored and investigated. Is that question being explored and investigated? Secretary RUMSFELD. It is. The Fay investigation is the one that is looking at military intelligence. What is the due date? General MYERS. I think it is several weeks out, if it stays on schedule. The CHAIRMAN. And, Mr. Secretary and Secretary Brownlee, as you move forward, as we have this weekly briefing that is available for our Members on the status on this overall issue, that, of course, I think is a very important element because that obviously makes the perspective here much different. Okay. The gentleman from Arkansas Dr. Snyder. Dr. SNYDER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you gentlemen for being here. I think you have made a good start both with the Senate and over here today on trying to get this resolved, and I know that your country appreciates you. Secretary Rumsfeld, I want to answer one of your questions which you brought up just a minute ago: Is there anything out there that we could be doing that could avoid things like this? ne members of this committee that are very interested in doing an update in the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), modernize the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) with regard to sexual crimes. The Cox Commission three years ago recommended that it be revamped. It has been sitting there. We still have questions coming from DOD. The markup of the defense bill is on Wednesday and it would be a wonderful thing if you could resolve those concerns and questions by this next week, because it is the over-50-year-old provisions that we are now using in the UCMJ to prosecute sex crimes. It needs to be updated. And I think we are just quibbling over some details that I would hope could get resolved. General Smith, there was a press report last week about special- ist or, I guess, Sergeant Darby, a family member expressed concern for his safety. I assume from the comments you all have made here today and at the Senate that not only is he protected, but that he is well respected for what he has done throughout the military. Is that a fair statement? General SMITH. Sir, I can't tell you that personally. I mean, I can make that assumption. Dr. SNYDER. You don't have any reason to think that there would be anyone to bring—within the military, there would be concern for his safety? 317 General SMITH. Sir, the shame for all this for the soldiers that are doing—I mean, the danger is for the folks that protected them, not for the ones that turned them in. Dr. SNYDER. General Myers, in your discussions with CBS about that report in which they delayed it, I think, for two weeks or something while things were going on, was there anything that you agreed to do in response for that? Did you agree not to go public with this or not to discuss this? Or it was just a courtesy that they extended to you in the interest of protecting the lives of our men and women in uniform? General MYERS. Right. And that is why I did it, because I talked to General Abizaid, I think it was on Saturday. On Sunday I talked to my public affairs folks. They—you know, we heard about—this was in April. We heard for months that these photographs were out there. I hadn't seen them. Dr. SNYDER. I don't have much time, but your answer to that question was, no, you didn't agree to do anything to General MYERS. No. We did say, when the photographs were re- leased, that we would be willing to provide, you know, somebody to come and talk about this issue. Dr. SNYDER. And General Kimmitt did that. General MYERS. I think it was General Kimmitt that wound up. And it wasn't an agreement, it was just a suggestion that we would like to have somebody senior talking about this. Dr. SNYDER. And I think he did a good job. One of the concerns of this Congress has been, as you heard it today at the Senate, about our involvement in this and our lack of information, because we want to help you. I mean, this is a huge problem, as Heather Wilson pointed out. And you know it is a huge problem; and Secretary Rumsfeld's statements about it being a huge problem. But when you were here last week, General Myers, and as we left, I said to one of my colleagues that I wondered how long it had been—you had a three-day weekend with your wife be- cause you looked very tired. But you probably, perhaps one of the reasons, knew this thing was coming. Perhaps if we had known that was coming, and General Myers and the Chairman of the committee and Mr. Warner and you all could have done some kind of a joint press conference and said, this thing is coming tonight on this show with very, very ugly photos, but we are committed as a Congress and a people to get to the bot- tom of that, that we could have helped you deal with it. Instead in this business, you know, a 1-day story becomes a 2-day story; obviously, it is much longer than that. But we want to help you. And I think that there are Members here, some of the most senior Members, that could have helped in this situation had we known. That is my only 20/20 hindsight com- ment that I am going to make. I am not going to prejudge all this stuff here. General MYERS. Two comments. You are right, we could have done a better job of that. I am sorry I look tired, but- Dr. SNYDER. You are entitled. You have been working hard for a year and a half or 2, or 39. You have been working hard for 39 years. 318 General MYERS. Sir, and in fairness, though, there was a process that did inform some staff members that the show was going to come out on Wednesday night. I am not saying that was sufficient, but I am just saying— . Dr. SNYDER. That was not sufficient, and we can't help you—and there are Members, the Chairman would have sat down with you for—and could have come up with what I think clearly would have been a better plan than what occurred. I wanted to ask a specific question of General Smith, and it is a detailed question. You mentioned 20 to 30 detainees and a small number of people. The most recent Washington Post photo shows by my count nine military people in the photo. And then I don't know if there was a photographer, if that was a video camera from the second floor, but that potentially is 10 people. We can't possibly be having a 2-to-1 or 3-to-1 ratio of military to detainee, are we, in that prison? It is like 6- or 7,000. Is that number? Am I- General SMITH. Sir, that cell was a special cell that kept 7/24 coverage with a number of folks. Now, some of the folks that were in those photos were people that should not have been in the photos and were not part of the hour-to-hour, minute-to-minute protection, or members of—that the guard—I mean, the guys with the dogs, for instance. But those six folks in one form or another were the ones—those six or seven were the ones that in one form or another were involved in it. But we had about 450 people in a battalion that were guarding the 7- to 8,000 folks there with a contingent that stayed in that cell block one. Dr. SNYDER. My time is up. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Secretary RUMSFELD. May I just say, you are right on—if we had seen those photographs, you are absolutely right, we could have gotten together with the President, with the Congress, with others and figured out a way that—it still would have been terrible, and it is going to get still more terrible, I am afraid, because there a still good deal more pictures and videos. But, you know, you are right. The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman. This is indeed a red-letter day, because you always want the Sec- retary to end up a statement by saying you are right, Dr. Snyder. I wished it happened all the time. Dr. SNYDER. Not as important as you saying I am right, Mr. Chairman, but almost. Thank you. The CHAIRMAN. That will happen soon. The fine gentleman from Connecticut Mr. Simmons. Mr. SIMMONS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you, Mr. Secretary, members of the panel. I have al- ways been proud of my service as a soldier in the U.S. Army. I have been proud to be a military intelligence officer for over 30 U.S. Army. I am proud to be a Vietnam veteran. But I think, like a lot of folks who saw these images, I am not proud of what took place at the Baghdad central correctional facility. It doesn't reflect our values. It doesn't reflect my values, or yours, or those of the American people, or those of the majority of our sol- diers. And it also—and I think this is really important-it doesn't reflect our rules, our laws, our regulations. 319 And I refer the committee to FM 34-52, which is intelligence in- terrogation. This is the regulation which prohibits acts of violence or intimidation. It says: Such illegal acts are not authorized, will not be condoned by the U.S. Army. And it says that, in our experi- ence, these acts don't work. And I agree with that. I did some inter- rogation work when I was assigned to Vietnam, and these types of activities don't work. And then it goes on to say something that is really important: Revelation of use of torture by U.S. personnel will bring discredit upon the United States and its Armed Forces while undermining domestic and international support for the war effort. is Field Manual (FM) 34–52. That is what it says. And it also puts our soldiers and allied personnel at risk. This is the book. This is what the book says. And the book apparently was ignored or not read, or people were not trained in it. Or, as my colleague from New Mexico pointed out, under FRAGO 1108 issued on 19 No- vember 2003, the lines that discriminated between MI personnel and MP personnel were blurred. Now, I also went through the report, not the one with the an- nexes, but the one with the basic text, and what I see in the 800th MP brigade is a unit with low morale, no posted Standard Operat- ing Procedures (SOPs), no Mission Essential Task List (METL), poor training, no discipline, no saluting. And when the MI folks said, we need to salute, the Brigadier General said, no, we are not going to salute. No strictness on uniform, and no corrective actions. And it seems to me that under those circumstances, that general should have been relieved. But my guess is that the—my guess is that the FRAG order was issued to bring some of her MPs under the control of the MIs so that the MI could get what they wanted out of the situation. And then I look at the recommendations for punishment. For the General, for the Lieutenant Colonel, promotable; for Colonel Pappas and for others, relieved of command, reprimands. And I guess my question goes to two things. When you discover that you have a senior officer who is not getting it done, why don't you just get rid of them, send them home, not move the system around so that MI and MP are blurred? Because we know that is not the way it is supposed to be, and we know that is what the regulations say should not be done. And are people really going to be convinced of our seriousness about the leadership problems and the chain of command if it is the enlisted personnel and I served as an enlisted person for 3– 1/2 years—if it is the enlisted who have their hands on the pris- oners who are going to get the court martials, and the Majors and the Lieutenant Colonels and the Colonels and the Brigadier Gen- erals are going to essentially get a reprimand and off they go? Is that the message that we want to be sending out at this point in time? ecretary RUMSFELD. I guess that is a question that is difficult for each of us to answer because of the problem of command influ- ence. The investigations are open, criminal and otherwise. They are proceeding. Each level, as I understand the process, and as you know, has an opportunity to review. And for those of us here in senior positions of responsibility to be commenting on the nature 320 of the decisions that have been made at the lower level could have an unintended consequence. Mr. SIMMONS. I thank you for that answer, and I respect the sit- uation that you are in. Let me just ask you this: Do you under- stand what my concern is? Secretary RUMSFELD. I do. Mr. SIMMONS. Thank you. The CHAIRMAN. Thank the gentleman. The gentlelady from California Mrs. Tauscher. Ms. TAUSCHER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Secretary, General Myers, Secretary Brownlee, General Schoomaker, General Smith, it has been a long day, and I know it has been uncomfortable for many of you as it has been for us. I think a lot has been made of the pictures, and I think the pic- tures certainly were a gut punch for many of us. But I would like to talk for a second about the fact that I believe you, Mr. Secretary, when you say that while there is a criminal investigation going on, it is very difficult because of the necessary protections one has to afford people that are under alleged crimes and under alleged criminal activity and potential prosecution, that evidence and things like that need to be protected. But I guess I wonder, were there no other sources or ways to know that there was a real prob- lem? And I look at that time line over there, and I find it interesting that the October to December 2003 abuse—alleged detainee abuse occurred. And I look above that, and I see that basically from May, June, until, thank God for Specialist Darby, webasically, where would we be today without Specialist Darby? And what—but it confounds me that there was no other way for us to know that there were problems. Where was the International Red Cross (IRC)? Where were the humanitarian organizations? Where was the Red Crescent? Mr. Secretary, there was no other way for you to find this out? You were not aware of concerns offered by the Red Cross? There were press reports today that the Red Cross and other human rights organizations were talking to Secretary Powell, Dr. Rice, and others in 2003 before Specialist Darby came forward. And if their concerns had been addressed, if there had been a proper hearing, perhaps we wouldn't be in a situation right now where we have parallel criminal investigations going on where we can't speak to issues, and maybe we could have addressed this a lot sooner. Secretary RÚMSFELD. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) visits all of the facilities that the Department of De- fense has.** They have been doing so since the outset. They have made a series of comments on each of their visits. Those comments e been addressed by the Department of Defense, by the com mands that have the responsibility for managing detainees, and it has been an ongoing relationship. They take their reports, they give them to the local commander, they also periodically visit the **Corrections submitted by the Secretary of Defense: The ICRC has access to all DOD detention facilities overseas. It does not, however, visit U.S. military personnel held in U.S. mili- tary prisons in the United States. My staff is currently providing the ICRC reports to the Con- gress according to an arrangement worked out with the ICRC and the Congressional committees of jurisdiction. 321 White House, they visit the Department of State, they visit the De- partment of Defense and provide their concerns, and the concerns get addressed. It is a continuing process. It goes on and on and on. The implication that there was some pocket of information in the Department of State or in the White House that wasn't available to the Department of Defense and hadn't been addressed by the command, it seems to me, is a misunderstanding notwithstanding how it is being written in the press. to comment, General Smith? Ms. TAUSCHER. Well, Mr. Secretary, before you go there- Secretary RUMSFELD. He is the one who receives the report. Ms. TAUSCHER. But you are telling us that you never heard of any suspected abuse prior to Specialist Darby coming forward in January of 2004? Secretary RUMSFELD. I would have to think. There have been other charges of abuse at different locations around the world. It happens from time to time. Ms. TAUSCHER. But you heard of no terrible abuse or questions of criminal behavior— Secretary RUMSFELD. In Abu Ghraib- Ms. TAUSCHER [continuing]. In Abu Ghraib, prior to Specialist Darby coming forward? Secretary ŘUMSFELD. I recall no indication. Do you, Dick? General MYERS. No, sir. Secretary RUMSFELD. Do you, Steve? He just said what I said, that we had continuing reports of trou- bles in various places, and including the International Committee of the Red Cross. But in terms—nothing of the scope that you are talking about here. Ms. TAUSCHER. Well, so they were not taken seriously? It was the pictures, then, that you are suggesting? Secretary RUMSFELD. No, I am not. Of course they are taken seri- ously. They are taken seriously. There are 18,000 criminal inves- tigations opened a year in the Department of Defense. You would not open them if you did not take them seriously. They are the re- sponsibility of the commands. General Smith is the deputy combat- ant commander for the command. I think he should comment on this. General SMITH. We did get the ICR, the International Red Cross report. Now, you know that that is not releasable information be- cause of the relationship between the people that they investigate or that they visit, and so we can't theoretically talk about exactly the things that they saw. But that report was received. The 800th MP Brigade commander responded to that. Whether the response was adequate or not, I can't tell you. But then the ICRC came back and visited 4 through 8 January, and the indications from there was that there were improvements. And it is a continuing system of improvements. And so—the interesting thing about the October 1 is it was a no- notice visit, and they didn't debrief anybody on the way out. So no action could be taken or respond to it until they submitted the for- mal report, which was significantly later. So the 800th MP Brigade command response was not until the 24th of December, but they 322 made—they obviously improved sufficient that they got a better re- port card in the January visit. Ms. TAUSCHER. Could that have been because they weren't there at night? General SMITH. Possible. Ms. TAUSCHER. Thank you. The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentlelady. The gentleman from Oklahoma Mr. Cole. Mr. COLE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate that. Before we begin, I just wanted to frankly thank each one of you for your service. You collectively have spent your lives, and, Mr. Secretary, you in more capacities than anybody I can imagine, serving your country, and I appreciate that. I think everybody here respects your patriotism collectively and individually, and your pro- fessionalism, and, frankly, your professional integrity. And this is a very sad and difficult day for us. I can't imagine what it is for you. And I just felt like that needed to be said. Having said that, I want to make one other comment before I get to my questions, or make two other points. One, it was mentioned earlier that the response, once this came up, was timely and thorough, and I think that is true, but only to a point. I think it is very true with respect to as soon as people knew something was happening, things started—criminal inves- tigations began, people started looking at it, actions were taken. But I think the Department, frankly, was extraordinarily slow in understanding the implications of what was going on and what that was going to do for public support for this effort and this coun- try; what it was going to do to our efforts to win support in Iraq, and what it was going to do with respect to our enemy. I mean, we shouldn't kid ourselves. This is a political and public relations Pearl Harbor. It is a disaster of enormous magnitude and of great setback to us, and I think we were very slow to recognize that. I would also say, and I agree with my friend Dr. Snyder. I think you were very slow in coming to your civilian counterparts, or cer- tainly the Congress. I think we could have and would have been helpful. I mean, terrible things happen in war. Awful things hap- pen in war. But I know this country well enough to know it can't sustain conflict if it doesn't believe in the conflict that it is fighting and it doesn't believe in the cause that it is for. And I think we could have helped in that regard and explained that. And I would hope, as we move forward, that you keep that in mind. Having said those things, there is a couple of things I would real- ly like to focus on. One, we have had these press reports, and we began discussing a moment ago that we have had multiple alarm bells; not just a lot of bad things happening in one place, but a number of bad things happening in a number of different places. And there is a big difference between those two. If we have got something that went wrong with a particular unit, particular place, particular time, that is one thing. And we have got a number of places where we are detaining prisoners of war, detainees of one sort or another, and there are bad things happening in all those places, and that suggests a real problem in our systems, our com- mand, and our personnel, our training. 323 So I would ask you, which is it? And be happy to direct-maybe, Mr. Smith, you first, because I think you are most-but I think that is a very important thing for us to establish how broad is this problem? General SMITH. Sir, I mean, there is obviously abuse that occurs in the system from the time that somebody is captured to the time they are interned and released. Most of that occurs before arrival at the internment facility. But there are events that occur. But it is, in my view, not systemic, that they are rare events. That is what I was trying to get at about when I described how Abu Ghraib is. I mean, at the time there were 7- to 8,000 detainees there, and the—while there were probably other levels of abuse, they were more the kind of being hooded and standing outside the facility with your arms tied behind you or something like that while they were waiting too long to get in, nothing—nothing that even begins to compare to what we see in the pictures. Mr. COLE. And I would—again, that is a very important point as you move forward to establish whether or not that is true, because I really think the confidence that the country has will—you know, will turn on that a great deal. Second, let me ask you. I would argue, and I think you have ac- knowledged, that you were slow in informing Congress. We found out the very unfortunate way the American people found out in a very unfortunate way about this. Given that, when were you plan- ning to let us know, and how were you planning to let us know? There is clearly a process here, but what were you thinking in terms of time line? Secretary RUMSFELD. Well, let me walk back over it. It was an- nounced to the public in January that there were charges of abuse. In March, he announced it again, and he listed specific indecent acts and sexual acts and other aspects of abuse, and that was an- nounced to the world. It was briefed to the press in Baghdad. Mr. COLE. I have been Secretary RUMSFELD. And there were questions on CNN here. Mr. COLE. I understand that, Mr. Secretary. And I am not trying to be contrary or adversarial, but there is a big difference. Secretary RUMSFELD. Of course there is. Mr. COLE. I mean, when you really want us to know something, it is amazing, we usually have a classified hearing. I am not saying- Secretary RUMSFELD. I will answer you. Mr. COLE. Yes, sir. Secretary RUMSFELD. You knew exactly what we knew, I knew. The people in the command who were running the investigations, the criminal investigations, who had access to that disk knew more. I didn't know it, the President didn't know it, you didn't know it. The real issue is that a secret report was given to the press, and the disk. It-out of order. And you say, when did you plan to do this? We didn't plan it because we didn't know about it. We hadn't seen that report. We hadn't seen the disk. Mr. COLE. And that is precisely perhaps the problem, Mr. Sec- retary. Secretary RUMSFELD. Exactly. 324 Mr. COLE. Not just that it was let out, because honestly some- thing like this was going to get out. But why did this not get to you, I mean, with extraordinary speed, and why did it not-be- cause I think, as you say, the minute you see it, the implications were breathtakingly obvious. But that information was in the sys- tem, that there was something badly wrong for months. And this was not just a question of individual rights, but for months. And now it has undercut our ability to wage this war, to be successful, the credibility of outstanding men and women. And it was not acted upon, and it was not brought to you or to us in a way in which we could help you. And I would just hope I know this is agonizing that you have to go back through this, and I am really trying to look forward. The most important thing to me is, one, could you figure out if it is sys- temic and let us work with you on it, because, if it is, we have got a big problem; and, two, how do we deal with this stuff where it doesn't break out of the blue on us in a way that really is an enor- mous setback to our efforts? You know, aside from the atrocity and the horror of this where the individuals—and I know you share that. I have no doubt. I mean, you are all honorable and decent men. I know you were re- pelled by what you saw and what occurred, no doubt. But we are even beyond that, as bad as that is. What has stemmed from this of national and international consequences are just—it is just stag- gering to me. Secretary RUMSFELD. Congressman, we are trying to figure out what can be done to the process that is respectful of the defend- ants' rights, that does not put the Pentagon into the 18,000 crimi- nal investigations that are going on in any one year, and yet we have the ability to find out something that is that big, that enor- mous, that is that potential for damage to our country. ne system currently does not provide for that. And unless somebody down below looked at it out of the-probably first in the criminal inves- tigation procedures, looks at it and says, well, we don't give these things to anybody, this has got to be kept in the criminal—but this is different. And I don't know how we do that, but we are going to sure try to figure out a way to do it. Mr. COLE. Let us, if I may, just close with this. Let us work with you on that, because this committee is fully your friends on both sides of the aisle, I can assure you that, and believes in what you are trying to do and trusts your personal integrity. And part of this perhaps is we have not had quite the degree of trust or dialog back and forth that we ought to have. So let us try and work with you to try and achieve that objective. Again, thank you very much. Again, thank you for your service. I know this is a tough, tough day. And, you know, you have earned everybody's respect in this country and certainly on this committee. Secretary RUMSFELD. Thank you. The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman. And the Ranking Member had a comment. Mr. SKELTON. I would like to follow up with an observation based on Mrs. Tauscher's line of questioning and now Mr. Cole's ques- tions. 325 You know, if Private Jones down in the second platoon lost his helmet, no one is going to pay much attention to that. If Private Jones down in the second platoon lost his rifle, that is going to go up the chain of command to goodness knows where, probably with someone with stars on his or her shoulders. This is very much like losing a weapon, not just ordinary piece of equipment. I know there are a lot of court martials out there, but there are some that are so explosive strategically that they ought to go up the chain of command, at least the potential of it. And I would hope that there would be some established procedure should these the future, because this is an absolute night- mare for everyone involved, our country, our soldiers, the Iraqi peo- ple. And I would hope, along that line, that there could be a rec- ognition of the potential strategic court martials that have such an impact. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman. The gentleman from Connecticut Mr. Langevin. Mr. LANGEVIN. Rhode Island, Mr. Chairman. The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Langevin, I am sorry. Mr. LANGEVIN. I know. It has been a long day. The CHAIRMAN. The distinguished gentleman from Rhode Island Mr. Langevin. Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Though we are very close with Connecticut. Let me just thank the gentlemen for being here. It has been a long day. I share my colleagues' outrage at this entire situation. It has done an enormous amount of damage to the credibility of this Nation, and it is going to take us years to recover from it. It has done great damage to us achieving the mission in Iraq. And I have been of the opinion that the success in Iraq is by no means as- sured, although we know that failure is not an option, and this is going to make it immeasurably more difficult to achieve the mis- sion of establishing a functioning democracy in Iraq. What I want to know as we go forward from this point forward, how do we repair the damage to our credibility as a Nation on the issue on human rights? How do we criticize other nations on their human rights violations? How does the President of the United States speak with credibility on human rights violations of other nations when he is meeting with foreign leaders? What advice are you going to give him to be able to do that with any sense of credi- bility, especially in the Arab world on this particular issue, and winning the hearts and minds of the Iraqi people? The overwhelmingly majority—I want to be on record, too, as ac- knowledging the overwhelming majority of our men and women in uniform are doing an outstanding job. I have traveled to Iraq, and I had the opportunity to visit with our soldiers, and I know the pride that they share and the professionalism of their service and the dedication of their mission, and they have been tarnished by all this. They are owed an apology not only by the individuals who committed these acts, but the way this whole thing was bungled in terms of its handling in informing the world and particularly the Congress, because it could have been done better. 326 Mr. Secretary, I am looking at this chart, this elaborate chart, and the one thing I don't see on there is the specific date on which you and General Myers actually became aware that something like this existed. And I would like that clarified, if I could, for the record. I know we have touched on it, but the specific date. And I also want to know what efforts were taken by—I see there was- on the 16th of January that General Kimmitt notified reporters. But what did he or others do in terms of taking specific steps to run this up the flag pole as high to the Pentagon as it could pos- sibly go? I would like some answers to those questions. Secretary RUMSFELD. Well, let me see if I can–I cannot be cer- tain of this; my memory is not perfect. But my first recollection of being aware of the abuses was in the context of the announcement that was made by the Central Command that they had someone who had provided information about possible abuses in that prison. That would have been January, in the mid-January period. The first time I was aware of this report, I believe, was after it had been given to the media. It had still basically been in the Central Command chain. The first time I was aware of the photos was when somebody said-rumored that there were photos connected with the allega- tions of abuse in the prison. And that would have been sometime between January 16th and the 60 Minutes show. At that next point, there were a few pictures made available that had been doc- tored to make them less sensitive. The first time I saw the disk was last night at 7:30 at night, and I have now still never seen the videos, nor have I seen the remain- er of possibly a second disk which I am told today may exist. I believe you are roughly the same time period? General MYERS. The same time frame. I remember, I did a little research, and I can't tell you the exact date, but it was in the 13th or 14th of January time frame, maybe the 15th, certainly before General Kimmitt going to the media, where General Abizaid—we talked to him once a day, once every other day, depends what is going on, and he informed us of this. And that was—he informed us of basically the same thing that General Kimmitt said: Hey, there are reports of abuse, there are reports of pictures; here is what basically the pictures might show. This is a big deal. And so we knew that back then. And then he outlined the steps that were being taken. Secretary RUMSFELD. I am told that there was some notification that came up in connection with the announcement that was made in the Central Command, and at that time there was a reference to the fact that there were some pictures connected to it. Mr. LANGEVIN. On the credibility question, where do we go from here? How do we restore our credibility on human rights, Mr. Sec- retary? How do you advise the President on this issue of restoring our credibility on human rights when we come to criticize other na- tions? Secretary RUMSFELD. Well, when you have got 2.4 men and women in uniform, Active Duty, Guard, Reserve individuals, Selec- tive Reserve, they are doing a lot of wonderful things in the world. Some people did some perfectly terrible things. 327 What happened after that? We announced it. It became public. We are having an open process. We are prosecuting the people who have done something wrong. The world is seeing what a democracy does. The world is seeing how people who care about human rights behave. This isn't a pattern or practice or policy of the government as it was under Saddam Hussein. This is something totally dif- ferent. And how do we always get from one step to the next step? We live our lives as best we can, knowing we are imperfect. Mistakes get made. People do bad things to people. We see it in every State of the Union every year, murder, rapes. How do we restore our credibility? What do we do is we get up the next day and try to live our lives better, and we try to do a better job in government and public service. And over time truth wins out. We have a free, open system. We have got wonderful peo- ple in this country. We are not an evil society. There is not some- thing bad about America. America is not what is wrong with the world, and the overwhelming majority of the people in the world know that. I mean, why do people line up to get into this country year after year after year? I read all this stuff, people hate us, peo- ple don't like us. The fact of the matter is people line up to come into this country every year because it is better here than other places, and because they respect the fact that we respect human beings. And we will get by this. I don't like it any more than you do. General MYERS. Let me just talk about the military angle of that. We have got 37,000 folks in Korea, been there for 50 years; we have got 47,000 troops in Japan, been there for 50 years, over 50 years; over 100,000 troops in Germany. They want us there. Occa- sionally a solder, sailor, airman, marine missteps, and we work our way through it, because it has been a long, long relationship. The world knows that the U.S. military is the best trained, the best led, and carries American values wherever they go, and they appreciate that. And as despicable as these events are, and as dis- gusting as they are to us, the fact that we are having this hearing, the fact that democracy is working, the fact that it has been in the open, the fact that as soon as we knew about it, two days later we are in front of the press, the free press, and saying, we think this may have happened, we are going to do an investigation, and we think it is going to be bad, the fact that we did that earns the world's respect. Certainly there are going to be some setbacks, but most of the people that we have been working with in the world understand what this Armed Forces is about. And I frankly think that we will work our way through this just fine, because 99.9999 percent of the folks who serve on Active Duty—and I didn't do the math in Iraq. I was going to, but—but it would be whatever it is, is not going to be dispersed by six people. It will not happen. I just came from a North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) meeting. I talked to the major contributors to our operations in Iraq, the other countries. They were firm in their resolve. This was not—this incident was not lessening their resolve. They want to get the mission done, and I thanked them for that. But they are with us. They know us. The world knows us. We are probably in 140 328 countries today, or this past year we have been in 140 or 50 coun- tries doing training operations and other things. They know us. They know the true American serviceman and woman, and they trust us. And they respect us. Mr. LANGEVIN. I thank you for your time today. And thank you for your answers. The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman from Rhode Island. And the gentleman from Georgia Dr. Gingrey. Dr. GINGREY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And let me at the outset tell you, Mr. Secretary, Generals, that I have a great deal of confidence in you and your leadership. And I think what we have done here today, and maybe as well on the other side earlier in the day, it is a question of who knew what, and when did you know it. And you have answered those questions, at least to my satisfaction. I agree with my colleague from Arkansas, a fellow physician, Dr. Snyder, and I think you agreed with him, too, that maybe in retro- spect, when you did know it, when you did know the magnitude, when you had an opportunity to look at those heinous, disgusting photographs, it probably would have been good to let us know that, to share that with us at that time, and not wait for the Congress to see it on television. Secretary RUMSFELD. I didn't see them until last night at 7:30. Dr. GINGREY. I understand that, Mr. Secretary. And I think that is true of General Schoomaker as well as General Myers, and I un- derstand that completely. General Myers, you said—and I agree with you—earlier in your testimony, in response to somebody's question, that no matter how much training these individuals, the six or eight miscreants, may have received, there was no way you could prevent just a few to go off on a tangent as they did. And I agree with your statement there, and indeed—and I think every Girl Scout and Boy Scout in this country without $50,000 worth of military training clearly would understand that. But at the same time, I would like to asso- ciate myself with my colleague, the gentleman from Connecticut Mr. Simmons, in regards to we need to look very, very closely, I think, at this chain of command. And it is a little disturbing to me and I think other members of this committee that we take rather harsh but appropriate action for those miscreant few, and maybe a slap on the wrist of those who were maybe in a situation of com- mand and creating a climate upon which something like this could occur. So those are my statements. I wanted to specifically get back to Mr. Langevin's question, be- cause the Ranking Member earlier at the outset mentioned: Well, gee, for one thing we ought to go in there and bulldoze that prison and wipe it from the face of the Earth. But the damage, has already been done in regard to the prison. It is like shutting the barn door after the horse has already escaped. But there, I would like to know, and I think Mr. Langevin was asking this question, too, is there something that we specifically can do to— other than the apology that the President gave to the Iraqi people, indeed to the Arab world, the same apology that you, Secretary Rumsfeld, have offered, is there more specifically that we can do 329 to undo this damage? As an example, should we consider some kind of reparation, even indeed financial, for these particular prisoners, these 30 or so that were subject to both physical and emotional abuse? Secretary RUMSFELD. Congressman, we proposed that; in my opening statement I mentioned it. And I agree with you completely. It is—I checked. We do have the legal authority to do it. I am going to see that we do it. It is the right thing to do. Those people were badly treated by those people. Dr. GINGREY. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. And I am very pleased with that response. Let me ask one last question. In regard to these prisoners, were these considered high-value prisoners or particularly violent indi- viduals; or were they low-level, who had maybe just been swept up in either combat or intelligence operations? And does the Army have a different standard operating procedure for detaining and in- terrogating a high-valued target as opposed to, say, a low-level enemy combatant? Secretary RUMSFELD. The answer is that high-valued targets are generally kept at a different facility, if by high-value you mean peo- ple like Saddam Hussein and the top 55 types that we have been looking after. General MYERS. But no different treatment. The treatment is the same. Dr. GINGREY. The treatment is consistent for each and every prisoner? General MYERS. Exactly. Secretary RUMSFELD. In terms of the Geneva Convention. On the other hand, there is a difference in this sense that the high-value targets become much more interesting from the standpoint of the interrogation process, whereas a simple low-level person is simply being kept off the street for a period. General MYERS. But the standards, the Geneva Convention standards and the standards of treatment, are as prescribed in the Army manual, and those were the orders that were issued by Gen- eral Sanchez, which I have a copy here, by the way. Dr. GINGREY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. That concludes my questions. The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman. The gentleman from Florida Mr. Meek. Mr. MEEK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank all of you for testifying today before this commit- tee also, the men and women behind you who have been in forward areas before and that have worked hard toward making sure that we are successful in Iraq. I have a couple of questions, because I don't think this hearing today is about how we feel about the leadership that is sitting at the table; it is how the American people feel, and it is how the Arab world feel that we need in this effort against terrorism. So I guess I have a line of questioning, and if you could answer as soon as possible because I need to get to the end of that question- ing. 330 General Smith, you spoke earlier about you had pictures in Janu- ary, you thought you had it all, all of the information. What was that? What kind of pictures? General SMITH. It was two disks with the type of pictures that you are seeing on the news, and many are more graphic. Mr. MEEK. Thank you, sir. General Myers, you mentioned that you were contacted by Cen- tral Command or had some knowledge; you were called and they said somewhere in mid-January that this is a big deal. I mean, these pictures are—and this investigation is a big deal. General MYERS. Right. When we were first notified by General Abizaid, he said, this is a big deal. Mr. MEEK. Sure. Okay. And, Secretary Rumsfeld, at this time you and General Myers, you all meet, you mentioned in the Senate earlier and you men- tioned here, quite often. I mean, you come together, you work to- gether. General Myers, yourself, you all meet- Secretary RUMSFELD. Four or five times a day. Mr. MEEK. You need another mike, I am sorry, because we can't hear you. Secretary RUMSFELD. We are together four or five times a day. Mr. MEEK. Okay. And that you meet with the President at least once a week to go over the issues of Iraq and what is going on. Secretary RUMSFELD. Well, I meet with the President to go over all the issues that are involved with the Department of Defense, Iraq being one of them. Mr. MEEK. Thank you very much. So, in this big deal that General Smith has just said, the pictures that General Smith obviously and others have seen, General Myers said that he didn't see it, didn't see the pictures until last night or at 7:30—you didn't see these pictures until 7:30. You meeting with the President day after day after day in a prison that not only he has said that atrocities have taken place, you have said it, you met with Saddam Hussein in the early 1980's and Bush 41. You also—and Secretary Colin Powell has said a lot about this prison and atrocities that took place. I know you said there are 18,000 cases that are out there that you a looking at, but there are not 18,000 cases in that prison. And to tell me and the American people and the people of the Arab world that this did not rise to the President of the United States nor the Congress, and that you were in this room hours be- fore-well, General Myers was in this room hours before briefing Members like myself and others of Congress, and no one said, hey, guess what, prime time tonight these pictures are going to come out, and we are going to have issues? I am not-I am concerned about the time line that we have here, but I have a bigger concern about the fact that there is a lack of what happened at the highest ranks of our Pentagon and our mili- tary here in Washington, D.C., about how long we are going to be in the dark. So I just want to say, Mr. Secretary, in all due respect, it really gives me no pleasure to say this, I think today there has been some reference to Members of Congress that have said that maybe you need to say this was good, I did all I could. But on behalf of troop 331 protection, on behalf of the efforts that we have to move forth in the Arab world and protect America and what people think about us, maybe I need to think about my leadership, maybe I need to be able to allow someone else to be able to lead us from this point on. And I want to tell you, sir, I have a great deal of respect for you, your service. You have been a Member of Congress. You have to understand our job and our responsibility to the American people. And I will tell you, sir, in all due respect, I pray for you, and I know that you pray to give yourself wisdom and others to do the same, but I would ask you to please think about the forward days, the days that are going to come, more will come out; the fact that the integrity of the United States, the integrity of our Armed Forces, the integrity of our effort against terrorism is at stake; the fact that you are going to appoint, I am pretty sure, honorable men and women to get to the bottom of this will come into question. The U.N. Will have an investigation. We get concerned about what the U.N. Says and does. But I will tell you, I know the President will not do it. He said that, no, you are an outstanding Secretary of Defense. But it be- comes a point where some of us in this room, some of us in this Congress have already said that there is going to be great dif- ficulty, sir, with all due respect, under your leadership leading the Pentagon in this very trying time with pictures that are—words in- adequate even to describe the feelings of them. And the fact that the men that are sitting at the table with you, at least some of them, saw these pictures, knew about these pictures, knew that it was Saddam Hussein's prison, knew all of these things, and you didn't see it until 7:30 last night is very—the pictures, is question- ing how we move from this point. So I hope that I haven't offended anyone, but I think that this is really where we are, and this is where the rubber meets the road from this point on. Secretary RUMSFELD. Well, Congressman, I don't know how quite how to respond to that other than to say that it is a fair question. Since this fire storm started, I have given a good deal of thought to the question. For me, the key issue is the one you ask, and that is, can I be effective if we have got tough tasks for this country and for this Department. And I would resign in a minute if I thought that I couldn't be effective. And I think of the task of helping, trying to be able to help the terrific civilian and military men and women in the United States, in the Department, and all across the globe, trying to be helpful to them in the critically vital work they are doing, and if I thought that I could not be effective, I certainly wouldn't want to serve. And I have to wrestle with that. I will add, I am certainly not going to resign because some people are trying to make a political issue out of it. It is a substantive issue for me. And I will leave it at that. Mr. MEEK. Mr. Secretary, I respect your response to the utmost, and I believe that you believe that, but I have heard that response in the Senate, and I heard it earlier today. This goes far beyond | Republican. We are far beyond that right now. We have troops that are in the forward area, that are going to be- 332 Secretary RUMSFELD. You don't need to tell me where the troops are, I know. Mr. MEEK. I didn't cut you off. But I was just saying, as you think and pray on the coming days, please please I know there is some people out there on the political bandwagon, but in this committee- Secretary RUMSFELD. There is the understatement of the morn- ing. Mr. MEEK. It was mentioned earlier-it was mentioned earlier, sir—and, Mr. Chairman, I am closing. It was mentioned earlier the bipartisan effort that we have here in this committee. I was in Miami when you spoke on the Guantanamo issue, you and General Myers was there. I voted for things that you have asked me to vote for. We have given flexibility to the DOD. when it was asked at any given time. And I will just tell you as you move forward without me even wanting a response is that that it is not all politics. And I think that all of us in this room are aware of that. But thank you : for your service, sir. Secretary RUMSFELD. I certainly understand it is not all politics. The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman. Ms. Bordallo. Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and, gen- tlemen, for your patience and perseverance, for the long hours you have been before the Senate and now the House. I am sure that when you look at me, you think, thank goodness, this will be the last line of questions. But I do want to say thank you to the Secretary for coming to visit Guam. We were very honored and pleased that you took the time to come out and check out our territory. I have a couple of questions. I believe that the tragedy at the Abu Ghraib detention facility is symptomatic of the pervasive prob- lems in the organization of our military force in Iraq. And in this case, these negative pressures came together with horrendous con- sequences, as we all know. Secretary Rumsfeld, I recall your recent press briefing where you said you had read over the report of the 870th Military Police Bri- gade, and I would like to reference that report which highlights these negative pressures. On page 43: The real presence of mortal danger over an extended time period and the failure of commanders to recognize these pres- sures contributed to the atmosphere that exists at the facility. On page 37: Morale suffered. And over the next few months there did not appear to have been any attempt by the command to mitigate this morale problem. Page 38: Over time, the 800th MP Brigade clearly suffered from personnel shortages through release from Active Duty options, medical evacuation, demobilization. In addition to being severely undermanned, the quality of life at Abu Ghraib was extremely poor. The brigade lacked adequate resources and personnel. In ad- dition, overcrowding; because of slow process of releasing detainees, the prison was overcrowded. Confrontation between MPs and de- tainees, resulting in numerous shootings. 333 I would like to know what the status is of that. Escapes. What is our record there? This report states that investigated reports of escape were ignored by the command. Now, while the media may be focused on the fate of the pris- rs, it falls to you, gentlemen, and to us as members of this com- mittee to address the shortcomings in our military operations that denied our servicemen and women the support, the leadership, and resources that their duties required. I believe we have an obliga- tion to address them. Secretary Rumsfeld, General Myers, and the others, what changes across the entire Iraqi theater of operations will you imple- ment in these three areas to address the underlying problems clearly identified in the Taguba report? General MYERS. I will start. One of the issues that you mentioned is a very serious one, and that is the ability to release detainees when they are no longer- and that has been an issue, because part of that is a release proc- ess. And now I think we do a 6-day-a-week release process, 12, 15 hours a day, where we look at the detainees for their-do we have a case, or is the intelligence value still there, or should they be re- leased? And you take some risk in that, because some of them might go back to fighting. But in that effort, I think we are releas- ing-how many right now? General SMITH. Sir, we did 350 last week, we are doing 400 next week, and 1,800 by 20 June is what we expect. Secretary RUMSFELD. We have released 31,000 out of 43,000 that were detained. General MYERS. What we also need to make sure is that we have the Iraqi courts set up to handle the criminal cases, and that has been a slow process, getting that stood up. But that is absolutely what you are just talking about, so the detainee population can continue to be moved through. One of the reasons General Miller was put in charge over there was because of the good job he did in Guantanamo not only in handling the interrogation piece and the intelligence piece of it, but also just in the physical running of the facility. And I am confident that is a major part of what is going to fix the problems you cited. A lot of those problems you cited are leadership and command problems. When you have a unit that doesn't have to wear hats, when you have a unit that doesn't have to wear uniforms, when you have a unit that calls lieutenant colonel "Joe" and the sergeant "Jim,” you have got a unit that has morale problems no matter if they are living in the dirt or they are living in the Hyatt Regency. You have got a real problem. Ms. BORDALLO. Or a palace. General MYERS. Or a palace. You have got a real problem there. So those problems are fixed, obviously, by putting another unit in charge and working on those problems. I would only say that all those things on that time line over there, General Sanchez is very concerned about this; it looked at all these issues and took action on almost every point that you have brought up either before or during this report. General SMITH. Yes, sir. In fact, special attention has been paid to Abu Ghraib. They now have probably the best dining facility 334 around. I am not sure that they have a Post Exchange (PX) yet, which was one of their complaints, but they are getting hard back buildings to live in. And so that has all been taken seriously and money put against many of the problems. Ms. BORDALLO. I am pleased to hear that. Secretary RUMSFELD. We are trying to correct some of those things. We ought to do it; it is getting done. But go back and look at th s not the problem of quality of life. That is something so fundamental involved with the people involved that whether they have a Post Exchange (PX) or a good restaurant is not the issue. Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you. I have one follow-up question. I believe one of the biggest perva- sive negative factors is that our troops and the public don't know for sure why we are still in Iraq. We have Saddam, and there are no weapons of mass destruction. Mr. Secretary, what is the mission in Iraq? What lies ahead? Is it nation-building? Secretary RUMSFELD. The mission in Iraq is as the President and the Secretary of State and others have articulated and told to the Congress and to the United Nations and told to the world. The plan is to turn the country back to the Iraqi people on June 30. The plan is to continue to assist them to develop the Iraqi secu- rity forces so that they can provide for their own security and our forces can come home. The hope is that what will be left will be a country that is whole, one country, not broken into pieces, a country that is respectful of the various religious and ethnic minorities in that nation, a country that is at peace with its neighbors and is not engaged in terrorist acts or weapons of mass destruction. And it is not an easy thing to do. It is a tough road to go from a vicious dictatorship to a rep- resentative system that is peaceful and rational and civilized and behaves that way. And there are a lot of wonderful people out there who know pre- cisely what the mission is, and all anyone has to do is visit our troops. They know what the mission is. And they are proud they are doing it. They know it is noble work, and they are dedicated to getting it done right. . Ms. BORDALLO. Do you think this incident will have any effect? Secretary RUMSFELD. Of course. Ms. BORDALLO. In what way? Secretary RUMSFELD. Harmful. Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentlelady. Mr. Israel. Mr. ISRAEL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Secretary, if this day is difficult for you and for our troops and for Members of Congress, it is an especially difficult day for the family of Nathan Brukenthal. I attended his funeral this morn- ing at Arlington Cemetery. He was the first member of the Coast Guard to be killed in action since Vietnam. He was killed by a fa- natic. He was killed by a suicide bomber. He was killed by a mari- time, improvised explosive device, by a culture that values death over life. 335 I am, as we all are, as you are, very concerned about the implica- tions of this abuse on force protection. Instead of seeing images of empathetic soldiers right now, the Middle East is being bombarded with images over Al Jazeera and elsewhere of the most grotesque distortions of what we are about. There was an article in the New York Times this morning that said that, within Iraq, these images so far have not had a particularly virulent effect, but outside of Iraq, throughout the rest of the Middle East, they are very damag- ing. So my question is, as a matter of force protection, what is your assessment of how these—this media crisis is playing out through the Middle East? How are we responding to those images? And do you agree that if it takes the resignation, not necessarily yours, but resignations and the rolling of heads at the most senior levels in order to correct those images and create the contrast between a culture that condoned and considered torture commonplace versus a culture that demands resignations and departures when there are abuses, if that is what it takes, would you agree that we ought to head in that direction? Secretary RUMSFELD. Well, I will let General Smith respond to your question as to what the effect in the area is. He has just land- ed this morning from there and can speak to it better than I. Those are—it is a tough balance. It is a tough question to an- swer. What will help? What would be the most effective? I serve at the pleasure of the President, and I have responded on that issue. There is no question but that—I do not believe that it would be right for me to run around looking for scapegoats so you can toss someone over the side. And I will be damned if I am going to look at that list and pre- tend that I think it was badly done. I do not. I think they did a darn good job. Perfect? No. But a good job. They announced it to the public. They told the world. They started the prosecutions. And so what am I supposed to do? Look for someone down there and say hey, “Let's heave that guy over the side?” that is not the way we do business in this country. That is all I have to say. The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman. And the—we have a good friend of the committee who used to serve on the committee and now serves on defense Appropriations and also happens to be one of, in fact the only, Navy ace from Viet- nam and a gentleman who was recommended for the Congressional Medal of Honor for his own service to our country, Mr. Cunningham. And he has been with us all day. And Duke, we would like to give you an opportunity to ask some questions. The gentleman is recognized. Mr. CUNNINGHAM. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I sat here for nearly 3 hours because I believe this is important, critically important. And Mr. Secretary, not exaggerating, and I have spoken to thousands of our enlisted and our officers, military, active duty and our veterans, and they would follow you into hell because they know you would get them back. You got us through two wars. You did it efficiently. You fought tooth, hook and nail against the enemy, and I would follow you, and you have my full support. 336 You know something? I saw the Congressional Black Caucus press conference when they talked about minimum politics in this. I sure hope somebody prays for me as they try and slip the knife in. You know that I would like to allude a little bit to what Mr. Tay- lor said and why all of us feel so bad about this thing. And all of us do, on both sides of the aisle. And out there. But I will tell you, it comes down to a word-un-American—what happened. It is not this country. But what is American is the re- sults that are going to come out of this. The world is going to see just how fair, under a free enterprise, under a free nation, that jus- tice will come about and that the leaders themselves will take measure. One thing that does bother me is the word, I think, scapegoat be- cause, you know, there was another event that I lived through, it was called Tailhook. And I beg you Mr. Secretary, I know a hun- dred officers that were tied up in that that should not have been penalized, but because of politics, many Members of Congress dug their heads in and ran for cover and would not stand up for those kids. You know, penalize the guilty ones, but by God, protect those fine kids. Secretary RUMSFELD. You can count on it. Mr. CUNNINGHAM. Thank you. You know, the—I have a recommendation for you. It is, I think, an advantage sitting here listening to other people. And that is why I wanted to sit in. I wanted to get kind of a feel and a tempo. When I was in the service, I had an admiral, one of the best guys I ever worked for. We had a problem with driving under the influ- ence (DUI), driving while intoxicated (DWIs) in the military. I mean, it is in the regulations. It is in the rules. You get trained. Hey, do not do it. But we had a rash of them. This Admiral was Commander, Naval Air Force, US Pacific Fleet (COMNAVAÍRPAC), brought all of us Commanding Officers (COs) in, and he said, “Guys, any one of you get a DUI, a DWI”-prob- ably like that guy on TV-"you are fired." and then we to our division officers and officers and enlisted and said, “If you do this, you are fired.” And my concern was, at that prison, I do not feel that someone came across—yes, they were trained. They had the rules. They had the regulations. But in my own mind, I do not know if someone told them, said, “These are the consequences if you act in a certain way.” small recommendation. Second recommendation. When I—the day of my change of com- mand, I pulled my squadron together because I had women in it, too. It was shore-based. And I know how important the chain of command is. People that have never served in the military do not understand that, many times, that it is chaos without it. But I told my squadron mates that there were some exceptions to the chain of command. One of those was anything known racial—and that in- cluded verbal, because I saw an air craft carrier lose its mission ca- pability because of it. And it was not something that I wanted to wait on over a period of time. I wanted to know about it. They could bypass my chief. They could bypass my division officer. They could bypass my department head, my executive officer, my com- 337 mand master chief, and they could walk right into that office. The other one was any known use or sale of drugs. The third was any sexual abuse, because I had women in there. And the fourth, which I think would be applicable to this hearing especially, that if any of my kids, enlisted or officers, did anything that reflected nega- tively on my unit, the Navy, or the United States, they could walk through that door. Let me give you another good example. I never went to Tailhook without my wife. She went right along and so did my daughters, go along with me. And this was actually before the blow up, Mr. Secretary. I told my squadron that I was going to pay for our admin where everybody could go. It was going to be a place where the wives, the girlfriends, and your daughters or your sons could go, and there would be no alcohol in our admin suite. But yet, I did not restrict them from going to the other activities. But I said, “If you do anything that violates the rules, if your con- duct reflects negatively or if you get a DUI or a DWI, going or com- ing/I paid for the bus to get them there I am going to fire butts.” you know, not one of my kids had a problem. And that is leadership, I think. And then, you know, I was so proud. One of my lieutenants had just took over as a commanding officer, sat his squadron down and did the same exact thing. But it gets down, right down to the nitty gritty that, it may be in rules, it may be in regulations—and I hear it over and over. One of the big concerns we have is the timeliness. And I think, maybe in the future, something like this, especially, even at a lower level, if we know that these things are available, that they go right straight to the top and they walk through that door to the CO. Thank you. Secretary RUMSFELD. That is good advice. Thank you. And thank you for your wonderful courageous service also. Mr. CUNNINGHAM. Thank you. The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Duke. And Mr. Secretary, we have a somewhat unusual question, but our vice chairman, Mr. Weldon, was unavoidably detained in his district, but wanted to be here. He is on the telephone. He has got a question for you. So with that, we will—Curt, we can hear you. Mr. WELDON. Thank you for your service to the country. General Myers, thank you for your service to the country. I led a delegation of our colleagues from the committee to Iraq and Af- ghanistan a few short weeks ago, and I want to tell you, at every stop that we made, we were impressed and proud of our troops and the leadership from Baghdad to Tikrit, from Kabul to our Karakorams 2 (K2) base in Uzbekistan. We saw nothing but pride and dignity and positive feelings about the leadership structure, the mission and role, and their dedication to complete the objec- tives. The hearing today, which I have been able to see through TV be- cause I cannot be with you, is an extremely important hearing be- cause of the focus and the seriousness of the charges. And all of us are outraged. I am especially outraged because two of the units involved, the 372 and the 320 are from Pennsylvania and Maryland and involve our citizens. 338 I am proud that one of our soldiers blew the whistle when he did. I am saddened and outraged that other Pennsylvanians evidently were involved and implicated in these tragic acts. I am also I am confident that you will take the steps, along with the general, to get to the bottom of what happened here. I just wish the American media would put the same level of focus on the atrocities caused by our enemies as they have on the current situation. When we had a young pregnant woman ambushed just a week or so ago in her station wagon and, at point blank range, was methodically killed with her four children ages 2 to 11 and then killed herself, it received one line in one of our newspapers. But on the same day, had half of a page dedicated to the allega- tions of brutality in Iraq. We need to understand that this incident is an isolated case in- volving a very small number of our troops, but it in no way reflects on the total commitment of our troops and the leadership that is there. I did want to talk to you today, however, with some specific ques- tions because I spent 2 hours yesterday with one of our young ser- geants who just returned and who was involved in the unit, the 372, from the period of October to December. And I would ask you, in the course of the investigation, to please look at some things and get to the bottom of some questions that he raised that I promised him I would raise with you. He first reported his concerns in late December of 2003 and did not hear from a CID officer until yesterday. He talked to us about-that in the prison in question, there were 900 prisoners. But in the evening, only six to 8 troops were in fact on duty. That may or may not be true, but that is what he told us. He told us that MI ran the show, and that there was significant involvement and input from both the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the contractor CACI. And I know that you will get to the bottom of our military's ac- tions, but I would also ask you to please get to the bottom of what actions the CIA and CAI officials had, since their names were not on their uniforms as they directed our troops that were in fact in place. I would also ask you to look into a platoon leader that evidently was aware of these actions, and a commander, who has been trans- ferred but I understand not yet reprimanded or had charges brought, who is a staff member to a sitting Member of Congress, to see whether or not there was any special treatment granted. And I would also ask that you consider that there were at least two cases where soldiers were put into positions in the prison, one, an administrative clerk, and the other, a specialist who in fact was under a marital abuse order from his hometown and allegedly asked not to be assigned to be put in the place as a prison guard. And finally, in the conduct of what to do after we get tom of this, and I am confident that you will do that, I would also ask that we consider perhaps tearing down that prison because it was a symbol of torture under Saddam, and it unfortunately has a reputation now because of what just happened, caused by a very few in our military. 339 But again, Mr. Secretary, I want to congratulate you, and as my colleague said, we will work with you. We will get to the bottom of this. We will get beyond it, and our country will come out strong- er. And our military will continue to shine, as they do around the world, in every location where they are on duty today. Thank you very much. Secretary RUMSFELD. Thank you. The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Secretary, that is it. We do not have any more special questions to ask. Thank you for being with us today. And let me just say, because there has been lots of editorial comment as we have gone through these questions, in my judgment, you have managed a war in two very difficult theaters. You have managed our 2.5 million people in the military, active and reserve. At the same time, you have re- formed the civil service system, which has at least made the major step in reform, which affects 750,000 people, all the while putting together a pretty big and complex defense budget. And I am not unmindful of the fact that what we do in Iraq and Afghanistan also involves dozens of allies, some of whom are more enthusiastic than others. In my estimation, you have done a great job, and you have done the one thing that the Nation requires and demands of its Secretary of Defense, and that is to be effective in managing this military complex. So you have my full faith and I think you have done a good job. And I look forward—and I wish we had time, I know secretary Brownlee had many instances to bring forth today. But I look for- ward to working with you on the challenges in the future because we have our forces engaged right now. We have a political transition which will take place very quickly, which will require our full focus. And I think that you have now delivered this problem to the appropriate—and in fact, it was deliv- ered early on in January, to the military system, which is walking it down through the criminal justice system, which is precisely where it should be. And I would ask you to return that focus now that we have had a full airing on this issue, to the 135,000 troops who are doing a great job, who are in theater, as well as our troops in Afghanistan and oth cher parts of the world. And let's knock out this defense budg- et, try to do good things for our country and for the troops. We ap- preciate you being with us today. Secretary RUMSFELD. Thank you. The CHAIRMAN. And I think the ranking member has a state- ment to Mr. Secretary. Mr. SKELTON. Just a word to thank you very much, and we look ward to your continued information to us in the days ahead per our discussion earlier. Thank you very much. [Whereupon, at 6:15 p.m., the committee was adjourned.] forward APPENDIX MAY 7, 2004 PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD MAY 7, 2004 OPENING REMARKS OF CHAIRMAN HUNTER Hearing on the investigation into the abuse of prisoners within the Central Command area of responsibility. May 7, 2004 The hearing will come to order. Our guests this afternoon are: Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld Secretary of Defense General Richard B. Myers, USAF Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Honorable Les Brownlee Acting Secretary of the Army General Peter J. Schoomaker, USA Chief of Staff of the Army Lieutenant General Lance L. Smith Deputy Commander Central Command Welcome to the Committee gentlemen. (345) 346 We're here for one simple reason: last year, several members of the United States military disgraced the uniform. By abusing enemy detainees, a handful of miscreants broke our laws, embarrassed their country, and created an international incident. Justice will be done because the United States isn't like Iraq under Saddam, where abuse was conducted as a matter of state policy. For us, this type of conduct is simply intolerable. This is evidenced by the swiftness of the investigation and the punishments that followed after the initial disclosure of this behavior. Unfortunately, the full consequence of these crimes will go far beyond those responsible. The reputation of our nation will also bear that burden. 347 Here are the facts as we know them. Last fall, members of the 800th Military Police Brigade turned their backs on everything America holds dear and abused and humiliated detainees under their control. On January 13, a brave soldier came forward and provided evidence of the abuse to the Army's criminal investigators, who promptly launched a criminal probe. So far, that investigation has resulted in charges being levied against 6. individuals, three of whom have been recommended for a court martial. The other three cases are pending. On January 16, U.S. Central Command announced to the world that the Army was investigating reports of prisoner abuse at the Abu Ghraib prison. At the end of the month, CENTCOM initiated an administrative investigation—the so-called Taguba report—which was completed in March. As a result, six military officers in the battalion chain of command were reprimanded, probably ending their careers. Two of those were also removed 348 from their positions. Two other individuals, including a Brigadier General, received letters of admonishment. Since January, the Army Inspector General has launched a review of Army training and doctrine related to detainee operations. The Army Chief of Reserve Affairs has launched a review of reserve training, focusing on military police and military intelligence activities. The head of Army Intelligence appointed a Major General to investigate intelligence activities in Iraq. All of this started well before this became an international news story. Ultimately, that's a sign that the system worked. The Department of Defense started investigating these matters as soon it learned of them. It didn't take an order from the President. It didn't take a shocking story on TV. It didn't take a Congressional hearing or investigation. That's because this Department, this military, and this nation acted automatically to identify and punish people who violate our laws, our policies, and our values. 349 We are all outraged by what happened. I'm sure that nobody in this room is angrier than our witnesses. Gentlemen, we look forward to hearing how the Department of Defense is ensuring that the guilty parties are identified and brought to justice. We need to ensure that such abuse never again occurs at the hands of an . . American soldier. Let me turn now to the committee's ranking Democrat, Mr. Skelton, for any remarks he may wish to make. The entirety of our witnesses' prepared statements will be entered into the record. Mr. Secretary, the floor is yours. 350 STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE IKE SKELTON RANKING MEMBER, HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE FULL COMMITTEE HEARING ON DETAINEE ABUSES AT ABU GHRAIB PRISON MAY 7, 2004 Mr. Chairman, thank you and gentlemen thank you for appearing before us. We have some very difficult questions because this is a very serious and disturbing matter. Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you for holding this hearing, but I want to express my strong conviction that this must be the first of many hearings on this subject. These appalling revelations have done incalculable damage to our nation's reputation and to our military and one hearing, however important a start, will not suffice. For that reason, I believe strongly and say here at the outset that we must hold an independent Congressional investigation into these abuses and into the command atmosphere that permitted them to occur. Mr. Secretary, I have read your testimony and I am pleased that you will be appointing senior former officials to look at the 351 sufficiency of the current ongoing investigations. But this is not enough. Congress, having not been informed, must now be involved. Oversight of the Department of Defense and of the military is this committee's most important role. We must find out what happened and how far up this goes. To do this we need staff investigations and we need to get out into the field. Second hand information is not enough. I have never before been sadder or more disappointed. Each of us and every American have been horrified by the images we have seen and the stories we have heard in the last week from the Abu Ghraib prison in Baghdad. The individuals who committed these shameful acts forgot that they were soldiers. They also forgot that the middle name of the American soldier is “honor”. We deplore and condemn the abuse of those in the custody of . the United States in Iraq. I am reminded of my conversation with the late historian Stephen Ambrose at a small breakfast in my office. 352 When asked what makes America so great and so unique, he said that while Russia had a hearty workforce and great natural resources, they did not have a George Washington or a John Adams, a Thomas Jefferson or a James Madison and the values they established. · The actions taken by the soldiers at Abu Ghraib do not reflect the values of Americans and the Iraqi people must understand it. If they don't, this incident could well become the tipping point for our entire effort to bring security and reconstruction to Iraq. If we lose the trust of the Iraqi people-if we lose their hearts and minds—we cannot bring anything else effectively. We must win back this trust- the safety of our troops and Iraq's future depend on it. Abu Ghraib, once a chamber of horrors under Saddam Hussein, has become a chamber of indignities under the American military. It must be bulldozed to the ground to symbolize a break with the past and a new beginning with the Iraq people. Many more steps are needed, but we must start with this symbol. 353 We must also bring all responsible to justice. I support General Schoomaker's and appropriate military authorities' efforts to complete thorough investigations and to bring anyone who committed crimes to justice. This must apply regardless of who committed crimes military personnel, personnel of other government agencies, or private contractors. The Iraqi people must see us take swift, strong, but fair action. We must also address the command and other systemic deficiencies that contributed to the abuse and I believe that we will need some independent Congressional investigations on these matters. But I have to say that there is another trust that has been lost- and that is between the Department of Defense and this Congress. The investigation into this matter has been ongoing since January Neither this committee, nor myself or Mr. Hunter was informed, despite numerous meetings with you, Mr. Secretary. I don't consider a passing reference in a Central Command press conference—which I never saw-to be adequate notification of a matter that has such serious implications for our efforts in Iraq and our role in the world. 354 Mr. Secretary, you were here last Wednesday briefing us on the situation in Iraq—the very day that this story aired on 60 Minutes II and did not tell us. It is appalling that we should learn about this from a news program. I believe in the words of President John Kennedy that “An error does not become a mistake until you refuse to correct it. Without debate, without criticism, no administration and no country can succeed—and no republic can survive.” These mistakes must be corrected for the sake of this nation and for our standing in the world. Mr. Secretary, I look forward to your statement and to the answers to our questions. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 355 TESTIMONY OF SECRETARY OF DEFENSE DONALD H. RUMSFELD BEFORE THE SENATE AND HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEES MAY 7, 2004 Mr. Chairman, members of the Committee -- Thank you for the opportunity to testify today, In recent days, there has been a good deal of discussion about who bears responsibility for the terrible activities that took place at Abu Ghraib. These events occurred on my watch. As Secretary of Defense, I am accountable for them. I take full responsibility. It is my obligation to evaluate what happened, to make sure those who have committed wrongdoing are brought to justice, and to make changes as needed to see that it doesn't happen again. . I feel terrible about what happened to these Iraqi detainees. They are human beings. They were in U.S. custody. Our country had an obligation to treat them right. We didn't do that. That was wrong. To those Iraqis who were mistreated by members of U.S. armed forces, I offer my deepest apology. It was un-American. And it was inconsistent with the values of our nation.. Further, I deeply regret the damage that has been done: First, to the reputation of the honorable men and women of our armed forces who are. courageously, skillfully and responsibly defending our freedom across the globe. They are truly wonderful human beings, and their families and loved ones can be enormously proud of them. Second, to the President, the Congress and the American people. I wish we had been able to convey to them the gravity of this was before we saw it in the media; Third, to the Iraqi people, whose trust in our coalition has been shaken; and finally To the reputation of our country. • • The photographic depictions of U.S. military personnel that the public has seen have unquestionably offended and outraged everyone in the Department of Defense. If you could have seen the anguished expressions on the faces of those of us in the Department upon seeing the photos, you would know how we feel today. We take this seriously. It should not have happened. Any wrongdoers need to be punished, procedures evaluated, and problems corrected. It's important for the American people and the world to know that while these terrible acts were perpetrated by a small number of the U.S. military, they were also brought to light by the honorable and responsible actions of other military personnel. There are many who did their duty professionally and we should mention that as well: • First the soldier, Specialist Joseph Darby, who alerted the appropriate authorities that abuses of detainees were occurring. My thanks and appreciation to him for his courage and his values.. . 356 • Second, those in the military chain of command who acted promptly upon learning of those activities by initiating a series of investigations -- criminal and administrative -- to ensure that the abuses were stopped, that the responsible chain of command was relieved and replaced, and that the Uniform Code of Military Justice was followed; • Third, units singled out for praise in General Taguba's Report for the care they provided detainees in their custody and their intolerance of abuses by others. • And finally, the CENTCOM chain of command for taking action and publicly announcing to the world that investigations of abuse were underway. The American people and members of the committee deserve an accounting of what has happened and what's being done to fix it. Gathered today are the senior military officials with responsibility in the care and treatment of detainees. The responsibility for training falls to the U.S. Army. The responsibility for the actions and conduct of forces in Iraq falls to the combatant commander. And the ultimate responsibility for the department rests with me. Each of us has had a strong interest in getting the facts out to the American people. We want you to know the facts. I want you to have all the documentation and the data you require. If some material is classified, we will ensure members get an opportunity to see it privately. Having said that, all the facts that may be of interest are not yet in hand. In addition to the Taguba Report, there are other investigations underway. We will make the results of these investigations available to you. But because all the facts are not in hand, there will be corrections and clarifications to the record as more information is learned. If we have something to add later, we'll do so. If we find something that we've said that needs to be corrected, we'll correct it. From the other witnesses here, you will be told the sequence of events and investigations that have taken place since these activities first came to light. What I want to do is to inform you of the measures underway to remedy some of the damage done and to improve our performance in the future. Before I do that, let me make one further note: As members of this Committee are aware, each of us at this table is either in the chain of command or has senior responsibilities in the Department. This means that anything we say publicly could have an impact on legal proceedings against those accused of wrongdoing in this matter. Our responsibility at this hearing, and in our public comments, is to conduct ourselves consistent with that well known fact. So please understand that if some of our responses are measured, it is to ensure that pending cases are not jeopardized by seeming to exert "command influence" and that the rights of any accused are protected. Now let me tell you the measures we are taking to deal with this issue. 357 When this incident came to light and was reported within the Chain of Command, we took several immediate actions. These will be discussed in detail by others here today, but let me highlight them. • General Sanchez launched a criminal investigation immediately. He then asked for an administrative review of procedures at the Abu Ghraib facility. That is the so-called Taguba Report. These two investigations have resulted thus far in criminal or administrative actions against at least 12 individuals, including the relief of the prison chain of command and criminal referrals of several soldiers directly involved in abuse. The Army also launched an Inspector General Review of detainee operations throughout Afghanistan and Iraq. That review continues. The Army has initiated an investigation of Reserve training with respect to military intelligence and police functions. General Sanchez also asked for an Army Intelligence review of the circumstances discussed in General Taguba's report and that is ongoing. And, I also asked the Navy Inspector General to review procedures at Guantanamo and the Charleston Naval Brig. As these investigations mature, we will endeavor to keep you informed. But there is more to be done. First, to ensure we have a handle on the scope of this catastrophe, I will be announcing today the appointment of several senior former officials who are being asked to examine the pace, breadth, and thoroughness of the existing investigations, and to determine whether additional investigations need to be initiated. They are being asked to report their findings within 45 days of taking up their duties. I am confident these distinguished individuals will provide a full and fair assessment of what has been done thus far -- and recommend whether further steps may be necessary. I will encourage them to meet with members of Congress to keep them apprised of their progress. I look forward to their suggestions and recommendations. Second, we need to review our habits and procedures. One of the things we've tried to do since September 11" is to get the Department to adjust its habits and procedures at a time of war, and in the information age. For the past three years, we have looked for areas where adjustments were needed, and regrettably, we have now found another one. Let me be clear. I failed to identify the catastrophic damage that the allegations of abuse could do to our operations in the theater, to the safety of our troops in the field, the cause to which we are committed. When these allegations first surfaced, I failed to recognize how important it was to elevate a matter of such gravity to the highest levels, including leaders in Congress. Nor did we anticipate that a classified investigation report that had not yet been delivered to the senior levels of the Department would be given to the media. That was my failing. In the future, we will take whatever steps are necessary to elevate to the appropriate levels charges of this magnitude. 358 Third, I am seeking a way to provide appropriate compensation to those detainees who suffered grievous and brutal abuse and cruelty at the hands of a few members of the U.S. military. It is the right thing to do. I'm told we have the ability to do so. And so we will - one way or another. One of the great strengths of our nation is its ability to recognize failures, deal with them, and to strive to make things better. Indeed, the openness with which these problems are being dealt is one of the strengths of our free society. Democracies are imperfect, because they are made up of human beings who are, by our nature, imperfect. Of course, we wish that every person in our government and our Armed Forces would conduct themselves in accordance with the highest standards of ethics. But the reality is some do not. One mistake we have made during our initial investigation into these charges, for example, was failing to sufficiently call to your attention the information made public in the CENTCOM press release regarding the investigations they had initiated back in January. We also failed to sufficiently call your attention and brief you on the preliminary findings of the criminal investigation announced on March 20 by General Kimmitt. I am advised the Army has had periodic meetings to inform Congressional staffs. There are indications that the information provided was penetrating at some level, however. On January 204, for example, CNN reported that a CID investigation was being conducted into allegations of detainee abuse at Abu Ghraib, and mentioned the possible existence of photographs taken of detainees. Nonetheless, I know that we did not fully brief you on this subject along the way and we should have done so. I wish we would have known more sooner and been able to tell you more sooner. But we didn't. For that, I apologize. We need to discuss a better way to keep you informed about matters of such gravity in the future. The fact that abuses take place - in the military, in law enforcement, and in our society - is not surprising. But the standard by which our country and our government should be judged is not by whether abuses take place, but rather how our nation deals with them. We are dealing with them forthrightly. These incidents are being investigated and any found to have committed crimes or misconduct will receive the appropriate justice. Most of the time, at least, the system works. None of this is meant to diminish the gravity of the recent situation at Abu Ghraib. To the contrary, that is precisely why these abuses are so damaging -- because they can be used by the enemies of our country to undermine our mission and spread the false impression that such conduct is the rule and not the exception - when, in fact, the opposite is true. Which is why it is so important that we investigate them publicly and openly, and hold people accountable in similar fashion. And that is exactly what we are doing. 359 QUESTIONS: When we first were told about these activities and saw those photographs, I and everyone at this table was as shocked and stunned as you were. In the period since, a number of questions have been raised -- here in the Congress, in the media, and by the public. Let me respond to some of them. Some have asked: Why weren't those charged with guarding prisoners properly trained? If one looks at the behavior depicted in those photos, it is fair to ask: what kind of training could one possibly provide that would stop people from doing that? Either you learn that in life, or you don't. And if someone doesn't know that doing what is shown in those photos is wrong, cruel, brutal, indecent, and against American values, I am at a loss as to what kind of training could be provided to teach them. The fact is, the vast majority of the people in the United States Armed Forces are decent, honorable individuals who know right from wrong, and conduct themselves in a manner that is in keeping with the spirit and values of our country. And there is only a very small minority who do not. Some have asked: Hasn't a climate allowing for abuses to occur been created because of a decision to "disregard” the Geneva Convention? No. Indeed, the U.S. Government recognized that the Geneva Conventions apply in Iraq, and the armed forces are obliged to follow them. DoD personnel are trained in the law of war, including the Geneva Conventions. Doctrine requires that they follow those rules and report, investigate, and take corrective action to remedy violations. We did conclude that our war against al-Qaeda is not governed precisely by the Conventions, but nevertheless announced that detained individuals would be treated consistent with the principles of the Geneva Conventions. Some have asked: Can we repair the damage done to our credibility in the region? I hope so and I believe so. We have to trust that in the course of events the truth will eventually come out. And the truth is that the United States is a liberator, not a conqueror. Our people are devoted to freedom and democracy, not enslavement or oppression. Every day, these men and women risk their lives to protect the Iraqi people and help them build a more hopeful future. They have liberated 25 million people; dismantled two terrorist regimes; and battled an enemy that shows no compassion or respect for innocent human life. These men and women, and the families who love and support them, deserve better than to have their sacrifices on behalf of our country sullied by the despicable actions of a few. To that vast majority of our soldiers abroad, I extend my support and my appreciation for their truly outstanding service. One final thought: 360 Today we'll have a full discussion of this terrible incident and I welcome that. But first, let's take a step back for a moment. Within the constraints imposed on those of us in the chain of command, I want to say a few additional words. First, beyond abuse of prisoners, we have seen photos that depict incidents of physical violence towards prisoners - acts that may be described as blatantly sadistic, cruel, and inhuman. Second, the individuals who took the photos took many more. The ramifications of these two facts are far reaching. Congress and the American people and the rest of the world need to know this. . In addition, the photos give these incidents a vividness – indeed a horror - in the eyes of the world. Mr. Chairman, that is why this hearing today is important. And why the actions we take in the days and weeks ahead are so important. Because however terrible the setback, this is also an occasion to demonstrate to the world the difference between those who believe in democracy and human rights and those who believe in rule by the terrorist code. We value human life; we believe in their right to individual freedom and the rule of law. . For those beliefs we send the men and women in the armed forces abroad - to protect that right for our own people and to give millions of others who aren't Americans the hope of a future of freedom. Part of that mission -- part of what we believe in - is making sure that when wrongdoing or scandal occur that they are not covered up, but exposed, investigated, publicly disclosed - and the guilty brought to justice. Mr. Chairman, I know you join me today in saying to the world: Judge us by our actions. Watch how Americans, watch how a democracy deals with wrongdoing and scandal and the pain of acknowledging and correcting our own mistakes and weaknesses. And then after they have seen America in action -- then ask those who preach resentment and hatred of America if our behavior doesn't give the lie to the falsehood and slander they speak about our people and way of life. Ask them if the resolve of Americans in crisis and difficulty -- and, yes, the heartache of acknowledging the evil in our midst -- doesn't have meaning far beyond their code of hatred. Above all, ask them if the willingness of Americans to acknowledge their own failures before humanity doesn't light the world as surely as the great ideas and beliefs that first made this nation a beacon of hope and liberty to all who strive to be free. 361 We know what the terrorists will do. We know they will try to exploit all that is bad to obscure all that is good. That is the nature of evil. And that is the nature of those who think they can kill innocent men, women and children to gratify their own cruel will to power. We say to the enemies of humanity and freedom: Do your worst. Because we will strive to do our best I thank you Mr. Chairman. My colleagues each have a brief statement. ## CONDUCT AND SUPPORT OF OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, Washington, DC, Friday, May 21, 2004. The committee met, pursuant to call, at 9 a.m., in room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Duncan Hunter (chairman of the committee) presiding. OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. DUNCAN HUNTER, A REP- RESENTATIVE FROM CALIFORNIA, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES The CHAIRMAN. The hearing will come to order. Our guests this morning are General Richard B. Myers, United States Air Force, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; General Peter J. Schoomaker, United States Army, Chief of Staff for the Army; General Michael W. Hagee, United States Marine Corps, Commandant of the Marine Corps. Welcome to the Committee, gentlemen. We look forward to your testimony, and we appreciate your appearance before the commit- tee this morning. We called this hearing because the Committee has focused all of its energy on moving our Defense Authorization Bill through the House and addressing the Abu Ghraib prison situation for much of the last month. While that is all very important, we must not for- get that there is a war on, and our troops are in the thick of it. And we appreciate all your great work over the last several months in helping us to know what your requirements are and helping us to shape this Defense bill. I think we turned out a great product yesterday afternoon. While the media has been absorbed with the misdeeds of a few military police (MPs), our soldiers turned back an uprising by Muqtada al-Sadr and his Iranian supported al-Mahdi brigade. He and his militia are now cornered, and they have retreated into holy sites in Najaf, proving to Iraqis and the world that he has no re- spect for Islam or Iraq's future as a nation. Ultimately, winning that war and building a secure Iraq are im- mensely important to the future, and we must not lose site of that. I called this hearing this morning to make sure we don't. Gentlemen, we look forward to your testimony. And I want to take this opportunity to thank my colleagues, Republican and Dem- ocrat, on this committee who put together a Defense bill for your personnel and your services. And this year, the Year of the Troops, and we passed this bill out 60 to 0, which I think reflected the com- mon ground we have in supporting our troops. A . (363) 364 We want to thank you for the great relationship that we have had here over the last several months. When we needed informa- tion, we have received it quickly. As we go through the conference with the Senate, when they turn away from this prison mess and get on with the work of main- taining our military, they will be producing a product, and we need to get into this conference and get this thing done and get it to the President's desk so we can have everything we need to continue to pursue our mission, not only in Iraq but in the Afghanistan theater and with our total force around the world. We look forward to continuing to work with you on a very close basis and produce a good product for the folks who wear the uni- form of the United States and for our national security. Thank you for being with us. I want to thank Mr. Skelton for all of his great work on shaping this bill and would turn to the gentleman from Missouri for any re- marks he might want to make. [The prepared statement of Mr. Hunter can be found in the Ap- pendix on page 423.] STATEMENT OF HON. IKE SKELTON, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM MISSOURI, RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. I join you in welcoming our witnesses, General Myers, General Schoomaker and General Hagee. I hope we can have a full and in- teresting discussion this morning. As the Chairman noted, we passed a bill yesterday afternoon, t of Defense Authorization bill, $422 billion. We think it is a good bill and good for the troops in particular. A good part of it, as you know, is the $25 billion supplemental, which we marked up and will help with the end strength and both of your services, the Army and the Marines. And I think that is a very, very positive step, and I hope you all will support that at the end of the day. I think the question we want answered today is where we are in all of this? There is reason for optimism. There is reason for pride. Our forces, acting in concert with our coalition partners, have ac- complished a great deal, and we want to hear about that. And they are having success in some areas. Reconstruction efforts seem to be progressing. And on the other hand, we are bombarded in the news media, not just with the incidents at the Abu Ghraib prison, pictures thereof, but more recently, yesterday, today, with the Chalabi situ- ation. Í hope you will tell us what you know about that. That is very distressing, because, as I understand it, we relied so much on him. And I was troubled when I watched on CNN and I think I have the quote correct-former General Joseph Hoar said we are on the brink of failure. I certainly hope that is not correct. I would wish that you would address that.. Tell us the positives that are out there. Tell us how we are get- ting along and don't whitewash or varnish it or anything, because we want to know. We are in charge of maintaining oversight of what you do, and we must come out successfully in these two ef- 365 forts. I will underline the word must. We will write a very damag- ing chapter in American history if we don't. So, Mr. Chairman, with that lecture, I will yield my time. [The prepared statement of Mr. Skelton can be found in the Ap- pendix on page 426.) The CHAIRMAN. Well, on that note of optimism, we will move to our witnesses. And one thing, too, General Myers, that we are very concerned about is the status of forces in Korea. We are shifting the brigade, and we are moving a brigade. I think one of the smart things we are doing is moving our forces, resetting them out of the range of the 6,000 or so artillery troops from the north and getting them out of that artillery fan, which I think is a good thing. But we are moving a brigade, roughly a tenth of the force, from Korea to Iraq, and from the information we have received—and maybe a little information about your evaluation of the capability of the Koreans to maintain defense, the state of their forces versus their threat to the north. I think that is now an important piece of this overall global footprint. Thank you very much, gentlemen. And we look forward to work- ing with you as we work this bill down through conference. And this is why I think this is very timely. We have a little prod- uct out there that we hope it has met a number of your needs. And we need to know, as my colleague from Missouri said, the unvar- nished outlook on what we have done and on the state of play in Iraq and on our global footprint. Thank you. General Myers, the floor is yours. STATEMENT OF GEN. RICHARD B. MYERS, CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, U.S. AIR FORCE General MYERS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Congressman Skel- ton and Members of the committee. I will just take this time to briefly share my assessment of our progress on the war on terrorism, and then, obviously, we will go into more depth. First let me assure that the coalition remains strong. Two weeks ago, my staff co-hosted a coalition conference. Poland and the United Kingdom were the other co-hosts. It was an extremely pro- ductive session with senior military representatives fr tries as well as representatives from the United Nations and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The goal of this con- ference was to share information, primarily from a strategic per- spective, on the war on terrorism, focusing on coalition operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. We received tremendous positive feedback from the participants and are planning another conference this fall. In Afghanistan, the 25th Infantry Division (ID) has replaced the 10th Mountain Division, and the Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) 180 continues combat operations in the south and the east. We are seeing steady progress in the destruction of the al Qaeda and Taliban and continue to focus on the kill or capture of high value targets. Enemy attacks have been primarily targeting the Afghan Gov- ernment and nongovernmental organizations. We believe that con- tinuous presence provided by the provincial reconstruction teams is 366 having a positive impact on the security situation, which is why we plan to expand this effort into additional regions. We are also focused on the national elections in Afghanistan now ned for September. We expect anti-government elements will attempt to disrupt or influence the elections, so we are working with the Afghan government, the interim security assistance force in Kabul and the United Nations (UN) to develop a comprehensive security plan to ensure the safety and the legitimacy of those elec- tions. In Iraq, we continue to move steadily toward the 30 June trans- fer of sovereignty. You heard General Abizaid stress how important sovereignty is. The Iraqi people want to know that their efforts are in support of their own country and their own government. Iraqi security forces went to work under an Iraqi chain of command and put their lives on the line for their own country. Department of Defense personnel both here in Washington and in the Central Command (CENTCOM) area of responsibility have been working very hard to ensure the 30 June transition is as smooth and effective as possible. On May 15, the Multinational Force of Iraq was officially stood up, which replaced our Combined Joint Task Force 7. This coalition headquarters is designed to co- ordinate and integrate the parallel efforts of Iraqi security forces. Iraqi security liaisons will work within the headquarters and di- vision staffs and coordination centers, and that will ensure at the tactical level that we are fully integrated with our Iraqi partners. Of the 25 government ministries in Iraq, authority has been transferred to 11 of them already. Much work has been done on the part of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), the Department of State and Department of Defense and many other Government agencies and organizations to enable the transfer of the remaining 14 ministries. Members of my staff have participated in an ongoing series of planning conferences and exercises to ensure a productive relationship between a sovereign Iraqi government, the U.S. mis- sion under Ambassador Negroponte and the Multinational Force Iraq headquarters under the command of General Sanchez You specifically asked about the decision to send a brigade from the 2nd infantry division from Korea to Iraq. We think this deci- sion makes sense. We need those forces in Iraq, and we will still have sufficient capability in Korea to meet our commitments to the alliance there. We are always very conscious of the stress on all our troops, active, Guard and Reserve, and the need to equitably share the deployment load. Exactly what the troop requirement will be in the future is al- ways something that General Abizaid evaluates and is never fully clear until we get closer to those decisions. I do think the situation after June 30 will still be challenging. There are positive signs, however, that the Iraqi people are ready to take responsibility for their future. A recent report in the New York Daily News quoted General Latif, the leader of the Interim Fallujah Brigade. He told a gather- ing of sheiks and tribal leaders, quote, “We can make them," mean- ing the Americans, "use their rifles against us, or we can make them build our country. They did not come here to occupy our land but to get rid of Saddam. We can help them leave by helping them 367 0 Le do their job, or we can make them stay ten years and more by keeping fighting,” end quote. Most Iraqis do want and deserve a peaceful, prosperous, demo- cratic Iraq, and they understand why our troops are there. So it is especially frustrating when all the progress and cause for optimism is lost from public view. A few days ago a member of my staff, a Navy Captain went to southern Pennsylvania to give a talk to a Lion's Club. The people there told them when they go to church or out in the neighborhood, they often get to talk to soldiers who have recently come book from Iraq. The troops tell them they are mak- ing great progress in lrag, and they are appreciated people. The Lion's Club audience asked this captain why the situa- tion looks so bad in the news, because it doesn't match the stories they hear firsthand from these soldiers who have just returned. I get the same question all the time, of course, as I am sure many of you do as well. I especially want to thank all of you who visited our troops in Iraq, Afghanistan and other deployed locations and met with them in your districts and for helping to tell their story. Y a great job they are doing. It is very important to give our troops due credit and give the American people an accurate view of the situation. Again, I thank you for all you do to support our brave men and women in uniform. I haven't fully looked at your bill yet, but appreciate the fact that you have passed a bill and look forward to seeing all the details in it. I know some of the details, and we appreciate very much your support of our efforts. And with that, I am standing by for ques- tions. The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, General. General Schoomaker. STATEMENT OF GEN. PETER J. SCHOOMAKER, CHIEF OF STAFF, U.S. ARMY General SCHOOMAKER. Chairman Hunter, Congressman, Skelton, distinguished Members of the Committee, I don't have a formal statement, but I would like to say a few brief comments. First of all, I stand with the Chairman on his statement, and I, too, would like to thank you for your support, continued support. w we have had lots of dialogue as you have worked through this bill. We have had our points of difference, and I think that we have had very beneficial discussions as we have gone through. Al- though I don't know all the points of the bill, I understand that our points have been heard and that it appears that we have gotten great support and I thank you for that. The United States Army continues to take the long view on this. We have two strategic vectors, and that is to support the Global War on Terrorism and transform the Army for the 21st century. And that is precisely what we are committed to do, and we are doing it. And finally, I would like to say, I remain very proud of our men and women in uniform, not just our soldiers, but our sailors, air- men and Marines and Coast Guard's men, and I am proud to serve with them during this difficult time. 368 I thank you for your support, and I stand ready to answer your questions. The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. General Hagee, thank you for being with us. STATEMENT OF GEN. MICHAEL W. HAGEE, COMMANDANT, U.S. MARINE CORPS General HAGEE. Sir, it is good to be here. Mr. Chairman, Congressman Skelton and Members of this com- mittee, I would also like to thank you very much for your great support. It means a great deal to those young Americans deployed throughout the world. Just in the last month, I had an opportunity to visit Marines, soldiers and sailors in Afghanistan and Iraq. In fact, I was in Fallujah. And I can report to you that their morale is high. They are focused on the mission. And I believe there are three main reasons for that. They are well equipped. They know that they are well trained. And they know that we have the support of this Congress and the American people. And I cannot stress that latter point enough. That is the most often question I receive, do the American people understand what we are doing, and do they support us? I am always happy to be able to report that, in fact, they do. Just ten days ago, I was in Hawaii and southern California and had an opportunity to talk with the spouses and families of our de- ployed Marines and sailors. Are they happy that they are separated from their Marines and sailors? Obviously not. But I can also re- port to you that they are quite proud of what they are doing. They understand the importance of what their Marines and sailors are doing, and they strongly support what they are doing. Once again, sir, thank you very much for your support, and I look forward to your questions. The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, General Hagee. General Myers, we have got about 38,000 troops in Korea, and we are going to be moving out roughly a tenth of those troops for deployment to Iraq. The obvious obviously, the defense of the Ko- rean peninsula depends primarily on the Korean military, South Korean military. As I understand, we have some 19 infantry divisions, three mech Divisions. They have approximately the equivalent of seven wings of tacair, some of it modern, much of it less modern. Nonetheless, it appears that it is vastly superior to any air power that the North Koreans have. Just giving us your view of the evolution of the South Korean military, which in the past has had big numbers but hasn't been modern, I would like you to give us your take of whether you think they have the wherewithal to carry this burden increasingly? And General Schoomaker, you obviously—you have the bulk of those troops in-country. Could you give us also your view on the capability of the South Korean forces and the capability of the American forces that will be in place after this move of approxi- mately 3800 personnel to Iraq? General MYERS. Chairman Hunter, it is a great question. Re- member that all our moves in Korea are centered around our over- all study of our global basing posture. This is part of it. It is look- 369 ing at a situation on the peninsula, where in many cases we are in the same locations we were when the cease-fire was signed back in 1953. As you mentioned earlier, part of it is a consolidation move, and part of it is to give more responsibility to the Republic of Korea Armed Forces. As you mentioned, they have a total of 41 divi- sions—21 active, 11 reserves, seven homeland divisions. General LaPorte, our Combined Forces Command and UN commander and U.S. Forces Korea commander, thinks that these forces are well- trained and generally very well-equipped, well-motivated. And we have been passing various tasks that used to be U.S.-only tasks, in terms of some of the command and control and some of the mis- sions, over time. The CHAIRMAN. Now, General, the information I saw was they have 21 active divisions, and of those, they have 19 infantry and 22 active divisions. But do they also have a substantial reserve or homeland division? General MYERS. They have seven homeland divisions that basi- cally are the rear area of security. And my information is 21 active, 11 reserve. And the mix between mechanized and so forth, I don't have that breakout in front of me. But we have over time—and General LaPorte is very comfortable in passing some of the mis- sions to the senior military and their headquarters, thinks they can handle this. And it is time to move some of this rest them. So over time, over the last couple of years, we have been doing that. It has been, I think, welcomed by the Iraq milita senior leadership in the Republic of Korea. We think it is the right thing to do as well. We do not think taking this brigade out is going to leave the security situation on the peninsula any less than it was when they were there. We think one brigade with all those forces we talked about, our remaining forces there, that we have a very robust presence to counter any threat from North Korea. As I think Secretary Wolfowitz testified to, there is about $13 bil- lion in enhancements to our forces that are committed to the sula in the next several years that are going to make our forces even more robust in terms of their capability to handle the threat. We are deploying additional Patriot systems to deal with the exten- sive missile threats that North Korea has. And we are going to rely on those things that we know where we have an asymmetric ad- vantage, and that is in our tactical air. In a classified setting I can talk to you about that, too, but there are going to be some adjustments. General SCHOOMAKER. Yes, sir. I would just add to the Chairman's statement here that, since the first time I served in Korea, which was 1974, in the intervening 30 years, the situation on the peninsula, in my view, has changed enormously, and not only the standpoint of the development of the Rock Army and the Air Forces and Navy, but in terms of the way the terrain has changed there, the way in which the peninsula has developed. It has fundamentally changed the way conflict would occur there, if, in fact, conflict does occur. In this form, it is probably not appro- priate to talk about that, but I would tell you that I share General 370 LaPorte's confidence that, you know, should we have to fight there, it would be a significantly different fight than it would have been 30 years ago. And I share his confidence that this move of pulling a brigade off of there should not be of concern. And other than that, I fully support, you know, what General Myers has said here. I think there are other dimensions of our capability over there that play a far more important role than they have in the past. . General MYERS. I may have mis-stated. It is 23 active divisions, which come closer to adding up to the breakout. I think I said 21. The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. The gentleman from Missouri, Mr. Skelton. Mr. ŠKELTON. I don't know who to ask the question of, but have you considered backfilling the 4,000 numbers, the brigade that you are moving out of Korea into Iraq, backfilling them with either Guard or Reserve? General MYERS. In Korea? Mr. SKELTON. No, sir. General MYERS. No, sir. We haven't. That has not been part of the calculation. Mr. SKELTON. We seem to be getting two pictures of chances for success in Iraq. In speaking with you and in our trips to there, we get a pretty positive picture in talking with the troops that are there and talking with the leaders and, of course, some Iraqis. Things seem to be moving along, in particular, the reconstruction portion. And then, here we are bombarded with negative images of what is going on in Iraq. So let me touch on a few of those if I may. How damaging is this prison situation, General Myers, in relation to winning the hearts and minds of the Iraqis? General MYERS. Well, obviously, you know, the Iraqi people, I think, deserve to see how we handle this and they got a glimpse of that, I think it was yesterday or the day before when we had the first court-martial. There will be more of that. Obviously, the results of those events will be made public. And I think that most Iraqis, whose contact is with our servicemen and women who are out there throughout the land from basically north to south understand that they are only there for one reason and that is to—and it is a very noble cause—and that is to give the Iraqis a chance for peace and prosperity. I think the majority of Iraqis understand that I think they probably understand that this is—whatever abuse has occurred will be worked very hard by this Government, by our military. The process we have in place to work this, by the way, is a process that has been around for a long time, has stood the test of time..: And I would just note; the detainee issue has been an issue for the last 3, 3.5 weeks, but this investigation started back in Janu- ary, and we already have one court-martial completed and other in- vestigations going on to look at every little thread that we can pos- sibly find here to see if there are other situations where abuse could have occurred that maybe we haven't uncovered yet.. I think the Iraqi people will look at our process. General Abizaid tells me as he talks to not only Iraqi leaders but other leaders in 371 the region that what they want out of this is justice for those who have perpetrated these activities. I think they understand that the security situation in the country of Iraq is not something that the Iraqis can handle today. They are going to need coalition help. And we want to take that help and turn it into a partnership with the Iraqis. And that is why we set up this new Multinational Force Iraq so we can start to create that partnership with the ministry of inte- rior, ministry of defense and all the way down to their tactical units, that we are working with them, in concert with them, against the common enemy, to progress in Iraq. Mr. SKELTON. I am not sure you know enough to answer the question about the Chalabi situation, but is there anything you can touch on regarding that? General MYERS. What I can say about the Chalabi situation is that it was the-my understanding is—and the reports to me say that it was the Iraqi minister of interior that wanted this action to happen, that it was Iraqi police who conducted the activity, that the role for U.S. forces was as an outer corridor and not part of the activity in any of the facilities or that business, and that the coali- tion provisional authority was notified of this. That is the limit of my knowledge. But I think it is important that this was an Iraqi minister of in- terior initiative done by their police. And my understanding is that the evidence is now in an Iraqi court. That is a good process. It is Iraqis doing what they should be doing. And I don't know about the facts in the case about Chalabi and so forth, but to have the min- ister of interior, the police and the court connected, doing things they think are important, is a good sign. Mr. SKELTON. Do you see a potential positive change or uplifting change in attitude of the Iraqi people come the June 30 sovereignty turnover? General MYERS. Personally, I think that, as the UN helps set the stage for this turnover of sovereignty—and we know that the first folks that are selected to be the executive part of this new govern- ment will probably be temporary, but I- Mr. SKELTON. Called interim government. General MYERS. Interim government-I think the Iraqi people will have to take hope in that. The Iraqis are now going to be re- sponsible for their own decisions, and they are going to have to make those decisions. They will need help along the way, and we should provide help. I think we will be particularly strong in the security sector. That is where we need to cooperate for some time to come because there will be those—and I will point back to Zarqawi. The assassination of the President of the Interim Governing Council the other day is a terrible blow, and there will be people that will try very hard with tactics like that and other tactics of intimidation and so forth to keep from having political progress in Iraq. There are a lot of forces, though, on the side and I think most Iraqis are on the side of, “Let us progress, let us get our interim government going, let us enact a national assembly and get our constitution going.” And there is reason for great hope that the Iraqi people will take this and run with it. It will not be without its challenges, both from 372 a security standpoint and from a political standpoint, but I think it is time to get going. I have been in favor of moving this faster rather than slower. So I think there is cause for hope. I think, any time you give people a chance to decide their own destiny, people that have the responsibility for these very impor- tant decisions they will be making, it is a good thing. Mr. SKELTON. I have more questions, but I will reserve until later. The CHAIRMAN. Thank the gentleman for his thoughtful ques- tions. But I would turn to the Chairman of the Terrorism Subcommit- tee, Mr. Saxton. Mr. SAXTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General Myers, General Schoomaker, General Hagee, thank you for being here this morning and thank you for doing the great work that you do. · And at every chance, I like to thank the folks who are in the field doing a great job as well. General Myers, it is easy for us to talk about the past and what has transpired so far on the war on terror. It is a little more dif- ficult to talk about the future. But I would like to talk about the future from this perspective. Some months ago, I invited a well-re- spected columnist by the name of Tom Friedman to my office to talk about some columns that I had seen him author, that were printed in the New York Times, on Iraq. And I called him because I found that what he was saying in the New York Times was kind of unusual for the New York Times. And basically, he was saying that the Iraqis will find a way to make a government work in Iraq, but they have to do it. And to put as bluntly as he did, he said, “We have to get out of their face.” Now, recently in Fallujah, we have stepped back and put an Iraqi peace-keeping force, if you will, we have put an Iraqi unit in charge of security in Fallujah. And that force, Iraqi force, has been in place now for I am just going to guess, a couple or three weeks. I guess the question is, how is it working? And if it is working rel- atively well, does it lend credence to the fact that we can kind of look forward to stepping back, but still being there, of course, out- side of the cities, turning security, in cities like Fallujah, over to an Iraqi force? General MYERS. Congressman Saxton, that is an excellent ques- tion. I have read a lot of Tom Friedman articles. I don't know that I have read that one. He is very thoughtful. In fact, we asked Mr. Friedman to lead a breakfast discussion the last time we had the combatant commanders in town for a con- ference and give us his views. I am not the tactician or strategist in Iraq. That is General Abizaid's responsibility, but I can tell you, we are in agreement that we need to turn Iraq over to Iraqis. And there is always risk in that. And there is risk in the Fallujah situation. But it is a risk I believe we must take. So far, the situation in Fallujah is working out okay. It does not mean that in 3 days from now or a week from now, we are not going to have to use force to achieve some of the objectives that we set out to achieve in Fallujah. That may still be the case. But we 373 are working with Iraqis, the so-called Fallujah Brigade led by Gen- eral Latif. He is working, I believe well with General Conway, the three-star Marine who is responsible for operations in that sector. I am sure they have had many conversations. Maybe General Hagee can comment in a minute on that. My per- sonal view is, this is the right way to do it. Like I said, there are risks with this approach, but we have our goals in Fallujah. And so far, the people of Fallujah seem to be responding. General Conway is responding with lots of reconstruction projects for that area, which is something that has not been con- sistently applied. That is very, very important. The unemployment, as you might imagine, would be very high. I think General Conway and the Marines out there are probably the largest employer in Fallujah with the money you have made available for them to use in these kinds of situations. So I would say, the trend is going in the right direction. We need to know when to use force. We need to know when to back off. We need to know when to lend the Iraqis help with the solution. But I am of the school, the more the Iraqis can do, the better and the faster we can get them to do that, the better as well. And General Hagee is pretty fresh, having just talked to some of the folks out there. General HAGEE. Yes, sir.. And like the chairman, I am also not the tactician or the opera- tor over there, but I did talk with General Conway this morning. And I can tell you that, over the past couple of weeks, it has been very quiet in Fallujah. Not only is the Fallujah Brigade doing rel- atively well, but most importantly, the people in Fallujah are sup- porting that particular Brigade. As General Myers mentioned, the leader of that Brigade, in a news conference yesterday, along with the Mayor of Fallujah, talk- ing with the Arab press, supported what was going on. And in fact, I have this second hand, but I believe it is correct that the mayor of Fallujah apologized for what happened to the Americans in Fallujah to the Arab press. Over the past couple of days, some of the heavy weapons have been turned in to the Fallujah Brigade. But as General Myers said, this is a day-by-day process. We are optimistic, but there will prob- ably be downturns as we move forward. We not only want to put- I say we, the Department of Defense, the American Government- an Iraqi face on this. We also want to put an Iraqi chain of com- mand in place there. And right now, it is working quite well in the Amara province. The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. I thank the gentleman. The distinguished gentleman from Texas, Mr. Reyes. Mr. REYES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And gentlemen, welcome. We appreciate the hard work that ev- eryone is doing on this issue and in support of our military troops. I want to start off by asking, has the security situation in Iraq deteriorated to an extent that Congressional Delegations (CODELS) cannot be supported, because staff was telling us there is a ques- tion whether or not we are able to go in next week into Iraq? 374 General MYERS. Congressman Reyes, I haven't gotten an update. During the hearing, we will have somebody research that question and get back to you. [The information referred to can be found in the Appendix begin- ning on page 431.] Mr. REYES. Earlier this week, we were told we have got about 210,000 Iraqis, combination of security, Army, police, that are being trained and prepared to take over their own security. My question is, what kind of a system do we have in place to evaluate eir effectiveness, their ability to stand up against attacks, to be able to repel attacks? What method or evaluation do we have re- garding those 210,000 Iraqis that we are training? General MYERS. Congressman Reyes, it depends on what seg- ment of that security force we are talking about, depends—will dic- tate what kind of system we have. With the Iraqi police, there is a formal certification system that certifies them after they are trained. And there is a mentorship program that we want to con- tinue for some time, where we do joint patrols with them and so forth. There is a lot of leadership training that has to go on past the formal eight-week school that is being conducted now. And we think that can be done by coalition forces to help, you know, instill the sorts of traits we want these police officers to have as they go about their daily business. In the Iraqi Army, the coalition is training them, and they will be certified like any Armed Forces. With the Civil Defense Corps (CDC), each Army unit that trains one of those Corps certifies them. And compared to the police or the new Iraqi Army, it is a level below that. And so it goes all the way through. But there are certification regimes for each of those. I might mention that in this new organization, how we train, how we equip and how we mentor once we get back to the field are very important questions. And we have put General Petraeus, who was the commander of the 101st and I think just turned over com- mand about 3 days ago, and he will be in Iraq between the 2 and e is coming from Iraq, changed command, and he goes back to work, the training and equip of these forces. And he did a superb, job up north in this capacity, and we put our very best to go back over there and work the very issues you are talking about to make sure we have a certification program. If I may, as has been said before, when people aren't properly trained, aren't properly equipped and if there isn't an Iraqi chain of command, it is not surprising that some of the performance, when the going gets tough, is less than perfect. But the equip issue, I think, has been solved. That does not mean that everybody has their equipment today. For instance, I think, in cases of the police, they will be 94 percent equipped with their vehicles, their communications gear and their weapons by December—94 percent. We should have done this ear- lier, but it was somebody else's responsibility for awhile, and now that will come under General Petraeus. But this equipment is on order and will be delivered. And that will be a very important com- ponent of allowing these people to do what they are supposed to do to protect their citizens. I think we can be pretty positive about those developments. 375 Mr. REYES. Thank you. The other area I would like to ask a question on is the use of contractors. And I ask this question because, last weekend, when I was in El Paso, Halliburton was there recruiting for contract drivers and a few other duties in—particularly in Iraq. And a num- ber of questions came up that I think it would be beneficial to get your perspective on. The first question is, where are we on allowing contractors to be armed, to carry weapons? I know a number of their families—of those contractors that are already in Iraq, that are from El Paso have asked me why contractors are not allowed to carry weapons in a combat zone. And I see the red light is on. If you can answer that question. General MYERS. I am going to have to get back to you for the record on the arming of contractors. I have not seen the final pol- icy. Based on a lot of the issues that you know about and that you have raised, we have had an extensive review of the policy of arm- ing contractors, because there are so many different types of con- tractors in country, and the needs are different. So let me get back to you. I haven't seen the final policy. My guess is, it is probably close to being fully developed. I know Gen- eral Sanchez is the final approval for that and has a practical view toward that. We got one of those questions when we had our town hall meeting in Baghdad, and General Sanchez was the one that answered it. But let me get back to you. It is a concern. I understand why the families of contractors might be concerned. I need to see where our policy is, and it should be pretty close to being promulgated, and I will get you a copy. [The information referred to can be found in the Appendix begin- ning on page 431.] Mr. REYES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman. I think that is a very im- portant question. And General, the figures that I saw were to the effect that Halli- burton has had 34 people killed in action, mostly running those ambush alleys, bringing food and supply up to our people in the bases in the Baghdad region. So obviously, having the wherewithal for defense and also having the requisite fire power attending those convoys, I think, is extremely important to this Committee. So if you can let us know what the state of play is here, that is impor- tant. General MYERS. The other thing I would mention, when you brought up the convoys and our major supply routes, the major supply routes were a target in the April time frame. Looked like a fairly coordinated tactical approach trying to interrupt the con- voys, as you said. Since that time, General Sanchez and the division commanders have changed their tactics, techniques and procedures with respect to the major supply routes. And I think the overall situation now in terms of convoys and their security is much different than it was ist three or four weeks ago because of the tactics, techniques and procedures that have been changed. 376 The CHAIRMAN. It might be useful for us to engage with you folks on a classified basis and take a look at that. General MYERS. You bet. And General Sanchez and his folks thought it was important. And they have done some pretty smart and aggressive things in that regard and, I think, cut down the instances where convoys were being disrupted. The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman for his questions. The gentlelady from Virginia, Ms. Davis. Mrs. DAVIS OF VIRGINIA. Thank you Mr. Chairman. Thank you gentlemen for being here today. I know that you are under a lot of fire and a lot of questions. And I know you must get tired of it, but there are still some that we need answered. And I do thank you for your service. General Myers, I think you were talking about the Iraqi forces when you said 94 percent of the equipment- General MYERS. I was talking about the Iraqi police service spe- cifically in that case. Mrs. DAVIS OF VIRGINIA. Let us go to our men and women. Do they have everything that they need? And you know, recently, a lot of our units over there had stays extended another 90 days. And I think General Abizaid is contemplating extending them even more. And now, we are taking 3,500 or so forces out of Korea and over to Iraq. Getting to the end strength, do we have the troops that we need to do the rotations so our young men and women who are over there, who are doing a dynamite job, but you know, it gets to a point when you are living in that kind of stress and situation that, after a while it has to get to you and maybe you don't make the right decisions or the best decisions because you are just tired and you are working 12 to 14 to 20 hours a day. Are we giving them everything we need, number one? And number two, do we have enough folks, that we are not overworking the ones that we have? General MYERS. You mentioned that you thought maybe General Abizaid said that we might extend the folks that we extended for 90 days some more? I never heard him say that. To my knowledge, that is not going to happen. What we have said is that we will backfill those approximately 20,000 that were held over, primarily the First Armored Division and the Second Calvary. Hold them over and we are going to backfill them with forces that would have gone in later. We are going to move them forward and their support units. I don't know the numbers of the support units. By the way, let me make an advertisement for the First Ar- mored Division and the Second Calvary. Those folks were replaced and were basically in the Baghdad area. They were replaced there by the First Cavalry Division out of Fort Hood primarily in the middle of this big increase in violence that we had in April that started in Fallujah. During that time frame, they have repositioned in many different places. So they showed great mobility, great tactical competence and took the fight to the enemy in terrain and positions they weren't familiar with. Terrific leadership at all levels, no doubt, down to the individual soldier level. They are still there. They are fighting hard. They have done a terrific job. I am going to see some of the 377 families of the First Armored Division when I am in Europe for the Normandy services here coming up the first of June and will try to get a firsthand feel for how they are doing. But all indications, they are doing fine. But there is no plan that I know of to extend them beyond the 90 days. We are going to replace them, but not extend them. Also, in terms of equipment, as far as I know, there are no equipment shortages that have been brought to my attention. I will tell you this, the requirements for up-armored Humvees is likely to con- tinue to grow. We have indications, while not a formal requirement yet, I think they are around 4,400/4,500 are required in Iraq in the- ater. That number could grow. It could grow by several more thou- sand. And we are paying attention to that, because that will dictate how we solidify the plans. Other than that, I don't know of equipment shortages that the Guard, the Reserve or the active forces have. I think we are send- ing them over there with everything they need. Mrs. DAVIS OF VIRGINIA. Do we have enough of the right people for the jobs they are trained for? Are we being put in a position where we are putting our young men and women into jobs where they don't have the training? General MYERS. I will start off the answer, and then I will turn it over to General Hagee and General Schoomaker. We have obvi- ously, as we know what specific tasks have to be performed, we take units and train them in those tasks before they go into thea- ter, and we train them to those tasks. Occasionally, we get into theater, and the mission changes a lit- tle bit, and people have to adapt. And I think the flexibility that our forces have is essential to be able to do that. But in the perfect world, we will send them over well-trained for the task they are going to do. In the case of the active units, not much of an issue. But in the case of the Reserve and National Guard, more of an issue, because you have to mobilize them to train them, to get them to go there, and we have to make sure we mobilize them in time. There is a tension here. We don't want to mobilize them too early and have them spend a lot of time here either training or in unpro- ductive time. But at the same time, we want to send them over well-trained. That is something General Schoomaker and his folks and the Army Reserve folks work very, very hard to make sure we mobilize them in an efficient way, train them in the task they are going to be asked to perform and move forward. Clearly, after major combat, there were units in theater-be- cause of the swiftness of the victory of major combats, there were units that had to do things that, perhaps, they hadn't thought they were going to be asked to do. But as the situation is unfolding now, I think we can predict, for the most part, what we are going to ask units to do, and they should be properly trained before they leave wherever their home station, whether it is Europe, the Pacific or the United States. General SCHOOMAKER. My answer is going to be quite complex, and a lot of it will go back to much of the testimony that we have had here before the committee in the past. I said our strategic vec- tors in the United States Army are to support the Global War on Terrorism, as we have been, based upon what the combatant com- 378 an mander requests, and, at the same time, to transform our Army to the 21st century. And a great portion of this transformation is taking us out of our Cold War constructs and the unreadiness that, in particular, that we vested in our Guard and Reserve forces in a way that we in the past and to build our Army in a way that gives us the kind of the numbers of brigades and support units that are required to sustain this level of effort over time. And much of what we have come to you and have received great support on is assistance in both the funding and other authorities to be able to do this transformation. We are operating at a very high level of effort right now to support the war. And this gives us real tension, as we support the war, to also do that other vector, which is to transform. And the short answer to your question, in my opinion, we have ample numbers of soldiers. Our challenge is organizing, training equipping those soldiers into the kind of formations we will need for the future and the kinds we need today. I don't think we did a particularly good job in mobilizing last spring. I think that we compressed things. We did some things, and people worked very hard to do it right. But we saw that we had some problems in terms of equipping and training. I think we did a much better job last fall because we started with greater lead time and anticipation, especially with the 30th, 39th and 81st brigades that we deployed, did a much better job in prepa- ration there. I can tell you for sure that we are doing a better job now. I mean, we have had alerts now four or five months in advance. We have programs going now. We have 2,500 National Guard soldiers that are going through Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) qualifica- tion prior to mobilization, which really helps us post-mode to do the kinds of things collectively we need. We are doing a better job with medical readiness. We are doing a fantastic job getting our rapid fielding initiative and the equip- ment, the new body armor, the new weapons and all t! that. And we will continue to improve in this regard The longer we support this transformation, the broader the base of available units will be and the greater number of units. As I told you before here in testimony, we are moving toward an Army of be- tween 77 and 82 Brigades. That number of Brigades, Active, Guard and Reserve, are going to allow us to sustain this level of effort in- definitely with adequate times between deployments. But right now, we are not there yet. As you know, we are sup- porting the effort in both Iraq and Afghanistan at a higher level than we anticipated doing six months ago. And so this is frustrat- ing a little bit our efforts to transform. But I am happy to tell you that, in spite of that, I think we are making some great progress. As you know, by the end of this year, we will have three more Brigades that we did not have last year. At the end of next year, we will have six more Brigades. That is the equivalent of two divisions of combat power over and above, within the same constraints. Again, as I testified here, we requested 30,000 people, using tem- porary supplemental authority to fund those. The purpose was to 379 prime the pump and to give us the head space we needed to do this transformation. We anticipate that once we have transformed, to bring it down within the levels that we are authorized under stat- ute, in terms of end strength. And we think this is important be- cause of the extraordinary cost of people today. We cannot afford in the future to be burdened with personnel costs in excess of what it takes for us to man the force. And so I know we are still in a lot of discussion about all this, but that is about how simple I can make it in the short time we have available to us, but it is a very complex situation. Mrs. DAVIS OF VIRGINIA. Thank you, General. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Arkansas, Dr. Snyder. Dr. SNYDER. Thank you Mr. Chairman. Thank you, gentlemen, we appreciate you being here on such short notice. · The Defense bill is coming up. And I hope, as you study, I hope you let us know if we need to do things differently, because we want to help you in this very challenging time. General Myers, would a two-year delay in the base closure proc- ess be helpful or harmful to the national security of the country? General MYERS. A delay in the base realignment closure process would be very harmful to our national security. Dr. SNYDER. You mentioned earlier, General Myers, with regard to the issues of prisoners and the detainees, that we are being watched how we handle this, and we have a process that is being worked by the military. And Secretary Rumsfeld has made mention of investigations going on, apart from criminal investigations, to figure out what happened. It seems to me, the three criteria for judging how well we do on these investigations are, we get the facts out, people held account- able with justice so that both the perpetrators and the ones that are alleged are treated fairly. And we don't want to overreact and do things to the alleged perpetrators to somehow make a point if justice doesn't require it. But the third part of it is the part that I have the most concern about, is that the process will have to be perceived by as many peo- ple in the world as we can as one worthy of a transparent democ- racy. And my two questions are in terms of the investigations that you know are going on, how will the perception when these investiga- tions are concluded, will it be perceived as complete and factual and transparent with regard to civilians and Office of the Judge Advocate (OJA) and Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) alleged per- petrators in some of these incidences? General MYERS. Congressman Snyder, I believe it will be. And there are some things that I am not cognizant of in terms of OJ and others that are going to have to be worked very hard. But in terms of what I know about the military piece of this, that abso- lutely that will be transparent. There are things that we are look- ing at Dr. SNYDER. Excuse me for interrupting. I believe that. I believe that the military side of it will be transparent. My concern is that the OJA side of it will not and we will end up with months and 380 years of conspiracy theories. I have fear that your processes that you and General Åbizaid think are important, as you think this is important here today, but will not reach to the OJA and CIA part of it. General MYERS. The only problem I have is I can't speak for the other government agencies that might be involved. They are going to have to speak for themselves. It is important, though, that all of this is surfaced, the facts are known and we work at this, as you said, as swiftly as we can without prejudicing the process against those who may have been alleged to do something. You have to give it time to work in a thorough manner. Again, we have a time- tested way of doing this. And we have to let that process work. We have to do that. The perception, we can't leave any stone unturned. It all has to be on the table. Dr. SNYDER. I agree with that. One of the issues of transparency in October there was a press report that former senior Iraqi Air Defense Commander General Mahoush had been detained, and then at the end of November there were press reports that he died in this interrogation. I will just read part of it. Was being ques- tioned on Wednesday when he lost consciousness after complaining that he did not feel well. The military said he was pronounced dead by U.S. Army doctor. The cause of death, interrogation techniques are under investigation, but General Mahoush was not hooded dur- ing questioning the 82nd Airborne said. Has that press report been undated publicly or is that still con- sidered accurate? As you know we have General MYERS. I will have to get that for the record. I am famil- iar with the case. I don't know if it has been updated. I don't know if it has been closed out. I have some reference material here, and if I have a second, I will go through and come back to you and see if it is in that reference material. But we can get that for the record. [The information referred to can be found in the Appendix begin- ning on page 432.] Dr. SNYDER. As you know, The Denver Post a few days ago had a concerning story specifically regarded General Mahoush that, in fact, he had died of asphyxiaton while being head first in a sleeping bag and the allegation; I have actually have a copy of the Pentagon report—that the allegation is that someone was sitting on his chest while he was in a sleeping bag with a hand over his mouth and he was asphyxiated. General MYERS. I don't know about that. Dr. SNYDER. That seems different than the report that was re- leased. General MYERS. I have read through summaries of all of those reports, and some of those investigations are ongoing. I never re- member reading anything like that. That was not any of the allega- tions that I have read. But I can get that to you for the record. Dr. SNYDER. I wanted to ask, Dr. Hamre was involved in a study, a report that came out in the middle of July. He reached seven con- clusions, in fact, I think Secretary Rumsfeld asked him to do the study. Seven major areas need immediate attention. The coalition must establish public safety in all parts of the country. Iraqi own- ership of the rebuilding process must be expanded at national, pro- 381 vincial, and local levels. Idle hands must be put to work. And basic economic and social services provided immediately to avoid exacer- bating political and security problems. Decentralization is essen- tial. Number five, the coalition must facilitate a profound change in the Iraqi national frame of mind from centralized authority to sig- nificant freedoms, from suspicion to trust, from skepticism to hope. Number six, the United States needs to quickly mobilize a new re- construction coalition that is significantly broader than the coali- tion that successfully waged the war. And number seven, money must be significantly more forthcoming and more flexible. Secretary Rumsfeld as talked about desiring good metrics for measuring success and progress. Those seem like pretty reasonable ones but to me it seems like a lot of those are out of the hands of what we think of as traditional military function. How is the rest of the efforts going as far as putting idle hands to work and re- building and those kinds of efforts that are perhaps out of your hands? General MYERS. There is, I think, great progress on all fronts. And, Dr. Snyder, you are absolutely right, in my view. I have said this before. It applies to the war on terrorism, it also applies to the efforts in Iraq. From a military standpoint, we can't lose militarily, but we can't win with the military alone. It will take the effort on the political and economic fronts as well, which means reconstruc- tion and so forth. From the military point of view, these funds that we provide commanders to take action and employ people and fix things as they see they need to be fixed is extremely important. And you all have been very good about providing those funds and the flexibility to use them in the way that our commanders need to do that. I think that is a crucial element, not the whole of it, but the crucial element of what we are talking about here. I think progress in the other areas has been very, very good. If you look at power production, some of the other water and sanita- tion, all of that seems to be doing very well. The marsh areas in the south that the Saddam regime wanted to dry up have been re- flooded. There is lots of that kind of thing that has gone on in the country that I think give us great hope. As time goes forward, with some of the funding that has been provided by Congress, with some of the funding that the Iraqis are going to have from their own resources, they need to start making their own decisions in these areas. They need to start figuring out how to protect their oil infrastructure which is under attack in a more sophisticated way today by those that don't want progress in Iraq. I mean, they are not just picking on the pipelines they are picking on key pumping stations. So that is what I mean by more sophisticated. The Iraqis more and more need to participate how they are going to address that threat. We can help. We can help train. We can help equip. We can provide advice. We can provide intelligence. But in the end, the Iraqis are going to have to do it. But I would agree that across a wide range of activities, which we measure, by the way, and I think we provide documents over here on Capitol Hill every week on how we are doing and how we are coming against some of these metrics, I think we are doing 382 very well. But this is going to have to continue. We haven't got to the end of this. As we get closer and closer to 30 June, the Iraqis are more and more going to have to take charge of their own af- fairs. As I mentioned in my opening remarks, many of the ministries have already been turned over to Iraqis. They are responsible now. They will help. The coalition will help. Various countries will help them through this process. But I think we have done a pretty good job measuring this. I think there has been a lot of progress made in other fronts. Clearly, the most critical right now is the political front. And that is the one where the UN envoy Brahimi is in there working with the Iraqis to decide what the interim government is going to look like and who the personalities are going to be. We don't have visibilities in that right now, but I think shortly we will. And we will know who that is going to be and we will be off and running hopefully. The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman. The next gentleman is the gentleman from Minnesota, Mr. Kline. Mr. KLINE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, gentlemen, for being here. I have said privately, I want to say now publicly and as often as I can how proud I am of our troops. We have shown the world, I think for some time, that we have the best soldiers, sailors, airmen and Marines in the world. I want to thank you and commend you because I think that you gentlemen here in front of us today are showing the world not only do we have the best troops but we have the best leaders in the world. I think that your testi- mony, your appearance before camera, your presence is very reas- suring to our troops and to the American people. So thank you for that. We are here talking about how we are doing in Iraq. And we have had a number of terrific questions here today. I appreciate your answers. One of my colleagues on national television said the other day that we had suffered a defeat in Fallujah because we had put an Iraqi Brigade in and the Marines had withdrawn. And Gen- eral Hagee, you haven't had nearly enough opportunity to speak today, so if you could address that and give me your assessment of this defeat that we have had in Fallujah. General HAGEE. Once again, I am not the, as you know, Con- gressman Kline, not the operational tactical commander there. However, over the last couple of weeks it has been quiet in Fallujah. The number of attacks have gone down not only in Fallujah, but around Fallujah. The people are starting to come back out in the streets. There is support by the citizens of Fallujah for the brigade that is there. As I mentioned at a news conference yesterday, conducted by the Mayor of Fallujah, and the leader of the Fallujah Brigade for the Arab press, they were very supportive of what the Fallujah Brigade was doing and very supportive, publicly, of what the U.S. forces were doing. It is Friday evening in Iraq right now. And from the mosques in Fallujah during prayers yesterday, they were also supportive of what was going on. If that is a defeat, we need more defeats like that. As both the Chairman and General Schoomaker have said, 383 there is probably still going to be problems. This is risky. But I be- lieve that this helps put an Iraqi face on it. We are allowing the Iraqis to conduct their own security and stability in that area and they are taking that mission on. We had to turn away individuals who wanted to join the Fallujah brigade just because we did not have enough room to house everyone there. Hopefully, if this continues in this particular direction, we will be able—when I talk about we, I am talking about General Metz and General Sanchez over there expanding this particular concept in that area. So I am actually quite optimistic about what is hap- pening in and around Fallujah, sir. Mr. KLINE. Thank you, General. It doesn't sound at all like a de- feat to me either. It underscores something we all need to be care- ful of. You made the point, General Myers made the point, General Schoomaker has made the point you are not the tactical com- mander there and nor are we. I believe it is very important that we in Congress, while exercising our appropriate Constitutional oversight responsibilities, don't decide that we are tactical com- ther and become critical or suggestive of every decision that is made by the commanders in the theater. And clearly, to me there was a wise decision made and we have seen what appears to be a terrific results from it. I am going to run out of time very quickly. I know how this works. I know, General Hagee, you have addressed this already, but I remember very well a discussion with you which you have re- iterated here today where you said as you have traveled around the world talking to our Marines, and their families, that the most often asked question is general are the American people still with us. And you testified today that you are always very pleased to be able to say yes they are. But I am troubled that that is the ques- tion that they are asking. And I wondered if you would take an- other minute or two to talk about that. Clearly this doesn't come out of thin air. They have some con- cerns or they wouldn't be asking those questions. General HAGEE. Sir, I am not so sure it is a concern. I would say that it is more that the young Americans that we have in the Armed Forces today are really quite sophisticated. They are well read, they keep up on the news, they know how things work. They also remember what it was in Vietnam. Sir, you and I both served in Vietnam. And we know the reception that we got when we came back. So these are sophisticated, young men and women out there. And I think that is a good question that they have on their mind. It is also a really good answer that we are able to deliver to them. I have had the opportunity, as I am sure everyone on this Com- mittee has, to be able to travel throughout the United States and talk to civilian groups. And it doesn't matter what part of the coun- try I go to, what their political persuasion is, the support of what ng over there is very, very strong. And I am happy to report that to the young men and women we have over there. Mr. KLINE. Thank you, General. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman. And General Myers, I i have to have had a hard stop. I think. at 11:15. but if I could ask your indulgence the gentleman from Tennessee is next, 384 Mr. Cooper, maybe we could let Mr. Cooper have his question be- fore you take off. Have you got- General MYERS. I think it is, General SCHOOMAKER. I have the hard stop there, sir. General MYERS. I think I am good to go. The CHAIRMAN. Is it General Schoomaker that has the hard stop? Okay. In that case, the gentleman from Tennessee is recognized. And General Schoomaker, if you have to take off, thank you for your for being with us today. Obviously we I have a lot of work to do with you. You have a big investment in this bill. There is a big piece of money in this bill for this new modularity that you are achieving, both with respect to personnel and equipment. And we want to work with you as we walk this thing down through con- ference. General SCHOOMAKER. Thank you very much. We have some time yet. I have to depart at 11:15. The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Tennessee. Mr. Cooper. Mr. COOPER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. We support our troops and we support you gentlemen. It is your civilian bosses in the Pentagon I am increasingly worried about. If you look at the front page of today's paper, you see a picture of Mr. Chalabi. You also see a picture of him seated right next to the First Lady of the United States at this year's State of the Union message. If you read the paper, you see that the Defense Intelligence Agency has been paying him and his political party $335.000 a month for years. We have terminated those payments apparently a week ago today. But today we hear the news that someone ordered the raid of his headquarters and ransacking in Baghdad yesterday. There are even allegations that he may have been an Iranian agent all the time. We don't know. The New York Times is saying that the Defense Minister or Inte- rior Minister in Iraq did not order the raid, and no one can order- determined who did. But here we have a gentleman who is pictured in the paper with Secretary Wolfowitz, apparently very close to the Vice President Cheney, this seems to be a substantial development in the war when one of the most highly paid and trusted advisors may have deliberately misled our Nation for months and years. And some of our officials may have swallowed it hook, line, and sinker. To me this is one of the most disturbing developments of the war. We don't have answers to this question. General Myers has said that the Interior Minister did order the raid. General MYERS. That is the information that I have. Mr. COOPER. Were there Americans present during the raid? General MYERS. The information I have is that it was ordered by the Minister of Interior, that it was carried out by t service, that U.S. forces or coalition forces provided at outer cordon, so they were not involved in going into the facilities, an outer cor- don, and that the evidence is now resident in an Iraqi court. That is the information that I have been told. I asked about that before we came over to make sure we had the latest information on that. Mr. COOPER. If this man was on the U.S. payroll until last week, what has changed in the last few days to make him the subject of a raid of this type? 385 General MYERS. That I can't tell you. What I can tell you is that the organization that he is associated with, has provided intel- ligence to our intelligence unit there in Baghdad that has saved soldiers' lives. So I know at least that part of it has been beneficial. I cannot comment on the rest. I just don't know. Mr. COOPER. Do you know who invited him to sit next to the First Lady of the United States at this year's State of the Union message in January? General MYERS. I have no idea. Mr. COOPER. Has the overall intelligence that has been offered by Mr. Chalabi been accurate? General MYERS. As I said. I can only say what has been said to me by the intelligence leadership in Baghdad that works for, then, the combined Joint Task Force 7 is that intelligence was accurate and useful in many cases. Mr. COOPER. Many cases. What has changed in the last few days to make this man almost subject to arrest? General MYERS. Sir, I can't answer that. Mr. COOPER. You answered in response to Dr. Snyder. You gave some clarification of the statement that you have made in the past that I think is probably been misinterpreted when you said that there is no way that we can lose militarily in Iraq but there is no way that we can win either. If you would care to further elaborate, because I think most of our troops need to hear that their role is important. General MYERS. Their role is extremely important. We haven't lost a tactical fight we have been there in Iraq for that matter Af- ghanistan. The troops are doing superb work. Their work is abso- lutely essential to success in Iraq. At the same time, unless you have progress on the political front, if you don't have progress on the economic front, then it can't all be done by our U.S. forces and our friends and allies who are in there with us. That is what we mean when we say we can't lose militarily but we can't win it ei- ther. No, our forces are doing a superb job. Everything asked of them by the way, and more. We have asked a great deal of our forces. We have asked young men and women to do things that you would never suspect in helping set up you know, municipal govern- ments to aid in that, to make judgments that you could never train anybody for. They have to do that with the values they carry for- ward from America into that country. They are doing that. Mr. COOPER. We in Tennessee are particularly proud of General Patreus and the outstanding service that he has rendered and re- gret that the Nation has to call on him again. General MYERS. When somebody comes back that has served in Iraq for a long time and to come back and then change command at the division and then to go right back, that is a true public serv- ant that has only one thing on his mind, and that is to try to make that situation better in Iraq. He will I think be enormously success- ful. Mr. COOPER. Amen. The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman. And General Myers, I think the discussion about General Patreus and the number of ex- perienced hands that we have developed in this war against terror- ism is, I think, raises a good point. That is that you have some 386 great folks, who many of whom we have met with when we have been over there in country and Iraq and Afghanistan, you have got now in the active duty in our military leadership circles a lot of what you would call old hands. Do you ever think about putting- understanding these folks come back and they have assignments and duty status in Continental United States (ČONUS) and around the world, have you thought about putting together a little group of old hands in some of these former division commanders and leadership and talking with them a little bit and getting their take as we walk down this road toward the transition. Since they have been in those shoes and they have been in coun- try, their experience is usually more insightful than people you ull out of think tanks to give advice on this new, very im- portant era in this transition. General MYERS. Well, some of those old hands are still in Iraq. General Rick Sanchez is still, The CHAIRMAN. How about those that have come back here who might be available to— . General MYERS. Right. Let me tell you how we are trying to use those. Everybody that has experience in Afghanistan or Iraq, I think I can say this without exception, we very carefully manage between the services myself and the Secretary in terms of where these people go to be effective. It is a little different than your question. And I can't get ahead of myself because some of these haven't been announced yet. But we are going to try and ensure that they are in places where they can affect major decisions on the war on terrorism befitting their background. So we look at that very, very carefully. Some of them are in those positions now, some will be nominated to be in those positions shortly. It hasn't been approved by the President yet. But you bet. It is very important and I know both services look at that very carefully. We talk and try to make sure we have the right folks in the right places so we can take advantage of the experience that they have. The CHAIRMAN. You have a lot of talent. Just to have them avail- able for comments as new faces are engaged in it, just to have some insights in certain areas could be invaluable. General MYERS. That is one of the reasons, again, why General Patreus—not to draw on General Patreus, but that is one of the reasons he was he's going back. He was so successful overall in his where he was located in Iraq, but specifically on these issues that now he is going to work Iraq wide, with all his contacts with his knowledge, with his enthusiasm, that is why he is going back there to be part of this major part of this effort. The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. The distinguished gentleman from Arizona, Mr. Franks. Mr. FRANKS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you gentle- men. I know that you have already received words of appreciation this morning. But it is well known that you can never be thanked enough for your noble efforts. I realize that in any war cir- cumstance there are always going to be challenges and difficulties, nothing can ever be a perfect operation, but you have come very close. I believe with all of my heart that the counci. and eternity will deem your efforts worthwhile if we are able to see able torchts in certain areas of the reasons, agant is one of the 387 a beach head of freedom established in Iraq that could see the whole of humanity turned in a better direction. So I just want to add my own expressions of appreciation to you. Having said that, I am sure that most of your focus is on this next paradigm shift that will occur on the 30th of June. I guess I have two questions related to that. The hope is all of us hope that the seat of freedom will germinate in the hearts of Iraqis and we can see this really go forward as we all believe it can. After the 30th of June, two questions, what do you believe will be the pos- ture of the insurgency there, the terrorists, the enemy in general, how will that change, given the new Iraqi leadership, even if it is an interim structure? And second, how do you think the command structure will work? I mean, will it be a strictly a civilian sov- ereignty, will our troops, our generals, be subordinate in any way to the Iraqi leadership? Will they be there as partners if there are conflicts in strategy or if there are emergencies or if indeed ulti- mately we were asked to leave? I know these are pretty sweeping questions, but how will that command structure work and will our own generals be subordinated to Iraqi orders, as it were? And I am sure that that is as a lot of reticence on the part of all of us, includ- ing yourselves, but give us some perspective on that. I know that you have thought about it a lot. Again, your answer may outrun my time. So I just express, again, my appreciation to all of you. General MYERS. Thank you, Congressman Franks. I will star out and then my colleagues can join in any time they want to. The threat after 30 June, I think there will continue to be a big security threat progress in Iraq past 30 June clearly. Those that are dedi- cated, and I am talking about the Zarqawis of the world who are working a bigger issue they are working the issue of extremism versus a more moderate approach to governance, that that threat will continue to intensify. I think also, though, that the threat once you have an Iraqi interim government, that it will be seen as ille- gitimate by more and more Iraqis. Not only Zarqawi and the for- eign fighters, but the former Ba'athists and so forth will be seen as more illegitimate, should help, I think, in working the security problem. At the same time, we have these Iraqi forces who will be as every month goes by better trained and equipped to deal with this. In terms of the command and control arrangements, the way we view this is we want a partnership with Iraqis. We want to be able to share the threat situation with the Iraqi leadership so that as they view the threat as the coalition forces view the threat, that if we view it the same way, if we can agree on the threat, then rea- sonable people can come to conclusions about what you need to do. So the first thing we have to do is ensure we have the mechanisms to share the picture. That is already being done by General Fast and her people in Baghdad. It needs to be more intense, more regu- lar, and a regular way of doing business. That will happen as soon as we have the right interlocutors on the Iraqi side, and then I think under the current U.N. Security council resolution 1511, under the transitional administrative law that the coalition forces have the authority to take whatever action they need to take. But my view, again, is that we ought to view this as a partner- ship. We ought to work with the Iraqis on how we take whatever 388 action is required. There will be some action that only coalition forces can do because we are only ones that will be trained and equipped to do it. There will be other actions that the Iraqi police or the Civil Defense Corp or the border force and so on can do, and they ought to do that or maybe they need to be help, maybe we need to be with them and support them. We see a partnership, to work through the issues. To be sure, there will be differences. To be sure, there will be challenges. To be sure, there will be risk. I can't tell you how it might work out. But I do know that there will be differences of opinion on how to handle issues. Another Fallujah, there will probably be great differences of opinion. But like this last Fallujah incident, if I may use that his was worked out with the Iraqis and General Sanchez and his folks and the 3rd Mech out in the west, that was worked out over time to come to this—the situation we have now which we think is going in the right direction. Time will tell. But that is the notion. General SCHOOMAKER. I would add to that very simply, I had the opportunity to meet with Mr. Negroponte two days ago and listen to his view in a private way in view of his thinking in the way ahead. I think the establishment of an American embassy in the more traditional role of an embassy vice the CPA kind of role is an important dimension to this. The establishment of the multi- national forces Iraq, which will continue to provide the command and control of U.S. forces that are there. And, of course, under- neath that having General Patreus' effort which will support and mentor and train the Iraqi security forces in concert with the Iraqi governmental structures over there is a very important. I would just like to add to the Fallujah discussion here, General Patreus, in a different circumstance up north employed precisely these kinds of techniques that are being employed in Fallujah to great success. It is for that reason that I feel that the risks are worthwhile in Fallujah and the approaches being taken there is worth the risk. Because I think this is precisely what it is we want to do. And, finally, I would say these hard core people, regardless of their persuasion, and the reason they are hard core, are going to take this opportunity to try to derail the efforts of the transition. I think we should anticipate that there will be increased levels of in a variety of places from a variety of people, but that this transitional period has to happen. We have got to get to it. And so therefore, I think that I have a certain sense of optimism that we will see some progress through it even though it will be difficult. General HAGEE. I would align myself, Mr. Congressman, with the Chairman and Chief of Staff of the Army. I really have nothing significant more to add. Mr. FRANKS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman. The distinguished gen- tleman from Mississippi, Mr. Taylor. Mr. TAYLOR. Thank you, gentlemen, for being here and giving us ir time, and thank you for your service to our Nation and for all the young people that serve under you. A couple of things. As you know we have had a huge rotation of National Guard and Reservists into Iraq. I recently met with the Commanding Officer (CO) of a returning unit, an engineering unit 389 who told me that that every piece of equipment in his heavy engi- neering unit was left behind. I understand the reason for that. General MYERS. What was left behind? Mr. TAYLOR. Every piece of heavy equipment in his engineering unit was left behind. I would presume that is the norm. And I un- derstand the reason for that. But since they are dual-hatted as Na- tional Guardsman to serve both a State role and a national role, and since they are, in effect, the first responders in a part of the country that regularly gets hurricanes, my question is will the sup- plemental address the replacement of equipment for this unit and the other units who left their equipment behind, again I under- stand the need to leave the armored Humvees in theater. Are we taking the steps to replace what is left behind? Second question, General, I picked up an article from a ked up an article from about a year ago dated April the 28th. And it is about the time of Ameri- cans first being captured in Iraq. The President responded to that probability by saying, and I am quoting, we expect the Americans who were captured to be treated humanely just like we will treat any prisoners of theirs that we capture humanely. If not, the peo- ple who mistreat the prisoners will be treated as war criminals. That is the commander in chief. The Congressman from Arkansas just mentioned a report in The Denver Post, that I am also aware of, that speaks of the head of the Iraqi Air Force who turned him- self in this November, apparently was placed in a sleeping bag, head first, and suffocated while being interrogated. And again ap- parently within the Pentagon it confirms that. This troubles me for a number of reasons, but number one, I think it puts young Americans at risk when they are captured. I think it provides our enemy with stories to make our intentions in Iraq look less than noble. And so for a great many reasons, this troubles me. If the Commander in Chief is saying they will be treated humanely, at what point was the message lost? Because, again, I can understand five or six bad apples in one prison. This did not occur at that prison. And if someone who surrendered is treated like this, I fear it is going to lead to fewer Iraqis surrender- ing not more at a time when we want them to surrender rather than prolong this conflict. Please, I would welcome your response of all of you gentlemen. General MYERS. Let's do the first question. General SCHOOMAKER. The first question is more appropriate for me, I think. I will take this for the record because I don't know the specific instance. I don't know whether we are going to convert that engineering unit to some other capability. Mr. TAYLOR. If I may, sir, so you don't have to look it up; it is the 890th. General SCHOOMAKER. We will get that to you. But if we are going to retain it as an engineer unit, that is precisely what we use supplemental funding money to do and most likely we will redirect equipment that is here in ČONUS to backfill that equipment that they have taken. But if we are going to convert it to some other capability, then, of course, we will use supplemental money to do that. But we will take the 890th and get back to you specifically on what the plan is. 390 [The information referred to can be found in the Appendix begin- ning on page 431.] General MYERS. It is not lost on this committee, but when we talk about equipment just one more time, I think my colleagues would agree with this, we are using up equipment at a very rapid rate. We have lost many helicopters, I think about 70 helicopters have been lost in operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. The equip- ment that we leave is being used very hard and more than we would ever use it in peacetime. So as we look at future budgets and supplementals and so forth, we have got a program in, and we intend to do that, the ability to fix this equipment, if it can be fixed through depot or replaced if it has to be replaced. I know nobody is more sensitive about that than this Committee, and we appreciate it. But I think it is impor- tant to talk about that. General SCHOOMAKER. One of the reasons we asked in the sup- plemental funding that you just talked to have procurement at this time because we do have about 70 helicopters in the Army to re- place. We have over 200 wheeled vehicles to replace that we lost. We have lost some 20 large systems tanks, Bradlees, these kind of ings. And so that is why we have asked for some procurement money in the supplemental that is coming. General HAGEE. Even though our numbers are obviously not as great, we face the same challenge in replacing equipment and the equipment being used very, very hard. Mr. TAYLOR. On the breakdown where our Commander in Chief has said how the Iraqis will be treated and how in unfortunately in some limited instances they were treated? General MYERS. On a couple of points on that. First of all, you are exactly right, Congressman Taylor. How we treat detainees we can expect, of course, that others might treat us the same way. That is why it is important even though it was decided that the Geneva Convention didn't directly apply to—I am not going through the detail, but I will use that, in general in Afghanistan, we did say that we would treat our detainees humanely and in ac- cordance with the tenets of the Geneva Convention. The breakdown is what we are trying to figure out. And we have the issue in Abu Ghraib. We still have one of the key reports that has to be done is the General Fay report who is looking at the mili- tary intelligence piece of that to see how that was involved with the military police part. We don't know that yet because we haven't seen his report. He is back in the United States. He has been in Iraq, he has been in Germany. He's back here now. I think we are on a several week timeline for him to finish that report. It again is administrative in nature. It can result in administrative action against people. So there will probably be some time for people to respond to some of the things that will be alleged in that report. So it will have to go through its process. But that is part of the answer. The other part is these individual cases come up and I think they are all being looked at by the folks in the Army that do the criminal investigations that people will have to be held ac- countable for that. And we have got other things going on to see if there is any guid- ance that was issued by anybody that would lead people to believe 391 that that kind of behavior was appropriate. So far we haven't found that guidance that says that is appropriate behavior. Just the oppo- site, in fact. But we have a lot of things going on as we talked about with Congressman Snyder we have to get this up on the table and everybody have a look at it. Mr. TAYLOR. Thank you, gentlemen. The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman. And just want to let you know, General Schoomaker and General Hagee and General Myers, we have placed a lot of money in this supplemental that we bolted on to our bill. We tried to get ahead of the curve there. We have over $500 million in the bill we passed last night for helicopter re- placement for Army aviation alone. We similarly have money for The Marines in that category. So we are moving ahead and we will try to get you a read-out on the precise dollars that we have for war losses across the world before you get out of here today. So the next gentleman in our lineup here is the gentleman from Okla- homa, Mr. Cole. Mr. COLE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And let me begin, if I may, by associating myself very strongly with my colleague, Mr. Kline's remarks, and Mr. Franks. We are very appreciative of the job that each of you do and more importantly even the outstanding men and women that you lead. So I think you have just conducted your- selves magnificently. I know this is a particularly difficult and troubling and trying patch that we are going through, but you have enormous respect on this committee and certainly appreciation for what you do. Let me, if I can, sort of switch the focus a little bit. Because we spend a lot of time, as we should, talking about ourselves and talk- ing about our allies. I want to talk a little bit about our enemies and get your impressions on that and make an observation and get a comment. As I look at the enemy, I break them down into three different categories. We have foreign fighters, maybe even state- supported, but foreign fighters, al Qaeda types associated with ter- rorism are there. We have got the Saddamists, the remnants of the regime, we have maybe some folks like al-Sadr, that sort of Shi'a extremist. And they don't really have a common theme between them. We are having to contend with them but they are not linked by a common ideology. They really have a very different vision each one of them for Iraq. Some people want an internal jihad, some people want a sort of Shi'a theocracy like Iran. Other people want to go back to the old Saddam regime. And all the information we have is that none of those alter- natives are particularly attractive to the Iraqi people, speaking broadly. We have for all the problems and difficulties that we face, a pretty attractive vision out there that we are working toward, democratic country, a free country, a country that runs its own af- fairs, a country that, at some point, would be free of our direct in- volvement in any way shape or form. I believe the President very firmly, when he says we want to stay there as long as it takes to get it done and not a day longer. We want to come home a as soon as we can but not leave something behind. So I would like to you talk from your perspective, I would love it if all three of you could address it, just describe the nature 392 of the enemy as you see it, how it has evolved over the last year, because obviously it has changed in some ways become more so- phisticated, and how you assess how we line up with them and how the Iraqi people view this conflict between us, Iraqi security forces as our allies, and these very different types of enemies that you are dealing with. General MYERS. Well, Congressman Cole, I think you have done a good job of pretty much outlining the threat that we face. And it does have different elements. We are seeing, I think, more co- ordination between them, coordination of convention, not of even states or philosophical agreement, but tactical agreement that they can help one another share weapons and so forth. I think there is probably great dislike among the various ele- ments for the other elements, but they are willing to cooperate to some degree. And I think we are seeing some of that. I think we saw some of that on the attacks of the major supply routes. Some of that cooperation, again, more of convenience, certainly not to be looked at as a popular uprising in Iraq, nothing like that, but at the tactical level some cooperation. And you are right, there is—in the Shia population, there is not homogeneity in their view of how Iraq ought to go forward. There is lots of different thoughts in that community. We think Sadr and his thugs are more and more isolated. Again the strategy there, we haven't talked much about that strategy, but the strategy is to let Iragis try to solve that problem. He is wanted in connection with the murder of one of the clerics, and Iraqis need to bring him to court and determine what his involvement was. And I think they are interested in doing that. I think they know they have to do that. Our role is to make sure that his thugs aren't disrupting security in other parts of the country or in Karbala and Najaf without being right there in their holy places. So we have tried to work that much like Fallujah with Iraqis. So there is that part of it. The foreign fighters probably characterized—and Zarqawi, we an't ignore him. We think he's still in Iraq. He's working a dif- ferent agenda. It is the bigger agenda that is being worked in Iraq beyond the former regime elements. I will get to them in just a minute. That agenda if you go to the 30,000 foot view, that agenda is that extremism should win out and part of the tenants there, as we heard from Osama bin Laden and others and Zarqawi, while not al Qaeda, is affiliated with them and has the same view, and many other extremists do as well, and that is that they want to bring down our way of life. They have said it and they want to do it. They certainly do not want an Iraq that is in any way democratic, is in any way where the people have a say in their future. They would like to see it apparently an anarchy, because he is the one that talked about while we can't make the coalition leave so we will start a civil war between the Sunni and the Shia here. That view is the one that has threatened Europe, that has threatened us, that results in the Madrid bombings, that results in the bombings in Ri- yadh, that resulted in 9/11. That threat is still there. While we have been very successful in addressing it from a military standpoint and, in some cases, diplo- 393 matic standpoint, and we have done away with the safe havens and a lot of the leadership has been rolled up and we have stopped lots of attacks, it is still there. There are people that believe so strongly that they are willing to commit suicide. There is that element not only in Iraq but throughout the region, for that matter throughout the world. We know those cells. Mr. COLE. Would it be fair to say, General, we would be dealing with those people whether we were in Iraq or not? In other words General MYERS. In my view, that's absolutely right. This is a view of the world. And Îraq is a convenient place for them to be. But it is a view of the world that with or without our involvement in Iraq would be out there and would have to be dealt with. Abso- lutely. It pervades many, many countries, and you know the story. But that is the 30,000-foot view. It is also why we in America and American people ought to care mightily about how successful we are in places like Afghanistan and Iraq. We have about 1,000 troops in the Horn of Africa and other places in the world, why we need to be successful and why it also can't be just a military, it is all elements of national power that have to carry this fight. To the former regime elements, we have had various names for them over time but the people that are part of the Ba’athist re- gime, part of the solution there is to give them hope that they have a future in Iraq. And that hasn't been done perfectly. I think what you are seeing in Fallujah now is part of that process to give these people that provided a lot of the senior leadership to Saddam's re- gime you are giving them hope that there is a way forward without just fighting the coalition, that there is economic hope. And that is why I mentioned that the Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) out there is perhaps the largest employer out there, that they use their funds that the commanders have to help establish work for a lot of people that are out of work. Then they have to be coaxed into the political process. These are not going to be their natural in- stincts, but they have to be coaxed into that process. I thi nink. in fact, the coalition forces can help. certainly the UN can help, the Iraqi interim government is going to have to help make them see that there is a future here that they can be part of that decision-making process, however it works out, for their fu- ture. And that is a big part of it. But I think you have named the threat. It is not the same throughout the country. If you look at the north, the north is relatively stable, relatively prosperous. Some- body brought up the fact that Patreus, that the success of General Patreus had in the north was very high. We saw that during these recent attacks in April. There were lots of demonstrators that stormed up to the government buildings in Mosul. And who turned them away and who settled the issue there? It was the Mayor, it was the police, and it was the Iraqi Civil Defense Force that we trained. Iraqis took care of their own situation up in Mosul which could have been a very dynamic one if they hadn't acted. General SCHOOMAKER. If I could very quickly add. I agree with the chairman and with your description in general of the foe, and I am speaking basically from a past life here and some experience, I would caution that we rush too quick to—while it is very impor- 394 tant for us to attempt to define and understand the threat, I would caution about rushing to judgment and closure on that. Because I think this is a very dynamic threat. And I think there will be some surprises yet to come in the woodpile, so to speak, in terms of what might be some of the motivations and what might be some of the sources. And I think depending upon how things go, we need to think about this in a broader context than just Iraq. That there are all kinds of other possible motivations and we need to keep our ap- erture pretty wide to recognize how this may develop in the future. And in my view when we talk about this, as I think about it, I think it is global, I think it is going to be long, I think it is not just defined by Iraq. And I think this is something that we are going to have to learn as we go and just be careful we don't even up stereotyping and buying into definitions here that may limit our understanding about what it is we should be doing. I hope that doesn't overconfuse the issue. But I am worried about our tendency to want to always come to closure and overdefine a stereotype, and then kind of stick our stake in the ground and miss the obvious for that reason. General HAGEE. Congressman Cole, I will try hard not to pile on even though I agree with both of my colleagues here. The elements that you described I think are out there. I sort of put them in one pile, call them hard core. They are not really for anything in my mind. They are against what Iraq is trying to do, what Afghanistan is trying to do, what a lot of other countries over in that area are trying to do. And I think Tom Friedman called some of the other people over there “individuals standing around.” in other words, they are attracted to whoever they think is going to win. As the Chairman talked about, I think that is where our focus needs to be. It is where our focus was in Fallujah, to separate this hard core element from the average Iraqi, if you will, and give them some- thing to fight for rather than something to be against. I think that is what you are seeing down with the great work that the 1st Ar- mored Division has done and the see the support waning for Sadr down there because they are starting to see that there is something that might be worth fighting for. So I agree with them, look at it just a little bit differs Mr. COLE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for your indulgence. Just in closing, I think it is important we remember who the bad guys are and the good guys are in this particular confrontation. We cer- tainly have our difficulties and our challenges, but our people have done a tremendous job. And the elements that we are dealing with do not wish the United States of America well, and do not wish the Iraqi people well. Because the future that they would impose upon them, whether they are the hard core Saddamists or the jihadists would be a terrible fate for them. So I just hope as we work our way through the challenges, we always remember that. I really do believe you gentlemen are associated with a very noble cause. You are doing great things for our country and, frankly, you are doing great things for people in other countries to provide them with some security, some freedom and some opportunities and hope for future. So again, thank you for what you do. The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman. You know one message that has flowed from all these comments is that we have gone back 395 look at differe reminded ruited for the bring the hi to Fallujah a number of times and with the successes up north it is apparent now that some of these solutions are custom-made. And there are solutions that depend on the creativity and the talent of the military leadership that happens to be in that area of oper- ations (AO). I think that may be a message for us. That may be instructive for us with respect to this transition. You have got obviously a country with lots of disparities. And one size fits all, or the attempt to homogenize this thing may not be the right direction. What we do is may depend on our ability to look at different areas and come up with different solutions. And I am reminded of being in the museum at Fort George where the Scots are recruited for the British Army. The old recruit- ing posters that they used to use to bring the highlanders into the recruiting office said you will be with your own clan. And that gave when you had those little British squares fighting against enor- mous odds, one reason the squares held is because they were clans. That may be to some degree the same give us some of the same instruction that we received from this Fallujah experience. And I would hope we use that. General MYERS. You are exactly right, Mr. Chairman, in terms of flexibility that is exactly the right picture, I think. The CHAIRMAN. The distinguished gentleman from Florida, Mr. Meek. Thank you for the work you have done and the number of recent trips that have you taken on behalf of the Committee. We appreciate the work you did on the bill yesterday. Mr. MEEK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am glad to be here this morning. I just had a few questions of General Myers. I am sorry that the Assistant Under Secretary of Defense is not here, Honor- able Wolfowitz. And I am sorry that Secretary Rumsfeld is not here. Because I believe that this morning I mean waking up this morning and watching the Today Show and seeing the pictures that have leaked out of the Pentagon or leaked from somewhere, is now on the Washington Post Web site, is available for everyone throughout the world at 7 a.m. This morning, videos, this is a major, major issue. General, I want to ask you, did you have any indication that this was leaked to the Washington Post? General MYERS. Absolutely not. Mr. MEEK. So you learned it this morning when the rest of us learned the fact that they had it. General MYERS. I think the staff meeting this morning somebody said they had leaked out. I believe it was this morning. Mr. MEEK. I am overly concerned about the leaks that are com- ing out of our government. It is jeopardizing troop safety. Last time that you were here and Secretary Rumsfeld was here, I said it gave me no pleasure but this is what I am talking about as relates to the future days in this effort against terrorism and what we are doing in Iraq. And I can't help to say but paper after paper, news report after news report, some of it is very much unbelievable, but some of it you have to believe about some of the things that are going on. There are six investigations, and, Mr. Chairman, and General Myers, if we can, I would like a paragraph on each one of those investigations and what they are doing. 