S. HRG. 109–885 4.AR 5/3:S.HRG.109-885 IRAQ, AFGHANISTAN, AND THE GLOBAL WAR ON TERRORISM HEARINGS BEFORE THE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES UNITED STATES SENATE ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS SECOND SESSION AUGUST 3; NOVEMBER 15, 2006 Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services Pennsylvania State University Libraries JUN 2 8 2007 Documents Collection U.S. Depository Copy U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE WASHINGTON : 2007 35-223 PDF For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512–1800; DC area (202) 512–1800 Fax: (202) 512–2250 Mail: Stop SSOP, Washington, DC 20402-0001 COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES JOHN WARNER, Virginia, Chairman JOHN MCCAIN, Arizona CARL LEVIN, Michigan JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma EDWARD M. KENNEDY, Massachusetts PAT ROBERTS, Kansas ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine JACK REED, Rhode Island JOHN ENSIGN, Nevada DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii JAMES M. TALENT, Missouri BILL NELSON, Florida SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia E. BENJAMIN NELSON, Nebraska LINDSEY O. GRAHAM, South Carolina MARK DAYTON, Minnesota ELIZABETH DOLE, North Carolina EVAN BAYH, Indiana JOHN CORNYN, Texas HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON, New York JOHN THUNE, South Dakota CHARLES S. ABELL, Staff Director RICHARD D. DEBOBES, Democratic Staff Director (II) IRAQ, AFGHANISTAN, AND THE GLOBAL WAR ON TERRORISM THURSDAY, AUGUST 3, 2006 U.S. SENATE, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, Washington, DC. The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:31 a.m. in room SH- 216, Hart Senate Office Building, Senator John Warner (chairman) presiding. Committee members present: Senators Warner, McCain, Inhofe, Sessions, Collins, Talent, Chambliss, Graham, Cornyn, Thune, Levin, Kennedy, Byrd, Reed, Bill Nelson, E. Benjamin Nelson, Day- ton, Bayh, and Clinton. Committee staff members present: Charles S. Abell, staff direc- tor; and Leah C. Brewer, nominations and hearings clerk. Majority staff members present: William M. Caniano, profes- sional staff member; Gregory T. Kiley, professional staff member; Sandra E. Luff, professional staff member; Derek J. Maurer, pro- fessional staff member; David M. Morriss, counsel; Lynn F. Rusten, professional staff member; and Kristine L. Svinicki, professional staff member. Minority staff members present: Richard D. DeBobes, Democratic staff director; Daniel J. Cox, Jr., professional staff member; Creighton Greene, professional staff member; Michael J. Kuiken, professional staff member; Michael J. McCord, professional staff member; William G.P. Monahan, minority counsel; and Michael J. Noblet, staff assistant. Staff assistants present: Jessica L. Kingston, Benjamin L. Rubin, and Pendred K. Wilson. Committee members' assistants present: Christopher J. Paul and Richard H. Fontaine, Jr., assistants to Senator McCain; John A. Bonsell and Jeremy Shull, assistants to Senator Inhofe; Arch Gallo- way II, assistant to Senator Sessions; Mackenzie M. Eaglen, assist- ant to Senator Collins; Matthew R. Rimkunas, assistant to Senator Graham; Greg Riels, assistant to Senator Dole; Russell J. Thomasson, assistant to Senator Cornyn; Stuart C. Mallory, assist- ant to Senator Thune; Sharon L. Waxman, assistant to Senator Kennedy; Christine Evans and Erik Raven, assistants to Senator Byrd; Frederick M. Downey, assistant to Senator Lieberman; Wil- liam K. Sutey, assistant to Senator Bill Nelson; Eric Pierce, assist- ant to Senator Ben Nelson; Luke Ballman, assistant to Senator Dayton; Robert J. Ehrich, assistant to Senator Bayh; and Andrew Shapiro, assistant to Senator Clinton. (1) OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN WARNER, CHAIRMAN Chairman WARNER. Good morning, everyone. The committee meets this morning to receive testimony from the distinguished Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld; General Peter Pace, Chair- man of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; and General John Abizaid, Com- mander of the United States Central Command (CENTCOM), on progress in Iraq, Afghanistan, and the war on terrorism, and such other aspects as relative to your area of operations. The committee will also look in their insights on the ongoing crisis involving Israel, Hezbollah, Lebanon, and to some extent, Palestine. Secretary Rumsfeld, the committee appreciates the changes you have made in your schedule that you have outlined to me very carefully and we welcome you this morning. Last week, in an historic visit the prime minister of Iraq met with President Bush, addressed a joint session of Congress, and spoke with military personnel at Fort Belvoir, Virginia. I was privi- leged to be present at all of those events and I think it was an ex- tremely important chapter in the ongoing developments in Iraq that he took that time to come over here. He demonstrated the re- solve of the Iraqi people to build a free and stable country. During the meeting with military personnel and their families- and I witnessed this in a very passionate and sincere way, he con- veyed to those military people present at Fort Belvoir and for broadcast to military people all over the United States and the world the gratefulness in the hearts of the Iraqi people for their sacrifices of life and limb and that of their families in order to en- able the people of Iraq to gain a measure of democracy, elect their government, and share in the freedom that we all have in this country. In meetings with Prime Minister Maliki, President Bush re- affirmed America's commitment to support Iraq's constitutional de- mocracy and to help Prime Minister Maliki's government succeed. On July 25, President Bush said: “The Iraqi people want to suc- ceed. They want to end this violence.” The President also said that "America will not abandon the Iraqi people.” I am, however, gravely concerned by the recent spike in violence and sectarian attacks, and the instability in Baghdad and recent decisions to extend the deployment of 3,500 American troops in Iraq and to relocate additional American forces to reinforce Bagh- dad. Those were important decisions made by you, Mr. Secretary, General Abizaid, and you, Chairman Pace. I hope that you will share with us this morning the reasons for doing so. I do not ques- tion the seriousness of this situation, the need to do it, but we should have a very clear explanation, because we had, I regret to say, expectations, largely generated by certain reports of General Casey, about the hope to draw down our forces in the near future. That is a question I hope that we address this morning, because I do not like to see the hopes of the men and women of the Armed Forces raised and then have to be changed and the impact on their families and indeed the confusion that results here at home when those decisions have to be made. must be achieved, and that is the disbanding of these private mili- tias, notably Sadr's. Back to Osama bin Laden. His deputy issued a worldwide call for Muslims to rise up against Israel and join the fighting in Lebanon and Gaza, raising again the specter of an Islamic caliphate that I clearly remember General Abizaid discussed in testimony before the committee last year. We hope you will bring us up-to-date on the Osama bin Laden situation and the ongoing activities of our forces together with others trying to bring about this man being brought to justice or otherwise taken care of. In light of all these developments, the mission in Iraq and Af- ghanistan is even more critical and your time with us today is crit- ical. General Pace and General Abizaid, I want to express our grati- tude to both of you and the countless men and women that you rep- resent, for your continued service and historic efforts of our Na- tion's military to bring freedom and liberty to Iraq, Afghanistan, and to preserve it here at home. Secretary Rumsfeld, once again the committee welcomes you. Now, just before the committee meeting started General Abizaid of- fered to meet with Senator Levin and myself, for information of the members of the committee, and he outlined the progress being made with the various reports examining the activities of the chain of command relative to certain incidents in Iraq. It is our under- standing, General Abizaid, that those reports will soon be given to you. There is a convergence of the criminal investigation together with the chain of command investigation under General Chiarelli. It is now in the overall commander of the Marine Forces, General Zilmer, and then it comes to you, and it is your hope and expecta- tion that, working with the Secretary, those reports can be made available to this committee early on in September. Senator Levin. STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN Senator LEVIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for calling this very important hearing, and thank you to all of our witnesses for being here this morning. The American service men and women in Iraq, Afghanistan, and other trouble spots around the world are performing their duties magnificently. We salute them and their families. We thank them for their unselfish service and devotion to our Nation. Despite their heroic efforts, the security situation in Iraq con- tinues to worsen. Sectarian violence is not only on the rise, it has eclipsed the Sunni insurgency and the terrorism of al Qaeda in Iraq in terms of the toll it has taken and the threats to Iraq's chances of stability. Our military leadership has identified Baghdad as the key, what they call the center of gravity, to success or failure in Iraq. The highly vaunted recent plan to stabilize Baghdad has not worked, and we are going back to the drawing board and sending more U.S. troops to the Iraqi capital. We are having difficulty finding suffi- cient troops for that purpose. The fact that the Army's Stryker bri- gade that is being sent to Baghdad is being extended past its 12- month rotation date by another 3 to 4 months speaks volumes HA about how our military is overextended and unable to find other units ready for immediate reinforcement in Iraq. .. While there appears to be an immediate necessity for additional troops in Baghdad, more troops will not be the ultimate answer. Our military leadership has repeatedly said there is no military so- lution, that there must be a political solution in Iraq. Iraqis reaching the political compromises now is more important and more critical to defusing the violence and conflict in Iraq. That is why we need to clearly tell the Iraqi political leaders that our commitment to Iraq is not open-ended, that we will begin the phased redeployment of our troops by the end of the year and that they must make the political compromises necessary to avoid all- out civil war and defeat the insurgency. When General Casey was asked at a press conference recently whether he still believed that there would be fairly substantial troop reductions over the course of this year, he said, “I think so.” Marine Corps General Conway testified before us last week at his confirmation hearing to be the next Commandant that, “I person- ally believe that you will have Iraqis who have started to look at us as occupiers and are resisting us in some instances, whereas they would not resist an Iraqi force doing precisely the same thing.” He also testified that it is critical that the Iraqis under- stand that our presence is not open-ended and unlimited. The President has assured the Nation that as Iraqi forces stand up we will stand down. General Dempsey, our senior general re- sponsible for the training and equipping of Iraqi security forces, has said publicly that, “The Iraqi army will be built by the end of this calendar year” and that their army would be, “fully capable of recruiting, vetting, inducting, training, forming into units, putting them in barracks, and sending them out the gate to perform their missions.” Congress has been told that over 70 percent of Iraqi combat battalions are capable of independent counterinsurgency operations or capable of taking the lead in those operations. The Iraqi security forces are standing up. We need to begin to stand down with a phased redeployment starting by the end of this year. It is time for the Iraqis to take greater responsibility for the se- curity of their own country. It is time to do what the President re- peatedly said he would do. Now that the Iraqis have done a signifi- cant amount of standing up their troops, surely by the end of this year we should begin to stand down some of our troops. Now, not only do the operations in the CENTCOM region have broad implications on the future of that region, they are also hav- is impact on our own military. Our ground forces—the Army and the Marine Corps—are under enormous strain due to several years of large-scale deployments to Iraq and Afghanistan. This is because a large amount of equipment has been left in Iraq and because the remaining equipment has been subjected to large amounts of wear and tear, there is a lack of readiness for Army and Marine Corps units which have redeployed to their home bases. It is argued that our units are more capable now because of orga- nizational changes and the infusion of technology and better equip- ment. But that is only true if the units actually have the equip- ment on hand, and only if what they have on hand is in a high state of maintenance so that they can train for their potential con- tingencies. Hypothetically, if 50 combat units could now do what 100 units could do in the past, that would be true only if those units are ready to do so. Over two-thirds of the Army's combat bri- gades are not in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the Army's own statis- tics show that the vast majority of those are not in command, or in command and control—in other words, by the Army's own meas- urements are not ready to respond to those contingencies which they must be prepared to do by Department of Defense (DOD) war plans. Mr. Chairman, again I thank you for calling this hearing and I thank our witnesses, all of them, for making the arrangements which they had to make in order to be with us this morning. Chairman WARNER. Thank you, Senator Levin. Secretary Rumsfeld. STATEMENT OF HON. DONALD RUMSFELD, UNITED STATES SECRETARY OF DEFENSE; ACCOMPANIED BY GEN. PETER PACE, USMC, CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF; AND GEN JOHN ABIZAID, USA, COMMANDER, U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND Secretary RUMSFELD. Thank you. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, members of the committee. Thank you for the invitation to testify. Senator Clinton, thank you for seconding the motion. I know we all agree that the American people deserve a healthy, preferably constructive, exchange on matters that so directly affect the lives, their lives, their families' lives, and their country's secu- rity. I am joined by General Peter Pace, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; and General John Abizaid, the Combatant Com- mander of the U.S. Central Command. We will be providing an up- date on the global struggle against violent extremists and certainly we will welcome questions. In the past few weeks, in terrorist attacks in Afghanistan, in Iraq, and now by Hezbollah, we have seen the face of the early part of the 21st century. In this period of asymmetric warfare, irregular warfare, one side puts their men and women at risk in uniform and obeys the laws of war, while the other side uses them against us. One side does all it can to avoid civilian casualties while the other side uses civilians as shields and then skillfully orchestrates a pub- lic outcry when the other side accidentally kills civilians in their midst. One side is held to exacting standards of near-perfection; the other side is held to no standards and no accountability at all. This enemy has called Iraq the central front on the war on ter- rorism, while some on our side seem to argue that the outcome in Iraq is not part of that global war on terror. Sixteen years ago this week, Saddam Hussein's forces invaded Kuwait, killing civilians, unleashing environmental devastation, provoking a crisis that led to Iraqi attacks on Israel and threats to Saudi Arabia and others region. Last week, by contrast, as you mentioned, Mr. Chair- man, the new Iraqi prime minister, who was elected by the Iraqi people under a constitution the Iraqi people wrote and ratified, came to the United States to thank the American people for their assistance in building a new future for the people of Iraq. He had spent 25 years in opposition to the Saddam Hussein regime, and in th before a joint session of Congress he noted that if terror were per- mitted to triumph in Iraq then the war on terror will never be won elsewhere. The enemy understands this as well. They are waging a psycho- logical war of attrition, planning attacks to gain the maximum media coverage and the maximum public outcry. They want us to believe that perseverance by us is futile rather than necessary. They want us to focus on our casualties and losses, not on the peo- ple causing the casualties and losses. They want us to think about what will happen if our forces stay in Iraq, as opposed to the con- sequences if our forces were to leave prematurely. They want us to be divided because they know that when we are united they lose. They want us pointing fingers at each other rath- er than pointing fingers at them. I know there are calls in some quarters for withdrawal or arbi- trary timelines for withdrawals. The enemies hear those words as well. We need to be realistic about the consequences. If we left Iraq prematurely, as the terrorists demand, the enemy would tell us to leave Afghanistan and then withdraw from the Middle East, and if we left the Middle East they would order us and all those who do not share their militant ideology to leave what they call the oc- cupied Muslim lands from Spain to the Philippines. Then we would face not only the evil ideology of these violent extremists, but a enemy that will have grown accustomed to succeeding in telling free people everywhere what to do. We can persevere in Iraq or we can withdraw prematurely until they force us to make a stand nearer home. But make no mistake, they are not going to give up whether we acquiesce in their imme- diate demands or not. Decisions about conditions for a drawdown of our forces in Iraq are best based on the recommendations of the commanders in the field and the recommendations of the gentlemen sitting beside me. We should strive to think through how our words can be inter- preted by our troops, by the people of Afghanistan and Iraq, by our 42 allies in our coalition in Afghanistan, and our 34 allies in our coalition in Iraq. We should consider how our words can be used by our deadly enemy. The war on terror is going to be a long struggle. It is not some- thing we asked for, but neither is it something we can avoid. But I remain confident in our mission, in our commanders, in our troops, and in our cause. I remain confident in the good common sense of the American people. Americans did not cross oceans and settle the wilderness and build history's greatest democracy only to run away from a bunch of murderers and extremists who try to kill everyone that they cannot convert and to tear down what they could never build. Over the past few years, I have had the honor of meeting count- less young men and women in uniform, all volunteers, who have answered our country's call. I remember a serviceman outside of Afghanistan who looked me in the eye and said, “I cannot believe that we are being allowed to do something so important." Our troops represent the finest and the most professional troops in history. I think of these remarkable people every day. I know every aspect of life. Such extremism, whether state-sponsored by Iran or ideologically motivated by al Qaeda and its associated movements, remains a serious danger to global peace and stability. My duties took me to Iraq, Afghanistan, Central Asia, and else- where in the Arabian Gulf, where our troops continue to perform with great professional calm and determination under dangerous and difficult circumstances. Of course, over the past several weeks the media has been filled with images of war in Lebanon, Israel, and Palestine. Indeed, U.S. forces under CENTCOM helped evac- uate nearly 15,000 Americans from Lebanon's war zone. While the media's eye often directs public attention to Iraq and Afghanistan, it is important to remember that U.S. and coalition forces serve throughout Central Asia, the Middle East, and the Horn of Africa, increasing regional states' capacity to battle extre- mism and keeping open the vital air and sea links of the region. In the broader struggle against extremism, we face complex and potentially intersecting problems. Our strategic imperatives are formidable. With the continuing help of our friends, we must focus on three strategic objectives: We must synchronize the appropriate diplomatic, economic, and military means to defeat al Qaeda and its associated movements; we must deter Iranian designs for re- gional hegemony, to include its sponsorship of terrorist organiza- tions and its development of nuclear weapons; finally, we must find a comprehensive solution to the corrosive Arab-Israeli conflict. I fully recognize that each of these tasks is filled with danger and enormous difficulties. I also realize that trying to solve any of these problems will take a considerable amount of time and effort. But failure to apply coordinated regional and international pres- sure against these three problems will further encourage extre- mism and could eventually lead to a broader, even more dangerous conflict. The arming of independent militias and the subsequent under- mining of state institutions by these militias is the curse of the re- gion. In many ways, interconnectedness brought on by 21st century globalization has been turned to the advantage by non-state actors. Globalization brings with it great benefits, but it also accelerates the dissolution of sovereignty in weak or corroded states. If this century is to be dominated by non-state actors with no responsi- bility to the international community, we are in for even greater dangers. It should not be lost on us, for example, that Hezbollah fields greater and longer-range weapons than most regional armed forces. If left unchecked, it is possible to imagine chemical, biological, or even nuclear weapons being transferred to militias or terrorist or- ganizations by a state actor. In the highly unsettled Middle East, the problem of extremist- sponsored terror and intimidation is complicated. But we must be willing to talk about al Qaeda's ideological designs and face the im- plications of revolutionary Iran's ambitions, so often and so clearly stated by its president. There is no doubt that these are dangerous times for the world, but there should also be no doubt that, with concerted inter- national action and the application of our own substantial power, these dangers can be overcome. 10 Iraq sits at the center of the broader regional problem. Al Qaeda and Shiite extremists form terrorist groups and death squads to challenge the new government and undermine confidence in a bet- ter future. Iran talks about stabilizing Iraq, but, just as in Leb- anon, it arms, trains, and equips local extremist Shiite militias to do Iran's bidding. As the primary security problem in Iraq has shifted from a Sunni insurgency to sectarian violence, al Qaeda ter- rorists, insurgents, and Shiite militants compete to plunge the country into civil war. Prime Minister Maliki and his new government know what must be done and in 3 short months in office are responsibly tackling the complex and difficult problems of security and governance. Iraqi se- curity forces in conjunction with coalition forces must bring Bagh- dad, the center of sectarian violence, under control. Illegal militias must be disbanded. National reconciliation must proceed. Death squad leaders must be brought to justice. It is a decisive time in Baghdad and it requires decisive Iraqi ac- tion with our clear support. Despite the many challenges, progress does continue to be made in Iraq and I am confident that there are still many more people in Iraq trying to hold that country together than there are trying to tear it apart. Our ongoing support of their efforts is essential for their success, especially as they assume more and more responsibility for their own security. I know the committee wants to focus these hearings on Iraq, but I close with the reminder that Iraq is only one part of a broader regional struggle underway, one which requires the wise applica- tion of all our resources. Our own troops along with NATO Inter- national Security Assistance Force (ISAF) continue to operate in Afghanistan. Pakistani and Saudi forces are fighting extremists daily. Insurgencies, secular violence, and terror sponsored by Sunni and Shiite religious extremist groups are pervasive throughout the region. Fortunately, as in our own society, the vast majority of the people in the region do not want extremists to win. Our challenge is to help these moderate forces help themselves in the struggle. Afghanistan, Iraq, and the entire region remain dangerous and often deadly. Our continued involvement in shaping regional secu- rity forces and providing the framework for regional action against extremist groups is essential for our own safety and prosperity at home. Finally, we must be ever mindful of the sacrifice of our young men and women in uniform. Out of the over 1.5 million service per- sonnel who have rotated through the CENTCOM region since Sep- tember 11, 2001, over 3,000 have given their lives. We owe them and their families an enormous debt of gratitude. Today nearly 200,000 of our troops serve in harm's way. These are incredibly dedicated and resourceful professionals. Thank you for your contin- ued support to these great Americans, who willingly fight for all of us. Thank you. Chairman WARNER. Thank you very much, General, for a very incisive and important statement that you have just made. We are going to depart from our normal rotation here. Senator Levin and I both serve on the Senate Select Committee on Intel- ligence. They are now having a meeting and the Senator from 11 Michigan has to go to that meeting. Therefore I will offer you the first opportunity to initiate questioning. Senator LEVIN. Mr. Chairman, thank you for your invariable courtesies. General Abizaid, when General Casey was asked at a press con- ference recently whether he still believed what he said last year, when he predicted that there would be troop reductions over the course of this year, he said that he still believes there will be such reductions this year. Do you personally share that view? General ABIZAID. Senator, since the time that General Casey made that statement it is clear that the operational and the tac- tical situation in Baghdad is such that it requires additional secu- rity forces, both U.S. and Iraqi. I think the most important thing ahead of us throughout the remainder of this year is ensuring that the Baghdad security situation be brought under control. It is pos- sible to imagine some reductions in forces, but I think the most im- portant thing to imagine is Baghdad coming under the control of the Iraqi government. Senator LEVIN. When you say it is possible to imagine some re- duction in forces, you mean this year? General ABIZAID. It is possible, depending upon how things go in Baghdad and how Prime Minister Maliki and his government grab hold of the security situation. Senator LEVIN. Is it important that the Iraqis understand that our commitment is not open-ended? General ABIZAID. Sir, I think they fully understand it is not open-ended. Senator LEVIN. Some of their statements have not reflected that full understanding. But in any event, would you agree that it is im- portant that they do understand our commitment is not open- ended? General ABIZAID. I believe they do understand it is not open- ended. They know our commitment and they know the necessity for over time to increase their capacity against the extremists. Senator LEVIN. Thank you. Mr. Secretary, the President has assured the Nation frequently that as Iraqi security forces stand up we will stand down. They have stood up. The majority of their combat battalions are capable now of independent counterinsurgency or capable of taking the lead in those operations. Should we not, at least by the end of this year, begin to do what the President said we would do? Since the secu- rity forces of Iraq have stood up in such significant measure, should we not begin to stand down as the President said we would? Secretary RUMSFELD. Senator, you are correct, the Iraqi security forces are now up to something like 275,000. They are headed to- wards 325,000 by the end of the year, unless the prime minister makes an adjustment in those numbers, which as a new govern- ment he has every right to do in a sovereign nation. I guess the issue of drawdown depends on what you think your base is. We were up at 160,000. Today—we have gotten as low as I think 127,000. Today we are at 135,000 or 133,000, and certainly everyone from the Iraqis, the troops, and the President would hope that those troops could be drawn down as conditions permit. The question, the only difference between the way you phrase it and 12 the President phrases it as he ends by pointing out that he intends to succeed here and he believes that the determinant should be the conditions on the ground, as opposed to some timetable. I do think the point you raise, the core of what you are asking, is important. That is the tension that exists between having too many troops and having it feed an insurgency. I believe, as indi- cated by General Conway, and having too few so that you do not have a sufficient number to allow the security situation to permit the political and the economic activities to go forward. That is a fair tension that exists there, and it is an art, not a science. There is no guidebook that says how to do that. So clearly we would all hope that there could be drawdowns on those forces as the conditions permit. Senator LEVIN. Thank you. The press reported that Iraqi President Talabani said yesterday that the Iraqi government is confident that Iraqi troops will take over security duties for the entire country by the end of this year. Then he also reportedly said that the recent increase in violence by insurgents is "the last arrows in their quivers.” Now, that phrase is reminiscent of Vice President Cheney's claim a year ago that the insurgency was in its “last throes.” General Abizaid, does our intelligence on the insurgency provide any basis for the assertion that the recent surge in violence represents the last arrows in the insurgents' quivers? General ABIZAID. Senator Levin, I think it is clear that the insur- gency has a lot of resiliency. It is probably going to last for some time, even after U.S. forces depart and hand over security control completely to the Iraqis. The question for President Talabani, as I have d discussed with him before, whether or not over time the Iraqis can control it, and I believe they will be able to. Senator LEVIN. You do not agree, then, that it is in its last throes or that they are shooting the last arrows? General ABIZAID. I am making no comment about what he said about last arrows or last throes. Senator LEVIN. Why? General ABIZAID. I do not see any reason to dispute what the President says. I know that I think it is a long-term problem for Iraq that they will be able to work through over time. Senator LEVIN. According to USA Today, the British Ambassador to Iraq, Mr. Patey, made the following assessment. Mr. Patey has warned that Iraq is descending towards civil war, and he said it is likely to split along ethnic lines. He is reported