an
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana, Chairman
CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska
JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR., Delaware
LINCOLN CHAFEE, Rhode Island
PAUL S. SARBANES, Maryland
GEORGE ALLEN, Virginia
CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut
NORM COLEMAN, Minnesota
JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts
GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio
RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin
LAMAR ALEXANDER, Tennessee
BARBARA BOXER, California
JOHN E. SUNUNU, New Hampshire
BILL NELSON, Florida
LISA MURKOWSKI, Alaska
BARACK OBAMA, Illinois
MEL MARTINEZ, Florida
KENNETH A. MYERS, Jr., Staff Director
ANTONY J. BLINKEN, Democratic Staff Director


CONTENTS
Page
Biden, Hon. Joseph R., Jr., U.S. Senator from Delaware, opening statement ...
Prepared statement ........
Lugar, Hon Richard G., U.S. Senator from Indiana, opening statement ............
Khalilzad, Hon. Zalmay, Ambassador to Iraq, Department of State, Wash-
ington, DC ........................
Prepared statement ..........
Responses to questions submitted by Senator Lugar
Responses to questions submitted by Senator Biden ........
(III)





AN IRAQ UPDATE
THURSDAY, JULY 13, 2006
U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:32 a.m., in room
419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Richard Lugar (chair-
man of the committee) presiding.
Present: Senators Lugar, Hagel, Chafee, Coleman, Alexander,
Sununu, Martinez, Biden, Sarbanes, Dodd, Kerry, Feingold, Boxer,
Nelson, and Obama.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD G. LUGAR, U.S.
SENATOR FROM INDIANA
The CHAIRMAN. This hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee is called to order. The committee meets today to review
the situation in Iraq. We welcome our ·Ambassador, Zalmay
Khalilzad, who has been on the job in Baghdad for just over a year.
Ambassador, we are grateful to have you back today, safe and
sound. We look forward to your update. As some of my colleagues
are aware, you planned three other trips home during the last sev-
eral months and graciously offered to testify each time before our
committee. The events in Iraq, including critical efforts to name a
Prime Minister and to finalize the Iraqi Government, required your
presence in Baghdad. We are heartened that you have finally been
rewarded with a break and that you are willing to share a par
that with us. We also appreciate the dedication of your Embassy
team, which has worked under very, very challenging circum-
stances. Your efforts have contributed to several breakthroughs in
forming a government that have opened new avenues for progress.
The Iraqi Government under Prime Minister Maliki is inclusive
and broadly representative. Significantly, it was approved by a vote
of 95 percent in the Council of Representatives. Its diversity im-
proves the prospects that the political and sectarian divisions that
have cut violently into Iraqi society can be overcome to institu-
tionalize a functional government. But the people of Iraq des-
perately need their government to deliver tangible benefits. The
government must begin to show progress in solving the vexing se-
curity situation that has produced daily violence, including ethnic
killings and suicide bombings. The government must have a strat-
egy for dealing with militias that are responsible for much of the
ethnic violence. We are interested in your views on the condition
of the Iraqi security forces and whether they can become a reliable
force for stability. Beyond disbanding the militias, the government
(1)


is swelling the ranks of the militia, the insurgency, and criminal
gangs.
In speaking to some of our flag officers there, several of them
pointed to the fact-one actually used the phrase, “Senator, if you
want me to be able to deal with the militias that have actually in-
creased in their numbers since the election last December, get the
Department of Agriculture working.” He said this used to be the
breadbasket of the entire Middle East. If you could get that up and
moving, he said, that would take care of the militia more than any
single other thing that could happen, this in the opinion of one
general. So, Mr. Ambassador, I know you know this better than we
do but if we don't make these challenges, I think we risk having
traded a maniacal dictator for some chaos.
Let me say a few words about each one of these things. First, the
actions of a political solution, the Sunni insurgence, in my view,
won't stand down and the Shia militia violence won't stop and so
how do we cut that Gordian knot? I know you recognize the cen-
trality of a political solution. Last year, you pulled, I believe, a rab-
bit out of the hat. You were kind enough to put up with me being
there as well, back in December. I remember vividly—vividly—and
coming back, telling everyone who would listen, that your—I didn't
know how you did it but in the last couple weeks before that con-
stitution was put out there, you essentially got an amendment to
the constitution, saying this is open for further negotiation. I won't
go through the detail that you know better than I: Four months
after the Parliament meets, that there is a committee about so and
so forth. But you I think that is the reason why there was such
Sunni participation and I think that agreement averted a crisis.
But now, I'm told by a number of people that we are not any
longer pushing the Iraqis to follow through with amendments, that
somehow—I'm not mentioning anyone in particular and Senator
Reed found the same experience—speaking to a number of people
on the ground in Iraq last weekend. When I'd raise the amendment
process, they said, well look, this is kind of—you know, maybe we
should put that off, down the road. We're going to move this fur-
ther down. And from my perspective and I would like you to speak
to that, I think that is a gigantic mistake. Maybe I'm wrong but
I think it is a big mistake. Whether by amendment or some other
mechanisms, the Shia-led government, it seems to me, have to take
significant steps beyond ministries to get Sunni buy-in. In par-
ticular, I think they have to guarantee some form or another, some
share of the single biggest resource that country has, is oil. In addi-
tion, the government has to be willing, I think, to move against a
Shia militia with the same intensity that it moves against the
Sunni-based insurgency.
After meeting with Prime Minister Maliki, I'm not sure—and
again, you know him better than I do—he is an impressive man.
But I came away not all assured. You know—you have been with
me in those meetings. I'm very straightforward and he was very re-
ceptive to my being straightforward but the answers I got raised
two possibilities with me. Either, one, he was so constrained by try-
ing to keep together his Shia constituency, which is somewhat dis-
parate, as we spoke to the Brits down in Basra. They said, “Look,
there is not an insurgence here, there is a competition among Shia


more but meeting with the No. 2 military man in Iraq, he talked
about the situation in Baghdad and around and near Sadr City and
he said. "Look. we've built this great water treatment facil
said, “It's the largest water fountain in the Middle East,” meaning
that folks can take their buckets and they can go and get the water
and he raised the question about why—were we going to be able
to get the water from this facility into the homes? And he said, the
question was raised whether or not you bring in a large outfit with
backhoes and engineers and bulldozers and do it and he said—and
don't hold me to this. You'd know the number better than I but I
can't remember whether he said 3,000 or 4,000. He said, “Let me
have 3,000 or 4,000 Iraqis I can hire to dig ditches, to lay the pipe,
to move this,” he said, “That will help me more in terms of violence
and insurgency in that part of that community than if you, in fact,
give me more trainers over here.” So there is a lot to talk about,
Mr. Ambassador, no one better to talk about it than you and—ex-
cuse me one second.
Mr. Ambassador, I want to—I'm going to probably ruin his career
but I want to particularly compliment you on Clarke Cooper. I
don't know whether everybody knows him. He is a guy that leaves
the embassy, gets in those helicopters on these CODELS and sits
next to the guy with the nine millimeter machine gun and goes on
every one of these, at least every time I've been there in the recent
past. He is incredibly knowledgeable, he is one of the kind of guys
I like at State and you don't often get and as you ask him a ques-
tion, you get an answer. So I'm sure my colleagues have visited and
all of us have, share my view but I see him in the audience there
and I want to publicly compliment him. He has-does a first rate
job, besides speaking the language, which is a nice thing to have
a guy along who can do that.
Anyway, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Mr.
Ambassador, I'm anxious to hear from you.
[The prepared statement of Senator Biden follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR., U.S. SENATOR FROM
DELAWARE
Mr. Ambassador, welcome. I'm sorry that Senator Jack Reed and I didn't have a
chance to see you in Baghdad last week. I look forward to catching up today.
We are fortunate to have someone of your caliber in Baghdad. I can't think of any.
one better for such a consequential job. And your civilian team and our men and
women in uniform deserve our gratitude for their courage and commitment.
Mr. Ambassador, it seems to me that there are two parallel realities in Iraq right
now. If you spend time with our military and with your staff, you can't help but
be impressed with the job they're doing, under very difficult conditions. But for all
their achievements, the larger reality is this is my impression: Iraq-and the suc-
cess of our mission there remains a prisoner to terrible and growing violence and
the lack of a plan to stop it. I still do not see a clear strategy for victory in Iraq-
I see a strategy to prevent outright defeat.
As you've acknowledged, sectarian violence has trumped the insurgency and for-
eign terrorists as the main security threat in Iraq. It is spiraling in Baghdad in
spite of a much-publicized operation to secure the city with more than 50,000 forces.
Three overwhelming problems feed the violence.
First, the absence of a political settlement that gets Sunni buy-in and a commit-
ment from the major groups to pursue their interests peacefully.
Second, the absence of any governing capacity in the civilian agencies to deliver
basic services to the Iraqi people.
And third, mass unemployment which is swelling the ranks of the militias, the
insurgency, and criminal gangs.
If we do not meet these challenges, we risk trading a dictator for chaos.