396 General MYERS. Absolutely. We can get that to you. Mr. MEEK. That would be good. The CHAIRMAN. Let me just tell my colleague, too. We have an arrangement whereby we have regular briefings, ongoing briefings as these investigations and prosecutions walk down, in which the Department of Defense (DOD) comes over and all Members are in- vited, all Members on the Committee are invited to it. In fact, we will invite the full House Membership, and so we will be kept up to date as these investigations walk on down. Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Chairman, may I add there, too, because it is of great concern, making the front page of the paper, would it be possible, from what you know, during those briefings to give us the ongoing situation regarding Mr. Chalabi, please? General MYERS. Sure. Mr. MEEK. General Myers, being very, very concerned about it, I know that there are hopefully provisions on the ground in Iraq that are being taken. Some of the things that were in the Washing- ton Post today were very disturbing about what some of the wit- nesses or Iraqi prisoners have testified, of an Army translator forc- ing sex with an underage individual, having someone denounce their religion and thank Jesus Christ for their life. This is really, really very disturbing that this took place, and I can't help to say that outside of how we handle this situation, not only dealing with the individuals that are under court martial right now—there has been time after time we have said there are six bad apples, there are a few bad apples, and every day we are finding out that this apple cart is getting bigger. And I am concerned not only about get- ting to the bottom of this but also about getting to the top of it, and I think some of the folks that are wearing suits and ties and running around Washington, D.C., in and out of the Pentagon, there has to be more questions asked. Mr. Chairman, I am glad we are here this morning. There have to be more questions asked. We have to know more. The American people have to know more, or we are going to continue going back and saying, what I really meant-and the fact that you and the rest of the individuals at the Pentagon, and I would include the Secretary, I am assuming that he learned about this this morning, too—is very disturbing that this continues to happen. And I just want to know, is there anything within the Pentagon as it relates to the leaks, because I think that you are looking into the leaks trying to find out where they are coming from, because I believe, General Myers, that there are one or two things. One, ei- ther there is someone that is saying, I am going to leak information because it is being suppressed at the top and they not handling it in the way they should; or, two, we have a situation, I guess, that is a normal thing that happens here in Washington, D.C. I am asking these questions not based upon news reports I might have watched this morning. I am asking these questions because we have troops right now in an area trying to do the job that we have asked them to do. I respect them. I pray for them daily. But we continue to have these—dropping the ball on keeping the infor- mation within the Pentagon and the lack of, I think-Mr. Chair- man, in all due respect, I don't think that we are doing what we are supposed to do as a Committee on the oversight of what is hap- 397 pening right now here in this House. And I hope and pray that from this day on that we have hearings, that we have real discus- sions about what took place, when it took place, who knew what, when, so that we can be able to not only speak to the American people in our districts, but we can also let folks know that we are- I mean, the people in the Arab world and throughout the world and allies that we need in this effort against terrorism, that we will get to the top of this. We are concerned about the bottom, but we are also concerned about the top, and all the way from the Secretary to reports the New York Times would have you think that he green-lighted cer- tain things to take place. I mean, these are questions that we have to allow the Secretary to, one, come before this Committee and let us know what he knows; and if it is untrue, it is untrue; but to release a press release saying, oh, it is unfounded, and then we are done with it, I have a problem with that. So, General, if you can, please let us know what is going on as it relates to the leaks there. Please also let us know if you hear of anything else as it relates to news reports that are going to come out, because we are getting our information through the media; and being on Armed Services Committee, that is not one of the rea- sons why I am here. I could be at home, you know, reading and stuff. I would like to hear it from you all before we see it in the paper, and if you all did know about it and the Chairman wasn't called, I don't know, I can't speak for the other body, but it is im- portant that we know this information so that we will be able to handle it. And, Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you for having this hearing today, even though it was called yesterday, and a lot of the Mem- bers I am pretty sure would have been here if there was future no- tice. And I was asked around earlier—I have only been here—this is my first turn, but some of the other members have been here for several years. Well, General, I will leave it at that. I asked you a couple of questions, but I guess, Mr. Chairman, we can have a discussion about this hearing being called the day after we passed a bill on the floor, I guess we are getting an update on Iraq. I am appreciative that we are having this hearing, but at the same time I am not. Why was this hearing called today after we passed the bill? General Myers, if you would just- The CHAIRMAN. In fact, Mr. Meek, you don't have to ask General Myers to respond, because I want to respond to you. I don't know if you have been missing these hearings, but we have had a full- blown hearing with the Secretary of Defense answering questions on Abu Ghraib. We have had also, with all the Members of the House invited full briefings, classified briefings with the Secretary answering all questions that were asked of him. We have had full showings of the pictures made available, not just to the Members nmittee on numerous occasions, more than one, but also all the Members of the House. We have spent more time on Abu Ghraib than we have on any weapons system in this $422 billion, and we have 141,000 troops in combat. We have pulled the combat commander, at the request of the other body apparently, because I told him to go home and not be here on Friday, because I wanted 398 him to be back leading his troops, because we have had 66 attacks on American troops in Iraq in the last 24 hours. We have taken casualties. We have taken a couple of killed in action (KIA), and a combat leader should be in front of his troops. So I don't know where you were, but we have had more hearings, open and closed, on this one subject than any other issue that has been before this committee, and as a result of those hearings and as a result of the Taguba report, we have embedded changes in the criminal justice system and the treatment of prisoners in the bill that presumably you voted for last night. This issue has not only been given a lot of publicity and atten- tion, but we have had numerous attempts to get any—even classi- fied or open facts from the Department of Defense, and you ou will continue to get that. We will have as we walk down through this, this prosecution, we will have regular briefings by DOD as to pre- cisely what those prosecutions are. And let me tell you, every single member who is being charged under the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) for these of- fenses at Abu Ghraib is under one admonition: Tell the truth, tell the whole truth, tell nothing but the truth. So if somebody was ordered to do something bad, that person is going to talk. At least that has been my experience in the criminal justice system. They will give their testimony, and they are urged to be absolutely truthful. You are going to hear that. So what we have to do at this point is remember that you have 141,000 troops in combat who need leadership, who need protec- tion, who need refocus, and to those ends, while perhaps we haven't had as many cameras because we haven't done as many open hearings as they have on the other body, on the other hand we have something the other body doesn't have. You know what we have got? We have got armor for the troops in our budget, because we went down and worked this budget and put in a supplemental that it was- Mr. SKELTON. Would the gentleman yield? The CHAIRMAN [continuing). Provides 500—I will, just as soon as I finish. I will tell my colleague, we provided for the $500 million for replenishment for helicopters, because we were doing our job and doing our work. So this is a question of balance, and I think there has been enormous focus on this problem that you are talk- ing about. But this is not the only problem in the world, and there have been, even though you apparently are looking forward to having more people being charged, to this day, to my knowledge—and I get the updates on this, there are seven people out of 2.5 million people in uniform charged with offenses. Now, if that list grows, you say the apple cart is getting bigger. Yes, it did get bigger by one so far. It has gone from six to seven. If it grows, so be it. And let's let peo- ple tell the truth, and let the chips fall where they may. In the meantime, I would just tell my friend, we have a war to fight, and we need to focus on that war. We need to win that war. I would be happy to yield to my colleague. Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Chairman, in our prior conversation earlier, General Abizaid will be made available to us in the very near fu- ture. Is that correct? 399 The CHAIRMAN. Well, certainly. I will not pull a combat com- mander out of his theater. Now, General Abizaid is stationed here, but General Sanchez is stationed in Iraq. And when you have ongo- ing combat operations, when you are having an average of 60 at- tacks per day on your forces, you need to be leading your forces, and so I will not pull General Sanchez out of theater. The other fact that I think you should be appreciative of, Mr. Meek, is that General Sanchez did everything exactly right. When this thing happened and the first troop came forward on January 13th, General Sanchez did this by the book. He immediately initi- ated an investigation and announced it to the world on January 16th, and it was those investigations that walk down to the court martial proceedings that are being undertaken right now and the conviction that was achieved a couple of days ago. So General Sanchez did his job, announced to the world that we Americans were investigating ourselves. If General Sanchez had not done that, then this Committee would be well placed in our oversight job to have been very concerned about that and to have worked that and focused on that and been very, very tough with General Sanchez. But he did his job, and he was able to point to briefings that he gave before the world press where we announced that we Americans, while we are fighting a war, are investigating ourselves. So I think that refocus is appropriate, and I think it is time to win the war. And I would hope you would agree with that. Mr. MEEK. Mr. Chairman, will you yield? The CHAIRMAN. Certainly. Mr. MEEK. Let me tell you, we are in the same vehicle when it comes down to winning this war, and that is the reason why I am asking the questions that I am asking- The CHAIRMAN. Well, but let me just take my time back, Mr. Meek. Were you here for the full-blown Committee hearing we had with Secretary Rumsfeld? Mr. MEEK. Mr. Chairman, yes; but would you allow me, please, sir-I mean, you have control of the time or whatever- The CHAIRMAN. Yes. Mr. MEEK. Mr. Chairman, we are in the same vehicle as it re- lates to winning this war, and I will tell you that right now. Every- thing that you just said, of course I did vote for the DOD bill that we passed, and I had an amendment to make sure Secretary Rums- feld sat right there at that table and said, hey, guess what? I didn't know what I need to know because I am not in the chain of com- mand. And we passed an amendment that we all agreed upon to help give him direction in being able to set up something as it relates to the Air Force. I don't have an issue with General Sanchez. I have an issue with the fact that we have court martials that are going on at the very bottom of the situation. I just said in my opinion I don't believe ve are doing what we are supposed to do to get to the top of the matter, and the top doesn't stop at General Sanchez, in my opinion. So what I am saying, Mr. Chairman, and very respectful, we have had Secretary Rumsfeld once in a public hearing, once in the 400 Chamber in a closed hearing. I will tell you that a lot of the issues that are coming out now goes to the very top. Questions have to be answered, okay, Mr. Chairman? And I am just saying that we should have more hearings on it. The CHAIRMAN. Well, we will. Mr. MEEK. That is all I am saying, and I am sorry, Mr. Chair- man. I hope, once again, that I didn't offend anyone. And I am sorry for trying to be a Congressman asking questions that may not necessarily be welcomed, but, Mr. Chairman, I look forward working with you. As you know, I am a hard worker for you on this Committee. I try to do everything I can, but I am concerned about the troops just as much as the next person, and if anyone believes that I am not concerned about the troops, then they have another think coming. The CHAIRMAN. Well, Mr. Meek, let me just tell you, first, we have continuing hearings with Secretary Rumsfeld. He briefs us regularly. All the developments in the war on terrorism walk down, you are going to have a chance, as you always have, to have him on a regular basis ever since the initial action in Iraq. So that is not a one time thing. We will have a continuing opportunity to do that. Now, let me go back to my base point. You have said that you think that we are prosecuting the people at the low end and some- how there are people at the high end who may need to be pros- ecuted. People are under an admonition in a military pro tell the truth. They are going to tell the truth. If somebody has committed a crime and somebody else told them to do that, they are going to say that, and they will then have the opportunity under the Uniform Code of Military Justice, you will have prosecu- tions that then will attend any other personnel who become in- volved. Now, every one of those defendants is right now under that ad- monition to tell the truth, and they are doing it presumably, so let's see where those prosecutions go. But the military justice system isn't just for enlisted people. The military justice system has re- sulted in-is for justice across the board and prosecutions across the board. So let's see that operate. And I appreciate the exchange, but I know we probably have a few other Members who want to ask some questions. Mr. MEEK. Oh, of course, Mr. Chairman, and I appreciate you taking time out to definitely state that we are going to have future hearings on this issue and that anywhere that there has been a de- cision that has been made that might have green-lighted some of the activity, that we would look into it. And I respect that, and I want to let you know that I am glad to be on the Committee. The CHAIRMAN. Well, it is good to have you here, Mr. Meek. Mr. MEEK. Thank you, sir. The CHAIRMAN. And we will keep working together. Mr. MEEK. Yes, sir. The CHAIRMAN. The distinguished gentleman from Florida, Mr. Miller, is recognized. Mr. MILLER OF FLORIDA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And in view of the time, I just have a statement and one short question, and I don't expect really to have a reaction from the table on this state- 401 is not be ment. But, recently, the Minority Leader, Nancy Pelosi, attacked the Commander in Chief, and I think that her comments were also aimed at the leadership that is prosecuting this war on terror. And I want to say that I think the words that she used were something like incompetent and inexperienced, and there may have been some other words that she threw in for effect. And I look at the three gentlemen that we have been listening to most all of the morning, and I know that you are in the positions that you are, because the Commander in Chief wants you there. And then I think of the words that she has used like incompetence and inexperienced, and I can't help but wonder what in the world this person is thinking. If she would just attend just one of these hearings and listen to what is being said by those that are pros- ecuting this war on terror, and spend less time trying to bash those who are trying to protect this country, she might learn a thing or two. Now, I just want to say that I am heartened by the fact that this war is not being run by the polls, and the fact that this battle plan ng shaped by the elite media that is out there that is try- ing to force the public opinion against the stated mission. And with that being said, I just want to ask a question in re- gards to the supposed wedding party engagement that took place a couple of days. And if you could comment about that issue, or add any additional insight that hasn't already been spread around in the press. General MYERS. I would be happy to, Congressman Miller. The strike took place at 3 o'clock in the morning, in the desert. There were no facilities close by. It was vehicles and tents. All of the intel pointed to this being bad guys. There were, I think, six women there, and there were two children that were with them as well that were injured. But we feel at this point very confident that this was a legitimate target, probably foreign fighters, still to be deter- mined their relationship to Zarqawi, but not out of the question. And that is probably all I can say in the open hearing. On the other hand, like all of these situations, we will investigate this to make sure we know for sure what we have, but the intel- ligence right now and what we found at the site, which were weap- ons, are the sort of things that you might not expect at an alleged wedding party, were not consistent with that. They were consistent with folks trying to come into the country across the desert and folks staying for the night, trying to make it into Iraq, those were the indications we had, and we think we had a very legitimate tar- get. Mr. MILLER OF FLORIDA. I just want to say thank you to both of you, and I want to remind my colleagues on this Committe anytime any one of us has a question that we want to pose to any Member of the leadership of the United States Military or of the Executive Branch, all we have to do is pick up the telephone and that question gets answered. It does not have to be asked or an- swered in a public hearing with a “got you” question. I have never been denied any information that I have asked from the DOD, and I have to say I am so respectful of the job that you are doing and so respectful of the men and women that are out there that are prosecuting this war on terror. I know that they are 402 making America a safer place, and I appreciate the service to our country. General MYERS. Thank you, sir. The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman. I just wanted to give you an update, gentlemen, on what we did pass. The Committee doing its work here did Army Aviation, a re- constitution of $498 million Humvees, 1,340,000,000, and that in- cludes new Humvees plus the bolt-up armor. Trucks, from tankers on down through cargo trucks, $25 million. Plus the medium trucks in Title I we have got so we have half a billion dollars in trucks. Reset maintenance, we have got $574 million. And operation and maintenance (O&M) war costs, 10,807,000,000. We will give you the breakout on that, but that is a combination of the base bill and the $25 billion supplemental that we bolted on to the base bill. So we took most of those numbers and most of those require- ments out of your requirements that you submitted to Mr. Skelton and myself on the unfunded requirement list. So we want you to know we think we have a fairly robust package, but if you think there are changes that need to be made, please let us know. General MYERS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General HAGEE. Thank you, sir. The CHAIRMAN. And the gentlelady from California, Mrs. Tauscher. Ms. TAUSCHER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General Myers, Gen- eral Hagee, I think you hear the frustration in some of our voices. I am, frankly, thankful that we don't hear frustration in your voice. I cannot tell you how disappointed I am that we have so many troops on the ground that a year and a half after declaring major combat operations over, that we are having 60 attacks, at least, a day. So I think that there is really a lot that has to be answered for and that we have to understand, and I am increasingly of the belief that our military has done such a phenomenal job. The outcome of the war was never in doubt militarily, but the failure of this ad- ministration to have a political solution and public diplomacy run- ning on the same track that you were on is the reason that we are here today, still wondering what we are going to do with 40 days to go to turn over power to God only knows who. Now, General Myers, do you believe that we need a Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) on July 1st? We are going to have 140,000 troops, 35,000 other Americans, contractors, some driving trucks, some feeding our troops, others interrogating. Do we need a Status of Forces Agreement on July 1st to protect our troops and to articulate whether we can actually drive convoys up from Ku- wait, whether we have takeoff and landing rights out of the air- ports, whether we can actually deliver treatment to troops that are injured in the field? Do you believe we need to have one? And who would it be that we can negotiate that with between now and June 30th? General MYERS. Good question. Our viewpoint is with the U.N. Security Council 1511, with the transitional administrative law, that we have the protections we need for our troops. It would be a good thing if in a future United Nations Security Council resolu- tion, which I think Secretary Powell has told people he hopes to 403 have before 30 June, that we would codify some of that protection in this new Security Council resolution. That would Ms. TAUSCHER. General Myers, I have to interrupt you. With all due respect, I have not even heard of a draft of a new U.N. Secu- rity Council resolution. General MYERS. Oh, there is a draft. Ms. TAUSCHER. Is there? General MYERS. The State Department is responsible for that, and there absolutely is a draft and- Ms. TAUSCHER. Well, the State Department, with all due respect, is also responsible for negotiating SOFA agreements, and because the Pentagon has been running the CPA and because we don't have a political solution, we have basically troops on the ground at risk, because we have not done the job that we were meant to do, which was to provide a political opportunity for the people of Iraq. And when we put that June 30th date out there arbitrarily in Novem- ber, we set off, I believe, this chain reaction of everybody deciding that the American government had put the table down, had set the chairs and turned on the music, and they had better get a chair before June 30th. And they are shooting their way to the table right now. Now, we have no idea who is going to take over on June 30th. so we can't negotiate an agreement for our troops on July 1st. And frankly I don't want to be sitting here on July 3rd to find out, oops, we thought we had it covered, perhaps by the same lawyers who gave us all the information about the Geneva Conventions not ap- plying to the people in Guantanamo Bay and other places. I just can't sit here any longer, with all due respect, General Myers, and take people's assertions that things are being taken care of when this thing has been botched so badly so far. General MYERS. Well, there is a lot in that question. I will just tell you from a military standpoint, that this date of 30 June is ex- tremely y important; that the military played a role in moving that date from the right to the left in the schedule, so it occurred ear- lier; that one of the things that is going to help our troops the most is to get Iraqis in charge of Iraq. General Abizaid will tell you that. General Sanchez would tell you that. I will tell you that. That is extremely important. It is, as you mentioned, a very challenging task. We are trying to change a country that had a dictator who ruled through fear and terror for many decades and turn that into a soci- ety that can make its own decisions in some sort of democratic process. Very, very difficult to do that. The U.N. envoy, Brahimi, is in there right now. The U.N. is seized with this matter trying to determine, and will determine here I think shortly, who the leadership of the interim government will be; and we are already working with the Minister of Interior, the other ministers that have been stood up, the Ministry of De- fense, to forge these relationships so, when they are in charge, that we have those relationships already set up. Ms. TAUSCHER. I understand that, General Myers. Let me ask you a question. Secretary Colin Powell the other day said something I think that shocked everybody. You have to watch these Sunday shows. If you don't watch the Sunday shows, you 404 don't know what is going on. And Colin Powell, you know, I am afraid I am missing an hour and a half of CNN right now, frankly, with all due respect, because that is where I am going to find out what is going on. Mr. MILLER OF FLORIDA. I am missing Fox. Ms. TAUSCHER. With all due respect, Mr. Miller, I sat here and listened to you politically attack the leader of my party, who I think asked some very serious and sobering questions, and if you are going to turn this into a political meeting, perhaps you should leave this building to do that. General Myers, listen to me, please. The CHAIRMAN. Let me just advise all of our members, we are in a political season, but everybody is an independent contractor and has a right to their opinion, and the gentlelady is expressing herself very, very assertively, and the gentleman from Florida ex- pressed his opinions, and I think shortly General Myers will ex- press his opinion. Ms. TAUSCHER. When I get my question finished, perhaps, Mr. Chairman. We have, I think, Colin Powell saying the other day—shocked ev- erybody—that if the new government then comes in on June 30th, asks us to leave, that our military would leave. How exactly in the environment that we have—which is more volatile than we ex- pected, very, very dangerous, 60 attacks every day, many people being killed every day-how exactly could we possibly get 140,000 troops and 25 to 35 American people, contractors, out of Iraq safely if we were told we had to leave, if we are the ones that are provid- ing basically the only security on the ground? General MYERS. Let me start at the beginning of this. We have the authority in the current U.N. Security Council resolution, clear- ly have the authority, and we have the authority in the transitional istrative law to stay. So that authority is clear. If asked to leave, we don't want to be places where we are not wanted; so then you have to say, well, are we going to be asked to leave? No, be- cause the Iraqis understand that the security has to be a partner- ship for some time in the future, because, as you said, those who don't want Iraq to prosper-I mean, there are people let me just go back to Zarqawi. We have read the letter. He is executing every- thing in that letter he has said he was going to do. He has tried to stir up violence between the Sunni and the Shia, probably re- sponsible for the vehicle-borne explosive device that killed the president of the Iraqi Governing Council. We have folks that do not want progress to happen. Iraqis know that the coalition forces working with them are the answer to the security problem for some time to come, especially since Iraqi forces, police included, are not fully trained and equipped and manned at this point to take over. So I think we are going to be wanted. I think we are going to be asked to stay. I think the worst thing, the worst fear the Iraqis have is that we would leave, because the country could potentially go into anarchy and chaos, and nobody wants that. Clearly the leadership that is going to be standing up here short- ly won't want that. 405 Ms. TAUSCHER. Mr. Chairman, I hope that we can keep these hearings much more on the policy than the politics, and I have to tell you that I am sitting here—I have been here for quite a long time—to be sitting here and have colleagues from the other side commenting while I am asking questions is not only rude and inap- propriate, but it is sending, I think, a message that these hearings are increasingly becoming political. And I think that you don't want that, and I certainly know that we don't want that. The CHAIRMAN. Let me just say to my friend, we have a good deal of collegiality, and I think we all have a sense of humor, and the gentlelady mentioned that she was getting her news from CNN, and the gentleman said he liked Fox. I don't think that com- ment went beyond the pale, and it reflected the fact that we all en- gage with each other, and that was not a mean comment. In fact, I think Fox probably likes it. They wanted to have at least equal billing, but I assure the gentlelady this: She will always have her time. She will have her time, and her time will be pro- tected, to ask her questions and receive her answers, and she will be treated with great courtesy and respect. And we do. And I don't think the comment that Mr. Miller made was beyond the pale. So let's all work together. We are coming down the line. We have a tough problem here, because we are coming down the line in a po- litical season, and we are all partisan—we all have a partisan hat that we all wear. On the other hand, we have this great common ground that pro- duced this defense bill in which we got a vote in this committee of 60 to 0 in favor of the bill, and so we have to make an extra effort to keep our eye on the ball. Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Chairman, I have a number of questions, but I want everyone else to get their questions in first, because I don't want to be shortchanged. Ms. TAUSCHER. Mr. Chairman, I can't figure out if you are talk- ing on my time or I am talking on yours, but if I could just close by saying- The CHAIRMAN. Well, sure- Ms. TAUSCHER To General Myers—and General Schoomaker has left-and certainly General Hagee, thank you very, very much for your continued service. Thank you for the leadership you provide, the phenomenal men and women in our military. These are very, very tough times for them and for their families. It is a tough time for this country, and it is time for us to be very frank and very clear about what we have to do to provide security for the Amer- ican people. And I just want to tell you that I am deeply concerned about what is going to be happening over the next how many days till this transfer of sovereignty is right and until we get ourselves to an understanding of who exactly is going to be running that country. Because we are going to have lots of people, Americans, in Iraq on July 1st, a much more important day to me than this transfer to somebody that I don't know who it is yet on June 30th. And I have got to be assured, as we all should be assured, that on July 1st we have conditions on the ground to protect ourselves and our interests. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 406 Mr. SKELTON. May I have a follow-on question to that? What is the mechanism, General, for choosing the interim government, if you know? General MYERS. Obviously I am not the expert. The mechanism is basically—my understanding of the mechanism, it is basically the United Nations. Their special envoy, Brahimi, who is in Bagh- dad at this time, is working with Iraqis, is working with other coa- lition partners, coming up with the interim government. And it is the U.N. that is working that issue. Mr. SKELTON. Thank you. The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman. General MYERS. And that exhausts my knowledge of the particu- lar process. The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentlelady for her questions, and the gentleman from South Carolina, Mr. Wilson, is recognized. Mr. WILSON OF SOUTH CAROLINA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And, Generals, thank you very much for being here today and being so thorough in your answers. I truly have such faith in you. I have faith in our civilians who are in the Department of Defense. I have faith in our troops. The perspective I have as a Member of Congress, of the Armed Services Committee, a person who just completed 31 years service in the Army National Guard myself as a veteran, I am just so grateful for the military protecting our country. Additionally, of course I am very proud to be as is the Chair- man, we are parents of persons who have been deployed to Iraq, and so we have different perspectives, but in each perspective I have I come back to one conclusion, and that is I have faith in our military leaders and in our troops. And of course it has been, thanks to the Ranking Member Ike Skelton and Chairman Hunter, I have had the opportunity to visit with our troops in Uzbekistan and Kurdistan, Qatar, Bahrain, in Kuwait and in Iraq itself, and everywhere that I have been I have seen the next greatest genera- tion. These young people are motivated. They know what they are doing, which is that they are changing regimes that had harbored d supported terrorists, and successfully so in Afghanistan, in Iraq, and I believe also the ripple effect in Libya. Who would ever dream that Mu'ammar Qadhafi would renounce the use of weapons of mass destruction and also disrupt terrorist organizations? So the success that is comin It is coming out of the war on terror, I am very, very ap- preciative. With all the other developments that have been going on, there has been a greater recognition of Zarqawi than ever before, but this really shouldn't be new. Somehow I am amazed the media hasn't picked up on it, but on February the 5th, 2003, Secretary of State Colin Powell appeared before the U.N. and detailed the connection beginning in 2000, beginning with the direct relationship of March 2002 of Zarqawi with Baghdad, with Saddam Hussein, course ultimately, in Jordan. I learned firsthand of his threat to the people of Jordan, when I visited last month which could have killed—it has been variously estimated, and it is been explained and reexplained about the chemical attack there. But of course then the murder of Nick Berg, again a Zarqawi situation. 407 Can either of you comment on the efforts to uncover Mr. Zarqawi, the brutal murderer that he is? General MYERS. I think all I can say in an open hearing is that we have a force that is dedicated to going after him, and it is a force that has access to all types of intelligence. And, by the way, the interrogation process is an important part of that, as we find people in the battle space, as we pick up some of his lieutenants. And we are working that very hard. He is indeed an extremist with no compunction to kill men, women and children, has done so. If indeed that was his hand that we saw in the Nick Berg murder, then we don't need much more than that. But we are working very hard, and we have got folks that that is what they do is to try to track him down. Mr. WILSON OF SOUTH CAROLINA. And indeed, the Secretary of State pointed out the connection of Osama bin Laden and Zarqawi, the terrorist network that was established in Baghdad, and so I again appreciate so much what is being done, because indeed it was a success story in Jordan that the explosives in the cell were determined before they acted. General MYERS. Absolutely. The Jordanian people did a great. service to lots of Jordanian citizens in that case. It could have been very tragic. Mr. WILSON OF SOUTH CAROLINA. Another development that has been surprising to me is the lack of coverage, and I hope there will be further reports, but in the improvised explosive device which was determined to have possibly chemical elements with it, pos- sibly sarin gas or mustard gas, can you tell us more about that, that occurred just this week? General MYERS. There was a device that was part of a—as you mentioned, part of an improvised explosive device that had what appears to be the chemicals that mix together to produce the sarin effect. We knew it, because two of the explosive ordnance disposal people that dealt with this device were affected by these chemicals in what we think was a minor way at this point, but it affected them. They looked at the chemicals. They are still being evaluated to make a positive identification. We think if it was, that it was from an oldstockpile of weapons that were the sarin gas weapon, absolutely. And previously we found residue of the mustard gas in weapons. Mr. WILSON OF SOUTH CAROLINA. Well, that has been a great concern of all of ours, and—weapons of mass destruction and I hope that as soon as a report can be provided that it will be done. And, again, I just am so proud. God bless our troops, and we will remember September the 11th. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General MYERS. You are exactly right about the troops, and we can't say that enough. Those folks are operating in some very, very difficult conditions, and what we need to remember, when I visited Abu Ghraib—I think it was last week—the conditions for the de- tainees are pretty severe. The conditions for our forces that are maintaining the camp and the well-being of the detainees is pretty severe as well. It is a tough environment. It is in the middle of combat. And yet our folks handle this with real grace, real skill and real courage every day all across Iraq, all across Afghanistan. 408 The American people should be so proud. I think they are very proud of these- Mr. WILSON OF SOUTH CAROLINA. Well, and I know every time that the chairman sends us over to encourage them we come back more encouraged. The encouragement, really it is almost in re- verse, and we are very, very grateful. General MYERS. Exactly. I am the say way, obviously. Mr. WILSON OF SOUTH CAROLINA. Thank you. The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman. The distinguished gentleman from Ohio, Mr. Ryan. Mr. RYAN OF OHIO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I thought we would never get here, although I was enjoying the banter. The CHAIRMAN. But first, Mr. Ryan, what is your favorite TV sta- tion, just to put you on the spot? Mr. RYAN OF OHIO. I was going to say I get my info from Imus in the Morning. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. A couple of questions. First, I know the gentleman from Florida had left and there was a statement made about our leader Nancy Pelosi, and I don't want to further politicize this but she was a Ranking Member on the Intelligence Committee. She is the leader of the minority party in the United States Congress. She is constantly briefed, by the White House, and I think it is dangerous to get in the position here where any kind of questioning of what is going on here is somehow unpatriotic or is somehow uninformed or ill-informed. I just wanted to say that. General Myers, September 11th I think has been identified by most people as an intelligence failure. Ambassador Wilson and the whole situation with him and his wife and the intelligence gather- ing operation that he went on I think shows further intelligence problems that we have had, and now the recent blow-up of Mr. Chalabi that we are seeking to arrest some of his employees for kidnapping, torture, embezzlement, these employees getting paid and funded by the United States taxpayer. Now we have put Chalabi in a position where he has many contacts in oil : in the banking systems in Iraq, and is in a real position to continue to be a puppeteer in many ways, whether he has the United States' blessing or not. And the question, General Myers, is have we been duped by a con man? General MYERS. I don't have the information that can allow me to make that judgment. I don't have all the information. Like I said earlier, I do know that the people in the Iraqi National Congress have provided very good intelligence to our forces in Iraq that have prevented our soldiers from dying, and that is what I know about the situation. I cannot talk about whether we have been duped or not. I think that remains to be seen probably. I just don't know. · Mr. RYAN OF OHIO. The reports that we are reading out of the newspaper or getting on Imus the Morning are saying that Chalabi is and has through his contacts—it seems like he was playing both sides, and now there is reports that he was helping out Iran, and you have no information on this? General MYERS. I have some information. We would have to go to a closed hearing to talk about it. 409 Mr. RYAN OF OHIO. Well, I look forward to that. Some of the info on the prisoner abuse problems that we had and General Taguba was here, and he mentioned a couple oth things. He said the problem was there was a lack of supervision, and another problem was there was a lack of training, and these soldiers are so amazing and so courageous and so patriotic through their actions, not just their words, and I know that there would not be a soldier over there who in any way, shape or form would want to somehow hurt the United States in any way or hurt our position in the world or our ability to stand for what the United States has always stood for. Just as a matter of training, did anyone tell these MPs, do not abuse these prisoners, do not film it, because if you do you will put the American diplomacy in grave danger? Did anyone directly tell those MPs that? General MYERS. I will check to make sure I am right, but I am confident in the talks we have had with the people who have been involved in this, absolutely, they had very clear instructions about the Geneva Convention applying. They had very clear instructions about treating everybody humanely and that every interrogation technique had to be part of a plan and the plan approved at the appropriate level for the techniques being used. So clearly they were instructed properly. Mr. RYAN OF OHIO. The problem I have—and I am having trou- ble reconciling this—is we send these kids over there, and they are so patriotic. They would never do anything if they completely un- derstood the ramifications of their behavior. And so hopefully as we have further hearings we can somehow piece this together. General MYERS. I think that is true for 99.9999% of them. There are always people that get in trouble. There is always a small per- centage in any population that gets in trouble. There is a lot more to know, and that is why I mentioned the General Fay report that is going to look at the military intelligence piece of this to see if there were instructions given that might be along the lines that would be counter to what I said, and we will just have to wait and see. So there is a lot more discovery to go through. N OF OHIO. You brought up the Geneva Convention. Did you or any members of your staff have any idea that there was a movement among some legal people within the White House Legal Counsel Office to try to skirt the Geneva Convention? General MYERS. I don't know that I can answer that question about skirting the Geneva Convention. I know that there was a de- bate about the applicability of the Geneva Convention to the con- flict in Afghanistan and to the al Qaeda and to the Taliban, and I was part of that debate. Mr. RYAN OF OHIO. And one of the positions was that—and maybe because of 9/11, the kind of war we are in, that the Geneva Convention is somehow outdated. During that debate, which side were you on? General MYERS. Where I came down on the debate was that reci- procity is an important aspect of this and that we ought to treat people the way we ought to be treated if we are captured. And there are the other aspects of the Convention, though, that this is a convention that tries to shape people's behavior who are involved 410 in conflict in a way that protects innocent men, women and chil- dren, and clearly there were some combatants on the battlefield, the Taliban and al Qaeda, who were not complying with that. So it was a tough issue, but reciprocity is an important aspect of this, and we have talked a little bit about it before today, and that is why even for the issue of the applicability of the Geneva Convention in Afghanistan we said that we would treat people hu- manely and in accordance with the Geneva Convention, even though it might not apply to the al Qaeda or to the Taliban. Mr. RYAN OF OHIO. So your position is you lean toward applying Geneva Convention as we have traditionally applied it? General MYERS. We want our folks to be treated humanely and in accordance with. Mr. RYAN OF OHIO. Okay. That is good to know, too. How much time do I have here, Mr. Chairman? The CHAIRMAN. We have been fairly lenient with all members. The gentleman can go right ahead. But let me ask you, General, how is your time schedule and General Hagee? How are you folks doing? Are you okay for a bit? General MYERS. Yes, sir, for a bit. The CHAIRMAN. Go right ahead. Mr. RYAN OF OHIO. I appreciate that, Mr. Chairman. I want to switch gears here for just one second, a little bit about Afghanistan. This military intelligence unit that the New York Times reported today, and I am sure it has been in other publica- tions, the unit that served in Afghanistan was moved to an Iraq, is that correct? General MYERS. I don't know that. We have to be very careful with the facts here, and I don't know that. I can get it for the record. Mr. RYAN OF OHIO. Well, it is reported here that the Afghanistan military intelligence was moved from Afghanistan to Abu Ghraib in Iraq. I know we have also had discussions in this Committee and elsewhere about hundreds of millions of dollars that were moved from Afghanistan to Iraq, and some of that is explained off as being dual use for some of the money. We know troops have been moved from other places of the country, from Afghanistan into Iraq. And Afghanistan now, they are selling more narcotics. They are raising enormous amounts of money through the illegal drug trade, and much of this money is making its way back into al Qaeda to fund further terrorists' actions. And the question that I had before the war and many of us had before the war, aren't we taking our eye off the ball? What should I go home and tell-given these set of facts, how do I go home and explain to someone in Youngstown, Ohio that we haven't taken our eye off the ball in Afghanistan, we can focus both on Afghanistan and Iraq, but all these resources, all this attention, all the energy seems to have shifted? General MYERS. Congressman. what I think I would tell your constituents back home is that we have plused up our forces in Iraq-I mean in Afghanistan since the springtime by about 5,000. We have put an additional headquarters in there, that we have in- tensified hunt for the high-value targets in that area and have dedicated additional resources for that. 411 In addition, NATO has a political ambition to expand their influ- ence in Afghanistan and their responsibility to more than just the interim security assistance force in the Kabul region, that they want to expand that influence through the provincial reconstruc- tion teams up to the north and then down to the west, that we have created—and the exact number I will give for— Mr. RYAN OF OHIO. How many exact troops, NATO? General MYERS. About 6,000 NATO troops. Mr. RYAN OF OHIO. So roughly over 20,000 troops total in Af- ghanistan? General MYERS. Roughly. Roughly. I don't have the numbers. I can look them up, but I don't have them in front of me. [The information referred to can be found in the Appendix begin- ning on page 433.] Mr. RYAN OF OHIO. That is fine. . General MYERS. We have a significantly enhanced presence for a couple of reasons. One is it is the time of year when the terrain becomes more passable. It is also the time of year leading up to · elections where we know that there will be those forces, the rem- nants of the Taliban, others that don't want a government to suc- ceed in Afghanistan, and certainly the al Qaeda that will try to dis- rupt the erections that are planned now for September. : The precursor to elections, of course, is voter registration, which U.N. is busily doing, and we have got to provide the appro- priate security for that along with the Afghan national army and other coalition forces, and we are doing that. We have not taken our eve off the ball in Afghanistan. Things are actually going fairly well. We have stood up I will get it for the record—but five or six or seven new provincial reconstruction teams. We have more on the docket to stand up as a way to bring not only security but other government services, interagency, inter- national services to the Afghan people. So there has been a lot of attention paid, and with I think some very good success. : You mentioned one thing that needs attention. A strategic issue in Afghanistan is the drug issue. It is recognized by our sador. It is recognized by our military, it needs to be dealt with. And it is probably going to be a long-term problem, but it has all of the downside that you mentioned. It is a serious strategic prob- lem to the health of that society, and we have got to deal with that eventually. Mr. RYAN OF OHIO. What is our immediate reaction to that? Be- cause something needs to be done. I mean, if you are making bil- lions of dollars on- General MYERS. They already—the problem with this year is the crop came in early and they already harvested the crop. So as we come across labs, as we come across the drugs themselves, we take care of them. Mr. RYAN OF OHIO. So they already harvested the drug crop? General MYERS. My understanding is they already harvested the crop this year. Mr. RYAN OF OHIO. How did we not know that was happening? General MYERS. It is the responsibility of another government for the drug business, just like it is the responsibility of another gov- ernment to train their police. 412 Mr. RYAN OF OHIO. Which government, General? General MYERS. The United Kingdom, the British. The British have the drug issue as their issue. Mr. RYAN OF OHIO. So the United Kingdom is in charge of the drug issue in Afghanistan? General MYERS. That is correct. Mr. RYAN OF OHIO. They harvested the crops early, and now we will have another year of drugs on the market funding al Qaeda? General MYERS. Well, I don't know what they are going to fund, but the problem you always have Mr. RYAN OF OHIO. Well, it is clear they were funding al Qaeda. I mean, that was home base. General MYERS. But that is a strategic issue that needs to be dealt with, and it is going to take more resources to do that. And I am not talking about military resources. I am talking about lots of other resources if we want to get at it. Mr. RYAN OF OHIO. Well, what are we going to do? That is bil- lions of dollars if the crop has already been harvested. General MYERS. That is right. Mr. RYAN OF OHIO. So we have another year before we can have any impact on the financing of the drug trade going to al Qaeda? General MYERS. A strategy is being developed. We have a very, very good ambassador, as you know, there who is working that problem very hard, as is the Mr. RYAN OF OHIO. With all due respect, General, how good of an ambassador is he if the United Kingdom is in charge of the drug trade and this is outrageous to me. We have another year's worth of drugs that are going to be on the market, sold, money going to al Qaeda, and the reason is that the harvest came in early. What are the people doing on the ground? General MYERS. Congressman, we have a series of very serious problems in Afghanistan, of which drugs and the cultivation- Mr. RYAN OF OHIO. Drugs is the problem, General General MYERS. No. It is not the problem. It is one of the prob- lems, Congressman, with all due respect. It is one of the very seri- ous problems. It is not the only problem. We have al Qaeda that want to bring down any hope that we have in Afghanistan to get through elections and get a government stood up and go along with a constitution. We have Taliban who are trying to decide whether to be part of this new government or to obstruct the situation. We have roads to build. We have lots of things to do. Drugs are an im- portant strategic problem. They must be dealt with. Mr. RYAN OF OHIO. I agree, because if al Qaeda doesn't have the money, the funds, then the dissension among the ranks, you know, if you don't have the necessary tools. I mean, I am from Ohio. We know when the corn is coming in a little early. I mean General MYERS. I don't know if we knew or not. All I know is that the crop came in early. I know that. I have been told that.. Mr. RYAN OF OHIO. Let me just say, Mr. Chairman, I appreciate you being so generous with the time. That is outrageous that a crop can come in early—that the reason we don't know about the drug trade and we can't have any kind of intervention on the drug trade this year is because the crop came in early. 413 General MYERS. I didn't say we couldn't have intervention. I said the crop came in early Mr. RYAN OF OHIO. But the drugs are going to be in the market, they are going to be sold and that money is going to go back to al Qaeda. We know it goes to al Qaeda. . The CHAIRMAN. I think the gentleman has worked this issue fair- ly thoroughly, and any additional information we can get, General Myers, on the narcotics problem, have our British allies move us some information, if the gentleman wants to have additional infor- mation on that, let's try to get it to the Committee. Mr. RYAN OF OHIO. And I would like to see how the UK is han- dling this situation and what their strategy is. The CHAIRMAN. Let's see if we can't get a briefing over here and maybe have a UK officer come over and give us some info from their perspective here, General. I would just say to my friend, though, we have a big drug crop that is harvested every year in the United States that we have been trying to eradicate for the last 30 years. We have never suc- cessfully eradicated the drug crop, and we have spent tons of money on it, and we have obviously a drug crop also in other places like Mexico, Central America. So no one has ever claimed that but for a slight mistake we can eliminate the drug crop from Afghani- stan. So what I would ask the gentleman to do is this. General Myers has told you that the British-our British allies are the folks that have been working that problem in the alliance. Why don't we have them come over? Mr. RYAN OF OHIO. That would be great. The CHAIRMAN. And give us a briefing on how much progress they have made and what they have to do to advance the ball. But this is a massive problem which we have never been able to eliminate domestically. Mr. RYAN OF OHIO. My point was that people in Ohio and my district think we took our eye off the ball in Afghanistan, al Qaeda, which is responsible for September 11th, and now because re- sources are being diverted to Iraq. And my only point is that, if we were completely focused on that, would we have been able to stop that drug trade and will we have enough money and information and people on the ground to say, Hey, guess what- The CHAIRMAN. I think that is a good question, but I think it is. going to take information from our British allies. General MYERS. Have we taken our eye off the ball in Afghani- stan? I would say, no. I can say that with all sincerity. We have actually increased the number of forces. The number of drug shipments that have been interdicted, the number of lab have been destroyed, are not insignificant, even though that is not our primary mission over there. We have not taken our eye off the ball in Afghanistan. This is a problem that is over time, in a very poor country, peo- ple are going to produce whatever produces money for them. And this is something, as I was pointing out, this is a strategic problem that has to be dealt with. I don't think it is primarily tary problem. There are other ways to deal with this. And I am not even sure it is a U.S. problem. But as most- 414 Mr. RYAN OF OHIO. What is not a U.S. problem? General MYERS. I don't think necessarily the drug problem is a U.S. problem. I think it is going to take the international commu- nity of which we are part of, obviously, to deal with this problem. It is going to take lots of resources and lots of different approaches. We are interdicting some of these drugs by our Fifth Fleet in the Persian Gulf and other places over there. Mr. RYAN OF OHIO. Al Qaeda wants to destroy the United States and kill the infidels. I would think the drug problem in Afghani- stan is a big problem. General MYERS. We are going to be part of that solution, but other folks can help as well. Mr. RYAN OF OHIO. We are here to work with you, but I do, re- spectfully, think we have taken our eye off the ball in Afghanistan and has been proved by some of the comments here today. So thank you very much, Mr. Chairman The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman, and we will try to get ad- ditional briefings made available for all Members of the committee with respect to the drug problem in Afghanistan. The gentleman from Missouri has some additional questions, so why don't we go to those before we wrap up here? And I am sending down to you, General Hagee and General Myers, a summary of the additional combat loss replenishment and up-armoring that we have manifested in this bill, in the base bill we just passed and the $25 billion supplemental. So I want to get that to you. If you have additional comments on things that you need or any differences, as I said, most of those are derived from lists that you submitted on unfunded irements. But as we walk this thing down through the conference, we need at other body to shift their focus away from the massive publicity they have been giving to Abu Ghraib and get back to winning the war. And when they do that and get their lists put together, we will be conferencing with them on it. Any additional input you folks have would be welcome. The gentleman from Missouri. Mr. ŠKELTON. I had stepped out of the chamber to speak to Gen- eral Schoomaker as he was leaving when, evidently, some com- ments were made about our Minority Leader, Nancy Pelosi. And I am very disturbed that occurred. But I must tell you, that I had the opportunity to travel with her to Iraq and Afghanistan, and there is no more caring American than she in dealing with the troops that she met, not only in the field but in the hospitals. Now to some questions, General. The CHAIRMAN. And if the gentleman would just allow me for one minute. Let's both stipulate that the Minority Leader, Ms. Pelosi, and the President of the United States, George Bush, are both act- ing in good faith in trying to win this war against terrorism. Mr. SKELTON. My first question- The CHAIRMAN. Did I hear a stipulation there? Mr. SKELTON. Yes. We all are Americans. We in this Committee are charged with maintaining and raising the military of the United States. We in this Committee are charged with overseeing that oth 415 what the military does. That is our job, and we take it seriously. And I take great pride in the fact that we have worked so long and so well on a bipartisan basis. It bothers me to no end when partisanship creeps in here be- cause, when the soldier, sailor, airman or Marine is out there doing point duty, he is not thinking about politics; he is thinking about doing his duty. So let us do our duty as best we can. Ask the tough questions. I am about to do that. Get the answers. Raise and maintain the military, provide oversight. That is what we need to do. Now, what is this going to cost us, General, between now and the end of the rear and then for next year? Your best estimate, please. General MYERS. End of the fiscal year or calendar year? Mr. SKELTON. Fiscal year, excuse me. General MYERS. They are going to present the mid-year review of that today, in fact, in about an hour-and-a-half. They are going to go through that in the Pentagon to come up with the definitive numbers. And if you can allow me, I will get that to you. Mr. SKELTON. Would you make those available to our entire com- mittee then? General MYERS. We will try. It will be up to the Secretary, but we will sure try. [The information referred to can be found in the Appendix begin- ning on page 431.] The CHAIRMAN. Also the Ranking Member and I are very con- cerned about the last few months of this fiscal year. So we have an effective-upon-enactment provision in this bill that we passed that would allow you to reach forward. So I know we got a good analysis from the Marines that on our request several weeks ago that shows how tight it is going to be in the last few months of this year, but that is an important aspect of what the ranking member just asked for. So if we could add that to it. General MYERS. It is an important aspect and if I may, did you say, in your bill, you would authorize the use of these funds upon enactment? The CHAIRMAN. That is right. That is going to require cooperat- ing from the other body and from the Appropriations Committees, but we want to take a close look at that, General. And I will have our staff point that out for you here and give you a little analysis on it, but we know it is going to be tight in the last few months. General MYERS. Going to be very tight, and it would be very helpful. Mr. SKELTON. Would appreciate that information. I know there is a war on, and I realize that is number one. But I am concerned over the abuses—and one just came to my atten- tion this morning where a son was brought into the prison cell where his father was hooded and naked and then his hood was re- moved and, from the newspaper reporting, it said, “Regarding the young son, he was crying because of seeing his father.” I think that there is a Damocles sword hanging over our security problem that really has to be addressed. We have to do that in con- junction with winning the war. We can't let it divert us, I under- stand. But we still must address the issue fully and squarely. 416 The issue of command atmosphere, where does it begin, where does it end. And I don't wish to belabor the point, but I trust that, in the days and years ahead, with the briefings we have already received and we understand we are going to receive on a weekly basis, we would certainly appreciate knowing the progress being made and the transparency being made because we want to let the Iraqis know, the world know, the Americans know that this is not a typical American military behavior. General MYERS. You are right. We need to do that. Mr. SKELTON. I have some other questions. These are tough questions. But let me put them to you, Mr. Chairman. A comment was made by a retired four-star general, "We are on the brink of failure.” true or false? General MYERS. I don't remember the comment. Referring to what, Iraq? Mr. SKELTON. Iraq. General MYERS. I don't think so. There are a lot of challenges left, and we know people are going to try to disrupt this process, and there will be many more killed. A Government official, a mu- nicipal official in Fallujah, I think, was assassinated yesterday even though things are going fairly well there. No, I don't think we are on the brink of failure; I think we are on the brink of success here. I think, as the new transitional gov- ernment stands up, there will be traction there with the Iraqi peo- ple that will be very important to them. And I think we will con- tinue to move forward. · Mr. SKELTON. Is the U.S. occupation of Iraq a stabilizing or de- stabilizing influence? General MYERS. I think it has been stabilizing. I think, as we said before, we have to quickly get out of the United States and our coalition doing this work and let Iraqis do this work. And that will be even more stabilizing as Iraqis take over. And I think the Fallujah example is one example of that. Mr. SKELTON. What will the U.S. Military exit strategy be? General MYERS. The exit strategy should be that, as you move along in the security front, the economic front, the political front, as they all move along simultaneous which they have to do because none can exist without the other two, that our strategy has to be to form this partnership with Iraqis which we are in the process of doing right now, and, through the transition of their sovereignty, we will continue to do and then Iraqis will more and more pick up the security responsibility. Their forces will become better trained and better equipped through next spring, and that will be our exit strategy when they are able to take care of their own security and when their political process is mature to the point that they can handle the kind of problems that they have to handle security-wise, politically and economically, in that country. Mr. SKELTON. Should General Abizaid feel that there is a need for additional troops, will they be provided to him? General MYERS. Absolutely Mr. SKELTON. Thank you so much for being with us today. These are ongoing questions that I hope we will have the opportunity to visit with you in Iraq and Afghanistan about the world, in general. 417 We have the finest military ever. And it pains me to see any prob- lem arising when most young men and women—I know the ones I represent—are really hardworking, patriotic, decent young folks. And I hate to see any disparaging of the military reputat So the sooner we get to the bottom of those abuses and remove that Damocles sword, as the Chairman says, we cannot take our eye off the ball of winning the war against the guerrillas in Iraq and the terrorists elsewhere. Second place doesn't count in that. So we are with you and we thank you for your service. General Hagee, thank you so much. General Myers, thank you. The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman. Gentlemen, thanks for being with us today. And you know, I reflected on the fact that some 16,000 people, uniformed personnel in that theater, have won the Bronze Star, 127 Silver Stars for Valor on the field of Combat, over 3,000 Purple Hearts. And obviously, the Americans who have given the full measure of devotion, we want you to know and them to know that we appreciate them. Let me tell you, looking at those commendations the other day, I was impressed with the courage that was manifested in those ac- tions that are described. Our Marines and soldiers and airmen that have been in that conflict are every bit as fine and courageous as the people that hit the beachheads at Normandy, Iwo Jima, Gua- dalcanal, Pork Chop Hill, the Chosin Reservoir chosen reservoir op- eration, the great battles of Vietnam which America never lost- Quezon, Hue City where a number of your Marines fought to-hand. I read about some of the hand-to-hand fighting that took place in Afghanistan and Iraq the other day and in our more recent, the First Gulf War, many acts of heroism. And our troops who been conducting this operation are every bit as courageous as those people. We appreciate their operations, their courage and their ef- forts. This bill endeavors to give them the tools that they need to get the job done, and that is why it is so important, General Myers and General Hagee, that you scrub this bill. As I said, there are many provisions here that the Democrats and Republicans on this Com- mittee have put in to make sure that you have a lot of flexibility, that you are able to rehab the equipment that is coming out of the- ater, replenish ammo stocks, weapons stocks and operate very robustly through what is going to be a difficult time because there is going to be an upswell of violence as we get closer to this hand- off. I would hope, General Myers and General Hagee, that you urge and look carefully at this custom-making that we have done in some of these communities like Fallujah where we have customized the American approach to the character and, in some cases, unique characteristics of some of these communities. And I think that cus- tomized approach, using the creative talents of our military leader- ship who are there in-country, I think can produce some good re- sults. So I would hope that you would look at that, and I know you are, but I think that has to be an important element in this transition. 418 I hope the transition, General Myers, also has an element, that there is a major element of military transition because, as Napo- leon said, I make my generals out of mud. His generals came out of operations. And we need to have continued operations with this new Iraqi military we are standing up. Having a transition of sorts, putting a little bit of weight on the shoulders of the Iraqi military is, I would think, should be an important part of this overall tran- sition. So I would hope we would emphasize that. Mr. MEEK. Mr. Chairman, just for information purposes. I want to make sure and General Myers and the rest of the brass that is here, we have a very proud moment coming up with the dedication of the World War II Memorial. And I just want to say that I hope that we are airing that to the troops throughout in Afghanistan, those that have downtimes, so they will have an opportunity to see those patriots honored by this country. I wanted to mention that. On the tail end of that, Mr. Chairman, I want to know how pro- ductive I believe this meeting was on both sides of the table for the Pentagon and also for Members of this committee. And I am glad that we are moving forth in an era of making sure that we have more meetings like this, but commending our World War II veter- ans and those that will be here in wheelchairs, it is going to be a very patriotic moment for this country. The CHAIRMAN. And I want to thank the gentleman and thank the gentlelady from California for her recognition of CNN today and Mr. Miller for his great recognition of Fox News. I don't know if there are some other stations they would like to throw out. But I wanted to thank the Ranking Member, because he reminds me of the importance of looking at history. You know, a couple of days ago, Mr. Meek, I went to the memorial service for one of those grand old veterans, Cornelius Smith, up in Riverside, California, fficer of the day at Pearl Harbor, December 7. 1941. And his father won the Congressional Medal of Honor in the 1800s and whose great uncle was the last courier out of the Alamo. Have a family who seemed to be at remarkable points in our history at critical times. And there were so many of those great veterans, including my father, who were at that memorial service. That reminded me of that legacy that they have left us. I wanted to mention to the peo- ple who are on the field today, they carry that same spirit of cour- age and devotion to our country as those great solders of World War II. And we have to keep our eye on the ball, and we have to support them; 300,000 people have served in that Iraq theater. And I know we are concentrating on the seven prosecutions right now. But 300,000 have done a great job. We appreciate it. We are going to keep supporting them, general. Thank you. [Whereupon, at 12:17 p.m., the Committee was adjourned.] APPENDIX MAY 21, 2004 OPENING REMARKS OF CHAIRMAN HUNTER Hearing on the Global War on Terror May 21, 2004 The hearing will come to order. Our guests this morning are: General Richard B. Myers, USAF Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff General Peter J. Schoomaker, USA Chief of Staff of the Army General Michael W. Hagee, USMC Commandant of the Marine Corps Welcome to the Committee gentlemen. We all look forward to your testimony and appreciate your appearance before the committee this morning. I called this hearing because the Committee has focused practically all of its energy on moving our defense authorization bill through the House and addressing the Abu Ghraib prison (423) 424 situation for much of the last month. While all of that is very important, we must not forget that there is a war on and our troops are in the thick of it. While the media has been absorbed with the misdeeds of a few MPs, our soldiers turned back an uprising by Moqtada al-Sadr and his Iranian-supported Mahdi brigade. He and his militia are now cornered and have retreated into holy sites in Najaf, proving to Iraqis and the world that he has no respect for Islam or Iraq's future as a nation. Ultimately, winning that war and building a secure Iraq are immensely more important to the future, and we must not lost sight of that. I called this hearing to make sure that we don't. Gentlemen, we look forward to your testimony and to the ensuing discussion. But first, let me recognize the committee's ranking Democrat, Mr. Skelton, for any remarks he may wish to make. 425 The entirety of our witnesses' prepared statements will be entered into the record. Mr. Secretary, the floor is yours. 426 Opening Statement for The Honorable Ike Skelton (D-MO), Ranking Member, Committee on Armed Services, U.S. House of Representatives Full Committee Hearing on the Global War on Terror May 21, 2004 Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I join you in welcoming our witnesses: General Myers, General Schoomaker, General Hagee. Thank you all for being here especially on a Friday morning. Yesterday we passed the defense authorization bill for Fiscal Year 2005 here in the House including $25 billion for ongoing operations for Iraq and Afghanistan. These funds and the continued support of our troops in those theaters are critical because these are central areas where U.S. interests hang most in the balance. Certainly there is reason for optimism and for pride in both places. . Our forces, acting in concert with our coalition partners, have accomplished a great deal. They have helping both these nations build 427 better futures and reconstruction efforts are progressing, albeit much more slowly than hoped. But we know that good long-term outcome is possible without security. And security is sorely lacking particularly in Iraq. The papers are filled with stories from Karbala and Najaf. These tactical pictures make up a strategic whole. In the midst of all this, I remain concerned with how we are doing in the battle for Iraqi hearts and minds and how all this will affect the upcoming transition--a transition that is now one month away. In the last week, General Myers, the Secretary announced the movement of approximately 4,000 soldiers from the 2nd Infantry Division in Korea to Iraq. During any other period, we would consider this extraordinary. Today, it is a sign of what is needed to provide security. I think we are probably going to need even more troops and that we will need to use NATO as an institution more-both in Iraq and in Afghanistan. I would welcome your thoughts on this. 428 We thank you all and all who serve with you for your continued service. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD MAY 21, 2004 QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. SKELTON Mr. SKELTON. We are all Americans. We in this Committee are charged with maintaining and raising the military of the United States. We in this Committee are charged with overseeing what the military does. That is our job, and we take it seriously. And I take great pride in the fact that we have worked so long and so well on a bipartisan basis. It bothers me to no end when partisanship creeps in here because, when the sol- dier, sailor, airman or Marine is out there doing point duty, he is not thinking about politics; he is thinking about doing his duty. So let us do our duty as best we can. Ask the tough questions. I am about to do that. Get the answers. Raise and maintain the military, provide oversight. That is what we need to do. Now, what is this going to cost us, General, between now and the end of the fiscal year and then for next year? Your best estimate, please. General MYERS. OSD/Comptroller will provide the results of the mid-year budget review to Congress during the June 7-18 time period. QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. TAYLOR Mr. TAYLOR. Will the supplemental address the replacement of equipment for this unit and the other units who left their equipment behind, again I understand the need to leave the armored Humvees in theater. Are we taking the steps to replace what is left behind? General SCHOOMAKER. The 890th Engineer Battalion was designated by the De- partment of the Army to leave their equipment in theater as stay behind equipment upon their redeployment, less their weapons and some other select equipment. The 120th Engineer Battalion from Oklahoma deployed without their equipment and is using the stay behind equipment of the 890th. To backfill the 890th with equipment, the State of Oklahoma was tasked to ship equipment from the Leave Behind Equipment set of the 120th Engineer Battalion to the 890th. The two states developed a plan to move the immediate need equipment by com- mercial truck with some of the equipment already received and another shipment scheduled to leave on August 16, 2004. The remainder of the equipment will follow shortly by the end of the August 2004. This backfill of equipment will provide the unit with training equipment and the capability to perform necessary missions such as disaster relief. QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. REYES Mr. REYES. Has the security situation in Iraq deteriorated to an extent that Con- gressional Delegations (CODELS) cannot be supported, because staff was telling us there is a question whether or not we are able to go in next week into Iraq? General MYERS. The Duncan Hunter CODEL, which Rep. Reyes was a member, departed on schedule, 26 June 2004. Mr. REYES. Where are we on allowing contractors to be armed, to carry weapons? I know a number of their families; of those contractors that are already in Iraq, that are from El Paso, have asked me why contractors are not allowed to carry weapons in a combat zone? General MYERS. A draft DOD policy message, DOD Directive, and DOD Instruc- tion governing the arming of civilian contractors is currently being staffed. Pending completion of this DOD policy, CPA policy restricts security contractors from the use of automatic weapons and individual indirect fire weapons and explosives. USCENTCOM policy is that arming of civilian USG personnel and contractors who are performing security services shall be decided on a case-by-case basis by CDR, USCENTCOM or his designee. USCENTCOM policy also states that non-security DOD civilian personnel and contract personnel shall slot normally be armed for per- sonal protection. (431) 432 o Protecting DOD civilian personnel and DOD contract employees in Iraq re- mains the responsibility of Coalition military acid host nation military and police/security forces. o Arming non-military personnel risks blurring the status under the law of armed conflict between combatants (military personnel) and noncombatants (civilians) as well as increasing the potential for friendly fire incidents. O Armed contractors pose additional concerns since military commanders and other DOD personnel lack the authority to effectively control or otherwise directly supervise contractor actions under non-personal services contracts. QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY DR. SNYDER Dr. SNYDER. I agree with that. One of the issues of transparency in October there was a press report that former senior Iraqi Air Defense Commander General Mahoush had been detained, and then at the end of November there were press re- ports that he died in this interrogation. I will just read part of it. Was being ques- tioned on Wednesday when he lost consciousness after complaining that he did not feel well. The military said he was pronounced dead by U.S. Army doctor. The cause of death, interrogation techniques are under investigation, but General Mahoush was not hooded during questioning the 82nd Airborne said. Has that press report been undated publicly or is that still considered accurate? General MYERS. • Major General Mowhosh, former Iraqi Air Defense commander. • Died on November 26, 2003 at Forward Operating Base Tiger, in western Iraq in the area of the 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment. The U.S. Army Criminal In- vestigation Division Command (CIDC) was notified of the death and initiated investigation that same day. Office of the Armed Forces Medical Examiner (OAFME) performed autopsy on December 2, 2003. • Determined death was a homicide by asphyxia. • Issued a death certificate on May 12, 2004. • Army Criminal Investigation Division investigation determined that: o On November 26, 2003, General Mowhosh was subjected to interrogation by two Army Military Intelligence warrant officers. o General Mowhosh was allegedly placed in a sleeping bag, and then bound in the bag to prevent his movement. o One of the warrant officers reportedly sat on his chest and continued the interrogation. o General Mowhosh was then rolled over and the warrant officer sat on his back. o It was during this procedure that General Mowhosh is believed to have died. The two warrant officers will be charged with involuntary manslaughter and negligent homicide, and two enlisted Soldiers present during the interrogation will be charged with dereliction of duty. • CID investigation is ONGOING. • This issue was raised by Senator McCain at the 7 May 2004 SASC hearing. Witnesses were SECDEF, CJCS, General Smith, Acting SECARMY and GEN Schoomaker. QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. CALVERT Mr. CALVERT. The creation of the Fallujah Brigade and the concurrent utilization of former regime soldiers to try to solve the problem in Fallujah is a unique solution to a unique situation. We see now that there is a measure of success that has come about as a result of this solution. Marines are not being shot at, heavy weapons are beginning to be turned in, and the town is returning to some degree of normalcy. With the success of this unit in Fallujah, are there other situations in Iraq where a similar solution such as this might be utilized to create other opportunities for success? Where? Are there any other places where solutions like the one found in Fallujah are being utilized right now? Where? General SCHOOMAKER. The answer to this question is not in my area of expertise. I recommend the Combatant Commander, U.S. Central Command, address this question. 433 Mr. CALVERT. General Hagee, The creation of the Fallujah Brigade and the con- current utilization of former regine soldiers to try to solve the problem in Fallujah is a unique solution to a unique situatiion. We see now that there is a measure of success that has come about as a result of this solution. Marines are not being shot at, heavy weapons are beginning to be turned in, and the town is returning to some degree of normalcy. With the success of this unit in Fallujah, are there other situa- tions in Iraq where a similar solution such as this might be utilized to create other opportunities for success? Where? Are there any other places where solutions like the one found in Fallujah are being utilized right now? Where? General HAGEE. This question should be answered by the Commander of US Cen- tral Command. The creation of the Fallujah Brigade was not a Marine Corps (nei- ther the I MEF Commander or the Commandant) decision. The decision to form units similar in composition to the Fallujah Brigade and the decision to employ former regime soldiers is also the Commander, US Central Command decision. QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. RYAN OF OHIO Mr. RYAN. So roughly over 20,000 troops total in Afghanistan? General MYERS. There are 17,865 US soldiers and 2,417 Coalition soldiers in Af- ghanistan serving in Operation ENDURING FREEDOM. There are 6,116 coalition soldiers serving in NATO's International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) for a total of 26,533 US and Coalition soldiers serving in Afghanistan. STATUS OF U.S. FORCES IN IRAQ AFTER JUNE 30, 2004 HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, Washington, DC, Wednesday, June 16, 2004. The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:05 a.m., in room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Duncan Hunter (chair- man of the committee) presiding. OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. DUNCAN HUNTER, A REP- RESENTATIVE FROM CALIFORNIA, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order. This morning, the committee continues its examination of Oper- ation Iraqi Freedom with a specific focus on the status of U.S. mili- tary forces following the handover of sovereignty on June 30th. We are also planning another hearing on this topic next Tuesday, June 22nd, with Deputy Secretary Paul Wolfowitz, who is presently in Iraq reviewing these very issues for Secretary Rumsfeld. To begin the committee's review of this topic, our witnesses this morning are the Honorable Peter Rodman, Assistant Secretary of Defense. Thank you, Mr. Rodman, for being with us. General Wal- ter Sharp, Director for Strategic Plans and Policy. Tha eral. And the Honorable Francis Ricciardone, Coordinator for Iraq Transition, United States Department of State. Thank you, sir. So welcome to the committee, gentlemen. We look forward to your testimony, and appreciate your appearance before the commit- tee this morning. Just two weeks from today, the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) in Iraq will hand sovereignty over to an Iraqi interim gov- ernment. This event marks the latest step in a plan that has been unfolding since last fall. It will be followed by national elections to a transitional government just after the new year, a popular vote on a new constitution next fall, and direct elections to a constitu- tional government before the end of 2005. Some people here and in Iraq may be impatient with the process, but I think Jefferson, Washington, Adams, and Franklin would be astounded at the speed with which things are happening. June 30th is a milestone on the road to a stable, democratic, and secure Iraq in which Iraqis decide the future of their own country. More importantly, the momentum toward a fully Sovereign and demo- cratic Iraq will accelerate. Already, roughly 60 percent of the Iraqi government has been turned over to Iraqi control. The Coalition Provisional Authority has issued an order transferring Iraqi secu- rity forces from under the command and control of the multi- national force (MNF) to the Iraqi interim government. (435) 436 Additionally, the multinational force is continuing its efforts at training the Iraqis to take over the security mission themselves. Roughly 150,000 Iraqis are on duty or in training to serve on the Iraqi Police Force, in the military, as members of the Civil Defense Corps, or in the Department of Border Enforcement. This is a clear sign that the Iraqis are moving forward and taking over the re- sponsibility for securing their country. And obviously, the news of the sabotage of the pipeline is evidence of the importance of this standup, certainly of the security of facilities, security forces, and border forces. The handover is significant on a strategic scale, but June 30th won't mean much change in the daily lives of our soldiers. They will still be in Iraq. They will face a determined terrorist enemy. They will still work with Iraqis to defeat that enemy. They will still be under American command. And I think that is an important point to establish. And I would hope, gentlemen, that you will speak to that point, because that is of interest to every American, is that our forces are under American command.. They will need every ounce of support this country can muster to succeed in their mission. And this is where the outcome of Iraqi Operation, Iraqi Freedom will be decided, and this is where we must focus our attention in the coming months. [The prepared statement of Mr. Hunter can be found in the Ap- pendix on page 491.] The CHAIRMAN. Gentlemen, thanks again for appearing before the committee. We look forward to your testimony. And at this time, let me recognize my partner, the gentleman from Missouri, the distinguished Mr. Skelton, for any remarks he might want to make. STATEMENT OF HON. IKE SKELTON, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM MISSOURI, RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Chairman, thank you. And thank you for call- ing this hearing. This is one that is very important, as we will soon learn from our witnesses. And I welcome Secretary Rodman, General Sharp, Ambassador Ricciardone, and am glad to have you back with us. There has been a fair amount of political progress since our last hearing on Iraq, and the Iraqis now have an interim leadership that will take that country from June the 30th, on through the na- tional elections. I am pleased that the United Nations (UN) Secu- rity Council was able to pass a unanimous resolution that sets the basic framework in place for the American and multinational forces. I have had the opportunity to read and study to a limited extent the United Nations resolution, and we will ask you about that shortly. But the wording seems to say the right thing, concern- ing our forces and their ability to defend themselves and to do their job. The assassinations of government leaders and those associated with improving Iraqi infrastructure sadly will continue, in all like- lihood, in the coming weeks and months. The release today of the results of the CPA Commission public opinion poll of course are disturbing. Only 10 percent of those polls support American troops, 437 . while 55 percent said that they would feel safer if our troops imme- diately left. This shows impact both of the ongoing violence and of Abu Ghraib prison situation, and it the demonstrates quite jarringly that we are not winning their hearts and minds. We have to develop a better partnership with the new Iraqi government. I would like to raise two issues, if I may, Mr. Chairman. One is the Iraqi security forces; clearly we need to make faster progress toward the time when Iraqis can provide for their own security. The appointment of Major General David Petraeus to lead the training of these forces is, frankly, an excellent choice, and I look forward to our hearing with him tomorrow. But I think we need a strategic plan in this area with clear benchmarks that can be measured. That is why I offered an amendment to that effect in our defense bill, and I thank the chairman for his support in that ef- fort. The performance of the Iraqi security forces to date has been un- even. That is probably an understatement, but there is no force more important for Iraqi's future than that. Second, while the Security Council's resolution is critical, it is ap- propriate and the program leaves no issues to be resolved, in the soon to be, sovereign Iraqi government. Both Secretary Powell and Prime Minister Allawi had letters referring to consultation regard- ing sensitive operations. But I would like to understand what addi- tional arrangements will be working out over the next few weeks. I further understand that we will not have a status of forces agreement until after the elections next January. That concerns me a great deal. And the status of forces agreement (SOFA) also would include in it the rules of engagement. Now, rather than under the protection of U.S. forces that are enshrined in the resolution and existing CPA orders, I think it is critical that those protections be explicit in some sort of status of forces agreement which we look forward to in the near future. [The Security Council, Resolution 1546 (2004) can be found in the Appendix on page 519.1 Mr. SKELTON. Again, we thank you, gentlemen, for being with us, and look forward to your testimony. [The prepared statement of Mr. Skelton can be found in the Ap- pendix on page 495.] The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman for his statement. And let me align myself with the last remarks of my good friend from Mis- souri. The rules of engagement that go directly to the force protec- tion (FP) of our forces are of utmost importance to this committee and I think to every Member of Congress and every American. And we want to scrub in detail any prospect for changing rules of en- gagement from the ones that presently exist as a result of political interaction with this new government in Iraq. Very, very clearly, this committee will not countenance any accommodations that are made, which result in less force protection for American personnel. So I hope that is understood, and I hope and I believe also, gentle- men, that the administration is fully in agreement with that. But that is an area of great concern to us. So having said that, again, Secretary Rodman, thank you for being with us this morning. We appreciate your appearance. And the floor is yours, sir. It [ Alliឌី 438 STATEMENT OF HON. PETER W. RODMAN, ASSISTANT SEC- RETARY OF DEFENSE FOR INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AF- FAIRS Secretary RODMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Representative Skelton, members of the committee. It is a privilege to appear be- fore this committee again. You have a prepared statement which I have submitted, and I hope that will be The CHAIRMAN. Without objection, Mr. Secretary, all the all statements will be taken into the record. Secretary RODMAN. Thank you. And so I don't need to go into the detail right now, but that statement does go into these questions in a certain degree of detail. It describes the UN resolution, it de- scribes parallel letters sent to the Security Council by Secretary of State Powell and by the new Iraqi prime minister addressing these issues. And those letters reflect an understanding that we have al- ready reached with the Iraqis on basic principles of security part- nership. And that understanding which we have reached with the Iraqis is incorporated by reference in the UN resolution, and, in ef- fect, blessed by the UN resolution. So the basic elements of— The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Secretary, let me just say, Mr. Secretary: I e reviewed those letters and the UN resolution, and I think one thing all Americans would agree on is that we are well served by having a former military leader, that is, in Colin Powell in this po- sition, where politics and political considerations can very easily re- sult in making military policies that don't accrue to benefit of our troops. And I think it is good to have a guy who has done this be- fore, I guess what I am saying, who knows what it means and knows what it means from both sides, the diplomatic side and the military side putting this thing together. So I didn't mean to interrupt you, but I think that is something that I am grateful for, and, I think, most Americans. Secretary RODMAN. We can discuss, I am sure, in the course of the hearing, more of the details of this understanding that we have worked out with the Iraqis and which the UN, as I say, has blessed. The point I would like to emphasize right now at the beginning is just, again, to reiterate, the significance of June 30th, because our basic strategy for defeating the insurgency is political as well as military. It is precisely to empower the moderates in Iraq to help them take responsibility for their country. And that is a way of marginalizing the extremists politically. And even while we and the Iraqis are hunting them down militarily, the pol political strategy is to fill the vacuum left by the old regime by helping Iraqis build their own new institutions and to take charge. And that is why we are very pleased with the new interim government. We think it is a group of capable and impressive people. And we are confident that we, and they, already have some basic understandings on the security partnership, and the details of that will continue to be fleshed out. And the security partnership is part of that political strategy of helping Iraqis take charge. I think you have cited an opinion, the opinion polls which sug- gest, oh, the Iraqis are getting impatient. We understand that. As a political leader, you are familiar with the "what have you done for me lately” syndrome. We are absolutely convinced that the Iraqi 439 people overwhelmingly consider what happened last year as libera- tion from a tyrant. But a year has gone by, and there is still some hardships, there is still uncertainties, and it is natural for them to resent the people in authority, and especially when the people in authority are foreign forces sitting there under the banner of occu- pation. So that is why it was absolutely essential to have this June 30th handover to begin the process of Iraqis taking charge of their own affairs. And, as I say, the security partnership with them will be part of the next phase. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. [The prepared statement of Secretary Rodman can be found in the Appendix on page 498.] The CHAIRMAN. General Sharp. STATEMENT OF LT. GEN. WALTER L. SHARP, DIRECTOR, STRATEGIC PLANS AND POLICY, THE JOINT STAFF General SHARP. Mr. Chairman, Congressman Skelton, members mmittee, I would like to also thank you for the opportunity to address you here today on this very important subject. Before I begin, I would like to also thank you for the continued support of the men and women of our Armed Forces. Today, Iraqi security personnel, the United States, and 31 coali- tion partners are working together to secure, protect, and establish peace and justice for all Iraqi citizens so they may enjoy a future of their own choosing. Establishment of a safe and secure environ- ment is the single most important element for improved Iraqi qual- ity of life because it enables relief efforts, a free political process, economic prosperity, and social opportunity. Multinational personnel have made significant progress along with the Iragis in recruiting, training, and equipping Iraqi securit forces. The Iraqi people have stepped forward. More than 225,000 Iraqi citizens have taken positions of various components of the Iraqi security forces. By the end of this month, over $3 billion will have been committed to Iraqi security forces for equipment, infra- structure, and training. And, if I might also add, that General Petraeus, as you pointed out, has been on the ground over there for approximately two weeks, and already the emphasis that he and we and the Iraqis are putting on the training and the equip- ping of the Iraqi security forces are being noted. In his meetings that he has had with Prime Minister Allawi over the last several days, he has noted back to us the forward leaning and the desire for the Iraqis to take charge of their security respon- sibilities. They are moving forward, they desire to be out and be seen in front, and we are working together to make sure that they are trained and equipped to be able to accomplish that mission. By the 30th of June, the United States and its coalition partners will transition control of Iraq to a fully sovereign Iraqi interim gov- ernment. Our responsibilities will not end with the 30 June transi- tion. Multinational forces will remain in Iraq at the invitation of the Iraqi people and with the authorization of the United Nations after the Iraqi interim government assumes its leadership respon- sibilities. These forces and increasingly Iraqi forces will continue to Iraqi security 440 conduct offensive operations to defeat remaining anti-Iraqi forces, and neutralize destabilizing influences in Iraq in order to create a secure environment in which the people of Iraq can build their own future. They will also continue the current efforts to organize, train, equip, mentor, and certify credible and capable Iraqi security forces in order to continue the transition of responsibility for secu- rity from multinational forces to Iraqi forces. Concurrently, Iraqi and multinational forces will continue to con- duct stability operations to support the evolving Iraqi government, the restoration of essential services, and the economic development. According to the United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1546, the multinational force shall have the authority to take all necessary measures to contribute to the maintenance of se- curity and stability in Irag. This UN Security Council resolution further requires that arrangements are put in place to establish a security partnership between the sovereign government of Iraq and the multinational force and to assure coordination between the two. In Prime Minister Allawi's letter, together with Secretary Powell's letter, both that are part of the United States—or the UN Security Council resolution, serve as a foundation for establishing the co- ordinating mechanisms that will be essential to this unity of com- mand in Iraq. The security structures described in these letters will serve as a forum for the government of Iraq and the multinational force to reach agreement on the full range of fundamental security and pol- icy issues, including policy on the sensitive offensive operations, and will ensure full partnership between Iraqi security forces and the multinational force through close cooperation and coordination. I am confident that through this partnership we—we, the Iraqis, the coalition, and the U.S. Armed Forces, will succeed in establish- ing a secure and stable environment in Iraq. Sir, I am happy to take your questions. The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, General. [The prepared statement of General Sharp can be found in the Appendix on page 507.] The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Ambassador, thank you for being with us this morning. The floor is yours, sir. STATEMENT OF HON. FRANCIS J. RICCIARDONE, COORDINA- TOR FOR IRAQ TRANSITION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE Ambassador RICCIARDONE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Skel- ton, members of the committee. It is an honor to be with you today. And thank you also for letting me put the more detailed and ex- tended text into the record. I would like to begin by paying tribute to the men and women who are serving in Iraq. Mr. Chairman, I know you have a son serving in Fallujah with the Marines. All of us as Americans are very, very proud of our countrymen serving, whether civilians or military. I also want to thank our coalition partners who are lend- ing their civilians and their soldiers to the effort as well. Mr. Chairman, on May 24th, President Bush outlined, very clear- what we must do to support the mission in Iraq, and achieve freedom and democracy there. 441 Number one, hand over authority to a sovereign Iraqi govern- ment. Second, help establish security. Third, continue rebuilding Iraqi infrastructure. Fourth, encourage international support. And, fifth, move toward free national elections. We are making progress in all these fronts. The first one will be accomplished just two weeks from now as the Coalition Provisional Authority hands over power to the Iraqi interim government. And on that day, our relationship will change fundamentally. What I am here to report to you on, ladies and gentlemen, is the progress we have made in establishing the U.S. mission, the U.S. embassy that we need in Iraq to get the job done, to support our troops, to plish what we need to for the United States in support of the new Iraqi government. In January, Secretary Powell called me back from Manila to Washington to work with the Department of Defense (DOD) in a ingle interagency team. My colleague and good friend, retired Lieutenant General Mick Kicklighter, just left for Baghdad last weekend where he is going to be through the transition. Mick and I have established a partnership and our two agencies have worked together extremely close and have made great progress toward. We now have a team effort that I am convinced will persist well through the transition and beyond. I would like to update you, if I may, on the four areas Under Sec- retary Grossman covered when he last visited with you at the end of April. First, on people. Many people have focused on the fact that the embassy in Baghdad will be among our largest in the world. That is true. In fact, it would rank about number 3 of our 260 diplomatic and consular missions around the world. But more important than the size of it I think is the quality. Under the leadership of Ambas- sador Negroponte and others of our most senior and experienced foreign officers, civil service specialists, and U.S. Government em- ployees of other agencies as well, I think Embassy Baghdad is tak- ing shape as one of our very best, not just one of our largest. We will have about 900 Americans in under permanent assignments there under chief of mission authority, and ultimately about 550 foreign service nationals, that is Iraqi employees, for a total mis- sion size of something under 1,500. And that mission will include two temporary organizations, the Iraq reconstruction management office and the program contract- ing office. Those offices will be devoted to supporting the Iraq relief and reconstruction fund management and implementation. From our global experience, we expect that over time, the num- ber of Americans will decline a bit while the number of Iraqi em- ployees will increase. And I will provide more detailed statistics in my formal testimony. Our diplomats in Iraq will represent the United States and sup- port Iraqi development programs not only in Baghdad, but also in Iraq's provinces. We are establishing four regional hubs in Kirkuk, Mosul, Hillah, and Basrah. And we also plan to embed foreign service officers in five United States military commands. 442 I would note here that our American security rests on our Amer- ican diplomacy as well as our military power, and our diplomatic readiness will depend on the continued foresight and support of the President and the Congress to invest in training, protecting, and supporting all our people, foreign service, civil service, and foreign service nationals. We have used the recent increases in the Depart- ment's civil and foreign service workforce, including new positions planned in the 2005 budget to meet our staffing requirements in Īraq as part of the diplomatic readiness initiative. President Bush and Secretary Powell, with the support of Congress, had estab- lished the diplomatic readiness initiative to improve the training standards of our people and to address just such emerging foreign policy priorities. On security, this remains a dangerous mission. Our top priority is to keep our people safe while enabling our diplomats to accom- plish our work with the Iraqi government and people in support of our forces. In the past few days, the Deputy Secretaries of State and Defense signed a memoranda of understanding, making clear the security responsibilities and support that each agency will as- sume. Meanwhile, the security upgrade of the planned interim em- bassy buildings is progressing to meet deadlines. We have selected a site for a future new embassy compound based largely on security. Fifty-one armored vehicles of the future embassy are already in Iraq, another 90 are on order, and we ex- pect to receive many more from the Coalition Provisional Author- ity. And, to complement the security personnel who are already there under the United States military and CPA funded contracts, we have 30 diplomatic security personnel of the Department of State (DOS) and 10 other Department of State contract people who are already on the ground. On buildings, we have a building in the green zone that will serve temporarily as the embassy chancery until we build a more permanent one. It is under renovation, it will be ready for occu- pancy before July 1st for the ambassador and a small number of staff. Until we build a new embassy compound, we will tem use the former Republican palace where the CPA is now located for most nonpublic purposes. We will also continue to use another building temporarily as the ambassador's residence. We have iden- tified a site on which we will build a new embassy which could in- clude all the offices, housing, and support facilities. We would ex- pect to build and occupy the new facility within about 2 years of receiving the funding. On the financial outlook, I could share our budget projections for you to operate the embassy. And I need to emphasize that what I present to you is an estimate, it is a snapshot that we have today, it is subject to very much change depending on conditions in Iraq. We now estimate the cost of operating the new mission in Iraq for the balance of this fiscal year to be in the range of $483 million. We will cover the cost in several ways. First, Congress has provided already about $97 million for an in- terim embassy facility and interim operations in our fiscal year 2004 supplemental appropriations. We also expect to have avail- able existing fourth quarter portion of the operating expense budg- et appropriated for the CPA, $196 million, and, under the supple- 443 mental, up to 1 percent of the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund (IRRF) for another 184 million. We estimate 2005 costs to operate the mission could amount to $1 billion, excluding construction of the new embassy facility and the program contracting office. The largest costs of running the mission are logistics and security. The Defense Department is cov- ering those costs until needs can be assessed more precisely and we can determine supplemental requirements and come back to you and ask for more support. Thank you very much, ladies and gentlemen. I will be glad to take any questions. [The prepared statement of Mr. Ricciardone can be found in the Appendix on page 510.] The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador. And I will tell the members, I think we are passing out or getting together the UN d the accompanying letters from Dr. Allawi and Colin Powell. I think it is clear and let me just ask this as a first ques- tion, Mr. Rodman. Usually in entering or working within a country with military forces, a status of forces agreement is negotiated. Ob- viously, that did not apply in this case. And it is not contemplated that we are going to have a status of forces agreement until we have the elections at the end of the year, first of next year. So, in reality, it appears to me that the letters that accompany the UN resolution, an nd especially Colin Powell's letter that lays out basi- cally status quo, that the structure that is presently in place is a structure under which we are operating, for practical purposes that is the status of forces agreement. Is that not accurate? Secretary RODMAN. That is an important part of the answer. Sec- retary Powell's letter makes explicit reference to this issue of juris- diction. The Prime Minister Allawi's letter refers to that indirectly, and the whole arrangement is blessed by the UN. In addition, however, we have the Iraqi interim constitution that transitional administrative law says that existing CPA regulations will stay in effect until rescinded by new legislation. And that in- cludes CPA order number 17, which is the present doc spells out status of forces protections for our people. And so that, by this document, the Iraqi interim constitution is the guiding doc- ument that governs the next 2 years, and CPA order 17 will re- main in effect and give us those protections more explicitly, in ad- dition to having the whole arrangement blessed by the UN Security Council resolution and clearly with the consent of the Iraqi interim government as reflected in the letter from the Prime Minister. So we think we have pinned this down in different ways. The CHAIRMAN. And so for all the coalition partners, they can be assured that the status quo with respect to their forces as manifest in the CPA policy will be continued, and so they don't necessarily have to rely on the letters that Colin Powell has—the letter that is attached to the resolution that Colin Powell issued. On the other hand, he does refer to the multinational force, and that basically the rules are going to be status quo. Is that have you had any dis- cussions with any of the coalition partners on this? Secretary RODMAN. Well, first of all, you are correct, and Sec- retary Powell's letter refers to all contributing states being in this position. 444 Second, I am sure we have had discussions with the British for quite some time as we were developing the concept for the next phase and I suspect with other coalition partners as well. The CHAIRMAN. Okay. Let us say we have an interim, the gov- ernment which is now going into place, and we have a security problem and they make a request for American forces to be moved to a certain location and undertake a certain mission. What hap- pens? Secretary RODMAN. Well, I think I will ask General Sharp to re- spond in more detail. But what we have outlined here is a security partnership, and it rests on a very clear sense of common interest of the two countries. It is not a legal contract as much as it is a political alliance, if you will. And as in any relationship of alliance or partnership, when any complicated situation arises you discuss it. And if the premise of common interest isn't there, then we shouldn't be in this situation at all. But, so it is not spelled out, every contingency is not spelled out in detail. What is described in the letters is a set of procedures, a set of channels of communica- tion which describe how sensitive problems will be discussed. The CHAIRMAN. But let me pin you down on that a little bit. Let is say you have a specific issue that comes up that is of interest to the interim government. They think there is a substantial secu- rity problem in a certain area in Iraq, and they make a request to American forces or to coalition forces to undertake a certain action. What is the blueprint for moving this issue with the Americans and for either engaging or not engaging in the policy that is re- quested? Secretary RODMAN. Well, if it can't be resolved low on the chain of command, it gets moved up the chain of command and can be discussed at a political level. One of the forums that we have agreed to engage with them in is a ministerial committee for na tional security. This is the top leadership of the Iraqi chain of com- mand. And our commander will be able to communicate with the leaders of Iraq. But perhaps General Sharp wants to give more de- tail. General SHARP. Sir, I can just add that all levels of command there will also be in the headquarters elements both Iraqis and co- alition forces. And that has already been estab ed to be put in place. And these are both in U.S. coalition and Iraqi headquarters. So from a military perspective on how to coordinate operations and how to, as Mr. Rodman said, establish what the threats are, what the interests are that we have to go after in of- fensive operations is going to be done in partnership as it goes up. So I believe, to directly answer your question, what you refer to in your question, is really a group of both Iraqis and coalition forces together to determine where these threats are, believe it is a threat there, then we—and again, “we” meaning Iraqis and the coalition—will go after to destroy that threat. The CHAIRMAN. But what is the forum? Colin Powell, I think, re- fers to certain fora in which we will work in the fora described by Prime Minister Allawi in his June 5th letter to reach agreement on the full range of fundamental security and policy issues. What I am trying to do is get a sense of what happens, because precise things must happen before military action takes place. In the general, you 445 don't simply have general discussions with general membership in the Iraqi leadership. Have you got specific points of contact who are designated to both deliver requests to the Americans and to consult with Americans on those requests? Or is, as General Sanchez's shop, along with Ambassadors Negroponte's shop, to put those together? How is this thing going to work, is what I want to know? General SHARP. Sir, we are in the detail discussions as Prime Minister Allawi and the minister of defense office and the minister of interior office are stand up. But what is envisioned is potentially a contact group or a commanders group that will be headed by General Sanchez and, if confirmed, General Casey, when he gets in country that will work with the Iraqi ministers of defense, the sen- ior military representative on the joint force headquarters which will be the senior military officer there. That will be the top level of operations to work together to be able to do this. There will also be out in the division level and the brigade level what has already been set up and will continue joint coordination centers (JCCs). And these joint coordination centers are members of the military force, U.S. coalition, the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps (ICDC), for example, the Iraqi Armed Forces, the Iraqi police to make sure that all of the operations in that geographic area are being coordinated and deconflicted so we don't have any problems along those lines. A lot of that mechanism at the lower levels is al- ready in place, and what we are trying to do now is to link it from the top to the bottom so that the policy, the security interests of the country are continuous all the way across those realms. The CHAIRMAN. And so, in the meantime, in general, all the pre- rogatives that have existed prior to June 30th with respect to the ability of our forces to move and to go after the enemy. And I know that is stated, carried out in Colin Powell's letter. And I would ask all members of the committee to take a look at that letter from Colin Powell, because for all practical purposes it appears to me that is the status of forces agreement at this point. But those are all preserved as they exist now. Is that your understanding, Gen- eral? General SHARP. Yes, sir. Absolutely. Especially, in, I guess, it is the fourth to the last paragraph where he talks through the spe- cific tasks that include offensive operations in there. And it is re- ferred to also in Prime Minister Allawi's letter. He refers to the tasks that are in Secretary Powell's letter that authorize us to do that. And I guess the last point would be, again, the all necessary means that are referred to in the UN Security Council resolution. The CHAIRMAN. Yes, sir. Secretary RODMAN. May I add, when Secretary Powell refers to existing arrangements, he is referring to CPA order number 17, which also spells that out. The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. The gentleman from Missouri. Mr. SKELTON. I felt pretty good about this until our Chairman asked you these last several questions. Secretary Rodman used the phrase: We think we have pinned this down in several different ways. We have a United Security Council resolution. We have let- 446 ters between our Secretary of State and the interim Prime Minister Mr. Allawi. Then you said that it is not spelled out in detail. I look at the letter from Dr. Allawi, the fourth from the last para- graph. It says: “in addition, the relevant ministers and I will de- velop further mechanisms for coordination with the Multinational Force (MNF), intend to create with the MNF coordination bodies at national, regional, and local levels that will include Iraqi security forces, commanders, and civilian leadership to ensure that Iraqi se- curity forces will coordinate with the MNF on all security policy op- erations issues in order to achieve unity of command of military op- erations in which Iraqi forces are engaged with MNF.” This letter refers to the future, and I am not sure what the phrase unity of command references or what that means. People of authority told me some time ago, I think in this Cham- ber, that we were supposed to have a status of forces agreement on March the 31st. Am I correct? Am I correct? Secretary RODMAN. That was last year's political timetable. Mr. SKELTON. But I am correct? Secretary RODMAN. That was the plan several months ago. Yes. Mr. SKELTON. Of course. We don't have a status of forces agree- ment now? Do we? Secretary RODMAN. CPA order 17 is a detailed document that looks at—that is a status of forces arrangement. And that order- Mr. SKELTON. Excuse me for interrupting. I am talking about an agreement between the Iraqis and us. Is there a status of forces agreement between the Iraqis and us which would include rules of engagement? Let me tell you why I am worried about this. And I am not overstating the case. You are going to have some sergeant or some corporal or some second lieutenant at some point not hav- ing the right understanding of what his rights and duties are. I remember so well talking to that sergeant in Beirut who was standing guard without permission to have bullets in his rifle as this truck came barreling through the fence and blew up and killed some 280 American Marines. I want to know, what will you trans- mit to the sergeants and the corporals down there regarding the rules of engagement which should be based upon the status of force? I don't want to argue with you, but to the sergeant down there, it is going to be very, very important. Secretary RODMAN. I want to nail down, first of all, that CPA order 17 is a detailed status of forces arrangement which will con- tinue in effect and has been blessed by the Iraqis and now has even the more exalted status of being blessed by a UN Security Council resolution, which is not true of most of our status of forces arrange- ments. So I think the SOFA arrangements are nailed down under international law and by very clear-cut bilateral understanding with the Iraqis, reaffirmed by the new prime minister. So the sta- tus of forces arrangements I think are detailed and nailed down. On the rules of engagement, perhaps General Sharp can elaborate on how that is covered. General SHARP. Sir, as you know, the rules of engagement have been laid out in the orders that have been given to our troops. Those rules of engagement will continue as they are right now. That is point one. Point two is we always have the right to self- 447 all Just tell defense. And that is inherent in all, any type of mission that we carry out. So the rules of engagement for self-defense will be there without question. I believe, third, when the UN Security Council resolution says all necessary means, when Secretary Powell says we will continue to be able to do offensive operations, the tasks that are laid out in order to be able to provide a secure environ- ment, when Prime Minister Allawi in his letter acknowledges that, that allows us to have the robust rules of engagement that we need order to be able to accomplish the mission that you all, the President, and the UN have endorsed and given to us. Mr. SKELTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman. The gentleman from Pennsylvania, Mr. Weldon. Mr. WELDON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you all for coming. And let me add my praise for our troops. Almost everyone on this committee has been to Iraq and/ or Afghanistan over the past several months, and I can tell you that we have been overwhelmingly impressed with the quality of the men and women who are servi 10 are serving America. And I can you from the troops we have met up in Tikrit and Kirkuk to those in Baghdad and over in Kabul, the Kasakorams 2 (K2) case in Uzbekistan, our men and women are the best, and let no one be mistaken about that. But I have the same concerns that my chairman and ranking member have mentioned in regard to the rules of engagement (ROE). We have to make sure—and, General, this applies primarily to our military, and that is our responsibility here, making sure our soldiers and other military personnel are given the proper au- thority they need to defend themselves and protect their own lives and those of their colleagues. That is a major concern that I have as well. That it is clear, it is well defined, and the military under- stands what it can or cannot do. And that those rules of engage- ment are done with the best interests of our soldiers and military personnel in mind. Let me also share, and perhaps for our other witnesses, espe- cially from the State Department, my concern over, there has been some media reports of the latest poll in Iraq which has not been something that gives me a great deal of confidence. And now, granted, this poll was done right after the prison scandal that broke, but I saw one article that said 71 percent of the people in Iraq now depend on their family and friends for security more than they do the provisional authority. And 80 percent said they have no confidence in either the U.S., civilian authorities, or coalition authorities. And so I understand this is a difficult task, and with the in- creased acts of terrorism that have occurred in the past several months, that would be a reason why the Iraqis would feel this way, but as we transition the authority of the government, it is another major concern that I have. And let me say that an issue that has not been addressed here, and this is really for the State Depart- ment and perhaps not appropriate in this hearing. Mr. Chairman, we talk about the transfer of power to the new Iraqi government. And all of us want it to succeed and all of us are happy with the work our troops have done and the work that Paul Bremer has 448 done and General Sanchez has done. But I don't think any of that really answers the ultimate question of how stable Iraq is going to be after June 30th. I think the real question that needs to be an- swered, is what are we doing about Iran? In my opinion and I don't say this lightly. Over the past year I have been working with some informants in Paris who are former leaders of the Shah's government, and al- most every one of their predictions has come true, from their pre- diction 8 months ago that Iranians would funnel $75 or $70 million to Sadr. Back then, we didn't know who Sadr was and today every- one knows who Sadr is. I am not talking about the Iranian people, I want to make that clear distinction, because as the recent elec- tion showed, with only nine percent of the people came out to vote, they have no confidence in their government, at least in Khamenei. So I am clearly distinguishing between the Iranian people, who I clearly think want to be our friends and want to partner with us, and the radical Islamic fundamentalist regime that controls that country, Khamenei. My understanding is that Khamenei has set up a shadow operation separate from the government, a group of 8 or 10 people who are a terrorist network that are providing much of the financial and support of not just al Qaeda, but the radical fun- damentalist regimes like Islamic Jihad and Hamas and the other terrorist groups that are fomenting unrest in Iraq. And if you look at Iran, you can understand that very easily. You have a very unpopular government in Iran headed by Khamenei, that only nine percent of the people even bothered to come out and vote in elections this year because of their lack of confidence. And on one side you have Afghanistan moving toward a new constitu- tion and a stable government; on the other side you have Iraq that, as of June 30th, will do the same. And then you have the symbol of terrorism for the past 25 years, Colonel Qaddafi giving up his weapons of mass destruction (WMD) without us firing a single shot. Well, it doesn't take a rocket scientist to figure out that that radical regime in Iran has got to be extremely uncomfortable with vhat is going on in Iraq. And in my opinion, that is where the problem is. It is with Iran and it is with the funneling of money and support from the radical Islamic leadership in Iraq. And so my question for the State Department, perhaps it can't be answered today, is, what is our strategy in dealing with Iran as the transition of Iraq's legitimate government to its people? What is that strategy? And my own opinion is we haven't done enough to cultivate a stable relationship with Russia who could play the most influential role in helping us deal with Iran. But I would hope that the State Department, besides the strategy of rules of engage- ment, the rules of the status of forces, besides the transitional au- thority, the ultimate elections, the convening of meetings in Iraq, the key thing for me is, what is our strategy in regard to Iran as this transfer takes place over the next several months and years? So, Ambassador, I would just ask for the record, is there such a strategy specific to Iran relative to this transfer of power and au- thority? Ambassador RICCIARDONE. Congressman, I would like to get back to you on the larger question of Iran's strategy if you are talki talking about strategy toward Iran with respect to weapons of mass de- 449 struction and Russia and Afghanistan, all the points you touched on globally. With respect to Iraq, I would make the point that the Iraqis are at least as concerned as we are. And we are very concerned about Iranian influence and machinations and sending in people and money and so forth. I know this personally from having spoken with many Iraqis. I know it is a concern of Prime Minister Allawi. The overall strategy is really the strategy that the President has set forth for strengthening Iraq as a free country, a democracy, a prosperous one, strengthening the rule of law. All the things that we are doing to help Iraq become strong, not just to protect its in- ternal security but also to open its economy, are all things that will work as antidotes to what Iran is trying to sow. Having dealt with Iraq for a couple of decades now, I can reassure you that Iraqis have a very strong Iraqi identity. People often suggest that because a majority of Iraqis are of the Shiite branch of Islam that there is some kind of natural affinity for Iranian meddling or Iranian influ- ence. I have never found that to be true among the most devout Shiites that I have known, among the religious leadership that I have met at different times over the years. So that is the main point. The Iraqis are even more concerned about Iranian meddling than we are, and we are extremely con- cerned. Number one. Number two, our larger strategy for strengthening Iraq, training their Armed Forces, strengthening the rule of law by strengthening the judiciary, opening the economy, all those things I believe are the best way of confronting what Iran is trying to promote. Indeed, I think the Iranians fear that we might succeed in Iraq on all those fronts, and it will bleed over and destabilize what the Mullas are trying to do there. Mr. WELDON. Well, if I might, just to follow up. You are exactly right. I mean, that is the whole issue. The radical Islamic regime controlling Iran understands their days are numbered because of Afghanistan, because of what Qaddafi has done, and now because of what Irag is about to do. They have the most to lose nine percent of their people come out to vote in the elections this year, that is a clear indication, the student revolts that took place in Iran. But now it is time for us to stop playing games with the Iranian radical leadership and make the case publicly. And this is where the State Department, I think, has to take the lead. We do not have a problem with the Iranian people. I think ultimately they will be our friends once again. The problem is with Khamenei and the radical regime that controls Iran. And we have to call a spade a spade. I mean, we know they are violating the International Atomic En- ergy Agency (IAEA) regulations; we know they are developing a nu- clear weapons program; we know they are crashing on that; We know there has been ties to North Korean's nuclear program that they have benefited from; we know, they have developed a Shahab, 3, it is already deployed, they are working on the Shahab—4. We know they are trying to develop a long-range missile. It is time to call the Iranian radical regime for what it is. That is where the problem is. And unless we make that statement clear and let Iran unequivocally know we are not going to tolerate that. I agree with 450 all the points you have made. We have got to have Iraq be strong internally. They have got to be able to have a strong military force. But we have got to do more to stop the radical regime in Iran. I happen to think that the only way to do that is through a united front with Russia. Russia has more access into Iran than any other country on the face of the other. They have been a client state of Russia. But we don't have the credibility with Russia right now to go in there jointly and clean up Khamenei's regime and lay down the case to them that we are not going to tolerate any further in- volvement. If we don't do that, I think we are going to see more of the terrorism that has been occurring, more of it fomenting, com- ing from Iran, and more problem with killing of our troops. And we just saw the Iraqi oil industry devastated. My understanding is they are losing a billion dollars because of this recent attack on a pipeline that just occurred yesterday or the day before. That is going to continue. So I would just urge you go back to State and please tell our friends at State, that this is where I think the focus happens to be. And we have got to take the gloves off. And not to go to war with Iran, but we have got to have a clear strategy. Let the Iranian leadership know, and separate that from the Iranian people, that we are not going to tolerate their involvement in undermining this movement of the Iraqi people to a free society that they themselves can operate and control. Thank you. The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman. And Mr. Langevin, you were the last guy here for the last hear- ing and we closed the hearing down before you got your question in. And it is—you are up, sir. And we apologize for missing you in the last run. Mr. LANGEVIN. Not at all, Mr. Chairman. Thank you. I appre- ciate that. And good morning, gentlemen. Thank you for your presence here today and your testimony. I guess I would like to begin with our true presence in Iraq. And basically from conversations I would like to know if there is any indication as to what the expected U.S. troop presence will be in the coming years? And I know that has been an ongoing question and it has been speculated that we will be in Iraq for years. But what I would like to discuss this morning is what effect—I want to know about any conversations that have taken place with the Iraqi government on troop presence. But also, could you speculate on the current situation in Iraq if the U.S. declared a date specific by which U.S. troops would be withdrawn. In the same way that a certain date was set for transferring au- thority over to the Iraqis, if there were a date certain set for U.S. Troop withdrawal, what would the effects of that be, pro and con? In addition to that, I understand that the Coalition Provisional Authority has issued an order stating that members of the multi- national force were under the sole jurisdiction of their nation and were granted immunity from the Iraqi legal system. So my ques- tion is, has the Iraqi interim government indicated whether or not they will maintain that provision? 451 And also along those lines, under the provisions relevant of the U.N. Security Council's resolutions, does the Iraqi interim govern- ment have to sign treaties to join international organizations, such as the International Criminal Court (ICC)? If you could take those. Secretary RODMAN. Well, let me start on the number of troops, have we discussed that with the Iraqis? We are only at the begin- ning of discussing with the new team in Iraq what the security sit- uation is. One thing we obviously want to do is sit down and talk and compare notes about how we see the threat and what the com- mon strategy should be. So I am just not aware of any discussion that has gotten to that point yet. Second, a certain date. I do not think it is a good idea. We have a clear idea of what the goal is, which is for Iraqis to be capable of handling security themselves. And the goal is to accelerate train- ing, have them create their own chain of command, motivate their people and help them develop that capability as rapidly as possible. At the moment, I don't think setting a deadline is a good idea. It might give encouragement to the wrong people, that they can wait us out. I think that we have a goal and a strategy to meet that goal. At the moment we don't think setting a deadline is use- ful. On SOFA jurisdiction, have the Iraqis agreed to this? I think the answer is “yes.” In the transitional administrative law, which is their interim constitution, they explicitly say that CPA orders con- tinue in effect until changed by legislation; that covers Order Num- ber 17. The letter of the Prime Minister to the Security Council re- fers to the letter of Secretary Powell, all of these things are bound together with the blessing of the Iraqis, as I say, in several dif- ferent ways. So we are comfortable that this arrangement is firm. General SHARP. Sir, I can just add, on your first question, on the troop presence. Reading from Prime Minister Allawi's letter, where he says, “The government”—he is speaking of the Iraqi Govern- ment; this is in the second paragraph—“is determined to overcome these forces”—the forces that are against the Iraqi Government right now—“to develop security forces capable of providing ade- quate security for the Iraqi people.” And then he goes on to say, “Until we are able to provide secu- rity for ourselves, including the defense of Iraq's land, sea and air space, we ask support of the Security Council and the international community in this endeavor.” And all indications that we are get- ting from Prime Minister Allawi, from the Minister of Defense and the Minister of Interior is, they fully understand and they want Iraqis to take responsibility for the security of Iraq and are leaning very far forward in order to make that happen. As we move and that partnership develops in order to be able to have their security forces capable of doing what the Prime Minister has laid out here, and the terrorists, the folks that are going against the Iraqi Government right now, that are trying to tear this down, are destroyed and killed, as that balance grows, then the continuing presence of our forces will be analyzed as we go through this. 452 I guess the last point is, there is also, as you understand, a de- sire for the Iraqis to get their face on this out into the there are discussions that say, okay, as Iraqi security forces in spe- cific areas are capable to provide the security for the cities, then they will take the lead; they will take the responsibility there, and we will move in order to back them up, but to have a lot less pres- ence within those cities. And so adjustments aren't going to be made, troop presence-wise, across the whole country at one time. It will depend upon the secu- rity situation in each one of the different areas and the ability of the Iraqi security forces in those areas. That process has actually already started in many areas. Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you. Ambassador RICCIARDONE. My understanding of the question is, would the interim government of Iraq have to take specific actions to join the ICC? Is that the question. Mr. LANGEVIN. Yes. Ambassador RICCIARDONE. The answer is, yes, they would have to, except that they are not now members, except that my under- standing very clearly is that the consultative process that led to the creation of the ICC specifically limited its authorities so that it could not commit the Iraqi people or government in perpetuity. Be- cause it is not an elected government, it has deferred the mandate to do that, the authority to do that, until there is a permanent Iraqi Government in place that could make permanent inter- national commitments such as signing the Treaty of Rome. Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you. The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman. The gentleman from Colorado, Mr. Hefley. Mr. HEFLEY. Thank you very much. I have 2 or 3 questions. In light of the polling that Mr. Weldon referred to earlier, as we turn this over to the interim government, they, to be successful, must respond to the will of the Iraqi people. It is my understanding that I think it was Colin Powell in the administration, someone in the administration who said that if the Iraqi people don't want us here, we will get out. Is there concern on your part that these guys who now become politicians, responding to their people, will say, yeah, we do want the Americans out? And, if so, what would we do there? Second, the big story the last couple of days has been the idea that we will turn Saddam Hussein over to the Iraqis and let them do what they will with that. Well, that is all right to a point. The point is that if they are actually going to try him, I think they ought to be the ones who try him and so forth. But are we seriously considering turning him over to them with the idea that they might turn the guy loose, and then he makes one of those mi- raculous comebacks again as he has done in the past? And then, finally, Iraq is kind of an artificial country anyway, it seems to me, put together by the British and held together by a strongman, much as Yugoslavia was. Is there any thought that we are going to have trouble really putting Iraq as a whole together as a democratic country, or that this may indeed break into two or three countries before we are through? 453 Secretary RODMAN. Let me try. Opinion polls, as you know better than I, are elusive sometimes. We agree with the Iraqi people that it is time for the occupation to end. That is the lesson we draw, and we drew this a long time ago. We knew that it was very unhealthy for us to be there in that role. You remember, a couple months ago, in April when there were serious military problems, some people said we should postpone June 30th; and we correctly said, no, that is the worst possible thing to do. It makes it all the more important for us to cross this important milestone of turning over authority to the Iraqis, giving them a sense that it is their own country again and changing the basis for our relationship with them. Second, turning Saddam over to the Iraqis, this is still clearly under discussion between us and the Iraqis. They have set up this special tribunal with our support, precisely in order to handle trials of this kind. I think this is something that we will discuss with them, and this government, I think, shares the same objective. First of a nal. And second, there ought to be a fair process, you know, a respectable and decent process for dealing with him. So we think this will be worked out. And if they want him, I am sure we will respond to that, we will work out arrangements that ensure his proper detention and security and so forth. The third, on Iraqi as an artificial country, I am sure Ambas- sador Ricciardone will want to say something. But interestingly enough, this is the one problem we have not had; it is one of the most important problems that we did not have in the past year. The country has held together, the governing council held together. The Kurds, Sunni and Shi'a have been jockeying for position as they were negotiating the transitional administrative law. And there is some of that going on now, as those groups jockey for posi- tion and as they are working out permanent arrangements, but I am impressed by how well they have learned the arts of political compromise. They are all committed to the unity of the country. Zarkawi in his famous letter said one of his goals was to try to produce sectarian war among the communities, and he has failed to produce that result. So, we are pleased by how well over the past year these different communities have worked together politically and learned coexistence and compromise. And so that, I think, is a crisis we have not faced. Mr. HEFLEY. Do you want to add to that? Ambassador RICCIARDONE. I associate myself with the comments of my colleague from the Defense Department, on the first two points especially, on the third as well. I think Iraq under dictatorship had a kind of phony or superficial national unity. It has actually a real national unity and identity, and under freedom and democracy some of the diversity of the dif- ferent elements of Iraq are coming out. That is natural. It is good. It is healthy. At the end of the day it will probably make for a stronger national unity, ironically, than having a dictatorship that compelled the Kurds to submerge their own ethnic and linguistic identity, that compelled the Shi’a not celebrate their particular reli- gious rituals, and so forth, under a certain sort of sham that these 454 things made them somehow less Iraqi or less part of the larger unity. I am not at all worried about individual Iraqis saying, yes, I am an Iraqi, I am also a Kurd, I am a Shiite, I am a Christian, I am a Turkoman. Those things, as an American, strike me as quite compatible and normal. They are not normal under what Iraq went through for the past 30 years. I think Iraqis will sort this out. Mr. HEFLEY. Thank you very much. The CHAIRMAN. Thank the gentleman. The gentleman from Texas, Mr. Ortiz. Mr. ORTIZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. You know, I would like to see this transfer of power work, but when I see this emerging picture coming out, it leaves a lot of peo- ple a little jittery and confused now. To begin with, we started to use some of Saddam Hussein's key people, or generals, to see if maybe they could help us with the se- curity problems that we have; and the killings continue. Just re- cently the oil minister in Iraq was killed. I mean, why, now we are going to arm some of the people that will hopefully secure the country from all of these terrorist attacks. I hope that I could feel as comfortable as you feel that this is going to work and that some day we will be able to pull our troops out. What assurances do we have that some of those people that now are taking part in this government will not turn against us? I was there in Beirut when the terrorists killed 241 Marines. At this time, a group of Congressmen were in Beirut looking at the scene and we were being guarded by our military, who were carry- ing weapons without ammunition. And we asked them why. They said, because we don't want to create an international incident. Well, my God, we had just lost 241 young Marines. I mean, I just want to know, do you feel comfortable that in the next few days, once we transfer this power and some of the key people from Saddam Hussein are involved in helping out maintain peace, do you feel comfortable that this is going to work? ary RODMAN. Well, sir, we first of all, we are not leaving on July 1. I mean, our forces will be there. And the process of building up Iraqi capability will take some time. So, if anything, there will be a gradual transition. But we expect to make progress with the Iraqis, building up their national army, building up their police, what we have called the civil defense corps, which is a heavy police unit, and other forces. That is one of the most important things we have to do in the next period, to accelerate this process of training and equipping Iraqis. I mean, they will have advantages over us. They know the coun- try better. They will be motivated, we hope, to defend their coun- try; and we think it is better that they are not doing this for the occupying power, they are doing it for a government of their own. So we expect them to be motivated differently and better after July 1. But there is a security problem. This whole process is being as- saulted by a determined minority of people who don't want Iraq to achieve this democratic outcome. And so there is a fight going on. But we think we have the overwhelming majority of the Iraqis on 455 our side, not because it is our side, but because it is really their own side, their own democratic future. So, after July 1, I think the issue is going to be clearer for Iraqis. It is not about the Americans anymore, it is about which side are they on in terms of their own future? It will be difficult, but we hink the Iraqis basically, you know, will do the right thing General SHARP. Sir, I would just like to address the Beirut issue. Just to be clear, all U.S. Forces, nearly all coalition forces in the multinational force will be under unity command. For U.S. forces, it will go from the President to the Secretary of Defense to General Abizaid to General Casey, when he gets in theater, down to each of our individual units. The orders that he gives will be the core orders that will include rules of engagement, which are robust enough for not only self-defense, but also for the offensive oper- ations that are required out there in theater. We have learned from Beirut. We train our soldiers, all of them that are deployed in how to use their weapons, what the rules of engagement are, and we give them robust enough rules of engage- ment in order to be able to do what they need to do. I mean, I can personally testify to this from not only Desert Storm, which obviously we are in that type of conflict, but I have also spent a lot of time in Haiti, in Bosnia, where if we had the Beirut problem, we would have worried about what we armed our soldiers with, what the rules of engagement were and what they weren't. Because of the training that your military puts your forces through, that is not an issue anymore. We have rules of engage- ment. We have sufficiently trained forces in order to be able to properly protect ourselves from incidents like in Beirut. Mr. ORTIZ. Let me thank all three of you for your services. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman. The distinguished gentleman from Virginia, Mr. Schrock. Mr. SCHROCK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Secretary, General, Mr. Ambassador, thank you for being here. I have really enjoyed the line of questioning today. I think com- ments by the gentleman from Missouri, Mr. Skelton, have stuck with me. He talked about Beirut, and General, you just did too. I think of the USS Cole. Certainly there was a sailor on that ship that could have done something had he been given permission to do it. Even if we had the most specific regulations in the world and they were trained to the nth degree, is that soldier, sailor, airman, Marine, still going to be afraid to fire for fear of the ramifications that he will catch from the folks back here in Washington? He may have done everything right, but you know the political process as well as I do. If someone perceives he has created an international incident, how are we going to be assured that these kids are going to be protected? That is one thing that bothers me. Somebody mentioned a minute ago about the physical control or is going to turn over Saddam Hussein to whom. It is my un- derstanding that the Iraqis are going to have charge of him during the trial, but we are going to keep physical custody of him so the bird doesn't get away. 456 I guess I am concerned, too, about if the hand-over of sovereignty will also mean that the detainees that are currently held by our forces in Iraq, will be transferred to Iraqi custody as well? 'I am kind of curious about that. General SHARP. Sir, on the detainees, you are absolutely correct on Saddam Hussein. The jurisdiction, as far as trial, working with the Iraqi Government, when they have a trial capability to be able to do that, I think the intent is to turn him over, to allow them to try him. But rest assured we will not turn over Saddam Hussein or any of those other high-value detainees or any security detainees until we are confident that the prison system, the guard system is in place, that they are not able to walk out and escape. Now, on the detainee issue itself, you know, in Secretary Powell's letter, he specifically lines out as one of the tasks that we need to be able to continue to do, internment, where this is necessary for imperatives or reasons of security. So we will have the authority to be able to continue to detain people who have committed crimes against the coalition, who are security risks or of intel value, in order to be able to do what we need to do there. Do we want to eventually turn some of those over to Iragis? Ab- solutely. But again it gets back to, do they have the capability to try these people? And they are starting that up now with the crimi- nal court within Iraq. Do they have the ability to be able to detain them properly in prison? Those efforts are also ongoing. To be able to train Iraqi justice system prison guards? That has already start- ed, in order to be able to give them that capability so they can have that capability in the future. Mr. ŜCHROČK. General, I think I have been listening fairly care- fully. This may have been answered, but how will the requirement to coordinate and cooperate with the new Iraqi Government affect the rules of engagement for local U.S. commanders? If push comes to shove, who is going to have the final authority to say “yes” or "no" about something that needs to be done? Will we still have ulti- mate authority over that, or will the local folks at that point, have that? General SHARP. Sir, for rules of engagement again, all necessary means gives us the authority to have control over that. the cooperative mechanisms, we are going to work very closely together, the coalition is really becoming a partnership. So where before it was the U.S. and 31 countries, it is now Iraq and 32 countries all working together to be able to do this. But to specifically answer your question, it will be our com- mander on the ground. It will be the commander in the area that has the authority to establish the rules of engagement he needs, in order to be able to accomplish the missions that his commanders give him. Mr. SCHROCK. Do they, meaning the Iraqis, do they understand that, or will they understand it by the time the turnover occurs two weeks from today? General SHARP. Sir, I believe they do now, and that they will when it is done. Prime Minister Allawi's letter basically says that, when he endorses the tasks that are laid out in Secretary Powell's letter. The joint coordination centers (JCCs) that are already stand- 457 ing up or working in each one of the areas, as I described before, we have coordination among all of the security forces, and they are working very closely to understand that. So, yes, sir, I believe that it is in place. Mr. SCHROCK. I was going to ask if joint security patrols are going to be undertaken under Iraqi authority or control. So, I am hearing maybe that is not the case? General SHARP. Sir, there will be joint patrols that take place, but the chain of command for multinational forces, within those pa- trols, will remain with the coalition-if it is in a U.S. sector, with the U.S., if it is in a Polish sector, with the Poles. Mr. SCHROCK. Thank you. My time has expired. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The CHAIRMAN. I want to thank the gentleman for an excellent line of questions. Let me, if the committee will indulge me, make one follow-on to Mr. Schrock's question. You have a situation where the Iraqi political leadership wants to use the force and effect of American troops in a certain way: They talk to our ambassador and make that request; the command- ing general—whether it is General Sanchez or, later on, a succes- sor— makes a determination that in his view there is—the exposure of American troops or risks to American troops in a requested oper- ation overbalances the political value. Who makes the call? General SHARP. Sir, I think it is clear that the multinational force, the coalition, is in command. If the Iraqis ask us to do some- thing—your statement is interesting, in that if they ask us to do something that we agree is necessary to be done, I am confident we can work together with the Iraqis to get sufficient forces in order to be able to accomplish that. If they ask us to do something that we disagree is necessary, we also have the authority to say, we are not going to do that, because we don't think it is necessary. They do have the authority to do it with their forces as laid out in the Security Council resolution. The CHAIRMAN. I am asking the question slightly differently. Let's say Ambassador Negroponte agrees that it is the right thing to do, he wants to do it; General Sanchez feels that there is unnec- essary risk to our forces, overbalancing risks to the forces; between Negroponte and Sanchez, who makes the call? General SHARP. Sanchez, sir, because the chain of command again goes from the Secretary of Defense to General Sanchez to the troopers that are there on the ground. Now, you know as well as I do, if that situation happened, it would be brought up to the highest levels within our government to make that decision. And you know that the Secretary of Defense always has the authority to be able to give more forces if he be- lieves at that level it is necessary in order to be able to accomplish the task. But General Sanchez would never do a task that was given to him by anybody other than the Secretary of Defense un- less he believed he had enough forces to be able to do that. The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. The gentleman from Arkansas, Dr. Snyder. Dr. SNYDER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to pursue the same line, but from the other end, General Sharp, if I might, which is, if you are the person on the ground, 458 and you are having a problem and you are trying to get some at- tention from someone, who are you going to call? Back in April, I think it was late on a Friday afternoon, my office got a call, I was in Arkansas, but my legislative director got a call from one of my constituents who had just gotten off the phone with her husband, who had called her by satellite phone from someplace in the Ukranian sector. He is a contractor there, working for a pri- vate company. They were under attack and had been for some time, and had been very frustrated at getting the kind of help that they needed to get out. And he now gives my staff and my office some credit for getting someone's attention on the fact that there was a problem there. They were escorted out the next day with helicopters overhead as they made a run and got out. We had a hearing with a British offi- cer who said those things happen. It is key to have the right phone numbers to know who to call, which may not be the most satisfac- tory solution. It seems like what you describe as a partnership now, can make it more difficult. We have been talking a lot about rules of engage- ment for our troops. I think we have thousands, and I would hope over the next decade we have thousands and thousands of foreign contractors in the process of rebuilding Iraq, who may not know ex- actly what this line of authority is, that they will be put in the po- sition perhaps, if they have problems, of not knowing exactly who to call at what time. I know you can game this thing to death, and we are all asking these hypotheticals, but have you all considered these issues of the private sector and what they are going to do when they have dif- ficulty? General SHARP. Sir, I can start off, and I am sure that Ambas- sador Ricciardone can add on here, because this has been a line of discussions that we and the State Department have worked very closely together on. As Ambassador Ricciardone laid out in his initial statement, they are establishing centers all around the country, which are go which are going to be not only coordination centers between what the State Depart- ment is doing in reconstruction and what the military is doing, but they will also have elements there from United States Agency for International Development (USAID), they will have our civil affairs folks there. There will be a place from my experience in Bosnia, there is a place where non-government organizations (NGOs), other people that are trying to do reconstruction come, in order to be able to coordinate efforts at that local level. One of those coordination things, that they will do, is to deter- mine, what is the security situation? Is it safe for me to come and do this here? What is your estimate? Obviously, they have always got the ability to decide that on their own. But then also, going in, they say, okay, what are the security arrangements? If I get into trouble, what are you willing to come do? Who do I call? Exactly what is the risk? Then, based upon all of that coordination, generally what hap- pens, I think, is that the companies decide, okay, it is safe enough. I feel confident enough that if we have an issue, they will come and get me; or if not, you know, because of locality or other reasons, 459 I need to hire my own security people to be able to help out along these lines. But we have worked very closely together to make sure that our boundaries mesh, are together, and that we have a place that we can do some of that coordination. Dr. SNYDER. But, I mean, hopefully as time goes by, you will have the Iraqi police? That is my question. General SHARP. Yes, sir. Good point. These joint coordination centers that I spoke about earlier are also part of that same coordi- nation and structure. I mean, ideally what we would like to be able to do is have the people that you are talking about, the contractors, show up and go to the local Iraqi police station and say, hey, I am going to be work- ing on the school down the lane here; what if I get into trouble or start hearing some problems, who do Í call? And the answer is, you call right here, and, oh, by the way, we will have an Iraqi patrol or Iraqi police that walk by 'three times a day and see what is going on and provide security that way. That is where we would like to be able to get to. Dr. SNYDER. Okay. Secretary Rodman, I wanted to ask you a question about your written statement. I didn't get it until this morning. I didn't know if we had it before then. I know this hearing was put together fair- ly quickly. But one of the concerns that we have had over the last couple of years in the Congress is the information that we get, and you have a sentence in there that says, under a section, we will leave if the Iraqis ask our troops to leave? And reading from it, although we obviously would not stay if the Iraqi people do not want us to but, right now millions of Iraqis are afraid that we might leave prematurely. Now, the problem I have with that, is that it is a fairly definitive statement. But, in fact, it is a more complex picture than that. I mean, if I have the results of these polls right, 55 percent think that they would be safer if we left, 92 percent see us as occupiers; on the other hand, 45 percent want us to stay until after perma- nent elections, and 41 percent want us to leave now. So, there is a slight plurality of the state. But this is the kind of statement, in my view, overstates what is a fairly, I would think, complex analysis of trying to figure out what the Iraqi people want. I don't know if you want to respond to that or not, but, I think it is a mixed picture. You also have this issue of the Iraqi people. Well, relationships are often government-to-government, and the issue will be, if you have the Iraqi Government office-holders say, we don't want you around, it won't matter even if the predominant position of the Iraqi people is different. I don't know if you can reply. Secretary RODMAN. That is a fair comment. One shouldn't use phrases loosely unless one can back them up. What I would say in support of it is, that all of the moderate leaders of a country who are brought together in the new government and also reflected, I think, even in the governing council representing all of the commu- nities, all of the regions, want us to stay. . But this ality of the percent wa 460 I think the question about, will we leave if asked, didn't come out of Iraq first; it was asked in Congress, it was asked by Europeans who somehow wanted assurance that we were giving full sov- ereignty. All of the Iraqis we deal with, and I do think they are broadly representative of the country, want us to stay. It is reflected in the categorical statements by the leaders of the new government. The Kurds, the Shi'a, who are the majority, are part of this political process and support it. And there are a lot of the Sunni, maybe not enough of Sunni, but certainly a lot of the Sunni people are part of this new government. They want us to stay. They feel this is a war against extremism that they want our support for. So I agree. I shouldn't use the phrase loosely, and it does kind of invite a critical question like yours. But I really think the es- sence of the matter is, as I described, that the overwhelming major- ity of the Iraqis do not want to be run by these terrorists, do not want their hopes for democracy wrecked by these extremist forces. I think some of the same opinion polls do say that the Iraqis want to see a democratic process unfold, a large majority. Dr. SNYDER. Well, just in closing, Mr. Chairman, I was struck by a statement of General Petraeus the other day. If I am quoting him right, I think he said that it is not so important that the conclusion be that the Iraqis love Americans, but that they love the new Iraqi Government. And so you can have the satisfaction with America as an occupying force and still achieve our success of having an inde- pendent and democratic Iraq. Thank you. Secretary RODMAN. That is correct. The President has said some- thing very similar. That is a good way to express it. The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from North Carolina, Mr. Hayes. Mr. HAYES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. First, Mr. Ambassador, for the State Department, what is your vision of our troop strength, to the extent you can answer it, and the shape of the force as the transition progresses in its early stages? Ambassador RICCIARDONE. Congressman, I am really not the per- son to make determinations about troop strength. Mr. HAYES. I know you can not, but what would you like to see from the State Department's perspective? What type of forces, Spe- cial Operations, civil affairs, infantry, what- Ambassador RICCIARDONE. American forces. Mr. HAYES. Yes, American forces that work with the Iraqis. Ambassador RICCIARDONE. Sir, what I would like to see is pre- cisely what we are doing. It is not merely the military forces we have got there. As I say, I don't have the expertise to determine the numbers or the mix. What makes me optimistic, or at least confident that we are on the right track is, we are standing up the right kind of United States mission, interagency mission. That includes civilians, it in- cludes military, includes civilians from the Department of Defense to all bear down with a unity of purpose in specific areas. Training of the security forces of Iraq, that is a Defense Department/MNF responsibility in Iraq. No question, the commander is going to be doing that with the policy guidance of the ambassador. 461 What is unusual in the Iraq context is that the MNF will be doing that and, in addition, will also be directing and implementing the training and equipping of the civilian security forces. But we are going to be doing this together. We are going to be the support- ing force, if you will, in this context, although we are civilians. We are going to be supporting the U.S., and the coalition military in this particular area and in so many others. out the strategy of supporting elections. There, the embassy, the mission, is the leading force, if you will, with the training programs that go along with this. We use USAID, but we will be the supporting unit. There the MNF will be helping ll over the country to make sure those elections come off right. So I know your question, sir, was more limited to military forces. I am a diplomat. I am used to marshaling all of the resources of the U.S. Government, including military forces, with the Depart- ment of the Treasury, the Department of Justice, the Department of State. And when you bring all of the resources of the United States Government to bear on a problem, we are unstoppable. I am quite optimistic we are going to be doing that in Iraq. Mr. HAYES. I appreciate your optimism. You answered my ques- tion partially by what you are saying. I heard you say you wanted a significant focus, and that is reasonable, on continued training for both civil and military Iraqi forces. I agree with that. Now, Secretary Rodman, what is your vision of how the Defense Department wants to shape the force as the transition begins for- mally on the 30th, and then moving forward? Secretary RODMAN. Well, I think General Sharp will be able to contribute to this answer as well, but first of all, our relationship with Iraq will be different. We will be there as a partner, not as an occupying force. And our mission really at that point becomes to accelerate the training and equipping of Iraqis to enable them to take on a greater responsibility, including for security, just as they are able to take on responsibility in other spheres of life. That is what our mission becomes. I mean, our forces will be there. We will be in command of the multinational force. But I think the imperative is to accelerate, hasten the day, when the Iraqi security forces can take on the major responsibility. General SHARP. Sir, from a military perspective, when you look at the current plan, the strategy thať Central Command has, that is evolving into a partnership with Iraqis, there are basically five elements of that plan from a military perspective. Again, this is with Iraqis also. Number one is to, with the Iraqis, build the Iraqi security institution capability. This is what General Petraeus is all about. This is what we are trying to do across all of the lines of the security forces. And the Iraqis are fully on board with being able to help do that. Will some of those change? Yes, and there are discussions ongo- ing right now with General Petraeus as he works with the Iraqis to do what is really needed in the country. And it is not just coali- tion forces, but how do the Iraqi forces need to be shaped, sized, what should their missions and roles need to be? We are working that very closely with the Iraqis right now, so that we can, with them, establish security within the country. 462 Second, to defeat the insurgency we have got the forces to be able to do that, again with the strike forces that we have and with the forces that we are training and equipping on the Iraqi security forces. Conduct counterterrorism operations, continue civil military op- erations. We are doing that across the board, not just with our 800- some civil affairs officers that are there, but really with all of the troops there and with the funds that you all have authorized for nmanders to be able to use in each different area and to im- prove and support Iraqi enforcement of the rule of law. As I talked about earlier, we are working with Iraqis to be able to stand up a prison system. The Justice Department, the State artment are working very closely to be able to stand up a jus- tice system, to have fair trials within the country. So these are the types of forces and the types of lines of oper- ation that we are working against. Mr. HAYES. I appreciate the specificity of your answer. And part of the reason for my question is, there seems like occasionally, it is isn't meant as total criticism, but I am wondering if the Defense and State Department are closely communicating on what they are going to do and how they are going to do it. And as we go forward, that is crucial. We have got 11 out of 25 ministries that have been transitioned, but I do get a feeling that we have created more bureaucracy, sometimes with the State De- partment than we create here in Washington. So I hope going for- ward—and this is an optimistic time—we have been partners all along, we have never been an occupying force, except for the propa- ganda agents of various people. So, again, I appreciate your cooperation and encourage you going forward. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The CHAIRMAN. Thank the gentleman. The gentlelady from California, Mrs. Tauscher. Ms. TAUSCHER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General, and Mr. Secretary, Mr. Ambassador, I have been asking for a status of forces agreement since the moment I was told that we would actually close down the CPA and put an embassy up and move from an occupying force to a partner. My concern has not been mollified by these letters. Mr. Ambassador, is it true that we have a status-of-forces agree- ment with every country with whom we have troops deployed? Ambassador RICCIARDONE. Ma'am, I don't know if that is true. My guess is, it could be. I will check. [The information referred to can be found in the Appendix begin- ning on page 533.] Ms. TAUSCHER. My understanding is that it is. And in this case, we are not going to have a status-of-forces agreement. We are going to basically have correspondence crossing between the United States and this new interim government. And I understand, Mr. Secretary, the reason for that is because this government has not been elected. Is that true? Secretary RODMAN. That is right. It was the consensus of the Iraqis that this caretaker government not have that power, to nego- tiate such agreements. 463 Ms. TAUSCHER. Well, if the country's government doesn't have the power to negotiate an agreement that we would have with every other entity, why should I be satisfied with this letter that, effectively, is from the same people that don't have the power to do a status-of-forces agreement? Secretary RODMAN. Because the same Iraqi consensus confirmed that CPA Order 17 would remain in effect until an elected govern- ment—CPA Order 17 is a very—we can get you a copy of it. Ms. TAUSCHER. I have seen it. Secretary RODMAN. It is in fact a status-of-forces arrangement. Ms. TAUSCHER. But the CPA, with all due respect, is going out of business. So we have an agreement that they did not make, by people that didn't make it, with an entity that is now out of busi- ness. And I am just concerned that this is not as strong as it needs to be to protect our forces. I appreciate the questions offered by the chairman and Mr. Weldon and the ranking member and Mr. Snyder. I am frankly dizzy trying to understand all of these people that are meant to make these very cumbersome decisions, if we have troops at risk and our command now has to go to the interim government; and if our decision is that we have a force protection issue, and we have got to protect these troops. The Iraqis' interim government folks don't think that we are really at risk, but we want to make a move. Are you telling me that we can or you don't know? Secretary RODMAN. This is the law of the land in Iraq for the rest of this year, CPA Order 17. The Iraqi—the Transitional Adminis- trative Law (TAL), the interim constitution, says that CPA orders remain in effect. And so that, I think, is the core of it. You have the letters that are, in addition, blessed by the U.N. Security Council; and under the phrase “all necessary measures,” we think it is overdetermined. You are absolutely right to have raised this issue from the begin- ning. You and the chairman and the ranking member have raised this with us repeatedly; and you are right, and I can try to assure you that we asked the same question, because we have the same concern for our forces. And we think that we have multiple solutions that reinforce each other. But the law of the land in Iraq will be CPA Order 17, which spells it out. And we are encouraged by the fact that the new Iraqi Government is blessing it. It is not in dispute. Ms. TAUSCHER. I agree with you, Mr. Secretary. But, with all due respect, it will work until it doesn't. And at that moment, we are going to have troops at risk. But I want to ask the ambassador a question. Right now, in Af- ghanistan, we are hopeful that there will be an election in Septem- ber, which is basically a date that was postponed from earlier this year. They have only registered 40 percent of the likely eligible vot- ers in Afghanistan. I am concerned about whether this September date is going to slip. We have a very aggressive date for an election in Iraq, December-January. Are there precinct maps of Iraq? Have we figured out how to register people? Have we figured out how to do the basic little civic affairs lessons that we need to do in order to understand who is in this precinct and how many people are going to vote, and what their version of a census is, so that we un- 464 derstand how to apportion people for their general assembly equiv- alent? Do we have any of that stuff done? There isn't going to be any election by the end of this year or even 2005 if we don't have some of this done; and you can't do it if people are afraid to go and register because they are going to get shot in the marketplace. Ambassador RICCIARDONE. Congresswoman, you have identified the enormous administrative tasks, as well as the security burdens and challenges that are there. I am glad to be able to tell you, we have accomplished a lot of that, or I should say, the United Na- tions, actually, under Ms. Pirelli has accomplished much of that. Indeed, much of the information was already there to be had. A lot of survey work has been done. A lot of the nitty-gritty precinct identification and so forth has been done. But much more does re- main to be done in terms of registration, voter education, and all of that. We have the expertise to do that. We have the financial resources, now, thanks to the money that you all provided in the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund. USAID is preparing to support U.N. and international efforts on that. It is a huge amount of work. I believe we can get it done. And many Iraqis are saying, can't we do it sooner? I don't know. It is an ambitious schedule. But we do have a program and programs in place, and others we can put in place to do it. And thank you for giving us the resources to do it. . I have got some expert advice, ma'am, on the question you just asked. And the answer is, in fact, we have forces in Haiti without a SOFA right now. So it is at least—there is that one exception. I had understood that historically there have been others-Korea, for example, took us many years after the Korean conflict to actu- ally get a status-of-forces agreement with that country. So it is not unprecedented, put it that way, not to have a status- of-forces agreement when the people clearly want us there. Ms. TAUSCHER. I will agree that it is not unprecedented. I will tell you, it is unwise. I think we understand why we don't have one in Haiti. There really is an interim caretaker government in there. While we were negotiating for a very long time perhaps with South Korea, we do have one now. And that is why we are assured that the 37,000 troops that are there are at least protected, and we have rules of engagement. Mr. Chairman, if I can just close with one suggestion. I under- stand that it is vitally important for us in this political process, going forward, that I think we would all like to have an under- standing for how the political parties in Iraq are getting stood up. And I am all for understanding that the outcome that we are try- ing to achieve is actually not only achievable, but assured by un- derstanding how this is happening. I appreciate Secretary Rodman's comments about getting the Iraqi moderates to be able to survive this process. As a moderate myself, I am also interested in understanding how that might hap- pen. But I think it is really important for this committee and oth- ers to understand how this is happening, because this is where the slip between the lip and the cup is going to be a price we will pay for decades. I think it is vitally important to turn over sovereignty. I think it is vitally important to stand up a legitimate Iraqi Government. 465 But it is going to take a lot of time, tender loving care, and a lot of initiative on our part. So I hope, Mr. Chairman, that we will have another hearing and perhaps mostly with State Department folks, and certainly the good folks from the Defense Department, to keep us informed over the next few months of how this is going to happen. As politicians, we have a little expertise in this, and perhaps we can assist. The CHAIRMAN. I think members of the committee, as evidenced by their statements this morning, understand how important this is. We will do a lot of work on this. We need to do some classified work, too, in terms of sharing of information on military oper- ations. And I would just ask if the committee would indulge me for just one minute of follow up on this as we continue to get a little deeper in this question of requests for American military action. And we went through my question, if General Sanchez felt that a military action was not warranted or was too risky that even though you had a recommendation that it be undertaken by Am- bassador Negroponte, General Sanchez would be the determining entity, although the matter would move up the chain of command very quickly, and ultimately result in a decision by the White House if it was a substantial enough issue. If General Sanchez is going to make a decision on a request for military action by the new independent government of Iraq, what criteria, General, would General Sanchez be basing that decision on? Is he to make—is he to evaluate political value, or value to the Government of Iraq, and balance that against risk to American forces? What are his criteria? General SHARP. Sir, his criteria are based upon the mission that is given to him by Central Command in order to be able to provide a secure and stable environment within Iraq. The CHAIRMAN. But that is a very general mission. And the re- quest for force use will be in the specific. General SHARP. He will evaluate that against the enemy that he has, the troops available, the time that he has in order to be able to do this operation. He will make a call. He will not send forces if he knows that he is not able to accomplish the mission that he set to do. The CHAIRMAN. But General Sanchez will necessarily have to consider, at some point, political considerations. The force and ef- fect of the American military in Iraq is very large and of great power, and the use of it will be called upon, and requested by the Government of Iraq. It is still a little bit vague as to when you get into the specifics of the operation, and the specific operation is requested, and it is an operation where the independent Government of Iraq feels that it is necessary to carry out its mission, whether it is a protective mission or some other aspect of security. At some point, the Amer- ican who makes a determination as to whether the operation goes forward, will have to balance political considerations with military risk. Now, that is a little different from giving a commander an obiec- will or secure a position or engage a terrorist force. Do you understand what I am au I am saying 466 General SHARP. Yes, sir. The CHAIRMAN. A piece of that is diplomatic. Is General Sanchez vested with the authority to make that balance, to make that judg- ment? Or whoever takes that position? General SHARP. Yes, sir. He has the obligation to be able to take a look at the missions that either CENTCOM gives him, or he has in discussions with the Iraqis, as to what they believe and we be- lieve is necessary in order to be able to accomplish the overall strategy. Taking a look at that mission, he will use all of the training that he has had to determine the troops that he needs, in order to be able to successfully accomplish that mission within the risk level that will allow us to be able to do that. If he has the forces to be able to do that, then he will accomplish it. If he does not have the forces, he has several options. He has the options of going back to the Iraqis and saying, I understand this is important, but in order to be able to do this we need your forces to come help in order to give us the required forces. He has the ability to come back to the Secretary of Defense and ask for the same thing. But he is not going to do a mission that he believes is of too high a risk in order to be able to accomplish the mission for our troops. The CHAIRMAN. And so I take it he obviously will look for the po- litical component of this, or whether or not this is of value in a po- litical sense to the U.S., to Ambassador Negroponte and to State; is that right? General SHARP. Yes, sir. They are going to be working very close- ly together. And General Sanchez will have in his headquarters- as this stands up, actually have general officers in the embassy, in Ambassador Negroponte's area so that the coordination, intel oper- ations, political, are very closely intertwined, because we have learned over and over again in operations like this that we have to be of one mind as we move forward from the military and from the political side. And I am absolutely confident, because of the work that Ambas- sador Negroponte and General, Kicklighter which he talked about earlier, have done, those coordinating mechanisms. The way that we are standing this U.S. mission up, the way we are standing up MNFI, the multinational force of Iraq up, those mechanisms are tight; and when they are completely stood up here very soon, we will be able to coordinate that very effectively. The CHAIRMAN. I thank you for that answer. And the gentleman from South Carolina, Mr. Wilson. Mr. WILSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And General, Ambas- sador—also, Mr. Secretary—thank you for what you have done and your service. And I am very grateful because I really believe that we have had an awesome, historical-wonderful 2–1/2 years. Who would ever dream that there would now be 50 million people who are living not under a totalitarian regime, who now have the oppor- tunity to experience democracy, many people, even countries for the first time? Additionally, the key point, that is of great concern to me, is to protect the American people. We have now worked to establish communities which no longer harbor and support terrorists. There 467 are no longer going to be terrorist training camps in Afghanistan or Iraq. This is to protect the American people. And I am just very, very grateful on behalf of the people I represent. Additionally, it has provided resolve and backbone to our allies. In the last 72 hours, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, even the country of my heritage, France, have arrested significant terrorist cells. It is just a worldwide effort. And I want to thank the Department of De- fense, the Secretary of State, for what you have done to protect this country. Additionally, I am so grateful for the military leadership and the leadership we have had from Ambassador Bremer. I have had the opportunity to be with General Sanchez in Baghdad. It is just so inspiring to see the people who are leading our country and the leadership of General Franks, General Abizaid, General Petraeus, I had the opportunity to meet with him at Mosul, on and on, it has been reassuring. I wish more of the American people could have seen President Karzai yesterday. I had met with him several weeks ago at the Presidential palace in Kabul. But he came to the United States to thank the American people. Those of us in the Afghan Caucus had the opportunity to meet with him one-on-one. And he thanked the American people for liberating his country. I also had the opportunity last week, in a bipartisan delegation, to meet with Iraqi President, Ajil al Yawer. It was incredible. Again, he thanked us for the sacrifices of American families to lib- erate their country, which ultimately protects the United States. A perspective I have is that, in regard to a status-of-forces agree- ment interpretation, rules of engagement, I just retired last year after 31 years with the Army National Guard where I gave brief- ings on this topic. Additionally, I want to join-Chairman Duncan Hunter and I both have sons who are serving in Iraq. So the questions I would have for you on that particular topic are two items that can be ac- tually be answered yes or no: One is, will the America we proceed, be under U.S. Military command? And the other ques- tion would be, will the U.S. troops be under the Uniform Code of Military Justice? General SHARP. Sir, yes, to both questions. Mr. WILSON. And that is the key point of all for those of us who have worked on this issue and briefed American troops over the years. I want to thank you for what you have achieved. I want to thank our troops. God bless our troops. Thank you very much. Mr. SIMMONS. [Presiding.) Mr. Cooper. Mr. COOPER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Ambassador, I would like to focus on U.S. embassy personnel over there. What are their rules of engagement? Will they be al- lowed to carry weaponry when they leave the Green Zone or their und, or the chancery, whatever you want to call it? Ambassador RICCIARDONE. Normally, we deploy with talking points. Mr. COOPER. I know what you do normally. But this is an excep- tional situation. This will not look like any other embassy in the history of U.S. Diplomacy. 