as predicting that Iraq's security situation could remain volatile for the next 10 years. Do you agree, General, with the Ambassador from Britain to Iraq that Iraq is sliding toward civil war? General ABIZAID. I believe that the sectarian violence is probably as bad as I have seen it, in Baghdad in particular, and that if not stopped it is possible that Iraq could move towards civil war. Senator LEVIN. Thank you." Mr. Chairman, thank you. My time is up. Thank you again for allowing me to go ahead here. Chairman WARNER. I want to go back to, Secretary Rumsfeld, the observations I made in the opening statement. On July 17 at 13 about 8 o'clock, I went to the floor of the Senate. The Senate was about to consider a resolution, an important resolution reaffirming our support for Israel. But I said the following. I said I was con- cerned that we should take into account America's broader inter- ests in the region as we approach this resolution. I said specifically: “America's operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have taken the lives of more than 2,500 American servicemen, over 20,000 still severely wounded, and over $436 billion of our tax- payers' money over these 3 years.” That is an enormous investment of this country, and the credibility of our country in many respects rests on the conclusion of that conflict in such a way that the Iraqi government can exercise sovereignty and bring about a measure of freedom and democracy. We are committed to that and I stand strongly with our President to achieve that goal. America's participation with other nations in achieving a diplo- matic solution to the Iranian nuclear crisis, I can think of no prob- lem of greater significance than our resolve to not let Iran possess nuclear weapons. The stability of the Lebanese government, that must survive, that government, such that they can once again take an even stronger grip on that nation and govern it. There is a lot at stake with our relationships with other nations. In a region in which our distinguished witness General Abizaid, who spent much of your lifetime in that region, just said, rarely have I seen it so volatile. It is subject to the corrosive relationships coming out of the Arab-Israeli conflict. My concern is that as we go into this situation, and we have an obligation to try and work as an honest broker, I hope, in resolving the conflict between Israel and Hezbollah, as we pursue that and as our actions are interpreted by the Muslim world—and I read some of the statements of the clerics recently, in the last few days—I do not want to see our forces put at greater personal risk, subject to greater intensity brought against them by the adver- saries in Iraq. So my question to you, Mr. Secretary, as we take up our role, hopefully as an honest broker in this, are we mindful of the broad- er picture and the enormity of our investment in Iraq as we try to do what we can to bring about a cessation of the fighting in the conflict between Israel and Hezbollah? Secretary RUMSFELD. Mr. Chairman, in the meetings that I have been in with the President and the Secretary of State and those that are intimately involved in the situation in Lebanon and Israel with respect to the Hezbollah, there is a sensitivity to the desire to not have our country or our interests or our forces put at greater risk as a result of what is taking place between Israel and Hezbollah. I think I would suggest that it be phrased slightly differently be- cause there are risks, as you point out, but it is a matter of relative risks. There are also risks, if one thinks about it, that Iran is the principal sponsor of Hezbollah. Iran is seeking nuclear weapons, as you posed. Iran is the supplier of weapons to Hezbollah. The rock- ets that are heading into Israel by Hezbollah tend to be in a num- ber of cases Iranian rockets. Clearly, to the extent that Iran were to achieve weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and with a history 14 of a willingness to work intimately with a terrorist organization like Hezbollah, there is that risk as well. So there are a variety of risks that we face in that region and it is a difficult and delicate situation. As I indicated in my opening remarks, I do believe what we are seeing is really the face of the 21st century. The wars we are engaged in and we see are not wars between militaries only; they are wars, they are clashes between systems, political, economic, and military. They are being fought with asymmetric and irregular warfare, which is very much to the advantage of the attackers. Chairman WARNER. Mr. Secretary, that situation in Iraq is frag- ile. We need only look at the Baghdad situation. Baghdad could lit- erally tilt this thing if we fail to bring about a measure of security for those people, tilt it in a way that we could slide toward a civil war that General Abizaid recalled. General Pace, I go back to the resolution of October 16, 2002, which I participated in, and my good friend to the left, in drawing up that resolution for the Senate. It authorized the President of the United States to use the Armed Forces of the United States to: one, defend the national security of our country against the continuing threat posed by Iraq; two, enforce all relevant United Nations (U.N.) Security Council resolutions regarding Iraq. Many of those missions set out and envisioned by Congress when it gave this authority, namely the toppling of the Saddam Hussein regime, have been achieved. But in the words of General Abizaid, we are on the brink of a civil war. I do not have the exact words before me, but I was struck by General Chiarelli's statement the other day that in his 35 years of military training he had really never spent a day preparing for what faces him as our commander of forces in Iraq, sectarian violence, civil war. What is the mission of the United States today under this resolu- tion if that situation erupts into a civil war? What are the missions of our forces? General PACE. Sir, I believe that we do have the possibility of that devolving to a civil war, but it does not have to be a fact. I believe that U.S. Armed Forces today can continue to do what we are doing, which is to help provide enough security inside of Iraq for the Iraqi government to provide governance and economic op- portunity for their citizens. The weight of that opportunity rests with the Iraqi people. We can provide support. We can help provide security. But they must now decide about their sectarian violence. Shiite and Sunni are going to have to love their children more than they hate each other. If they do that and seize the opportunity that the international community has provided to them, then this will be what we want it to be, which is a success for ourselves and the Iraqi people. But the weight of that shift must be on the Iraqi people and the Iraqi government. Chairman WARNER. I think we have to examine very carefully what Congress authorized the President to do in the context of a situation if we are faced with an all-out civil war, and whether we have to come back to Congress to get further indication of support. General Abizaid, I have had the privilege of knowing you for a long time and I really think you speak with remarkable candor and 15 draw on an extraordinary career of professionalism. You spent 1 year of your career in Lebanon. Lebanon is a part of your AOR as CENTCOM., Do you agree with the premise that in this current conflict between Israel and Hezbollah, recognizing that Hezbollah attacked Israel, recognizing that Israel has a perfect right to de- fend itself, but in so executing their military campaign it is es tial in my judgment the Lebanese government not be toppled as a consequence of the infrastructure that is being destroyed in the course of this war, and can they achieve in this military operation such degradation of Hezbollah, its command and control, its inven- tory of weapons, as to result in a situation whereby a multinational force can eventually come in, subject to some form of a ceasefire, and begin to shore up, stabilize that government, and allow it to take firm control over the entirety of all aspects of sovereignty of the nation of Lebanon? General ABIZAID. Mr. Chairman, U.N. Resolution 1559 clearly calls for the disarmament of Hezbollah and the extension of Leba- nese sovereignty all the way from its northern border to its south- ern border. Had that resolution been implemented or started to move towards implementation, the current problem would be much less severe than it has become. The Iranians who have armed Hezbollah with cruise missiles, antiship missiles, missiles that can reach as far as Haifa and be- yond, have given Hezbollah a state-like existence and capacity that is unlike any other militia anywhere in the region. It is absolutely essential that the Lebanese government regain its sovereignty over its own territory. It will in my opinion need an international force to help it do that. There are ways that, in conjunction with the international community, Hezbollah can be disarmed over time and the Shiite people that participate in the political life of Hezbollah can be readily accommodated within the Lebanese body politic. The question as to whether or not the Israelis can degrade Hezbollah over time, degradation can take place. I think it is also very clear to say that over time the consensus of holding Lebanon together under external pressure starts to break down. It is very important that Lebanon stay together as a sovereign country. It is key to stability in the Middle East and it is essential that that take place, and the international community needs to move in that di- rection. Chairman WARNER. Thank you very much, General. Senator Kennedy. Senator KENNEDY. Thank you very much. General, just to first of all thank you, General Abizaid, General Pace, thank you very much for your service. Welcome, Secretary Rumsfeld. I think you can understand why it is so important for your presence here, given these range of issues that are front and center for the American people. · Let me ask you, General Abizaid, if we have difficulty with 130,000 troops in Iraq trying to disarm the insurgency, how in the world do we think we are going to be able to get an international force that is going to disarm Hezbollah? General ABIZAID. Senator, I think with the weight of the inter- national community and the right rules of engagement and the 17 really quite different in different provinces. We have forces in most provinces and the training is different for the different cir- cumstances that they face. One of the things that the DOD has done is have extensive les- sons learned from what is taking place in Iraq and different parts of the country brought back to the Joint Forces Command, the Na- tional Training Center, and the troops are then being trained up carefully to assure that they have the best kind of training they can have for the circumstances that we believe at the time they are going to find in the areas they are going to be assigned to. Senator KENNEDY. My time is just about up. General Abizaid, could you expand on this, are they getting in with the growth of the sectarian violence? How do our troops get in there, not get em- broiled in the sectarian violence, whether your estimate—is this the beginning or is this the end of the increased numbers of troops that we are going to need over there? How is their background and training actually going to quell that sectarian violence that you have identified as escalating at the present time? Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General ABIZAID. Senator Kennedy, the first line against sec- tarian violence is the Iraqi armed forces. The Iraqi armed forces know where the problem is coming from. They know how to deal with the problem. They can recognize it easier than our troops can. But I would also tell you that our forces do have the capability to precisely target the secular death squad structure that is respon- sible for this activity, and more and more over time we have be- come proficient at being able to attack the secular structure of al Qaeda and we intend to use that capability and intelligence activ- ity that we have used before to target the militia death squads that we are seeing operate now in Baghdad with a certain degree of freedom. Senator KENNEDY. Thank you. Chairman WARNER. Thank you. For the record, this is General Chiarelli's full statement. It is July 27, 2006. He said, “For the military, the plan is unchartered ground. Quite frankly, in 33 years in the United States Army I never trained to stop a sectarian fight,” he said. “This is something new.” That is the quote to which I referred to and Senator Kennedy referred to. Senator McCain. Senator MCCAIN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I thank the witnesses and I want to repeat at the outset my firm belief that we can and must win in Iraq and that the consequences of failure would be catastrophic. General Pace, you said there is a possibility of the situation in Iraq evolving into civil war, is that correct? General PACE. I did say that, yes, sir. Senator McCAIN. Did you anticipate this situation a year ago? General PACE. No, sir. Senator McCAIN. Did you, General Abizaid? General ABIZAID. I believe that a year ago it was clear to see that sectarian tensions were increasing. That they would be this high, no. 18 Senator MCCAIN. General Abizaid, we are moving 7,500 troops into Baghdad, is that correct? General ABIZAID. The number is closer to 3,500. Senator McCAIN. 3,500? General ABIZAID. Plus military police that were going there for other duties, that are being used in the outer cordon areas, mili- tary policemen in particular. Senator McCAIN. Where are these troops coming from? General ABIZAID. The troops, the Stryker brigade is coming down from Mosul. Senator McCain. From Mosul. Is the situation under control in Ramadi? General ABIZAID. The situation in Ramadi is better than it was 2 months ago. Senator MCCAIN. Is the situation under control in Ramadi? General ABIZAID. I think the situation in Ramadi is workable. Senator McCAIN. The troops from Ramadi came from Fallujah, is that not correct? General ABIZAID. I cannot say, Senator. Senator McCain. That is my information. What I worry about is we are playing a game of whack-a-mole here. We move troops. It flares up, we move troops there. We all know that Fallujah was al- lowed to become a base of operations and insurgency, so we had to go into Fallujah and fight one of the great battles in Marine Corps- Army history. Then when I was back there not too long ago, they said, we have big problems in Ramadi. Everybody knows we have big problems in Ramadi. I said: Where are you going to get the troops? We are going to have to move them from Fallujah. Now we are going to have to move troops into Baghdad from someplace else. It is very disturbing. If it is all up to the Iraqi military, General Abizaid, then I wonder why we have to move troops into Baghdad to intervene in what is clearly sectarian violence. General ABIZAID. Senator. Iragi troops are also being moved into Baghdad. The number of Iraqi troops in the Baghdad area are greater than our troops. We are in support with them in the main operational areas, and I believe that under the current cir- cumstances that the Iraqi forces need to benefit from our command and control capabilities and the systems of a unit such as the Stryker brigade that has been moved to the south. Senator MCCAIN. I would anticipate putting American troops into this very volatile situation means that American casualties will probably go up. General ABIZAID. I think it is possible that in the period ahead of us in Baghdad that we will take increased casualties, it is pos- sible. Senator McCain. The situation in southern Iraq. I was briefed by British military and others that there is a grave concern about Ira- nian penetration throughout southern Iraq. Is that a serious issue? General ABIZAID. The Iranian Revolutionary Guard Kudz force, intelligence agencies, arm, train, and equip what I would call rogue Shiite groups. Yes, it is a concern. Senator MCCAIN. Is Basra in control of the militias? UI0Opo e 21 Senator REED. Do you have any sort of sense of the timing of this, particularly with respect to the Mahdi Army and to Sadr? General ABIZAID. Again, I would not characterize the target as being either Sadr or the Mahdi Army. I would say there are ele- ments within the Jesh-al-Mahdi that will be targeted because they are participating in death squad activities. Senator REED. With the encouragement, the permission, the tol- erance of Sadr? General ABIZAID. I could not say whether there is a permission or tolerance or anything of Sadr. I can say that the prime minister knows and has been very forceful about saying that militias must be brought under control. He has a wide range of points that go all the way from direct military confrontation to agreement with various militias. Senator REED. But we will not be involved in that process? It will be exclusively up to the prime minister and his security forces? General ABIZAID. I would not say it would be exclusively the work of Iraqis. It is very clear that our forces in conjunction with the Iraqis will help target known death squad organizations. Senator REED. Mr. Secretary, the Chief of Staff of the Army testi- fied before the House Armed Services Committee on June 27 that $4.9 billion in funding that the Army requested for reset, which is the repair and replacement of equipment, was denied before the re- quest was submitted to Congress. Did you deny this request or did the OMB deny the request? Secretary RUMSFELD. Senator, the normal process is that the De- partment is given a budget by the OMB, and we take that budget and work within the Department to try to fashion a budget that is balanced and makes sense. Then in the event there is from time to time a need to go back to the OMB or the President and request additional funds, we have done that. . I do not know precisely what $4.9 billion, I think you said. Senator REED. Mr. Secretary, did you go back to the President and ask for more funds because of the critical needs of the Army and the Marine Corps for reset? Secretary RUMSFELD. We have certainly gone to the President and the OMB and explained the need for reset and n extensively with the OMB. Regrettably, there have been cuts made by Congress every year in the defense budget. There have been not only reductions in our budget, there have been things that have been added in that we did not request that required us to take money from other things. Third, there have been things required of us that we were prevented from making savings. The net effect of it, if you look just today in the authorization and appropriation bills between the House and the Sena somewhere between $10, $15, or $20 billion, depending on how you calculate it. Senator REED. So the White House did turn down your request for additional money for reset, yes or no? Secretary RUMSFELD. That would not be correct. Senator REED. So you did not ask? Secretary RUMSFELD. I cannot say that, because we went through an extensive discussion and negotiation and we ended up with the budget we ended up with, which was then reduced by Congress. 22 Senator REED. Last Tuesday evening the Senate passed an ap- propriation for $13 billion of additional funding for reset. Is that money appropriate or is it in some way a waste of resources? Secretary RUMSFELD. It is clearly needed. Senator REED. Why did you not ask the White House before they sent the request to Congress for that clearly needed money? Secretary RUMSFELD. We did talk to the White House about it and that is where the number came from, was from the DOD. Senator REED. Mr. Secretary, what you are saying, I think, is ei- ther you asked for the money and they said no or you accepted a limit despite the needs that you recognized for reset. It is one or the other? Secretary RUMSFELD. You have lost me. At first you were talking about- Senator REED. I think you have lost everyone with this dialogue. Secretary RUMSFELD. First you were talking about $4.9 billion, I thought. Now you are talking about the $13 billion, $13.1 billion I think, and we have requested that of OMB and they have re- quested it of Congress and Congress has put it in the bill, as I un- derstand it has. Senator REED. When did you request the $13 billion, Mr. Sec- retary? Secretary RUMSFELD. Within the last period of months, weeks. Senator REED. Weeks? Secretary RUMSFELD. Yes, weeks. Senator REED. Days. Why did you not request the $13 billion when the budget was being prepared to be sent to Congress? Secretary RUMSFELD. When the budget was being prepared to be sent to Congress, it would have been January of last year for the budget that still has not been passed by Congress this year. For the supplemental it would have been late last year, not the begin- ning of last year but late last year, when those budgets are pre- pared. We gain knowledge every month that goes by, and it is very clear the Army has a reset problem. It is also clear that the $13 billion is needed. Senator REED. Mr. Secretary, it is very clear that two-thirds of the Army operating force, Active-Duty and Reserve, is now report- ing as unready. There is not a single nondeployed Army brigade combat team in the United States that is ready to deploy. The bot- we have no ready strategic Reserve, and this is a stunning indictment of your leadership. Secretary RUMSFELD. I think it is an inaccurate statement. Senator REED. How so? Have you seen the readiness reports, Mr. Secretary? Secretary RUMSFELD. I have. Senator REED. It is inaccurate to say that the readiness reports of the Army do not indicate severe equipment shortages, leaving many brigades of the United States as nondeployable? Secretary RUMSFELD. If you will allow me a few minutes to re- spond, it is complicated, but I would be happy to do so. I stand with what I say. I think the characterization that you made is not accurate. It is complicated. If one sees a chart that shows a deterio- ration like this over a 5-, 6-, 7-, 10-year period, one has to assume 23 that the readiness of the military, in this case the Army, has dete- riorated. Now, the fact of the matter is if you begin with a stand- ard, a requirement, that is X and then you show the beginning of the chart, and then at the end you have changed your requirement use you have decided you need different things, you have learned from the experiences of the last period of years and you have increased your requirements to 5X, and then you compare yourself against 5X, so if you have improved 300 percent—you were O percent to begin, at IX, and now you need 5X, you have de- cided your requirement is different, and you have improved 300 percent to get there, you are still short of that requirement. That is what shows the deterioration. The fact of the matter is the equipment that the military has today is vastly better today than it was 5 years ago. The readiness of our capabilities are—if you measure them against full spectrum, you can say they are not ready to do everything that anyone conceivably might need to do. On the other hand, if you ask the readiness of the forces with respect to what they are being asked to do, ask General Abizaid, are the forces over there capable of doing what they are doing, equipped and trained to do what they are doing, he will tell you yes. If you ask General Schoomaker, are the Armed Forces of the United States considerably better today, more capable, better equipped than they were 5 years ago, he will say yes. If you ask General Pace the question, is the United States today capable of doing, fulfilling the requirements that the country has put on them, the answer is yes. Senator REED. Let me take that opportunity. General Pace, have you seen the last readiness- Chairman WARNER. Senator, wait a minute. Senator REED. Excuse me. Chairman WARNER. You are way over your time. Just a minute. We need to allow the witness to fully respond to your question. I think your question has been stated. We will have another round and you can pursue this at that time. But I have to accommodate other members. You are quite a bit over your time. Has the witness had the opportunity to fully reply to the ques- tion before him? Secretary RUMSFELD. I have. I think it would be useful just for the context if the Senator's last question could be responded to. Senator REED. Mr. Chairman, would you allow me to ask my questions, rather than have the Secretary ask my questions for me? Chairman WARNER. Well, now, Senator- Senator REED. If I have given up my time, then my time is gone. Chairman WARNER. Just a minute. We allowed you to ask your question very fully. It was stated. It is in the record, I think with clarity, and the Secretary was responding. We will have a second round, at which time you can further pursue this important sub- ject. I recognize the importance of the subject. Now, the Secretary has asked for General Pace to give his per- spective in response to the Senator's question. General PACE. Mr. Chairman, thank you. Readiness is reflected in personnel, in training, and in equip- ment. Any time a unit comes back from any deployment, when I was battalion commander, the unit has people change out and 24 therefore the personnel numbers go down. The training as a result of the unit coming back starts out anew into the new cycle. Equip- ment is taken from what has been used and put into depot mainte- nance. That is in normal peacetime. In wartime, we are using equipment at much greater rates. So where you have a notional unit that has 100 trucks and they de- ploy and they come back, and the trucks normally would be driven 1,000 miles in a year and they are driven 10,000 miles in combat, you have a larger number of those vehicles that end up being put into the depot maintenance, which for the unit that is home then reduces their readiness based on availability of equipment. The units that are forward have had not only the equipment that they went over with, but have been augmented thanks to Congress providing the funding. For example, our up-armored Humvees. The requirement globally when we started in September 2001 was about 2,000. That number now is up at 12,000. We have bought up to 12,000 and we have used them in combat, and now a number of those 12,000 are currently in depot maintenance waiting. So we are way over the 2,000 we started with. But now, because of maintenance, usage, and combat losses, we are below the 12,000 that folks are asking for today. So it is very difficult when you turn the kaleidoscope to see all the pieces and it does not allow itself to have a straight, easy answer. Fundamentally, the United States Army is much more capable today. Fundamentally, the Army that is fighting our war for us today deployed is in tremendous shape, personnel, training, and equipment-wise. But it is absolutely a fact that, for various budg- etary reasons, some of which are a result of actions taken by Con- gress, that we do not have enough funding currently to provide for the repair of all of the equipment that currently sits at our depots waiting to be repaired. I believe that is where the dialogue is about how much money is needed. That $13.1 billion as I understand it, if approved by Congress, will in fact allow the Marine Corps and the Army to take the equipment that is currently stacked up at their depots, hire the workforce, and begin the process. But what has happened, when we have not had budgets and we have had continuing resolutions, some of the workforce has had to be let go. We cannot have the depots not know whether or not they are going to be able to have the funding long-term to hire people. We cannot go out and hire Mechanic Pace for 6 months and then let him go and expect to hire him back again. I would ask as we look at this, that we look at some kind of no- year funding that is focused on the backlog of equipment repair, that will allow the depots to consciously go out and hire people who can stay in the workforce long enough to get this work done. Thank you. Chairman WARNER. The Senator from Rhode Island raises a very important question and we will further explore it in the course of this hearing. Mr. Secretary, I am going to seek to get documenta- tion that I looked at where you did engage with OMB about the need for these funds. So I think that documentation will be put in this record. I am advised by the cloakroom that we have two back-to-back votes. It is my intention to go over quickly and vote in the first vote 28 General ABIZAID. They are much improved and they continue to improve every month. Senator BEN NELSON. Which is part of the emphasis on standing their military up so that we can stand ours down. The faster and the more capable they are, hopefully then there should be some sort of connection with the reduction of our Armed Forces as a re- sult of that. In terms of the police, let us say the municipal police, do we know what percentage or what number of the total number you would look at as being, not combat or capably trained, but honest and as part of the overall government, as opposed to a militia? General ABIZAID. It is a difficult question to answer. There are some places where the local police are exceptionally efficient and very honest, very capable. There are other areas where we know that they have been infiltrated by various militias, such as in Basra, where the government and the British forces that are down there are doing their best to stand down those units, retrain them, and bring them on line in a credible and capable manner As far as the national police forces are concerned, in Baghdad it is clear that there are a number of battalions—again, without my notes in front of me I would take it for the record, but there are battalions that need to be stood down and retrained, and Generals Casey and Dempsey are working to do that now. [The information referred to follows:] [Deleted.] Senator BEN NELSON. Do we know whether approximately 50 percent or 30 percent? General ABIZAID. I would say it is probably 30 percent. Senator BEN NELSON. 30 percent. General ABIZAID. That is national police, which is separate and distinct from Senator BEN NELSON. Municipal and-or the military. I think the debate about whether we have a date for withdrawal or there is an open-ended commitment—hopefully the debate will continue. But I wonder about an approach that is different than setting a date for withdrawal and to close any question about whether it is an open-ended commitment, would be better ap- proached on setting conditions for staying with the prime minister, with the Iraqi government. In other words, there is a lot of slippage on how we have standing up to stand down in terms of their mili- tary versus our military because things change on the ground. But do we have some idea of what our conditions for staying are? Is there a tipping point in terms of their ability or inability to get to a certain level so that they can deal with sectarian violence on their own or the Sunni insurgency, to govern themselves, but also to secure themselves? I guess I would feel more comfortable if we could establish some sort of metrics to know what it takes in terms of percentage, num- bers, and what it will take in terms of time so that we can say that they are capable of not only governing themselves with the elected government, but also in terms of securing themselves so they can govern themselves. 