Let me say a few words about each one.
First, in the absence of a political solution, the Sunni insurgents won't stand down
and the Shiite militia violence won't stop. We have to cut this Gordian knot.
I know you recognize the centrality of a political solution. Last year, you pulled
a rabbit out of a hat by engineering an agreement to allow the Constitution to be
amended. That agreement averted a crisis and ensured Sunni participation in De-
cember's elections.
But now I'm told we are no longer pushing the Iraqis to follow through with
amendments. That's a big mistake. Whether by amendment or some other mecha-
nism, the Shia-led government has to take significant steps beyond giving them
ministries to bring the Sunnis in. In particular, they must guarantee Sunnis a share
of oil revenues. In addition, the government has to be willing to move against the
Shia militia with the same intensity that it moves against the Sunni-based insur-
gency.
After meeting with Prime Minister Maliki—and he's an impressive man—I'm not
sure about the government's ability or willingness to amend the Constitution or to
effectively demobilize the militias.
Maliki has to contend with the politics of the Shia coalition. If he gives up too
much to the Sunnis, or if he moves too harshly against the Shia militia, he risks
losing the support of his coalition.
We need to keep up the pressure to bring the Sunnis in and keep the militia out,
which will marginalize the Sunni insurgents. But we shouldn't be the only ones
doing it because our influence is a diminishing asset. That's why it is so urgent we
work the international community and Iraq's neighbors into the effort. I see no plan
to do that, beyond the so-called “compact” which is limited to getting others to put
more money into Iraq.
The second challenge is governing capacity. If the government can't do basic
things—like turn on the lights, provide clean water, make payrolls, or supply and
sustain the army—then we'll leave behind a failing state when our troops come
home.
We need a massive civilian effort to build the Iraqi Government, like the effort
our military is making to train and build the capacity of the security forces and
ministries. Your staff at the Embassy indicate there is such a plan—with clear tac-
tics, targets, and benchmarks. If so, you should share it with us.
After his visit, the President talked about sending some of his Cabinet Secretaries
to Iraq. This is encouraging, even if it's 3 years down the road.
But I wish he had gone himself to each of our key agencies—State, AID, Agri-
culture, Commerce, HHS, and so forth—and brought their employees together and
personally made an appeal to them to go to Iraq to help Iraq's ministries get up
to speed.
Even as we start to draw down our military forces, we have to make this massive
civilian effort. If we don't, we will see one of two things: Complete chaos or the
emergence of a military strongman as the training of the Iraqi Army outpaces civil-
ian reconstruction and, out of frustration, the military takes over everything.
The third challenge is massive unemployment. Angry young men are joining
criminal gangs, insurgent groups, and militia at an alarming rate for one simple
reason—they get paid.
We need specific plans to generate employment and give young men an alter-
native. The military has proposed solutions like investing in the agricultural sector,
which can soak up lots of the unemployed. But the military can't do this alone.
The President's budget for civilian reconstruction is dropping precipitously. For-
eign donors are not making good on old pledges or making new ones. Even with oil
prices up, the resources aren't there to create jobs.
Mr. Ambassador, our generals made clear that we will begin leaving Iraq this
year. But as we leave Iraq, it is very important what we leave behind. A few months
back, I offered a comprehensive plan for a political settlement in Iraq and to over-
come these fundamental challenges.
Whether what I proposed was right or wrong isn't the issue. What is the issue
is the lack of a strategy for success in Iraq. The President owes that to our soldiers
and their families, to the Iraqis, and to the American people.
The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Biden, and let me just say
that I, for one, appreciate this Senator's indefatigable interest in
the country. I think he has a room over there. I admire your stam-
ina and your courage. I will call now upon our Ambassador. Your
statement will be made part of the record in full but please do not
gone hiven if it: ab
to sponally manerce,


YO
feel inhibited. This is your time, and we want to hear from you.
Then we will have questions from our Senators. Please proceed.
STATEMENT OF THE HON. ZALMAY KHALILZAD, AMBASSADOR
TO IRAQ, DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, DC
Ambassador KHALILZAD. Mr. Chairman, Senator Biden, and dis-
tinguished members, I welcome this opportunity to share my as-
sessment of the situation in Iraq and my thoughts on the way
ahead. I have seen many of you in Baghdad and I want to thank
you for your visit and your interest in achieving a good outcome in
Iraq. Your visit also means support for the many courageous Amer-
icans who serve in both military and civilian posts in Iraq. I appre-
ciate, Mr. Chairman, your comments and Senator Biden, you
ments about the Americans who serve in Iraq. I will be brief in my
opening remarks and I look forward to exchanging views with you
in the remaining time.
I'll begin by giving my bottom-line assessment. Americans should
be strategically optimistic about Iraq, even as the continuing dif-
ficulties in Iraq will require tactical patience. The challenges of
curbing sectarian violence or defeating terrorism are difficult and
will require the full commitment of the Iraqi Government and the
coalition to resolve. And it will take time. However, the political
progress that has been made in Iraq has created opportunities and
has put Iraq on the right trajectory. The balance sheet in terms of
key developments during the past year has many positives, as well
as some new and continuing causes for concern. The positive devel-
opments, which give the Iraqi Government and friends of Iraq real
hope, create opportunities going forward to improve the situation
in Iraq.
They include a tectonic shift that has taken place in the political
orientation of the Sunni Arab community. The Sunni Arabs who
boycotted the January 2005 elections have largely participated in
the political process with representation in the National Assembly
and the government proportional to their share of the population.
Shia Arabs, who have been the principle target of sustained attacks
by terrorists, have exercised enormous restraint, even as some ex-
tremist Shia groups have opted for sectarian retaliation. Kurdish
leaders remain committed to a future as part of Iraq and have
played constructive roles in shaping a cross-ethnic and cross-sec-
tarian government. Iraqi leaders succeeded in forming Iraq's first
ever government of national unity, with nonsectarian security min-
isters, agreements on rules for decisionmaking on critical issues
and on the structure of institutions of the executive branch and a
broadly agreed-upon program. All elements of the Government of
National Unity have endorsed Prime Minister Maliki's National
Reconciliation and Dialogue Project, which is designed to address
the fundamental issues dividing Iraqis and to induce elements of
the armed opposition to lay down their arms and join the political
process. A divide has opened up between the Iraqi Sunni Arab in-
surgency and al-Qaeda and irreconcilable elements, as evidenced by
the fact that some insurgent groups have offered to provide intel-
ligence or to conduct operations against the terrorists. Key regional
countries, as well as the international community, have reassessed
their perspectives on the future if Iraq, with more and more coming