468 Ambassador RICCIARDONE. In each embassy the ambassador de- termines firearms policy, not just the carrying of them for all agen- cies under his or her authority, but also the import of them. That will be done there as well. To be honest- Mr. COOPER. What are going to be the rules? It starts in a couple of weeks. What are the rules? Ambassador RICCIARDONE. I would have to check and see what the firearms policy will be there. It really is a post-specific decision. It is done with the best judgment, taking into account what all of this law enforcement and the security people believe is necessary. Mr. COOPER. What waivers will U.S. embassy personnel have to sign before they go to Baghdad? Is this considered the ultimate hardship post? Ambassador RICCIARDONE. It is a danger post. It is a high-danger post. We recognize that. No waivers or special authorities would be necessary. To go back to your first question; as diplomats, they would be free to carry firearms. It would be a determination made by the ambassador as to whether the ambassador will permit them to do so and in what circumstances. Mr. COOPER. Will spouses and children be allowed to accompany embassy employees? Ambassador RICCIARDONE. No, not initially. Mr. COOPER. My impression, reading the columnist Tom Fried- man, that even the highway linking the airport and Baghdad with- in the Green Zone has been subject to violent and fatal attacks in recent weeks. That is the main artery into the country, so if that highway is not secure, then I would presume that no highway is secure, and certain car bombs have been detonated even entering the Green Zone. So, it looks as if our embassy personnel will not be able to mix freely with the population of the Nation and will not be able to con- duct their normal State Department activities.. Ambassador RICCIARDONE. It will not be normal. It will be very difficult. Not all highways are blocked at all times. Indeed, if the airport or the road-to-downtown highway was not blocked at all times, or you are right, we couldn't survive. It is a dangerous envi- ronment. It will be difficult. We will not have the normal environ- ment of free and easy contact with the host people that we have. But we will have contact. Mr. COOPER. Will the U.S. embassy personnel, when they leave the compound, always be escorted with U.S. military troops? Ambassador RICCIARDONE. Not U.S. military necessarily. We have the Department of State Security Bureau that is specialized g civilians, diplomats, dignitaries all of the time in dan- gerous environments. This is a far more dangerous wartime envi- ronment than we normally operate in. We have Department of Homeland Security (DHS) security people, broad-area security pro- vided by the multinational coalition. We have a very precise memorandum of understanding, as I mentioned in my testimony, between State and DOD, that specifies provide what forms of security in what circumstances. I would be glad to brief you on that in great detail, sir. 469 Mr. COOPER. Let me turn to Iraqi security forces. They will be under the command of the interim government? General SHARP. Yes, sir. They will be under the command of the interim government, the ministry of defense for the army and the civil defense corps, and then the police and the ministry of interior. They do have the authority and Prime Minister Allawi's letter lays out in there that if they are going to do operations with the coalition under unity of command, they can chop them, take on tac- tical command of our forces in order to be able to employ them on that operation, or they can do operations on their own as long as they are in those mechanisms, we talked about earlier, out there to do that. Mr. COOPER. So our General Petraeus is training Iraqi security forces who are under the command of the interim government, non- U.S. forces? General SHARP. For command purposes, that is correct. They are under the command of the minister of defense. However, for the op- erations during the actual training portion of it, they are under the command of and control of General Petraeus. Mr. COOPER. Unfortunately, some of the Iraqi security forces in the past who have been trained by us have then either not fought or in some cases turned on us while wearing the uniforms that we gave them and using the weapons that we gave them. What is there to ensure that the forces we are training now will not turn on us. General SHARP. Sir, we are taking a lot of lessons learned out of the time that you talked about, and that is one of the first things that General Petraeus is working on over there. What happened is that we did not have the leadership from the top level down through the middle level of the Iraqi security forces in place during those operations. We trained very hard, for exam- , on the police, on very basic police scales, but did not have the mid level or the upper level leadership in place. That has been- that is and has been corrected. There are new schools out there, shing noncommissioned officer schools that will work in order to be able to establish that strong chain of command. Second, I think what may end up being most important is as Iraq takes full sovereignty, and as the Minister of Defense, the Minister of Interior and Prime Minister have said over and over again: This is our responsibility. We are going to take charge of security. And at that high level, you know, leadership of pulling this country to- gether is apparent now and will be even more apparent. Combine those two together, and I am very optimistic on success. Mr. COOPER. Leadership is important. Mr. SIMMONS. The gentleman's time has expired. The Chair rec- ognizes Mr. Reyes for 5 minutes. Mr. REYES. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. Gentlemen, thank you for being here. I also want to talk about some issues that are currently exclusively in the domain of the U.S. and could be complicated as we talk about this trilogy of the Iraqis, the U.S., and perhaps the UN being involved in this process after June the 30th. For instance, let me just talk about a couple of examples. Cur- rently, we have a policy where if, as a result of U.S. action, there 470 is damage to property, to animals, to some of the Iraqi citizens, that there are military officers that are authorized to negotiate and pay on the spot for that damage. Obviously, if the Iraqis are going to take over, I hope for their own security, will our policy change in making restitution for that damage, damage done by the Iraqi protection forces or military? Because, if I understood you correctly here, the U.S. forces, it is the expectation that they will be kind of in a back-up mode to the Iraqi military or civil defense forces, police. So if they do the damage, do we still pay, or how is that going to work? General SHARP. Sir, I believe the details will have to be worked out. But that will be an Iraqi issue. I mean, the more and more they take over security responsibilities in their country, in a fully sovereign country, the actions that they do, they are accountable for. And so how they decide to deal with that, with their personnel, their people, their Iraqi citizens, I believe will be up to them. Ambassador RICCIARDONE. That would be an internal Iraqi af- fair. If Iraqi government officials cause harm to Iraqi citizens, they would be accountable under Iraqi law, one presumes. Mr. REYES. Would that also apply to these sabotage attacks that occurred over the last couple of days, where they have bombed the oil pipelines? Since the Iraqis are theoretically in charge of their own security and in charge of their own infrastructure, would the repair of that infrastructure, would that be the obligation of the Iraqi government, or would it be money that we are going to have to front for them? Ambassador RICCIARDONE. For now, we are providing all kinds of support, not only in repair but actual construction of plants, equipment, water, sewage, power, oil facilities that just needs to be done. We are doing this under the assistance program we have got. But at the end of the day, these are Iraqi national assets that they will have to not only construct, but repair when they wear out or repair and replace when sabotage occurs. Mr. REYES. So that, if I understand your answer correctly, that means that after June 30th they assume responsibility for not only for the protection but also for the rebuilding and in the case of sab- otage due to failure on the part of their protection forces to main- tain security protection, infrastructure, that becomes their nickel. Is that correct? · Ambassador RICCIARDONE. They already own their national fa- cilities. Mr. REYES. No. I am talking about the responsibility for recon- struction, the responsibility for restitution, the responsibility for re- building as a result of a failure on their part to maintain security, to maintain protection, to maintain infrastructure intact. Ambassador RICCIARDONE. And I would suggest to you, sir, that they have that responsibility now, increasingly — . Mr. REYES. No. And I have been to Irag four times. We currently have military armed officers that have money and authorization to go and make restitution, to go and make reimbursement for dam- age created. I am simply asking if, after they take they assume control, if that responsibility goes away from us. Because th important to me. That is important to us, because we are having to fund this through supplementals. And I guess my biggest con- 471 cern here is that if we don't have the ability to protect, if we don't have the responsibility to make sure that things stay in working order, why in the heck should we be continuing to pay for the re- pair of oil pipelines, for restitution of houses and farm animals and vehicles and all of these other things? Has that been thought through? Is that policy, come June 30th, going to be enacted? Secretary RODMAN. I think there are different kinds of situations that you have blended together. One is restitution if U.S. or friend- ly forces do some damage to civilians. And certainly right now we take responsibility for that. Damage to the oil industry caused by terrorists is a different situation. Now, and I think as the Ambas- sador is saying, we have turned over a lot of that authority already to the industry. It has a source of revenue, has quite a lot of reve- nue itself. Now, we are helping the training of different police forces that have a role in that. Mr. REYES. Well, the reason I ask that question is because the last time, which has been a couple of months ago, I was with Chairman Hunter, we were told that in those particular cases, the one you are just citing that where a pipeline is destroyed, we paid for its rebuilding. It is not the Iraqi government, it is not the in- dustry. We pay for it. The rationale given to us then was that it has got to be back up quickly, they don't have time to negotiate or find out who is going to do it when, how, or even why. So those are the kinds of things that I hope we have thought through. Those are the kinds of things that are going to be important to members on both sides, because our constituents are going to ex- pect some accountability from the new government. The respon- sibility cannot continue to be borne by our government, if we don't have the authority to protect and to preserve these kinds of entities there in Iraq. And I appreciate your indulgence, Mr. Chairman. Thank you very much. Secretary RODMAN. We owe you a definitive answer on that, sir. Mr. REYES. Thank you, sir. Mr. SIMMONS. We thank the gentleman for his statement and his question. The gentleman from Mississippi, Mr. Taylor, for five minutes. Mr. TAYLOR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you gentlemen very much for sticking around so long. General Sharp, I see you are the director of strategic plans and policy. Would that include plans for the rotation, the next rotation next spring? General SHARP. Sir, not directly. The J-3, the operations officer handles that. But I do have some details of that. Mr. TAYLOR. Based on the last rotation, if my memory serves me right, we were shipping equipment out of places lik and Charleston starting in September, October. When does the ro- tation of the equipment start for this cycle, and what size of a force do you anticipate having one year from today? General SHARP. Sir, the plan for the size of the force, what we are planning for and what is in the next rotation, is the same size force basically we have today. We will look at to see along the lines whether we have to adjust that or not. When the force will actually arrive and move is kind of a sliding scale. We have tried to laid 472 this out so we don't have this whole influx of 138,000 at once in and out. So, it is over a four or five month period. The equipment question to get at is we are really trying to leave as much equipment so that troops can fall on equipment over there, especially when you get into such areas as radios, command and control centers and things like that. Mr. TAYLOR. Which leads to my next question. My next question is, at what point one year ago—one year from today, what percent- age of our Humvees do you expect will be up-armored? What per- centa of our vehicles will be protected with some sort of elec- tronic jammers against improvised explosives? I would presume, with a similar sized force, that you are going to have the same equipment in place. You know of this committee's concern about up-armor and and you know about this committee's concern about im- provised explosives. General SHARP. Yes, sir. Mr. TAYLOR. To what extent will it be solved one year from today? General SHARP. Sir, by my data—and I will get back to you to verify that this is true. But the data from the J–3 is as follows: Currently, by October of this year we will have 84 percent fill of a requirement that was developed for up-armored Humvees several months ago, a requirement of 4,454. We will have 84 percent of that filled. Mr. TAYLOR. If I may, General, that doesn't answer my question, because your goal may be less than 100 percent. I need to know, of the Humvees that will be there a year from today, what percent- age of them will be up-armored. And of the approximately 19,000 vehicles that I presume we will still have there a year from today, what percentage of them will be protected from improvised explo- sives using some form of electronic jammer? General SHARP. Sir, I will have to get back to you on that. [The information referred to can be found in the Appendix begin- ning on page 533.] Mr. TAYLOR. Okay. Second question. Early in this conflict, a friend of mine from the United States Army Special Forces pointed out what he thought was a glaring mistake, and that was the mov- ing into the palaces. Of course, we did it for the short-term need of getting the kids a shower, out of the heat in the summer, out of the cold in the winter, and with a wall around them certainly cut down on people sniping. But long term, he thought it was creat- ing a terrible problem of guilt by association. Bad things happened in those palaces; and when you just move into that palace, in the eyes of a fairly simple people, you become the bad guy. They are doing? Without electricity, you are living in the palace. You have just replaced a bad person in that palace. I read with great interest where General Zinni, apparently pri- vately not before this committee, expressed the same concerns. I continue to think that is a problem. One year from now, what are our plans to be in those palaces? What percentage of those palaces will have been turned back over to the Iraqis for use as universities or whatever? And what percentage of our force will be in Bosnia- type encampments? That would really send two messages. They are made of plywood: We are going to keep our guys comfortable, we 473 are going to keep them warm in the winter, cool in the summer they are going to get a shower, but we are not here forever. General SHARP. Sir, I can't give you the exact percentage. Again, I will get back to you. But I can tell you that it is definitely Gen- eral Sanchez and General Abizaid's desire to move out of the pal- aces as soon as possible. And you laid out perfectly the reasons that we are there right now, for security purposes. And as we get the new camps built, not only do we want to move out of palaces, we would like to be able to move out of cities so that, again, we are not in and interfering with the Iraqi security forces doing what they need to be able to do there. So that is the intent. I will get back with you on the exact plan that the Army has in order to be able to accomplish that. [The information referred can be found in the Appendix begin- ning on page 533.] Mr. TAYLOR. Okay. The last question. What is the target date of getting total control of the weapons we have already captured? Like many members who visited in the middle of September of last year, I was really dumbfounded when David Kay, who was sent there by our government, told us that he felt like we had too small a force, and his proof in the pudding was that the weapons we had already captured were being regularly stolen by the insurgents and used against us. At what point do we have total control of the weapons that we have captured, either seen to it that they are de- stroyed, or at least kept in our hands? General SHARP. Sir, as the chairman has testified, number one, we identify new weapons caches every single day out there. There is a call made as far as how pilferable these items are. Now, weapons are easily taken, ammunition is easily taken, we guard that. And I don't have today's figures, but we guard the great ma- jority of those that are absolutely required. Where we decide that o't, for either the purposes of they are not needed, because you are not going to carry a huge thing away in the back of a truck, we either bulldoze them or we go and look at them occasion- ally as we go through. I don't think we will ever get to the point where every single cache is guarded by an individual 24 hours a day, 7 days a week. We make the call based upon, as I said, what we believe the mili- tary necessity is and how pilferable that is, with the goal to be able to get as much of it as possible so that it cannot be taken away and used against us. Mr. SIMMONS. I thank the gentleman. Mr. TAYLOR. Mr. Chairman, one quick question. For the record, I would like to know what percentage of the improvised explosive devices in our estimates that have been used against us were at one time under our control, but lost back to the enemy. General SHARP. I will take that for the record. [The information referred to can be found in the Appendix begin- ning on page 533.] Mr. SIMMONS. I thank the gentleman. And the Chair joins the gentleman in expressing concern over the use of the palaces, and joins the gentleman in concern over the percentage of up-armored equipment that we have a year from now. we can' 474 The gentleman from Texas, Mr. Turner, is recognized for five minutes. Mr. TURNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Secretary, I think the President was right when he set the June 30th date and he stuck to it, because I think timetables are important. They drive events, cause everyone to focus on the objec- tive, and I think it was important because it sent a message to those who have looked upon us as occupiers, that we intended to turn over control to the Iraqis. I think the same logic applies to our presence there in terms of our military. And Mr. Langevin asked you a question earlier about certain dates. I would hope that the President has requested, and if he hasn't that the Pentagon has prepared, a detailed timetable specifying the training of the Iraqi Army, the civilian forces, the po- lice, to complete not only with dates but numbers of Iraqis that will be trained. And it would seem to me to be entirely consistent with the President's setting of the political transition date to set a date for the withdrawal of military forces from Iraq. It would seem to me that, in a year and a half, if we haven't been able to train enough Iraqis to allow them to defend themselves against the in- surgents, that we have failed in our ability to train the forces nec- essary to provide the Iraqis the capability to provide their own se- curity. And I would like to see the plan. I would like for this committee to see the plan for the training of the Iraqi forces, complete with the dates, the numbers, the costs. And if there is additional cost involved, I am sure that Congress would be amenable to providing the additional funds. But I think that even though we like to believe that our title as occupiers will be erased by the political transition, I think the truth of the matter is those on the street in the Arab world are not going to perceive that the occupation has ended until the troops are gone. And I think if we set a date, everything in the Pentagon focused on the accomplishment of that date, that objective. And if it comes down to a year and a half from now and we find that the goals have not been accomplished and the new Iraqi government turns to us and pleads for us to stay, I am sure that we can change course and make the necessary adjustments. But I really would urge you to consider very seriously the value of a date. The only thing I heard you say against a date was that you thought it might allow those who oppose us, the insurgents to lay back and wait until we have gone and then take us on. That is not the way it would play out. The way it would play out is as the Iraqi forces grow, their capabilities increase. And if we can't ac- complish it in a year and a half, I don't think you will accomplish it in five. And I think it sends a good clear message to the world, to the Iraqi people, and to the American people that would be well received. Secretary RODMAN. Sir, we can give you the figures and the time- table of what, of the training schedule, our targets for training the different elements of the Iraqi forces, and what we hope to accom- plish. But I continue to believe that certainly in present cir- cumstances a fixed deadline for unconditional, unilateral with- drawal would be a mistake. 475 Mr. TURNER. Expand on that. I heard you say earlier that you thought maybe the insurgents would hide behind a log and not do much between now and then. Which would be a great thing, by the way, if they were to lay behind the log and not do anything and allow us to stand up the Iraqi forces and create stability and peace for the next year and a half. But beyond that, no decision is irre- versible. And if, in a year and a half from now, it was determined that things had gone to hell in a handbasket and the Iraqi govern- ment is begging us to stay around, the world community, I am sure, would support that decision as well. So give me another reason that it would be ill-advised to set a timetable and to drive the course of events by our dictates rather than putting us in a position, as I think has been suggested when Secretary Powell was asked what is going to happen if we are asked to leave, and he said, well, I guess we will leave. The truth of the matter is, we don't need to be in that position. We need to state it clearly up front what the plan is, and nobody will be asking us to leave if we do so. Secretary RODMAN. I think the key word is “unconditional.” if we set a deadline and say no matter what happens we are leaving, we are kind of washing our hands of responsibility and sending the wrong kind of message to the Iraqi- Mr. TURNER. I didn't ask you that. Secretary RODMAN. Well, but that is what it means. A fixed deadline for unilateral withdraw means we are going to do it. But let me add, you said the situation might go to hell in a handbasket. My worry is that setting such an unconditional deadline might con- tribute to the unraveling of the situation. It could undermine the morale of the people that are counting on us. My sense is that the Iraqis that we are working with want reas- surance right now that we are going to stay with them for the pe- that they need us. And it is very hard to put a target date on when those circumstances will change. Mr. TURNER. Well, I think you have to put a target date on your planning. I think if we don't have a plan somewhere that we could roll out and show this Congress right now of what the training schedule is, what the period of standing up is, and what our expec- tations are over the next several months and years, then I think we have certainly failed. So I am sure there is one there. Am I right, General Sharp? General SHARP. Sir, absolutely. And we have a plan that we could show you that lays out by month when equipment is pro- duced, it lays out by month exactly how many of the Iraqi security forces have gone through the different levels of training. It lays out the plan. Now, having said that, as I said earlier, General Petraeus is there right now working with this new ministry of defense and ministry of interior. And adjustments will come to that plan, and we will again have a plan that comes from that, that stands up all the Iraqi security forces. Mr. TURNER. On that plan, do you have a date where you have made a judgment that at that point in time the Iraqi forces, police forces, civilian forces, Army should be able to defend against the 476 types of threats and the types that we know are there and probably will continue to be there for a while? General SHARP. Sir, we have a date that shows when they are properly trained by the standards that we are laying out for them now. As conditions change, things will change. We may have to change some of those training things. But, yes, we have dates that say, based upon the standards we have as far as certifying and training these, all five of the lines of operation, when that they will be to 100 percent based upon the current plan. And, again, I don't think we are going to get major adjustments from the Iraqis as they stand up these two new ministries, but there will be modifica- tions made and we will adjust the plans to those with the Iraqis. r. TURNER. Could you give us the date that you anticipate the forces will be sufficient to handle their own defense? General SHARP. Sir, I can give you the date that they will be trained to the standards by which that we have set and agreed to Iraqis. Whether they will be sufficient will depend upon the cir- cumstances at that time in order to be able to accomplish those missions. But to answer your question, for example, the current plan for the Iraqi police is that they will be fully trained and equipped by June of 2005. For the border, by about the same time as far as the training. Although I will say that, for the border police, the latest discussions I have heard from General Petraeus, and you will be able to quiz him a little bit more about this tomorrow when he tes- tifies in front of this committee, is that there is a belief that service will probably have to change because there is not sufficient person- nel, we don't have the sufficient berming around the country to be able to basically close the borders down. So I think some of his ini- tial assessments, which he will talk to you tomorrow, probably will lay some of that out. The Iraqi Civil Defense Corps, by this September, as it is cur- rently planned. But, again, in that case the Iraqis are looking very hard at what is the long-term prospect for the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps? What do we want to do with them? Do we want to have them as a National Guard, as a gendarme? Do we want to incor- porate them into the Iraqi Armed Forces by some component and all? And those discussions are going on literally as we speak right now to make that determination. So we have a plan, we are making adjustments. And I can tell you when we will get to those levels. But, again, we have to look security situation on hand in order to be able to answer your question fully. Mr. SIMMONS. The gentleman's time has expired. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Florida, Mr. Meek. Mr. MEEK. Thank you, M Ambassador, I wanted to pretty much ask the question about the governing council in Iraq and their ability to be able to hold the line. And knowing the members of the governing council, is there any evidence of those members wanting to be a part of an elected Iraqi government? Ambassador RICCIARDONE. Congressman, you are referring to the governing council that is now out of business, right, that ended and has been succeeded by the IIG? Chairmar 477 Mr. MEEK. That is correct. Ambassador RICCIARDONE. A number did want to participate. Others did not. There was jostling. They were involved in the con- sultations with the Lakhdar Brahimi of the United Nations in which Mr. Bremer participated. A number of them have remained involved, not merely in the IIG but also among the ministers. There is some continuity and some change. Mr. MEEK. One of my concerns, because now they have a little free time now to go out and talk and give speeches, things of that nature. It may end up being a difficult situation for us as it relates to the United States, also the United Nations. As you know, just yesterday, here in this country there was a Gallup poll released that 57 percent of Americans feel that the administration is not handling the war well. · Fifty-two percent of Americans feel that we went to war for all the wrong reasons. I am saying all of that to say that, I believe as we start to head toward elections, which I understand will be in early 2006, 2005, I don't believe that we are going to be able to have those elections. But if we were to be able to have those elec- tions, those individual, since we are trying to create this democ- racy, are going to be out there campaigning and they are going to be saying things. I believe that there are those that are out there saying that we need to work with the Americans, we need to thank the Americans for what they have done. I don't see that being one of the issues or one of the main speeches that these individuals will be giving. They will be talking about an independent Iraq. And from what we are hearing of the polling in Iraq, I mean, the love that we thought we would have is not necessarily out there. How do you think diplomatically and safety wise for the troops, how will that atmosphere affect the safety of our troops and our mission to be able to make sure that we are able to carry out our rules of en- gagement as we see them? Ambassador RICCIARDONE. I think the plan that the President has laid out, that the United Nations has laid out, is a convincing one, it is one that has the support of the Iraqi people. The plan sets ies of steps over the next couple of years until there is a permanent democratic government of Iraq. It seems broadly accept- ed by the Iraqi people. There will be forces that try to undermine it. No question. There will be violent opposition. No question. I think the Iraqi people want so badly for the future to come that they will prevail. Mr. MEEK. You mentioned earlier, Ambassador, the urge that many Iraqis would like to have the elections more sooner than later. What is the driving force behind that urge? Ambassador RICCIARDONE. Their eagerness to be free, their ea- gerness to have democracy come, to have what they have heard about existing in much of the rest of the world. Mr. MEEK. Mr. Ambassador, I am sorry to cut you off. To be free from what? Ambassador RICCIARDONE. Not only to be free of tyranny, which they are free of. They want elections, they want to run their own country. Yes, they want the occupation to end and have made that clear. President Bush has made clear our job was to go in and not 478 to run Iraq, not to occupy it, but to set them free. So we want the same thing. - Mr. MEEK. Some from a scale of 1 to 10, how do you think they feel about us leaving and their willingness to have elections more sooner than later? Do you think from 1 to 10 you think it is like a 5 or a 4 or 7 or 8? Ambassador RICCIARDONE. I think scales of 1 to 10 don't apply to people that have lived under dictatorship and have been able to keep opposing thoughts in their same minds as a matter of daily life. On the one hand, they want protection. They want us there to help them secure their country and to give them confidence, to give the world confidence. On the other hand, they also want us to leave. The same people, the same individuals who want us to leave also want us there at the same time. Mr. MEEK. Well, it is going to be unfortunate, Mr. Ambassador, you know, we are in a difficult situation as we see it today. We are going to have individuals campaigning who want to be a part of this elected democracy that we have asked or that we are working towards, including the United Nations. We have a situation that our own State Department and the United Nations personnel that is out there now, they don't have a safe way of living there. We have one of the most dangerous situations there in Iraq. I feel that it is very important for us to look at the worst so that we don't treat this as another day at the office, because we have individuals that are out there that are trying to make it the worst situation possible so, that what we want as a goal as Americans never sees the light of day. And I look at Afghanistan. We had the President here just the other day, and he is non-elected democrat- ically at this particular time. We had to set back elections to be able to see that come to fru- ition. I think in September we are going to have to set the elections back again. So we really have to pay very close attention. The State Department is going to play a very strong role in that, be- cause I think it is going to have a lot to do with American troops and their safety and what is going to happen, not only how Iraqis feel about this process but how the American people feel process. And if we were to say that politics won't play a major role in our goals and objectives here in this room, I think, you know, that would be an understatement just to look at how they feel. We have to look at how Americans feel, especially as relates to our troops and how they feel about their mission. I think they are going to do everything they have to do to make sure that they carry out the order. I think it is the management of the war and the transition is the thing that all of us in this room have to continue to communicate with. So I would hope that the Chairman Hunter and the ranking member, that we continue to have this kind of conversations dis- course so that we can really work toward trying to look at the worst-case scenario. I know that it is hard to talk about the bad and the ugly; it is always easier to talk about the good. But I am very fearful of what is going to happen to many of those individuals t there trying to set an atmosphere for elections. At this point, I don't see it clearly, and I don't think that we will be able 479 to see it for some time. And there has to be some additional think- ing on this. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. SIMMONS. I thank the gentleman. The Chair recognizes the gentlewoman from California, Ms. Sanchez, for 5 minutes. Ms. SÁNCHEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you, gentlemen, for being before us once again to tes- tify. I actually have a question with respect to the Kurds. I want you to think ahead, because I keep trying to figure out what does a stable Iraq country look like, stable enough for us to be able to withdraw the majority of our troops and not be in a conflict situa- tion, one in which the people of Iraq, whoever that might be and whatever form might be, feel like it is their country and they are actually running things. And I don't think it is going to happen on June 30th, by the way. I think we are many years away from what that picture looks like. But I, in particular, want to know how you think we are going to resolve the looming conflict that I see between the Kurds and the Arabs in Iraq, especially with the flash point of Kirkuk. I want to know how we are going to use our military and the diplomatic tools we have to help the Iraqis resolve this flash point, which I believe is an important one, for civil war. Now, the Kurds, I think, have been consistent and faithful allies of the American forces. They made the northern front possible dur- ing the war. And they, unlike Arab-based forces, have fought with us these last few weeks in Fallujah. Their cooperation with us, I think, has embittered Sunni insurgents, and it has heightened the Kurds' expectations for American support when their separatist as- pirations come to roost in the coming year. What is our position and our strategy on the question of Kurdish autonomy? In particular, given that when the UN passed its resolution re- cently—and one of you mentioned earlier the transitional adminis- tration law or TAL, which was approved by the interim govern- ment, Sistani rejected that and, to some extent, has lost some of its luster. And the UN resolution failed to endorse the TAL despite heavy lobbying by Kurds. Why did the UN not do this? Well, be- cause the TAL contained provisions for limited Kurdish autonomy and a right of veto over any provision in the permanent constitu- tion. So, my question is, what do you see happening in the future when this flash point comes to a head? And all three of you can take that question. Secretary RODMAN. Well, let me start. The answer is that this is politics. Politics is going on in Iraq. And there have been a number of episodes over the last year where there were seeming disagree- ments or a great feud building up particularly in the negotiation of the TAL. But it was resolved politically by a group of people on both sides who shared the premise that they were in—they were all Iraqis. We have seen this flare-up again, it is true, because there were contrary expectations about what would be in the UN resolution. But that is being resolved. I mean, Prime Minister Allawi has already been discussing this with the Kurdish leaders and giving them some reassurances. I mean, part of the 480 ite or Ms. SANCHEZ. Some reassurances to what? I mean, it is pretty obvious what they want, and it is pretty obvious that the Si the Sunni in particular aren't going to stand for that, especially when you are looking at a very oil rich area which the Sunni wants and the Kurdish feel is theirs. So, I mean, what reassurance? I guess I am trying to figure out what reassurance? Secretary RODMAN. They are working this out. I mean, the obitu- ary of this government has been written too many times. There were fears that the governing council was going to split apart, and it didn't split apart. The foreign minister of the country is Kurdish. The Deputy Prime Minister is Kurdish. They are working this out. You know, the UN Security Council resolution did not mention the TAL explicitly, but it also blessed the political timetable that came out of the TAL. It blessed a number of other provisions. We were discussing SOFA issues there in the TAL, and the Secu- rity Council resolution has blessed this. You know, it is politics. I mean, I am struck by the fact that ever since last July when the governing council was formed they have all operated on the basis that they were all Iraqis, they need to learn to co-exist, they have disputes and they are jockeying for power and position and jobs, and they work it out. There have been many predictions that Civil War would break out. Zarqawi is trying to stimulate civil war. But I am struck by the fact that in the face of repeated provo- cations, the unity of the different groups in this society has held together. And they will solve it as political figures do. They will compromise, they will allocate jobs in a different way, they will give reassurances. I think since the war, they have all agreed that they are on the unity of the country. Certainly, the Kurds, you are absolutely right, they have been good allies of ours. We certainly owe them, you know, protection for their interests. But they have no support for independence they know, and they have welcomed the fact, they have accepted the fact that they are Iraqis and they are launched as all the other Iraqis are on this enterprise of a uni- fied country. And I am confident that they will work these things out politically. Ms. SANCHEZ. Thank you, Mr. Secretary, for that answer, al- though that was quite frankly not very appetizing or fulfilling. I guess I am struck by the fact that every tough milestone that we have set to meet so far we have pushed off for the future. And that goes back to the question that Ms. Tauscher had about the forces agreement which was supposed to be done in March and of course didn't get done, and almost every milestone that was set a year ago leading to this June 30th deadline has never been met. And now, every difficult situation we keep pushing off. And I think that leads back to this real problem that so many of us on this committee, not just this side, but so many of us on this com- mittee see is really a lack of plan and adherence to a plan with re- spect to the situation in Iraq. Is that an indication that my time is over, Mr. Chairman? Mr. SIMMONS. You are 2 minutes over, and there are 2 other members waiting. 481 Ms. SANCHEZ. I have other difficult questions. I will submit them for the record. And I hope I get better answers than just, you know, it is political. It is political. Mr. SIMMONS. We thank the lady for her questions and her com- ments. The Chair recognizes Mr. Ryan of Ohio for five minutes. Mr. RYAN OF OHIO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate it. Yesterday's New York Times had an article in it that said the tri- bunal in Iraq will be headed up by Mr. Chalabi's nephew. Are you guys familiar with this? After all that has been done and all that has been said about how we got into this war and the behavior of Mr. Chalabi and the kind of misinformation that a lot of us believe this government received, doesn't this give the perception that Mr. Chalabi's nephew is going to be responsible for the tribunal for Saddam Hussein? Doesn't this give the perception that this is going to be a kangaroo court? I would like each of you to comment on that. Secretary RODMAN. Well, Mr. Chalabi's nephew was appointed by CPA as head of the deba'athification. I don't think he is involved in the special tribunal. Is he? Ambassador RICCIARDONE. He is, actually. Secretary RODMAN. Then I should defer to my colleagues here on that. Ambassador RICCIARDONE. I will be glad to address that. I actu- ally had the privilege of working with Ahmed Chalabi, known also as Sam, a few years ago in the previous administration I was in- volved in working with the Iraqi opposition. And one of the projects we had going was on the rule of law. They were looking ahead to anticipate the problems that would arise on the happy day when Saddam Hussein would go down, whenever that would occur and through whatever means. And we worked with a number of Iraqi judges, lawyers, law professors, anyone we could find with experi- ence. Chalabi turned out to be a world-class lawyer with, if not edu- cation, practical experience in the United States and I th education in the United States. He did a lot of pro bono work, no payment at all for him doing this. We worked hard to establish cur- ricula for Iraqi training courses for police academies we worked hard to set up judiciary structures. Mr. RYAN OF OHIO. And I am not questioning him. We can't, we don't pick our family. We all know that. But I am just talking sheer perception. Doesn't this not look good given everything that has happened over the past few months and all the information that has come out in the New Yorker and all these different other articles? Doesn't it reflect poorly on the process? And I know he may not have anything to do with anything. Ambassador RICCIARDONE. I can't speak to how he was selected. I know he has emerged doing it. Mr. RYAN OF OHIO. But wouldn't you agree that it would be per- ceived very poorly around the world? Ambassador RICCIARDONE. Not necessarily. As you just said, sir, one can't pick one's relatives. This is a man with a track record of doing rule of law work for Iraq. He has a distinguished inter- national record. If Iraqis decide that they don't have confidence in 482 him, Iraqis will be free to remove him and put someone else in. So if Iraqis perceive it is a problem, I am sure they will deal with it. Mr. RYAN OF OHIO. Thank you. Also, yesterday's Washington Times has an article where Mr. Pearle was saying that the UN plan for elections will bring disastrous consequences for the people in Iraq. I would like each of you to comment on that. He is refer- ring to the system which will encourage people to vote strictly along the lines of ethnicity and sectarian practice rather than local political issues. Can each of you comment on that? Secretary RODMAN. Well, let me start. There have been some con- erns raised about the particular voting method that has been se- lected. This is treating all of Iraq as a single district, having pro- portional representation, and having party lists. And the UN rep- resentative selected that method on the grounds that it is the sim- plest to implement quickly. But, you know, those of us who are amateur political scientists have raised some questions, and this may still be discussed in our government and of course with the Iraqis, because other examples where this kind of electoral system may or may not produce the optimum result. So this is something being discussed, I think widely, and I don't want to prejudge it. And there were good reasons proposed by the UN experts. But there is an interesting debate going on about the possible effects of such a voting system. You know, what kind of political structure, what kind of political stability. Mr. RYAN OF OHIO. Do you believe it would have disastrous con- sequences? Secretary RODMAN. That is not the adjective I would use. But I know a number of people who are concerned, asking the legitimate question, whether this is the best kind of system. The alternative would be something like we and the British have of constituency, constituencies electing their representatives. But that does take more time to organize. So I think there a legitimate issue here. Mr. RYAN OF OHIO. Mr. Ambassador, do you believe it has disas- trous consequences, in your opinion? Ambassador RICCIARDONE. I would say I don't have the expertise to judge. It is up to Iraqis to figure out what system will work best for them. For me, the key question is what methods, what system, what procedure will give the greatest confidence in the results. And there is going to be a wide range of options, there will be no perfect one. Every one will be fraught with downsides as well as advan- tages. At the end of the day they have got to pick one, do it, and get the results. And that will happen. : Mr. RYAN OF OHIO. I guess this next question may be for you, General, regarding Fallujah. We were in control of it and we trans- ferred control. Is there talk now of us taking control over again? General SHARP. Sir, we are watching very closely the Fallujah brigade. The First Marine Division is watching very closely the cir- cumstances there. It changes from day to day. There was a patrol that we went in jointly with, with them at the Fallujah brigade just the other day that was successful. I do not believe that this is a model for the future as far as how we want to do this. But the final determination as to where we will end up with Fallujah, what type of operations we will need in order to be able to accomplish 483 the mission there is still to be determined, watching very closely by that division commander. Mr. RYAN OF OHIO. It is very scary to think we have already transferred some power over to them and it is really not working out all that well. Do you have some concerns? General SHARP. Yes, sir, we have concerns. But I think we have all said all along that we and the Iraqis want to give to the Iraqis the authority and the responsibility for their own security. In the same breath, we have also said there will be times that they falter. But we need to take our hand off the bike, and we realize the bike will fall sometimes. But as long as they get back up, which I am confident that they will to push forward what is needed, it is what we need in this progress, in this way ahead. Mr. SIMMONS. The gentleman's time has expired. Mr. RYAN OF OHIO. Mr. Chairman, can you indulge me for one final brief, very brief question to the Ambassador? Mr. SIMMONS. Very brief. Mr. RYAN OF OHIO. One of the issues when we had a hearing here a few weeks ago on Afghanistan was regarding the drugs and production and harvesting and all that. One of the issues there was the court system and the inability to have whether it was sub- poena power or to get search warrants and things like that. We have been talking a lot about troops. But I think what undergirds, that is, the ability to go to the courts and do this in a fair way. How are the court systems coming together? The time we haven't talked much about the timetable, and if we did, I missed it. Can you just briefly tell me where the courts stand right now? Ambassador RICCIARDONE. Sir, with your permission, I will just take that and get back to you. I honestly do not have the expertise to answer that. [The information referred to can be found in the Appendix begin- ning on page 533.] Mr. RYAN OF OHIO. Mr. Secretary or General, do you know? General SHARP. Mr. RYAN OF OHIO. No? Mr. SIMMONS. The gentleman's time has expired. Mr. RYAN OF OHIO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. SIMMONS. The gentleman from Hawaii, Mr. Abercrombie. Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, I guess it has come down to me. I will tell you that I think this is complete political lunacy. What I conclude from what you are say- ing is that the United States military is going to be set adrift in a desert sea on June 30th. The unreality of what is taking place here, of what you are saying is just stunning. General Sharp, you talk about as long as they get up. Well, who is going to get up? What do you mean as long as they get up? You said you are going to accomplish the mission. General Sanchez said the mission, for example, in Fallujah was to capture or kill this cleric Sadr. I see on television yesterday the President saying, well, maybe he is going to run for office. The Coalition Provisional Authority has a poll given to this committee today that shows that Sadr is the second most popular person in the country. 67 percent ap- proval, second only to Sistani's 70 percent approval. Now, do you contend, General Sharp, to tell me that you are going to continue 484 a fantasy. to send United States military personnel into Fallujah, and put them in harm's way under these circumstances? Is that what you mean by accomplishing the mission? General SHARP. Sir, in Najaf, where Sadr is, there is actually movement that the Iraqi police forces there are starting to do a lot better job in order to do be able to do that. Sadr's militias are going away. What the discussions away have been Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Going away where? General SHARP. They are stopping the attacks in Najaf, in Karbola of our forces and of the coalition forces. And the progress- Mr. ABERCROMBIE. That is because we have withdrawn them. Right? General SHARP. No, sir, it is not. It is because the Iraqi security forces in that area are getting much better in order to be able to do what they need to do. Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Let me tell you what the poll shows today about whether you support page 32. Would you support or oppose the idea of you or a member of your household joining the security forces, which include the new Iraqi police, the new Iraqi Army, and the other support? Less than 1 out of 10 people will support any- body in their household even joining this new Iraqi police. This is General SHARP. Sir, Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Supposed to put this police together more than a year ago, and they haven't come into existence yet. There is a fantasy. You can't answer this, General Sharp. You have got to answer this over here in the State Department and the rest of it. You have got the poll in front of you. Am I quoting correctly? Secretary RODMAN. Yes, that is correct. But I think General Sharp- Mr. ABERCROMBIE. That is a fact. Thank you very much. Secretary RODMAN. There are 220,000 Iraqis under arms in the police and the Army- Mr. ABERCROMBIE. And you have got confidence in them? Secretary RODMAN. Well, we are training them and equipping them. And they are very brave people. They are taking casualties, and most of them are doing well and showing up for work. And as the General saying, in the south- Mr. ABERCROMBIE. So then we won't have to use United States military any longer to carry on these duties once this sovereignty takes place on the 30th. Is that correct? Mr. RODMAN. No, that is not correct. That is not the intention. Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Then who is going to have the authority? Who has the authority to direct them and under what General Sharp called the details? On July 1st, who directs the United States mili- tary with respect to any action about, say, a remnant of this cleric Sadr's people operating in Fallujah? Will it be the United States military or the Iraqi authority? Who? General SHARP. Sir, it will be the United States military working with the Iraqi authorities to be able to do it in the partnership that we talked about. Mr. ABERCROMBIE. What does that mean? 485 General SHARP. Sir, what it means is that we will sit down with them just as we sit down with our other coalition partners and de- termine what is required to be able to have a secure environment in- Mr. ABERCROMBIE. So when the shooting starts, you are going to sit down and have a group discussion? General SHARP. Absolutely not, sir. Absolutely not. As we do all of our plans, we sit down and plan out what the operations are. We determine what type of patrols that we need, what type of capabili- ties that we need. Iraq will be part of that discussion. Mr. ABERCROMBIE. On page 341 of the poll: The following state- ments apply to those who attack the coalition forces and those who work with them. Of those who believe the coalition is trying to steal Iraq's wealth, 73 percent of the Iraqis believe we are trying to steal their wealth. 70 percent believe all foreign forces must leave at once. Mr. Ambassador, you are sitting here telling us the Iraqis want us to stay. 70 percent believe we should leave at once. 64 percent believe that the national dignity requires the kind of attacks that are being made on us in Fallujah. 64 percent. This is a fantasy. This is lunacy. You have got to start setting the time for us to be able to get our troops out of there and to establish a timetable for it and to see to it that we can leave honorably without subjecting them to this kind a situation. If we continue to have hearings like this in which this kind of fantasy is put forward as policy of the United States, the only thing that is going to take place is continued maiming, continuing deaths of our troops over there, and the complete failure to be able to carry through on anything that might have been contemplated when this attack began over a year ago. Nothing that has been said here today by you gives me the slightest indication or the slightest confidence that anything even remotely approaching what you say is going to take place is going to be able to be accomplished. Noth- ing. Mr. SIMMONS. I thank the gentleman for his comments. And I would ask my colleague from Mississippi if he has any closing remarks that he would like to make for the record? Hearing none, gentlemen, I want to thank you on behalf of Chairman Hunter. I will share with you the fact that back in the mid 1990's, Presi- dent Clinton announced that the administration had agreed in principle to keep U.S. troops in Bosnia only for a period of 1 or 2 years; but my recollection is we continue to have troops in that part of the world, which demonstrates the challenges that we face as Americans in a difficult and dangerous international situation. The comment was made earlier that the embassy in Baghdad will have substantial challenges. I know Ambassador Negroponte, I met him almost 20 years ago in Tegucigalpa. I think he is the man for the job. But it is a very difficult job. I served as a civilian out of the embassy in Saigon at a time when we were challenged in that environment, and I share with my colleagues concern that working with the multinational force, working with the new Iraqi government is going to be a challenge. It is not going to be easy. It is not going to be easy to determine how the brigade will provide 486 security for the UN when on occasion the UN decides, for political reasons, that they have to make decisions about security, and that can place people at risk, and that certainly happened with the last year when the UN mission was attacked. So these are very substantial challenges that we face that you have put before us, but I also believe that this committee has exer- cised its oversight responsibility in a very substantial way on both sides of the aisle, and I suspect that that will continue into the fu- ture. Again, on behalf of the Chairman, we thank you for your service and your testimony. And this hearing is now over. [Whereupon, at 1:02 p.m., the committee was adjourned.] A P PENDIX JUNE 16, 2004 PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD JUNE 16, 2004 OPENING REMARKS OF CHAIRMAN HUNTER Hearing on Status of Forces in Iraq after June 30 June 16, 2004 This morning the Committee continues its examination of Operation Iraqi Freedom with a specific focus on the status of U.S. military forces following the hand over of sovereignty on June 30h. We are also planning another hearing on this topic next Tuesday, June 22, with Deputy Secretary Paul Wolfowitz who is presently in Iraq reviewing these very issues for Secretary Rumsfeld. To begin the committee's review of this topic, our witnesses this morning are: The Honorable Peter Rodman Assistant Secretary of Defense General Walter Sharp Director for Strategic Plans and Policy The Honorable Francis Ricciardone Coordinator for Iraq Transition U.S. Department of State (491) 492 Welcome to the Committee gentlemen. We look forward to your testimony and appreciate your appearance before the committee this morning. Just two weeks from today, the Coalition Provisional Authority in Iraq will hand sovereignty over to an Iraqi Interim Government. This event marks the latest step in a plan that has been unfolding since last fall. It will be followed by: • national elections to a transitional government just after the new year, • a popular vote on a new Constitution next fall, and • direct elections to a constitutional government before the end of 2005. Some people here, and in Iraq, may be impatient with the process, but I think Jefferson, Washington, Adams, and Franklin would be astounded at the speed with which things are happening 493 June 30th is a milestone on the road to a stable, democratic, and secure Iraq in which Iraqis decide the future of their own country. More importantly, the momentum towards a fully- sovereign and democratic Iraq will accelerate. Already, roughly 60 percent of the Iraqi government has been turned over to Iraqi control. The Coalition Provisional Authority has issued an order transferring Iraqi security forces from under the command and control of the multinational force to the Iraqi Interim Government. Additionally, the multinational force is continuing its efforts at training the Iraqis to take over the security mission themselves. Roughly 150,000 Iraqis are either on duty or in training to serve on the Iraqi Police Force, in the military, as members of the Civil Defense Corps, or in the Department of Border Enforcement. This is a clear sign that Iraqis are moving forward in taking over the responsibility for securing their country. 494 The handover is significant on a strategic scale, but June 30h won't mean much change in the daily lives of our soldiers. They will still be in Iraq. They will still face a determined, terrorist enemy. They will still work with Iraqis to defeat that enemy. They will still be under American command. And they will still need every ounce of support this country can muster to succeed in their mission. This is where the outcome of Operation Iraqi Freedom will be decided, and this is where we must focus our attention in the coming months. Gentlemen, thanks again for appearing before the committee. We look forward to your testimony. But first, let me recognize the committee's ranking Democrat, Mr. Skelton, for any remarks he may wish to make. The entirety of our witnesses' prepared statements will be entered into the record. Secretary Rodman, the floor is yours. 495 Opening Statement for The Honorable Ike Skelton (D-MO), Ranking Member, Committee on Armed Services, U.S. House of Representatives Full Committee Hearing on the Status of U.S. Forces in Iraq After June 30 June 16, 2004 Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I join you in welcoming back our witnesses: Secretary Rodman, General Sharp, Ambassador Ricciardone--it is good to have you with us again. Mr. Chairman, there has been a fair amount of political progress since our last hearing on Iraq. The Iraqis now have interim leadership that will take that country from June 30th through national elections early next year. I am pleased that the United Nations Security Council was able to pass a unanimous resolution that sets the basic framework in place for the American and multinational forces to work with Iraqi forces going forward to establish security. This is particularly important because it is clear that the violence continues. The assassinations of government leaders and those associated with improving Iraqi infrastructure will likely continue in the 496 coming weeks and months. The release today of the results of the CPA- commissioned public opinion poll are disturbing. Only 10% of those polled supported American troops while 55% said they would feel safer if our troops immediately left. This shows the impact both of the ongoing violence and of Abu Ghraib and demonstrates quite jarringly that we are not winning hearts and minds. We have to develop a better partnership with the new Iraqi government if we are to ultimately leave Iraq on a positive note. I would like to raise just two issues today. One is the Iraqi security forces. Clearly we need to make faster progress toward the time when Iraqis can provide for their own security. The appointment of Major General David Petraeus to lead the training of these forces was an excellent choice and I look forward to our hearing with him tomorrow. But I think we need a strategic plan in this area—with clear benchmarks that can be measured over time—and that is why I offered an amendment to that effect in our defense bill this year. I thank the Chairman for his support in that effort. The performance of the Iraqi 497 security forces to date has been uneven, but there is no force more important for Iraq's future. Second, while the Security Council resolution is critical, it appropriately leaves a number of issues to be resolved between us and the soon-to-be-sovereign Iraqi government. Both Secretary Powell and Prime Minister Allawi's letters refer to consultation regarding sensitive operations, but I would like to understand what additional arrangements we will be working out over the next few weeks to operationalize this principle. I further understand that we will not have a Status of Forces agreement until after elections next January. Rather the protections for U.S. forces are enshrined in the resolution and in existing CPA orders. I think it is critical that those protections be explicit and that some understanding on the rules governing American contractors be explicit as well. I look forward to your testimony. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 498 “Status of Forces in Iraq after the Transfer of Sovereign Authority” Prepared Statement of Peter W. Rodman Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs Before the House Armed Services Committee Wednesday, June 16, 2004 Mr. Chairman, Congressman Skelton, Members of the Committee, I appreciate the opportunity to report to you today on the status of US troops in Iraq after the transfer of sovereign authority. First of all, however, on behalf of our forces serving in Iraq, I would like to express thanks to the Congress and to the members of this Committee for the bipartisan support you give our armed forces. You have signaled to the world, to friends and foes, America's national commitment to see this struggle against the forces of extremism and tyranny through to the end. It is reassuring to these brave Americans to know that our prayers and best wishes continue to be with all of our people currently serving in Iraq. They are making America - and the world - more secure by helping the Iraqi people to build a new peaceful, representative government in the heart of the Middle East - a potentially watershed moment in the Global War on Terror. Whether members of Active Duty, Reserve, or National Guard units, or civilians working with the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) or one of many non-governmental organizations active in Iraq, these heroes embody the best ideals of our nation. They serve so that others may be free, and we thank them all for the sacrifices they have endured. The Significance of June 30th In his address on May 24, President Bush outlined the basic principles of U.S. policy and strategy in Iraq. He described five steps: 499 First, the handover of sovereign authority to an Iraqi Interim Government on June 30. Second, to help the Iraqis establish security in the country. This means continuing to help the Iraqis build up their own capability to maintain security, as well as maintaining a U.S. and Coalition presence, as needed, in partnership with a sovereign Iraq. Third, to continue the effort to help Iraqis rebuild their nation's infrastructure, ravaged by decades of tyrannical misrule. Fourth, to continue and expand the international effort in support of the efforts of Iraqis. In this regard, the UN Security Council's unanimous passage of Resolution 1546 on June 8 was a major advance. Fifth, to help the Iraqi Interim Government maintain the timetable of Iraq's democratic political evolution, leading to an elected Transitional National Assembly by the end of this year, and no later than January 31 of next year. Thus, our strategy in Iraq is political as well as military. The transfer of sovereign authority on June 30 will be a major political and psychological milestone. The Coalition Provisional Authority will dissolve, and the Iraqi Interim Government will take responsibility for running Iraq's affairs. On July 1, U.S. Embassy Baghdad will open for business, as a full partner in helping to bring democracy and security to Iraq. This transfer of sovereign authority serves several purposes. It shows that we keep our promises: that we truly came as liberators, not occupiers. The end of occupation also provides a crucial incentive for Iraqis to step up and take responsibility for their country. As long as the Coalition is in charge, Iraqis may tend to hang back. Now they have come forward, bravely and capably. This also changes the nature of the conflict inside Iraq. The June 30 transfer is key to our strategy of empowering moderates and marginalizing extremists. Iraqis should be motivated to rally behind their own government and their own democratic future. As Secretary of State Powell put it eloquently: 500 They (the extremists) are now challenging their own (country's] leaders. They are now fighting against the dreams of their own people. The Coalition is there to help their government, and they are now attacking their own covenant, and they are attacking their own interests and the interests of their people, and they must be defeated. They cannot be allowed to deny the Iraqi people this hopeful future, and they cannot be allowed to drag them into the past, the terrible past that we got rid of last year when we got rid of Saddam Hussein. (June 8, 2004, remarks at the beginning of bilateral with President Ghazi al-Yawer) The extremists, such as the Al-Qaida-affiliated terrorist Abu Musab al- Zarqawi, understand our strategy very well; they fear it, and with all their might are seeking to derail it. Earlier this year we captured an important message that Zarqawi was sending to his Al-Qaida colleagues. Zarqawi considered that he was "racing against time” because of June 30. “We fight them," he wrote, "and this is difficult because of the gap that will emerge between us and the people of the land. How can we kill their cousins and sons and under what pretext, after the Americans ... pull back? ... Democracy is coming and there will be no excuse (for us] thereafter." An American-Iraqi Security Partnership After June 30, the U.S. and Coalition forces in Iraq will remain on a new basis - as invited guests and partners of a sovereign Iraq. This partnership was foreshadowed in the Transitional Administrative Law (TAL), the interim constitution agreed upon by Iraqis in early March. The TAL not only lays out the political timetable on which Iraq is now embarked. In Article 59, the TAL calls for the armed forces of sovereign Iraq to be “a principal partner in the multinational force operating in Iraq under unified command pursuant to UN Security Council Resolution 1511" (reaffirmed since then in Resolution 1546). Resolutions 1511 and 1546, both binding decisions of the Security Council, spell out the continuing international mandate for this multinational force. “Unified command" is understood in present circumstances to mean U.S. command. 501 The will of the Iraqi leadership, expressed first in the TAL in March, was reiterated by the Iraqi Foreign Minister, Hoshyar Zebari, on June 3, when he addressed the UN Security Council as that body was considering what became Resolution 1546 [Since April] last year we have been working very hard to re-establish Iraq's security, military, and police forces. However, we have yet to reach the stage of being able to maintain our own security and therefore the people of Iraq need and request the assistance of multinational forces to work closely with Iraqi forces to stabilize the situation. I stress that any premature departure of international troops would lead to chaos and the real possibility of a civil war in Iraq. This would cause a humanitarian crisis and provide a foothold for terrorists to launch their evil campaign in our country and beyond our borders. The continued presence of the multinational force will help preserve Iraq's unity, prevent regional intervention in our affairs and protect our borders at this critical stage of our reconstruction. The more precise outline of this partnership between Iraq and the MNF was provided in two letters sent to the UN Security Council, dated June 5. One letter was signed by Dr. Ayad Allawi, Prime Minister of the Iraqi Interim Government (IIG): Security and stability continue to be essential to our political transition (PM Allawi wrote). There continue, however, to be forces in Iraq - including foreign elements – that are opposed to our transition to peace, democracy, and security. This Government is determined to overcome these forces, and to develop security forces capable of providing adequate security for the Iraqi people. Until we are able to provide security for ourselves ... we ask for the support of the Security Council and the international community in this endeavor. We seek a new resolution on the Multinational Force (MNF) mandate to contribute to maintaining security in Iraq, including through the tasks and arrangements set out in the letter from Secretary of State Colin Powell to the president of the United Nations Security Council. 502 Secretary Powell's parallel letter confirmed that: The MNF under unified command is prepared to continue to contribute to the maintenance of security in Iraq, including by preventing and deterring terrorism and protecting the territory of Iraq. The goal of the MNF will be to help the Iraqi people to complete the political transition and will permit the United Nations and the international community to work to facilitate Iraq's reconstruction. Both letters described some of the mechanisms that the IIG and the Coalition have agreed to: • An IIG Ministerial Committee for National Security, chaired by the Prime Minister and consisting of the Deputy Prime Minister, Ministers of Defense, Foreign Affairs, Interior, Justice, and Finance. The Iraqis will invite the MNF commander or his designee to participate as appropriate in the Committee's deliberations. In addition, other coordinating bodies will be created at national, regional, and local levels in which Iraqi commanders and civilian leaders will “coordinate with the MNF on all security policy and operational issues ..." MNF and Iraqi leaders furthermore pledge to "keep each other informed of their activities, consult regularly to ensure effective allocation and use of personnel, resources, and facilities, will share intelligence and will refer issues up the respective chains of command where necessary.” This exchange of letters is incorporated by reference in UN Security Council. Resolution 1546. As the Committee will see, however, this security partnership between Iraq and the MNF is a political more than it is a legal arrangement. Iraq will be fully sovereign, and what we have is a clear-cut commitment by that sovereign Iraqi government to continue that partnership. At bottom, the partnership rests not on a legal contract but on a commonality of interests perceived with great clarity by both sides. Responses to every conceivable contingency need not be agreed and spelled out in advance. Issues that may arise between the two sides will be resolved as allies and partners always resolve problems - by consultation and accommodation based on the foundation of mutual confidence and common interests on which the partnership rests. 503 It is in this spirit of collaboration that a number of particular issues will be addressed if they arise. Will Iraq have a veto over MNF military operations? Both letters to the UN Security Council, from Secretary Powell and PM Allawi, referred to the mechanisms of "close coordination and consultation" as the forums in which “sensitive offensive operations” would be discussed, to be referred up the respective chains of command if not resolved at lower levels. Already, even while CPA is exercising authority in Iraq, Coalition conduct he most sensitive areas - such as in Fallujah and in the conflict with Muqtada al-Sadr - has been influenced significantly by the advice of Iraqi political leaders, national and local. This pattern of “close coordination and consultation” will only deepen, using the various new channels and forums set up between the IIG and MNF. In this regard, I would note also a comment in Foreign Minister Zebari's remarks to the UN Security Council on June 3, in which he acknowledged the all- important right of the MNF to defend itself: "It is an objective reality in Iraq today that we require the continued assistance and partnership of those [MNF) troops but we also need this presence to be regulated under arrangements that neither compromise the sovereignty of the interim government nor the right of the multinational force to defend itself.” Will U.S. and Coalition forces have Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) protections? In developing the TAL, their interim constitution, the Iraqis decided they did not want their Interim Government to make long-term agreements of this kind. Therefore, we resorted to another formula to ensure that our forces have those protections: • Secretary Powell's letter to the UN Security Council declares that “[i]n order to contribute to security, the MNF must continue to function under a framework that affords the force and its personnel the status they need to accomplish their mission, and in which the contributing states have responsibility for exercising jurisdiction over their personnel and which will ensure arrangements for, and use of assets by, the MNF. The existing framework governing these matters is sufficient for these purposes.” 504 PM Allawi's letter asked that the new UN mandate "contribute to maintaining security in Iraq, including through the tasks and arrangements set out in the letter from Secretary of State Powell...." Resolution 1546 then gave the MNF the mandate "to take all necessary measures to contribute to the maintenance of security and stability in Iraq in accordance with the letters annexed to this resolution...." In addition, the TAL in Article 26(C) ensures that CPA orders and regulations “shall remain in force until rescinded or amended by legislation duly enacted and having the force of law.” This includes CPA Order #17, which spells out SOFA-like protections for Coalition forces and will remain in effect until an international agreement is negotiated with the Iraqi Transitional Government. (This will not occur before 2005, since the Iraqi Interim Government does not have legislative authority.) Who will have control over detainees? Among the "broad range of tasks" cited by Secretary Powell “to contribute to the maintenance of security and to ensure force protection" - tasks that PM Allawi asked the Security Council to provide a mandate for - is the “internment [of violent elements) where this is necessary for imperative reasons of security." This applies in the first instance to those who pose a threat to Coalition forces. Detainees charged with crimes under Iraqi law are already being turned over to the Central Criminal Court of Iraq and other Iraqi criminal courts. . · The Coalition will work in partnership with the Iraqi Interim Government to enable to the Iraqis to take on more responsibility for detainees and, ultimately, full responsibility. In addition, the Coalition is already working with the IIG to support the efforts of the Iraqi Special Tribunal. This court will try Saddam Hussein and other former regime leaders for atrocities committed against the Iraqi people. The Coalition will continue to support Iraqi efforts to charge these criminals, as well as prepare the IIG to take custody of Saddam, and others, as soon as they are ready. Will U.S. troops leave when the UN mandate expires at the end of 2005? The UN mandate for the MNF“shall expire,” according to UNSCR 1546, upon completion of the political process describe in the TAL and in the UNSCR itself- namely when an elected government takes office under a new constitution. This would be at the end of 2005 or the beginning of 2006. (The UN mandate would also expire earlier if requested by the government of Iraq.) 505 However, expiration of the UN mandate for the international force is not synonymous with an automatic withdrawal of Coalition troops. Nothing precludes subsequent arrangements of a different nature worked out with Iraq's government. As Secretary Powell remarked in an interview on June 6 (CNN's “Late Edition with Wolf Blitzer”): [T]he more important point is not what the resolution says. It's what the Iraqi sovereign government wants. We have had troops in sovereign nations for, you know, the last 50 years. We've had them in Korea. We've had them in Germany. We've had them in the United Kingdom. And so we will be there for as long as we are needed. I hope it is not a long period of time. But we're there with the consent of the sovereign government and we've made arrangements with that sovereign government. Will we leave if the Iraqis ask our troops to leave? Of course we would not stay if the Iraqi government asked us to leave. UNSCR 1346, in a preambular paragraph, recognizes the "importance of the consent of the sovereign Government of Iraq for the presence of the multinational force.” The sar me applies to any U.S. troop presence This question, while it has been frequently asked of U.S. officials, was not raised often by Iraqis. The question came more frequently from members of Congress or from Europeans, asking for certainty that "full sovereignty” is being restored to Iraq. Right now -- as the categorical statements of Iraqi leaders make clear - Iraqis are more interested in reassurance that we will stay. Although we obviously would not stay if the Iraqi people do not want us to, right now millions of Iraqis are afraid that we might leave prematurely. It is a fear that the enemy plays on with posters and rumors and black propaganda, saying that the Americans will leave as they did before and hand the country back to the enemy who abused it for so long and its terrorist allies. Therefore, we need to be careful in answering this question. We must send two strong messages to the Iraqi people at the same time: • that we are committed to stay until Iraq is ready to defend itself; and that we are committed to leave, and will do so happily, as soon as that job is done. 506 We are on a path to bequeathing Iraq a fully representative government for the first time in decades, and the Iraqi people can be confident that we have no intention of remaining as an occupying power. At the same time, the Iraqi people need to be confident that we and our Coalition partners will not abandon them to the killers and terrorists who will do their best to destabilize the country prior to the elections that are scheduled for the end of this year. Both the friends and enemies of a new Iraq need to know that the campaign of coercion and intimidation against the thousands of Iraqis who are standing up for a free Iraq will not succeed in driving us out, even though that campaign will continue and perhaps intensify after the transfer of sovereignty on June 30. And it is my hope, Mr. Chairman, that all of us - in the Executive and Legislative branches - will continue to make sure the Iraqi people receive this message loud and strong. Thank you. 507 LIEUTENANT GENERAL WALTER L. SHARP Director, Strategic Plans and Policy LIEU Director, strhe Joint Staff House Armed Services Committee 16 June 2004 Mr. Chairman, Congressman Skelton, Members of the Committee:. Thank you for the opportunity to address you on this important subject. Before I begin, left me first thank you for your continued support of the men." and women serving in our Armed Forces. Today, Iraqi security personnel, the United States, and thirty-one Coalition partners are working together to secure, protect, and establish peace and justice for all Iraqi citizens so they may enjoy a future of their own choosing. Establishment of a safe and secure environment is the single most . important element for improved Iraqi quality of life because it enables relief efforts, a free political process, economic prosperity, and social opportunity. Multinational military personnel have made significant progress in 2 recruiting, training and equipping Iraqi security forces. The Iraqi people have stepped forward -- more than 225,000 Iraqi citizens have taken positions in the С various components of the Iraqi security forces. This includes 90,000 in the Iraqi Police Service, 18,000 in the Department of Border Enforcement, 37,500 in the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps, 9,750 in the Iraqi Armed Forces, and 74,000 in. the Facilities Protection Service. Based on current training and equipping schedules, we anticipate that the Department of Border Enforcement, the Iraqi 508 Civil Defense Corps and the Facilities Protection Service will be fully trained and equipped by September 2004, the Iraqi Armed Forces by December 2004, and the Iraqi Police by June 2005. By the end of this month, over $3B will have been committed for Iraqi Security Forces equipment, infrastructure and training By 30 June, the United States and its Coalition partners will transition control of Iraq to a fully sovereign Iraqi Interim Government. Our OV responsibilities will not end with the 30 June transition. Multinational forces will remain in Iraq at the invitation of the Iraqi people and with the authorization of the United Nations after the Iraqi Interim Government assumes its leadership responsibilities. These forces, and increasingly Iraqi forces, will continue to conduct offensive operations to defeat remaining anti- Iraqi forces and neutralize destabilizing influences in Iraq in order to create a secure environment in which the Iraqi people can build their own future. They will also continue current efforts to organize, train, equip, mentor, and certify credible and capable Iraqi security forces in order to continue the transition of responsibility for security from multinational forces to Iraqi forces. Concurrently, Iraqi and multinational forces will continue to conduct stability operations to support the evolving Iraqi government, the restoration of essential services, and economic development. Prime Minister Allawi's letter to the UN Security Council from the Interim Government of Iraq formed the basis for the UN authorizing the continued presence of the Multinational force in Iraq. According to 2. 509 United Nations Security Council Resolution 1546, the Multinational force shall have the authority to take all necessary measures to contribute to the maintenance of security and stability in Iraq. UNSCR 1546 further requires that arrangements are put in place to establish a security partnership - between the sovereign Government of Iraq and the Multinational force and to ensure coordination between the two. Prime Minister Allawi's letter, together with Secretary Powell's letter, both annexed to the UNSCR, serve as the foundation for establishing the coordinating mechanisms that will be essential to unity of command in Iraq. The security structures described in the letters will serve as the fora for the Government of Iraq and Multinational force to reach agreement on the full ena range of fundamental security and policy issues, including policy on sensitive offensive operations, and will ensure full partnership between Iraqi security forces and Multinational force through close coordination and consultation. All Multinational forces will work in close consultation and coordination with the Iraqi government at all levels. I am confident that through this partnership, we--the Iraqis, the Coalition, and the U.S. Armed Forces, will succeed in establishing a safe and secure environment in Iraq. I will be happy to take your questions. 510 Testimony by the Coordinator for Iraq Transition Ambassador Francis J. Ricciardone “Status of U.S. Forces in Iraq Post June 30" House Armed Services Committee June 16, 2004 Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the opportunity to report to you today on the progress we are making as we meet two weeks before Iraqis take back from the Coalition Provisional Authority full authority and responsibility for the administration of their national affairs. Let me begin by paying tribute to the men and women who are serving our country in Iraq. We are all immensely proud of the Americans - civilian and military - who demonstrate the highest degree of dedication, determination and courage as. they work to bring security, democracy and prosperity to Iraq. I also want to thank our many Coalition partners - civilian and military - for their steadfast support and sacrifices. Mr. Chairman, the State Department is working hard, with other USG agencies, with our coalition partners, with the UN, and with the Iraqi people, to carry out the direction provided by President Bush. On May 24, he outlined five steps that we must accomplish to achieve freedom and democracy in Iraq: First, hand over authority to a sovereign Iraqi government; Second, help establish security; Third, continue rebuilding Iraqi infrastructure; Forth, encourage international support; and Fifth, move toward free national elections. We will accomplish the first of these tasks just two weeks from now, when the Coalition Provisional Authority will hand power to the Iraqi Interim Government, led by Prime Minister Ayad al-Allawi and President Ghazi al-Yawar. On June 30, our relationship with Iraq will change fundamentally. We will quickly move to establish formal diplomatic relations and to build strong and friendly bilateral ties—two independent, sovereign nations working together toward a common goal of a peaceful and democratic Iraq. As the lead US government agency in Iraq, the State Department will be charged with carrying out the President's five steps to ensure that this common goal is reached. 511 -2- To accomplish the mission, the Department has been organizing an effective U.S. Embassy to harness and direct the expertise and resources of agencies across the U.S. government. I will report to you today on the status of our efforts to put the new Embassy in place In January, Secretary Powell called me back to Washington to head our transition team. On my first day on the job, I went to the Pentagon to meet with my partner, the Iraq Transition Team leader for the Department of Defense, LTG (ret.) Mick Kicklighter. Together, we head one interagency transition team. General Kicklighter left a few days ago for Baghdad, where he will stay on through the historic end of the CPA and re-establishment of US-Iraqi diplomatic relations. Our strong interagency collaboration has been the cornerstone of our fine progress. I'd like to thank General Kicklighter for his leadership, wise counsel, and unstinting support in our joint mission. Our interagency team has established an element in Baghdad under Deputy Chief of Mission-designate Jim Jeffrey, to lay the groundwork for the opening of the US Mission. Several weeks ago, Undersecretary Marc Grossman spoke with you about our -- work on establishing U.S. Embassy Baghdad, and the coming historic changes within Iraq and in our relations with that country. Let me update you on our planning and progress in four key sectors of transition planning: people, security, buildings and financial outlook. PEOPLE Many have focused on the fact that Embassy Baghdad will be among our largest. That is true, but more importantly, under the leadership of Ambassador Negroponte and others of our most experienced and committed Foreign Service Officers and Specialists, Embassy Baghdad is taking shape as one of our very - best. Embassy Baghdad will be about number three in size of some 260 US diplomatic and consular missions around the world. Let me go into a bit more detail on the numbers of our people. We now anticipate a total of about 900 American positions under Chief of Mission authority, and about 550 Foreign Service Nationals (FSNS) for a total Mission size of about 1,500, including two temporary organizations, the Iraq Reconstruction 512 . 3. Management Office (IRMO) and Program Contracting Office (PCO) that will support Iraq Relief and Reconstruction fund management and implementation. From our global experience, we expect that over time, the number of Americans will decline while the number of Iraqi employees will increase. The State Department has established 140 permanent American positions, for which we have formally assigned 130 people. About 25 of these have already started their one-year tour, joining 32 of their State Department colleagues who are assisting in the transition. We expect the rest to start their tours over the next three months. Another 50 Department of State employees will serve on 12-month temporary assignments in locations outside Baghdad. They will represent the US and support Iraqi development programs in Iraq's provinces. We are planning to establish four regional hubs in Kirkuk, Mosul, Hillah, and Basrah. We will also plan to embed Foreign Service Officers in five military commands. We have interviewed more than 250 Iraqi applicants for the 155 local hire State Department positions immediately needed, and we have hired our first Iraqi employees. In the short run, however, the Embassy will rely on Iraqi and third country staff now under the U.S. Army's "LOGCAP" contract to provide many basic support services, I would note here that American security rests on American diplomacy as well as our military power. And our diplomatic readiness will depend on the continued foresight and support of the President and Congress to invest in training, protecting, and supporting all our people -- Foreign Service, Civil Service, and Foreign Service Nationals. We have been able to utilize the recent increases in the Department's civil and foreign service workforce, including new positions planned in the FY 2005 budget, to meet our staffing requirements in Iraq as part of the Diplomatic Readiness Initiative (DRI), which President Bush and Secretary Powell, with Congressional support, had established to improve the training standards of our people and address emerging foreign policy priorities. The Global War on Terrorism has sharply increased the demands on our diplomatic resources. Other US Agencies also make up the new Embassy's Country Team. As of today, 9 cabinet agencies, other than the State Department, have assigned or planned a total of 384 American and 173 locally hired personnel. They include several agencies of the Departments of Justice and Defense, plus Agriculture, Commerce, DHS, EPA, HHS, Labor, Transportation, Treasury, and USAID. SECURITY 513 -4-. This is a dangerous mission. Our top priority is to keep our people safe, while , enabling our diplomats to accomplish our work with the Iraqi Government and people. We are pleased to report that the security upgrade of the planned interim Embassy buildings is progressing to meet deadlines. We have selected a site for a future new Embassy compound based largely on security. We already have 51 armored vehicles in Iraq and another 90 are on order. We are also currently working with CPA to determine how many CPA vehicles will be transferred to the Embassy and its provincial teams. To complement the security personnel already provided under the U.S. military and CPA-funded contracts, 30 Diplomatic Security (DS) staff and ten State Department contract security personnel are already in Iraq, of whom many have served there for some months. They have been defining the Mission's security requirements and have begun to meet them, even as they are helping to protect CPA officers and visitors. BUILDINGS We have identified a building in the Green Zone to serve as the Embassy until a . more permanent facility can be established. This building, which we refer to as the temporary Chancery, is already under renovation and will be ready for occupancy before July 1 The temporary Chancery will serve as the office of the Ambassador and a limited number of staff. Until we build a new Embassy compound, we will continue to use the former Republican Palace, where CPA is currently located, for most non-public purposes. We also will continue to use another building temporarily as the Ambassador's residence. We also have identified a site for a new American Embassy facility, which would include offices, housing, and support facilities. We can build and occupy that new facility within about two years of receiving funding. FINANCIAL OUTLOOK Finally, I would like to share our current thinking on the funds needed to ensure a smooth transition to Embassy Baghdad, and the continued operation of the mission thereafter. I need to emphasize that the costs I report to you are our best snapshot today. 514 In order to open an Embassy on July 1, we must meet basic security and communications needs, building on the use of existing CPA assets. The State Department must be prepared to cover its initial start-up and operating expenses, as well as follow-on costs of the programs begun under CPA that must continue We estimate these mission costs to be in the range of $480 million for the balance of Fiscal Year 2004. How will we cover these costs? Congress has already provided $97 million for an interim embassy facility and interim operations in FY 2004 supplemental appropriations. We also expect to have available the existing fourth quarter portion of the operating expense budget appropriated for the CPA ($196 million), and, pursuant to the FY 2004 Supplemental, up to 1% of the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund, available for transfer ($184 million). Looking ahead to FY 2005, we estimate that the costs to operate the U.S. mission could amount to $1 billion, excluding the cost of constructing a new Embassy facility and the Program Contracting Office (PCO). The largest cost components of running the U.S. mission in FY 2005 are logistics and security. DoD will continue to cover logistics and security costs until needs can be assessed and any supplemental requirements can be proposed and enacted upon in 2005. We will look to Ambassador Negroponte and his team to assess those actual needs and provide an estimate that can be considered as part of any supplemental that may be requested. We plan to meet the remaining FY 2005 traditional embassy requirements through funds requested by the Department in the FY 2005 budget and any remaining funds carried over from the fourth quarter of FY 2004. State may also have to rely on potions of its base Diplomatic and Consular Programs (D&CP) regular operating account to cash flow any interim requirements until a supplemental is requested in 2005. We are working closely with CPA, DOD, and OMB to refine these estimates and will provide you as much accurate information as quickly as we can. We will *: consult with you and your colleagues before anything is made final. 515 6 . Thank you for your time today. I'd be happy to answer any questions you might have on the management and operational planning for the Embassy transition. DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD JUNE 16, 2004 United Nations S/RES/1546 (2004) Security Council Distr.: General 8 June 2004 Resolution 1546 (2004) Adopted by the Security Council at its 4987th meeting, on 8 June 2004 The Security Council, Welcoming the beginning of a new phase in Iraq's transition to a democratically elected government, and looking forward to the end of the occupation and the assumption of full responsibility and authority by a fully sovereign and independent Interim Government of Iraq by 30 June 2004, Recalling all of its previovs relevant resolutions on Iraq, Reaffirming the independence, sovereignty, unity, and territorial integrity of Iraq, Reaffirming also the right of the Iraqi people freely to determine their own political future and control their own natural resources, Recognizing the importance of international support, particularly that of countries in the region, Iraq's neighbours, and regional organizations, for the people of Iraq in their efforts to achieve security and prosperity, and noting that the successful implementation of this resolution will contribute to regional stability, Welcoming the efforts of the Special Adviser to the Secretary-General to assist the people of Iraq in achieving the formation of the Interim Government of Iraq, as set out in the letter of the Secretary-General of 7 June 2004 (S/2004/461), Taking note of the dissolution of the Governing Council of Iraq, and welcoming the progress made in implementing the arrangements for Iraq's political transition referred to in resolution 1511 (2003) of 16 October 2003, Welcoming the commitment of the Interim Government of Iraq to work towards a federal, democratic, pluralist, and unified Iraq, in which there is full respect for political and human rights, Stressing the need for all parties to respect and protect Iraq's archaeological, historical, cultural, and religious heritage, Affirming the importance of the rule of law, national reconciliation, respect for human rights including the rights of women, fundamental freedoms, and democracy including free and fair elections, 04-38116(E) *0438116* (519) 520 S/RES/1546 (2004) . Recalling the establishment of the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI) on 14 August 2003, and affirming that the United Nations should play a leading role in assisting the Iraqi people and government in the formation of institutions for representative government, Recognizing that international support for restoration of stability and security is essential to the well-being of the people of Iraq as well as to the ability of all concerned to carry out their work on behalf of the people of Iraq, and welcoming Member State contributions in this regard under resolution 1483 (2003) of 22 May 2003 and resolution 1511 (2003), Recalling the report provided by the United States to the Security Council on 16 April 2004 on the efforts and progress made by the multinational force, Recognizing the request conveyed in the letter of 5 June 2004 from the Prime Minister of the Interim Government of Iraq to the President of the Council, which is annexed to this resolution, to retain the presence of the multinational force, Recognizing also the importance of the consent of the sovereign Government of Iraq for the presence of the multinational force and of close coordination between the multinational force and that government, Welcoming the willingness of the multinational force to continue efforts to contribute to the maintenance of security and stability in Iraq in support of the political transition, especially for upcoming elections, and to provide security for the United Nations presence in Iraq, as described in the letter of 5 June 2004 from the United States Secretary of State to the President of the Council, which is annexed to this resolution, Noting the commitment of all forces promoting the maintenance of security and stability in Iraq to act in accordance with international law, including obligations under international humanitarian law, and to cooperate with relevant international organizations, Affirming the importance of international assistance in reconstruction and development of the Iraqi economy, Recognizing the benefits to Irag of the immunities and privileges enjoyed by Iraqi oil revenues and by the Development Fund for Iraq, and noting the importance of providing for continued disbursements of this fund by the Interim Government of Iraq and its successors upon dissolution of the Coalition Provisional Authority, Determining that the situation in Iraq continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security, Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, 1. Endorses the formation of a sovereign Interim Government of Iraq, as presented on 1 June 2004, which will assume full responsibility and authority by 30 June 2004 for governing Iraq while refraining from taking any actions affecting Iraq's destiny beyond the limited interim period until an elected Transitional Government of Iraq assumes office as envisaged in paragraph four below; 2. Welcomes that, also by 30 June 2004, the occupation will end and the Coalition Provisional Authority will cease to exist, and that Iraq will reassert its full sovereignty; . 521 S/RES/1546 (2004) 3. Reaffirms the right of the Iraqi people freely to determine their own political future and to exercise full authority and control over their financial and natural resources; 4. Endorses the proposed timetable for Iraq's political transition to democratic government including: (a) formation of the sovereign Interim Government of Iraq that will assume governing responsibility and authority by 30 June 2004; (b) convening of a national conference reflecting the diversity of Iraqi society; and (c) holding of direct democratic elections by 31 December 2004 if possible, and in no case later than 31 January 2005, to a Transitional National Assembly, which will, inter alia, have responsibility for forming a Transitional Government of Iraq and drafting a permanent constitution for Iraq leading to a constitutionally elected government by 31 December 2005; 5. Invites the Government of Iraq to consider how the convening of an international meeting could support the above process, and notes that it would welcome such a meeting to support the Iraqi political transition and Iraqi recovery, to the benefit of the Iraqi people and in the interest of stability in the region; 6. Calls on all Iraqis to implement these arrangements peaceably and in full, and on all States and relevant organizations to support such implementation; 7. Decides that in implementing, as circumstances permit, their mandate to assist the Iraqi people and government, the Special Representative of the Secretary- General and the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI), as requested by the Government of Iraq, shall: (a) play a leading role to: (i) assist in the convening, during the month of July 2004, of a national conference to select a Consultative Council; (ii) advise and support the Independent Electoral Commission of Iraq, as well as the Interim Government of Iraq and the Transitional National Assembly, on the process for holding elections; (iii) promote national dialogue and consensus-building on the drafting of a national constitution by the people of Iraq; (b) and also: (i) advise the Government of Iraq in the development of effective civil and social services; (ii) contribute to the coordination and delivery of reconstruction, development, and humanitarian assistance; (iii) promote the protection of human rights, national reconciliation, and judicial and legal reform in order to strengthen the rule of law in Iraq; and (iv) advise and assist the Government of Iraq on initial planning for the eventual conduct of a comprehensive census; 522 S/RES/1546 (2004) 8. Welcomes ongoing efforts by the incoming Interim Government of Iraq to develop Iraqi security forces including the Iraqi armed forces (hereinafter referred to as “Iraqı security forces”), operating under the authority of the Interim Government of Iraq and its successors, which will progressively play a greater role and ultimately assume full responsibility for the maintenance of security and stability in Iraq; 9. Notes that the presence of the multinational force in Iraq is at the request of the incoming Interim Government of Iraq and therefore reaffirms the authorization for the multinational force under unified command established under resolution 1511 (2003), having regard to the letters annexed to this resolution; 10. Decides that the multinational force shall have the authority to take all.. necessary measures to contribute to the maintenance of security and stability in Iraq in accordance with the letters annexed to this resolution expressing, inter alia, the Iraqi request for the continued presence of the multinational force and setting out its tasks, including by preventing and deterring terrorism, so that, inter alia, the United Nations can fulfil its role in assisting the Iraqi people as outlined in paragraph seven above and the Iraqi people can implement freely and without intimidation the timetable and programme for the political process and benefit from reconstruction and rehabilitation activities; 11. Welcomes, in this regard, the letters annexed to this resolution stating, inter alia, that arrangements are being put in place to establish a security partnership between the sovereign Government of Iraq and the multinational force and to ensure coordination between the two, and notes also in this regard that Iraqi security forces are responsible to appropriate Iraqi ministers, that the Government of Iraq has authority to commit Iraqi security forces to the multinational force to engage in operations with it, and that the security structures described in the letters will serve as the fora for the Government of Iraq and the multinational force to reach agreement on the full range of fundamental security and policy issues, including policy on sensitive offensive operations, and will ensure full partnership between Iraqi security forces and the multinational force, through close coordination and consultation; . 12. Decides further that the mandate for the multinational force shall be reviewed at the request of the Government of Iraq or twelve months from the date of this resolution, and that this mandate shall expire upon the completion of the political process set out in paragraph four above, and declares that it will terminate this mandate earlier if requested by the Government of Iraq; 13. Notes the intention, set out in the annexed Jetter from the United States Secretary of State, to create a distinct entity under unified command of the multinational force with a dedicated mission to provide security for the United Nations presence in Iraq, recognizes that the implementation of measures to provide security for staff members of the United Nations system working in Iraq would require significant resources, and calls upon Member States and relevant organizations to provide such resources, including contributions to that entity; 14. Recognizes that the multinational force will also assist in building the capability of the Iraqi security forces and institutions, through a programme of recruitment, training, equipping, mentoring, and monitoring; 523 S/RES/1546 (2004) 15. Requests Member States and international and regional organizations to contribute assistance to the multinational force, including military forces, as agreed with the Government of Iraq, to help meet the needs of the Iraqi people for security and stability, humanitarian and reconstruction assistance, and to support the efforts of UNAMI; 16. Emphasizes the importance of developing effective Iraqi police, border enforcement, and the Facilities Protection Service, under the control of the Interior Ministry of Iraq, and, in the case of the Facilities Protection Service, other Iraqi ministries, for the maintenance of law, order, and security, including combating terrorism, and requests Member States and international organizations to assist the Government of Iraq in building the capability of these Iraqi institutions; 17. Condemns all acts of terrorism in Iraq, reaffirms the obligations of Member States under resolutions 1373 (2001) of 28 September 2001, 1267 (1999) of 15 October 1999, 1333 (2000) of 19 December 2000, 1390 (2002) of 16 January 2002, 1455 (2003) of 17 January 2003, and 1526 (2004) of 30 January 2004, and other relevant international obligations with respect, inter alia, to terrorist activities in and from Iraq or against its citizens, and specifically reiterates its call upon Member States to prevent the transit of terrorists to and from Iraq, arms for terrorists, and financing that would support terrorists, and re-emphasizes the importance of strengthening the cooperation of the countries of the region, particularly neighbours of Iraq, in this regard; 18. Recognizes that the Interim Government of Iraq will assume the primary role in coordinating international assistance to Iraq; 19. Welcomes efforts by Member States and international organizations to respond in support of requests by the Interim Government of Iraq to provide technical and expert assistance while Iraq is rebuilding administrative capacity; 20. Reiterates its request that Member States, international financial institutions and other organizations strengthen their efforts to assist the people of Iraq in the reconstruction and development of the Iraqi economy, including by providing international experts and necessary resources through a coordinated programme of donor assistance; 21. Decides that the prohibitions related to the sale or supply to Iraq of arms and related materiel under previous resolutions shall not apply to arms or related materiel required by the Government of Iraq or the multinational force to serve the purposes of this resolution, stresses the importance for all States to abide strictly by them, and notes the significance of Iraq's neighbours in this regard, and calls upon the Government of Iraq and the multinational force each to ensure that appropriate implementation procedures are in place; 22. Notes that nothing in the preceding paragraph affects the prohibitions on or obligations of States related to items specified in paragraphs 8 and 12 of resolution 687 (1991) of 3 April 1991 or activities described in paragraph 3 (1) of resolution 707 (1991) of 15 August 1991, and reaffirms its intention to revisit the mandates of the United Nations Monitoring, Verification, and Inspection Commission and the International Atomic Energy Agency; 524 SIRES/1546 (2004) 23. Calls on Member States and international organizations to respond to Iraqi requests to assist Iraqi efforts to integrate Iraqi veterans and former militia members into Iraqi society; 24. Notes that, upon dissolution of the Coalition Provisional Authority, the funds in the Development Fund for Iraq shall be disbursed solely at the direction of the Government of Iraq, and decides that the Development Fund for Iraq shall be utilized in a transparent and equitable manner and through the Iraqi budget including to satisfy outstanding obligations against the Development Fund for Iraq, that the arrangements for the depositing of proceeds from export sales of petroleum, petroleum products, and natural gas established in paragraph 20 of resolution 1483 (2003) shall continue to apply, that the International Advisory and Monitoring Board shall continue its activities in monitoring the Development Fund for Iraq and shall include as an additional full voting member a duly qualified individual designated by the Government of Iraq and that appropriate arrangements shall be made for the continuation of deposits of the proceeds referred to in paragraph 21 of resolution 1483 (2003); 25. Decides further that the provisions in the above paragraph for the deposit of proceeds into the Development Fund for Iraq and for the role of the IAMB shall be reviewed at the request of the Transitional Government of Iraq or twelve months from the date of this resolution, and shall expire upon the completion of the political process set out in paragraph four above; 26. Decides that, in connection with the dissolution of the Coalition Provisional Authority, the Interim Government of Iraq and its successors shall assume the rights, responsibilities and obligations relating to the Oil-for-Food Programme that were transferred to the Authority, including all operational responsibility for the Programme and any obligations undertaken by the Authority in connection with such responsibility, and responsibility for ensuring independently authenticated confirmation that goods have been delivered, and further decides that, following a 120-day transition period from the date of adoption of this resolution, the Interim Government of Iraq and its successors shall assume responsibility for certifying delivery of goods under previously prioritized contracts, and that such certification shall be deemed to constitute the independent authentication required for the release of funds associated with such contracts, consulting as appropriate to ensure the smooth implementation of these arrangements; 27. Further decides that the provisions of paragraph 22 of resolution 1483 (2003) shall continue to apply, except that the privileges and immunities provided in that paragraph shall not apply with respect to any final judgement arising out of a contractual obligation entered into by Iraq after 30 June 2004; 28. Welcomes the commitments of many creditors, including those of the Paris Club, to identify ways to reduce substantially Iraq's sovereign debt, calls on Member States, as well as international and regional organizations, to support the Iraq reconstruction effort, urges the international financial institutions and bilateral donors to take the immediate steps necessary to provide their full range of loans and other financial assistance and arrangements to Iraq, recognizes that the Interim Government of Iraq will have the authority to conclude and implement such agreements and other arrangements as may be necessary in this regard, and requests creditors, institutions and donors to work as a priority on these matters with the Interim Government of Iraq and its successors; 525 S/RES/1546 (2004) 29. Recalls the continuing obligations of Member States to freeze and transfer certain funds, assets, and economic resources to the Development Fund for Iraq in accordance with paragraphs 19 and 23 of resolution 1483 (2003) and with resolution 1518 (2003) of 24 November 2003; 30. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Council within three months from the date of this resolution on UNAMI operations in Iraq, and on a quarterly basis thereafter on the progress made towards national elections and fulfilment of all UNAMI's responsibilities; 31. Requests that the United States, on behalf of the multinational force, report to the Council within three months from the date of this resolution on the efforts and progress of this force, and on a quarterly basis thereafter; 32. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter. 526 S/RES/1546 (2004) Annex Text of letters from the Prime Minister of the Interim Government of Iraq Dr. Ayad Allawi and United States Secretary of State Colin L. Powell to the President of the Council 5 June 2004 . Republic of Iraq Prime Minister Office Excellency: On my appointment as Prime Minister of the Interim Government of Iraq, I am writing to express the commitment of the people of Iraq to complete the political transition process to establish a free, and democratic Iraq and to be a partner in preventing and combating terrorism. As we enter a critical new stage, regain full sovereignty and move towards elections, we will need the assistance of the international community. The Interim Government of Iraq will make every effort to ensure that these elections are fully democratic, free and fair. Security and stability continue to be essential to our political transition. There continue, however, to be forces in Iraq, including foreign elements, that are opposed to our transition to peace, democracy, and security. The Government is determined to overcome these forces, and to develop security forces capable of providing adequate security for the Iraqi people. Until we are able to provide security for ourselves, including the defence of Iraq's land, sea and air space, we ask for the support of the Security Council and the international community in this endeavour. We seek a new resolution on the Multinational Force (MNF) mandate to contribute to maintaining security in Iraq, including through the tasks and arrangements set out in the letter from Secretary of State Colin Powell to the President of the United Nations Security Council. The Government requests that the Security Council review the mandate of the MNF at the request of the Transitional Government of Iraq, or twelve months from the date on which such a resolution is adopted. In order to discharge the Iraqi Government's responsibility for security, I intend to establish appropriate security structures that will allow my Government and Iraqi security forces to progressively take on that responsibility. One such structure is the Ministerial Committee for National Security, consisting of myself as the Chair, the Deputy Prime Minister, and the Minister of Defense, Interior, Foreign Affairs, Justice, and Finance. The National Security Advisor, and Director of the Iraqi National Intelligence Service will serve as permanent advisory members of the committee. This forum will set the broad framework for Iraqi security policy. I intend to invite, as appropriate, the MNF commander, his Deputy, or the MNF His Excellency Mr. Lauro L. Baja, Jr. President of the Security Council United Nations New York, New York 527 S/RES/1546 (2004) Commander's designative representative, and other appropriate individuals, to attend and participate as well, and will stand ready to discuss mechanisms of coordination and cooperation with the MNF, Iraqi armed forces will be responsible to the Chief of Staff and Minister of Defense. Other security forces (the Iraqi police, border guards and Facilities Protection Service) will be responsible to the Minister of the Interior or other government ministers. In addition, the relevant ministers and I will develop further mechanisms for coordination with the MNF. Intend to create with the MNF coordination bodies at national, regional, and local levels, that will include Iraqi security forces commanders and civilian leadership, to ensure that Iraqi security forces will coordinate with the MNF on all security policy and operations issues in order to achieve unity of command of military operations in which Iraqi forces are engaged with MNF. In addition, the MNF and Iraqi government leaders will keep each other informed of their activities, consult regularly to ensure effective allocation and use of personnel, resources and facilities, will share intelligence, and will refer issues up the respective chains of command where necessary, Iraqi security forces will take on progressively greater responsibility as Iraqi capabilities improve. The structures I have described in this letter will serve as the fora for the MNF and the Iraqi government to reach agreement on the full range of fundamental security and policy issues, including policy on sensitive offensive operations, and will ensure full partnership between Iraqi forces and the MNF, through close coordination and consultation. Since these are sensitive issues for a number of sovereign governments, including Iraq and the United States, they need to be resolved in the framework of a mutual understanding on our strategic partnership. We will be working closely with the MNF leadership in the coming weeks to ensure that we have such an agreed strategic framework. We are ready to take sovereign responsibility for governing Iraq by June 30. We are well aware of the difficulties facing us, and of our responsibilities to the Iraqi people. The stakes are great, and we need the support of the international community to succeed. We ask the Security Council to help us by acting now to adopt a Security Council resolution giving us necessary support.. I understand that the Co-sponsors intend to annex this letter to the resolution on Iraq under consideration. In the meantime, I request that you provide copies of this letter to members of the Council as quickly as possible. (Signed) Dr. Ayad Allawi 528 S/RES/1546 (2004) The Secretary of State Washington 5 June 2004 Excellency: Recognizing the request of the government of Iraq for the continued presence of the Multi-National Force (MNF) in Iraq, and following consultations with Prime Minister Ayad Allawi of the Iraqi Interim Government, I am writing to confirm that the MNF under unified command is prepared to continue to contribute to the maintenance of security in Iraq, including by preventing and deterring terrorism and protecting the territory of Iraq. The goal of the MNF will be to help the Iraqi people to complete the political transition and will permit the United Nations and the international community to work to facilitate Iraq's reconstruction. The ability of the Iraqi people to achieve their goals will be heavily influenced .. by the security situation in Iraq. As recent events have demonstrated, continuing attacks by insurgents, including former regime elements, foreign fighters, and illegal militias challenge all those who are working for a better Iraq: .... Development of an effective and cooperative security partnership between the MNF and the sovereign Government of Iraq is critical to the stability of Iraq. The commander of the MNF will work in partnership with the sovereign Government of Iraq in helping to provide security while recognizing and respecting its sovereignty. To that end, the MNF stands ready to participate in discussions of the Ministerial Committee for National Security on the broad framework of security policy, as referred to in the letter from Prime Minister of the Interim Government of Iraq Allawi dated June 5, 2004. On the implementation of this policy, recognizing that Iraqi security forces are responsible to the appropriate Iraqi ministers, the MNF will coordinate with Iraqi security forces at all levels - national, regional, and local - in order to achieve unity of command of military operations in which Iraqi forces are engaged with the MNF. In addition, the MNF and the Iraqi government leaders will keep each other informed of their activities, consult regularly to ensure effective allocation and use of personnel, resources, and facilities, will share intelligence, and will refer issues up the respective chains of command where necessary. We will work in the fora described by Prime Minister Allawi in his June 5 letter to reach agreement on the full range of fundamental security and policy issues, including policy on sensitive offensive operations, and will ensure full partnership between MNF and fragi forces, through close coordination and consultation. His Excellency Mr. Lauro L. Baja, Jr. President of the Security Council United Nations New York, New York 529 S/RES/1546 (2004) Under the agreed arrangement, the MNF stands ready to continue to undertake a broad range of tasks to contribute to the maintenance of security and to ensure force protection. These include activities necessary to counter ongoing security threats posed by forces seeking to influence Iraq's political future through violence. This will include combat operations against members of these groups, internment where this is necessary for imperative reasons of security, and the continued search for and securing of weapons that threaten Iraq's security. A further objective will be to train and equip Iraqi security forces that will increasingly take responsibility for maintaining Iraq's security. The MNF also stands ready as needed to participate in the provision of humanitarian assistance, civil affairs support, and relief and reconstruction assistance requested by the Iraqi Interim Government and in line with previous Security Council Resolutions. In addition, the MNF is prepared to establish or support a force within the MNF to provide for the security of personnel and facilities of the United Nations. We have consulted closely with UN officials regarding the United Nations' security requirements and believe that a brigade-size force will be needed to support the United Nations' security effort. This force will be under the command and control of the MNF commander, and its missions will include static and perimeter security at UN facilities, and convoy escort duties for the UN mission's travel requirements. In order to continue to contribute to security, the MNF must continue to function under a framework that affords the force and its personnel the status that they need to accomplish their mission, and in which the contributing states have responsibility for exercising jurisdiction over their personnel and which will ensure arrangements for, and use of assets by, the MNF. The existing framework governing these matters is sufficient for these purposes. In addition, the forces that make up the MNF are and will remain committed at all times to act consistently with their obligations under the law of armed conflict, including the Geneva Conventions. The MNF is prepared to continue to pursue its current efforts to assist in providing a secure environment in which the broader international community is able to fulfil its important role in facilitating Iraq's reconstruction. In meeting these responsibilities in the period ahead, we will act in full recognition of and respect for Iraqi sovereignty. We look to other member states and international and regional organizations to assist the people of Iraq and the sovereign Iraqi government in overcoming the challenges that lie ahead to build a democratic, secure and prosperous country. The co-sponsors intend to annex this letter to the resolution on Iraq under consideration. In the meantime, I request that you provide copies of this letter to members of the Council as quickly as possible. Sincerely, (Signed) Colin L. Powell QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD JUNE 16, 2004 QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. TAYLOR Mr. TAYLOR. At what point one year ago—one year from today, what percentage of our Humvees do you expect will be up-armored? What percentage of our vehicles will be protected with some sort of electronic jammers against improvised explo- sives? I would presume, with a similar sized force, that you are going to have the same equipment in place. You know of this committee's concern about up-armor and you know about this committee's concern about improvised explosives. To what extent will it be solved one year from today? General SHARP. [The information referred to is classified and retained in the com- mittee files.] Mr. TAYLOR. Early in this conflict, a friend of mine from the United States Army Special Forces pointed out what he thought was a glaring mistake, and that was the moving into the palaces. Of course, we did it for the short-term need of getting the kids a shower, out of the heat in the summer, out of the cold in the winter, and with a wall around them certainly cut down on people sniping. But long term, he thought it was creating a terrible problem of guilt by association. Bad things happened in those palaces; and when you just move into that palace, in the eyes of a fairly simple people, you become the bad guy. They are doing? Without elec- tricity, you are living in the palace. You have just replaced a bad person in that palace. I read with great interest where General Zinni, apparently privately not before this committee, expressed the same concerns. I continue to think that is a problem. One year from now, what are our plans to be in those palaces? What percentage of those palaces will have been turned back over to the Iraqis for use as universities or whatever? And what percentage of our force will be in Bosnia-type encampments? That would really send two messages. They are made of plywood: We are going to keep our guys comfortable, we are going to keep them warm in the winter, cool in the summer they are going to get a shower, but we are not here forever. General SHARP. [The information referred to is classified and retained in the com- mittee files.] Mr. TAYLOR. I would like to know what percentage of the improvised explosive devices in our estimates that have been used against us were at one time under our control, but lost back to the enemy. General SHARP. (The information referred to is classified and retained in the com- mittee files.] QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. TAUSCHER Ms. TAUSCHER. Mr. Ambassador, is it true that we have a status-of-forces agree- ment with every country with whom we have troops deployed? Ambassador RICCIARDONE. [The information referred to was not available at the time of printing.) QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. RYAN OF OHIO Mr. RYAN. One of the issues when we had a hearing here a few weeks ago on Afghanistan was regarding the drugs and production ad harvesting and all that. One of the issues there was the court system and the inability to have—whether it was subpoena power or to get search warrants and things like that. We have been talking a lot about troops. But I think what undergirds, that is, the ability to go to the courts and do this in a fair way. How are the court systems coming together? The time we haven't talked much about the timetable, and if we did, I missed it. Can you just briefly tell me where the courts stand right now? Ambassador RICCIARDONE. [The information referred to was not available at the time of printing.] (533) TRAINING OF IRAQI SECURITY FORCES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, Washington, DC, Thursday, June 17, 2004. The committee met, pursuant to call, at 9 a.m., in room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Duncan Hunter (chairman of the committee) presiding. OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. DUNCAN HUNTER. A REP- RESENTATIVE FROM CALIFORNIA, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES The CHAIRMAN. General Petraeus, good morning. General PETRAEUS. Good morning, Mr. Chairman. Good to see you. The CHAIRMAN. We will go ahead and fire up here and talk for just a second here, and then we will ask the Ranking Member, the gentleman from Missouri, Mr. Skelton to say a few words, and then we look forward to your statement. But thanks for being with us. This morning, the committee continues its examination of Oper- ation Iraqi Freedom by focusing on an issue of great interest to the committee and the American public in general, the training of Iraqi security forces. In less than two weeks, the Iraqi people will as- sume responsibility for their government. While they no longer suf- fer from the tyranny of Saddam Hussein, there is yet much work to be done to achieve democracy and prosperity. Securing Iraq is a first step on this path. Today Iraq has over 225,000 security forces personnel on duty and in training, just some 35,000 short of its requirement. This number includes Iraqi police, border enforcers, a civil defense corps, facilities protection services and a small armed forces. So far the results are positive. The Iraqi Civil Defense Corps (ICDC) is conducting joint patrols in Iraq with other coalition forces and Iraqi police forces. Soon the ICDC will be equipped with additional vehicles, body armor, uniforms, radios, weapons, ammu- nition, night vision and binoculars. Through this on-the-job train- ing and upgrades, Iraqis will be able to assume more and more se- curity responsibilities on the ground. Tangible results may already be in the making. For instance, the Department of Defense tells us that Fallujah has remained quiet with no violations of the cease-fire since May 3, and the confronta- tions with al-Sadr's militia have declined recently. To give greater detail about the training of Iraq's security forces, our witnesses this morning are from Iraq via teleconference, Lieu- tenant General David H. Petraeus, Commander, Office of Security Transition; and before us, Brigadier General Kevin J. Bergner, (535) 536 Deputy Director For Political Military Affairs in the Middle East from the Joint Staff. Due to technical limitations, we only have the video teleconfer- ence link for one hour, and we are going to try to make the best of that. Welcome to the committee, gentlemen. We look forward to your testimony and appreciate your appearance, virtual and real, before the committee this morning. And before we fire up here, General Petraeus, let me ask my partner, the committee's Ranking Demo- crat Mr. Skelton for any remarks he would like to make. [The prepared statement of Mr. Hunter can be found in the Ap- pendix on page 577.] STATEMENT OF HON. IKE SKELTON, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM MISSOURI, RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES Mr. SKELTON. Thank you, and special thanks for having this very important hearing for us. By the way, General Petraeus, that third star sure looks good on you. Well deserved, and we are very, very pleased. General PETRAEUS. Thank you very much, sir, and I remember your visit to us back up in Mosul very fondly, and great to see you again, even virtually. Mr. SKELTON. We opened up that refinery together, didn't we? General PETRAEUS. We did, and since then the asphalt refinery is also producing. So we need to get you back here and let you see 200 tons of asphalt being produced everyday. Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Chairman, in light of the time constraint, let me welcome General Petraeus, General Bergner. I ask that my statement be put into the record as is. I am concerned about the potential Iraqi Armed Forces, particularly those that refuse to fight in Fallujah. And I ask unanimous consent that my statement be put in the record The CHAIRMAN. Without objection. [The prepared statement of Mr. Skelton can be found in the Ap- pendix on page 581.] The CHAIRMAN. And, General Petraeus, we will let you get right to it. Thanks for being with us. Obviously the success of this oper- ation is going to be dependent upon on great, talented leadership in our military. And, General Petraeus, we have a lot of great and talented leaders, and I think it is clear that your talents have been appreciated. You have done some great stuff over there, and we are looking for you to do a lot more stuff, and starting up this Iraqi military is a very key element to the hand-off. So have at it, sir. And if our video goes on the fritz, General Bergner stands ready and able to stand in for you. He is a good warm body in front of us right now. And we know we got that com- munication link down, so thanks for being with us, and tell us how it is going over there. 537 STATEMENT OF LT. GEN. DAVID H. PETRAEUS [DELIVERED VIA TELECONFERENCE), CHIEF, OFFICE OF SECURITY TRAN- SITION General PETRAEUS. Thanks, Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member Skelton. It really is a pleasure to be here. Sir, overall the roller coaster that is Iraq is ascending, although there are clearly bumps on the tracks on a daily basis as the daily sensational attacks seem to take place. I have been back here about two weeks now. Took over the day after I got back. The security transition piece in Iraq with the Ministry of De- fense, and the Ministry of Interior, and the Army, and the police and all the other elements that you mentioned is a hugely complex task with no easy solution, but the investments that have been made and the efforts that have been put in are now starting to show, and I believe that they will do so over the coming year. Just today, in fact, I was out at the Kurkush military training base northeast of Baghdad and the Taji base north of Baghdad. Great activities out there. Some 400 new Non-Commissioned Offi- cers (NCO)s were graduated today at the military training base. Over in Jordan today, some 800 officers graduated from the Jor- danian Air Force Military Academy, and that provides us the re- maining officers out of that academy, for example, for the rest of the Army divisions. In general, sir, I think you could say that the investments and the efforts over the past year, particularly in recent months, are about to reach a critical mass where we are very hopeful there will be a chain reaction where we will see the acceleration in the devel- opment of Iraqi security forces that we have all been looking for- ward to. As I mentioned, the training bases have now been well es- tablished. The infrastructure is generally built. And we will be working very hard over the coming months to start setting up the forces that will be deployed for success. The initial of those will be the initial battalion of the Iraqi National Task Force, a division within the Army that is established, trained and equipped for urban counterinsurgency operations. And Prime Minister Allawi and the Minister of Defense in one of their earlier decisions in the security arena directed the deployment of that element to south- east Baghdad at the end of this month when it completes its train- ing. There are also, as you already mentioned, Mr. Chairman, numer- ous ICDC units, police units, border police and others, who are doing good jobs, but as you also noted, there are a number of areas where we have got to improve and that we clearly took a lot of les- sons out of the experiences in early April where there were some forces that refused to fight and others that did not do well, even as in the north in Basra and Hilla and other places. They did in- deed equip themselves quite well. Sir, this is playing out in an environment that is producing guarded optimism fostered by the interim Iraqi Government lead- ers who are very much demonstrating leadership already. I heard guidance from Prime Minister Allawi yesterday. In fact, we have to go back to him tomorrow with a coordinated U.S.—rather coali- tion-Iraqi recommendation to him on how to incorporate these ICDC battalions, these 45 battalions that have been organized, 538 equipped and trained by the divisions of the coalition forces; how to connect them to the emerging Iraqi National Command Author- ity in the form of the Ministry of Defense and the joint head- quarters. The commander of the army was with me today when we visited those two bases, as was the four-star senior advisor to the Minister of Defense. The commander of the Armed Forces is a former mili- tary officer, a Sunni who never joined the Baath Party. The Min- ister of Defense and Minister of the Interior have been in their jobs about two days longer than I have. They are growing into their jobs, getting a handle on the complexity of their respective posi- tions. They are already making decisions, the Minister of Defense's decision with the Prime Minister to commit the initial elements of the Iraq National Task Force to southeast Baghdad. In addition to that, they are also directing the deployment of Iraq Civil Defense Corps units in Baghdad to help the 1st Calvary Division secure the road to the airport. They are courageous individuals, and in many cases their safety is in jeopardy, but they are not flinching even as there are nearly daily attacks by those who don't want the new Iraq to succeed. As I mentioned to you on the phone the other day, we have a plan to obligate approximately $3 billion of the Development Fund Irag (DFI) money; that was about a billion dollars, and then of the $2.5 or so additional billion that was in the supplemental. So in other words, we will commit the billion of DFI and about $2 of the $2.5 billion of the supplemental Iraqi reconstruction funds by the end of June. A lot of this has already been obligated. Virtually all the rest has been committed. The contracting process here now, which you will recall when Congressman Skelton visited the north that we were hoping would get in high gear, is very much into high gear. In fact, it is in over- drive. Brigadier General Steve Reeves of the Army contracting community and a great team had really helped that process, and it is working very, very well. I do think it is important in these days, sir, and even as the daily sensational attack goes off, to keep our eyes on the horizon and to remain, if you will, determined and steadfast, because as I men- tioned, we are climbing. The roller coaster is ascending. This is like a supertanker, and what we are trying to do is gather momentum. And we now have, as I mentioned, the Iraqi Interim Government. And that is just tweaking the course, but generally continuing to play, although again, Prime Minister Allawi has some very good ideas about how to connect the ICDC battalions and incorporate them into the army by retraining headquarter structures. But we owe him options on that tomorrow, and it would be premature to go into too much more on that. I just got back from Taji and Kurkush, again 463 Iraqi NCOs. That is the fourth class to graduate from the NCO Academy there. That is also a terrific piece of infrastructure that has been built over the last year. We have 843 officers graduating in Jordan. Those are company grade officers, lieutenants and captains, and also field grade staff officers, and also future battalion brigade com- manders. We had 54 Iraqis just graduate from the Dignitary Pro- 539 tection Service training that is going on, 50 more in class, 300 more by the end of the summer, likely growing to the number of 900. A lot of great things going on in the major subordinate com- mands where the ICDC concept was changed as a result of the ex- periences in April at a conference on 4 May when I was back here doing an assessment for General Abizaid. Regional training acad- emies have been instituted; standardized programs of instruction and close relationship between the coalition forces and the ICDC units. And we saw that the other day. And we saw that in Saddam's former hometown, Tikrit, where we watched a Primary Leader Development Class (PLDC), of sergeants, 240 of them grad- uated. And again, we had the leadership of the Iraqi Armed Forces with us. We do have on the police side, the international police trainers and the international police advisors, a number of them on station now, 287 police advisors in Iraq. That will go to 500 this summer. There are 63 police trainers in Iraq. That will grow to over 200. And there are some 326 police trainers in Jordan from 15 different countries where they are running the police academy that, together with the police academy from Baghdad, as they are expanded by the midfall, will be producing some 5,000 trained police officers every 10 weeks. To give you a very quick snapshot on the military side, the Iraq National Task Force, the initial battalion of that will be ready by the end of June. It will be deployed into Baghdad. All three battal- ions will be ready by the end of July. The commander of the army and I met with the leadership of these organizations today and have been in training for months. And we met with the advisor support teams that are with their coalition members, and they be- lieve that they will be ready. We will obviously do all that we can to set them up for success in terms of training, preparation, equipping and so forth. We are hardening their vehicles just as we hardened coalition vehicles, putting armed machine gun mounts in the back. And we will do a cold walk-run approach with them when they enter their area of responsibility at the direction of the Prime Minister. Iraq Armed Forces, there will be 2 divisions, 6 brigades, 18 bat- talions. We will see the first battalion of that by July. All the rest of the 18 will be done by about February of next year. We slid the final two to make way for a new initiative by the Minister of Inte- rior, which we think is very important, and that is creating a high- end element in the police in what is called a Civil Intervention Force. And I will talk a bit about that in a moment. Sir, there is also a small Iraqi Special Operations Force that is already operating now with our Special Forces that we are going to add to that a Ranger-like or commando like battalion, perhaps built on the 36th ICDC battalion, which, you will recall, did fight in Fallujah where it lost 2 of its soldiers and had 16 wounded, in- cluding its deputy commander. On the ICDC, it is our expectation that the 45 battalions that are in the field right now are organized; some going through initial training, and a number of others already operating at full strength d very effectively, as you mentioned. In our old area, in the 101st, as Congressman Skelton saw when he was up there, they 540 took over from us, for example, the security of the five ammo dumps. The border police had already taken over the security of the border in that particular area, and that is something we need to do for the whole country. I believe the ICDC may expand somewhat and may go as high as 51 battalions. That is what the major subordinate commands would like, and I think that that will be the direction we are head- ing. And we owe Prime Minister Allawi a coordinated U.S.-Iraqi po- n on how to link these battalions that have been built at the bottom to the structure that is being built at the top, so that as it comes down, there is, in fact, a command-and-control linkage that is effective and under Iraqis. . Sir, switching to the police, as you mentioned, a large number of them on duty. The truth is there are too many of them on duty. They are about 90,000. They have about 120,000 on the payroll. Obviously need to trim this, and we are in fact going to do that. Prime Minister Allawi supports the use of Development Fund Iraq money for that, from $60 million most likely as a severance pay concept, and also probably going a bit farther than that to create the head room for the additional police officers that are coming out of the academies now. The Civil Intervention Force, high-end police going to form two battalions of public order, and three battalions for riot control growing to nine over time. We are going to actually use military bases to train these because we have the infrastructure there now. We have large military bases that are either completed or nearing completion throughout the country that provide us the flexibility in the training arena, and that will help in that regard. Border police is an area of concern. There are about 18,000 in the border enforcement. We are taking a hard look at this function, the same way we did at the ICDC. We need to look hard at the strat- egy and do simple things like firming up the border and then get- ting technology into the official border crossings so we can X-ray vehicles, smell gunpowder, and identify fraudulent documents, hay- ing watch lists and so forth, and have connectivity between the bor- der crossing locations and the provinces and in Baghdad. The Facility Protection Security Force is another large organiza- tion, some 70,000 of them. They do not include oil infrastructure police or the electrical police, but we did learn some lessons the in early April. We need to keep province-level brigade commanders with a small headquarters training base, and they essentially need to have us. The corporate headquarters for these ministry activities have hired these guards from them, and although the ministry paid the salaries, we need these brigade commanders to just be con- stantly going around their location all day everyday, essentially spinning plates, as we call it, ensuring standards are in force, and ensuring there is adequate force protection and so forth. We are working hard in terms of literally building Iraqi security institutions. A lot of what I have talked about has been done at the bottom, been done by either the major subordinate commands of the coalition force or by coalition trainers and now recently by Iraqis. What we have to do now is assist also with the establish- e institutions that will control these forces. The Ministry of Defense is now in its headquarters. It was refurbished right in- 541 side the edge of the Green Zone. There is a joint headquarters that is forming. As I mentioned, there is a commander of that force. The staff is getting in place and building operation centers and so forth. And we are also going to assist, along with a number of civilian members of the organization here, in the process of their develop- ing a national security strategy, joint U.S.-U.K, a coalition effort. That will also help as they come to grips with the roles and mis- sions of the various elements of the Iraqi security forces, and, of considerable importance, determine how the coordinating mecha- nisms and chains of command of the relative forces should be es- tablished and should function. The equipment is flowing. It is not flowing fast enough yet, but it is starting to come in. We are already, for example, able in the case of Najaf last week, when it was clear that we needed to shore them up somewhat, although they are actually—we see that as a successful endeavor right now. We sent 41 vehicles, 24,000 rounds of ammunition, 2,900 batons, 545 holsters, hundreds of uniforms. And then the 1st Armored Division added heavy machine guns and Rocket Powered Grenades (RPG)s. We are working very hard to en- sure that the security forces do have the equipment they need, and that they are not outgunned by the bad guys. Sir, we are also working hard, frankly, to identify emerging re- quirements. There are some of these coming along. The militia in- tegration announcement the other day identified some areas that we may well need some additional resources. The divisional brigade headquarters for the ICDC is not something in the original plan. I mentioned the Director of Border Enforcement. There are prob- ably some additional infrastructure issues that are going to come out of it desired by Prime Minister Allawi and the Minister of De- fense to be able to move their forces around. All of these forces you would love, frankly, your committee, be- cause you have never seen an army or a police force with a higher tooth-to-tail ratio. These are all folks with rifles and bayonets in their hand for the most part. It is only now that we are building the headquarters and the support structures and the so-called com- bat multipliers, and as we do that, as that process carries on, we are identifying some additional requirements. We are also working hard with the Iraqis to determine their abil- ity to fund their own budget beyond salaries. That is an effort be- tween the two ministries to which we give the most attention in the Ministry of Defense. Right now it looks half of the money alone is going to go to salaries, and so we will have to see what they are able to do in terms of capital investment as we go along. Let me sum up by saying again, this is an enormously endeavor. It is a supertanker, not a speedboat. We think it is about to get the course charted that the new government buys into and, in fact, has had considerable input on, as I mentioned. Prime Min- ister Allawi laid out a clearly articulated and concise statement of strategic desires in the security force arena yesterday when he met with Department Secretary Wolfowitz, Mr. Tibbits from the U.K., the Polish representative and others. We are working hard to try to protect Iraqi leaders. That is a very, very tall order beyond the immediate principals. There is un- doubtedly going to be continued violence and a continuation of sen- 542 sational attacks, but paradoxically right now, at least in recent weeks, the number of attacks on coalition forces has decreased no- ticeably. Again, sir, we have to keep our eye on the horizon and keep our shoulder to the wheel and keep pushing, because it is a long, hard slug, but we are about to see the chain reaction begin, and that is going to help with the development of Iraqi security forces in the coming months. Sir, that concludes the opening comments and now welcome the opportunity to address any questions that you will have. The CHAIRMAN. General Petraeus, thank you for an excellent overview, and let me just ask one brief question and then move to Mr. Skelton. The cornerstone of this new Iraqi military is going to be leadership capabilities of your NCO and your officer corps. You mentioned the graduations that are taking place, some today and some in the near future, in the academies for both officers and en- listed personnel. Are you personally satisfied with the quality of the training for the NCOs and for the officers? Could you comment on that? General Bergner, this may be your opportunity. Are you person- ally satisfied with the quality of our training? General BERGNER. I was making sure his mike wasn't going to come back on. General PETRAEUS. Can you hear me now, Mr. Chairman? The CHAIRMAN. Yes. General PETRAEUS. We are back on, sir? The CHAIRMAN. Yes. General PETRAEUS. The answer to your question is yes. We obvi- ously are not conducting as lengthy and as comprehensive training as we would in the United States. What we are doing is trying to do as much as we can and yet still get security forces to the field as quick as we can. So there are these two tensions. There is one that is pulling us to accelerate, and there is another that says don't rush to failure, and we are trying to find the right approach in there, and think we have that. And one of the techniques we use is when we do, in fact, put forces in the field, to employ them in the situations where they can get operations under their belt, really develop confidence, experi- ence and competence before they have to go into something that is really high end. Were you able to hear that, sir? The CHAIRMAN. Yes. Thank you very much. And Mr. Skelton. Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Chairman, let me pass at this moment, and I will come back at a later time and ask my questions. The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Arkansas Dr. Snyder. Dr. SNYDER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you, General Petraeus, for being with us this morning. I was struck by the poll results that came out a few days ago, and the question that was asked to Iraqis was, “do you think it is likely that the Iraqi police and Army will maintain security without the presence of coalition forces?” And the answer on this poll was that 62 percent said very likely, and 29 percent said somewhat likely. And so if my math is right, about 87 percent of the Iraqi people believe that the Iraqi po- 543 lice and Army will be able to maintain security without the pres- ence of coalition forces. What seems like a great opportunity, as you are describing it, and I was struck by what you just said in response to the Chair- man's question, that you want to be very careful about, in your words, a rush to failure, because this public opinion, when it comes to security, could change pretty rapidly. Do you have any com- ments on this kind of opportunity? I know you were quoted the other day as saying it is not important that Iraqis love America. General PETRAEUS. Sir, that is right. Iraqis do have an enormous national feeling of pride in their army, the institution of the army, as it existed, which they see as having saved them during the Iran- Iraq war, which suffered terrible casualties during that particular war. The police, again, source of pride for the Iraqi people. And there certainly is a sense of national pride that frankly surprised all of us when we came here back in the very beginning. As you recall, when I was up in the north, for example, I was surprised how proud they were of their country despite the fact that they had endured 35 years of Saddam Hussein and in a sense that they had put up with this. They also do believe that they ought to be the Middle Eastern version of Japan. They are keenly aware of the incredible resources they have not only in oil, but also in water and sulfur and, frankly, even in human capital. So there is an optimism in Iraq, although there is a tremendous impatience in their culture that is also at play. I do think, Dr. Snyder, that it is an opportunity. It is one that we have to make the most of. And again, we have to balance these conflicting desires between getting out there right away—there is enormous enthusiasm for doing something right now, but the capa- bility to do additional somethings is a bit limited. And so what we have got to do again is do what we can with those forces that we have, employ the additional forces as they come on line, strengthen those that are out there. To give an example, as we saw with the Najaf police the other night, keep the police advisors, keep the very close links with the coalition, but also, frankly, sir, increasing the deferring to the Iraqis because they are actually taking charge. Make no mistake about it. The other thing, you know, sir, I never thought it would be a light switch. It certainly is not. You know, again, in various places of the country, with transition, various security tasks; the fact that the 101st Airborne Division was replaced by a force less than one- third its size just meant that Iraqi security forces had to pick up hd some 20,000 of them up there that were trained by our forces indeed did just that. So we are aware of this public support for them, sort of this opti- mism about what Iraqis can do. And again, what we need to do is play on it and build on it, but set the Iraqis up for success as much as we can. And we think the increasing flow of equipment that is starting to come in now is going to help us do just that. Dr. SNYDER. General, I wanted to ask two specific questions, and one of them is with regard to equipment. This committee has been frustrated over the last year with hearing from constituents that have troops overseas and their difficulty in both Active and Reserve 544 I components getting the equipment they need. And it is a bit dis- cou to hear that you are still having problems as of this date of getting the kinds of equipment that you need for putting these Iraqi troops and police in the field. My specific question is what went wrong? I suspect that must be frustrating to you that you are dealing with this flow of equipment. My specific question is what went wrong, and is there anything the Congress needs to do to help you correct it? My second question is I think we have one of my Arkansas con- stituents, Lieutenant General Crocker, I think, is involved in train- ing as a contractor. What role are contractors playing in this train- ing? And how are you maintaining accountability over their work product and the amount of money going to contractors? He is a great man. Thank you, General. General PETRAEUS. Let me start off with the great George Crock- er, because I was a brigade commander for him in the 82nd Air- borne Division when he was All American 6, the Commander of that great organization. In fact, I was just out at the base where is or was, because he is about to leave, and that is a sign of the times. The Grinnell Corporation, which he headed the element of here, did a tremendous amount to set up the Kurkush military training base, to establish the infrastructure, literally the training ranges, the courses, the programs of instruction and all the rest of that, and they have just handed it off. They are going down right now, and I think he leaves in another day to two. We have contracting officer representatives and the usual over- sight mechanisms for them, sir. By all accounts they did a great job out there and under pretty austere circumstances last year when they were out there. It was a very, very long, hot summer for General Crocker and his comrades. Sir, let me go back to the equipment. We were all frustrated about that. Of course, we were sitting up in the north. Thank you for providing the funds you did when you did, because those are the critical bridge to us. Remember the Commanders? Emergency Reconstruction Program money that allowed commanders to fund things on the spot. There were good mechanisms and doublechecks, but that helped enormously. And that is how we equipped the Iraqi security forces early on, and still in large measure in the case of the ICDC, and to a lesser degree the police. I honestly don't know what went wrong, Congressman, other than that the capacity of the contracting operation here certainly hat it needed to be. As I mentioned during the opening statement, though, that is absolutely an idea right now. And again, the Secretary of the Army deserves a great deal of credit for essen- tially volunteering to take that commission on. He took an existing organization and essentially threw it at the mission. And their pro- fessional, Brigadier General Steve Reeves is working round the clock for his team, and they are obligating money at an incredible rate right now. Really, in the last several months, by the end of June, we have obligated nearly $3 billion for Iraqi security force training, equipment and infrastructure. And I think that probably answers that, sir. The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman. The gentleman from Colorado Mr. Hefley. 545 Mr. HEFLEY. Thank you very much, and thank you, General, for being with us. The training, the equipment, all, of course, is very crucial and very important to the Iraqi security forces, but it appears to me that even a bigger problem is a cultural change that you must bring about in them. The police and maybe to a lesser extent the Army, I would think, have been instruments of suppression and in- struments of Saddam Hussein's control of the country. Do you find this in the officer corps and in the noncommissioned officers and those that you are training in leadership positions, that they still have some of that old negative culture, or are you able to teach them that they need to have the proper attitudes toward their role and toward the people; that their job is not to suppress; that they are servants of those people, and their job is to keep them safe and secure? Can you speak to that at all? General PETRAEUS. I can. And I can say when we came up, when we were up in the north and tried to stand the police back up, it was a real revelation the day that we realized that these individ- uals were not in the past conducting Western policing, if you will; that they played a very minor role. The heavy lifting was done by thugs, the Baath militia, Fedayeen, the secret police and so forth, and there was a tremendous amount of corruption because the pay was miniscule, and they augmented it in a variety of different ways. To be honest, some of this is going to take generational change, although the idea by Prime Minister Allawi to thank the number of police that are serving now particularly in the upper ranks for their service, to give them a severance arrangement and offer them the opportunity to return home will help in that regard while re- taining some. There are leaders like that out there. It took us three tries, but we got one up in the north. A police chief has now sur- vived about eight assassination attempts. He took three rounds to the leg, lost two of his bodyguards, and his aide was wounded. I personally presented a Purple Heart to him. It was the first man in the province to receive it. Since then we returned there a couple of times for memorial services, at which the real martyrs in Iraq, and those are the secu- rity forces who were dying for the country, not the people blowing themselves up, the real martyrs were honored. In our area-I can't speak to the rest of the country, but in our area up in the north, I can tell you that in the final few months that we were up there prior to mid-February, that the police and Iraqi security forces were taking more casualties than we were. They were out front, they were getting shot at and were shooting back. Nonetheless, there is a culture, as you know, Congressman, that has to be changed. It is why we are putting so much emphasis on the academies, on finding the good leadership. It is not easy, and it is something we have to keep our nose to the grindstone on and continue to pursue. The police advisors do help a great deal, espe- y now since the security environment generally allows them to get to the stations, which was not the case in a number of places in the country in the early April to probably early May time frame. Mr. HEFLEY. Thank you very much. The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman. 546 gard. The gentleman from Mississippi Mr. Taylor. Mr. TAYLOR. Good morning, General. Thank you very much for your valuable time and for what you do for our country. I have been concerned for some time about the enemy's use of improvised explosive devices and, unfortunately, their success at using those devices. Again, I am sitting here in Washington, D.C. Our information is pretty well learned to what I read in the press. How are we doing on our efforts to implement more electronic jammers and countermeasures to take away some of the success our enemies have had with that? General PETRAEUS. Sir, there is a huge effort ongoing in that re- Great to see you again, sir, as well, and thank you for your visit to our soldiers. Sir, in fact, our solders and the coalition forces, through a com- bination of better force protection at base camps, through better f technology, although still a way to go in that regard-and sadly, the enemy has a hook in this as well. So as we get jammers, he goes back to using wires or something else, or now increasingly, as you have seen, just blowing himself up. Through force protec- tion, also training, our soldiers are finding a good number of the IEDs, and they are still getting intelligence from the population, and that varies by place to place, and that is good. The challenge right now is these suicide bombers who are blow- ing themselves up on the street. As you may have heard, there was an explosion today outside the Baghdad recruiting station for the Army. It was a place that was hit some months back with horrific ving up close to 100 recruits. It is one of the worst bombing episodes during the time we have been here. Huge force protection measures were instituted since then. In fact, today I believe, although I don't have all the details—I believe none of the recruits were actually there unless there were folks just trying to get in. And I think sadly that it hit just as the bus is passing or something, but there was between 30 and 40 Iraqis killed in that particular episode. That is a very, very challenging enemy action to prevent. It in- volves, as you well know, starting by gaining control of the borders, which is why I mentioned earlier the urgent need to have a better border strategy that is much more comprehensive, and working the lines by which these suicide bombers are able to come into the country to bring explosives into the country, money, and sometimes tise to find the safe houses of course, that is very heavily in- telligence driven—and then to get them to disrupt them as quickly as we can before they can carry out such attacks. There has been varying levels of success with that. You may re- call at various times we have done operations in Mosul. One time we did 35 sites simultaneously at 2 o'clock in the morning with only one shot fired, but that depends, again, on building these in- telligence networks. It dies down after something like that. But gradually then they will build it back, because there are some ex- traordinarily determined enemies who do not want the new Iraq to succeed. It is not just about the coalition failing, it is about the new Iraq not succeeding. The former regular elements don't want the new Iraq to succeed. The extremists do not want it to succeed be- 547 cause they have a different conception of what the country should be. And then the element that has always been there, the criminals that were let out of jail by Saddam, murderers already showing a willingness to kill people, they remain willing guns for hire because they frankly need the money and don't have jobs. So it is a very volatile combination, and it is going to take a com- prehensive strategy to reduce it and disrupt it and eventually eliminate it. Mr. TAYLOR. General, in yesterday's paper there were reports that the interim Iraqi Government is asking to reoccupy the Green Zone; that they would like that to govern from. My first reaction is that is probably a good idea, but I would like to hear your thoughts on that. I realize that is going to create some logistical problems. But, again, if the purpose of all of this is to hand the government back to the Iraqis, I think that might be a great sym- bolic move. But I would like to hear your thoughts on what kind of problems that might present. General PETRAEUS. Sir, I see you are asking my professional opinion, but this is not an area that I am in. I fully recognize for having been here well over a year the psychological impact over us staying in these palaces. And I can tell you that there are efforts ongoing in a variety of places in the country to indeed build base camps away from those locations. The challenge is, though, that for some of the really big head- quarters and the really big organizations like the U.S. Embassy-to- be and some of the other outfits, to achieve the standoff that you want that so you are not getting RPG’d on a regular basis or mor- tared on a regular basis or very accurate rocket fire, these com- plexes that are the palaces are extraordinarily useful. I think ev- erybody has taken a hard look, and I know General Sanchez men- tioned it to the staff yesterday morning, because they did, in fact, hear President Sheikh Ghazi raise it, and others have raised it as well, and clearly over time we are going to have to figure out how we can relocate to someplace that can still provide the force protec- tion and the standoff that has taken months to achieve here. Mr. TAYLOR. Thank you, General. The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman. The gentleman from New Jersey Mr. Saxton. Mr. ŠAXTON. General, good to see you. It has been 6 months or so since we had the opportunity to spend time together in Mosul. And I would like to point out I see a new set of stars on your collar, so congratulations. General PETRAEUS. Thanks very much. Mr. SAXTON. General, we are doing something that we have not done before, and that is to stand up a new government in a Middle Eastern country where the culture is different, and it is proving to be a difficult task. And so for the successes that we have had, we should make note of them and congratulate yourselves for the suc- cesses we have had. The American people and Members of Congress are now con- templating how U.S. forces will—how coalition forces, I should say, will hand off the job of providing security to the forces that you are now standing up. Can you give us a look into your crystal ball and tell us how you see this process going? How will the American and 548 coalition forces move out of perhaps their current positions and move the Iraqi forces in? How long will this take, and what will the process look like? General PETRAEUS. Congressman, good to see you as well, and thank you as well for visiting our soldiers. We have seen the process. The process has been ongoing in the country, and what we will do is to continue that process. Again, it is not a light switch, it is a sliding bar. But there has been transfer of security responsibilities for a vari- ety of tasks in the country. Again, I point to Nineveh Province, which, again, not just Kurds; it was a Sunni majority with a Kurd- ish minority and really laid on the ethnic fault lines. Whereas you recall up here, you saw the Iraq Civil Defense Corps soldiers. We were right in the process of transitioning-literally we did formal ceremonies, transferred authority for security for each of the ammo dumps in that area up there. They now secure those dumps. In fact, the force that replaced us, as I mentioned, less than one-third our size, could not have done that without Iraqis doing it. The bor- der police, several battalions out there also trained; again, formal transfer of authority ceremony for them to take over responsibility for that border on either side of the official crossing near Rabiyah up in the northwest quadrant. In some other cases, frankly, we transitioned responsibility, and it backfired, and that is where we have to learn lessons and do it better next time. But that is what I see is the process, Congressman, a conditions- base process. There is, in fact, a time line. We do know where we want to go. We know that we want to have 29 battalions of the Army by the early part of next year. We want to reduce the num- ber in the police, but increase the quality. We are keenly aware that it is quality not quantity when it comes to police, and it is peo- ple, not technology, although we would like to have as many really good people we can, enabled by the best technology we can. But as conditions are met, as we bring forces on line, we will lit- erally transition authority for certain tasks and certain areas to them. And that really, again, has happened throughout the cour in countless cases, and it is going to continue to happen. The chal- lenge is in a place like Baghdad where the security threats remain very substantial and where the impact of these sensational attacks psychologically is very, very important, that we are going to have to continue to focus a big effort here, and that is going to take some time before Iraqi security forces can be truly trained, and equipped, ind enabled, and operating successfully to try to deal with that. There is another element that is related to all of this, Congress- man, that I didn't talk about in the opening statement, and prob- ably two or three other elements. One is the intelligence structure The Iraqi National Intelligence Service is very much an early work in progress. As I mentioned earlier, the way that we have to get at the suicide bombers and the terrorists is to get at the safe houses and at the rat lines and get at the individuals who are ferrying in the explosives, the suicide bombers and so forth. It is all intelligence based, and we have a lot of work to do there. That is being done largely right now by the multinational Force Iraq G2 section and by other governmental agencies, the Central Intel- ligence Agency (CIA). And that is going to take a considerable 549 amount of effort in the country where there is so much distrust, and they have to build trust in one another if they are going to build an intel service. There are also other security forces that are outside the Ministry of Interior and the Ministry of Defense that are critically important to the country. Among these are the security oil infrastructure, much of which is contracted out, and that is the way that has been handed off, and there is going to have to be some review of that. Because it involved the north and the south, there have been seri- ous attacks in the past week or so. And then the Electrical Police Security Service as well as with the Railway Police Service, again, is going to need some bolstering, and it may be we have to get into that arena and assist them substantially, too. Mr. SAXTON. Just one quick follow up. As you pointed out, the transition started many months ago as we began to stand up Íraqi security forces. So when we get to June the 30th, so that nobody is disappointed, this process that has been gradual was started at least six months ago, and that we are well into. That process we can expect to see continue, but we won't see any radical change for quite some time; is that a fair statement? General PETRAEUS. It is, indeed. It is a very, very accurate depic- tion of the situation that we expect to see in early July and, frank- ly, through the early fall or midfall. We very much have our eye on the time frame at the end of the year when the first step in the election process will be held. That is a very important event, and we do want to have as many capable Iraqi security forces as we can have on duty at that time. It may be the next really volatile period once we are through the transition process. And again, we are pointing toward that very directly. But you are absolutely right that on 1 July you are not going to see a switch flip that will transition from coalition to Iraqi security forces throughout the country. Mr. SAXTON. Thank you, General. And congratulations on a great job. The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman. And the gentleman from Texas Mr. Reyes. Mr. REYES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And, General, good to see you again, and congratulations as well. I have just a couple of areas that I wanted to ask questions about. The first one is after June 30, how do you envision the Iraqi Survey Group and their work to be affected by the transition? That is number one. And number two, what kind of work is being done on the ground to ensure that in this transition, as the Iraqis as- sume more control or more responsibility for their security and op- erations, and the U.S. forces, as we have been told, are more in a backup mode, what kind of discussions have gone on to settle things like potential conflicts in terms of operational disagree- ments? In other words, should there be disagreements between the commander of the Iraqi forces versus the commander of the U.S. forces acting in a backup mode? What kind of resolution will be in place? And then another important thing is we have been paying the ci- vilian community for any damages that have been inadvertently caused as a result of our operations. Are those restitutions going 550 to continue, and is it still going to continue to be our responsibility? And I will just hear your response. And, again, thank you for your service, General, and I hope to see you there in a couple of weeks. Thanks. General PETRAEUS. Good to see you again, Congressman Reyes. On the Iraqi Survey Group (ISG), I honestly don't know. That was beyond me, and I am not in that arena right now, and I need to defer that one, I am afraid. On the decision making process, that is an area, in fact, that is getting a lot of attention right now, as you might imagine. There is a structure that has been created, if you will, at the top level and includes the Prime Minister, right now Ambassador Bremer, presumably it will be the U.K. Ambassador and others, and the Multinational Force Iraq Commander. And then there are other structures that are being established that will stretch all the way down to the province level, both for the Iraqis and in a sense to connect activities of coalition forces at each level. The truth is that at the province level, that already functions pretty well. In fact, in some places the province governments have been in position well over a year, and they are quite well estab- lished and have close relationships with coalition forces, as do typi- cally the province police chiefs, the ICDC brigade commanders, the border police and the Facility Protection Security Forces (FPSF) chiefs. The issue is, in a sense, having to connect them again to Bagh- dad on the Iraqi side in the same way that we have with the very good chain of command on the coalition side. Again, that process, that determining process, if you will, is actu- ally ongoing right now to determine what should be specifically below what is called the ministerial level body at the top, the dep- uty's committee that is below that, and then there is a command- er's council, what is below the commander's council and so forth. On the restitution, sir, I can really only tell you, I guess, again I will give my professional opinion because I am not right out there in the field right now, I do know that, again, Commander Emer- gency Response Fund (CERF) has been used for a lot of that be- cause there is typically not a great deal of money and there is a legal basis for that that our lawyers found a way of doing that. I am certain that that is going to continue because commanders will feel an obligation to do that. And I would if I were still out there commanding the 101st in northern Iraq. The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman. The gentleman from Pennsylvania, Mr. Weldon. Mr. WELDON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General, let me add my thanks to you for your work and the work of all of our troops. The bulk of this committee has been over to Iraq and Afghanistan on at least one occasion over the past sev- eral months. And I would say to you, and I know I speak for all of my colleagues, when it is appropriate for you we will bring other delegations over and pay our personal, not just thanks to our troops but the new Iraqi military and police that you are standing up. But we won't do it in a way that disrupts your very important activities, but when you are prepared you let Chairman Hunter 551 know and Ike Skelton, and I know they will put together a biparti- san delegation, and a lot of us will join with that. A lot of us are concerned about Iran's involvement in fermenting unrest in Iraq. I personally think that Hamani and the Iranians are a large part of what is funding everyone from Sadr to the local groups that are taking hostages. As a part of the overall com- prehensive strategy, we are pressing the State Department. In fact, I met with Ambassador Negroponte this morning about the issue of having a strategy to deal with Iran's involvement, which com- plements the other areas that you focused on. My questions to you refer to two areas. One is our concern about having clear and well defined rules of engagement so that our troops do not get caught without having the ability to defend them- selves and their fellow troops. So if you could give us an under- standing of the rules of engagement that are being developed and that will be in place when we transition control within the next several weeks. The second issue is we have been trying to give you the best technology that we can to assist in dealing with these terrorist at- tacks. And some of that technology is very sophisticated and in- volves unmanned aerial vehicles and other kinds of technologies. Will the new Iraq military have access to some of those tech- nologies that we are giving to our military so that they have the same capability to understand the threat environment? In particu- lar, will we be transitioning technologies like Unmanned Aerial Ve- hicles (UAV)s to the new Iraq military? General PETRAEUS. Congressman, we do look forward to seeing you, and it actually would be very important to be able to introduce the Iraq Ministry of Defense and military leadership to you. When we have had those visits and been able to introduce our members, the Province Governor was always, frankly, quite grateful to talk to those from Washington. Sir, on the Iranian influence, this is one of those areas again that has to be part of the border strategy. There has been some atten- tion given to that; certainly some border crossing sites, for exam- ple, are closed. There are some good procedures. The truth is that I think we have got to check very hard on whether or not the pro- cedures are being enforced or not. This is very complicated because of the religious tourism issue. As you know, the most holy shrines for the Shi'a; which is the pre- dominant sect in Iran, are in Najaf and Karbala. There are literally waves of religious tourists that go and visit. It is very important for the economies of Najaf and Karbala. Najaf in particular was very downtrodden under Saddam. It received absolutely no help whatsoever from 92 or 93 when he put down a revolt down there and eventually eve, as you recall, drained the marshes farther southeast and so forth. So this, say, real—again, another one of those where there are conflicting tensions and we have got to get the right procedures and then enforce those procedures. Sir, on the Rules of Engagement (ROE) issue, I can assure you that we will never put American soldiers in a position where they are not allowed to protect themselves. As you know, even peace- time rules of engagement allow you to do that. So I would not be concerned in that regard. And I am not personally-I am not on 552 the multinational force side or multinational corps, but I am not are of any substantial revisions to the rules of engagement as part of the transition. On the issue of technology, we are trying to get reasonable tech- nology for the Iraqi armed forces. In fact, today I saw the display of the package that in fact you all have funded for the Iraq Army, and it does in fact include PVS–7 night vision goggles. There are two seeker aircraft. It is a small—not a UAV, but a piloted recon- naissance aircraft that will come on line in early July. It was just funded. This is very important because we believe it can help run the lines up in the vicinity of Kirkuk. That line has been attacked re- peatedly. It clearly has some very tough enemy help there that con- tinue to blow up that very critical line that leads from the Kirkuk oil fields to the massive refinery in Baiji. As to the more advanced stuff, sir, the $3 billion is a heck of a lot of money, but as you know better than anybody else, to go real- ly high end starts to add up considerably. Just a simple topic or simple piece of equipment like shifting from the AK-47 or that family of weaponry to the M-16, for example, the cost would go up by several orders of magnitude. And that is something that they would sort of like to do because there is a symbolism to the AK- 47; it is just something that they can tackle right now given the resources available to them. Mr. WELDON. Thank you. Do you have enough in the way of re- sources or do we need to look at providing you additional monies? General PETRAEUS. Sir, we are going through the process of de- termining that right now. As I mentioned in the opening statement there are emergent requirements that are a result of either new initiatives that are very commendable by the Iraqis; for example, the civil intervention course. I think we are going to be able to fund that with the existing monies. But some of the additional base camp structure that may have to go into place, there is a list that we are developing and then we are going to try and scrunch it down as much as we can and see if we can fit it in the existing resources. But at some point we owe, in fact, to the Department a report on that. The unknown that we are grappling with, sir, as well is that the Iraqis themselves are really struggling with this, as you might imagine. They have just stood up the Ministry of Defense. There is not an elaborate Program Analysis and Evaluation (PA&E) structure there by any means. They are literally about one deep. Everybody goes to the minister for everything right now. 'he only thing that we are really confident that they have prob- ably budgeted for with the Ministry of Finance we think is person- nel. We have really got to get a handle on how much will be al- lowed to them for operation maintenance costs. And to be fair to the Ministry of Finance, their challenge is trying to de to develop realis- tic assumptions about how much they are going to get out of the export of oil, most particularly, and as you know, I forget how many tens of billions of dollars a day—or tens of millions of dollars t through the southern oil terminal when it is operat- ing. 553 So, again, it both highlights the importance of keeping that line open and also, again, of getting the Ministry of Finance to identify how much they are going to fund above and beyond salaries for the Defense and the Interior Ministries. The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman. The gentleman from Washington, Mr. Larsen. Mr. LARSEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you, General, for taking some time with us this morning, for us I guess later in the day for you. I was pleased to certainly hear that you are try- ing—you recognize the problem of connecting the command and control at the top with all the developments taking place already that has been put forth by U.S. and the coalition forces to develop security forces for Iraq. Just going down the list of what we have developed here, a police force, a border force, the ICDC, the Iraqi Army, the Facility Protection Service (FPS). Today you mentioned the Iraqi National Task Force, a new civil intervention force. You also let us know that the FPS doesn't include oil security or elec- tricity police. That is separate. That is outside. You certainly have an organizational challenge on your hands. I have some questions related to that. First question is generally, how do you propose to get a handle on all these various elements and make them connect? But more in particular, exactly what is the Civil Intervention Force (CIF)? How does it differ from the police? What is it its exact role? I think you said either the Prime Minister or the President has proposed this. What is the Iraqi vision for the CIF, and also what is the dif- ference between the ICDC and the Iraqi National Task Force? And where are we recruiting for the Iraqi National Task Force and why was it created, as opposed to maintaining the current focus with ICDC and the army? And then you haven't mentioned yet, with regards to security, the militias. And the Prime Minister I think announced a ban on all militias. How can we expect that ban to be any more successful than the previous announcement that the Coalition Provisional Au- thority (CPA) made about a ban on militias? And what role does the Peshmerga play in security arrangements in Iraq in the future? Is it considered a militia that would be banned, or is it in fact going to be operating in the north as a part of security forces? That is a lot of questions, but hopefully I have organized them in an order where you can get them answered. Thank you. General PETRAEUS. Sir, that is a good number of questions here. I think I got them. You left out the air force, the Coastal Defense Force, and the police, Congressman. By the way, the Coastal De- fense Force we actually turned over to them. It just went on and was not remarked on too much, but we formally turned over to them five patrol boats last week. Big ceremony. The first seahort of the United Kingdom was in for that. And they are down in Basra at a very good base; yet another piece of infrastructure that has been built. They should be operational fully by the mid fall. They are doing a go The Air Force as well. We actually have Air Force officers in the Iraq armed forces that are training in Jordan on an early model C-130 and on Hueys, helicopters. And then I already mentione the purchase of the two seeker reconnaissance aircraft. 