30 rorist groups that have views that they want Iraq to descend into a state of anarchy and chaos so they can establish safe havens for terrorism in the region. But I think that as I go around and I talk to Iraqi military offi- cers, Iraqi government officials, and people throughout the coun- try—and I think General Casey certainly would echo this—the ma- jority of the people want Iraq to come together as a free and inde- pendent nation that is capable of being a meaningful member of the community of nations in that part of the world, that is not dominated by either Iranians or dominated by Sunni extremist groups. I believe that they know they have to fight in order to achieve that. Secretary RUMSFELD. I think it ought not to be surprising, Sen- ator, that an American soldier would visit with Iraqis and see that they do have a different perspective. They live in a different part of the world, they have a different history, and it is fully under- standable. On the other hand, 12 million of them went out and voted, and they went out and fashioned a constitution and then ratified it. It is there for the world to see. They have been voting in increasing numbers. So while you are right and General Abizaid is certainly right that there are Baathists who want to take back the country, there are Shiite who would like to dominate it to the detriment of the Sunnis, the fact of the matter is that 12 million Iraqis went out and voted for that constitution, and that is not nothing. It is some- thing important. Senator THUNE. I appreciate General Abizaid's comment, which I have heard you make previously as well, that the forces that want to hold the country together and see it succeed outnumber and are greater than those that want to see it fail. But I just want- ed to get your assessment of the on-the-ground, average Iraqi on the street type of view of what is happening there, because it seems to me at least that that is a key component in starting to turn over information on some of the bad guys who are committing the violence there and really making this thing work. One other question has to do again with the borders and how are we doing with respect to Iran and Syria? Foreign arms serve as the lifeblood of the insurgent groups. Does the Iraqi government see that as a threat to their sovereignty and are they stepping up and doing some of the work to protect the borders and make sure that a lot of the arms that are coming in are cut off? What is your assessment of that? I have asked a lot of questions of your colleagues who have been in front of this committee about IEDs, for example, and where are they getting the materials to make these IEDs. It seems at least a lot of that is coming from some of these other countries. I know it is impossible, with the length of the borders and everything else, to completely shut it off, but are there efforts being made to regulate and control the mate- rials that are coming in that are being used to inflict casualties on our troops? General ABIZAID. Yes, Senator, there is a lot of effort building a border force. The border force is effective in some areas, less effec- tive in others. The Iraqi armed forces also back up the border forces. The Syrian border remains the primary conduit for foreign 33 I think it is not correct to assume that they were wrong num- bers. I do not think the evidence suggests that, and it will be inter- esting to see what history decides. The balance between having too many and contributing to an insurgency by the feeding of occupa- tion and the risk of having too few and having the security situa- tion not be sufficient for the political progress to go forward is a complicated set of decisions, and I do not know that there is any guidebook that tells you how to do it. There is no rule book, there is no history for this. The judgments that have been made have been made by exceedingly well-trained people, the gentlemen sit- ting next to me, the people on the ground in Iraq. They were stud- ied and examined and analyzed by the civilian leadership and by the President and they were confirmed. So I think your assertion is at least debatable. The idea that the army was disbanded I think is one that is kind of flying around. My impression is that to a great extent that army disbanded itself. Our forces came in so fast. It was made up of a lot of Shiite conscripts who did not want to be in it and thousands, or at least many hundreds of Sunni generals, who were not about to hang around after Saddam Hussein and his sons and adminis- tration were replaced. The work to build a new army has included an awful lot of the people from the prior army and it has benefited from that. Third, the assertion that the government rejected all the plan- ning that had been done before is just simply false. That is not the case. The planning that had been done before was taken into ac- count by the people who were executing the post-major combat op- erations activities. The comments about Baghdad I will possibly let General Abizaid comment on. The goal is not to have U.S. forces do the heavy lifting in Baghdad. There are many more Iraqi forces in Baghdad. The role of the U.S. forces is to help them, to provide logistics, to assist them as needed, and to create a presence that will allow the Iraqi security forces to succeed, and then as our forces step back allow the Iraqi security forces to be sufficient to maintain order in the city. I cannot predict if it will work this time. It may or it may not. It happens to represent the best judgment of General Casey, Gen- eral Chiarelli, and the military leadership, and General Abizaid and General Pace and I have reviewed it and we think that it is a sensible approach, as General Abizaid testified earlier. As for Afghanistan, I do not know who said what about the Taliban are gone, but in fact, the Taliban that were running Af- ghanistan and ruling Afghanistan were replaced, and they were re- placed by an election that took place in that country. In terms of a government or a governing entity, they were gone and that is a fact. Are there still Taliban around? You bet. Are they occupying safe havens in Afghanistan and other places—correction, in Pakistan and other places? Certainly they are. Is the violence up? Yes. Does the violence tend to be up during the summer and spring, summer fall months? Yes, it does, and it tends to decline during the winter period. 34 Does that represent failed policy? I do not know. I would say not. I think you have an awful lot of very talented people engaged in this and the decisions that are being made are being made with great care, after a great deal of consideration. Are there setbacks? Yes. Are there things that people cannot anticipate? Yes. Does the enemy have a brain and continue to make adjustments on the ground, requiring our forces to continue to make adjustments? You bet. Is that going to continue to be the case? I think so. Is this problem going to get solved in the near-term about this long struggle against violent extremism? No, I do not believe it is. I think it is going to take some time. I know the question was some wars lasted 3 years, some wars lasted 4 years, some wars lasted 5 years. The Cold War lasted 40-plus years. This struggle against violent extremists who are determined to prevent free people from exercising their rights as free people is going to go on a long time and it is going to be a tough one. That does not mean that we have to spend the rest of our lives as the United States Armed Forces in Iraq. The Iraqis are going to have to take that over. We cannot want freedom more for the Iraqi people than they want for themselves. Senator Thune men- tioned earlier about that issue. I would point out the number of tips that have been coming from Iraqi people have been going up steadily. They are at a very high level and it does suggest to me that the Iraqi people do want to have a free country, as I mentioned because of their voting pat- terns. So I would disagree strongly with your statement. Senator CLINTON. Mr. Secretary, I know you would and I know you feel strongly about it, but there is a track record here. This is not 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, when you appeared before this com- mittee and made many comments and presented many assurances that have, frankly, proven to be unfulfilled. Secretary RUMSFELD. Senator, I do not think that is true. I have never painted a rosy picture. I have been very measured in my words, and you would have a dickens of a time trying to find in- stances where I have been excessively optimistic. I understand this is tough stuff. Senator CLINTON. Mr. Chairman, I would like unanimous con- sent to submit for the record a number of the Secretary's former comments. Also, may we keep the record open for additional ques- tions? [The information referred to follows:] 35 A. Congressional Hearings 1. July 9, 2003 Senate Armed Services Committee hearing “The residents of Baghdad may not have power 24 hours a day, but they no longer wake up each morning in fear wondering whether this will be the day that a death squad would come to cut out their tongues, chop off their ears, or take their children away for "questioning,' never to be seen again.” Source: http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/2003/sp20030709-secdef0364.html 2. September 30, 2003 House Appropriations Committee hearing “My impression is that the war was highly successful.” Source: Transcript of Hearing of House Appropriations Committee, Subcommittee on Defense on President's FY '04 Supplemental Request for Iraq and Afghanistan, available online from FDCH Political Transcripts on Lexis-Nexis. 37 000001743474.html@committees&metapub=CQ- CONGTRANSCRIPTS&searchindex=0&seqNum=97 7. March 9, 2006 Senate Appropriations Committee hearing "SEN. ROBERT BYRD: Mr. Secretary, how can Congress be assured that the funds in this bill won't be used to put our troops right in the middle of a full-blown Iraqi civil war? SEC. DONALD RUMSFELD: Senator, I can say that certainly it is not the intention of the military commanders to allow that to happen. The -- and to repeat, the -- at least thus far, the situation has been such that the Iraqi security forces could for the most part deal with the problems that exist." Source: http://www.jcs.mil/chairman/speeches/060309CJCS_SecDefSecStateCENTCOMSenApp roCom.html B. Press Interviews and Other Forums 1. November 14, 2002 Infinity CBS Radio Connect, interview with Steve Kroft “The Gulf War in the 1990s lasted five days on the ground. I can't tell you if the use of force in Iraq today would last five days, or five weeks, or five months, but it certainly isn't going to last any longer than that." Source: http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/2002/t11152002 t1114rum.html 2. December 18, 2002 CNN "Larry King Live" “The Taliban are gone. The al Qaeda are gone." Source: http://www.defenselink.mil/Transcripts/Transcript.aspx?TranscriptID=2940 3. February 7, 2003 Town hall meeting with U.S. troops in Aviano, Italy "And it is not knowable if force will be used, but if it is to be used, it is not knowable how long that conflict would last. It could last, you know, six days, six weeks. I doubt six months." ould fast, you know, bir days, six weeks. doubt six 38 Source: http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/2003/t02072003_t0207sdtownhall.html 4. February 20, 2003 PBS “NewsHour" “Lehrer: Do you expect the invasion, if it comes, to be welcomed by the majority of the civilian population of Iraq? Rumsfeld: There's obviously the Shia population in Iraq and the Kurdish population in Iraq have been treated very badly by Saddam Hussein's regime, they represent a large fraction of the total. There is no question but that they would be welcomed." Source: http://www.defenselink.mil/Transcripts/Transcript.aspx?TranscriptID=1938 5. March 30, 2003 ABC "This Week with George Stephanopoulos" “We know where the WMD) are. They're in the area around Tikrit and Baghdad and east, west, south and north somewhat.” Source: http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/2003/t03302003_t0330sdabcsteph.html 6. February 1, 2006 Department of Defense News Briefing “Q: One clarification on the long war.' Is Iraq going to be a long war? SEC. RUMSFELD: No, I don't believe it is." Source: http://www.defenselink.mil/Transcripts/Transcript.aspx?TranscriptID=905 Chairman WARNER [presiding). The record will remain open until the close of business today for all members to contribute additional questions. Senator CLINTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General PACE. Senator, may I go on the record, sir? Chairman WARNER. Yes, of course. General PACE. Thank you, sir. I think it is very important that I as Chairman, having been Vice Chairman since October 1, 2001, having been part of the dialogue, having worked closely with Gen- eral Franks, General Casey, General Abizaid, all the Joint Chiefs: rs of forces that have been requested up the chain of command have been thoroughly discussed, the pros and cons or the balance, what was needed, how we might provide it, the equip- ment, the tactics of the major operations, all of those things have come up through the Joint Chiefs. We have given our best military advice. The collaborative nature between our leaders here in Washington and those in the field is as thorough and complete as I can imag- ine. I have personally been part of each of those decisions and I 39 want to go on record as saying that I along with the Joint Chiefs have been, continue to be, part of the decision process, and every- thing to my knowledge that we have ever asked for with regards to equipment or personnel has been provided to us. Chairman WARNER. Thank you very much, General. 2. I have listened to this very important colloquy, but I do believe, Mr. Secretary, having followed this, as is my responsibility, these many years, I think both Secretary Rumsfeld, your prede- cessor General Myers, and you, General Pace, have always made statements which were in balance and definitely indicating the se- riousness of the conflict and the fact that it is going to be a long and a drawn-out one. Our record has many entries in it to the ef- fect that the President and the Secretary of Defense have relied upon the advice of the senior military commanders in structuring those force levels. We will be happy to include in the record some material of our own on that point. I think, given the number of questions coming about the record, we will hold the record open until close of busi- ness on Friday. Senator Dayton. Senator DAYTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank sincerely each of you for your service to our country. I know that all of you live with enormous demands of your positions and the conditions around the world. With respect, we and more importantly the American people deserve to be told. I think more candidly perhaps than we have so far, why the Iraqis remain incapable of succeeding in Iraq and, since our success is predicated on their success, what we and they are going to do about it. Secretary Rumsfeld, you said in your remarks that you remain confident in the good common sense of the American people, and I agree with you that confidence is well-placed. The American peo- ple can tell the difference between succeeding and failing. They perceive, I think correctly, that the Iraqis are failing in Iraq and that our courageous troops continue to bear the brunt of the Iraqi failures, and that the realities there overall are getting worse, not better. I believe that all of you are mistaken to cast the failures in Iraq as a test of our citizens' will and resolve. I think it is unfair to the American people to do so. I respectfully disagree with your assertion, General Pace, that most Americans are not affected by this war every day. Most of them lived through September 11, 2001, as you did and we did. They remain profoundly affected by it. They accepted the Presi- dent's assertion that the United States invasion of Iraq was essen- tial to protect our national security, that Saddam Hussein pos- sessed WMD, as the President and the Vice President said, that immediately and urgently threatened the United States. The American people continued to support the war even after no WMD were found, even when their sons and daughters and hus- bands and wives, as you said, General, over a million of them, have been sent halfway around the world, risking their lives, giving their lives, to carry out the orders of their commander in chief. 41 Hezbollah destroyed the Marine barracks and killed over 200 American marines that were stationed there. You could say the war played itself out to a certain extent at a lower level in Somalia, where we stayed there for a short period of time and then left. You could say that throwing a few Tomahawk land attack missiles (TLAMs) at this enemy created the circumstances by which we had to end up facing this enemy with greater force and greater perse- verance and greater patience and courage than we had been able to muster before then. . This is a very serious problem that requires the application of our national might and will along with that of the international community to face down the extremist threat, whether it is spon- sored by Iran or whether it comes from al Qaeda, or we will fight one of the biggest wars we have ever fought. WMD may not have been found in Iraq, but this enemy is trying to develop WMD. We know that from just looking at any unclassi- fied Web site you want to look at. They are working at it day after day and they want to use it against us, and we can simply not walk away from this enemy until the people in the region have the capacity to deal with it themselves, and they want to do that. We have to shape the environment that allows them to help themselves. It is a slow process. When I think of how long it took us to win the American Revolution and then to solidify our own independence and freedom through the Constitution and eventually through our own Civil War, this is not an easy task. This is a very difficult task. I think we should give the people in the region credit for wanting to live a better life and achieve greater security and stability. We have to help them if we are going to keep our own children safe from the greater dangers that lurk out there. Senator DAYTON. General, I do not say this is about walking away from the enemy. I think it is a very unfair characterization. I can say I voted against the resolutions to set a timetable to begin to drawdown troops. I have gotten a lot of heat back home. So be it, because I agree the military command needs to decide what force level is necessary to carry out the mission that they are as- signed by their Commander in Chief, and I am not going to second- guess that. But I express the concern that the force level is going to remain there indefinitely because of the incapacity of the Iraqi society. I recognize that, after living 25 years under a severe dictatorship, that it takes some time. But we heard testimony last week from Iraqis that the health ministry is more corrupt than it was under Saddam Hussein. The amount of electricity in Baghdad we are told a day. I was there with the Chairman in July 2003. As you well know, sir, being there, when you get 115 degree tempera- tures and no air conditioning and no running water and no sanita- tion and no refrigeration, you have a crisis on your hands. People, as I said earlier, cannot go to work without fearing and they are fleeing. So again, you cannot paint it all one way or the other, but it seems to me that the incompetence, the corruption, and the inca- pacity of the Iraqi forces, despite our 3 years of the best training forces we have capable—when you can train Americans in 8 weeks Iraq and Afghanistan while keeping our military well-equipped and ready to respond. The administration urges the Senate to fully sup- port the procurement request to provide full funding for Afghan and Iraqi forces to enable them to assume full responsibility for their own security and fully fund our coalition support, to ensure timely reimbursement of critical partners.” Now, this is right on point: "The administration supports the Senate's acceleration of $13.1 billion into the bridge that would have been requested next year in the spring supplemental, bring- ing the total level of bridge funding in this bill to $63.1 billion. This action will facilitate the needed resetting of the Armed Forces to continue their important missions and provide needed certainty to military planners. This additional funding is necessary to accel- erate planned efforts to repair or replace war-damaged equip- ment”--the point that you addressed, General Pace. “In particular, these funds address Army and Marine Corps depot and unit main- tenance requirements and procurement needs, including Abrams, Bradley, Apache, and other helicopters, tactical vehicles, trailers, generators, and bridge equipment." This is a document that I will also insert, which states the OMB funding levels, and they were followed by the Appropriations Com- mittee in that amendment. So that will be placed in the record as I stated, and I thank the Secretary for bringing that to our further attention and clarifying it. [The information referred to follows:] 49 na Senator GRAHAM. Al Qaeda, after Zarqawi's death how would you rate their capability and their makeup in terms of numbers? General ABIZAID. Al Qaeda is significantly depleted. I think their numbers are less than 1,000. I think they are a tenacious and cel- lular group that needs continued work, but we are ma good progress against them and we will continue to make good progress against them. Senator GRAHAM. The reason I bring this question up is when you add up all the numbers we are talking maybe less than 30,000 people, 40,000 people. The question for our country and the world at large is how can we let 40,000 people in a nation of–how many million in Iraq? General PACE. 25, 26 million. Senator GRAHAM. 25 million. Why cannot 200,000 armed people working together contain 30,000 or 40,000? Secretary RUMSFELD. A couple of comments. One, it is a country the size of California, I suppose, and it is a heck of a lot easier to go around killing innocent men, women, and children and hiding without uniforms and not in any organized military activity which another military could go address- Senator GRAHAM. That goes to the point, it seems to me, that if the 25 million were united against the 40,000 that they would not put up with this. So it seems to me that the country is not united, because if you had 25 million people minus 40,000 that were on one side of the ledger versus the 40,000 this thing would come to an end overnight. There is something more going on in Iraq at a deeper level from a common sense perspective for this violence to be sustained so long and grow, not lessen. What do you think that so General PACE. Sir, I think you are fundamentally correct that if the Iraqi people as a whole decided today that, my words now, they love their children more than they hate their neighbor, that this could come to a quick conclusion. Many, about 4,500 to 5,000 pe month, are currently feeding tips to their government and to our Armed Forces about potential aggressive movements. We need the Iraqi people to seize this moment. We provided se- curity for them. Their armed forces are providing security for them and their armed forces are dying for them. They need to decide that this is their moment. Senator GRAHAM. Well said. The question for the American peo- ple I think as we go forward: Will they ever seize this moment any time soon? I would like each of you to give me an evaluation as to whether or not the 25 million less 40,000 will seize this moment any time soon, and what is the general view of the average Iraqi on the street about our military presence and the role that we are playing in their future? Are they more supportive or less supportive of us being there now than they were a year ago? I would stop there. General PACE. Sir, I think they will seize the moment. I do not know how soon that will be. I think the Iraqi people need to get to the point where the amount of pain they are inflicting on each other goes beyond their ability to endure. I do not have, based on my upbringing, an understanding of how much they can endure or how their society accepts that kind of violence. 51 of Iraq's refined fuels and 30 percent of its imported fuels were being stolen. Can you explain in your strategy how it is tailored to prevent the corruption and theft of the investments and the Iraqis' own re- sources as we get into the reconstruction? General ABIZAID. Senator, clearly corruption is endemic in this part of the world. It was very heavily part of Saddam's society. It continues to be part of the current Iraqi society, but I believe that there are many forces within Iraq that recognize the problem, that the good governance that will emerge from representative govern- ment and accountability will over time move this in a positive di- rection. I think that corruption in this part of the world is one of the great corrosive influences that causes extremism to flourish and in order to be successful against the extremists governments must be held more and more accountable, and I believe this Iraqi govern- ment will be held accountable by their people over time. Secretary RUMSFELD. I would add one other thing, Senator Nel- son, if I might. One of the real problems in my view has been the fact that historically the Iraqis have been paying a very small frac- tion for their fuel of what the market price is. So as we all know, it ought not to be a surprise, if you can buy it at that price you can immediately take it across the border and sell it for a higher price, and that has been a problem because the government has been-is now in the process of raising the price towards the market price, has not gotten there, but is in that direction. But in the mean time, it is very damaging and it does lead to corruption. Senator BILL NELSON. The SIGIR's report stated the deterio- rating security situation has had a particularly deleterious effect on the establishment of our Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), only five of which have begun operations in Iraq. They went on to tell how the concept, the PRT concept, had worked well in Afghanistan and it was thought to be a key component in the Irag reconstruction strategy. So General Abizaid, in your discussions with the Iraqi govern- ment and our State Department, what is your thinking in the strategy to implement the PRT in every province to aid in the tran- sition? General ABIZAID. The PRTs are the strategic responsibility of the Ambassador and I think it is too soon to say that they have not been successful. I was in Mosul the other day and I talked to the PRT up there and it was clear to me that they were making good progress, that they had good access to the Iraqi provincial leader- ship. In other parts of the country, the vast majority of the country, by the way, which is fairly secure and fairly stable, the PRTs will over time gain more access and become more efficient. Certainly in those areas around Baghdad where the sectarian vi- olence is extreme it is difficult for the PRTs to do the work. But I am confident that the strategy that the Ambassador has adopted to move the PRTs forward will be successful, especially provided that the other agencies of the U.S. Government, U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), State Department, et cetera, 54 40,000 military insurgents cannot be controlled by 127,000 or whatever, Mr. Secretary, you said we had over there now, plus the Iraqi army. I think the numbers in Lebanon of Hezbollah insur- gents is probably very insignificant, particularly compared to the force. As long as they are moving, hostile, and agile, as you refer to them, General Abizaid, it is pretty obvious that does present sig- nificant problems. Lastly, let me just say that Senator Graham referred to our trip over there in December. We met with eight members of the Iraqi Election Commission, all of whom happened to be Sunnis, and every "one of them made the comment, unsolicited on our part, about the presence of the American soldier. The comment was that, do we want to see the American soldier leave, and if you ask the Iraqi people that today they would say sure. But if you ask, do you want the American soldier to leave today, the answer would be overwhelmingly no. I think that is borne out in a newspaper story today where there are a number of quotes here in the Washington Times from Iraqi citizens with regard to the troops, General Abizaid, that you put into Baghdad to run the militia out of the various neighborhoods, and the fact now that these Iraqi citizens are quoted as saying that for the first time in months that they are able to come out of their homes now, to reopen their shops, and for commerce to once again be present within the city of Baghdad, speaks volumes about the American soldier, and there are nothing but compliments about the job that the American soldiers are doing. It still goes back to the fact that they do want us to leave, but they do not want us to leave until the job is done. So I hope that the Iraqi leadership is right that by the end of the year that they are able to take over control of the entire country, but in the mean time it is pretty obvious that our troops are doing the right things over there today under your leadership. So with that, thank you. I appreciate it. Mr. Chairman. Chairman WARNER. Thank you very much, Senator Chambliss. Senator Bayh. Senator BAYH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Gentlemen, thank you for your presence here today. General Abizaid, I would be interested in your opinion. Some observers have commented that there remain unresolved political questions for the Iraqis involving their constitution, division of oil revenues, that sort of thing, and that this is in significant part fueling the insurgencies and the continuing conflict. I would be interested in your opinion about whether you think that is true and, if so, what you think we can do to keep the pressure on the Iraqis to resolve their remaining political disputes. General ABIZAID. Senator, as General Casey has said to me on numerous occasions, this conflict has gone from essentially insur- gency to a discussion within the internal Iraqi groupings about the distribution of power, resources, and future control. You can ap- proach it one of two ways. One way is by violence, the other way is by compromise. It is my opinion that the forces of compromise will eventually un- derstand that violence gets them nothing and that the compromise is absolutely essential, just like we had to determine that in our 57 ton. Mr. Secretary, my last question, back to you again on the Day- Chairman WARNER. Just a minute, Senator. I think you have posed a question in your preliminary comments. Is it, or do you wish to go to your last question? Senator BAYH. My last question, assuming we have—I have a couple blue cards here. Chairman WARNER. I want to make sure the panel had adequate opportunity to answer. Senator BAYH. Let me pose it as a question, then. If it does come to that, do we have a continuing mission in Iraq? If the Iraqis themselves have not been able to hold the center and they have chosen up sides along sectarian lines, at that point do we have a continuing mission in Iraq or not? Chairman WARNER. That will be your last question, but let us give the panel—it is directed to whom? All three? Secretary RUMSFELD. I am reluctant to speculate about that. It could lead to a discussion that suggests that we presume that is going to happen and both General Abizaid and General Pace have offered their comments on that. Our role is to support the govern- ment. The government is holding together. The armed forces are holding together. We are functioning in a very close relationship with that government in providing them assistance in achieving their goals. We have seen what happens when governments pull apart, mili- taries pull apart. We saw it in Lebanon and it is not a pretty pic- ture. Obviously, that would be a set of decisions that the President and Congress and the country would address. But I think that be- yond that it would be not my place to be discussing it. Chairman WARNER. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. I think that dis- poses of the question unless either of the other witnesses want to add any views. If not, Senator Sessions. Senator SESSIONS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. One discussion that we have had here and had some votes—I think the last vote we had was on the question of whether we should set a firm date for pulling out regardless of the situation in Iraq. It was voted down 83 to 16 or something to that effect. Senator Warner made a reference, General Abizaid, to the fact that the emotional reactions to the Lebanon situation could make the situation more difficult perhaps for our soldiers in Iraq. I would like to ask a little bit of a different question. It would be, what kind of reaction, what kind of impact would there be with regard to the Islamic extremists in the Middle East and you are a stu- dent of that region. You have spent time in that region as a young person. You speak Arabic and you have been with us conducting this Iraq war from the beginning. What kind of impact would re- sult if we were to precipitously withdraw? Would it mollify the extremists? Would it make them say, well, the United States is a nicer place and we do not have to be so ag- gressive now? Or would they likely be emboldened and empowered and more aggressive? General ABIZAID. Emboldened, empowered, and more aggressive. Senator SESSIONS. We have people say, well, we are spending too much on this war, and then they come forward and say, well, you did not spend enough, you did not have enough equipment. Let us talk about that a little bit, General Pace. I am familiar with just one depot, Anniston Army Depot. I know that they are vigorously and aggressively hiring new people to reset the equipment. I was also aware that we did not have enough money apparently in this budget to meet the high challenges that we were facing with the reset. The DOD blessed the Army's concern in that. It was made known to Congress. We just added another $13 billion and another amendment by Senator Dodd that would allow another $6 billion, allow another $6 billion to meet that challenge. First I will ask you, do you think we are going to, with those funds, will be able to meet that reset problem? General PACE. Sir, the money that was just—the $13.1 billion will meet the current Marine Corps and Army backlogs at the de- pots. It will allow for hiring of the additional shifts of skilled work- ers to get the job done. That is why I mentioned before that as best Congress can provide a no-year funding stream that the depots can depend on, so they can go out and hire workers who know they will have a job for the foreseeable future, we can start working off this backlog, sir. Senator SESSIONS. I think you are exactly right and I am glad we have taken steps on that, and if we need to do more I believe this Congress will meet your demands. One more thing. With regard to readiness, I was in an Army Re- serve unit and they rated us whether we were ready or not in the 1970s and 1980s. If you do not have all your vehicles, you are not rated ready. When a unit comes off any major deployment, particu- larly coming off a combat deployment, is it not inevitable, I think you indicated, that you will not be rated ready? One of the complicating factors for an effort like we are under- going in Iraq, it seems to me, is units take their equipment with them and it is cheaper and smarter to leave that equipment over there for the next unit that replaces them. Therefore when they get back they may not have the full complement of equipment they need to be rated in your strict standards of readiness as ready. General PACE. Sir, you are exactly right, and the reset money has been in the supplementals. The money for the Reserve and Na- tional Guard to build the 28 fully-manned, trained, and equipped brigades that the Army has stipulated they need is in the baseline budget to the tune of $21 billion over the next 5 years. Senator SESSIONS. General Pace, you have been at this quite a number of years. Would you say that we are moving to have the best-equipped, most ready military the world has ever seen, at least this Army in peacetime before this war started, and as we go forward are we not better equipped and moving to a way to have our Guard and Reserve have the kind of equipment they have never had before? General PACE. Sir, we are today the best-equipped, manned, trained, battle-hardened that we have ever been. With your contin- ued support in Congress, we will be able to maintain the equip- ment and replace the combat equipment that has been lost. It takes upwards of 36 months from the time you lose a helicopter in 60 combat until the time the replacement helicopter comes on line. That does not mean that people are not trying to do the right thing or that the system is not working. It just takes that amount of time for that kind of equipment to be identified as lost, put into the budget process, funded, contracted, and built. Senator SESSIONS. Thank you very much. Secretary RUMSFELD. It argues, Senator Sessions, for the possi- bility of Congress looking at the idea of a reset fund. That is to say, if you want to shorten that period of time, the time it takes for the analysis as to what has been lost or degraded, the time that Con- gress takes to consider and weigh it, the time it takes to place the orders and have the contract validated, and then the time it takes to produce it, which is, as General Pace said, it can be up to 3 years, if you had a reset fund that Congress approved and it was only for those purposes, the funds could then be drawn down in a much shorter period of time. Depots could plan their hiring earlier and you would have the ability to shorten that. I have not talked to the OMB about this, but inside the DOD we have been talking that there has to be a way to shorten that time period, and one of the ways would be for Congress to act more rapidly on budgets than happens each year. Another way would be for Congress to approve a reset, and another way would be for us in the DOD to find a way to try to cut in half the period of time it takes to actually let a contract and go through that whole procedure. If the three of us did those things, it is conceivable we could ab- breviate that period and solve some of the problem General Pace is talking about. Senator SESSIONS. General Pace, just briefly, the idea that was stated earlier about a number of our brigades not being ready, in your opinion does that misrepresent the status of our capability at this time? Would it cause someone to have a higher degree of con- cern than is warranted? I know we want to do better. We want every unit to be ready. But is it not inevitable that as units transi- tion off combat that there will be a period when they do not meet your high standards of readiness? General PACE. Sir, there will be a period like that. Our readiness reporting system has been accurately reported to Congress as is re- quired every quarter. We have been talking about the need to re- pair equipment now for about the last year to 18 months. So it is not wrong to say that we have equipment deficiencies and that we need to spend the money to do that. That is an accurate use of the data that is available. But if you say to me would I rather have 100 percent of the 2,000 up-armored Humvees that I thought I needed in 2001 or 50 percent of the 12,000 up-armored Humvees that I say I need today, and which Army is better, I would tell you that, although my reporting system would tell you I am now at 50 percent and therefore com- mand, control, communications, and computers (C4), that the Army I have built is three times better with regard to Humvees. You can multiple that toward hundreds of thousands of end items. That is why it is really a kaleidoscope, and to try to have a discussion that just lays out exactly precisely what the readiness ratings are lends itself to misinterpretation and misunderstanding. 64 I would like to, before calling on Senator Talent, and then I want to ensure that the Senator from Rhode Island has an opportunity to speak, but our panel of witnesses must appear before the whole Senate at 2 o'clock sharp and consequently within the period of roughly 1 o'clock to 2 o'clock they have other obligations. So it is my ho O conclude this session here in a matter of 10 minutes or so. Senator Talent, your time is now recognized. Senator TALENT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank all three of you for your service. I was going to say- General PACE. He will be right back, sir. Senator TALENT.—in absentia General Abizaid in particular for being in that crucible for years. Chairman WARNER. He got a telephone call. Senator TALENT. I understand entirely, Mr. Chairman. I will di- rect my questions at the Secretary anyway. Mr. Secretary, I agree with an awful lot of what you said in your opening statement. I think it is important to remind people about what this is about. I agree this is an existential struggle and that is how they view it, a struggle for existence. I agree that there are no conceivable accommodations with them that would cause them to stop attacking us. Just we do not have the choice of them not attacking us. They are going to attack us. We therefore have to fight the war. I also agree that the war in Iraq, the mission in Iraq, was a good strategic option and maybe the only strategic option. I have always said that mission was to remove Saddam, who was an organic threat, and replace him with a multi-ethnic democracy that would be an ally in the war on terror. I also agree that we are making progress towards that end. If we are talking about whether the circumstances are such that we can withdraw, we are talking about whether the mission has been com- pleted. I think we need to understand that. As long as the terror- ists are prepared to concentrate to the extent they are in Iraq, we cannot guarantee that it is going to be a pacified country. But we are getting closer to the point where the Iraqi government can sus- tain itself with less American help. So I do think there has been progress and I am pleased about all that. What I want to ask you about, Mr. Secretary, is this. Given that we are involved in this war and in this existential struggle, how can we be in a situation where we are allowing the budgets that you think you need to be reduced by the OMB year after year? I refer to the budget reduction in the fall of 2004, $30 billion over the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP), in the fall of 2005, $32 billion over the FYDP, April of this year indications there would be another 2 percent cut. I am concerned that we may see a cut in the fall of this year, and these cuts are coming from the OMB. Now, we are in an exis- tential struggle. I just do not think-you referred appropriately, I think, that we have to be concerned about the message we are sending. I am concerned that these budget cuts coming from people who are not warfighters are sending the message that we are weakening, that we are not prepared to bear the cost of this. 68 for more funding is absolutely correct. I am just trying to make sure that everybody listening to this conversation understands how you can go from 2001 with 2,000 vehicles, 2006 with 12,000 vehi- cles, and not have all 12,000 vehicles and still feel better about our Army's capacity to get the job done. Chairman WARNER. Thank you very much, General. Senator REED. Thank you. Chairman WARNER. May I say to my colleague from Rhode Is- land, General Schoomaker is visiting with me on this issue this afternoon at 4 p.m. I would be pleased to have you join us. I have invited Senator Levin. He is likewise going to join us. It may well be that he will wish to put his comments on the record of these proceedings today in the section relating to your questions. Senator REED. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chairman WARNER. Thank you very much. One last question and then we will conclude this, I think an ex- cellent hearing. Last week President Bush and Prime Minister Blair agreed to seek a U.N. resolution calling for the creation of a multinational force to help the Lebanese government extend con- trol in southern Lebanon. I strongly support those initiatives by our President and, given that that country, Lebanon, is in area of operations, given your long experience, first I would like to have your assessment of what is the capability of the Lebanese army today and what training and equipment would they require for the mission of their government to go out and begin to maintain control, given the assumption that there will be a multinational force eventually put together. So if you could include your assessment of the size and the capa- bility of such force that would be needed to fulfill the commitments that President Bush and Prime Minister Blair made to our respec- tive nations and the world. General ABIZAID. Senator, certainly I do not want to let any of my comments get in the way of the diplomacy that is going on right now. It is very important that the diplomats do their work. The Lebanese armed forces is a professional armed force. It has one of the most educated officer corps in the Middle East. It is a small force for Middle Eastern standards of about 50,000 or so, and it needs significant upgrade of equipment and training, capability that I believe the western nations, in particular the United States, can assist with. We recently, before the current difficulty started, visited the Leb- anese armed forces, did an assessment of where they h open to be in readiness. We saw that they needed some significant spare parts. I think we have made our desires known through the DOD as to how we could help them immediately. I think there will be need for other assistance to the Lebanese armed forces because it will never work for Lebanon if over time Hezbollah has a greater military capacity than the Lebanese armed forces. The Lebanese armed forces must extend the sovereignty of the nation throughout the country. I believe that they can do that in assistance with the international community and with a robust peacekeeping force or peace enforcement force, depending upon what the diplomats de- cide is the right equation. 69 I would say that I served with the U.N. Interim Force in Leb- anon back in the mid-1980s and it was not capable of really enforc- ing peace and security in the region. So whatever force goes in has to have robust rules of engagement. Chairman WARNER. Robust rules? General ABIZAID. Robust rules of engagement, very clear and un- ambiguous mandate, and clear cooperation from the Lebanese gov- ernment and any other parties. Chairman WARNER. Could you further define your professional definition of “robust rules of engagement”? That was the second robust rules of you further detin part of my General ABIZAID. Robust rules of engagement means that the commander has the ability to effect the mandate that has been given to him by the international community, to include the use of all available means at his forces disposal, and I think in the case of southern Lebanon he will have to have capabilities that are just not minor small arms, but would include all arms. Chairman WARNER. Thank you. My distinguished colleague from Minnesota, I indicated the hopes to have a second round. We have had some, but the interven- tion of two votes precludes a further second round of questions by members. But I invite you to provide for the record your question. It will be open until tomorrow close of business. I would like to say in conclusion, Secretary Rumsfeld, General Pace, General Abizaid, that this has been a very thorough and con- structive hearing and I thank each of you for your participation and forthrightness in your responses. The hearing is now adjourned. [Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:] QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JOHN MCCAIN TROOP LEVELS IN IRAQ 1. Senator MCCAIN. Secretary Rumsfeld, General Pace, and General Abizaid, what do you believe are the most likely ramifications of a withdrawal of American forces from Iraq by a date certain? What effect might setting a timeline for withdrawal have? Secretary RUMSFELD. There are calls in some quarters for withdrawal or arbitrary timelines for withdrawals. The enemies hear those words as well. We need to be realistic about the consequences. If we left Iraq prematurely, as the terrorists de- mand, the enemy would tell us to leave Afghanistan and then withdraw from the Middle East, and if we left the Middle East they would order us and all those who do not share their militant ideology to leave what they call the occupied Muslim lands from Spain to the Philippines. Then we would face not only the evil ideology of these violent extremists, but an enemy that will have grown accustomed to suic- ceeding in telling free people everywhere what to do. Setting an artificial deadline to withdraw would also send a message across the world that America is a weak and unreliable ally. Setting an artificial deadline to withdraw would send a signal to our enemies that if they wait long enough, America will cut and run and abandon its friends. General PACE. First, a set date for American withdrawal would provide something the enemy could anticipate. It would give them light at the end of the tunnel, a date for which to wait, prepare, and then claim victory. Second, it would set a limit for American commitment to the Iraqi government. There should not be a time limit for our support of a new democratic government in Iraq. Third, a set date for with- drawal would not be based on the actual situation, which is fluid and uncertain. Force reductions should be conditions-based so that we are adjusting troop levels to the realities on the ground. Lastly, a set date may limit or inhibit international donor commitment and investment. 70 General ABIZAID. Early withdrawal of American troops will endanger the stability of Iraqi security force (ISF) institutions, the Iraqi political process, and establish- ment of Iraqi civil institutions. Our objectives were developed to be conditions-based within a timeframe reflected in the Joint Campaign Plan in agreement with our coa- lition partners, and in line with our mandate from the United Nations. However, a fixed timeline for leaving Iraq would lead terrorists to believe that they could win by waiting for our departure. It would also signal a lack of coalition patience and will, and would play directly into the intentions of terrorists and foreign fighters who seek to destroy the ability of the Iraqi people to forge their own national iden- tity. Our enemies know that they cannot defeat us militarily. To succeed, they will focus on the battle of perceptions, which they plan to win by encouraging the coali- tion's withdrawal before Iraq is ready to stand alone. 2. Senator McCAIN. Secretary Rumsfeld, General Pace, and General Abizaid, could you describe the new strategy for Baghdad, one that reportedly involves the deployment of several thousand additional troops to the city and the adoption of the so-called "oil spot” strategy? Secretary RUMSFELD. The Baghdad Security Plan, named Operation Together For- ward, is not an "oil spot” strategy but is designed to improve the security situation in Baghdad by increasing checkpoints, curfews, and enforced weapons bans in fo- cused areas within the city. Security forces are also conducting targeted operations against terrorist cells and death squads. Security forces are moving from neighborhood to neighborhood identifying and eliminating violent forces, securing weapons caches, and restoring basic civil sery- ices. As the situation improves, security forces will transition to policing and emer- gency response operations. In addition to stepping up security operations, the Government of Iraq, with Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF-I) support, is working with the local District Advi- sory Councils to employ local labor to rebuild neighborhood markets and restore es- sential services. As of September 22, Iraqis have spent more than 11,000 man-days cleaning up and restoring essential services. The Provincial Reconstruction Develop- ment Committee approved 15 reconstruction projects totaling $9.2 million. Fourteen projects are in the Doura District which, until recently, was one of the most violent districts in Baghdad. General PACE. The concept of the plan is to assert increased control over the pop- ulace by conducting increased checkpoints, curfews, and enforced weapons bans in focused areas within Baghdad. Security forces are also conducting targeted oper- ations against terrorist cells and death squads. They are conducting systematic neighborhood by neighborhood operations to identify and clean out violent forces, identify and secure weapons caches, and identify and restore basic civil services. Ul- timately, this operation will restore the confidence of the Iraqi people in the ISF, which will also assist in lowering the levels of violence. As the situation improves, security forces will transition to steady state policing and emergency response oper- ations. The positive reaction to the "clean-up Baghdad streets” initiative, in which Iraqi and coalition force troops were cleaning the streets together, is an excellent example of the 'nonkinetic effect aspect of the Baghdad Security Plan. The Government of Iraq, with MNF-I in support, is working very closely with the local District Advisory Councils in the areas of operations by employing local labor from the community to clean and rebuild parts of the neighborhood markets and re- pair and restore essential services. To date, more than 11,000 man-days of employ- ment have been executed by Iraqis for projects directly related to cleaning up and developing the areas where operations are focused. On 24 August, the Provincial Re- construction Development Committee voted unanimously to support the Baghdad Security Plan with Economic Security Funds; 15 reconstruction projects totaling $9.2 million were approved. Fourteen projects are in the Doura District, until re- cently one of the most violent districts in the city. One project is in the Ghazaliya, Al Mansour District. Included are the following: - Four road projects (to include an asphalt overlay of all residential city roads); - Two water projects; - Four sewer projects (to include completion of a sewer network that will connect approximately 2 million residents to the waste water treatment plant); - Four school projects (to include construction of one primary, one sec- ondary, and one high school); and - One project to supply essential service equipment. 71 General ABIZAID. The "oil spot” strategy is a counterinsurgency effort based on fix- ing parts of the country across all lines of operation such as security, government, and economic in order to return basic services such as sewage, water, electricity, education, trash, medical, and transportation. As life returns to normalcy in these "oil spots” the citizens dislocate themselves from the insurgency as they come to re- alize that the insurgency is a destructive force while the host nation government gains legitimacy. It is the legitimacy of the government which is the key in any suc- cessful counterinsurgency. Other areas around this “oil spot” will then want to enjoy those benefits and as the theory goes the "oil spot” begins to spread as oil does on top of water. The security of Baghdad is without a doubt very important to the successful out- come of this campaign. In order to displace the local citizens from the insurgency and in order to boost the legitimacy of the Government of Iraq we have started Op- eration Together Forward. Operation Together Forward is designed to regain those areas that were hardest hit by the insurgency. Those objective areas within Bagh- dad are first cleared by coalition and ISF-house by house, building by building. Next is a hold phase with ISF in the lead the citizens and the local government begin to help not only clean up the objective but also to re-open businesses and com- merce. The last phase is the build phase whereupon the local citizens will build upon the successes in the security, economic, and government lines of operations. We are still in the clear stage of this operation. NP commanders activity. Moreover, the capability or 3. Senator MCCAIN. Secretary Rumsfeld, General Pace, and General Abizaid, where will these additional troops come from? If we are redeploying U.S. troops from outside Baghdad, won't we need to replace those troops with additional forces? Secretary RUMSFELD. It is important to remember that Iraqi troops are also being moved into Baghdad. The number of Iraqi troops in the Baghdad area is greater than our troops. We are supporting them in the main operational areas. They can benefit from our command and control capabilities and the systems that a unit such as the Stryker brigade brings to the fight. Levels of violence and terrorist activities drive decisions to reallocate U.S. forces inside Iraq. MNF-I commanders normally do not reallocate troops to areas experi- encing moderate levels of enemy activity. Moreover, the capability of the local ISF is a deciding factor as to whether to reallocate U.S. forces. Before any U.S. combat unit is reallocated, U.S. commanders must be confident that the departed area will not backslide into increased violence. General PACE. After being relieved by the 3rd Stryker Brigade Combat Team (SBCT), 2nd Infantry Division (21D) in MND-N, the 172nd SBČT was extended for up to 120 days and repositioned to support the main security effort in Baghdad. Since their replacement (3rd SBCT, 2ID) was part of a normal Operation Iraqi Free- dom (OIF) force rotation, no additional forces were required to backfill. That said, commanders in the field continue to evaluate conditions on the ground and make recommendations and requests for force adjustments as conditions warrant. General ABIZAID. [Deleted.] 4. Senator MCCAIN. Secretary Rumsfeld, General Pace, and General Abizaid, President Talabani has stated that Iraqi forces will assume security duties for the entire country by the end of this year. How does this square with the increased U.S. troop presence in Baghdad and the continuing presence of coalition troops through- out Iraq? Secretary RUMSFELD. Coalition commanders expect ISF units will have the secu- rity lead in all of Iraq by March or April 2007. The ministries and the joint head- quarters, with coalition support, are expected to take the lead by the end of 2007. However, we believe that our partnership with these institutions will be required for some time into the future. However, our assessments are conditions-based; un- foreseen improvements or setbacks could affect the ISF's scheduled assumption of the security lead. The enemy will have an affect on the timeline. General PACE. Given the current security situation on the ground, the level of training and equipping of ISF, and the development of the leadership core of ISF, we estimate that all Iraqi territory will be under ISF lead by the end of 2007. The ministries and the joint headquarters are expected to be in the lead with coalition support by the end of 2007. However, a partnership with these institutions will be required through at least the first peaceful transfer of power in 2010. These assess- ments are conditions-based, and unforeseen improvements or setbacks may affect the ISF's scheduled assumption of the security lead. The enemy will always get a vote. General ABIZAID. Coalition force requirements are determined through a condi- tions-based process, factoring in the presence and activities of the terrorists and in- improvements future. However, inu with these instiead by the lenigint he 72 surgents in an area as well as the strength and capabilities of Iraqi army and police forces in area. These factors ultimately determine the level of coalition force require- ments in an area. Each area has its own unique circumstances. President Talibani noted the significant capabilities of the ISF and the fact that Iraqi army and police forces have assumed responsibility across Iraq, responsibilities that will increase through the remainder of the year. In many areas, however, Iraqi forces will still require coalition forces to help back them up. Additionally, until the Iraqi logistics system is fully established, Iraqi forces will require coalition support to provide some key resources until the Iraqi system is able to provide these requirements. Ad- ditionally, there are some areas where the terrorist and insurgent presence requires additional security force presence. Baghdad is currently one such area where addi- tional coalition forces are required until additional ISF can be deployed. 5. Senator MCCAIN. Secretary Rumsfeld, General Pace, and General Abizaid, it seems clear that even today, more than 3 years after our invasion of Iraq, we do not have sufficient troops to control the country or help the Iraqi government im- pose its authority. We are talking about redeploying thousands of troops from around Iraq to Baghdad. More troops will be deployed to Ramadi, possibly coming from Falluja. Have we had since our invasion, and do we have today, sufficient force levels in Iraq? If you believe we do, what do you believe will be the turning point in this war, since additional troops seem to be unnecessary? Secretary RUMSFELD. The number of troops that went in, and the number of troops that were there every month since, and the number of troops that are there today reflected the best judgment of the military commanders on the ground, their superiors, General Pace, General Abizaid, the civilian leadership of the Department of Defense (DOD) and the President of the United States. The Iraqis will determine the “turning point” in the war when they view their se- curity situation tenable, their political process as legitimate, and their economic fu- ture as hopeful. For its part, the Government of Iraq needs to resolve the difficult issues of national reconciliation, militias, oil revenue sharing, federalism, and de- Baathification. They must address these issues in a way that does not exacerbate sectarian tensions. General PACE. It is impossible to provide a discreet "turning point” because the turning point must happen in the minds of the Iraqis. Iraqis, including minorities, must view the political process as legitimate and effective and Iraq's economic pros- pects as sufficient and equitable for themselves, their families, and their tribe or sect. Effective political and economic reform is central to a lasting reduction in vio- lence, to a far greater extent than solely increasing U.S. troop numbers. The Gov- ernment of Iraq must resolve the difficult issues of national reconciliation, including de-Baathification reform, militias, oil revenue sharing, and the nature of Iraqi fed- eralism. They must address these issues in a way that does not exacerbate sectarian tensions. Additionally, the Government of Iraq must deliver basic goods and services and a program to increase economic opportunities to provide a counter to crime and militias. The 172nd SBCT was temporarily extended. This unit is the coalition's most expe- rienced unit, with the most mobile and agile systems, in support of the main secu- rity effort in Baghdad at a decisive time. With the rest of the elements of the plan to protect the population in Baghdad, this unit's deployment gives coalition forces a potentially decisive capability to affect security in Baghdad in the near-term. Com- manders in the field will continue to evaluate our force structure and recommend changes as conditions warrant. We continually assess future force requirements with the Iraqi government. Decisions about coalition troop levels are conditions based and tailored to the overall situation in Iraq. We continue to transition and transfer additional responsibilities to the ISF. The people of Iraq continue to meet the political milestones they have established. As these and other conditions are met we assess the capabilities here and make recommendations as to the levels of troops needed in the coming months. We are committed to ensuring Iraq's security forces are trained, equipped, and organized in a manner that will allow them to provide security and stability on their own. They are making progress and our partnership program should help develop their capabilities even more. Adjustments to the coali- tion troop levels are conditions-based and not based on a timeline. Those conditions include continued political development, ISF development, and the transition of se- curity responsibilities from coalition forces to ISF. Coalition forces remain in a sup- port role. General ABIZAID. I believe we have had and currently have sufficient troops in Iraq. While the number of U.S. forces has varied from as many as 185,000 to as few as 120,000 depending on rotation cycles, there are still 23,000 coalition troops in Iraq, and most importantly we now have trained and equipped over 300,000 Iraqi 73 soldiers and police, and an additional 100,000 forces in the ministries as well. The increasing number of ISF is the most telling number as it is integral to the Govern- ment of Iraq bearing ultimate responsibility for Iraq's security. As decisive as our joint military operations are, particularly our efforts to secure Baghdad, the turning point in this war will be when the majority of Iraqis believe in and support their elected government in the difficult tasks ahead. The year-old Iraqi Constitution calls for approximately 55 enabling or implementing acts to make it operative, including such significant and broad areas as judiciary development and economic reform. Passing and enforcing this legislation will be a key indicator of progress for the new Iraqi government and this campaign. Ha and suppoution calls fouch significanforcing this campaign. IRAQI MILITIAS 6. Senator MCCAIN. Secretary Rumsfeld, General Pace, and General Abizaid, with the death of Zarqawi and the capture of several of his lieutenants, how would you assess the threat posed today by al Qaeda in Iraq? Secretary RUMSFELD. Killing Zarqawi did not destroy al Qaeda in Iraq. Its capac- ity, however, has been diminished. Although al Qaeda is a tenacious organization, we are making progress against them and we will continue to make progress. Sec- tarian violence was always Zarqawi's strategy. Violence creates fear and targets in- nocent civilians in an attempt to derail democracy. General PACE. [Deleted.] General ABIZAID. [Deleted.] 