13
they meet the criteria-while others will be reintegrated into soci-
ety and be trained for jobs that are in demand in this new Iraqi
economy. That will take time and the resources—there will be a re-
quirement of resources for that reintegration, besides the political
will of the Iraqi leaders and part of those resources, I hope, will
come though this compact process that I mentioned in my state-
ment and you mentioned, Mr. Chairman.
So, this is going to be a very important issue for the success of
Iraq and we will work with the Iraqi Government. I have to tell
you, first of all, I can assure you that the people you have in the
mission there work closely together. We see ourselves as a single
team, good relations with General Casey and others involved. And
at the same time, I can assure you that we have, very good rela-
tions, good working relationship with the Prime Minister in the
new government. This is a significant, positive development. I will
have the opportunity to engage and to affect things in ways that
take our interests into account.
The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Ambassador, do you have a gut feeling, as
someone who is as close an observer of anyone I can think of on
the scene, that a predominant majority of Iraqis, quite apart from
this governmental group, really want to be Iraqis? Is there a sense
of being Iraqi among them that gives us some hope that those who
are attempting to disrupt that process as Sunnis or Shiites or mili-
tias or what have you, finally will be subordinated? And absent
re those who predict civil war, or separation of the
groups in the country, likely to have the last date? What is your
gut feeling as to whether there is this sense of wanting to be Iraqi?
Mr. KHALILZAD. We talked in the previous question, Mr. Chair-
man, about state-building issues. Here you are raising a funda-
mental issue with regard to nation-building. Iraq is a nation but
it is really a new nation, in the sense that for the first time in the
history of Iraq, perhaps, at least in the modern history of Iraq, you
have the people of Iraq, the community leaders, engaging with each
other about what does it mean to be an Iraqi and how do they re-
late to each other? In the earlier periods, external imperial powers
ruled Iraq. Whether it was the Ottomans or subsequently,
or an internal autocrat, they determined what it meant to be an
Iraqi, without full participation of all communities of Iraq. And
now, for the first time, all Iraqis are participating in the elections.
They have sat across the table with each other, arguing about fed-
eralism, arguing about the nature of the state, what powers should
be given to what institutions, rules and procedures for decision-
making, programs and so on.
So, I think state institutions are being built and a new Iraqi na-
tion also is being born. These processes, as we know from the his-
tory of our own country and the history of other old lands in Eu-
rope, are not easy. I know that you stated, Mr. Chairman, that the
American people are impatient—and they are entitled to be impa-
tient. They want to see results. They want to know that we are
heading in the right direction, that we know what we are doing
and I certainly appreciate that. But at the same time, I urge that
we be patient because the issues that the Iraqis are dealing with
are difficult, complicated issues that will take time to resolve and
that we need to be agile and adapt and adjust as they move for-


16
I have sat through hundreds if not more meetings with Iraqi lead-
ers in the process of negotiating, both in regard to the Constitution
and with regard to the government formation. I believe that there
is—you see the tendency to want to build a new Iraq with the
rights of the different communities.
Senator BIDEN. I acknowledge that, Mr. Ambassador.
Mr. KHALILZAD. We see both.
Senator BIDEN. That's what I said, there are two realities. That
is one of them. But there is the other reality.
Mr. KHALILZAD. We hope that the reality that I speak of will be-
come dominant and we can contain and reverse the other reality
that also exists.
With regard to the capacity of the ministries, it is very impor-
tant. The model that we have embraced is to help in the short
term; to help them do what needs to be done. But at the same
time, build institutional capacity for self-reliance because if we do
everything for them, there is the question of dependence that will
develop in terms of the longer term. The American people, through
you, the representatives, have been generous. We have this year
about $150 million for capacity-building; $60 million of that will be
spent in terms of short-term measures, from technical assistance,
where they need computers and hardware and so forth, to hiring
people that need to do the job when they can't do it, advising them
in terms of planning, programming, budgeting, and the capability.
We've done an overall assessment of the key ministries to see
where the weaknesses are and how to deal with those weaknesses.
But we do that through the Ministerial Advisory Team—MATs. Be-
sides the immediate assistance to our MATs, and then the longer
term program, which the bulk of our effort will go into—and we
think that will take time to build institutional capacity to train
Iraqis, building their civil service commission, building other insti-
tutions where their government officials will be trained. Due to the
methods of Saddam Hussein and then the de-Baathification and
the current problems of Iraq, capacity is limited in the ministries.
I agree with you. It varies from ministry to ministry but we are
we do have a plan and I'll be glad to—
Senator BIDEN. If you have a plan-if you will indulge me. A
plan for institution building. If I can make a terrible analogy.
There are a lot of new candidates for public office in the United
States. They know exactly what they think. They are very bright.
They know what they want to do.
Mr. KHALILZAD. Right, right.
Senator BIDEN. But they have to bring somebody in to say, by
the way, here's what you have to do.
Mr. KHALILZAD. Exactly.
Senator BIDEN. You have to have a plan to go raise money. You
have to have a plan to organize within these territories—you have
to have a plan—that's the institution-building.
Mr. KHALILZAD. Right.
Senator BIDEN. What is—are we laying out that plan for them,
not telling them what to do, how to build an institution?
Mr. KHALILZAD. We are. As I said, this is the responsibility of the
Ministry Advisory Team to develop those plans. But at the same


18
Iraq in the last 6 months? If my numbers are correct and I got
these from the State Department, that only $3.5 billion has been
provided out of the $4.6 billion that has been pledged from the
international community. As far as I know, it is still unclear
whether the Arab League will host a conference on Iraq. Unless
you have something new to talk about on that, this is a followup,
as you know, from November 2005 in Cairo. As you know and has
said it, as I have said it and we have had discussions about this,
there will be no resolution in the Middle East without a regional
understanding and a regional resolution. You have just noted that
in Iraq and I completely agree. But I'm not encouraged, Mr. Am-
bassador, with the lack of participation and effort and commitment
I see from the neighbors. I also am concerned about—I don't see
any effort to bolster or increase in the military as well. The United
States continues to carry the burden: The dying, the fighting, the
financing. And that really kind of loops me back to your point
about strategic optimism. Where is the strategic optimism when we
talk about how does that translate into Iraqi governance? We have
talked about magnificent progress and contributions that have
been made and successes: The Constitution; a freely elected govern-
ment. How does that translate into day-to-day governance, secu-
rity, supporting their own country, the corruption problem, our own
inspector general's report on this a couple of months ago, the Iraqi
inspector general. I understand where you have to be, to a certain
extent on this, but if you could answer some of those questions, be-
cause we need a clearer understanding of the specifics, of the meas-
urements, Mr. Ambassador, of what you are talking about here.
Thank you.
Mr. KHALILZAD. Thank you, Senator Hagel. I appreciate your
statement about me. With regard to strategic optimism that I
talked about, my judgment is that the participation of the Sunni
Arabs in the political process—they've changed from opposing this
change that took place in Iraq, to embracing it and wanting to
work with it. It gives me strategic hope that the different commu-
nities, the three principle communities of Iraq: The Shia Arab, the
Sunni Arab, and Kurds, are now working together to deal with the
problems of state- and nation-building that I referred to earlier.
That was a necessary step. You couldn't get Iraq on the right tra-
jectory if one of the three principle communities, as it was the case
a year ago, opposed it. Now that has changed. It was necessary but
it is not sufficient. A lot more has to happen and that's where I was
referring to the tactical patience, working through the problems
that exist, given this fundamental requirement, which has now
been met. It required patience. Now, of course, the question of a
timeline that you talked about, Senator Hagel, I believe that the
issue, the challenge that we face in this part of the world, which
is to encourage this region which has been dysfunctional for a long
time, which is the source of many of the security problems, is more
analogous in a timeline to dealing with the Soviet threat, in my
view, although it is not identical. We're talking about a trans-
formation that will take decades to achieve, not all by military
means, clearly, in most cases. In this case, we do have a significant
military means as part of it. But the challenge of the broader
change that is needed in this region, solving regional problems