554 The police are being trained down in the Basra area. They also are doing a good job. The U.K. Is training them with Royal Marine commandoes. The truth is that on the Ministry of Interior side, the connectivity is not too bad. The structure at least exists, although, candidly, they can't always get a phone call through or get some- body to answer it. And so we are going through a process. We also have a substantial command and control program that you all funded that is part of this $3 billion that will enable them to connect from an operation center in Baghdad to the joint coordi- nation centers that are established in each province, or being es- tablished, and then on down to the precincts or the subordinate cit- ies, if you will. That is pretty straightforward on the Ministry of the Interior side. The Civil Intervention Force probably will be controlled out of Baghdad. Again, it is a new initiative for which we are just hosting the recruiting conference this Friday to discuss how to recruit. Again, it will be two battalions of a Gendarme Marie type force craft, lightly armored vehicles. We believe we can fund this, by the way, sir, again with that $3 billion. And then it will be about three battalions initially, growing to nine battalions, that will be trained and equipped in riot control. Their purpose is to take over where the police don't have the capacity to retake a police station, for ex- ample, if for example the enemy throws the police out or something like that. Sir, the Iraq Civil Defense Corps was generally regionally re- cruited and trained and performs regional security functions that are not performed by the police. So they often are outside cities, again, guarding infrastructure, conducting convoy security, per- forming checkpoint duties and the like, and also conducting offen- sive operations along with coalition forces. The Irag National Task Force, on the other hand, was developed after early April as an Iraqi initiative, their desire to have an army division that was explicitly recruited, equipped, and trained; and the emphasis on recruited, to conduct urban counterinsurgency op- erations. As you may recall, there was the failure in April when a battal- ion was to be sent down to Fallujah, and essentially it is a little bit more complex than has been depicted. They actually did start. They got ambushed. They had a firefight. They had to pull back up to Taji. And then that is where the discussion ensued where they reminded people that they had been hired, which was correct, with the idea that the army was to do what it used to do: defend the country from external invaders. The Iraqi leadership said, fine; we will explicitly recruit. They generally recruited from existing Army units, took good people out of those, signed on the dotted line that they were ready to fight fel- low Iraqis. It is those forces that are now coming on line. The re- cruiting was done by the Iraqi generals. In fact, the Commander of the Army himself went out and talked to each battalion and to others. Sir, as to the militias, I do think that this one will be more suc- cessful than previous endeavors, because first of all, in general, there is buy in by the political leadership of these militias. Second, the armed forces, the security services, are in fact able to absorb 555 a reasonable number of them. And in fact we have had recently, for example, various Peshmerga Days, Iraqi Communist Party Day, Iraqi Islamic Party Day, at various recruiting stations throughout the country. So they are getting their opportunity to sign up for the and for other security servis ices. So the Peshmerga have for a long time been being incorporated into Iraq civil defense corps units. We have had a number of them in units up in the north. There were some that were in the Iraqi Kurdish areas that were predominantly Kurdish, and then others that were in the Ninawa Province, for example, tended to be mi- norities within units that were typically majority Sunni Arab in that particular area, although they also included Turkmen, Chris- tians, and others. The transitional administrative law allows the Iraqi Kurdish area to retain internal security forces. So in addition to those Peshmerga that are absorbed into the army, absorbed into the ICDC, the police, and the other security services, writ large Iraqi- wide, they will also be able to retain internal security forces that can absorb a number of these former Peshmerga. And they are en- visioning, for example, mountain battalions. We had already built water police battalions out there up in our area when we were there because we had all three of the Kurdish provinces in the 101st Airborne area. They have forestry police and a couple of other varieties of secu- rity services. And, in fact, that is a another emergent task that jumped out at us after we started doing the mission analysis, if you will, after that militia agreement was announced, that we may in- deed have to assist them in some of the organizing, training, and equipping of those internal security forces, just as we are for all of Iraq's security forces. Mr. LARSEN. Thank you, General. That is a very complete answer to my long question. I appreciate it. I thank you very much. Mr. Chairman. The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman. The gentleman from Ne- vada, Mr. Gibbons. Mr. GIBBONS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And General Petraeus, thank you for your service to our country. We are very proud of you and the service that you and your fellow soldiers have done for us over there. I guess my question is one which deals with the issue of intel- ligence. If you are talking about security and establishing a secu- rity force, the number one issue would be intelligence. What are we doing to establish an intelligence agency in Iraq that is going to be effective, be controllable, be able to process intelligence, share it both pre- and post-June 30th? And then finally, if you get through that, give us a brief update on what Moqtada Sadr is up to today and what do we know about him? General PETRAEUS. Sir, I am not the expert on the intelligence services. That is something that we are clearly going to have to get into. But since getting back, I have been focusing on the security forces that are essentially overseen by the Office of Security Tran- sition. The CIA and the G-2 multinational force in Iraq have been working with the the Iraqi National Intelligence Service (INIS). It 556 has, in fact, developed some pretty good intelligence. When I was here before, we used a fair amount of that. But there is still an enormous amount of work that has to go forward, frankly, to achieve the level of sophistication that you are talking about. There still are barriers that have to be broken down. There is still trust that has to be developed among individuals from dif- ferent backgrounds. And, again, some of this is going to take quite some time, I think. There is an issue that we are grappling with with the sharing of intelligence. We are working hard to be able to get the right clas- sification that allows us to share with our Iraqi partners right now. It is literally about the "for official use only.” that is not as big a deal as you might think, because we are already sharing with a pretty broad variety of coalition partners. In truth, the office or the organization that I had—which was really a command; we are well over 2,000 in terms of advisers, contract trainers, police trainers, the people in uniform, the support teams and all the rest of that, and it is really a multinational security transition and command. We have seven or eight different countries represented. So we are grappling with some of that. But, again, as we get into the more sensitive intelligence, we are going to have to really work hard to speed that process of, if you will, laundering intelligence from the very sensitive compartmented arena into something that can be handed with a tear line, if you will, to our Iraqi partners. Sir, on Moqtada al Sadr, the latest signs are encouraging, that he has given direction to his militia members to withdraw from Najaf and Karbala, unless that is where they live. The police chief in Najaf and the Governor there have been gaining confidence over recent weeks considerably. There was a patrol that was done joint- ly by the 1st Armored Division Forces and the 2nd Armored Cal- vary Regiment Forces under 1st Armored Division. And by the way, sir, you talk about folks that have done a magnificent job; that is the 1st Armored Division element that was on the verge of going home, then was told they had to stay on longer into the long hot summer. And as you are thanking individuals, I know that sometimes it is tough to get into theater. It might not be as tough to get into Germany, when they are back there, to thank Major General Marty Dempsey and his tremendous team. Because the way they have shouldered the additional burden and putting that rucksack back on and went back to it is really admirable. There is nothing harder than telling soldiers they will have to stay longer, unless it is tell- ing their families. The leadership of that organization, the officers and noncommissioned officers and troopers, has all done magnifi- cently. As to the long run with Sadr, there is also a lot of Iraqi work going on. As you know, an Iraqi issue was brought against him, so there is a legal issue there. Again, that is going to be one that the new Iraqi Interim Government is going to deal with. I think it is one they already are dealing with, frankly, to figure out in a sense if they can bring some of those people at least into the legitimate political process. 557 Others, General Corelli, working in Sadr City where he is lit- erally about to launch a huge avalanche of programs as this con- tracting process has really begun to snowball. Hopefully, we can lit- erally employ them right out under from Sadr. Because an awful lot of this is about unemployed young men without hope. And they are very vulnerable to the kind of persuasion of someone like Sadr, and all of a sudden they are in the back of the pickup truck with the AK-47s, controlling the proceeds of some of these religious shrines. So, again, I think it will be a many pronged effort to try to both attract some of his supporters, perhaps the Iraqis will try to incor- porate them into the political process. In the meantime, we want to continue to shore up the police forces, particularly in those sen- sitive areas of Najaf and then over east to Kirkuk and north to Karbala. Mr. GIBBONS. Thank you very much, General. And Godspeed to you and all your forces. The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman. And the gentlelady from California, Ms. Davis, is recognized Ms. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, General Petraeus, for your extraordinary service. I wonder if we could go back for just a bit. I am sorry I had to leave the room, and perhaps my colleagues have already asked about this, but if we go back and think about it was, quote, that the army was disbanded. I know that there are many different takes on whether or not that was truly disbanded or not, but I am just won- dering about the lessons learned from that now. As you look at the individuals who are engaged in leadership in the Iraqi Army or even in law enforcement, where are those people coming from? Is it coming from those ranks? Have you been able to recoup a lot of the people who had skills and were making a contribution to tal- ent? Where is that coming from? General PETRAEUS. Well Congresswoman, an awful lot of the new Iraq Army officers, the vast majority of them, are former soldiers. Many of them in fact are former officers and/or they are former Peshmerga. Because, remember, we are also hiring Kurds, recruit- ing Kurds for the Army. In fact, when we are up there today ask- ing down the ranks, how many years did you have in the Army and so forth, a number of them had over 10 years in the Army. So there has been a great deal of recruiting of former soldiers who wanted to be part of this professional force and also met the criteria. That is part of the challenge, is that there is a physical requirement and there is an educational requirement for some of the positions in the army. And that excludes some of those who were conscripts in the old army. I think that we will see Prime Minister Allawi sorting out, again, options as to how he can both engage and then perhaps use some of the former leaders at various levels. I think that this connection process that we talked about where we assist the Iraqis in the es- tablishment of additional brigades for their ICDC, probably going from the 6-brigade structure that exists rights now to as many as 18 brigade headquarters for what may be as high as 51 battalions. It is 45 right now. So those structures are legitimate given the su- pervisory numbers. 558 And then probably a number of divisional headquarters on top of that. In fact we owe to Prime Minister Allawi tomorrow a coordi- nated Iraqi military, Coalition military, and Ministry set of options that he charged us with developing yesterday when he met with Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz. And he gave, as I mentioned earlier, some pretty clear and concise and coherent guidance as to some of his objectives. And I think that we can in a sense help him achieve his objectives and, again, engage and even employ some of these former soldiers in a way that is very much needed right now, in fact, to create a chain of command in the ICDC and yet not do away with all the work that has been done in creating the ICDC, their infrastructure, their rebuilt training academies, and so forth. There are problems with the ICDC still. We have to address those as well. Ms. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. Thank you, General Petraeus. We have to go back and forth a little differently here than usual. As you look back on that decision, what are your thoughts? Was it nec- essary to have a strong break or would there have been another way to have done that? General PETRAEUS. Well, again, if you are asking my professional military advice, it would have had to start with a decision way back before probably we crossed the berm. If they could have per- haps communicated more effectively early on, and I don't know that that was possible. I know there were attempts made to do that. We were told about a number of those targeting of individual units. Frankly, they did not do what they were asked to do early on, and that necessitated fighting. The truth is by the time that de- cision was made, frankly by the time Baghdad fell, and in fact cer- tainly by the time that we had pushed all the way from Baghdad to the north, there was no army, there was no infrastructure, there ammo dumps left, no barracks, no vehicles, no fighting sys- tems. And so I guess there were people out there and they might have had AK-47s at their home, but as to coherent structures, again, not that much out there. Then the other question you have to ask is, did you want to bring that back? Did you want an extraordinarily top heavy military? In Mosul alone, there are 1,100 generals; just in Mosul, a city of 1.7 million people. I heard reports of over 10,000 in Iraq at large. And so you get into all of those kinds of issues, is that what you want to bring back? And, again, there is a variety of different things that certainly folks I think look back on and perhaps say this might have run a little faster here or there. But that hindsight is awfully clear right now and I don't think it sure was at the time. Ms. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. Thank you. Just one additional ques- tion. Are you seeing many incidents of individuals who are being trained and then deserting and perhaps bringing that power against us? How prevalent do you think that is? General PETRAEUS. I don't have the figures on the ICDC, which would be the one where that might be more prevalent. We clearly have to go through a rebuilding process, Congresswoman, after the early April period for a number of the ICDC battalions. The Army has been pretty stable since late April. And I think the increases 559 in pay, essentially the hostile fire pay that they get now, as well as the equipment, the better leadership, the better facilities, lit- erally the better food, the better treatment, and all the rest of that has made a substantial difference. We frankly tried to adopt the same approach on the ICDC side. I don't know if you were in there earlier when I explained the various changes that we made in the ICDC based on the lessons learned out of early April. But those are being applied now. As I mentioned, it is really heartening to take one of the Iraqi Army generals up to Tikrit, Saddam's former hometown, where the Big Řed One, the 1st Infantry Division, their ICDC regional training academy graduated 240 sergeants. They just flat look good. You just felt good about them. So I think that there has been a lot of progress in there since early April based on some of the lessons we learned. And what we have to do is continue that progress and that focus. We are even going now to the point of we are helping them build technical vehi- cles, you know, pickup trucks with machine guns on the back. We are even giving really, anti-aircraft artillery weapons or at least large caliber machine guns to some of the police. So we have got to make sure that the security forces are not outgunned by the bad iys. And we are also giving them RPGs and other weapons as well. Ms. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. Thank you very much. The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentlelady. The gentleman from South Carolina, Mr. Wilson. Mr. WILSON OF SOUTH CAROLINA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And, General, thank you very much for your leadership. I had the opportunity to visit with you last September in Mosul. I was so impressed by what you were doing. I was so impressed by our troops. It just was so heart-warming. In particular while we were there, you were making an emphasis on the civil action projects. I only regret that indeed these are not given media coverage. This means so much to individual citizens of Iraq, and I know it means a lot to the American and coalition troops that are working to build a civil society. Additionally I have a perspective too. I appreciate your leader- ship, General Sanchez. I have a son serving in Iraq, as the Chair- man has a son serving in Iraq. In fact, I have been in touch with him twice today by Blackberry. And so as a parent, it is very reas- suring to know the qualities of the leadership. And these young people are in touch with us around the clock, and it means a lot. Additionally, I am grateful to hear of your close working relation- ship with Prime Minister Allawi. I was very honored last Thursday in a bipartisan delegation to meet with Iraqi President Ghazi al Yawar. And President al Yawar, who is a graduate of George Washington University, was very clear in his optimism for the fu- ture of Iraq. Obviously, with extraordinary difficulties, but his opti- mism was just infectious. And I am really so pleased with so much that is being done. And then, specifically, in April I had the opportunity to visit the police academy in Ammam, Jordan. We met with some of the re- cruits there. They had been, in fact, part of the Iraqi Army and 560 they were selected at random, very spontaneously, but indicated a dedication to building a civil society. I also had the opportunity to helicopter up in April to Kirkush and meet with some of the 30th Infantry Division troops there who told of working with the Iraqi security forces. A sad testimonial as to the success of the security forces is that they are under such at- tack. The attack today on the recruits, the attack on the stations, is an indication of the effectiveness of what you are putting to- gether. I want to thank you. A concern I have, though, is in October 2002 Saddam Hussein re- leased all the persons from prisons in Iraq. And obviously many of us were happy; these were political prisoners, but at least half were violent criminals. And I know that the Iraqi Survey Group has made tremendous progress in recreating the arrest records. But what is being done to pick up violent criminals? I know in any American community, if all the violent criminals were back on the street, it would just be catastrophic. And so what is being done about the violent criminals? General PETRAEUS. First off, Congressman, it is good to see you again as well. I don't know if you were in there earlier when I men- tioned that the asphalt refinery that I think I told you about, which hadn't operated for 18 years down in Qayyarah, south of Mosul, de- spite having a workforce of 450 Iraqis during that entire time, is now producing 200 tons of asphalt a day and may be the biggest in the region at some point. The young recruits are indeed impressive. That underscores once again the importance of using some of the DFI money that Prime Minister Allawi approved to, in fact, thank some of the very, very senior police and to offer early retirement schemes for some of them. As you noted, sir, in fact the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF), have been the targets of an awful lot of attacks. It is not just because they are in a sense softer targets, and it is because they are, in fact, making a difference. Those that don't want the new Iraq to succeed are certainly going to go after the Iraqi Security Forces, just as they went after us and still go after us. Sir, the criminals are a very, very big element. I don't know if you were in there earlier there when I mentioned there are three large categories of bad guys: The former Baathists obviously don't want the real regime insiders to have money, to have expertise; some of it still stashed away outside the country. They certainly don't want the new Iraq to succeed, or they are finally out in the cold. The extremists, some inside the country, some from outside the country, that did not want this new Iraq, as conceived, to suc- ceed because it threatens their conception of what it should be. And then finally these violent criminals. They are the ready guns for hire in the communities. They were an enormous source of problem to us in Mosul and the same is true throughout the country. I can tell you that what we are doing—I don't know what is being done about them nationwide. In fact, frankly, sir, I wrote a note down here that that is one to discuss with the Iraqi leaders, and perhaps their approach might be refined a bit when they take over. We were in fact trying. We had recreated the records in Mosul. The judges had found records. They knew who some of 561 these criminals were, quite a few of them. There was an attempt to arrest them on new charges where that was possible because there had been an amnesty actually. So again I made a note there that is a great one to jog us on. That could make a big difference actually if some of these could be picked up in great numbers. Thank you, sir. Mr. WILSON OF SOUTH CAROLINA. Thank you very much for your service. And God bless our troops and we will remember September the 11th. I yield the balance of my time. The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman. The gentleman from Florida, Mr. Meek. Mr. MEEK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General Petraeus, thank you for your service, sir. I know that you have a very difficult job in training the new security forces there in Iraq. There was a report earlier this morning that six in- surgents who tried to fire upon U.S. troops were actually Iraqi Se- curity Forces, and I know that there are ongoing investigations of trying to locate and weed out these individuals. And I just wanted to ask, is there a new vetting process of trying to figure out who are the bad guys and who are the good people? And two, has there been an assessment of the quality of recruit- ment? I heard you say earlier that you had at least 100 individuals ough the recruitment station every day. I know that this is a very difficult thing to do, but I think at the same time, the integrity of what we are doing is at stake. So could you explain to us that process, number one, assessing the recruitment quality; and also what is going on as it relates to some of these individuals that are caught with either uniforms stuffed in the car, because they were able to get into certain areas because they were security forces, or Infantry Division (ID), what is actually happening with those individuals now? General PETRAEUS. Congressman, I don't have the details back from the 1st Marine Expeditionary Force that took place out in Ramadi, I believe, and in fact I just heard about that in the morn- ing update this morning. We are trying to get the details on that. It is not the first time it happened though, and sadly it likely will not be the last. That has been a challenge all along. We have always tried hard to construct a variety of lists from various old records and so forth. But in fact, you have put your fin- ger on something that Prime Minister Allawi raised yesterday; frankly, the same concern, that there is a apparently a CPA con- tract or CPA effort to provide to him the form of a database that they can then take over and really do it themselves. Because, obvi- ously, they can vet a lot better than we can. They understand the culture, the way that the names—just a whole host of other nu- ances that are tougher for those of our side of the counterintel- ligence world doing the vetting. There are a couple pieces to the recruitment quality issue that you raised, Congressman. One of them is just basic requirements. They actually do have a medical exam, a physical exam, that are tougher, frankly, than they used to be, clearly, because quite a few former soldiers regrettably don't meet those requirements, and an education requirement. And then there is a vetting process that does go through again a challenge, because again if they are not 562 in some record from the past, we are not going to pick them up. And an awful lot of these folks are young people without a trac record, that were not in something, and somehow or other either took the uniform from someone else or just flat turned and took an action against the coalition. Mr. MEEK. Like I said earlier, I know that is a very difficult thing to do right now when you don't have the kind of information that you need to be able to figure out who is doing what. General, do you know what is actually happening with these in- dividuals that we have trained that are firing upon U.S. troops? I know that is a small number, but are the Iraqis dealing with it in a way as we are dealing with our court martials, dealing with the criminal aspect of that to deter other individuals that may think about firing upon U.S. troops, that there is a level of punishment in a very public way to try to deter that? What kind of efforts are taking place in that area; or do we, for those individuals that are still alive, do we take those individuals within our system and do we have them detained at this time? And I guess eventually they will be turned over to the Iraqis for prosecution. General PETRAEUS. Sir, as a general rule, the first thing is that they shoot at us, we are going to try and shoot back and kill them or capture them. But if they in fact surrender, if they are captured, typically they are going into the coalition incarceration system, if you will, vice the civil system. There are some people who commit criminal acts that are not di- rected again the coalition, that our soldiers might catch someone doing, particularly when we have larger numbers of MPs out there, for example, doing joint patrols with the police in a variety of loca- tions, who would then be put into the civil system. And a great deal of work has gone into standing back up the ju- dicial system. Before we had Mosul I might, had we had a very, very big effort there to try to stand up that province judicial sys- tem. All the courthouses were rebuilt. The main judicial center which had, I think, five or seven courtrooms, it was that large a number; of other facilities was rebuilt. They had a 43 percent con- viction rate up there, Congressman, which I think actually is pretty reasonable by our terms as well. But those that attack our soldiers first of all, again, are in jeop- ardy of being shot back, and then certainly captured and put into our detention facilities. The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman. And we have got four. more colleagues who need to ask questions, and hopefully we can get this in before we lose our air time. The gentleman from Oklahoma, Mr. Cole. Mr. COLE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And, General Petraeus, thank you as well. I was one of the many people that had the opportunity to visit with you when you were in Mosul last October, and came away enormously impressed with your professionalism and the quality of the people that you led and their dedication to task. And the fact that you have been willing to go back again is something that is a real testament to your com- mitment to our country and to the mission. So thank you quite pro- foundly for what you do and the people that are associated with what you are doing. 563 I am interested in coming at your task from a little bit different direction. You told us a great deal about the challenges you have in assembling security forces and the progress that we have made in that regard. Can you tell me a little bit about what the attitude of the civilian population is toward the security forces that you are beginning to assemble? In the end, those forces aren't going to be successful unless they have a civilian population that believes in them, believes in their mission, and frankly is willing to cooperate with them, probably to a degree beyond what they have been will- ing to cooperate with coalition forces that are from other countries. So could you give us some insight into how that relationship be- tween the forces you are developing and the civilian population they are serving is going? General PETRAEUS. Yes, sir. First of all, I don't know if you were in there earlier when it was mentioned, the poll that was con- ducted in Iraq indicated a considerable degree of optimism that Iraqi Security Forces could in fact secure Iraq at some point. And we have found that very true over here as well. I did mention earlier as well, the enormous national pride that has existed by Iraqis in their army. We do gradually see that pride coming back. We think it will increase as they are in fact deployed from these training bases, where as I mentioned, again, the initial battalion will depart from its training base at the end of this month and move down into Baghdad, and then two more after that in the month of July, and then it will start to snowball a bit. The Iraq Civil Defense Corps, sir, they are to actually to change the name, of all things. I think somewhere along the line we prob- ably didn't have the cultural recognition that the name does not translate well, and by the time it was named and enough people realized that, I think we were—probably were stuck with it. I think, again, Prime Minister Allawi will change the name. It comes from the fact that they have also civil defense organizations which are essentially fire department emergency services, emergency div- ers, and that kind of element in their cities in particular. And so the name means a lot. And, again, I think that he will do some- thing about that. And also in terms of connecting them into the army by the creation of these headquarters between these battal- ions and now the six brigades that exist and the headquarters, the joint headquarters in Baghdad. The police are uneven, sir. There is respect in certain areas, con- siderable respect in other areas. And then there are some where it is sort of shifting. And, frankly, Najaf is an area where we have seen it shift. We have a lot to do with that. We have to give them the equipment. We have to give them every advantage that we can give to them, and every backing that we can give to them; and then also over time, make sure that they are seen not as agents of the coalition but as, obviously, Iraqi police. And, again, this severance payment endeavor that will take some 30,000 at least of the older members of the police force and allow them to go into retirement, we think is going to make a big difference. And really we are very eager to see how that plays out. As I mentioned, Prime Minister Allawi supports that strongly. 564 Mr. COLE. Thank you, General. I understand we have a hard drop at 11. I have a lot of questions but there are other members that haven't got to ask any. Mr. Chairman, I yield back. _The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman; appreciate his courtesy. The gentleman from South Carolina, Mr. Spratt. Mr. SPRATT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General Petraeus, we met in September with a Congressional Delegation (CODEL) and everyone in our CODEL was impressed with what you were doing. We are deeply grateful for your service to our country. I don't think we could have chosen a better person for this follow on assignment to train the Iraqi Army. I want to ask you a few questions about that. First of all, I have seen various numbers as the target size, at least the initial size of the Iraqi Army, ranking from 35,000 to 50,000. Could you tell us what size force you have in mind, at least for the near future? General PETRAEUS. Sir, I think it will be closer to 35,000 than 50,000. Because as I mentioned earlier, we really have to develop these options for Prime Minister Allawi with his Iraqi defense lead- ership to develop the structure that is not in the plan right now and doesn't exist right now, particularly with respect to the ICDC. I can tell you that I think that the end result will be certainly the two divisions that are envisioned, the Iraq National Task Force di- vision (INTF); the small coastal defense force that does exist in the commando battalions are being trained now; the small air force; and then between 45 and 51 battalions of ICDC, with perhaps as many as 18 brigade headquarters on top of those, with a larger number of combat multipliers. Again, as I mentioned earlier, these are the ultimate tooth-to-tail ratio organizations that are very, very, very heavy on instruments, oots on the ground, but rely for all their-not all their logis- tics, but a large amount of their logistics, for contracted food, con- tracted living arrangements, if you will, and a variety of other sup- port. It is not a bad approach, but over time we have to give them more self-sufficiency so that the Iraqi National Command Author- ity can more easily move these forces around without having to do some shell game where they have infrastructure already built in a lot of places in the country, although we do need to do some of that. Again on top of these 18 brigades, I didn't mention that per- hapsI am not sure exactly, it is up to the Prime Minister-but perhaps as many as six divisional headquarters. So that again, sir, is going to take us certainly above that 35,000 number that is the original plan, but I am just not sure how much, again, until the Iraqis make the decisions because, frankly, it is their Ármy now, their armed forces. It is up to us to help their general staff officers and defense officials to come up with these options that satisfy the objectives that he articulated yesterday. Mr. SPRATT. I have seen various numbers also as to the number of trained troops already available to you and what is the begin- ning core of this army. The numbers I have seen from the Depart- ment of Defense range from 3,500 trained troops available right now to about 9,500. First question is, about how many trained troops would you say you have that are qualified and eligible at this point in time, and 565 why has training of the Army lagged behind the other security forces? General PETRAEUS. Sir, let me take on the last part first. That is because, frankly—because of the model that was adopted, where first infrastructure had to be built for the training base, individuals are brought in, many of them contractors, to help with that train- ing to reduce the burden on U.S. soldiers and coalition soldiers, and then there was a very deliberate process whereby the non- commissioned officers (NCOs) and the officers were trained first and then they started the recruit training, and you have a process where once the recruits are trained, the NCOs and the officers all join up together for the general collective training of the companies and battalions, and done at battalion level. The high number you used is probably about the number, a little bit more than the number that are actually in uniform in the mili- tary right now. And, frankly, there are a variety of training levels, all the way from probably over 1,000, certainly thousands, I would think actually, as we think about the various training courses that are ongoing, everything from basic training to leader training, al- though we just did complete, as I mentioned earlier, the second and last large officer training exercise out of the Jordanian Armed Forces Military Academy where some 800 officers graduated today. And that is the end of that, other than some speciality training for officers in other than just strictly infantry company-level battalion staff brigade staff and battalion brigade commanders. And then at the collective training there are sill several battal- ions right now that are in various stages of training. Two of those—well, one is certainly conducting operations right now out at the training base at Takagi, north of Baghdad. And that is the bat- talion that is going to then deploy down into southeast Baghdad. It is sort of a graduation exercise, which over here we can do real ns in a relatively quiet environment up there but still very much real operations. And then there is another battalion right behind them that is completing its training in military oper- ations in urban terrain, that was an add-on that we wanted to pro- vide to these battalions of the Iraqi National Task Force so they are prepared when they go into urban environment. Here is another one a little bit behind that. At the end of July we will have three Iraq National Task Force battalions. That will give us probably 2,500 or so soldiers actually deployed and on oper- ations and through all stages of training. Mr. SPRATT. One final question. When you get a force of 35,000 to 40,000 trained and stood up, will this be sufficient for the mis- sion for internal security in Iraq, or will this require other forces and coalition forces for some time to come as augmenting forces? General PETRAEUS. Sir, there are really a lot of factors that will go into that determination, and one of them is one we don't have an enormous control over, and that is the enemy still has a vote in this. A lot will depend on what does happen to the enemy after 1 July once the Iraqi authorities are in charge; will that reduce some of those that might see themselves as nationalist figures who just want to get rid of the coalition? On the other hand, it will not necessarily reduce the—those that want to see the new Iraq fail. 566 So, again, a lot is going to depend on how resilient that opposi- tion is. Other factors include how well the ICDC and their new con- cept do and as they are connected, again, to the Ministry and the joint headquarters through the creation of these additional brigade and divisional headquarters, again a decision that is up to Prime Minister Allawi but one that we are developing options fo Beyond that, I think very important on a related note, not in the Ministry of Defense but in the Ministry of Interior, certainly the border police, we will have to go to more border police. That is on nothing more than on the ground experience and gut feel. But I can do the math and I know the number of kilometers of bor- der here and I know the number of border police forces, border guards, and I just don't see them able to do that mission, certainly not until we can firm the whole border up and eventually make it more robust, the way many of the international borders in this part of the country are, such as that between, for example, Kuwait and Iraq. Beyond that, obviously, the police, if we can increase the professionalization of the police, 90,000, which should be their end strength, and that will be achieved after we offer early retirements. Some of those are already serving now because the payroll is close to 120,000. They are critically important. They are in the first line of defense, obviously. And if we can improve their performance sub- stantially, that again also will have a big impact. And so those are the factors, Congressman. And again, it is real good to see you again, sir. Mr. SPRATT. Thank you, sir The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman. The gentleman from Georgia, Doctor Gingrey. Dr. GINGREY. General Petraeus, I was at a meeting earlier today and Ambassador Negroponte spoke with us, and of course soon be standing up the embassy there in Baghdad. And he empha- sized the fact that as the baton is passed over on July 1, that really he would have very little to do with the civilian control and the government they set up. That will be clearly in the hands of the Iraqi people. And I wonder in regard to the military—and maybe you an- swered this question earlier, but it seems that in light of the unani- mous U.N. Security Council Resolution, that emphasized that the Iraqi Minister of Defense should ultimately make the decisions for security operations in Iraq, I guess about the same time, July 1, it does concern me—this is sort of a follow-on to what Congressman Spratt, his line of questioning—are they ready for 7 for that? And who will make the ultimate decisions? And it seems to me it is going to be a long time before they are going to be capable of doing that, and what authority will we have militarily after the handover oc- curs? General PETRAEUS. Sir, first of all, again, the real final mecha- nisms, if you will, are still being polished, I guess—or refined, al- though they have, again, the senior consultive bodies established and they have already been meeting, in fact, to determine answers to a variety of questions. And I point out again, sir, you know the Iraqis have already made decisions in the security realm. I mentioned a couple of big 567 ones right off the bat. One of them was to create the Civil Interven- tion Force in the Ministry of Interior on the police side. That is a substantial decision, and one that there is enough money for what was budgeted for the Ministry of Interior. The deployment of the Iraq National Task Force, that is a decision by the Prime Minister and the Minister of Defense and it is one that, frankly, is a great decision. And I can tell you that all of us and Pete Corelli, Commander of the 1st Calvary Division is going to do his very utmost to get them established. That is his area of responsibility right now, to get them established to work out the liaison and coordination mechanisms that are so essential. Where forces of different coun- tries are working side by side. Again, he will have advisory and support teams with them. These elements will help with that a great deal. But, again, that was an Iraqi decision. And there are other deci- sions that they are making about, frankly, the deployment of forces that, again, we are working to help them make happen. The bigger decisions, Prime Minister Allawi, again as I men- tioned earlier, we and our Iraqi partners owe him some options on some of the structures that he might build. Again, those are going to be his decisions. The other thing, sir, I have been working now with these various Iraqi leaders on virtually a daily basis, certainly on the side of the Ministry of Interior and the Ministry of Defense. They are great leaders; reasonable, rational men who have enor- mous enthusiasm and also recognize the limitations and the capa- bilities. They very much want to take charge, they are taking charge, but we can work with them, sir. And that is what we need to do, have to do, and will do. And I have told them on a number of occasions, as we used to tell our Iraqi partners in the north, their success is our success. And we mean that. Dr. GINGREY. Thank you, General. Thank you for your service. And, Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time. The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman. And, General Petraeus, thank you for hanging in there with us, and we are just about done. And we have the distinguished Ranking Member, the gentleman from Missouri. Mr. Skelton had just a few wrap-up questions here and then we will let you go back to work. Mr. SKELTON. First let me thank you for being with us today, and we are very, very proud of the service you have given, and you are the right person for this very tough job. So thank you again, ve wish you all the best. I have two concerns that we can wrap up into one. June 14, USA Today article, headlines: “Fallujah Brigade Tries U.S. Patience. Ex- periment Falling Short, Colonel Says. A top Marine officer here says the compromise that gave control of Fallujah to an Iraqi bri- gade in exchange for the withdrawal of Marines may be a failure.” And, General, in addition to that, we of course saw some Iraqi soldiers 2that did not fight well and even some of them turned on us. What lessons do we take away from these two. efforts, the one earlier and the one more recently, the Fallujah Iraqi brigade? General PETRAEUS. Sir, first of all let me just start by thanking you one more time for all you have done to make the U.S. mili- 568 tary—professional military education system the best in the world. I think General Galvin, an old friend of yours, used to say you knew more about that system than we did, and it has evolved won- derfully, in large measure because of the attention you have given to it. Sir, on the Fallujah brigade, I think everybody recognizes that that was in a sense a one-off deal. There were an awful lot of fac- tors that went into the-to that particular—the evolution of that particular organization. There are certainly limitations to it that are being recognized, and it is certainly not a long run solution for security in that area. But on the other hand, the longer run solu- tion has got to be developed before our organization is offered op- portunities to either be incorporated in Iraqi security forces, or, given separate circumstances, who knows what. That was a very, very specific context out there, I think extraor- dinarily complex, and an awful lot of interest in assistance, if you will, from Iraqi political figures. And frankly, they will be very heavily involved. It is very clear in what the eventual outcome is there, and they will work closely with the 1st Marine Expedition- ary Force in the days and weeks ahead. There are have been dis- cussions and negotiations out there to get others incorporated in various processes and see if they can move ahead in that regard. Sir, I mentioned earlier, we did take an awful lot of lessons after what happened in early April. We really revamped the ICDC con- cept. One of the factors that we identified as being present in those ICDC units that did well and fought and shot back when they were shot at and took casualties was, for example, a close relation with the coalition forces in their area; very, very close. As you may recall, I think you saw, sir, up in Mosul, the ICDC lived with us, lived in our mess hall, worked out in our gym there, such as it was, and in fact in the guard towers, we actually had one ICDC soldier, one American soldier, one interpreter, and it worked out fine. There was a huge change in the sense that the ICDC soldiers have to be soldiers and not day workers, day laborers, or day guards. There were places in which they were walking to work in the morning, doing their job during the day, and then walking home at night. Obviously, that opens the possibility of them not showing up for work on the day that you really want them; intimi- dation at home and all the rest of that. So the decision then was made that they would live on base camps three weeks on and one week off. And again that has already helped. FPS concept, lessons learned there that there needed to be atten- tion of some additional central command and control at the prov- ince level and also established at the national level. That has since been established. And they are going to be established at the prov- ince level after the big huddle we are going to have tomorrow, in fact nationwide, with all the various FPS leaders to ensure that that is established and that those leaders—compounds, commu- nications, machine guns on the backs of vehicles. And, again, they spend all day, every day, going around spinning plates and ensur- ing that their guards are doing the job that they need to do for their ministry activities for which they are serving. 569 Lessons learned in regard to the police, big one there having to do with certainly, equipping, training, and again the relationship with coalition forces. We can never allow them to think that they might not be backed up if they get in a tough spot. And that may een the case in a couple of places where some other forces were located. And again, the footprint of coalition forces now, we think, will make that less likely. So those kinds of lessons were definitely learned, Congressman. And in addition to the earlier ones that were mentioned about training leaders, we have also done a variety of police leader courses since then. Again, these are never as long as we would like them to be. They are never comparable in length or comprehensive as to what is done in the United States, but they are an attempt, again, to both make some progress in that area and yet not take so long in doing it that we remain a work in progress forever. Thank you, sir. The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman. And, General Petraeus, congratulations on your endurance. We have had a good two hours with you, and I think it has been a very productive hearing. Oh, excuse me, I almost missed the distinguished gentleman from Maryland, the Chairman of Projection Forces Subcommittee, Mr. Bartlett. He has some questions. Mr. BARTLETT. I have just one question, sir. Thank you very much for your service. In our country, to assure civil stability and support we have de- veloped through the years a number of different organizations like the National Guard, the sheriff, the local police, state police, fire- fighters, emergency medical. And as they developed, as we grew, they determined kind of by joint agreement, areas of responsibility and jurisdictional boundaries and lines of authority. My question is here in Iraq, you have a number of different orga- nizations that you are standing up and training. And you know, we are going to just impose these on an already established mature so- ciety. And I am concerned about how you are going to assure that they understand what their areas of responsibility are and their ju- risdictional boundaries and their lines of authority so that they are all working very efficiently and cooperatively together. General PETRAEUS. Yes, sir, Congressman Bartlett. In most cases, first of all, by the way, they do in fact have very comparable numbers of emergency and security services to what we have in the United States. And in most cases these did exist before. The only one that I am aware of that did not exist in the past is the Iraq Civil Defense Corps, and that was done as a short term measure by the divisions in the field with the support of Ambassador Bremer, and certainly the Iraqis, to get some Iraqi security forces out right away, even as this model for the Army and the training of the police began to gather some momentum. The structure established is all the joint coordinating commission (JCCs), and there are varying levels of maturity. But again, frank- ly, we were very fortunate, as I mentioned, to have it up in Mosul. And it is basically a large conference room with maps, with all the radios that allow them—and liaison officers—allow them to connect to each of their precincts and their civil defense, which to them in that case means fire department and emergency medical services, 570 combat divers and some others. The ICDC brigade is represented in there; the facility projection, security forces and also liaison with coalition forces. Again, in this buildup structure, it is reasonably good in many of the provinces, and in those where it is still being established there is a great deal of emphasis on doing just that. In some cases, where there are larger cities that are not the capital of a province, there are additional joint coordination committees, and they are out there, again, to do the same thing in these other large metro- politan areas. The Iraqis themselves are looking at the establishment of more regional organizations as well. That is really up to them at this point, sir. In some cases, there are regional police establishments, but they are not mirrored by all of the others and, again, they are going to have to come to grips with that. At a national level, there really is an effort that has to be under- taken to build in each of the ministries, particularly in the Min- istry of Defense, which really did not exist until just recently—and, of course, the new Minister has been on the job for a couple of weeks—but to create in there their version of our national military command center, and then the communications links that allow them to actually command and control their armed forces. Same on the Ministry of the Interior side, their overall center is a work in progress. It is coming along. We have to enable them with the command and control architecture that will again enable them to connect with each of the province joint coordination cen- ters, and in the interior side with the province police chiefs, and then on so on down the line. The money is there, we believe, for just about all of that. Contracts are already let for a great deal of that as well. The overall national emergency system is also designed and we are now even getting into the area of frequency spectrum manage- ment which gives you some idea that people are gripping this issue in trying to resolve this. Those are the mechanisms. But as I mentioned, there is still some work going on at the top to work below these top level organi- zations. One additional coordinating mechanism will exist, but I think those are all going to be viable in short order. Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you, sir, for a good job and for your pa- tience and for your very thoughtful answers to my questions. Thank you and God bless. General PETRAEUS. Thank you, sir. The CHAIRMAN. General Petraeus, thank you for the two and a half hours you have given us. I think your testimony has been very instructive. It has helped us to know what we have to do to give you the tools to get the job done. And I think we are going to be successful in this very challenging endeavor because of the great talent and courage of the men in uniform who wear the of the United States. You and your team is a great representative of that. Thanks. We will let you get back to work. This hearing is ad- journed. General PETRAEUS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 571 The CHAIRMAN. And before we go, incidentally, I want to thank your backup quarterback, General Bergner, who was waiting for any questions he might have to take if our video communications broke down. He has done a great job waiting on the sidelines and we haven't had to send him in. General Bergner, thank you for being with us this morning. [Whereupon, at 11:20 p.m., the committee was adjourned.] APPENDIX JUNE 17, 2004 PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD JUNE 17, 2004 OPENING REMARKS OF CHAIRMAN HUNTER Hearing on Training of Iraqi Security Forces June 17, 2004 This morning the Committee continues its examination of Operation Iraqi Freedom by focusing on an issue of great interest to this committee and the American public in general-the training of Iraqi security forces. In less than two weeks, the Iraqi people will assume responsibility for their government. While they no longer suffer from the tyranny of Saddam Hussein, there is yet much work to be done to achieve democracy and prosperity. Securing Iraq is the first step on this path. Today, Iraq has over 225,000 security forces personnel on duty and in training, just 35,000 short of its requirement. This (577) 578 number includes Iraqi police, border enforcers, a Civil Defense Corps, the Facilities Protection Services, and a small armed forces. So far, the results are positive. The Iraqi Civil Defense Corps, for example, is conducting joint patrols throughout Iraq with other Coalition Forces and Iraqi Police forces. Soon, the ICDC will be equipped with additional vehicles, body armor, uniforms, radios, weapons, ammunition, night vision and binoculars. Through this on-the-job-training and equipment upgrades, the Iraqis will be able to assume more and more security responsibilities on the ground. Tangible results may already be in the making. For instance, the Department of Defense tells us that Fallujah has remained quiet with no violations of the cease-fire since May 3rd, and that confrontations with al-Sadr’s militia have declined recently. 579 To give greater detail about the training of Iraq's security forces, our witnesses this morning are: From Iraq via video teleconference, Lieutenant General David H. Petraeus Commander, Office of Security Transition And before us in person, Brigadier General Kevin J. Bergner Deputy Director for Politico-Military Affairs in the Middle East, The Joint Staff Due to technical limitations, we will only have the video teleconference link for one hour. Welcome to the Committee, gentlemen. We look forward to your testimony and appreciate your appearance—virtual and real- before the committee this morning. But first, let me recognize the committee's ranking Democrat, Mr. Skelton, for any remarks he may wish to make. 580 The entirety of our witnesses' prepared statements will be entered into the record. General Petraeus, the airwaves are yours. 581 Opening Statement for The Honorable Ike Skelton (D-MO), Ranking Member, Committee on Armed Services, U.S. House of Representatives Full Committee Hearing on the Transition Status of the Training of Iraqi Security Forces June 17, 2004 Thank you, Mr. Chairman for holding this important hearing and thank you, General Petraeus, for being with us under these unusual circumstances. General, many of us had a chance to visit you when you were with the 101st Airborne near Mosul and I think I speak for all of us when I say that we couldn't have a better man for the difficult job of getting Iraq's security forces ready to take over their country's security. But that is an enormously difficult job. We all remember well the stories of the 2nd battalion of the Iraqi Armed Forces which was reported to refuse to fight at Fallujah. Other Iraqi units served honorably, but the stories of that unit-and of the cumulative figures of over 25% of Iraqi forces that either refused to fight, changed sides, or folded—were deeply disturbing. 582 I asked my staff to try to confirm those figures and found that there was no way to do so on a country-wide basis, because the only data existed at the unit level. It is the reason why I sponsored an amendment to our defense bill this year that requires a strategic plan for the training of Iraqi security forces, including a description of metrics other than just numbers recruited. It is not just the overall numbers of forces that is critical to Iraq's success; it is the quality of their training, their preparation to fight under conditions of an ongoing insurgency, and ultimately their willingness to kill fellow Iraqis who are putting their nation's security at risk.. General, I hope you will tell us what you did when you came on board to assess the performance of the existing Iraqi units and what conclusions you came to about those units that refused to perform their duties. I hope you can also tell us what your plans are for measuring progress over time. 583 Finally, General, I'd like to express my sympathy and condolence for those Iraqis killed today near the Iraqi Army recruiting center in Baghdad. Clearly the insurgents are trying to deter Iraqis from serving. I am concerned, however, with the violence in combination with the dynamics expressed in the public opinion poll released yesterday. While the poll showed a strong desire for Iraqi forces to take over security functions from the American military, it also showed declining confidence in all Iraqi security forces. I hope you'll address what trends you are seeing in confidence levels and also in recruiting and retention. General, thank you again for being with us and for continuing to serve. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. PROGRESS IN IRAQ HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, Washington, DC, Tuesday, June 22, 2004. The committee met, pursuant to call, at 9 a.m., in room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Duncan Hunter (chairman of the committee) presiding. OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. DUNCAN HUNTER, A REP- RESENTATIVE FROM CALIFORNIA, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES The CHAIRMAN. The hearing will come to order. This morning the committee will continue our review of the tran- sition in Iraq, in particular, under what circumstances U.S. forces will operate post-June 30th. Our witnesses today are the Honorable Paul Wolfowitz, Deputy Secretary of Defense, and General Peter Pace, Vice Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. Welcome to the committee, gentlemen. We look forward to your testimony. Mr. Secretary, last week the committee held a preliminary hear- ing on how the transition to Iraqi sovereignty will affect our forces in Iraq. That hearing was very helpful in understanding what just transpired in the U.N. and how those negotiations would translate into reality on the ground as U.S. Forces continue to carry out their difficult mission in Iraq. Given that you have just returned from Iraq, the committee is very interested to hear your firsthand impressions on this and other topics, as well as how our operational commanders view these matters. While the assumption of Iraqi sovereignty next week is an impor- tant and needed step, there is also no question that Iraq is not yet able to stand on its own two feet in terms of security. Iraqis and those foreigners who want to help them must be safe enough to go about their daily lives and get on with the business of rebuilding the country. Established democracies can be very strong in the face of terrorism. But Iraq's democracy is sometimes in the conceptual stages and could be derailed by bioterrorists if we or the Iraqis sur- render to terror. Further, security is essential to the business of rebuilding Iraq. Coalition forces and the Iraqis have made great strides in repairing damage from the war and rehabilitating an infrastructure that suf- fered from 20 years of abuse and neglect under Saddam. But Iraq's young democracy is still burdened by Saddam's debt, and terrorists (585) 586 have identified the economy as a vulnerability. The world needs to come together to tackle this problem. Finally, we need to help foster representative government and re- spect for individual liberties in Iraq. Again, the Coalition Provi- sional Authority (CPA) has made great strides down this route with the issuance of a transitional administrative law and the cre- ation of a sovereign Iraqi Interim Government. I look forward to the rest of the plan unfolding next year as Iraq moves toward a constitutional government, but I wonder if we can't do more. The CPA, the United Nations, and the media have taken a very top-down view of things. But most of us here can tell you from experience that democracy works best from the bottom up. A fair number of Members of Congress learned the give-and-take needed in democracy on the city council and the state legislature. That is where Iraq's future democratic leaders are likely to be found. The military did a great job in setting up local and regional gov- ernments. We need to find ways of bringing those individuals to- gether in a constructive way, through a league of cities, or the Iraqi equivalent of the National Governors Association, Iraqis may learn from their common experiences as local officials unite them more their different religious or ethnic backgrounds divide them. That is where our strategic interests lie, in building a better fu- ture for Iraq, in partnership with the Iraqis. Gentlemen, I know we share that perspective, so I am looking forward to hearing your views on the subject. So thank you, Mr. Secretary, and General. And, Mr. Secretary, I know you have just gotten back. We had, incidentally, several good hearings last week on this transition and especially the military piece of this transition, how American forces would continue to provide force protection for themselves and for this fledgling government and how our rules of engagement would - remain the same. I know you have obviously had a number of brief- ings from your people in field on that. We also had a great hearing with General Petraeus from Iraq with respect to the stand up of the Iraqi military. We thought that was especially interesting and very instructive. And I know you have also been briefed by General Petraeus and his people while you were over there. These next several weeks coming up are very important. So thank you for coming over to see us so soon after you got back. And we look forward to your testimony. General Pace, thank you for attending this morning as well. And before we go, Mr. Secretary, to you, let me turn to my col- league from Missouri, Mr. Skelton, for any comments he might want to make. [The prepared statement of Mr. Hunter can be found in the Ap- pendix on page 651.] 587 STATEMENT OF HON. IKE SKELTON, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM MISSOURI, RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES Mr. SKELTON. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman. Let me wel- come Secretary Wolfowitz and General Pace back to this commit- tee. We appreciate your being before us and your testimony. Mr. Chairman, recent revelations of abuse at Abu Ghraib prison, the continued attacks of insurgents against our forces, as well as the questions about how well the new Interim Iraqi Government will be able to govern all highlight the difficult and dangerous and uncertain situation in that country. is paramount now is that we need to have a concrete plan to ensure success in Iraq. And I am not sure today we see such a plan. We broke it; we must do our best to fix it. Last July the Department came up with what amounted to a strateg lan for Iraq. The four pillars of this plan were establish- ing security, restoring essential services, creating conditions for economic development, and enabling the transition to democratic governance. It is clear that these goals have not been achieved, at least not to the extent that we had hoped, largely because we haven't established security, and rebuilding Iraq requires a stable security environment. It seems to me that there are some steps that the United States needs to take so that the world can have some confidence that the way ahead holds some prospects for ultimate success. First, we have to do a better job of internationalizing the situation in Iraq, so it is not just the face of U.S. Military that is primarily occupying that country. The Administration should also specify the steps that will be taken to train the Iraqi Army, police and civil defense forces so that we can accelerate their ability to provide security and so we can be assured that we won't see a reoccurrence of the problems those forces have experienced in the past. I know General Petraeus is doing his best-by the way, I think he is an outstanding American leader—but I think it would inspire confidence if more specifics about his efforts were widely known. If my view, we should also have an understanding now about what happens if a new sovereign government seeks to dictate our mili- tary operations in Iraq. I don't think the Iraqi Government should be able to limit what our forces can do to hunt terrorists or to protect themselves. Con- versely, I would have real concern if the Iraqi Government were to ask our forces to enforce that government's imposition of martial law, which the new interim Prime Minister is presently consider- ing. I have been saying for some time we need to have some kind of status of forces arrangement which will be binding upon the new government. I am not convinced that existing authorities are ade- quate. You will recall a status of forces agreement was to have been had by March the 31st, but that date came and went. And finally, I think we need a comprehensive public investiga- tion into prisoner abuses. America's world image has been tar- nished, and we need to prove to other nations, as well as to the 588 Iraqi people, that the abuses at Abu Ghraib prison are not stand- ard operating procedure for our military and do not reflect the val- ues we stand for as a nation. Looking longer term, in a broader sense, I see at least four poten- tial strategic approaches that can be had to the Iraqi situation. First, we can stay the current course. We can continue in the present vein, trying to provide security, rebuild infrastructure and trying to create the conditions under which a new representative government may flourish. However, this approach brings with it the certainty of continued violence against our forces, as well as the new government, and will slow down the reconstruction proc- ess. Second, we can cut and run. We can begin a relatively rapid withdrawal of our forces upon appointment of the interim govern- ment and leave it to the U.N., North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) or Iraqis to provide security and stability to Iraq. This ap- proach can result in Iraq descending into ethnic or religious squab- bling, or both, national and regional instability and the prospect that Iraq will become a terrorist haven. Third, we can increase our military presence, as well as that of other nations, and induce NATO into a significant military and po- litical role until the United Nations can assume more responsibility and until security and stability ensue. Under this proposal, the number of U.S. forces in Iraq would increase, at least until after the elections and a more permanent new government may be in- stalled. Obviously, though, if we assign more forces to Iraq, there is the possibility that we will suffer more casualties. Realistically, we will not be able to increase our force level in Iraq by very much over the short term, frankly just because we don't have the troops. And fourth, we can embark on a phased withdrawal of U.S. forces over time, and we can maintain a less visible presence in the interim. Our forces could withdraw from many urban places and cease aggressive patrolling in favor of safeguarding Iraqi infra- structure, and securing the borders against foreign incursions. At first, the model the Marines used at Fallujah seemed promising, but recent experience suggests their approach may not hold prom- ise for use in other urban areas. Some national security experts have even suggested setting a date certain by which our forces would ultimately withdraw from Iraq. I think there is value in deadlines, and perhaps a deadline for the withdrawal of our forces could foster stability and give the Iraqis confidence we do not intend to occupy their country for an indefinite period. I suggest these various approachs as a way forward in Iraq only because I am not aware of any specific plan at this time that the administration has for long-term success and for an ultimate end to our military presence in Iraq. That is the question I get when I go home. How much longer are we going to be there? What puzzles me is that just a year ago the administration was talking about reducing our forces in Iraq. Now, unfortunately, we have still got 138,000 troops in Iraq. I see no end in sight. 589 So, Mr. Secretary, do you see an end in sight? I do see the transi- tion date of June 30 as a new opportunity. It gives us a potential fresh start toward a better Iraq. But if that goal is to be reached, the administration will have to do things better. There will have be to be better planning on how to rebuild Iraq and how to provide a stable government once elections are held. There will have to be more and better international participation than we have had. We in Congress will need better information about the cost of the war, the status of our forces, and about the prisoner abuse situation, as well as the kind of equipment that troops do and don't have. We need to perform able oversight so we can be confident that your ac- tions are wise to our Country's needs. Mr. Secretary, I don't think anyone here questions your resolve or questions the resolve of the President to succeed in Iraq. But there is a difference between resolve on the one hand and com- petence on the other. I think the American people need to under- stand that. Regrettably, what has happened in Iraq so far, aside from the outstanding performance of our troops in the field—and I must say, they are outstanding—persuades that me that we have gotten the situation into a security quagmire. Mr. Secretary, I welcome your thoughts about the way ahead in a strategic sense. I am also interested in what the Department of Defense (DOD) is doing to ensure our forces have the operational flexibility they need to remedy the damage to our international standing caused by the prisoner abuse scandal. Mr. Chairman, thank you. [The prepared statement of Mr. Skelton can be found in the Ap- pendix on page 656.] The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman. Mr. Secretary, with that optimistic send off, thank you for being with us today. And we appreciate your coming to report to us on the status of this transition. The floor is yours, sir. Mr. ABECROMBIE. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Chairman, before we begin. : Mr. Chairman, I notice that the statement here from Mr. Wolfowitz is 25 pages long. Is it your intention to have all 25 pages read, or are we going to get a summary, perhaps under the five minute rule, so that we can move on to the questions. The CHAIRMAN. Well, Mr. Abercrombie, both statements, as al- ways, will be taken into the record. And the witnesses are allowed to proceed in the manner they see fit. And so we will leave that to the discretion of Mr. Wolfowitz and General Pace. Mr. Secretary. STATEMENT OF THE HON. PAUL WOLFOWITZ, DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE Secretary WOLFOWITZ. I hope I won't disappoint Mr. Aber- crombie. I know I will please Mr. Skelton. I don't plan to read the statement at all. I will put it in the record. I would like to just make some observations about my recent trip. And your comment on perspective in Washington versus the perspective out in field brings to mind the fact that we were stand- ing around in northern Iraq talking to a couple of sergeants who 590 were taking a few days of well-earned leave from very, very tough duty in a Baathist town in Iraq. And they said, people back home just don't seem to see what we see out here. We are making enormous progress in this town. It used to be a stronghold for Saddam Hussein. These are just two sergeants standing by the pool, volunteering. And it is something we heard almost everywhere, from Iraqis, from Americans, from the British general down in Basra. It doesn't mean that there aren't serious problems in Iraq. We all know about the problems. But I think what doesn't get through in all of the reporting on problems is there has also been enormous progress. I visited, Mr. Chairman, all five U.S. divisions, visited the Brit- ish division down at Basra, and visited with the Polish commander of the Multinational Division, South Central. It is inspiring to talk to our troops, from the Private First Class (PFC) on up to the gen- erals. They are doing a magnificent job. They do it with enormous courage. They do it with enormous skill. And I think they really believe that they are making substantial progress, and I think they are. In fact, I think we are at a point now of a change that is prop- erly described as historic... For the first time in almost half a century, Iraq is about to have a sovereign government that is committed to the rule of law, to the values of freedom and democracy, a sovereign government that is committed to undoing the enormous abuse and damage that has been inflicted on that country by Saddam Hussein. With all respect to the Ranking Member, we didn't break Iraq, Saddam Hussein broke Iraq. Broke it in a viscious, horrible way, almost beyond imagining. It is going to be a big job to repair it. But I feel much more confident than before this trip, after spending many hours with the new Prime Minister and members of his gov- ernment, that there is an Iraqi team ready to take charge on July 1st and committed to fixing that damage. We spent almost eight hours in discussions over the course of three days with Prime Minister Allawi and his national security team, including his new Defense Minister, his new Minister of the Interior, and his National Security Advisor. Also had meetings with the new President of Iraq, with the Deputy Prime Minister of Iraq. When I say “we,” it was a multinational team. I was accom- panied on the American side by our Vice Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army, General George Casey, whose nomination, as you know, now is before the Senate to become Commander of Multinational Force Iraq; and by the current Deputy Chief of Mission in Iraq, Jim Jef. frey, Ambassador Jim Jeffrey, who will take over on July 1st as the Deputy Chief of Mission (DCM) to our new Ambassador, John Negroponte. We were also accompanied by representives of the British Government and the Polish Government. The talks were wide ranging. I think one of the things that is very impressive, there was no question who was in charge in those talks, it was the Iraqi Prime Minister. He spoke forcefully for his delegation, and he laid out his plans. Many are ambitious plans for an Iraqi national security strategy that will confront what he cor- rectly describes as an evil enemy, and build up Iraqi security forces to deal with that challenge. 591 I would confess, going into those discussions, there was some concern on our side that his plans might be too grandiose, that they might be more idea than substance, that they might reject the considerable progress that we believe we have made already in our own efforts to build Iraqi security forces. I am happy to report that the conclusion of our discussions, I think, was a very realistic meshing of our existing plans with his adjusted plans and his somewhat more ambitious plans. General Petraeus, whom you mentioned earlier, commented that building Iraqi security forces has to be approached as steering a large supertanker, not a high-speed power boat. It can't turn on a dime. Prime Minister Allawi does not plan to turn it on a dime, he plans to turn it in a reasonable way, with a very clear sense-in my view, a very clear sense of priorities. One of his recurrent themes was the Iraqi Army as a symbol of national strength. He continues to say that he believes it was a mistake to have disbanded the old Army, and it would not surprise me, at least as a symbolic move, if he were to undo that order when he becomes prime minister. But he is interested in something much more than symbolic gestures. He is interested in constructing an Iraqi army that reports to Iraqi officers through an Iraqi chain of command that is responsible to a sovereign Iraqi Government. I think we have put in place some important building blocks that he can do that with. One of those building blocks is an organization that we have been working on called the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps. We talked about this a lot, because, to the Iraqis, the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps (ICDC) has a lot of problems, starting with its name. As translated into Arabic at least, it sounds more like a branch of the fire department than a branch of the Army. I think also its performance around the country has been mixed, and very disappointing in some areas, including the areas I think the Prime Minister was most familiar with. Significantly, it has performed extremely well in two parts of the country: in the far north in the city of Mosul, where General Petraeus was, in fact, re- sponsible for organizing. He introduced some concepts that were unique to that area, but I think are now going to be applied throughout the country. Much more effective ways of organizing the Civil Defense Corps (CDC) than was done in most other places. And that Civil Defense Corps up in Mosul performed outstand- ingly on the night of April 9th when the enemy attacked the Gov- ernment House in Mosul. The Governor of the province--who is a Sunni Arab, by the way-stayed in the Government House all night when it was under attack, while the Iraqi police initially re- fused come on duty: and I think one might forgive them, because they were definitely outgunned by the enemy. The Civil Defense Corps and the facilities protection service people stood their ground, beat off the enemy attack and eventually the police came back. I think it is significant also that General Carter Hamm of the 2nd Infantry Division, in charge up in Mosul, General Petraeus' successor, made sure that the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps knew throughout the night that if they got into really deep trouble, U.S. Forces were there to help out. That is what General Petraeus de- 592 : scribed as embracing Iraqi security forces, letting them do the job as much as they possibly can, but making sure that they have the courage that comes from knowing that there is a backup. I think that is a model for the future. The more rapidly we can move to that model, the more rapidly we can not only bring our numbers down, but I think, more importantly, bring our people off the front lines. That is good for us and it is good for the Iraqis.. The Prime Minister is also organizing a new unit called the Iraqi Intervention Force, which will basically be a division created out of the Army structures that we were training, but oriented toward urban security. That, in fact, is his first priority. I would emphasize here, one of things that was also impressive as we talked about funding requirements is, this is a man who un derstands that you need to have a sense of priority, that some of his requirements may exceed what is currently available or at least what is currently available in our supplemental funding. . There is Iraqi funding. By the way, I would point out that some $20 billion of Iraqi funds, both Oil for Food and oil revenues that have already been put into the Iraqi budget since the liberation of Baghdad, and more on the way. But those funds have many de- mands on them. One of the things we hope to get from the inter- national community is more support for training and equipping Iraqi security forces. His first priority, as I mentioned, is this Iraqi Intervention Force. His second priority is something they call the Iraq Special Oper- ations Force. That will consist of a counterterrorist force, similar to what we would call a Special Weapons and Tactics Team (SWAT), with some 760 troops, and a supporting commando battal- ion that is similar to a Ranger battalion of slightly over 800. The third priority is this new Iraqi National Guard, which, as I said, is built on the old Civil Defense Corps, but with, if I might call it the “Petraeus concept of organization." and very importantly, from Prime Minister Allawi's point of view, with a much stronger officer structure. It would be organized into 50 plus battalions, organized into 18 bridages—that makes one brigade for each province organized, in turn, into six division headquarters which turns out to be one divi- sion headquarters for each multinational division that is in Iraq. Each of those headquarters presents both a requirement and, I think from the prime minister's point of view, an opportunity to bring back officers from the old Iraqi Army who were clean and who are committed to a new Iraq. I believe he sees that as impor- tant not only in terms of building capable security forces and re- storing Iraqi pride in their Army, but also in reducing potential sources of dissatisfaction among the former officers that the enemy can feed off of. His fourth priority is to continue the development of two divi- sions of the regular Army, troop strength of some 27,000. He is also interested in adding two more divisions as well as potentially three corps headquarters to the National Guard, but they agree that both of those are lower priorities that can be deferred until we get first things first and second things second. This is definitely further down the list. 593 General Petraeus will be leading the effort in Baghdad to allo- cate resources, to determine the resource implications of these en- hancements, and to make allocations among them. As I said, there may be requirements that go beyond what is currently budgeted in our supplemental. We will look to Iraqi resources, we will look to international contributions, and we will see as we go. But there is a great deal that can be accomplished already within the present famework. We also had a lot of discussion about command and control ar- rangements. The Iraqis proposed and we accepted the creation of a Joint Operations Center at the national level as well as Joint Co- ordinating Centers at the regional and local levels. These centers will perform two functions, first of all, making sure that the oper- ations of our forces and Iraqi forces are well coordinated and well integrated until they have filled in the gaps in their own chain of command and communications, it enables them to have an effective chain of command by working in parallel with us. We committed ourselves in the letter that Secretary Powell sent to the United Nations, in parallel to the letter that Prime Minister Allawi sent to the United Nations, to have close coordination and consultation with the Iraqis on sensitive security issues, including the initiation of sensitive offensive operations. We committed again in these meetings that those consultations will be serious consulta- tions. It is a process that one might say started it with our visit, but I think will be carried forward on an almost daily basis by Am- bassador Negroponte and General Casey when they arrive. Finally, the Iraqis also expressed an interest in getting support from the international community and are particularly eager to support our requests to get international troop contributions to support the United Nations presence in Iraq and additional func- tions that the United Nations may take on, such as supervising the elections. There is much more that we can discuss in the course of ques- tions, Mr. Chairman, but I think I would just like to summarize by saying what an impressive group of people we are dealing with. They are intelligent. They know their country in a way that no American can ever expect to know their country. That kind of knowledge is obviously essential in making the kinds of decisions that confront them and us, going forward. And they are clearly peo- ple who are prepared to step up to making tough decision. In fact, I would like to just conclude finally and open by com- menting on the bravery of our forces. I would like to comment briefly on the bravery of Iraqis. We vis- ited Fallujah, where the U.S. Marines have just awarded Navy commendation medals and Navy achievement medals to five Iraqi Civil Defense Corps members who rescued and saved the life of a Marine Private First Class under enemy fire at the risk of their own lives. During that visit, we met with the new head of the Iraqi Intel- ligence Service who lost three of his sons to Saddam's executioners. Up north, our interpreter was an incredibly engaging young Kurd- ish woman whose sister had recently been assassinated because she was working with our forces. And when we asked her, Why do you continue working when it is so dangerous? She said, “Because 594 my father told me after the assassination, you must never retreat in the face of evil.” We met with a Deputy Prime Minister Barham Salih, who many of us have known for a long time, who was the target of an assas- sination attempt by al Qaeda elements back in 2002 that were sup- ported in northern Iraq by the Saddam regime. We met with the President, Sheik Ghazi al-Yawar, who became the acting president of the interim governing council because his predecessor was assassinated in a car bomb that exploded right outside of the so-called Green Zone. And, of course, the Prime Min- ister himself was a target of an assassination attempt by Saddam's thugs in London in 1979, nearly chopped in two, and just barely realized the attack in time to get out, get his head out of the way of the axe. He was hospitalized for a year. His wife suffered a per- manent nervous breakdown. He was pursued by Saddam's killers for years after that. He knows that he is now number one on the enemy target list; there is no one they would like to assassinate more than Iyad al- Allawi. He is doing this because he is a patriot. He is doing this because he knows what his country has been through. We have Iraqis by the thousands who are signing up to fight for their country, more than 400 by our own count; and General Petraeus thinks the real number is twice that. More than 400 have died in the line of duty since May 1st of last year. We have coura- geous Iraqis who are prepared to take on this fight for their coun- try. The key to success, the key to victory, I think the answer to most of Mr. Skelton's questions, lies in Iraqi self-government and Iraqi self-defense. We met this new government. They are prepared to step up to their responsibilities, and I think we owe them all the support we can give them. Thank you. [The prepared statement of Secretary Wolfowitz can be found in the Appendix on page 662.] The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. General Pace, do you have a statement? STATEMENT OF GEN. PETER PACE, VICE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF General PACE. Mr. Chairman, thank you. I will keep mine very short. But I, although I have said it before, I think every time any of us in uniform appears before this committee, we should thank you and all of the members of this committee-indeed, the Con- gress as a whole—for the incredibly strong, sustained, bipartisan support that provides us the resources that allow us to do the mis- sions that we do. Second, to once again thank the families of the incredible folks we have serving our country overseas. Their sustained support makes all of the difference in the world to those who are wearing the uniform. And in the case of the Guard and Reserve, to thank their employers for their patience, understanding and support. And although this particular hearing is about Iraq, on Friday of this week, on the 25th of June, the great Americans who have been serving our country in Haiti will complete their mission and turn it over to a U.N. force led by Brazil. But the folks who have been 595 serving our country in Haiti, along with some terrific partners, the French forces that are there, Canadian forces and Chilean forces, have done this hemisphere and the people of Haiti a great service. So I wanted to thank them publicly on the record. With that, sir, we will take questions. The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, General. And thank you, Mr. Sec- retary, for I think a very good summary Let's talk about the security apparatus for this fledgling govern- ment that is standing up. Obviously, they are targets. There have been assassinations; there have been lots of attempts. And the one thing that General Petraeus talked about in his remote hearing last week was the standing up of Iraqi security forces for the pro- tection of government, to make sure that this new government has a shield behind which they can operate. From your discussions—just give us a little insight, from your discussions with this new leadership, Iraqi leadership, what is the threat doing to these folks? You said they are standing up to it. But are they—in your estimation, is the apparatus that we are training right now, the military forces that will be charged with de- fending the government, just keeping this government going? Do you think it is moving along well? Do you think it is adequate? Secretary WOLFOWITZ. It is an excellent question. In fact, our people told us that their first priority, in fact, is pro- tection of the new government. And they are going to depend on us to a considerable degree for a certain period of time. We want to, for a lot of reasons, as rapidly as possible, give them their own capacity, especially for close in protection. There are a lot of reasons why that is a better way to proceed. But we are not going to take any chances; until they are fully ready to deal with their own personal security, they will have all of the support they need from us. And I think that is probably all I will say in an open session. But you are absolutely right. It is a matter of the utmost impor- tance. We also ought to recognize that there are no guarantees out there. It is a dangerous place. Those of you who have tried to get us to arrange visits understand how dangerous it is, there are real problems, although we think it is very important for Members of Congress to visit. We try to arrange that. As I say, none of these very brave men are under any illusions that there are guarantees for their safety, but we need to do every- thing we possibly can to ensure it. I might say in that regard, Mr. Chairman, it would help a great deal, I think, if we had more flexi- bility in how we define force protection when it comes to the use of our own funds. We have been at this subject several times. We have a request up here for $500 million of authority to use DOD funds to train and equip Iraqi forces. I think that needs to be understood as every bit as important as body armor and up armored Humvees. That is part of force protection. I think this committee understands that, and I hope we will get the support we need for that request. Similarly, I think this committee, particularly those of you who visited Iraq, have come to understand how important it is to sup- port the Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERÐ) 596 which pays for things like rehabilitating schools and hospitals, which may not seem, initially, like force protection, but our troops understand it as exactly that, because it helps to improve signifi- cantly their relationship with the population. Why do I mention all of this? Because in this visit I learned about one other thing which is in this boundary line of who has the authority, who has this responsibility. That is the question of creat- ing some kind of biometric identity card that could not be forged. It has apparently fallen between the cracks of whether it is authority or a Central Command (CENTCOM) authority. But when I think about how to protect the new Iraqi Government, I can think of very few things that would do more than that to develop a reli- able means of identifying people throughout the country. So I don't have a specific proposal here, but I would like to be able to work with this committee to figure out ways in which we can get the flexibility and funding to make those kind of things possible. The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. Mr. Secretary, as we hand this thing over, we will have many in- stances where the Iraqi Government, at least I would think we would, where the Iraqi Government would request American forces to move to certain locations, to undertake certain missions, to do things that they think are important to their survival and to the maintenance of this government. In some cases, we are going to be able to say, “yes,” and in other cases, we are going to be able to say, “no.” I think it is very impor- tant that we have got a lock on this process, that we know exactly how we move it, that we don't have American military commanders who feel that they are compelled to do certain things because there are Iraqi requests to do it, but rather that they are, in fact, clearly vetted with our diplomatic leadership, but also that they have a veto in cases where they think that American force protection is going to be degraded substantially. And I have seen operations over the years—thinking of the Ma- rine barracks in Beirut where the first question I asked Colonel Garrity was why he was down in the low country there, taking those incoming artillery shells. And he said, “State mandated our location down here rather than up there in the high country.” You are going to have many instances where a callous going to be between Iraqi requests and American interests. You will have Ambassador Negroponte in place. You will have General Sanchez and General Casey. Are you satisfied that the process for making the decisions on these requests is well in place and is well scrubbed? Secretary WOLFOWITZ. I think it is well designed, Mr. Chairman. Until it is actually in place and the Ambassador is there, and the new Multinational Force Commander, assuming Senate approves him, General Casey is there, you only know when you exercise it. But we have actually been exercising a very similar mechanism for over two years now in Afghanistan, with exactly those kind of issues that you raise. Not infrequently, the Karzai government has asked us to do things on its behalf, and we have questioned whether they really know what they are doing, and whether we should get in the busi- 597 ness of enforcing the edicts of the government. We have tried to make sure they understand realistically that they should relate their own desire to direct things, related realistically to their capac- ity to enforce their will. I think over time it has worked out very well. There is no question in Afghanistan, there will be no question in Iraq, that American forces report through their commander to the President of the United States. We will be getting input from all directions, including from our good ambassador, including from the Iraqi political authorities. But the ultimate responsibility for the safety of our forces rests with their commander and with their Commander in Chief. The CHAIRMAN. And last, Mr. Secretary, we have had in some cases offerings from other states in the neighborhood, of sending forces in. And it is clear, whether it is the Egyptians or the Turks, the Saudis, you have resources in the neighborhood, and military resources that could be utilized, and in some cases could be utilized to displace American forces. To date, our understanding is that this has been strongly resisted by the Iraqi leadership, the idea of hav- ing a contingent from Egypt come in, for example-military forces, Saudi, Turkey, other locations. Do you think it is wise to continue to basically go along with this resistance, and for the Iraqi Government itself to resist this help from neighboring states which could provide very substantial forces and obviously have logistical lines that would be much shorter than those—than the ones that are currently being exercised with this coalition of some nearly 20,000 forces from around the v What do you think about this? Are we going to see any change here? Is there any more diplomatic way to invite this participation? Secretary WOLFOWITZ. We talked about this specifically, and the Prime Minister is quite prepared to join us in requesting other countries to participate, with the important exception that they do not want any troops from neighboring countries, because that raises large political issues. I think even if one neighbor doesn't raise all of the issues, it opens it up to other neighbors. But beyond that, including Egypt specifically, they are quite pre- pared to work with us to encourage international contributions. They understand its importance. The CHAIRMAN. You are saying they will entertain contributions, but not personnel? Secretary WOLFOWITZ. No, no contributions of forces. Absolutely no contribution of forces. But they would also say, The highest pri- ority is standing up our own people, getting them equipped, and es- tablishing Iraqi pride that they can defend their own country. Those are not mutually exclusive objectives, and I think we will get help in bringing in certainly this government, this new Iraqi Government will do everything it can to encourage other countries to contribute forces associated with the United Nations. The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. The gentleman from Missouri, Mr. Skelton. Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. Mr. Secretary, you have mentioned a number of positive accom- plishments in your opening statement. And I agree there certainly 598 have been a number of good things that have happened in Iraq this last year. The deficiencies seem to be centered on one, and that is the secu- rity quagmire that we find ourselves in. I think that prevents so much of continued good things. For instance, the $18 billion that we have appropriated for reconstruction, only $3.7 billion have been spent because of the security situation that is there. I see, Mr. Secretary, two Iraqs. One is the optimistic Iraq that you describe—and we thank you for your testimony—and the other Îraq is the one that I see every morning with the violence, the deaths of soldiers and Marines; and I must tell you, it breaks my heart a little bit more every day. And to use a phrase, the face of evil, it is there. The security sit- uation is a Damocles sword that hangs over this entire positive work that you and our country are doing to achieve this. It seems to me that because of this and allowing it to get started, it has caused us to fall short. Mr. Secretary, Ambassador Bremer commented in this last Sun- day's Washington Post on mistakes he thought he had made as the CPA leader relative to what was happening in Iraq. May I ask you from your perspective; as one of the architects of this engagement, what are the lessons that you have learned in the last 15 months of what should have been done better, what should have been done differently? Secretary WOLFOWITZ. Mr. Skelton, let me start by—you said I presented an optimistic picture. Maybe it is optimistic compared to the total gloom and doom that one otherwise hears, but I in no way to minimize the security problem. I agree with you. It is the obsta- cle to all of the other progress that is being made. It is incredibly serious. I gave you a recital, every Iraqi we met with is under some de- gree of death threat. We know about the horrible killing and wounding of our wonderful Americans. And there is no way to ade- quately describe how violent the situation is there and how threat- ening it is. I think it is also, though, important to stop and think about the nature of the enemy. The enemy consists primarily of two groups. One is the people who kept Saddam Hussein in power for 35 years. He did not kill hundreds of thousands of Iraqis and torture even more single handedly. He had some thousands of people in his so called Mukhabarat, the so called intelligence service, which is probably best described as a modern day equivalent of the Nazi Gestapo. He had other even more horrendous killers in something called the Fedeyeen Saddam, which is like the Hitler youth or like the Schutzstaffein (SS) perhaps. This was a regime that depended for its survival on absolute terror. Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Secretary, let me interrupt, if I may. I under- stand. But my question is: What lessons we have learned, you have learned the last 15 months? Secretary WOLFOWITZ. This is part of the lesson, if I may. Mr. SKELTON. Please. Secretary WOLFOWITZ. It was a regime that survived with thou- sands of killers, and it was a regime that began making alliance with another group of killers, those people associated with bin 599 Laden and particularly this man named Zarkawi, who has now emerged as probably the most significant author of suicide bomb- ings in Iraq today. That is the enemy we are fighting. It is a truly evil enemy. And if you want to say what might have been underestimated, I think there was probably too great a willingness to believe that once we got the 55 people on the black list, the rest of those killers would stop fighting—the key to defeating them, I believed before the war. I believe now the key to defeating them all along has been get- ting Iraqis trained and equipped and capable of fighting them as quickly as possible. In fact, we went through some of this argument before the war about whether it was necessary or not to train free Iraqi forces. As you may recall, we did, in fact, set up a base in Hungary to do it. There was so much resistance to the idea within our government that by the time the war began, we had only trained a total of 71 people. It could have been much more. We could have started on that whole project earlier. But we are on that project. It is the key to success. Getting Iraqi forces up and fighting for their country is the answer. There are plenty of them who want to do it. If you have any doubt about its being an answer, then go and read the letter that Zarkawi sent to bin Laden in Afghanistan, in which he says explicitly that it will be suffocation for us—“suffocation” is the word he uses—when we are fighting Iraqis who are fighting for their own country and for their own brothers. Mr. SKELTON. Were there other mistakes besides thinking that if you got the 55 people, that would put an end to the violence? Other mistakes, or things that you would have done differently over the last 15 months? Secretary WOLFOWITZ. There is a list of might-have-beens. And in all of those lists of might-have-beens and reasons why we are having trouble, I have never heard anyone mention the name of Abu Abrahim. Abu Abrahim is a leader of the so-called May 15th organization. It is a Palestine professional killer group that has been harbored by Saddam for 25 years in Baghdad. He is one of the world's masters in plastics explosives. And he is still out there making bombs today to kill Americans. That has got much more to do with why we are having trouble than with whether or not there were enough State Department people in CPA headquarters in Baghdad. By the way, there were plenty. The fact is, you can can second-guess a lot of decisions. There were some that we might have done differently. There were some that were done brillantly. Let me talk about one in particular. I hear constant comment that we didn't have enough troops; I will say two things about that. First of all, there was a very delib- erate decision, and I believe it was the correct decision, and I think General Franks was probably the key author of it and deserves credit for what I think was a brilliant plan, a plan that moved in so quickly that Saddam did not have time to explode, to burn the oil fields. He did not have time to organize massive killing fields in Iraqi cities. I think we achieved a substantial degree of surprise and saved a lot of American lives and Iraqi lives in the process. 600 If we had waited for a much longer, much bigger buildup that might not have been necessary, I think we would have given him time to prepare some terrible things. We will never know for sure. But it was a conscious decision; I think it was the correct decision. I am not sure how having any more troops would have helped us to root out these elements of the old intelligence service once they had scattered out to cities like Fallujah. They are killers. Let's recognize what they are instead of trying to figure out where we did something wrong to create them. We didn't. We have got to get them. This new government understands we have got to get them. And we understand the way to go about doing it. To tell you another mistake: Another mistake was not giving our people the funding flexibility to field Iraqi security forces faster. It is disappointing to me that it has taken so long to get equipment into their hands. It is finally arriving and it is arriving in large quantities, but if we had been a little less fussy about competitive racting and a little more eager to get guns and radios in the hands of Iraqi police, it could have been done faster. Mr. SKELTON. From your description, Mr. Secretary, I don't see an end in sight. We are stuck? Secretary WOLFOWITZ. We are not stuck, Mr. Skelton. Mr. SKELTON. Tell us what your measurement is for success, for Americans to say, We have succeeded, and to bring the troops home. At what point? People ask me this. I have no answer. Secretary WOLFOWITZ. When it becomes an Iraqi fight, and the Iraqis are prepared to take on the fight—they are prepared to join their security forces. We are prepared to arm and equip them to do it. I can't tell you how long that is going to take. It is dangerous. I remember when people were up here eight years ago saying we would be in Bosnia only for a year. We are finally about to end the Bosnian missions. What is it, eight years later? This is a vastly more important mission for our national security. It is important to stay and finish it. But there is an end. The end is when Iraqis are governing their own country. The great advantage that we have is that while those killers are incredibly evil and incredibly ruthless and generate enormous ter- ror—by their very nature, they are not people that appeal to a broad population—the overwhelming number of Iraqis want suc- cess in this venture. You are absolutely right in your earlier comment. What scares them the most is the lack of security. But I think that they can provide their own security. That is the key to success. Mr. SKELTON. Is it your testimony you think that we might be there a good number of years? Secretary WOLFOWITZ. I think it is entirely possible. But what I think is also nearly certain is, the more they step up, and they will be doing so more and more each month, the less and less we will have to do. We will begin to—as they take over more responsibility, we will be able to let them be in the front lines and us be in a sup- porting position. 601 That example I gave from the April 9th attack in Mosul where the Iraqis Civil Defense Corps was able, by itself, to defend the Governor and the Government House, because they knew that American forces were there, that is a success story. If American forces, simply by being there and without having to enter the com- bat, can enable Iraqi forces to succeed, that will be huge progress. Mr. SKELTON. Switching to the prison investigation. The Army has decided to appoint General Paul Kern, four star general, to oversee all of the investigation. Was this an Army decision? Secretary WOLFOWITZ. I have been away. To the best of my knowledge it is an Army decision. Do you know, General Pace? General PACE. Sir, General Sanchez asked General Abizaid to ask the Army to appoint another officer to oversee Major General Fay's investigation, because General Sanchez felt that he needed to be part of the answers to the questions that needed to be asked. So it was an Army request, up the Army chain, and an Army deci- sion; specifically, Acting Secretary Brownlee appointed General Kern. Mr. SKELTON. Will he have the ability to question civilians with- in the chain of command regarding this investigation? General PACE. Sir, I do not know the answer to that question. I will find out. [The information refered to can be found in the Appendix begin- ning on page 695.] Mr. SKELTON. Will you? I am concerned, Mr. Secretary, and I mentioned it a few mo- ments ago, about the Prime Minister's announcement that he was. considering imposition of martial law after June the 30th. We have our troops over there, and who is going to enforce it but our troops? And of course that flies in the face of common sense, American common sense. I ask whether we would ever be in a position of enforcing Iraqi martial law. Secretary WOLFOWITZ. I think we have to know what he means by that. As I recall the statement he made, actually it was in se- lected areas, and I think it would depend on what areas. It might actually be something that we might mutually agree was necessary to bring order in a particularly difficult place. But as in Afghanistan, we certainly have no obligation to enforce edicts or decrees of the Iraqi Government that we don't agree with. I think that is why it is so important to have these consultative mechanisms that have been agreed on. Most of the emphasis in talking about them has been to give the Iraqis an input to things we might do that might cause problems for their government. But equally it is a mechanism for us warning them about things that they may do that we would not be in a position to support. At the end of the day, we have complete control over our forces, and our forces will not do anything that their commanders and their commander in chief do not believe is appropriate. Mr. SKELTON. My last question, Mr. Secretary. Ahmed Chalabi has been all over the news recently. And we paid him and his na- tional congress millions of dollars; is that correct? Secretary WOLFOWITZ. Yes. 602 Mr. SKELTON. I think it would be a good idea to seek an account- ing of where that money was spent in light of the fact that we have cut him off, that we assisted in raiding his quarters, and obviously he has been discredited. Could you provide us with an accounting, either classified or un- classified, as to how that money was spent? Secretary WOLFOWITZ. I am sure we can provide a classified one. [The information referred to can be found in the Appendix begin- ning on page 695.] Secretary WOLFOWITZ. I would point out that there is a mixed picture there, and we know from our commanders that some of the intelligence that his organization has provided us has saved Amer- ican lives and enabled us to capture some key enemy targets. So it is not black and white. Nothing in Iraq is black and white. I don't think I know of any figure we are dealing with who hasn't had in one way or another to compromise with incredibly difficult circumstances the last 35 years of that country's history. Let's bear in mind there was a long period of time, right up until the Gulf War, when it was U.S. Government policy that we weren't allowed to talk to members of the Iraqi opposition. I guess that was be- cause of the Iran Iraq war. It is not surprising that many of them, and Chalabi is not the only one, made contacts with countries like Iran or Syria or others. We deal with a lot of people. Contrary to what I see over and over again in the newspapers, Chalabi was not a favorite of the Pentagon; we do not believe in having favorites. We believe the Iraqi people have got to choose their own leaders, and that means that Americans shouldn't have favorites. I am surprised that he seems to be the target for many years of particular animus from some parts of this government. But, on the other hand, there are aspects of his recent behavior that are puzzling to me. You certainly deserve, as best we can, an accounting of what has happened with our money. I would point out, too, he is by no means the only person that we have been paying for intelligence. I assume you would be disappointed if we weren't going to all pos- sible sources. Mr. SKELTON. We would appreciate the classified information that you said you would furnish. Thank you. General PACE. Mr. Skelton, if I may, sir, just clarify a bit more on my answer to your question about General Kern. General Sanchez was the officer who was the convening authority for Major General Fay's investigation. General Sanchez asked to be replaced as a conveying authority chain of command. Secretary Brownlee appointed General Kern to be a new convening authority. That doesn't mean that he will be the person conducting the investigation. He will work with General Fay to determine whether or not General Fay has the au- thority or if he needs to appoint someone else new. I will get the information for you about civilians, sir. The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentlemen. One thing, Mr. Secretary. We have discussed these four that we are going to have to make sure that when requests come from the Iraqi Government, as they came from the Government of Afghani- 603 stan, whether we will respond to undertake missions on their be- half or not undertake them. And we have these forms put together where we work together with the Iraqi military. How quickly will those things move to a head and a decision at a higher level when they appear to be very close questions? Do you understand what I am talking about? We may have some tough ones that need to go up and be resolved at the top very quickly. How will those proceed? Secretary WOLFOWITZ. I hope they will proceed quickly. One of the things sometimes is that you encounter this in gov- ernment at all levels; people sort of feel it is their obligation to try to work out an agreement instead of elevating the disagreement and getting a decision. I know Secretary Rumfseld and the Presi- dent both encourage people to bring them decisions. They are not afraid to make them. I think the implication of your question is a very good one, that we are not looking necessarily for compromise, we are looking for clarity. And sometimes that clarity needs to happen very quickly. Do you want to add anything, General Pace. General PACE. Sir, from a commander's standpoint on the ground, the connectivity both by secure telephone and secure video teleconference (VTC) with General Abizaid to General Sanchez, if confirmed, to General Casey and General Metz and all the division commanders is very quick, very rapid. And we use it daily for very sensitive targeting, for example. So I am very confident that if the commanders in the field need to bring questions up the chain of command, they will be able to do so very quickly. Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Mr. Chairman, would you yield for a moment? The CHAIRMAN. Certainly. Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Thank you. General Pace, you answered that the question that the Chairman is asking, however, refers to page 16 plus in Mr. Wolfowitz's testi- mony. This is not a question about what you are doing now. You have the joint operating centers. What the Chairman is asking is how are the joint operating centers going to operate. Who is in charge? General PACE. Sir, U.S. commanders are and will remain in charge of U.S. troops. The joint operations centers are being dis- cussed with our Iraqi counterparts right now, and we will find a way to move forward on that that works for the Iraqis and for our- selves. But we will cede no authority nor responsibility to anyone other than U.S. commanders. Mr. ABERCROMBIE. So the answer to the Chairman's question is that you haven't arrived at a modus operandi between the Iraqi sovereign government and yourselves as to how you are going to conduct military operations. Nothing exists and we are turning it over on the 30th. General PACE. I would not say it that way, sir. I would Mr. ABERCROMBIE. You don't have to say it that way. I just said it. Is that correct or not? 604 Secretary WOLFOWITZ. No, it is not correct. When they operate in joint operations, they are under the command of the multi- national force commander, which means the American commander. Joint Operations Center is to coordinate so that the forces operate together in a coherent way. Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Who is in charge of the center? Secretary WOLFOWITZ. The center is not in charge of anything. It is a coordination center. It is the American commander that is in charge of the troops. Mr. ABERCROMBIE. So the Iraqis aren't in charge of their own op- erations. Secretary WOLFOWITZ. If they go into a joint operation with us, they are committing their forces to unified command, just as the Poles are or the British if it is a joint operation. They have the authority- Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Who is in charge of the unified command? All you have got do is answer the question. Secretary WOLFOWITZ. The Multinational Force Commander, who is an American general. Mr. ABERCROMBIE. So the Americans are still in charge. That's the answer. Secretary WOLFOWITZ. The Multinational Force sanctioned by the United Nations with a U.S. Commander is in charge. It is actually a United Nations sanctioned force. The CHAIRMAN. The key question here was simply as this walks ome of these questions are going to be very tough and they need to get up to the top quickly, to Ambassador Negroponte and General Sanchez, soon-to-be General Casey. And that's the ques- tion, Mr. Secretary. But I think that has been answered, well an- swered, those questions will move quickly to the top when they have to. Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The CHAIRMAN. Is that your understanding? Thank the gen- tleman. That is my understanding, that those questions will move very quickly when the circumstances compel it. General PACE. Yes, sir. Secretary WOLFOWITZ. That is right. General PACE. Yes, sir. The CHAIRMAN. Okay. Thank you. The gentleman from Pennsyl- vania, Mr. Weldon. Mr. WELDON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Secretary, General, thank you for being here. I am not going to try to second-guess our actions in Iraq because I have been sup- portive of them and I am very proud of the job that our troops and their leaders have done. Having visited the theater, I am contin- ually impressed with the quality of leadership that has been pro- vided. However, this hearing regards the future of Iraq and the topic that I think will have the most bearing on the long-term success of Iraq has not been discussed. And I raised this issue last week with the State Department and I will continue to raise this issue, because I think it is at the heart of the problem we are experienc- ing right now. And that is Iran. The problem, in my opinion, with our instability in Iraq is being caused by the Khomeini regime in 605 Iran. Over 15 months ago, we started providing information to the Intelligence Community that the Iranians were in fact under Kho- meini setting up a separate entity, separate from legitimate gov- ernment. In fact, the first $70 million of funding to al Sadr oc- curred 8 months ago, before anyone knew Sadr's name. We knew that was the case, or at least the Intelligence Communities did. - If we look at what is happening in Iran right now, only nine per- cent of their population came out to vote in elections this year. It is not a problem with the Iranian people. It is a problem with Kho- meini's regime: Khomeini seeing on one side Afghanistan stabiliz- ing; on the other side, Iraq about to be stabilized. And then we see right down the road, Colonel Qadhafi giving up his weapons of mass destruction without us firing a single shot. It doesn't take a rocket scientist to understand that Khomeini understands his days are numbered. If Iraq, in fact, is successful in controlling their own country and securing their own borders and securing their own civilization, then eventually the Khomeini regime will fall. Just recently, in fact last month, the Revolutionary Guard took over an airport outside of Tehran, a brand new airport that the Government of Iran had actually contracted Turkish authorities to run. The Revolutionary Guard took over that airport and, in a statement they issued, said it would be a bad signal for Iran to allow a Turkish entity to come in and operate that airport. We saw Khomeini last month put several dozen legislators, all members of the Revolutionary Guard, into their Parliament as an effort to destabilize and have significant influence in the Par- liament. We have seen significant efforts at developing a crash pro- gram on a nuclear weapon. In fact, I will tell you where the work is being done. It is being done at Isfayhan. There are 17 enrich- ment operations underway right now in Isfayhan. Their goal is to have a nuclear bomb within 6 months. Now, I am not giving classified information, Secretary Wolfowitz, because I gave this information to the Intelligence Committee in a document that thick, including our new Intelligence Committees, over the past 15 months. In my opinion we are not putting enough focus on Iran. In fact, there was just a meeting of Khomeini's sepa- rate entity that he has established, separate from the government, just last week where the head of the terrorist action in Iraq in- formed Khomeini that during 10 days, 12 suicidal attacks were car- ried out inside of Iraq and he was congratulated by Khomeini. So in my opinion, the bulk of what we are seeing in terms of un- rest in Iraq is being carried out both by Iranians, by those groups being supported by Iran's money, and by those organizations that are determined not to have Iraq be a stable nation. In fact most recently, Khomeini has announced $3 billion for an internal pro- gram inside of Iran to control its population by using mosques. And so my question is the same one I posed to the State Depart- ment: What is our plan to deal with Iran, because we don't want another Vietnam where neighboring countries, when we are fin- ished and have done our job, and I think done it quite well, then have the constant barrage of impact by a neighbor that sees the long-term success of Iraq directly jeopardizing the capability of 606 Khomeini's regime to stay in power? That is where I think the problem is. And so my question to you—and I realize this is really a State Department issue—but obviously it has to have your input: What are we doing about Iran? And what are we doing about Khomeini's activities fomenting so much unrest? In fact right now, the major goal of Khomeini's regime is to increase the price of oil to $50 a barrel—he has said it privately to his own people—$50 a barrel, be- cause he thinks that is the greatest way to invoke unrest in Amer- ica and the West. Now, these factors are in fact true and taking place, and at least five of the major suggestions provided to me by these people have all come true, including their crash program on a nuclear weapon. What is our plan to deal with Iran? Because I think in the long term, that is going to be the ultimate determination of the success that we will have in Iraq. Secretary WOLFOWITZ. I think I will take your invitation, Mr. Weldon, and say that it is a State Department issue, but it is a big issue. Everywhere we went in Iraq, we heard strong expressions of concern about destabilizing activities by several of their neighbors, particularly Syria and Iran. And there is no question in their minds—and I think you are right—that neither of those countries want to see success in Iraq. They are in many ways terrified of it. And I think part of an effective strategy has to be figured out dealing with those two neighbors in particular. I think it is impor- tant to recognize that this whole problem is a multifaceted prob- lem. I agree with you, Iran is important. I wouldn't say it is the key to everything. I think Iraq is important. I wouldn't say it is the key to everything. Saudi Arabia is incredibly important. It is under assault right now, probably by some of those same people who want to get $50 a barrel for oil. Syria is part of the problem. The Arab-Israeli issue is part of the problem. Afghanistan, we know, is part of the problem. Pakistan and potential incivility there is part of the problem. We are facing an unholy alliance of killers and terrorists who want to take the Arab and Muslim world backwards as far as they can take it and want to bring us down in the process. And I think we sometimes make a mistake of thinking we can split hairs and say this group is against us, but that group isn't really, or Zarqawi is against us in Iraq, he isn't really a member of al Qaeda. These groups work with one another, and I think the President has been right since he first said that we need to deal with terrorism sys- tematically, with all the global terrorist networks and all the state sponsors of terrorism. Clearly, Iran is a state sponsor of terrorism and we are seeing some of that effect today. The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman. The gentleman from South Carolina, Mr. Spratt. Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Secretary, General Petraeus told us last week that the Iraqi Army that he is training will number around 35,000. And this is obviously insufficient to hold this violent, fractious country together. And you have to be struck by the contrast. We maintain 140,000 troops. They have 35,000 troops, a fourth of our troop level. I know they have other forces. But General Petraeus also told us. ect to the border police I can for with resn With respecu 10 607 do the math, I know the number of kilometers of border here and I know the number of border police forces. And I just don't see them able to do that mission. Let me ask you several questions in that regard. Does the small size of the Iraqi Army, relatively small, require the United States to have a sizable deployment in Iraq for some years to come? Second, given the necessity of the Army in making this country more stable and more secure, why is its training lagging behind the training of the other security forces? And then, finally, if we have to maintain substantial troops there for some years to come, are you concerned about our forces, and in particular about our Reserve and Guard components? We have 168,000 on active duty now. We are implementing stop-loss orders. We are extending tours. Are you worried about the effects on our all-volunteer forces if we are there for some period of time to come? Secretary WOLFOWITZ. Let me just ask one thing. Did you say, why is the Army being trained relatively slowly compared to the other forces? Mr. SPRATT. Yeah. As I understand, there are about 9,000 trained military. If you look at the other security force components, they are much more fully trained, and sooner than any of the other. Now, I know it takes a while to get the army up and trained, but nevertheless we have been there more than a year. Are we con- cerned that if we build up a strong army that it might take advan- tage of the unstable situation, and a strong man, an authoritarian figure, might seize control again? Secretary WOLFOWITZ. Those are all very good questions. Let me try to start with an answer and ask some more. First of all, on that specific question, the Army, as designed by us at least, takes longer to train because it is a force oriented toward external defense, whereas a civil defense corps is basically sort of an initial three week training, and then the rest is on-the-job training I think we had the wrong design for the Army, myself. And I think the Prime Minister is changing that orientation. With the kind of international presence that is in Iraq today, he doesn't need to worry about external defense. And it is in our interest to have him concentrate on dealing with the real enemy, which is this in- ternal one. I think that the Iraqi Army doesn't need to be as elabo- rately equipped or as elaborately trained, and I think we can prob- ably stand up capable army units for the internal administration of that unit. Mr. SPRATT. Surely you don't think 35,000 troops is sufficient to hold this country together, ourselves being 140,000, to be pushing the envelope itself? Secretary WOLFOWITZ. I don't, Mr. Spratt, and I don't think that 75,000, which would be the 35,000 plus the 40,000 in the National Guard are enough. In fact, I have been asking questions for a long time about what is the right number, and keep being defeated by people who say, well, we aren't at the 35,000 yet. We aren't at the 40,000 yet. Wait until we get there. I think we will find and I hope sooner rather than later-that we get there and we need more. And let me say there is no short- age of Iraqis to serve in those armed forces. The shortage is going to be equipping them, and I don't think that should be beyond ca- 608 pacity to handle. The Iraqis have funds. We are spending $4 billion a mo s you know very well, on our own forces. It would be a huge saving to be able to substitute Iraqi forces, which are much cheaper. And our European allies and our rich Gulf countries I think have some obligations to step up and help supply that. So I think I am kind of with the premise of your question, 70,000 or 35,000 plus 40,000, may well not be enough. I would say it prob- ably isn't enough. Mr. SPRATT. Well, that has been the question. Do we take up the slack, or, if not, what do we do? Secretary WOLFOWITZ. I think we should—they are capable of fielding much more than is in our plan. And if more is needed, then we should make plans to do more. That is my view. I accept the point that first things first, and you need to start along the path we are on, but I think we should be prepared to ex- pand beyond it. I do not believe it makes any sense to have Ameri- cans defending Iraq when Iraqis are prepared to step up and do the job. The border enforcement issue which you raise is—I mean, it is in the long term, it is their problem and there is a question wheth- er any country can provide the sort of security to stop anyone from coming across the border. You can make it more difficult, but you also have to keep in mind, I think, the greater border problem still today is the ability of people to come legally through border cross- ings. And that is one of the reasons why the initiative I mentioned earlier, to have some kind of biometric identity card so that people can't hide so easily once they are in the country, would be a very important step forward, probably as important as border enforce- ment. But again to come back to the basic point of your question and to come to your point about what we can sustain in the long term, the key to reducing our presence in Iraq is getting Iraqis to step up. They are ready to step up in enormous numbers. I don't think there is a shortage of manpower. I don't think there is a shortage of willingness to risk your life and die. We see that in large num- bers. There is, unfortunately, a shortage of funding to equip them And I hope if we find that we don't have enough of them, we aren't going to find another shortage in funding. That is one of the rea- sons why we asked for this $500 million in authority, not funding but just authority, to go into DOD funds to train and equip Iraqi armed forces. And I think we still encounter a sort of old Cold War mentality that somehow security assistance should be a State De- partment function. Mr. SPRATT. Could I ask a question? The light is red, but you said one of your concerns is foreign infiltration. That is a concern we all have. It changes the nature of the conflict there. But isn't one solution to go ahead and strengthen the border patrol so that you can make borders less porous, less penetrable by these foreign elements? Secretary WOLFOWITZ. Absolutely. But recognize what kind of borders we are talking about. Especially on the Iranian border, you ng about miles and miles of mountainous terrain. There is no way you can seal off that kind of a border. You can make it 609 more difficult; and their—the border enforcement, the border police force, should be strengthened. But I come back to my other point. The best way to control bor- ders is on either side. Čongressman Weldon's point: The Iranians and the Syrians could do a lot to control the borders if they felt it was in their interest or we compelled them to think it was in their interest. And the Iraqis could do a lot more to control infiltration on their side if they had a way of tracking who is legitimately where they are and who is not. Everywhere I have talked to Iraqis and to American security peo- ple, they all agree that some kind of nonforgeable identity card would be a huge step forward in that regard. So you need to look at border security, I think, in a broad way. I am not arguing about better security on the borders themselves, but it is not the main part of the answer. Mr. SPRATT. We have some questions about the budget which we will submit for the record. We would appreciate your answers. Thank you, sir. Secretary WOLFOWITZ. Thank you Mr. Spratt. The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman. The gentleman from New Jersey, Mr. Saxton. Mr. SAXTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Secretary, General, thank you for being here today and being so frank with us. Over the past year and a half or so, we have had many discussions about progress and the kind of progress that we would like to see in Iraq. We have seen progress to a degree in re- building infrastructure and we know how important it is to rebuild the oil infrastructure in particular. We have seen progress in Iraqi society, particularly in schools opening and schools being rebuilt and health care institutions being reopened and equipped and put into operation. Just last week, General Petraeus was here via satellite, and he talked about plants opening; and he was particularly proud of one asphalt plant that had been opened up in the northern part the country. And we have seen progress in standing up governments as well. The first time I visited Iraq last November, again, General Petraeus hosted us in Mosul, and we saw local people for the first time in decades taking part in their local government and in secu- rity for the northern part of the country. In spite of the fact that we have seen progress in all of these areas, the nature of the questioning this morning strongly suggests that we would like to see more. And that depends on, we think, on more success, more progress in terms of our security—of the secu- rity that we are able to provide there. So my question is this: Knowing that this has been a particularly difficult time in terms of violence in Iraq, because people were try- ing to stop the Iraqi people from standing up their own govern- ment, and recognizing as well that it is unrealistic for us to expect the violence to subside after June the 30th, for some period of time, what do you see in terms of the progress over, let's say, the next six months in terms of security forces, in terms of what we might expect to see in terms of the Iraqi people being able to provide the kinds of security that will really make a difference, not only on the security side but on the infrastructure rebuilding side, on the Iraqi 610 society side, as well as the economy and the success of the govern- ment? Secretary WOLFOWITZ. I know General Pace has something to say, and I will turn to him in just a minute. But I think Mr. Skel- ton's point earlier, that all the progress that we have made on the whole range of things on the civilian side is fundamentally threat- ened by the lack of security. In fact, I think most Iraqis would say the lack of security is their greatest personal concern. Electricity is starting to be fixed. Health care is 30 times higher expenditures than it was under Saddam. Schools are being fixed. By the way, significantly, a lot of that work is being done with Iraqi monies. Some $800 million of Iraqi money has gone to our commanders and to local governments to fix schools and fix hos- pitals as just one example. But as long as the situation, the security situation, remains as bad as it is, there is enormous anxiety. And, moreover, the enemy is targeting a lot of that progress. It is not an accident that it is harder to hit Americans, so they go after electricity, they go after the oil infrastructure. I think I will let General Pace speak now, but I think it would be wrong to suggest that the violence is going to suddenly subside after June 30. I think the enemy is going to be targeting this proc- ess all the way through elections. And elections, of course, create another opportunity for intimidation and terror which this enemy will work at. But I think as we go forward, we may not see a reduc- tion in enemy activity, but I think we will see a steady increase in Iraqi capacity. General Pace. General PACE. Yes, sir. I would echo that, Mr. Saxton. First of all, as you know, sir, about 250,000 Iraqis are required, by our esti- mates, for their own security. And about 226,000 of those are on duty now in one capacity or another. Many of them need further training. Example: The police force; we are training about a thou- sand police a month in Jordan, the Jordanians are. That is going to increase to about 1,500 a month. There are police academies in- side of Iraq that are producing about 500 a month now and will increase to about 1000. They are looking to countries, NATO coun- tries. For example, there is a NATO summit at the end of this month. We are hoping that more countries outside of Iraq will offer to help, to help train, so as we focus on the number one priority, which is to make the Iraqi security forces of all flavors more capa- ble, I think you will see a sustained increase in that capacity. What I really wanted to say most was that we should expect more violence, not less, in the immediate weeks ahead as our en- emies understand that the Iraqi people are about to do what our enemies most fear, which is to take control of their own govern- ment and start making representative decisions about the future of their own country. And this is a great threat to our enemies, and we can expect that they will try disrupt that in any way they can. Mr. SAXTON. Mr. Chairman, if I could just have one quick follow- up question. You know, it is very difficult for us from our vantage point here in the U.S. to gauge progress in these areas because, quite frankly, you know, it seems to me the tendency to report on bad news rather than good news for whatever reasons. And I am 611 wondering if, Mr. Secretary, any thought has been given to how we can convey the true nature of progress in Iraq that the American people have been unable to gauge for themselves because of access to that information. Secretary WOLFOWITZ. It is a constant challenge to us, and I wish I knew a silver-bullet answer. It certainly makes a big dif- ference when Members of Congress visit. I think they bring back a firsthand perspective that is invaluable, and often you can bring some press along with you that I think help also, because, frankly, part of our problem is a lot of the press are afraid to travel very much so they sit in Baghdad and they publish rumors, and rumors are plentiful. I think as our soldiers come back and they get an op- portunity to get around the country and tell their own stories, that may help. But we are up against some heavy competition. The Arab media, like al Jazeera, have no interest in telling the story straight, and I think our own media have some responsibility to try to present a balanced picture instead of always gravitating for the sensa- tional. And the violent is admittedly sensational. Mr. SAXTON. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman. The gentleman from Ar- kansas, Dr. Snyder. Dr. SNYDER. Mr. Chairman, I think Mr. Abercrombie was in the room, I think he did get in the room; am I right, Neil? Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Yes. The CHAIRMAN. We will take the gentleman's word for it. The gentleman from Hawaii, Mr. Abercrombie. Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairm very much, Mr. Chairman. Secretary Wolfowitz, you indicate the one of the things you said was we shouldn't have favorites. I have read your testimony. One of the things you have on page four is you call the supporters of the cleric al Sadr, “nags.” you have the Coalitional Provisional Authority, Secretary WOLFOWITZ. That is a typo, Mr. Abercrombie. It should be gangs. Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Okay. Gangs. Secretary WOLFOWITZ. Thank you for catching it. It may have been a Freudian typo, but Mr. ABERCROMBIE. I would really read your testimony. I can do proofreading apparently. Secretary WOLFOWITZ. Thank you. Mr. ABERCROMBIE. You say “gangs.” I am not sure that that im- proves the problem I think you have there. The Coalition Provi- sional Authority has done polling recently. I mentioned in the last hearing Sadr-right, I know-is second only to Sistani in terms of favorability throughout Iraq-67 percent favorability. At the same time, you say on page 3 and extend on up to 15, 16, full partner- ship. Now, I am going to go back over the questions that I have raised in previous sessions with you, because I still don't have an answer and I believe the Chairman's question has not been answered yet. Who, exactly, is going to be in charge after June 30? If we have this full partnership and we are not picking favorites, who is going to be in charge, whether it is the prisons, trials, prosecutions, Iraqi 612 Army actions, border patrol activity, the special operations that are supposed to—Iraqi intervention forces that are supposed to be oper- ating in the urban areas? Who is going to be in charge of issuing the orders with respect to attacks or responses to the violence that General Pace says is bound to increase? Secretary WOLFOWITZ. Mr. Abercrombie, I think it might help to think about the fact that in a country like Korea, even today, we have a clearly sovereign government with enormously capable armed forces. Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Excuse me. Mr. Wolfowitz, the time is short. I am not interested in Korea because it is not a parallel situation. South Korea does not have the same elements that we are talking about here. Secretary WOLFOWITZ. In the event of war, it would have very much the same elements and Korean armed forces would be under U.S. command, as U.S. forces are, both in peacetime and in war- time. And it is the tension between a sovereign country that is ereign in its own country, and it depends on the United States or the international community for critical security support that they can't provide for themselves. There is not a formula for working it out. It has to be worked out in partnership. But I would say two principles of the partnership are our forces Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Is it being worked out? The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Abercrombie, Mr. Wolfowitz- Secretary WOLFOWITZ. Our forces are under- The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Wolfowitz, would you suspend for just a sec- ond? Mr. Abercrombie, you are asking good questions. They are somewhat complex questions. You have got to let the witness be able to answer the question. If you don't give him more than two or three seconds to start his answers, we are not going to be able to have a good constructive dialogue, Mr. ABERCROMBIE. I don't want the answers to get started. I just want the answers. The CHAIRMAN. And I think it is- Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Mr. Chairman, either we are having this process completed before June 30 or we don't. If we don't, the an- swer is that we don't have it done. The CHAIRMAN. Well, Mr. Abercrombie, you can dictate your questions. You can't dictate his answers, and you have to give him an opportunity to give his answers and we are going to give him plenty of time, so let's- Mr. ABERCROMBIE. All right. The CHAIRMAN. Let's let him answer fully. Secretary WOLFOWITZ. After June 30, all operations of U.S. forces and the Multinational Forces (MNF), part of the MNF, will be under U.S. command, clear U.S. command, reporting ultimately to the President of the United States. Iraqi forces that are committed to joint operations will be under the same command; that is a joint command headed by the Multinational Force commander. İraqi forces, if they choose to undertake independent operations, are free to do so. It is a sovereign government, although they are obliged under the terms of these letters to coordinate with the Multi- national Force commander, and where there are sensitive issues of policy, we are committed to reaching agreement on what to do. 613 Similarly, where we plan to undertake sensitive offensive oper- ations that cause issues for the Iraqi Government, we are commit- ted to consulting with them on matters of policy to reach some com- mon understanding. I think that is a very clear arrangement. It is as clear as it is possible to be. It is going to depend on cir- cumstances and on concrete cases. But I would say, based on just a few weeks experience of working with this new government, even before they are sovereign, I am quite confident the mechanisms will work. Mr. ABERCROMBIE. So if the troops that you outline in your testi- mony here, for example, the border police, 20,000 by July, fully equipped by September, the other forces—Facility Protection Serv- ice (FPS), 74,000 are on duty, final number to be determined, but fully equipped by September; the Iraqi Army, 35,000 soldiers and 27 battalions, trained and on duty by October, et cetera. Then you should have some idea about when we can expect this to end for us. I am not asking you for a specific date. But I am saying, I am asking you, when can we expect these fully trained and equipped elements, from special operation forces to border police, to be able to assume authority in Iraq and begin the process of withdrawing troops, particularly those in the Guard and Reserve, back to the United States? Or is the end in sight? Be- cause, I am not asking for a specific date, but if all of this is taking place and you make testimony, as you do every time here, that ev- erything is moving along, and, if not right on schedule, almost on schedule, surely we can have some understanding then of when our obligations are going to be taking another level. Secretary WOLFOWITZ. We can do our best, Mr. Abercrombie, but let's think about Bosnia, which is a vastly simpler case. Nobody was shooting at us, and yet eight years ago people said we will be out in a year. And I don't think anyone would have been able to tell you in eight years we will be out, which is where we are about to be. And this is a war, we are fighting an enemy which is a very determined enemy, which is determined to try to upset this process and I think is going to make a particularly determined e the next six months or so, because once there is a elected govern- ment I think they are going to face a very, very serious defeat, which they are trying to prevent. So I would Mr. ABERCROMBIE. You continually use Bosnia as an example, but you don't represent it accurately. On the contrary, where Bos- nia is concerned we had specific times of drawdowns, which we have met. We have gone from thousands of troops, with specific numbers of troops being drawn down at specific times, and all that has worked because we had the infrastructure there in place. I suggest to you that what you are proposing here is virtually schizophrenic. On the one hand you are saying everything is work- ing according to the plans that we have, if not exactly on time, al- most on time. And yet when it comes to the United States being able to extract itself in an honorable fashion and in an orderly fashion, it suddenly disappears. If you are going to use Bosnia as an analogy rather than a parallel, then it seems to me that you should stick with it as an analogy and give us the drawdown time. Mr. WELDON. Will the gentleman yield? Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Certainly. 614 Mr. WELDON. My good friend and colleague, I just have to state for the record I can fully remember, because I have given this speech probably 30 times, the President of the United States telling us we would be out of Bosnia by Christmas of 1998, emphatically, end of record. That was what he told us. Christmas of 1998. This is June of 2004. And we are still in Bosnia. Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Well, reclaiming my time. The CHAIRMAN. Let the Chair reclaim the time for just a second. I would say to my good friend from Hawaii, we have got about 30 folks here that need to ask questions. The gentleman has had a pretty good run at the Secretary, and I would like to recognize Secretary WOLFOWITZ. Let me just say that Bosnia is a not anal- ogy. I said Bosnia was vastly simpler because there wasn't an enemy trying to defeat us; and it is the enemy in Iraq that makes things unpredictable. And I also didn't say that everything is going swimmingly on schedule. I said our equipping of Iraqi security forces is sadly behind schedule, partly because of our cumbersome contracting procedures. I think it is finally on schedule. I am hope- ful, but I think we are reasonably confident, reasonably confident, about the numbers we have given you about what we expect they will be capable of fielding by the end of this year, and that should make a significant difference. I can't tell you how big a difference, and I agree with Mr. Spratt in saying I am not convinced that it is enough, but it will get us substantially improved over where we are today. And I think there is no question in my mind that at some point a relative handful of killers, no matter how ruthless they are, can be defeated by an Irad e that in the vast majority does not want to see a return to the old horrors. Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Well, I will conclude, Mr. Chairman, by say- ing that does not answer the question with respect to the respon- sibility of the United States, then, to keep on providing military forces when we don't have them, when we continue to have stop losses for Guard and Reserve and when we do not have a clear un- derstanding of what our deployment schedules are going to be or requirements were going to be, and this committee is going to have to deal with that. Thank you. The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman for a very fulsome ques- tion. And the gentleman from New York, Mr. McHugh. Mr. McHUGH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Gentlemen, welcome. I am tempted to ask—to demand. what our exit strategy is from Germany, seeing as how we are still there a half a century later. I can't help but express my frustration when I hear members of this committee demand an exit strategy when we will be done, but don't need a date to tell us that. I think the strategy has been outlined. I suggest perhaps our debate should be focused upon the fact of whether or not the strategy will work. I don't think any of us know the answer to that at the moment. But having said all of that, Mr. Secretary, I want to go back to our opening comments. People like to say what mistakes were made. I happen to believe a mistake is something that you know should not be done, that all evidence suggests that if you do it you are stupid, but you do it anyway. I think there have, rather than 615 mistakes been made, lessons to be learned as we look back. I can't imagine a military engagement of this or any other size that sug- gests after the fact that, had you known then what you hold in your intelligence now, you would be doing some things differently. I think the disbanding of the Iraqi Army in its totality was prob- ably something as a lessons learned we might have done dif- ferently. You commented that you believe that or suggest the possi- bility that Prime Minister Allawi may in fact issue a rescission of that order. Given where we are today, I am not sure now that that is the right thing to do. I am not sure that it is not. But could you tell me, from your perspective, what the political reaction of that would be amongst al Sadr and his supporters, particularly the Shia population, Ali Sistani, Grand Ayatollah and others, to the recon- figuration of that Army that by and large was a Suni instrument of suppression? Secretary WOLFOWITZ. You have just described the very dilemma that led Ambassador Bremer to decide to dissolve the Army, which, by the way, had largely gone home anyway. It was a conscript Army and heavily overweighted with officers, which is where the issue arises. But most of that army were getting $2 a month, and they had no interest in coming back on duty. But the issue has to do—and it is a legitimate issue-as to whether or not that order may have alienated some significant number of Army officers who otherwise would have been cooperative. But, again, let us be under no illusions. It had nothing to do with the fact that the members of the old gestapo—and I don't know a better word for it, because if you say Mahabharata it doesn't mean that much. Maybe gestapo doesn't mean that much anymore to people who don't know their history, but those people didn't decide to fight us because we dis- banded the Army. Saddam Hussein was out there funding fights against us until December. He didn't make that decision because of our decision on the Army. So let us be clear. The core of the Army are the hard-core killers and they have been there since the beginning. This issue about the Army has to do with whether some officers, who otherwise are decent people, might have provided some at least passive support to the enemy because they were dis- illusioned. And I think the Prime Minister is trying to pull those people back and at the same time do it without, as your question properly suggests, providing ammunition for somebody else, Sadr, or maybe a more reasonable person, to say this government is bringing back the old regime. I am absolutely certain this government has no intention of bringing back the old regime. I gave you a recital earlier of how Allawi himself suffered from the old regime. I was very struck, in fact, when General Latif, who was the initial man in charge of the Fallujah Brigade, who is an Army veteran himself, spoke with elo- quence, not too far along the lines of Mr. Weldon, that our neigh- bors do not want us to succeed, he said, in this hard bid in general, because they know that a genuine democratic Iraq is going to be a threat to them. And he clearly meant particularly, I think, Syria and Iran. He believes in it. He doesn't want to go back. But after what Iraq has been through, there are a lot of people who will be fearful that bringing back old army officers might rep- resent a return to the past. The Prime Minister has a challenge. 616 It is much better that this challenge be faced by an Iraqi than by an American administrator. I imagine he will make mistakes, or at least he will make errors of judgment that he will go in one direc- tion and the political process will scream and say you have gone too far. I think he is a smart enough man to tack and change a little. I think what democratic process is about is the ability to cor- rect mistakes through a process of public debate and transparency. And I see Iraq heading into that era. And it needs it, because this issue of how do you handle people who served their country honor- ably but under a totally dishonorable regime, how do you treatment them appropriately, it is a big challenge and I am glad there will be an Iraqi government to make those judgments. Mr. MCHUGH. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. General PACE. Sir, if I might add with regard to timing, I can't give you a precise timeline, but I do know the things that must happen. First of all, we must have a well trained, competent Iraqi security force. That will take time. We are behind for the reasons that have been stated. But that needs to happen. When they are well-trained and competent, then they need to take, for example, Baghdad, where they should be Iraqis should be standing the po- lice beat in downtown Iraq-downtown Baghdad, excuse me. They should be doing the patrolling downtown Baghdad, and we should initially move back from the center of the city to the outside of the city, so that if they get in trouble that they can't handle, we are in close proximity to respond and support. And as they become more capable, then they take over the outer cordon as well and we will back even further. And then as they become totally capable and competent, then we can leave the country. But this should be event driven, not calendar driven. Mr. McHUGH. Mr. Chairman if I might, and I couldn't agree with you more, General, and that was my point about cannot establish dates. But I would just say to my colleagues, if there is any doubt in any of our minds that the key to the success here lies in the Iraqi people and the standing up of these various security forces, just look at where more and more of the bombings are occurring. They are occurring at army recruitment centers. They are occur- ring at police stations where Iraqis are on duty. I think the enemy and those who wish this fledgling democracy ill understand that as well. So I would suggest, as I started to say earlier, the strategy is what should be debated here, and at least our enemies, in part, feel the strategy very achievable. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman. And now the gentleman from Arkansas, Dr. Snyder. Dr. SNYDER. Thank you Mr. Chairman. And thank you, Mr. Sec- retary and General Pace, for being here. Mr. Secretary, do we have a parts problem in Iraq? Just in the last 30 minutes I got an e-mail from someone I know over there, and their platoon has three of their six dozers down because of equipment and maintenance problems. Two of their front-end load- ers are down because of parts and maintenance problems. And these are machines that are used for filling in containers and pro- viding protection from blasts. Do we continue to have a parts and maintenance problem on our vehicles? 617 General PACE. Sir, there may be spot problems for specific units getting resources down to them. I am not aware of those. But I do know that this Congress has provided sufficient resources for us to have all the spare parts we need to continue this mission. If you could give me, off line, the name of the unit, sir, I can get you spec- ificity on why that particular problem exists. Dr. SNYDER. But you think it is a rare and spotty problem, not a systemic problem we are having with equipment and vehicles maintenance and parts? General PACE. I do believe that; yes, sir. Dr. SNYDER. Mr. Secretary, I wanted to ask you about this issue of the equipping of the Iraqi Army. We have had ongoing discus- sions about these troops and for the last six to eight months or so, Secretary Rumsfeld has said multiple times, when he would list the coalition forces, the numbers of troops, and he would add in there impressive looking numbers. But then today both in your oral statement but also in your written statement, you spent quite a bit of time talking about the equipment, and on PAGE 21 of your statement you say the Iraqi security forces need more and better equipment. We had not planned for them to be fully equipped at this point. But you know, candidly, Mr. Secretary, when you had listed these charts in the last six to eight months that would list those troops, I think most of us assumed that if there were on the list, they were considered part of the coalition, that they had been properly equipped. You go into detail now about getting these troops equipped. Are we on track now to have this equipment? Who is responsible for what went wrong that they were not equipped at this point in time? Secretary WOLFOWITZ. We would have to look at particular num- bers. I have tried always to be careful about saying, for example, we have large numbers of police but the great majority of them are not well trained, and the big challenge has been, and it remains, to get police training up, and also equipping. I think—and this is something we are monitoring closely—and having General Petraeus there I think is a key factor. I was told just this past week that large quantities of equipment are now arriving under Dr. SNYDER. Well, he told us last week, he says the contracting process, in his words, is up and in high gear; that there was origi- nally a problem, he thought, at his end of things in Iraq with the contracting process. And, you know, you talk about what might have been or trying to learn from this. We had problems with the Small Arms Protec- tive Inserts (SAPI). We had trouble with up-armored Humvees. I am hearing from folks in Iraq we have parts and maintenance problems with vehicles. And then your statement says we are behind in our equipping of Iraqi troops. And you made reference to the Congress, in error, but I read General Petraeus' statement to say that the contracting is up and running and perhaps this is an area where advanced plan- ning could have foreseen that we were going to need so many troops, or we want to have Iraqi troops well equipped. 618 Secretary WOLFOWITZ. Dr. Snyder, I think it is important; ad- vance planning is great. But when you are in a war, flexibility is also essential. And the Congress has given us a lot of flexibility on things like up armored Humvees and SAPI plates. I think we were able to move about $2.5 billion thanks to the flexibility you have given us against those force protection needs. As I think you know, I think, and it is not only on this end of Pennsylvania Avenue, there are jurisdictional arguments on the other end. But this issue of whether equipping the security forces is a military mission or a foreign affairs mission I think has gotten us hung up unnecessarily and deprived us of some flexibility that would have allowed us to fill in where the plan ran into a problem. In the case of the supplemental, the plan ran into a problem be- cause the fairly cumbersome requirements for competitive bidding I don't think were appropriate for this particular piece of the sup- plemental. Dr. SNYDER. Well, that is where I have gotten confused, because General Petraeus says the contracting process, in his words, is up and in high gear. And I don't understand how- Secretary WOLFOWITZ. It is now, but it took six months. Dr. SNYDER Why have we gotten so behind, because clearly any- one's plan a year and a half ago or two years ago would have been that we are going to have an Iraqi Army that needs to be able to defend the country. The issue of the prisoner detainees, the allega- tions that have been made and the pictures we have seen—to me this an issue about protecting troops, protecting our troops; that anything that the world perceives as our mistreatment of our pris- oner detainees, the signal will go out it is okay to treat Americans that way. And so I had hoped when we first heard about these allegations, that, in the words of General Myers sitting right there at that table, saying we need to get everything out on the table, to resolve it, to lance it like a boil—those are my words, I guess, from my medical background—we get it all out on the table. The sooner we can resolve this, find out who is responsible, take appropriate ac- tion, we will regain the moral authority. . The problem is it does not seem to me that you all are interested in getting things out on the table. Mr. Skelton has made multiple requests for information and documents that have not been forth- coming. I don't think any member of this committee ha to review the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) re- port that Ms. Tauscher has been trying to get access to. Either we are interested in getting it out on the table or we are not. ed General Myers a question about General Mowhoush. It was just a very simple question. There had been a press release put out by someone that he had died. There was no reference to any allegation of mistreatment. Then some reports got leaked from the Pentagon. The Denver Post did a story on it. My question was, did anyone ever do an updated press release? Last night and this morning I got a response back to my question, but did not answer the question. It just gave me a status of the case, but did not indi- cate whether it had ever been a correction of the first press release that came out. That to me is not putting everything out on the table, so that the Congress, working with you both as representa- 619 tives of the American people, can regain the moral authority on this issue, with the ultimate goal being of protecting U.S. troops. Am I missing something here on why—it doesn't seem- Secretary WOLFOWITZ. I think we are determined to get every- thing out on the table. The ICRC presents a special dilemma be- cause that organization depends on confidentiality to function, and it functions effectively in a great many countries around the world where its activity could be seriously jeopardized by this issue. We are trying to work with the Congress to find a way to get the Con- gress fully informed, while respecting the concerns of the ICRC. On many of the issues that we are dealing with, we are trying to get the facts up. It is not a matter of hiding facts, but a matter of multiple investigations that are underway to try to find out what really happened and what were the causes of things. I must say I would like to, since this subject has come up, I would like to at least clarify one thing that has been seriously misreported for almost the last 24 hours by CNN, claiming that Secretary Rumsfeld authorized some kind of extreme interrogation method in Guantanamo that I think they describe as water torture. That is wrong. CNN was told yesterday that it was wrong. They have continued running the story until, I am told, finally this morning at 8:30 they published a correction. I was in discussions with Secretary Rumsfeld where he specifi- cally ruled out the use of that kind of technique. I agree with you that how we treat people is important. I think it is particularly im- portant with respect to the fact that we stand for something very different from the governments in that part of the world. I do have to tell you, though, what concerns Iraqis is winning this battle against this enemy. I was struck at how little this issue ever came up in my discussions with Iraqis when I was out there. It doesn't mean it is not a serious issue. Dr. SNYDER. What concerns Americans is not only winning the battle, but protecting our own troops, and regaining the moral au- thority on this issue is crucial to that. Just a clarification. You are not saying, are you, that ICRC has told you they do not want Mr. Hunter or Mr. Skelton to see the ICRČ report? You are not saying that to us today, are you? Secretary WOLFOWITZ. I have been away. I am not certain of the exact state of the discussions. I know the ICRC has concerns about sharing information with this Congress that could cause precedents that create problems with them with other countries where the sit- uation is more tenuous, and we are trying to work through it. We have no desire to hide the reports. Dr. SNYDER. Thank you. The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman. The gentleman from Con- necticut, Mr. Simmons. Mr. SIMMONS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you gentle- men for your testimony. As I have listened this morning, it kind of takes me back a little bit to my own service in Vietnam. The dif- ficulty we had in this country, but in particular as a soldier, the difficulty I had in observing the dissension and criticism of the war that came from my own Representatives back stateside, and how difficult and demoralizing it was. I also think of my kids playing video games, many of which have to do with somewhat violent ac- and 620 tivities. But, you know, when the day is over, you turn the game off. And what comes to mind to me is the larger question as to whether the United States of Americas as a Nation and as a cul- ture has the willpower to muster the energy to win against reli- gious fanatics using suicide tactics. Do we have the staying power? Certainly in Korea we had the staying power. We still have troops in Korea. In Germany we had the staying power. We still have troops in Germany. Bosnia, which doesn't hold a candle to the war on Islamic fundamentalist terrorists, we still have people there. It seems like the pressure is on to get out quick and dirty, and it doesn't really matter what the consequences of getting out quick and dirty are. Do we have the willpower? Does this Nation have the cultural resources to proceed against this kind of opponent? General PACE. Sir, your troops certainly have the willpower and we do not mind criticism. In fact, lessons learned is what we are about as we do things, and in fact we have our lessons learned teams with us so we can learn and do better the next time. But I agree with you. It would be nice if, in addition to the criti- cism, that the vast majority of wonderful things that your troops do every day got public recognition. They are doing this govern- ment and this country a wonderful service and they will stay at it and they will not blink. And they just need to know that we appre- ciate what they are doing, sir. Secretary WOLFOWITZ. I also think you have got to look at les- sons learned and where you can improve, and criticism is not only an essential feature of the democratic system, I think it is an es- sential feature of success. I do think it is important for the troops to hear that we are committed as a country to winning. And I think we have to be committed as a country to winning. We have an opportunity in Iraq, in fact—and that is what all this discussion about equipping Iraqi security forces is about to enlisting tens of millions of Arab Muslims in this fight against a coalition of terrorist killers that have their eye on much more than feating us in Iraq, although defeating us in Iraq is clearly the main agenda of those people who are there. But look what is going on next door in Saudi Arabia. I mean, they are out to bring down the government of the world's biggest oil producer. And it is not to do anything nice for us. Look at what they are trying to do in Pakistan, where they made two or three assassina- tion attempts at President Musharraf. It is, as I said earlier, it is an unholy alliance of different groups who are committed to taking the Arab and Muslim world back- wards and hurting us disastrously in the process, and they under- stand that this battle in Iraq is crucial to their success, and I thi their success, and I think we have to show that we equally understand that it is crucial and we are going to win it. And we have the great majority of the Iraqi people on our side to win it. I think that is the one of our biggest strategic assets, that and the fact that we have the best young men and women in uni- form any country could ever have. Mr. SIMMONS. I thank the gentlemen for their response. I guess I will simply conclude by saying that I will do my best under Arti- 621 cle I, Section 8 to provide you with the resources you need. I appre- ciate this oversight hearing. But I am mindful of the fact that there cannot be 535 Secretaries of Defense. There cannot be 535 commanders in the field, that we have to take some of what you have to say on faith, because that is part of the division of powers that our forefathers and foremothers established for us, and I will do my best to provide you with the support you need. I thank the Chair. The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentlemen. The gentlelady from Cali- fornia, Mrs. Tauscher. Ms. TAUSCHER. Secretary, General Pace, thank you for being here. Mr. Secretary, for a long time you and the rest of the admin- istration have talked about turning Iraq into a democratic, or at least functioning state, that will serve as a model for the region, and I don't disagree with that. But I am deeply concerned about a precipitous withdrawal of the troops for whatever reason in the short term if we don't achieve a political end state that is satisfactory to the American people. If we cut and run in the next few months, none of this will work for the long-term stability of the region, and certainly not for the people of the United States. So I want to talk to you about those metrics of success that Gen- eral Pace so articulately talked about, and I actually think that there are more that we can expand upon. But what specifically are you going to ensure that we achieve before we leave in terms of se- curity, governance, elections, reconstruction and economic growth? Assuming that there is no additional assistance coming from NATO, and I have gone to many NATO meetings recently, and I can tell you there are no fresh troops on the horizon from NATO, how long do you think our troops are going to need to stay? You have used the Bosnia analogy in a tortured way, in my opinion. Frankly, we have withdrawn troops on a steady basis. We are about to withdraw most of our troops, I would say. But you also said that it is a much easier situation in Bosnia. We have been there for eight years. Are you suggesting that we are going to be in Iraq for longer than eight years? And what does it mean that you think things are going easier somehow, and why? Secretary WOLFOWITZ. I don't think I said they are going easier. I think I tried to say over and over again, I think the next six months are going to be particularly difficult, particularly dan- gerous, because I think what terrifies the enemy the most is the prospect of an elected Iraqi government, which is—I mean, let me go through the five steps of the President's plan. It starts with having this interim government established on July 1st. It includes, second, training and equipping Iraqi security forces, which we have talked about at some length now. It includes moving toward an elected government at the end of this year, the beginning of next year. It includes bringing additional international forces. And I agree with you, they are not going to come in huge num- bers. It is not because of an absence of United Nations (UN) resolu- tions. We have now had the fourth United Nations resolution. The problem is most of these countries don't have forces. We are having difficulty getting the NATO countries to provide the things they 622 have committed to in Afghanistan. They have hollowed out their military over the last ten years. I suppose it is not dangerous if you think the threats have gone away, but the threats haven't gone away. And finally, and this is the end of next year, the plan is for there to be a constitution adopted by the Iraqi people and an elected gov- ernment under that constitution. It seems to me that implies at least through the end of that time period some substantial require- ments for the Iraqi security forces to need support from us. I can't tell you how much. I think General Pace has outlined the kinds of events we would look for to gradually reduce our numbers, and also reduce our involvement, direct involvement in combat, which I think is at least as important as reducing our numbers. You say my bringing up Bosnia is tortured. I brought it up to say that even a simple case like Bosnia has taken seven years longer than was initially predicted. I guess I would also say even a case like Bosnia, where it is in the U.S. national interest was fairly minimal, and it was a largely humanitarian action, although I hap- pen to believe it was the correct action, it was worth sticking it out for eight years. Other members of this committee have mentioned that we are still sticking it out in Korea, still sticking it out in Germany, this is part of fighting an enemy that has made it clear its determina- tion to attack the United States, its determination to take down the world's oil supplies, its determination to take down every mod- erate government in the Arab world, its determination to oppose the advance in the Muslim world, which I think is the key to de- feating this terrorist threat. So I guess I am saying a little patience wouldn't be bad. And pa- tience, Mrs. Tauscher, if I might say, the more the enemy senses the American people are patient, the more discouraged they will become and the less eager they will be to join this fight. The more they sense that we are impatient and maybe a few more car bombs and we will go the way of Beirut, the more car bombs there will be. Ms. TAUSCHER. But the truth is that we are not in Germany in a postwar effort, we are there because of the Cold War and because of our ability, because of our cooperation through NATO and other reasons to station our troops there. We are not in South Korea because of the post-Cold Effort or be- cause of the post-Korean conflict. We are there because we happen to have a strategic reason for being there. Secretary WOLFOWITZ. No, we are there because of the North Ko- rean threat to South Korea, just as we are in Iraq because of a threat to a new Iraqi government. And the fact is if you recall the Marshall Plan was played out in 1948, because it was viewed that the occupation of Germany and the occupation of Western Europe was going so disastrously bad that we had to come in with a major bail out. That was three years after the end of World War II. These things take time. Ms. TAUSCHER. What will happen, Mr. Secretary, if the elections are not able to be achieved in Iraq in December as you have laid out? 623 Secretary WOLFOWITZ. It is possible. The enemy is going to try to make it as difficult as possible to hold elections. When you have a plan, I mean, I think it is the same in the Pentagon, no plan sur- vives first contact with the enemy. Any plan that depends on abso- lute rigid following of the plan isn't a very good plan. So it is a very important target, and we are going to work very, very hard to meet it, and if it turns out that the enemy has made it too difficult, we will have to figure out what is the way to adapt to that. But there is no qu that elections are the goal. Look, we encountered that in Afghanistan. There was a plan for elec- tions. I am sorry I have been in Iraq too long and I have forgotten my Afghanistan timetables. But you know we just had to slip the Afghan elections by some three months, because the UN was way behind schedule in reg- istering people. Was that a deviation from plan? Yes. Was it a set- back? Well, it was a minor one. Was it defeat? I mean, no, we are still on track to have elections in Afghanistan. They will be a little later than originally planned. But it makes a big difference to the Afghan people that they see a way ahead. I think it makes a big difference to the Iraqi people now that they see a way ahead. One local official, I think he was a mayor of a town near Fallujah, said to General Mattis, In my heart I want you to leave tomorrow. In my head I know we need you quite a bit longer. Iraqis are wrestling with this dilemma of resenting being occu- pied, wanting to govern themselves, and knowing that they don't yet have the capacity to do it. There is no magic moment when you can suddenly flip a switch and go from one to the other. That is why you need a process and a way ahead. I think the plan the President laid out, which takes us hopefully through the end of next year and a constitution, is a very good way ahead, that tells Iraqis you have a country that is worth fighting for, and I think they will do so in large numbers. The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentlelady. The gentleman from Vir- ginia, Mr. Schrock. Mr. SCHROCK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Mr. Secretary, and General Pace, thank you for being here. I hope all of you heard what Mr. McHugh said, and Mr. Weldon said, and then my col- league from Connecticut, Mr. Simmons, and I identify myself with every bit of that. As far as an exit strategy is concerned, I lived in Vietnam for two years. So I know how difficult it is. And frankly we are in Germany and Korea because of a variety of complex circumstances, you know, make it in the best interests of the United States to do so, both in terms of sending signals to our enemies and our friends, and a continued presence certainly has its advantages. I think the same thing will remain true for Iraq as well. If we have the blueprints from what the enemy is doing now and was going to do, then we might be able to have an exit strategy. We don't have that. So we play it a day at a time. Nothing in war is certain, and exit is certainly one of those that is uncertain.. I am sorry I heard one of the responses earlier this morning in the opening statements that said that they believe the Pentagon 624 has the resolve—that questioned the competence. I don't believe that for a minute. Some of the people who are at the top levels of the Pentagon now were my colleagues when I was still active duty. I know what great people they are. So to question the competence of anybody in the uniform I think is untrue. I am sorry that was said. It seems like blame America first seems to be the pattern right now. I am really tired of that. There are so many optimistic and wonderful things going on in Iraq right now, as the troops are say- ing why don't we understand that? Why doesn't the media pi that? Because good news is no news, and negativism seems to play better than the optimistic type things. And we are seeing that in the campaigns this year. One can- didate is very optimistic about our country and where it is going and one is not. And frankly, you know, the optimist sees the donut, the pessimist sees the hole. I would rather see the donut, because I think a lot of wonderful things are being done by you and by the men and women we have put in Iraq, and I think we are blessed by that and I think everything is going to turn out just great in the end. But time, it takes time. It just takes a lot of time. Let me ask a couple of questions. The Iraqi Prime Minister has raised the prospect of implementing martial law in various parts of the country. Who is going to enforce such an edict, and will that edict fall to the Coalition forces or the Iraqi forces? General PACE. Sir, any edict like that by the Iraqi government would be backed up by their own security forces. Mr. SCHROCK. Their own? General PACE. We would obviously have consultations with them if they were to decide that that was a path to take. We would want to discuss with them ahead of time their capacity to enforce that kind of edict. But at the end of the day, the U.S. Forces will be exe- cuting missions that are given to us by our Secretary and our President. Secretary WOLFOWITZ. We would also discuss with them the wis- dom or lack of wisdom of doing it. I think they would be listening to us, just as President Karzai listens to us about edicts that he proposes. Mr. SCHROCK. Let me do a follow-up on that then. Will Coalition forces be obligated to carry out the edicts of the interim govern- ment, and how will we avoid—if that is the case, how will we avoid the perception that the interim government is truly not sovereign? Is not truly sovereign? Secretary WOLFOWITZ. We are not obligated to carry out their edicts. That doesn't make them unsovereign. They can carry out whatever edicts or decisions they make if they have the capa to do so. But we are not under an obligation to enforce decisions they make if we think it is either not our role or we think it is the wrong thing to do. If we think it is the wrong thing to do, I hope we could actually come to some agreement with them that neither of us should do it. But at the end of the day there are judgment calls here. If they make a judgment call one way, and we choose to separate ourselves from them, it wouldn't be the end of the world. 