7. Senator McCAIN. Secretary Rumsfeld, General Pace, and General Abizaid, has Moqtada al Sadr's militia become problem number one for the Iraqi government and the coalition, and what are our current plans to deal with his and other independent militias? Secretary RUMSFELD. Article 9 of the Iraqi constitution prohibits the formation of military militias outside the framework of the armed forces. Nevertheless, the problem of illegal armed groups and militias requires both ki- netic and political solutions. Coalition forces will assist the Iraqi government in ad- dressing illegal armed groups by reintegrating individuals into the ISF, disarming them, and demobilizing them. Indeed, the two primary objectives of the security op- erations in Baghdad are rapidly reducing sectarian violence by de-legitimizing the illegally armed groups and establishing the ISF as the dominant security presence. Once Iraqi citizens have more confidence in their security forces, they will be less likely to rely on militias. Improvements in the capabilities of the ÍSF are steady as seen in Baghdad neighborhoods cleared as part of Operation Together Forward. The Iraqi government is also encouraging the organization of popular committees. The committees, like neighborhood watches, assist Iraqi police and Iraqi army by providing information on threats in the neighborhood. The unarmed popular com- mittees should provide information to be acted on by the security forces. General PACE. The recent increase in sectarian violence is the number one prob- lem for the Iraqi government and the coalition; that said, any group associated with terror, murder, or extreme violence is equally detrimental to a free and democrat- ically-elected Iraqi government. Those groups will be pursued and brought to justice by Iraqi and coalition forces. In that Iraq is a sovereign nation, current plans to deal with security in Iraq require close coordination with Iraqi government and associ- ated ISF. An example of this is Operation Together Forward, in which coalition forces are working closely with Iraqi counterparts to reduce murders, kidnappings, assassinations, terrorism, and sectarian violence in Baghdad. General ABIZAID. Preventing sectarian violence from escalating into civil war is the coalition's highest priority. Sadr's Jaysh-al-Mahdi militia is a contributor to sec- tarian violence but only part of the overall problem. Sunni and Shiite extremists at both ends of the spectrum are increasingly locked in retaliatory violence, contesting control of ethnically mixed neighborhoods in order to expand their existing areas of influence. The challenge for the coalition is to support the government in breaking the cycle of ethno-sectarian violence while allowing the Prime Minister to consolidate the Shi- ite and Sunni constituency he needs in order to be able to exercise power. An effec- tive disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration program for militias and illegal armed groups is essential to meeting security requirements that will have long-term implications for economic development and foreign investment. Integrated with the effort to disarm the militias is the Prime Minister's “National Reconciliation and Dialogue Project,” which he presented to the Iraqi Council of Representatives in June. This 24-point initiative was aimed at reconciling past inequities, rallying 74 Iraqis around a principle of equality devoid of sectarian divisions, firmly estab- lishing the basis of national unity via a democratic political process, and creating conditions for Iraq to assume a leading role regionally and internationally. The Na- tional Reconciliation Project is intended to open dialogue, reduce sectarian tensions and violence in Iraq, and increase commitment to the democratic process and the new National Unity Government. 8. Senator McCAIN. Secretary Rumsfeld, General Pace, and General Abizaid, the police obviously pose a problem for stability and safety in Iraq. Are there plans to eliminate infiltrators from the police ranks, and distance the police from militia con- trol? Secretary RUMSFELD. There are some places where the local police are exception- ally efficient and very honest. There are other areas where we know that they have been infiltrated by various militias, such as in Basra, where the government and the British forces that are down there are doing their best to stand down those units, retrain them, and bring them on line in a credible and capable manner. As far as national police forces, there are battalions that need to be stood down and retrained. We are in the process of doing that now. The Iraqis are building Internal Affairs and Inspector General units in the police ranks, a move that will ensure that police respond to the legitimate chain of com- mand. General PACE. The Ministry of Interior (MOI), in conjunction with coalition forces, is conducting a unit-by-unit inspection of the Iraqi national police. While this in- spection is focusing on equipment accountability and training level proficiency, it is also providing a platform to conduct retraining of policemen on basic profes- sionalism and anti-corruption methods. This inspection is also providing ministry and coalition leadership the opportunity to rid the police of those members whose militia affiliations take precedence over loyalties to the nation. While this inspection has been ongoing for more than a month, the retraining and revetting of police will continue for the foreseeable future. General ABIZAID. During his 31 July speech to Parliament, MOI Bolani acknowl- edged there are disloyal and corrupt elements that had infiltrated the police and government and in less than 3 months in office, has shown himself to be decisive in removing infiltrators and criminals from police ranks. Within MOI, Internal Af- fairs (IA) is leading the effort to eliminate militia and terrorist infiltrators through the implementation of an aggressive MOI employee vetting process using the Auto- mated Fingerprint Identification System (AFIS) combined with criminal record checks. The AFIS is also being integrated into the police cadet screening process which involves the collection of personal information and biometric data, to include fingerprints. Over 7,000 "hits" have been referred to the IA Directorate based on known criminal connections. In addition to the AFIS screening process, the MOI staff has taken the initiative to conduct an internal audit of all personnel to ensure that every employee meets the initial entry criteria. IRAN'S INFLUENCE IN IRAQ 9. Senator McCain. Secretary Rumsfeld, General Pace, and General Abizaid, what role is Iran playing today in southern Iraq and more widely throughout the country? Secretary RUMSFELD. The primary security problem in Iraq has shifted from a Sunni insurgency to sectarian violence. Al Qaeda terrorists, insurgents, and armed Shiite militants supported by Iran also compete to plunge the country into civil war. The Iranian Revolutionary Guard Qods Force arms, trains, and equips rogue Shiite groups. These Shiite militias do Iran's bidding and exert an improper and undue influence from Basra to Baghdad. Prime Minister Maliki is concerned and has ap- pointed a military officer to go to the south to get the security situation back under control. General PACE. [Deleted.] General ABIZAID. [Deleted.] 10. Senator McCAIN. Secretary Rumsfeld, General Pace, and General Abizaid, if Iran's influence were somehow eliminated, what concrete effect would that have on violence in Iraq? Secretary RÚMSFELD. Iran talks about stabilizing Iraq but in reality, it arms, trains, and equips Iraqi extremist Shiite militias to do its bidding. Eliminating Iran's influence would likely result in less Shiite extremism and sectarian violence. Moreover, Sunni resistance probably would diminish along with their fear of a Shi- 75 ite-dominated Iranian-sponsored government that discriminates against Sunnis. Stability would increase. General PACE. First, although it is difficult to predict with concrete certainty, most likely there would be a reduction in funding, guidance, morale, and material support to Iranian parties, resulting in a reduction of Shiite extremism and sec- tarian violence. There would also very likely be a reduction in the sectarian moti- vated violence and a reduction in the Sunni resistance that is based on fear of a Shiite-dominated government that discriminates against Sunnis. and is a proxy of Iran. There would likely also be an increase in stability as these factors that drive conflict are eliminated. General ABIZAID. [Deleted.] VIOLENCE IN IRAQ 11. Senator MCCAIN. Secretary Rumsfeld, General Pace, and General Abizaid, what, if any, events do you think will bring down the level of violence in Iraq? Secretary RUMSFELD. National reconciliation could reduce the factors leading to violence by resolving those outstanding issues among Iraq's major factions. Disman- tling militias and extragovernmental armed groups and reintegrating them into so- ciety would permit the Iraqi government to control the sole use of force which should also reduce violence. Finally, reforming the MOI and the Iraqi Police Service will also increase stability in Iraq. General PACE. First, national reconciliation promises to resolve the outstanding issues between the major factions in Iraq. This should greatly reduce many of the drivers of the violence. Second, the successful reduction of militias and extra-govern- mental armed groups, which includes a fully implemented disarm, demobilize, and reintegration program, should reduce violence and allow the Iraqi government to re- tain the monopoly on the use of force. Third, MOI and Iraqi Police Service reform, development, and supervision will also reduce violence in Iraq. General ABIZAID. While individual events can cause an escalation in the level of violence, only a sustained campaign can reverse the trend. The campaign in Iraq will bring down the level of violence by generating capable, non-sectarian security forces with the capacity to counter internal threats and to deny the passage of for- eign fighters and their support across Iraq's borders. An effective democratically elected government of national unity will provide security and essential services, re- moving the need to rely on local militias for protection and other support. Finally, provincial elections and constitutional reform will reinforce equities between Iraqis and their country's future prosperity. IRAQI ARMY 12. Senator MCCAIN. Secretary Rumsfeld, General Pace, and General Abizaid, to build a truly national Iraqi army, it is necessary to build units of mixed ethnicities and religions (Shiite, Sunni, Kurds)—not simply an army comprising homogenous units. How far have we gone toward the goal of building mixed units so far, and what steps are we taking to accelerate it? Secretary RUMSFELD. We are committed to creating an Iraqi military that reflects the ethnic and religious diversity of Iraq, with units loyal to the nation and not to sectarian interests. Although competence and merit are the deciding factors when selecting recruits, (particularly leaders), the ISF are developing so they generally mirror the demographic makeup of Iraq. Sectarian lines remain drawn, however, in those units recruited along geographic lines, with Sunni, Shiite, or Kurdish over- representation within those units reflecting the areas where the units were formed. The Minister of Defense, through an Officer Selection Committee, uses the normal transitions to continue to diversify the senior leadership in the Iraqi army. This con- tinuing process strives to ensure that the Iraqi army is led by competent leaders who are representative of the nation. General PACE. We do not track soldiers by ethnicity—they are all Iraqis. Histori- cally, we have seen that the Iraqi army does a much better job in recruiting mul- tiple ethnicities than the Iraqi police. The Government of Iraq is committed to en- suring ISF represent the population, both ethnically and geographically, to enable the Iraqi people to build and maintain confidence in their security forces. A rep- resentation of the Iraqi populace would ideally consist of 60 percent Shiite, 20 per- cent Sunni, and 20 percent Kurd force. General ABIZAID. The senior Iraqi military and political leadership share our views on the requirement to build units of mixed ethnicity and religions. It is impor- tant to note that the Iraqis are taking the lead to properly integrate their army and 76 to ensure they do everything possible to make each division representative of the population at large and not a collection of units that represent different ethnic, reli- gious or geographical areas. Recruiting efforts are focused at providing an equal op- portunity to everyone to join the military. In a recent visit to Iraqi army units, Prime Minister Maliki stressed that when Iraqis join the military they must forget about the town or province they came from and must forget about the circumstances under which they joined and focus on representing Iraq as a whole. This has been a recurring theme for the Iraqi army and it fits well into the Prime Minister's plan for reconciliation. During recent missions, the Iraqis have sent Mobile Recruiting Teams out into areas of the country where no teams were previously sent, in an effort to extend opportunities for service to the nation. The Iraqis, with coalition partners in support, have made a genuine effort to extend the opportunity for serv- ice to all ethnic and religious groups in the country. They also monitor the distribu- tion of soldiers who complete initial entry training to ensure ethnic diversity con- tinues as the units build and sustain. The coalition understands the importance of diversity and will continue to provide overwatch and advice to our Iraqi partners. Currently, the Iraqi army units and their leaders are largely representative of the population of Iraq. 13. Senator MCCAIN. Secretary Rumsfeld, General Pace, and General Abizaid, there have been reports that large numbers of Iraqi troops are deserting and that there is corruption among the troops. In one report, only half of an entire unit was actually present in an operation. In some places, Iraqi troops have gotten caught with bombmaking materials or allowed insurgents to attack U.S. convoys by looking the other way. These activities are fueling distrust for Iraqi soldiers. What is being done to fix these problems and how do we ensure that it will not happen in the fu- ture? How is this going to affect transfer of command to the Iraqis and how do we guarantee that once the transfer occurs, they will be able to prevent corruption themselves? Secretary RUMSFELD. There have been several cases of unit-wide corruption and malfeasance but we do not see a wide-spread problem. Coalition force partners and ISF embedded transition teams conduct monthly assessments, to include unit lead- ership and loyalty. ISF units cannot assume a security lead until they are assessed as ready. Multi National Security Transition Corps-Iraq (MNSTC-I) along with the Government of Iraq and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Training Mission-Iraq, developed and fielded an Iraqi Army Training Command that resem- bles the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRĀDOC). TRADOC imple- ments training at all levels within the Iraqi army. Part of TRADOC's curriculum focuses on professionalism and loyalty, especially for the officers and noncommis- sioned officers. We do not believe that the few incidents of anti-coalition activity will affect the transfer of command to the Iraqis. Regarding corruption, the Iraqi Public Integrity Commission is conducting internal audits of senior government employees' incomes, and will investigate any suspicious findings. General PACE. While there have been a few cases of unit-wide corruption and mal- feasance, we do not believe that it is a widespread problem. Units are assessed monthly in several areas, and are not allowed to move forward to a security lead posture until they are assessed as competent to do so. Coalition force partner units, in conjunction with ISF embedded transition teams, routinely assess ISF unit lead- ership and loyalty. Multi National Security Transition Corps-Iraq (MNSTC-I) has, in cooperation with the Government of Iraq and the NATO Training Mission-Iraq, developed and fielded an Iraqi army Training Command that resembles the U.S. TRADOC. This command oversees and implements training at all levels within the Iraqi army. Some of this training is centered on professionalism and loyalty, espe- cially for the officers and noncommissioned officers. We do not believe that these few cases of anti-coalition complicity will affect the transfer of command to the Iraqis. In fact, we have already transferred control of the Iraqi air force, navy, and Iraqi ground forces command (with one Iraqi army di- vision), and will transfer another division later in September. The Iraqi Public In- tegrity Commission is conducting internal audits of senior government employees' incomes and will investigate any situation that exhibits suspicious activity. These procedures represent another step in fighting corruption from two angles-adminis- tratively and financially. General ABIZAID. The Iraqi army is a developing institution. From essentially nothing in the summer of 2003, the Iraqi army has grown rapidly to meet Iraq's security requirements in the fight against the terrorists and insurgents. In many areas of Iraq, they have assumed the security lead in this fight and performed admi- rably—most notably in securing the voting process for the Constitutional Ref- Iraqi zin ommand that these feussioned of on profesoing at all sembles the Iraq, he summer of 20 fight against thread in this fightea Constit 77 erendum and National Elections in late 2005, to the fight against the terrorists and insurgents across Iraq today. In a complex environment such as Iraq, the rapid buildup of the ISF has been remarkable. Challenges are expected in these conditions and the Iraqi government and military leaders are directly addressing these issues with the support of coalition forces. Iraqi leaders are working hard to place the right leaders in their units to provide dedicated, professional leadership. Our embedded transition teams are also making a great contribution to this effort and demonstrate on a daily basis how professional military leaders execute their missions. Desertions and other actions are an issue in Iraq, but the facts are that the leadership-espe- cially the Iraqi leadership—is directly dealing with these issues. Every day, the Iraq army improves. The transition of operational responsibility to the Iraqi army is a conditions-based process. We will take each step as conditions are right to transition responsibility. Our training teams will remain with their Iraqi partnered units after transition and will continue to provide that direct support. Additionally, the Iraqis take great pride in this transition of responsibility and we look to the Iraqi govern- ment and military leaders to continue to provide direct support to ensure issues of performance and corruption are dealt with appropriately. 14. Senator MCCAIN. Secretary Rumsfeld, General Pace, and General Abizaid, I understand there are small soldier-teams supervising and training Iraqi forces. What feedback do you have from them regarding the capabilities of Iraqi troops, and how would you rate the success of these teams? Secretary RUMSFELD. More than 1,200 U.S. soldiers and leaders are embedded with Iraqi army and Iraqi police units. To the degree that one can generalize about Iraqi troops, the embedded trainers describe them as brave and aggressive soldiers. The trainers' monthly reports measure the staffing, command and control, training, sustainment/logistics, equipping and leadership of their partnered Iraqi units. These reports play a major role in determining when Iraqi provinces are ready to be re- leased to Iraqi control. Iraqi units, specifically their leadership, benefit from the presence of these teams. The transition teams are a great success story, and are key in assisting Iraq to achieve security self-reliance. General PACE. We currently have more than 1,200 soldiers and leaders embedded with both Iraqi army and Iraqi police units throughout Iraq. We receive feedback from these teams monthly, which encompasses a large part of the overall assess- ment that determines when Iraqi provinces are released to Iraqi control. The feed- back we receive from these teams is as dynamic as the environment in which they exist. What we are seeing is that Iraqi units are benefiting from the presence of these transition teams, specifically within the leadership of Iraqi units. These tran- sition teams have been a great success story, and are key in Iraq achieving self- security reliance. General ABIZAID. [Deleted.] AFGHANISTAN 15. Senator McCain. Secretary Rumsfeld, General Pace, and General Abizaid, what accounts for the recent upsurge in fighting in southern Afghanistan? Secretary RUMSFELD. The insurgency views the ongoing transfer of authority in Afghanistan as an opportunity to test NATO's will. The increased violence against coalition, International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), and Afghan national secu- rity forces is intended to intimidate our allies and cause them to question their com- mitments in Afghanistan. As Operation Mountain Thrust demonstrates, however, we are on the offensive and inflicting heavy casualties on the enemy. General PACE. [Deleted.] General ABIZAID. [Deleted.] 16. Senator MCCAIN. Secretary Rumsfeld, General Pace, and General Abizaid, now that the NATO has taken over operations in southern Afghanistan, please de- scribe how NATO operations will interact with Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) operations. Do the missions and the rules of engagement (ROE) for NATO and OEF differ, as several NATO officials have suggested? · Secretary RUMSFELD. Both ISAF and OEF share the same vision and the same endstate—a safe, free, and self-sufficient Afghanistan. Both share the same general lines of approach: a reconstruction and stabilization effort with the military creating a safe and secure environment for civilian relief agencies, international organiza- tions and-most importantly—Afghan government agencies rebuilding the country. There are differences in the missions traceable, to the different powers of NATO versus autonomous nations in a coalition, and to different national capabilities and 78 constraints. However, combat and stabilization operations in the field have shown that both forces are compatible on the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. This cooperation will only increase when the remaining OEF troops in the east fall under ISAF command this fall. The U.S. Deputy Commander of ISAF for Secu- rity will be charged with ensuring coordination. General PACE. OEF and the IŠAF do have different ROE, as would be expected for any NATO operation involved in the same country as a coalition operation. How- ever, this has precedent for success with many previous NATO operations, which include Balkan operations in the 1990s and Operation Active Endeavor maritime forces operating in proximity of other naval vessels. It is not an issue to have two forces operating together with different ROE but it is critically important that those forces have good procedures in place to provide deconfliction. NATO operations will interact with OEF operations in much the same way as they have been doing for the last couple of weeks in Operation Medusa. Operation Medusa concluded offen- sive operations on 13 September 2006 and was accomplished by ISAFs operating in southern region of Afghanistan with OEF forces integrated into the operations. In this example, the OEF forces were SOF in their foreign internal defense role, but it serves as a good example of how well these two operations can work together. Thorough planning was conducted to ensure deconfliction procedures are integrated into NATO procedures as they operate in the region south. The primary deconfliction occurs through the Deputy Commander (DCOM), Security billet in the headquarters of Commander, ISAF DCOM Security will be a U.S. general officer indefinitely and is currently being executed by Major General Freakley, who is also Commander, JTF-76 as the 10th Mountain Division Commanding General. With his "dual-hat” role as DCOM Security and CJTF-76, he has responsibility for deconflicting ISAF operations with OEF operations. The DOD and NATO continue to work on the effectiveness of this deconfliction to ensure it is set up for success for the long-term. General ABIZAID. [Deleted.] 17. Senator McCAIN. Secretary Rumsfeld, General Pace, and General Abizaid, could Pakistan be doing more to crack down on Taliban and al Qaeda operating from Pakistani territory? Secretary RUMSFELD. Pakistan is a key ally in the war on terror. We work closely with Pakistan to improve its military capabilities, particularly in the critical Paki- stan-Afghanistan border regions. There are approximately 80,000 Pakistani troops currently assigned to this region. Furthermore, the Government of Pakistan recently announced a new three-pronged strategy in the federally administered tribal areas, which combines political, economic, and military initiatives. These initiatives are de- signed to yield long-term results. We will continually assess their effectiveness. Si- multaneously, we will continue to impress on Pakistan our desire to see results in cracking down on al Qaeda and Taliban in the border region. General PACE. Pakistan is a key ally in the war on terrorism and cooperates close- ly with the U.S. military in the ongoing fight along the Afghan-Pakistan border. The U.S. Government and DOD continue to look at ways to help improve Pakistani mili- tary capabilities in order to enhance their effectiveness in war on terrorism efforts in the border regions. President Musharraf recently unveiled a new strategy for ef- forts in the federally administered tribal areas, which includes a comprehensive ap- proach involving political, economic, and military initiatives. Since these initiatives are just underway and many will be long-term efforts, it is too early to measure the effectiveness of the new Pakistan strategy. Of course we would like to see better results in cracking down on al Qaeda and Taliban in the border region. We continue to work closely with the Pakistan government and military to improve the effective- ness of the Pakistan effort. General ABIZAID. [Deleted.] 