19
such as the one that you talked about with regard to the Arab-
Israel problem, talking about the evolution of Iran. It is a great
people, a terrific civilization, right now, in a very difficult situation
given the policies of the leadership there on some issues as well as
some of the other challenges of this area. So this will take time and
the outcome in Iraq will be very important in shaping where this
region goes. God forbid, if we were to abandon this effort, the
threat that will emanate from that possibility, from that scenario,
would create, in my judgment, bigger problems than we face now.
I believe that for good strategic reasons, as well as for moral rea-
sons because we have had a role in bringing about these sets of cir-
cumstances in which Iraqis find themselves, that we can't abandon
them. We need to help them stand on their own feet because it
serves our strategic interests and we have a responsibility to see
it through. But staying the course that Senator Biden was saying,
in my view, is not doing everything exactly as you did before, ad-
ing as the circumstances warrant. I am not a believer in stay-
ing the course, do exactly what you did before although the cir-
cumstances would have changed.
Now, with regard to the regional situation and the international
situation, your specific questions, Senator Hagel, I believe and I
travel a lot in the region. I recently went to see the King of Saudi
Arabia, the leadership of UAE before the Prime Minister went
there. The fact that the Sunni Arabs are in, because most of the
leadership of the Arab world is Sunni Arab, the fact that the Sunni
Arabs are in the strategic issue that I talked about and the rec-
onciliation plan that the Prime Minister offered, reaching out to
the insurgency, had a big and positive impact in terms of how Iraq
is now perceived by the Arabs—and they are willing to help. They
are willing to help with the reconciliation because some of the in-
surgent groups are Sunnis that are still outside the political proc-
ess. These countries can influence them and they are willing to fa-
cilitate meetings and encourage these people to participate in the
political process. Also internationally, I believe that in the discus-
sions that we already have had on the compact, countries that op-
posed this project at the beginning are now saying they want to
participate. Some of their companies, particularly in the energy
sector, are already reengaging because Iraq, unlike Afghanistan,
has huge potential economically and the countries are beginning to
sort of see how they could benefit from that and participate. There-
fore, are looking for ways to enhance their engagement. So that is
what I would say about the strategic level as well with regard to
my regional and international assessment.
Senator HAGEL. Mr. Chairman, may I just add one thing? My
staff representative noted that I said $4.6 billion.
Mr. KHALILZAD. Right, that was $13.5—
Senator HAGEL. It is $14.6 billion that has been pledged, but only
$3.5 billion that has been given, is my understanding and again,
I received these numbers from the State Department.
Mr. KHALILZAD. That is correct.
Senator HAGEL. Which I don't think stands up very well in your
efforts, all of our efforts, in trying to engage commitments and con-
nect those to reality.


23
Ambassador KHALILZAD. I believe the policy has to be, and I be-
lieve it is, that we want Iraq to succeed and for Iraq to stand on
its own feet, to take care of its own security. But that will be—that
depends on building Iraqi capacity but also on conditions. I believe
that is why we have talked always about a condition-based frame-
work and there are places that there could be adjustments down-
ward inside Iraq, in terms of the presence. There are places, be-
cause of conditions and the help that the Iraqis need, that we may
have to increase the level of our forces. But that will be calibrated
and we will do constant recalibration, depending on the cir-
cumstances. But the target, the objective is an Iraq that can stand
on its own feet as soon as possible. .
Senator KERRY. Let me just say this, Mr. Chairman. I know my
time is up. It's hard to do this in 7 minutes and get through the
kind of series of questions that are important to really under-
standing a point. So let me, if I could just summarize quickly.
he word abandonment earlier and you used the word
adjustment now for success. None of us who have articulated alter-
native policies have suggested it as an abandonment or believe it
is. In fact, in the policy that the three of us sitting here proposed
as an alternative in the Senate, we specifically allowed the Presi-
dent the discretion to leave a certain number of troops to deal with
training, to fight al-Qaeda, to protect American facilities, to have
an over-the-horizon capacity in order to encourage success. But
there is a strong belief based on a lot of the statements of Sunni
and Shia politicians themselves about how our presence attracts in-
surgency and increases violence. I think there are plans right now
within the military to actually garrison troops, begin to move them
out, to take a very different posture, which is, in effect, the policy
we've prescribed. So I think using the word abandonment is the
wrong way to frame what the real choice is. The question here is
how do we get success? There are many people who believe that it
is only by pushing the Iraqis with the same kind of deadline that
required the elections, the transfer of authority, the Constitution,
all of which they met—with your pressure, I may add—that's the
only way to really affect the kind of transition necessary.
Ambassador KHALILZAD. While I am in complete agreement with
you, Senator Kerry, that we need to keep the pressure on the
İraqis to take on more responsibility, to deliver, to do the right
thing. I appreciate the sentiment behind some of the efforts and I
don't dismiss the utility of those efforts. So to the extent to which
efforts to encourage self-reliance is the motive that is welcome. But
the extent to which signals abandonment, undermine confidence, I
think that will be counterproductive to our goal.
Senator KERRY. So you don't believe that General Casey in mak-
ing a recommendation for a timetable for withdrawal has under-
mined the effort, do you?
Ambassador KHALILZAD. I don't believe that General Casey has
recommended a timetable for withdrawal.
Senator KERRY. He made a presentation to the Pentagon with re-
spect to plans.
* Ambassador KHALILZAD. You know the Pentagon and I have
worked—you know, I used to head the planning and policy shop
there. We have a lot of plans and then adjustments are made as