625 Mr. SCHROCK. Now, Mr. Secretary, the prisoners issue. Will the prisoners that are currently detained be handed over to the interim government, and what obligations will the Iraqi interim govern- ment have to treat them in a humane fashion as we have done, and hope to continue to do? Secretary WOLFOWITZ. We would certainly expect anyone we hand over to be treated humanely. And obviously that is more than just a matter of verbal assurances. I think it is a very complicated question. In part it involves their current very limited capacity to manage detainees themselves. It involves the fact that we have certain legal authorities which are actually quite broad under the UN resolution. They don't have those legal authorities. They have their own law to work with. What is clear to both of us is that this is an issue that is critical for us to handle effectively together, and for that reason we have agreed with the Prime Minister to set up a joint detainee commit- tee that would include representatives from those countries holding detainees, which at the moment is ourselves and the United King- dom, and representatives of the Iraqi government, because there are a lot of case-by-case decisions that are going to have to be made. Mr. SCHROCK. Mr. Chairman, I see my time is up. Again, thank you. A week from today is going to be a fascinating day. Patience is a virtue. And I am one who doesn't have patience, I can assure you. But we are going to have to be in this case, and just take it a day at a time. It is going to work. But we just have to cut down on some of the rhetoric that we have heard and get behind the folks that are trying to make this work to make sure that the enemy isn't emboldened by some of the things that we might say up here to make them think if they hold out for one more hour or one more day that we will cave in, because we won't cave in. Our men and women won't tolerate that nor you, nor will we. Thank you. The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman. The gentleman from In- diana, Mr. Hill. Mr. HILL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Secretary, thank you for being here this morning. Mr. Secretary, you have advocated for a long time, many years, a preemptive strike against Iraq. Correct? Secretary WOLFOWITZ. No, that is not correct. Mr. HILL. Set the record straight then. Secretary WOLFOWITZ. I believed for a long time that basically from the end of the Gulf War on that we should have more actively supported the Iraqi opposition in efforts to overthrow the Saddam Hussein regime, and I still think we missed quite a few opportuni- ties, including at the end of the war and throughout the 1990's, to enable Iraqis to take their fate in their own hands and what might have spared us this situation today. For me everything changed after September 11th. And the prob- lem of state sponsors of terrorism, and particularly a state that had harbored, continued to harbor, a fugitive from the 1993 World Trade Center bombing, a state that had contacts of a murky but ominous sort with al Qaeda. Al Qaeda was not the sort of organiza- tion that you approached to do joint humanitarian projects. It is ex- clusively a terrorist organization. The mere fact of contact is dis- 626 turbing. All of that said, to me that we are in a different era and we had to think about the Iraqi problem in a different way. And by the way, I don't believe the action the President took can be called preemption. It was after what, 17 UN resolutions, 12 years of a failing containment policy, a constant virtually daily bombing of Iraq, a large American military presence in Saudi Arabia to sup- port that containment that was destabilizing the Saudi govern- ment. It certainly wasn't preemptive. Mr. HILL. Did you make this decision to remove Saddam Hussein based upon intelligence from Chalabi? Secretary WOLFOWITZ. First of all, I didn't make the decision. Second, the intelligence I relied on- Mr. Hill. Let me restate the question. Did you arrive at a con- clusion that Saddam Hussein had to be removed because of infor- mation that you have received from Mr. Chalabi? Secretary WOLFOWITZ. No. I relied on the intelligence that I got from our Intelligence Community. I relied on certain things that are open facts, like the fact that Saddam was harboring a bomber from the 1993 World Trade Center bombing. I didn't need Mr. Chalabi to tell me that. If Chalabi's intelligence was part of what we were getting from the Intelligence Commu- nity, you would have to ask the Intelligence Community about that. In fact I recall one memo from the Intelligence Community that I read in the year 2002, that analyzed a grand total of five sources they claimed that they had gotten from the Iraqi National Con- gress and basically dismissed all but one of them. So I don't believe it was an important part of our intelligence. Mr. HILL. Why were we paying him $300,000 a month then? Secretary WOLFOWITZ. We have gotten some very valuable intel- ligence since the war from his organization about the location of key enemies. It has helped us to capture, for example, I believe the number is six of the people who were identified in the documents that were captured with Saddam Hussein. One of our division commanders has said it has saved American lives. We pay a lot of people for intelligence. We are paying a lot of people quite a bit more than that. You have to go into a classi- fied hearing to assess whether it is worth it or not. This was not, by the way-it was funded—it was a use of money that Congress appropriated under the Iraq Liberation Act. I don't know if you re- member at the time in 1998, I think it was some $97 million. Some of it was devoted to this operation by the Iraqi National ed the information collection program. It was funded. out of the State Department until whatever time in the year 2002, I believe when State said this is essentially an intelligence oper- ation, we shouldn't be funding it. It was a general judgment that it was bringing in potentially information of value. And so since we have with the Defense Intelligence Agency a mechanism for collect- ing intelligence, the funding was channeled through us. Mr. HILL. Mr. Secretary, I think the evidence is overwhelming that you and Mr. Perle and others decided a long time ago that Saddam Hussein had to be removed prior to September the 11th. I think that you are somehow trying to connect in ways that. I don't understand September the 11th and Iraq. I don't think there is a connection. I think the evidence is overwhelming. But we are 627 where we are today based upon decisions that have been made that have been influenced by your assessment of what we should be doing with Iraq many years ago. And so we are dealing with the problem as we are dealing with it now. Could you tell me what your vision is five years from now, best case scenario, worst case scenario, of what the Middle East should look like? Secretary WOLFOWITZ. Congressman, my record is very clear, and it is right out in the open, and I just repeated to you. I favored ena- bling Iraqis to overthrow Saddam Hussein up until 2001. And I re- peat, I think there is some missed opportunities that would have spared the whole world a great deal of trouble. The issue isn't whether Saddam Hussein was involved in Sep- tember 11th. The issue is whether Saddam Hussein, among other things, was a state supporter of terrorism, which he was. The issue is whether Saddam Hussein was involved with bombers in the 1993 World Trade Center bombing. He was harboring the one fugi- tive still at large. The issue is Saddam Hussein's contacts with al Qaeda and support for al Qaeda. If you go and look at the sealed indictment that was issued against Osama bin Laden in February of 1998, this is not me, this is the U.S. Justice Department during the Clinton Administration, said that in 1992 and 1993 Saddam and al Qaeda came to an un- derstanding not to attack one another and to provide r port. I don't need proof of involvement in September 11th to be con- cerned that Saddam Hussein is providing mutual support to al Qaeda. It seems to me it is like saying if someone breeds rotweilers and leaves the gate open but doesn't tell the dog who to attack that he is not operationally involved in the thing. This is a man who funded terrorists, supported terrorists. We know that he had weapons of mass destruction programs. What ex- atus of those programs was we don't know. But let's look at something else. At the end of the day, we staked everything on a UN Security Council Resolution 1441. We said if Saddam will finally at last comply with his obligations to accept UN inspectors, e will essentially—these weren't quite the words—but effectively we were saying we will wipe the slate clean or we will start fresh on all of those other issues. We had issues about how he abused his people. We had issues his support for terrorism. We said. let's focus on this one key issue, weapons of mass destruction. Let's set the standard that he has to fully disclose what he has and he has to comply with UN inspectors. People seem to have forgotten that standard. David Kay has testified that Saddam Hussein was in blatant vio- lation of Resolution 1441. He was not disclosing everything and he was obstructing inspectors at every turn. And then suddenly the bar is raised and we are saying, but where are the stockpiles. UN Resolution 1441 didn't talk about stockpiles, it talked about compliance with the resolution. We talk about Saddam Hussein's association with al Qaeda, and suddenly people raise the bar and say, yes, but where is the proof that he was involved in 9/11? I don't think he has to have been involved in 9/11 to be involved 628 al Qaeda; strikes me insufficiently disturbing to want to think after September 11th that maybe we need to do something serious. Mr. HILL. I could engage in an argument about what you just said, Mr. Secretary, but I don't have time. My red light is on. But would you please answer my question about what your vision is for the Middle East five years from now? Secretary WOLFOWITZ. The best I can say is that I think I would go back to The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Secretary, before you answer that question, let me just remind the committee we have got the Secretary until about 15 after the hour. We still have about 25 Members who want to ask questions. So if you can move that question—that answer along fairly rapidly, that would be good for us. Secretary WOLFOWITZ. I would hope, five years from now we see an Iraq that has more or less effectively defeated this enemy, doesn't mean that terrorism will be gone. Terrorists in small num- bers can do damage. But it will be a functioning country, that it will be not our model of a perfect democracy, let's be clear about that, but that it will be a developing, emerging democracy like the countries that have emerged in Central and Eastern Europe from decades of actually milder dictatorship, that it will be a force for stability in the Middle East instead of instability. I also hope that five years from now the Saudis, with all of their admitted faults, will have succeeded in defeating an enemy that is anything we criticize the Saudi gov being. Let's remember there is a serious battle on there. I would hope that five years from now the Israeli withdrawal from the Palestinian territories will have gone way beyond just Gaza and in fact we will be able to realize what the President has said is I think the only solution to that problem; that is, two states living side by side. I guess if I want to get really hopeful, I guess I would say I would hope that people who say that Bashir Assad is really—would like to see a Syria that behaves differently, that if that is the case, that he will have been able to assert himself and that we will see a Syria that stops destabilizing Iraq and moves to peace with its neighbors. I think it is possible. I think it is essential to move in that direc- tion because the alternative is a continuation of the last 20 years that have produced murderers and killers by the thousands aimed at us. The notion that this was, quote, a war of choice, that we could just sit there and live with the Middle Eastern status quo ter 9/11 I think is wrong. The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentlemen. I would just remind my colleagues that Mr. Wolfowitz did not pass the resolution to take military action against Iraq. This Congress, Democrat and Repub- lican, including the vast majority of members on this committee, voted to take military action against Iraq. Mr. HILL. Mr. Chairman, I voted for that resolution, and I voted on it based upon a briefing that I had at the Pentagon, where drone airplanes were displayed as a security threat to the interests of the United States. We have proved that that was a fabricated story, not true. RMAN. I would just say to my colleague that we all took votes on that resolution. And this committee in fact had several 630 Additionally I had the opportunity within the last 24 hours to meet President al-Yawar, Prime Minister Allawi, the Deputy Prime Minister representing the Kurdish population. Their optimism is very high. Their courage is very high, and I can see that they will be prepared to work for a civil and democratic society. Also, we met with the Health Minister, who had previously been the Education Minister, and he told us of how there have been the refurbishing of thousands of schools, that 65 million textbooks have been dis- tributed to the students of Iraq, that there are 5 to 6 million stu- dents in Iraq. This is unprecedented the number of textbooks, that there are 293,000 teachers teaching in Iraq, developing a civil soci- ety, that nearly 90 percent of the students that qualify are going en in the turmoil of April the children were going to school. Their parents were taking them to school. So a civil society, which is not reflected very much in the media, is actually taking place. And, again, I want to thank you, again give you a firsthand report of what I saw. I am very optimistic. This is long term. We talk about troops in Korea. We talk about troops in Germany. We have troops in Japan. And so this is to be understood, that as we protect the American people, that is what this is all about. There were people who said we couldn't defeat communism too, but we did. I am confident that we can defeat terrorism with the competence of the people, as you hear today. God bless our troops. I am not going to forget September the 11th. Thank you. General PACE. Thank you. Secretary WOLFOWITZ. Thank you. The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman. The ranking member had something he wanted to get into the record here. Mr. SKELTON. Yes. Thank you very much. Mr. Spratt and I are submitting questions for the record about the cost of the deploy- ment in Iraq as well as past and prospective, and respectfully ask if these answers could be back by the end of next week. And I will submit them for the record right now. Thank you. . RMAN. Why don't you put them in? And hopefully. if they are not too complex, they can get a response out fairly quickly. The gentlelady from California, Ms. Davis. Ms. ĎAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Mr. Secretary, General Pace. Thank you for being here. I know that we all share your tremendous respect for the professionalism of the troops, as well as the Iraqi people who are working so hard. But I think that we also want to try and understand better some of the lessons we have to learn and what it is about the planning that has caused some of the problems that our troops face today, because I think in many ways we have made it tougher for them than perhaps it had to be. Could you talk a little bit about one of the issues that you men- tioned regarding lessons learned, that we underestimated the in- surgency? I am wondering if you could give me more. Why did we do that? On what was that based? General PACE. Let me start, if I may, and then the Secretary can speak where he wants to say. I think that the hope, which is not a plan, but the hope is that the Iraqi people, upon having Saddam Hussein deposed, would step 631 forward enthusiastically and embrace this new opportunity, turned out to be more optimistic than it should have been. I did not realize the power of the fear that still resides in their minds over there, and I guess after them living decades under that kind of tyranny, it shouldn't come as a surprise. It was disappoint- ing that, from their perspective, that they did not see what we thought we were bridging to them early on, which was an oppor- tunity to step forward and take control of their own lives. They were still very much fearful of the thugs and the gangs. So that I think has led to an opportunity for the terrorists then to be able to operate without fear of being exposed by the population. Once the Iraqi people get it in their minds that this is their coun- try, that they in fact do have the freedom of choice and that they can in fact make a huge difference in their own security by turning over those in their midst, then I think the kinds of terrorism that we see we will see dissipate relatively quickly. Ms. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. General, was that based on some kind of theory that the Iraqis would step up, or I mean something spe- cific that we could base that on? Secretary WOLFOWITZ. Congresswoman Davis, if I might say, I mean, I don't think there is any question that the Iraqi people wel- comed the end of the Saddam regime and welcomed what we had to offer. In fact, I am just looking here at some headlines from April 10th of last year. Hussein's Baghdad falls. U.S. Forces move triumphantly through capital cheered by crowds jubilant at end of repressive regime. I don't think that we were wrong in thinking the Iraqis wanted something different. I think what may have been a little too hopeful was the idea that once Saddam Hussein was de- feated that he would stop fighting. It turns out he didn't. That if we identified 55 members of the black list, that 56 and above would see that they had a stake in not fighting. You know, this is, as I have said before, we are deal- ing with several thousand people who are as bad or worse than the Nazi Gestapo, and maybe we were a little too hopeful that they would accept defeat and at least not fight, and they have gone on to do that. I think, and that then brings in play the intimidation and the fear that General Pace referred to. There are different judgments on that score. I feel compelled at a personal level to say I felt before the war that there would be a continuing need for reliable Iraqi security forces afterwards and that that was the reason why I thought we ought to do more to train them before. I think some people were here hopeful that the old Army would be there and be effective. But someone referred earlier to the always looking to blame us for our mistakes. I mean, let's also blame us for our great suc- cesses. There was no fortress Baghdad. There was no torching of oil fields. There was no ethnic conflict. There was no massive flow of refugees. The problem could have been a lot worse than it is. Ms. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. I can ap- preciate that. In your response, I know we are all limited here in terms of time; the one thing that you haven't mentioned today, I haven't heard much of it, are the reconstruction efforts. And I am wondering to what extent you see that that was a problem. I know there was the sense that somehow, gee, if Ameri- 632 cans could invade and occupy why can't they fix the electricity. As a Member who traveled, as most of us did, have traveled to Iraq, we knew how important the reconstruction dollars were to getting things together so that people were employed, and yet I know that very few dollars that we committed to reconstruction have actually been spent. In fact, I think it is a very small amount of the $18.4 billion that we supported. You mentioned earlier that we need to have—Iraqis know their country well. And yet, 15,000 Iraqis, it is my understanding, have been employed. Where has that piece, you know, I guess been uprooted? Čertainly the security issues, we know people can't work on projects if they are not secure. But how do you see this moving? I mean, could you give me a sense, now that sovereignty in the next two weeks, what will hap- pen to the projects? Will there be any difference in the way those are governed, and what can we expect, say, in the next 6 in terms of those appropriation dollars getting on line? Secretary WOLFOWITZ. Well, actually the $18 billion, and I would rather get you the numbers rather than doing it off my head. But there is a significant increase in the expenditure rate. And the project management people say this is a sort of, they say, typically S curve where it takes a little while to get started, then you have a very high rate of expenditure and then it flattens out. There was a startup delay. There was a large amount of money, in the several billions and multiple billions, of both U.S. Funds and Iraqi funds put into reconstruction prior to the supplemental. Cur- rently the report from Baghdad is that $10.9 billion of the supple- mental has been apportioned, $7.6 billion of that has been commit- ted, $4 billion to construction contracts and $3 billion to non- construction contracts. And of that $7.6 billion, $3.6 billion has been obligated. I think the difference is committed means it is dedi- cated to a particular project, obligated means there is a signed con- tract. Once it is committed, you are well on the way to a signed contract. So this money is flowing rapidly, and in fact what we want to make sure that it is a partial answer to your question that there is enough still unallocated that Ambassador Negroponte, when he gets there, he will be in charge of this program, it remains under U.S. Control. And Ambassador Negroponte will have the principal say in how that is allocated. That is very important, I think. [The information referred to can be found in the Appendix begin- ning on page 700.] Ms. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. Do you have any idea of the percent- age of the money that was allocated that is now going to security, so that in fact there may be a number of projects that we can't do because we are spending that on security? I also, I guess, wanted to follow up real quickly in terms of what we anticipate in terms of the growing percentage of Iraqis that hopefully will be employed in these projects? Secretary WOLFOWITZ. We are still working within the original budget allocation, which I believe—what was the number on secu- rity? $3.2 billion for security. As I think you know, the Congress gave us some flexibility to move between accounts. And if we need it, we will come and ask for it. 633 But the estimate we have currently is that 10 to 15 percent of project costs are now a kind of security tax to provide security for contractors. It is a serious issue. But it is not stopping things from going forward. And we are, I think one of the very important things that is happening, and we were briefed on this in some de- tail by General Chiarelli, who is the Commander of the Baghdad Sector, with the 1st Calvary Division, something they call the Seven Cities Program, to take more of that heavy construction money that goes into long-term infrastructure with less employ- ment effect and let division commanders use it on smaller scale projects that can put Iraqis to work more quickly. I think that makes a lot of sense. The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentlelady. Dr. Gingrey. Dr. GINGREY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Sec- retary and General Pace, for being with us this morning. I want to make a brief statement, and then I am going to ask a couple of seemingly tongue in cheek questions, but I think they cut right to the chase. I think we are dangerously overfocusing on the prisoner abuse issue. I think Members of Congress, indeed some members of this committee, and certainly the media, is myopic on this issue. Keep in mind, I want my colleagues to especially keep in mind that we did have the, quote, moral authority, unquote, when the four secu- rity contractors were ambushed, burned, their bodies dragged through the streets of Fallujah, and the carcasses then hung from telephone poles for public display, all of this prior to any public re- ports of prisoner abuse at Abu Ghraib.. I don't know if any of you had an opportunity to see the CNN program yesterday broadcast live over the noon hour, where the CNN anchor had the Arab media, including Al Jazeera and the an- chor essentially said the same thing that I have heard mentioned here this morning, we broke it, we the United States, and now have the responsibility to fix it, and then stood back and let the a attack us without any fair and balanced coverage. And I am for one getting sick and tired of this. Now, here are my two questions. Saddam attempted to assas- sinate President George Herbert Walker Bush, Bush 41, in Kuwait in the early 1990's. Did he, Saddam, miraculously change his ani- mosity and hatred for us after that aborted attempt, and just give up on inflicting any harm to the United States? That is question number one. Question number two: Al Qaeda, including Osama bin Laden himself, met with Iraqi officials in the Sudan in 1994. In fact there were several meetings. What were they discussing? Were they planning a Nineveh class reunion with a boat trip down the Eu- phrates River or what? Secretary WOLFOWITZ. I don't know if you wanted an answer. But I-no. I made this point earlier. You know, even when people meet with Hezbollah they can at least pretend that they are there to discuss charitable works because Hezbollah keeps up a front. Al Qaeda makes no pretense of being anything other than a terrorist organization, and we know of numerous contacts the Iraqis had with that organization. And I suspect they made a great effort to 634 hide what contact they had. So I would assume that we don't know everything. If I can take advantage of your tongue and cheek questions to say one thing in response to Mr. Hill, because he used the word “fabrication.” that is a pretty strong word. I don't think any intel- ligence we ever presented to you was known by us to be fabricated. And if you were briefed on Iraqi remotely piloted vehicle (RPVs), about which people had differing judgments, they had differing judgments, it remains a fact that that is one of the areas in v Saddam was found to be in violation of the various range limits that were imposed, and that were part of the reason for David Kay saying that he was in violation of 1441. So it is—look, intelligence is a murky business. We rely on a very big Intelligence Community to make assessments of those ques- tions, and we did the best we could. I don't think, Mr. Hill, that anybody was fabricating. General PACE. Sir, from a purely military standpoint, a threat is analyzed from, one, capabilities, and, two, intent, and clearly Saddam's regime with chemicals and death squads and all of the means that he used to suppress his people had capabilities, and I believe that tied to his intent of harm to the United States that he posed a threat. Dr. GINGREY. Thank you. The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentlemen. The gentleman from New York, Mr. Israel. Mr. ISRAEL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, before I ask the Secretary my question, I just can't help but state that when we sit at hearings like this and hear from some of our col- leagues that our constitutional oversight authority should be mini- mized to a debate between optimists and pessimists, that we are doing a disservice to the Constitution and to this committee and to this Congress and to our troops. We are here because we do have a constitutional oversight authority, and it should not be reduced to rhetoric between optimists and pessimists. Wars are not won by optimism. And now I would like to segue into my question. Perhaps the Secretary will agree or disagree with me. I am a new Member of this committee. But I can't think of a single war in world history that was the won by optimism alone. My understanding is that they are won with planning, and with human intelligence, and with supplies and training, personnel and resources. There are plenty of troops in Iraq right now, in Afghanistan, who will appreciate our optimism, but they would probably prefer to have up-armored Humvees, they know that we all have faith in them, but they probably would prefer to have some more Kevlar for their vests. Now, Mr. Secretary, I supported the use of force- The CHAIRMAN. Just on that point, Mr. Israel, because it is a very important point. There is 138,000 troops in country. We have 260,000, that is almost twice as many Kevlar vests as the troops in country. I don't want people watching this telecast going out and buying body armor, because you literally have cases of mothers and fathers going out and buying body armor for their kids because they hear that they don't have them. There is a body armor set for 635 0ܟ1 ܘܘ every single troop in Iraq and every single civil servant almost times two.. And there are 7,113 armored Humvees, either up-armored in manufacture or with add-on kits. We are working to get the rest of them. But that is the case right now. Thank the gentleman for letting me interject there. Mr. ISRAEL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. In last Sunday's New York Times there was a paragraph that read as follows: On April 4th, around 6 p.m. A call came in that a sister unit, Company C, had been ambushed in Sa’dr City. Soldiers jumped into whatever vehicle was available, including Humvees with no doors and open sided trucks and rushed to the rescue. My question, Mr. Secretary, is as one who supported the use of force in Iraq. At the time I expressed the concern that I didn't be- lieve that many of the civilians in the Pentagon were engaging in straight talk. There was a lot of optimism and a lot of wishful thinking. On March 27th, you testified to the House Budget Committee as follows: I am reasonably certain that they will greet us as lib- erators and that will help us to keep requirements down. Keep re- quirements down. In the same testimony you said, some of the higher end pre- dictions that we have been hearing recently, such a e notion that it will take several hundred thousand troops to provide stabil- ity in post-Saddam Iraq are wildly off the mark. And third, you stated in the same testimony, it is hard to con- ceive that it would take more forces to provide stability in post- Saddam Iraq than it would take to conduct the war itself and to secure the surrender of Saddam's security forces and his Army. Hard to imagine. My question, Mr. Secretary, is very simple. You said in response to Congresswoman Davis questioning that maybe we were too hopeful in the past. Was your testimony on March 27th too hope- ful? Was it too optimistic? Would you take it back if you could? Secretary WOLFOWITZ. My testimony then reflected not just my personal judgment, it was the judgment of our commanders, it was the judgment of the CENTCOM staff. I think it remains a fact today that we don't have 300,000 troops in Iraq, and none of our commanders think we would be well off if we had them before or need them now. So I think those particulars statements happen to still be true. The fact that this war went on longer than simply the capture of Baghdad is one of those uncertainties of war, just as the fact that there was no major torching of oil fields, there was no major com- bat in cities is also the one of those unpredictable facts of war. Nobody I believe tried to say that we knew for certain what a war would be like. But those estimates of troop requirements I think were off the mark, remain off the mark, and in any case I think it is important to say they were not the estimates of combat- ant commanders, they were not the estimates of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Am I correct, General Pace. General PACE. That is correct, sir. 636 Mr. ISRAEL. Mr. Secretary, just responding to the chairman's point, this story in the New York Times, why are our personnel continuing to jump into Humvees with no doors and open-sided trucks in order to rush to a rescue, or is this article not accurate? General PACE. Sir, I don't know about the article, but I do know for a fact that there is not an up-armored Humvee for every single soldier in Iraq. There is body armor-nor should there be an up- armored Humvee for every soldier in Iraq, nor should there be a tank for every soldier, nor should there be an armored personnel carrier (APC) or Bradley. What we need to do as commanders is design the force in a way that you have the proper mobility, the proper protection, but also you need foot soldiers to do the job. The specifics of that I don't know, sir. But it is not because of a lack of types of equipment that you could end up in a situation like that. Mr. ISRAEL. General, I would like to submit this article for the record, if I may, Mr. Chairman, and ask if you would respond to the specifics that it raises. And I don't want to take up any more time. I know there are others. But I am particularly interested in understanding how the decision is made to up-armor certain Humvees and where those Humvees are. In this case obviously the decision did not work, and I think that rather than talking about being optimistic and exhibiting our faith in our troops we would do a lot better to make sure that those poli- cies work for our troops. That would protect them far more than our optimism wouldłºops. That would protoke sure that those o o we Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. [The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on page 689.] General PACE. I would like to thank the Congress, because you have provided all of the resources we have asked for for up-ar- mored Humvees. You have taken us from 2,000 to over 4,000, head- ed to 7,000. You have given us the additional protective applique armor that we asked for. You have provided hundreds of millions of dollars for things like the insert body armor. So ev have asked the Congress for with regard to force protection you have provided, and we thank you for that. Mr. ISRAEL. This unit doesn't have what they need, evidently. General, thank you. The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentlemen. The gentleman from North Carolina, Mr. Hayes. Mr. HAYES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank the witnesses. Today, I think it would be helpful for me, all of this discussion has deteriorated somewhat, to refocus on the fact that our goal is to help the Iraqi people establish their own democratically elected government and to win a war on terrorism. I would like to identify myself with Mr. Schrock's remark and ex- press my disappointment in the politics that has been injected in this discussion today. We have got an election going on. That is im- portant, but winning a war and protecting our troops I think should take precedence over this. It says on my schedule that we are going to talk about the ress in Iraq. I think that is important, or the lack thereof. And we have been off that nark. And I am sorry for that. 637 My question for you has to do with the progress in contracting in Iraq. I think it is very important, as we look at June the 30th and beyond. How well, Mr. Secretary and General Pace, do you think we are doing transitioning to the Iraqi ministers? I know there have been a lot of problems in the contracting process. You alluded it to earlier, where we are doing a pretty fair job of train- ing various Iraqi forces, but my understanding is we are not get- ting the equipment to them because of contracting and some con- flicts between State and DOD. Would you just update us on that? I think that is crucial as we go forward. Secretary WOLFOWITZ. I think your question refers to I think two different issues. And with respect to the main contracting, which is the $3.2 billion in the supplemental that is allocated to security forces, it hasn't been any interagency issues, it is just simply a matter that we have federal acquisition regulations to go through. We had a major problem because one of the contracts was bid and competed, and then the award was challenged, and we had to go through challenge procedures. And basically the lawyers said there was no way around going through yet another couple of months or six weeks of rebidding. I think all of those problems are now be- hind us. We have I think most of that $3 billion is in fact commit- ted, and quite a bit of it is obligated and large quantities of equip- ment are flowing in. The extent to which there is any jurisdictional argument, I don't think there is one between us and the State De- partment, but I think there may be a little bit between committees up here, is to what extent there should be authority within the DOD budget to pay for equipping Iraqi security forces. And we have been arguing that having that kind of flexibility would have been very helpful in the early part of this year when the other funding mechanisms weren't moving, could again be valuable if, let's say, those funding mechanisms turn out to be inadequate. Having the flexibility to go into DOD funds to equip Iraqi secu- rity forces I think is, in my view, in the same category as the flexi- bility to buy extra up-armored Humvees or the ability to buy extra body armor. The more Iraqis that are out there fighting, the safer Americans will be. So I hope the Congress can give us that flexibility that we have asked for. Mr. HAYES. Do you think that process is getting more smooth as we go forward? Are we making progress there? Secretary WOLFOWITZ. We are. Definitely with respect to the big supplemental, a lot of the bugs are out of the system. The contract- ing officer is in place in Iraq. There is a good mechanism back here to support them. Some people even worry that the money is going to start flowing too fast, and it will be gone too soon. It is feast or famine, I suppose. But there are always unpredictables, and having some flexibility to deal with the unpredictables would be valuable. General PACE. You asked about ministries, sir. My understand- ing is that by the end of this week all Iraqi ministries will be led by Iraqis. Mr. HAYES. Thank you. I think it is important again to note that we are making tremendous progress in Iraqi sovereignty, and that is what June the 30th is all about. And our continued resolve and 638 public show of resolve to see this thing through is vitally important to protect our soldiers and also to get the job done. As we become an embassy functioning, General Pace, as opposed to what we are now, describe how that is going to affect the mili- tary. And then let me quickly say that the earlier question about who is in charge, it was very clear to me that the Iraqis will have sovereignty, they will be in charge, but Americans will be in charge of our own troops when they are asked to do, something that is pretty daggone straightforward and common sense. So again talk about how this embassy concept will work with the military as we move forward in the process. General PACE. Yes, sir. The chain of command will not change. It will be the Commander in Chief to the Secretary of Defense to General Abizaid to General Casey, if he is confirmed, and that change of command will stay as it is today. With Ambassador Negroponte becoming the Ambassador to the country, there will be the very normal linkages that take place and a very special bond between General Casey and Ambassador Negroponte. They will be discussing things on a daily basis. There will be military officers on the Ambassador's staff in his embassy, and there will be discussions and collaboration. If there are dis- agreements between General Casey and Ambassador Negroponte, they would be sent back here to Washington for the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense to work through. But I would imagine those would be few and far between. These two gentlemen are already working, talking with each other, not in anticipation of or presumption of confirmation on the part of General Casey, but should the Senate approve his confirma- tion later this week. So they are working to have a proper relation- ship down the road. So I see a very, very healthy relationship be- tween those two gentlemen. Mr. HAYES. Thanks again to both of you, and a special thanks to our troops for their courage, commitment, and successes. The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Tennessee, Mr. Cooper. Mr. COOPER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you, Mr. Sec- retary and General. We appreciate your service to our Nation. Mr. Secretary, on page 2 of your testimony you write the follow- ing sentence: The 25 billion budget amendment that this committee authorized will ensure that our forces continue to have the full re- sources necessary to complete their missions in Iraq and Afghani- stan. We all know the $25 billion is a lot of money, but do you think that is an accurate statement? Secretary WOLFOWITZ. Yes, if we—I mean, the $25 billion, as we have explained, is a kind of a bridge to take us into the first quar- ter of next year when we will have a much better fix on what the full requirements for next year. It should in no way be taken as implying that $25 billion is what we need for fiscal year 2005. In fact, the number could very easily be twice that, and it is hard to predict. It could be more than twice that. It is certainly not going to be less than that. And what that allows us to do, and I don't know if we have ex- plained this before this committee or not, it allows us to get into the second quarter of the fiscal year, the first quarter of the cal- 639 endar year, when we should have a very good fix on what the ex- penditure rates are for the full year, and come up to the Congress with a full supplemental request for fiscal year 2005. This is a kind of bridging request. Mr. COOPER. Well, as I understand it, the $25 billion would fund about four, maybe five months of activity. Secretary WOLFOWITZ. That is right. Mr. COOPER. So I think you are giving this Committee and this Congress far too much credit when you say that somehow this ex- penditure enables us to have the full resources necessary to com- plete our missions in Iraq and Afghanistan. Secretary WOLFOWITZ. Well, I am sorry if the sentence read that way. It is bad language. It gives us the funds we need to get us safely into the first quarter of next calendar year when we will be back here with a much bigger request for funding. And we have been very clear on that in all our testimony, and I am sorry if that sentence was in any way misleading. Mr. COOPER. I wanted to give you the chance to correct your statement because we have been worried about, you know, we want to have a clear fix on what the expectations are. Do you have any idea what the funding expectations are likely to be next year? Secretary WOLFOWITZ. Again, I will repeat what we have said in other testimony. We don't know, and weat this stage it is impos- sible—any prediction we make is likely to be wrong, either too high or too low. If you do a sort of monthly calculation, you can easily come to the $50 or $60 billion figure. It could be more than that, and it could be less. Mr. COOPER. Mr. Secretary, I want to focus on the money and the money it takes us to win in Iraq. Why shouldn't this Congress have gone ahead and, say, looked at $50 billion for our troops to give them staying power not for 4 or 5 months, but maybe 8 or 10 months? Wouldn't that have shown a greater commitment? Almost everybody in this Congress, Democrat and Republican, already voted in our respective budgets to set aside $50 billion to take care of this need, and yet the only money we are coming up with is $25 billion. Why wouldn't it have been better and more accurate and a more sustainable show of strength to come up with 50 billion in- stead of $25 billion? Secretary WOLFOWITZ. I think you can argue it different ways. I think the judgment was made that it is better to work ourselves into the first quarter of next year and then proceed on a much more precise estimate of what we are going to need. There is a lit- tle bit of danger when you get too much contingency funding with- out specified requirements that you suddenly find yourself using it in an undisciplined manner. I think there is a little bit of discipline in the way this request has been put forward. Mr. COOPER. But surely we don't anticipate funding this war three or four months at a time. Secretary WOLFOWITZ. No, and we have made that very clear we will be up here in the first quarter of next year with a full year's supplemental request that will be substantially larger than that $25 billion. Mr. COOPER. Secretary, last year you testified that Iraq was basi- cally so oil rich that they would have money to, quote, really fi- 640 na we? nance its own reconstruction, and relatively soon. You also said that the oil revenues of Iraq could bring in between $50 and $100 billion over the course of the next two or three years. We are not seeing those sorts of revenues being produced, are we? Secretary WOLFOWITZ. I think we actually are. And the numbers that I have most recently are some $20 billion of Iragi funds, about half of that is from Oil For Food, and about half of that is from oil revenues that have gone into the development fund of Iraq that finances the government operations. It finances reconstruction. And an additional $8 billion are projected to be produced from oil reve- nues by the end of next year assuming, and it is a big assumption, that the enemy isn't successful at disrupting oil production. That is a big uncertainty. But that money has paid the salaries of 350,000 teachers and professors. It has paid the salaries of 100,000 doctors and health workers. It has paid for $1.2 billion—this is Iraqi funds—$1.2 bil- lion of Iraqi funds for improvement to the electricity infrastructure, $300 million for water sewage and irrigation, $660 million to sus- tain and expand oil production. I think I mentioned earlier there are some $800 million in Iraqi funds that has gone into the CERP program, which is our Commanders Emergency Reserve Program, or a similar program by the local Iraqi Government. That statement that I keep seeing quoted back over and over again, it was made after the war began. It was prefaced by saying very carefully, because we had no idea at the time that there would be so little war damage to infrastructure, we had no idea what the reconstruction bill would be, but that unlike Afghanistan, or for that matter Bosnia or Kosovo, which have no resources of their own and which are permanent wards of the international commu- nity probably, Iraq has substantial resources of its own, and it is contributing substantial resources. We are having to as well, and I never meant to imply we wouldn't. But this is a country that has a lot to contribute to its own reconstruction, and it is doing so al- ready. Mr. COOPER. How much has the war so far cost the American taxpayer? Secretary WOLFOWITZ. I would have to do the numbers in my head. I would rather not do that. You know, it is a lot of money. Mr. COOPER. Can you give us a ballpark estimate? How about in terms of American lives? Secretary WOLFOWITZ. Over 800 Americans killed, and every one of those hurts. As I think I said earlier, a lot of Iraqis are dying for this cause, and we estimate some 400 of them have died, and General Petraeus thinks it may very well be twice that number. We are up against a very vicious enemy. There is no question about it. The totals shown here for military—I can give you the sheet on this number—it shows enacted for Iraq so far in the military and reconstruction side together is $119 billion, of which $20 billion is reconstruction, and obligated so far is $27 billion, of which $6 bil- lion is reconstruction. Mr. COOPER. The total as we see it is about $150 billion all in all, and that is not counting the next $25 billion, and then the sup- plemental request that we will get at the beginning of next year. 641 Secretary WOLFOWITZ. I will be happy to compare our numbers with yours and figure out where the difference is, but- Mr. COOPER. It is getting to be in the neighborhood of $200 bil- lion; is that right? Secretary WOLFOWITZ. I am telling you what I am given here by our comptroller says $119 billion enacted so far by the Congress for military and reconstruction expenditures in Iraq, of which $65 bil- lion, $65.8 billion, has been obligated for the military and $6.1 bil- lion for reconstruction. Mr. COOPER. And our allies have contributed $1 billion. Secretary WOLFOWITZ. Well, they support their own forces, which is not insignificant. Contributions to reconstruction, again, there has been a great deal more pledges-quite substantial amounts pledged by the international community at the Madrid conference. Mr. COOPER. $13 billion pledged, $1 billion delivered. Secretary WOLFOWITZ. So far. Correct. Mr. COOPER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman. The gentleman from Florida Mr. Miller. Mr. MILLER OF FLORIDA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I hope my colleague, who just asked the question of the Secretary before about the resources that have been committed by the Iraqi people, if he would provide me with a copy of the notes that he took while Secretary Wolfowitz was telling about all of the dollars that the people of Iraq have spent and the lives that have been lost as well. I want to thank both of you for staying so long today, providing very clear testimony, very frank testimony. But I also would like to, for the record, one more time, Mr. Secretary, if you would, we have heard a lot of people ask about deadlines and when certain things are going to happen. And in your written comments you talked about it being inadvisable to set a hard line for the multi- national forces mandate in Iraq. In fact, I think you said that it would put at risk the significant gains that have already been made by the people that are rebuilding their nation, Iraq, and it would endanger the lives of American soldiers. And I would like, as we come close to drawing this hearing to a close, for you to ex- pound on that again, why we don't need to set artificial deadlines out there at this point. Secretary WOLFOWITZ. I guess I would say two things. First of re artificial, and there is no way to know, even in a peacekeeping circumstance like Bosnia, but especially in a war, which is what we are still in in Iraq—there is no way to know how things will proceed. You can make plans. You can even be reason- ably successful in carrying out your plans, and the enemy may have a different plan and disrupt it. I just mentioned earlier the problem with oil revenues. We can make projection of oil revenues, but it is a major enemy target. I think the more important point, and I think it is the premise of your question, there is a perverse inverse relationship between our setting deadlines and our ability to achieve them. The more the enemy believes that we lack patience, the more they will sustain their efforts. The more they think that we are there for the long haul, the more they will start, especially the less committed of 642 them, to start thinking, well, maybe it is time to make peace with this new situation and become part of the new Iraq. The same thing, by the way, goes for those people that have to step forward and defend this new country. And they do so, as we have said over and over again today, at the risk of their own lives. It makes a big difference for them to believe that we and the rest of the world are committed to their success, because they are tak- ing enormous risks in stepping up to do this. So I think there are times when it may make sense to put pres- sure on countries. We have done this, in my experience, many times to say, you need to step up to your responsibilities, and one way to get that to happen is we are going to start reducing ours. I think in this particular circumstance, particularly because we have an enemy that thinks we lack resolve, it is very important not to suggest to that enemy that they can just outwait us. The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman. We are pretty close, Mr. Secretary, to your hard stop, and I know you have an important secure activity, shortly. Mr. Meek will be our final question. And I will work with the Ranking Member, and Members that didn't get their questions in, at our next activity, the next hearing they will be given priority. So the gentleman from Florida Mr. Meek. Mr. MEEK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And, Secretary Wolfowitz- The CHAIRMAN. Oh, excuse me. Mr. Meek, could you hold on for one minute? I think the Ranking Member had a comment on that. Mr. SKELTON. Yes. I think it is important that everyone here have the opportunity to ask questions of the Secretary come back at some opportune time for at least an hour? I think an hour would probably get it done. The CHAIRMAN. We will work on that. Mr. Secretary, we thank you first for coming to us very quickly after you got back from Iraq, but can we get together here in the near future? Secretary WOLFOWITZ. Be happy to try to work it out. The CHAIRMAN. I appreciate that. The gentleman from Florida is recognized. Mr. ÑEEK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you Mr. Secretary, General Pace. Mr. Secretary, I will tell you that if I was feeling as good as some folks are feeling in this room as it relates to the war, and as it re- lates to the management of the war, I feel that our troops will fight for 20 years if this country asks them to fight for 20 years. They will do it. They are dedicated. They are patriots, and we honor and respect their commitment and their families' commitment. Some things that are very troubling, every time we mention Abu Ghraib, folks start taking about we need to talk about son else, not that. And I will tell you, the 250 troops that have lost their lives since this story has broken, and the increase in individ- uals being taken hostage, either be Americans or coalition forces, civilian workers, every day there are new individuals getting their heads chopped off, things of that nature. We have the U.N. that is now Security Council fighting against the United States from re- ceiving the waiver not to go before International Criminal Court that may seem to fall under the category—Abu Ghraib issue. We 643 have countries like China that is bringing into question the United States' resolve to human rights. I mean, this is really something that I didn't think that would ever happen. But I am very, very concerned, sir, of the direction not only of how the Iraqi people feel about the United States and our occupation or our efforts in Iraq, but I also feel about how Americans feel. Being a Member of the American Congress, I will tell you that when we have 76 percent of Americans feel that our image has been damaged in this process, and 7 out of 10 Americans now feel that the casualty count is unacceptable, you know, that brings into question not only what people say here in the Congress or how the Secretary is editorialized for chastising anyone that may say anything about Abu Ghraib. Now, another big question that comes in, Mr. Secretary, is from your level and from Secretary Rumsfeld's level, how do we really want to get to the top of the matter? Because the top may be deal- ing with both of you or a few other people that are surrounding this issue of prisoner abuse. This goes toward force protection as far as I am concerned. You mention the training of Iraqi Army or civil defense or whatever we are calling them now going toward force protection. I would also say getting to the top of what hap- pened with the prisoner abuse issue is important, too. I traveled to Guantanamo. What I saw there at Guantanamo when Mr. Gingrey and I went there, I came back and defended the administration and anyone else that made decisions of what is presently going on in Guantanamo Bay. I was very pleased with, glad to see the training, glad to see the military police (MPs) that have experience in corrections there. But I would also have just as much resolve in saying that I have a problem when the Defense Department, either Secretary Brown of the Army, appoints a two- star to investigate what happened in that prison after the Taguba report came out.. And if we want to talk about Major General Taguba, I mean, goodness gracious, the Chairman challenged Members of the Com- mittee to read the report. I read what you may say is the beginning of it, but I went back and read it again. Some of the things that General Taguba is talking about in his report, hiding of prisoners, he said, was very dishonorable. And that is something that we have admitted, along with the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), that we have done from the Red Cross. So, who is looking into what is going on at the top of the Defense Department, including yourself, including Mr. Rumsfeld's involve- ment, and this whole scenario that we have right now and inves- tigating this issue in Abu Ghraib? Who is doing it? Is it supposed to be the Congress, or it is another group out there looking at this? es this four-star have the autonomy to be able to question decisions that you have made or the Secretary has made? Secretary WOLFOWITZ. As you know, well, first of all, let me say, Secretary Rumsfeld has correctly described Abu Ghraib as a body blow. The damage is enormous. At the same time, I don't think we should say that this justifies the kind of hypocrisy that you cited the Chinese or other people invoking, and I don't think we should say it has anything to do with terrorists beheading their victims and claiming that this is something the Americans do. A sense of 644 proportion, I think, is important, and I must tell you the Iraqis with whom I met are focused far, far more on how to defeat this enemy than on the issue of Abu Ghraib. I don't mean to minimize Abu Ghraib, but when they are out there on the front line being assassinated every day, they know where their priorities are. There are multiple investigations going on, as I think you know. Overall the Schlesinger Commission, which includes, among others, a distinguished former Member of this body, Congresswoman Fowler, have complete authority to investigate anything or to look at the reports of all investigations or to ask for any new ones. I be- lieve that General Kern has authority to investigate everything in- volved. Let us be clear to the American people and the whole world. The reason we know about this is because the Army investigated itself. General Taguba was appointed to dig into this to get the facts up. The facts have led us to ask more questions and make more inves- tigations. As shameful as this whole episode is, we deal with this kind of abuse in a way that is unknown in most of the world, and I hope when the chapter is finally closed, and it is going to take some time, the Iraqi people will see that this country doesn't toler- ate abuse; that it punishes abuse; that it holds people accountable for abuse that takes place under their authority. Mr. MEEK. You know, Mr. Secretary, I would hope at the end of what I am saying here that the Chairman will ask for information that I asked for 35 plus days ago. I received a call from the Penta- gon yesterday, after two open hearings asking for information as it relates to the investigations that are ongoing within the DOD as it relates to prisoner abuse, either in Iraq or Afghanistan. I think it goes toward troop protection. If we are looking for elections in December, which I believe will not happen, sitting right here, be- cause they haven't happened in Afghanistan, if it is the U.N. reg- istration or it is something that we have done, it is just not going to happen. And realistically thinking, if we want to win the hearts of the Iraqi people, if we want to have the American people backing the management of this war—oh, they back the troops; oh, there is no question about that—and anyone that sits here or stands here—and one thing about being a second-generation Member of Congress, I have learned and been taught to tolerate other state- ments that other Members make. They are in their right preroga- tive to make it. But what I am saying, in the reality of the situation, that we have to think realistically, and we are not thinking realistically now. We have the Secretary of Defense chastising anyone that has anything to say about Abu Ghraib. That is not democracy, in my opinion. Now, right now we are going to have a four-star, what I am hear- ing in the press, going to this hearing of this court martial; and the fact that from the beginning, I think, the deck was set never to rise to the top. The cream was never supposed to rise to the top. But I believe it will eventually, because as my Chairman said once be- fore, Mr. Meek, be patient and watch military justice play its role, because once things start coming out, the truth will rise to the top. And I will tell you, when it rises to the top, it may be too ses to the top, it may be too late as it relates to many of our troops that are in harm's way. 645 So that is my motivation. It is not political in any way, because I believe the American people are going to do what they feel they need to do come this November. And if we are in the middle a war or not, there will be a change at the Pentagon. And I have asked the Secretary that he may want to consider just thinking maybe he has taken us as far as he can take us at this particular time, be- cause every time he says something or do something, it is not like they are shaking in their boots saying, Donald Rumsfeld is going to get us. It is recruiting other individuals to be insurgents against our troops. And I will tell you that is honestly how I feel, and I hope that there is a rethinking of how we deal with this prisoner abuse issue at the Pentagon. Once again, General Pace, I am sorry for your loss of your four Marines that are out there. There are many individuals that have lost their lives. Secretary Wolfowitz, I want to thank you for coming before the committee, but we have to hear the good and bad and ugly, and I think you accept that when you come before the Congress. But I will tell you right now that we have to rethink how we do things, and I think we do need a change in leadership, and I think it should be voluntary. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Secretary WOLFOWITZ. Let me just say I feel as terribly, as you do, about the four Marines that were killed and the 800 plus Amer- icans that have been killed. I don't think those four Marines being killed have anything to do with Abu Ghraib. Abu Ghraib is a ter- rible thing, and we need to get to the bottom of it, but let us not lay every problem we have off on Abu Ghraib. I think it is a dis- service, and I think it is harmful. Mr. MEEK. I am not saying that, Mr. Secretary, respectfully. I am just saying that it has something to do with the insurgents and the recruitment of new insurgents in Iraq, respectfully. The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman for his question. And, Mr. Secretary, thank you for remaining with us. And since Mr. Meek offered his opinion of Abu Ghraib, my opinion is that when the Secretary of Defense called Mr. Rather when those pic- tures were to be made available to the world and told him that we had Americans who were hostages at that time, and we had sen- sitive military operations that would accrue to the detriment of our troops to have those pictures go out, and Dan Rather hesitated but in the end said he might get scooped and put those pictures out to the world, I think that that injured American interests. And I know that statements of both groups who beheaded Americans talked about those pictures and stated—their statement was that that was retaliation for those pictures. I think it was a mistake for Mr. Rather to have released them, and that that ultimately hurt American troops. And the vast amount of disinformation that has been put out about this situation, the false impressions that have been given, the impression that it is an official policy of the United States to torture people, which is absolutely wrong, that has been embedded in many, many news stories throughout the world has been very detrimental to the forces, and it has also been an absolute lie. 646 So it is—I think it is sad that this issue, which has political ramifications as well as substantive ramifications, continues to play out when we have so very many very important issues to work on with respect to this transition, this handover, both militarily and political. Mr. Secretary, thank you for being with us, and I think the key here is to stay steady. You are going to have lots of criticism in the coming weeks. We are going to have lots of folks who have ideas on how we should make this transition, both militarily and politi- cal. But the transition is taking place. It is tough. It is hard. I don't think you have said anything other than that. It is going to be a difficult thing; nonetheless, it is taking place. We have good talent in countries, and I think that has been manifested in the hearings that we have had with General Petreaus and many other people in this room. So thank you for your appearance here today. Let us keep work- ing these issues—and I will recognize the gentleman in just a sec- ond. Let us keep working these issues of force protection. We are going to need to have, I think, a classified hearing with respect to the intelligence, the interaction of our intelligence capability with our line units in country, and also a classified hearing with respect to this relationship against the backdrop of a sovereign Iraq. We are going to need to continue to work that. And on Thursday we are going to try to get up a hearing, with the cooperation of the Ranking Member, on Iran. I think that is going to be necessarily classified, but I think it is a very major part of this picture. Thank you for being with us today. And the gentleman from Missouri is recognized. Mr. SKELTON. Let me also say thank you, Mr. Secretary and General, for being with us. I hope that those who have not had the opportunity to ask questions could have an hour of your time, and I think the Chairman will probably work toward that. But let me also add, if I might, I have been on this committee a good number of years, and I have enjoyed every minute of it. Through the years, regardless of the Administration, we have asked tough questions of those who testify. That is our job in over- sight because it is up to us, under the Constitution, to provide, maintain and do the oversight work. And we will continue to do that regardless of who sits in the chair and regardless of who is on the dais as time goes on. That is the constitutional duty of this Congress. We thank you for participating. These have been tough ques- tions, but they need to be asked, and we will continue to do our very best job under the Constitution and as strong Americans, and thank you very much for being with us. The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentlemen, and perhaps now, Mr. Secretary, after these questions you are anxious to get back to Iraq where it is much, much more secure. Secretary WOLFOWITZ. Yes. The CHAIRMAN. The hearing is adjourned. [Whereupon, at 12:30 p.m., the committee was adjourned.] APPENDIX JUNE 22, 2004 PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD JUNE 22, 2004 OPENING REMARKS OF CHAIRMAN HUNTER Hearing on Iraq Transition June 22, 2004 The hearing will come to order. This morning the committee will continue our review of the transition in Iraq, in particular under what circumstances U.S. forces will operate post-June 30th. Our witnesses today are: The Honorable Paul Wolfowitz Deputy Secretary of Defense General Peter Pace Vice Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Welcome to the Committee gentlemen. We look forward to your testimony. (651) 652 Mr. Secretary, last week the committee held a preliminary hearing on how the transition to Iraqi sovereignty will affect U.S. forces in Iraq. That hearing was very helpful in understanding what just transpired in the UN and how those negotiations would translate into reality on the ground as U.S. forces continue to carry out their difficult mission in Iraq. Given that you just returned from Iraq, the committee is very interested to hear your first-hand impressions on this and other topics as well as how our operational commanders view these matters. While the assumption of Iraqi sovereignty next week is an important and needed step, there is also no question that Iraq is not yet able to stand on its own two feet in terms of security. Iraqis, and those foreigners who want to help them, must be safe enough to go about their daily lives and get on with the business of rebuilding the country. Established democracies can be very strong in the face of terrorism, but Iraq's democracy is still in the conceptual stages and could be derailed by terrorists if we—or the Iraqis—surrender to terror. 653 Further, security is essential to the business of rebuilding Iraq. Coalition forces and the Iraqis have made great strides in repairing damage from the war and rehabilitating an infrastructure that suffered from 20 years of abuse and neglect under Saddam. But, Iraq's young democracy is still burdened by Saddam's debt and terrorists have identified the economy as a vulnerability. The world needs to come together to tackle this problem. We need to help foster representative government and respect for individual liberties in Iraq. Again, the Coalition Provisional Authority has made great strides down this route with the issuance of a Transitional Administrative Law and the creation of a sovereign Iraqi Interim Government. I look forward to the rest of the plan unfolding next year as Iraq moves towards a constitutional government. But, I wonder if we can't do more. 654 The CPA, the United Nations, and the media have taken a very top-down view of things. But, most of us here can tell you from experience that democracy works best from the bottom up. A fair number of members of Congress learned the give-and-take needed in democracy on the city council or in the state legislature. That's where Iraq's future democratic leaders are likely to be found. The military did a great job in setting up local and regional governments; we need to find ways of bringing those individuals together in a constructive way. Through a league of cities, or the Iraqi equivalent of the National Governor's Association, Iraqis may learn that their common experiences as local officials unites them more than their different religious or ethnic backgrounds divide them. That's where our strategic interests lie; in building a better future for Iraq in partnership with the Iraqis. Gentlemen, I know we share that perspective, so I'm looking forward to hearing your views on the subject. 655 But first, let me recognize the committee's ranking Democrat, Mr. Skelton, for any remarks he may wish to make. The entirety of our witnesses' prepared statements will be entered into the record. Mr. Secretary, the floor is yours. 656 OPENING STATEMENT RANKING MEMBER IKE SKELTON FULL COMMITTEE IRAQ UPDATE HEARING JUNE 22, 2004 Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I join you in welcoming Secretary Woflowitz and General Pace back to the committee. The recent revelations of abuse at Abu Ghraib prison, the continuing attacks of insurgents against our forces, as well as the questions about how well the new, interim Iraqi government will be able to govern all highlight the difficult, dangerous and uncertain situation in that country. What is paramount now is that we have a concrete plan to ensure ultimate success in Iraq. I'm not sure I see such a plan in existence today. But we broke it, and so we must try to fix it. Last July the Department came up with what amounted to a strategic plan for Iraq. The four pillars of this plan were: establishing security, restoring essential services, creating conditions for economic development, and enabling the transition to democratic governance. It is clear that these goals have not been achieved—at least not to the extent we all would have hoped—largely because we haven't established security, and rebuilding Iraq requires a stable security environment. It seems to me that there are some steps that the United States needs to take so that we and the world can have some confidence 658 been tarnished, and we need to prove to other nations and the Iraqi people that the abuses at Abu Ghraib are not standard operating procedure for our military and do not reflect the values we stand for as a nation. Looking longer term and in a broader sense, I see at least four potential strategic approaches to the situation in Iraq. First, we can stay the current course. We can continue in the present vein trying to provide security, rebuild infrastructure and trying to create the conditions under which a new, representative government may flourish. However, this approach brings with it the certainty of continued violence against our forces and the new government, as well as a slowed reconstruction process. .. Second, we could cut and run. We could begin a relatively rapid withdrawal of our forces upon appointment of the interim government and leave it to the UN, NATO or Iraqis to provide security and stability in Iraq. This approach could result in Iraq descending into ethnic and/or religious squabbling, national and regional instability, and the prospect that Iraq will become a terrorist haven. Third, we could increase our military presence, as well as that of other nations and induce NATO into a significant military and political role until the UN can assume more responsibility and until security and stability ensue. Under this scheme, the number 659 of US forces in Iraq would increase at least until after elections and a more permanent new government may be installed. Obviously, if we assign more forces to Iraq, there's the possibility that we will suffer more casualties. Realistically, we will not be able to increase our force level in Iraq by very much over the short term- we just don't have the troops to do it. Fourth, we could embark on a phased withdrawal of US forces over time and maintain a less visible presence in the interim. Our forces could withdraw from many urban places and cease aggressive patrolling in favor of safeguarding Iraqi infrastructure and securing the borders against foreign incursions. At first, the model the Marines used in Fallujah seemed promising, but recent experience suggests their approach may not hold promise for use in other urban areas. Some national security experts have even suggested setting a date certain by which our forces would ultimately withdraw from Iraq. I think there is value in deadlines, and perhaps a deadline for the withdrawal of our forces could foster stability and give the Iraqis confidence we do not intend to occupy their country for an indefinite period. I suggest these various approaches to the way forward in Iraq only because I am not aware of any specific plan the Administration has for long term success and for an ultimate end to our military presence in Iraq. What puzzles me is that just a year 660 ago the Administration was talking about reducing our forces in Iraq. Now, unfortunately, we've still got 138,000 troops in Iraq, and I can see no end in sight. Mr. Secretary, do you see an end in sight? I do see the transition date of June 30 as a new opportunity. It gives us a potential fresh start toward a better Iraq. But if that goal is to be reached, the Administration will have to do things better. There will have to be better planning for how to rebuild Iraq and how we can provide a stable government once elections are held. There will have to be more and better international participation than we have had to this point. We in Congress will need better information-about the cost of the war, the status of our forces, about the prisoner abuse situation, and the kind of equipment the troops do and don't have—we need to be able to perform oversight here so we can be confident in your actions and act wisely to help our country succeed. Mr. Secretary, I don't think anyone here questions your resolve or that of the president to succeed in Iraq. But there's a difference between resolve and competence. I think the American people need to understand that. Regrettably, what's happened in Iraq so far—aside from the outstanding performance of our troops in the field-doesn't persuade me that the Administration has handled the adventure in Iraq competently. 661 Mr. Secretary, I welcome your thoughts about the way ahead in a strategic sense. I am also interested in what the Department is doing to ensure our forces have the operational flexibility they need and to remedy the damage to our international standing caused by the prisoner abuse scandal. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 662 Written Statement of Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz Prepared for the House Armed Services Committee June 22, 2004 Mr. Chairman, Congressman Skelton, Members of the Committee, I am happy to be here today to testify on the recent progress in the transition to Iraqi sovereignty and my talks last week with Prime Minister Allawi and his national security team. As President Bush noted recently, the selection of the Iraqi Interim Government "brings us one step closer to realizing the dream of millions of Iraqis: a fully sovereign nation with a representative government that protects their rights and serves their needs.” The transition to Iraqi sovereignty represents the culmination of the more than a year-long partnership between the Iraqi people and the Coalition forces serving in Iraq, working together to create a secure environment in which freedom and prosperity can grow. Whether from Australia or El Salvador, Poland or the Philippines, we owe a sincere debt of gratitude to the roughly 23,000 men and women from our 32 Coalition partners. And of course, our prayers continue to be with all of our people currently serving in Iraq. I returned last week from a four-and-a-half-day trip that took us to northern, central western and southern Iraq, visiting all five American divisions as well as the British and Polish division commanders in Iraq. In temperatures consistently above 100 degrees, I saw firsthand the tremendous work our brave young Americans are doing, and 663 with every trip I make to Iraq I am consistently amazed at the leaps in progress they are achieving They are making America - and the world - more secure by helping the Iraqi people to plant the seeds of peaceful, representative government in the heart of the Middle East - a potentially watershed moment in the Global War on Terror. Whether members of Active Duty, Reserve, or National Guard units, or civilians working with the CPA or one of many NGOs active in Iraq, these heroes embody the best ideals of our nation. They serve so that others may be free and Americans can be secure, and we thank them all for the sacrifices they endure. Finally, on behalf of these brave Americans, let me express thanks to the Congress and the members of this Committee for the continued and unfailing bipartisan support you give our armed forces. The $25 billion budget amendment you authorized will ensure that our forces continue to have the full resources necessary to complete their missions in Iraq and Afghanistan. You have signaled to the world, both to our allies and to our enemies, America's commitment to see this new struggle against tyranny and barbarism through to the end. Additionally, I would like to personally thank the members of this committee for your support of the Commander's Emergency Response Program and I would ask for your support in conference of the Train and Equip authorities to help U.S. military forces 664 secure and stabilize Iraq and Afghanistan, enhance the ability of these countries' military and security forces to combat terrorism and support U.S. and Coalition military operations. Both provisions are extremely vital tools as we work to rebuild Iraq and provide security for our troops. The Department will continue to work with the Members to increase the Train and Equip authority to the President's requested amount of $500 million in FY 2005. Our Strategy in Iraq Speaking at the United States Air Force Academy Graduation Ceremony three weeks ago, President Bush outlined the strategy for helping Iraqis achieve a fully constitutional government, one that enables Iraq to preserve its territorial integrity, reject territorial integrity, reject both weapons of mass destruction and terrorism, and live peacefully with its neighbors. The strategy involves five interdependent phases to build Iraqi capacity and transfer responsibilities from the Coalition to Iraq rapidly--but not recklessly Transferring Authority to a Sovereign Iraq. The first phase of the President's plan will become effective on June 30" when the Coalition Provisional Authority transfers authority to the Interim Iraqi Government-a body that will consist of a president, two deputy-presidents, a prime minister and 26 ministries, and will be responsible for day-to- day governing of Iraqi state affairs and will work as a full partner in providing security to Iraq. On July 1, U.S. Embassy Iraq will open for business, as a full partner in helping to bring democracy, prosperity, and security to Iraq. . . to Iraq. : 665 When Iraq becomes sovereign on June 30, our engagement will naturally change. es sove But our commitment will not. During this stage, our focus will rest on shaping and supporting Iraq's political transition and particularly on setting the stage for national elections. Security. Security is the foundation for victory in Iraq-the foundation on which all other successes in Iraq are built. As President Bush noted, we are again at war against philosophies of death and tyranny. In Iraq, the forces presently trying to derail Iraq's progress towards democracy include the killers who used to work in Saddam's fascist . intelligence services and the Fedayeeen Saddam, Al Qaeda-inspired foreign terrorists, and the gants that follow Muqtada al-Sadr. Accordingly, a critical step in the strategy is to help Iraqis fashion the stability and security on which representative government depends. Since the beginning of our mission in Iraq, a principal goal has been to encourage and enable Iraqis to defend, guard and police Iraq for themselves. It is far better that Iraqis—who have a native knowledge of everything from city neighborhoods and is regional accents to religious sensitivities and even local license plates—deal with problems unique to Iraq. Allowing them to take the lead in securing Iraq is a major key to victory over the enemies of a free Iraq. 666 Although there are currently over 200,000 Iraqi Security Forces on duty or in training, Iraq's security forces are still a work in progress. They require training, equipment, leadership and team-building to be able to handle continuing threats-internal and external-on their own. We have accelerated our efforts to recruit, train, equip and, most importantly, mentor Iraqi security forces. However, U.S. and other international forces will remain indispensable to preserving security while Iraqi forces build their strength. This is recognized in UN Security Council Resolution 1546, which reaffirms the authorization for Multinational Force-Iraq. U.S. forces in Iraq will remain under U.S. command and will have clear rules of engagement. U.S. commanders, however, will coordinate security efforts closely with their Iraqi counterparts. These troops will be maintained at the level required to do the job, as our commanders in Iraq constantly reassess the numbers of troops they need. As we have often said, and as the President reiterated in his recent address to the nation, if our commanders on the ground ask for more troops, they will get more troops. Rebuilding Iraq's Infrastructure. The third step in the President's plan for victory in Iraq involves rebuilding Iraq's civil infrastructure-deeply damaged by decades of Saddam's neglect and the ravages of three wars Saddam brought upon his people. At present, 16 ministries which will address such programs—to include Health, Education and Public Works and Municipalities—have been handed over to Iraqis who are running 667 these ministries with full authority. We will continue to work with Iraqis to build on 19 what has already been achieved in areas such as healthcare and education. Enlisting International Support. Investment in Iraq's success is not just an American investment, it is one that must be shared by the international community. The fourth step in the President's plan involves enlisting additional international support for Iraq's transition to democracy. The UN will play a critical role in that process. In the last couple of weeks, the UN Security Council unanimously passed Resolution 1546, endorsing the transition timetable adopted by Iraqis and encouraging other UN members to add their support. The international community at large will continue to play a key role in helping Iraq stand on its own feet-through such actions as economic assistance, debt relief, and continued military support. Continue Building on Iraq's Capacity for Self-government. The fifth step in the President's plan involves nurturing Iraq's capacity for representative self-government that will lead to a constitutional government by the end of 2005. The Interim Government will serve until representatives to a Transitional Government are elected, no later than the end of January 2005 -- the first free elections held in Iraqi history. By the end of 2005, Iragis are scheduled to vote on a new constitution that will protect the rights of all Iraqi citizens regardless of their religion or ethnicity. This is the historic point when Iraq will have the necessary legitimacy for durable self-rule. During 668 this process Iraqis will decide for themselves the exact structure of their permanent government and the provisions of their Iraqi constitution. As important as clarity about these five phases of our strategy is, it is equally important that we maintain the ability to adjust to rapidly evolving conditions in Iraq. For history has demonstrated that even the best laid plans for post-war reconstruction can go awry if not matched to the realities on the ground. For example, in World War II post- war planning for the reconstruction of Germany began three years before the end of the wa war. Before the German surrender, the Joint Chiefs of Staff's blueprint for the Oc occupation of Germany, JSC 1067, specified tough programs to "prevent Germany from ever again becoming a threat to the peace of the world.” No sooner did military and civilian officials arrive in devastated Germany after the war, however, than they began to realize this plan was wholly inadequate. All of the programs specified in JCS 1067, the result of three years worth of planning, either failed or were aborted. Eventually, more than two years after VE day, JCS 1067 was replaced altogether by JCS 1779, which stressed the goal of a “stable and productive Germany." That history demonstrates that the key to post-war reconstruction lies not in impressive looking paperwork devised thousands of miles away from the frontline, but flexibility when planning meets reality. In reconstruction, as in war, plans are at best the basis for future changes. Whereas it took the United States more than two years to alter its plans after World War II, in less than 15 months this Coalition has repeatedly 669 demonstrated that it can be flexible when necessary, and it has done so in the face of an evil enemy that continues to kill and destroy. Examples of this flexibility include: - Creating a new type of indigenous force (the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps) to fill the gap between the Iraqi police service and an army oriented to external defense; Requesting a large supplemental when the requirements for Iraqi reconstruction became clear; Responding to Iraqi demands for a more rapid resumption of sovereignty by developing the idea of a transitional government that could take power before a. permanent constitution is ratified; Dropping the “caucus plan” for selecting the transitional government, when it turned out to be unpopular with Iraqis, and substituting a two-step process involving an interim government that will take power before legislative elections; Revising the mechanisms for implementing the de-Ba'athification policy to address complaints that the appeals process was not working as intended, and to respond to the Sunni minority's fears of marginalization. Although the reconstruction plans first envisioned in the summer of 2002, and submitted by the CPA to Congress last July have undergone substantial changes, it has been the Coalition's ability to adapt to rapidly changing circumstances that has brought us now to the transfer of sovereignty, and the beginning of representative government in Iraq. 670 The Iraqi Interim Government The first phase of the President's plan takes effect on June 30", when the Coalition Provisional Authority will cease to exist, transferring all governmental authority to the Iraqi Interim Government. This Interim Government was formed through a process of wide-ranging consultation with Iraqis, including political leaders, religious and tribal leaders, and civic associations. The process was led by Ambassador Lakhdar Brahimi, Special Adviser on Iraq to the Secretary General of the United Nations, working in consultation with the CPA and the Iraqi Governing Council. The Iraqi Interim Government consists of a President, two Deputy Presidents, and a Prime Minister leading a Council of Ministers. The new government will also include an Interim National Council and a Judicial Authority. The Interim National Council will be chosen by a National Conference, to be held in July, involving at least a thousand Iraqis from across Iraq, and representing every province in the country, as well as various political parties, tribal leaders, trade and professional unions, universities, and religious leaders. The composition of the Iraqi Interim Government is as follows: President of Iraq - Sheikh Ghazi Ajil Al-Yawar Deputy President of Iraq - Dr. Ibrahim Jaafari Deputy President of Iraq - Dr. Rowsch Shaways Prime Minister of Iraq - Dr. Ayad Allawi Deputy Prime Minister - Dr. Barham Salih 671 Minister of Agriculture - Dr. Sawsan Ali Magid Al-Sharifi Minister of Communications - Dr. Mohammad Ali Al-Hakim Minister of Culture -- Mr. Mufeed Mohammed Jawad al-Jaza'iri Minister of Defense - Mr. Hazem Sha'alan Minister of Displacement and Migration - Ms. Pascale Isho Warda Minister of Education - Professor Sami Al-Mudhaffar Minister of Electricity – Dr. Aiham Al-Sammarae Minister of Environment - Professor Mishkat Moumin Minister of Finance – Dr. Adel Abdul Mahdi Minister of Foreign Affairs - Mr. Hoshyar Mahmood Mohammed Zebari Minister of Health - Dr. Ala'adin Alwan Minister of Higher Education - Dr. Taher Khalaf Jabur Al-Bakaa Minister of Housing and Construction – Dr. Omar Al-Farouq Salim Al-Damluji Minister of Human Rights - Dr. Bakhtiar Amin Minister of Industry and Minerals – Dr. Hajem Al-Hasssani Minister of Interior - Mr. Falah al-Nakib Minister of Justice - Dr. Malik Dohan Al-Hassan Minister of Labor and Social Affairs - Ms. Leyla Abdul Latif Minister of Public Works - Ms. Nasreen Mustapha Berwari Minister of Oil – Mr. Thamir Abbas Ghadban Minister of Planning - Dr. Mehdi Al-Hafidh Minister of Science and Technology - Dr. Rashad Mandan Omar 672 Minister of State for Provinces - Judge Wa'il Abdul al-Latif Minister of State for Women - Ms. Narmin Othman Minister of State - Dr. Kasim Daoud Minister of State - Dr. Mamu Farham Othman Minister of State - Mr. Adnan al-Janabi Minister of Trade - Mr. Mohammed Mostafa al-Jibouri Minister of Transportation – Mr. Louay Hatem Sultan Al Erris Minister of Water Resources - Dr. Abdul Latif Jamal Rashid Minister of Youth and Sports – Mr. Ali Fa’iq Al-Ghabban This is a remarkable group of individuals. They reflect a wide array of talents and backgrounds, and they are all committed to serving the interests of the Iraqi people and paving away for the first free elections in Iraqi history. They are doing so in full knowledge that they are risking their lives. I hope that the Members of this Committee will join me in pledging our full support, and our prayers, to the Interim Government as they prepare to assume ultimate authority in Iraq in less than three weeks. The Iraqi Interim Government will operate under the legal framework established by the Transitional Administrative Law (TAL) and the TAL Annex. The President and the two Deputy Presidents will form a Presidency of the State that represents the sovereignty of Iraq and oversees the higher affairs of the country. The Presidency will have ceremonial functions and must unanimously approve orders issued by the Council of Ministers before they can become law. 673 The Prime Minster will have day-to-day responsibility for the management of the government. Iraq's ministers, who will oversee the ministries, will report to the Prime Minister. The government will be responsible for improving security, promoting economic development, and for the important process of preparing for democratic elections in January 2005. The Council of Ministers, with the unanimous approval of the Presidency, may issue orders or decrees with the force of law. The Interim National SO Council can veto these orders or decrees by a two-thirds majority vote. As noted above, the National Conference will choose an Interim National Council of 100 members. The Interim National Council will oversee the government and will have other substantive powers specified in the TAL Annex. It will be able to hear the views of citizens, advise and question the government on policy, form committees and veto orders or decrees from the Council of Ministers by a two-thirds majority vote. It will also have the authority to appoint replacements to the Presidency in the event that a 10 member of the Presidency dies or resigns, and it will have the right to approve the 2005 Iraqi national budget. As set out in the Transitional Administrative Law, the Judicial Authority is independent of the executive branch of government. The federal judicial branch will include a Federal Supreme Court, a Court of Cassation, Courts of Appeal and the Central Criminal Court of Iraq. In addition, there will be a Higher Juridical Council that will supervise the federal judiciary and administer the budget. 674 Some have argued that the Iraqi Interim Government will be a puppet of the United States, or will have only limited sovereignty. This is, quite simply, false, and ignores the fully sovereign powers of the Interim Government. For example, the Iraqi Interim Government that takes power on June 30 will have the power to conclude agreements in the areas of diplomatic relations and economic reconstruction, including Iraq's sovereign debt. At the same time, the Iraqi people desire to limit the powers of an unelected government. After 30 years of living under Saddam's tyranny, it is perfectly understandable that the Iraqi people would seek to limit the power of a government that is not yet fully accountable to the Iraqi electorate. And given our nation's history of resistance to taxation without representation, Americans should easily understand why Iraqis want the Interim Government's authority to be limited. Consequently, the Iraqi Interim Government will not be able to amend the Transitional Administrative Law or to form agreements which permanently alter the destiny of Iraq. The Iraqi people have made clear that only an elected government should have such powers. The Interim Government will operate under rules defined in the Transitional Administrative Law, which provides a historic bill of rights for the Iraqi people and a roadmap to a permanent constitution in 2005. The Iraqi Interim Government and the Multinational Force 675 Although this progress on the political track is impressive, the ability of the Iraqi people to achieve their aspirations will be heavily influence by the security situation in Iraq. As recent events have demonstrated, continuing attacks by insurgents, including members of Saddam's security services, foreign fighters and terrorists, and illegal militias challenge all those who are working for a better Iraq. This is why both the new Prime Minister and Foreign Minister have publicly requested that the U.S.-led multinational forces remain in Iraq to help the Iraqi people complete their political transition and permit the United Nations and the international community to work to facilitate Iraq's reconstruction. In a statement this week, Prime Minister Allawi said: We are deeply grateful for the sacrifices that the forces of friendly countries have made to help liberate us from one of the most abusive tyrants of modern times. ... Until our forces are fully capable, we will continue to need support from our friends in the Multi-National Force – Iraq. We appreciate the understanding and contributions of the international community, and we hope that additional international support will be forthcoming in response to United Nations Security Council Resolution 1546. Similarly, addressing the UN Security Council earlier this month as that body was considering what became Resolution 1546, Foreign Minister Hoshyar Zebari said: [Since April] last year we have been working very hard to re-establish Iraq's security, military, and police forces. However, we have yet to reach the stage of being able to maintain our own security and therefore the people of Iraq need and request the assistance of multinational forces to work closely with Iraqi forces to stabilize the situation. I stress that any premature departure of international troops would lead to chaos and 676 the real possibility of a civil war in Iraq. This would cause a humanitarian crisis and provide a foothold for terrorists to launch their evil campaign in our country and beyond our borders. The continued presence of the multinational force will help preserve Iraq's unity, prevent regional intervention in our affairs and protect our borders at this critical stage of our reconstruction. The Iraqi Armed Forces will be a principal partner of the Multinational Force. The Iraqi National Guard – built on the present Civil Defense Corps – will be part of the Iraqi Army, which will be responsible to the Iraqi Ministry of Defense. The objectives and functions of the Multinational Force after the transfer of sovereignty will remain as it has been, except that it wil now coordinate with the sovereign Iraqi government through agreed consultative mechanisms. We will need to develop an effective and cooperative security partnership between the Multinational Force and the sovereign government of Iraq. The commander of the Multinational Force will work in partnership with the sovereign Government of Iraq in helping to provide security while recognizing and respecting its sovereignty. To that end, Multinational Force commanders will, at the invitation of the Iraqi Prime Minister, participate in discussions of the Ministerial Committee for National Security on the broad framework of security policy. The Iraqi security forces will be responsible to the appropriate Iraqi ministers. The Multinational Force will coordinate with them at all levels – national, regional, and local – in order to maintain unity of command of military operations in which Iraqi forces are engaged with the Multinational Force. 677 While the Iraqi Government may withhold their forces from specific Multinational Force operations, units committed to joint operations with the MNF will act under unified command. Iraqi leaders and the MNF will keep each other informed of their respective activities, consult regularly to ensure the effective allocation and use of personnel, resources and facilities, will share intelligence, and will refer issues up the respective chains of command where necessary. This will be a partnership - where both sides will bring their views to the table and agreements will be reached through mutual consent. We were able to fill in many details of this partnership during our talks last week with Prime Minister Allawi and his national security team. Those talks enabled us to gain insight into the new Iraqi government's strategy to defeat its enemies, as it prepares to assume sovereign authority and as our role changes from that of an occupying power responsible for maintaining security to helping the Iraqis defend themselves. We met with Prime Minister Allawi and his team for about eight hours over the course of three days. The meetings were very cordial and productive. Based on Lieutenant General Petraeus' ongoing work with the Iraqis, as well as on last week's discussions, we achieved consensus on a way ahead, which was reflected in Prime Minister Allawi's statement this past Sunday of Iraq's national security strategy. A key element of these talks was the delineation of several mechanisms for the coordination of operations between Iraqi Security Forces and the Multinational Force. The Iraqis proposed the creation of a Joint Operating Center to coordinate operations at 678 the national level. It will fill the gap between the Joint Coordinating Centers, which function at the regional and local levels, and the Ministerial Committee for National Security, which would deal with political-military issues at the strategic level. Participants in this body will include representatives of the Prime Minister, the Ministers of Defense and the Interior, the Multinational Force Commander and the Chief of the Office of Security Transition. The Iraqis also agreed that the Iraq Survey Group (ISG) will continue to operate as part of the Multinational Force authorized by UNSCRs 1511 and 1546, although they will want increased input and coordination in the ISG's activities. We also agreed to establish a Joint Committee on Detainees. We agreed that representation in this Committee should include representatives from the Iraqi government, the Multinational Force, and ambassadors from contributing countries. The Iraqis also requested help in creating a command center in the Prime Minister's office. We agreed that we could re-allocate resources already committed to creating command centers at the Ministries of Defense and the Interior, and at the Joint Headquarters and could begin work quickly. General Sanchez noted that once the Iraqis have identified appropriate officers, we can embed them at lower-level Multinational Force headquarters. These embedded officers could be connected to the Prime Minister's 679 command center to provide situational awareness before lower-level Iraqi headquarters were up and running. Iraqi Security Forces Of course, the long-term key to success in Iraq requires building indigenous Iraqi capacity and transitioning responsibilities from the coalition to Iraq. Nowhere is this more vital than in our efforts to build capable Iraqi security forces to achieve stability. Our plan was - and is - for Iraqi forces to develop strength, capability, and experience with the help of the Multinational Force, with the MNF playing a crucial supporting role. until the Iraqis can stand on their own. Current plans call for: • Iraqi Army: 27 battalions, or 35,000 soldiers, trained and on duty by October. Most of their equipment is planned to be on hand by that time, with vehicles continuing to be delivered through March 2005. • Iraqi National Guard: 45 battalions (40,000 soldiers) by September, with possible additional battalions beyond. Equipment is arriving rapidly, and the 45 battalions should be equipped by September. Iraqi Police Service: 90,000 policemen, which is the current number on duty, full trained by June 2005. Equipment is flowing in, and they are planned to be fully equipped by September. 680 • Iraqi Border Patrol: 20,000 by July, to be fully equipped by September. • Facility Protection Service: There are currently 74,000 on duty, with the final number to be determined by the Iraqi Ministry of the Interior. These forces might also be fully equipped by September. During our meetings with Prime Minster Allawi, the Prime Minister conveyed a clear sense of priorities for the different elements of the Iraqi Security Forces. The first .. priority will be the Iraqi Intervention Force (previously called the Iraqi National Task Force). This force's main mission will be to defeat enemy forces in urban areas, and will have a troop strength of 6,600 troops organized into three brigades. The second priority will be an Iraq Special Operations Force, consisting of a 764-troop Iraqi Counter Terrorist Force, similar to our SWAT teams, and a supporting Commando Battalion, similar to a Ranger Battalion, comprised of 828 troops. The third priority will be the creation of an Iraqi National Guard, based on the current Iraqi Civil Defense Corps, as part of the Iraq Army. While the planned size of the . force will remain initially at 45 battalions, a command structure of six division headquarters and eighteen brigade headquarters would be added. This would create an . all-Iraqi chain of command for the ICDC battalions, through brigade and division headquarters, to the Army Chief of Staff and Defense Minister, and finally all the way up . to the Prime Minister. ::: 681 The areas of operation of the six divisions could be aligned with the AOs of the Multinational Force's six Major Subordinate Commands. This would facilitate coordination between Iraqi and international forces at the regional level. The fourth priority is the continued development of two divisions of the Regular Army. While the current mission statement of the regular army emphasizes defense against external conventional attack, the new government wants to be able to use it against the internal enemy, the real current threat to Iraq's security. Additionally, although the Iraqis had considered adding two more divisions, they agreed that this is a lower priority that can be deferred to a later date. Lessons Learned The spike in combat activity we witnessed in Iraq, and the mixed performance of Iraqi Security Forces we saw in response, have provided further lessons we can apply to increase the impact of what we are doing to recruit, train, equip and, most importantly, mentor Iraqi security forces. The first lesson is the need for stronger leaders in the security forces. We will build on the leaders whose units fought and we will replace those whose units did not. We will integrate Iraqi officers with Coalition forces and we will embed Coalition officers with the Iraqi security forces. This arrangement provides liaison, which produces 682 mutual confidence, and it also helps us develop Iraqi leadership. Similarly, we need Ons ns are police liaisons and specialized trainers to get down to police stations around the country to provide confidence and set the example. Second, the Iraqi security forces need more and better equipment. We had not ore planned for them to be fully equipped at this point, and many police and ICDC units were outgunned in recent action. We are reexamining the equipment requirements. We have also incurred some delays in equipping the Iraqi security forces. Part of the delay has been caused by challenges in the contracting process, and those problems finally seem to be fixed. We need to make up for lost time, but any further delay is unacceptable. Third, it is clear that the members of the security forces, most of whom are Iraqi patriots, need an Iraqi rallying point. They need to understand they report to an Iraqi chain of command, and that at the top of that chain of command is a lawfully constituted Iraqi government. The chain of command is being put in place now. A defense minister has been named, along with a commander in chief of the armed forces and a chief of staff. A new interior minister has also taken office. The rest of the chain needs to be .. filled, but Iraqis in the security forces can see today that there are Iraqis at the top. The greatest factor in the mixed performance of the security forces was an intangible: fear. The enemies of a democratic future for Iraq have so terrorized the cities of central Iraq that many members of the security forces doubt that they or their families". can be protected from the retribution that may follow their participation in operations . 683 alongside the Coalition. Until Iraqis are convinced that Saddam's regime has been ... permanently and irreversibly removed, and until a long and ghastly part of their history is put to rest and overcome, that fear will remain. Convincing them of this truth - that Saddam and the Saddamists are finished - will continue to require investments of our time and our resources and our precious men and women in uniform, to continue to build trust among the Iraqi people. That is why it is so important in this time of stress to show that our commitment to their freedom is rock-solid. This is also why it is inadvisable to set a hard deadline for the Multinational Force's mandate in Iraq. Such a deadline would risk creating the impression amongst the great majority of moderate Iraqis who hope for a new Iraq that we were not committed to the long-term stability of Iraq. It would encourage the terrorists and murderers from Saddam's intelligence services to wait us out so that they could unleash a wave of . violence in order to regain political power and begin their tyranny over the Iraqi people anew. Creating artificial deadlines for withdrawal will only serve to undermine our current mission in Iraq. It will put at risk the significant gains already made by the Iraqi people in the rebuilding of their nation, and will endanger the lives of American soldiers. The Role of NATO and the UN Contrary to assertions that we are in Iraq with a coalition that is just window dressing for unilateralism, the Coalition's mission to liberate and reconstruct Iraq has 684 been an international effort from the start. This includes heavy NATO participation, as sixteen of our NATO allies currently have more than 19,000 troops deployed in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom's stability operations. Appropriately, British and Polish representatives participated in our meetings with Iraq's national security leaders. Similarly, this Administration has made a significant effort to involve the United Nations in the reconstruction of Iraq. The Coalition's ongoing efforts in Iraq have repeatedly received the endorsement of the UN. UN Security Council Resolution 1483 – passed May 22, 2003 – supported the formation of the CPA and an Iraqi Interim Administration. UNSCR 1500 – passed August 14, 2003 – recognized the establishment of the Governing Council. UNSCR 1511 - passed October 16, 2003 - authorizes a multinational force under unified command. All three of these resolutions were unanimously endorsed by the UN Security Council. - W The Administration has worked closely with the United Nations Secretary General throughout the past year. Before his tragic murder by terrorists, UN envoy Sergio Viera de Mello was instrumental in establishing the Iraqi Governing Council. The new UN envoy, Lakdar Brahimi, has been invaluable in facilitating the creation of the Iraqi Interim Government. Since the tragic bombing of the UN Headquarters in Baghdad last August - which Zarqawi boasts was his doing and which was clearly aimed at driving out. the UN - security for the UN has been a major challenge. However, the UN representative for Security Coordination's Office has been in Baghdad since mid- 685 January, and a UN Election Commission headed by Carina Perelli has been in Iraq since April. On May 24th the U.S. and UK submitted a draft UN Security Council Resolution that defines U.S. and international responsibilities in Iraq. This resolution was passed unanimously on June 8th as UNSCR 1546. We look forward to the United Nations providing election expertise and assistance in preparation for the election of the Iraqi Transitional Government by January 2005. We have also proposed a specific allotment of international forces falling under the unified command of the Multinational Force whose sole mission would be the protection of UN personnel and facilities in Iraq. This would permit the United Nations to expand their presence and activities within Iraq, something this Administration has supported since Iraq's liberation over a year ago. We look forward to the continued participation of these international organizations in Iraq after the transition to Iraqi sovereignty. Many allies support an increased role by NATO in Iraq. Several have called for the passing of a new UN Security Council Resolution authorizing a NATO force presence, functional tasking, such as election support, ordnance disposal, the protection of UN personnel, or assisting in the equipping of Iraqi security forces. Conclusion 686 My recent travels through Iraq, from my visit to Basra in the far south to Lake Dokan in Northern Iraq, as well our meetings with Prime Minister Allawi and his team, have convinced me that the Iraqi Interim Government is comprised of leaders who understand the magnitude of the task laid before them, but also recognize the necessity of compromise and sacrifice required to achieve a free and prosperous Iraq. More importantly, accompanying this realization of the hardships to come is an unflinching optimism on the part of the Iraqi people. In his statement Sunday, Dr. Allawi declared: The enemy we are fighting is truly evil. They have nothing to offer the Iraqi . people except death and destruction and the slaughter of innocents. Having suffered under tyranny for so many years, the Iraqi people are determined to establish a democratic government that provides freedom and equal rights for all its citizens. We are prepared to fight and, if necessary, die for that cause. We are confident that we will prevail.” One Iraqi, identified only as Omar, reflected recently on the assassination of the President: of the Iraqi Governing Council, Izzedine Salim, on his website: "Are we sad?" he wrote in his Web log. "Yes of course, but we're absolutely not discouraged because we know our enemies and we decided to go in this battle to the end. ... I've tasted freedom, my friends, and I'd rather die fighting to preserve my freedom before I find myself trapped in another nightmare of blood and oppression." Like Omar, brave young Americans in Iraq are committed as well and we are as a nation. And we remain cautiously optimistic, despite the daily death and violence caused... by the evil enemy Prime Minister Allawi described. Our own history attests to the fact that democracy can be a hard-won prize. But we also know that the goal is worth the fight. DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD JUNE 22, 2004 Copyright 2004 The New York Times Company The New York Times June 20, 2004 Sunday Late Edition - Final Just after midnight on June 12, Specialist Gerardo Barajas and about 30 other soldiers from Company A, Second Battalion, Fifth Cavalry, First Cavalry Division, rolled out of Camp Eagle for a raid on an insurgent stronghold in the fiercely anti-American Sadr City slun. As the convoy made its way into the densely populated downtown, roadside bombs exploded and burning barricades blocked its path. Specialist Barajas sat in the turret of a Bradley Fighting Vehicle, at the trigger of a 7.62 millimeter machine gun, with a 25-millimeter cannon loaded with high explosive rounds nearby. As the convoy rounded a comer, the lead vehicle's thermal imaging scopes picked up two men 300 yards away carrying a box with trailing wires -- a homemade bomb, almost certainly with a remote control trigger. The lead Bradley opened fire, but the gunsight malfunctioned and the bullets struck wide. As the two men dropped and tried to crawl to safety, the platoon leader, Lt. Chris Cannon, radioed Specialist Barajas, who had already moved into action. He had the men in his sights and blasted away. Through the live video images projected from the thermal scopes onto screens in the Bradleys, the scene took on a chilling quality. The men seemed to quiver when hit and crawled desperately toward a wall as Specialist Barajas brought their lives to an end. At age 21, Specialist Barajas is a combat veteran. He has seen more fighting in his three months in Iraq than most soldiers do in their careers. In the heat of battle, he and the other members of his platoon work as a nearly seamless unit. It is just that kind of expertise, forged in harrowing battles, that Army officials say has led them to a policy that adds considerably to the time soldiers like Specialist Barajas will spend in Iraq. Rather than returning home at the end of their normal tours, the soldiers have been ordered to remain in Iraq until the scheduled return of their full units, usually after a year in Iraq. The program, called stop loss, has also caused many soldiers who would have been discharged before their units had been sent to Iraq to remain with them. Commanders say the program could affect about one in four soldiers in Iraq. (689) 690 For the soldiers of Company A, several of whom normally would have been discharged before their unit shipped out in March, the new discharge date is next June. Critics say the service extensions are a desperate effort to maintain troop levels in Iraq and Afghanistan at a time when poor planning has caused forces to be spread too thin. Military officials disagree. They say the teamwork and sharpened skills are too prized to be lost. They also say that young men like Specialist Barajas can break in soldiers new to the battlefield. Among the soldiers there is a respect for the logic. "I trained with these guys for three years," Specialist Barajas said recently. "You can't just send a new guy over here. It puts my crew in jeopardy." Furthermore, he said, he would never leave the other members of his three-man Bradley crew. "What if I leave and they get hurt? I'll wonder, 'What if I would have been there?'" But the orders still hit hard. Specialist Armando Olazaba, who has shared long hours in battle with Specialist Barajas, got the news about the stop-loss order three months before his scheduled discharge in February and before Company A had been deployed to Iraq. His service has been extended by 15 months. "I was just in disbelief when they told me," he recalled. "I thought, 'They really got me good.'I was so looking forward to getting out." On April 4, around 6 p.m., a call came in that a sister unit, Company C, had been ambushed in Sadr City. Soldiers jumped into whatever vehicle was available -- including Humvees with no doors and open-sided trucks -- and rushed to the rescue. Within minutes, they found themselves in what officers here are calling, "the largest urban terrain battle since Vietnam." Specialist Barajas was lucky to be ensconced in his heavily armored Bradley. In a nearby Humvee, Sgt. First Class Reginald Butler took turns firing at attackers and trying to save the life of his wounded, gunner, Specialist Ahmed Cason. In the back of an open truck, Specialist Olazaba was hit hard, his leg torn up by shrapnel and his buddy Specialist Ray Flores shot twice in the head and bleeding heavily. They both continued to shoot at fleeting figures on rooftops as their friends fell around them. Within minutes, a heap of bloodied soldiers lay on the truck; 10 of the 15 men on board were wounded, two others lay dying. Company A suffered 38 casualties that day, including four fatalities. Sergeant Butler, a respected 11-year veteran who was to be discharged in August, will serve an . . additional 10 months. Specialist Flores, who was to be discharged this month, will serve an extra year. They are among six soldiers in the nine-man squad whose tours were extended through the program, including Pfc. Robert Arsiaga, who, upon hearing last fall that he would be kept past his discharge date and shipped to Iraq, requested a leave to get married. He was killed fighting next to Specialist Flores on April 4. The grimmest implications of the order hit home on that day, when many of the men, who had been toid to prepare for a peacekeeping mission in Iraq, caught the full blast of war. "Men came in to me crying," Sgt. Butler said. "They said, 'Sergeant, I ain't going back out there. I told them, 'I know it's hard; I know- you seen your friends die, but we got to go back out and keep fighting.'" Some men did not go back out for weeks, and a few were sent home because of combat stress. 691 After Specialist Flores was treated for his wounds and returned to the unit, he began to sit alone in his room, aiming his weapon out the window. He has been placed on modified duty inside the barracks. "I have so much grief," he said in a recent interview. "It's pretty much ruined my life. I'm just lost out here." Specialist Barajas, after gunning down the men carrying the bomb, spent the rest of the early moming of June 12 in the cramped turret of his Bradley, taking aim at rooftops and in an alley at attackers who fired rocket-propelled grenades in return. As dawn approached, the convoy rumbled back to base, then left again on a sweep of roadside bombs. When the convoy returned for good in mid-morning, nearly twelve hours into their shift, a dozen soldiers gathered around a battle-scarred Bradley for a re-enlistment ceremony. Jessie Lopez, a staff sergeant in Company A who enlisted when he was 17, was signing up for five more years. "I don't want to leave the Army and end up working at McDonald's," he said in an interview. "Here I get a steady check and benefits for my wife and two kids." The ceremony took about two minutes under the blazing sun. An oath of re-enlistment was read and Polaroids were snapped. Sergeant Lopez got a coffee cup, a pen and a medallion, all with Operation Iraqi Freedom II engraved on them, along with a certificate in a green vinyl folder. Staff Sgt. Johnnie Waters, who was in charge of re-enlistment for the Second Battalion, was to retire the previous day, having served 20 years, but he, too, is being held over by the stop-loss program. He said it was harder to get young soldiers and married ones to re-enlist with the war on, despite special inducements -- $10,000 tax-free bonus payable in 45 days and choice of next assignment -- for those who re-enlist while in Iraq. and choice of recen, despite specim, He said the Specialist Barajas watched Sergeant Lopez's re-enlistment ceremony from the edge of the crowd. Afterward, Fernando Rodriguez, the battalion's command sergeant major, homed in on him. "You don't re-enlist, you're turning your back on a sure thing," the sergeant major told him, unleashing a protracted argument for a life in the army. "I joined the Army to get away from being a parasite. See, this here is independence." Specialist Barajas looked at the ground a lot and filled each pause with, "Yes, Command Sergeant Major." He did not point out that he was in the middle of an 18-hour shift, or tell the command sergeant major about the men he had just killed. When he thinks about re-enlistment, Specialist Barajas thinks about a childhood friend who was a Marine corporal, Jorge Gonzales, like him, 21 years old and from East Los Angeles. Corporal Gonzales was killed last year in Nasariya, leaving behind a wife and infant child. "I don't want my family to go through that," he said. When the Army finally lets him out, he said, he may return to Los Angeles to work in his family's business. He also wants to start a family, maybe with a young woman named Carissa, whose picture is taped next to him in the turret of his Bradley. "I got nothing against the Army," he said. "I just want to make it out of here." business. He also wants to start a family, maybe with a young woman named Carissa, whose picture is QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD JUNE 22, 2004 QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. SKELTON Mr. SKELTON. The Army has decided to appoint General Paul Kern, four star gen- eral, to oversee all of the investigation. Will he have the ability to question civilians within the chain of command regarding this investigation? General PACE. Yes, General Kern will have that opportunity if he chooses. Civil- ian government employees can be directed to participate in interviews. They can al- ways take the Fifth amendment, but they can be directed to participate in investiga- tions, as a witness. For Article 32 hearings and courts-martial, they could be sub- poenaed. But, then they can still take the Fifth amendment. Civilian contractors: it depends upon the contract. Normally, they cannot. The military commander has limited if any authority over contractors. If a contractor does not want to be inter- viewed, the disciplinary apparatus (contracting officers rep to contractor) will prob- ably not be helpful. Contractors could be subpoenaed as well for a hearing, but this doesn't help with interviews. Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Secretary, Ahmed Chalabi has been all over the news recently. And we paid him and his national congress millions of dollars; I think it would be a good idea to seek an accounting of where that money was spent in light of the fact that we have cut him off, that we assisted in raiding his quarters, and obviously he has been discredited. Could you provide us with an accounting, either classified or unclassified, as to how that money was spent? Secretary WOLFOWITZ. There have been no direct payments from the Department of Defense to Mr. Chalabi. The Iraqi National Congress (INC), an organization head- ed by Mr. Chalabi, has received Department of Defense support. In the Iraq Liberation Act of 1998 (ILA), Congress authorized several forms of support to the INC. Under the ILA, the Department of State was authorized to make grants to the INC from Economic Support Funds. Pursuant to Presidential Determinations under the ILA, the Department of Defense was authorized to pro- vide up to $97 million in drawdown assistance to thirteen Iraqi opposition groups, including the INC. The Department of Defense has expended, from fiscal year 1999 through fiscal year 2003, approximately $1.13 million through ILA drawdown authority to train students associated with the INC. A detailed listing of the courses provided and the associated costs, by fiscal year, is enclosed. [The information referred to was not available at the time of printing.] In addition to the training provided to the INC, the Department also paid the INC funds related to a classified intelligence program. It also provided the IRNC funds for the training of volunteers for the Free Iraqi Forces who had been nominated by a number of groups, including the INC. The Defense Intelligence Agency will provide you a classified briefing on the intel- ligence program upon request. I note that the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Richard Myers, testified to the House Committee on Armed Services on May 21, 2004, that the program in question provided information that was “useful and accurate," and that the organization which he [Chalabi] is associated with has provided intelligence to our intelligence unit there in Baghdad that has saved sol- diers' lives.” QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. SPRATT Mr. SPRATT. Is the true shortfall $10 billion, and if so, how does the DOD plan to address the balance of the shortfall if the DOD plans to reprogram only $3.1 bil- lion to replenish fast-spending accounts? Will the Department defer requirements from the last quarter of the fiscal year? If so, which requirements will be deferred and how will this affect the readiness of our non-deployed forces? Secretary WOLFOWITZ. When the Components initially submitted their list of un- funded requests for FY 2004, they totaled $10 billion. During the midyear financial execution review, we focused on funding those requests that were most critical to the execution of current operations and the readiness of our military and that were executable during FY 2004. The Department was able to identify funding sources (695) 696 to finance $7.5 billion of these requests. The recommended solution includes trans- ferring the assets identified in the Omnibus reprogramming action ($3.1 billion) and transferring corporate assets from the Defense Working Capital Fund ($2.8 billion), the Iraqi Freedom Fund ($0.5 billion), and the Foreign Currency Fluctuations, De- fense appropriation ($1.1 billion). The remaining $2.5 billion requests were determined to be of lower priority or could be deferred to FY 2005. These lower priority requests will include some facil- ity sustainment, restoration and modernization efforts, noncritical depot mainte- nance, noncritical travel, supplies and administrative costs, and similar items. The emphasis is on deferring activities so that the readiness of non-deployed forces is not adversely affected. The best way ahead for the Department in closing out FY 2004 requires an in- creased flexibility of $1.1 billion in general transfer authority and timely approval by the Congress of the various reprogramming actions to include the Omnibus re- programming action. These actions are critically needed to ensure adequate funds flow to the highest priority needs of the Department. Mr. SPRATT. If DOD defers requirements until next fiscal year in order to free up enough funds to finance operations through the end of the fiscal year, one can as- sume that the Department will be forced to spend the $25 billion 2005 supplemental at a faster rate than Congress envisioned when drafting the supplemental. In view of this, when in fiscal year 2005 will the Department need supplemental funds to avoid funding shortages? How does your answer change if one assumes you do not "cash flow” regular DOD 2005 appropriations? Secretary WOLFOWITZ. If the Congress approves the Omnibus reprogramming and provides an increase in general transfer authority, there should be no impact to the readiness of non-deployed forces. Without this congressional approval, the Depart- ment of Defense would be required to defer expenses such as depot maintenance, which if not replenished in FY 2005, would begin to degrade readiness. However, that situation does not necessarily mean that funds will be used at a faster rate in early FY 2005. Lower priority requirements that can be “unfunded” would con- tinue to be sought so that the Department focuses resources on the core, must-fund items. In addition, there is a limit to surge capacity in the depots and equipment maintenance facilities that would moderate the workload flow and expenditure of funds. Due to the uncertainties of the situation globally, particularly in Iraq and Afghan- istan, the Department cannot pinpoint a time in FY 2005 when additional funds will be needed to avoid funding shortages. The plan, which should meet anticipated funding requirements, is to submit a request for supplemental funds early in 2005 to finance the full costs of contingency operations and the reconstitution of forces during FY 2005. Having access to the $25 billion contingent reserve fund in early FY 2005 should allow the Department to continue to support military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan until the Congress has time to enact the full FY 2005 supple- mental appropriation in early spring. The availability of the $25 billion will allow the DOD to avoid disruptions that could occur if DOD had to rely solely on cash flowing. Any requirements that are deferred from FY 2004 will be prioritized along with other FY 2005 requirements. Those that are urgent will be funded and other FY 2005 requirements will be deferred until additional FY 2005 funding is provided. The magnitude of the requirements which must be met early in FY 2005 will de- pend greatly on the global situation, particularly in Iraq and Afghanistan. The $25 billion contingent reserve could only be used to finance requirements directly related to military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, not to cash flow regular DOD activi- ties. Mr. SPRATT. How much does DOD project to spend on each of Operations Iraqi Freedom, Enduring Freedom, and Noble Eagle on a monthly basis for the rest of the year? Secretary WOLFOWITZ. The Department estimates that total obligations for the on- going operations will be approximately $69.3 billion this year. Using current month- ly reports, the projected allocation by contingency operation is shown below. The table assumes that all the funding for classified programs will be spent as planned this year. erations and then and Afched allow the Denss to the $ 697 Military Operations 1 (Dollars in Billions) Projected Obligations May through September 2004 Estimated Total Obligations 2 1.8 Operation Iraqi Freedom 19.3 55.5 Operation Noble Eagle 4.4 Operation Enduring Freedom 3.8 9.4 Total 24.9 69.3 1 The above amounts exclude obligations for the reconstruction of Iraq financed in the Iraq Re- lief and Reconstruction Fund. Estimate as of June 24, 2004. 2 Estimated Total Obligations include the anticipated $4.0 billion from the Omnibus Re- programming and other transfers necessary to support extended troop deployments in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom. Mr. SPRATT. Based on what is known to date, what is DOD's minimum projected cost for Operations Iraqi Freedom (OIF), Enduring Freedom (OEF), and Noble Eagle (ONE) for Fiscal Year 2005? Secretary WOLFOWITZ. The monthly burn rate, adjusted for known force structure changes in Iraq and Afghanistan, is about $5.1 billion per month for military oper- ations excluding investment-related (one-time) costs. If non-recurring costs (i.e., in- vestment items) are included, the monthly burn rate is $5.3 billion per month for these operations. Providing FY 2005 requirements based on FY 2004 obligations may be misleading because of continued uncertainties and other factors. For exam- ple, this would not include the cost of resetting the force or financing other initia- tives like the Army Modularity program. However, the situations in both Iraq and Afghanistan are sufficiently uncertain that any attempt to build a credible budget plan at this time will be fraught with error. The following table provides the specific burn rates by military operation as of March 31, 2004: these operisteading because the cost of resettiwever, the (Dollars in Millions) Recurring Costs Total Costs 4,028 Operation Iraqi Freedom Operation Enduring Freedom Operation Noble Eagle 733 4,244 751 350 5,345 350 5,111 Mr. SPRATT. Please identify total (cumulative) obligations to date for Operations Iraqi Freedom, Enduring Freedom, and Noble Eagle. Identify the source of funding by appropriations act for each operation, and also identify unobligated balances for each operation. Identify outlays associated with each operation. Break out the infor- mation for obligated funds, unobligated funds, and outlays by detailed cost cat- egories (such as fuel and spare parts, facility support, operating support, deploy- ment, redeployment, and refurbishment of equipment). This is similar to the re- quest, Rep. Skelton and I made on July 29 and September 24, 2003. Secretary WOLFOWITZ. The Congress did not appropriate the funding for Oper- ation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), and Operation Noble Eagle (ONE) by operation, thus there is no corresponding "budget authority" amount by military operation. The source of funding is the Emergency Supple- mental Acts for: FY 2001 (P.L. 107–38), FY 2002 (P.L. 107–206), FY 2003 (P.L. 108– 11), FY 2004 (P.L. 108–106), the FY 2002 Appropriations Act (P.L: 107–117), and the Omnibus Appropriations Act of FY 2003 (P.L. 108–7). Outlay data is generally not available since funds that were transferred from centralized appropriations such as the IFF lose their visibility once the funds are transferred and merged with base- line appropriation funding. The following table shows obligations as of March 31, 2004. mental ACD04" (P.L. 108 tions Act of Fynsferred from ceferred and merg of March 31, 698 Budget Authority (Dollars in Billions) 1 Obligations Unobligated FY 20012 16.3 FY 2002 13.9 FY 01/02 30.2 29.6 0.63 FY 20034 69.2 68.4 0.8 FY 2004 65.3 32.0 33.3 Total 164.7 130.0 34.7 1 Amounts may not add due to rounding. Includes funding for classified activities ($5.3 billion) and excludes funding for Storm Damage ($313 million). 2 FY 2001 funds appropriated in the FY 2001 Emergency Supplemental (P.L. 107–38) are available in FY 2002. For display purposes, FY 2001 and FY 2002 are reported concurrently in this exhibit. 3 In April 2004, DOD transferred $126.0 million of unobligated balances from the DERF to the IFF consistent with section 1313 of P.L. 108–11. 4 Budget Authority in FY 2003 does reflect the $3.5 billion rescission and the $10.0 billion in- crease from the Omnibus Appropriations Act. Obligations for GWOT-related Military Operations The following data is derived from the Consolidated Terrorist Reports, which re- port only those obligations directly supporting military contingency operations. Breaking down obligations in these categories excludes $12.8 billion of obligations for funds appropriated in the FY 2001 Emergency Supplemental Act (P.L. 107–38) for programs that are not directly supporting a military contingency operation (such as costs for Pentagon reconstruction, funds transferred for classified activities, and other direct appropriations that were not specifically for GWOT military operations). (Dollars in Millions) * ONE OEF OIF Cum Break out by Fiscal Year FY 2001 FY 2002 FY 2003 FY 2004 Total 135 5,686 6,466 2,106 14,392 105 10,959 16,230 4,509 31,803 42,238 25,464 67,702 240 16,645 64,933 32,078 113,896 FY 2001 FY 20022 FY 20033 FY 2004 7,027 73 1,248 116 15,566 196 1,501 677 1,103 78 8,985 133 1,013 359 1,176 67 140 73 Break out by cost category 1 Military Personnel Civilian Personnel Temporary Duty Allowance Health Care Services Other Personnel Support Training Operational Tempo (combat oper- ations, includes fuel) Supplies and Equipment Facilities and Base Support Communications & Intelligence Maintenance Activites (includes spare parts) Other Operational and Logistics Support 2,564 1,419 500 658 7,066 6,993 4,124 1,825 2,577 2,296 4,828 589 1,509 3,756 2,283 251 8,652 3,407 699 FY 2001 FY 20022 FY 20033 FY 2004 895 48 i 125 Airlift Transportation Sealift Transportation Other Transportation Support Procurement Research and Development Working Capital Fund Military Construction 3,744 1,192 3,270 4,714 431 1,720 290 974 1,366 15 45 240 2012 y 2007axmat add due to roumeint costs are covered Total 16,645 64,933 32,078 Note: Deployment and redeployment costs are covered in the transportation categories. 1 Totals may not add due to rounding. 2 FY 2001 funds appropriated in the FY 2001 Emergency Supplemental (P.L. 107–38) are reflected in FY 2001 and FY 2002 obligations. 3 FY 2003 obligations do not include classified activities. Mr. SPRATT. Building on the answers provided to question 5, provide the amount of funding transferred to each operation (whether it required congressional approval or not) from "regular" (not supplemental) funding provided by DOD, Omnibus, or Military Construction Appropriations Acts. Identify the amount and specific appro- priations act from which funds were transferred Secretary WOLFOWITZ. To date, most funding for Operation Iraqi Freedom, Oper- ation Enduring Freelom and Operation Noble Eagle has been provided from the sup- plemental appropriations. In Part II of the Omnibus reprogramming action, now being considered by the congressional defense committees, the Department proposes transferring approximately $1.1 billion from baseline activities to finance require- ments associated with these operations. Part IV of the same reprogramming rec- ommends the transfer of $120 million from baseline programs to meet critical force protection requirements. In addition, the Department has reprogrammed approxi- mately $2.95 billion from the Defense Working Capital Fund to the Operation and Maintenance appropriations to address operational funding needs. The Components have certainly made additional transfers, in line with their below threshold re- programming authority, to meet the requirements of on-going operations. The De- partment has not been collecting information on these below threshold transactions, so the data is not readily available. Mr. SPRATT. Ranking Minority Member Ike Shelton and I have requested informa- tion on the costs of the Global War on Terrorism in writing on three occasions: On July 29, 2003, in a letter addressed to OMB Director Joshua B. Bolten and cc'ed to the Department of Defense Comptroller (Dr. Dov Zakheim); on September 24, 2003, in a letter addressed to Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz; and on April 19, 2004, identical letters addressed to Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and OMB Director Bolten. Why have we never even received an acknowledgement of these letters? When will we receive responses to our questions? Secretary WOLFOWITZ. The response to your most recent letter will be sent to you shortly. It addresses the questions you have raised in your correspondence. Please also see the attached answers from January 27, 2004 to your September 24, 2003 letter. [The information referred to was not available at the time of printing.] We appreciate your interest in this very important subject. Thank you for your support of our troops. We look forward to continuing to work with you on these ur- gent issues. QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. CALVERT Mr. CALVERT. As the Iraqi Security forces become more capable and begin to as- sume more of a role in the security of their nation, will the U.S. and Coalition forces move to more remote locations than they are currently? If so, when will this begin? Will there be joint patrolling operations, or will the Iraqi security forces have their own areas of operation and coordinate on their boundaries just like any other mili- tary forces would? General PACE. As the capability of Iraqi Security Forces improves, multinational forces will move to more remote locations within their areas of operation. The first stage of this change in posture occurs at the municipal level and is referred to as 700 "local control". Once local Iraqi security forces can respond to local incidents and the judicial systems can arraign, hold, and try criminals in a timely manner, a city is considered ready for local control. Multinational forces provide oversight and serve as a credible back up for the local Iraqi forces. We expect to be able to transition to local control in the northernmost and south- ernmost provinces in the fall of 2004. Transition in the cities more affected by the insurgency will obviously take much longer. The specifics of how the local Iraqi forces will operate with multinational forces will be worked out on a case-by-case basis between the local Iraqi authorities and the military commander. In some cases the local officials will desire a visible coali- tion presence, and in other localities the Iraqi's may desire more of a stand off ap- proach. QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA Ms. Davis. What can we expect, say, in the next 6 months in terms of those ap- propriation dollars getting on line? Secretary WOLFOWITZ. Data as of June 16, 2004 Dollars in Millions Apportioned Committed Obligated Construction Non-Construction Total $5,815 $5,240 $11,055 $4,372 $3,232 $7,604 $3,214 $1,537 $4,751 - QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LARSEN Mr. LARSEN. At an earlier hearing, Administration officials testified that it will take a full seven years to train and equip the Afghan National Army. Specifically, we will train 10,000 per year for seven years. Secretary Wolfowitz testified that we will have trained 35,000 in the New Iraqi Army by September and 40,000 in the National Guard by fall. Why is training so slow in Afghanistan or are we training too quickly in Iraq re- sulting in undertraining of the NIA? If US troops possibly will participate in the enforcement of martial law decreed by the the selected leaders of Iraq, how does their involvement fit with our goal of a free and democratic Iraq? Iraqi security forces seem to be proliferating. Why do the police need a civil inter- vention force and what will its role be? Why is there an Iraqi National Task Force and what is its role if there is an army and a National Guard? Why is there a plan to fire up to 30,000 police and hire an additional 5,000 every ten weeks this fall (Patraeus testimony)? Secretary WOLFOWITZ. [The information referred to was not available at the time of printing.) QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. ISRAEL Mr. ISRAEL. Responding to the chairman's point, this story in the New York Times, why are our personnel continuing to jump into Humvees with no doors and open-sided trucks in order to rush to a rescue, or is this article not accurate? General PACE. [The information referred to is classified and retained in the com- mittee files.] ARMY AND MARINE CORPS TROOP ROTATIONS FOR OP- ERATION IRAQI FREEDOM 3 AND OPERATION ENDUR- ING FREEDOM 6 AND THE MOBILIZATION OF THE IN- DIVIDUAL READY RESERVE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, Washington, DC, Wednesday, July 7, 2004. The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:36 a.m., in room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Duncan Hunter (chair- man of the committee) presiding. OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. DUNCAN HUNTER, A REP- RESENTATIVE FROM CALIFORNIA, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES The CHAIRMAN. The hearing will come to order. The transfer of power to the interim Iraqi government and the televised images of that government beginning the judicial process against Saddam Hussein and 11 of his henchmen are some of the most recent indications that real progress is being made in Iraq. Having just returned from Iraq last week and visited the areas of Mosul, Balad, Tikrit, Ramadi, Fallujah and Baghdad, I can re- port that there are many more good things going on in that country to restore freedom and provide a modicum of democracy to the Iraqi people. doubt, the most impressive part of our visit involved the American soldiers, Marines and airmen that we met who are doing a fantastic job in difficult conditions and in the most professional way. Coming back from the theater, we stopped at Ramstein and Landstuhl, had a good run there, and at Landstuhl Medical Center there in Germany met with lots of the American troops who had been wounded. And I might say, Silvestre Reyes, a great former crew chief from El Paso, was a member of our Čongressional Delegation (CODEL), and Ken Calvert, my colleague from just north of San Diego there, in Riverside County, did a wonderful job on this trip. And we were very impressed, not just with the morale of the folks in theater, but the morale of the kids at Landstuhl was re- markable. And Silvestre has commented several times on the GI humor that they displayed upon our visit. And I remember when we arrived, we asked one of the troopers what we could do for him, and he turned to his buddy and said, “Does this mean I get promoted to E-9?" [Laughter.] (701) 702 And I think Silvestre said no. But I think they had a little fun at our expense there. They are great folks, and we are very, very appreciative of that great medical help, and also the expeditious movement of those folks back to the base hospitals in the States. Today's hearing is about continuing the U.S. military mission in Iraq and Afghanistan, how that mission's going. And specifically, we have asked our witnesses to address the plan for the third rotation of forces in Iraq and the sixth rotation of forces in Afghanistan. There are a couple of issues we would like to get to today, and among them are the mission size, scope, phasing and length of the Operation Iraqi Freedom 3 (OIF-3) and ÕIF-6 force rotations; sec- ond, the continued heavy reliance on the reserve components, which we understand will make up 43 percent of the force going into Iraq, and the reasons behind the Army's need to involuntarily mobilize 5,600 people in the Individual Ready Reserve, the IRR. It is a given that the Army and Marine Corps are under stress because of deployments. But we want to know more about the measures being taken to preserve what we would call the elasticity of the force. That is the ability to recover sufficiently from one commitment before commit- ting to another. And we are especially concerned that operational requirements in both the Army and Marine Corps are forcing the redeployment of forces without sufficient time to reset at home stations. So, gentlemen, if you could comment on that, I think that is an important issue for the committee. We are also concerned that insufficient force structure and man- power are leading the services to make decision that I liken to eat- ing the seed corn. That is in order to make it through today, we do things that mortgage the future. For instance, we need to know more about the Army decision to deploy the Opposing Force (OPFOR) unit from the National Train- ing Center (NTC) and some of the OPFOR from the Joint Readi- ness Training Center (JRTC) to Iraq and replace them with guard units. These two combat training centers have provided the bedrock of experience that's allowed our forces to be so exceptionally success- ful in combat. So if we move those OPFOR folks out, that means that the troops that are going in for training are not going to meet the degree of skill and capability that they have been meeting in the past with these units who have shaped their mission to undertake that train- Finally, the Army's 3rd Infantry Division is going back to Iraq, but in a new configuration with four modularized brigades. As the first of the Army's new units of action, we need to understand more about how these brigades will be employed and evaluated... So we have lots of questions this morning. Thank you, gentlemen, for being with us. Thank you for your service to our country. And before I introduce our panel of witnesses, I would like to rec- ognize my partner on the committee, the ranking member, the gen- ing.. 703 tleman from Missouri, Mr. Skelton, for any remarks he would like to make. [The prepared statement of Mr. Hunter can be found in the Ap- pendix on page 769.] STATEMENT OF HON. IKE SKELTON, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM MISSOURI, RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. And first let me thank you for your report on your visit in Iraq with Silvestre Reyes and Ken Calvert. It is important that from time to time members do go to the scene of where our young people who are in harm's way, and we thank you for your very positive remarks on that. You know, let me speak to our witnesses today. This committee from time to time will pursue some very difficult questions to you. And this is not meant for any purpose other than to allow us to do our duty. Under the Constitution, we raise and maintain the military. And I am really proud of the young men and young women in uniform. I am proud of what they have done for our country. And quite honestly, a lot of that is because of the work that we have done through the years in this committee, glueing things together, finding things where we can do them better, supplying armor, sup- plying better training, supplying better education. And please understand that when those questions are put to you, we are trying to learn all we can. So, Mr. Chairman, our subject today really is one of the most im- portant, if not the most, that we have had before this committee in a long time. You know, we hear the phrase, “Support our troops.” We hear it so often that it tends to lose its meaning. But today we retain a good, hard look at how we are using our troops' most precious commodity, young men and young women in uniform, our sons and our daughters. Words cannot describe how proud each of us are at how they con- tinually respond to the very difficult challenges our nation puts be- fore them. And I have got to tell you, I am worried, worried for them. We are asking very few to exert an enormous sustained effort for the good of all of us here in America. We need to pay very strict atten- tion to that. There is a saying, “First people always,” and we have a moral duty to see our mission through in Iraq, in Afghanistan. But our soldiers, sailors, airmen and Marines are not pawns on a chess board. They are ours. They are our treasure. We owe each of them a debt we truly cannot repay. We charge them with a duty, and you are their leaders, and they are to follow your orders to success. This committee has seen, on a bipartisan basis, that they have body armor, that they have other protective gear that they need in the field, up-armored vehicles, particularly Humvees. And we con- tinue to make that effort to make sure that we authorize the addi- tional strength that they need to succeed. 704 Time and again I have personally, I guess since back in 1995, I have called for increase in the end strength of our forces. So have other members on both sides of this aisle. And with the chairman's support, and we should recognize that, we have managed to add 30,000 soldiers, 9,000 Marines over a pe- riod of three years in this year's bill. That is good stuff. But you need it. But even that comes over a period of years. We cannot do it all at one time. I hope it is not too little too late. The 2001 Department of Defense publishment of the Quadren- nial Defense Reviews (CDR) has called for a capabilities-based ap- proach to defense spending. As the force-sizing construct of the monly known as 1421, it requires a military to: one, de- fend the homeland; second, to deter forward in four critical regions; third, to conduct simultaneous warfare missions in two regions; and fourth, to pursue decisive victory in one of those conflicts. Now, clearly, we are currently trying to pursue a decisive victory in Iraq. It's proven to be much more challenging and resource-in- tensive than we anticipated. Around the world this year we are de- ploying over 80 percent of our active combat brigades, and more than half our National Guard-enhanced battalions. And I don't see how the force-sizing construct of the 2001 QDR is still valid today in 2004. I think, in talking with young people, whether it is in Iraq, Af- ghanistan, Fort Leonard Wood, Fort Jackson, Whiteman Air Force Base, I think we are wearing our people out. And today we are watching the Defense Department take some drastic measures to man the next rotation of forces to Iraq and Af- ghanistan. Units are returning to combat with less than a year in the States. I know of one particular young man who spent a year in Iraq, came back 90 days with his new unit, and he is back again for a year. And his wife is handling it quite well. Large numbers of Individual Ready Reserve (IRR), 5,600 are being called upon. We are locking the force down with stop-loss or- ders. We are taking great risk with everything. We make our forces so great, our ability to train them against a world class opposing force, which we have to do. Each of these measures is of concern and we are going to ask about them. But taken together, they pose for me a serious alarm. We are managing this conflict with stop-gap measures as if the end is near. Secretary Wolfowitz sat right where you are, Dr. Chu, two weeks ago and told us it was likely to go on for years. And even if the need for forces lessens in Iraq, which we cer- tainly hope it does, who is to say that another need will not emerge before our troops are rested and recovered? This is a Global War on Terrorism. At what point do we stop pre- tending that this year will be the last the demand is so high? I think we are taxing our part-time soldiers in the Guard and Re- serve nearly to the breaking point. I go home a lot to the 4th Congressional District in Missouri. And the spouses talk to me about their spouses in uniform who are deployed. 705 Of course I tell them how proud I am of them. But their attitude is one of, in many cases, I am quoting, “I will tell you one thing: When he gets back he is getting out.” Now, hopefully, that will not happen, but we have to be aware that the families back home are paying a significant price. As part of the national military strategy required in our bill last year the Congress asked the Joint Chiefs for an assessment of risk executing the current strategy. That assessment was due on Feb- ruary the 15th. Has not been submitted.. And, Dr. Chu, I hope you would give us your thoughts on that please. Mr. Chairman, let me again thank you for calling this hearing. I look forward to hearing from our witnesses just how they plan to meet the challenges of the conflict in Iraq and Afghanistan that protects our people from undue stress and preserves our national military capability. We do not want to break the force. We cannot. Watching the stability phase unfold in Iraq over the last year, I have been particularly struck by the impression that our plans were based on overly rosy assessments, which, when they did not prove to be realistic, caused serious complications in our mission, complications that should have been avoided by better planning. So, therefore, Mr. Chairman, thank you again for this hearing. k forward to hearing from these witnesses and the answers they will give us. [The prepared statement of Mr. Skelton can be found in the Ap- pendix on page 774.] The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman. And, gentlemen, again, thank you. We look forward to your testi- mony. And I am going to introduce you in order of your presen- tations. We have with us the Honorable David S. Chu, undersecretary of defense for personnel and readiness. And, Dr. Chu, you are a real veteran of this committee. Thank you for being with us today. And also Lieutenant General Norton A. Schwartz, United States Air Force, director of operations for the Joint Chiefs of Staff. And, General Schwartz, thank you, and thanks for your continu- ing participation in the briefings that we have had for the last sev- eral years on this Area of Operations (AO). And, of course, General Richard A. Cody, United States Army, vice chief of staff, Department of the Army. Thank you, General Cody. And Lieutenant General Jan C. Huly, United States Marine Corps, deputy commandant of the Marine Corps for plans, policies and operations. So, General Cody, before we begin, we want to offer our con- gratulations upon your recent appointment and confirmation as vice chief of staff of the Army and promotion to four-star rank. Both are very well deserved. And we congratulate you for that. General CODY. Thank you, sir. [Applause.] The CHAIRMAN. So, Dr. Chu, that may be the high point of the hearing. [Laughter.] 706 But I would recommend you start right off following the ap- plause. Dr. Chu, thank you for being with us. Dr. CHu. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The CHAIRMAN. Thanks for working these very challenging issues over the last several years with us also. STATEMENT OF HON. DAVID S.C. CHU, UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (PERSONNEL AND READINESS) Dr. CHU. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Skelton. It is my privi- lege to appear before you today with my colleagues in the military services to describe how we are managing the rotation of American troops in support of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan as well as other locations around the world. I want to take this opportunity, in the spirit of the chairman's opening remarks, to thank this committee for your support over the years and including this year's authorization bill for our people. It is important to their morale. It is essential to their continuing willingness to serve their country. And we are very grateful for that support. Permit me, if I may, to say a few words about the process. I have a longer statement, if I may, Mr. Chairman, I would like to submit. The CHAIRMAN. Without objection, all statements will be taken into the record. Dr. CHu. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The process, of course, begins with a request for forces from the combatant commander. This is reviewed in considerable detail by the Joint Staff and the military departments concerned to look at the alternative sources we might have for meeting that need from the combatant commander. That review includes consideration of the role that indigenous forces may play, the role that allied forces might play, the role that civilians, both government and contractor, might play before we turn to units of the United States military itself. The proposal from the Joint Staff as to how best to meet the combatant commander's need is then presented to the chairman and the secretary of defense who review it carefully. And the guide- lines that they use in making their decisions are included in my written testimony. I would point, Mr. Chairman, in specific response to your query on reset, that one of those guidelines is to aim at providing each unit an approximate equal period of time back home or out of the theater for the period of time spent forward. The theme of these guidelines is to ensure that we do ensure eq- uitably the burdens of these deployments and so that we do not over-concentrate the load on any particular unit. Two issues have arisen in recent days. You mentioned one, Mr. Chairman, and that's the use of the In- dividual Ready Reserve. The Individual Ready Reserve service, of course, is part of the ob- ligation of military service that each entrant into the military as- sumes. That fact that it is rare that we call up an Individual Ready Reservist does not, of course, mean that it is inappropriate. 707 It is important to our military readiness. It allows us to fill holes in other reserve units that develop, perhaps because the individual member originally mobilized is not medically able to deploy. It al- lows us to fill holes quickly with a trained person in the appro- priate skill and avoids tearing up other units that we may need at a later stage of the mobilization process. I should emphasize that the use of mobilization of Individual Ready Reservists has been historically, both in the Persian Gulf War of 1990/1991 and today, limited in scope. The second issue that has arisen has been the question of why the Marines typically in Iraq serve a seven-month tour and the Army troops serve 12 months. I should note that Marine headquarter elements will be serving a 12-month tour, but the seven-month tour for the rank and file is the result of a decision by the secretary of defense that this is the best way to use our Marine forces given the length of initial service obligation undertaken. It allows us to realize more than one rota- tion during a first time of service. As a practical matter, it also respects the fact that the 1st MEF, which returned to Iraq recently, had been in Iraq earlier in 2003, as members of this committee are well aware. Let me say, and consistent with the remarks of the chairman and the ranking member, that above all we admire and want to praise the spirit, the service of the people in uniform of the United States today. They have answered the nation's call in the 2.5 years, almost 3 years now, since the attack of September 11th, 2001. They have accepted the hardships associated with these deploy- ments. They, like members of this committee, understand that no plan outlasts the first contact with the enemy and that the key ingredi- ent in our ability to be successful is our agility in responding and refashioning our response to meet the contemporary needs that we then confront. Let me again say that their outlook is importantly strengthened by the support that this committee has given. And I thank this committee again for the concern with the welfare of our troops and their continuing efforts to make sure that it is sustained. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I turn to General Schwartz. [The prepared statement of Dr. Chu can be found in the Appen- dix on page 779.] STATEMENT OF LT. GEN. NORTON A. SCHWARTZ, DIRECTOR OF OPERATIONS (J-3), JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, U.S. AIR FORCE General SCHWARTZ. Mr. Chairman, Congress Skelton, distin- guished members of the committee, thank you for having me to dis- cuss today the rotation plan for Operation Iraqi Freedom 3 and Op- eration Enduring Freedom 6. On behalf of the chairman, let me emphasize as well that we are grateful for your support, as are all the men and womer armed forces of the United States. 708 If we can go to the first slide please, and each of you have paper copies of these slides before you. This is a lay-down on the left of where we were and where we are moving to. We have today 18-plus brigade equivalents in Iraq. That will be attriting to 17-plus brigades as the transition between the 1st Ar- mored Division and the 2nd Light Cavalry Regiment and their suc- ceeding units transpires here in the next couple weeks. In fact, it is currently under way. As you can see, we have a Stryker brigade in the north. We have a division, the 1st Infantry Division, with four brigades in the north-central region. In the western sector are the Marines, like- wise with four alents. The 1st Cavalry Division is responsible for Baghdad at the mo- ment. There is one brigade of the 1st Armored Division currently attached to the Polish division in the south-central sector. And then, in addition, there are two brigades which work what we call theater security missions; that is, both static security, con- voy security and the like throughout the region. The transition, as you see, will move from about 140,000 to about 130,000 U.S. It will retain a Stryker brigade in the north; a divi- sion, the 42nd Infantry Division, in the north-central sector; 2 Ma- rine Expeditionary Force (MEF) will succeed 1 MEF in the west; the 2nd Brigade of the 10th will succeed the 1st Armored Brigade in south-central; and significantly, as was mentioned earlier by the ranking member, the 3rd Infantry Division will succeed the 1st Cavalry in Baghdad. I will take you to the next level of detail on the next slide. Once again, in the columns is Operation Iraqi Freedom 2, then 3, and then the transition dates associated with the units. And you will recall that the way we work transition is to move the succeeding unit in. They arrive in theater. They prepare to move into Iraq. They do a handoff with the outgoing unit to ensure that there is an exchange of continuity. And then the outgoing unit, of course, departs for home. Once again, the Stryker is succeeded by a Stryker in the north. In the case of the 1st Infantry Division, it will be succeeded by the 42nd Infantry Division of the New York Army National Guard. Note that two brigades of the 3rd Infantry Division are embed- ded in that formation along with two other brigades from the Na- tional Guard. That transition will occur late in the year, December through February of 2005. The MEF, with three regiments of Marines and one brigade Army, will transition to 2 MEF, as I indicated earlier, with two Marine regiments and the infantry division, which was recently an- nounced as moving from Korea—Í should say the infantry brigade moving from Korea to Iraq. That is the 2nd of the 2nd. And that will occur after the first of the year. The 1st Cavalry in Baghdad with three brigades, plus a National Guard brigade, will transition to the 3rd Infantry Division with two of its own brigades and then a National Guard brigade and one from the 1st Armored Division as well. The major transition, which is occurring as we speak, relates to the 1st Armored Division, with two brigades and a Light Cavalry 709 Regiment which, as you recall, were extended to deal with the uprisings which occurred in the April time frame. They are cur- rently rolling up and will be returning home in relatively short order. The 2nd Brigade of the 10th from Fort Drum, New York, is al- ready on the ground and has already done the handoff. The two Marine units, the 11th and the 24th Marine Expeditionary Units, are en route, and they are in the North Arabian Gulf and will be offloading beginning this week in Kuwait. One of the brigades, it is a National Guard brigade, which is pro- viding the theater security support that I mentioned earlier, will be succeeded by the 29th Infantry Brigade from Hawaii. And likewise the 3rd Cavalry Regiment will come in late in the flow, which is in the March 2005 time frame. To talk for just a minute, Mr. Chairman, about Afghanistan, Af- istan has a division formation with three brigades. That cur- rently is being performed by the 25th Infantry Division out of Ha- waii. In addition to the Army brigade formation shown, we have a sub- stantial contribution from the Marines, both ground forces and aviation. That will be transitioning to a division headquarters ele- ment from Europe out of the Southern European Task Force, an- chored by the 173rd Infantry Brigade and likewise a very substan- tial contribution from the Marines, both air and ground. Of note, the training mission currently being performed by the 45th Brigade of the Oklahoma National Guard—that is the train- ing mission of the Afghan national army, of which we now have about 10,000 trained personnel—will transition to the 76th Brigade of the Indiana Army National Guard. Once again, that will be a division formation with three brigade equivalents. Next slide please. What I would like to do now, Mr. Chairman and members, is give you a sense of the flow, and as it compared to the transition between OIF-1 and OIF-2. You will note that in the earlier transition, between 1 and 2, de- picted in the burgundy-color columns, that transition occurred pri- marily between February and May, just recently, of this year. The flow currently, as depicted in blue, with the patches of the various brigade-size units, reflects an effort to spread that out over a lengthier period of time, which accomplished three things. First, it reduced the footprint in Kuwait in reception, staging and onward movement. Second, it managed better the transportation requirements for the force, such that we did not have the spikes that we experienced this year. And finally, what we accomplished was to enable the training process for reserve component units to proceed on a measured pace, one that went instead of a narrower period of months, rather to many months. Finally, Mr. Chairman, to address one issue which you men- tioned in your remarks, sir, during OIF-1, we were about a dis- n of active duty to reserve component personnel of about 75-25. 710 In OIF-2, we were about 61–39. For OIF-3, we, as you indicated, will be about 58–42, 57–43, in that neighborhood. One would expect as a result that the rotations that follow will have a higher percentage of active forces given the preponderance, the number of Reserve component assets associated with this rotation. That is particularly true in the context of the combat forces. With that, sir, I will be happy to take any questions. And I will hand the mike, with your permission, sir, to General Cody. The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, General And, General Cody, once again, congratulations. STATEMENT OF GEN. RICHARD A. CODY, VICE CHIEF OF STAFF, U.S. ARMY General Cody. Thank you, sir. Chairman Hunter, Congressman Skelton, distinguished members of this committee, I appreciate the opportunity to appear before you again today to discuss the Army's mobilization of our Individual Ready Reserve, as well as to discuss any details of the Operation Enduring Freedom-3 or Operation Iraqi Freedom-3 and Enduring Freedom-6 rotations of our Army forces. First, I want to thank this committee on behalf of the magnifi- cent men and women of the Army for your continued support throughout the Global War on Terrorism, in particular in Afghani- stan and Iraq. I know most of you have traveled to the combat zone and visited with our soldiers. And almost all of you have been to Bethesda and Walter Reed to see our soldiers. And you truly are making a dif- ference with these young men and women. And your resolute ac- tions and deep faith in America's sons and daughters is widely rec- ognized throughout the rank and file of our soldiers. And I want to thank you for it. Mr. Chairman, I have a written statement. It is not that long. The CHAIRMAN. Without objection, we are taking that right into the record there, General Cody. General Cody. With that, I look forward to your questions and our discussion. Thank you. [The prepared statement of General Cody can be found in the Appendix on page 787.] The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, General. General Huly. STATEMENT OF LT. GEN. JAN C. HULY, DEPUTY COMMANDANT PLANS, POLICIES, AND OPERATIONS, U.S. MARINE CORPS General HULY. Chairman Hunter, Congressman Skelton and dis- tinguished members of the committee, thank you for the oppor- tunity to appear before you today. I am honored to represent the 215,000 active and reserve Ma- rines serving in your corps. Today there are over 56,000, almost one out of every three active duty Marines forward-deployed, based or stationed worldwide. Some 30,000 of these Marines have just completed an arduous tour in Haiti or are participating in combat, in stability and secu- 711 rity operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Our plans are to continue to support Operation Iraqi Freedom-3 and Operation Enduring Freedom-6 with similarly sized forces. Marines are deploying and operating overseas at much higher tempos than at any other time in recent memory. We are taking careful and deliberate steps to manage this increased current ope ational tempo so as to prepare for future deployments of Marines to OIF-3 and OEF-6. As Dr. Chu previously stated, we will continue to deploy our operational battalions, squadrons and detachments for seven- month tours and our command elements and headquarters for 12- month rotations. Over 30 years of experience has demonstrated that this policy is the best course for the Marine Corps to organize, train and deploy combat-ready forces. Just as we are examining the stress on our personnel, we are keeping a wary eye on our equipment to determine our future re- quirements. Our concern as we plan for OEF-3 and OEF-6 is to maintain the operational and materiel readiness of the force while investing in our commitment to transform and modernize the Ma- rine Corps. Thanks to the support of this Congress, we have superior equip- ment. But aging equipment undergoing high usage rates in austere combat conditions clearly presents challenges to us. Sustaining our combat power, maintaining our commitment to Marines and their families while transforming and modernizing the Marine Corps will necessitate your continued support. You have every reason to be proud of the contributions and sac- rifices of the women, men and families of the Marine Corps and their brothers and sisters with whom they serve so closely in the United States Army, the Navy and the Air Force. You can be confident of their continued success in OIF-3 and OEF-6. I thank you for your support and the opportunity to appear here today, and I look forward to answering your questions. [The prepared statement of General Huly can be found in the Ap- pendix on page 794.) The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, General. And to all of our guests, thanks for your opening statements. And, Dr. Chu, let us lead off with the question of the day, and that is recruitment/retention. Give it to us straight. There have been rumors that the recruit- ing rates are taking a little bit of a hit right now, and retention rates are taking a hit. Where do we stand? Dr. CHU. Sir, our recruiting/retention continues strong. All four military services in the period through May, which is the last pe- riod which I have complete data, met their active duty recruiting goals and met them handsomely. We continue to recruit well above our target in terms of high school diploma graduates, typically in the mid-90 percent range. And we are continuing the strong aptitude scores in our new re- cruits, typically in the 70 to 80 percent range scoring above the 50th percentile on the Armed Forces Qualification Test. 712 Retention is likewise generally good in the active forces. The Army, I think, did not quite make its numbers through the third quarter, but it is confident about its ability to do so by the end of the year. I would say that, The CHAIRMAN. How close was the Army? Dr. CHU. This was an issue of first- and second-term reenlist- ment rates. It is ranging 95–98 percent of the goal it would like to set for itself. We have to be a little careful about these rates during the course of the year. As your comments and the ranking member's com- ments emphasize, it is a very high-quality force. People time their reenlistment decision to be sure that, if they are going to accept the bonus, it occurs during their combat tour to benefit from the tax- free status of that bonus. So there is some, I think, statistical problem with how you look at these numbers. But the Army is generally doing just fine. The CHAIRMAN. General Cody, and back to General Schwartz, this is obviously your area of expertise also. We kept 1st Armored in because we had problems. We had the upswell of violence in Baghdad. We moved the 1st Cavalry in. We had already shipped out part of the 1st. A.D. back to Europe. We had the bulk of the 1st A.D. in place. And as I understand, we moved some of their heavy stuff back to them at that point. I understand that this thing wasn't going to be handled by a bunch of guys with Military Police (M.P.) badges and .45s on their hips. We are now moving the 1st A.D. out. You are going to move the 10th Mountain Division into some of that tough AO in Baghdad. Have we got an appropriate armor set sufficient for force protection and operations? Because I have always thought of the 10th Mountain Division- of course, championed by Mr. McHugh on this committee, which did such a wonderful job in Afghanistan-as I understand is a light operation. You are going to be in some streets with lots of Rocket Propelled Grenade (RPGs), lots of frags, lots of Improvised Explo- sive Device (IEDs). What is the armor set for 10th Mountain going to be? General CODY. Want me to take that one? General SCHWARTZ. Let me just begin. Sir, just to clarify, the 2nd of the 10th is going to be in the south- central sector; will not be in the Baghdad sector. I think more importantly, though, with respect to the Baghdad contingent, what we will have is the 3rd Infantry with two brigades from the 3rd. A brigade from the 3rd of the 1st Armored Division will be there, as well as an enhanced separate brigade from the 256th from Louisiana. And they will be properly postured—and General Cody can ad- dress this in detail—for the mission with sufficient armor for mo- bility, both to prosecute the mission and for self-protection. General Cody. Here's what we have, Mr. Chairman. Norton laid it out for you, the set. 713 First off, the 2nd of the 10th, that is the brigade headquarters. It will have a battalion of the 10th Mountain Division, which, as you know, is a light unit. But it will also have mechanized forces from 1st of the 41st out of Fort Riley, Kansas. It is a brigade com- bat team that we sized and structured for this fight. As you know, each one of our brigade combat teams doesn't look like anything over there if you went back to home station and said, “What does your table of organization look like?” We have sized it for this fight. As we did in OIF-2, I want to go back a little bit so we get the context. In OIF-2, you remember that the combatant commander said, “I don't want all the tracks. I want more mobility.” And so the OIF-2 units went in one-third heavy. In other words, if you were a tank battalion, you went in with one-third of your tanks and two-thirds up-armored Humvees, and that is how we structured the OIF-2. As things went along, the combatant commander came back to us and said, “We really need to look at the 3rd Infantry Division. It is coming over with four of its new brigades. We would like it to come over heavy, three-fourths heavy, one-fourth motorized. The up-armored Humvees that you are giving us in-country, we will cascade them down to the combat service support. And, oh, by the way, we would like to have the enhanced separate brigades come in heavy; at least three of their companies heavy, one tactical mo- bility with up-armored Humvees.” So the OIF-3 units going in are going in heavy. Above and beyond that, 1st Cavalry, we sent 100 tanks in to heavy them up. And we also sent about 100 tanks and Bradleys to the 1st Infantry Division. So you have a heavier force, but as we have grown to about 6,000 up-armored Humvees, you also have a heavier, more mobile tactical force. And I think over time, General Metz, the way he has got his forces arrayed, you will have the right balance for close combat in- side the cities as well as the requisite combat power you need out- side for the protection of our soldiers. So we think they have got the right set. The CHAIRMAN. Okay, and as I understand it, no up-armored Humvees will be removed from country. So when you make this handoff, all the heavy Humvees stay? General Cody. The stay-behind equipment policy is all the up-ar- mored Humvees stay that we ship in, plus the add-on armor Humvees and add-on armor Light Medium Tactical Vehicle (LMTVs), Family of Medium Tactical Vehicles (FMTVs), the Osh Kosh trucks, any truck that we have invested and put applique armor on, they all stay in the stay-behind equipment. And then back here we do the swap-out. The CHAIRMAN. Okay. Thank you, gentlemen. The gentleman from Missouri? Mr. SKELTON. Dr. Chu, you mentioned the first term and second term in the aggregate when re-enlistment is good. But the second term, mid-career is truthfully struggling. Is that not correct? 714 Dr. CHu. I would not say it's struggling, sir. In fact, General Cody shared with me the latest results to the end of June where first term is just fine. Overall Army retention is above goal. They are off just under two percentage points of their goal in the mid-term area. They have excess retention in the initial and career ranks. So I think it is fair to say that the Army is on the mark, and it is confident it is going to make its numbers for the year. Mr. SKELTON. Do you agree with the Los Angeles Times report that the Marines could be short infantry platoon sergeants by 17 percent? Dr. CHU. I am not aware of where The Los Angeles Times gets that number. I will turn to General Huly. Mr. SKELTON. General, how about that? General HULY. Sir, our infantry platoon sergeants are normally a staff sergeant in rank. Mr. SKELTON. Is that correct or not? You will be short 17 percent of infantry platoon sergeants. General HULY. No, sir, we will not be short 17 percent. As a mat- ter of fact, our subsequent term alignment plan for re-enlistment, we have already closed out for fiscal year 2004. We have attained our goals and our quotas. Mr. SKELTON. The Pentagon continues to oppose an increase in end strength; that is troop numbers. And yet it has resorted to a series of emergency measures, efforts, that the department is call- ing asures of last resort. These include recent announcement of the large Individual Ready Reserve mobilization, which totals 5,600 for the Army; wide use of the stop-loss orders, which we are all familiar with; deploy- ment of troops stationed in South Korea are already 3,800 from a brigade have been singled out, and there is serious discussion of re- moving another 12,000 from South Korea. An area that Chairman Hunter, I think, makes reference to with his phrase eating our seed corn, and this is the deployments of dedicated opposing forces, OPFOR, at the combat training centers at Fort Irwin and Fort Polk and then redeploying units back to combat after less than a year at home. And this committee, on a bipartisan basis, added additional Army troops and Marines in the bill we passed. And rather than resisting that, I think you ought to write a let- ter of thanks to Chairman Hunter and the rest of us for doing that, because the measures that I just read off — The CHAIRMAN. Maybe we will just take that orally today, Ike. Mr. SKELTON. Yes, Dr. Chu. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. We would. Many of these measures that I just read off have long-term im- plications, even if this war is over tomorrow. And once you have used these measures of last resort, what happens when you need to reuse them in subsequent rotations, especially since we may be in Iraq for years? I have got to tell you, I am seriously worried about this. Am I the only one? I think every member of this committee is concerned about it. 715 How do we keep it up, Dr. Chu? How do we keep going and then meet the rigid requirements? Dr. CHU. Sir, first of all, let me, if I may— Mr. SKELTON. Just answer my question, Doctor, just answer it. Dr. CHU. I will. First of all, there is no disagreement between the department and the committee about the intermediate-term strength level of the active Army; we all agree approximately 30,000 above the fiscal 2004 end strength, permanent end strength, set by the Congress. Disagreement is over how it is going to be financed and whether that increase is permanent or not. A permanent increase, as you know, requires financing inside the established top line. Temporary increases are financed through supplemental appropriations. The department's position is this is temporary. It may last sev- eral years during this period of Army transition. The exact end point is not stipulated here. But the Army believes it can, as the 3rd Infantry Division transformation indicates, create more combat capability out of a fixed number of soldiers. To your question on the specific measures we have taken, I would not call these measures a last resort. Rather, they are, as I testified, part of the effort by the chairman and the secretary to ensure that the burden of service in Iraq and Afghanistan is shared equitably. And let me take Korea specifically. I think commentators have long argued that the improvements in South Korean military forces reduces the need for American ground combat troops to be sta- ed there permanently in peacetime. This is an opportunity to have that brigade serve in Iraq, as is currently planned. So I don't want to call these a measure of last resort. These are measures that keep the burden equitably shared among the var- ious components of our American military. And I think that is the way, as General Schwartz has indicated in his testimony about the plans for OIF-3, that is the way we would sustain this over a long-term future, if that is indeed the re- quirement. Exactly what the requirements are going to be, that, of course, is unknowable at this juncture. We have a new Iraqi government. It is a hopeful step. As the chairman indicated in his opening re- marks, there are a great number of things going right in the situa- tion there today. We remain optimistic. Mr. SKELTON. I think you are missing the seed corn the chair- man's talking about. If you remove the OPFOR, those who train well against potential battalions that go into combat at the Na- tional Training Center at Fort Irwin, the Joint Readiness Training Center down at Fort Polk, no one is left to train these folks for the future. That is your seed corn. I just don't think you understand the seriousness of the situa- tion. Come with me, Dr. Chu, and talk with some of these spouses back home and listen to them. Talk with some of these folks that tell us, “We are stretched, Congressman.” But they are doing their duty, bless their hearts. So proud of them. Let me go on to another question, Secretary Chu, General Schwartz. 716 Last year Congress required the chairman of the Joint Chiefs to submit a national military strategy. And part of the requirement was an assessment of the capabilities and adequacy of the United States forces to successfully execute the national military strategy. We received an unclassified section of that informally after it was leaked to the press. And if I may, Mr. Chairman, with your indulgence, I would like to read just a bit of that, if I may. This is a quote: "While U.S. conventional military capabilities are and will likely remain unmatched for the foreseeable future, de- mands on the armed forces across the range of military operations remain considerable. “Pursuing the war on terrorism, conducting stability operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, ensuring power projection from the home- land and sustaining global commitments while protecting the long- term health of the armed forces will require actions to mitigate risks. "Commanders must develop options to balance demands like transformation, modernization and recapitalization that if unreal- ized over the long term could make it increasingly difficult to exe- cute this military strategy." Annex A provides a complete assessment of risk and options. Well, first, let me ask you, Dr. Chu, what are the risks and miti- gating options? And second, under what scenarios do we put our ability to execute this strategy at risk by doing so with the current force levels? Dr. CHU. Mr. Skelton, I think we believe that the force-sizing cri- teria that came out in the Quadrennial Defense Review remains appropriate. They emphasize that there is a series of different t our military must prepare to do, and I think that is in- deed illustrated by current operations. They underscore that they cannot do everything at once, that there are tradeoffs involved here. So I think it remains a good guideline for our future. Mr. SKELTON. General Cody, the New York Times reported re- cently that Lieutenant General Steven Blum, chief of National Guard Bureau, which is responsible for more than a half a million Army and Air National Guard personnel, was adamant in s that the reserves and guard could sustain the pace and scope re- quired by the current mission. And then he quotes, “We are stretched, but we are not broken.” He goes on to say, “I will tell you that we can sustain this if we do two things: if we give soldiers predictability on when they are going to go and when they are going to come home, and some rea- sonable predictability on how frequently they will be recalled.” Does that imply that no surge capacity can occur without break- ing the force? So, General Cody, what more forces are required? And what if there is another contingency that requires substantial forces? Which, let us hope, never happens. General CODY. We are building back our surge capability right now, Mr. Congressman. And you and I have had some of these dis- cussions. 717 Are we stretched thin with our active and reserve component forces right now? Absolutely We just did the largest move of the Army since World War II. You cannot move 8.5 divisions and 240,000 soldiers without stress- ing the force. And we still have equipment that is en route bad to those units that have already been home for a month or so. And so when we talk about surge capability, we are rapidly try- ing to rebuild the surge capability. Some of the things we can talk about in here; others we will have to take to a different session. But we are concerned about it, and we are working through building a capability so that we maintain a rapid capability for the 1421 construct you discussed. Mr. SKELTON. One last question. You can certainly use those 10,000 Army troops per year for the next three years. Could you not? General CODY. Yes, sir. Mr. SKELTON. Thank you. The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman. The gentleman from Pennsylvania, Mr. Weldon. Mr. WELDON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you all for your service to the country and for attending the hearing today and for your statements. Mr. Chairman, I think it is important that we lay out some his- tory for this committee since the focus of this hearing is obviously going to play a major role in the Presidential election campaigns, and it already is with, I think, a gross distortion in some cases of the facts. So let me take my five minutes to lay some facts on the table. First of all, Mr. Chairman, the hearing and the topic is some- thing that we discussed at length in the 1990's. Only nine members of this committee today were here all during the 1990's-only nine members. Let us look at what happened in the 1990's, if the staff would hold the chart up. We had a period of time where our troops were being deployed at the most massive rate. I probably used this chart in 50 speeches. If you have seen the previous 40 years before 1990 we had 10 major deployments. From 1990, starting with President Bush through the Clinton administration, we had a total of 35 major de- ployments; 35 major deployments at a time where our defense budgets were being decreased. And let me give my colleagues some facts. Our Army divisions were cut from 18 to 10. Our Air Force Tac- tical Fighter Squadrons were cut from 24 to 13. Our Navy ships that are operating today were cut from 585 to 314. Now, even though those cuts were severe, this committee dis- agreed from 1994 to 2000 and plussed up defense spending by $43 billion more than that administration asked for. I don't know where we would be if we didn't plus up that $43 billion of extra funding while all these deployments were taking place. So for us to sit here—not us, this committee, this committee un- derstands—but for Members of Congress to go out and wail about how Iraq and Afghanistan are harming our troops, I would say: Where were you during the 1990's? Where were you when Air 718 Force Fighter Squadrons and Army Divisions were being deci- mated? Where were you when our Navy ships were being cut? And were you one of the ones who voted to increase defense funding by $43 billion over six years, which this committee did repeatedly? But to add insult to injury what really offends me, Mr. Chair- man, is there is now a massive politically based effort to scare our college students into thinking that somehow there is a secret plan by this administration to reinstate the draft. I know you are all getting these e-mails. So, Mr. Chairman, I would like to put something in the record. In fact, there's a story running in “Family Circle” that says that, in fact, your child could be drafted. And they cite such really well- known people on the draft as the program coordinator of the non- rofit project on youth and nonmilitary opportunities, who states that yes, this administration is pushing for a draft. In fact, let me read from an e-mail that is being sent nationwide. “Just after the 2004 Presidential election, as early as spring 2005, the administration is quietly trying to get these bills passed now. The bills are two bills introduced to reinstate the draft while the public's attention is on the elections.” So somehow, there is this effort to scare young college students, in my opinion, for political purposes. But somehow the actions of this administration in both Iraq and Afghanistan, coupled with our shortage of military personnel, which obviously was just caused in the words of this writer by this administration, are going to cause us to secretly pass the draft. Now, Dr. Chu, Secretary Rumsfeld has said, and I quote, "we are not going to re-implement a draft. There is no need for it. The dis- advantages of using compulsion to bring into the armed forces the men and women needed are notable,” end quote. So let me ask you once and for all for the record, for these e- mails that are going around the country scaring our for political posturing that is going on in perhaps both parties that somehow are saying there is a secret plan to reinstate the draft. I won't support a reinstatement of the draft, and I have said s not until I would hear from the administration there is an absolute need. What is the official position of the administration in spite of what rhetoric's being placed around the country? Dr. CHU. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I could hardly say it better than the secretary, but let me reiterate for the record the adminis- tration does not support resumption of the draft. There is no secret plan on this front. I do not know where these people in the e-mails are getting this idea from. We would believe it ill-advised to try to replace the volunteers, who I testified in response to Chairman Hunter's question, are signing up, a tribute to patriotism and willingness to serve. Young Americans today are signing up as volunteers for the all-volunteer force today as they have been for the last 31 years—high quality. I cannot see the merit in replacing those fine volunteers with a set of people who do not want to volunteer, which is, of course, the outcome of conscription. We have a terrific military today. One of the reasons we have that terrific military, as we saw from the embedded correspondence 719 reports last spring in the march to Baghdad, is because these are all volunteers. They all want to be there. They are professionals. They want to perform at high levels of competence. There is no rea- son to reinstate the draft. Mr. WELDON. So the official position on the Rangel bill is the ad- ministration does not and will not support it, is that correct? Dr. CHU. That is correct, sir. Mr. WELDON. Thank you. The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman. And now, from the other side of the draft question [Laughter.] I am just kidding. My good colleague from South Carolina, Mr. Spratt. Mr. SPRATT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman And thank you, gentlemen, for a thorough presentation. I did find two elements lacking as you went through everything else. One is: What is the rotation plan for our getting out? What is the end game? Surely somewhere in the Pentagon, somewhere. someone has a plan for rotating our troops out and their troops in our place. As a complement to what you have just given us, maybe it is not within the near-term horizon, but let us hope it is over the horizon. Can you give us an idea of how that works? How many troops do we have to stand up in Iraq? When can we reasonably expect that their army will be sufficient to assume the better part of the burden and do the heavy lifting in lieu of having us there? e reason I ask the question is we had General Petraeus on teleconference a week or so ago. And he said that his initial force will be a force of 35,000, of which about 5,000 to 10,000 have al- ready been trained, mostly cadre junior officers and enlisted per- sonnel. And, obviously, 35,000 troops in an army is not nearly sufficient to do the job, evidenced by the fact that we are keeping 140,000 troops there. When can we expect the Iraqi army to build up to the point where they will be rotating in and we will be rotating out? General SCHWARTZ. Sir, I will start with that answer, Mr. Sec- retary. The bottom line is that this will be done incrementally, and it will be done in locations around Iraq where transitions can occur and the Iraqi security forces can be successful. Mr. SPRATT. What is your current planning? When do you expect to see these increments — General SCHWARTZ. Some will occur in the very near term. In the north, for example, we anticipate seeing patrols done exclusively by Iraqi security forces. Sir, the strategy is that in some places we have U.S. troops, high-risk locations where we are doing patrols, on occasion we do joint patrols, and on very few occasions would you have unilateral patrols by Iraqi security forces. On the other hand, there are locations in Iraq where the opposite is true. And in those locations, transitions will occur in the near term. And we will cascade American forces from those locations to places where they can be better utilized. And, ultimately, natu- rally, we will reduce the force structure in Iraq. 720 It goes from close control to local control, that is, the partnership with Iraqi security forces. I believe General Petraeus discussed this with you. Mr. SPRATT. But we are training just a force of 35,000. General SCHWARTZ. Sir, that is the Iraqi army. It is important to recognize. Mr. SPRATT. There is a national guard. It is not nearly as well trained, not nearly as mobile and as capable as the other, and there is a difference between them for a reason. Still, you are way short of the number that we see fit to maintain right there. General SCHWARTZ. Sir, it will take time to develop the full com- plement of forces. Mr. SPRATT. Are we talking one year, two years, three years? General SCHWARTZ. I would say, sir, that if Afghanistan is any indication, it will be several years. Mr. SPRATT. Afghanistan is the other element that I found un- derstated here. Obviously we have a huge ongoing mission there, not least of which is the capture of Saddam Hussein and the rest of his leadership. Yet we have only got 12,000 troops there. Karzai asked for more troops, and NATO was not able to meet his de- mands in time for the election. Are we sliding and undersizing, under-resourcing the mission in Afghanistan because of the exigent demands in Iraq? General SCHWARTZ. Sir, I do not think so, because in point of fact, right at the moment we have about 17,900 U.S. in Afghani- stan. It has grown over the last few months for a number of rea- sons, including anticipation of elections in the early fall. And that number of troops is adequate for the mission. Mr. SPRATT. So you think it will be a steady-state at that level for months to come? General SCHWARTZ. I think for months to come. I believe that after the first of the year we will begin to see some adjustments. Mr. SPRATT. One final question with respect to the Guard and the Army Guard in particular. The head of the Army Guard said, as Mr. Skelton just quoted, that if he could give his troops predictability, predictability of when they would be deployed, how long they would be deployed, and when they would come back home and dwell time—it was one of the elements that I found in talking to guard families and also to guardsmen who are returning, the reserve components, and that is, they like to be assigned to missions which approximate their own Military Occupational Specialty (MOSs), their own unit designa- tions, not send units guarding prisons and things like that. They don't feel as capable and competent and as confident in themselves when they get assigned to those missions. Can you iron these wrinkles out? And will the next complement be told with predictability when it is going and how long it is going and what it will be doin General SCHWARTZ. Absolutely. It is clear on this rotation we gave in some cases months of advance notice to the units. We alert- ed units well, well in advance of their mobilization date. That was the goal, and the secretary's guidance was "Alert early, as “Alert early, mobilize late, in order to accomplish the required training." 