18. Senator McCAIN. Secretary Rumsfeld, General Pace, and General Abizaid, has the United States and the international community provided enough attention and resources to Afghanistan to ensure that it does not slide backward? Secretary RUMSFELD. The situation on the ground in Afghanistan is dynamic and requires both the United States and our international partners to continually review our initial assumptions and refine our strategy. The DOD, along with the inter- agency, is conducting a review of the situation in Afghanistan to ensure that the necessary requirements are correctly identified and appropriately resourced. The United States is fully committed to the security, stability, and reconstruction of Af- ghanistan. We and the international community are helping Afghanistan to rebuild and assisting the Afghans to establish a credible and self-sustaining government. ay with the PakistPaeda and Taliban urse we would like 79 General PACE. The United States is leading the international community in con- ducting a comprehensive strategic review of all aspects of DOD efforts in Afghani- stan to ensure that it does not slide backward. This comprehensive strategic review, led by the NSC and in close coordination with the interagency, will reprioritize U.S. and coalition efforts to achieve the permissive environment vital to achieving our goals in Afghanistan. Although initial efforts were well thought out and appro- priately resourced by the United States and international community, the reality on the ground has changed in Afghanistan and we must adapt to this new reality. I think we must keep in mind that not only are we fighting a counterinsurgency, but we are also rebuilding a nation, one of the poorest on Earth. Of course the U.S. Gov- ernment and the international community could always do more, but right now, from a military viewpoint, I believe we are providing enough attention and re- sources to prevent a backward slide. General ABIZAID. Resource levels in Afghanistan are based on the needs of the ground commanders and their assessment of the threat. I continue to review and adjust resources as necessary in order to achieve success. The center of gravity in Afghanistan is decreasingly military and increasingly within the domain of governance and economic development. Therefore, resource re- quirements are shifting. The enemy is focused on winning the battle of perception, so we must counter any perception that our commitment to Afghanistan is in any way wavering. Continued development of the Government of Afghanistan and suc- cess in stabilizing the country require uncompromising commitment and consistent international cooperation. Afghanistan will continue to require both U.S. and inter- national community resources to maintain development of the Afghan national secu- rity forces, counternarcotics assistance, infrastructure, and border security. The London Compact of 2006 provides the framework for the international community to help the Afghans create a legitimate government. As NATO assumes control of security and stability operations, I will maintain a close relationship so as to advise and support with regard to NATO's requirements. The strength and capability of the Afghan government is growing rapidly. Coalition forces provide the shield behind which the accomplishments of the past 442 years can be made permanent. e y wavering under any perception is focused development. There and incr zing the coundevelopment of our commitmene the battle of resource re- QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR SUSAN COLLINS NATIONAL GUARD 19. Senator COLLINS. General Pace and General Abizaid, it has been widely re- ported in the press and through senior National Guard officials' testimony before Congress that the war in Iraq has badly depleted the National Guard's domestic store of vehicles, weapons, and communications gear-leaving National Guard units with one-third the equipment needed to meet homeland security and homeland de- fense requirements. The Chief of the National Guard Bureau, Lieutenant General Steven Blum, has repeatedly stated that in September 2001, the National Guard had 75 percent of its needed equipment “on hand.” Today, that number is 34 percent. Maine's National Guard certainly is not immune to this severe equipment short- age. My State's Adjutant General has informed me that the Army National Guard (ARNG) in Maine is currently experiencing a lack of vehicles—primarily Humvees and crew-served weapons—and I am concerned with the amount of suitable equip- ment available to deploy overseas, conduct training, or respond to a domestic emer- gency. What kind of risk is incurred by having so few resources stateside, and what type of vulnerability does this expose for State National Guard troops in responding to domestic crises? General PACE. At this time last year, the ARNG was just completing its largest deployment since World War II. Approximately 17 brigades or brigade equivalents were deploying, deployed, or preparing to deploy. Equipment on hand, available to the Governors to respond to natural disasters, in the 54 States and Territories was at about 26 percent. Yet, the ARNG was able to deploy around 50,000 soldiers, equipped to the Gulf Coast in support of fellow citizens during hurricane Katrina. Since last year, equipment has been coming out of reset and returning to the States and we are now at around 39 percent as a national average. The Army in coordination with the ARNG has completed an analysis of equipment required along the coast from Texas to Maine, and in the islands (Virgin Islands, Puerto Rico, Hawaii, and Guam) to support possible hurricanes. The Adjutants Gen- eral of these States/Territories provided their requirements through the National nal avereted an Jands Virutants. Gonal 80 Guard Bureau to the Department of the Army. All components of the Army have provided equipment or pledged unit capabilities to respond to these possible hurri- canes. The States are confident that there is enough equipment on hand or through the use of the additional capabilities and Emergency Management Assistance Com- pacts to respond. Maine did not request any additional equipment for hurricane re- sponse. Maine has received 67 percent of their Table of Organization and Equipment re- quirements. They do not have all of this equipment on hand. The whereabouts of their equipment is as follows: 31 percent of their authorized equipment is nondeployed and currently available (5 percent substitute items) national average is 39 percent. 31 percent of their authorized equipment is deployed or in reset (Maine should get 5,141 pieces back from reset in fiscal year 2007). 5 percent of their authorized equipment has been left in theater (Depart- ment of the Army and ARNG are working payback plans for equipment left in theater). Critical Dual Use Equipment: Maine is at 60 percent and national aver- age is 53 percent. Maine is scheduled to get 68 pieces of new equipment in fiscal years 2007 and 2008 (includes 20 medium trucks and 15 trailers for medium vehicles). Of Army's total new procurement allocations over fiscal years 2007 and 2008, ARNG will receive 24 percent of night vision devices, 32 percent of Single Channel Ground Airborne Radio System (SINCGARS) radios, and 71 percent of Medium Tactical Vehicles. General ABIZAID. As the combatant commander, the Service force providers con- tinue to provide me with highly qualified troops and the equipment needed to meet operational requirements in the Central Command AOR. As the proponent for man- ning and equipping the National Guard to meet their full spectrum of missions, the National Guard Bureau is best suited to respond to this query. TROOP LEVELS IN IRAQ 20. Senator COLLINS. Secretary Rumsfeld, the DOD Office of Inspector General (OIG) announced several months ago that it is conducting an audit to see if U.S. troops deployed to Iraq have the equipment they need. The ongoing audit is sup- posed to determine whether units were provided with required equipment before they deployed, whether modifications made to equipment satisfy unit requirements, and the impact decisions on equipment repair have when units are redeployed, ac- cording to the IG's office. What is the status of this audit and can you share any interim findings with the committee at this time, particularly regarding the equipment available to units as they prepare to deploy from the United States to Iraq? Secretary RUMSFELD. The OIG has initiated two separate audits regarding the equipment provided to troops deployed to Iraq. The first audit is nearing completion and the second was just recently announced. On November 17, 2005, the DOD OIG announced the Audit of Equipment Status of Deployed Forces within U.S. Central Command. The objective of the audit is to determine whether units deployed to Iraq have been equipped in accordance with mission requirements. Specifically, the audit is evaluating whether units were pro- vided the required items of equipment and whether the equipment modifications satisfied mission requirements. The audit is still ongoing and final results are not available. The OIG expects to issue a final report by the end of the year. On August 30, 2006, the OIG announced the Audit of the Inspection Process of the Army Reset Program for Ground Vehicles for Units Returning from OIF. The objective of the audit is to evaluate the Army's reset program for ground vehicles to determine the effectiveness of the technical inspection process for those units that are completing their tours in support of OIF. The audit team plans to start the project in September and travel to Iraq during the first quarter fiscal year 2007. Cel? 2005, tently annou to Iraq. Thwo separat HADITHA 21. Senator COLLINS. General Abizaid, on November 19, 2005, a Marine convoy in the Iraqi town of Haditha was hit by a roadside bomb. One marine and 24 Iraqi civilians, including women and children, were killed. Allegations surfaced in Feb- ruary 2006 that the marines may have killed the Iraqi civilians in reprisal. Two investigations were then opened to review this tragic incident. The Naval Criminal Investigative Service is conducting one investigation, and Major General 81 Eldon Bargewell, USA, recently completed a separate, independent report into whether marines attempted to cover up the incident or if commanders were neg- ligent in failing to initially investigate. While General Bargewell's report is not yet public, he reportedly submitted his findings to General Chiarelli on June 16, 2006. As a member of the Senate Armed Services Committee, I have asked Senator Warner, the chairman of the committee, to hold a public hearing on the Haditha incident at the earliest possible date. He has assured me that such a hearing will be held in the coming weeks. I believe congressional oversight is essential to ensure that our Armed Forces in- vestigate accusations of this nature in an appropriate manner. These serious allega- tions of misconduct are deeply troubling, although the vast majority of our troops in Iraq continue to perform their duties with the utmost respect, restraint, and cour- age. What strikes me as curious is the lapse of time between the incident and subse- quent investigations. Although marines initially reported that civilian casualties re- sulted from an IED explosion, photographs taken by the exploitation team conflicted with this report. The photographs clearly showed that the victims were killed as a result of gunshot wounds. According to a June 1 Washington Post article, the exploitation team's reporting chain lay outside that of the other marines—who were members of the 3rd Battalion of the 1st Marines—and went up through military intelligence channels directly to the 1st Marine Division's intelligence director. Had the exploitation team reported accurately what it witnessed, it would have presumably set off alarms and prodded military commanders to immediately investigate. I understand that you are currently reviewing General Bargewell's report on the Haditha incident. Are you able to share what his investigation revealed about the exploitation team actions or inactions? Are you aware of any exploitation team re- porting policies changed as a result of this incident? General ABIZAID. The United States Central Command is unable to share any de- tails of the Major General Bargewell AR 15–6 Investigation. That investigation was previously forwarded to U.S. Marine Forces Central Command and this head- quarters will transmit a copy of the investigation to the Secretary of Defense through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. I recommend appropriate coordi- nation with the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Marines. TROOP READINESS 22. Senator COLLINS. General Pace and General Abizaid, General Pace's answer to Senator Reed talked about the components of readiness. Just this week, USA Today reported that the Army has begun training the oldest recruits in its history ... "the result of a concerted effort to fill ranks depleted during the Iraq war.” Just 5 months after the enlistment age limit was raised from 35 to 40, the Army raised it to just under 42. The Army has also lowered the minimum physical re- quirements needed to pass basic training * Another article earlier this year described one strategy being employed by General Thomas Bostick, USA, Commander of all Army recruiting efforts. The article ref- erenced many new and varied incentives being used to attract potential recruits in what has been a tough environment during the last several years. The ARNG, Reserve, and Active-Duty Forces all fell short of their fiscal year 2005 recruiting goals. While the Army has reached many of its recruiting targets this year, some could argue that this occurred in part due to the fact that the goals were lowered. The press report indicates that recruiters sent 2,697 fewer Active-Duty re- cruits to basic training from October to December than they did during that period in 2004. More troublesome is the fact that General Bostick admitted that more than 10 percent of the recruits during these 3 months had scores on the aptitude test that were “near the bottom of the scale—more than double the annual 4 percent limit set by the DOD.”. Does the recruiting shortfall, combined with lowered benchmarks, indicate trouble for our force and ability to re-supply the ranks? General PACE. At this time, we do not see any significant challenges with our abil- ity to resupply the ranks with high quality men and women needed to support our deployed forces. Although challenges remain in this tough recruiting environment, our superb re- cruiters in the field and the great support of Congress have made for recruitment success during fiscal year 2006. The Active Army and the ARNG are postured for mission success as we near the end of the fiscal year. Predictions for the Army Re- admitted that more set by thear the bottom of the chese 3 months had 82 serve are somewhat less optimistic. However, with high missions the last 2 months and continued strong resourcing and efforts, the fiscal year 2006 accession mission is achievable. In fact, the Army Reserve has already recruited more soldiers this year than they did in all of fiscal year 2005. As of the end of July 2006, the Army has met its Active recruiting goals for 14 consecutive months and has recently announced that they will meet their annual recruiting goal of 80,000. The Army Reserve and the National Guard are just behind (99 percent) their mission goals through the month of July. Additionally, a major contributing factor to the overall health of the force is that retention rates remain high across all three Army components. The Army accessed higher numbers of lower mental category soldiers early this fiscal year. However, through the end of July they remain at 3.8 percent, under the DOD goal of 4 percent for Test Category IV accessions (those scoring between the 10th and the 30th percentiles on the Armed Forces Qualification Test). They are committed to achieving mission success while maintaining this DOD standard. At this point, there is no indication that the increase in this area will have any effect on overall unit readiness. In fact, attrition in the training base remains at all-time lows; a remarkable feat in light of the increased rigor of basic training. General ABIZAID. As the combatant commander, the Service force providers con- tinue to provide me with highly qualified troops to meet my operational manpower requirements. As the title X proponents for recruiting and training requirements, the Service Chiefs are best able to fully respond to this query. QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR CARL LEVIN COUNTERDRUG—U.S. MILITARY SUPPORT 23. Senator LEVIN. General Abizaid, in January 2005 a group of 35 NGOs wrote to Secretary Rice recommending that coalition forces: (1) focus intelligence collection efforts on identifying major traffickers; (2) cease all payments to traffickers; and (3) assist in the destruction of laboratories and interdiction of imports of precursor chemicals and exports of narcotics. Are the forces under your command doing any of this? General ABIZAID. The United States Central Command has supported the lead na- tion and lead U.S. Government agencies responsible for the counternarcotic mission in Afghanistan with intelligence support and has provided assistance, within our ex- isting means and authorities, to those lead agencies to identify and destroy labora- tories, and interdict the movement of narcotics. Regarding the group's second rec- ommendation, forces under my command are not authorized to make payments to traffickers. Since counternarcotics is primarily a law enforcement mission, the United States Central Command is actively supporting Department of State (DOS) International Narcotics and Law (INL), Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), international, and Afghan efforts to build an Afghan capability to effectively address the threat posed by the illicit narcotics trade. Since 2004, Congress has provided, and the DOD has expended, approximately $470 million for counternarcotics pro- grams in Afghanistan and the surrounding region. These programs are training Af- ghan counternarcotics police forces, providing infrastructure and equipment for the police and border security forces, purchasing equipment to improve command and control, building an Afghan counternarcotics intelligence capability, assisting the Government of Afghanistan in their public information campaign, and leveraging interagency intelligence capabilities in the fight against drugs. We are also pro- viding operational support as directed by the Secretary of Defense in support of the U.S. Embassy Kabul Counternarcotics Action Plan. 24. Senator LEVIN. General Abizaid, do the United States and ISAF have a uni- fied operational plan to deal with eliminating drug cultivation and trafficking—ac- tivity which essentially funds the Taliban and al Qaeda? More specifically, are we doing enough to interdict cross-border flows of narcotics? General ABIZAID. Reducing drug cultivation and trafficking in Afghanistan are missions of U.S. Government and international aid and law enforcement agencies. However, the ISAF does have sufficient ROE which allow these forces to assist with the drug threat in Afghanistan. We are confident that ISAF will continue to provide adequate support_to these organizations in the poppy elimination and counter- trafficking tasks. Regarding our efforts at stopping the cross-border movements of narcotics, U.S. military forces are currently not actively engaged on the border to interdict drugs. However, DOD is aggressively assisting the Government of Afghani- 85 General PACE. Yes. I remain confident that the Armed Forces can accomplish the objectives of the NMS. The 2006 Biennial Review of the NMS provided an assess- ment of the current security environment and the capacity of the Armed Forces to accomplish the objectives of the NMS. This assessment is updated through a contin- uous risk assessment process in which the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the combatant commanders review the risks associated with accomplishing the objectives of the NMS and recommend appropriate actions to address these risks. I will not hesitate to notify the committee should my judgment change on the risk of executing our NMS. 32. Senator LEVIN. General Pace, what level of risk exists today if our military were called on to execute a mission, requiring a substantial number of ground forces, somewhere in addition to the operations ongoing in Iraq and Afghanistan? General PACE. While our Armed Forces are engaged in a variety of activities, in- cluding significant operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, we fight as a joint team- ground, air, and naval forces working together. This joint approach provides the Na- tion with an exceptionally flexible and capable military. Our joint team is fully capa- ble of responding to changing circumstances and situations throughout the world and prevailing against any threat-decisively. QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR DANIEL K. AKAKA CORRUPTION IN IRAQ 33. Senator AKAKA. Secretary Rumsfeld, the July 2006, Quarterly and Semi-An- nual Report by the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction states that cor- ruption has become wide-spread in Iraq, so much so that, according to the report, it *threatens to undermine Iraq's democracy.” Prior to this report, to what extent were you aware of how rampant corruption had become in Iraq? Also, what steps have you taken or do you plan to take to coun- teract fraud and corruption? Secretary RUMSFELD. Corruption was omnipresent in Saddam's society and it con- tinues to be a part of the current Iraqi society. It is one of the causes that leads to extremism. In order to be successful against extremists, governments must be held accountable. Such accountability will emerge in Iraq with the good governance created by representative government. For our part, we are helping the Iraqis de- velop anti-corruption agencies such as the Board of Supreme Audit and the Commis- sion on Public Integrity. MIDDLE EAST CONFLICT 34. Senator AKAKA. Secretary Rumsfeld, if the U.N. were able to successfully ne- gotiate a permanent cease-fire between Israel and the Hezbollah forces in Lebanon, a number of European countries, including France, Italy, and Poland, have indicated a willingness to contribute forces in order to help maintain the peace. What role do you imagine that U.S. forces would play in the deployment of an international peacekeeping force? Secretary RUMSFELD. The United States is considering how it can best support an international peacekeeping force in Lebanon. That support could take the form of logistics, communications, and other assistance. TROOP LEVELS 35. Senator AKAKA. Secretary Rumsfeld, the President has asserted the need for more troops in Iraq in order to help stem the ongoing violence and insurgency. Just last week, you approved a request to extend the deployment of the Army's 172nd SBCT. Given that Lieutenant General Steven Blum, Chief of the National Guard Bureau, has recently asserted that two-thirds of the Active Army's National Guard's brigades are not ready for war, I am very concerned about our military's ability to fulfill its worldwide mission. More specifically, to what extent has the large scale deployment of troops to Iraq limited our ability to respond to a threat from North Korea? Secretary RUMSFELD. The DOD has refined its Force Planning Construct to focus on three objective areas: homeland defense, war on terrorism and irregular warfare, and conventional campaigns. We are continuously assessing the force sizing and ca- pability mix required by the operational commitments associated with our world- wide mission. Operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have stressed military personnel 86 and equipment, particularly of the ground forces. We are seeking ways to reset the force and are reassessing the overall size of our military forces.' The United States must maintain the ability to conduct and win conventional campaigns, and we remain fully committed to fulfilling our historic responsibilities of mutual defense on the Korean peninsula to deter and, if required, defend against the threat from North Korea. The United States has encouraged all parties involved to resume the Six-Party Talks that provide a multinational discourse on achieving a peaceful resolution to the North Korean weapon issue. Moreover, U.S. Pacific Command and U.S. Forces Korea have been working with the South Korean mili- tary to increase capacity to deter aggression and further prospects for lasting peace. The increased operational tempo and resulting readiness concerns have impacted the risk associated with other commitments, and we are continuously analyzing risk and prioritizing U.S. military activities. The Chairman is specifically charged with formally assessing the National Military Risk and will provide that annual assess- ment to Congress in 2007. IRAQI SECURITY FORCES 36. Senator AKAKA. General Pace and General Abizaid, the latest Executive Sum- mary Report to Congress regarding the United States policy in Iraq asserts that Iraq's Ministry and Defense and MOI forces "continue to increase in size and capa- bility and are increasingly taking over lead combat responsibility from coalition forces” yet rather than drawing down our troops we are increasing the numbers de- ployed and extending the tours of the men and women already there. To what extent did the report overestimate the progress of the ISF? Also, what more needs to be done in order to make the transition to a more limited mission and to prepare the ISF to be able to take over responsibility? General PACE. Effective political and economic reform is central to a lasting re- duction in violence, to a far greater extent than the number of Iraqi or coalition troops. The Government of Iraq (GOI) must resolve the difficult issues of national reconciliation, including de-Baathification reform, militias, oil revenue sharing, and the nature of Iraqi federalism. They must address these issues in a way that does not exacerbate sectarian tensions. Additionally, the GOI must deliver basic goods and services and a program to increase economic opportunities to provide a counter to crime and militias. Before the Samarra shrine bombing in February 2006, we anticipated that insur- gent attacks would decline. The bombing ignited sectarian tensions that have neces- sitated adjusting U.S. troops to assist the ISF in quelling the violence. Accomplish- ment of 325,000 individually trained and equipped ISF is just a step in the process. Our ability to reduce the number of coalition forces depends on the overall capa- bility of ISF, capacity of the GOI and its institutions, and GOI ability to provide essential services. We are seeing progress as Iraqi units go from formation to being able to operate side-by-side to being in the lead. We are just now beginning to see more ISF being able to operate independently without coalition support. We anticipate we will begin to reduce our footprint as ISF become more capable and enemy activity can be han- dled solely by the ISF. The MNF-I Commander is the best judge of when forces can be redeployed. He has a process to make those decisions and we base our recommendations to the Sec- retary of Defense based on his judgment. Finally, the enemy gets a vote on when we withdraw forces. General ABIZAID. The August Report to Congress did not overestimate the progress of the ISF. Rather, the report accurately stated the progress the coalition is making in developing the ISF. By the end of 2006, the 325,000-person ISF will be trained and equipped. In just under a year's time, the Iraqi army has grown from 23 battalions in the lead conducting security operations, to 88 battalions in the lead. Iraqi units designated as “in the lead” are capable of planning and executing counterinsurgency and security operations today. These units can and do conduct independent operations, however most of these units still require support from the coalition, particularly in the areas of logistics and sustainment. Where our initial focus in developing the ISF was on creating, equipping, and training the units, our focus is now shifting to developing the ISF's capacity to sustain itself. One of our key efforts is to assist the Government of Iraq in developing policy, planning, and budgeting capabilities in the Ministries of Defense and Interior. These efforts will allow the ISF to continue assuming more of the security responsibility for Iraq, thus permitting coalition forces to transition to a supporting role. hi s wovernment of Iraq in developino nalia 87 tional supportrag is a joint Trap of Iraq com IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION 37. Senator AKAKA. General Pace and General Abizaid, the DOD reported that it is working closely with Iraq and international donors to maximize international re- construction assistance. What impact do you believe that the recent violence be- tween Iraq and Hezbollah forces in Lebanon will have on the ability of the Iraqi government to garner further international support? General PACE. The International Compact with Iraq is a joint Iraqi/U.N. initiative to garner increased international support for Iraq. The Government of Iraq commits to reforms, while donor nations pledge assistance to help Iraq meet its commit- ments. As the co-lead U.S. Government agencies, the Departments of State and Treasury are better positioned to comment on the impact on the Compact of the re- cent fighting between Hezbollah and Israel. General ABIZAID. Recently, the struggle within Iraq has transitioned from violence directed against coalition forces to violence between ethnic and sectarian groups, mainly Sunni and Shiite, seeking to control Baghdad and the distribution of political and economic power. Continued sectarian violence will ultimately serve as a deter- rent to further international support. In order to set favorable conditions for gar- nering international support, Prime Minister Maliki has initiated key programs to resolve issues leading to sectarian violence. These key programs include the Na- tional Reconciliation and Dialog Plan, the International Compact for Iraq, the Iraq Constitutional Review Process, and the Baghdad Peace Initiative. QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON AFGHANISTAN 38. Senator CLINTON. Secretary Rumsfeld, on July 21, Lt. Gen. David Richards, the head of NATO's International Security Force in Afghanistan, the man now in charge of coalition military operations in the south, described the situation in Af- ghanistan as “close to anarchy," and said that we are “running out of time” if we are going to meet the expectations of the Afghan people. Reports indicate that Operation Mountain Thrust has been successful in killing more than 600 suspected Taliban in the run-up to the recent handover of operations in the south to NATO forces. Considering that we've had a significant troop pres- ence in Afghanistan for over 442 years, it's disturbing that there has been a come- back of the Taliban in the south. Were you wrong when you said “the Taliban are gone”? What has gone wrong in Afghanistan? Secretary RUMSFELD. Five years ago, Afghanistan was ruled by the Taliban and provided a safe haven for the terrorists who planned September 11. Today, the Taliban are no longer in power. The Afghans have a democratically elected Presi- dent and National Assembly leading the international community's reconstruction efforts. Meanwhile, ANSF are fighting insurgents alongside U.S., coalition, and NATO ISAF forces. Challenges remain, including violence, narcotics, and the lack of infrastructure, but it will take time and international participation to completely address the damages caused by close to 30 years of war. 39. Senator CLINTON. Secretary Rumsfeld, General Pace, and General Abizaid, given that the lead coalition commander has described the situation as "close to an- archy," how does the current plan to turn this around differ from the earlier game plan? What are our “lessons learned”? Secretary RUMSFELD. A cornerstone of our strategy in Afghanistan is the coordi- nation of aggressive combat operations with reconstruction and development efforts. We have found that in areas where this coordination is implemented effectively, the perception of government control is bolstered and the local populace is disinclined to lend its support to insurgent elements. Successfully pairing the removal of insur- gents with reconstruction efforts will prove to the Afghans that it is the government, not the insurgency, which will provide the security and economic stability that is needed for Afghans to prosper. General PACE. One of the larger lessons learned at this stage in our mission is the strategic importance of redevelopment. Within the broad category of redevelop- ment, three areas are most prominent and appear to be the most cost-effective. Our strategic review strives to incorporate our lessons learned and place great emphasis in these three areas: roads, power, and rural development. In areas that the central Government of Afghanistan and the ANSF and alliance can access via roads, the insurgency is far less likely to hold sway over the local area. Simply put, where the roads end, the Taliban begins. Power increases in pri- ority based on the broad-based expectation from the Afghans that they should have 88 power. Power also gains them access to alliance information operation efforts via radio and television. Rural development is the ability to stimulate economic activity through efforts aimed at supporting farmers getting their produce to markets. Taken in combination, we are striving to create an environment where Afghans from outlying areas maintain a greater connection with the central government through the ability to grow, transport, and market goods to areas beyond the imme- diate village. With a greater belief in the ability of the central government to pro- vide, we are hopeful that Afghans who earlier tolerated or even supported the insur- gency see a greater benefit to themselves and their families to support the central government. If so, they will no longer provide any support and may start to actively oppose the presence and activities of insurgents. The south of Afghanistan is the historical home of the Taliban and the area where most of the violence is occurring. We have adapted our strategy there to more broad- ly coordinate kinetic and nonkinetic activities. This summer we have conducted a series of major operations in the south and achieved significant successes against the Taliban. One of the most important components of our effort is that once the kinetic activity is complete and we gain control of an area, we then begin intensive nonkinetic civil-military operations to solidly control and maintain it. General ABIZAID. U.S. Central Command's strategic vision for Afghanistan has not changed since the beginning of OEF. We remain committed to a fully self-reliant Afghanistan with a representative government that is committed to national devel- opment, respect for the rule of law, and that rejects international terrorism. It is an Afghanistan that is capable of providing for its own security, controlling and gov- erning its territory, implementing economic development policies, and eliminating the production of illegal art of military and non-military operahanistan. Much of We are conducting a variety of military and non-military operations to counter the recent resurgence of Taliban rejectionist forces in Southern Afghanistan. Much of this resistance is occurring as NATO and the Government of Afghanistan expand control into those areas; areas where we have had a very small presence over the past 4 years. As they expand, they will naturally encounter areas where the popu- lace is unaccustomed to a national government and will provide some level of resist- ance until the population accepts that the Government of Afghanistan is serving their interests. adiness standard, do then you get a differenceivable task that TROOP READINESS 40. Senator CLINTON. Secretary Rumsfeld, General Pace, General Abizaid, at the August 2, 2006, DOD press conference, Secretary Rumsfeld stated, “One of the prob- lems we've seen is that in the readiness charts that are used, we see apples and oranges; we see a standard on the left side for some years back, and then a standard that's different on the right side.” Secretary Rumsfeld went on to say, “... a third aspect of that that General Pace and I have been probing is you can say, 'Ready for what,' and if they're ready for the task they're doing, that's what you want. Or you could put a standard that says, 'Are they ready for any conceivable task that might be asked,' and if that's the standard, then you get a different set of numbers.” If you change the readiness standard, doesn't it make sense to measure against the new standard? Secretary RUMSFELD. Yes, we should measure our readiness against the new standard, and are in the process of changing our readiness reporting system to do exactly that. Our legacy reporting system, the Status of Resources and Training System (SORTS), simply measures the amount of assets assigned to a unit. This measure does not account for the mission the unit is tasked to perform, the capabili- ties of its equipment, or the experience of the people. These legacy system measures can be very misleading. A unit can be "unready” simply because it did not deploy with all of its equipment, even if that equipment is not needed for the mission. Like- wise, units undergoing transformation to a modular configuration can become “un- ready” overnight because of newly authorized organizational structures and equip- ment. Our new Defense Readiness Reporting System (DRRS) allows us to see true mission requirements as well as unit assets on hand. General PACE. Yes. To meet this new standard, the DOD is transitioning readi- ness reporting to a capabilities-based readiness assessment focused on a unit's abil- ity to perform specific mission essential tasks (MET) while integrating this addi- tional information with our legacy resources-based readiness assessment of per- sonnel, equipment, supply, training, and ordnance. The integration of MET data re- quires establishing conditions and standards for the tasks and dissemination of the new requirements procedures across the DOD. imunt for the mission, the people. These legacy iy did not deploy 89 The DOD is in the process of developing new policy guidance to address the im- proved standards. In addition, the new standard requires information technology systems and training to accompany the process. The new DRRS is making signifi- cant progress toward supporting the new readiness reporting model. We need appro- priate testing and validation for the DRRS system prior to full implementation. General ABIZAID. The new DRRS is intended to identify and implement reporting standards across the DOD. The DDRS Office is responsible for developing and estab- lishing this system within the DOD. As the proponent responsible for this new read- iness measurement system, the DRRS Implementation Office is best able to fully respond to this query. 