27
element of our strategies. It has got to be, to deal with the prob-
lems. How we configure our military posture to deal with the prob-
lems of the region as an element in an overall strategy, I'll leave
it to the Pentagon planners and to the Secretary of Defense.
Senator CHAFEE. Seeing as I am holding the microphone, I'll con-
tinue until another Senator comes back and then go vote myself.
I believe Tuesday you gave a speech to the Center for Strategic and
International Studies. Is that right?
Ambassador KHALILZAD. Yes; I did.
Senator CHAFEE. And in that speech, I think you've made some
similar comments this morning, also, about Syria and Iran. In that
speech to the CSIS, you said that if Iran persists in its unhelpful
actions, the Iraqi Government, as well as the United States and
other friends of Iraq, will need to consider necessary measures to
deny Tehran the ability to undertake destabilizing policies. So back
to the reshaping of the Middle East, what do you have in mind
there? With that sentence?
Ambassador KHALILZAD. This is about reshaping Iran and poli-
cies in Iraq. I had a very specific issue in mind and that is, Šen-
that Iran is pursing a two-track approach to Iraq. On the one
hand, it has good state-to-state relations with the new Government
of Iraq. But in addition, it is using its Quds forces, which is part
of its Revolutionary Guards, as well as its intelligence and some
surrogates in Iraq, to attack coalition forces to support militias. We
discussed earlier the problem of militias for the success of Iraq.
And what I was saying is that unless Iran abandons this second
prong of its policy that is unhelpful to Iraq and to the coalition, and
the Iraqi Government recognizes this, together with the Iraqi Gov-
ernment, we have to take steps to deal with that challenge. That
was my intent, that we are cognizant of the second element and we
are thinking, together with the Iraqi Government, what to do about
it. We are considering options if Iran persists.
Senator CHAFEE. You led off that answer by saying there are
some positive elements of the relationship between Iran and the
Government of Iraq.
Ambassador KHALILZAD. I agree with that. As I said, it is a two-
track approach and I was referring to the second track.
Senator CHAFEE. Are we working to—on the first track-to make
that stronger?
Ambassador KHALILZAD. As you know, we did make an offer ear-
lier on, to talk to the Iranians about the situation in Iraq and to
have the opportunity to express our concerns with regard to the
second track and to also express to them that we do not seek a hos-
tile relationship between Iran and Iraq. They are neighbors. We
want a good relationship between neighboring states in that region.
Our goal has been an Iraq that set peace internally and in terms
of the region, unlike Saddam, who went to war against Iran at a
huge cost to both countries and Kuwait was a source of huge inse-
curity for the region. That is not the goal. Our goal is an Iraq that
is both internally secure and has peaceful relations with its neigh-
bors. For various reasons in terms of timing, those discussions did
not take place. Now the focus is clearly in terms of a dialog with
Iran on the nuclear issue and we'll see how things evolve from here
1. But I would not rule out that—and there are appropriate


28
circumstances that we will go back to an engagement on the Iraqi
situation.
Senator CHAFEE. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador, for all your serv-
ice.
Ambassador KHALILZAD. Thank you, sir.
The CHAIRMAN (presiding). Thank you very much, Senator
Chafee.
Senator Boxer.
Senator BOXER. Thank you very much, Mr. Ambassador. Thank
you for your service. As I said when I supported you when you
came before this committee, I also thanked your family at that
time and I continue to do that. My trip to Iraq was a harrowing
experience and fortunately, there was no particular incident. So
you are facing this uncertainty every minute when you are there
and I just want to say thank you for your service.
During your confirmation hearing, you expressed confidence that
Irag's sectarian divisions could be overcome and you still exhibit
that confidence. At your confirmation hearing, you said, “there is
a lot to build on to foster a focus on a united Iraq, an Iraq that
brings the Iraqi people together rather than splits them apart
based on ethnicity and sectarianism.” Now, since you made that
statement, incidents of sectarian violence have risen from 5 per
month to 250 per month and you questioned the database. I'll put
it in the record, Mr. Chairman, this is the Brookings Institution so
this is solid data.
The CHAIRMAN. It is placed in the record.
[The Brookings Institution information submitted by Senator
Boxer follows:]
THE STATE OF IRAQ: AN UPDATE
Categories
May 2003
May 2004
May 2005
May 2006
250
1,000
1,000
1,500
56
10
25
60
35
30
20,000
77
60,000
68
37
10
..............
10
150/23
3,000
100
65
138/24
15,000
500
259
138/23
16,000
1,000
Iraq civilian deaths ............
Multifatality bombings .....
Iraqis kidnapped per day ......
Iraqis optimistic about future (percent)
Iraqi police officers and soldiers in top two readiness tiers (out
of four) ............
U.S. troop fatalities
Other foreign troop fatalities .....
Iraqi Army and police fatalities ................... ........
U.S./other coalition troops (in thousands)
Estimated number of insurgents .....
Estimated number of foreign fighters ................
Daily attacks by insurgents .....
Monthly incidents of sectarian violence
Monthly attacks on oil and gas assets
Oil production (millions of barrels per day; prewar: 2.5) .....
Household fuel supplies (as percentage of estimated need; gas-
oline, kerosine, etc.) .............
Average electric power from official grid (in megawatts; prewar:
4,000)
Telephone subscribers (in millions; prewar: 0.8) .................
Real GDP per capita (in dollars; prewar: 900) ................
Eligible Iraqis voting freely in last election (percent)
Actionable intelligence tips from Iraqi civilians ..................
149
132/20
20,000
1,500
90
250
10
20
1.9
2.1
os
3,900
1.2
3,800
7.5
1,100
1,000
3,700
3.5
1,075
58
1,700
550
0
100
77
300
4.400
Senator BOXER. Just yesterday, a gunman abducted two dozen
Shiites from a bus station northeast of Baghdad, took them to a


30
That's what they think. I don't know, you come here with a rosy
view and by the way, you're the best of them. You're the most di-
rect of them. But you come here with a far rosier view than the
Iraqis, than the legislators, who Senator Kerry quoted, and I'm
quoting, and then let's look at what the Iraqi people think. Again,
the Brookings Institution, only 30 percent of them are now opti-
mistic, where a couple of years ago, 70 percent of them were opti-
mistic.
So how do you square your view and who should the people in
America believe? They're smart. Should they believe this adminis-
tration that went into this war without a plan and is struggling
every day to figure out another mission or should they believe the
Iraqi people? By the way, a vast majority say that things will get
better if there is a timetable for America's withdrawal.
Ambassador KHALILZAD. Senator, I have tried to level with the
American people and with the Congress. I call it as I see it. Some-
times it gets me in trouble with people I work for. But the situation
is as I described. There could be, obviously, honorable differences
of view, an honest difference of view in terms of the assessment.
I don't rule that out. My judgment is, as I've said in CSIS speeches,
I said today, that sectarianism has become the dominant problem.
But at the same time, the fact of the unity government, the fact
that Sunnis were not in the political process a year ago, did not
vote in that election, now, they've voted in the last election, as pro-
portional to their numbers or negotiated with the government,
program to which they agree, a key part of which was a reconcili-
ation, which the government has taken. I believe to these successes
that terrorists have adapted, Senator Boxer, by focusi
sectarian conflict. Sectarian conflict is a faultline that is being ex-
ploited.
Senator BOXER. Let me just stop you here, if I can.
Ambassador KHALILZAD. Let me say, let me say something on
Mr. Mutlak. Mr. Mutlak is an opposition politician and we know
about politics when you are in the opposition. He is not part of the
government so I am not surprised by an opposition politician judg-
ing the government the way he did.
Senator BOXER. OK, are you surprised by the fact that 87 per-
cent of the Iraqi people want to see us have a timeline? Are you
surprised about that?
Ambassador KHALILZAD. I believe that the vast majority of the
Iraqi people would like the American coalition forces to leave. But
the vast majority of the Iraqi people also do not want the United
States to leave immediately.
Senator BOXER. OK, well, we're not talking about—we're talking
about a timetable, which is a big issue around this place and 87
percent say things will get better if there is a timetable put out.
Let me, because my time is up and I've talked to the chairman. I
promised him. I will just ask one more quick question here because
I've written two letters to Secretary Rumsfeld, asking for a plan in
the event of a full scale civil war. Now, the Pentagon has not pro-
vided that plan and instead refers me to the so-called National
Strategy for Victory in Iraq. On Tuesday, the GAO called the Bush
administration's Iraq strategy inadequate and poorly planned. Now