721 Now, with regard to units that are trained for in lieu of capabili- ties—and General Cody can address this more directly—but it is important to know, the Army will not send a unit forward unless it is trained and certified. And that is where we are. Mr. SPRATT. Does that mean more dwell time then, as it is called, more time State-side getting ready for the deployment? General SCHWARTZ. For those who have not previously deployed, there is more lead time involved. But the key point I think, sir, is that these individuals—for example, artillery units that were trained as security forces—there is a training regimen for that, and they are certified for the task they are to perform. Mr. SPRATT. And final question, once they have deployed and come back, are we going to be able to tell them with assurance that they won't be called up again for some period of years, five or six years? Dr. CHu. That is our present intent, sir. Mr. SPRATT. General. General Huly. Well, they are doing such a fine job, Mr. Con- gressman.. First, General Schwartz has it right. Well, let me step back one. The real issue, what you are seeing in the first part of the OIF- 1 and 2 forces was because we did not have access to the IRR. And because of that, there was a force structure allowance prob- lem. We had more force structure in the National Guard than we had end strength for. In other words, they had more units that were at 50 percent fill or 70 percent fill. And so when the combatant commander asked for an M.P. company, we had to go to three M.P. companies or two M.P. companies the first time around to cross level, to fill. That causes some unpredictability and some stress. Because we could not go to the IRR. we had to do that more often. As we got to OIF-3, it got to be a real problem. And as we are going through, we are working very hard now to, one, reset the high-demand, low-density units as part of our trans- formation, to reset our modularity for the National Guard. We will fix it. And we think over time, in the next two or three years, as we build the active force up by another 30,000, as we restructure some of the high-demand, low-density formations, we will be able to give a lot more predictability to the National Guard. But what helps us do it this time around in the combat service support, quite frankly, is access to the IRR so we can put them in there without having to go to about six or seven of your units across six or seven states to build a capability. Mr. SPRATT. Thank you. General HULY. That is the crux of the issue. The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman. The gentleman from Colorado, Mr. Hefley? Mr. HEFLEY. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. You know, you are moving people in and out. And you are getting the com- plement of people that you need in there. But we are continually getting reports that, and Mr. Spratt touched on this, continually getting reports that we have people in there doing things that they are simply not specifically trained to do. 722 It came out considerably when we were talking about the guards in the prison. The young lady who was featured prominently in some of those Iraqi pictures in that prison was a clerk. And you wonder: Why is she in there involved in interrogation of prisoners at all? Did she train for that at all? We have the best-trained defense force probably in the history of the world to go and fight and win wars. But do we have the best-trained force to do police activity, which we are asking them to do; to do civil activity, which we are asking them to do; to do guard duty, which we are asking them to do? Are we training these people to do what we are really asking them to · do? And every time there is an incident over there, the excuse is, “Oh, well, these people weren't properly trained,” and that is why a prisoner was thrown off a bridge and drowned in the river or something else. Second, we continually get complaints from the guard and re- serve that they simply do not have the good quality equipment that the regular forces have. And that is one thing to accept when they are back at their home station training and you could understand, well, we got to have the best equipment over there where the war is. But when we put them in the same danger, and we are putting 40 percent of the force that happens to be the guard and reserve over there, we are putting them in the same dangerous situation as the regular forces, do they have the equipment that they need, or are we giving them second-class treatment and treating them like second-class citizens? Dr. CHU. There is no intent to treat the guard or reserve as sec- ond-class citizens. I will acknowledge early in the deployments there were some issues of guard and reserve equipment, and some of it goes back to Mr. Weldon's eloquent comments a few minutes ago about the level of defense budgeting in the last decade. I believe those problems are largely solved. I will defer to Gen- eral Cody in terms of some of the specifics. General CODY. Let me hit some of your points, Mr. Congressman, because I think they are very important to understand. One is, it is not just the National Guard or the reserve compo- nent units that are doing missions other than what we designed them for. Our entire force is doing that. We have got Multiple Launch Rocket Systems (MLRS) battalions, Cold War battalions set up for the plains of Europe doing missions around the ammunition handling. We have got air defense artillery formations doing cordon-and-searches-active, guard and reserve. This is a different war. That is why it is so important that every- understands, and that is why we asked for the 30,000, so we could build up. We know we have to reset this force in a different formation for the realities of this contemporary operation environ- ment of the Global War on Terrorism. We cannot have the same force we had in the 1990's. And so every force is doing something different. Now, having said that, it goes back to Congressman Skelton's point about our National Training Center and our JRTC, Joint Readiness Training Center. Our ability to be able to lift and ship 723 these formations has been the training centers and putting these units in and training them for the mission set that we have over in Iraq. And we have done that and done that very well. I have looked at the training. Some of you have been out there. Eighteen field artillery batteries we trained to be M.P. units, and they are doing very, very well. Some we ran through Fort Dix, some we ran through the Joint Readiness Training So this is a different paradigm that we are working through. The training is going fine. When you bring up isolated cases, and I don't want to get into the ones you brought up, but when you bring up isolated cases of saying, "Well, the soldier wasn't trained or this or that.” I will you, in most cases, as we look at it, what we have is a leadership failure. And we can address that in a different forum. As far as equipment, the National Guard and reserve soldiers are getting the rapid fielding he rapid fielding initiative equipment before the active components. We made the decision in OIF-1, on the back side of it, and we are working that hard. We are trying to buy back the risk that was bought into in the 1990's, quite frankly. And it has cost us about—well, you have allocated the money—almost $100 million to do this, across each brigade. So the 29th Brigade out of Hawaii, when we mobilize them, they will be fielded, their equipment, prior to the 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment (ACR) being refit, just so we can get that right. Thank you very much. The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman. The gentleman from Texas, Mr. Ortiz? Mr. ORTIZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General Cody, good to see you again, sir, and welcome to this committee. The operating tempo in Iraq and Afghanistan has taken a heavy toll on the equipment that is being used there. I think we are add- ing years of wear in just months. What maintenance issues are concerning you the most at this point? And what is the average equipment readiness of units cur- rently operating in Iraq and Afghanistan? And we understand sometimes that when either a reserve or a National Guard company is deployed, that some of the equipment stays there, it does not return back with the unit. What do they use for training purposes once they rotate back? And would they be able to respond to emergencies, knowing that the equipment stays behind in the theater? Maybe you can enlighten us on those questions, General. General CODY. Yes, sir. Thank you for that. The wear and tear on our vehicles, 46,000 vehicles, I think I tes- tified here in 2003, when we had the first reset discussion, we asked for $3.2 billion in the supplemental. We got about $2 billion. I testified at that time I thought we could make it up with the Operating Tempo (OPTEMPO) that we were already allocated in the 2004 budget. And it looks like we are probably okay. The bridging supplemental that you just worked through and the supplemental that is coming in 2005, we believe will take care of what we predict is the wear and tear on our wheeled vehicle fleet and our track fleet. 724 The aircraft fleet is a different story. As you know, we had over elicopters over there for OIF-1. And it gets to your point. We brought those back. We are resetting those aircraft. Because of that, we have had to ask some of the units, especially the National Guard units, when we put new engines in Chinooks and bigger engines in Apaches, and when their time was up in Af- ghanistan, we said, “You have to leave those aircraft there because they have the best engines and they are ready. Come back, we will give you some other aircraft.”. And so our whole aviation fleet is in flux right now as we are resetting. In fact, I have directed them to leave the aircraft that have the most survivable, aircraft survivability equipment for mis- otection as well as the up-gunned engines. And we are talk- ing about eight or nine units that we have done that to. It is going to take us two to three years to get through this. Mr. ORTIZ. And how much of this equipment that is utilized by the National Guard or Reserves when they are activated and sent to theater, how much is coming back? General CODY. It really depends. The Chinooks and the Apaches I know for a fact, it stays over there and then we reallocate and move the aircraft, the unit that deployed over, we are moving them around. But it is a delicate balance that we are working through right now. And the National Guard has done a great job managing it. We are doing the same with the active force, by the way. I have got the same issues right now with the 3rd Infantry Division. The commander wants to train and we want to put on the best aircraft survivability equipment, and he does not have time for us to pull those aircraft off-line to spend three months putting the aircraft survivability equipment on because he has got to train. We have got to give him more helicopters to do that so we can accomplish both missions so that when they get downrange, they have the best survivability equipment. Those are some of the complexities of an Army that is doing a 1421, but is rotational, and is rotational at a swiftly I mean, that is what we are dealing with here. And so that is the stress and strain on it. Mr. ORTIZ. See, my concern is that some other state units, in case they do have an emergency or a terror lo have an emergency or a terrorist attack and they do not have the equipment because it was left behind, how are they going to respond? General CODY. I would be more concerned about wheels than I would be about aircraft, because we just approved extending the fleet life of 100 UH-1s just because of that to meet the state mis- sions and the raid missions. On the wheel vehicle side, we are watching it very, very closely, but we are stretched thin on our tactical wheeled vehicles right now. That is a fact. And we are working through it Mr. ORTIZ. General Huly, do you encounter some of these same issues that we talked about? General Huly. Yes, sir. The equipment that the Marines in Iraq are using came from two sources. Some of it was off the maritime prepositioned ships that we sailed in there and we off-loaded those. 725 So that was equipment that was above and beyond what was nor- mally assigned to the unit. And then some of the units brought some of their equipment in with them. Our challenges are a little bit different. We are sustaining our force with about 20 percent use of reserves and about 80 percent is active duty. Our reserves are falling in on either their own equipment, which is the same as the active component, or they are falling in on active component units that they are relieving. So they are using the same equipment as the regulars are using while they are over there. Our equipment readiness rates are, for the ground side, they are out 85 to 90 percent while they are in theater. And we have suf- ficient equipment in theater to sustain that effort. And our aviation readiness rates, averaging about 75 to 80 per- cent, changes with the type, model and series of aircraft. Equipment readiness, as I said, it is there. We are working it. And we are able to maintain what we have got. And we believe that we have got to balance throughout the force for both the active component and reserve component. Mr. ORTIZ. Gentlemen, thank you very much for your dedication and your service. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman. The gentleman who has been over so many times to see not only in Iraq, but to see his beloved 10th Mountain Division, Mr. McHugh? Mr. McHUGH. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Gentlemen, welcome. Thank you for your service. General Cody, let me add my words of congratulations to you, fol- lowing in the footsteps of a great American, Jack Keane. I am look- ing forward to working with you, as I know all of us are, as the new vice chief. Certainly, one thing we can all agree upon is that, in one way or another, we are associated and deal with some extraordinary men and women in uniform. And as the chairman graciously com- mented, not just about me but about everyone, most of us on this committee have been either to Iraq or Afghanistan or both to wit- ness firsthand the incredible job that they are doing. It is, of course, a tribute to your leadership that that is so. And it is an even greater tribute to the volunteer force, it seems to me. And I want to associate myself with the comments of the gen- tleman from Pennsylvania with respect to my personal opinion that not only is a draft unnecessary, it would be the absolute wrong thing to do. That does not mean circumstances can't change, but in spite of my deep affection for my colleague from New York, Mr. Rangel, I will not be supporting his bill. It would have to come through my subcommittee as I understand it, Mr. Chairman, so for whatever that is worth. [Laughte My dad had a saying, God rest his soul. He used to say, in his skeptical attitude toward statistics, “You know, John, if you put one foot in a bucket of ice water and another foot in a bucket of boiling water, on average you are comfortable.” 726 I think we have to keep that in mind as we look at some of these recruiting and retention statistics. And, Secretary Chu, you were very cautious in your statements and I commend you for that, that these bear watching. But it is a little hard to assess accurately, it seems to me, what our reten- tion rates are when we have got a pretty broad-based stop-loss pro- gram in place. I mean, that is just a factor. And I know there are ways to statistically look at that, but obviously that does tend to skew that. But you did not, Mr. Secretary, talk about the reserve compo- nent. And as you know, sir, the statistics there are somewhat less re- assuring. And in fact, with the exception of the Marine Corps Re- serve and the Naval Reserve, all four other components are below their recruiting goals. And, in fact, the Air National Guard is at 77 percent. That is a pretty disturbing figure. Now, it is one set of figures, as my dad would be very, very quick to point out. And clearly I think the next round of quarters num- bers will be far more indicative of what the trends are in that re- gard. But as I look at those recruiting figures, it brings me to the fact that OIF-2 used 40 percent Reserve components. If we look now at the projected OIF-3, it looks to be about 43 percent. What do all of you envision? Maybe, Mr. Secretary, it is most ap- propriate for you. What is the optimal balance of that mix? Do you have a figure in mind? Are you looking to achieve some sort of steady rate, 40 percent, 43 percent, or what might it be? Dr. CHU. There is no specific number, sir. This is the outcome of a series of individual decisions taken with due regard for the rel- ative burden we ought to put on active forces as opposed to the burden that reserve forces ought to shoulder. The secretary last summer indicated for force-planning purposes that we should expect reserve forces to serve no more than one year in six, something on that order of magnitude. Active forces, of course, are serving continuously. And so the ratios that you see in theater are an outcome of indi- vidual decisions. I think it is worth pointing out, as I know you are aware, that in the Army case specifically, the Army Guard and the Army Re- serve are actually larger in numeric totals than the active Army. So it's not surprising. The purpose of reserve forces is to give the Nation this expansion capability specifically for the kind of cir- cumstances which we know we face. And I think it is a tribute to reserve members that they have an- swered this call. They understand the commitment. This is a volun- teer force, as I know you appreciate, sir, in the reserve just as much in the active. They have different personal circumstances. And we must be careful, as you suggest, about being sensitive to those personal circumstances. To the question of the recruiting numbers, yes, there are issues in reserve recruiting. I think reserve continuation, which is not quite the same as re- tention-retention is a specific decision to sign up for a period of service-reserve continuation, the attrition rate, which is what we 727 actually measure in the reserves, is actually at very good levels, substantially better than we would normally expect in the reserve components. I do think overall, as you suggest, sir, that the whole recruiting- retention picture is one we want to watch carefully. It is one of the reasons we are grateful for the support of this committee in terms of conditions of service and the compensation package offered to our members, and we will continue to be so in that regard. We are likewise grateful to this committee for your strong sup- port of our access to high schools and to other institutions from which young people may decide to make the military an immediate choice or a career choice as their particular circumstances may merit. Mr. McHugh. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. I see my time has expired, Mr. Chairman. Yield back. Thank you. The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman. The distinguished gentleman from Mississippi, Mr. Taylor? Mr. TAYLOR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And, again, I want to thank all of you gentlemen for being here today and for your great service to our country. A couple of quick questions. Several of my colleagues have touched on equipment replace- ment. I will use one unit, for example. The 890th out of Mis- sissippi, heavy engineering unit, left all of its equipment in place. As you know, the National Guard wears two hats. They are there in time of war. They are there in time of peace with national disas- ters. We are one month away from the anniversary of the most deadly hurricane in American history that hit South Mississippi, killed al- most 300 people. They have not gotten one piece of replacement equipment. What is the plan to replace their equipment? And I am sure they are not alone. The second question is: I would like to ask for the record, and hopefully as quickly as possible, a list of every National Guard and Reserve unit that has been either notified that they will be called up, including the Marines, or notified that they could be called up for OIF-3. [The information referred to is classified and retained in the com- mittee files.] Last question goes back to a book I read a while back, one of the most disturbing books I have ever read. It was called “Dereliction of Duty,” not the one about the Clinton administration, but one written by a history professor at West Point. And the point he makes in his book was that the Joint Chiefs in the summer of 1964 were fully aware that the so-called peace candidate had a plan to rapidly increase troop strength in Vietnam as he was running as the peace candidate. And sure enough, once he was elected, he did rapidly increase American involvement there. My question to you, gentlemen, since apparently no Congressmen were asking this question then, I feel compelled to ask it now, is 728 there a plan in OIF-3 B or A or C that calls for a substantial in- crease in the number of troops in Iraq after the November election? General SCHWARTZ. There is not. Unequivocally, there is not, Congressman. I indicated to you earlier that we are at a 17-brigade level of ef- fort. And that is what we anticipate maintaining through OIF-3. If the combatant commander asks for more, as others in the de- partment have testified before you, that obviously will be enter- tained, considered and supported. But that is not the plan. There is no such game plan. Mr. TAYLOR. General, I am always impressed with the level of preparation in the Department of Defense, the incredible logistics take place in order to get the equipment from places like Jacksonville, Charleston, over in place for when the troops get there and time lags. I am sure that somewhere an OIF-4 is being drawn up. My question is: What is the troop level anticipated for OIF-4? General SCHWARTZ. Sir, I do not want to be specific in this forum, if you do not mind. Mr. TAYLOR. We as a committee do not tell you how to take hills, cell you how to fly airplanes. We do, however, write the checks for the equipment. We write the checks for the personnel, for their pay and for the benefits. And I do think, given our fiscal responsibilities—which we have not done a very good job of when you are running a $500 billion annual operating deficits—but in an effort to try to do better, we have to have some idea of what this is going to cost. General SCHWARTZ. Sir, I would be happy to either answer that question in closed session or separately. The bottom line is, it is different than what we anticipate for OIF-3. Planning is under way for exactly the reason as you suggested earlier, for purposes of predictability. There is a significant planning effort that will wrap up later this summer. But I will be happy to address that to you specifically— Mr. TAYLOR. I am making that request, if you could find some time to come in, or I can go over to see you. General SCHWARTZ. I will be happy to, sir. Easy to do, sir. Mr. TAYLOR. Again, on the units that have been notified, how many guardsmen and reservists are anticipated to be participating in OIF-3? Dr. CHu. I think General Schwartz already testified to the aggre- gate figures that are involved here. And I will be glad to provide you a list of the units that we have alerted thus far- Mr. TAYLOR. Once again, the aggregate numbers are what? What percentage of that theater force will be guards and Reserves? Dr. CHU. If I recall your numbers correctly, General Schwartz, on the order of General SCHWARTZ. I think it was 57 percent-43 percent. Dr. CHU [continuing). Active, 43 percent Reserve. General Cody. I have got them right here, Mr. Taylor, for the Army. If you would like, I can read them right off to you. Mr. TAYLOR. Okay. General CODY. To give you a perspective, National Guard for OIF-2 was 33,000. For OIF-3, the one coming up, it is 37,000. 729 Army Reserve, 20,000 for OIF-2; 17,000 for OIF-3. And our Active Component (A.C.) to Reserve Component (R.C.) mix for OIF-3 will be 56 percent A.C., 44 percent R.C., and that is 1 percentage dif- ferent than OIF-2. General HULY. For our reserve component, sir, currently in Iraq, I have about a little over 3,000 reserve components of the 26,000. For our second rotation, commencing in the fall, our numbers are going to go up to about 7,200 of the 26,000 that we have. And that was an intentional plan, because the majority of our- many of our reservists are college students. And we wanted to wait for them to be able to finish the spring semester before we acti- vated them. They had been activated during the month of June. They were notified last November, December that they would be activated in June. They have made their plans and preparations. They are acti- vated. They are going through training. And they will serve a seven-month deployment there. For my aviation assets, it is a little bit tougher on them. We are riding them a little bit harder. And some of them are going to be activated for a little bit longer. And perhaps their tours of duty are going to last a little bit longer as the situation requires. For OIF-3, our current plans only anticipate activating about 1,500 reserves for the size force that we are anticipating for Oper- ation Iraqi Freedom-3. _Mr. TAYLOR. General, would you have the numbers for the Air Force Reserve and the Air Guard? General HULY. Sir, I will have to take that for the record. I do not have that off the top. [The information referred to can be found in the Appendix begin- ning on page 810.) Mr. TAYLOR. Okay. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, gentlemen. The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentlemen. The gentleman from North Carolina, Mr. Hayes? Mr. HAYES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I did not know we had gotten there. General Cody, I think it is important to talk for just a minute about Army transformation and how the new rotations affect the actual manpower availability of the Army. You are doing a number of different things: forming more bri- gades and units of actions while at the same time providing stabil- ity for families, extending tours of duty. Could you talk more in detail about how the reorganization—you and Dr. Chu—will provide stability in terms of predictability, but also the efficiencies from a business standpoint that will be pro- vided when you take so many of the Army members who are now, mple, in the midst of a move and giving them longer deploy- ments? Explain for the committee how that makes more manpower available at any given time. In other words, that ties in very accurately and well with your efforts and ours to increase the number of available troops, but at the same time does not create the financial burden of bringing new folks on board. If you could expand on that. 730 General CODY. Yes, sir. It is a complex answer so bear with me. I threw a chart up there and I probably will not brief off it. But what those patches show you is OIF-1, OIF-2 and OIF-3 brigade sets. And what it shows you is the 3rd Infantry Division, which came home, we put in to the 1st Division to be changed under our trans- formation. By that, we take its three-brigade division set that have nine maneuver companies and move it into a four-brigade set that has 11 maneuver companies in each brigade, more combat power. We embed all the combat service support at the brigade level. And that gives us a brigade that can sustain itself in combat much bet- ter, much more mobile, adaptive. That transformation was ongoing while we are doing OIF-2. In order to do that, you have to get the right sergeants, the right offi- cers, and the right grade structure as you built that extra brigade, that fourth brigade. At the same time we were doing that, we were also attacking and working the restructuring that we briefed this committee on before of the high-demand, low-density M.P. units, civil affair units, psyops units and other units. We thought we could do it faster but, quite frankly, the brigade requirements for OIF-2 and OIF-3 stayed as General Schwartz has talked to you about, about 17 to 18 brigade sets. We thought, initially, as we laid this thing out, we would be at a lesser requirement. We are not. So that makes this a little bit tougher to do. At the end of the day, for 2004, we will build three brand new brigades in the Army, one in the 3rd Infantry Division. It is done. It will deploy for OIF-3. And we are starting with the 101st and 10th Mountain Division, units that just came back. And we will build another brigade in each one of those divisions in 2004. And in 2005, we will build three more brigades while we are exe- cuting OIF-3 units that are coming back, 4th Infantry Division being one of them, 10th Mountain being the second. And then in 2006, we will build four more to give us 10 more brigades as well as restructure the divisions. And we still believe, even if the 17-bri- gade requirement for OIF and OEF, we can do this. But that is why we needed the 30,000. And that is why we need- ed to have that inject of the 30,000 early so that we could get the right grade structure, the right MOS and balance across our force while we are building the new transformed Army and still sustain- ing the Global War on Terrorism. Mr. HAYES. I appreciate that. And let me add my thanks to all the others for not only your service, but the men and women that serve under you. Schedule-wise, I think you have touched on, but just to be spe- cific, the plan is to complete and field a new brigade, six this year, six next, plus an additional four. Is that schedule working out pret- ty well? General CODY. It is working out. We do have some challenges, in the Military Intelligence (M.I.) community in particular, because there is such a demand for M.I. and M.P. units, we are having to watch that particularly close. 731 You cannot grow an M.I. soldier or officer very quickly. And with the demand and the growth and investment we have to make in them, we are challenged a little bit there. But we are on track. I have great confidence that we will build our first 10 new brigades on time in the first three years, and then we will make a decision in 2006 with the secretary and the chief and everybody else as to whether we go through the 15 brigades or we stop at 10. Mr. HAYES. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, one more quick question, if I may? Secretary Chu, if you could think in terms of a chart, reserve and guard, then, now, and hoped for, how are we doing in terms of meeting our needs on scheduling deployments, equipment, match- ing folks up? Just a quick overview. And quickly touch on how NATO taking over some of the training is going to help relieve some of the pressure on us. Thank you. Dr. CHU. I think, sir—I thank you for the question—that we have made major progress in improving the reserve mob serve mobilization process. As you know, early in this sequence of events there was a lot of short notice to units. We have entirely cured that, thanks, importantly, to the Joint Staff's fine work. As you also heard this morning, we have, I think, straightened out the equipment problems for the guard and reserve in large ex- tent, although there may be still in this unit that Mr. Taylor has mentioned. We will look into that. I do think it is important, as you point out, that NATO has ac- cepted important responsibilities in Afghanistan, and we are count- ing on NATO forces in that regard. There is, of course, the three dozen or so countries that are participating in Iraq, and we are grateful for their contributions as well. So there has been, I think, a major shift, much as General Cody described, for the active Army. This has been done sort of on the move, moving to a different construct for how we are going to em- ploy reserve forces, what their role is going to be, what they can expect over time. It is at the same time respectful of the fact that these are not active duty troops and that they will serve periodi- cally, but not continuously. Mr. HAYES. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The CHAIRMAN. Thank the gentleman. The ranking member had a follow-up on that. Mr. SKELTON. General Cody, if you had your druthers today, what would you increase the M increase the M.I. numbers with and the M.P. num- bers with? General CODY. Over 9,000 for M.I. In the career field of the mili- tary intelligence, that is active guard and reserve, 9,000 plus up is what we think we need because of the new reconnaissance lance and target acquisition units as well as the unmanned aerial vehicle investments that we are making. On the M.P.s, I will have to take it for the record. As you know We have worked it pretty hard. But I am having a senior moment on the M.P.s. But it is not as big as the M.I., but it is sizable. 732 [The information referred to can be found in the Appendix begin- ning on page 809.] Mr. SKELTON. Thanks a lot. The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman. The distinguished gentleman who just made this trip to Iraq and did such a great job with us, Silvestre Reyes. Mr. REYES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you, gentlemen, for being here. I want to add my congratulations to General Cody as well. And I want to start off by saying that I think part of the issue here that we lose sight of in terms of—and going back to my good friend and colleague, Congressman Weldon-is that, based on some of the conversations I had with some of the soldiers that have been affected by that stop-loss, that, I do not think, is fully taking into account, in terms of whether or not we are impacting or whether or not people are sharing the burden. At least the soldiers that talked to me about that felt that they were being unduly penalized by that stop-loss. So that is one of the factors that I think we need to take into consideration. The other one would be the fact that we have got contractors in country that are charged with delivering critical supplies, ammuni- tion, fuel, all these kinds of things. And some of the soldiers that we talked to last week were very uncomfortable with that. Essen- tial things sometimes do not get through because contractors un- derstandably do not want to deliver under the dangerous cir- cumstances that are currently being seen in Iraq. So if you could comment on those two things. But before you do, I want to ask you, Dr. Chu, because I noticed in your biography that you served as director and then assistant secretary of defense for Program Analysis and Evaluation (PA&E) from May 1981 through January of 1983. And in your bio, it says that in that capacity, you advised the secretary of defense on the future size, structure of the armed forces, their equipment and their preparation for crisis or conflict. So in the context of the history that Congressman Weldon gave us about-and I did not-I was elected in 1996, so I served part of the 1990's on this committee, and am proud to be on this com- mittee. But I am curious, the cutbacks that he referred to, the cut- back in ships, the divisions, all of these kinds of things, were those your recommendations, prior to the past administration taking of- fice? Dr. CHU. I think Mr. Weldon was referring in his comments—al- though we should obviously ask him—to the procurement holiday that was taken last administration in terms of defense budgeting- Mr. REYES. No, no. I am asking the question, were the cutbacks, from 500 to 314 or 318 ships, from 18 divisions to 10 divisions, those kinds of things, you served immediately-during that whole decade before were those recommendations done by you or your office? Did you agree with what_back then, the peace dividend, so to speak? Dr. Chu. Let me be sure to get the record straight here. My sery- ice ended January 20th, 1993. Mr. REYES. Right. 733 Dr. CHU. I was not part of the last administration. Mr. REYES. I understand. Dr. CHU. So I was not part—whatever my views might be, I was not part of the record Mr. Weldon is speaking to, at least as I un- derstood it in his comments. Mr. REYES. But the positions—being a member of this committee, it is my understanding, and I am having my staff do some research on this, but it is my understanding that the past administration followed through on recommendations that had been made with the QDR, the Base Realignment and Closing (BRAC) process, all of those kinds of things. So I am just asking you, Dr. Chu- Dr. CHU. The QDR, sir, as you recall was 1996, 1997, not 1993. Mr. REYES. But having been there in the capacity, to, again, from your bio, advise on future size, structure, equipment and prepara- tions for crisis or conflict, were the things that occurred, that Mr. Weldon was referring to, part of what you recommended during that- Dr. CHU. I do not mean to be overly persistent, but Mr. Weldon is speaking about a different period. I advised the Reagan and Bush 41 administrations. This was a period in which we bought much of the equipment with which the United States armed forces is equipped today. I think the issue Mr. Weldon is raising is the adequacy of procurement budgets during the 1990's, where this committee did indeed, as he points out, play a leadership role in adding to the past administration's requests. Mr. REYES. But, again, from serving on this committee and going back and looking into it, it had been the position of the Clinton ad- ministration that they were following through on recommendations from the first Bush administration, of which you were a part. And, you know, nobody has a crystal ball. And I think when we had the press conference after we came back from Iraq, I men- tioned in the press conference that, look, things change. And no- body has a crystal ball. But I do want to make sure that we k if you were part of that process that recommended and handed off to the Clinton administration the cutbacks that Mr. Weldon was talking about. Dr. CHU. Sir, I think we are talking about two different periods in history here. Mr. Weldon is speaking to the period in the 1990's when the country did not buy equipment for its armed forces at the replacement rate needed to sustain those armed forces. Mr. REYES. No, I heard him say that the cutbacks from 18 to 10 divisions, from 500-and-something ships to 300-and-something ships and so forth during the 1990's. But it is my recollection from sitting on this committee that those recommendations came out of the first Bush administration and were followed through by the past administration. But my staff is doing some research. And maybe next time you appear, I will have better information so that, The CHAIRMAN. Would the gentleman yield on that point? Mr. REYES. Yes, I will. The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman for yielding. The reason we have some record on this is because when we did the base closing, the provision that I placed in based closing last year, with respect to surge, was based on the Cheney-Powell blue- 735 we cut air wings to the point we had 13 active air wings from 24 in 1991. So without objection, we will put that Cheney-Powell rec- ommendation in the provision. Mr. REYES. Mr. Chairman, which brings a logical question to my mind, back when the Clinton administration finished out, we had troops in 77 countries, which they were severely criticized for. Today, according to this handout here, we have got troops in 120 different countries. Why in the heck do we not plus it up to 12 divisions, if that was the absolute base minimum? The CHAIRMAN. Well, let me say to the gentleman, if we go with General Schoomaker's plan that this committee is accommodating and if complementing, because we put in an increase for 30,000 Army personnel—and, incidentally, we want to ask the Marines shortly to fully endorse our 9,000 increase for the Marines, too- but for practical purposes, that will give us an additional three bri- gades this year, which is the better part of a division, three bri- gades the next year, and four brigades in the third year. So we will have, for practical purposes, in terms of fighting forces, produced a brigade equivalent in excess of 12 divisions, ef- fectively. In fact, we will have more effective brigades than under the present division constitution. Is that accurate, Dr. Chu and General Cody? Dr. CHU. Yes. That is absolutely the case. We are building more combat power, and it is a credit to the Army, a credit to General Schoomaker's leadership that that is happening. The CHAIRMAN. General Cody, could you comment on that? What will the 43 brigades give us, if you use the old construct of divi- sions? What is the equivalent? And, obviously, we will still have di- visions, but if you compared that to the 10-division force we have today— General CODY. It would be a 14-plus divisions equivalence. But more importantly, the brigade combat teams that we are building will have much more lethality, much more survivability, as well as the discussion I had earlier with Congressman Skelton, a lot more reconnaissance. And so it is about 14-plus divisions worth of brigade combat team, but they are different brigades. Mr. SKELTON. Could I ask a short question? The CHAIRMAN. Certainly. Then we are going to go to the long- suffering Mr. Cole, who has a lot of those brigades—or thinks he is going to have a lot of those brigades. Mr. ŠKELTON. One last question. Then would you reinstate the two OPFOR forces? General Coty. Yes, sir. I never answered your question, so I be- lieve I need to One, we are very concerned about the OPFOR. First the 21st Guard unit, armored unit out of Nevada will backfill the 11th ACR that there is now, that is the OPFOR unit. They have been working with them, as you know. They have a habitual relationship. The OPs group will stay. The Operations OPs) group guys will stay there. We are just taking the combat formation of the 11th. They will do two right-seat rides during two 736 rotations before we had the mission off to the 1st of the 221st, as well as we are augmenting them with the Vermont Guard, the 86th Armored Brigade. And that will take care of the OPFOR as well as the civilians on the battlefield. And JRTC, as you know, the 509th, the Geronimos, are deploying also. We are going to backfield them with an entire brigade out of Illinois. They are coming down. They will do two right-seat rides, and they will take all the OPFOR missions as well as the civilians on the battlefield. And then, when we get ourselves rightsized again, the 11th ACR and the 509th or a like unit, active, deployable, fully equipped, will go back and assume the OPFOR mission as well as its capability deployed mission. Mr. REYES. Mr. Chairman, reclaiming my time, oh, I do not have any more. Okay, thank you. The CHAIRMAN. You know something, you traveled many miles, Mr. Reyes. If you have a final question, go right ahead. Okay. The distinguished gentleman from Oklahoma, Mr. Cole? Mr. COLE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is never a pain to listen to my more senior colleagues. I always learn a lot, a lot of history, a lot of insight, quite frankly. But I do want to pick up, and I want to make a couple comments first on Mr. Reyes' line of questioning and Mr. Weldon's earlier line of questioning, and Mr. Skelton's line as well. First, I want to compliment I think you gentlemen have done an incredible job in upgrading, modernizing the force, particularly doing it in a time of war. It is quite amazing, the use of force in terms of making it more efficient. Getting more combat power out of the same number of people, again, is quite remarkable. And I think you are to be commended for it. So I think you have stretched these dollars a lot further than any of your predecessors have, and that is a compliment to the people that you lead and to yourselves for your vision. Having said that, and without being critical of anybody in the 1990's, that was a Democratic president and a Republican Con- gress that arrived at those decision, even though there were vigor- ous debates internally, and so if we cut too far in the 1990's, and I think we did, it was probably a bipartisan failure. And we thought we were living in one kind of world, and we found out on September 11th it is a very different world than anybody thought we were living in in the 1990's. But we do have a blueprint in 1992, as was mentioned in some of the debate earlier. And it is for a considerably larger force than we have today. And that was a force that we thought was the ap- propriate size, moving into the post-Cold War era, an era that we thought was going to be more peaceful than it has turned out to be, an era where I doubt we thought we would see as many deploy- ments, as Mr. Weldon pointed out, as we have seen. Given the history of the last decade, and that we are now deploy- ing frequently—no reason to believe that is going to change-given the fact that we are in a war and we are stretching, using equip- ment and personnel, why do we not go back to the 1992 benchmark 737 in terms of two more divisions, in terms of two more air wings, in terms of 100 more ships, and at least work toward that. I think there is obviously a lot of sentiment on this committee to move in that direction. But quite frankly while I think the ad- ministration has done a terrific job, We have not heard that de- mand from the department or from the administration. We are doing a better job with what we have, without a doubt, but there is going to be a limit. And I think we are there. Every officer I talk to off the record tells me the Army is too small. Every retired officer I talk to, for whom I have great respect, tell me that we are stretching too much. We have not gotten the administration to quite go that far. You have done a lot of marvelous things short of that, but I would like to ask you, where do you see the size of the Army in particular, but all the services, evolving over the next 5 or 10 years, not just the next fiscal year? Dr. CHU. Well, thank you, sir, first of all, for your words of praise. We are grateful for them. Second, to your question, I think no one would want to use a 1992 blueprint today. And I think, as General Cody has testified, the answer for the Army lies in expanded brigade numbers, not more overhead in terms of division structure, but more brigade strength and greater interchangeability of that strength, hence the modular concept, so that you could put brigades together on the battlefield without having the current interface issues that some- times arise, equipping not just the Army but all elements of our force, with the cutting edge equipment that enhances substantially their effectiveness. So the agenda of the administration I think is very similar to the spirit of your question, which is to make our units more effective. That does not necessarily mean more people in every case. The Navy is an excellent case in point. Navy capabilities today are going to be higher than they were yesterday. They are going to do it with fewer people, which, again, comes back to your point of using the taxpayers' dollars wisely, minimizing cost. Mr. COLE. Without question, I think you are doing a great job of that. But I do think at some point there is a limit in terms of per- sonnel, and I think you are there. And, I mean, is there no plan, no thought beyond, you know, again, a temporary increase? Be- cause I do not think we are going to be in Iraq a very short period of time. Dr. Chu. No, sir. Across the board, although we have not talked about it this morning, across the board we believe that we can make better use of the uniformed personnel of the United States, that we have too many uniformed personnel doing things that civil- ian personnel, either government or contractor, could do. We have begun the process—the Army has been a leader in that regard—begun the process of taking some of the military billets that really do not have to be devoted to these tasks and using civil- ians instead. The Army has 5,000 fiscal 2004, 5,000 again in fiscal 2005—converting them to head space, so to speak, that the Army can use. The same thing is going on in the other military services. 738 So the constant here is the recognition that we will need an ex- panded set of capabilities to deal with the kind of world that we have. Mr. COLE. Again, my time is about expired. Let me make one point, if I may, not to disagree with you, but to augment. I mean, I really think you are wrong, and not in terms of what you are doing, I think you are doing it brilliantly, I think you are using your resources superbly, I think you are maximizing your capabil- ity. But in the end, it does take people, and you are using people pretty hard right now. And I compliment those people. I mean, they are clearly great patriots, they are doing a wonderful job. ald urge the administration to begin to look at a larger military. There is support for it now, and there is nothing suggest- ing that on the basis of a decade experience and the fact that we are in a war that three years ago none of us knew we were going to be in, including this administration, would suggest looking again at the basic numbers, while you are achieving the efficiencies that you clearly are ach: But I think in the end it is too small a force for the number of deployments that Mr. Weldon laid out that we have had and we are likely to have. But, again, thank you, gentlemen, for your service. I appreciate it very greatly. But I suspect we will be revisiting this issue in this committee again and again and again. Thank you. The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman for his point. And I think we have learned two things in this operation, the two phases. The first phase was that you can attack and drive that armored spear very quickly with a small number of people, because of tech- nologies, but that occupation does not lend itself to technology to the degree that the attack does, and occupations are tensive. And so we got a double lesson from this theater. And I think the gentleman makes an excellent point. The gentleman from Arkansas, Dr. Snyder. Dr. SNYDER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for having this hearing. General Cody, I recall one of your predecessors, General Keane, was here a few months ago. And one of the things about Iraq, Í think it was in his opening statement, he said that one of the keys will be that we keep our resolve to accomplish the mission, even when we make mistakes. And I appreciate you all being here, because I think that is in the spirit that this hearing is being held, that we see as our job to—when we hear things that may indicate mistakes, and we all hear—have our own contacts overseas, that we point them out and ask questions. By the same token, Congress makes mistakes too, and so, we are in the middle of the defense bill, and we are always looking for ways that we could do things better, particularly in these very com- plicated personnel issues. A specific question I wanted to ask, General Huly, for you, two weeks ago, I was here during a hearing with Secretary Wolfowitz. And during the hearing, I got an e-mail from somebody I know in Iraq who complained about the fact that in his heavy equipment 739 unit, three of the six bulldozers were not working because of parts problems and two front-end loaders were not working. This was a company. And the Army has contacted several times since then, but has not yet found out if that is accurate or not. Well, just coincidentally, I have got one for you. I got an e-mail last night, on my way in here, from a Seabee who is serving with a Marine unit I believe on the Syrian border. And I just wanted to read part of his e-mail. It is not the food thing I am talking about, it is the water. He said the food at the KBR facilities is fine, but lately really going down hill. I do not believe there are convoy ambushes keep- ing supplies from reaching us like there was in April, but each day, there is less and less choice and quality. On the Fourth of July, the food was not that great. And yesterday, they had absolutely noth- ing to drink—no water, nothing. And my concern, consistent with the bulldozers, is: Do we have a problem with supply and equipment and parts? And if after this I get to you, my staff will get to somebody that works for you and get you the name of that unit, if we could check on if they had a water problem. What I wanted to ask, General Cody, was with regard to the In- dividual Ready Reserve. And this obviously has gotten the atten- tion of the American people, in particular the 5,600 people that are involuntarily being called up. Just some very specific things. I remember in my Marine Corps days serving at the headquarters company of the 1st Marine Divi- sion. Lived in a hooch just a short distance from where the 1st Ma- rine Division band served. And, you know, they got hit one night, and we saw all their in- struments all laying out there on the ground. But they were great Marines, General Huly, because during the day and the night they were serving guard duty and they still did their responsibilities as band members. But the list we got from Army Legislative Affairs, General Cody, is that there are 15 band members that are being called up as part of the IRR, you know, one euphonium player, two trumpets, one trombone, four clarinets, three saxophones, one electric bass player. And in contrast with that, 11 Bravo, there are 18 infantrymen being called and 21 infantry officers, 11 Alpha. It seems like the whole bulk of this is support troops. Did somebody go line by line through this and recognizing that each one of these 5,600 is a person who has a family that did not expect that they would be called back, to say: Is there not a way to do without a euphonium player? Do we need to really draft an electric bass player, to pull them back in? Is there not a way that we cannot let that kind of thing slide and then do an analysis tooth to tail? I assume you all have gone line by line through this. Would you respond to that please? General CODY. Yes, sir, we have. First off, it is mostly combat service support, because that is where the stress and strain is on remobilization and the stress and strain that we are having on our combat service support side. 740 Bands are being stressed quite a bit. Unfortunately, as you know, our bands do an awful lot of our burial services, as well as some other things. And the great soldiers and airmen and Marines that defended World War II and fought World War II, as you know, are passing away at pretty high rates. And our bands are stretched across the nation. So it does not surprise me that we have 15 band members on there. We do have a process, as you know. Once the letters go out—we sent them out on the 6th of July—once the letter goes out, there is a 1–800 number that the notified IRR member gets to call. Dr. SNYDER. Well, General, if I might interrupt, I understand the process. And I think you all try to do it as fair as you can. But I want to talk about the specific people that are being called up. As we look ahead over the next—General Meyers, on Friday-I could not find the exact quote, but he is quoted in the Washington as—I think it was on a FOX interview, that he antici- pates that we could be there as long as five years. Secretary Wolfowitz said-in response to Mr. Skelton—possibly be there for several more years. And as I look at the list, you know, you are calling up 166 heavy- construction equipment operators. You are calling up 790, I think, truck drivers and those kind of support people you are talking about, incidentally, which I think relates to this water and parts challenge that we have. What are we doing as we are looking ahead now that a year from now or two years from now that we will not have to revisit the In- dividual Ready Reserve forces. And the second part of that is: A year ago, could we not have looked ahead? I mean, is there something going on in the planning process that we could not have anticipated we would need? We had long supply lines, would need more heavy-equipment operators to maintain roads, all that kind of thing. Dr. CHU. Let me, if I may, take the first part of that, which is, looking ahead. The current call by IRR goes back to the set of deci- sions made at the turn of the year. We could look ahead and see the skill levels we need and where we had holes in our units and what needed to be built. And that was done in an adequate way at that time. The secretary approved a ceiling in terms of IRR call-ups. The Army then worked the details of exactly which units, which ties in with the joint sourcing process General Schwartz testified to, exactly which unit is going to be needed in combat support, es- pecially combat service support arena for OIF-3. Dr. SNYDER. The number, Dr. Chu, that we received from, I think it was Army Legislative Affairs on this list, is a total of 5,674. Dr. CHU. That is correct. That is how many are going to be alert- ed. The same number are going to be sent forward. Dr. SNYDER. Right, but they are being alerted. General Cody. Yes, we alerted 5,674, Mr. Congressman, to fill positions for about 4,000. Dr. SNYDER. And would you respond to the question, General Cody, about a year ago, in terms of maintaining the supply lines. 741 Absolutely, as Mr. Cole was saying, maybe this is masterful work on your part to put it together. On the other hand, I think we have had 5,600 people being very surprised Americans. And looking back on it, is there not-could we not have looked at a different way as we were looking ahead on maintaining a supply line? General CODY. That busy chart there to your front shows you what OIF-1, 2 and 3 were. OIF-2 requirements, the combatant commander changed several times because of the level of violence and the security of what was going on in Iraq. And we executed the worst-case plan for OIF-2. And we are executing in what being the worst-case plan in terms of numbers of formations for OIF-3. That put a stress on the combat service support troops, in par- ticular, heavy equipment drivers, engineer units. We had to keep more engineer units over there because of the roads as well as some of the bridges. And we had to keep more truck drivers over e because the level of violence was such you could not get the Logistics Command Assessment of Projects (LOGCAP) and the ci- vilian contractors to do some of that stuff. And so that quite frankly is what drove us to have to go back to more transportation units the second time that we had not planned on, more engineer units the second time that we had not planned on. The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman The gentleman from Minnesota, Mr. Kline? Mr. KLINE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, gentlemen, for being here today, for your long serv- ice. And I want to echo what all my colleagues have s absolutely fantastic men and women that are serving today in uni- form here, in the Horn of Africa, in Afghanistan, in Iraq, and so many other places. I want to take just one minute to echo the concerns that you have heard repeatedly today about what I believe is the overuse of the reserve component. This is a discussion that I am sure that this committee, we as individuals and as a committee, will continue to have. But I think when you have a number that is in the 40 per- cent plus range in theater, that is just too high. We had an informal forum briefing a week or so ago, a couple of weeks ago, and we heard some pretty strong pushback from em- ployers and members of the guard. And in fact, the adjutant gen- eral of Minnesota made the point that his soldiers were enlisting in the National Guard and not in the active Army. And while he thought that they could maintain a one in six-year activation, if it turns out that the math is one in three or four, it is going to put too much strain. So let me leave that aside now and jump down in to the Marine Corps weeds, if I could, for just a minute, with General Huly. And I am looking at OIF-3, the Marine Corps is planning to use two Marine Expeditionary Units, (MEUs), it looks like one from each coast, perhaps. Are those going ashore and letting the ships sail away, or are the ships not part of this? This looks like an unusual employment for MEUs. And are we using them as freestanding MEUs or are they going to be put together as a single unit? General HULY. Thank you for the question, sir. 742 As you know, our normal peacetime operation for Marine expedi- tionary units, one of their primary missions out there is forward presence. Circumstances have required that the forward presence now turn into actual presence on the ground, and that is where they are being employed. Both the 11th and the 24th MEU, as General Schwartz earlier referred to, one from the 11th MEU from California, and the 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit out of Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, are currently either in transit or elements of them are being off-loaded right now in Kuwait and are process- ing through. Both Marine Expeditionary Units anticipate being on the ground for about their tour, which will at least be somewhere in the six- to seven-month range. We also have the 22nd Marine Expeditionary Unit that is cur- rently in Afghanistan, and it has been on the ground there for ap- proximately three to four months operating. So, yes, sir, the Marine Expeditionary Units in the future, at least for what we see now for the next few months, are going to be employed on the ground. One of the Marine Expeditionary, because we knew that the Ma- rine Expeditionary Units were going to be on the ground, it did not seem necessarily prudent to shop them over in total on amphibious ships that the Marine Expeditionary Units are normally embarked on. We found a more expeditious and a more cost-effective way to do that was to use our strategic mobility assets, both ships and air- craft, to get some of the elements of the 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit, though their aircraft—some of their aircraft did transport by amphibious ship. The ships for both the 22nd Marine Expeditionary Unit have re- mained with them in Afghanistan off the coast doing other mis- sions as tasked by the 5th Fleet. We anticipate that those ships will bring the 22nd Marine Expeditionary Unit out of Afghanistan and back home in the near future. The ships from the 11 Marine Expeditionary Unit that they de- ployed on out of California are anticipated to be remaining in thea- ter in the event that the Marine Expeditionary Unit is required to be reconstituted aboard ship. Mr. KLINE. And therefore there are no ships associated with the 24th MEU? General Huly. There will be no amphibious ships remaining with the 24th MEU, yes, sir. Mr. KLINE. And what does that do to the normal MEU deploy- ments with the ARGs? Are we short now somewhere? General HULY. Are we short somewhere? Mr. KLINE. Are we missing a MEU in the Mediterranean or- General HULY. The global presence for Marine Expeditionary Units has in fact changed, and we are meeting up to the combatant commander's current requirements. And I will defer to General Schwartz. General SCHWARTZ. One of the mitigating mechanisms for the workload that we have discussed is the notion of global sourcing. And that is that heretofore the construct was that combatant com- manders had forces assigned, and they remained in that area of op- 743 eration, regardless of what happened elsewhere. That is no longer an operative construct. And so where we are now is, we will assess the risk of where forces may be, whether it be in Korea, in the case of 22nd, or in the case of a MEU in the Med, assess the risk and determine on a recommendation from the Joint Chiefs to the secretary what is the optimal thing to do in this set of circumstances. à so, what has occurred is we have uncovered certain commit- ments that heretofore were covered, but it was a conscious, analyt- ically based decision. Mr. KLINE. Okay. I get it. Thank you very much. My time has expired. Ì yield back. Thank you. The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman. The gentlelady from California, Ms. Sanchez. Ms. SANCHEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And again, thank you, gentlemen, for being before us. I really do not want to talk about this, I just want to make a statement for the record with respect to the discussion that has been going on that Mr. Weldon started and everybody has been throwing back and forth about the reductions in the 1990's. So I just would like to say that it is my understanding that most the numerous deployments in the 1990's which Mr. Weldon pointed out were small and brief, compared to the massive under- taking in the invasion and the occupation of Iraq. But the administration chose the time and the place for Iraq. Wolfowitz, Rumsfeld and Bush knew our force constraints that they had inherited, and they had a duty to work within those con- straints. Instead, they ignored the imperatives of planning, of available intelligence, the expressed warnings of General Shinseki and others, and they used our forces to the breaking point. And I think we are at breaking point when we talk about the re- serves and the National Guard and the stop-loss and the ready re- serve being called up. I would just say that planners cannot ignore resource constraints and risks and then blame the force reductions of the last decade for the predicament that we are in today. Gentlemen, today I want to talk to you about the mental situa- tion of our combat troops. I trust you are familiar with the Army report published in the New England Journal of Medicine on July 1st, entitled “Combat Duty in Iraq and Afghanistan: Mental Health Problems and Barriers to Care.” This study, conducted by the Walter Reed Army Institute of Re- search, brought a number of issues to light which I find particu- larly troubling, including the fact that roughly 16 percent of Iraqi war veterans suffer from post-traumatic stress disorder, and that, of those, fewer than 40 percent have sought professional help. There are a lot of reasons. Basically they have a fear that they are going to be stigmatized, they are afraid that they will appear weak to their fellow servicemembers, and they think that seeking help for mental health issues could ruin their careers. So I have a number of questions because I have been trying to understand, if we are doing anything or what we can do, or if we need to do something. 744 be- First of all, in addition to the fear of stigmatism, I have repeat- edly heard that soldiers have a difficult time actually obtaining mental health services in Iraq. Can you describe in detail to the committee what a soldier in Iraq would actually have to do to actu- ally obtain care from a psychiatrist or psychologist or some other qualified mental health professional. Do all service members have access to confidential counseling in Iraq? Dr. CHU. Let me start, Ms. Sanchez, by trying to put the New England Journal article into context. I think, by the way, the figure is more like 16 percent for post-traumatic stress disorder. Ms. SANCHEZ. I am sorry. You thought I said something else. I said 16. Dr. CHU. Sixteen, yes. I think an impressive result in that article, which has not been the focus of most of the reporting, is the rather mod tween pre-deployment indicators of this kind and post-deployment indicators, on the order of specifically 3 to 10 percentage points. I think that is an extraordinary tribute to the quality of young peo- ple we have in our ranks today and their leadership that we see so modest movement in these indicators despite the fact these are basically convenience surveys, as the phrase would go, of 3rd Infan- try Division troops when they returned and 1st MEF troops when they returned. In terms of specifics on- Ms. SANCHEZ. The example was rather- Dr. Chu. Let me turn this over to General Cody to—well, actu- ally, it is not inconsistent with past conflicts. Again, the change, which I think is the more interesting issue here, because the base- line level with these questionnaires, as to what people answer on them, and so pre-deployment, you had numbers like 9 percent to 10 percent. And so a change of six or seven percentage points after nine months in combat, in my book, it is an extraordinary tribute to the quality of the young people, their preparation, their training, their mindset and their leadership. And let me turn it over to General Cody who may want to com- ment on in-theater assets. Ms. SANCHEZ. Yes. I really want to find out what the answer to my first question is. General CODY. Thank you, ma'am. First, I have got some firsthand knowledge. On my trip when I was over there, I actually visited some of these soldiers that were going through this—two sergeants, and I was surprised to see two captains, because of the things you just talked about, where you would think that they would be concerned about their career—they were. But I was pleased to see that we had the mechanisms in place, the mental health assets deployed in place to be able to help these soldiers through the post-traumatic stress disorder. And this was right after some of the hottest fighting. And so you can imag- ine some of these soldiers and officers had seen some pretty ter- rible stuff. We have got two combat support hospitals over there, five sur- gical support teams. That gives you level-three hospitalization. And each one of them have large mental health assets. 745 We have area support with medical battalions and medical com- panies. And we have combat stress control companies, combat stress control detachments at our level-two area support. And then, down at the organic level, we have counselin e have counseling as well as mental health specialists down at the division and battalion level. We do have soldiers that, obviously, do not want to report it. Ms. SANCHEZ. What are we doing to get the word out to them? General CODY. Well, we are working it. Here are some of the things we are doing. And that gets to your second question. We have initiatives based upon the study from Walter Reed, but also based upon commanders in the field who are assessing and taking a look-because they are responsible ultimately for the health, wel- fare and morality of troops. So we are looking at initiatives right now for pre- and post-de- ployment health assessments that we are doing when soldiers are coming out of combat through Kuwait. Sufficient mental health assets, as I have told you, are in thea- ter, but we are also making sure that they are in Kuwait so that as young soldiers come back, we are not only looking at their phys- ical health, but also assessing their mental health. We are re-looking at our suicide-prevention program because some of these things, as you know, crop up after they come back here. And so we are emphasizing unit awareness and kind of not letting the troops go for long periods of time without being as- sessed. We are looking at a deployment cycle support program and how we can work that. And, basically, we are taking some of the things in the study and seeing if we have put the safety net out there. Will we be perfect in execution on this? Absolutely not. Will we try to be perfect? Yes. But it is something that we are very concerned about. And I think we are putting the right things in place. I am not the expert on this, and so anything else you need, I can take for the record and make sure I get the people at Walter Reed to let you know what we are doing. [The information referred to can be found in the Appendix begin- ning on page 810.] Ms. SANCHEZ. I see that my time is up. Mr. Chairman, I do have several questions along this order of questioning. And I would like to get some written answers back for them. The CHAIRMAN. Without objection. If we can get responses on the record, we will do that. Okay, I thank the gentlelady. Let me just remark that since I just came back with Mr. Reyes and Mr. Calvert, with respect to the mental stability and the atti- tude of our troops, I thought it was extraordinary. And I want to give you one little example. When we were in Balad, we managed to show up there in time for the daily mortaring. 4. And these mortars impacted, maybe a click or two away. They were quite a ways off. But the folks who were giving us the tour of the armored trucks at that point, said, quick, let us get inside a shelter. 746 We watched the GIs, and they were close to us, maintain their conversations and simply not run, not panic, not stampede, but just walk briskly, while they continued to talk, into their shelters. So we rushed into our shelter, which happened to be a movie the- ater,—the General said, get away from the glass, get inside. We walked inside and it was a very large church service, about 400 GIS there with their combat gear off at their feet. And several of them turned around to shush us as we came in. And so we, as politicians, were forced, first, to go to church, by a mortar attack, but second, we said, when can we leave. And they said you are going to have to wait until the service is over, because we have not given the all-clear. I have never seen—and this—the demeanor, the coolness and the calmness of our GIs and our Marines in Fallujah and the demeanor of the people in the hospital—when Silvestre Reyes asked one of the badly wounded guys if he could do anything for him, he said, yes, send a fruit basket to the guy that did this to me. Another one made a somewhat caustic remark about U.S. con- gressmen and the possibility of getting promoted now that they have met us. And another one had a playful remark for the guy two stretchers down from him. My impression was that our troops are holding firm and that we should hold firm. We should emulate them rather than an image of people who are highly upset. And, certainly, there are always stress disorders that attend combat. That is a fact of life. On the other hand, in general, the folks over there are cool, calm and collected. And they walk, not run, in the face of a mortar at- tack. They maintain coolness as they go out on these missions. And I think they develop a lot of character. First, I think they come into the situation with a lot of character. But I see a lot of the people who are serving in Iraq now ending up being leaders in in their communities and in their nation when they come back. And with that slight editorial, let me recognize the fine gen- tleman from Georgia, Dr. Gingrey, for any remarks he might want to make. Dr. GINGREY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Gentlemen, thank you for taking some of your valuable time to come and see us today. We certainly appreciate your input on this very important issue. And thanks, too, for your hard work and forward thinking as you work to enact the largest and most complex transfer ever under- taken by United States forces probably since World War II. General Cody, I wanted to follow up my friend from North Caro- lina, Mr. Hayes, with his line of questioning about the force trans- formation and modernization, and, specifically, with regard to the already completed transformation of the 3rd Infantry Division Can you expand on some specific challenges you have faced and what you have learned for future transformations? And what can we in Congress do to assist in that process? And, as a follow up, can you help us understand how this bri- gade-based system will help our effectiveness, particularly in Iraq, but also in other theaters of combat operations as we move for- ward? 747 General CODY. Yes, sir. First, I think the process went pretty well. I mean if you take a look at the fact that we pulled the 3rd In- fantry Division out; and, as you know, one brigade is stationed in Fort Benning, Georgia, the Sledgehammers; and the other two com- bat brigades were up at Fort Stewart; and the aviation brigade is down at Hunter Army Airfield. So we are resetting all of their equipment, coming back from a tough fight in combat, and then turn right around and change com- mand, put a new division commander in, and then say, “You are going to be our first division to transform. Oh, by the way, while you are transforming, you are also our first division to deploy if we have a strategic requirement. And once you are transformed, you will be one of our first divisions we send back for OIF-3 as a new transformed division." So that division commander, General Webster, has a lot on his plate, as does all his leaders. I think it went rather smoothly. We had a pretty good laid out plan. We do have some hiccups, as I have testified, in the M.I. com- munity, only because of the large demand of M.I. soldiers right now across the board. And we are looking for some relief there, and I think we are going to be able to do it, because you cannot build the M.I. soldiers very, very quick In the equipping side, we are Okay. This is our first heavy bri- gade that we have built. The next two, the 101st and the 10th Mountain, will be light, and that buys us some more time on the back side to continue to reset our tanks and Bradleys and associ- ated heavy equipment for the next heavy brigade we build, which will be the 4th Infantry Division down at Fort Hood. So we are real pleased with how the 3rd Infantry Division bri- gades went. Now, specifically, the brigade combat team itself has all the enablers—the M.I., the artillery, the engineers, the M.P.s, the sig- nal. All that now is embedded under the brigade combat team com- mander, he has all that, as well as his forward repair companies and his forward support battalions. That is all part of his forma- tion. All the overhead of those engineer, signal and all that were taken out and embedd rters, so we go of those headquarters and we delayered and got more efficient, I believe, and more modular in doing so. So we are happy with the results of it. The biggest change for the division above that was the aviation brigade. As you know, they had a small aviation briga our divisions will have an aviation brigade because we took all aviation out of the corps as part of the Comanche decision. And he will go back to combat with 48 Apaches, where the first time around they had 18. He will go in with 38 Black Hawks, 12 Chi- nooks and medivac company. That is a pretty sizable aviation force that commander to have to sustain his four combat brigades. At the end, modularity will allow us to clean up the combat serv- ice support of the entire Army, because, as you know, we had three different corps that had three different corps support groups, three in at divisio) rid 748 different types of support to the different divisions that were as- signed to those corps, and they are all different. The 10th Mountain did not look like the 101st. The 3rd Infantry Division did not look like 1st Infantry Division And by making them all modular, an armored brigade and an infantry brigade looking the same throughout our Army will allow our combat serv- ice support to be much more modular, and that will greatly assist our rotation and help our National Guard. So that is where we are going with it. Dr. GINGREY. My time is expired, General, but let me just say in closing that all of us who are members from Georgia are very, very proud of the 3rd Infantry Division and the work they are doing as they rotate back in in this transformation. And once again I just want to say how proud we are of our troops and how grateful we are to the leadership you bring to us. Thank you very much. Appreciate it. The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman. The gentleman from Texas, Mr. Rodriguez? Mr. RODRIGUEZ. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. And I have two questions that I wanted to ask. Let me just first add that, General, I think there is no doubt that at least—Í sit on the Veterans Affairs (VA) committee, and there is a real need for us to gather the data, the medical data as they get discharged to see how we can help out. And I really believe that anyone who has been in a combat set- ting needs to go through, even after they are discharged to the VA, through some counseling on post-traumatic stress disorders, be- cause anytime you witness any of those incidents, anytime you are involved in those incidents, you are going to go through some post- traumatic stress disorder. There is no getting away from that in terms of those feeling of guilt that you could have done something to prevent it, the feelings that come afterwards in terms of blame, that somebody else could have done something. You go though that. I mean, there is no get- ting away from that. We know that now. And it's not something that is so evident. But as they come out of there they are real macho. It hits them a little later on. And it does have an impact on people. And the ones where it does not have an impact on them, those are the ones that are even more se- riously ill that we have to look at. But, anyway, let me ask you two questions. One of them, I was reading where the reports were indicating that we are going to be looking at 8,000 to 10,000 more soldiers in addition to the 25,000 soldiers that we already trained; that we need about 100 drill ser- geants to be able to make that happen, because we have a lot in Afghanistan already out there; and how are we going going to be able to get those hundred—we are looking at 100 reservists, to do some of that training as a drill sergeant; and how do we make sure we have good quality training in that process? This is a question that we have come up with, and we have had a battle with the military—Mexican Americans, we get about 48 percent drop out of school, never get a high school-my prede- cessor, on that basis, would never have been able to get into the military, and later on got all kinds of degrees afterwards. 749 We know that at least the Mexican-Americans, a lot of them drop out, not because of academic reasons. We have a large percentage of African-Americans also and also white Americans. Under Sec- retary Alvarez, we push hard to try to get that 10 percent. In the Air Force, we still have not been able to, you know, convince them that there are some bright Latinos out there that did drop out of school and not because of academic reasons. And so I was wondering if we have had some difficulties there or we need to go back to that 10 percent, and it is just a magical number, and not increase that to 15? Well, you know, once again, half of Mexican-Americans are not going to be able to join the mili- tary because of that one reason. Dr. Chu. Let me deal with the second part of your question. The department is very interested, for just the reason you have indi- cated, sir, encouraging Hispanic-Americans to complete high school. It is, unfortunately, a strong predictor of whether you are going to succeed in the military. It is not a matter so much of what you learn in high school, it is your ability to cope with it or to- Mr. RODRIGUEZ. If I could also disagree with you. We have gone through that battle. When it comes to the Hispanic, there is—and I have heard that, but that applies mainly to the general popu- lation. But there is a large percentage and there are studies to show that there are about seven reasons why they drop out, and a lot of it has not to do with academics. And you talk about discipline, but those are the same ones—and I can give you example after example of Medal of Honor recipients that have been dropouts that have done real well. And so I am telling you that that logic that you have does not apply to the Mexican-American. Dr. CHu. No quarrel, sir. We have looked at specific subgroups, and it is true within sub- groups as well. I think our most important partnership on this issue needs to be—and we have been working with various interest groups to this end—to encourage Hispanic-Americans, especially Mexican-Ameri- cans, to finish high school. Mr. RODRIGUEZ. And I agree. Dr. CHU. and that really is key to their future whether they join the military or not, because- Mr. RODRIGUEZ. And I agree totally with you. The key is that they are not. So at the present time, we limit 10 percent have to get a G.E.D. in order to-is that holding us back from being able to get the additional- Dr. CHU. No, it is not impeding our recruiting efforts. In fact, we are typically in the mid-90 percentage range for high school di- ploma graduates—diploma—which is indication, as you suggest sir, it is not a matter of intelligence, it is a separate test, armed forces qualification test in terms of your mental ability, it s a signal of your ability to function in a highly organized environment. Mr. RODRIGUEZ. I understand. Let me quickly ask: Can I ask the others, how many we have that applied that do not have a high school, but have a GED equiv- alent that we are turning down, or because of the numbers? 750 Dr. CHU. We are succeeding in meeting our recruiting standards which are 90 percent content for high school diploma graduates. We are actually, typically very— Mr. RODRIGUEZ. That is not the question I asked. How many of the people that are applying under the 10 percent are you saying no to? Dr. CHU. I am sure there are quite a number that do not meet the standard that we are saying no to. Yes, sir. General CODY. I have to take that for the record, Mr. Congress- man, and get you the data. I see where you are going with this. And I think it is very germane to what we are doing, because we are growing. Mr. RODRIGUEZ. But I do not want to let that comment go. It is not that they do not cut the standard, it is that we cut the 10 per- cent to a certain amount, because those individuals, I am sure, do well, as well as the others. And it is not in terms that there are lower standards. And I am not asking you to go to lower standards. Dr. CHU. This is not a matter of Mr. RODRIGUEZ. I am sorry, General. You know, I just needed to make sure, because you made that comment, as if you are keeping the standards—I am not saying you should lower the standards, because there are some people without a high school diploma that are even higher qualified, if they could be given that opportunity. I am sorry, General, go ahead. General CODY. I need to take this for the record, to get you the details of, one, how we are doing on recruiting across the board, how we are doing on the high school side, the GED side, as well as what we are looking at right now as we increase our accessions. Right now, our recruitment looks good. Across the Hispanic, it still looks very well. We do have data on GED, We have got data for everything, and do they meet their full enlistment when we enlist them? We have got all kinds of data. And we can bring that do you and show you. But right now, I think we are on track with our recruiting efforts. Mr. RODRIGUEZ. I know the Air Force, you are limited to one per- cent? General CODY. Sir, I cannot speak to the Air Force personnel pol- icy on this. I will have to take that for the record. [The information referred to can be found in the Appendix begin- ning on page 810.) General HULY. In the Marine Corps, sir, we are making recruit- ing our mission. Over 98 percent are high school graduates, and that does include also the Mexican-Americans. We are doing fine in our Mexican-American recruitment. We have not closed the door. If I told the recruiters to get 100 percent high school graduates, they could get 100 percent high school graduates. But as you pointed out, some kids can be a good Marine, and they just perhaps for one reason or another did not get it. We have not closed the door to them. But we do have enough qualified applicants who are coming in with the high school appli- cation. 751 And I, too, will take your question for the record and get you how many we turn aside, but it is hard to accept one when you have got another qualified applicant- Mr. RODRIGUEZ. But, once again, I dropped out of school, also, in the 9th grade. My predecessor dropped out in the 9th grade. And that is not a reflection in terms of academic or anything else. What I am saying is we have got to make sure and allow that opportunity, not to lower the standards, but if you can provide an alternative test or provide some other stuff that will be able to show that that individual will be able to cut the mustard, and not necessarily just cut them off because of the fact that you have reached your quota of 10 percent with GEDs. Dr. CHU. It is not a matter of quota, sir. I think it is a matter of our experience. We are eager to identify among the poor, non- high school graduate who is going to be a success in the armed forces. We have tried various kinds of cuts like this. Experiment GED-Plus was attempted that didn't work. We will continue to ex- periment with that. It is just in terms of when we say we do not want to shut off military opportunity to promising young men and women. I do think, however, as you and I agree, the most important thing we do is encourage these young people to finish high school. That is the most important thing. Mr. RODRIGUEZ. No disagreement. On the 100 drill sergeants that we are going to need, how do we make sure that they are well qualified to teach our soldiers to be able to General CODY. We are doing that for several reasons. One is be- cause we are increasing the training base load because of modularity as well as because of the new accessions. And we are taking those soldiers on. They will be trained by the other drill sergeants we have, the cadre we have. And they will all be trained to standard before we release them into the drill sergeant business. Mr. RODRIGUEZ. But that cadre, my understanding, was going to be about 100 new drill sergeants? General CODY. This is not the first time we have ebbed and flowed on the numbers of drill sergeants, as you know. The Train- ing and Doctrine (TRADOC) commander has a solid plan to do this, sir. Mr. RODRIGUEZ. Thank you very much. Thank you. The CHAIRMAN. Thank the gentleman for his line of questions. en, if we can work in this area that the gentleman from Texas has talked about, I think that is an excellent oppor- tunity there for us. I was looking through the citations for bravery in Afghanistan and Iraq, and they are replete with actions of Hispanic-Americans. And I am reminded of the great sergeant, Roy Benavidez, who passed away last year in Texas, the only guy to ever make a com- bat assault trying to rescue an A-Team with nothing but a bowie knife, and was successful. So I thank the gentleman for his line of questions. And we have two gentlemen left who have been very patient. The gentleman from Texas, Mr. Thornberry? 752 Mr. THORNBERRY. Dr. Chu, I want to get back to the bigger pic- ture, because I do think it is very important not only for now, but for the future of our military. First, check me on my numbers, but as I add up the people in Iraq, Kuwait and Afghanistan, I get about 182,000 folks. Does that sound like in the ballpark? Dr. CHU. Approximately correct, yes, sir. Mr. THORNBERRY. Which represent eight percent of our total force. If they all happened to be active duty, it would be about 12 percent of our active duty force. And then, according to the num- bers the committee has, we have total deployed people in 120 coun- tries the number is something like 466,000. Does that sound right? Dr. CHU. I think that includes forward-stationed personnel as well, sir, people permanently assigned to Korea or Europe or wher- ever the case might be. Mr. THORNBERRY. So that represents something like 20 percent of our total force is deployed or in permanent forward station, as you describe. What I think is challenging to sort out is how this much pain comes from having eight percent of our folks in Iraq and Afghani- stan and having 80 percent of our folks who are not deployed at all. It seems to me there is something deeper, something more sys- temic that is going on here, and we are really derelict in o if we do not try to address that. Now, in response to Mr. Cole, you talked about having military folks do jobs that military folks need not do, and try to get that to civilians and contractors, that is part of the answer. Obviously, the Army is going through a transformation to get more out of the folks we have. That is part of the answer. But I am still not sure that is the whole answer, yet. Some people suggest that we do have a deeper problem in how ple we have got war-fighting and how many people we have got providing support and all of the other functions. And I guess I want to ask one specific question: That is, if you had to divide up all the military into war-fighters in one camp and then the other camp support and other sorts of folks, how many are in support? And I have heard estimates, but I would like to know your estimate. What percentage of our military is in support and non war-fighting jobs? My second question is: Why does eight percent of the force in Iraq and Afghanistan, 20 percent of the force deployed, cause this much difficulty? Dr. CHU. Sir, let me start with your second question. You and the secretary are on the same wavelength. This is his question, constantly challenging people like General Schwartz and myself, General Cody and others. I do think it reflects the fact that the military today still impor- tantly is organized along lines left from the Cold War. And I think General Cody has spoken eloquently to that in his description of Army transformation, which puts the Army in a different place and will make a higher fraction of the Army deployable, getting more capability out of the strength that we are privileged to have. 753 There is in my judgment no one single thing that we can do that will by itself transform this picture. There is a long list of actions we are undertaking. But just let me, if I could, come back to the military-civilian con- version issue. The last administration estimated that approxi- mately 325,000 active military slots devoted to activities that at least in theory could be performed by a civilian. That is equivalent, practically, to the overseas deployed and stationed force that you summarized in your numbers. Now not every one of those can be changed. There are a lot of good reasons why they are the way they are. But there are also some not so great reasons the way they are, some of which go back to tradition, the way we do things, how we handle ship-to-shore ro- tation in the Navy case, and so on and so forth. Mr. THORNBERRY. And you said that is a Clinton administration estimate? Dr. CHU. That was a Clinton administration estimate. That was their study. And we do not disagree with it. In fact, we would prob- ably get a slightly higher number. I do not want to quarrel about the number. The order of magnitude I think indicates the target in front of us. But let me take a different element that we are likewise working on. And that is a joint approach to solving some of these issues We are working with the Joint Staff to create an OIF-4. There is no reason that a medical person, for example, in the Air Force cannot support an Army deployment. Now, that is now how we are organized today. So there is not the easy mechanism when it comes to sourcing the request of forces from the combatant com- mander other than turning to the service that has classically pro- vided that kind of capability. But we have that capability resident in other parts of the force. We need to bring it to bear. And that is part of the challenge ahead of us. Again, coming back to the reserves, I do think vigorous use of re- serves—and I disagree with the conclusion we are overusing the re- serves—vigorous use of the reserves is part of the answer. The re- serves are an important part of our force. They are an important part of the budgetary expenditure of the department. The Congress has given them important compensation incentives, immediate and I to the service. And they are willing to serve, as long as we are prudent in that use. And I think the prudent use of reserves, which is typical of OIF- 1, 2 and 3, is part of the answer. Now, it does mean you do not use the same reserve unit until you move down the list. It is different from the Cold War. You move down the list, the units that were not classically as well-pre- pared, and they will take more IRR numbers to fill out their ranks, because, as General Cody testified, unfortunately the reserves are, as I like to say, overstructured. In other words, we kept more units than we had people on the rolls. And General Helmly, the Army Reserve chief, is intent on chang- ing that, shrinking the structure to match the number of people ac- tually there, so that when a unit is called, it is going to be filled. And we are likewise trying to change the training regimen for our reserve units, so that war training is done in peacetime in prepara- 754 tion for wartime use and so once mobilized, you do not have to spend as long a time as we now require to get the units up to speed. Bottom line is there are a long series of steps that I think will undergird this transformation. They will not be effective right away. They will take in some cases several years to carry out, maybe a decade in other cases to reach full fruition. But I think we can get there and make more use of the capabilities, not have so much strain for these kinds of deployments. . To your first question, “How much is support and how much is combat?” I would, if I may serve, try to quarrel a bit with the premise. In this kind of post-9/11 world, I think it is risky for us to label prejudicially one part of the structure as support and one part as combat. And let's take the OPFOR, for example, which we discussed this morning. That is, one could argue, a support element. But it is es- sential to the combat success of our forces. And so I would be very leery of such characterizations. The real question is, what is our ability, as you said in the second query, what is our ability to put those capabilities on the battlefield in a timely and responsive way that meets the needs of the combatant commander? Can we do so without strain? I think that is the test we need to pass. Can we do so without strain, without undue burdens on the force? And I think in this era with, where we have reach-back, when you would control a Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) from this room forward in Afghanistan, that is technically possible. In fact, I have visited the center at Dayton that the Air Force runs in intel- ligence where civilian analysts were busy giving cues to American aircraft pilots in combat as to the targets, saying, “No, no, that is. not the one you are supposed to be looking at, you are supposed to be looking at something else over here.” In fact, they turned out to be civilians. So in this era there is a much less pronounced dividing line between combat and support than there was before. The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman. The gentleman from New York, Mr. Israel. Mr. ISRAEL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And let me apologize for delaying the departure of these gentle- men. I will try to make this as quick as possible. And if somebody has asked this question, then feel free to give me the abbreviated response. I want to pick up on something that was said much earlier by Mr. Hefley. He was raising the concern that pern people have been trained for the wrong jobs. And he cited civil affairs and prison guards. And I just want to pursue that theme. The OIF rotation is going to pull out many people who have had their ear to the ground over the past many months, who have al- ready developed relationships, who have a strong cultural aware- ness where they are now. 755 We provide our troops with exquisite situational awareness. But one of the concerns that many of us have had is: Do we give them the right kind of cultural awareness? My question is: Will this rotation remove some of those people who have been in civil affairs, who have been involved in linguis- tics, who have had their ears to the ground, who already have that cultural awareness, will that now set that kind of cultural aware- ness back as those people are rotated out and a new group of peo- ple, brand new and fresh, without that kind of knowledge of the culture and religion and tribal leaders and the politics of that area are deployed? That is my question. I will ask Secretary Chu to respond. That is fine, General. It is a jump ball. Whoever gets it answers. General SCHWARTZ. Sir, when you do a rotation there is some loss of continuity. It is inevitable. However, it is important to note that the number of the units that are going in OIF-3 were in Iraq in OIF-1. So there is some build up of experience. Now, there is some loss of personnel in those units, some swap-outs and so on, retirements and what have you. But on balance about 55 percent of those forces going back will have had a prior tour on the ground in Iraq. That is point one. So the force is more experienced than it was the first time around or the first two times around. Second, as I tried to describe inadequately earlier, there is a mechanism for trying to make sure that the experiences and the relationships and the key contacts and so on, on the ground that, that gets handed off, both by commanders, troop leaders and so on. between units. And it is the euphemism of the right seat/left seat sort of ar- rangement. I would be kidding you if I told you it resulted in a per- fect transfer. It cannot possibly But I do think that on balance the force will be more experienced given prior time in theater, and that we do have a formal mecha- nism for handoff between the unit which is departing and that which is arriving. Dr. CHU. If I may, sir, if I could just supplement General Schwartz's comments. First, I think your point underscores why we have gone to longer as opposed to shorter tours of theater in the first place. Tenure doesn't matter. Continuity matters in these things. Second, we are taking a number of steps on the culture aware- ness front to improve our capabilities, particularly in the linguistic area. some of those are technological in character. You see some "gee whiz” articles in the press about some of these devices. Some of those are old fashioned. They just instruct people, for ex- ample, ask for a set of mobile training teams to bring rudimentary Arabic training to the deploying unit. Marines have made substan- tial use of this capability. At the same time, we have enlisted a number of heritage Arab speakers and Pashto and Dari speakers using the IRR authority for the department as a way to give our- selves better confidence. The first of those deployed this past spring. 756 So there are varieties we are doing, as General Schwartz has em- phasized, to ratchet up the cultural awareness level of the units that are deployed. But I think the key ingredient, in response to your question, is tenure. And that is one reason we have adopted longer tours. We recognize there are hardship for the troops. But just as was re- ported, one of the reasons I think 1st Armored Division was effec- tive in responding to Abizaid's request for more force these past few months is because they had already been there for a year. One battalion commander, very, I think, telling interview, very much along your line of questioning, when he was asked to the point, “Well, how did you know how to do this?” he said, I have been here a year. Mr. ISRAEL. Mr. Secretary, thank you. I am going to ask my of- fice to follow up with yours, if I may, because I do not want to take any more of the committee's time and exhaust their patience. I am interested in learning the percentage of civil affairs personnel in Iraq prior to this rotation and the percentage that we contemplate after the rotation. If my office can contact you and get those num- bers, I would be deeply appreciative. Dr. Chu. We would be delighted to. Mr. ISRAEL. Thank you. And thank you very much for your patience, Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member. The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman. And to finish off here, the gentleman from Nevada, Mr. Gibbons. Mr. GIBBONS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And to each of you, let me express my thanks to your men and women who serve under each of you for their great service to this country over the past several decades on any front that we may have engaged this country in the battle for freedom and justice around the world. We are very proud of you. We are very proud of them. And I want to make sure that you do not take away from this hearing the political discourse that we have here to have any effect on our admiration for your service to this country. There is no doubt in my mind that we are a nation at war. We are in a global war. We are in a Global War on Terrorism, with global deployments. And this does cause stress. It will cause stress, hether it was 1776, 1996, 2004. And you are dealing with those stresses I think most admirably for what is there. I have two questions, and I do not want to belabor the process too long, because when you get to me, you know that the time is near an end, that you will be able to leave. And so I want to get to those quickly. You look at the guard and reserve contribution to the services, and we know that in the next Iraqi rotation to Iraq, there is going to be about 43 percent of the make-up will be guard and reserve forces. Will that change the total force structure, the way you view it, in terms of the relationship of guard and reserve to total forces out there that comprise our combatant activities? Dr. CHU. Sir. I think. first of all, that the significant fraction that is reserve component, both National Guard and reserve, in the past 757 rotation and this next rotation underscores it is a total force; it is one force. The chairman, General Myers, he remarked that when he goes to a unit, you cannot tell where the people came from. They are all competent and serving their country well. I do not think it is going to change the total force concept. But for both active and reserve component forces, as I think General Cody and others have testified, we recognize we need more of some kind of units—he cited military intelligence, military police, espe- cially. We perhaps do not need quite so many of some of the units we had against the Cold War reserve structure. We think particu- larly of field artillery, air defense artillery being in that category in the Army case. But each service is undertaking a similar view. The Marine Corps is undertaking a similar scrub of its structure, active and re- serve, asking itself the hard question: Is this unit really important to the missions we have today for more capability of what is being pressed in the Global War on Terrorism? And that process is going on, active and reserve. It is not against the total force. It doesn't change the concept in its fundamental principle, that it is one force, and it is a continuum of capability here. Mr. GIBBONS. Dr. Chu, I appreciate that answer. And what I want to get at is of course the institutional concept that has been the struggle between the active duty forces, guard and reserve forces. Guard and reserve traditionally have been viewed as the hand-me-down kind of operation. Having served myself in the guard, and having served in the ac- tive duty, there is an attitudinal difference between active duty forces and the way they view guard and reserve and what they hand down to them in terms of equipment, training dollars, every- thing. I am hoping that the men who are sitting at this table, who are in charge of guard and reserve forces, and what they get from the active duty forces is viewed now in a different light in terms of whether or not they get the old, beat-up, retired systems that the active duty services no longer want. That has been a past practice which I think has to come to an end. There is no longer the ability for the guard and reserve, if they are going to come in and act, as you say, without distinction as to their source or generation of service, you know, we have to treat them with the same respect that we treat our active duty forces. Dr. CHU. Absolutely. I think that is the standard at which we are aiming. You are absolutely right. The department fell short on that standard in the past. My own personal view is the extraordinary service of guard and reserve units have driven a stake through that proposition. And there is no reason not to treat them equally. We are going to count on them equally. We should treat them equally. Mr. GIBBONS. Well, I appreciate that. Let me go to my real line of questioning that I really want to get to. We have heard a lot about the security forces, the Iraqi security forces, coalition security forces, now that we have the trans- 760 much more likely to have a child in early age, so “we” really does count. I think there are two things that we need to work on and we have made some progress on, but we would appreciate the support from this committee on. First is spousal employment and really spousal careers, because it matters to that spouse whether she or he has a chance to pursue an interesting line of work. There are a variety of barriers in our society in this regard. Let me mention one that is not under the purview of the committee, but is something where your exhortation will be heard by our na- tions' governors. Many states take the position that if the spouse changes location to follow the military member, unemployment compen available. We think that is unjust. I mean, there is not a real choice here, as you point out. It is "we.” I think the second thing that we can do is to ensure that the school system outside the gate is of high quality. Too many loca- tions around the United States, the public school systems are not of the quality that I think our military members aspire to.. Again, that is a local issue, not a Federal issue. We are trying to work with the states on that question. This committee has been superb, in my judgment, in support of the things we can do on the “we” front at the Federal level. One of them is to be sure we compensate our people fairly. That is one of the reasons we went to targeted pay increases, early in the administration. You have been terrific in supporting us on that front. That is very important, not just for the dollars, but it also signals, espe- cially for mid-career Non-Commissioned Officer (NCO) force, that we noted and care about their service, something that has been brought back to us in visits to the field, that this is a signal of our appreciation of what they are doing, which often is unsung, unheralded. They are the ones who man the midnight shift that fixes the air- craft so it can go out the next morning. It is terrific, and we are very grateful for that. The other thing it has done is help support things, such as our Military One-Source Program, which is intended to give military families an easy way to get help, ranging all the way from where to find a plumber in my new location, to the serious, as Ms. Sanchez raised, “I need mental health assistance for a member of the family.” And we give visits as part of this above and beyo vond the TRICARE program. And so your continued support for those missions I think will be very, very welcome, and critical for our success." Ms. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. Well, thank you. I appreciate it. Be- cause I think what I am hearing is that in terms of your basic as- sumption, it is largely the continuity that people would experience in the area in which they are serving and where they could be re- deployed in another station, duty station. I think that is important. One of the things I would just like to convey, having visited with our National Guard just last week, if there is a morale problem, 761 I think that it does lie partly with the National Guard. There is a sense that somehow they are not being treated the same. I know you addressed equipment earlier, but there are equip- ment shortages in home regions that do not allow them to train the way that they should be training, because the equipment is else- where. I am wondering how we are dealing with that issue, par- ticularly, and also the general issue of having so far fewer people stationed in a community that is being counted on while people are obviously being deployed elsewhere. Are those numbers coming up in terms of shortages? Are we con- sidering those when we think about our ability to engage the way we think that we should? Dr. CHU. We are careful in terms of National Guard call-outs to watch out for the individual state situation. On the equipment issue, I think that is a combination of two fac- tors, the heritage from the past which Mr. Gibbons spoke to a few moments ago, which I think we are aimed at correcting Second, in some particular areas, and armored Humvees is one of them, we have sent all of their equipment forward because the demand rose so substantially from initial projections. And so, yes, they have to train on a substitute. We correct that as rapidly as we can. I do not know, General Cody, if you want to add anything to that. General CODY. Well, you are all over it, Dr. Chu. We are working that hard. And we have so many different requirements out there for the up-armored Humvee, we are just barely now getting ahead of the power curve on it. Ms. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. Okay. Thank you. And I know that we hear stories of some our up-armored Humvees sitting in Kuwait, and the supply line being perhaps short, and that is another con- cern. Can I ask, why does the National Guard feel that they aren't being treated equally? Why do you think? General CODY. I have talked to them. I have got Roger Schultz here behind me, I think, unless he went out for a hamburger. I think it is because of the way we funded them in the past, the way we equipped them in the past, based upon the top line of the Army, and where we were at. I will tell you that modularity and transformation will absolutely make the National Guard's 34 brigades look like the active compo- nent brigades. The equipping of the 256th, the 116th, the 278th, their soldiers, as well as the 39th and 30th, are all getting the same equipment and the same stuff that we have. We didn't give them all the trucks, because, quite frankly, we are truck short. And so they do have some of the older five tons. But they are getting the applied armor and the up-armored Humvees, just like the active force. And hopefully as we come out of this OIF-2 and OIF-3, and we build the modular force, active, guard and reserve, we will put to a tiered Army and absolutely be what we are today, side by side, just one Army. And I think we are there. 762 Ms. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. Is there any difference in the way their deaths are treated, the way they are reported— General CODY. No. Ms. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA [continuing]. The way that they are consulted? General CODY. No, not at all. In fact, I just lost a dear friend from Vermont that worked for us for nine years. And the report came up, Sergeant Jamie Grey, he died in a up-armored Humvee. I talked to his dad. And of course, two weeks prior to that, we had another sergeant die that wasn't in an up-armored Humvee, an ac- tive soldier and a National Guard soldier. Their deaths are re- ported absolutely the same way. I take the briefings every day. You can't tell unless you know the unit, is that is a guard unit, is it not? We do not even differentiate and say the 1st of the 86th, Vermont National Guard. We say, 1st of the 86th, artillery. So I think we have come a long way. Roger, would you like to comment? Ms. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. It may be that they were suggesting that perhaps there be a-well, if you do it differently then you are discriminating in a different way. But I think there was a feeling that the community doesn't quite appreciate the fact that many of these soldiers are National Guard community-based individuals and that we need to somehow bring that forward in some way. And I will just pass that on, because there was Dr. CHU. We will look at that, ma'am. Ms. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA [continuing). A lot of concern about that. Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentlelady. And I want to let the gentlelady know, my good friend, that it is not the fault of the services that the guard and a lot of the active units have been underequipped in years past. And I want to give her a statistic. In 1998, we did a CBO, Congressional Budget Office analysis, nonpartisan, and we asked them to take all of the equipment that our military needed and to project the life expectancy of that equip- ment: trucks, tanks, ships, planes and other equipment and tell us how much we needed to be spending each year on a steady-state basis. This was during the Clinton administration. The answer was, we needed to be spending about $90 billion a year on equipment. We were spending an average of $45 billion to $50 billion a year on equipment under those budgets even though this committee added some $40 billion-plus during the tenure of that administration to the equipment. That is why National Guardsmen had old stuff. That is why ac- tive guys had old stuff. And the interesting thing is I would meet Guardsmen too. And they would say, “How come I got this old piece of equipment?” They thought that there was new equipment and the active guys had them. And you would go to the active unit, they would have the old equipment, too. Now, that $90 billion requirement has evolved into a $100 billion requirement, and we are still short. We still have a bow wave. But 763 we are up above $70 billion now. And so We have increased by about 70 percent over what we had in the old days. But that is the genesis of the shortages. And it wasn't a result of General Cody or the chief of staff of the Army then or anybody else or the Air Force or the Marines shortchanging their reserves. It was a matter of the government shortchanging the military. And so, hopefully, we are moving past those days. One other point of record was brought up here. And I wanted to get the precise record, because I think it is important to lay out a history. There was a discussion as to what the base force was sup- posed to be in the 1990's, how it evolved to the position it is in today and where it is going. I have the precise numbers in front of me. And the base force, it was established, which was intended to be maintained during the mid-1990's. that was put together by Secretary Cheney, or Se retary Powell and Secretary Cheney, was 12 active divisions, 13 ac- tive air wings, and 451 ships. Now, that was the blueprint that they left for the ensuing admin- istration. The ensuing administration cut below that by two divi- sions, to 10 divisions, and cut below the air wings by two air wings and cut below the ship numbers by 37 ships. So that is the base force that we entered this new century with: 10 divisions, down from 18 in 1991; 13 active air wings, down from 24 in 1991; and a little over 300 ships, down from almost 600 in 1991. And so we have a rebuilding job to undertake. We look forward to meeting this challenge. So thank you, gentlemen, for a very full hearing. And, General Huly, you got away with this for a long time, as my old friend from San Diego. Do you guys like the 9,000 new Ma- rines we want to give you? General HULY. Sir, I thought I dodged that one. Sir, thank you for the offer of the 9,000 Marines. We are looking at our total force right now, our structure. And we, too, are bal- ancing how many active-civilian billets that we are going to con- vert. And We have got some 4.000 of those that are still 1 in the process. We recognize that we need more infantry, we need more military police, we need more civilian affairs. We have not yet completed our structure study to see what it is that we do not need much of any more. We know we need those things for today. We have got to antici- pate what we are going to need two and three years from now, to be able to incorporate that total 9,000. The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. The record will reflect that General Huly totally supports the committee actions. [Laughter.] Thank you. Thank you very much, gentlemen, sincerely, for participating in this hearing. And the hearing is adjourned. [Whereupon, at 2 p.m., the committee was adjourned.] APPENDIX JULY 7, 2004 PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD JULY 7, 2004 OPENING REMARKS OF CHAIRMAN HUNTER Hearing on Iraq/Afghanistan Troop Rotation Plan July 7, 2004 The transfer of power to the interim Iraqi government and the televised images of that government beginning the judicial process against Saddam Hussein and 11 of his henchman are some of the most recent indications that real progress is being made in Iraq. Having just returned from Iraq last week and visited the areas of Mosul, Balad, Tikrit, Ramadi, Fallujah and Baghdad, I can report that there are many more good things going on in that country to restore freedom and provide a modicum of democracy to the Iraqi people. Without doubt, the most impressive part of my visit involved the American soldiers, marines and airmen I met who are doing a fantastic job, in difficult conditions in the most professional way. One Marine I met made a particular impression. He was in the ras hospital at Landstuhl, Germany, with a wound from a bullet that had gone into his side, passed through his chest, and exited into his protective vest. This Marine, with eight years service, told me the story and showed me the (769) 770 bullet that he had hanging from his neck. He knew he was lucky to be alive. But he also said that his wound was not going to stop him and he was going to continue serving. I salute him and his dedication and commitment. There are tens of thousands like him wearing the uniform with that same kind of spirit. America can be proud of them and their willingness to continue performing a tough mission with dedication and bravery. Today's hearing is about continuing the U.S. military mission is Iraq and Afghanistan. Specifically, we have asked our witnesses to address the plan for the third rotation of forces in Iraq and the sixth rotation of forces in Afghanistan. There are a number of issues that we'd like to get into today. Among them are: • The missions, size, scope, phasing and length of the OIF 3 and OEF 6 force rotations; • The continued heavy reliance on the reserve components, which we understand will make up 43 percent of the force going into Iraq, and, • The reasons behind the Army's need to involuntarily mobilize 5,600 people in the individual ready reserve – the IRR. 771 It's a given that the Army and Marine Corps are under stress because of deployments, but we want to know more about the measures being taken to preserve what I would call the “elasticity of the force" -- that is the ability to recover sufficiently from one commitment before committing to another. I am especially concerned that operational requirements in both the Army and Marine Corps are forcing the redeployment of forces without sufficient to reset at home station. I am also concerned that insufficient force structure and manpower are leading the services to make decisions that I liken to "eating the seed corn" -- that is, in order to make it through today we do things that mortgage the future. For instance, we need to know more about the Army decision to deploy the OPFOR unit from the National Training Center and some of the OPFOR from the Joint Readiness Training Center to Iraq and replace them with Guard units. Those two combat training centers have provided the bedrock of experience that has allowed our forces to be so exceptionally successful in combat. Finally, the Army's 3rd Infantry Division is going back to Iraq, but in a new configuration with four modularized brigades. As the first of the 772 Army's new units of action, we need to understand more about how these brigades will be employed and evaluated. Before I introduce our panel of witnesses, let me first recognize the Ranking Minority Member, Mr. Skelton, for any opening remarks he wishes to make. [After Skelton Remarks] Gentleman, welcome and we look forward to your testimony. I will introduce you in the order of your presentations. Honorable David S. C. Chu Under Secretary of Defense Personnel and Readiness Lieutenant General Norton A. Schwartz, USAF Director of Operations (1-3) Joint Chiefs of Staff General Richard A. Cody, USA Vice Chief of Staff Department of the Army Lieutenant General Jan C. Huly, USMC Deputy Commandant of the Marine Corps Plan, Policies, and Operations 773 General Cody, before we begin, let me offer our congratulations upon your recent appointment and confirmation as Vice Chief of Staff of the Army and promotion to four-star rank. Both are well deserved.. Dr. Chu, welcome and you may begin. 774 Opening Statement for the Honorable Ike Skelton (D-MO), Hearing on Army and Marine Corps Troop Rotations For Operation Iraqi Freedom 3 and Operation Enduring Freedom 6 and the Mobilization of the Army's Individual Ready Reserve. July 7, 2004 Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, gentlemen, for appearing before us today. Our subject today is one of the most important, if not the most, important matters to come before this committee in a long, long time. We hear the phrase "support our troops” so often these days that sometimes I'm afraid it loses its meaning. Today we take a good hard look at how we're using our nation's most precious commodity – our sons and daughters. Words cannot describe how proud we all are of them as they continually respond to every challenge we put before them. But I am very worried for them. We are asking a very few to exert an enormous, sustained effort for the good of all of us, and we need to pay careful attention so that we do it right. 775 There is a saying, “Mission first. People always.” We have a moral duty to see our mission through in Iraq and Afghanistan, but our soldiers, sailors, airmen and Marines are not pawns on a chessboard. Each of them is a national treasure. We all owe them a debt we cannot repay. This committee has seen on a bipartisan basis that they have the body armor and other protective gear they need in the field, and we can continue that effort by making sure we authorize what the additional strength they need to succeed. Time and time again I have called for an increase in endstrength for our forces. And so have other members on both sides of the aisle. With your support Mr. Chairman, we managed to add 30,000 soldiers and 9,000 Marines in our bill this year. But even that comes spread over three years. I worry that it's too little too late. In 2001, the Department of Defense published the Quadrennial Defense Review which called for a capabilities-based approach to defense planning. The force-sizing construct force the QDR used is commonly referred to as “1-4-2-1" and requires our military to: 1 - Defend the Homeland 776 4- Deter forward in four critical regions 2 - Conduct simultaneous warfighting missions in two regions 1 - Pursue decisive victory in one of those conflicts Clearly, we are currently trying to pursue a decisive victory in Iraq, and it's proving to be much more challenging and resource intensive than anticipated. Around the world this year, we're deploying over 80% of our active combat brigades and more than half of our National Guard combat brigades. I don't see how the force sizing construct of the 2001 QDR is still valid in 2004. We are wearing our people out. Today, we are watching the Defense Department take some drastic measures to man the next rotation of forces to Iraq and Afghanistan. Units are returning to combat with less than a year back in the States. Large numbers of the Individual Ready Reserve are being mobilized. We're locking the force down with stop-loss orders, and we're taking great risk with the very thing that makes our forces so great - our ability to train them against a world-class opposing force. Each of these measures is of concern, but when taken together they are cause for 777 serious alarm. We are managing this conflict with stop-gap measures as if the end is near - but Secretary Wolfowitz sat before this committee just two weeks ago and told us it was likely to go on for years. Even if the need for forces lessens in Iraq, who's to say that another need will not emerge before our troops are rested and recovered? This is a global war on terrorism, after all. At what point do we stop pretending that this year will be the last the demand is this high and that next year will bring some relief? We are taxing our part-time soldiers in the Guard and Reserve to the breaking point. Reserve forces will compose over 40% of this next rotation to Iraq, and to make those numbers the Department had to undertake the largest mobilization of the Individual Ready Reserve since Desert Storm. Now we're sending some back for a second tour. They come home and change units, only to deploy again! As part of the National Military Strategy required in our bill last year, this Congress asked the Joint Chiefs for an assessment of the risks of executing the current strategy. That assessment-due on February 15—has not yet been submitted, but I would like your 778 views today. I think we are accepting serious risk here and this tempo is unsustainable. Mr. Chairman, thank you for calling this hearing. I look forward to hearing from our witnesses just how they plan to meet the challenges of the conflict in Iraq in a way that protects our people from undue stress and preserves our national military capability so we don't break the force now only to need it later in an : unexpected crisis. • Watching the stability phase unfold in Iraq over the last year, I .. have been particularly struck by the impression that our plans were based on overly rosy assessments which, when they did not prove to be realistic, caused serious complications in our mission - complications that could have been avoided with proper planning! Therefore, I am especially interested to hear the thinking behind this rotation plan so that we can be sure we're taking prudent measures to mitigate the risk we are assuming. Thank you Mr. Chairman. 780 Biography Dr. David S.C. Chu Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness David S. C. Chu was sworn in as the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness on June 1, 2001. A Presidential appointee confirmed by the Senate, he is the Secretary's senior policy advisor on recruitment, career development, pay and benefits for 1.4 million active duty military personnel, 1.2 million Guard and Reserve personnel and 680,000 DoD civilians and is responsible for overseeing the state of military readiness.. The Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness also oversees the $15 billion Defense Health Program, Defense Commissaries and Exchanges with $14.5 billion in annual sales, the Defense Education Activity which supports over 100,000 students, and the Defense Equal Opportunity Management Institute, the nation's largest equal opportunity training program. Dr. Chu earlier served in government as the Director and then Assistant Secretary of Defense (Program Analysis and Evaluation) from May 1981 to January 1993. In that capacity, he advised the Secretary of Defense on the future size and structure of the armed forces, their equipment, and their preparation for crisis or conflict. From 1978 to 1981, Dr. Chu served as the Assistant Director for National Security and International Affairs, Congressional Budget Office, providing advice to the Congress on the full range of national security and international economic issues. Dr. Chu began his service to the nation in 1968 when he was commissioned in the Army and became an instructor at the U.S. Army Logistics Management Center, Fort Lee VA. He later served a tour of duty in the Republic of Vietnam, working in the Office of the Comptroller, Headquarters, 1st Logistical Command. He attained the rank of captain and completed his service with the Army in 1970. Prior to rejoining the Department of Defense, Dr. Chu served in several senior executive positions with RAND, including Director of the Arroyo Center, the Army's federally funded research and development center for studies and analysis and Director of RAND's Washington Office. . Dr. Chu received a Bachelor of Arts Degree, magna cum laude, in Economics and Mathematics from Yale University in 1964 and a Doctorate in Economics, also from Yale, in 1972. He is a fellow of the National Academy of Public Administration and a recipient of its National Public Senior Award. He holds the Department of Defense Medal for Distinguished Public service with silver palm. 781 INTRODUCTION Mr. Chairman, Mr. Skelton, and distinguished members of this Committee, it is my pleasure to join my military colleagues in discussing with you the upcoming troop rotations supporting Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom. Since September 11, 2001, the United States military has proven itself to be flexible and adaptive in meeting the operational demands of the new security environment. I would like to take the opportunity today to tell you about the guidance, process, and initiatives we are using to ensure that we are responsive to both the needs of the Combatant Commanders and the men and women who serve this nation. Our first and overarching priority is to fight and win the Global War on Terrorism. To the fullest extent practical, we must do so without overburdening those who elect to serve in our military forces. The Secretary of Defense has challenged us to ensure the judicious and prudent use of our forces, and we have instituted a number of improvements in how we manage the deployment of our forces to meet the Secretary's guidance. The Decision Process I would like to highlight our deployment review process to illustrate the care we exercise before we call upon our military forces to deploy. First, the Department conducts a thorough care we e we analysis of alternatives prior to deploying U.S. military forces. These alternatives include host nation assets, allied forces, and commercial support. Only if these alternative sources are infeasible do we then consider the use of U. S. military assets. These alternative manpower sources have allowed us to reduce the need for reserve support forces. For requirements that are to be met by U.S. military units, we take a global view of the available assets, and where prudent, may use forces from around the world and across Combatant 782 Commands to meet the need. Likewise, we look across the Military Departments for similar force capabilities so as to distribute the mission requirements. We are also expanding the use of Joint Manning Documents to facilitate our ability to draw critical skill sets across all four military services. When we must turn to our Reserve component forces, we first encourage the use of volunteers for the mission, if appropriate, through the use of incentives. If a unit must be mobilized, we first look to ensure that unit has not been mobilized in the past six years. If that is not possible, then we consider the nature and duration of the last deployment, and choose the unit that has had the least deployment burden. Additionally, we call upon the Individual Ready Reserve, where necessary, to reduce the amount of cross leveling needed between units preparing for mobilization, and to fill critical skill shortfalls such as military police and combat engineers. Using members of the Individual Ready Reserve provides trained manpower quickly, without raiding other units and undercutting their integrity. For Operation Iraqi Freedom III and Operation Enduring Freedom VI, we have used the following standards to guide our deployment effort: • Ensure forces do not exceed one year "boots on the ground.” Protect a 1:1 “dwell” time, i.e. the amount of time spent at home station should be no less than the time spent deployed. Identify Reserve Component requirements as early as possible; and encourage the use of volunteers. Do not exceed 24 months cumulative mobilization time. • Share the mission across the Department so that all military services contribute fully. 783 • Manage carefully the flow of forces rotating into theater to control bottlenecks, capability gaps, and backlogs. • Protect transformation initiatives. We are also employing a number of innovative force management practices to meet the challenge of current operations. Approaches such as the continuum of service concept, volunteerism, and "reachback," can help to ensure that we have access to individuals with the . skills and capabilities required for both emergent operations and sustained, day-to-day activities. However, to fully benefit from some of these initiatives, we will need your help in enacting legislation to improve flexibility in personnel management. Continuum of Service - This is a proposed management practice that sets aside the traditional definitions of Active and Reserve components, and recognizes that service may range from füll- time duty to availability in the event of mobilization without participation in military training or performance of duty on a regular basis. Between these extremes is a pool of individuals who may participate at varying levels of service throughout a career. Movement along the continuum should be transparent, and supported by a continuum of benefits that match service member contributions. Individual Volunteerism - The Department needs greater flexibility in accessing individuals that have the skills that can meet military requirements, but who do not fit the traditional career- oriented profiles generally recruited. Several pilot programs have been established for the Reserve components to test direct entry concepts into the IRR. One example is the Army's Arab Linguist Program that is focused on recruiting native Arab speakers into the IRR. Reachback - In an effort to reduce the number of forward deployed personnel needed to support combat troops, DoD has taken a close look at mission areas that might be accomplished remotely 784 via reachback. Reachback refers to the ability to connect electronically to sites in CONUS or other locations around the world to accomplish essential tasks and missions. An illustrative example of this is the Joint Reserve Intelligence Program that is comprised of 27 Joint Reserve Intelligence Centers (JRIC) located in CONUS where reservists provide mission support to -supported commands. During OIF, Central Command used mobilized reservists in JRICs to perform targeting, bomb damage assessment, and imagery exploitation... Individual Ready Reserve - We have redefined how we access the IRR to make IRR members a . more viable source of military manpower and to provide greater depth of capabilities. Efforts on : the part of the Services to reconnect with their IRR members and to clarify their mission and expectations will reduce the amount of cross leveling needed between units to prepare for mobilization. Force Rebalancing - To enhance early responsiveness and minimize the need for reserve it . .. mobilization, the Department has shifted or “rebalanced” about 10,000 military spaces both within and between the Active and Reserve components in fiscal year 2003, and is rebalancing about 20,000 spaces in fiscal year 2004. By fiscal year 2005, we expect an additional 20,000 spaces. Phased Mobilization - As a result of our experience with previous rotations, we have determined that phasing a unit, i. e. mobilizing the leadership and those requiring specific additional training prior to deployment in advance of the majority of the unit's members, results in a smoother mobilization and training transition. Adaptive Training – We are working toward providing adaptive training programs and... expanding the training base to accommodate rapid, responsive retraining to build new.. capabilities when needed. 785 Military-to-Civilian Conversions - We are converting support functions that are not inherently military in nature to be performed by civilian personnel. This ensures that our soldiers, sailors, marines and airmen are available for military operations. Train-Mobilize-Deploy - This legislation will support training efforts in advance of deployment, and will particularly help alleviate shortfalls in critical skills that are in high demand. Building Additional Combat Capability As is well known, the Army is building additional active combat capability of the type relevant to our contemporary military challenges, within its existing structure of ten active divisions. In the future, each division should be able to provide four brigades, versus the three that characterizes today's force. The 3rd Infantry Division, scheduled to be part of OIF 3, will be the first to complete this conversion. And, these new brigades will be "modular"—that is, easily able to operate with brigades from another division, or as part of another division. The Marine Corps is similarly refocusing its manpower on contemporary combat needs, likewise with the objective of creating additional capability within the same permanent end strength. Marines Corps 7-MONTH ROTATION You have asked about the difference between the Army's one-year rotation and the seven-month rotation policy of the Marines Corps. To ensure continuity and minimize disruption, headquarter elements will deploy for twelve months. A seven-month rotation for the battalions was decided by the Secretary of Defense as the best use of Marine manpower under present circumstances. It allows for several rotations during the first enlistment period, given a 1:1 dwell time and typical Marine enlistment contracts. And, for I MEF it recognizes their service in OIF. 786 CONCLUSION Mr. Chairman, we are all impressed and gratified by the performance of our military Te ai during this very challenging and fluid time in its history. The consistency and enthusiasm displayed by so many is properly the focus of great national pride. We should applaud the Active 11 Duty and Reserve Service members, their families, Defense civilians, and contractors who, in the face of often daunting circumstances, have remained committed to the call to serve professionally and responsibly. This concludes my statement. I thank you and the members of this Committee for your conse outstanding and continuing support for the men and women of the Department of Defense. . 787 STATEMENT BY GENERAL RICHARD A. CODY VICE CHIEF OF STAFF UNITED STATES ARMY BEFORE THE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ON TROOP ROTATIONS FOR OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM 3 & OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM 6, AND THE ARMY'S MOBILIZATION OF THE INDIVIDUAL READY RESERVE SECOND SESSION, 108TH CONGRESS JULY 7, 2004 788 STATEMENT BY GENERAL RICHARD A. CODY UNITED STATES ARMY VICE CHIEF OF STAFF Introduction Chairman Hunter, Congressman Skelton, distinguished members of the committee, I appreciate the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss troop rotations for Operation Iraqi Freedom 3 and Operation Enduring Freedom 6, and the Army's Mobilization of the Individual Ready Reserve. I also want to take this opportunity to thank the committee, on behalf of the magnificent men and women of our Army, for your continued support as they execute the global war on terrorism. Your concern, resolute actions and deep faith in America's sons and daughters are widely recognized throughout the rank and file of our service. With over 304 thousand Soldiers deployed in over 120 countries worldwide, the Army remains actively engaged in support of the nation's operational requirements, including Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom in Southwest Asia, the Stabilization Force and Kosovo Force in the Balkans, and the Multinational Force and Observers mission in the Sinai. Concurrently, we are undertaking large scale and absolutely necessary actions to ensure our Army's readiness and relevance to efficiently meet national security challenges now and well into the 21st Century, while sustaining our magnificent volunteer force. These actions include resetting, rebalancing, modularizing, stabilizing, and training of the force. It is in the context of all these actions that the One Army Concept is proving its worth during an unprecedented period in our Nation's history. As we accomplish these actions, our great Soldiers in the Army's Active and Reserve Components, including the Individual Ready Reserve, will remain the centerpiece of everything we do. They will ensure our success .2 . 789 in future operations and transformational efforts, just as they do today in tough combat and stability operations around the world. Today, I would like to first highlight some of these actions to provide a clearer context for our subsequent discussion on troop rotations and mobilization of the Individual Ready Reserve. Resetting the Force After conducting a strategic assessment and incorporating lessons learned in Afghanistan and Iraq, we have further defined how to set the force for success. We have designed a process of reconstituting our current equipment by undertaking a rigorous long-range plan known as "Reset" for short. This plan requires intensive resourcing, repair and overhaul of our ground equipment and aircraft, and prioritization and streamlining of our facilities and personnel to support these efforts. As sustained operations are likely to be the norm for the foreseeable future, our plans include establishing force rotation plans for on-going operations, and reestablishing and restructuring Army Pre-positioned Stocks (APS) to better support Combatant Commanders. Rebalancing the Force We are moving away from the force structure designed for the Cold War to provide the Nation with full-spectrum ground combat and support units that are capable of defeating a persistent, adaptive enemy. The challenge within the force structure is not that we have too few soldiers, it has been the ability to take a force designed to fight and win against a symmetric threat, and transform it to a force that matches the skill and unit sets required to execute the global war on terrorism and other operations, swiftly, and on a sustained basis. Modularizing the Force 790 We are transforming into a brigade-based modular Army to enhance responsiveness, strengthen our decisive campaign qualities, and increase our joint and expeditionary capabilities. Modularization increases our war-fighting capabilities with more interchangeable active and reserve component brigade units of action; transforms Army Aviation, Combat Support, and Combat Service Support formations to increase flexibility, capability, and to decrease logistical support requirements; and de-layers headquarters structure to increase responsiveness and to meet joint and combined command and control requirements. The sum of our maneuver, support, and headquarters restructuring will be a force with improved interchangeable capabilities, the ability to simultaneously project combat power from our CONUS and OCONUS bases, and headquarters that can be rapidly configured to provide command and control for joint and coalition forces. Stabilizing the Force Today's volunteer Army is engaged at a pace unseen since the end of the draft, some 30 years ago. The challenges associated with current operational requirements place significant stress on existing forces, both active and reserve. We aim to remedy much of this stress through force stabilization, which will allow Soldiers to remain on their initial installation for longer periods and to arrive, train and serve together for roughly three years. We will enhance unit cohesion, improve training effectiveness and create more deployable, combat-ready units. During the unit's operational cycle, Soldiers can expect to complete an operational deployment rotation of 6 to 12 months. Besides enhancing unit readiness and cohesion, force stabilization initiatives will improve quality of life for our Soldiers and their families by increasing the predictability of deployments and other requirements. Training the Force 791 The adaptability, competence and resiliency our units are demonstrating deployment after deployment have validated our investment in training and development of our Soldiers and leaders. The Army's training programs have also been, and will continue to be, the cultural drivers for the future. The Army is fully committed to adapting and strengthening Noncommissioned and Commissioned Officer development and education programs. Leaders will not learn what to think, but instead how to think-jointly, strategically and within the context of an expeditionary mindset. We will continue to invest in cutting edge facilities and technology and constantly modify our curricula to reflect current and expected threats, and incorporate the lessons of actual operations, as we already are doing with the experience gained in Afghanistan and Iraq. Individual Ready Reserve Soldier Notifications As a part of the Army's Ready Reserve, the Individual Ready Reserve consists of over 111,000 trained Soldiers most of whom served previously on Active Duty or in the Selected Reserve--such as a member of an Army Reserve unit. These Soldiers may be called upon during a National Emergency to fill the mobilization needs of the Army. Unlike new recruits, these Soldiers are experienced, and can contribute significantly to Army readiness. Accessing the IRR to obtain the right Soldiers for specific requirements allows us to minimize cross-leveling between units, thereby protecting other units for future requirements by maintaining their cohesion, a critical force multiplier in combat. Within the week, the Army, in support of Central Command requirements, will begin the mobilization of approximately 5,600 Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) soldiers. Although approximately 2,300 IRR Soldiers have previously been called to active duty in support of the War on Terror, this will be the first major use of the authority granted on - 5 - 792 January 20, 2004, by the Secretary of Defense to mobilize up to 6,500 members of the IRR. We will accomplish this with a phased mobilization over the next several months. Most Soldiers will serve 18 months, with some serving up to a total of 24 months, which accounts for training time and 12 months in theater. These Soldiers will fill vacancies in National Guard and Army Reserve units scheduled to deploy in support of Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom late this year and in early 2005. Each individual Soldier will undergo refresher training, physical evaluation, and be equipped before they join a mobilized unit and then continue with unit training prior to theater deployment. This will facilitate Army National Guard and U.S. Army Reserve units that are cohesive, fully trained and ready for combat operations. As requirements become clear for operations in 2005 there may be a need to mobilize additional IRR soldiers. The IRR call-up is not all-inclusive. The Army does not intend to recall IRR Soldiers who have returned from a combat zone or hardship tour within the past 12 months; however, these soldiers may volunteer for mobilization. Mobilization orders will advise Soldiers how to proceed in order to request deferment. All IRR Soldiers should receive their orders at least 30 days prior to their report date. Operations Iraqi Freedom (OIF) 3 and Enduring Freedom (OEF) 6 Finally, I would like to address the Army's next rotation of trained and ready forces in support of the U.S. Central Command requirements for Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom. Based on the Secretary of Defense's plan to support U.S. Central Command requirements, the Army will deploy Active and Reserve Component combat, combat support, and combat service support units for OIF 3 and OEF 6. In accordance with the procedures we used to successfully -6- 793 execute the last rotation, there will be a phased rotation in and out of the Central Command area of operations to provide maximum overlap for the affected units. All Reserve Component units identified for deployment will be given sufficient time to train in preparation for their employment. The total length of mobilization for each unit is dependant upon training requirements and the requirements of the Combatant Commander. The current rotation notification process allows the Army to provide trained and ready units to Central Command, while also providing maximum possible notification for Soldiers, their families, employers, and communities. Conclusion The contributions of each component of the Army -- Active, Army National Guard, and Army Reserve - are indispensable to our ability to support our Combatant Commanders as they execute their full range of strategic commitments to include the global war on terrorism. We appreciate the support this Congress has provided the Armed Services, America's sons and daughters, who are serving selflessly throughout the world to keep America safe and free. I look forward to the opportunity to participate in this session and answering your questions. -7- 794 STATEMENT OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL JAN C. HULY DEPUTY COMMANDANT PLANS, POLICIES, & OPERATIONS UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS BEFORE THE HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE CONCERNING THE ARMY'S AND THE MARINE CORPS' TROOP ROTATIONS FOR OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF) 3 AND OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF) 6 AND THE ARMY'S INVOLUNTARY MOBILIZATION OF THE INDIVIDUAL READY RESERVE ON JULY 07, 2004 796 for OIF III and OEF VI. Headquarters, command elements, and the Marines that man them deploy for a period of 12 months. In light of current operational commitments, we believe that this rotation policy remains the best course to provide the combatant commander with the most effective, combat ready units. The policy also minimizes stop-loss/stop-move orders and interruptions in recruit training. It also allows Marines to receive the latest training in their preparation to re-deploy in support of OIF III and OEF VI. Moreover, this policy allows for flexible force applications for other deployment requirements, while retaining the flexibility to extend units without breaking 365 days of “Boots on the Ground.” Manning the Force While the operational tempo remains high, recruiting and retention efforts continue to meet our manpower goals. We are continually monitoring the health of our Service, and we are focused on ensuring that the Marine Corps remains ready to support OIF III and OEF VI. Our Total Force approach to operational commitments plays a key role in the management of Personnel Tempo. Personnel Tempo (Perstempo). As of 30 June 2004, the Marine Corps had 3,379 active component and 1,732 reserve component Marines who have exceeded the 400 out of the preceding 730 days Perstempo threshold. Currently, there are 48,834 active component and 18,855 reserve component Marines who have accrued between 182 and 399 days of Perstempo. Prior to September 2001, the Marine Corps maintained a 2.7:1 unit-level rotation ratio. As a result of the current operational demands associated with the Global War on Terrorism, Marine he Corps units are rotating at a 1:1 or higher rate. Nevertheless, to date we have no evidence that the increase in Perstempo has adversely affected retention. We expect that we will continue to 797 meet recruiting and retention goals to keep the force strong through our commitments to OIF III and OEF VI. Recruiting and Retention. The Marine Corps Reserve achieved its Fiscal Year 2003 recruiting goals with the accession of 6,174 Non-Prior Service Marines and 2,663 Prior Service Marines, and our recruiters continue to meet mission goals. Our First Term Alignment Plan (first tour) has achieved its reenlistment requirements for the past nine years. With just over two-thirds of the current Fiscal Year completed, we have achieved 96 percent of our first-term retention goal for the year. Our Subsequent Term Alignment Plan (second tour and beyond) is at 109 percent of our retention goal. Officer retention is at a 19-year high, continuing a four-year trend of increasing retention. However, certain Military Occupational Specialties continue to suffer perennially high attrition. Examples include Explosive Ordnance Disposal technicians, ca Aviation Electronics Technicians, Electronic Maintenance Technicians, and Public Affairs. Reserves. Our Reserve Marines remain a vital and critical element of our Total Force. Of the 9,801 reservists on active duty as of 30 June this year, 1,391 Individual Mobilization Augmentees, Individual Ready Reserves, and Retirees fill critical joint and internal billets. Reservists will continue to play critical roles in the Total Force plans for OIF III and OEF VI. End Strength. The Marine Corps assimilated last year's congressionally authorized increase in Marine Corps end-strength to 175,000. The increase of 2,400 Marines authorized by Congress addressed an urgent need to train and maintain enough Marines for the long-term requirements associated with the Global War on Terrorism. We recently completed a Force Structure Working Group study to examine our force structure and manning requirements, and considerations for a possible increase in end strength are under review. Key among these considerations is training support (recruit depot and military occupational school loading), 798 FTAP/STAP supportability, phased increases in officer and enlisted promotions in support of a phased end strength increase, and the infrastructure and funding required to support an increase we in manpower. While the force is under stress, our current manning and force rotation policies enable us to plan with confidence to meet the troop rotation requirements for OIF III and OEF VI. Equipping the Force As a result of your support to date, the Marine Corps has had sufficient equipment to support current operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. The readiness of our forces in OIF-II and OEF V continues to be high; currently the overall readiness of operating forces in-theater is 92%. However, aging equipment, high usage rates, and austere conditions in Iraq clearly present future readiness challenges. As an example, our combat vehicles alone (Amphibious Assault Vehicle/ Light Assault Vehicle/ Logistics Vehicle System) are operating at a ratio of combat utilization eleven times that of a normal peacetime rate. Additionally, multiple weapon systems are rapidly approaching the end of their life expectancy. As an example, our Logistics Vehicle System (LVS) with a life expectancy of 20 years when initially fielded, had a pre-OIF age of 18 years on the average. Since the onset of the war, we have incurred several equipment major end item losses (24) due to combat operations, and no "hot production line” exists to replenish such losses. For the LVS, as with other weapons systems, the challenge is exacerbated by the fact that the initial fielding of its replacement is a number of years in the future (FY09 for the LVS Replacement). Mitigation plans do exist, such as the Service Life Extension (SLEP) and Inspect and Repair Only As Necessary (IROAN) programs; however, aging equipment, high usage, and combat losses are affecting our readiness. 799 Combat stress on equipment is an area we are studying closely, and a concern with which we will need your continued support. Maintaining equipment readiness levels through OIF III and OEF VI will necessitate your continued support as our equipment continues to age at a pace that may exceed our ability to repair, refurbish, or replace equipment. As we prepare the force, we will continue to make every effort to pursue modernization and transformation. Maintaining aging “legacy” equipment requires increased financial and manpower investment with each passing year, due to obsolescent parts and higher rates of equipment failure or destruction due to enemy action. With our modernization and transformation goals in mind, we are using the funds provided by Congress to repair, refurbish, and where necessary, replace equipment. To mitigate those challenges noted, the Marine Corps is developing a Total Life Cycle Management tool scheduled for completion later this summer that will compile equipment usage rates and cost factors from our operating forces, program managers, and Marine Corps Logistics Command into a comprehensive document to better assess the costs of OIF III and OEF VI operations, and to determine the most efficient and cost effective manner to either repair or replace our equipment. Additionally, we have formed a Strategic Equipment Working Group that is tasked to work with the operating forces to formulate overall sourcing practices related to all Marine Corps requirements to include current and future OIF III and OEF VI obligations. Maritime Prepositioning Force Program. It will take time to return the Maritime Prepositioning Force program to pre-OIF employment capability, and the use of Maritime Prepositioning Squadron assets in support of OIF II may extend reconstitution. One squadron is complete and ready to respond to any contingency. Several ships in the other two squadrons had completed reconstitution, but those ships have since been used to support the Marine forces 800 deploying for OIF II. The current schedule has one Maritime Prepositioning Squadron completing its scheduled maintenance cycle in April 2005, and the second squadron concluding its scheduled maintenance cycle in April 2006. The time it will take until we have all three squadrons back up will be a function of additional equipment requirements in support of OIF ILI and OEF VI, Corps-wide equipment readiness, and the condition of the equipment that returns from OIF II. Reconstitution of our forces and Maritime Prepositioning Squadrons will be a challenge for the foreseeable future. Conclusion In conclusion, I would like to again thank the members of this Committee for your continuing support of the Marine Corps. The young men and women of your Corps are doing an exceptional job and will continue to do so through OIF III and OEF VI. Their accomplishments are a direct reflection of your continued commitment to maintaining our Nation's expeditionary warfighting capability. We go forward with confidence because Marines have the best training and equipment in the world, thanks to this Congress, and the Nation we proudly serve. DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD JULY 7, 2004 UNCLASSIFIED As of 0830, 7 Jul 04 OIF 2 - OIF 3 US Force Disposition OIF 2 US Force Disposition OIF 3 US Force Disposition wwwww Stryker Brigade MNB - N Stryker Brigade MNB - NS DER 1st ID 42nd D 15 CAV 3rd ID eaghdad 1 MEF ESPRE 1 MEF 1st AD 32 BDE / 10th ID- Reserve: 2 X BDES Reserve: 1 X BDE OEF THEATER | OFE SECURITY THEATER SECURITY ALBORNE 4 (+) Divisions (18 US Brigades) ~140,000 3 (+) Divisions (17 US Brigades) ~135,000 UNCLASSIFIED (803) 804 Transition Nov 04 UNCLASSIFIED Ground Troop Rotation Plan OIF 2 Operation Iragi. Stryker Brigade Stryker Brigade 300 Brigade, 200 10 1st Brigade. 250 D 15t Infantry Division 42nd Infantry Division (NY) 2 x Brigades, 1st 10 2 x Brigades, 30 D 2ne Brigade, 25mm 3D 1161 Brigade (National Guard, ID). 30th Brigade (National Guard, NC) 2789 Brigade (National Guard, TN) T Marine Expeditionary Force Marine Expeditionary Force 3 x Marine Expeditionary Brigades 2 x Marine Regimenisa - 131 Brigade, 1sID znu BDE 2nd Infantry Division 151 Cavalry Division 3rd Infantry Division 2660 Brigade (National Guard, LA 3 x Brigades, 13 CD 39th Brigade (National Guard, ÅR) 2 * Brigades, 31 iD 3rd BOE, 1 AD Dec 04 - Feb 05 Mar 05 Nov 04 Mar Os 1st Armored Division 2 x Brigades, 181 Armored Division Jul 04 | 2nd Brigade, 10th Mountain Division 1 x Intantry Brigade 11th Marine Expeditionary Unit 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit 2nd Light Cavalry Regiment * x Cavalry Regiment Feb 05 819! Brigade 1 x Brigade (National Guard, WAICA) 1551h Armored Brigade (MS) 1x Brigade National Guard 29th Brigade (National Guard, Hi). 1 x Brigade National Guard | grd Armored Cavalry Regiment 1 x Cavalry Regiment 3 DIVISIONS Mar 05 A DIVISIONS | Up to 12 Month Rotations | UNCLASSIFIED 805 UNCLASSIFIED Ground Troop Rotation Plan Operation Enduring Freedom OEF-AFG VE Mansition OEF-AFGV 25TH Infantry Division (1) 3ro Brigade, 25M D -- 25+ Artillery Brigade sith Marine Regiment 2nd Battalion, 8th Marines i x Maritte Aviation Combat Element Southern European Task Force 17. 3rd Separate Infantry Brigade 3rd Baitallon, 6Marinez und Brigade 82m+ ABN 13. Marme Aviation Combat Element Afghanistan National Army Training Headquarters A5th Brigade, National Guard (OK Afghanistan National Army Training Headquarters 765 Brigade, National Guard (N) I DIVISION 1 OIVISION Up to 12 Month Rotations UNCLASSIFIED ES 806 UNCLASSIFIED OIF 3 & QEF VI Force Flow OF 2 & OEF IVIV OIF 3 & OEF VI 155 ect if Zum ZOO I 176 BCT IN L INIS) | 11 MEU 2:10 ID 152 1256 BCT KLAN 116 BCTV21 CRO Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun 2004 2005 UNCLASSIFIED QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD JULY 7, 2004 QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. SKELTON Mr. SKELTON. General Cody, if you had your druthers today, what would you in- crease the M.I. numbers with and the M.P. numbers with? General CODY. The Army will increase Military Police capabilities by more than 21,000 spaces to enhance support for homeland defense and the regional combatant commanders. The guard will see an increase of 16,600 with the active and reserve increasing by approximately 2,000 and 2,600 respectively. These increases are pro- grammed for completion by 2011. Mr. SKELTON. Ĝeneral Cody, you mentioned, if you had your druthers, you would have 9,000. more military intelligence, soldiers. And for the record, you are going to get us the number of M.P.s. You did not mention the need for additional civil affairs soldiers. I would like to have that figure, too. General CODY. The Army will increase Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations (PSYOP) capabilities by more than 1,300 spaces to enhance support for the regional combatant commanders. Increases will take place in both the active and reserve force and are programmed for completion by 2011. ealt seems to me that and today we are cast in 2003 we firedt, electronics QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. MEEHAN Mr. MEEHAN. A recent report conducted by the University of California-Santa Barbara's Center for the Study of Sexual Minorities in the Military analyzing the Defense Department's discharge statistics found that nearly 1,000 service members with special skills needed in Iraq have been expelled from the military in the last five years because they are gay. Now the military is calling up 5,600 members of the Individual Ready Reserve, a pool of manpower concentrated with these high-in- demand skills. These actions seem inconsistent. For example, in the past three years we have discharged 26 linguists from the military; today we are calling up 3. In the past five years we have discharged 14 electronic intelligence personnel; today we are calling up 10. In the past three years we fired 29 operational intelligence personnel; today we are calling up 33. In the past three years we discharged 29 troops trained in aircraft electronics mainte- nance; today we are calling up 29. And last, in 2003 we fired 20 combat helicopter repairmen and women and today we are calling up 24. It seems to me that discharging skilled service members, simply because they are gay or lesbian, hurts our military readiness, particularly if we are now recall Indi- vidual Ready Reserve personnel with many of the same skills. Do you think that discharging linguists and combat helicopter maintenance staff because of their sexu- ality is the best use of our time and resources? Finally, do you think that 'Don't Ask, Don't Tell is the best policy for our mili- tary? I do not, and according to a recent Gallup poll, 79$ of Americans agree with me. General SCHWARTZ. The US Military "Don't Ask, Don't Tell” policy is directed by 10 USC section 654. Our commanders in uniform adhere to the law. As you may know, the number of personnel discharged under this policy declined in the last year (770 in 2003, versus 885 in 2002). We will continue to make every effort to reduce attrition from all causes, and ensure every service member has the opportunity to complete his or her full term of enlistment while achieving their full potential in service to our country. General CODY. The military's Don't Ask, Don't Tell policy discharges openly gay or lesbian service members. The policy wholly supports Congress' finding that the presence of "persons who demonstrate a propensity or intent to engage in homo- sexual acts would create an unacceptable risk to the high standards of morale, good order and discipline, and unit cohesion that are the essence of military capability.” In other words, homosexual conduct is incompatible with military service. It is true that the skill sets of service members (for example, linguists or heli- copter mechanics) discharged under the Don't Ask, Don't Tell policy are no longer available for military purposes. And, it is foreseeable that in certain situations, the discharge of service members under the Don't Ask, Don't Tell policy may bring about the recall of Individual Ready Reserve personnel with the same skill sets. (809) 810 However, to permit openly gay or lesbian persons to serve in the military would di- rectly and negatively impact the military, posing an unacceptable risk to its ability to accomplish the mission. This is why the Don't Ask, Don't Tell policy is the right policy for our military. General HULY. Between 1990 and 2003 the Marine Corps has discharged 6 Offi- cers and 1,037 enlisted Marines for Homosexual Conduct, which averages less than 75 Marines per year or 0.043% of the Marine Corps active duty strength. For 2004, the Marine Corps has discharged 48 Marines. 22 of the 48 discharges have taken place in recruit training prior to primary MOS training, so the impact on oper- ational requirements has been minimal. The Marine Corps treats all Marines within the guidelines established in the “Don't Ask, Don't Tell” Policy. The Marine Corps supports the current policy. QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. TAYLOR. Mr. TAYLOR. I would like to ask for the record, and hopefully as quickly as pos- sible, a list of every National Guard and Reserve unit that has been either notified that they will be called up, including the Marines, or notified that they could be called up for OIF-3. General SCHWARTZ. [The information referred to is classified and retained in the committee files.] Mr. TAYLOR. General, would you have the numbers for the Air Force Reserve and the Air Guard? General HULY. The AF Reserve currently has 1,158 mobilized for OIF of our total 4,295 reservists mobilized. By the end of FY04, we estimate that about 900 resery- ists will be mobilized for OIF. By Sept. 05, we anticipate that we will have a total of less than 50 reservists mobilized. Unlike the Army and Marines, our rotations are done IAW. the established AEF rotation (15 day, 30 day, or 120 day) schedule. Short of major increases in terrorist activities in either operation, we do not expect to have major mobilizations through FY05 (attempt is to maximize volunteerism vice mobilizations). From the period of I Mar 04 to the present, the Air National Guard has deployed 2,516 personnel in support of OIF-3 and 8,207 personnel in support of OEF-6. Our projections indicate that we will deploy an additional 650 personnel for the remain- der of OIF-3 and 2,400 personnel to OEF-6, bringing the total number of personnel deployed in support of OIF-3 and OEF-6 to 13,773. . QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. RODRIGUEZ Mr. RODRIGUEZ. How many do we have that applied that do not have a high school, but have a GED equivalent that we are turning down, or because have the numbers? How many of the people that are applying under the 10 percent are you saying no to? General Cody. The fiscal year 2004 (FY04) active Army accession mission is on glide to achieve the 77,000 accessions mission with the projection of approximately 77,500. Year-to-date through the end of August, the active Army has achieved 101 percent (70,479) for a mission of 69,903. Quality marks are currently 92.5 percent for High School Degree Graduates (HSDG), 71.2 percent for Test Score Category (TSC) I-IIIA and 0.5 percent for TSC IV. The Army Goal is 290 percent HSDG, 267 percent TSC I-IIIA and 52. percent TSC IV. The Army does not measure as a metric or track the number of personnel turned away due to qualifications. The only data point that can be examined is the dif- ference of 2.5 percent, between the Army HSDG achievement (92.5 percent) and the goal (90 percent). The Army has been able to garner the higher percentage of HSDG applicants and this difference represents 1,794 Soldiers. The Army's enlisted accession mission for FY05 is 80,000. QUESTIONS SUBMITTED MS. SANCHEZ Ms. SANCHEZ. I trust you are both familiar with the Army report published in the New England Journal of Medicine on July 1 entitled "Combat Duty in Iraq and Af- ghanistan, Mental Health Problems, and Barriers to Care.” The study, conducted by the Walter Reed Army Institute of Research, brought a number of issues to light which I find particularly troubling, including the fact that roughly 16% of Iraqi war 811 by their in their per of que, and of Afghanista, i havent veterans suffer from Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (or PTSD), and of those, fewer than 40% have sought professional help. The study gives reasons for these high figures. It specifically highlights a link be- tween exposure to combat and the increased incidence of mental health problems, and we know many of our ground troops face ground combat on a frequent basis. The study also indicates that many of our troops are reluctant to seek help because they fear being stigmatized-many are afraid that they could be perceived as weak by their fellow Service members, and that seeking help for mental health issues could ruin their careers. I have a number of questions that seek to gain a greater understanding of the magnitude of the problem, and of the mental health services currently available to our Service members in Iraq and Afghanistan: In addition to the fear of stigmatization, I have repeatedly heard that soldiers have a difficult time actually obtaining mental health services in Iraq. Can you de- scribe, in detail, to the Committee, what a soldier in Iraq would actually have to do to obtain care from a psychiatrist, psychologist, or other qualified mental health professional? Do our Service members have access to confidential counseling in Iraq? Dr. CHU. The Army has several programs to provide support to soldiers and their families who are under stress due to deployment to Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). The first is the complete range of mental healthcare services provided by the hos- pitals and clinics of the Military Health System (MHS). While soldiers are deployed, a full range of mental health services are provided by the combat medical system and the Combat Stress Control units deployed with the forces. In order to obtain care from a mental health care professional, the soldier would go to either a primary healthcare provider and be referred to behavioral health or walk in to the behav- ioral healthcare clinic servicing the unit to which they are assigned. While deployed, the soldier can also seek help from the Combat Stress Control units providing preventive and educational mental health services to front line units. The Deployment Cycle Support program provides education and support for sol- diers and families regarding the stresses of deployment before, during, and after the deployment. Each of the Services has a One Source program, which provides telephone assist- ance on a wide range of problems, including referral to mental health services. The Army One Source program provides toll-free telephone access to advisors and up to six face-to-face visits with a counselor at no charge to military members, family members and civilian employees. The six visits are generally confidential and are independent of the patient's TRICARE benefit. General CODY. What a Soldier must do to access a mental health (MH) profes- sional depends on the Soldier's location and that of the MH team. When the Sol- dier's unit is adjacent to a division medical company, most brigade or area support medical companies, a combat stress control unit's team, or a combat support hos- pital, walk-in care is available. When the soldier's unit is one that the mobile MH Combat Stress Control (CSC) teams visit on a regular basis, the Soldier may talk with the chaplain or primary medical care provider who assembles them at a place where the behavioral healthcare provider can meet with them individually. While visits to battalions and companies at small forward operating bases is part of the MH/CSC team's mission, each visit requires substantial time and effort for coordina- tion and travel, personnel, and equipment from the team, as they must travel in convoy with full force protection measures. When there is a need for the Soldier to travel to a separate operating base to reach the MH/CSC team, the Soldier must have the permission of the commander in order for transportation to be arranged. This requires substantial administrative/logistics time and effort, personnel, and equipment from the sending unit, as they must travel in convoy with full force pro- tection measures. Soldiers do have access to confidential counseling in Iraq. However, this confiden- tiality is limited. There is a greater requirement to report if the Soldier's current condition would interfere with performing the unit's mission. There exists a univer- sal requirement to report serious suicidal or homicidal risk and certain major crimes. The Soldier is advised of limitations to privacy before evaluation. Ms. SANCHEZ. As a follow-up to that question—what are we doing to get the word out about mental health services, and what are we doing to lessen the fear of stig- matization associated with seeking mental health treatment? We all know that our very best soldiers are susceptible to mental health problems—what are you doing to let them know it is OK to seek help? Dr. CHU. The issue of stigma associated with mental health care is problematic in the society as a whole, not just in the military. In all of the Services, mental health support and suicide prevention are available to Service members before, dur- dicedical compacare is avacso) teadical care prov meet wit rating basefort for 813 pared to his/her peers, that requires additional evaluation or treatment. Appropriate actions, such as profile changes, Medical Evaluation Board/Physical Evaluation Board review, or assignment limitations, then occur. ; General Cody. Redeployment of Soldiers diagnosed with combat trauma is on a case-by-case basis. In general, combat experience, including traumatic experience, makes Soldiers better prepared for future combat. Many excellent Soldiers have hid- den serious Post Traumatic Syndrome (PTSD) for years, in fear that if it were known they would not be deployed and would lose their dedicated military careers. They should not have to hide, but should instead get treatment. However, severe PTSD could so interfere with mission performance that a Soldier might be tempo- rarily deferred from deployment or removed from combat for treatment. When the ability to function does not improve, the Soldier may be medically discharged. Soldiers are responsible for indicating on their Pre-deployment Health Assess- ment (DD Form 2795) any prior mental health problems or medication. The screen- ing protocol includes a brief review with the Soldier by a primary care provider and a referral to a behavioral health provider if there are mental health findings. Active component Soldiers may have their medical records reviewed and an mental health provider may review their confidential records and evaluate the Soldier. Ms. SANCHEZ. What is the total number of troops that have been evacuated from Iraq and Afghanistan for mental health issues since the beginning of OIF and OEF? Are you able to break this down by the type of mental health issue-for example, depression, anxiety, or PTSD? I think it is very important that this committee get a greater sense of the problems plaguing our Service members.. Dr. CHU. DOD maintains a database with information on medical evacuations called TRAC2ES. This database was used to determine the numbers of troops who have been evacuated for mental disorders from OIF and OEF. Mild or moderate cases of illnesses, including mental disorders, can be treated in theater, so only the more severe cases of illnesses need to be evacuated. The database contains informa- tion on the preliminary diagnosis, which can be refined or changed after the Service member receives more definitive evaluation and treatment back in the U.S. This means that the numbers provided mainly reflect the more severe cases of mental illnesses in theater, and the diagnoses are tentative, not final. Depressive disorders and anxiety disorders were the most common mental disorders leading to evacu- ations. Post-traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) was not a common reason for evacu- ation. There have been a total of 15,134 Service members who were evacuated for all medical reasons from OIF from March 19, 2003 to July 7, 2004. Of these, 726 Sery- ice members (4.8%) were evacuated for mental disorders. The most frequent diag- noses among the mental disorders were: 1. Affective psychoses 2. Neurotic disorders 3. Depressive disorders 4. Adjustment reactions 5. Non-organic psychoses There have been a total of 3,055 Service members who were evacuated for all medical reasons from OEF from November 1, 2001 to July 7, 2004. Of these, 215 Service members (7.0%) were evacuated for mental disorders. The most frequent di- agnoses among the mental disorders were: 1. Affective psychoses 2. Adjustment reactions 3. Depressive disorders 4. Neurotic disorders 5. Non-organic psychoses Definitions of categories of mental disorders: 1. Affective psychoses (severe mood disorders (depression and/or manic disorder]; may be accompanied by delusions, disorders of perception, or hallucinations) 2. Neurotic disorders (anxiety, panic disorder, or phobias) 3. Depressive disorders (depression that is not accompanied by manic disorder, nor by delusions or other disorders of perception) 4. Adjustment reactions (transient reactions to stressful experiences, including de- pression or anxiety symptoms, that usually last a few months or less) 5. Non-organic psychoses (psychotic conditions due to or provoked by emotional stress or having situational factors as a major causal factor) General CODY. With regards to OIF, there have been 820 psychiatric evacuations of Army Soldiers evacuated to Army medical treatment facilities from March 19, 2003, through July 31, 2004. This figure represents 11.2 percent of the total disease 815 Soldiers moehavioral hea RE for up togram. i theystem through evaluation boaare and someone for mental health. A primary care provider reviews the DD Form 2796 and will refer Soldiers to a behavioral health provider if they screen positive for behav- ioral health issues. Soldiers who are diagnosed as having a mental disorder are managed and treated in a variety of ways depending on the severity of their disorder and their component of service (Active or Reserve Component). Active Component Soldiers and Reserve Soldiers on active status are eligible for inpatient or outpatient care by the Services' medical/behavioral health system. Reserve Soldiers may seek behavioral health services through TRICARE for up to 180 days after leaving active duty under Tran- sition Assistance Management Program. If they develop an issue later, they can seek assistance through the Military Health System through a line of duty deter- mination. A medical evaluation board followed by a physical evaluation board may lead to temporary disability with Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) care and periodic reexamination, or a medical discharge to the VA. If a Reserve Component Soldiers has gone beyond the 180 days after active duty, they should seek assistance through the VA, either through the VA hospital system, or through one the VA's 250 service centers located in many cities and towns. The centers will see them and family members (with or without a behavioral health diagnosis). They can encour- age veterans to make clinic/hospital appointments, which is helpful for those who fear the stigma of seeking treatment or distrust hold in the VA health. New Initiatives for Active and Reserve Component Soldiers include: (1) Case man- agers at the medical facilities posts that conduct demobilization; (2) Army One Source 1-800 number for information on how to access mental health care, includ- ing up to six free, confidential counseling sessions; (3) The Veterans Administration Health Service gives priority for appointments (including mental health) to veterans from combat zones. As of June 30, 2004, The VA health system provided care to 1743 service members with PTSD from OIF and OEF. This is 0.57 percent of all OIF and OEF veterans who have received VA health service care. Ms. SANCHEZ. What are we doing for the families of returning veterans to help them recognize signs of mental illness? I have heard troubling reports that families are inadequately, if not grossly unprepared, for recognizing signs of mental illness. Dr. CHU. Each of the Services has resources committed to the support of the fami- lies of deployed Service members. These include the military healthcare system, Family Service Centers located on military installations and in communities with military populations, Service Return and Reunion programs for both deployed Sery- ice members and their families, and the Service One Source programs noted above. Families of Reserve and National Guard Service members who are not close to a military installation can get information and referrals to programs and services through the telephone access to the One Source program. One Source can provide referrals to TRICARE network providers to families not near a military medical treatment facility. Also, each Service has an Internet website to provide access to its Family Service Program. General CODY. The returning Soldiers and most family members receive briefings and handouts/mail materials from chaplains, behavioral health personnel, Army Community Service, Reserve Support Commands, and other sources. These describe the common frictions of reunion and how to cope with them. They include mental/ behavioral symptoms that are common in just-returned combat veterans, some of which are also symptoms of Post Traumatic Stress Disorder. There are many good family support groups that help distribute information and flyers, as well as, the toll-free Army One Source number for information on how to access mental health care, including up to six free confidential counseling sessions. The challenge is in preparing the Soldier and family members not to over-react to moderate but distressing levels of these symptoms, which normally improve with time in a safe environment, while encouraging to seek professional help if the symp- toms are too disruptive or persist without improving. Ms. SANCHEZ. With respect to sexual assault-How have things changed in OIF and OEF since the task force chaired by Ellen Embrey released its report? Has DOD implemented any of the recommendations issued by the task force thus far? Õr. CHU. The task force identified nine broad recommendations for immediate and near-term action. Since the report was published, three of four recommended meas- ures for immediate action have been accomplished. Efforts to accomplish the fourth recommendation are well under way. They are: • “Establish a single point of accountability for all sexual assault policy matters within the Department of Defense." Secretary Rumsfeld authorized the creation of an office to address these matters. When established, the Director will report to the Under Secretary of Defense (Per- sonnel and Readiness). Currently, an individual to serve as the Director has been identified, and efforts are under way to finalize other staffing actions. In the next ice menim populationsters located eos. These incl committed to this ures term action sincerce identifieda 816 month, establishment of the office and a permanent staff will be formally an- nounced. • “During the upcoming Combatant Commanders Conference, allocate time on the agenda to discern how the findings and recommendations of this report should apply to their areas of responsibility.” Immediately upon receiving the task force's report, the Secretary of Defense di- rected that combatant commanders assess compliance with DOD policy. Specifically, the Secretary of Defense directed that the combatant commanders meet with their respective commanders and senior enlisted advisors to address three questions: Are victims comfortable in coming forward? Are appropriate support, care and protection mechanisms in place and are they effective? What are you doing to identify, remove, and encourage the prosecution of those responsible for this violence? The Secretary also directed that these questions be addressed down the chain of command with every officer in a leadership position. The answers served as a start point for the discussion during the May Combatant Commanders Conference. During the discussion, commanders reaffirmed the need for command emphasis on prevention, victim support and assailant accountability. They agreed on the need for a summit and reemphasized a desire to make necessary changes to successfully address the issue of sexual assault, establish overarching policies and identify com- mon tenets, while remaining flexible enough to respond to differing Service cultures and programs. • "Ensure broadest dissemination of the sexual assault information regarding DOD's. policies, programs and resources available for sexual assault prevention, re- porting response, protection and accountability through DOD-wide communication outlets." This effort is currently under way through a number of internal communications tools. This includes print and electronic news stories developed at the OSD level and published at military installations and information presented formally and infor- mally at unit formations, briefings and one-on-one discussions. This includes utiliza- tion of the “The Commander's Page,” which enables the Department's senior Person- nel and Readiness leaders to establish a channel for open communication directly to the field on significant policy and program initiatives. The Department recognizes that this task is iterative in nature and will require constant attention and action. • “Within the next three months, convene a summit of DOD leaders and recog- nized experts to develop strategic courses of action.” The Services, the Joint Staff, and combatant commanders are currently engaged in a full-time effort to plan and conduct the summit in mid-September specifically to address the issues raised in the Task Force's report. At the summit, senior lead- ers and subject-matter experts will devise the cohesive policies and procedures for sexual assault prevention, reporting, response and accountability that will enable DOD to more effectively protect the victims and respond to the needs of sexual as- sault victims. General CODY. The task force identified nine broad recommendations for imme- diate and near-term action. Since the report was published, three of four rec- ommended measures for immediate action have been accomplished. Efforts to ac- complish the fourth recommendation are well under way. They are: Establish a single point of accountability for all sexual assault policy matters with- in the Department of Defense. Secretary Rumsfeld authorized the creation of an of- fice to address these matters. When established, the director will report to the Under Secretary of Defense (Personnel and Readiness). Currently, an individual has been identified and efforts are under way to finalize other staffing actions. In the next month, establishment of the office and a permanent staff will be formally an- nounced. During the upcoming Combatant Commanders Conference, allocate time on the agenda to discern how the findings and recommendations of this report should apply to their areas of responsibility. Immediately upon receiving the Task Force's report, the Secretary of Defense directed that combatant commanders assess compliance with DOD policy. Specifically, the Secretary of Defense directed that the combatant commanders meet with their respective commanders and senior enlisted advisors to address three questions: Are victims comfortable in coming forward? Are appro- priate support, care and protection mechanisms in place and are they effective? What are you doing to identify, remove, and encourage the prosecution of those re- sponsible for this violence? The Secretary also directed that these questions be ad- dressed down the chain of command with every officer in a leadership position. The answers served as a start point for the discussion during the May Combatant Com- manders Conference. During the discussion, commanders reaffirmed the need for command emphasis on prevention, victim support and assailant accountability. They agreed on the need for a summit and reemphasized a desire to make necessary nounced the upcoming he findings naediately uporante commandeels that the com 817 changes to successfully address the issue of sexual assault, establish overarching policies and identify common tenets, while remaining flexible enough to respond to differing Service cultures and programs. Ensure broadest dissemination of the sexual assault information regarding DOD's policies, programs and resources available for sexual assault prevention, reporting re- sponse, protection and accountability through DOD-wide communication outlets. This effort is currently under way through a number of internal communications tools. This includes print and electronic news stories developed at the Office of the Sec- retary of Defense level and published at military installations and information pre- sented formally and informally at unit formations, briefings and one-on-one discus- sions. This includes utilization of the “The Commander's Page,” which enables the Department's senior Personnel and Readiness leaders to establish a channel for open communication directly to the field on significant policy and program initia- tives. The Department recognizes that this task is iterative in nature and will re- quire constant attention and action. Within the next three months, convene a summit of DOD leaders and recognized experts to develop strategic courses of action. The military Services, the Joint Staff and combatant commanders are currently engaged in a full-time effort to plan and conduct the summit in mid-September specifically to address the issues raised in the Task Force's report. At the summit, senior leaders and subject-matter experts will devise the cohesive policies and procedures for sexual assault prevention, re- porting, response and accountability that will enable DOD to more effectively pro- tect the victims and respond to the needs of sexual assault victims. QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. ISRAEL Mr. ISRAEL. I am interested in learning the percentage of civil affairs personnel in Iraq prior to this rotation and the percentage that we contemplate after the rota- tion. Dr. CHU. Rotation/replacement numbers will be available once plans for OIF3/ OEF6 are complete. It would be premature and inaccurate to provide any numbers of soldiers or units that are in the next rotation, and/or whether these represent in- creases or decreases. Once these numbers are available, we will be happy to provide them to you. OEF6 are complete. It would be premature THE PERFORMANCE OF U.S. MILITARY SERVICEMEMBERS IN IRAQ AND AFGHANISTAN HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, Washington, DC, Wednesday, September 8, 2004. The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:05 a.m., in room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Joel Hefley presiding. OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOEL HEFLEY, A REPRESETATIVE FROM COLORADO Mr. HEFLEY. If our witnesses would take their places, and the Members take their seats, we will begin this hearing. Our Chairman, Duncan Hunter, is unfortunately detained at the White House. And so I will be filling in for him for the time being. Our guests this morning are Colonel Michael Linnington, former Brigade Commander of the 101st Airborne Division; Lieutenant Colonel McCoy of the U.S. Marine Corps, who is a former Com- mander of the Third Battalion, Fourth Marine Regiment; Lieuten- ant Colonel Jeffrey Springman, former Commander, Third Battal- ion, in support of the Fourth Infantry Division; Captain Patrick Costello, former Air Defense Artillery Commander of the 101st Air- borne Division; Captain Morgan Savage, U.S. Marine Corps, former Company Commander, Third Battalion, Fourth Marine Regiment. Welcome, gentlemen, to our committee. We look forward to your testimony and appreciate your willingness to appear before us this morning. Today's hearing is a bit of a departure from the conventional Armed Services Committee hearings. Today, we will hear from these military officers directly in charge of commanding our men and women in uniform who are performing with bravery, honor and effectiveness, in multiple theatres around the world in the fight against global terrorism. While we normally hear from generals several steps removed, today, we will hear from those with the most direct experience in how the American soldier and Marine is carrying out this impor- tant mission for their country. This hearing is about the selfless work of the American military in Iraq. It is about how we acknowledge the efforts of our troops who are deployed halfway around the world. It is about how future generations will remember this generation of Americans called to serve their country in the Global War on Terrorism. Now, some may think this is merely another attempt to justify the war in Iraq. I happen to personally believe that the American people are safer with Saddam Hussein out of power and in jail, and (819) 820 I think that our efforts to bring democracy to the Middle East will discredit, demoralize and undermine our terrorist enemies. Others may, and I am sure actually do, disagree. However, I trust that we can all agree that the vast majority of Americans serving in Iraq and Afghanistan are answering their country's call to service with bravery, dedication, integrity and honor. Tomorrow, we will have two full committee hearings on the abuse of detainees in the Global War on Terrorism. What happened in those instances was inexcusable, but it is hardly representative of the vast major majority of our military personnel in Iraq. The misdeeds of some soldiers at Abu Ghraib Prison and elsewhere must not be allowed to define worldwide perceptions of our Armed Forces. Thirty years ago, a generation of Americans fought in another foreign war. Because the war was controversial, some people who opposed it sought to tar all Vietnam veterans with the crimes of a small handful. We can't allow that to happen again. That is why we are here, to hear from individuals who have returned from the battlefield about all that they have accomplished and why the American soldier, Marine, sailor and airman still represents the best that this country has to offer. Gentlemen, thank you, again, for appearing before this commit- tee, and we understand that you don't set national policy. Our pur- pose here today is not to pull you into these debates. But, you know your soldier and Marines, and you know the challenges that they have overcome. You know the courage they have demonstrated in combat. You know the seriousness with which they take their mis- sions. And you know the hard work they have done to help the abused people secure a Democratic future. The American people need to know it, too. We all look forward to your testimony, but first, let me recognize the committee's rank- ing Democrat, Mr. Skelton, for any remarks he might like to make. Mr. Skelton. STATEMENT OF HON. IKE SKELTON, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM MISSOURI, RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES Mr. SKELTON. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman. Let me join you in welcoming our witnesses, a colonel, two lieu- tenant colonels, and two captains. And it gives us the opportunity, speaking for those we represent as well as the entire American people, to say thank you to you and to all who wear the uniform that are engaged in the challenges in Iraq. Cicero, the great Roman orator, once said that gratitude is the greatest of all virtues. And we want to, before we do anything else today, express our gratitude and our thanks to you for your service, your devotion to duty, for your patriotism and for your profes- sionalism. And for that, we thank you, and it is a pleasure to have you. Mr. Chairman, when I awoke on Labor Day morning, I heard the disturbing news that seven Marines were killed outside of Fallujah. Needless to say, that news saddened me more than I can tell. My heart sank further still yesterday when we passed the symbolic but 821 distressing milestone of a thousand American troops who have died in Iraq. And, of course, I think every congressional district has felt that pain, including mine. This number represents a thousand families who have paid the highest price for the war in Iraq. When the price is this high, what exactly do we have to show for the sacrifice of our sons and daughters? But we made a commitment to a free Iraq, and I have main- tained from the beginning that we must see that commitment through. We must have a strategy and a plan that takes account of the lessons of history. It is no surprise to the Members of this committee that I have been reading and studying history literally all of my adult life, and I would like to share some of my thoughts with the gentlemen before us today. We ignore the lessons of history at our peril. And unfortunately, that calls for some of us—who called for the detailed planning for the Post Cold War—or the post-war period, those proposals and urging of plans were ignored in the months leading up to the war. I sent two letters to the President on this, one September the Fourth, 2002, and one the day before we went in to attack in March. I am not convinced that we have a viable exit strategy. When I look at Monday's attack on the Marine convoy near Fallujah, I can't help but, gentlemen, think of Vietnam. In that war, we al- lowed the enemy sanctuaries in Cambodia and Laos to exist, only to suffer the consequences later, when they came back to fight an- other day. So I ask the question, have we not learned the lessons of denying the enemy sanctuary? Within a political agreement from the Iraqi government, the Marine patrols have not entered Fallujah since April, allowing it to become a safe haven for insurgents, an allowing guerrilla leader Abu Zarqawi to use the city as a base of operations. My fears about our withdrawal last April have been confirmed. Sadr City has also become another sanctuary for insurgents, and we must have a plan for developing viable and strong Iraqi forces. Lieutenant General Petraeus, who some of you I know know, is giving that mission his all. That is a long-term mission. We can't k sinking further into a quagmire while we wait for those forces to be fully trained. We need a strategy now to force the insurgents from their holes, from their sanctuary holes. We cannot afford to surrender the cities of Iraq to the insurgents and then sit by while they attack us from these safe havens. Allowing the enemy to establish sanctuaries didn't work 35 years ago in Vietnam, and it doesn't work today in Iraq. It doesn't please me to say this, particularly with such fine examples of American valor sitting right here before us. We owe the men and women of America who serve this Nation in Iraq, in Afghanistan, around the world a strategy befitting their service. I am very proud of all you have accomplished. It speaks well of our Nation that our troops have shouldered the burden of this war and carried our country so far for so long. I am concerned, however, that we are asking a great deal of our troops when we continue to deploy them into combat with no end in sight. risk 822 Some of these witnesses have deployed multiple times in Iraq and Afghanistan. I am sure they will deploy again. ) pain. How long can we continue this pace before we do irreparable harm to our mili- tary's readiness and retention, our troops morale? I don't know. I had an interesting visit with the adjutant general of the Mis- souri National Guard the other day. And to hear him tell about the lowered end-strength of certain National Guard units in Missouri tells me that many of the people are not joining, or they are getting out, and it is a serious problem for the National Guard in my home state. We are stretching the force too thin. We have the finest military in the world, the finest that the world has ever seen. That is rep- resented today by the soldiers and Marines who, Mr. Chairman, will testify before them. So we owe you the very best we can pro- vide. That is the purpose of this committee.. It is also the purpose of this committee to ask tough questions. Second place in Iraq, second place in Afghanistan doesn't count, or your efforts, your valorous efforts will be for naught. Let's hope that we have true success, and we learn the lessons from the past, particularly the past in Vietnam. And thank you again for being here. Mr. HEFLEY. Thank you, Mr. Skelton. [The prepared statement of Mr. Skelton can be found in the Ap- pendix on page 877.] Colonel Linnington, why don't we start with you, and then we will move down the row here. And, without objection, your com- plete statement will be put in the record. And if you would like to summarize in any way, well, you have the time. STATEMENT OF COL. MICHAEL LINNINGTON, FORMER BRIGADE COMMANDER, 101ST AIRBORNE DIVISION, U.S. ARMY Colonel LINNINGTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Good morning, Mr. Chairman, Congressman Skelton, distin- guished Members, good morning. I am here this morning with my brothers in arms, Lieutenant Colonel Bryan McCoy, formerly Battalion Commander in the Third Battalion, Fourth Marine Regiment; Lieutenant Colonel Jeff Springman, formerly a Battalion Commander in the Third Battal- ion, 29th Field Artillery of the Fourth Infantry Division at Fort Carson; Captain Morgan Savage, formerly K Company Commander in Third Battalion, Fourth Marines; and Captain Pat Costello, on the end, formerly Company Commander in Ĉ Company, second to the 44th Field Artillery, and the 101st Airborne Division at Ft. . Campbell. Before coming to the Joint Staff in early July, I commanded the Third Infantry Brigade in the 101st Airborne Division at Fort Campbell, Kentucky. During my command, I was privileged to serve in both Afghanistan and Iraq, most recently, from February of 2003 through February of 2004, as part of the 101st Airborne Di- vision's efforts in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom. My brigade departed Iraq after transferring authority to the First Battalion, 14th Calvary Stryker Unit from the Iron Horse Brigade out of Fort Lewis last February. I would like to thank you for this opportunity to talk about our soldiers and also for your tre- ; 823 mendous support, concern for our troops, and especially your visits to soldiers deployed throughout Iraq and Afghanistan. I had the opportunity to meet many of you in this room-over the past year—that visited us in Iraq, and I thank you personally for your visit. The support of the American people and our elected officials is very important to our soldiers. Nothing makes me prouder than to have the opportunity today to talk about our sol- diers and the great job they are doing throughout the full range of military operations. In the early days of combat, my soldiers crossed by air and ground into Iraq, fought in Al Hillah in South Baghdad, and after the regime, moved with the 101st Airborne Division north to the Nineveh Province, centered on the city of Mosul. My brigade was responsible for the area west of Mosul, centered on the city of Telefar and out to the Syrian border, south of the Ti- gris River. My brigade performed a wide range of operations from war fight- ing to stability-and-support operations, often conducting both with- in blocks or hours of each other. It was not uncommon for my sol- diers to be rebuilding schools and medical clinics during the day and conducting mounted and foot patrols at night, or fighting in- surgents in one part of town while assisting in elections in another. In all of these operations, our soldiers performed magnificently with courage, dedication, selflessness, compassion and respect for the Iraqi people that made me very proud to be their commander. Our junior leaders in particular made me especially proud. Our junior leaders displayed tremendous maturity in their leadership and tackled responsibility that is normally reserved for those much more senior in rank. It wasn't uncommon in any zone for young lieutenants and sergeants to be conducting traditional infantry tasks, like raids, securing key infrastructure and conducting foot patrols, with newly trained Iraqi security forces. What was unique was that my young leaders also conducted non- traditional missions, like supervising harvests, restoring key infra- structure, especially oil and water facilities. They settled land dis- putes. They retrained city and border policemen. And they assisted in local elections. Our soldiers performed all of these operations, as you mentioned, Mr. Chairman, with courage and integrity. They bravely fought side by side with loyal Iraqi police and secu- rity forces in an effort to maintain peace and security for the Iraqi people. I can recall countless incidents of heroism by our young sol- diers and our young leaders in intense fighting, in dark and dan- gerous streets and back alleys and in uncertain conditions where they knowingly exposed themselves to danger in order to accom- plish their mission, because that is our primary task, accomplish- ment of the mission. They are also impressive for their innovation and initiative. I am happy to have one of my company commanders with me this morn- ing, on the end, Captain Pat Costello, commander of an Air De- fense Artillery Battery that was attached to my brigade combat team in Iraq. In normal life, Pat's unit was responsible for provid- ing air defense coverage and early warning for my 4,000-plus sol- diers. In Iraq, once we transitioned to stability operations, Pat be- came my emergency response program coordinator, responsible for 826 province. Our battalion was responsible for the cities of Haditha, wah. Heading into this deployment, we continued to train at the high intensity level, but also developed the tactics, techniques and procedures required in security-and-stability oper- ations. We had select Marines and sailors attend intensive language training. We all underwent training to attune us to the Iraqi cul- ture and the religion of Islam. We also employed the new operating principle of the First Marine Division: First, do no harm. Those were our watch words as we went about our mission. We would not inflict any more harm on a people that had suffered for 30 years under Saddam Hussein. Our mission was to build on the incredibly good work of the Third Armed Calvary Regiment (ACR) which we had relieved. In short, we were to maintain the rule of law, build the capabili- ties and competence of the Iraqi security forces and identify re- source projects to aid the recovery of Iraq. We aimed project fund- ing at buildings for schools, government institutions, infrastruc- ture, such as water pumping stations and electric substations. Above all else, we offered the Iraqi people a chance at a better life, not so much by what we could do by our hands, but by Iraqis doing things for Iraqis. We were simply enablers. Learning from our experiences in Baghdad the previous year, we again sought to make that critical human-to-human contact with the Iraqi people. We engaged the Iraqi police as equals. Under the leadership of Captain Matt Danner, a reinforced rifle squad moved into the Haditha police station and lived with them 24/7. They were the only permanent U.S. presence in the city. By living and working side-by-side with the Iraqi people, this small hand-picked squad earned their trust. Soon, the human intelligence vital to counter an insurgency was flowing, and we began to make a real impact on the criminal and terrorist elements in that town. Captain Danner's squad also served as a mirror and a window. As a mirror, they provided valuable insight into how our battalion's actions or inactions were perceived, and we were able to adjust our posture when needed in order to project the right message. As a window, that squad provided me with valuable insight into the often Byzantine world of local Iraqi politics, their personalities, feuds, alliances and debts. More importantly, they were a constant reminder to the Iraqi police that we were not leaving them alone, and we were committed to their future. Our work was interrupted in April when we were called to Fallujah to participate in Operation Vigilant Resolve. Once again, the Marines and sailors responded brilliantly, transitioning from security-stability operations to high-intensity urban combat. By mid-May, we were back in our former area of operations and picked up where we had left off. Earlier in our deployment, the Haditha and Ana police stations were weak, demoralized and easily intimidated institutions that did not hold the respect of their adversaries, the people, even of themselves. And they labored under the stigma of the old police force or as American lackeys. 827 By the time we finished our deployment, they were confident, pro-active departments that were respected and not feared by the average Iraqi citizen. And they dealt with the anti-Iraqi govern- mental forces on equal footing. Our presence was that of a close friend and partner, not as an occupier. This change did not come about overnight. Success was almost imperceptible, much like a tide coming in. We made some very strong bonds with the Iraqis there. I can tell you, there are some very brave and stout-hearted men who are just as passionate about their country as we are about ours. When it was time for the battalion to rotate home, I was peti- tioned by the mayor of Haditha and the chief of police to allow Captain Danner and his squad to stay on. Captain Danner was made an honorary member of the Jerrafa tribe, which is the largest tribe in Haditha. He even received a few marriage proposals to marry the daugh- ters of a few of the policemen. On the day that Captain Danner and his Marines did leave, they slaughtered a goat and had a feast in their honor. There was a celebration. That was almost unthink- able the five months when we first arrived in country. Perhaps the biggest impact we made was on the children. Ma- rines and sailors love kids, and the relationship was an easy key one to forge. The children are the future of Iraq. They no longer ve to fear for their parents being murdered or raped by their government. . We have done and continue to do great things in Iraq. And we are doing it side-by-side with some very brave and dedicated Iraqis. I can tell you stories about the chiefs of police that are out there, personally disarming Improvised Explosive Devices (IED) so we don't have to. Your young Marines have demonstrated incredible courage, en- durance, will and compassion on a daily basis, all to make a better Iraq. And I believe we are being successful. Thank you for this op- portunity, and I look forward to your questions. Mr. HEFLEY. Thank you, Colonel. Colonel Springman. STATEMENT OF LT. COL. JEFFERY A. SPRINGMAN, FORMER COMMANDER, 3–29 FIELD ARTILLERY BATTALION, FOURTH INFANTRY DIVISION, U.S. ARMY Colonel SPRINGMAN. Mr. Chairman, Congressman Skelton, and distinguished Members of the committee, thank you for the oppor- tunity to appear before you today to share with you my recent ex- perience serving in Operation Iraqi Freedom. I currently serve as a member of the Army staff in the Pentagon. I participated in Operation Iraqi Freedom from early April 2003 to late March 2004, as the Commander of the Third Battalion, 29th Field Artillery, Task Force Pace Setter, part of the Third Brigade Combat Team, Fourth Infantry Division from Fort Carson, Colo- rado. Our unit began combat operations north of Baghdad. Next, we operated near the Iranian border, then, in the vicinity of Kirkurk and, for the last nine months, in the Sunni triangle between Balad and Samarra in a city named An Dhuluiya. 828 While we performed many tasks, our major missions were con- trolling an area of over 750 square kilometers to include providing security alongside local security forces and repairing or rebuilding ucture suffering from years of neglect. We provided artillery support throughout the brigade combat team's entire area. We moved over 6,000 captured enemy bombs from the air base we used as our forward operating base, and we operated the brigade holding area. I had the privilege of leading some of America's finest young men and women and some of the world's finest soldiers. In addition to U.S. Army artillery, infantry, military police and engineers, we had an infantry platoon and an explosive ordnance detachment from the Republic of Moldova attached to us. They were with us for their entire six-month deployment. Thanks to our mid-level noncommis- ers, lieutenants and captains, we performed our task to standard, and despite having soldiers wounded, we suffered no deaths to enemy action or accident. I feel we were able to bring all of our soldiers home because the young leaders performed magnificently, making good decisions and ensuring their soldiers were ready. Daily, I witnessed artillery lieu- tenants and sergeants leading patrols to the same standards as in- fantry leaders, yet quickly switching back to their artillery duties without a misstep. These same leaders performed duties as civil affairs (CA) officers. Additionally, we have soldiers alive because their immediate lead- ers ensured they were properly trained and maintained uniform standards despite the extreme conditions. One of our soldiers earned the Silver Star after being wounded. I have no doubt he would have been killed or too seriously wound- ed to continue fighting if he had not been wearing his body armor and helmet properly. I am extremely honored to be here and wanted to thank you for this opportunity. Thank you. Mr. HEFLEY. Thank you very much, Colonel. Captain Savage. STATEMENT OF CAPT. MORGAN SAVAGE, FORMER COMPANY COMMANDER, THIRD BATTALION, FOURTH MARINE REGI- MENT, U.S. MARINE CORPS Captain SAVAGE. Good morning, Mr. Chairman, Congressman Skelton, distinguished ladies and gentlemen of Congress. My name is Captain Morgan Savage, currently the Academics Officer at the Officer Candidate School. Í had the privilege of serv- ing the Third Battalion, Fourth Marines, for two years, from the summer of 2002 to the summer of 2004. We did one deployment in Operation Iraqi Freedom, as the headquarters and services (H&S) company commander. And in the second deployment, I had the opportunity to serve as a rifle company commander in Lieutenant Colonel McCoy's battal- ion. I will offer you perspectives on both deployments, OIF I and OIF II. In Operation Iraqi Freedom I, we had a clear mission from the beginning, standard to our Marine ethos: Locate, close with and destroy enemy forces, whether it be Saddam's Fedayeen or the 51st Infantry Division. Essentially, as we all know, it was a 20-day 829 sprint that ended in Baghdad with a battalion and its companies transitioning from offensive operations to stability-and-support op- erations to help the Iraqi people. At that time, the Iraqi people, regardless of what they had suf- fered for many years, were in a state of euphoria. This is dem- onstrated by the fact that, as we patrolled the streets of Baghdad, we would constantly be met by Iraqis, be it vendors or families - coming out of their homes, to offer us fresh baked bread, sodas or artifacts from their personal life, things from their personal line that told us a story. And sometimes, they didn't have to offer us anything; we could look at them and see, perhaps, that either through service to their country or through torture, what some of their experiences had been. As we operated in Baghdad, the Iraqi people also were willing to help us locate enemy forces, which demonstrated the fact that they understood our intent and what we were trying to do, and it was for the common Iraqi person. We were there to help them. And that paid off, as they added to us setting a secure environment for the battalion, for our respective companies and for themselves. We returned home for six months, a little under six months, and focused heavily on stability-and-support operations. Going back to Iraq in February of 2004, our mission was two-fold. It was to elimi- nate the conditions that allow anti-Iraqi forces to operate and con- tinue to feed an environment of instability to the Iraqi people. And number two, quite frankly, to kill or capture anti-Coalition, anti-Iraqi forces that would seek to do us harm and the people of Iraq harm. The second aim was self-explanatory. Those that sought to engage us or whose actions fell within the rules of engagement were either engaged and killed or detained for intelligence value to further roll-up targets on our high-value target list. It is part of our ethos in the First Marine Division: No worse enemy. The first part of our ethos: No better friend. Helping to eliminate the conditions that allow terrorists and anti-Iraqi forces to operate was what we spent most of our time in Iraq doing, for Operation Iraqi Freedom, part two. This translated into working with various police agencies in Haditha, Haqlaniyah, Ana, Iraqi National Guard and also numer- ous civil affairs projects that demonstrated that we were good for our word, that we are there to help the Iraqi people and that we are not there with just our rifles; we are there with a sense of com- passion and dignity for the Iraqi people. Specific examples that demonstrate the Iraqi resolve and willing- ness to be successful at the current task at hand: We constantly received assistance from the Haditha police station to help us exe- cute our raids that included intelligence or, in essence, what the word of mouth was from the street. The use of sources to help us identify targets that were either moving against Coalition Forces in zone or working to destabilize the zone itself. And this was done at great loss to several members of the police station. stance from various police stations in keeping our Ma- rines out of harm's way by letting us know routes on a specific day that were fairly secure or, toward the end of our deployment, using their policemen, not our explosive ordnance disposal technicians, but their policemen to disarm IEDs. I watched an Iraqi police cap- 831 Combat Team, 101st Airborne Division, in support of Iraqi Free- dom. I value the opportunity to speak this morning, not only of the ac- tions of our great soldiers, but also to say, thank you for your sup- port, the support of the American people and, most importantly, the support of the soldiers, both those who served under my com- mand and those who continue to serve overseas today. During my year in Iraq, my battery was asked to perform a myr- iad of missions, both doctrinal and nondoctrinal. As an Air Defense Battery Commander, I had anywhere from 85 to 105 soldiers under my command on any given day. Our primary mission was to provide the Third Brigade Combat Team, air and missile defense and early warning. By the end of April, it was evident that our mission had changed, and there was no threat from aircraft or tactical ballistic missiles. I assumed a civil affairs role during our month in Baghdad, co- ordinating with various humanitarian organizations to bring much needed assistance into our brigade area of operations (AO). By the beginning of May 2003, the brigade combat team relocated to Telefar, Iraq, under division control from Mosul. I expanded my new job by managing the brigade's Commander's Emergency Response Program funds, designed to improve the qual- ity of life for Iraqis. Under the program, in a little more than seven months, I spent more than $7 million on reconstruction projects and salaries to the new Iraqi police, border guard and facility pro- tection forces. It was not uncommon for me to travel hundreds of kilometers each day to hire Iraqis to restore the flow of electricity or water to many cities, towns and villages, to rebuild government buildings, hospitals and schools. As time progressed, the program evolved. And by the time that we redeployed, we had completed over 700 projects, and project se- lection and payments was no longer being decided by the Army; it was being handled exclusively by newly elected officials. As I performed a nondoctrinal mission, so did my soldiers. Each day, they would drive hundreds of kilometers to pick up and escort fuel trucks to gas stations in areas in need to help alleviate the fuel shortage. Simultaneously, they conducted perimeter security missions, convoy escorts, mounted, dismounted patrols and numer- ous other nontraditional air defense missions. My soldiers are just one example of the great work being done by our military on a day-to-day basis in Iraq. The missions that we completed are a testament to the flexibility and ingenuity of our soldiers, and I am proud to serve with our soldiers. I am proud to have returned each and every one of my soldiers home to their families. Thank you, again, for the opportunity to speak this morning, the support that you have shown our soldiers. And I look forward to answering any questions that you have. Mr. HEFLEY. Thank you, Captain. Thank each of you for your very excellent testimony. Before we get to questions, I would like to recognize Mr. Skelton to speak out of order. Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Chairman, thank you. 832 And let me speak out of order for a moment, if I may, for the purpose of welcoming our newest member to this committee, the gentleman from Texas and my good friend, Charlie Stenholm. We thank you for joining us today. Mr. Chairman, the House just acted to appoint Charlie Stenholm to our committee, the Armed Services Committee. We couldn't have a finer Member in the United States Congress. Charlie Stenholm came to Congress 2 years after I did in 1978. Of course, we have been fast friends ever since. He is a man of the highest honor, strongest integrity. He presently serves as the ranking Member on the Agriculture Committee, but known to so many of us for his full knowledge of Federal rules and for his fiscal conservatism. He has been for a strong balanced budget through the years. I also know he supports a strong national defense. He also has worked and does work in a bipartisan fashion, which is what we like to have here on this committee, on the defense issues that are being considered. So I am extremely pleased, Mr. Chairman, to welcome Charlie Stenholm to the Armed Services Committee. And we hope you enjoy your work here as much as we do. Mr. HEFLEY. Charlie, I, too, would like to welcome you to the committee. I can tell by watching you, you were wondering why none of the witnesses were talking about wheat allotments and the dairy situation. But we do get into some other things here. We think you are going to enjoy it. As most of you know, Charlie has represented the 17th District of Texas since 1979, which includes Dyess and Good- fellow Air Force bases. And as has already been mentioned, he has been very, very active on the Agriculture Committee. And, Charlie, we welcome you to this committee. As you—as the Members ask questions, since we do have five witnesses, if you would try to direct your questions to a witness, so they don't feel that they have to go down the line and answer everybody's question all the way down the line, it might be helpful to get more Members the opportunity to ask questions. Mr. Skelton, I recognize you first for questions. Mr. SKELTON. Let me ask each of the captains, were either or both of you trained in civil affairs or in urban counterterrorism combat before you went to Iraq the first time? Either one of you. Captain SAVAGE. Sir, I will go ahead and answer that first. For civil affairs, we were not. For urban combat in an urban environ- ment, yes, sir, we were. Our battalion had spent the better part of six months knowing that Operation Iraqi Freedom was a matter of time, and part of that work was training in an urban environment, working from Toots in Victorville, to things that we could do in the backyard. Basically, during what we called downtime, the com- manders have their Marines work through the barracks and talk through, chalk through and then exercise tactics, techniques and procedures for potentially every possible mission that might come. One of the reasons why we didn't focus on civil affairs, Congress- man Skelton, is because civil affairs has its own separate groups that they detach to every infantry battalion specifically, and what the rifle companies and the Marine Corps would often provide is 833 security for the Marines in the civil affairs group to go and execute work in various projects or perform negotiations with Iraqi busi- ness leaders. Mr. SKELTON. Thank you. Captain. Captain COSTELLO. Congressman Skelton, as far as civil affairs, go, I received no training before we deployed. I don't think I per- sonally understood the scope or the need of civil affairs over there. It quickly became evident. And I received a lot of on-the-job train- ing from the civil affairs detachment that was attached to our bri- gade. Mr. SKELTON. Was that a battalion company or what? Captain COSTELLO. No, sir. It was a section. Each brigade re- ceived a section of civil affairs. Mr. SKELTON. Okay. Captain COSTELLO. As far as the other training goes, sir, we train on that at home station. And the Army CTCs, the Combined Training Centers, Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC), Na- tional Traning Center (NTC), do a great job in training on mobile environment team (MET) operations and dealing with civilians and different roles that they may play. So, not so much as Colonel Linnington said yesterday, what to think, but more how to think Mr. SKELTON. Good. Thank you. I have one question for Colonel Linnington, and I will limit mine. Colonel, you have been deployed to both Afghanistan and Iraq. And I understand that you have performed with distinction. And we thank you for that. Do you see any signs of deployment fatigue in the soldiers anywhere you have been deployed? Colonel LINNINGTON. Congressman, coming back from Afghani- stan, we had a very short break between when we got back to Fort mpbell and then when we deployed into Iraq. I think because of the mission we were given and the soldier realization that it was an important mission and wanting to be part of the team, part of the 101st team that went to Iraq, there was overwhelming consen- sus among them that they wanted to go. After coming back and being gone for, in some cases, 16 or 18 months out of 2 years for some of the soldiers, they were happy for the predictability that came with being home and getting a sched- ule at Fort Campbell that allowed them to stay for what is now looking like it is going to be over a year or two years. We measure troop fatigue in terms of morale and reenlistment. I am proud to say, today, that in my unit, that was in both thea- ters, we overwhelmingly exceeded our reenlistment rates in all cat- egories the whole two years I was in command. hink that comes from soldiers realizing they are doing what they have joined the Army to do and realizing the importance of the missions. So, in my unit, I would say, no. Mr. SKELTON. I think that also speaks well of you. Thank you. Mr. HEFLEY. Mr. Bartlett. Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you very much for your testimony. As you know from reading our press, particularly most of the word media, ritten media, you get the impression that the average Iraqi sees us as an occupier rather than a liberator. 834 I would just like you to go down the line to give me a percentage, each of you, as to your estimate of the percentage of Iraqis that see us as liberators and the percentage of those that see us as occupi- ers from your contact with the Iraqi people for the months that you were over there. Colonel LINNINGTON. Congressman Bartlett, I would say, from my context of being up north, in Nineveh Province, it was about 99 percent looking at as liberators versus occupiers. Of course, those that saw us as occupiers were usually trying to kill us, so I don't see very much of them. I would say, if you took the Iraqi people on whole, it had to be greater than 90 percent saw us as liberators, and they were rou- tinely happy for our presence. Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you. Colonel McCoy. Sir, I would have to concur with that. I would say, in excess of 90 percent saw us as liberators, not occupiers. They very well saw what we were providing for them and were happy to have us. I am sure, down the road, they want to have their country back. There is no denying that. Who wouldn't? But they definitely see us as liberators. Colonel SPRINGMAN. Sir, I served in the Sunni Triangle. Even there, I would agree with the 90 percent figure seeing us as lib- erators and as the best hope for the future, working with us. Captain SAVAGE. Sir, I would say, well above 95 percent. And if ever there was a perceived indifference from the Iraqi people, that can be contributed to a spike in anti-Coalition and anti-Iraq force activity, essentially an element of coercion, perhaps changing a per- ception of the Iraqi people. But they understood why we were there. It was to help them. It was as liberators, not conquerors. Captain COSTELLO. Sir, I have the disadvantage of sitting at the end of the table. But I also agree with, about 90 percent saw us as liberators, not occupiers. Mr. BARTLETT. Mr. Chairman, it would be nice if this last two or three minutes of testimony could lead the news this evening, be- cause what you gather from our newscasts and from the print media is that we are mostly seen over there as occupiers rather than liberators. And it would be nice if the testimony of those who have been on the front lines over there could reach the American r than the news that does reach the American people, which-let me just ask you, again, very generally. Your response to the media reports of what is going on in Iraq compared to what you saw in Iraq. Do you feel that there is a dif- at the American people are being told and what you saw over there? Let's just go down the line ag Colonel LINNINGTON. Mr. Congressman, I think, because the loss of any American soldier or Marine is significant, that that will dominate the news, and it should, because the American sons and daughters are our most precious resource. Unfortunately, the good news stories in a lot of cases don't make the news, because it is dominated by the more tragic events. We had the opportunity when we came back to Fort Campbell to get out and visit local communities, Veterns of Foreign Wars (VFW), Parent Teacher Associations (PTA), church groups. Heck, I even talked to Dell Computers about what was going on in Iraq II again. 835 and showed some video and talked about some of the good news stories that were going on. And a lot of the American people didn't realize that was going on, frankly. And they were happy for us. Because they are obvi- ously the ones that pay our salaries, and they wanted to know what we were doing over there was worthwhile. I would answer your question from that perspective being that, whenever there is loss of life, it must dominate the news, but there are a tremendous number of good-news stories that offset those sacrifices. Mr. BARTLETT. But those aren't getting in the media; are they? Colonel LINNINGTON. No, sir. Not in my experience. Colonel McCoy. Sir, the good news does not make the news, it is the shipwrecks that make the news, the Abu Ghraibs and the causalities are going to dominate the news. I think that is just the fact of making good copy. I can tell you that on a daily basis, there are good news things happening that are being conducted by our Armed Forces members over there every single day, and doing it for the betterment of the Iraqi people. They are serving with honor courage and commit- ment. Colonel SPRINGMAN. Sir, I also agree that while I served, there the good news was not being put out. There was a lot more good news than bad news that I saw. I wish the news media could have seen the towns that we went to as we went into them and then a year later when we left to see how active business was and how secure they were compared to the time we moved in, sir. Captain SAVAGE. Since returning from Iraq on July 12, having spent a lot of time watching Headline News and CNN and Fox News to decompress, I have not seen any good news stories about what soldiers, Marines, airmen and sailors are doing. Part of our mission statement, part of our battalion commanders intent from Colonel McCoy was win one family at a time through dignity and human respect, the average Iraqi person the average Iraqi family. And it is too bad that a lot of members of the press are not over there to see one family member, one community at a time being won over because that is what happens on a daily basis from the vehicle-borne IEDs and the negative things that make the news. Captain COSTELLO. Sir, in the six months that I have been back from Iraq I find it very difficult to watch the news, because I think it is a misrepresentation of what is actually going on there on a day-to-day basis. I think this is tied to your last question about the percentage of Iraqis that see us as occupiers or liberators. And news now it makes it seem like it's 90 percent of the Iraqi people that do not appreciate what has happened for them and see us as occupiers. Every experience that I had in Iraq was completely to the contrary. Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you all very much for your testimony. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Mr. HEFLEY. Mr. Ortiz. Mr. ORTIZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. First of all, let me say thank you for the outstanding work that you have done. We are proud of you. 836 I would like to touch a little bit on the rules of engagement. I have a letter here from a Navy corpsman who is serving along with the Marines, and this is what he says: The only far missions they, officers, approve are all out of range. And they know that when they approve them, the higher up, is really bunching this up and it has got to stop. He says, “Please write our Congressman and tell him we need to either do this or get off the pot. They are just let- ting them kill us. We are not allowed to do much about the insur- gent activity. It may be our battalion. It may be higher than that. I don't know. But people are going to die unnecessarily, and the enemy will only get bolder if this keeps up. Please tell Congress there is no polite way to fight a war. And despite whatever the hell they are thinking, this will not save the government any face. In fact, it will do the opposite. They are laughing at us because the show of force that we are supposed to be showing around and they are dropping rounds on us and escaping without a single shot being fired at them. It is entirely within our means to stop this.”. And then, of course, the father comes by the office and gives us the complaint of one of his sons. He has two sons in Iraq. I can remember when I went to Lebanon when the village containing 245 Marines were killed. A group of this committee. I think you were with us, Mr. Skelton. Myself, Bob Stump and others were there, two days, three days after the killings of these Marines. We felt se- cure because we saw the soldiers carrying their weapons to later find out that the weapons they were carrying did not have any am- munition because they did not want to create an international inci- dent. I just want to ask you if any of you have had this problem where even small fires coming at you and there is an order given not to fire back? Have you had any such experience like this. Are there any of you that can answer this question? Colonel LINNINGTON. Congressman, that was not my experience. I know when our troops come under fire, they return fire accu- rately and within the rules of engagement. One of things that Gen- eral Petrais did tell us, however, was that in all operations, offen- sive, defensive, or whatever we were doing, his principle and the principle we operated under is that we did not want to create more enemies than we took off the street. So as we conducted offensive operations or even as we conducted routine searches of Iraqis homes looking for weapons or things like that, we did it under those conditions. Sometimes there would be an attempt by the insurgents to bait us into producing or returning overwhelming fire, which would cre- ate more enemies than we take off the street. In those cases, it is really a leadership decision where the young leader at the point of the spear makes that decision and executes according to how he has been trained. Mr. ORTIZ. That decision did not put any of our young soldiers in harm's way? Colonel LINNINGTON. We are always in harm's way. We under- stand that. I will tell you that without question, when our soldiers were being engaged, we were fighting back. I cannot remember an incident where we sat and took fire and did not return fire because of a restrictions on the rules of engagement. 837 Mr. ORTIZ. One of the reasons I bring this up is in south Texas, just Monday, we had our tenth soldier killed. He was home two weeks ago and returned back and died. I am just concerned. I want you young men and women to come back alive. We value your life. We value the lives of our families. I am just concerned that if we have any flaws in the rules of engagement, we want to know so that we can tell the higher ups that we cannot continue to have young men and women die just because we do not want to create an international incident. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. HEFLEY. Thank you. Mr. Jones. Mr. JONES. Thank you very much. I want to thank those of you on the panel today. I have the privilege to represent three bases: Camp Lejeune Marine Base. Cherry Point, Ranier Station, actually Fornewell Air Station, and also Seymour Johnson Air Force Base. I do have a question but I want to share with the committee also that I have great respect for those of you who are fighting in Af- ghanistan and Iraq. I, two years ago, had the humbling experience al experience of attending the funeral of Michael Bit, Sergeant Marine killed at Nasaryia. There was a reason that I was involved, because Congressman Elton Gallegly called me and he said, Walter, a Marine was killed that was my constituent, and his wife, Janina, had twins born after he was deployed and would need help with her mother visiting from Australia to extend the visa. From that, I felt my responsibility as a Member of Congress to at- tend the funeral. And it has not been the only one, but it has been one that, again, because of the circumstances, will be a spiritual experience, because Janina read the last letter she received from Michael, and Michael talked about loving his family, proud to be a Marine and that whether that he would see his wife on earth or in heaven would be God's will. And I share that because like many on this committee, we know that there is a reason and a purpose, and you have said in your statements that you believe that we need to be there and that we need to fight this war and win this war. And we want you to have all that you need to win. And I just want to make those state- ments. And, by the way, I did attend the ceremony to award the wife, in memory of her husband's service, the Silver Star down at Camp Lejeune last Friday and General Roberson, I told him after- wards I never heard such eloquent comments about our men and women in uniform and about the need to have those of you who are so brave to serve this great Nation and put your life on the line. About three weeks ago, the Secretary of the Navy and Marine Corps—and I hope that the committee will stand strong on that this year, and we do end up naming the Secretary of the Navy, Navy and Marine Corps; it is the right thing to do—the Secretary of the Navy and Marine Corps visited Camp Lejeune in New River anterior point about three weeks ago, and he had occasion to speak to the 8th Marine regiment. And this is my question, both to the United States Army and to the Marine Corps. I was pleased that the leadership down at Camp Lejeune would allow the troops who were assembled at parade rest, or at ease, I should say, to ask questions. 839 Maybe they had had alcohol problems before. Those people are all identified as at risk, even though they had not shown any symp- toms either in combat or their post-deployment survey. And we got them preemptive counseling, if you will. Combat stress is very real. They estimate about everyone coming back, depending on where you were and what you were doing, car- ries about 30 days of post-traumatic stress disorder or PTSD inside them. If you add up all the time, we spent about 30 days treating that in country and when we got back before we went on our block leave. So you can never weed it all out, but I can tell you that from the commanding general on down we made a very intense intensive ef- fort at that. Mr. JONES. I am so pleased to hear that. Mr. Chairman, could the Army answer that question, as well? Mr. HEFLEY. Briefly. Colonel Linnington. Colonel LINNINGTON. Congressman, a very similar approach to what Colonel McCoy said in the Army. There are health profes- sionals on site at our base in Talifar, a psychologist with the for- ward surgical team that was there, chaplains in our unit as well as trained medical officials. More importantly, a trained and caring chain of command that knows how to recognize soldiers that are undergoing stressful conditions and getting them to the right pro- fessionals. Very similar to the Marine Corps, we had training programs be- fore we came back to Ft. Campbell both to the soldiers and for their families that were at Campbell awaiting their return. And then, after we got back to Ft. Campbell, a lock-in period of at least ten days, in some cases as much as two weeks where predictable schedules were in place for soldiers to reintegrate with their fami- lies and make sure everything was okay before they went on leave. High risk soldiers were identified by the chain of command, and again given to professionals to work those issues. So a very similar approach Mr. JONES. Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. HEFLEY. Thank you. Mr. Taylor. Mr. TAYLOR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I especially want to thank our panel for being here, and I think it is a particularly good move to have some of the younger officers here to hopefully speak frankly with us. We very much appreciate your service. one of my trips over there, I was amazed by the very large number or percentage of the causalities that were the result of im- provised explosives. And you guys have already figured this out. We do not tell you how to take a hill on this committee. We hope- fully buy the things you need. I did not feel like our Nation was putting the right amount of emphasis on trying to jam some of those signals. I know that when I traveled and my colleagues traveled over there, we were protect 100 percent of the time. And I do not feel like you were. So I would like to hear from you as quickly as possible, what percentages of the causalities your units experienced came as a result of impro- vised explosives and what percentage of the troops do you think 840 were protected on a daily basis as they went out on parole that could have been protected, were not protected. I realize it is not there for everything Colonel LINNINGTON. Congressman, very early on, we did not have the up-armored Humvees or the armored protection that we needed to conduct routine patrols, especially given such large land area we were responsible for up north. We did not have a large IED problem initially, so that was not really an issue with us, but as the IED problem started to surface and migrate from the south to the north, we had to take precautionary measures to protect our- selves. We knew the Army was coming forward with additional up- armored Humvees and the armored plating kits to augment our light vehicles with some protection, but what we did in the interim was we started out fitting our own vehicles with local contractors in the local community that provided us armor shielding on the side of light skinned vehicles, floor boarding to protect from explo- sives coming through the floor boards and pinholes to mount ma- chine guns on those vehicles that did not have it. So I would agree with you, we did not have enough armor vehi- cles, up armored Humvees that we needed. But as things got along, we got more and more of them. Mr. TAYLOR. What percentage of your force do you think was adequately protected by the time you left? Colonel LĪNNINGTON. By the time we left, everyone was, because it became a requirement that no vehicles would leave our patrol, our forward operating base, unless they has some form of protec- tion, ballistic protection on the sides and the floors. Mr. TAYLOR. This was February 2004. Colonel LINNINGTON. This was March 2004, yes, sir. Mr. TAYLOR. Okay. Colonel. Colonel McCoy. Sir, I would say 75 percent of my causalities were due to IEDs. Of those, nearly all of them were returned to duty. The wounds were superficial. The reason they were super- ficial is that, because I had 100 percent of the force protected with sappy plates, ballistic goggles and additional armor on the Humvees Mr. TAYLOR. What about jammers? What percentage of your force do you think had some form of jammer? Colonel McCoy. The only jammers we had in our area belonged to the EOD personnel. We did not have any jammers. Mr. TAYLOR. You left Iraq when? Colonel McCoy. I left Irag in July, sir. Mr. TAYLOR. Okay. Colonel. Colonel SPRINGMAN. Sir, I left in March of 2004. I had no one killed by IEDs. However, about half my wounded, about 11 or 12 guys were probably due to IEDs. By the time we left, I believe ev- eryone was adequately protected. We all had the proper body armor and we even got the proper body armor for the Mandovians who were supporting us, sir. Mr. TAYLOR. What about some form of jamming device. Colonel SPRINGMAN. Sir, we actually had a Warlock. I used it, just one. We had several patrols out at any time. What we used it for was our logistics patrol that was less protected in vehicles. And it always went with our logistics patrol out and back, sir. 841 Mr. TAYLOR. But what percentage of your vehicles-since you do not need one for every vehicle, I am told, but you certainly need one for every patrol—what percentage of your patrols actually had some form of device to jam the signals of the IEDs? Colonel SPRINGMAN. Sir, we probably had twelve patrols a day, ten to twelve, and one of those would have the device Mr. TAYLOR. So 11 were not? Colonel SPRINGMAN. Correct, sir Mr. TAYLOR. All right. Captain. Captain SAVAGE. Congressman Taylor, to amplify Lt. Colonel McCoy's remarks, all the causalities from kilo company were direct fire. We did receive two IED attacks, one on March 5, one on June 9, both of which, had the Marines not had the side armor for the Humvees, had they not been wearing their ballistic goggles, they probably would have suffered several Wounded in Action (WIA) and at least one Killed in Action (KIA) in each incident. As fate would have it, and as the leadership imposed, we have to do precombat check and inspections on our Marines, making sure they have the ballistic goggles. The Marine Corps did not buy those ballistic goggles to look cool on top of their helmets. The Ma- rines wear them for a specific reason. If they are getting ready to do an entry into a house that re- quires an explosive breach, whether it be night, day, whatever the conditions, they have to wear every bit of protection they have. And as far as the Humvees that we drove around in, Humvees, it was not until April that we started doing company-sized missions. And by the time we were doing company-sized missions, the battalions were task-organized. One company might be an all seven tons with side armored panels, another company might be in all Humvees. But every mission that we went on, every Humvee or every 7 ton would have side armor on it. So it was never really a concern given the fact that a lot of our movements were platoon-sized missions. It works. I know first hand that it works. Mr. TAYLOR. What percentage of your convoys had some form of jammer along with you. Captain SAVAGE. Zero. We never saw it at the company level, sir. Captain COSTELLO. Sir, I had one soldier injured by an IED ex- plosion. Until we received the up-armored kits for the Humvees, we relied on soldiers ingenuity, fabricating steel plates, sand bags, anything we could do to protect ourselves. As far as personal equip- ment, we were 100 percent protected. And as Colonel Linnington stated earlier, there is a requirement to leave the forward operat- ing base, that the vehicle was completely up armored and had some form of protection. As far as jammers were concerned, sir, I left in February of 2004, and I never saw one. Mr. TAYLOR. Thank you all again. Mr. HEFLEY. Mrs. Wilson. Mrs. WILSON OF NEW MEXICO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to join my colleagues in thanking all of you for serving. It is very much appreciated and thank you for your leadership of your sol- diers. I wanted to ask you a couple of things. One was—and I am not sure who is the most appropriate, but you can flip a coin if you want to did you have the resources you needed either interior to 842 your units or attached to your units, that you needed for the civil affairs work that you did, both financial, language specialists, those kind of things, or were you hampered in any way to the projects you were trying to accomplish? Colonel LINNINGTON. Congresswoman, I will hit that first briefly. We had a civil affairs detached with us. It quickly became evident that we needed to augment them with some additional assets and her Military Occupational Specialist (MOS) like Captain Costello's folks who helped us administer some of the CERP money for projects and programs; and where we lacked the number of translators that we needed, we hired more from the local economy and trusted agents as well as Coalation Provisional Authority (CPA)-directed folks from Titan gave us a large number of inter- preters to accomplish those missions. So it was a lot of ingenuity on soldiers' parts initially to get where we needed to go, but we got there pretty quickly Colonel McCoy. Ma'am, our civil affairs group—we had a team attached to us. They were from our Reserve Component. I cannot think of trying to accomplish my mission without them. They were vital in everything that we did. We did augment them, but only in terms of security and interpreters, that we, again, got from Titan or our own Marine interpreters that happened to speak the lan- guage. Colonel SPRINGMAN. Ma'am, as an artillery unit, initially we were not task organized with a CA detachment. About 30 days after we took over our own area, we received a detachment. In the meantime, I had created my own using artillery officers and Non- Commissioned Officers (NCO). They continued to work in that even after we received our civil affairs detachment. As far as inter- preters, as far as civil affairs went, we used all local contract that we had hired from the local populous and used the official military interpreters for other duties. Mrs. WILSON OF NEW MEXICO. What about our captains? Did you have what you needed? Captain SAVAGE. Yes, ma'am, we had our civil affairs attachment within the battalion that if we had a specific mission that required the presence, we were able to tap into them and if not, our platoon- level leadership, our platoon commanders and platoon sergeants re- ceived paying agent authority, some of the basic skills that our civil affairs teams perform, that if, for whatever reason they were em- ployed, elsewhere, the platoon commander or platoon sergeant, my- self or a company executive officer (XO) could perform if needed. To answer your question, yes, ma'am. Captain COSTELLO. Ma'am, I think the only civil affairs resources we were short was that there were not enough school trained civil affairs soldiers there. I have no doubt in my mind that every one of us at this table played some sort of civil affairs role at some ime over there, as does every soldier. As Colonel Linnington said, we had plenty of translators. They were aug- mented by soldiers. I had a young private first class that spoke flu- ent Arabic, and he would augment the teams depending on what was needed. Mrs. WILSON OF NEW MEXICO. The other question I wanted to " ask you-soldiers are great at adapting; American soldiers are. I 843 know that you all dealt with the situation and adapted. But there are always lessons learned and things that you want to pass on to the guy that is coming into your job that you did not expect when you showed up and so you wanted to pass those things on. From your experience, what were the things that you did not expect that you want to make sure you take back as lessons learned for the American Marines or the American Army or even just for your suc- cessor walking in when you walked out. What did you not expect and how can we better prepare our soldiers and Marines? Colonel LINNINGTON. Ma'am, the one thing that surprised us was really the scope of responsibility at the very junior level and the responsibility of junior soldiers to be solved in the civil affairs mis- sion. We trained that extensively, as the other services do in our combat training center. Specifically for a light unit at the joint readiness training center, we tend to sometimes get put in situa- tions at that training center that are very ambiguous and you do not quite know how to handle them. And you get home and you try to learn how to do better in those situations. And we did a lot of that before we left. But then you go over there and find ourselves thrust in those sit- uations, really we were all kind of having flash backs about the width and breadth of the responsibilities at the junior level. We captured all of our lessons learned as we came home. The Army did a good job of sending out teams of scholars and trainers that picked up the things that we were doing and brought them back to the United States prior to the deployment of the unit that replaced us. And when the strykers came in from Fort Lewis to replace us in the northern portion of Iraq, we spent a full 2–1/2 or 3 weeks with them to give them the ability to become familiar with the terrain, meet all the local officials that they needed to know about and there was a pretty seamless transition. So we were happy for that time period that we were allowed to transition. Colonel McCoy. Congresswoman we had a taste of what, SASO, or stability and security operations, would be like with final bit of OIF I being in Baghdad at the beginning of phase four operations. We took those lessons home with us. In addition to that, we went through, as I mentioned in my statements, intensive language, cul- tural training. We also had a very dedicated professional military education program, taken articles written from across the spectrum from periodicals and newspapers and then discussed those in a guide discussion format down at the squad level led by often the company commander or the platoon commander. After that, it was a matter of taking our tactics, techniques and procedures and applying them to the specific AO that we had. TTPs if you will, tactics, techniques and procedures, that would not work in Baville, would not necessarily work in Al Umbar, so you had to adjust those specifically to that. I cannot say that there was anything that surprised me. Mrs. WILSON OF NEW MEXICO. Do any of the other three have particular insights on that? I know I am out of time, but is there something that you particularly want to share. Colonel SPRINGMAN. Ma'am, we went through similar process as has been described. The one thing I emphasized to both the unit that was coming in whenever I could, and with the ones we re- 844 turned was junior leaders having to maintain the standards and discipline. Be that the uniform or just how they act and interact with Iraqis, and if the junior leaders were involved they could make the right decisions and their soldiers would be both more se- cure and able to accomplish their mission. Mrs. WILSON OF NEW MEXICO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. HEFLEY. Thank you. Mr. Reyes. Mr. REYES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you gentlemen for being here. We definitely appreciate your service and the hard work that you have done. And as I ask each one of you, please pass on out of appreciation to those that serve with you and for you. We appreciate everybody's service. Having said that, Mr. Chairman, are we going to have another panel on this. Is this it? Mr. HEFLEY. This is it. Mr. REYES. I want to express, or maybe just make a rec- ommendation that until the future we include enlisted personnel and minorities and women, because I have been to Iraq five times and Afghanistan about nine times, and each one of those trips I have seen what America looks like and I just, no knock on our panel here, because I respect and honor their service, but I do think we need enlisted personnel, minorities, women represented at the table, as well. When we talk about our military, it is reflec- tive of our country and, certainly representing a border district, the 14 causality that causality that we suffered in our area, most have been minorities. So I just offer that as an observation, and I hope a recommendation that we will follow in the future. I have got a number of questions that I would like some of you to comment on. Over this August break, I had a couple that ap- proached me and tell me that their son was very troubled, because ecent action in Iraq, his best buddy had been killed. It was a firefight where there were rocket-propelled grenades (RPG) and small arms fire, but this individual was driving a Humvee and got broad sided by a truck apparently and got killed. And yet his death was categorized as non-hostile becaus I guess, a vehicle accident. That is a huge problem. This is not the first time that I have heard of that, and I would ask you to com- ment. The other thing that I would ask you to comment on, when you were there, is we have these no-go areas as we have today and what are the consequences both in being able to have a presence that reinforces the good news that you have testified to here today about the liberation of the country and the fact that we are there standing to help the Iraqi people, and most importantly, the 21 or so billion dollars authorized for projects to improve the quality of life of the Iraqi people. How can we administer into those areas if there are these no-go areas that we are not able to service, to pro- tect or to be with the Iraqi people. So if you can comment on those two things, I would appreciate it. Colonel LINNINGTON. Congressman Reyes, we had no no-go areas in my area of responsibility except for the mosques where the cul- tural sensitivities of non-Muslims in the mosque, we abided by that, and what we would do is we would work with our Iraqi secu- 845 rity officials that were trained and walking side-by-side with us to enter those areas Mr. REYES. Is this a recent phenomenon of the no-go regions or areas that we are experiencing now? Colonel LINNINGTON. We did not have any in my area, in the 101st area. Colonel McCoy. I can speak for my area, I did not have any no- go areas. Just as Colonel Linnington said, mosques obviously are a protected site. When we did need to go into a mosque, we did it with Iraqi forces. Colonel SPRINGMAN. Same sir. I have not heard the term "no-go area” used. Captain SAVAGE. To echo Lt. Colonel McCoy, we did not have no- go area, but we were trained that if we had to, we would have Iraqi policemen or Iraqi national guard so as to not incite the civilian population. Captain COSTELLO. Sir, other than cultural sites and things like mosques, there are no no-go areas Mr. REYES. I would be remiss—I have known Captain Costello for over eight years. He is the son of our commander at Fort Bliss, and with El Paso ties, an El Paso young man. We are very proud of his service and we are very happy for you to be here today. Captain COSTELLO. Thank you. Mr. REYES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. HEFLEY. Thank you. We will stand in recess. We have one vote and possibly two votes coming up here and then we will recon- vene. [Recess.] Mr. CALVERT (presiding]. The hearing will please come to order. The next person to ask questions is Congressman Calvert, who is temporarily the chair. And I appreciate you gentlemen for coming today. I certain want to be one of those to thank you for your service. I recently returned from Iraq, also. I was there with Congressman-Chair- man Hunter and Congressman Reyes. And we certainly saw evi- dence of all of the good that the military has done and continues to do every day. And certainly, unfortunately, that is not being con- veyed to the American public. But, certainly, we are very appre- ciative of that. But one problem, that—when we were in one part of the theater, was Fallujah. And I probably want to specifically ask the Marines this question, because certainly you guys are there. And obviously, April was a very tough month. We suffered significant casualties, not just in Fallujah, but in other parts of Iraq. But that seems to be the crossroads of insurgency at this time, and certainly we have got some bad news over the weekend of what is occurring in Fallujah. So I would like to get start with Colonel McCoy, your feelings about how do we deal with Fallujah. Is that a problem that you think needs to be resolved in order for us to stop the trans- shipping of not just individuals, but bombs and other parapherna- lia that is being shipped apparently through Fallujah? Colonel McCoy. Šir, my involvement with Fallujah lasted about five weeks, when we were called from western Al Anbar into and participated in Operation Vigilant Resolve. The 846 thrust of your question, respectfully, Mr. Chairman, is really out- side of my lane. As a battalion commander, I execute tactical tasks. That is ex- actly what I did. I executed tactical tasks while we were there in Fallujah. And you know, frankly, we took the fight to the enemy. And that is pretty much where my lane ends, sir. Mr. CALVERT. Staying in that vein, the enemy in Fallujah, what did you see there? When we define insurgency, was it mainly a local insurgency, or were those some foreign fighters, also? Colonel McCoy. I think we are fighting a—from my experience, we are fighting—this insurgency at large actually has a few compo- nents to it. There are the foreign fighters that are there to further their cause: turn Iraq into the next Afghanistan, Baghdad into the next Beirut. Ms. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. Is there a percentage that anecdotally you can share with us, what you have seen in the field, what per- centage of foreign fighters versus- Colonel McCoy. It would be pure speculation, since I wasn't able to, you know, take a census with these guys. It is hard to tell who is shooting at you, whether he is one of the criminal elements that are out to make a buck, or if it is a former Baath party regime, or a hard-core terrorist. I will tell you, in Fallujah you can tell when you are up against a guy that has a little bit more formal training. And you have to make sure that your tactics are very precise when you deal with them. They are much more accurate, much more lethal, than if you are going up against the guy that is firing an RPG at you for a cou- ple hundred bucks. When you deal with a professional terrorist, you know it. Their fire is much more accurate and you need to be much more careful. We did run into a combination of all three, I believe, in Fallujah. There were very well-trained insurgents that we fought, that fought from fortified houses that were constructed in a textbook manner. We also fought against those that were not as proficient. Mr. CALVERT. The criminal element are these folks being paid for by former Baathists or foreign fighters in order to inflict- Colonel McCoy. Yes, sir. When we follow the money, it is coming from former Baath party. Where they get their money—or from for- eign terrorists that are also kind of extending their operational reach, if you will, by getting some surrogate foot soldiers to do some of their bidding. Mr. CALVERT. Any other comments from the panel regarding the insurgency in general? The component of the insurgency movement today, and what kind of progress, I think, Colonel, I will talk to you and then we will talk to the other folks. Colonel LINNINGTON. Mr. Chairman, one of the things that we looked at was money as ammunition. And in a lot of cases the un- employment issues in Iraq were what fed the insurgency, be- cause-especially some of the young men are looking for ways earn money. And one way, of course, is to attack Americans, if you are paid by former Baath officials or foreign extremists. So as we use the money this Congress provided us to rebuild the infrastruc- ture of Iraq, we tried to hire as many folks as we could so that we THAI 847 removed that opportunity to hire poor Iraqi young men, especially to participate in the insurgency. So we appreciate your support there. Mr. CALVERT. Colonel. Colonel SPRINGMAN. Sir, I believe we saw very similar. There were definitely those who were just being paid off the street to at- tack, and those who were better trained. And I would agree with the last comment. The more we got back to work, either through our projects or through just the economy itself rebuilding, the less good being paid to attack us, especially with the inherent dangers there, and the attacks became fewer from the people just being paid to attack us, sir. Mr. CALVERT. Captain, you just got back in July. How do you see that? Captain SAVAGE. Sir, I look at it from two perspectives. One, it was a constant fight for the 80 percent gray; 10 percent are com- mitted to doing—aligning with us. In other words, those that can go one way or the other, that is where creating the conditions for them to understand our cause and understand that we are there to help them get back on their feet was so critical, because if those conditions existed—a sense of despair existed amongst the dis- enchanted youth, then the concern is that there would be more enemy, and that is why getting out there with the civil affairs projects was important. The second part to that is seeing those that were better trained, whether they be foreign fighters or former Baathist members, could definitely spark or ignite a certain sense of euphoria. I think the term in Regimental Combat Team 1 (RCT 1) headquarters was "drunk with Jihad”; but after getting smacked down and after they got punished quite severely, I think that would go away and you would be left with those that were die-hard committed to killing Americans, and the rest would be like it is not so cool to jump on the band wagon. Captain COSTELLO. Sir, I would like to echo what Colonel Linnington and Colonel Springman said, the big difference that the money played in keeping those potential guys on our side of the fence. Mr. CALVERT. Thank you. Next, Congressman Snyder. Dr. SNYDER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think in the interests of time, I will just direct my questions to you, Colonel Linnington and Colonel McCoy, and get an Army and a Marine Corps perspec- tive on a couple of questions I have. I have visited Iraq a couple of times. Was there, I think, three weeks ago. And we visited the 39th Brigade, which is attached to the 1st Cav. And I hadn't—when we first arrived, we had a meet- ing with Ambassador Negraponte and Ambassador David Nash, and we got to talking to Ambassador Nash. And I asked him about the flow of development dollars, getting funds to everyone so they can do the sweat projects, sewer, water, electricity, trash pickup, and the kinds of things that make neighborhoods better and safer and that raise neighbor morale. And we were assured at our meeting with the civilian leadership that the money was flowing, everything was great, the development 849 Saddam's 30 years of rule. In most cases we were able to take that infrastructure and develop it so it exceeded prewar capabilities. Iraq is a very big place. There are in many towns that we small fishing villages, if you will, along the Euphrates that we probably just didn't get to. It is a matter of time, and we put our money and our effort toward the larger population areas that would breed some of this dissent. I never had problems getting access to money. Any project I put forward was certainly approved. We did try to be good stewards of that money. We didn't arbitrarily approve projects until we had gone on site. Dr. SNYDER. When did you get back? Colonel McCoy. I got back in July of 2004. Dr. SNYDER. Second question for the two of you, if you don't mind. Another issue that we have heard about intermittently, both by e-mail—we all have friends, they are just a split second away by e-mail now that serve—and I have some questions about over there was the problem with parts primarily for vehicles. But did you all feel like your supply lines were well maintained, that you were able to maintain your vehicles and keep them up and running and the other kind of equipment you need? Colonel LINNINGTON. Initially, it was a challenge. I think that was primarily because we moved as quickly as we did. And there was some frustration with getting the parts, especially tires and rims that we wanted. It is very rough terrain. And we were going through tires and rims on our vehicles very quickly. Our problem was visibility of where those parts were. And in some cases, we ordered and double ordered parts. And then after we had been there four or five months, all of a sudden we started getting-parts were coming out of the sky. Dr. SNYDER. The delay is what I have a concern on. Colonel LINNINGTON. The Army has done a lot of work on making sure that we have what we wanted. And we had priority of repair parts across the Army. That was beneficial. We ran very quickly in the early stages. It took a while to get the infrastructure estab- lished. Dr. SNYDER. Once you got settled into Mosul it was better? Colonel LINNINGTON. Yes, sir. Much better. Dr. SNYDER. Do you agree with that general assessment, Colonel McCoy? Colonel McCoy. I would agree with that, sir. For OIF I, during the march-up, I arrived in Baghdad with 15 of 15 Abrams tanks, and 49 of 50 of our Amtraks. Supply parts were short but we had done a 600 movement to contact, if you will. OIF II, I was easily able to maintain above a 98 percent readi- ness rating for all of my rolling stock. Dr. SNYDER. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. WILSON OF SOUTH CAROLINA (presiding). Next up is Tom Cole from Oklahoma. Mr. COLE. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Let me again just begin by echoing the opinion I am sure everybody on this com- mittee has. We very much appreciate your professionalism and what you have done and what you are doing. It just is awesome. 850 I had the good fortune to be in Iraq and Afghanistan guided by your colleague to your rear, Colonel Simcock, but extraordinarily impressive performance by American soldiers across the board. Let me begin by asking you: I am going to kind of exclude if I understand your responses, Colonel McCoy and Captain Savage, because I think you both spoke to this in your remarks about Iraqi forces and security people that you were working with, as I under- stood it the improvement was impressive. I would like to direct the same question to you, Colonel, and then just across the board for the others. What was your impression and nteraction with Iraqi security forces and armed personnel? Were they getting better? Just your overall impression. Colonel LINNINGTON. had a very favorable impression, Congress- man. We actually had so many young Iraqi men, some former mili- tary, and some obviously not coming forward, wanting to partici- pate as Iraqi security forces. Our difficulty in the early days was getting all of them the equip- ment and the training that they needed quickly, and getting them working either on the border with Syria, which is where I was re- sponsible for, or in security protection forces or even in the police forces. So over the period of about six to eight months we ran several border training academies, we ran half a dozen or more police training academies, intel, and we started to establish the infra- structure for training of the Iraqi military forces. And they got bet- ter and better as time progressed. Initially it was all us. And then progressively it became us and them. And then, you know, people have asked me how do you deter- mine success, or how do you measure success? Success for me was three weeks before we left, an Iraqi border patrol of all Iraqis inter- dicted a smuggler coming through the border, tracked him and chased him into an Iraqi town, where an Iraqi police checkpoint was established. And those two Iraqi forces, with vehicles and ra- dios and communicating with each other, apprehended those indi- viduals. And that, for me was success, because that was definitely not there when we got there. So, progressively it got better and better. And, I think, reading the paper and seeing what General Petraeus is doing with the training of the new Iraqi military forces, I think it will progres- sively get better and better and be a good-news story for all of Iraq. Mr. ČOLE. Colonel Springman. Colonel SPRINGMAN. Sir, what I saw down in the Sunni Triangle, in my area, initially the police were fairly poor. There were one or two that were pretty good policemen. And when we first started to form the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps, we had six members. And we were—by the time we were done, though, it was very successful, and we had over 250 members that we had trained. I had the sergeant major train them. And these six were actually a great success story. No one wanted to come for- ward. These six did, relatively poor. And we trained them. They went on patrols with us. When we were attacked they came to our aid, and the success came when one of them was attacked by him- self, and we went to his aid. Then the word started to spread that 851 we were equals and working with us, and the numbers started to increase. And I saw that as a success story. They did all of the patrols with us at the end. They secured some of their own buildings themselves. And they helped capture some of the local leaders who were attacking us, simply because they were Iraqis and could do it better. Mr. COLE. Captain Costello, did you have any experiences? STELLO. Sir, I saw a little bit of this. There was defi- nitely an improvement through my time there, for the border guard, the police and the facility protection forces. I could see a big difference in the folks as they came through, because I was respon- sible for paying all of their salaries. I had a lot of contact with them. You know, they started off with just a basic school: get issued a weapon, sometimes there was a uniform, sometimes there wasn't. By the time we had left, we had leadership academies run by our NCOs to help train these forces more. As the money started flowing, we were able to equip them with the uniforms that they needed. It helped them more mentally to build their confidence and legiti- mize them in the eyes of the other folks from the town. They see the uniform, and they know that this guy is not just another guy just carrying around a weapon or something like that. So with the new equipment and training and a little more confidence, I defi- nitely saw an improvement, sir. Mr. COLE. Terrific. Let me address—my time is running a little short, but let me address a question, Colonel Linnington, to you then also to you, Colonel McCoy, and if we have time for the others that would be great. As was alluded to early on, we have seen—it has been a pretty tough couple of days, to say the least. And, you know, we are mov- ing into the height of the political season in this country. Do you have any speculation as to whether or not we are seeing intensified activity partly to impact public opinion inside the United States? I am not asking you to do-draw a partisan—but just to impact American morale or determination at home; or do you think this is just happening independently of our own political timetable in- side this country? Colonel LINNINGTON. Sir, speculation on my part. But, we saw a similar spike in activities as we were approaching the election pe- riod in Iraq. And, I think with the elections coming up in Iraq in January, it may be more tied to their election period and trying to destabilize the country for their election period than their own again. That is speculation on my part. Mr. COLE. It is a very speculative question. Colonel McCoy. McCoy. One coincidence that may be there is that we are doing troop rotations. We experienced, when we rotated back in for OIF II, an increase in enemy activity as they introduced the new unit to the AO, so to speak. That is going on with 1st Marine Division right now in Fallujah, and out west in Al Anbar Province with units that are doing what we call left-seat, right seat rides, as part of the relief/replace proc- ess. That has historically been a window when the enemy attempts to increase their operations and exploit a seam in command and control, a perceived seam. 852 pecific Mr. COLE. My time has expired. So unless somebody else has an observation. Did you have one? Colonel SPRINGMAN. No, sir. Mr. COLE. Okay. Just again, thank you gentlemen very much for your service. It is deeply appreciated. Mr. WILSON SOUTH CAROLINA. At this time, Congresswoman Susan Davis of California. Ms. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you to all of you for your dedicated service. And particularly I think the way that you have addressed your ability. And I'm not sure it was your training, but something in you that allowed you to work as closely with the Iraqis as you did and have some success as a result of that. I wonder if you could talk a little bit about that success. I think we know that success is really dependent on having the Iraqis take charge through police forces, security, counterinsurgency. You have addressed that somewhat. But can time line, so on a worst—and really a best-case scenario, what is your sense of how that is going in terms of some kind of a timeline; what it will take, and what you saw in terms of going from 6 to, say, 250 soldiers who were adequately trained? The numbers of Iraqis in service are quite large. But the num- bers, as I can tell from figures I have looked at, that are actually trained and able to do the work that is required, is still a relatively small number. How do you assess that? What do you-give us some better idea about those numbers. Colonel LINNINGTON. Ma'am, I can't put a time line on it, to be honest with you. I know that the more that the Iraqi security forces and army forces are trained up, in place, and operating and gain that experience of providing security for Iraq, then the better they will be. I think it is important that we stand side by side with them to train them. And that is really what our responsibility was when I was there to help get them trained, be they border secu- rity or police or even the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps folks that we trained of all ethnicities. Then they were confident because we were there training them, and we always conducted our training so that we had the opportunity afterwards to talk about it, get feed- back from them, and then take it an extra step. I know we are still on the road to training the rest of the forces, Iraqi security forces. I can't speculate on how long that will také to accomplish that. Ms. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. A third of the way there? Half of the way there? Colonel LINNINGTON. The numbers I have seen indicate that we are about 50 percent or so, in training and filling the ranks of Iraqi Army soldiers, and probably a little less or greater number, de- pendent upon whether you are talking about border security or force protection security, that are guarding key infrastructure or city police. I think it is important that the training take place, the whole gamut of training that they go through, because it makes them bet- ter on the job, and then they can obviously train themselves after a certain point, and they don't need us around to conduct that training. 853 Ms. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. Anybody else want to comment on that? Colonel McCoy. Yes, ma'am, I would like to. And Captain Savage may be a little bit closer to this than I, since he worked very close with the Hadetha police. In December, just before we arrived, the police station in Hadetha was, frankly, overrun by local thugs and bandits who confiscated the weapons from the police and released all of the prisoners, all of this really without firing a shot. Over the next seven months, that changed dramatically. There was now a police force that just didn't sit in the police station and try to defend itself and occasionally surrender. They actually went out and patrolled and had adopted our police-American police- mindset to serve and protect. When two police officers can walk into a crowd and arrest two men, that signals a sea change in the respect that the local people had for the police, and the confidence that the police had in their training. No longer when they make an arrest does the family come down to the police station, large extended family, and intimidate the police into releasing them. The police are the authority and the final authority in that town. That to me spells more, or is a greater indicator than the number of police we have on the force. We had maxed out our cap with the number of police. The Iraqi National Guard, another element of the Iraqi security forces, was also dysfunctional, if you will, when we first arrived. I will tell you that after the transfer of sovereignty, there was a—it is as if a light switch had gone off. And that force had spring in their step, a little swagger in their step, and became very, very dedicated under some very strong Iraqi leadership that stepped forward. And we, of course, encouraged that and reinforced that every chance that we had. They intend to expand that battalion to a bri- gade size to add another two battalions to that. That is when I left in July. That is still in the works. So in that case, I guess we are a third there, for western Al Anbar, or my part of it. We have made great strides. And a lot of it is really not quantifi- able, but we can certainly qualify that success with their perform- ance and the fact that the Iraqi police were definitely in charge. Maybe an indicator of that was soon after we left, that police sta- tion was targeted for a pair of suicide bombs as well as the Iraqi National Guard headquarters that were very close to each other. And they had operated together very well. That may have been an indicator that they were having more ef- fect than the bad guys liked. They were able to minimize the dam- age to that suicide bomb, and then conducted their own investiga- tion and rounded up the people that were responsible for it. Ms. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. Thank you. I appreciate that. Perhaps in the interest of time, quickly, if you or most of you would like to address the intelligence issue. Are you—is most of the intelligence coming from people in the community? Are you getting intelligence from the outside? Could you give us a sense of that? And also, the issue of the numbers of foreign fighters that you feel-has that di- minished greatly? Is that still about where it was? What are you hearing, I guess, from the street; or what were you hearing from the street, and where does the bulk of your intelligence come from? 854 T. Inst Ironia Taois u vai 10 Colonel LINNINGTON. Ma'am, 80 percent or more of our intel- ligence came from human intellig ce, came from based on the human-to-human contact with American forces, would tell us where the caches were or where the pockets of insurgents were in our area. So in that regard, it was important for us to maintain close personal relationships with all of the folks in our area, and thus the importance of all of the things that we were doing. In terms of foreign fighters, being responsible for a large portion of the border with Syria, that was my concern. And there has been a longstanding debate about how many foreign fighters are coming from Syria. I can tell you that I did not see a lot of foreign fighters coming from Syria. But I can only speak to the 270 kilometers that I was responsible for. And part of that reason I think was because we quickly trained up border security forces and ran a lot of pa- trols, American patrols, along the border. And I think they know where we are, and they know where the security patrols are from the Iraqi side. So it was probably not a big port of entry, if you will, for the area I was responsible for. Ms. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. I know my time is up, Mr. Chairman. Perhaps someone else can follow up on that. Thank you. Mr. WILSON SOUTH CAROLINA. Next up is a proud Marine, Con- gressman John Kline of Minnesota. Mr. KLINE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, gentlemen, all for being here. Thank you for your leadership and for the just out- standing performance of you and your marines and soldiers in Iraq. We are all so proud of you. I was interested to hear that all five of you felt that over 90 per- cent of the Iraqi population looked at our presence there, the U.S. presence, the coalition presence there, as liberators and not occupi- ers. And 1 I particularly thought, Captain Costello, when you said that you didn't like to watch or listen to the news since you came back, because it was so out of proportion, the news to what your perception, what was really happening in Iraq, I think that is very helpful for us to hear that from you. I would like to take just a minute and kind of follow. up on what my colleague from South Texas was getting at with rules of en- gagement. So I would like to go to where the rubber meets the road and start with you, Captain Savage. Can you tell me what your Marines' understanding was and is, of when they can shoot and when they can't shoot? Captain SAVAGE. Yes, sir. Very plainly. If somebody in the popu- lation or in the process of executing a mission identifies themselves as a target, meaning they demonstrate a hostile act-they are ei- ther shooting at us, preparing to shoot as us, or they are doing something that indicates that they are going to make us a target- the enemy had a very significant and direct fire threat over there. So if we were in an area that was a known indirect fire target, es- sentially a target reference point for the enemy, and there was somebody on rooftops, on buildings that had been engaged before with a pair of binos, we could engage that target. The right to self- defense is inherent in every unit commander beyond the squad leader and fire team leader. 855 So at no time were the rules of engagement unclear. They were echoed before every mission, sir, in every op order, in every back brief, every precombat check inspection. I mean, if we had time to do nothing else, we talked through the mission at hand, what we are getting ready to do, to make sure that Marines understand the key points, what are your keys to success, our main effort, and where can we really cause catastrophic failure. As a company commander, I would venture to say I have never had a concern about Marines not understanding the rules of en- gagement or being able to pull the trigger when the time was right. I was more concerned about having somebody that was overzealous pull the trigger on somebody unnecessarily. And, you know, as a subordinate commander, I am responsible for every round. And I would venture to say we are fortunate that that never happened. Essentially it was rule number five, safety rule number five: Know your target and its background. Because for every person, hypothetically, that we may have killed that didn't need to be killed, then that would create probably 20 or 30 more of the enemy or simply people that would try to kill us, just to avenge a death in the family. Mr. KLINE. But, specifically—I think I heard you say this clearly, but I want to underscore it for purposes of the record-none of your Marines had to wait to be shot at before they could return fire, right? If they perceived a threat to themselves or the force, they could shoot? Captain SAVAGE. That is correct, sir. Captain COSTELLO. Yes, sir. That is correct. Mr. KLINE. Okay. Right answer, folks. Thanks very much. In the ever faint hope of setting an example for my colleagues, Mr. Chair- man, I will yield back. Mr. WILSON SOUTH CAROLINA. Thank you, Congressman Kline. And certainly questions in a great Marine tradition. Next up we have Congressman Frank LoBiondo of New Jersey. Mr. LOBIONDO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And, gentlemen, I echo the comments of all of my colleagues. Thank you for serving your country so well, for making us all so proud, especially Colonel Linnington. I have had a relationship with your brother for about 20 years now. So I feel a special kinship toward you. A couple of questions that I have. On a local south Jersey radio talk show which I am on pretty frequently, and open up to ques- tions from callers, there is one particular caller—it is easy to tell from his comments where he is coming from—but he is insisting that he has a contact with a friend who has either a son or a grandson that has been in Iraq—so that is where his connection is coming from. And he is continuing to insist that—a couple of things: that not all of our troops in harm's way have body armor. You talked about the up-armored Humvees. I think I have got ur take on that. And also that morale is nose-diving, that it was okay for a while, but now that the rank-and-file troops believe that they shouldn't be there, that they are not getting the right equip- ment in all cases, that there is more that we can be doing as a Na- n to support them, and that if the truth be known, according to this individual, that morale is really a problem. 856 Colonel Linnington, could you start with trying to make some comments on that? Colonel LINNINGTON. Congressman, that is about 180 degrees out from my experience. As I left, the 101st's morale was at an all-time high. We were exceeding reenlistment rates. And our equipment was getting refurbished and refit amazingly quickly, primarily due to the resources that were given to us by your committee and by the United States Congress. So I appreciate that. Body armor was not an issue in our unit. Everybody had it when we got there, and we left it in Iraq when we came back home for units that were replacing us. And the things that we had, the up- armored kits for vehicles, we left all of that in Iraq as well so that units coming in would have it when they came in. We didn't take any of it home. As we refit our equipment upon return, part of the refit of the equipment is replenishment of the stocks and the things that we left in Iraq. There are lots of indications of morale in a unit. And the biggest reason, the biggest thing, I think, is troops wanting to stay in the unit and stay in the Army to do what they are doing. And over- whelmingly our troops' morale is high. And there is no other way can I justify the comments of the caller that talked to you on the radio. Mr. LOBIONDO. Okay. Colonel McCoy. Yes, sir. I can address the body armor question first. I will restate for the record that 100 percent of my Marines and sailors had both the Small Arms Protective Insert (SAPI) plate interceptor vest and ballistic goggles With regards to morale, I can assure you there is no sense of victimhood from where I stand in my battalion, my regiment, my division; a few individuals notwithstanding. The families, who you would expect to see the first cracks in morale—since our families in my battalion endured 13 out of 18 months we were deployed to Iraq, we came back for 5 months and then redeployed—they are solid. We are as proud of them as they are of us. Finally, we are doing what Marines do. This is why we joined. It is an all-volunteer force. Marines join to do this, to fight and win their Nation's battles. That is exactly what we are doing. Last week I had the opportunity to go to Bethesda to visit a Marine, Corporal Peter Bagarella, from Cape Cod. He wasn't one of my Ma- rines, but he was a Marine from 1st Battalion, 8th Marines, that relieved us in Hadeetha. This Marine had lost a foot and his eyes to an IED. He is going to regain his eyesight. What was significant and striking was this young Marine's morale was sky-high. And even though he knew- he had lost his foot, his first concern was to get back to his unit and to get back to his comrades. We believe in our mission. We trust in our brothers. And we have fought with a happy heart. To suggest that there is dissent in the ranks is, again, to echo Colonel Linnington, 180 degrees out from my experience, sir. Mr. LOBIONDO. Thank you. Colonel SPRINGMAN. Sir, I saw high morale, also. Again, reenlist- ment rates were over 100 percent. Soldiers know they were doing 857 what soldiers do. Families—I had several soldiers reenlist in Iraq who said the main deciding factor was their wife was happy with the support she was getting, and everything was going well back here in the States as well as with the soldier deployed, sir. You know, also saw soldiers who were wounded, drive along with the mission that day. I drive on with patrols, because they didn't want to leave their fellow soldiers out there. Of course, the more seriously wounded were evacuated right away. But we had soldiers continue-PFC Chapman, I remember was hit, his interceptor body armor stopped it, he had a black-and-blue mark, but it probably would have killed him had he not been wearing his interceptor body armor. He got up and drove on with the mission a few min- utes later, sir. I saw morale high while I was over there, sir. Mr. LOBIONDO. Captain, your experience the same? Captain SAVAGE. That is correct, sir. I would say morale and happiness are not always—do not always coexist. Getting ready, standing at the gates to do a grim task, doesn't mean that you are happy about it; but at the same time, Marines volunteer to be test- ed, and at the end of a deployment, if a Marine were fortunate to come back home to our families, we know how we did. And for the 5–1/2 months we were in Iraq, for the 7 months that we were gone, Marines constantly sought the test, constantly sought to be tested. And the worst thing for a Marine was to spend time away from his unit, as I know personally, sir. Mr. LOBIONDO. Captain Costello. Captain COSTELLO. Yes, sir. Similar thoughts. First off, 100 per- cent of my soldiers had body armor. There was never a time that there was a body armor shortage within my unit. I think the caller that you referenced may be confusing morale with being homesick. There is no doubt in my mind that every sol- dier that is over there right now would rather be back home. And, you know, some of the e-mails or phone calls that family members or friends may receive sometimes may be, you know, not so opti- mistic or not so happy and things like that. But I did not witness any morale problems. I had one discipline a year that required an Article 15 for almost a hundred soldiers. And, you know, my guys had smiles on their face con- stantly. Would they rather be home? Yes. Mr. LOBIONDO. Thanks. Mr. Chairman, can I indulge for another minute? Mr. WILSON SOUTH CAROLINA. Yes. Mr. LOBIONDO. Just real quickly, and I will just ask Colonel Linnington and Colonel McCoy. When I was—when I visited and the-as you know, they arranged for us to have meals with the sol- diers. One of the comments that I heard was that most of our troops get to watch Armed Forces Network, which is basically our cable system. And along the lines that we heard before that you were mentioning, none of the good news stories are basically mak- ing the TV networks. Do you think that the troops that are watching that at the time over in theater recognize that? And is that causing any kind of a ney are seeing good things happening on the ground and then they are watching TV when they are coming off duty and 858 saying, where is the good story? Do you hear any of that? And I know I am overtime, so I would just ask you to comment briefly. Colonel LINNINGTON. Troops tend to watch football games and wrestling and boxing and things. And believe it or not, as Pat said earlier, we tended to leave the news off while we were in theater, so it didn't affect them that much. And the ones that did, you know, they understood the importance of the mission, and took pride in what they were doing. So they took it for what it was worth. Colonel McCoy. I concur with that statement. Mr. LOBIONDO. Gentlemen, thank you very much for your service to our country. Mr. WILSON SOUTH CAROLINA. Thank you, Congressman LoBiondo. And next up we have Dr. Phil Gingrey, Congressman from Georgia. Dr. GINGREY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And, gentlemen, let me join—first of all, join with my colleagues in thanking you, thanking you from the bottom of our hearts for your service in Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom, and your continued service to our country. We are deeply appreciative. And you enjoy, as you know, I hope, 100 percent sup- port of this committee from members on both sides of the aisle, in a very bipartisan fashion. I want to address my first question, I think, to Colonel Linnington, Lieutenant Colonel McCoy, and Lieutenant Colonel Springman. And this is a little bit of a follow-up on what Congress- woman Davis from California asked a little earlier about the Iraqi troops. You know, before the handoff on June the 28th, it certainly, I think-I will have to admit I had had the impression that we were dealing with some Keystone Cops over there. And when—that first, handoff in Fallujah, when our Marines pulled back, we didn't have a very good experience there. And their performance was less than exemplary. And I am just wondering, we had a couple of—three months ago our Chairman, Chairman Duncan Hunter, arranged for us to have a video conference with General Petraeus. And, of course, his is a heavy lift; it is a truly tough job to try to stand up that Iraqi Army. I am still concerned about how we are doing; how are they doing now that we indeed are in an advisory role to them? How are we doing in regard to recruiting? Are we able to reach into the Iraqi civilian population and get good people and get them well trained? the colonel and lieutenant colonels could comment on that. And then I have a short question, Mr. Chairman, for our cap- tains. Colonel LINNINGTON. Mr. Congressman, we had an abundance of folks volunteering to serve in the positions, Iraqi security positions in our area. And I can only talk up through the time we left, which was about mid-February when we got home. When we left in February, we had trained up all of the border guards that were in place along the Syrian border; 270 kilometers of the border in my area were 100 percent Iraqi. And we had come off of those positions at the completion of their training, and they had that wholly on their own. 859 L AHIFALL We were initially guarding lots of key infrastructure: oil refiner- ies, water distribution centers, the dam, a lot of other key facilities. And in the 6 or 8 months that we had recruited, trained, and equipped Iraqi forces, by the time we left, they were 100 percent in control of all of those facilities, as well, without issue and with- out incident. I can't speak to what is happening in Fallujah or with the estab- lishment in training, equipping of the Iraqi Army, because we had left-my unit had left Iraq prior to a lot of those forces standing up. I will tell you, however, that when it came to recruiting young Iraqi men for those positions in the Army, there was an over- whelming response by the young Iraqi young men to participate and become soldiers for the new Iraq. That is how they called it. So I would suspect, as I have seen General Petraeus quoted, that it will take time. But based on the enthusiasm of the young Iraqi men to become part of the future of Iraq, that can only get better over time. Colonel McCoy. Mr. Congressman, we found that the key was Iraqi leadership. Recruitment was never an issue. But finding dedi- cated and courageous Iraqi leadership to fill those billet positions was the crux move, if you will. The battalion commander in our zone was arrested in late May for being corrupt. And based on his testimony, we found body armor, radios, uniforms, in his possession in his house. That he was probably selling on the black market. He was arrested. Most of his chain of command was sacked along with him. And we brought in young lions that we had identified in the ranks and promoted them up. Many of them had military train- ing or police training in the past, mostly military. That, too, is like a light switch going off. And that unit turned around overnight and began to operate on its own, to conduct checkpoints on their own, and to closely work with the Iraqi police in our sector. That was the crux move; just swelling the ranks with numbers, with the rank and file is fine. But the key is identifying and nur- turing those young leaders and then backing them up. And it was—under Iraqi leadership, those National Guard. battalions were fantastic. Colonel SPRINGMAN. I left in late March. Recruiting initially where we were in the Sunni Triangle was a little bit difficult. We started with six members of the ICDC, or the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps. That eventually recently got up to 250.. These six were what I would call poor Iraqis. They did not have family position, nor did they have money. And, actually, I think this became an opportunity for them, because they became leaders and a way for them to show their leadership ability. . They quickly took charge, those six. They took charge of the oth- ers as they came in. By the time we were done, they were conduct- ing operations very well, and at the squad and platoon level, sir. I think a lot of the—for lack of a better word—“disenfranchised” Iraqis saw this as a means that was not going to—as a means for them actually to advance and have a part in the new Iraq. In our area, I was on the Tigress River. There were two bridges across. It was the true lifeline of my area to the outside. And they AL 861 of the electricity in the country, start digging sewers and the sew- age system to help clean the streets and things like that. Captain COSTELLO. But would see the excitement again when we would repair a medical clinic or reopen a hospital or a school or a government building. You would have thousands of townspeople out there, and it was like when we first came into the different cit- ies. Dr. GINGREY. I know I am well beyond my time. I thank you for your patience with me. Thank you, gentlemen, for your service. Mr. WILSON OF SOUTH CAROLINA (presiding]. Thank you, Dr. Gingrey. And, indeed, there is a Last Mohican. I am Congressman Joe Wilson from South Carolina, and I would like you to know how much I appreciate your service. And in lieu of a question, I just want to let you know, I appreciate your service as a Member of Congress, as a veteran of 31 years with the Army National Guard and as the parent of three children who are serving in the military. And so, what you have done is so important for our country, and I am very, very grateful. I am particularly grateful because I think it is historic, the serv- ice in Afghanistan, in Iraq, liberating two countries, over 50 million people. And all of it, from my perspective, really is to protect the American public. And you are protecting the American people. And as you well know, there are no longer any training camps in Afghanistan or Iraq where terrorists could be trained. And we had the e chilling reminder of what terrorists can do with the action in Russia just this last week. How horrific and how barbarous these terrorists can be to target innocent children. And, of course, they would not hesitate, as they did on Septem- ber 11th, 2001, to target the civilian population of the United States, who they have declared as their enemy. Additionally, have I had the opportunity to visit Iraq three times. A year ago, I am very grateful that the Ranking Member here, Ike Skelton, included me on his delegation. And we saw firsthand the civil action projects. It was just so inspiring. And I know that there have been 27,600 civil action projects working with the people of Iraq to build a civil society, which, again, benefits the American public. Another highlight that you all reiterated is that, on our visits to Iraq and also to Afghanistan, we had the opportunity to meet with all ranks from our home state, had breakfast, lunch and dinner. And they stated, just as you did, that they were patrolling by foot, not speeding through communities. They were talking with the peo- ple. They were finding support, ranging from 70 to 90 percent. As an elected official, we are very happy with anything over 50 per- cent. So I can assure you, the number 70 to 90 had an impact on me. Another point I wanted to make, too, my older son is serving in Iraq. I am very grateful for his service there. He is, in fact, joined by the son of the Chairman of our Committee, Duncan Hunter. And so we are very grateful that our sons are there. And I receive daily e-mail photos from Iraq. I receive satellite phone calls from him, 862 e-mail every few minutes practically on the progress that is being made to build a civil society. And what you did today—I regret the media coverage—but being a former reporter, the statement is that good news has no feet, and bad news has wings. But putting it all in perspective, I grew up my whole life being told that we couldn't win the Cold War, that communism, in fact, was the wave of the future. But we persisted and persevered. We won.. The irony to me I had the opportunity to visit Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, Karshi-Kanabad, Uzbekistan, Bagrami, Afghanistan, former-Soviet air bases designed to destroy the United States, now American and coalition bases fighting terrorism. And I have had the opportunity to travel to Bucharest, Romania, and seeing people living in democracy who did not have a chance 15 years ago. So I am just really encouraged, and I want to thank you for your service. At this time, I believe Congressman Taylor may have another question. Then, I would certainly want to consult further with Con- gressman Skelton. Mr. TAYLOR. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. And I do want to thank the panel for staying so long. You have been very generous with your time. Colonel, I mentioned at the beginning that I had a chance to visit with one of our mutual friends when I was in Mosul, and I would prefer to not mention his name over the air for a couple of reasons. But I do know him well enough, and I know that he wants to spend a career in the Army, and he is a great soldier. Something that he said in September—I took him at his word was something to the effect that, “Well, we got this place—how is it—and he said something to the effect, “We got this place licked,” or something like that. I don't think he said it in an offhand manner. I think he meant it. I am just curious if you could kind of walk me through, and I would ask the panel to walk me through. We have had several highs and lows. Several of us happened to have been over there shortly after the capture of Saddam Hussein. At that time, there was an increase in the level of violence. It was attributed to some of the hot heads, maybe one last dash, on their part, trying to do something, their frustration at the capture of Hussein. And obvi- ously, like every American, grief at the 14 young Marines that have died just in the past few days. I would very much appreciate the comments of some of the panel that said, “ Well, we see a rise in casualties to correspond with the swapping out of unison, and that stands to reason.” But I guess what I would like to know—and what I think the American people would like to hear from you experts, not the folks in the media, but you people who were actually there—what do you attribute the most recent rise in the level of violence to? Do you see this as a short-term thing? And if you were sent back tomorrow, would you feel safer or less safe than on your previous tour? Colonel LINNINGTON. Congressman, I will take the question. I haven't been in Iraq in several months. I can only get-I can only tell you my experience, and I do still have contact with those who are in Iraq. I can tell you how they feel. 864 And the people see that, that their way is another life of terror and repression. And they understand that. Why is there a spike in violence? I think, every day the Iraqi government exists, the insurgency is one day further from accom- plishing their objective. They—once the elections are done and there are free and fair elections, they are even that much further away from their goal of upsetting the balance there. I think that that is why we are seeing a spike in it. Part of it is because there are new units rotating in, and it is an opportunity there because there is also going to be increased traffic out as units are conducting reconnaissance of their area. So their percentage of opportunities for the enemy to hit folks is greater. And they not as attuned to the area. But I feel that you are going to see a spike, not based on U.S. elections but—that is speculation—but based on their own elec- tions, that you will see a spike there as they try and derail the democratic process that is going on in Iraq right now. And every day it is alive and well, they are further and further away from their objective. Mr. TAYLOR. Thank you. Colonel SPRINGMAN. Sir, I left in March of 2004, and can only speak about my area while I was there. I can tell you, if I went back now, especially with the same soldiers I served with there, I would feel just as confident if not more confident. What caused spikes in attacks in our area? It varied. Some were tied to money. And thanks to good work from a captain on patrol, Captain Loren Johnson, something looked strange about a chicken coop, and we went in and found a money-making machine and the people operating it. Some of that stopped some of the attacks. Some of them are young men wanting to prove their manhood. not very good at it, but that caused some of the attacks. And also, if they had some success, that would inspire some other young men to do it. So the quicker we put it down, the more the other young men knew that was a bad idea and to stay away. I also feel we are winning. In the town of Dhuluiya, when I got there, stores had very few products. People were hungry. Rice ship- ments, other grain shipments, were not regular. Gasoline ship- ments were not regular. They were at the time we left. Stores had an abundance of both food and products, from cell phones to satellite dishes to cars. The economy was picking up. And a lot of that was just generated on the economy's success on its own, sir. I felt and would feel very con- fident going back there." Mr. TAYLOR. Thank you, sir. Captain. Captain SAVAGE. Congressman Taylor, I can't recall at any time that anybody ever took-speaking for Kilo Company—the area as being safe. But we were secure and staying offensive, staying ac- tive, actively patrolling. Actively conducting raids against the anti- Coalition and anti-Iraqi forces was our greatest safety and security. Having the opportunity to spend over 5.5 months there, you could see the progression from the day we got there, March 1st, to the day we left on July 12th, the change in what the civilian popu- lation had done in western Iraq. And that, if nothing else, I think, They we 865 should give everybody greater confidence that these people are well on their way to getting back on their feet. Mr. TAYLOR. So you would feel the area is as safe or more safe? I realize that is a relative term. Would you ask your Marines to be more alert than they were then? Captain SAVAGE. Sir, I don't know if our approach would change because we always approach it from the highest threat, and if it turns out that we are not engaged, we are not engaged. I think what happens is, when met with successes, when coalition forces are successful, or the Iraqi authorities, legitimate Iraqi authorities, are successful, then that puts, perhaps, the ball back in the en- emy's court to do something desperate to counter that success. And it may be Iraqi elections coming up, and it also may be things stra- tegic, surprises, things that occur like we were surprised in Kilo Company on June 28 at 12 when the transfer of authority had oc- curred, and we were all scratching our heads like, “Wow, that was pretty good.” And things that we do at the tactical level that just totally threw a curve ball to what enemy forces can expect. I would feel no more threatened or no less threatened going back over there tomorrow if tasked to do so; it is just something that you are also on your highest level of alert, and you take everything, ev- eryone seriously. Because each of your Marines, all of our lives, de- pend on it. Mr. TAYLOR. Thank you, sir. Captain. Captain COSTELLO. Congressman Taylor, to answer your first question, I got back in February of 2004, and I can't really speak to the recent resurgent violence over in Iraq. If I went back today, I think I would feel safer than I did the first time I went for a cou- ple of reasons, the most important, just having the knowledge that I know after being there for a year. I picked up a lot. It is an ad- venture, learning for the first time, going through, as it is, the first time going through anything. With that being said, you never become comfortable or compla- cent with anything over there, and as Captain Savage said, you are always at your highest state of alert. But between the knowledge and the equipment that is overseas now, the things that we are just getting and just getting fielded as we began to leave, I would definitely feel safer going back now. Mr. TAYLOR. Again, thank all of you gentlemen for what you have done for your country and, I presume, what you will do in fu- ture years. Thank you very much. Mr. Chairman, thank you for giving me a second chance. Mr. WILSON. OF SOUTH CAROLINA. Thank you, Congressman Tay- lor. And before we conclude with Congressman Skelton, at his ap- proval, I would like to recognize a guest that we have with us in the audience. We are pleased to have with us a person who has been a member of the Senate of the Republic of Romania. Indeed, this was a coun- try that was a dictatorship like Iraq and, just within the last 15 years, has emerged, obviously, into a developing democracy, a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), an ally 866 of the United States. And so, with us today, we have Ms. Norica Nicolai. Please be recognized. Thank you. And at this time, Congressman Skelton. Mr. SKELTON. Just a special thanks to each one of you, to those troops you have commanded, those with whom you work; you make us proud. Mr. WILSON OF SOUTH CAROLINA. And at this time, as we con- clude, we have been joined by our Chairman, Chai Hunter, from the State of California. STATEMENT OF HON. DUNCAN HUNTER, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM CALIFORNIA, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES The CHAIRMAN. Well, thank you Mr. Chairman. You did a great job by running this hearing. Many thanks gentleman. It has been an excellent hearing for our Members. Please excuse my absence in the early part of this hear- ing. [The prepared statement of Mr. Hunter can be found in the Ap- pendix on page 871.) Mr. WILSON OF SOUTH CAROLINA. There being no further busi- ness, the meeting is adjourned. Thank you. [Whereupon, at 1:15 p.m., the committee was adjourned.] FROMENALOPE HON.DE PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD SEPTEMBER 8, 2004 OPENING REMARKS OF CHAIRMAN HUNTER Hearing on the Performance of U.S. Military Servicemembers in Iraq and Afgbanistan September 8, 2004 Our guests this morning are: Colonel Michael Linnington, USA Former Brigade Commander 101st Airborne Division Lieutenant Colonel Bryan P. McCoy, USMC Former Commander 3rd Battalion, 4th Marine Regiment Lieutenant Colonel Jeffrey Springman, USA Former Commander 3rd Battalion in support of the 4th Infantry Division Captain Patrick Costello, USA Former Air Defense Artillery Commander 101* Airborne Division Captain Morgan Savage, USMC Former Company Commander 3rd Battalion, 4th Marine Regiment (871) 872 Welcome to the Committee gentlemen. We look forward to your testimony and appreciate your willingness to appear before us this morning. Today's hearing is a bit of a departure from the conventional Armed Services Committee hearing. Today we will hear from those military officers directly in charge of commanding our men and women in uniform who are performing with bravery, honor and effectiveness in multiple theaters around the world in the fight against global terrorism. While we normally hear from the generals several steps removed, today we will hear from those with the most direct experience in how the American soldier and marine is carrying out this important mission for their country. • This hearing is about the selfless work of the American military in Iraq. 873 • It's about how we acknowledge the efforts of our troops, who are deployed halfway around the world. • It's about how future generations will remember this . generation of Americans, called to serve their country in the global war on terrorism. Now some may think this is merely another attempt to justify the war in Iraq. I happen to personally believe that the American people are safer with Saddam Hussein out of power and in jail. And I think that our efforts to bring democracy to the Middle East will discredit, demoralize, and undermine our terrorist enemies. Others may and I'm sure actually do disagree. However, I trust that we can all agree that the vast majority of Americans serving in Iraq and Afghanistan are answering their country's call to service with bravery, dedication, integrity, and honor. 874 Tomorrow we will have two full committee hearings on the abuse of detainees in the global war on terrorism. What happened in those instances was inexcusable, but it is hardly representative of the vast majority of our military personnel in Iraq. The misdeeds of some soldiers at Abu Ghraib prison and elsewhere must not be allowed to define worldwide perceptions of our Armed Forces. Thirty years ago, a generation of Americans fought in another foreign war. Because the war was controversial, some people who opposed it sought to tar all Vietnam-veterans with the crimes of a small handful. We can't allow that to happen again.. That's why we're here; to hear from individuals who have returned from the battlefield about all that they've accomplished, c . and why the American soldier, Marine, sailor, and airman, still represents the best that this country has to offer. 875 Gentlemen, thank you again for appearing before the committee. We understand that you don't set national policy and our purpose here today is not to pull you into those debates. But, • you know your soldiers and Marines; • you know the challenges they've overcome; • you know the courage they've demonstrated in combat; • you know the seriousness with which they take their mission; and, • you know the hard work they've done to help an abused people secure a democratic future. The American people need to know it, too. We all look forward to your testimony, but first, let me recognize the committee's ranking Democrat, Mr. Skelton, for any remarks he may wish to make. 876 The entirety of our witnesses' prepared statements will be entered into the record. 877 Opening Statement for The Honorable Ike Skelton (D-MO) Full Committee Hearing on the Performance of U.S. Military Servicemembers in Iraq and Afghanistan September 8, 2004 Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I join you in welcoming our witnesses: Colonel Linnington, Lieutenant Colonel McCoy, Lieutenant Colonel Springman, Captain Costello and Captain Savage. I am pleased to have before us representatives of the Army and Marine Corps who have served with such distinction in Afghanistan and in Iraq. When I awoke on Labor Day morning, it was to the disturbing news that seven Marines were killed outside Fallujah. The news saddened me more than I can tell you. But my heart sank further still yesterday when we passed the symbolic, but distressing milestone of 1,000 American troops who have died in Iraq. This number represents 1,000 families who have paid the highest price for our war in Iraq. When the price is this high, what exactly do we have to show for this sacrifice our sons and daughters have made? 879 We simply must have a plan for developing viable and strong Iraqi security forces. Lieutenant General Petraeus is giving that mission his all. But it is a long-term mission, and we can't risk sinking further into a quagmire while we wait for these forces to be fully trained. We need a strategy now to force the insurgents from their holes. We can not afford to surrender the cities of Iraq to the insurgents and then sit by while they attack us from these safe havens. Allowing the enemy to establish sanctuaries didn't work 35 years ago in Vietnam, and it doesn't work today in Iraq. It doesn't please me to say this, particularly with such fine examples of American valor sitting before us. We owe the men and women who serve this nation in Iraq, Afghanistan, and around the world a strategy befitting their service. I am very proud of all they have accomplished. It speaks well of our nation that our troops have shouldered the burden of this war and carried our country so far for so long. I am concerned, however, that we are asking a great deal of our troops when we continue to deploy them into combat with no 880 end in sight. Some of these witnesses have deployed multiple times to Iraq and Afghanistan, and I am sure they will deploy again. How long can we continue this pace before we do irreparable harm to our military's readiness, our retention, and our troops' morale? We are stretching our force too thin to meet our current commitments, and we certainly can't expect to be as responsive to emerging threats as we need to be. We have today the finest military force the world has ever seen. It is represented well today by these Soldiers and Marines who will testify before this committee. We owe them the very best this nation can provide. We thank you all and all who serve with you for your. . continued service. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 881 Congressnan Jeff Miller (FL-01) Full Committee Hearing on The performance of U.S. military servicemembers in Iraq and Afghanistan September 8, 2004 - Mr. Speaker - Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for calling this hearing so that we may highlight the actions of our men and women in uniform. Just about every week you call in some of the best academics on Iraq. We also hear from the top civilians in the Pentagon and the top military leaders. From these people, we are able to ask questions, get answers and fulfill our oversight responsibilities as a Committee. And I believe, we as a body, have fulfilled that role well. We are a demanding in our oversight, as our constituents expect us to do more than our best to protect their sons and daughters, husbands and wives. We protect our service members by ensuring they have the best equipment, the best training, and the best leadership. Including Afgahnistan, our American sons and daughters liberated 50 million people from oppressive regimes. Because of the actions and sacrifices of our brave men and women in uniform, the brutal regime of Saddam Hussein is no longer, America is more secure, and Iraq is on the path to becoming a free and prosperous nation. And yet America's successes in this liberation and reconstruction get no salute from the media. "If it bleeds, it leads," goes the time-tested motto of our media. Our newspapers and nightly newscasts are full of stories about car bombings and predicaments rather than the impressive - and historical – milestones of Iraq's reconstruction. Mr. Chairman, some perspective is in order. As the hollow Manhattan skyline reminds us, it is far easier to destroy something than to rebuild it. Our military forces have been charged with a complex mission of staggering scope: they have searched for weapons of mass destruction, sealed the borders, provided basic public services, prevented civil war, apprehended regime leaders - and they continue to do so. They protect diplomats, hunt Saddam's leftovers - and al-Qaeda's - and rebuild infrastructure. And all the while, they have laid the groundwork for something truly revolutionary: the first democracy in the Arab world. In August, I had a first-hand look at the progress being made by our troops and those of the coalition in Iraq and Afghanistan, and I can confidently say, it's an entirely different place than it was just one year ago. I look forward to hearing from our witnesses about that progress today. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Page 1 of 1 THE FINAL REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT PANEL TO REVIEW DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE DETENTION OP- ERATIONS HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, Washington, DC, Thursday, September 9, 2004. The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:36 a.m., in room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Duncan Hunter (chair- man of the committee) presiding. OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. DUNCAN HUNTER, A REP- RESENTATIVE FROM CALIFORNIA, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES The CHAIRMAN. Our guests this morning are the Honorable James Schlesinger, Chairman of the Independent Panel to Review Department of Defense (DOD) Detention Operations, and the Hon- orable Harold Brown, who is a copanelist. Gentlemen, thank you very much for agreeing to appear this morning and for your continued public service in examining these difficult issues. And I know we have called on you to look at lots of major defense issues over the years, and there are probably some that are more pleasant, but certainly this is an area that requires scrutiny by folks of stature and capability and intelligence, and we certainly appreciate your service to the country. Your review identified important problems that need attention, and I believe your recommendations will go a long way in prevent- ing future detainee abuse. On May 12, 2004, Secretary Rumsfeld asked a distinguished panel to review all Department of Defense detainee operations and to provide independent professional advice on issues the panel con- sidered most pertinent to allegations of abuse. The panel, com- prised of two former Secretaries of Defense, a retired four-star gen- eral and a former member of this committee, released its report at the end of last month. The independent panel is the seventh of ten major investigations, reviews, inspections and reports into detainee operations, all of those in addition to the over 220 criminal investigations being un- dertaken by the Department. Already the Department is acting on some of the recommenda- tions of earlier reports. It will undoubtedly incorporate the Schles- inger panel recommendations as it moves forward. În and of itself, the sheer volume of this effort should serve as compelling evidence that the Department of Defense finds the abuse of detainees unacceptable and is moving very aggressively to (883) 885 The Fay investigation found an additional 23 military intel- ligence personnel and four contractors associated with abuse at Abu Ghraib. It has also been reported that the Army is close to bringing charges against 26 soldiers in the deaths of two detainees in Afghanistan. These instances suggest nothing about the overall quality of the vast majority of our troops serving in Iraq or in Afghanistan or around the world. Most of them are doing a tremendous job, a great job, and they deserve our pride and support, but these inci- dents have had a significant impact on our relationship with the Arab and the Muslim world, and they put our troops in a greater risk. Reports today have gotten to the bottom of individual criminal behavior. Now it is time to get to the top of this problem. The abuses committed here are not just an indictment of isolated sol- diers. The dysfunctional command climate that facilitated the abuses at Abu Ghraib and originated in the Pentagon with our in- terrogation policies permeated every theater of combat operations in this way, at the highest levels of our civilian and military lead- ership, as well as the causes of this abuse. Both the Schlesinger panel report and the report of Generals Kern, Jones and Fay that we will hear about later today highlight how this shift in interrogation policy within Iraq and among Iraq and Afghanistan and Guantanamo created confusion and injected uncertainty in the minds of interrogators and military police. That responsibility resides at the very top. When we approve policies that treat prisoners differently in different theaters and changes the standards in multiple times and multiple months, we open the door to abuse. The Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) also must take re- sponsibility for the failure to plan adequately for the have talked about that before. General Sanchez wasn't given the resources he was needed to accomplish his mission. This is a stra- tegic failure with strategic implications, not the least of which is for detention operations in Iraq. Given the certainty of our military victory against the Iraqi mili- tary, it was completely foreseeable that significant detainee oper- ations would be necessary. The myriad problems identified in the reports that we consider today make clear there is virtually no planning for this eventuality. This is not a failing of General Sanchez or of any of the personnel who committed and might still be held accountable for abuses. We also must look seriously at the finding of the Fay report on ghost detainees, because it couldn't be more sobering. Holding ghost detainees with the enemy not disclosing them in the Inter- national Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) is a direct violation of the Geneva Conventions. The Fay report found at least eight such ghosts, and Secretary Rumsfeld has admitted to ordering one held at the request of Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Director Tenet. This practice raises serious questions at the tactical level about the way that the military and the CIA personnel interact in detention operations, but it raises larger policy questions as well about our national willingness to adhere to international law. 886 Mr. Chairman, while we must not paint all of our servicemen and women with the brush of prison abuse, so too we must not con- tinue to call this the work of just a few bad apples. We must pros- ecute those who have violated the law, whether officer, enlisted or contractor. We must also fix the broader command climate and hold responsible the senior officials who created the conditions that allowed abuses to occur. We must do all we can to prevent future abuses. We in Congress must all send a signal to the world that what happened at Abu Ghraib does not reflect the values of our military and does not reflect the values of our Nation. And I thank you very much. [The prepared statement of Mr. Skelton can be found in the Ap- pendix on page 932.] The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman. Once again, gentlemen, thank you for being with us and for de- voting this time to this important issue, and, Mr. Chairman, the floor is yours, sir. STATEMENT OF JAMES R. SCHLESINGER, CHAIRMAN, INDE- PENDENT PANEL TO REVIEW DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE DETENTION OPERATIONS Mr. SCHLESINGER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Skelton, mem- bers of the committee. I am grateful to the committee for providing this opportunity to discuss the panel's report on abuses at Abu Ghraib and elsewhere. As you know, Secretary Rumsfeld established the panel to pro- vide an independent and objective assessment of what has gone wrong in our detention operations, to review the other DOD inves- tigations that were underway for the gaps, possible gaps, and to provide any recommendations and additional observations that were required. He added in his charge to us, let the chips fall where they may. We have striven to fulfill that mandate. In that effort, we have re- ceived the full cooperation of the Department of Defense, which is already moving ahead in numerous areas with adjustments in re- forms to prevent a recurrence. . We believe that we have provided a full and accurate, down to the time of publication, description regarding the extent of these abuses and how they came about and what might be done in the future to reduce the risk of reappearance. Since the full report, including the executive summary, has been available for more than three weeks, I shall not attempt to summa- rize it here. Instead, I should like to place the details of a primarily descriptive report in a wider context and make some observations about salient issues that may readily be overlooked. In a matter of this sort, it is important that we not overlook the forest for the trees. First, our focus and our prime concern should be the morale, health and performance of our Armed Forces—I do not think that I need to underline that to this committee—and that their behavior upholds the standards that the American society be- lieves appropriate. If there are any defects, they must be diagnosed and any infected areas must be lanced and cauterized as we seek to avoid repetition. In this manner, we can cleanse any stain on the 887 reputation of our Armed Forces so that their overall performance continues to be understood and highly valued by our larger society. Second, in this regard we must continuously bear in mind that the overall performance of those Armed Forces has been commend- able. We must not lose sight of that fundamental reality, which re- flects both technology and a professional force. Through the ad- vance of technology, we have been able to target enemy forces with precision. As a consequence, we sought in Iraq to preserve Iraq's infrastructure so that it could serve Iraq's future, and to success- fully limit collateral damage. Moreover, we now have, by and large, a trained professional force. The vast majority of that force has behaved in Iraq with ex- traordinary forbearance, and including countless acts of kindness. In this respect, their performance has been vastly better than in previous wars, World War II, Korea and Vietnam. While we did not feel it necessary to spell this out in the report. in light of some of the public commentary I can only say that it de- serves emphasis and repetition. Our troops have performed well. Bear in mind that we have had some 50,000 detainees and that over 300,000 of our troops have now served in Iraq. To be sure, any abuses are too many, but to date we have identified some 300 cases of possible abuse, of which fewer than 100 have been confirmed. One-third of those abuses have been at the point of capture. War is a matter of violence, and in combat passions run high. Third, the administration may have initially erred in characteriz- ing the actions at Abu Ghraib, as Mr. Skelton just indicated, as the result of a handful of MPs. Still, in the overall performance, the 66 cases of confirmed abuse is a small number, comparing quite well, as I say, with previous wars. War remains a brutal business. Some critics reveal that they un- derstand neither war nor history. We must not confuse the speed and extent of communication today with the extent of abuse as compared to the past. Fourth, the panel found no policy that encouraged or justified abuse, and more than a few actions to avoid abuse. To be sure, given the initial act of terrorism on 9/11 and the spurt in U.S. cas- ualties in the summer of 2003, it was concluded that interrogations should be thorough and aggressive. In the war on terrorism, we would be naive to limit ourselves to the traditional name, rank and serial number. The injunction from the top, however, was to ensure humane treatment of all detainees, even those who were judged to be out- side the scope of Geneva protection. Admittedly, what constitutes humane treatment lies in the eye of the beholder. Some, including some in the services, argued that aggressive interrogation went too far. That remains a matter of judgment. It also remains a far cry from a policy that encourages abuse. Five, these issues and the public reaction have been exacerbated by the photographs taken on the night shift at Abu Ghraib. Those photos constitute, to say the least, an idiosyncratic and obviously unauthorized activity by the night shift on Tier 1. The photographs are quite misleading. In contrast to the inferences that some initially drew, those pho- tographs have nothing to do with interrogation policy. None of the 888 detainees abused in the photographs were targets of intelligence or of interrogation to gain intelligence. Nonetheless, abuses did occur at Abu Ghraib and elsewhere dur- ing interrogation. In such cases, the MPs had been encouraged by MI personnel to use aggressive tactics. Those excesses must be identified and corrected, and they have been by Admiral Church's investigation and by others, to discourage any recurrence in the fu- ture. Such excesses may have resulted from confusion as to what was permissible. Some of that confusion may be understandable, if not justifiable, since we had interrogation operations in three different places with varying rules that created ambiguity. Nonetheless, in the future such ambiguity is unacceptable. Our olicy should be enshrined in doctrine so that military personnel are properly trained to observe appropriate rules. Six, though abuses were indeed more widespread than observed on the night shift at Abu Ghraib, nonetheless, it is correct to char- acterize the situation on that night shift as having its unique as- pects. Some have seized upon those photographs to suggest that torture was condoned. This is simply wrong. The actions of the night shift on Tier 1 were an aberration. The members were off on their own. As one participant admitted, we did it for the fun of it. I have characterize those activities by the night shift on Tier 1 às Animal House. Seven, in this connection, President Kennedy said during the Cuban missile crisis that a picture is worth a thousand words. It clearly is, if and only if, you know what the picture means; but if the pictures are misinterpreted, they can readily become a distort- ing mechanism. They can easily create an inaccurate impression, hiding, indeed distorting, the overall performance, as I have sug- gested, with respect to our Armed Forces in Iraq. Mr. Chairman, the panel's report delineated both errors of com- mission and errors of omission, but we found no indication of a pol- icy encouraging abuse. To be sure, these abuses and the failed oversight that allowed them are an embarrassment. They do not reflect the standards that this society believes appropriate. We must take those steps necessary to see that those standards are in- deed upheld in the future. Yet, we must not allow some of the trees to obscure the view of the general forest. These actions, by histori- cal standards, quite limited in number, are not representative of the overall behavior of our forces, as Mr. Skelton observed in his initial comments, which have generally been admirable. When sitting for his portrait, Oliver Cromwell ordered his por- traitist, who wanted to pretty Cromwell up, that the portrait should include warts and all. Of necessity, our panel was charged to concentrate on the warts. Yet, Members of Congress must re- main aware of the full portrait. In these somewhat personal re- marks, I have tried to suggest that the full portrait is more than the warts, which in our panel we were obliged to analyze. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I shall be happy to answer any ques- tions that you or other members of the committee may have. [The prepared statement of Mr. Schlesinger can be found in the Appendix on page 937.] The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Mr. Schlesinger. 890 dam regime; that is, that Iraq, including urban areas, remained, and still remains, a zone of continued and substantial combat, as well as economic deprivation and political instability. And in fact, Abu Ghraib was subject to mortar attack throughout this period, with quite a few casualties, both among detainees and among the U.S. forces there. Second judgment deals with the policy adopted toward various classes of detainees, set first for al Qaeda and Taliban after 9/11, that followed debate within the U.S. Government and a decision by the President. The President determined that the provisions of Ge- neva did not apply to our conflict with al Qaeda and that Taliban detainees were, quote, unlawful combatants, not qualifying as pris- oners of war; but the President, at the same time, reaffirmed a pre- vious order by the Secretary of Defense that all detainees be treat- ed humanely and to the extent appropriated consistent with mili- tary necessity in a manner consistent with Geneva principles. In turn, that led to a series of determinations about allowed in- terrogation methods beyond those long customary under standard Army procedure, Army Field Manual 34-52. The Secret fense authorized and later rescinded a list of such methods for Guantanamo, only for Guantanamo, and after study by a working group that was chaired by the General Counsel of the Air Force, promulgated a narrow approved list, still limited to interrogations of unlawful combatants held at Guantanamo. And all that hap- pened before operations, major military operations, took place in Iraq. We found no evidence, and we don't believe there was, of a policy on the part of senior civilian or military authorities that coun- tenanced, let alone encouraged or directed, abuse of detainees. Any approval of interrogation techniques beyond those in Army Field Manual (AFM) 34–52 was limited to Guantanamo and re- quired that any of those techniques be used only with the specific approval of the Secretary of Defense in each case. He approved any of them in only two cases, and those additional methods of interro- gation were intended for and limited to resistant al Qaeda mem- bers at Guantanamo who were knowledgeable about what had been their plans for 9/11 and for the future. Nevertheless, various versions of expanded lists migrated, unau- thorized, to Afghanistan and to Iran, where the Geneva Conven- tions continued ed to apply. That migration of rules, and also of per- sonnel, led to confusion about what interrogation practices were authorized and to several changes in directions to interrogators. I believe that was a contributing factor in the abuse of detainees. Whether the initial more expansive considerations by that working group headed by the Air Force General Counsel, or whether the findings of the Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) in the Department of Justice further contributed to an atmosphere of per- missiveness in the field is more difficult to assess. A result of the first misjudgment was, especially at Abu Ghraib, a situation in which both military police capabilities for custody of protection and military intelligence capabilities for interrogation to obtain tactical, strategic and counterterrorist intelligence, suffered extreme lack of resources. 891 Another result was of the number and mix of detainees went far beyond what had been planned for, and the respective responsibil- ities, authorities and modes of cooperation for MP and MI units were poorly defined. Separately, the policy failure at all levels to assure a clear and stable set of rules for treatment and interrogation further opened the door to abuse. The problems were compounded by inadequate training, confused command arrangements and, at Abu Ghraib, personal deficiencies at command levels up to and including the brigade level. Hindsight always finds it too easy to assign blame. Nevertheless, varying degrees of responsibility for failure to provide adequate re- sources to support the custodial and intelligence requirements throughout the theater and for the confusion about permissible in- terrogation techniques extend all way up to chain of command, to include the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Office of the Secretary of Defense. Our report goes into considerably more detail about why abuses occur and how they occurred and lessons learned. It includes a dozen or so, I guess about 14, recommendations to improve the way we deal with such matters. I have concentrated on the warts, as Secretary Schlesinger has described them. They should not be seen as the whole picture or even the main part of the picture. A bright spot is that action on many of these recommendations is already underway. The Depart- ment of Defense, when it makes mistakes, is unusually good for a government agency in trying to correct them, and I believe the ac- tions undertaken are a good example of that. The report, in addition to describing the warts, notes that though any abuse of detainees is too much, these cases are only a small percentage of the tens of thousands of prisoners and detainees in the theater of combat. Moreover, in many cases, they were brought to light by American military personnel who spoke up, having recognized that these ac- tions were inconsistent with the rules and with the nature of the American military. This new sort of conflict in which we are en- gaged, not only in Iraq, but on a global basis, poses difficult prob- lems of many kinds. Detention and interrogation are among those problems. The U.S. needs to deal with them more effectively. I hope that our report helps in that effort. Thank you again for the opportunity to appear before you, Mr. Chairman, and I am also open to questions. [The prepared statement of Dr. Brown can be found in the Ap- pendix on page 942.] The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Dr. Brown, and both of you, thanks. And also to the other members of the panel. We know they spent a lot of time working on this report, also. have got to have a lot of members who want to ask questions, and we are going to go to the five-minute rule, and what I am going to try to do is keep the question and response packaged in that five-minutes. So I would just advise members after three min- utes your yellow light will go on. So if you want to make a state- ment, you can just keep on making it. If you want to give your pan- 892 elist a chance to respond to you, you might want to let them have the last several minutes to answer the question. The world knows, gentlemen—you have talked about the big pic- ture here. The world knows this mess by the pictures that Mr. Schlesinger talked about, and I think it is appropriate that you talked to those pictures, because that is the representation that was made to the world." In discussing those pictures, in showing them, the world media had a number of commentators that described the pictures as car- rying out interrogation techniques. Some commentators said they were part of a psychological operation, this stripping down of pris- oners and embarrassing them. Others talked about them as being part of a directed and ordered procedure by superiors to, quote, “soften up detainees.” Mr. Schlesinger, you have made a pretty strong statement that it is clear now that those were not part of official interrogation op- erations and were not condoned. Do you know that to a certainty? Mr. SCHLESINGER. I know that to a certainty for all of the photo- graphs that have been seen. There is one that is ambiguous, and it may have involved an interrogation, but all the rest of them, which amount to hundreds of photographs, are totally aside from interrogation. Dr. BROWN. That is certainly true. At the same time, some of the same things happened elsewhere. The stripping, for example, was used in other circumstances and indeed sometimes in connection with interrogation. Mr. SCHLESINGER. There may have been a spillover of some of the techniques that were encouraged by the military intelligence people that were employed by the night shift, as well, but that had nothing to do with interrogation, as I have indicated. That was, The CHAIRMAN. So what was that night shift doing? If you were to describe—this was at what time of night, and this was at—what you described as Tier 3? Mr. SCHLESINGER. Tier 1. The CHAIRMAN. Tier 1. Excuse me. Mr. SCHLESINGER. The night shift, as one of the participants in- dicated, we did it for the fun of it. They were kind of bored. I as- sume that many of you, if not all of you, have seen the photo- graphs. As you will discern from those photographs, the activities there were extracurricular and certainly unauthorized, and they were not entirely appropriate. Dr. BROWN. Well, they were pathological. That is the word I used, and we did not see that kind of thing elsewhere. As you say, Mr. Chairman, what people see are pictures, and that has resulted in the Abu Ghraib Tier 1 events being seen as either the whole story or representative of the whole story, and that is just not the case. But there is not much we can do about it except to try to explain, because pictures have such a great im- pact. The CHAIRMAN. Let me go to one picture in particular. That is the picture that showed the person being hooked up to wires. The implication was, as you said, Mr. Schlesinger, pictures tell a story if you know what they mean, but the clear message was that that 893 person was being shocked with electric shock. He wasn't being shocked? Mr. SCHLESINGER. He was not being shocked. As I indicated ear- lier, that particular picture is the one that was referred to, we did it for the fun of it, on the part of members of that night shift. They did not use shock techniques, and that was just an act of sadism. Dr. BROWN. The wires were hooked up to the detainee, but they weren't hooked up to any electrical source. The CHAIRMAN. As you know, that picture appeared in dem- onstrations around the world as evidence-purported evidence of American official interrogation techniques being utilized to brutal- ize detainees. Mr. SCHLESINGER. Quite inaccurate, but for those who are recep- tive to it, quite effective. The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Skelton. Mr. SKELTON. Thank you. Secretary Schlesinger, you made ref- erence to confusion as to what was permissible created ambiguity, and, Secretary Brown, you told of two judgments that were made before combat operation. One was the failure to anticipate what would happen after the victory, and the second w igment among the types of detainees as to whether the Geneva Convention applied to them or not, and you made reference that the Secretary of Defense authorized or rescinded methods at Guantanamo where they were given additional approval to two detainees. And then you also said, Secretary Brown, that the degree of responsibility and confusion went all the way up the chain of command to the Joint Chiefs of Staff and to the Office of the Secretary of Defense. Would you elaborate the degrees of responsibility and the confu- sion that went all the way up the chain of command? I have had two questions, which I have stated through the years or through the months. One is how high up the chain of command this respon- sibility goes, and second, what was actually ordered and what was not ordered. So can you elaborate on the responsibility and the con- fusion, please? Dr. BROWN. Well, the report, Mr. Skelton, explains that in some detail. There was—let me start from the beginning. Clearly, the responsibility for failing to plan for what actually happened after this overthrow of Saddam Hussein extends all the way up to the top. I mean, obviously the Office of the Secretary of Defense, but goes beyond that, and that is true of the whole admin- istration. The responsibility for the confusion about what methods of inter- rogation were allowed also clearly goes all the way up to the JCS and the Office of the Secretary of Defense. The Secretary of Defense ħimself, it seems to me, was not con- fused about this, and the confusion did not issue from him. He was always quite explicit that anything beyond AFM 34–52 required his personal approval, and it was given only in those two cases, and it was quite productive in those two cases. The 9/11 Commission report describing al Qaeda's plans comes from that. I would say that his staff was less than completely assiduous in seeing that his instructions were carried out. For example, when the International Committee of the Red Cross made its report in January of this year, no one in the OSD was aware of it, and I 894 think that clearly was a mistake of omission. So that is why I de- scribe the degrees of responsibility as differing. Now, Secretary Rumsfeld himself has said as Secretary of De- fense he is responsible for everything that goes on in the Defense Department, but that is a very generalized responsibility. In this specific case, I think he behaved responsibly, but I think he was let down, to some degree, by his staff. As you go further down the chain of command, clearly the Joint Staff, the staff at Central Command and at Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF)–7 failed to make available the resources in terms of personnel and training and everything else that was needed in the event to cope with the demands of custody and interrogation of this very large number of mixed population prisoners. Mr. SKELTON. One last question. At what level within his staff did they let him down? Dr. BROWN. Well, look, you have an Under Secretary For Policy. You have an Under Secretary For Personnel and Readiness. You have General Counsel. All of those were either involved or should have been involved in dealing with these issues, and I don't want to personalize it more than that. Mr. SCHLESINGER. May I add a word on that, Mr. Chairman? In testimony before the Senate, both General Abizaid and General Sanchez stated, “The Secretary of Defense provides the guidance, but the execution is that of the Army.” We do not turn to the Office of the Secretary of Defense after that guidance has been issued. Now, I agree with Harold that there certainly should have been curiosity on the part of some members of the OSD staff, but it was not their responsibility, other than in their service to the Secretary. The Army believes that it should be responsible, and we fre- quently chide the Secretary of Defense for micromanagement, and it is kind of unfair if we chide then the Secretary of Defense or the OSD for failing to micromanage. The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman. The gentleman from Colorado, Mr. Hefley.. Mr. HEFLEY. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and thank you, gentlemen. You spoke to the fact that the Department of Defense, once they find a mess, are pretty good about cleaning it up and taking care of it. I would agree with that. But would you speak to the appro- priateness of the response that they have had, and I am particu- larly concerned about whether or not officers are being treated the same way as enlisted people when there are offenses involved. And particularly, the example I am thinking of is the fellow that was thrown off the bridge and drowned. The soldiers on patrol are charged with all kinds of things, murder and all kinds of things, and it sounds to me like appropriately so. Some of them are charged-more directly involved, some of those soldiers are charged with covering up the incident. There were also some officers informed, and they are charged, very severely, too, for covering it up. Some of the officers involved with a coverup also—maybe they weren't there, but they knew about it and they covered it up—were given a slap on the wrist. 895 So would you speak to the appropriateness of the way we are re- sponding? Are we treating the various ranks involved the same, or is there a disparity here? Mr. SCHLESINGER. The people in the prison, Abu Ghraib Tier 1, were engaged in reprehensible, indeed culpable, criminal activities. People further up the line were not necessarily engaged in those activities. They were culpable, in that they failed to report. So one must discriminate between those who were the instruments of these acts of sadism and those who averted their gaze. That, I think, is a fundamental point. Indeed, as we go further up the chain of command, we discover that there were lapses on the part of the staff of CÍTF-7. Those are lapses. That is regrettable, and there should be an appropriate response on the part of the authorities to such lapses; but that, once again, is not the same as the criminal behavior down at the lowest level. I think that the military, the Department will have to be very careful to see to it that the responses are appropriate and that the punishment fits the crime or the noncrime, as the case may be. Mr. HEFLEY. Secretary Schlesinger, I agree with you whole- heartedly about that, but in the example I gave, some of the sol- diers who were present on that patrol, but didn't actually throw the iy off the bridge, were charged with coverup, and they are going to get kicked out of the service and maybe serve time in Leaven- worth. Some of the officers above them who knew about it—again, the soldiers there were not involved really, except they covered it up, and the officers above were not informed really, except they covered it up, and yet they get a slap on the wrist and continue their service in the service. Did you look at that case at all? Mr. SCHLESINGER. No. I am not familiar with that case, and it was not the responsibility of this panel to decide on what appro- priate punishments were. The responsibility for that was left to the Uniformed Code of Military Justice. I think that in the case that you refer in which officers did the same things as enlisted people; that is, fail to report acts of sadism, that the officers being at a higher level should be held more accountable perhaps than the en- listed people. But once again, that was beyond the purview of this commission. Dr. BROWN. Without knowing more specific details of that case than I have read about in the newspapers, Mr. Hefley, I can't ex- press a judgment as to degree of criminal guilt at various levels. I agree that if there is to be a distinction, it should be that of hold- ing more senior people more responsible, providing that they did exactly the same things, but I don't know enough about that case to make that kind of judgment. Mr. HEFLEY. Well, thank you both for your responses, and I think none of us know enough of the actual facts, probably, to make a judgment on this, but, Mr. Chairman, this is something I think we ought to look into further. And I don't know if we want to hold a hearing on this or a part of a hearing on this, but I think we ought to look into this further, because on the surface, with what little information we have on it, it looks like there is a dispar- ity here, and if there is a disparity there shouldn't be. 896 The CHAIRMAN. Well, I would just say to my colleague, I am not familiar with the details of the bridge and the patrol incident my- self, but what I would recommend is, why don't we have the De- partment of Defense come over and sit down and give us the full details of that particular operation and the resulting discipline/ criminal accusations or charges that have arisen from it. So why don't we start off with that? All I know is what I saw in the paper. Mr. HEFLEY. I think that would be excellent, Mr. Chairman, and I think that might be indicative of a pattern there—one way or the other, a pattern, for good or bad, as to how we are really handling these things. The CHAIRMAN. I would be happy to do that. And once again, Mr. Hefley, and all the members—and I think the panelists have made it pretty clear, you know, I have just gotten the latest reports on the attacks being made on American troops, our responses. We had a great panel yesterday talking about the heroism and the capabil- ity and the humanitarian acts of our troops, and I am reminded that some 300,000 Americans have served in Iraq, and we are talk- ing about—we have focused on, and the entire world is focused on, an issue on which their primary connection is the pictures, which we now understand represent nothing of official policy and were the acts of a few people in what you described as acts of sadism that were totally outside the scope of military activity. And yet, that has colored the military—the face of America's military for hundreds of millions of people who have seen those pictures. The gentleman from South Carolina, Mr. Spratt. Mr. SPRATT. Thank you both for lending your enormous experi- ence, and great respect to what is a serious, serious problem and for coming back with a report with a very clear analysis of events. It seems to me, if I read your section on policy promulgation, that as we trace up the line of command, the ball ends up in the Office of Legal Counsel, the Attorney General, where this really started. Apparently, the State Department took one attitude, which was supportive of the Geneva Convention, and the Office of Legal Counsel said, no, the Geneva Convention doesn't apply to combat- ants in Afghanistan because they are unlawful combatants. And they went so far to say that the Commander in Chief exercising his powers could even exercise torture if he so decided, and they are a factor, it appears, in the whole process of determining exactly what is the applicable law, domestic and international, for the next several months. Am I reading this correctly? Mr. SCHLESINGER. I think that is—they are certainly a factor, and that is a correct—if it is a factor. I think that the White House tended to brush off that report of the OLC as—what shall I say?- a somewhat inflated academic exercise. Dr. BROWN. Mr. Spratt, I would distinguish two pieces here. First, is the finding that al Qaeda and Taliban are not entitled to Geneva Convention protections. It seems to me that is actually pretty reasonable. The other piece, the over the top piece I would describe it, assert- ing that the President as Commander in Chief cannot be chal- lenged, is something that I think the Congress would have an opin- ion on. I am not a constitutional lawyer myself, but I am not sur- 897 prised that the White House has pulled back on that piece. It is ħard to tell whether that particular legal judgment had any reso- nance down below. You know, it is conceivable that a combat com- mander in the field could have said to himself, well, if the Com- mander in Chief can do what he wants, I can do what I want; but I find that very unlikely. Mr. SPRATT. I read this chapter in your report to indicate that this debate began in the summer of 2002. It didn't just occur in late-2003 and suddenly appear on the desk of the Secretary of De- fense, the Attorney General, the President or the National Security Council. It was an ongoing debate. So at the highest levels of our government, we knew we had policy indecision and a lack of clarity in the guidance that the troops in the field were supposed to be fol- lowing? Dr. BROWN. Well, this was all pre-spring of 2003, so it was before Iraq, and it really dealt with Afghanistan. Mr. SPRATT. That is what I am saying, but the Secretary of De- fense knew it. He issued one memorandum. Then on reconsider- ation retracted that, reissued another memorandum. This ball was batted back and forth. So it was clear in the highest levels of the government that we did not have a resolution of the applicable law, and therefore the troops in the field, the commanders in the field, were left to improvise? Dr. BROWN. There was some division within the government be- fore the President made his decision; that is correct. But none of that was officially communicated to the field. It leaked out, essen- tially, and it didn't leak out, but specific decisions of the Secretary of Defense, which in my judgment were appropriate for the case of Guantanamo, were misapplied elsewhere. Mr. SPRATT. Let me ask you this. General Miller goes to the the- ater, goes to Iraq. Somebody sent him. He didn't go on his own ini- tiative. Was he operating under the authority of the Secretary Mr. SCHLESINGER. No. He was operating under the authority of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Mr. SPRATT. Okay. Mr. SCHLESINGER. Steve Cambone testified, I think maybe before this body, that he had encouraged the Chiefs to send him out there. Dr. BROWN. He didn't initiate it. Mr. SCHLESINGER. But it was under the authority of the Chief. Mr. SPRATT. Goes in with the apparent authority of the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs. He has got with him a list of applicable rules and regulations that applies at Guan- tanamo, but he tells them there is a different legal status between these prisons and those prisons, and nevertheless he brings that list with him. General Taguba says he is the one who left behind the notion that the military police should set up the prisoners for interrogation, soften them up, prepare them for interrogation. As I said, he has got apparent authority to speak for Washington, for the Pentagon. Dr. BROWN. So far as we could tell, he did not say soften them up. Mr. SPRATT. Taguba found that; is that correct? Dr. BROWN. We did not find that he used those words. of 898 Mr. SCHLESINGER. I think that General Taguba may have modi- fied that statement. There was a conflict between what General Miller and General Taguba said on that issue. Mr. SPRATT. Thank you again for your testimony. The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman. The gentleman from Maryland, Mr. Bartlett. Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you. Gentlemen, thank you very much for your testimony and your service. You made the statement that there is no indication of a policy encouraging abuse. I would like to suggest that others may have reached a different conclusion. Let me explain. Frequently, what you see depends on where you sit. Suppose you were observing our actions after the Afghanistan war when we placed the prisoners in Guantanamo Bay, making two statements relative to that. One of them was that we put them there because they were beyond the reach of our Constitution, and second we described them as being unlawful combatants and therefore they were not afforded the pro- tections of the Geneva Convention. Why would we do that if we did not intend to treat them in a way that would not be consistent with our Constitution, nor con- sistent with the Geneva Conventions. Why would we put them in Guantanamo Bay, say they are beyond the protection of the Con- stitution, then give them some name that we said put them beyond the protection of the Geneva Conventions if we did not intend to treat them in ways that would not be consistent with both our Con- stitution and the Geneva Conventions? Mr. SCHLESINGER. The President's decision of 7 February, the Presidential memorandum stated that they were not entitled to the protections of the Geneva Convention for clear reasons: They did not bear arms openly, they did not dress as soldiers or have distin- guishing marks of a uniform—which are requirements for under Geneva III-and they did not respond to a recognized leader. Mr. BARTLETT. Is not there a Ĝeneva IV, also, which includes ci- vilians, and therefore, is it not possible to place a person beyond the protection of the Geneva Conventions? There is a Geneva IV which includes civilians. The point I am trying to make, gentlemen, is if I am sitting somewhere else and I am seeing a country make a statement that they are putting prisoners outside their territorial limits, that they are beyond the protection of the Constitution, they are giving them a name that says they are not protected by the Ge- neva Conventions, but the International Red Cross says it is impos- sible to have a prisoner not protected by the Geneva Conventions because there is a Geneva IV, and then when the President makes the statement that they are going to be treated consistent with the Geneva Conventions, as appropriate and consistent with military necessity, does not that leave a hole big enough to drive a 70-ton tank through? Mr. SCHLESINGER. As was indicated by Dr. Brown, the rules at Guantanamo were quite strict in that the Secretary of Defense would have to be asked for approval of any actions beyond those normally in the field manual, and those approvals were applied in only two cases. Now, the Geneva Convention is quite clear that people in al Qaeda quite certainly were not entitled to protections. The Taliban is a more ambiguous case, as was reflected in the dis- 900 The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman. The gentleman from Texas, Mr. Ortiz. Mr. ORTIZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank you both for the outstanding work that you have done, and we have a lot to learn. I think that there needs to be a lot of sorting out, Mr. Chairman. I can remember when General Taguba testified before this committee. His scope of the investiga- tion was very limited, and this is why I agree with Mr. Hefley and Chairman Hunter that we do need to have another hearing. It was very limited in his investigation only to investigate the military po- lice, most of whom were enlisted people. I think that what has been said before, mixed signals coming from the Attorney General's of- fice and mixed signals coming from the counsel to the White House, and then others are suffering from the point that I was under the impression that General Sanchez was going to be pro- moted, but because of the investigation that was going on, he was pulled from the promotion list. Another thing that was mentioned, Dr. Brown, was they suffered from extreme lack of resources. Would you expand a little bit as to what those resources were? Dr. BROWN. Principally they were personnel. The military police unit at Abu Ghraib was agglomerated partly from reserves. They had not trained together; they were continually underresourced. They did not get enough transportation support. They did not get enough protection support. They were called on both to provide cus- tody of prisoners roughly a hundred times their own number, and, at the same time, were charged with force protection. They were under attack from outside. The report goes into more detail on that. It explains that it would have at least conceivably been pos- sible to pull units that were not fully being utilized, artillery units, for example, which did not find much use in Iraq in combat oper- ations, and use some of them in support of the force protection re- quirement, for example. These are examples on the military police side. A similar set of considerations applied on the military intel- ligence side. Most of the military intelligence people had actually been trained for small-unit battlefield interrogation, not for the kind of more strategic interrogation or theater-wide interrogation that was to be carried out at a place like Abu Ghraib. The language skills were miss This is not specific to these cases or these units. That goes across the government in connection with our activities in the greater- our interests in the greater Middle East. As a result, contractor personnel had to be pulled in and you had problems on that side because you had experienced contractor per- sonnel reporting to inexperienced corporals. Those are the exam- ples of the lack of resourcing. Mr. SCHLESINGER. May I add, the interrogators and inter- preters—we had a shortage of interrogators; and even if we did not have that shortage, we would have had a greater problem simply because interpreters were even in greater shortage than were the interrogators. And this goes back to the reduction of the Armed Forces and particularly to the reduction of the Army in an earlier period, in which the reduction of those forces fell with greater n missing. 901 weight on interpreters, interrogators, military police, military intel- ligence and the like. Mr. ORTIZ. I know that you came up, both of you, with some rec- ommendations. Are you aware as to whether these problems have been fixed, have been corrected? Mr. SCHLESINGER. Many of them are in the process of being cor- rected and there is a report, I believe, that the Department will brief to you, if it has not already done so. The Department reacted quite quickly, I think, once the information reached the level of the Secretary of Defense in May. Mr. ORTIZ. I want to thank both of you for your services. Thank you so much. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman. The gentleman from North Carolina, Mr. Hayes. Mr. HAYES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Gentlemen, thank you for your work. There are two comments that I just want to spend a moment on, and I think it is very important to investigate and prevent these types of things. But Mr. Secretary, in your written testimony you said very clearly that we found no evidence of a policy on the part of senior civilian or military authorities that countenanced, let alone encouraged or directed, abuse. And then, Dr. Brown, you said we found no indication of a policy encouraging abuse. I think this is very important as we look at this in an ongoing fashion. We have troops in the field who are at war, who have sig- nificant and dangerous jobs to do, including the protection of their teammates in the fields facing issues that can be solved and pre- vented by good intelligence. Can you just kind of expand on that and help us get a focus on winning this war on terrorism and how we move forward with win- ning the war, and at the same time deal with the issue of the prob- lems that were uncovered, but put that behind us? I know getting the election behind us would help. Mr. SCHLESINGER. What we see now is weapons of mass destruc- tion in the hands of potential—in the hands of a few and the capac- ity of individuals with conventional explosives, which have been greatly improved and widely available to do substantial damage, as I observed. We protected the infrastructure of Iraq, which is now being wrecked by the insurgents. We are trying to preserve the basis of livelihood for the Iraqi population. They are in the process of destroying it. Given that these weapons are available, given that you are dealing with these insurgent groups or with terrorist groups, if the distinction can be made, we need to have vastly supe- rior intelligence than when—folks in the Cold War. In the Cold War, one did not have to have as much intelligence with regard to where units were, simply because we had signals intelligence (SIGINT), we had photographic intelligence, overhead satellites so that we could trace large units if they were to move against the West. We could trace ships at sea. Insurgents, terrorists are far more furtive, and they can do substantial damage. And as a con- sequence, we need to be more aggressive than we have been in the past in gathering intelligence at the human level, when one en- counters drifts or insurgents, as opposed to the traditional prisoner of war. 903 should resign if people did not undertake to act in a manner con- sistent with what is expected of the United States? I do not understand from—starting from page 48 in your own re- port, where you indicate there was ample evidence in both joint and Army lessons learned that planning for detention operations for Iraq required alternatives to standard doctrinal approaches. And because I have only got five minutes, I cannot outline in de- tail, but you are familiar with your own report, I am sure, that vir- tually everything that you are talking about here that needed to be done was well known from lessons learned just from Guanta- namo and the Afghanistan situation. How is it not possible that if we are talking about the accepting of responsibilities, particularly in light of the questioning that has gone on previously with other members, that the consequences for accepting that responsibility do not reach up into the Office of the Secretary of Defense? Dr. BROWN. Mr. Abercrombie, clearly the Secretary of Defense is responsible for what happens in his Department. There are dif- ferent kinds of error, different degrees of error, and since the Sec- retary of Defense neither authorized nor countenanced any of this, his responsibility is there but it is an overall responsibility and has to be judged against overall performance. You ask, how could he have let any of this out? Well, e-mail goes er. I suspect stuff comes out of this committee in a way that is not authorized. That is just a fact of life. And I do not think a Secretary of Defense should find it a resigning matter that an un- authorized version of a directive of his should migrate in that way. When it comes to overall performance of a Cabinet is a matter between that Cabinet member and the President. When it comes to overall performance of his Department and of the ad- ministration, there is another way of dealing with that. That is called an election. Mr. SCHLESINGER. May I add something to that? Not only did these migrations occur because of e-mail, which is impossible to control, including classified e-mail, but we now seem to have-be- cause of the speed of communications, as I mentioned earlier—a degree of demanded accountability which does not apply in any past circumstances. Should Secretary McNamara have resigned after My Lai? In World War II, Secretary of War Stimson, given the speed of communications, would have been obliged to r Indeed on the military side, Eisenhower would have been cashiered after the Battle of Casaran Pass. MacArthur would never have got- ten to Inchon after the retreat from the Yalu. One is imposing upon a very complex operation known as war, dominated by the fog of war, a set of standards that are wholly in- applicable. Secretary Rumsfeld, I believe, was extraordinarily distressed. I think Harold will agree with that. We have known him for 35 years or more. Dr. BROWN. I have never seen him so shaken. Mr. SCHLESINGER. As soon as this news came to him, he estab- lished a whole series of investigations. He encouraged the Army to get the Inspector General (IG) to work. You have seen the report of that. We have had a most transparent process. He has got a 904 complete report from the Inspector General of the Navy, Admiral Church. He established this committee and ordered this panel to do the work from the first. He has been distressed that this oc- curred, and he was certainly distressed by what was referred to as the migration. For the life of me, I do not see how anybody could suggest that this episode should be the basis of resignation, particularly in light of the fact that he has been criticized from the very first before 9/ 11, after 9/11, because of the slow-allegedly slow response to the Taliban. It died down after Kabul fell. Then the criticism picked up during the start of the Iraq war. There was a quagmire, just as there had been a quagmire, allegedly, in Afghanistan. Then the criticism died down after a swift military victory. He was the head of the Department through two major and rapid and low-cost military victories for the United States; and, Mr. Abercrombie, I do not see that that is the basis for resignation. Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Apparently, Mr. Secretary, you have never worked in a prison system or have any familiarity with it, and maybe that is why the answer is so inadequate. The plain fact of the matter is, for those of us who have, and do have, some experience with it, the second you decide to run a pris- on other than a prison, the second you start bifurcating what the authority is in that prison, you are opening up not just the oppor- tunity, but the likelihood that there is going to be a deterioration from the very beginning of discipline and order in that institutional setting in which coercive force is exercised. The plain fact is that both the testimony in your report and what you are indicating here today fails to take into account what hap- pened when the Secretary of Defense decided that he was not going to run a prison as a prison and then let this loose to go as it will. And if you reexamine your own report, you will see what sequences of that are. When you issue orders from the top, you have to expect that those at the bottom are going to reflect what those orders indicate from the beginning. TAN. The gentleman's time has expired. We have a lot of members here to ask questions. Mr. ABERCROMBIE. I understand that, Mr. Chairman. We are under the five-minute rule. But the plain fact is that what this tes- timony is stating today and what is in this report will not be re- flected in the kind of responses that have been given up to this point. The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman's time has expired. The gentle- woman from New Mexico, Mrs. Wilson. Mrs. WILSON OF NEW MEXICO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to follow on to some questions that Mr. Spratt began to explore, particularly with respect to the clarity of guidance that DOD had given and its policies. I am particularly concerned about the issue of ghost detainees and whether there is any gap in DOD guidance. First, whether the Defense Department violated its own policies by accepting detainees from other government agencies, we assume the CIA—and not recording them as prisoners of war, or whether that was just a gap in guidance and everybody just looked the other way; if you find whether they violated policies or whether a policy just did not exist. 