41. Senator CLINTON. Secretary Rumsfeld, General Pace, and General Abizaid, aside from the fact that changing standards apparently is causing issues with the readiness charts, how long is reasonable for units to not be ready as they reset? Secretary RUMSFELD. As the Army resets, it is refurbishing some assets, modern- izing others, and creating the new Brigade Combat Team structure. As one would expect, these processes take some time to complete. Generally speaking, it takes about 9 to 12 months to complete this process. We are very interested in making sure this conversion happens expeditiously. General PACE. The amount of time necessary for a unit to reset varies according to individual Service reset procedures, the type of unit, length of deployment, equip- ment availability, and other issues. There is no single answer or template for all units on how quickly they reset. Each Service maintains a structured process to pro- vide combat ready forces. For example, the Army uses an Army Force Generation model with force pools of 'Reset/Train,' 'Ready,' and 'Available' forces as a framework for the structured progression of increased readiness. In this model, Army Active component units require 9 to 12 months in the 'Reset/Train' Force Pool before the unit can be certified to move into the 'Ready Force Pool. An Army Reserve compo- nent unit will typically spend 36 to 48 months in the 'Reset/Train' Force Pool before it can be certified to move into the 'Ready Force Pool. Currently, these time frames are compressed due to high operational tempo of ongoing war on terrorism oper- ations. The sustained strategic demand has placed tremendous strain on the Army's people and equipment that have been employed in the harsh operating environ- ments of Iraq and Afghanistan. Case-by-case assessments are made by senior commanders within each Service, and rolled up into top-level reporting forums. This process ensures that deploying units are trained and equipped to support the full spectrum of operations outlined in our NMS. General ABIZAID. As the combatant commander, the Service force providers con- tinue to provide me with highly qualified troops to meet my operational manpower requirements. As the title X proponents for establishing individual Service reset re- quirements, the Service Chiefs are best able to fully respond to this query. 42. Senator CLINTON. Secretary Rumsfeld, General Pace, and General Abizaid, how far in front of the next deployment is sufficient to ensure units have the equip- ment and personnel they need to accomplish their assigned mission? Secretary RUMSFELD. We try to maximize the time available to man, equip, and train our units for the mission at hand. To date, we have been able to provide most units with the appropriate personnel and equipment in time to conduct a Mission Readiness Exercise prior to deployment. The “lead time” necessary for these actions vary considerably depending on the mission and unit assigned. General PACE. This answer varies by the type of unit, the deployed mission as- signment, and the requirements associated with that assigned mission. We make every effort to have the equipment and personnel necessary to train for assigned missions in place before units commence their pre-deployment training cycles. Opti- mally, these training cycles range from 120 days to 20 months prior to deployment. Currently, these times are compressed due to high operational tempo and demand. General ABIZAID. As the combatant commander, the Service force providers con- tinue to provide me with highly qualified troops to meet my operational manpower requirements. As the title X proponents for establishing individual Service per- sonnel and training requirements, the Service Chiefs are best able to fully respond to this query. 43. Senator CLINTON. Secretary Rumsfeld, General Pace, and General Abizaid, how does that timeline mesh with the units' training timeline? · Secretary RUMSFELD. Training timelines are tailored to account for the lessons learned from previous deployments, the experience of the unit and personnel in- 90 volved, and current events in theater. In the preponderance of cases, there is time available to allow units to become fully trained for their assigned missions. General PACE. Training timelines are built into Service pre-deployment cycles and vary by individual unit missions. The consistent policy across Services is that every effort is made to ensure appropriate enablers are in place for units commencing their pre-deployment training. In a traditional operational cycle, training com- mences from 120 days to 20 months prior to deployment and would enable forces to train to a full-spectrum capability. The current high operational tempo has re- sulted in shortened training timelines and, in some cases, has required the focusing of training enablers on deployed missions. General ABIZAID. As the combatant commander, the Service force providers con- tinue to provide me with highly qualified troops to meet my operational manpower requirements. As the title X proponents for establishing individual Service per- sonnel and training requirements, the Service Chiefs are best able to fully respond to this query. 44. Senator CLINTON. Secretary Rumsfeld, General Pace, and General Abizaid, what standard of personnel and equipment on hand is required for units to partici- pate in the collective training prior to deployment? Secretary RUMSFELD. The unit commander makes the decision on whether his unit can perform collective training with the personnel and equipment on hand. Col- lective training is a continuum, and starts with smaller units of organization and builds to include multiple organizations and command staffs. Generally speaking, the unit will have appropriate personnel and equipment in place to conduct the mis- sion rehearsal exercise. General PACE. The goal is to ensure there is an adequate amount and type of equipment on hand to support the realistic training objectives required for deploy- ment. Those specific numbers vary by the type of unit, assigned mission, equipment on hand, training level of personnel, and other variables. Two specific examples fol- low: The Army mans units to 85 percent and equips them to a level determined by a Force Feasibility Review as required to start collective training. The Army's goal is to increase equipment and manning to 100 percent prior to the unit's deployment. Certain Navy units, such as the Naval Mobile Construction Battalions, train with stateside equipment and systems that are identical to those that are used when de- ployed overseas. They remain fully capable to participate in collective training prior to deployment. The intent is to ensure units have enough personnel and equipment to fully par- ticipate in pre-deployment training events as they ramp up to peak readiness for deployments and wartime taskings. General ABIZAID. As the combatant commander, the Service force providers con- tinue to provide me with highly qualified troops to meet my operational manpower requirements. As the title X proponents for establishing individual Service train and equip requirements, the Service Chiefs are best able to fully respond to this query. 45. Senator CLINTON. Secretary Rumsfeld, General Pace, and General Abizaid, is it possible to train to standard if you do not have comparable equipment on hand to train with? Secretary RUMSFELD. Yes, the majority of training can be accomplished with simi- lar or substitute items. Ideally, units will have comparable equipment for the mis- sion rehearsal exercise, but some of this equipment may only be available in theater (e.g., up-armored High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles). Accordingly, train- ing with these specific pieces of equipment will only take place upon deployment in a non-combat, training environment in theater. The Udari range in Kuwait is used specifically for this in-theater training. General PACE. With approved equipment substitutes, our personnel train to standards every day. Military processes exist that ensure equipment substitutes are similar enough in form, substance, and function to be adequate for realistic and rea- sonable training. In those cases in which units do not organically possess adequate equipment, we ensure that equipment or a suitable substitute is provided to the unit during its training for deployment. Additionally, many of our military systems rely on simulators and embedded training systems. Quite often, a large percentage of the initial training is actually conducted on these simulators, so there is no loss of capability associated with the usage of these systems. We will continue to do our best to ensure the needs of the units getting ready for their next rotation are met to ensure they are at the peak of readiness prior to deploying 91 General ABIZAID. As the combatant commander, the Service force providers con- tinue to provide me with highly qualified troops to meet my operational manpower requirements. As the title X proponents for establishing individual Service train and equip requirements, the Service Chiefs are best able to fully respond to this query. [Whereupon, at 1:06 p.m., the committee adjourned.] TO RECEIVE TESTIMONY ON THE CURRENT SITUATION AND U.S. MILITARY OPER- ATIONS IN IRAQ AND AFGHANISTAN WEDNESDAY, NOVEMBER 15, 2006 U.S. SENATE, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, Washington, DC. The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 11:28 a.m. in room SH-216, Hart Senate Office Building, Senator John Warner (chair- man) presiding. Committee members present: Senators Warner, McCain, Roberts, Sessions, Collins, Talent, Chambliss, Graham, Cornyn, Thune, Levin, Kennedy, Lieberman, Reed, Akaka, Bill Nelson, É. Benjamin Nelson, Dayton, Bayh, and Clinton. Committee staff members present: Charles S. Abell, staff direc- tor; Leah C. Brewer, nominations and hearings clerk; and John H. Quirk V, security clerk. Majority staff members present: William M. Caniano, profes- sional staff member; Regina A. Dubey, professional staff member; Ambrose R. Hock, professional staff member; Derek J. Maurer, pro- fessional staff member; Elaine A. McCusker, professional staff member; David M. Morriss, counsel; Lucian L. Niemeyer, profes- sional staff member; Lynn F. Rusten, professional staff member; Sean G. Stackley, professional staff member; Scott W. Stucky, gen- eral counsel; Kristine L. Svinicki, professional staff member; Diana G. Tabler, professional staff member; and Richard F. Walsh, coun- sel. Minority staff members present: Richard D. DeBobes, Democratic staff director; Jonathan D. Clark, minority counsel; Daniel J. Cox, Jr., professional staff member; Evelyn N. Farkas, professional staff member; Richard W. Fieldhouse, professional staff member; Gerald J. Leeling, minority counsel; Peter K. Levine, minority counsel; Mi- chael J. McCord, professional staff member; William G.P. Monahan, minority counsel; and Michael J. Noblet, research assist- ant. Staff assistants present: David G. Collins, Micah H. Harris, and Jessica L. Kingston Committee members' assistants present: Sandra E. Luff, assist- ant to Senator Warner; Christopher J. Paul and Richard H. Fontaine, Jr., assistants to Senator McCain; John A. Bonsell, as- sistant to Senator Inhofe; Libby Burgess, assistant to Senator Rob- erts; Arch Galloway II, assistant to Senator Sessions; Mark Winter, assistant to Senator Collins; Clyde A. Taylor IV, assistant to Sen- (93) 94 ator Chambliss; Andrew G. Brake, assistant to Senator Graham; Arjun Mody, assistant to Senator Dole; Stuart C. Mallory, assistant to Senator Thune; Mieke Y. Eoyang, assistant to Senator Kennedy; Barry Gene (B.G.) Wright, assistant to Senator Byrd; Frederick M. Downey, assistant to Senator Lieberman; Elizabeth King, assistant to Senator Reed; Richard Kessler and Darcie Tokioka, assistants to Senator Akaka; William K. Sutey and Alea Brown, assistants to Senator Bill Nelson; Eric Pierce, assistant to Senator Ben Nelson; Luke Ballman, assistant to Senator Dayton; Todd Rosenblum, as- sistant to Senator Bayh; and Andrew Shapiro, assistant to Senator Clinton. OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN WARNER, CHAIRMAN Chairman WARNER. Good morning, everyone. The committee will meet today to receive testimony on the current situation in Iraq as well as Afghanistan and to discuss strategy options for the future. The hearing will be conducted with two panels. It was a challenge to arrange this hearing and our schedules, and I thank you, Sen- ator Levin, for assisting me in making this come about. I congratulate you on the recognition that your colleagues have given you and that you will become chairman the first of the year. Senator LEVIN. If I could intervene, Mr. Chairman, as always we are going to need your help, support, and advice, because we have been doing this together for many years. Chairman WARNER. Twenty-eight years the Senator and I have been working together. We came together to the Senate. As I look back on my own modest career and association with the U.S. military, I value above all events in my life the association over these many decades with the men and women of the Armed Forces. General Abizaid, I say to you, as I have come to know you very well over the past 3-plus years in meetings here, in Wash- ington, and in this committee room, and both of us in fatigues in far parts of the world where you have commanded our forces with an extraordinary degree of professionalism. You have been at the point of one of the most challenging chapters in the military his- tory of this country. Speaking for myself, and I do believe a number of my colleagues, you have discharged that professionalism, not only to your own credit, but to the credit of the men and women of the Armed Forces in your command and all those who have served. We thank you, sir. The committee also welcomes Ambassador David Satterfield, Special Advisor and Coordinator for Iraq, on his first appearance before this committee. Ambassador Satterfield has a distinguished background. He served as Deputy Chief of Mission at the embassy in Baghdad from May 2005 until July 2006, where we saw him in visits that Senator Levin and I made to the area. We thank you for your work and service to country. I have had the opportunity, as has Senator Levin, to visit with you on a number of occasions. I think you are an extraordinary professional and you tell it like it is, and we anticipate you will do the same this morning. nth when Senator Levin and I returned from Iraq, in press conferences we both described the situation as we saw it. I 95 used a phrase that was given to me by a Marine sergeant in the darkness as we were departing the Al Anbar Province. I turned to him and said: “How do you think things are going?” He said: “Sen- ator, I simply say that Iraq is going sideways.” I saw personally the forward progress in many areas in Iraq, but I also witnessed and learned of other areas sliding backwards. So I think that sergeant's appraisal was pretty accurate. That was about 4 weeks ago is my recollection. My views and that of my colleague Senator Levin and other Sen- ators expressed in that timeframe I think, and say with modesty, resulted in a substantial increase in the introspective study within all levels of the executive and legislative branches of our Govern- ment. I draw your attention to press reports this morning where the President has formally launched a sweeping internal review of Iraq policy yesterday, pulling together studies underway by various Government agencies, according to U.S. officials. I understand, Am- bassador Satterfield, in your opening remarks you will address that subject further. It is interesting to note that World War II began on December 7, 1941. The European theater conflict concluded with the German surrender in May 1945 and operations in the Pacific theater ended in August 1945. I remember the period well. I was a young sailor in the following year of that war. Accordingly, I note that on No- vember 26, 2006, this year, but a few days away, our involvement in Iraq will surpass the length of this historic World War II period. In October 2002, Congress approved a joint resolution author- izing the President to use the Armed Forces of the United States to, "One, defend the national security of the United States against the continuing threat posed by Iraq; and two, enforce all relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions regarding Iraq.” With regard to this resolution, I make two observations. First, I observe that the resolution at that time—and I had a hand in drafting it-addressed the Iraq of Saddam Hussein, which is now gone and no more a threat to us. Today our Nation, together with our coalition partners, is engaged with a government of Iraq which we helped create and was freely elected by the people of Iraq. We are helping this Government to assume the full reins of sovereignty and eventually become a member of the coalition of free nations fighting international terrorism. That has been our goal, certainly this Senator's goal, and hopefully will continue to be our goal. But we need to revise our strategy to achieve that goal. Second, I note that the current United States Security Council Resolution on Iraq, No. 1637, will expire on December 31, 2006. We anticipate the coalition of nations and the Government of Iraq will work with the United Nations Security Council on a follow-on version of this resolution. Having just spoken with Ambassador Satterfield, I learned there have been developments overnight and he will specifically refer to them in his opening statement. Again, currently all levels of the executive branch, now confirmed by the President, that have a responsibility for our Nation's secu- rity are in the process of reexamining the strategy and means to achieve a goal, to continue our support for the Government of Iraq. In addition, in Congress as well as the executive branch we have 96 the potential benefit of views coming from the private sector, par- ticularly from the Baker-Hamilton Iraq Study Group. With that said, we as Congress, and particularly the Senate through our Committee on Armed Services, have to consider at least five developments between today and late in December. First, this very important hearing today. This is a most appro- priate and timely way to perform the committee's first step in our thorough review of this situation. Second, our committee, as the White House forwards the nomina- tion of Robert Gates to the Senate, will provide Dr. Gates with an opportunity to share his views on the future strategies in Iraq. Third, the Baker-Hamilton Iraq Study Group will submit their report. Depending on the timing of their report, Senator Levin and I will renew our invitation to members of that group to come before our committee and to give us a briefing. Fourth, General Pace, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has undertaken an independent study among his own military ana- lysts. Likewise, I have spoken to him desiring that he and such col- leagues as he wishes come before the committee and provide us with the advice that he will be giving to the President. Finally, the committee will benefit from the overall dialogue be- tween the Government of Iraq, our coalition partners, and other nations as the Security Council resolution progresses, that is the revised one. We have been informed that the Government of Iraq is interested in influencing how that follow-on resolution will be drawn up and, Ambassador Satterfield, you showed me this morning copies of a communication that related to those recommendations by the Gov- ernment of Iraq to the Security Council, and you will cover that im- portant subject. As we go through this process as a committee, indeed as a Sen- ate, we must be ever mindful of the daily loss of life, and life of not only our brave forces, men and women, but of those of our coa- lition partners and indeed the many, many innocent citizens of Iraq who every day, every hour of every day, are losing their lives. Fortunately, the American people know and deeply appreciate that our Nation's men and women in uniform and their coalition partners are performing courageously, selflessly, and with the high- est degree of military professionalism. The American people honor deeply, reverently the sacrifices of the families of our service- members. I am personally concerned about the challenges of two sovereign nations, Iraq and the United States, exercising command and con- trol, directly, as in the case of the United States from President to the privates, and likewise Prime Minister Maliki through his forces. This poses a very challenging situation and we are endeavoring to bring about the increased security and stability of Iraq for the people of Iraq through the coordination of those two independent sovereign nations' forces. For example, I found the events in late October in Sadr City es- pecially complex. On October 25 Iraqi special forces and U.S. forces launched a combined joint raid in Sadr City. That was a step, in my judgment, in the right direction. We put tremendous emphasis, General, on the importance of bringing about a degree of security 97 in Baghdad and this was an integral part of that operation. How- ever, on October 31, U.S. troops complied with orders from U.S. commanders, those commanders reacting to Prime Minister Maliki's direction, to abandon certain checkpoints, particularly in Sadr City. I would like to know if that situation in any way increased the danger to any of our Armed Forces in the performance of their mili- tary mission and was that a reflection of what we expect to come, or can we have a clear sense of confidence in the coordination be- tween the two military forces in the days and months to come as they continue to try and help the Iraqi people? In closing, I urge my colleagues as we proceed through the steps outlined above to carefully study all of the material that we de- velop in this committee and elsewhere and then reach individual and collective recommendations for the Senate and indeed for the President on the future strategy in Iraq. The committee welcomes our first panel and looks forward to your very important testimony. Senator Levin. STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN Senator LEVIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for scheduling this important t hearing, which is just the most recent example of your steady, thoughtful, and fair leadership of this committee. I join you in welcoming our witnesses this morning. Last week, the American people delivered a clear, indeed a dra- matic, message to the administration, to Congress, and to the Iraqi Government that “stay the course” is not a strategy for success in Iraq. It was a message heard around the world. The American peo- ple don't accept the President's recent assessment that, “absolutely we're winning" in Iraq, nor should we. The American people have said forcefully that they are impatient with Iraqi leaders who will not make the political compromises re- quired to blunt the sectarian violence and unite the Iraqi people. They are impatient with Iragi Government leaders who have not disbanded the militias and death squads that are a plague on Iraqi society. They have lost patience with the Iraqi leaders who will not condemn Sunni-Shiite enmity, tribal rivalries, and ethnic hatred. America has given the Iraqi people the opportunity to build a new nation at the cost of nearly 3,000 American lives and over 20,000 wounded. But the American people do not want our valiant troops to get caught in a crossfire between Iraqis, if Iraqis insist on squandering that opportunity through civil war and sectarian strife. We were assured by the President over a year ago that, “As Iraqis stand up, we will stand down." Even though the Pentagon claims that almost 90 percent of the Iraqi security forces (ISFs) are now trained and equipped, our troop level remains about the same. We were momentarily hopeful when the Iraqi leaders signed a four- point agreement on October 2 to end the sectarian violence. That turned out to be another false hope. Recently, Ambassador Khalilzad announced that Iraqi officials had agreed to a timeline for reaching benchmarks to confront the sectarian militias, to implement a reconciliation program, to share oil revenues, and to recommend changes to the constitution. Prime 100 gion. In the north, significant progress is being made in transitioning security responsibilities to capable Iraqi forces. Cur- rently around 80 percent of the sectarian violence in Iraq happens within a 35-mile radius of Baghdad. Nonetheless, security transi- tions continue in most of the country. Iraqis and Americans alike believe that Iraq can stabilize and that the key to stabilization is effective, loyal, nonsectarian ISFs coupled with an effective government of national unity. In discussions with our commanders and Iraqi leaders, it is clear that they believe Iraqi forces can take more control faster, provided we invest more manpower and resources into the coalition military transition teams, speed the delivery of logistics and mobility enablers, and embrace an aggressive Iraqi-led effort to disarm ille- gal militias. This is particularly important with regard to the Jaysh al-Mahdi elements operating as armed death squads in Baghdad and elsewhere. As we increase our efforts to build Iraqi capacity, we envision co- alition forces providing needed military support and combat power to Iraqi units in the lead. Precisely how we do this continues to be worked out with the Iraqis and with our own staffs, but we believe that ultimately capable, independent Iraqi forces loyal to an equal- ly capable independent Iraqi Government will set the conditions for the withdrawal of our major combat forces. Our commanders and diplomats believe it is possible to achieve 1 end state in Iraq that finds Iraq at peace with its neighbors, an ally in the war against extremists, respectful of the lives and rights of its citizens, and with security forces sufficient to maintain order, prevent terrorist safe havens, and defend the independence of Iraq. At this stage in the campaign, we will need flexibility to manage our force and to help manage the Iraqi force. Force caps and spe- cific timetables limit that flexibility. We must also remember that our enemies have a vote in this fight. The enemy watches not only what we do on the ground, but what we say and do here at home. Also, Prime Minister Maliki and his team want to do more. We want them to do more. Increased Iraqi military activity under greater Iraqi national control will only work, however, if his government embraces meaningful national reconciliation. His duly elected legitimate government deserves our support and his Armed Forces, backed by ours, deserve his full support. While I know the committee has a wide range of interests, in- cluding developments in Central Asia, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Leb- anon, and the Horn of Africa, I will defer comment on those sub- jects in order to take your questions. In closing, thank you for your support of our great soldiers, sail- ors, airmen, and marines in the field. Their still unfinished work keeps us safe at home. Thank you. [The prepared statement of General Abizaid follows:] PREPARED STATEMENT BY GEN JOHN P. ABIZAID, USA Chairman Warner, Senator Levin, members of the committee: Thank you for the opportunity to testify today. I refer the committee to my August 3 opening state- ment where I outlined my broader strategic dangers to United States interests in the Middle East. 101 mes order. How we conuill define our future... deployed in the m amen of the Armed Forces are aepiuyuu on Indeed the dangers outlined in that statement; al Qaeda's extremist ideology, hegemonistic revolutionary Iranian ambitions, and the corrosive effect of continued Palestinian-Israeli confrontation represent major dangers