31
we've seen your cable, which I am sure you didn't write but had
your name on it.
Ambassador KHALILZAD. No, no, I stand behind that cable.
Senator BOXER. That's fine. The cable in which,
Ambassador KHALILZAD. I salute the courage of the Iraqis who
work with us in the difficult circumstances. They come every day
to the Embassy and work.
Senator BOXER. I agree. They are very weary.
Ambassador KHALILZAD. That cable was a factual cable that I
stand behind.
Senator BOXER. Well, I so appreciate that because that cable tells
a story that the American people aren't hearing about what it is
really like. But in that cable, a few of your Iraqi staff members
asked what provisions would be made for them if you had to evac-
uate. So your Iraqi staff clearly believes a full scale civil war is a
real possibility. So what I want to ask you is this: Since you have
said we are not going to stay where we're not wanted—you've said
that—since 87 percent of the people in Iraqi want to see a plan for
withdrawal, I'll tell you—and since your own people are saying,
what are we going to do if there is full-scale civil war? Since you
said there is a tectonic shift in the views in sight of the Sunnis and
the leading Sunni legislator says it is a hopeless situation, will you
please, for me, send me something that explains what are our con-
tingencies if there is a full-blown civil war, because Rumsfeld won't
get it to me. They send me on a journey through some plan that
the GAO says is inadequate. Will you let me know? You don't have
r it now. What are our plans for a contingency if there is
a full-blown civil war or however you want to phrase it, call it?
Ambassador KHALILZAD. We are doing everything we can with
the Ir 1 Government, Senator Boxer, to prevent a civil war, to
bring sectarian violence down. I have talked about that.
Senator BOXER. I'm not asking you that. I believe that so much.
My question is, Will you send me what your contingency plans are?
Your own staff is saying, what are the contingency plans and while
we're at it, will you also give me your assurance that our military
will not be handed over to the Iraqi Government to face any type
of trial, because these are people who have already said they are
going to give they are considering amnesty for those who cut off
the heads of our soldiers. I'm not turning a soldier over to them.
I assume you agree with that.
Ambassador KHALILZAD. Sustained ethno-sectarian violence is
the greatest threat to security and stability in Iraq. The violence
in Iraq is terrible and regrettable, but it is not a civil war. The
United States is doing all it can to support the Iraqi Government's
initiatives to reduce the violence. This support is wide-ranging,
from military support such as for the Iraqi-led and Coalition
Forces-supported Baghdad Security Plan, to assistance for recon-
struction and to improve essential services, to political encourage-
ment of PM Maliki's national reconciliation efforts and the deep-
ening of democracy and the rule of law.
All Department of State overseas facilities maintain a post-spe-
cific emergency action plan detailing the planned responses to a
wide range of emergency situations. An evacuation plan is a stand-
ard chapter within these emergency action plans. U.S. Embassy


32
Baghdad maintains such an emergency action plan. Those aspects
of the emergency action plan that deal with our contingency plans
under various levels of violence are classified. As such, I am not in
a position to discuss this in an open session. I can assure you, how-
ever that we are working hard to avoid a situation in which we
would need to implement such a plan.
Senator BOXER. I would like a more detailed answer. That's not
a good enough answer for me. Could you give me an answer in
writing on this, how you feel about turning our soldiers over-
Ambassador KHALILZAD. Under the existing framework, U.S.
forces are subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States,
consistent with longstanding U.S. policy of maximizing U.S. juris-
diction over our forces abroad. As issues have arisen, we have
worked with the Prime Minister to address his concerns and we
will continue to do so. I know that General Casey is absolutely
committed to his forces acting appropriately. Any allegations of un-
ethical or criminal behavior will be investigated and any service-
members found to have committed violations will be held account-
able. If the Prime Minister wants to know about particular cases,
we are certainly open to discussions on that.
We're not going to turn our soldiers over to the Iraqis. I would
like to give that answer very clearly.
Senator BOXER. That is a good, clear answer and you're going to
send me something about-
Ambassador KHALILZAD. I will talk about the amnesty issue but
turning over-certainly we will not turn over American soldiers.
We have an agreement with Iraq on this issue, under the U.N. res-
olution, under the rules put in place by CPA.
Senator BOXER. But the Prime Minister wants to take another
look at that agreement.
Ambassador KHALILZAD. Oh, we will. We are perfectly willing to
discuss with the Prime Minister his concerns about the issue. If he
believes that the American soldiers who violated the law, the Law
of War, policy and rules of the United States, that they will go Scot
free, he is wrong. They are prosecuted. The law is applied. If he
wants to know what rule Iraqis can plan for in terms of getting in-
formed about the different stages of particular cases, we certainly
are open to a dialog and suggestions with him on that. But with
regard to the turning over of the American soldiers to the Iraqis;
no.
Senator BOXER. OK.
The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Boxer.
Senator Feingold.
Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Mr.
Ambassador, for coming to testify in front of the committee. I know
you are really busy and I hope that you know that all of us appre-
ciate the incredibly hard work that you and the men and women
who work with you are doing in Iraq. My colleagues have already
discussed a range of important issues and I won't take a lot of time
but I do want to talk about what has obviously become one of the
largest questions we are facing in Iraq today: How long U.S. forces
will remain there. Unfortunately, we can't get this administration
to clarify for the American people about when our troops will come
home and as Senator Boxer just alluded to, a new GÃO study re-


36
thinking in time about nation-building, would that be the correct
measure? I mean, wouldn't we—we're past the idea of the war in
Iraq. We're at a point where a nation is being built. You're calling
it a new nation. The United States of America was once called the
First New Nation. So what lessons do we have there?
Some of the ones I think of in terms of nation-building, we may
be approaching the time of World War II but we're not close to the
time of our involvement after World War II in Japan. I mean, we've
had U.S. troops there since 1945. The occupation of Japan ended
7 years after the war. We've had troops in Germany since 1945.
West Germany wasn't set up until 4 years after the war, fully sov-
ereign in 1955. In Kosovo, United States troops have been there
now for 7 years. So that's one way to measure tactical patience for
nation-building. In terms of constitutional development, Iraq, you
say, is a new nation. If America was the first new nation, our Con-
stitution came 11 years after our Declaration of Independence. Giv-
ing women the right to vote came 120 years after our Constitution.
We still—we're denying equal opportunity to African-Americans
180 years after our Constitution. So as we Senators and we citizens
sit here in the United States looking at Iraq in a period of nation-
building, what is the measure of tactical patience?
Ambassador KHALILZAD. Thank you, Senator Alexander. I believe
that the issues that we face are state-building, nation-building, and
fighting terror. Those are the three things that we are doing in
Iraq. With regard to nation-building, the key issue, in my judg-
ment, is constitutional agreement; we still have a set of issues left
that have to be addressed. Second, there has to be the issue of
what happens with the de-Baathification, because in the aftermath
of the liberation of Iraq, the party was outlawed and a commission
was established to look at people who were candidates for jobs or
were in the government that could not hold positions. It has be-
come a controversial issue that needs some closure on that. There
are issues also, which gets into state- and nation-building, which
covers both—that is building new institutions of the state: The po-
lice who are truly credible and respected and we know from our
own experience how difficult and complicated that can be, and the
institution of the army. But the war of terror, of course, element
is a separate track, related because they are seeking to undermine
our state- and nation-building efforts. There, in my judgment, the
process overall will take time to do, as you say. You can't do these
important things in 2, 3 years. But it doesn't have to be—the mix
of instruments that we apply to it will not be the same. I think,
assuming if things move in the direction that we're working for, it
will allow for a significant diminution in the role of the military,
not a complete elimination of the role of the military, but allow for
an increase relatively and other instruments of our policy, to cope
with the situation, to encourage a successful state- and nation-
building program and defeating terror in Iraq. So you're right that
the war model, in terms of a timeline, is not the right model for
what we are doing: A state/nation-building and a war of terror
model needs to be applied in this case.
Senator ALEXANDER. My other question is, it's been suggested
that maybe a solution is a federation, three states, Kurdistan, a