905 Mr. SCHLESINGER. I think that there may be some directives in conflict, and I suggest that you have the Intelligence Committee take this up. Mrs. WILSON OF NEW MEXICO. Were you given access? Mr. SCHLESINGER. As we indicated in there, the relationship be- tween the Central Intelligence Agency and the Department of De- fense demands better definition. However, the actions that Sec- retary Rumsfeld took in accepting that particular detainee, I be- lieve, were actions that were within the authorized procedures not only of this administration, but of prior administrations. Mrs. WILSON OF NEW MEXICO. I would like you to expand on that a little bit because of the ir tions. Mr. SCHLESINGER. I am trying to avoid expansions. Mrs. WILSON OF NEW MEXICO. We laugh here, but this is very important. We are talking about people who are detained in a for- eign country who may be held outside of the Geneva Conventions because we have conflicting guidance, and perhaps intentionally so, to treat them as not subject to the Geneva Conventions. And I would like to know what you found and what you think about it. Secretary Brown. Dr. BROWN. We did not have access to the CIA's investigation. Mrs. WILSON OF NEW MEXICO. Do you believe that there is U.S. Government guidance of some kind that suggests that detainees can be held outside of the scope of the Geneva Conventions who may be eligible for treatment as prisoners of war? Mr. SCHLESINGER. That detainees can be held outside of the Ge- neva Convention? Mrs. WILSON OF NEW MEXICO. Who are eligible for treatment as prisoners of war. Mr. SCHLESINGER. I think that that question answers itself. If they are eligible as prisoners of war, they should be treated as pris- oners of war. Mrs. WILSON OF NEW MEXICO. I did not ask if they should be; I said do you believe there is U.S. guidance whic them to be held outside of the protections of the Geneva Conven- tions when they are eligible for that treatment? Secretary Brown. Dr. BROWN. I cannot answer the question. I am not aware of any. Mrs. WILSON OF NEW MEXICO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentlewoman. Go ahead. Mr. SKELTON. I have a clarifying question. You were not given any access to any CIA investigation at all in this matter? Mr. SCHLESINGER. I'm sorry? Mr. SKELTON. You were not given any access to any CIA informa- tion in this matter? Mr. SCHLESINGER. We were given a briefing by the CIA. Dr. BROWN. We met with some CIA people. They told us they were investigating. Mr. SKELTON. Thank you. The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman. The gentleman from Texas, Mr. Reyes. · Mr. REYES. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Thank you very much for holding this hearing. As you know, you and I have had many conversations about doing hearings on the abuse at Abu Ghraib and what it led to. But I am troubled by the fact that you 906 did not have access to or—I do not know if you did or not-maybe you can answer whether or not you felt it was important to have the CIA and other intelligence agencies that obviously had a role to play in the abuse that occurred there. But I have let me start off by saying, or asking you, have you read General Fay's report? Mr. SCHLESINGER. We have been briefed on it. Mr. REYES. But you have not read it? Mr. SCHLESINGER. No. Mr. REYES. Just for clarification, in the briefing that we have been given by General Fay and General Kern and General Jones, in the issue of detainee abuse there were at least 23 military intel- ligence personnel that were involved, four contractors, a total of 27, and they are accused of violating not only Geneva but international law. Also there are six military intelligence personnel and two con- tractors that are accused of failing to report, seven military police and two medical personnel that also are being investigated and charged in the situation. I think in terms of hearing your response to both my colleague from New Mexico and Hawaii, I think it speaks volumes. And maybe this is a good time, Mr. Chairman, for me to make a request to enter into the record a letter that was sent yesterday, dated Sep- tember 8, from eight retired generals and admirals to the Presi- dent, asking that he appoint an independent commission that is bi- partisan; that has recognized experts in military operations and in- telligence, human rights and international law; that is fundamen- tally independent from the executive branch; that has access to classified information, which we know that you gentlemen have testified you did not have access to; that are able to take and have power to subpoena and to take testimony under oath; that they be empowered to offer whistle-blower protection; and that it be con- sistent—the appointments be consistent with the U.S. national se- curity classification needs and needs of the best interest of the na- tional security of this country. And I would ask, Mr. Chairman, if I could have this entered into the record. The CHAIRMAN. Without objection. [The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on page 949.] Mr. REYES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Because I think it gets to the crux of what we are looking at in this hearing, that we need an independent commission to be able, for the aforementioned rea- sons here, to be able to clearly look into this. I want to ask one question. In your looking into this matter, did CJTF-7 leadership indicate to you that they were discouraged, ei- ther explicitly or implicitly, from asking for additional personnel in the operations in Iraq? Were they told not to ask for additional per- sonnel? Because we have had a lot of testimony in this committee and a lot of public testimony that if they wanted more personnel, they would have had them from DOD. Mr. SCHLESINGER. The answer to that is absolutely no. Dr. BROWN. I think that is right. The problem was not numbers of personnel overall. It was the mix. Mr. REYES. But let me in the seconds that I have got left, let me tell you that when we are talking here we are talking about ac- 907 countability. There is at least one general that is suffering by being accountable for something that, in my opinion, he had no control over, and that is General Sanchez who has been pulled, as my col- league from Texas mentioned, has been pulled from the consider- ation for a four star. This is a general that inherited somebody else's plan, that inherited a situation in Abu Ghraib and in Iraq, that had soldiers that were not trained in detention. We have had testimony that there were MPs dealing, traffic cops, and were put into this situation, this untenable situation here. This is a general who heard the pleas from the colonel and general in charge of this facility for additional resources, additional personnel, additional protection. They were overwhelmed by not just prisoners, but civil- ians, men, women and children, co-mixed with military detainees, and he was unable to provide them additional resources. This is one individual that is being unfairly held accountable while the individual that is out selling a book, who takes credit for having put together this abomination of a plan in how to conduct a war against Iraq and what the President has characterized as a catastrophic success, accountability has to be there someplace. And it is not just for the enlisted men, and it is not just to the colonel- level, and it is not just one poor general who is put in an untenable situation. And that is the problem that I have with your testimony. I agree with my colleague, and I will finish here. What you are saying here and what you put in this report are two different things in my opinion. Mr. SCHLESINGER. Well, let us start with what is in the report, that there were problems with the command structure. The 800th MP Brigade was to report to General McKernan, not to General Sanchez, so there was no official link. Now, that was a problem of the command structure. It certainly was not a problem, as you indi- cate, of General Sanchez. The indications of the need for additional personnel was, to say the least, sotto voce, and it did not I think resonate anywhere in the higher levels, either at the Combined Land Forces or at CJTF- 7. Now, let me take on the issue that you have raised about Gen- eral Sanchez. I think that you are absolutely right that there are many extenuating circumstances with regard to General Sanchez. As we indicate in the report, he was raised from major general in command of a division; suddenly he is a corps commander. He is not given the resources of a corps commander. He has 33 percent of the level of commands. He sensed there was a problem at Abu Ghraib and he went to visit it on four occasions. I think that Gen- eral Sanchez was unlucky in the position that he was placed in. So I agree completely that there are many extenuating circumstances with regard to General Sanchez. The problem for General Sanchez, I think, is the directive that he handed down with respect to approved techniques. That is more of a problem, I think, than the problem that you referred to. He was not discouraged from asking for additional resources, but he was not in the chain of commands with regard to the MPs. That was somebody else's responsibility. That command of the Combined Land Forces was moved back to Georgia, if I recall correctly. So the 908 800th was responding at that point to a general officer elsewhere than in Iraq. Mr. REYES. Why is a memo that General Sanchez wrote a prob- lem for him and not a problem for the Secretary of Defense that he had to retract? It is not that General Sanchez was unlucky, it is that he got screwed in this whole process by a plan that was an abomination that we did not plan for, we did not plan right, we did not anticipate, and we did not have enough forces in country. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman. We are starting to move away from our discipline on this five minutes. We are going to have to get through this panel and we have another panel that is going to be coming up, and we have lots of members who want to ask questions. So let us stick to the five. The gentleman from Connecticut, Mr. Simmons. Mr. SIMMONS. I thank the Chairman and I thank our witnesses, and in particular Secretary Schlesinger, for your description of the broad history of warfare, the fog of war, and the problems that we have in warfare. I recall that the acronym SNAFU means “situa- tion normal, all F'd up.” And this is what you encounter in these situations, and that is unfortunate. I am a Vietnam vet and I served in Vietnam in the military and also the CIA. I was in Vietnam during the investigation of the My Lai massacre. I was horrified by the images, but I can also say that in 3-1/2 years of service, I did not observe the sorts of things that were being reported out of the My Lai massacre. But when I re- turned back to the United States in 1972, the antiwar movement, the propaganda directed against our soldiers was so intense that in many respects Vietnam veterans have been labeled—were smeared by those events ever since. Now we have this situation in Abu Ghraib. Many of us on this committee, myself included, have observed all of the photographs, shocking photographs, which, as you have mentioned, convey a message that may be a false message. In your testimony today you said our troops did well. You said that, I believe, none, or perhaps no more than one, of the individuals in the photographs was a tar- get of intelligence investigation. In other words, what we saw in those photographs was not a technique of interrogation. What we saw was Animal House, was the night shift doing things for fun; the guy that was wired up was wired up just for fun. And you have testified that there was no pol- icy of abuse. I guess my view is that the damage has already been done. The world has an impression of what went on in that prison and per- haps in other locations, and that impression smears our troops and ation, perhaps unfairly, perhaps falsely. I would say falsely. But the damage has already been done. So my question is, how do we erase the stain? When we had the previous hearings on the Taguba report, this room was filled with cameras. Today with your testimony that I think clearly estab- lishes what actually occurred, one television camera. Not a lot of interest. Empty seats. How do we remove the stain from our sol- diers, the hundreds of thousands who have served so well, the thousand who have given their lives? And I will just mention 910 Mr. SIMMONS. Thank you. The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman. Incidentally, I wanted to say, with respect to General Sanchez and the comments that were made by my friend, Mr. Reyes, about his activities, I am reminded that when that information came forward last January on Abu Ghraib, General Sanchez's public relations officer held a press con- ference and put it out to the world. In fact, I can remember there is a CNN clip I saw recently where the CNN announcer said, in an unprecedented move, the United States Army announced it is investigating itself. And that was as soon as General Sanchez had the information. So with respect to his conduct in initiating an in- vestigation immediately, he did exactly the right thing and acted very responsibly. Mr. REYES. Mr. Chairman, can I ask a question? Would it be fea- sible, possible, for us to have General Sanchez come and testify be- fore the committee? And then the other part of the question: Would it be appropriate for us to ask why he has been pulled off of the list, the four-star list? The CHAIRMAN. I would be happy to work with the gentleman. I will tell him when we get done here to talk respecting General Sanchez, but whether or not we can in the couple of weeks that we have got left to get our defense bill done—whether we will have time I do not know. But I will work with him with respect to Gen- eral Sanchez. I have met General Sanchez with the gentleman. We made that last run to Iraq, and I was very impressed with his oper- ations and his leadership. The gentleman from Arkansas, Dr. Snyder. Dr. SNYDER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate you gentlemen being here and the work you have done. I remember when we met several weeks ago, Dr. Schlesinger, you talked about the importance of what Mr. Simmons was talking about. I think you talked about getting rid of the moral stain so the men and women in the military could feel good about that. I thought of you three weeks ago when I was in Iraq. And just as we were getting ready to get on the C-130 to leave, a young offi- cer came over alone to talk to a couple of us, and his question was about the support of the American people for the troops. And you could tell that there is some stain that needs to be removed. I know that you are committed to trying to do that. I just want to make one comment, Secretary Brown. You said earlier on that there was a failure to plan throughout the Adminis- tration. I think there were actually people within the Administra- tion who had spent a lot of time looking at postwar planning. I think they were in the State Department, and they did not get lis- tened to, including to the point where they had actually had, while Saddam Hussein was in power, before the war had started, had brought people out, had snuck them out, who had come to the States, and they had spent time with them, and they did work on planning. Dr. Schlesinger, you referred a little bit ago to the 66 substan- tiated cases. You talked about 300 alleged cases. What is a case? Is 66—is that 66 American troops that have been substantiated or is it 66 Iraqis who have been abused? What is the 66? 911 Mr. SCHLESINGER. It is not entirely clear whether it is American troops. In some cases it could be contractor personnel, and the cases are—I cannot deal definitively with that. Dr. SNYDER. I will give you a hypothetical. Hypothetically, if we had five U.S. troops that illegally beat up one Iraqi, is that five cases or one case, or do we know? Mr. SCHLESINGER. I am afraid that there is no definite answer to that. It varies by the case. Dr. SNYDER. All right. I wanted to get in these numbers that Mr. Reyes was talking about, and Secretary Brown, you said it was not a numbers problem, it was a mix problem, but I am confused now, because I read your written report last night, and in your opening statement, Secretary Brown, you talk about extreme lack of re- sources. You don't say a mix. You say an extreme lack of resources. You all discussed the one-to-one ratio in Guantanamo, the 75-to-1 ratio at Abu Ghraib, which it seems to me to imply more than just a mix, but a resource problem. On page 49 of your written report, you refer to the point that, quote, “We note that CJTF-7 headquarters was never fully resourced to meet the size and complexity of its mission.” You go on to say at one point, the headquarters had only 495 of the 1,400 personnel. They were short a thousand personnel. It was not a mix problem. On page 50, you go on and even suggest, quote, “Mobiliza- tion and deployment of additional forces from the Continental United States (ČONUS) was also a feasible option.” I mean, it was a numbers problem, according to your report, be- cause you actually considered and asked a question, why didn't they consider the possibility of mobilizing and deploying additional troops. The point I want to get to is what comes next in your re- port. You say, quote, “ A system is in place for commands to submit a formal request for forces, RFF.” Earlier, CJTF-7 had submitted a request for forces for a judge advocate organization, but U.S. Central Command (CENTCO would not forward it to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Perhaps this expe- rience made CJTF-7 reluctant to submit a request for forces for MP units and goes on from there. So my question is, you have a specific example in which someone thought they needed additional force. CJTF thought they needed additional troops for a judge advocate organization. They told you that they submitted that to CENTCOM. CENTCOM did not for- ward that on to the Joint Chiefs or to DOD. And then you make the comment-basically what you are saying; perhaps word got around—“Do not submit requests for additional forces and troops to CJTF, because it is not going to be forwarded on to CENTCOM.” Now, what is important about that to us here is there has been bipartisan concern that there has not been adequate troops to do missions in Iraq, and Secretary Rumsfeld has sat there and testi- fied—or talked about publicly, if I hear from CENTCOM command- ers they need more troops, we are going to give more troops; we will authorize more troops, but then in your report you give a spe- cific example of when someone wanted more troops, CENTCOM did not forward that on, and then make the comment, perhaps word got around to not make further requests for troops to CENTCOM because you are not going to get it. 913 The matches to the firestorm, so to speak, were available in Jan- uary and popped up at that point in theater. People were doing the right things. It was moving up the chain of command. The Sec- retary's office, I am sure, was informed about the same time, but the pictures themselves, which clearly people should have been able to see this is going to create an enormous political problem for the Department and for the country, more broadly in the region, did not reach the Secretary 'till literally the night before he testi- fied, I guess, to us, and they were in the hands of the press before they got to the Secretary, even though they—and so number one, I would like to know, in your opinion, what happened there, what should happen, what steps have been taken. And then two, the other thing that—well, there are a lot of things that are distressing about the situation, but the other as- pect, from a communications standpoint is, again, this committee, I thought we were very slow to know. I mean, we should have known well ahead of when we did, and I think we could have—this would have been less supercharged, quite frankly, had this commit- tee been in a position to know, again, before sort of watching it on 60 Minutes. So I would like to get your reflections on where the breakdown was there and what can be done about that. Mr. SCHLESINGER. The first point to be made is that one must always bear in mind the concern about command influence, that the people who might be guilty of infractions should not have their cases contaminated by remarks at a higher level, and this led to some inhibitions about moving this information up the chain of command. The second point is that this is totally unacceptable, and one of our recommendations is that this kind of information be rapidly brought to the top, irrespective—not irrespective in a way tha does not create a problem with trials under the Uniform Code of Military Justice through excessive command influence. The Air Force had a procedure, and we recommended that proce- dure take place in the future, be used by the Department in the future. Harold. Dr. BROWN. Yeah, and I believe that is now being implemented by the Department of Defense. You are right, Mr. Cole, that knowl- edge of the pictures at the top and to the committee would have been helpful. There still would have been a firestorm, and I think part of the problem is that without seeing the pictures, retary of Defense and some of the senior commanders who didn't see them either didn't really know how big a problem there was going to be, no matter what they did, but they could have tried, as the committee could have tried, to ease some of the fallout from it. He is right of the concern, and it wasn't an excuse. It was a rea- son for not forwarding them up the line, the concern about com- mand influence, but I think it was misplaced in this case, because although clearly anybody seeing the pictures would be prejudiced by them, you could still, I think, have handled it in a different way. It has been pointed out several times that in January an an- nouncement was made that an investigation of abuse was going forward, and I think the Secretary of Defense was aware of that, 914 but without seeing the pictures, you couldn't know what a big deal it was going to be. Mr. SCHLESINGER. There was one other aspect, and that was that these pictures were transmitted to CENTCOM and that the lieu- tenant colonel who received them looked at the pictures and did not recognize the political bombshell. So he did not transmit the in- formation you have got to see these pictures upward. Mr. COLE. Let me ask one more question. I am going to direct this to you, if I may, Secretary Brown. You mentioned in your com- ments—and it is something I agree with, but I would like you to be more specific, if you could, that there may be appropriate dif- ferent ways to question different classification of detainees. On the other hand. I have some sympathy with Mr. Bartlett's concern that once you start having different systems, it is awful easy for lines to blur and things to get out of control. Is it realistic to have separate levels or types of questioning, or should we just stick with the Geneva Convention? Dr. BROWN. We do stick with the Geneva Convention in Iraq. It applies to everybody except terrorists. It applies to resistors. It is a different convention. Mr. SCHLESINGER. Except for foreign terrorists, because they come in, they don't get Geneva protection. Dr. BROWN. That is right. But I think we can abide by them, but we have to abide by our interpretation of them. The ICRC has a protocol to the Geneva Convention which essen- tially says what we consider terrorists should be treated as pris- oners of war. What that means, according to that interpretation, to which we don't subscribe, is that if Mr. Zarqawi, the fellow who is going around chopping heads off, is captured, according to that pro- tocol, he is a prisoner of war and we are barred from asking him where his colleagues might be and what they might be up to. In fact, some interpretations say that that kind of question, interroga- tion, is torture. Well, we don't buy that. Mr. COLE. Thank you very much, gentlemen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman. The gentleman from Mississippi, Mr. Taylor. Mr. TAYLOR. Can we go to Mrs. Tauscher first? The CHAIRMAN. By the gentleman's agreement, the gentlelady from California, Mrs. Tauscher. Ms. TAUSCHER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Secretary Schles- inger, Mr. Secretary Brown, thank you for your exemplary service to your country and over many decades, and I just want to thank you for working as hard as you did and as quickly as you did. . You know, while I firmly believe that authority can be delegated, I don't believe responsibility can, and I believe that we have fallen way short of really understanding the macroconditions put in place by this Administration, from the President to the Secretary on down, that led us to have an overreliance on Guard and Reserve in Iraq, not enough troops, and led us to have people that were ab- solutely incapable of babysitting, never mind being in charge of a prison, being, you know, at Tier 1 on the night shift, and I believe somebody is responsible for that, and I think that we are all re- sponsible for that. 915 I am willing to take my responsibility for it by not having enough oversight to understand that this was going to be—and thank God for Specialist Darby, the only hero in this little nightmare, because frankly, where would we be if he hadn't blown the whistle. I am sure right now he has had his identity changed and has a food test- er, but frankly, isn't that a shame, too? What I want to ask both of you gentlemen is, while your report is very succinct and comprehensive, you alluded in testimony today, in the report, that the Secretary has been ill-served by peo- ple reporting to him by the chain of command by not getting infor- mation on a timely basis, by people not understanding the political ramifications of the pictures. I want to know who has ill-served our fighting men and women, that we are in Iraq now with still not enough troops, where it is worse and getting worse, where we don't have a plan in my opinion, and I will be there next week to check on it myself, to have a one-to-one ratio of an Iraqi security person that is going to take over for an American fighting person. We don't have that quickly enough, and I just need you to tell me, do you think that 11 investigations are the right way of going about this? I support what the generals and the admirals have requested of the President. We need a 9/11 commission-type review of this. I feel as if I have got arms and legs and body parts that I am trying to put together here and I can't quite identify whether I have got an ant or an elephant. We need to have an unambiguous investigation of people that are completely out of the scope of things, because what we have right now are 11 different reports, and what we have been treated to is data dump and a paper blizzard. And you can't tell me you even talked to the CIA, so you don't have the complete picture. So what about having one investigation to get to the bottom of this and to the top of this? Dr. BROWN. Mrs. Tauscher, I think you have raised two separate questions. One has to do with the question of prisoner abuse, de- tainee abuse, and what led to it. I believe that insofar as the De- partment of Defense is concerned, our report answers those que tions and deals with the issue of responsibility throughout the De- partment of Defense. It is true that there is a separate investigation going on in an- other government agency, and whether this committee wants to look at that, that is not in our hands. It is in your hands. But I think, so far as the Department of Defense behavior in this, it is in our report, and everyone can make his or her own judgment on the degree of responsibility at various levels. I have said what mine is, and it may not exactly coincide with what Jim Schlesinger says. The other question that you have raised, and in my view it is a more important one, is what is our strategy and what is our tactic in Iraq. That of course goes somewhat beyond our report, in fact quite far beyond it. And I have an opinion, but I don't think it is particularly relevant at this point. I think it is a very complicated question. You have to start from where we are because our options are limited, and I think in answer to another question was what I thought would be an acceptable outcome, an impression that re- places the impression of the detainee abuse. 916 Mr. SCHLESINGER. In regard to any shortfalls that existed, I think you used the phrase, Mrs. Tauscher, that we all have a re- sponsibility. That is indeed correct. During the 1990's, after the end of the Cold War, we probably reduced certain categories of our ore than they should be, and we mention those, MPs, MI interrogators, and so forth, which were costly in this case. Second point, in your initial flattering remarks, you thanked us for the comprehensive report. I think it is a comprehensive report, and I think, as Harold does, that it does answer for the DOĐ. It does not pretend to answer for other government agencies. The third point on the question of tactics in Iraq, we were slower to recognize the insurgency than I think we should have been and to adapt to that circumstance. I would be happy to submit for the record, Mr. Chairman, my testimony to the Senate Foreign Rela- tions Committee on this particular issue. We cannot resolve the security problem in Iraq. We have neither the cultural feel nor the intelligence capability nor the language as- sets. We must get Iraqis to do that. We were lagging in putting that together. Also the Congress appropriated money. That money has flowed much more slowly than it should have in terms of lifting the Iraqi economy and bringing more people to our side. I spell this out at much greater length. Ms. TAUSCHER. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. EVERETT (presiding]. The Chair recognizes Representative Taylor. Mr. TAYLOR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank both of you gentlemen for sticking around for better than three hours now. I have always found that the timing of all this to be interesting, and I was curious if within your—if in your review you looked at a couple of things. I was in the Coast Guard. We painted our ships and boats white because we believed a high visibility cut down on infractions. General Miller is in Iraq looking into prison abuse. From what I can tell, either immediately after or possibly during or immediately before a lot of the incidents at Abu Ghraib. Mr. SCHLESINGER. Prior. Prior. Mr. TAYLOR. Okay. Second thing is, somewhere in that time frame is the allegation that the Iraqi Air Defense Minister-I am going to say it wrong—Mullah Huwaysh surrenders, comes in, turns himself in, and within a couple of weeks of surrendering- not within the heat of battle, but within a couple of weeks of sur- rendering, according to published reports and we all know they can be wrong—but according to published reports he was stuffed into a sleeping bag, rolled around, and his family is told he is dead in a couple of weeks. I would certainly think that would o next person to think twice about surrendering. I see that as coun- terproductive. My question is, as all this is going on, there is still no weapons of mass destruction found. Saddam Hussein is still on the loose. So kind of all these things are occurring in the month of January. You have got a general looking into a prison abuse, yet it is going on. According to published reports, there is abuse of someone who turned himself in, not in the heat of battle, and Hussein still hadn't been found. So did you detect—and I am asking this in a formal 917 question, because I don't know the answer—did you detect any sense of urgency being pushed down the chain to make something happen; let's find Hussein? Because conversely, it could lead one to the conclusion that what happened at the prison, particularly at Abu Ghraib, is you either have guards who are oblivious to the presence of this general or who are not very bright, or the third conclusion could be that they think they are doing something wrong. And, again, I know you had a zillion things to look at, but I was wondering if any of those things you had a chance to look into and have reached conclusions, because I am just asking ques- tions. I don't have conclusions. Mr. SCHLESINGER. Let me answer the three questions as quickly as I can. First, with regard to the Iraqi minister, if it is true, it is reprehensible. Mr. TAYLOR. Did your commission look into that specific in- stance? Mr. SCHLESINGER. Did we, Jim? Did we look at that? No, we did not. It is still under investigation. If true—one must recognize that not all accusations are true, but if it is true, then it is reprehen- sible. Second, with regard to General Miller, because of the improve- ments that he introduced at Guantanamo he was sent over in Au- gust and he left in early September, and the episodes that we are referring to here took place in October and November. His actions were primarily in the direction of getting a better integration be- tween MI and MP personnel, as had prevailed successfully at Guantanamo, in which MP persons would look at the behavior of the people in their charge and would say, I think he is ripe for in- terrogation; he seems to be more cooperative than the people down the line. And I think that General Miller's actions were intended to bring a more successful operation at Abu Ghraib, and indeed to bring it to the command. He did insist that what was appropriate at Guantanamo was not appropriate in Iraq, because Iraq was under the Geneva Convention, except for possible foreign terrorists who came in. Mr. TAYLOR. And this is a form of a question. When he made that—when he insisted upon that, was this in writing? How well was it disseminated down the chain? Mr. SCHLESINGER. My impression is that he did this not in writ- ing, but that this was his advice to the command, to those who were in it, and as you know, General Sanchez's list was more ex- tensive than the one at Guantanamo approved by Secretary Rums- feld. As we say in the report, General Sanchez thought that this was within the prerogatives of the commander in the region. What was the third part of your question? I am sorry. Mr. TAYLOR. The timing. It is getting to be November, the timing of it all. It is getting to be November. They have still not found any weapons of mass destruction. Hussein at that point is still on the loose. Is there any evidence that because of all of this, Mr. SCHLESINGER. Pressure, yes, sir. Mr. TAYLOR [continuing]. That there is increasing pressure from above to make something happen? Mr. SCHLESINGER. It depends what you mean by pressure. If you mean 918 Mr. TAYLOR. That is why I left it fairly open. I am asking the question. I don't know the answer. Mr. SCHLESINGER. It depends what one means by pressure. If one means by pressure was there a growing interest in good intel- ligence as a result of this spurt in American casualties, I think the answer to that is yes. If one means by that did somebody come along and say, here are some additional techniques that you should employ that are well beyond the Geneva Convention, and so forth, I think the answer is no. There was no doubt an atmosphere that was generated by the rising level of American casualties, and that psychological aura rather than any direct suggestion I think was there. Dr. BROWN. I think it is about right. I think that there is no evi- dence that direction came down saying, “We are loosening up the rules, because we need information.” There is evidence and reason for there to have been statements, “Look, we really do need more intelligence. We are being shot at. The resistance is very substan- tial. We want some results.” That was not accompanied, so far as we can see, by statements saying, “And take the gloves off,” but psychological pressure that might have influenced some interrogators to violate the rules. The rules state the rules. That may have been the case. Mr. EVERETT. The gentleman's time has expired. The Chair recognizes the gentlelady from California, Ms. Davis. Ms. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to both of you for hanging in so long and for your service. I wonder if you could just take the example of the use of dogs, partly because that was something that people knew perhaps. Í have a phobia against dogs barking at me, so I can imagine that people would have that, but could you please talk a little bit about that, because that is one thing that we know did migrate? Whether it migrated from just Guantanamo or also from Afghanistan, I guess there is some question about that. And the relationship be- tween the military police and military intelligence, it seems to me that that provides us with some kind of an example about why things worked or they didn't and how in fact that was used. I un- derstand they were authorized, although not authorized in the way that they were used. It seems to me also that people were very aware of the fact that dogs were very available to the guards. I did have an opportunity in looking at the classified reports to see that there is a lot said about that. I mean, it is very graphic, and it is very disconcerting. Could you please talk a little bit about that, your experience in getting that information and the relationship between the military police and intelligence there? Mr. SCHLESINGER. As I indicated in my statement, we had full cooperation of all of the investigations, including Admiral Church's, which has not yet been fully completed and may have some addi- tional information, though I doubt-I think it is basically in shape. The policy is clearly no use of unmuzzled dogs, no use of unmuzzled dogs. The policy did permit in some cases or the tech- niques, I should say, rather than the policy, the techniques per- mitted use of muzzled dogs in some cases. 919 Ms. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. I guess what I am wondering is, was it not a policy if in fact, as you state in your report, there was no training for the use of these dogs? Mr. SCHLESINGER. There was no training for the dog handlers, and some of them were—what shall I say?-absorbed in the atmos- phere of Abu Ghraib. There were a number of cases in which dogs were used in relation to interrogations. I am not sure whether any of those involved unmuzzled dogs, but there may have been. There were cases, clearly, of unmuzzled dogs used not in connec- tion with interrogations and that there were also a number of dog incidents with unmuzzled dogs that were wholly unrelated to inter- rogations and that this was simply for the pleasure or the sadistic pleasure of the military police who were involved. One of the sections of the report describes the Stanford experi- ment in which you have these fairly well-bred students who were put aside as guards and others as prisoners, and the behavior de- generated so quickly that Stanford canceled the experiment. These people were not trained. Some of the dog handlers were seduced, as it were, into allowing the dogs to be used inappropriately. 1. I would add two points. One is that there was. I think, a confusion between the use of dogs for custodial purposes and for interrogation purposes. Mr. SCHLESINGER. Oh, very good point. Dr. BROWN. And I think that contributed to the abuse. And the other point is, and I am not sure how well it was under- stood, or if it was understood it was abused, is that dogs play a very negative role in Arab culture, and as a result, the effects were intensified. I am not sure how many of the people involved understood that or, if they did understand it, misused it. Ms. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. Did it trouble you that they had been authorized, that their use had been authorized? Dr. BROWN. Well, the use for custodial purposes I think is not so troublesome, especially if they are kept muzzled. Once it spills over into interrogation and if they become unmuzzled especially, that certainly spills over into abuse, in my opinion. Ms. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. And responsibility and accountability for that use? Dr. BROWN. It belongs at the military police, up to the brigade- level, in my view. Mr. SCHLESINGER. On the dog handlers, when they came to Abu Ghraib, they were under the impression that their dogs were to be used to patrol the perimeter, which as you will remember was under attack from mortarings by insurgents, Iraqi insurgents. And some of them, at least, were drawn because they were not properly trained, led into allowing the dogs to be used within the framework of Tier 1. Ms. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. I think you certainly have commented well that it was a situation in which knowing it and understanding it, you could not have expected them to be used in the way that they were intended, and I think that is one of the problems that we have. Mr. Chairman, just one statement, because I think we have asked how can we erase some of this, and I think a recent article suggested that more positive reinforcement is being used of late, 920 and actually they are having some good results with that. That is not to say that every time positive reinforcement is used that we have good results, but I think that that in some way can help. The whole purpose, of course, is to save lives, to save our soldiers' lives, and we need to be certain that whatever we are doing is doing that and not causing other harm. Mr. SCHLESINGER. That the training was inadequate is quite clear. Ms. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. EVERETT. The gentlelady from California, Ms. Sanchez, is recognized. Ms. SANCHEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you, gentle- men, for staying this long with us. There are approximately 300 cases of abuse under investigation or prosecution from Iraq, Afghanistan and JTF Guantanamo. These cases cut across different services, locations, commands, theaters of operations, countries and conditions. In other words, I think that we know that the abuses that occurred at Abu Ghraib were not iso- lated incidents, but were symptomatic of broader systemic training, force structure and policy problems within the Department of De- fense. Your report confirms that conclusion and identifies some of the systemic causes of these devastating incidents. I guess I am the last one here. I have listened to you talk about how this might have been an aberration, that there certainly has not been a cover- up, that it has been a pretty transparent process from the Depart- ment of Defense. That information has been rapidly brought up to the top, that your report answers— Mr. SCHLESINGER. No. Failed to be brought up to the top. Ms. SANCHEZ. Okay. That your report answers for situations throughout the Department of Defense. My question is—well, I have several questions. I hope we keep them short, because I really want to hear what you have to say, and they are not detailed questions. Do you think the Geneva Convention applies to the prisoners we have in Afghanistan? Dr. BROWN. Not to Taliban or al Qaeda. Ms. SANCHEZ. You talked about the sadistic. pleasure of the guards involved in doing some of these in particular, some of the things that were in the photographs. Do you believe that any of our soldiers purposefully tortured any of the cases that you have taken a look at or that we purposefully torture in Afghanistan and Iraq? Dr. BROWN. I think the Abu Ghraib Tier 1 pictures show what I would consider torture. Mr. SCHLESINGER. Clearly, mental torture. Ms. SANCHEZ. A lot of people say, oh, my God, look at the 3,000 they killed and the tortures and look at the fact that they are be- heading. The contractors are being-look what they did in Fallujah to those four contractors. None of these pictures bother us. I am talking about some of the American people out there. Do you think that torture was out of the norm for what we might even expect in a time of war? - 921 Dr. BROWN. I suppose it is to be expected, but it is not to be con- doned. As to public opinion, I suspect there is a substantial public opinion that considers almost anything we do in response to what was done to us as justified. I do not. I think there are limits. Mr. SCHLESINGER. Indeed, if one looks at Abu Ghraib itself, which at least for the night shift was not symptomatic of these other episodes, but Abu Ghraib was under mortar assault and there was a lot of anger on the part of an understaffed set of MPs, and I think that that certainly was an emotional factor. They were under assault. Ms. SANCHEZ. Do either of you gentlemen have you seen the in- vestigation report of the beating deaths of the two detainees at Bagram prison in Afghanistan? Dr. BROWN. I think we were aware of it, but I don't think we read the report. Mr. SCHLESINGER. No. Ms. SANCHEZ. The report I am talking about is the one that the Pentagon has had in its hands for about ten days and is trying to figure out how to show it to the Members of Congress here because it is so bad, the one that talks about torturing those two people who died, the one that talks about pressure points and acts, their bodies being so mutilated it is worse than being hit by a semi truck? Do you know anything about this? Are you aware of that, all the rumors going on? Dr. BROWN. We are not aware of every word that you said. Ms. SANCHEZ. So knowing what you know about that report, be- cause I haven't seen it. As I said, the Pentagon is trying to figure out how it brings it before Congress. Do you still think that I guess this would be to Mr. Schlesinger. Do you still think that they were only mentally tortured? Do you know anything about that re- port I am talking about? Dr. BROWN. We spoke to Abu Ghraib, not to Bagram. Mr. SCHLESINGER. Bagram is still under investigation. Ms. SANCHEZ. The report is not done? Mr. SCHLESINGER. The report has not been completed, no.. Ms. SANCHEZ. Has not been completed? Mr. SCHLESINGER. It has not been completed. However, I think, as is reflected in our report, Afghanistan was looked upon as an area unprotected, agreed on as unprotected by Geneva rights. I think that the one had more special operating forces, more-other government agency personnel in Afghanistan, and aside from the night shift at Abu Ghraib, I think that the techniques that were used in Afghanistan may have been rougher than what we Ms. SANCHEZ. So you think there is no connection between Cap- tain Wood, who was using those techniques in Afghanistan and then got placed at Abu Ghraib later, but there was no migration or- Mr. SCHLESINGER. Oh, no. There was migration, yes. There was migration of those techniques back to Abu Ghraib. Ms. SANCHEZ. But you have no- Mr. SCHLESINGER. But that was, Ms. SANCHEZ. But you still don't think there was torture done? Mr. SCHLESINGER. Where? Well, that depends if there were—if, as you describe, there was mutilation of bodies at Bagram, then 922 that was torture, but we do not see that as having occurred in Abu Ghraib. As Harold indicated, it certainly is mental torture to see what was in the photographs. Ms. SANCHEZ. I am sorry. I guess I just took that when you talked about your report in particular, you said that the answers were about throughout the Department of Defense, and I guess I thought the Department of Defense was actually doing the fighting in Afghanistan. So I- Mr. SCHLESINGER. Yes. Ms. SANCHEZ [continuing). You had the feeling from background, from everywhere rather than just one particular case. Mr. SCHLESINGER. As we indicated, our report deals with the sit- uation up until the present time, and new facts might come to light and in some respects the conclusions might be changed. We have not seen the report on Bagram, which is unfinished. Ms. SANCHEZ. Okay. Great. Thank you, gentlemen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. EVERETT. Thank you, gentlemen, very much. You have been enormously generous with your time. Thank you for indulging the committee, and thank you for your service. We are adjourned until two o'clock. [Whereupon, at 1:20 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] APPENDIX SEPTEMBER 9, 2004 OPENING REMARKS OF CHAIRMAN HUNTER Hearing on Schlesinger Panel Review of DOD Detention Operations September 9, 2004 The hearing will come to order. Our guests this morning are: Honorable James Schlesinger Chairman Independent Panel to Review DOD Detention Operations Honorable Harold Brown Panelist Gentlemen, thank you for agreeing to appear this morning and for your continued public service in examining these difficult issues. Your review identified important problems that need attention and I believe your recommendations will go a long way in preventing future detainee abuse. On May 12, 2004, Secretary Rumsfeld asked a distinguished panel to review all Department of Defense detainee operations to (927) 928 provide independent, professional advice on issues the panel considered most pertinent to allegations of abuse. The panel, comprised of two former Secretaries of Defense, a retired four-star General, and a former member of this committee, released its report at the end of last month. The Independent Panel is the seventh of ten major investigations, reviews, inspections, and reports into detainee operations. All of those are in addition to the over 220 criminal investigations being undertaken by the Department. Already, the Department is acting on some of the recommendations of earlier reports. It will undoubtedly incorporate the Schlesinger Panel recommendations as it moves forward. In and of itself, the sheer volume of this effort should serve as compelling evidence that the Department of Defense finds the abuse of detainees unacceptable and is moving very aggressively 930 The question we should address is: where do we go from here? In the House version of the fiscal year 2005 defense authorization act, this committee took preemptive action to require new, and better guidance and training in the Geneva Conventions and improved oversight by higher authorities. Based on the Schlesinger panel's findings, we will need to go further in the areas of resources, doctrine, and force structure. Fortunately, the Department is already moving forward in many of these areas, further proving that it will leave no stone unturned in ensuring that justice is done and all steps possible are being taken to treat detainees in a manner consistent with our nation's values. Gentlemen, we are honored to have you here and look forward to your testimony. But first, let me recognize the committee's ranking Democrat, Mr. Skelton, for any remarks he may wish to make. 931 The entirety of our witnesses' prepared statements will be entered into the record. 934 Both the Schlesinger panel report and the report of Generals Kern, Jones, and Fay, that we will hear about later today, highlight how the shifts in interrogation policy within Iraq and among Iraq, Afghanistan, and Guantanamo created confusion and injected uncertainty in the minds of interrogators and military police. That responsibility resides at the very top-when we approve policies that treat prisoners differently in different theaters and change the standards multiple times in multiple months, we open the door to abuse. The Office of the Secretary of Defense also must take responsibility for the failure to plan adequately for the post-war. General Sanchez wasn't given the resources he needed to accomplish his mission. This is a strategic failure with strategic implications, not the least of which was for detention operations in . Iraq. Given the certainty of our military victory against the Iraqi military, it was completely foreseeable that significant detainee operations would be necessary. Yet the myriad problems identified by the reports we consider today make clear there was virtually no 935 planning for this eventuality. This is not a failing of General Sanchez or of any of the enlisted personnel who committed and must still be held to account for abuses. We also must look seriously at the finding of the Fay report on ghost detainees because it couldn't be more sobering. Holding ghost detainees and by that I mean not disclosing them to the International Committee of the Red Cross—is a direct violation of the Geneva Conventions. The Fay report found at least 8 such ghosts and Secretary Rumsfeld has admitted ordering one held at the request of Director Tenet. This practice raises serious questions at the tactical level about the way that the military and CIA personnel interact in detention operations. But it raises larger policy questions as well about our national willingness to adhere to international law. Mr. Chairman, while we must not paint all of our servicemen and women with the brush of prison abuse, so, too, must we not continue to call this the work of just a few bad apples. We must prosecute those who have violated the law-whether officer or 936 enlisted or contractor. We must also fix the broader command climate and hold responsible the senior officials who created the conditions that allowed abuses to occur. We must do all we can to prevent future abuses. We in Congress must all send a signal to the world that what happened at Abu Ghraib does not reflect the values of our military or our nation as a whole. . I thank the witnesses for being with us. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 937 STATEMENT OF JAMES SCHLESINGER BEFORE THE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES September 9, 2004 Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee: I am grateful to the Committee for providing the opportunity to discuss the Panel's report on abuses at Abu Ghraib and elsewhere. As you know, Secretary Rumsfeld established the Panel to provide an independent and objective assessment of what had gone wrong in our detention operations, to review the other DoD investigations that were underway for gaps, and to provide any recommendations and additional observations that were required. He added in his charge to us: “Let the chips fall where they may.” We have striven to fulfill that mandate. In that effort, we have received the full cooperation of the Department of Defense, which is already moving ahead in numerous areas with adjustments and reforms to prevent a recurrence. We believe that we have provided a full and accurate (down to the time of publication) description regarding the extent of these abuses and how they came about- and what might be done in the future to reduce the risk of reoccurrence. Since the full report, including the Executive Summary, has been available for more than three weeks, I shall not attempt to summarize it here. Instead, I should like to place the details of a primarily descriptive report in a wider context--and make some observations about salient issues that may readily be overlooked. In a matter of this sort, it is important that we not overlook the forest for the trees. 1. Our focus and our prime concern should be the morale, health, and performance of our armed forces and that their behavior upholds the standards that the American 938 society believes appropriate. If there are any defects, they must be diagnosed and any infected areas must be lanced and cauterized-as we seek to avoid repetition. In this manner, we can cleanse any stain on the reputation of our armed forces so that their overall performance continues to be understood and highly valued by the larger society. 2. In this regard, we must continuously bear in mind that the overall performance of tanice those armed forces has been commendable. We must not lose sight of that fundamental reality, which reflects both technology and a professional force. Through the advance of technology, we have been able to target enemy forces with precision. As a consequence, we sought in Iraq to preserve the infrastructure, so that it could serve Iraq's future and to successfully limit collateral damage. Moreover, we now have, by and large, a trained professional force. The vast majority of that force has behaved in Iraq with extraordinary forbearance-and including countless acts of kindness. In this respect, their performance has been vastly better than in previous wars-World War II, Korea, and Vietnam. While we did not feel it necessary to spell this out in the Report, in light of some of the public commentary, I can only say that it deserves emphasis and repetition. OUR TROOPS HAVE PERFORMED WELL. Bear in mind that we have had some fifty thousand detainees—and that over three hundred thousand of our troops have served in Iraq. To be sure, any abuses are too many. But, to date, we have identified some 300 cases of possible abuse of which fewer than 100 have been confirmed. One-third of those abuses have been at the point of capture. War is a matter of violence, and, in combat, passions run high. 940 gain intelligence. Nonetheless, abuses did occur at Abu Ghraib (and elsewhere) during interrogation. In such cases, the MPs had been encouraged by MI personnel to use aggressive tactics. Those excesses must be identified and corrected—to discourage any recurrence in the future. Such excesses may have resulted from confusion as to what was permissible. Some of that confusion may be understandable, since we had interrogation operations in three different places with varying rules. That created ambiguity. Nonetheless, in the future such ambiguity is unacceptable. A general policy should be designed and enshrined in doctrines that military personnel are properly trained to observe appropriate rules. 6. Though abuses were indeed more widespread than observed on the night shift at Abu Ghraib; nonetheless, it is correct to characterize the situation on that night shift as having its unique aspects. Some have seized upon the photographs to suggest that torture was condoned. That is simply wrong. The actions of the night shift on Tier 1 were an aberration. The members were off on their own. As one participant admitted: “We did it for the fun of it." I have characterized those activities by the night shift on Tier 1 as “animal house." 7. In this connection, President Kennedy said, during the Cuban Missile Crisis, that a picture is worth a thousand words. It clearly is-if, and only if, you know what the picture means. But if pictures are misinterpreted, they can readily become a distorted mechanism. That can easily create an inaccurate impression—hiding, indeed distorting, the overall performance, as I have suggested with respect to our armed forces in Iraq. 941 Mr. Chairman, the Panel's report delineated both errors of commission and errors of omission. But we found no indication of a policy encouraging abuse. To be sure, these abuses and the failed oversight that allowed them are an embarrassment. They do not reflect the standards that this society believes appropriate. We must take those steps necessary to see that those standards are, indeed, upheld in the future. Yet, we must not allow some of the trees to obscure the view of the entire forest. These actions, by historical standards quite limited in number, are not representative of the overall behavior of our forces, which has been generally admirable. When sitting for his portrait, Oliver Cromwell ordered his portraitist, who wanted to pretty Cromwell up, that the portrait should include “warts and all.” Of necessity, our Panel was charged to concentrate on the warts. Yet, members of Congress must remain aware of the full portrait. In these somewhat personal remarks, I have tried to stress that a full portrait is more than those warts—which in our Panel we were obliged to analyze. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I shall be happy to answer any questions that you or other members of the Committee may have. 943 Mr. Chairman, Mr. Skelton and members of the Committee: I am pleased to appear before you today to report on the work of the Independent Panel and to present my personal conclusions on the issues involved. Let me begin by noting that some related investigations are still in progress and that further facts may well emerge. That means that a degree of tentativeness remains. But the Panel's own work and our access to almost all of the other investigations have revealed enough so that conclusions, if not final ones, can be drawn. The abuses in Block 1A at Abu Ghraib displayed a pathology not, so far as we were able to find, duplicated elsewhere. But there have been several hundred other cases of abuse of detainees alleged at Abu Ghraib and elsewhere in Iraq, in Afghanistan and at Guantanamo; a significant fraction have been or will be confirmed as such. About a third of the cases appear to have been connected with interrogations. In addition to their unacceptability on humanitarian grounds, these events have been extremely damaging to U.S. standing, policies and objectives in the Greater Middle East and to the struggle against transnational terrorism, as well as to the image and self-image of the armed forces and of America itself. The underlying context for abuses was framed by two judgments made before combat operations began. First was the expectation by the Defense Department leadership, along with most of the rest of the Administration, that following the collapse of the Saddam Hussein regime through Coalition military operations, a stable successor regime would soon emerge in Iraq. Though there was planning for some contingencies, those planned for did not include what actually happened: a breakdown of order, widespread looting and infrastructure destruction and strong resistance to the occupation. This in turn produced a large mixed population of detainees-Baathist holdouts; high level officials; surrendered military; domestic and foreign religious extremists; ordinary criminals; individuals captured in the act of attacking Coalition forces or suspected of doing so; and undoubtedly some innocents— rather than a large number of relatively passive prisoners of war. Moreover, detention operations took place within a situation that is a more serious product of the misjudged forecast of what would happen following the overthrow of the Saddam regime: Iraq, including urban areas, remained (and remains) a zone of continued and substantial combat, as well as economic deprivation and political instability. The second judgment was the policy adopted toward various classes of detainee, set for Al Qa’eda and Taliban after 9/11, following debate within the U.S. Government and decision by the President. The President determined that the provisions of Geneva did not apply to our conflict with Al Qa'eda, that Taliban 944 detainees were "unlawful combatants” not qualifying as prisoners of war, but reaffirmed a previous order by the Secretary of Defense that detainees be treated humanely and, to the extent appropriate and consistent with military necessity, in a manner consistent with the Geneva principles. This in turn led to a series of determinations about allowed interrogation methods beyond those long customary under Army Field Manual 34-52. The Secretary of Defense authorized, then rescinded, a list of such methods for Guantanamo and, after study by a working group, promulgated a narrowed approved list “limited to interrogations of unlawful combatants held at Guantanamo." These events occurred before operations took place in Iraq. We found no evidence of a policy on the part of senior civilian or military authorities that countenanced, let alone encouraged or directed, abuse. Approval of interrogation techniques beyond those in AFM 34-52 was limited to Guantanamo and required that any of them be used only with the specific approval of the Secretary of Defense in each case. He approved any of them in only two cases. Those additional methods of interrogation were intended for and limited to resistant Al Qa'eda members at Guantanamo knowledgeable about what had been their plans for 9/11 and for the future. Nevertheless, various versions of expanded lists migrated unauthorized to Afghanistan, and to Iraq where the Geneva Conventions continued to apply. That migration of rules (and of personnel) led to confusion about what interrogation practices were authorized and to several changes in directions to interrogators. I believe that was a contributing factor in the abuse of detainees. Whether the initial, more expansive, guidelines or the findings of the Office of Legal Counsel in the Department of Justice further contributed to an atmosphere of permissiveness in the field is more difficult to assess. A result of the first misjudgment was, especially at Abu Ghraib, a situation in which both Military Police capabilities for custody and protection, and Military Intelligence capabilities for interrogation to obtain tactical, strategic and counterterrorist intelligence, suffered extreme lack of resources. Another result was that the number and mix of detainees went far beyond what had been planned for. And the respective responsibilities, authorities and modes of cooperation for MP and MI units were poorly defined. Separately, the policy failure at all levels to assure a clear and stable set of rules for treatment and interrogation further opened the door to abuse. The problems were compounded by inadequate training, confused command arrangements and, at Abu Ghraib, personal deficiencies at command levels up to and including the brigade level. Hindsight always finds it too easy to assign blame. Nevertheless, varying degrees of responsibility for failure to provide adequate resources to support the custodial and intelligence DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD N SEPTEMBER 9, 2004 GENERAL DAVID M. BRAHMS (RET. USMC) GENERAL JAMES CULLEN (RET. USA) GENERAL ROBERT GARD (RET. USA) ADMIRAL LEE F. GUNN (RET. USN) GENERAL JOHN L. FUGH (RET. USA) GENERAL JOSEPH HOAR (RET. USMC) ADMIRAL JOHN D. HUTSON (RET. USN) GENERAL RICHARD OMEARA (RET. USA) September 8, 2004 The Honorable George W. Bush President of the United States 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W. Washington, DC 20500 Dear President Bush: As retired professional military and civilian leaders of the U.S. Armed Forces, we have worked for decades to defend the national security of the United States and to uphold the honor, integrity and effectiveness of its military and intelligence services. We have greatly valued the opportunity to serve, and we remain committed to this critically important cause. It is thus with regret that we, the undersigned, write to express our deep concern about the serious allegations of wrongdoing in U.S. military and intelligence detention and interrogation practices in the global “war on terror." We urge you to commit - immediately and publicly- to support the creation of a comprehensive, independent commission to investigate and report on the truth about all of these allegations, and to chart a course for how practices that violate the law should be addressed. The photographs of torture and other abuse that emerged from the U.S. detention facility at Abu Ghraib horrified us all, and were met appropriately with condemnation in the United States and around the world. Several of those accused of these abuses are now being prosecuted, and we trust that additional prosecutions, if appropriate, will be brought as promptly as possible. While we do not wish to prejudge the guilt or innocence of anyone accused of wrongdoing, we cannot ignore that there are now dozens of well-documented allegations of torture, abuse, and otherwise questionable detention practices that appear to have been imposed upon individuals held in U.S. custody at detention facilities from Iraq to Afghanistan to Guantanamo Bay.' These reports have implicated both U.S. military and intelligence agencies, ranging from junior enlisted members to senior command officials, as well as civilian contractors. As of the date of this letter, no fewer than a hundred See, e.g., Report of the International Committee of the Red Cross On The Treatment By The Coalition Forces Of Prisoners or War And Other Protected Persons By The Geneva Conventions In Iraq During Arrest, Internment And Interrogation, February 2004; Report of Major General Antonio Taguba, “Article 15-6: Investigation of the 800th Military Police Brigade"; Department of the Army The Inspector General, "Detainee Operations Inspection," July 21, 2004. (949) 950 competent, cannot examine the whole picture. The same is true for investigations of particular individuals, our criminal and military justice systems are designed to evaluate the facts and dispense justice in the individual case - not to evaluate broader problems. Finally, internal investigations by their nature also suffer from a critical lack of independence. Americans have never thought it wise or fair for one branch of government to police itself. But that has been exactly the case in many of the abuse inquiries to date, including the investigative “panel" that released its report in late August 2004. That panel was comprised of four members of the Secretary's own Defense Policy Board – members selected by the Secretary himself. The panel also lacked subpoena powers. For these reasons, we urge you to commit - immediately and publicly- to support the creation of an independent commission to investigate and report on the detention and interrogation practices of U.S. military and intelligence agencies deployed in the global “war on terror." To overcome the deficiencies of existing investigations, such a commission - modeled on successful efforts such as the just-concluded 9/11 Commission – would satisfy the following criteria: 1. It must be bipartisan and led by recognized experts of unimpeachable credibility in military and intelligence operations, human rights and international law. 2. It must be fundamentally independent of the Executive Branch, with commission members selected jointly by appropriate congressional and executive officials. 3. It must have access to classified information and a mandate to inquire into information from all relevant agencies and all levels of authority. 4. It must have the power to take testimony under oath, and to subpoena witnesses. 5. It must be empowered to offer whistleblower protection to all those with relevant knowledge, including those who may fear retribution for testifying truthfully: 6. It must review and build on the findings of investigations already underway. 7. It should, to the extent consistent with U.S. national security classification needs, be open to the public - a feature unique to democracy and essential to the commission's credibility in the United States and around the world. Whether this commission begins its work before or after the upcoming presidential election, there should be no question that as president, you will actively support the creation and work of such a commission. The integrity, effectiveness, and honor of the U.S. Armed Forces and related agencies were badly - we hope not irrevocably- damaged when the Abu Ghraib photos came to light. Subsequent allegations raise 951 criminal, military, and administrative inquiries have been launched into apparently improper or unlawful U.S. practices related to detention and interrogation? Given the range of individuals and locations involved in these reports, it is simply no longer possible to view these allegations as a few instances of an isolated problem. Understanding what has gone wrong and what can be done to avoid systemic failure in the future is essential not only to ensure that those who may be responsible are held accountable for any wrongdoing, but also to ensure that the effectiveness of the U.S. military and intelligence operations is not compromised by an atmosphere of permissiveness, ambiguity, or confusion. This is fundamentally a command responsibility. The well-developed system of national and international laws governing detention and interrogation was designed - and has long been followed by the United States - for critical policy reasons in the United States' self-interest. Experience and common sense have shown that information gathered through physical torture or dehumanizing humiliation is notoriously unreliable. It has a demoralizing, dehumanizing effect not only on those subject to violations, but also on our own troops - those who may be directly involved, and those unfairly tarred with the same brush. Violation of basic rules of international law by those acting under U.S. control also puts U.S. forces at greater risk. It jeopardizes the United States' moral and practical authority to promote democracy and human rights abroad. And it seriously undermines the United States' ability to "win the hearts and minds” of the global community - a goal essential to defeating terrorism over the long term. While we welcome the investigations now underway into instances of abuse in U.S. detention and interrogation practices, none of them is sufficiently comprehensive or independent to effectively identify and recommend how to address any underlying causes of such widespread abuse. For example, the excellent investigative report by Major General Antonio Taguba looked only at the role of U.S. military police at Abu Ghraib; a subsequent internal investigation looked into the role of military intelligence forces at that facility. But early accounts have suggested that a critical part of what went wrong at Abu Ghraib was the relationship - and failures in the command structure – between intelligence and police operations. Only a more overarching inquiry can fully understand that interaction, and recommend appropriate corrective measures. Similarly, while Major General Taguba's investigation was admirable in its thoroughness and clarity, informal investigations such as his, which are authorized by Army Regulation 15-6, are limited in scope and power. They do not require sworn statements or provide subpoena power. Such internal military investigations likewise generally lack the authority to examine the full chain of command, or the role of other U.S. government agencies in abuse. Investigations that are purely internal to the military, however 2 For a catalog of the investigations we understand have been initiated, please consult the list maintained at www.humanrightsfirst.org 952 similarly serious questions concerning U.S. detention policy. It is past time to begin a comprehensive inquiry into what has gone wrong in U.S. military and intelligence detentions since September 11 - an inquiry led by a body empowered to get at the truth. We urge you to commit to such an inquiry today. Sincerely, General David M. Brahms (Ret. USMC) General James Cullen (Ret. USA) General Robert Gard (Ret. USA) Admiral Lee F. Gunn (Ret. USN) General John L. Fugh (Ret. USA) General Joseph Hoar (Ret. USMC) Admiral John D. Hutson (Ret. USN) General Richard Omeara (Ret. USA) Biographical information on the signatories is attached. 953 Biographical Information on Signatories General David M. Brahms (Ret. USMC) Brigadier General David M. Brahms served in the Marine Corps from 1963-1988. He served as the Marine Corps' senior legal adviser from 1983 until his retirement in 1988. General Brahms currently practices law in Carlsbad, CA and sits on the board of directors of the Judge Advocates Association. General James Cullen (Ret. USA) James Cullen is a retired Brigadier General in the United States Army Reserve Judge Advocate General's Corps and last served as the Chief Judge (IMA) of the U.S. Army Court of Criminal Appeals. He currently practices law in New York City. General Robert Gard (Ret. USA) Robert Gard is a retired Lieutenant General who served in the United States Army; his military assignments included combat service in Korea and Vietnam. He is currently a consultant on international security and president emeritus of the Monterey Institute for International Studies. Admiral Lee F. Gunn (Ret. USN) Vice Admiral Gunn served as the Inspector General of the Department of the Navy until his retirement in August 2000. Admiral Gunn commanded the USS BARBEY and the Destroyer Squadron “Thirty-one," a component of the U.S. Navy's Anti-Submarine Warfare Destroyer Squadrons. Gunn is from Bakersfield, California and is a graduate of the University of California, Los Angeles. He received his commission from the Naval ROTC program at UCLA in June 1965. General John L. Fugh (Ret. USA) General Fugh was The Judge Advocate General of the U.S. Army, retiring from that post in July 1993 as a major general.General Fugh was 15 when he migrated to the United States with his family from China. He was the first Chinese-American to attain general officer status in the U.S. Army. General Fugh currently lives in the Washington, D.C. metropolitan area. General Joseph Hoar (Ret. USMC) General Hoar served as Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Central Command. After the first Gulf War, General Hoar led the effort to enforce the naval embargo in the Red Sea and 954 the Persian Gulf, enforce the no-fly zone in the south of Iraq. He oversaw the humanitarian and peacekeeping operations in Kenya and Somalia and also led the U.S. Marine Corps support for operations in Rwanda, and the evacuation of U.S. civilians from Yemen during the 1994 civil war. He was the Deputy for Operations for the Marine Crops during the Gulf War and served as General Norman Schwartzkopf's Chief of Staff at Central Command. General Hoar presently runs a consulting business in California. Admiral John D. Hutson (Ret. USN) Rear Admiral John D. Hutson served as the Navy's Judge Advocate General from 1997 to 2000. Admiral Hutson now serves as President and Dean of the Franklin Pierce Law Center in Concord, New Hampshire. INVESTIGATION OF MILITARY INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES AT ABU GHRAIB PRISON FACILITY HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, Washington, DC, Thursday, September 9, 2004. The committee met, pursuant to call, at 2:05 p.m., in room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Duncan Hunter (chairman of the committee) presiding. OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. DUNCAN HUNTER, A REP- RESENTATIVE FROM CALIFORNIA, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES The CHAIRMAN. The hearing will come to order. This morning we heard from Secretaries Schlesinger and Brown on the results of their independent review of Department of Defense (DOD) detainee operations. This afternoon we are fortunate to have as our wit- nesses three general officers with decades of military service who have lent their experience to yet another exhaustive examination of what went wrong with military detainee operations in Iraq. They are General Paul J. Kern, a Procedure 15 Appointing Au- thority, Lieutenant General Anthony R. Jones, Additional Proce- dure 15 Investigating Officer, and Major General George R. Fay, Investigating Officer. Gentlemen, thanks for your work on this issue. We have received your report, all 9,000 pages. We are going to review it over the coming weeks as we continue to monitor how the Department pro- ceeds to correct and identify problems. On January 19th, 2004, within days of viewing evidence of the abuse of detainees at Abu Ghraib prison, Lieutenant General Ri- cardo Sanchez ordered a formal administrative investigation of op- erations at the prison. Most of us are now familiar with the resulting report by Major General Antonio Taguba. When General Sanchez reviewed these findings, he also requested another inquiry into military intel- ligence (MI) activities at the prison. Major General Fay was ap- pointed on March 31st, but General Kern replaced General Sanchez as the Appointing Officer on June 16th, and appointed Lieutenant General Jones as the investigating officer in order to continue the investigation up the chain of command. I believe this step is further proof that the military is committed to getting to the truth of these issues and letting the chips fall where they may. As we move forward, there are important facts to remember. The military started the investigations. And I am to—in the wake of Mr. Reyes pointing out that General Sanchez started and announced to the world that the Army was investigat- U19 (955) 958 tain detainees to the International Committee of the Red Cross is a direct violation of the Geneva Conventions. This report found at least eight such ghosts, and Secretary Rumsfeld has admitted ordering one held at the request of Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Director Tenet. This practice raises seri- ous questions at the tactical level about the way that the military and CIA personnel interacted in the detention operations. It raises larger policy questions as well about our national will- ingness to adhere to international law. So, gentlemen, we thank you for being with us. We look forward to your testimony. [The prepared statement of Mr. Skelton can be found in the Ap- pendix on page 1010.) The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman. And why don't we go ahead and play this film, because I think it directly relates to the announcement that was made by the military, somewhat unprece- dented in terms of announcing this investigation. Video played.) The CHAIRMAN. The reason I wanted to play that was to show that was January 16th, long before the press put out any pictures of Abu Ghraib, and that was the announcement by General Sanchez that the Army was investigating itself with respect to abuses at Abu Ghraib prison. I think that goes directly to Mr. Reyes' comments about the solid performance of General Sanchez in the theater as the head of the theaters, and the fact that he acted not only responsibly, but very quickly in terms of starting to move the investigative process. So gentlemen, with that as a backdrop, again thank you for being with us. I know this is maybe a long day for you because you have already had a full panel of testimony to the other body. Thanks for being with us. And, General Kern, the floor is yours, sir. STATEMENT OF GEN. PAUL J. KERN, COMMANDING GENERAL, U.S. ARMY MATERIEL COMMAND, PROCEDURE 15 APPOINT- ING AUTHORITY; LT. GEN. ANTHONY R. JONES, ADDITIONAL PROCEDURE 15 INVESTIGATING OFFICER; AND MAJ. GEN. GEORGE R. FAY, INVESTIGATING OFFICER General KERN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. If I could request that my report be submitted for the record. The CHAIRMAN. Absolutely. Without objection, all written state- ments will be taken into the record. General KERN. I would like to summarize using some charts. First, I would like to start by saying thank you for recognizing the good work that is going on as well by our soldiers, sailors, airmen, Department of Defense civilians, and contractors in this theater. We are going to talk to you today about the shortcomings of a few of those soldiers, but I would ask that when the day is done that we all remember that even with the units that we are talking about, there are outstanding people who are doing tough duty every single day. If I could briefly introduce my two panel members with me, Lieu- tenant General Tony Jones is the Deputy Commanding General of the Training and Doctrine Command. He was the Senior Inves- tigating Officer, which I asked to be appointed after I was made the Appointing Authority. 959 Major General George Fay is the Assistant Intelligence Officer on the Army staff, the Assistant G2, and he was appointed as the In- vestigating Officer by Lieutenant General Sanchez in April of this year. General Fay is a Reservist, and an intelligence officer, and I would comment that he has done a very, very thorough job, which we will lay out for you, going through this investigation, which was aided by two factors. One, he used a number of the military intel- ligence tools, which allowed us to cross-reference many reports and databases together so that we could uncover discrepancies that may occur. And, second, in his civilian job in the insurance busi- ness, he also does a number of investigations. So his talents there are amplified as he worked on this report for us. The three of us represent probably at least a hundred years of service, and though we come from different backgrounds and dif- ferent commissioning sources, we have all been trained, schooled and believe in values. What we are going to report to you today is a number of soldiers and civilians who failed in their ability to ad- here to the standards of the values that we expect of them. That has bee been a challenge for all of us to work our way through. But, as noted, our issue here is to fix the problems, identify the sources of the problems, and to make sure that we have put into place those policies and changes which are necessary to ensure that that is what happens in the future. And we will be able to talk to you that while we report the bad news, we have also been back into theater, to Abu Għraib within the last few weeks, and can report to you a significant change; that the issues which we report have been fixed, and that in fact we have some model activities that are taking place today as opposed to what you are going to hear about in this report. If I could start with a few charts, I would like to put in context where our report fits. We are down, as you are looking at the charts, and I hope that you all have a paper copy of this on your desk, which should have been distributed. At the lower right-hand corner of the chart is the Fay-Jones- Kern report focused on the investigation of the 205th Military In- telligence Brigade. The other investigation, formal investigation, was conducted by Major General Tony Taguba. [The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on page 1029 and page 1030.] The CHAIRMAN. General, if we don't have copies of those, could our staff get them out if in fact you folks provided some for us? General KERN. Yes, we can. If there is anyone that needs it, please, we will make sure we will get it to you right away. The CHAIRMAN. Go ahead. We will—if you got some handy, I think we have got someone going to get some. We will pass them out. General KERN. The report that we have done is a formal inves- tigation, which was conducted in accordance with the Procedure 15, which is required for intelligence activities under the Army Regula- tion 15–6. [The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on page 1038.] General KERN. In simple terms, that means the report that we have done on an intelligence activity is done with sufficient sub- 960 stantiation from a legal standpoint so that when we hand in our report, our recommendations are legally supportable by the affida- vits, the depositions, and the information which we have provided in our report. And that is what we have done with this in terms of disposition to the commanders, the Department of Justice and to the other investigatory agencies with our findings. We also relied on the other reports that are shown there, as as- sessments. The Ryder report was done by Major General Ryder, who is the head of our he is our Army Provost Marshal, and he is in charge of all of the military police organizations. The Department of the Army Inspector General (IG) report cov- ered all of the training doctrine and policy pieces, and the Miller report was done by Major General Jeff Miller to apply the lessons learned from Guantanamo to improving the operations and the fa- cilities at Abu Ghraib and within CJTF, Combined Joint Task Force 7. On top of that you have heard the Schlesinger panel report to you earlier today, and that is a capstone, comprehensive look across all of these different detention operations. There is one additional report which is shown in the block at the top in yellow, which is being conducted by Vice Admiral Church. Admiral Church is the Inspector General of the Navy, but he has been tasked by the Secretary of Defense to do a report on the gaps, to fill in those things that all of these other assessments and re- ports may have missed. In each case, we have shared our complete findings with the Schlesinger panel and with Admiral Church, and we have used the other reports and not duplicated all of their findings, but you will find in that 9,000-page report that we have prepared that they are annexes that are referred to as we use them in our findings and recommendations. Go to the next chart, please. The methodology we used we are confident was very thorough and exhaustive. There were more than 9,000 documents which were databased and searched. There are 170 interviews that were conducted primarily by Maj Major General Fay and his team of more than 28 experts. Those experts included investigators, subject matter experts in the intelligence operations and legal review. Eight investigative visits were made to Iraq itself, to include one final one by the three of us a few weeks ago where we conveyed the findings of our report to General Abizaid and General Casey in theater, and on our way back from the theater to the Secretary of Defense. And so our report has been reviewed a number of times. I did a final review with an investigative team that looked at all of our findings and recommendations, again from a legal substan- o make sure that what we presented in our findings are in accordance with all of our regulations and policies. What I am going to try to capture in the next few charts is the background of what we found, to lay out the framework of what was going on for Lieutenant General Sanchez and at Abu Ghraib. This is a map of Texas. That is a map of Iraq, about the size of Texas, just so you can calibrate it in terms of the geographic boundaries that we are dealing with. It is a large country. And the blue represents detention facilities in Iraq which were run by the 961 Iraqis. The red represents the four detention facilities that were run by Americans. I would note, however, that all of those deten- tion facilities in Iraq had an American presence. Lieutenant Gen- eral Sanchez, when he became the Commander of the Combined Joint Task Force, became essentially the governor of Iraq, and so he assumed responsibility for all of those facilities over a country about the size of Texas. The 800th MP Brigade, reported by General Taguba, and the 205th Military Intelligence Brigade, which we report, was respon- sible for the entire country. And we will focus on their events as they are reported within Abu Ghraib, which if you note is shown as both a blue and a red detention facility. It was used previously by the Saddam Hussein regime as a rath- er sordid detention facility. During the war it received a significant amount of damage, and at the end of our takedown of Baghdad it was severely looted. And so while it was a detention facility de- signed for approximately 12,000 people, it was not in good repair at the time of our occupation of Baghdad in June of 2003. It also denotes a problem, because our own regulations require us to separate civil detainees from military detainees, and the Iraqis had already detained civilian violators of their law in this fa- cility. They were separated from the detainees we were bringing in from military operations, but in fact they were both located in the same detention facility. This is an overhead photograph of Abu Ghraib, and I think it points out a couple of key points. First, it is a large facility de- signed to hold about 12,000 detainees. However, since much of it was destroyed and looted, the detainees were held in the lower left- hand corner in a tent operation, at the time that General Sanchez took command of the Combined Joint Task Force. There were on the order of 3 to 600 detainees in the early phases of the operation, which I will show you grew to a much larger extent. The facilities that have become infamous are Tiers 1 Alpha and 1 Bravo, also known as the hard sites. It is in these facilities, which were concrete buildings, which the abuses took place. And it is, I think, of value to note that while the detainees were held in the tents, which during the hot summer period most of the flaps were open so people could see what was going on, there were not abuses taking place. When they moved inside of the closed de- tection facilities, that is where we saw the abuse begin to appear. It is also worth noting today that those facilities are much re- duced, and that those facilities are much improved, both physically and from the way that they are run, than when this picture was taken. 1A and 1B, the whole hard side operation, is now turned over to the Iraqi government, and there are fewer than 2,400 de- tainees in the whole U.S. piece of the operation. So it is a very dif- ferent picture today than what was being laid out in both this pic- ture and what we have reported. I would also like to paint the background on the detainees. This is a complex period in which Lieutenant General Sanchez took command of the Combined Joint Task Force 7. He had entered the theater in April as the Commander of the First Armored Division from Europe, a 2-star command of about 15,000 people. In June, he was given a promotion to Lieutenant General, in command of 962 the 5th U.S. Corps. The 5th Corps was the unit that conducted the major military operations into Iraq. And shortly thereafter, the 5th Corps was converted to the Combined Joint Task Force 7, CJTF- 7, of about 180,000 people, a coalition operation with multiple bri- gades and multiple responsibilities across the whole country. General Sanchez's mission was to conduct stability and support operations, to support Ambassador Bremer in the Coalition Provi- sional Authority (CPA), and to begin to return forces to the United States. That is not what he found was actually occurring. As he took command of CJTF-7, the number of insurgent attacks began to take place. As a division commander, he was provided an order of battle, for whom he was attacking against the Iraqi Army, the Republican Guard. We knew their organization. We knew their personalities. We knew their equipment. In his new organization, he was being attacked by a faceless enemy. He did not know their organization. He did not know who ere, and he did not know what their objectives were. It was not a stable situation, and so he had to develop the intelligence pic- ture. And so he went about developing very robust intelligence gather- ing activities. Some of that resulted in an increase in the number of detainees. And while the expectation was that when he was given the mission that the number of detainees would decrease, in fact they increased. And we show in the light bars the total number of the detainee population across the country, in the dark bars the population at Abu Ghraib. The decrease across the country, in part, was because we were consolidating detection facilities, and some of those other personnel were moved to Abu Ghraib. They were also there as a result of increased insurgent activity and military operations with- in the theater, and a specific mission which was launched in the late summer, early fall to round up as many of the intelligence per- mission-intelligence data that we had that would allow them to gather detainees whom we thought could paint a picture of the order of battle of the insurgency. So we have a picture then of increasing number of detainees throughout the entire period. If we look specifically at Abu Ghraib, there is another factor. I will take that same chart and break it down into the ones at Abu Ghraib specifically. You can see again in the dark bars that the numbers grew from about 600 to more than 6,000 during the period of our investigation. The majority of ses took place in the October-November time frame where there was a significant jump in the number of detainees. We broke it out even more in this chart between military intel- ligence holds, those detainees in which we thought there was intel- ligence value and further interrogation would be required, and the total number of detainees. The fact is, though, that we did not have all of the information that was required to classify them as either of military intelligence value or in some other classification. And so there was a significant number of personnel who were detained at Abu Ghraib who had to be interrogated. The very smallest bar at the bottom shows the number of inter- rogators, which were valuable, which started at about 14, and dur- 963 ing this entire period never grew much beyond 60 during the pe- riod of most of the abuses. Another factor that was going on was the development of the Joint Manning Document, the JMD, which was not approved until 2003. And so, the organization of the Combined Joint Task Force headquarters, which General Sanchez commanded, only started at about 40 percent of its total manning once it was ap- proved in December. And so you can see there is a disproportionate number of people to detainees, to the number of interrogations and the number of interrogators that has to take place during this pe- riod. And this paints a background of what was happening in the theater to the command, and to the operations in which these de- tainees were held at Abu Ghraib. Now, I would like to turn to what we found. Earlier reports may have suggested that there was only a number of military policemen involved. We found that is not to be the case. And, in fact, there were a number of—significant number of military intelligence per- sonnel who were involved in abuse cases at Abu Ghraib. And I am going to try to clarify numbers, as opposed to confuse you with numbers, and that is the purpose of the next couple of charts. But there are 44 cases, separate incidents of abuse that we report. That does not correspond to individuals. And so what I am showing you on these charts are the number of individuals by category that we found who are involved in those specific abuse cases. We also define abuse very carefully as a violation of international law and the Geneva Conventions. It was very clear to us that de- spite any confusion that may have occurred about procedures which were to be used, that everyone in Iraq knew that the Geneva Convention was to be followed. And so, clearly, if our policy and doctrine and training and procedures and regulations had been fol- lowed, these abuses would not have occurred. But they did, and so we are reporting to you what we found. I would also tell you that the abuses run a very large gamut of very severe physical abuse to relatively minor, in terms of people being interrogated while they were naked, which is an abuse of hu- mility in violation of the Geneva Convention; but in some cases we found that the person conducting that interrogation thought they had approval to do that. We referred to that as an abuse. It was, in fact, a violation of the Geneva Convention. I would also report to you that the major- ity of those photographs which you have seen which depict sexual and violent abuse were not in the category of the abuses that we are reporting here. They are different. But I also will report to you that we do have evidence in one picture of abuse taking place, a picture of a dog who is being used in an interrogation. Again, a vio- lation. d in military intelligence personnel, 23 were involved in abuses; in addition, 4 contractors who were involved. Contractors were used—in three cases they were used as interrogators. They were used as analysts, and they were used as linguists. In the cases here we found that four of them were involved, and been reported to the Department of Justice since they do not fall under our Uniform Code of Military Justice for further action. 964 In addition, we found another category of failures, and that is the failure to report. We found six military intelligence personnel and two contractors who saw abuses, knew they were wrong, and did nothing about it. And this is one of the great concerns to us throughout this entire process of the failure of leadership and dis- cipline to take place. If I could turn to the next category, with nonmilitary intelligence personnel. You have previously seen seven people, military police- men, who have been charged. We found three additional military policemen who were involved in abuses not previously charged, and one in the category of failure to report. In addition, we found two medical personnel who saw abuses and failed to report. In our view, this is as if a policemar had come across a crime scene and failed to take action and al- lowed that crime to continue. Next, I summarize here our findings. First, there is no single cause that resulted in the abuses at Abu Ghraib. There are mul- tiple reasons why these occurred. However, the primary cause was individual misconduct, a lack of discipline, and a lack of leadership. These are all extremely disappointing for an organization that val- ues its soldiers and the soldiers' values. And we found that where we expect discipline to occur when there is no supervision around and people do the right thing, that failed to happen. We also found that leaders were not supervising their subordinates as they should have, and so there was a failure of the leadership to take action. The good news is that there was one young specialist who came forward and reported. The bad news is that the rest of the people walked by and failed in their leader- ship and discipline. On the other side of the coin, though, there is a vast majority of the soldiers who are doing the right thing, and let me give you a specific example, the 372nd MP Company, which has been charac- terized as the military police organization for which those first seven are being charged right now. That same organization stayed in theater for more than a year. That same organization conducted security operations from Kuwait to Baghdad on an almost daily basis, in which they were under attack the whole time. People tend to forget that as part of those military security police operations. So we ought to remember that while we are focusing on those per- sonnel who failed us, there were thousands of soldiers doing the right thing at the same time. And, finally, we report to you in the category of what we refer to as ghost detainees. The ghost detainee by our definition is a per- son who has been detained in a U.S. facility and has not been re- corded. There is an exception in—the eight categories that we re- ported earlier are the exception to Article 143 of the Genev ventions, which allows one, for military necessity or military oper- ations, to not immediately report someone so that security for fu- ture operations can be conducted without divulging intelligence matters. However, it went beyond that, and while I cannot document to you the precise number, we clearly found that there were detainees who were brought to Abu Ghraib, not recorded, and therefore the reason that we cannot provide you the precise numbers. But we 965 suspect there were at least dozens who were brought by the intel- ligence agency, Central Intelligence Agency, to Abu Ghraib, de- tained, not recorded. This is in violation of our procedures, which requires us to record everyone. That is in violation of the Geneva Conventions. We have asked the Department of Defense Inspector General and the CIA Inspector General to continue on this investigation and to pursue that information to find out precisely what happened. There is also the one case which you have heard reported of the detainee who was brought in, not properly recorded, who was in very poor physical condition, had already been beaten and died. He is one of those which we would also refer to as a ghost de- tainee, because he was not properly recorded when he was brought into that facility, and that is what we have asked for further inves- tigation beyond what we have done in our report. That is a summary of what we found. It is a disappointing pic- ture of the failure on the parts of a number of individuals, but I can also report to you that the three of us, when we visited Abu Ghraib a few weeks ago and went over our report with Major Gen- eral Jeff Miller, saw a very different operation today. There were more than 6,000 detainees. Now there are fewer than 2,400. There is a very good operation that is going on that reviews detainees on a regular basis, and, if they are determined to be of no further value, they are released, and they are released in a very humane way. The towns that they come from are notified, their families are notified, the local community leaders are notified, and they are brought back with dignity to their communities. And so we have taken steps beyond what clearly was going on many months ago when this report was prepared. The medical facilities at Abu Ghraib are excellent, and in fact most of the detainees today are receiving medical treatment far be- yond anything that they have had in their entire life. I would also report to you that the food is good. The quality of life is continuing to improve, and we have learned today, also, that the American- the use of that facility will come to an end sometime later this year and that we will move our detection facilities elsewhere. So we are putting an end to what has been a very bad chapter in the story of our operations in Iraq. Our soldiers today, and I would add to that any other service member, a contractor, a civil- ian who is brought in, is certified against proper procedures. Our schools have been changed so that they are teaching the proper procedures. But we don't count on that. So that we certify each in- dividual who shows up in these detention facilities to ensure that they know the right policies, procedures, the right rules and the right laws. Mr. Chairman, that summarizes our findings, and we are pre- pared for your questions. [The prepared statement of General Kern can be found in the Appendix on page 1014.] The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, General Kern, and thank you, gentle- men, for the presentation you have made today. I want to ask you the same question that I asked the first panel, because I think it is important since the world knows the abuse mess by the pictures that they saw on television. I want to ask you about three specific 966 pictures, which were the three headliners for a number of months, and ask you if those were pictures that depicted interrogation tech- niques and if they were in any way related to official action. The first picture was the one in which a person was standing on a box, apparently connected to wires, with the clear implication that that person was being shocked. What was that picture? General Fay. That was not an interrogation procedure. That was done by the MPs that were involved. That was not even an MI hold. The CHAIRMAN. What were they doing it for? General Fay. We did not—we were not able to interview the seven MPs that are currently being prosecuted, so we were not able to ask them those types of questions directly. We can only surmise why they were doing it. The CHAIRMAN. Are you comfortable with the conclusion that that was in no way—as was implied on the media and stated on the media-a psychological interrogation technique? General Fay. Yes, sir. As I stated, that wasn't even a military intelligence hold in that particular picture. The CHAIRMAN. How about the picture with the naked bodies stacked on top of each other? Was that an interrogation? General Fay. No, sir. That was not an interrogation. If you are talking about the pyramid? The CHAIRMAN. Yes. General Fay. No, sir. That was not an interrogation procedure. That again were the abusive MPs that were performing those acts. The CHAIRMAN. How about the third picture that was so promi- nently displayed, and that was the one with a female MP holding a detainee on a leash? Was that pursuant to an interrogation tech- nique? General Fay. No, sir, that was not anything to do with a military intelligence issue or an interrogation techniqu The CHAIRMAN. Was there any direction to those people, to the MPs involved in those pictures, to do those acts, to, quote, soften up the prisoners for interrogation? General Fay. Well, we need to be very clear, sir. There were in- stances of softening up. There were conversations that we discov- ered during our investigation that suggested that military intel- ligence personnel were discussing softening up-type procedures with the MPs. Specifically, one of the pictures already mentioned by General Kern-he was referring to the picture where there is a dog that is about six inches—unmuzzled, about six inches away from the face of a detainee who is kneeling on the floor. We believe that was an instance of MI encouraging and condoning and suggesting softening up of that particular detainee, MI suggesting that to the MPs. That was a high value target. That was a detainee that was being worked pretty aggressively by MI, and we have pieced information together that leads us to believe that that was a softening up. The CHAIRMAN. How about the other three pictures, the one where the—was there any indication that this—that the holding of the prisoner on a leash was done at the direction, as a softening up technique by MI? General Fay. No, sir. 968 · General Fay. It was humiliation and use of dogs primarily. And isolation was a third category of abuse that people were diers performing there at Abu Ghraib, that they thought they had authority to do isolation, but they didn't. And actually, in some in- stances they had authority to do isolation, it wasn't the isolation that was the violation, it was the method that they were using of the isolation, putting them naked in a cell, unlighted cell with no heat or no light, no ventilation, and for long periods of time. That was the abusive violation. The CHAIRMAN. Of those 23, and of the other 10, with respect to the MPs, and the 23 with respect to the MIs, how many of those resulted in fatalities? General Fay. There was really only one fatality that we cover out of the 44 incidents. That is the one that is related to the ghost de- tainees. The CHAIRMAN. Is that the one whose body was moved out of the prison? General Fay. The so-called ice man. Yes, sir. The CHAIRMAN. But of the other incidents, did any of them result in, if not fatalities, permanent injuries? General Fay. I really couldn't answer the question on permanent injuries, because there was really no medical records that we could find. That was a major issue of our finding, the lack of medical records. So I couldn't answer the question on permanency. But as far as fatality, there were no other fatalities other than the one ghost detainee. The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Missouri, Mr. Skelton. Mr. SKELTON. You have told us about, General Kern, the military intelligence people involved. You told us about the MPs that were involved. Tell us about the contractors and any CIA people in- volved, if any. General KERN. As I said, the contractors fell into three cat- egories. They were hired as interrogators they were hired as ana- lysts, and they were hired as linguists. These are all shortages in the military specialties that we had, so they were brought in to ac- count for that. We found a number of problems with that. Specifically, there was no well written contract that specified that they were to abide by the same rules that our soldiers were, to apply the Geneva Conventions in this case. The second problem we found with this is that the contractors had no supervision of their direct contract, as we would expect that would occur with a contractor officer's tech rep or some type of a defense contract management agency oversight. So their chain of authority and reporting was not well supervised. The third set of challenges that we found with the contractors who were the interrogators, that many of these were senior person- nel in their early 40's, perhaps retired from the military with good military background, and they were mixed with these junior mili- tary personnel, 18 to 25-year olds who had relatively less experi- ence. But they were expected to report to the junior personnel under the contract requirements. Quite often, that created some strains within the actual operation that was going on. We also found that there were contractors who were not well qualified, and those were the cases where we found abuses took 969 place, where they espoused that they knew the right thing to do. They did not. So in the case of the contractors, we found a number of problems that we have reported; and, George, if you want to add some specif- ics on it. General Fay. Sir, I believe you covered it. Mr. SKELTON. What about the CIA personnel, if any? General KERN. The CIA personnel, I would like to be able to give you lots of background data on it, but we don't have it. There are two particular aspects. General Fay, when he began the investigation, asked for the CIA documentation, and it was never given to him. It still has not been given to him. The second point was that when I became involved in the inves- tigation I did get the CIA inspector general and their general coun- sel to come see me, and they have agreed to do the investigation. But, to date, they have not provided us the documentation. What we have found, though, are records of people signing in and out of the prison whom we can reasonably identify as CIA personnel. But I can't tell you specifically, because we don't know if they were the right names or cover names. Mr. SKELTON. Or what they did. General KERN. Or specifically what they did. Because, most cases, they were given a detention—they brought a detainee in and interrogated them without the presence of U.S. military Now, I will tell you that the Central Intelligence Agency has told us and shown us that they expect their personnel to operate on the same policies, procedures and laws that we do. But we don't be- lieve, particularly in the case that we reported to you of the de- tainee who died, that that was the case. We also know of a number of cases where they were brought in and not recorded, and so that is in violation of our policy and the Geneva Convention, and this was conducted by the Agency Mr. SKELTON. Do you know of any instance when the CIA person or persons worked with uniformed American military in interroga- tion? General FAY. I don't know of any specific instance. There are a couple of notations on a couple of the MP logs that suggest that what they called “OGA” personnel and MI personnel talked to the bout techniques being used. So that indicates that that is probably what happened. But nobody admitted to doing any joint interrogations with the CIA personnel at Abu Ghraib. Our under- standing is that the CIA were doing their own interrogations for the most part at Abu Ghraib. Mr. SKELTON. So, as far as you are concerned and the informa- tion you are giving this committee, you really tell us nothing about the ČIA activities; is that correct? General Fay. Well, the CIA-we requested Mr. SKELTON. As far as you can tell us today and as far as we can understand today, you are telling us nothing. General KERN. Congressman Skelton, we can tell you that they were there. We can tell you that they brought detainees to our fa- cilities and that they interrogated them there. We can tell you that they brought a detainee to our facility who died there. We can tell you that they had operations where we know that the—they con- 970 ducted interrogations inside of our facilities. We cannot document that for you and we cannot provide you anymore specific informa- tion than that. Mr. SKELTON. Can you tell us anything about these so-called ghost detainees? General KERN. We can tell you in a couple of cases that they were actually labeled on the door of their detention operation, OGĂ 1, 2, 3. Now can I tell you more than that? No. We can tell you that there were detainees who were brought to that facility who were never registered, but I can't tell you much more than that be- cause there are no records of it that would allow us to report on the numbers or who they were. Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Will the gentleman yield a moment? Mr. SKELTON. You bet. Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Over here. How is that possible? If you are in charge of the prison, how is that possible unless the commanders received orders out of the Pentagon allowing it to happen? This is a prison. How is it possible that you ceded the authority in that prison? General KERN. What we reported to you, Congressman Aber- crombie, is a failure of leadership and a failure of discipline, and so it happened because neither of those two things were present. Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Excuse me. That is not my question. Was there or was there not an order allowing that to take place? General KERN. There was no order that we found that allowed that to take place. What there was—and I state this from a per- spective of—or it is in your report. There was discussions that took place between the Combined Joint Task Force staff and the 205th Military Intelligence Brigade Commander, Colonel Pappas, to co- operate with the intelligence agencies, and I believe the way—the information that we have, is that "cooperate” is not the same as violate procedures, laws and regulations. Mr. ABERCROMBIE. I appreciate that. I will wait for my question time, Mr. Chairman. Thank you very much. Mr. SKELTON. My last question—what about the one particular detainee authorized at the request of George Tenet? General KERN. Sir, that did not occur at Abu Ghraib. Mr. SKELTON. Where did that occur? Afghanistan? General KERN. No, it occurred in Iraq at Cropper. Mr. SKELTON. Thank you. Mr. McHUGH (presiding). I thank the ranking member. I would just remind the other members, as the chairman of the full commit- pgested this morning, we will be operating under the five- minute clock, which means not just for the members of the commit- tee to pose their question, but also for the panelists to respond. So please give the panelists the opportunity to have some time re- maining after you complete your question to respond to that ques- tion. With that, I am going to take a pass, because I am seated here in the chair and yield to the gentlelady from Virginia, Mrs. Davis. Mrs. DAVIS OF VIRGINIA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman; and thank you, Generals, for being here. 971 General Kern, you said, and I think you quoted, that they thought they had approval, and then you said everyone in Iraq knew the Geneva Convention should be followed. If these were lower-ranking fellows and ladies, who, as you are taught in the military to follow your commanders, to do the job, how would they know what they are supposed to do and how would they have thought they had approval if they didn't have approval? General KERN. In the military intelligence schools where we train interrogators, they are taught to abide by the Geneva Con- ventions. And I believe it is more than a hundred hours of training that goes into that for their—that specific part. And so, they have lots of exposure as to what it is that they are supposed to do and how to conduct interrogations. What we found was that they did not correlate what they were trained to do with what they saw being done, and this was complicated for a number of reasons from our perspective and our findings. First, a number of the military intelligence personnel had oper- ated in three different locations from this 519th MI battalion. They have interrogators who operated at Guantanamo, they have inter- rogators who operated in Afghanistan, and they now find them- selves as interrogators in Iraq in Abu Ghraib. We changed the rules on them from location to location. also then put a lot of pressure on them to produce intel- ligence. Now, there has been some criticism of that. But on the one side, I would tell you I would criticize General Sanchez if he had not put a lot of pressure on people to produce intelligence. That was his job. He had to find out who was attacking him and what they were planning to do. Mrs. DAVIS OF VIRGINIA. General, with all due respect, I am going to be held to the five minutes. So where—I understand that you—there could be some confusion, because you had MIs from three different locations. And whose responsibility was it to make sure that they knew what they could do and what they couldn't do? Where does that stop? General KERN. In our view, there was a Lieutenant Colonel who was appointed as the commander for the joint interrogation facility, JIDC, Joint Interrogation and Debriefing Center. He does not ac- knowledge that that was the mission he was given, but everyone below him, on his level, and above him report that that is the mis- sion that he was given. He has since refused to give us any further statements. So he is the person who should have been in charge ogations who failed to supervise what was going on. But it goes beyond that, as far as I am concerned, that any senior officer, junior officer, NCO, noncommissioned officer, should have also stepped in and set the rules right. Mrs. DAVIS OF VIRGINIA. For the 15 MIs that thought they had the authority, thought they had the authority because they all came from different places because they know we did have ap- proval at Guantanamo for those types of — General KERN. They came from different backgrounds. But some of them had actually submitted an interrogation plan through that chain of command and had it approved, and so they thought what they were doing was right. Mrs. DAVIS OF VIRGINIA. Well, when the contractors, 972 General JONES. Ma'am, if I could help you, the execution of the collection-intelligence collections, that mission was given to the 205th Military Intelligence Brigade. They had interrogators out down to the units all the way back and in the detention facilities. The problem was there was no chain of command for the intel- ligence personnel in Abu Ghraib. So when that came down and there was nobody training them, ensuring they met standards or. they were doing the proper thing—so they were kind of missing the leadership that was needed there. Mrs. DAVIS OF VIRGINIA. And that is what I was trying to get to. Because I love our men and women in the military, and I think they are doing a fantastic job. I went to Iraq in June, and I think they are just great. And it just bothers me that they are going to be hung out to dry when they were doing what they thought they were supposed to be doing. The MPs that you talked about, the seven that were previously identified, the three new ones that were identified and then the one failure to report, do you know if they were trained as MPs? Or if they were the cooks and so forth that were put in there because we had a shortage of MPs? General KERN. I think in all cases they carried a military police military occupation specialty (MOS). General Fay. Yes, that is my understanding. They did, sir. Those three did. The original seven weren't all MPs, but the three addi- tional that we identified were MPs. Mrs. DAVIS OF VIRGINIA. But the original seven were not trained to be MPs. General Fay. No, that is not accurate, ma'am. My recollection that of the original seven there were at least two that were not MPs. Mr. McHugh. The gentlelady's time has expired. Mrs. DAVIS OF VIRGINIA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. McHugh. For the edification of other panel members I have learned in 12 years here that the chairman is never wrong. So I misunderstood this morning when I thought I heard him say that when the yellow light comes on there is 2 minutes remaining. There is 1 minute remaining, in case anyone else misunderstood as I did. With that, I would be happy to yield to the gentleman from Texas, Mr. Ortiz. Mr. ORTIZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Mr. Chairman, can we have your original un- derstanding? Mr. McHugh. Perhaps when the Chairman returns. Mr. ORTIZ. General Kern, thank you so much for your service to our country, for your 37 years of dedicated service to the military. We applaud you. You just mentioned a few moments ago that some of them sub- mitted an interrogation plan and they thought that it had been ap- proved. Now, who did they think had approved this plan? General KERN. We tried to track that down. We believe there is a major—the rank of major in the organization who approved them. But that was—one of the things we found was that the docu- mentation is very poor, and so it is not always clear and, in some 974 General Fay. No, I agree with what General Kern just said. Mr. ORTIZ. I have re 1. I have read some articles in the news media that even some of the people who came to the penitentiary or to the jail look- ing for some of their relatives were even jailed. Do you know any- thing about that? They were not? General KERN. I have heard those stories, but I don't think we have documented any of those in ours. Mr. ORTIZ. What about the resources provided or maybe the in- terrogators? Earlier today, they told us they did not have transpor- 1. They did not even have translators. They lacked personnel. Can you elaborate? Did you find that as well? General KERN. I think the limiting factor in the translation side—there were 18—is the maximum number of linguists that we had that were working there, so that kind of capped the number of interrogations that you could have ongoing with up h up to well over 6,000 people there in the facilities. We have had lots of discussions on what is the right ratio of military police to run a detention oper- ation to the number of detainees, and we were far out of balance with military police and with military intelligence to conduct inter- rogations. The belief was, early on, from what we have found, that they thought they had enough military policemen if they had reallocated rom different detention facilities, which were being closed, and moved them. That never happened. So even if it were a possi- bility, that was not the case. The second problem we found was that units were returning home and they didn't have replacements coming in for them on a timely basis, and so that further exacerbated the problem. Finally, I think what we saw was that General Abizaid recog- nized very quickly that the number of people he needed in theater had to be increased and so he stopped the returns from going home and he brought in more personnel. Mr. McHUGH. I apologize, General. I have already allowed more than a minute of excess time, and I hate to interrupt you, but we are going to stick with it. So maybe at some other point someone could pursue that point further. Thank you very much. I yield to the gentleman from Virginia, Mr. Forbes. Mr. FORBES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And, General Fay, the recommendations made in the Fay Report include the recommendation that CJTF-7 and U.S. Central Com- mand (CENTCOM) publish guidance for detention interrogation for all units and agencies. But why should the uniform policies only be at the combatant command level? Why isn't there a uniform DOD manual that applies to all the services in all situations, given our emphasis on jointness anyway? And then, commanders could pick and choose between techniques, but every technique would at least be uniform at that time. General Fay. Sir, that is a good suggestion. We were focusing on the Abu Ghraib and the CENTCOM theater. But what you are rec- ommending is a broader program that would be applicable for all of the commands. I see no reason why we shouldn't adopt some- ng like that, and then the combatant commands could pick and choose what would be applicable in their territories.* .. 976 arate the true insurgents from the suspects, if any? Because I fear what that Egyptian officer told me was true, that we have created a lot of enemies with those photographs and what our people did contribute to that effort when we certainly didn't want that to hap- pen. Let's hear your thoughts on that. General KERN. Congressman, I think your assessment that it was damaging is accurate, more than just from that one person that you talked to. We do spend a significant amount of time trying to teach the culture of the different countries, which we operate to our soldiers and through our mobilization stations and through our different entry points. We spend a fair amount of time talking to them just specifically about the culture of Islam. Mr. TAYLOR. How about the guards in particular? General KERN. They all went through that same type of training. Now, the issue is how well did it take? Did they have a set of leaders who followed up on it? Training isn't good if you just do it once and it is—and nobody else is there. And as we suggested in the military intelligence, there was a lack of a chain of command in the entire operation. There was very poor leadership. And so, some of the training that would have reinforced the initial training they got, we don't find evidence that it happened. Mr. TAYLOR. Going back to your question involving the conversa- tion from JTF-7 and I believe you said Colonel Pappas, who at JTF-7 gave that message to Colonel Pappas? There has to be an individual who actually said the words. General KERN. Colonel Boltz was the assistant C-2. He was originally the intelligence officer for Fifth Corps and then became the assistant on the intelligence staff of the Combined Joint Task Force, CJTF-7, and in his discussions with Colonel Pappas he told them to cooperate with the agency. Mr. TAYLOR. Those were the words. General KERN. Those were the words that we have. Mr. TAYLOR. If you—I know this is tough, but putting yourself back as a Colonel again General KERN. It is not too hard. Mr. TAYLOR. Okay–And with aspirations of becoming a four-star general, what exactly would that mean to you? Would that mean, do anything they say? Again, I am trying to— General KERN. I think I would have asked for clarification of it. Intelligence is a complex business, and “cooperate with other intel- ligence agencies” to me literally would mean ensure that we have built an architecture and it means that all of our intelligence ac- tivities can work together. It also would mean to me that if I were asked to hold a CIA detainee in a U.S. Army detention facility that I owned, that I would make sure that they abided by our rules, not by another set of rules. And if that didn't happen, then I would ask for a very clear, specific guidance as to why it didn't happen. General JONES. If I may. Mr. TAYLOR. Yes, sir. I would love to hear your follow-up. General JONES. If I may add something very quickly. What confuses the thing, the use of detention facilities and the chain of which should have approved that should not have been in 977 the intelligence area. They are doing intelligence and so forth. The C-3 and the provost marshal, in conjunction with the military po- lice who were in charge of those facilities, which should have been consulted, and originally General Fast told Colonel Pappas to con- sult with the MPs as she was approached on use of detainee facili- ties. And that is the channel. But it should have gone through the C-3 with an agreement of their use, and they would comply with the provisions that all people do in use of those facilities. And that is where it got convoluted there in the actual agreement and/or ab- sence of orders how they would use it. Mr. McHUGH. Thank you very much, General. The gentleman's time has expired. Gentleman from Minnesota. Mr. Kline. Mr. KLINE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, gentlemen, for being here today, for your great work on the report and for your leadership throughout your distin- guished careers. You have talked about some failure of recordkeeping, some lost papers, some perhaps inadequate training. But consistently the theme that I am hearing from you is there was a lack of leader- ship. So our question—or my question is- Mr. Chairman, could I get a hint from the light system here, just for fun? My question is, where did that breakdown occur and how did it occur? Let me just amplify for a second. Now that I see the green light is on, I am aware of a time limitation. You mention that there was no chain of command for the MI unit at Abu Ghraib. But, clearly, Colonel Pappas had a reporting senior, somewhere. Who was that? General KERN. That was Major General Wojiekowski. Mr. KLINE. Okay. So when you are saying there was not a chain of command, you are saying that it was an ineffective chain of com- mand or there was no leadership in that chain of command or help me understand. General KERN. Normally, in a chain of command that we expect to be supervising, an execution goes down through a noncommis- sioned officer and a fairly junior company grade officer, a lieuten- ant or a captain, platoon leaders, company commanders. In the military intelligence organizations it stops at the battalion com- mander. The battalion in this case, the 519th, was spread out over the whole country; and so there was no battalion commander tasked with that mission and there was no company commander tasked to follow up on it. There was no first sergeant, platoon ser- geant who was in that chain in the military intelligence. On the other side, on the military police, it is not true. There was a battalion commander there at Abu Ghraib prison who knew he was in charge of that prison. Mr. KLINE. Yes, sir. At least nominally he did. It has been shown that we have had a complete meltdown of leadership in the MP bri- gade at least. And, of course, meltdown implies that there was something there to melt. I would prefer to say perhaps there was an absence of leadership. And it sounds like what you are saying is that there was an absence of leadership or a failure of those who 978 were supposed to be there in the MI battalion, MI brigade; is that correct? General KERN. We believe it was both a failure in organization and a failure in the absence of leadership. Mr. KLINE. Whose responsibility was it to make sure that organi- zation was intact? General KERN. One, this is an ongoing problem. Because the military intelligence normally operates in a general support role, very direct support role and they get broken down into small teams, and so this is something that is going to have to get fixed organizationally at the top levels. But with respect to what happened here, we believe that Major General Wojiekowski—who had all the separate brigades reporting to him, down to Colonel Pappas, should have exerted more influ- ence on the integration of what happened down there. General JONES. Sir, if I could help you, I looked at leadership above the brigade, and I asked myself three things: Who had direct or indirect responsibilities for oversight of the mission execution? Did they provide clear and consistent guidance? And did they pro- vide the resources for the unit assigned the mission? And that is how I evaluated direct or indirect responsibility. Obviously, Colonel Pappas had the direct responsibility. He had the mission for intelligence collection, to include interrogations throughout the theater of operations. General Wojiekowski had two new brigade commanders with the separate brigades, the military police and—he had a total of 12. Those were two. And they were two new brigade commanders that came into theater the end of June, first part of July. It is there he should have given them more guidance and oversight because they were new to the theater. They had a mission, a large mission. And that did not happen. General Fay. Sir, if I may, they created a joint interrogation de- briefing center. There is no such thing in doctrine. It doesn't exist. There was no formed organization, so they put one together. And they did that by taking parts and pieces of six different battalions and melding them together in one place. So, therefore, each of those soldiers that went there lost the normal command and con- trol structure that they were used to. Addition to that, we actually flew in soldiers from literally all over the Army because we recognized that there was insufficiency in numbers. Then you had the contractors on top of that. So you had really a very disorganized situation when you are talking about the MI situation at Abu Ghraib. Mr. KLINE. Well, I see the light turning yellow here, and I just would underscore that we had a gigantic failure of leadership, one that had you even suggested such a thing could happen to me a year ago I would have said was impossible in the United States Army of today, to have a failure of leadership on such gigantic pro- portions as we saw in the MP brigade and now in the MI brigade. So there are some organizational things which can be addressed. They are training manuals that can be put together. But it seems to me we need to look at, as a big Army, as the Armed Forces, how did these leaders get there? How did they get there? I see my time is up. Mr. MCHUGH. The time of the gentleman has expired. 979 The gentleman from Texas, Mr. Reyes. Mr. REYES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And, gentlemen, you know, I had the privilege of hearing from you yesterday in the Intelligence Committee, and I shared with you a lot of the frustrations that I can see, that I can certainly sym- pathize with my colleagues. But let me tell you, I have deep respect and appreciation for the job that you have done, all of you, in this very difficult situation, and I want to thank you for doing that. s I sit here and listen to the questions from my col- leagues and your answers, I keep remembering that old adage that says, when you are up to your butt in alligators, it is hard to re- member that the original intent was to drain the swamp. We had our soldiers and their sergeants and their officers in a disastrous situation in Abu Ghraib and in Iraq. You know, I still point to who- ever put this abomination of a plan together for exercising this at- tack on Saddam Hussein and the catastrophic failure to plan for post conflict. That is where the fault is. That is where the respon- sibility is. And yes, we had failures on every different level, but you know what? You don't put a guy from the Peewee League up against the National Football League (NFL) in a Super Bowl environment. And you know what else what we did here. You know, I have had a number of conversations with general- grade officers expressing frustration that one of the first mantras of leadership for a general is to take care of his troops, and one way to take care of the troops is not to put them in situations that guarantee failure. Putting them in the situation that we put them in in Abu Ghraib was guaranteeing failure, catastrophic failure; and the responsibility is I think in the—my opinion in the civilian leadership. The reason I mention that is because we had soldiers, men and women, that were not in their MOS. They had been held over in country. They were given the responsibility to try to somehow man- age a prison that had civilian and military prisoners, men, women, children. They didn't have enough food. We have seen testimony and heard testimony to that effect. The billeting was atrocious. The fact that they couldn't get good medical attention. They, them- selves, our troops, were living in squalor. It is not unlike in today's world here in this country where we try to tell our students that education is our number one priority and we give them crappy schools to go to and we tell teachers how proud we are that they are professionals and we pay them a little bit better than maintenance workers. So it comes down, in my opinion, to accountability and somebody stepping forward and accepting responsibility. I mentioned to you, General Kern, yesterday, that I thought it was incredulous to remove General Sanchez from the list for pro- motion, four-stars, because of this failure. He was given a raw deal, a bum deal. This morning's panel said that, you know, he was just not lucky or he was unlucky in the hand that was drawn to him. And I submit that he also is a victim in this thing. I don't know how you put a good spin on this. And I applaud you for saying, look, we just went there. Things are a thousand percent better. The people are focused. We are doing a better job, and we 981 blow to our national image and undoubtedly is used as a recruiting tool. But if you take Abu Ghraib, not just Tier 1 and what terrible things happened there, but Abu Ghraib in general, would you de- scribe the Tier 1 as the exception rather than the rule? Or would you describe the Abu Ghraib facility in total as a catastrophic fail- ure? General KERN. Well, I think as we have described it, it was an underresourced facility that was questionable that we should have used it because of the fact that it already contained Iraqi civilian detainees. So our recommendation would have been to have chosen another facility. But that was not the decision that was made at the time, and we weren't there at the time, and so they did the very best they could with the resources they had on hand. I would—we also described to you while they were living in the tents, which was not a great quality of life in fact, it was a ter- rible quality of life—that most of these abuses did not take place. We have examples of a military police company that did an ex- traordinarily good job during those very difficult times along with their military intelligence counterparts. We also have the same company and supervisors during one shift did a very good job and in another shift did a very poor job. So, along with all of the bad, we have many, many cases of where the supervisor, the soldiers were all doing the right thing under very trying conditions. Mr. McHUGH. Well, thank you. And I am going to be tough on myself more so than others. So I am on yellow. I am going to yield back the balance of my time, yield to the gentleman from Arkansas, Dr. Snyder. Dr. SNYDER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General Fay, if I might ask you a detailed question. When Chair- man Hunter was asking you about photographs from Secretary Schlesinger's statement this morning, he said the issues and public reaction have been exacerbated by photographs taken on the night shift at Abu Ghraib. These photos constitute, to say the least, an idiosyncratic and obviously unauthorized activity by the night shift on Tier 1. The photographs are quite misleading. In contrast to the infer- ences that some initially drew, these photographs had nothing to do with interrogation policy. None-in capital letters—of the de- tainees abused in the photographs were targets of intelligence or of interrogation to gain intelligence. Do you agree with that? General Fay. No. The statement that is made there relative to none of the detainees were subjected to abuses or part of the photos, that is inaccurate. Some of them were. We found that 12 of the detainees that were actually being abused in those pictures were in MI holds. Dr. SNYDER. So 12– General Fay. Yeah. I am sorry. Let me restate that.. Of the 44 abuses that we found, 13 of those 44 were involving interrogations. The 12 that I just mentioned were 12 detainees that were MI holds that were part of that interrogation. In the pictures, some of those pictures do represent MI holds. I can't remember off- hand what the exact number is, but it is some part of the whole. Dr. SNYDER. One of the problems of having multiple investiga- tions is—well, maybe this is what we call competitive analysis. But 982 when we get conflicting information on something as factual as this, it creates a little uncertainty. General Fay. I can tell you ours is factual. We know specifically by detainee number, by picture. We matched it. We worked closely with the Criminal Investigation Department (CID). I am very con- fident that whatever it says on our report regarding the specifics is accurate. Dr. SNYDER. General Kern, I wanted to ask you, following up on what Mr. Reyes was talking about, in your report-I have the un- classified version-you-again referring to General Sanchez and General Wojiekowski-say, I find that they failed to ensure proper staff oversight of detention interrogation operations. As previously stated, Major General Wojiekowski had direct oversight of two new brigade commanders. Further staff elements of the CJTF-7 reacted inadequately to some of the indications and warnings discussed above. However, in light of the operational environment and CJTF-7s underresourcing and unplanned missions and the commanders con- sistent need to prioritize efforts, I find that the CJTF-7 com- mander and staff performed above expectations in the overall scheme of OIF. And I don't know whether it is true or not that Lieutenant General Sanchez has been removed from the four-star list, but, in your personal opinion, is it fair for him to have been removed from the four-star list if that is, in fact, accurate? General KERN. In my personal opinion, General Sanchez has per- formed heroically under very trying conditions. We cite him in our report for failures of staff supervision, as you just read to us. But when you put that in the context of the entire operation of which he was being asked to support and you look at the conditions which we have today, where General Abizaid has recognized that you really needed two separate complete staffs. And so today we have General Casey, who is supporting Ambassador Negroponte and the whole operation; we have General Metz, who is the commander of the third corps who is conducting military operations, where Gen- eral Sanchez was doing both of those functions in a very transitory and very difficult period of time. General JONES. Sir, I would like to address the one—first part of that. Because it came up this morning here, and I just realized why that was said in the report under failed to provide proper staff oversight. What we had is a situation because he split the staff. We had different elements of the staff in charge of different things. Dr. SNYDER. If I might interrupt, yeah, I appreciate that, because I have looked at the report. But I have got my yellow light now. I am more concerned—I don't know, General Kern, if you specifi- cally addressed the issue about the four-star list. Was it fair, if that is in fact the case that he has been removed from four-star consid- eration in view of—you have described it- General KERN. There really is not a four-star list. Each American is nominated as an individual through the President to the Senate and to the Armed Services Committee. And I think General Sanchez deserves a fair shot at being a four-star. They should evaluate him on his total performance. Dr. SNYDER. Thank you. 985 There is a third incident covered in our report which is on a med- ical doctor. It is not abusive incident, but it is a failure to respond. It is a below medical care issue where one of our interrogators found one of the detainees that had been shot, treated at the hos- pital, returned from the hospital, but was in his cell naked with a catheter still inserted. Our interrogator found that person in the cell, went over, physically reported to that doctor. That doctor re- fused to respond and said that needed to be dealt with from the medical personnel that had delivered him to that place at the first place. So we cite that as falling below the standard of care. General KERN. We have reported that to our surgeon general as something that needs to be fixed.. Dr. GINGREY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I see my time is ex- pired. Thank you. Mr. BARTLETT (presiding). Thank you. The gentlelady from California, Ms. Sanchez. Ms. SANCHEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman; and, once again, gen- tlemen, thank you for being before us today... I actually want to take this opportunity to just remind those who may be taking a look at this hearing that, in fact, most of our sol- diers and Marines and others who are out in Iraq and Afghanistan and other places are doing a great job for us. You know, as some- body who represents the southern California area and has many Marines from Camp Pendleton over in the Iraqi theater, as you know, the highest death total from any base has come from the Camp Pendleton area. So we are well aware that we have a lot of young men and women and others out there doing a great job, and that is why this becomes such a difficult thing. We are just trying to get to the bottom of this and trying to make sure that this—that something like those pictures doesn't happen again. Because it does affect our ability, I think, to be able to wage this war. Earlier today, I talked about the two deaths that happened in Af- ghanistan; and, you know, those are more than intense beatings. We are talking about death there. We are talking about three times as many suspects. And yet, the Department of Defense hasn't told us about it, hasn't got a report over there, and they haven't given it to us. I think the biggest problem that I see that the Department of De- fense failed to do was to keep Congress informed in the Abu Ghraib case. It is just my opinion that there is no learning value, as my father used to say, in getting kicked by a mule twice. You know, so we are just trying to get to the bottom of this. We are trying to use your information. Your report found that the senior leaders in the DOD failed to clarify the standards that young interrogators were required to apply in the field. I want to explore a few aspects of that issue. We held hearings this morning on the Schlesinger report, and the report notes that the Secretary of Defense authorized certain interrogation techniques to be used at Gitmo and Afghanistan that were more severe than those permitted under Army interrogation techniques. Basically, the report found that these techniques, while intended only for Gitmo and Afghanistan, had, as they called it, migrated to Iraq and elsewhere and so confusion about what inter- rogation practices were authorized. 986 Based on your investigation of Abu Ghraib, do you agree with that assessment? Did the Secretary of Defense memo contribute to the confusion about appropriate limits on interrogations at the prison. And how do you believe that this migration happened? What was ain of command to get these techniques into this prison. when in fact they might have been suggested by the SecDef for other countries? General KERN. I will start. I would like to ask each of the others to comment. First, some of the personnel served in all three loca- tions, some of the 519th MI interrogators served in Guantanamo, served in Afghanistan, and now have found themselves in Iraq. So you are now asking them to sort through—they were on long de- ployments, they have been gone a long time. Second, we found that on some of the hard drives of computers, memos and drafts of things which were written in the Pentagon, written in headquarters, written at other commands, Southern Command, et cetera, found their way. The World Wide Web works. And so anything that you write today is likely to be found almost anywhere. Third, we found that they were, as we have described, under in- tense pressure to produce intelligence. And so they had these other experiences, and they saw these other techniques which were being used. And somebody says we want intelligence out of these and so they were asking questions from the bottom up, at the same time we were writing different doctrine policies, techniques from the top down. And we never clarified completely all of those memos so that it was very crystal clear to those young soldiers and civilians who were doing the interrogations exactly what the rules were. Ms. SANCHEZ. Was there also CIA migration? In other words, were there CIA in Afghanistan that came over to Iraq? General KERN. I am sure that there were. But we haven't been able to document any of the CIA's role. But we do know that some the interrogators worked with both the Special Operations Forces and other agencies in those other countries. General JONES. Ďuring this time period, there was a thirst for- by all theaters-on what their limits of authority were and the def- inition of the population in terms of lawful and unlawful combat- ants. The memo you are referring to was first started—there is one in December of 2002, a response to the request from U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) for counterresistance techniques used at Guantanamo, subsequently rescinded in January, and then a work- ing group published another memo in April. The April memo, which was signed by the Sec Def, going back to Guantanamo for use with unlawful combatants, was used in ref- erence, when the legal personnel at CJTF-7 constructed the memo in September of 2003 as a reference. That is how it migrated from the top down. The other part of it, it is a very close community of interrogators, 97-Es, about 1,500 of them, of all components. And so they share the information, and they communicate based on where they were, what works. And so the different techniques are known. 987 General Fay. Just one quick point. The SecDef memo that you are referring to, ma'am, was approved for Gitmo. It was never ap- proved for Afghanistan. Ms. SANCHEZ. It wasn't? General Fay. No. Just Gitmo. Ms. SANCHEZ. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the time. Mr. BARTLETT (presiding]. Gentlemen, you have heard the bells and seen the lights. We have a series of votes that are on. We have just time to make the end of the first 15-minute vote. That will be followed by two 5-minute votes. And of course we will vote in the first 30 seconds of the second 5-minute and return as quickly as we can. We will be in recess until the end of that. Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Mr. Chairman, just for clarification, that memo may have been specifically cited, but the Schlesinger report makes very, very clear that it was migrating through Guantanamo, Afghanistan, and elsewhere, and was said to be common law and practice within the interrogator community. General Fay. It did migrate. But my point was that it was only approved for use at Gitmo by SecDef. Mr. ABERCROMBIE. I understand that. But the plain fact is it was well known in the Secretary's office and elsewhere that this was circulating all over the place. And the Schlesinger report says so. General Fay. Our report says the same thing, sir. Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Yes, I know it does. I commend you for it. I just don't want them off the hook as to how this was really work- ing. The second that they started away from, or went away from. strict attention and paying attention to what the Army manual al- ready said with regard to interrogation, they opened the floodgates to this and set the Army up for a fall. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you. And we shall return as soon as we can. [Recess.] Mr. BARTLETT. Our committee will reconvene. My apologies. We were told there were three votes. When we got there, there were five votes. Thank you very much for being patient. Coincidentally, I am next in the queue, so I will now take the next five minutes for my questions. A couple of you said that every- one knew the Geneva Conventions applied. I would like to suggest that maybe that isn't quite true. Let me explain. We put our prisoners in Guantanamo Bay with the express state- ment that we put them there so that they would be beyond the reach of the Constitution. And we called them unlawful combatants which, we said, put them beyond the reach of the Geneva Conven- tions. Now, I would suggest that observing this action, that it might have been reasonable for our military personnel to assume that these prisoners were beyond the reach of the Geneva Conventions. The White House said that we were going to follow the Geneva Conventions when appropriate and when consistent with military necessity. And, the MIs in the prison were telling, the military police—and I spent four hours with a Sergeant Ken Davis who was there, and 988 observed a great deal of this. And they were telling them: Hear those mortars going off out there? They are killing our boys. You need to turn up the pressure. You are doing a good job of softening them up. You need to continue. Now, in this climate, where nationally we are making the state- ment that we are putting the people beyond the reach of our Con- stitution, and we are naming them so that they are beyond the reach of the Geneva Conventions, you need to ask yourself, why would we do that, unless we intended to treat them in a way that was not consistent with the Constitution, and not consistent with the Geneva Conventions? And then when the military intelligence people were telling our folks that gee, you are doing a great job, you are softening them up, you need to increase the pressure, you hear those mortars going off out there, they are killing our boys, don't you think, sirs, that there is a reasonable possibility that these people thought they were doing the right thing? General KERN. Congressman Bartlett, I think that we reported that there was confusion. The other point that we tried to make, when you really ask somebody, did you understand that the Gene- va Convention applied in Iraq, the answer was always, yes. Now, the issue I think that you suggest and that we have sug- gested in our report is that because they operated in these other facilities at Guantanamo, Afghanistan, and Iraq, and because they saw these other techniques being used, there was question in their mind as to what was allowable when they conducted interrogations inside the facilities at Abu Ghraib. And we saw a number of docu- ments that went back and forth from the interrogation facility at Abu Ghraib, back up to the CJTF staff, asking for clarification as to what their limits of authority were. But in the end, when you get back to the basic question, do you understand the Geneva Convention applies, the answer was al- ways, yes. Now, when you ask them, as General Fay did, specifi- *cally walk them through the steps of what they were doing and saying, do you think that violated the Geneva Convention, they would come back and say, yes, I guess I did. And so there is an inconsistency and that is why our point is, clarity is required and consistency is required. Mr. BARTLETT. In your findings, the second bullet said the pri- mary cause of the detainee abuse were individual misconduct, a lack of discipline, leadership failure. And I think that it might be appropriate to add to that, the creation of a national climate in which this might presume to be okay. General JONES. Sir, I would just add to that the policy-well, first of all, our doctrine, both military police and military intel- ligence, the common thread in both of those has to do with they will conform to the law of land warfare and the Geneva Conven- tion. That is the common thing in both doctrinal mar · The other thing, the memos that went up and went out were clear in Iraq that the people, the detainees, should be treated in accordance with the Geneva Convention. So that was done by the leadership. And I think General Fay can talk about Serg Davis. 989 General Fay. Sir, when you are referring to when they believed that this was okay, certainly it would depend on what the defini- tion of the “this” is. And if we are referring to those horrendous pictures, I can't believe that there was any soldier, or any civilian for that matter, at Abu Ghraib that believed that any of those hor- rendous abuses were okay or that anybody condoned those abuses. Mr. BARTLETT. Sir, Sergeant Davis's boots were in one of those pictures, the picture of the pyramid. A military intelligence person asked him, do you think we have crossed the line? He said, yes, I think you have crossed the line. And the answer was, we are pro- fessionals, we know what we are doing. You know, I just think there was a lot of—I don't know who to blame for this. I bear part of the blame, because I was not vocal enough when we put those prisoners in Guantanamo Bay beyond the reach of our Constitution and gave them a title which put them beyond the reach of the Geneva Conventions. I just don't think there is any way to start down that road of tor- ture without going too far. And the rules that they are operating under permitted them certain types of torture, like put a hood over their head, strip them nude, put them in a cold cell, don't let them sleep, vary their diet, put them in stress positions. These are not that much different from the stress positions that they put our prisoners of war in in North Korea. I spent an hour last evening with a number of those who were detailing the kinds of treatment they received there. I just think there is enough guilt here to go around, sirs. I believe that what the world wants to see from us is a national confession that this is not America, and we are going to make darn sure it doesn't happen again. : . General Fay. Sir, we would have to go through each one of the issues that you enumerated there as regards to all of things that were being done. But many of what you mentioned were techniques that were never authorized, that they shouldn't have been using. And those that were using them, in many of the instances, as we saw in the picture, I still believe they knew that that was wrong. And if the MI—as we have identified in our report—the MI soldiers that participated in that, they also knew that they were doing wrong. There wasn't a confusion with the extremes that we saw. They knew that they were doing wrong. Mr. BARTLETT. But they still did it? General Fay. They were doing wrong. They did it. Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you. Mr. Rodriguez. Mr. RODRIGUEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And let me also thank you. General, all the three generals, thank you very much for your service. And I know you have had a dif- ficult task in hand. And let me just add that I agree with the act- ing Chairman that, you know, we also set a very negative prece- dent as an administration, as a Commander in Chief, to begin to allow different options at Cuba. I think that set a very negative—when we even start looking at treating soldiers and individuals, prisoners in a very different way. And you yourself in your testimony, you talked about the changing of the rules; that they applied here, but they didn't apply over there. But, yet, the staff that was in Cuba was some of the same staff that might have been over there. And I can see where that, 991 tion only covered through last February. And I only visited two de- tection facilities in the last month, Bagram- Mr. RODRIGUEZ. The CIA hasn't been responsive with you about telling you whether they do or not? General KERN. We haven't asked the question of what they are doing today. The CIA has given us their policy statement that says if they put someone in our detention facilities today, they will com- ply with our policies. So if they are complying with the policies, there will not be any ghost detainees. Mr. RODRIGUEZ. Any of the other generals want to comment? Where do we go from here? General KERN. Well, I will start it. But both—General Jones works with the Training and Doctrine Command as his full-time job. And they have already made some significant changes in how we are—where we are going with our policies. I would say the first point is that we need some consistency across all of our intelligence activities so that we can ensure that the youngest person that we put in a position knows what is right from wrong. The second thing that we have determined is that while we have been teaching Geneva Convention, we haven't been teaching it as effectively as we can. So we have changed that policy so people truly do understand right from wrong. The third point I guess I would make is where we go from here. I don't believe we put enough focus on human intelligence in the last few years. And we need to refocus that effort right now so that we have the right number of people with the right training, so that not only do they know what the standards are, but when we need them we can get them in the right numbers. Mr. SAXTON (presiding]. The gentleman's time has expired. If there is anybody that wants to comment. General JONES. I would say, sir, I think the situation you see in Iraq is probably a taste of the future of contemporary operational environment. That is causing us to adapt our doctrine, our tactics, techniques and procedures, our training, and that is being looked at very hard. And also, in cultural training and how we work with interagency. And one of the recommendations is that we have a uniform policy that deals with the interrogations and detention op- erations, whether it be tactical or strategic levels, so the people know their clear limits of authority. Mr. SAXTON. Thank you. The gentleman's time has expired. Mrs. Wilson. Mrs. WILSON OF NEW MEXICO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General Kern, you mentioned in your opening remarks that after you met with the CIA IG, they agreed to conduct an internal CIA investigation. Do you know the timeline or the scope of that inves- tigation? General KERN. I believe that they are conducting that investiga- tion now. When they are going to be completed with it and when they will finish with it, I do not know. We have also directed the Department of Defense Inspector Gen- eral to follow up on that. And they are our normal interface with other outside agencies in terms of inspection reports. Mrs. WILSON OF NEW MEXICO. What is the current—you men- tioned the holding of ghost detainees and putting “excepted by Arti- 993 General KERN. That is one of the challenges that we are dealing with, is the category of detainees as opposed to uniformed prisoners of war. Mrs. WILSON OF NEW MEXICO. I understand that. That is why I chose the words that I did. I may have misspoken. But people who might be eligible for protections under the Geneva Conventions, who are being treated and held outside of those protections. Maybe that is a little bit—I don't know if that is clearer. General KERN. That is clearer in your question. I am not aware of any. And I would ask either of the others- General Fay. No, ma'am. I am not aware of any. General JONES. No, ma'am. I have not seen that. Mrs. WILSON OF NEW MEXICO. Finally, if you could just briefly outline for us what changes in training and policies and procedures on acceptance of detainees from other government agencies you have implemented since this has come to light, this problem came to light. General KERN. As I mentioned earlier, and I will particularly let General Jones who is the Training and Doctrine Command rep- resentative, as well as being one of our investigators—we go through a certification process now of all the personnel, both from the military police and from military intelligence, as they enter these facilities. And they understand that anyone who comes in these facilities is to be registered, medically treated properly, not abused, and they are to be interrogated and detained in accordance with the Geneva Conventions. We certify that for each individual who is in that the- ater today. Mr. SAXTON. The gentlelady's time has expired. Mrs. Tauscher. Ms. TAUSCHER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Generals, thank you so much for your hard work. I know these are very tough conditions. You know, I have a very special fondness for the Army and lots of people that are in it, as do I for all of the services. But General Kern, I read your report, your statement, with great interest. I am going to paraphrase from some of it on page five and six. I am going to quote you: “Events at Abu Ghraib cannot be understood in a vacuum. Three terrelated aspects of the operation environment played important roles in the abuses that occurred at Abu Ghraib. "First, from the time the 5th Corps transitioned to become CJTF-7 and throughout the period under investigation, it was not resourced adequately to accomplish the missions of the Combined Joint Task Force. Those missions were stability and support oper- ation for the Coalition Provisional Authority. The CJTF7 head- rs lacked adequate personnel and equipment. In addition, the military police and military intelligence units at Abu Ghraib were severely underresourced. "Second providing support to the CPA required greater resources than envisioned in the operational plans because we had a fero- cious counterinsurgency. Operational plans envisioned that they would execute the support and provide support in a relatively non- hostile environment. In fact, opposition was robust and hostilities continued throughout the period under investigation. Therefore, 996 Mr. LOBIONDO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. SAXTON. Ms. Davis. Ms. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you very much to all of you for being here and for your service. I am sure that you must feel a lot of this frustration, as well. I ap- preciate the fact that you are not in a position to display it. But we just want to let you know that we do feel that there are a number of situations under which we know people were working in rather intolerable situations, considering the personnel that was available, the kind of training that folks had. And that is why it comes out in that way. I wonder if we can just go back for a second to look at some of the ratios that were utilized in Abu Ghraib. What do you think are appropriate ratios to be that we would want between prisoners or detainees or guards? What is an appropriate number? General KERN. Our doctrine and it refers to enemy prisoners of war more precisely than it does to detainees—is one military police battalion, and if I remember the number, it is 4,000 detainees. General Taguba reminded us of that this morning, because that is what he precisely covered in his analysis. Ms. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. One battalion to approximately 4,000 detainees. General FAY. About an 8 to 1 ratio. Ms. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. Okay. And in the general prison sys- tem, do you have any idea? General KERN. Of a general prison system? I think the number is quite a bit lower. It is probably on the order of 3 to 4 to 1.. Ms. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. Around four to five to one. What was the ratio at Abu Ghraib? General KERN. It varied over different periods of time. But at the worst case, I think it was about 75 to 1. Ms. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. 75 to 1. When you saw that in your reports, in your investigations, was anybody crying for help at that time? We know there were other reasons why people would be pulled out of the prison and be used elsewhere. General KERN. General Karpinski asked for help. And one of the directions that she was given was the first thing she needed to do was reallocate the military police personnel that she had. And one of the things that we did uncover is that if you look across the de- tention facilities, the numbers were disproportionate. Not-Abu Ghraib was the worst case. General JONES. I think at Camp Cropper there was 120 MPs for 102 detainees. So some of those people could have been moved. Both of those units were in the 800th MP Brigade. Ms. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. But they were not? General JONES. Correct. Ms. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. Looking at that ratio, is that fair? Does that also make the case that we were underresourced gen- erally? General KERN. I think our answer has been very consistent- that we do not have enough military police for the kinds of oper- ations we have been conducting for almost the last ten years. I know I have met some MPs, Active Duty battalions in three or four 998 It is like I take the glass of milk off the table or something like that. It doesn't mean anything. And the problem tha is that this includes Secretary Schlesinger and Secretary Brown running away from their own report. Have the two of you, or have all three of you read the Schles- inger report. General KERN. Yes, we have. Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Well, I hope you would agree, then, that, your reports were put together independently of the Schlesinger re- port. Right? General KERN. They were put together independently, but we provided them all of our analysis and information. Ir. ABERCROMBIE. Sure. But what I am saying is, would you agree, then, that when you go to—what they call the promulgation of policy and the command responsibility sections of the Schles- inger et. al. report, it reflects on the question of where did the pol- icy originate. And if you go back to it, I am going ba retary of Defense's April 16th, 2003 policy guidelines for Guanta- namo. And that is what I mentioned just at the end, before we went to nere. This is from their report, recommending a command- wide policy be established In addition to these various printed sources, after seeing the Ge- neva Conventions did apply to Iraq, quote, “There was also a store of common law and practice where, within the interrogator commu- nity circulating through Guantanamo, Afghanistan and elsewhere,” and they go on to say, “the techniques had migrated from Afghani- Now, techniques; I have never seen a technique. Is it a Franken- stein monster? Is it a golem? I mean, how does it migrate? Does it have legs? I think we know from an institutional basis what they are talking about when they say the techniques migrated and when they say there was common law and practice that was moving. In your report, General Jones, and in yours, General Fay, you also indicate very, very clearly it seems to me, that there was inad- equate operational environment, inconsistency in the need to prioritize efforts and so on. What I am trying to get to here is that when we get as high as General Sanchez, in terms of whether or not he had adequate resources—this goes back also to a policy, not just the Secretary's 2003 policy guidelines, but the Secretary's ad- monition to the Armed Forces that they would have to make do with the forces that they had. And that when we came to your report, am I correct and accurate in saying that the Army was well aware of its inadequacies in terms of logistical support, et cetera, across the board, not enough numbers of people adequately trained, et cetera, and they knew that, and that they knew that they had to have it based on the les- sons-learned activity in Afghanistan? General KERN. I think we clearly outlined the shortage of re- sources in our report and the migration of policies referred to. And my primary job is the logistician of the Army, and providing all of the resources, and there are a number of cases where Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Am I correct—I am not trying to override you, I am just trying to stay within my time limit here. stan.” 999 Am I correct, then, that the Secretary of Defense's Office, and those various under secretaries for policy and all of the rest of it that you have to report to, were also aware that these inadequacies or those holes in the superstructure existed? General KERN. I cannot confirm to you what all of those under secretaries were aware of. I can confirm to you that when General Abizaid stepped in as the commander there, he stopped the flow of forces, brought in more, and that it changed. And so I think it was clearly recognized. And he is the first commander in the chain of command reporting to the Secretary of Defense, and he got that changed. Mr. SAXTON. Thank you. The gentleman's time has expired. Mr. Skelton, I believe, has a closing statement that he would like to offer at this time. Mr. SKELTON. Two things are apparent. And first let me, by the way, thank you for your testimony. This has been straightforward. We have learned more from you than we have in other settings and other hearings. And we thank you for your answers and your straightforwardness, as well as your professional duty that you have performed so well. Two gaps. Number one is the obvious gap that you don't know about is where the CIA played a role or what they played a role in, or what they did other than maybe the briefing that they gave you. And allegealy they have their inspector general doing an in- you. And allegedly they hav vestigation. Am I correct? General KERN. That is correct. Mr. SKELTON. But we don't know anything about that. And the question remains, will we ever see the results of that, either on a classified or unclassified basis? Do you have any reason to believe that we will receive such information from the CIA? General KERN. Congressman, every committee we have talked to, to include the Intelligence Committees, the Senate, the House, both sides, all asked that same question. And they all are—have come to the conclusion that they will see the report. That is what I have heard. Mr. SKELTON. I certainly hope so. Second, it is apparent that this is not a new thing, that we were certainly not prepared for the aftermath of the combat that was so highly successful. This committee has heard me talk about it on several occasions. But I sent two letters to the President, copies to the Pentagon and everyone else, warning—first on September the 4th, 2002, then the other was later on March the 18th, 2003—warning of the very things that are happening in the insurgency today and the reasons therefor. And they sent a couple of titled folks over from the Pentagon on the 17th of September 2002 to say, Ike, it is going to be all right. Well, it is not all right, and still we are paying the price for it. I have had a couple of years' experience in sitting here and lis- tening and learning about the challenges in different parts of this world militarily, and I feel very frustrated that no one seemed to pay attention to my warnings. Had they been heeded, had there been a good plan, I think we probably would have saved a lot of good lives of American soldiers. 1000 Well, be that as it may, Mr. Chairman, thank you. And thank you for your service. You have done your country well. Thank you. Mr. SAXTON. Gentlemen, I also would like to thank you. And just by way of conclusion to this hearing, it is apparent to me that DOD is leaving no stone unturned to set the record straight and to bring forward every ounce of truth surrounding these events that is available. - You know we have carried out more than 225 criminal investiga- tions. There have been ten major reviews and systemic investiga- tions, beginning with the Taguba report, investigation and report. This committee has received over 15,000 pages of material during the course of our activities relative to those events. And every re- port confirms that the abuse was not a result of policy, doctrine, or orders. And as you represented again today, there were some folks who did some wrong things, and we are doing everything we can to get to the bottom of those matters. It is interesting. Just today I was—I had the opportunity to meet with-in a classified setting—with an operator. And he was telling me of some very current events which are most encouraging. And I think we must remember that it is—it is our troops that are car- rying out those events and those activities and those operations in service to this country on a daily basis still today. And yet we have spent more time on this series of events than we do talking about the things that are going right. And so others have expressed frustration. That is mine. And I hope that the American people soon get to focus on the things that are going right, because we talk about them inside closed rooms, and there are good reasons for that. But this one has had a full airing, this set of events has had a full airing, and we really need to close the book on this, make sure it doesn't happen again, make sure those who are responsible for it pay for the bad deeds that they have done. But we need to move forward with the issues involving the na- tional security of this country and the war on terror. So thank you for the part that you have played in helping us set the record straight on this set of issues. We look forward to seeing you again, and we look forward to see- ing a rapid conclusion or some kind of a conclusion to this matter in the very near future. Thank you very much. We appreciate your service to the country. And we appreciate your being here today. [Whereupon, at 5:40 p.m., the committee was adjourned.] APPENDIX SEPTEMBER 9, 2004 PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD SEPTEMBER 9, 2004 OPENING REMARKS OF CHAIRMAN HUNTER Hearing on the Report by Generals Kern, Fay, and Jones September 9, 2004 The hearing will come to order. This morning we heard from Secretaries Schlesinger and Brown on the results of their independent review of DOD detainee operations. This afternoon, we are fortunate to have as our witnesses three general officers with decades of military service who have lent their experience to yet another exhaustive examination of what went wrong with military detainee operations in Iraq. They are: General Paul J. Kern Procedure 15 Appointing Authority Lieutenant General Anthony R. Jones Additional Procedure 15 Investigating Officer Major General George R. Fay Investigating Officer (1005) 1007 military is committed to getting to the truth of these issues and letting the chips fall where they may. As we move forward, these are important facts to remember. The military started the investigations. The military first reported them to the public. The military took aggressive steps to identify any systemic problems that contributed to abuse. The Department of Defense took immediate steps to correct problems as it discovered them. And today, the Department is revising its doctrine, training, and policies in order to ensure that detainees are treated in a manner consistent with our values and our obligations. That's the image of the military that must replace the faces of a few individuals photographed disgracing their uniforms, in violation of their orders, their training, our policies, and our values. If you read the reports by Generals Fay, Jones, and Kern carefully enough, you'll see a Department wrestling mightily with the challenges of honoring our values while developing 1011 military police soldiers. The standard of justice must be blind and consistent whether the perpetrator is officer or enlisted or contractor. The detailed work provided in your investigation will hopefully provide the basis for additional prosecutions. As importantly, this report provides insights into the structural and policy failures that led to the abuses at Abu Ghraib. The command structure in Iraq was dysfunctional from the start. When CJTF-7 stood up, it had only a third of the personnel it needed and was short almost 170 staff officers in the area of detainee operations. General Sanchez did not have sufficient resources to undertake the immensely complex missions he was given in Iraq and soon found his force in the midst of an active insurgency. The failure to provide him adequate resources was a strategic failure with strategic implications, not the least of which was for detention operations in Iraq. The report also rightly points out the dangers of conflicting policy guidance for interrogators and military police. We pointed out this morning that the evolution of interrogation policy in 1013 and CIA personnel interact in detention operations. But it raises larger policy questions as well about our national willingness to adhere to international law. Gentleman, I want to thank you again for your service and for the seriousness of your investigation. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 1014 STATEMENT BY GENERAL PAUL KERN COMMANDING GENERAL, UNITED STATES ARMY MATERIEL COMMAND BEFORE THE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ON THE INVESTIGATION OF THE 205TH MILITARY INTELLIGENCE BRIGADE AT ABU GHRAIB PRISON, IRAQ SECOND SESSION, 108TH CONGRESS SEPTEMBER 9TH, 2004 1016 fought bravely and courageously until he was captured in An Nasiriya - to senior officers such as Generals McArthur and Patton. These people, and thousands like them, dedicate their lives to their country quietly, with honor. Our report, however, discusses the failure of a f relatively small number of soldiers who served at Abu Ghraib prison. The teams conducted an investigation that focused on the 205th Military Intelligence Brigade and its chain of command; however, we went where the facts led us. Our final report from this investigation is complete. In the course of this investigation, we discovered serious misconduct and a loss of moral values. We set our course to find truth, not to "whitewash" nor to convict those who are not incriminated. We found the pictures you have seen were not the result of any doctrine, training or policy, but violations of law. We learned there were leaders in Abu Ghraib who knew 'e wen about this misconduct - knew better and did nothing. Some Soldiers behaved improperly because they were confused by their experiences and direction. And we violated our own regulations by allowing "ghost detainees" in detention facilities. All this was happening as thousands of soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, Marines, civilians and contractors fought 1018 have been invaluable to the scope of our investigation. He is a șoldier's Soldier who knows what is right. MG Fay served on active duty for four years, followed by 27 years in the Army Reserve. He was mobilized immediately after 9/11 and has been on active duty for almost two and one-half years since then. The vast majority of both his Active and Reserve experience has been in Military Intelligence. In civilian life, MG Fay is a managing director of a major global property/casualty insurance company. He has nearly 30 years' experience investigating and overseeing complex claims and litigation. The investigative teams conducted a comprehensive review of all available background documents and statements pertaining to Abu Ghraib from a wide variety of sources. These sources included the reports written by MG Geoffrey Miller, MG Donald Ryder, MG Antonio Taguba and the Department of Army Inspector General. LTG Jones did extensive review of previous reports, operations plans, policy memorandums, and sworn statements collected by the MG Fay team. He also personally interviewed LTG Richardo Sanchez and MG Barbara Fast, the CJTF-7 Senior Intelligence Staff Officer. MG Fay's team conducted over 170 interviews concerning the interviewees' knowledge of interrogation and detention operations at Abu Ghraib and/or their knowledge 1019 of and involvement in detainee abuse. MG Fay's interviews included interviews with MG Fast, MG Walter Wojdakowski, MG Geoffrey Miller, MG Thomas Miller, and BG Janis Karpinski. Over 9,000 documents were collected, catalogued and archived into a database. My review team consisted of 12 people, including general officers, subject matter experts and legal advisors. The investigative teams traveled to a Irag eight times, including a visit by the appointing authority and investigating officers in early August 2004. The events at Abu Ghraib cannot be understood in a vacuum. Three interrelated aspects of the operational environment played important roles in the abuses that occurred at Abu Ghraib. First, from the time v Corps transitioned to become Combined Joint Task Force-7 (CJTF- 7), and throughout the period under investigation, it was not resourced adequately to accomplish the missions of the Combined Joint Task Force. Those missions were stability and support operations (SASO) and support to the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA). The CJTF-7 headquarters lacked adequate personnel and equipment. In addition, the military police and military intelligence units at Abu Ghraib were severely under-resourced. Second, providing support to the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) required greater resources than envisioned in operational plans. Third, 1020 operational plans envisioned that CJTF-7 would execute SASO and provide support to the CPA in a relatively nonhostile environment. In fact, opposition was robust and hostilities continued throughout the period under investigation. Therefore, CJTF-7 had to conduct tactical counter- insurgency operations, while also executing its planned missions. That is the operational context in which the abuses at Abu Ghraib took place. Abuses We found that abuses-on the part of military intelligence and military police personnel-- clearly occurred at the prison at Abu Ghraib. For purposes of this report, abuse is defined as treatment of detainees that violated U.S. criminal law or international law or treatment that was inhumane or coercive without lawful justification. Whether the soldier or contractor knew, at the time of the acts, that the conduct violated any law or standard, is not an element of the definition. There is no single, simple explanation for why this abuse at Abu Ghraib happened. The primary causes are misconduct (ranging from inhumane to sadistic) by a relatively small group of soldiers and civilians, a lack of discipline on the part of the leaders and soldiers of the S 205th MI BDE and a failure or lack of leadership by multiple 1023 however, 205th MI Brigade and 800th Military Police Brigade leaders at Abu Ghraib failed to execute their assigned responsibilities. The leaders from units located at Abu Ghraib or with supervision over Soldiers and units at Abu Ghraib, failed to supervise subordinates or provide direct oversight of this important mission. These leaders failed to properly discipline their Soldiers. These leaders failed to learn from prior mistakes and failed to provide continued mission-specific training. The 205th MI Brigade commander did not assign a specific subordinate unit to be responsible for interrogations at Abu Ghraib and did not ensure that a Military Intelligence chain of command at Abu Ghraib was established. The absence of effective leadership was a factor in not sooner discovering and taking actions to prevent both the violent/sexual abuse incidents and the misinterpretation/confusion incidents. Neither Department of Defense nor Army doctrine caused any abuses. Abuses would not have occurred had doctrine been followed and mission training conducted. Nonetheless, certain facets of interrogation and detention operations doctrine need to be updated, refined or expanded, including, the concept, organization, and operations of a Joint Interrogation and Debriefing Center (JIDC); guidance for interrogation techniques at both tactical and strategic 1024 levels; the roles, responsibilities and relationships between Military Police and Military Intelligence personnel at detention facilities; and, the establishment and organization of a Joint Task Force structure and, in particular, its intelligence architecture. 1 Other Contributing factors Demands on the Human Intelligence (HUMINT) capabilities in a counterinsurgency and in the future joint operational environment will continue to tax tactical and strategic assets. The Army needs trained and experienced tactical HUMINT personnel. Working alongside non-DOD organizations/agencies in detention facilities proved complex and demanding. The perception that non-DOD agencies had different rules regarding interrogation and detention operations was evident. Interrogation and detention policies and limits of authority should apply equally to all agencies in the Iraqi Theater of Operations. "Ghost Detainees" My investigation resulted in specific findings regarding the issue of "ghost detainees" within Abu Ghraib. It is clear that the interrogation practices of other government agencies led to a loss of accountability at Abu Ghraib. DOD must document and enforce adherence by other 10 1030 INVESTIGATIVE METHODOLOGY • IN EXCESS OF 9,000 DOCUMENTS COLLECTED, CATALOGUED AND ARCHIVED • OVER 170 INTERVIEWS CONDUCTED • 8 INVESTIGATIVE VISITS TO IRAQ • INVESTIGATIVE TEAMS CONSISTED OF 28 PERSONNEL TO INCLUDE INVESTIGATORS, ANALYSTS, SUBJECT MATTER EXPERTS AND LEGAL ADVISORS • INDEPENDENT REVIEW TEAM CHARTERED BY APPOINTING AUTHORITY 1032 1. Camp Ganci 2. Camp Vigilant 3. CPA Prison 4. In Processing | 5. 320th LSA. 6. MP/MI LSA Tier 1A & 1B 5196 1325 LSA 1 320th TOC ECP Intg Booths ( 1036 Non-MI Personnel Alleged to be involved in Detainee Abuse: • MP: • Previously Charged: 7 • Newly Identified: · Abuse: • Failure to Report: • Medical: • Failure to Report: 1038 Procedure 15 (Intelligence) Investigation of the Abu Ghraib Prison and 205th Military Intelligence Brigade 1042 KEY POSITIONS/PERSONNEL CENTCOM GEN Franks CENTCOM GEN Abizaid CFLCC LTG McKieri BG Kratzer (CG, 377TH TSC) ARCENT LTG McKiernan (CG) BG Diamond (CG, 377TH TSC) V CORPS LTG Wallace (CG) MG Wodjakowski (DCG) BG Hahn (COS) COL Cellucci (G1) COL Boltz (G2) COL Hicks (G3) COL Carter (G4) CJTF-7 ... LTG Sanchez (CG) MG Wodjakowski (DCG) MG Gallinetti - (COS) COL McKuen (C1) BG Fast (C2) MG Miller (C3) BG West (C4) SEP BDE COL Parrish (205th MI BDE) BG Hill (800th MP BDE) SEP BDE COL Pappas (205th MI BDE BG Karpinski (800th MP BDE) 1044 MAJOR FINDINGS 205TH MILITARY INTELLIGENCE BRIGADE • 205th Military Intelligence Brigade personnel at Abu Ghraib solicited, condoned, or participated in abuse incidents • Established interrogation procedures and applicable laws and regulations in interrogation operations were violated 1046 ABUSE INCIDENTS "Incident" means an event or category of events · 44 Incidents of Abuse Identified (some previously identified by Taguba report): - 24 Incidents Involved Physical Abuse - 8 Incidents Involved Use of Dogs - 9 Incidents Involved Humiliation - 3 Incidents Involved Isolation (Or Improper Use of Segregation) • 26 of the 44 incidents are under investigation by Criminal Investigation Command. The remaining 18 incidents will be referred to the appropriate commanders for action. 1047 ABUSE 205 Military Intelligence Brigade Personnel Alleged to be involved in Detainee Abuse: Recommendations: • Abuse: Military Intelligence Personnel: 23 • 15 retraining . 3 previous UCMJ • Contractors: 4 • 9 referred to Commanders/Depart- • Failure to Report: ment of Justice • Military Intelligence Personnel: 6 • Refer to Commander • Contractor: • Refer to Department of Justice 10 1051 CAUSES No Single, Simple Explanation Exists for Why Abu Ghraib Abuse Happened. • Primary Causes: -Misconduct (ranges from inhumane to sadistic) -Lack of Discipline -Failure or Lack of Leadership • Contributing Factors: -Command and Control :-Doctrine -Training -Policy -Detention Operations -Experience -Resources 1052 APPOINTING AUTHORITY MAJOR RECOMMENDATIONS • Further investigation is required to determine role of Other Government Agencies in violations of detention and interrogation operations policy- Refer issue to Department of Defense Inspector General for further investigation by Central Intelligence Agency Inspector General . Refer personal accountability issues to appropriate Commanders for action with details of behavior • Refer alleged abuses by Soldiers to Criminal Investigation Command for investigation • Refer alleged abuses by civilians to Department of Justice for investigation Establish joint doctrine and training for Combined Joint Task Force Organizations 15 * PENN STATE UNIVERSITY LIBRARIES A 000058944820