37
Shia state, a Sunni state. If that were to happen, what would the
consequences be?
Ambassador KHALILZAD. Well, the Constitution allows for Iraqis
to organize themselves the way they see fit, but I think it would
be a mistake for us, for the United States, to say and impose that
on them. I think the process for imposing such an outcome on Iraq
will cause huge difficulties, intensifing sectarian violence. But if
democratically and voluntarily, they want to federalize the rest of
Iraq in that way, that is available to them constitutionally. But
that's not what they want at the present time, the Sunni Arabs.
Generally, they want a stronger central government at this point,
thinking the problem is not too strong a central government but too
weak a central government. The assumption using the same argu-
ment saying: Well, since the center is preoccupied with issues of se-
curity, let's allow the providences and the regions to do more things
for themselves. These are perfectly legitimate big issues that the
Iraqis need to come to an agreement on, and they have agreed,
thank goodness, for a path to deal with this, for resolving this issue
in the agreement at the end of the drafting of the constitution. I
think we ought to be supporting a constitutional process, rather
than kind of suggesting that we divide the country along sectarian
lines.
Senator ALEXANDER. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador. Thank you,
Mr. Chairman.
The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Alexander.
Senator Nelson.
Senator NELSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Ambassador,
it's good to see you. What message do you want to send to Tehran
about their involvement in Iraq?
Ambassador KHALILZAD. The message has two parts. Part one is
that we favor good relations between Iraq and all its neighbors.
The United States is not seeking to impose its differences with Iran
on the Iraqis in terms of dealing with Iran. The second part of the
message, however, is that Iranian efforts to undermine this new
Iraq by sending arms, training militias and extremists, by sending
money to them, to keep Iraq weak so that Iraq will not be able to
play the traditional balancing role vis-a-vis Iran as a significant
power in its own right, is unacceptable to the Iraqi Governm
and to us. We are looking for, and the Iraqi Government also is,
for an adjustment in Iranian policy. And if that adjustment doesn't
come as a—to Iraqis and those of us who are supporting Iraq will
look at measures to be able to deal with that challenge, by the sec-
ond element of the Iranian policy.
Senator NELSON. Earlier today in this hearing, you suggested
that some of this Iranian influence was with the direct approval of
the Government of Iran. To what extent are Iranian groups, inde-
pendent of the Iranian Government, operating in Iraq?
Ambassador KHALILZAD. There are things I can speak about with
confidence, that I believe the Iranian Government does directly
bear a responsibility for when its particular forces, such as the
Quds Force, does things. There are things where, of course, infor-
mation is contradictory and this is not an appropriate forum to get
into that, but I think there are things that I am pretty confident


40
gically to deal with the violence without having the political
progress that had to take place with the Sunni Arab community
accepting to play its role in the political process. The question is,
there is no doubt that—well, let's just say it hasn't been sufficient,
as you say correctly and others have adapted to this, particularly
the terrorists, by focusing, extenuating the sectarian faultline that
was there, to exploiting it. Since they have adjusted to our strat-
egy, which was to bring people together, they are trying to push
a button, work on an issue that can keep us from succeeding. I be-
lieve that I outlined in my statement, steps that need to be taken
politically and securitywise, to deal with the sectarian violence
issue to bring it under control. And I believe those are issues hav-
ing to do with militias, with the insurgency and bringing those two
elements that are principally responsible, besides terrorists, to this
violence increasing end of control. The reform of the Ministry of In-
terior, which we talked about when you were there, I think we now
have a Minister that we can work with to reform the Ministry.
There are instances in which the militia gets support from ele-
ments in the Interior of Ministry when they are involved in sec-
tarian violence, so we have to deal with those. Those are difficult
issues of state- and nation-building that we've talked about earlier.
But I believe that this government, has 6 months or so, to bring
the sectarian violence under control and if it doesn't, then I think
we would have a serious situation because now, politically, you
have the forces, all the key forces in the government. So if the peo-
ple come to view that this government cannot deal with it, then
there will be a serious issue.
Senator OBAMA. Can I focus on that point? I've always found you
to be very open and thoughtful and all of us feel that you've made
an enormous contribution with your presence there, so I hate to get
you in trouble. But I'm going to try to pin you down on what you
said. If this government has not significantly reduced sectarian vio-
lence in about 6 months, then we've got real problems. Right? If
I'm hearing this correctly, what I'm hearing you say is that at that
point, the Iraqi people will have the confidence and the central gov-
ernment will have eroded to the point where its not clear what we
do now. I guess the question then becomes, what do we do then?
Because you may be back here in 6 months and I'm going to feel
bad when I read back this transcript and say, 6 mon
the sectarian violence continues. So at that point, how do you re-
spond to Senators Kerry or Feingold when they say, OK, look, at
some point, we have to cut out losses here. This thing is not work-
ing and something entirely different is going to have to be tried
that does not involve this sort of—I was little worried when Sen-
ator Alexander mentioned us being in Japan for 45 years and Ger-
many—as far as I know, we weren't spending $100 billion a year
during that 50-year period. Why don't you respond to what I think
was a fairly open-ended question? Take it where you will.
Ambassador KHALILZAD. What I would like to say, Senator, is
that we have to work with the Iraqi Government in the course of
the next 6 months to bring the sectarian violence under
encourage them to do the steps that are necessary, both on the po-
litical and on the security track, and we will need to help them on


42
sembly names of people who were under investigation for charges
of corruption. As to the financing of the insurgency, I think I can
say that it is multiple sources. Some money comes from outside, in
my view. I can't go into too much detail in this forum, but also
from smuggling and from some of the hostage taking. Those are
also sources of money for the insurgents.
Senator COLEMAN. I was just told that we have a full and firm
commitment that if you can cut off the economic support, that you
have somewhat of a chance of slowing down the veracity of the ef-
fort. Since there is limited time, Mr. Chairman, I will yield the rest
of my time back for my colleague from Connecticut.
The CHAIRMAN. I appreciate the thoughtfulness, Senator.
Senator Dodd.
Senator DODD. Well, I, too, appreciate the thoughtfulness. Thank
you, Senator. I apologize to you, Mr. Chairman, and to you, Mr.
Ambassador. The timing was not perfect this morning. I had an
amendment they asked me to offer on the floor of the U.S. Senate
dealing with homeland security issues so I apologize not being here
at the outset to hear your remarks. And I apologize to the chair-
man and Senator Biden as well, for not being here earlier. Thank
you for your presence and again, thank you for your dedication and
your work. I want you to understand here, I think all of us prob-
ably feel that whatever criticisms we have are not focused on you,
specifically. There is a huge task you have and I have great respect
for the efforts you make.
I'm going to focus on two quick questions, if I can. Picking up on
some of the things I'm told that you raised earlier, one has to do
with the issue of your suggestion. I think it was made in a speech.
You may have made it as part of the response to a question here
today, of increasing the U.Š. force strength around Baghdad, from
40,000 to 55,000 troops. Let me make two points here if I can. One
is about a year ago, Senator Reid of Rhode Island and myself were
in Baghdad meeting with U.S. military commanders and one of the
points that was made about a year ago was that there wa
good likelihood that the city of Baghdad could be policed effectively
by Iraqi forces. We are now told—I think the numbers—my col-
leagues will correct me here or you will—are some 265,000 İraqis
are in uniform and trained to one degree or another.
Let me pose the question to you by referring to a cable that was
reported in the Washington Post, that you sent to the Secretary of
State, which you point out here that we describing the difficulties
of our employees at the U.S. Embassy. We cannot call employees
in on weekends or holidays without blowing their cover. Likewise,
they have been unavailable during multiple security closures im-
posed by the government since February. A Sunni Arab female em-
ployee tells us that her family pressures, the inability to share de-
tails of her employment, is very tough. Mounting criticism of the
United States at home among her family members also makes her
life difficult. She told us that in mid-June, that most of her family
believed the United States, which is widely perceived as fully con-
trolling the country, is punishing populations as Saddam did but
with Sunnis and very poor Shiites now at the bottom of the list.
My point and the question to you is, if, in fact, you are making,
you are reporting this kind of a problem that exists, why in the


46
Ambassador KHALILZAD. The Iraqi Government is, along with the
United Nations, cochairing an international conference on Iraq, in
which Iraqis will commit themselves to certain goals and timelines
in exchange for political and economic support from the inter-
national community.
Senator SARBANES. Now, I understand earlier-
Ambassador KHALILZAD. And we support that.
Senator SARBANES [continuing]. Yes. I apologize—I wasn't able to
be here at the outset so if some of these questions are redundant,
I apologize for that. But earlier in this hearing in response to Sen-
ator Hagel, you said that of the $14 billion that had originally been
pledged for Iraq, only $4 billion of it has been received. Is that cor-
rect?
Ambassador KHALILZAD. I think that is largely correct; yes, Sen-
ator.
Senator SARBANES. Why do you think we've had so much trouble
getting those contributions to come through?
Ambassador KHALILZAD. Part of it that I am aware of, that I deal
with in the neighborhood of Iraq has been the reluctance of some
of the Arab countries who pledged to deliver on, and they have
been slow because of their concern about the government there.
The Sunni Arabs and most of the Arab countries are Sunni
Arabs—have taken a negative view of the previous government,
which did not have elected Sunni members. Now that there is a
unity government with Sunnis fully participating, in my judgment,
there is a transition to a more positive attitude.
Senator SARBANES. Could I interject right there?
Ambassador KHALILZAD. Yes, sir.
Senator SARBANES. Is it your judgment that we are fully over the
hump of having a unity government, that that has now
worked out in a lasting way or does it still remain a very shaky
situation with respect to a unity government?
Ambassador KHALILZAD. Well, there is a unity government but it
faces the challenge of sectarianism on the street. This is the best
government, in a sense, to deal with it but at the same time, of
course, I can understand that continuing sectarian violence can
strain relations inside that government. So I suppose, an oppor-
tunity and a challenge, but there is the issue of integrating some
of those other elements that are not in yet, insurgency, which was
first necessary to bring the political leadership of the Sunnis and
now the Prime Minister reaching out as part of the reconciliation,
to the insurgency to be brought in and we support that. The Arab
governments in the neighborhood can help and that is why they
went to Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and UAE to seek their help and
they have offered to assist them.
Senator SARBANES. Speaking of the neighborhood—and I'll close
with this—could you very quickly run through for us the roles that
are being played by the neighboring countries with respect to the
situation in Iraq? I understand earlier you spoke at considerable
length on Iran so I'll leave that aside on the assumption that it has
been covered. But you could go through the other countries and
give us some sense of the roles they are playing?
Ambassador KHALILZAD. I believe Syria is also playing a mixed
role with a lot of negative in it. Turkey, Jordan, Kuwait, Saudi


49
The United States remains engaged with Iraqi political, religious, and civil society
leaders to assist in the transition from government formation to governing. While
there are still many challenges that lie ahead to address the pressing needs of the
Iraqi people, PM Maliki remains focused on a long-term strategy to ensure success
of the Iraqi Government.
Question. What are the objectives of the International Compact that the adminis-
tration hopes to put into place? What will it encompass? Will the compact involve
a wider involvement than the Council of Ministers? What are we doing to ensure
its legitimacy?
Answer. The International Compact with Iraq is an Iraqi initiative supported by
the United Nations and the World Bank. The objectives of the compact are for Iraq
to commit to reforming its political economy so that will become self-sustaining over
the next 5 years. In return, Iraq's international partners (countries and inter-
national organizations) will commit to providing the assistance needed until Iraq is
capable of meeting its goals with its own resources. While the content of the com-
pact will be mainly economic, dealing with such vital sectors as oil, electricity, and
agriculture, and such important topics as subsidy reform, social safety nets, and
fighting corruption, the document will also point to the importance of Iraq con-
tinuing to make gains with security and its political institutions.
The Government of Iraq, the United Nations, and the World Bank are organizing
the work effort for the compact so as to directly engage key Iraqi ministries into
the process. Iraq's provincial governments will also be involved in the process of for-
mulating the compact. We expect that the resulting document will receive the en-
dorsement of Iraq's Council of Ministers.
Legitimacy will also derive from the endorsements the compact receives from the
international community, in particular Iraq's Gulf Arab neighbors and their official
financial institutions.
We are encouraging the Iraqis to view the compact as a framework for focusing
their efforts for engaging international actors and organizations—to begin on eco-
nomic matters.
Question. Beyond the compact, are you involved in increasing the contributions of
international actors and organizations, or are you encouraging the Iraqi ministers
to lead this effort?
Answer. In every appropriate venue, we continue to urge international support for
Iraq politically, economically, and in the security area by upgrading diplomatic rela-
tions, supporting capacity-building programs, concluding bilateral debt forgiveness
agreements, disbursing existing pledges, seeking new donor support and seeking
support for security and stability.
În coordination with the Iraqi Government, our international engagement strat-
egy includes consultations by Ú.S. Government principals with regional and other
countries, and outreach to international organizations, NGOs, and international fi-
nancial institutions. I personally engage Iraq's neighbors such as with my recent
visits to UAE and Saudi Arabia. Foreign ministerial and bilateral meetings, inter-
national summits, official visits, and many congressional delegations are also rein-
forcing our objective of increased international support for the new Iraqi Govern-
ment. Most recently, the G-8 summit provided such a venue for engagement.
Question. You have spoken about Syria and Iran. With fingers being pointed at
Damascus and Tehran for destabilizing activities with respect to Iraq, and also for
backing the intransigence of Hamas and Hezbollah with respect to Israel, what is
the sense of Iraqis of their ability to deal effectively with these neighbors?
Answer. Despite public statements signaling their interest in dialog and coopera-
tion with Iraq, it is the position of the United States Government that Syria and
Iran continue to support destabilizing activities with respect to Iraq. Syria continues
to turn a blind eye toward insurgents' entry into Iraq and has claimed difficulty
with controlling transit. Iran continues to undertake destructive activities in Iraq,
and adversely affect the new national unity government's efforts to promote national
reconciliation.
The Iraqis understand that solutions will require coordinated and simultaneous
actions across the political, economic, and security tracks. The Government of Iraq
understands that it must lead these efforts, including carrying out an initiative fo-
cused on national reconciliation. For instance, the Iraqis are coordinating closely
with the Arab League, calling for Iraqi parties and Arab States to support Iraq and
respect the political will of the Iraqi people, bolstering any outside interference or
influence.
Senior Iraqi officials have made their views about Syrian and Iranian actions in
Iraq known to the officials of those governments. While the details of those con-