to international peace and security for several decades to come. American, regional, and international diplo- matic and security policies must be articulated and coordinated to confront these problems. Despite our current focus on the struggle underway to stabilize Iraq, the interests of the international community still require the confrontation and defeat of al Qaeda's dark ideology, the containment of Iranian expansionism, and progress toward Arab-Israeli peace. In the current atmosphere in the region, with the use of powerful non-state militias, the development of weapons of mass destruction, and the acceptance by some of terror as a legitimate tool of normal discourse American leadership in diplomatic, economic, and security elements of power is essential to protect the international order. How we confront these problems and empower forces of moderation in the region to resist them will define our future. Today, over 200,000 men and women of the Armed Forces are deployed in the Central Command area of operations. They protect the flow of global commerce; they confront terrorists; they work hard to stabilize young, unsteady, yet elected governments in Iraq and Afghanistan; and they indirectly support stability by in- creasing regional security capacities of our partners and friends in the region. Well over 1.5 million Americans have served in the region since September 11, 2001. Many have given their lives, and even more have suffered life-changing injuries. Whatever course our Nation chooses in the years ahead, we must be ever mindful of the sacrifice and courage of our troops and the debt we owe our veterans and their families. We must also remember that hundreds of thousands of coalition and partner forces fight directly or indirectly with us in the broader region. Today the committee will no doubt focus on the way ahead in Iraq and rightfully so. Yet we must be mindful of increasing threats from Iran as evidenced by its re- cent military exercise, which was designed to intimidate the smaller nations in the region. We must also be mindful of the real and pervasive global threat presented by al Qaeda and its associated movements. Failure to stabilize Iraq could increase Iranian aggressiveness and embolden al Qaeda's ideology. It could also deepen broader Sunni-Shiite fissures throughout the region. The changing security chal- lenges in Iraq require changes to our own approach to achieve stability. Let me re- mind the committee, however, that while new options are explored and debated, my testimony should not be taken to imply approval of shifts in direction. It is my de- sire today to provide an update on current security conditions in Iraq and elsewhere and current thinking about the way ahead on the security lines of operation. I re- main optimistic that we can stabilize Iraq. I just departed Iraq, where I visited with General Casey and his senior com- manders. On the Iraqi side I had meetings with the Prime Minister, the Defense Minister, and the Interior Minister. Over the past 4 weeks, levels of sectarian vio- lence are down in Baghdad from their Ramadan peak. The Iraqi armed forces, while under sectarian pressure, continues to perform effectively across Iraq. Our focus against al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) continues to take a toll on Iraqi AQI members and foreign fighters. Operations against selected targets on the Shiite death squad side also have had good effect, and our understanding of these complex organizations continues to improve. Sunni insurgent attacks against Iraqi security forces and Mul- tinational Forces remain at high levels, and our forces continue to experience at- tacks from armed Shiite groups, especially in the Baghdad region. In the north sig- nificant progress is being made in transitioning security responsibilities to capable Iraqi forces. Currently around 80 percent of the sectarian violence in Iraq happens within a 35-mile radius of Baghdad. Nonetheless, security transitions continue in most of the country. Iraqis and Americans alike believe that Iraq can stabilize and that the key to sta- bilization is effective, loyal, non-sectarian Iraqi security forces coupled with an effec- tive government of national unity. In discussions with our commanders and Iraqi leaders it is clear that they believe Iraqi forces can lake more control faster, provided we invest more manpower and resources into the coalition military transition teams, speed the delivery of logistics and mobility enablers, and embrace an aggressive Iraqi-led effort to disarm illegal militias. This is particularly important with regard to the Jaysh al Mahdi elements operating as armed death squads in Baghdad and elsewhere. As we increase our ef- forts to build Iraqi capacity, we envision coalition forces providing needed military support and combat power to Iraqi units in the lead. Precisely how we do this con- tinues to be worked out with the Iraqis as ultimately capable independent Iraqi forces, loyal to an equally capable independent Iraqi Government, will set the condi- tions for the withdrawal of our major combat forces. 102 Our commanders and diplomats believe it is possible to achieve an end state in Iraq that finds Iraq at peace with its neighbors, an ally in the war against extrem- ists, respectful of the lives and rights of its citizens, and with security forces suffi- cient to maintain order, prevent terrorist safe havens and defend the independence of Iraq. At this stage in the campaign, we'll need flexibility to manage our force and to help manage the Iraqi force. Force caps and specific timetables limit flexibility. We must also remember that our enemies have a vote in this fight. The enemy watches not only what we do on the ground but what we say and do here at home. Also, Prime Minister Maliki and his team want to do more; we want them to do more. Increased Iraqi military activity under greater Iraqi national control will only work however if his government embraces meaningful national reconciliation. His duly elected, legitimate government deserves our support and his armed forces, backed by ours, deserve his full support. While I know the committee has a wide range of interests, including developments in Central Asia, Afghanistan Pakistan, Lebanon, and the Horn of Africa, I will defer comment on those subjects in order to take your questions. In closing, thank you for your support of our great soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines in the field. Their still-unfinished work keeps us safe at home. Chairman WARNER. Thank you, General. Ambassador Satterfield. STATEMENT OF HON. DAVID M. SATTERFIELD, SENIOR ADVI- SOR TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE AND COORDINATOR FOR IRAQ, DEPARTMENT OF STATE Ambassador SATTERFIELD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator Levin, members of the committee, for the opportunity to testify today. The situation in Iraq is very serious. The Iraqi people as well as Iraqi and coalition forces have suffered through months of extreme brutal bloodshed. The insurgency and al Qaeda terror are respon- sible for the major U.S. casualties taken. They remain lethal chal- lenges above all to the Iraqi citizens themselves. It is increasingly clear that al Qaeda's strategy to undermine the Iraqi Government by sowing sectarian conflict has created and fuels today a dangerous, indeed a strategically threatening, cycle of violence. Some Iraqis have turned to armed militias and other extragovernmental groups to provide security, while others have seized upon a security vacuum to pursue local political power, criminal aims, or narrow sectarian interests. Sustained sectarian violence, the associated rise in armed militias and other extra- governmental groups are now the greatest threat to a stable, uni- fied, and prosperous Iraq. Sectarian differences in Iraq have long historic roots, but coexist- ence has been the rule in Iraq until the past 10 months, when, pushed too hard by al Qaeda's targeted attacks, sectarian violence has now emerged and continues to be fomented by al Qaeda vio- lence to create the violent conflagration we see today. the increasing presence and activity of armed militias with a sectarian identification are not dealt with, then indeed Iraqi na- tional identity will erode and hope for a united Iraq, a peaceful, stable Iraq, will over time diminish. This outcome in Iraq is unac- ceptable. It would undermine U.S. national interests in that coun- try and in the broader region and it would lead to a humanitarian disaster for the Iraqi people. The goals of the United States in Iraq remain clear. We support a democratic Iraq that can govern itself, sustain itself, defend itself, and be an ally in the war against terror. While our goals do 103 not change, we are constantly reviewing, adapting, and adjusting our tactics to achieve them. The President has asked his national security agencies to assess the situation in Iraq, to review options, to recommend the best way forward. The Iraq Study Group to which you referred, Mr. Chairman, will have its own recommenda- tions. They will be duly considered. We look forward to their rec- ommendations. As the President has said, our goal is success in Iraq, and we look forward to pursuing, including with the bipar- tisan leadership of Congress, the best means to accomplish that. At the Department of State (DOS), we have adapted over the past year by significantly increasing our staffing levels in Baghdad and at our vital Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) located throughout Iraq. Over twice the number of DOS employees and a significant number of other civilian agency staff are now present in these sites, some of which encounter daily incoming fire. This is a hazardous undertaking, but it is a vital undertaking for the sake of our interests in that country and for the sake of developing Iraqi institutions, Iraqi democracy, and projecting our own ability to shape events on the ground in a way that supports success. We have also changed in the DOS our fundamental assignments process. Filling positions quickly and with the most qualified offi- cers at posts which are in critical threat, which are unaccompanied, such as Iraq and Afghanistan, is now the DOS's number one pri- ority. We are pleased to be able to inform the committee that the rate of volunteerism by qualified officers for these positions has steadily increased. We are very pleased at the support being ex- pressed and we will continue to devote our own resources to ensur- ing that we provide our best to these challenging posts. Mr. Chairman, Iraq's future is dependent upon the performance and the commitment of three pillars of actors: first and foremost, the Iraqi Government and the Iraqi people; second, the United States and our coalition allies; and third, the international commu- nity, in particular Iraq's neighbors. All of these groups need to work together to help make progress in Iraq possible. Progress has to occur along three critical strategic tracks-polit- ical, security, and economic-if a stable, united, peaceful Iraq is to emerge. As the President, Ambassador Khalilzad, and General Casey have all stated, it is essential that, we the United States, work with the Government of Iraq to set out measurable, achiev- able goals and objectives on each of these tracks. In short, the Iraqis themselves need, with our help but with their lead, to articu- late and then achieve clearly defined goals on a clearly defined timeline. On the security track, our focus is on transitioning more control and responsibility to the Iraqis, as General Abizaid has stated. Prime Minister Maliki wants this and so do we. While I will leave further details to questions to General Abizaid, we are in the proc- ess of transitioning more command and control to Iraqi com- manders, to divisions, to battalions. We have already moved Muthanna and Dhi Qar Provinces to provincial Iraqi control and we expect to move the rest of Iraq's provinces to that status over the months to come. We are working very closely, Mr. Chairman, with Iraq's leaders to produce a set of security goals and objectives that ensure the 105 political, and economic reform. Iraq will commit to reforming its main economic sectors—oil, electricity, agriculture and to estab- lishing the laws and building the institutions necessary to combat corruption, assure good governance, and protect human rights, and in return the international community will provide the assistance necessary to support Iraq's needs over the next 5 years. With the compact, Iraq is reaching out to the world. I am pleased to report that the world is beginning to reach back, though more commitment is certainly needed, particularly from Iraq's neighbors. This compact is nearly complete. On October 31, Kuwait hosted a preparatory group meeting where a final text was neared. The compact we hope can be completed before the end of this year. Iraqis will be asking their friends and neighbors to consider what Iraq has pledged to do and what Iraq is doing and will ask them to come forward with concrete pledges, and we will help. In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, we will continue to support the Government of Iraq as it moves forward on the tracks that I have outlined. But I want to make one point very clear. Each of these tracks—security, political, and economic-is inextricably insepa- rably linked one to the other. While all must move forward to- gether, a failure or significant setback in any one area will cer- tainly affect progress in the others. Militias cannot be effectively onfronted and demobilized in the absence of a larger political rec- onciliation agreement. Political reconciliation cannot survive if the government cannot agree on the distribution of oil revenue, if it cannot create jobs. Iraqis cannot modernize their economy or draw foreign investment if there is violence in the streets. We believe that a successful path forward can still be forged in Iraq. As the transition continues to full Iraqi Government control, we will stand firmly behind the Iraqi Government. They have much work to do in the weeks and months ahead to resolve differences and reach compromises on issues that will determine their coun try's future. The fate, the interests of our two countries, and beyond our two countries of the region and the world, are intertwined. Success is critical. Failure is unacceptable. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I look forward to your questions. [The prepared statement of Ambassador Satterfield follows:] PREPARED STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR DAVID SATTERFIELD Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the opportunity to testify before your committee today. The situation in Iraq is very serious. The Iraqi people, as well as Iraqi and coali- tion forces, have suffered through several months of extreme, brutal bloodshed. The insurgency and al Qaeda terror are responsible for the majority of U.S. military cas- ualties and remain lethal challenges to Iraqis. It is increasingly clear that al Qaeda's strategy to undermine the Iraqi Government by sowing sectarian conflict has created a dangerous cycle of violence. Some Iraqis have turned to armed militias and other extra-governmental groups to provide security, while others have seized upon this security vacuum to pursue local political power or narrow sectarian interests. Sustained sectarian violence and the associated rise in armed militias and other extra-governmental groups are now the greatest strategic threat to a stable, unified, and prosperous Iraq. Sectarian differences in Iraq are like tectonic plates. Historically, they have been stable. However, if pushed too hard they can lead to tremors and, ultimately, to a devastating earthquake. While average Iraqis want nothing more than sanctuary from violence and a normal life, if they believe that the only source of security is 107 Second, the Iraqi Government must reach out and engage all those willing to abandon violence and terror, including former members of the Baath Party, while credibly threatening to combat those insurgents and terrorists who remain wholly opposed to a democratic Iraq. Third, they must establish a robust process aimed at disarming, demobilizing, and reintegrating (DDR) members of armed groups into normal Iraqi society. To be suc- cessful, the DDR process will require agreement on an amnesty plan that gives mili- tants incentives to return to civilian life. Fourth, the Iraqis must pursue and complete a national hydrocarbon law both to ensure that the country remains united as well as to spur much-needed inter- national investment that will come only when Iraq's laws are firmly established and clear to all. Iraq and the United - International Comparttween Iraq and the in ECONOMIC-INTERNATIONAL COMPACT In the economic track, the Government of Iraq is moving forward aggressively. Iraq and the United Nations announced on July 27 that they would jointly lead ef- forts to launch a new International Compact with Iraq. The Compact will provide a new framework for mutual commitments between Iraq and the international com- munity, particularly those in Iraq's neighborhood, in bolstering Iraq's economic re- covery. The goal of the Compact is for the Iraqi Government to demonstrate to the inter- national community its commitment to implementing needed social, political, and economic reforms. Iraq will commit to reforming its main economic sectors -oil, elec- tricity and agriculture—and to establishing the laws and building the institutions needed to combat corruption, assure good governance and protect human rights. In return, the members of the international community will provide the assistance needed to support Iraqi efforts to achieve economic and financial self-sufficiency over the next 5 years. In short, with the Compact, Iraq is reaching out to the international community for help. I am pleased to report that the world is beginning to reach back, though more commitment is needed, especially from Iraq's neighbors. The Compact is nearly complete. On October 31, Kuwait hosted a preparatory group meeting where members moved closer to a final Compact text. They intend to complete the Compact before the end of the year. Between now and then, the Iraqis will be asking their friends and neighbors to consider their goals and reforms, and to come forward with concrete pledges of assistance. We are urging Iraq's neigh- bors, in particular, to step forward and support Iraq's future. CONCLUSION In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, we will continue to support the Government of Iraq as it moves forward on these three tracks. However, I want to make one point very clear. Each of these tracks—security, political, and economic—is inextricably linked to the other. While all must move forward together, a failure or setback in any one area hinders progress in the others. Thus, militias cannot be effectively demobilized in the absence of a larger political reconciliation agreement. Political reconciliation cannot survive if the government cannot agree on the distribution of oil revenue and create jobs. Iraqis cannot modernize their economy and draw foreign investment if there is sectarian violence in the streets. We believe that a successful path forward can still be forged in Iraq. As the tran- sition continues to full Iraqi Government control, we must stand firmly behind the Iraqis. They have a lot of work to do in the coming months to resolve their dif- ferences and reach compromises on issues that will determine their country's future. The fate and interests of our two countries are, for better or for worse, now inter- twined. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee. I look forward to your questions. Chairman WARNER. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador, for a very care- fully and well-delivered statement, quite informative about the sit- uation. We will now proceed with a first round of questions, limiting to 6 minutes each for each Senator. I will open, General Abizaid, with you. . On August 3 you appeared before the committee and you stated as follows, “I believe the sectarian violence is probably as bad as sager political reconciliation agreement 109 General ABIZAID. I have confidence that the Iraqi army is up to the job, providing the Iraqi Government shows the confidence in its own army and gives support to its own army to take the lead the way that they should. That has yet to be demonstrated, although today, for example, with Iraqi Ministry of Interior (MOI) and Min- istry of Defense (MOD) forces moving in to the Sadr City area to deal with the people that had perpetrated the kidnappings yester- day, I thought that they showed initiative and decisiveness that they will need to show in the days ahead. It was a good sign, but there needs to be more of it. Chairman WARNER. General, I mentioned in my opening state- ment that I am concerned about the ability of two sovereign na- ions exercising a chain of command from their respective leaders, our President and the prime minister, down to the troops, that they can effectively operate these joint operations. Sadr City seemed to some of us to pose a greater challenge than we anticipated to that problem. Could you give us your own professional judgment on the current ability to jointly operate so as not to put at risk either our forces, U.S. and other coalition, or the Iraqi forces, and what do you look to the future, particularly if this United Nations (U.N.) resolution has modifications in it giving greater authority as I understand it, Ambassador Satterfield, to the prime minister of Iraq? Ambassador SATTERFIELD. Mr. Chairman, if I could just comment on the resolution. The resolution's text as proposed is very similar in all key elements to the existing mandate for the Multi-National Forces. Chairman WARNER. We saw earlier statements to the effect that he wanted more authority. Ambassador SATTERFIELD. It is essentially the same authority. In our own dealings with the prime minister and his military com- manders, we are discussing the transition to greater Iraqi control. But that is outside the context of the mandate. Chairman WARNER. Thank you. Will you provide for the committee today that communication that you referred to? Ambassador SATTERFIELD. We will certainly provide the letter from the prime minister to the Security Council. [The information referred to follows:] 111 It is the intention of the Iragi government to continue increasing the number of governorates that fall fully under the control of the Iraqi authorities during 2006 in order to reach a point where all (18) govemorates are placed under the control of these authorities. When the security responsibilities are transferred to the Iraqi authorities in a certain governorate, the Multi-National Forces will be present in their bases and can provide support to the Iraqi Security Forces at the request of the Iraqi authorities based on an agreement that organizes the authorities and responsibilities between the two sides, We have agreed to three common goals: first, Iraqi assumption of recruiting, training, equipping, and arming of the Iraqi Security Forces; second, Iraqi assumption of command and control over Iraqi forces; and third, transferring responsibility for security to the government of Iraq. We have formed a high level working group in order to provide recommendations on how best to achieve these goals. It has also been agreed to work towards the Iragi authorities asšimming the apprehension, detention, and imprisonmer tasks on the basis of an agreement to be reached between the government of Iraq and the Multi-National Forces, Hence, the Iraqi govemment requests the extension of the mandate of the Multi-National Forces in accordance with UNSC Resolutions (1546) of 2004 and (1637) of 2005 and the letters attached thereto for another (12) months starting on 31 December 2006, provided that this extension is subject to a commitment by the Security Council to end this mandate at an earlier date in case the Iraqi government so requests and provided that the mandate is subject to periodic review before June 15, 2007. The Iraqi government requests the termination of the UNMOVIC mission due to the completion of its tasks. The Iraqi government believes that the time has come to terminate the war compensations that were imposed on Iraq. The Iraqi government realizes that the provisions of resolution (1546) which relate to depositing the revenues in the Development Fund for Iraq and the role of the International Advisory and Monitoring Board help to ensure the use of the natural resources of Iraq for the benefit of the people of Iraq. We recognize that the fund plays an important role in convincing the donors and creditors that Iraq is managing its resources and debts in a responsible way in service of the Iraqi people. This role is vital especially that Iraq is seeking to form a new partnership with the international community to build a vital network for economic transformation and integration in the economies of the region and the world through the International Compact with Iraq. We ask the Security Council to extend the mandate of the Development Fund for Iraq and the International Advisory and Monitoring Board for another 12 months and to review this mandate based on the request of the Iraqi government before June 15, 2007, The people of Iraq are determined to establish a stable and peaceful democracy for themselves and the proper basis for building a vital economy. This vision for the future of Iraq can not become a reality except with the help of the International Community. 113 بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم 11 تشرين الثاني 2006 من رئيس وزراء جمهورية العراق الى رئيس مجلس الأمن التابع للأمم المتحدة نهديكم تحياتنا ، لقد انجز العراق وفي الوقت المصد الخطوات اللازمة لإستكمال العملية السياسية ، لا سيما كتابة الدستور الدائم ووضع الأسس لبناء مؤسساته السياسية والقانونية. ولي شهر ايار من هذا العام ، شكل مجلس النواب المنتخب دستوريا حكومة الوحدة الوطنية. وقد تعززت خطوات بناء العراق الديمقراطي الاتحادي الموحد بإلتزام الحكومة بتبني مشروع الحوار والمصالحة الوطنية ، وتأمين المشاركة السياسية الواسعة ومراقبة حقوق الانسان وتثبيت سلطة القانون والنمو الاقتصادي وتوفير الخدمات للمواطنين إن تحقيق الأمن وتأمين الاستقرار الدائم من اهم اولويات برنامج الحكومة العراقية للوصول الى السلام والرفاهية المطلوبة للشعب العراقي ، إلا أن الإرهابيين والقوى المعادية للديمقراطية تواصل استهداف المواطنيين الأبرياء ومؤسسات الدولة المختلفة إن الأمن والاستقرار في العراق هم مسؤولية الحكومة العراقية. وكان مجلس الامن قد أقر في قراره المرقم (1546) في 8 حزيران 2004 بان القوات الأمنية العراقية ستلعب تدريجيا دورا أكبر في تمكين الحكومة العراقية التحمل هذه المسؤولية مقلصة ومنهية بذلك دور القوات المتعددة الجنسيات في الوقت الذي تزداد وتتوسع فيه المسؤولية الامنية لقوات الأمن العراقية. ومن خلال تجربة السنتين والنصف الماضية ، ثبت بان القوات الأمنية العراقية التي عملت بالمرة الحكومة العراقية إكتبت خبرات ومسؤوليات جديدة كما إنها تمت بالحجم والخبرة والقره مظهرة بذلك قدراتها المتزايدة لتولي المسؤولية الكاملة في مجالي الأمن والدفاع. . .. وقد بدأنا نحصد ثمرة النجاح عندما تولت قواتنا المسؤولية الأمنية في محافظتي المثني وذي قار وفي شهر ايلول 2006 ، تولت وزارة الدفاع مسؤولية القيادة والسيطرة العملياتية القيادة القوات البرية والبحرية والجوية ، وكذلك تولت القيادة والسيطرة العملياتية على فرقتين عسكريتين ، مما يشير الى زيادة قدرة الجيش العراقي لإستلام زمام القيادة في توفير الأمن للشعب العراقي. كما تعمل الحكومة العراقية وبشكل دؤوب لبناء المنظومة الإدارية واللوجستية الضرورية لجعل قواتنا العراقية معتمدة على نفسها. ان في نية الحكومة العراقية الإستمرار في زيادة عدد المحافظات الخاضعة كلية السيطرة السلطت العراقية خلال عام 2006 من أجل الوصول الى وضع جميع المحافظات ال(18) تحت سيطرة هذه السلطات وعند نقل المسؤوليات الأمنية في محافظة ما إلى السلطات العراقية ستتواجد القوات المتعددة الجنسيات في معسكرانها ويمكن أن توفر الإسناد القوات الأمنية العراقية عند طلب السلطات العراقية وفق اتفاقية تنظم الصلاحيات والمسؤوليات بين الطرفين. 114 لقد إتفقا على ثلاثة اهداف مشتركة: اولا ، تولي الحكومة العراقية تجنيد وتدريب وتجهيز وتسليح قوى الأمن العراقية، ثانية ، وتولي القيادة والسيطرة العراقية على القوات العراقية؟ ثالثا ، ونقل المسؤولية الأمنية الى الحكومة العراقية. وقد قمنا بتشكيل مجموعة عمل رفيعة المستوى من اجل تقديم توصيات بشأن كيفية انجاز هذه الأهداف على أفضل وجه. كما تم الإتفاق على العمل نحو تولی السلطات العراقية مهمات الحجز والاعتقال والسجن بناء على اتفاقية ستعقد بين الحكومة العراقية والقرات متعددة الجنسيات. وعليه فإن الحكومة العراقية تطلب تمديد تعريض القوات متعددة الجنسيات حسب قراري مجلس الأمن (1546) لعام 2004 و (1637) لعام 2005 والرسائل الملحقة بهما لمدة 12 شهرا اخری ابتداء من 31 كانون الأول 2006 على أن يخضع هذا التمديد بالإلتزام من مجلس الأمن لإنهاء هذا التفويض في وقت ابكر في حال طلبت الحكومة العراقية نلك وان يخضيع التفويض الى مراجعة دورية قبل 15 حزيران 2007. وتطلب الحكومة العراقية انهاء عمل الأمنوفيك إكتمال مهماتها. وتعتقد الحكومة العراقية ان الوقت قد حان لإنهاء تعويضات الحرب التي فرضت على العراق :. وتری حكومة العراق ان احكام القرار (1546 ) الخاصة بايداع العائدات في صندوق تنمية العراق ودور الهيئة الدولية للاستشارة والرقابة يساعد على ضمان إستخدام الموارد الطبيعية للعراق من اجل فائدة الشعب العراقي، ونحن ندرك بان الصندوق يلعب دورا مهما في إقناع المانحين والدائنين بان العراق يقوم بادارة مصادره ودیونه بطريقة مسؤولة لخدمة الشعب العراقي، وان هذا الدور حيوي سيما وان العراق يسعى لتشكيل شراكة جديدة مع الأسرة الدولية لبناء شبكة حيوية للتحول والاندماج الاقتصادي في اقتصاديات المنطقة والعالم من خلال العهد الدولي مع العراق. ونحن نطلب من مجلس الأمن تمديد تفویض صندوق تنمية العراق والهيئة الدولية للاستشارة والرقابة 12 شهرا اخرى ولمراجعته بناء على طلب الحكومة قبل 15 حزيران 2007 . ان الشعب العراقي مصمم على أن يقيم لنفسه نيمقراطية مستقرة ومسالمة وان يضع الأسس الصحيحة لبناء اقتصاد حيوي وان هذه الرؤية لمستقبل العراق لا يمكن أن تصبح واقعا الا بمساعدة المجتمع الدولي اننا ندرك ان مجلس الأمن ينوي جعل هذه الرسالة ملحقا بالقرار الخاص بالعراق الذي هو قيد الاعداد. وفي غضون ذلك ، نطلب أن تقدم نسخا من هذه الرسالة الى اعضاء مجلس الأمن وباسرع وقت ممكن. . نودي كامل الملكي رئيس مجلس الوزراء في جمهورية العراق /\ (۰۰۹ Chairman WARNER. Thank you very much. Ambassador SATTERFIELD. Thank you. General ABIZAID. Mr. Chairman, in the past 6 weeks we have had increasing success with joint Iraqi-U.S. forces moving into Sadr City, precisely targeting death cells and death squad leadership and taking them out. I believe that this will continue. It needs to be worked in consultation with the Iraqi Government. But I am 115 confident that the command and control arrangements are ade- quate for the current period, but they must be codified as we move ahead with Iraqi units taking more and more leadership in combat operations. Chairman WARNER. By codified, what do you mean? General ABIZAID. I think we need to have some very clear under- standing of who moves forward, with what type of units, who has the lead, and as we anticipate moving into the next phase of the campaign it becomes pretty clear to us that Iraqi forces will be in the lead and that we will move forward to assist them when they need our additional combat power. There will also be American military transition teams embedded with Iraqi units and it is our opinion that those military transition teams need to be substantially increased and given the capacity to operate more robustly with the Iraqis. Exactly what those arrange- ments need to be needs to be a subject of discussions and agree- ments between our staff and the senior Iraqi staffs. Chairman WARNER. Thank Mr. Ambassador, you mentioned the three pillars that were es- sential and you referred to the region and the responsibility within the region to bring to bear with respect to forces, not military but deployment and otherwise, of the surrounding nations. There are individuals and groups considering that that would embrace some contact with both the Syrian Government and Iranian Government. Can you advise the committee as to the current thinking on those options as a part of a plan to bring in the greater community in the region to hopefully bring about the stabilization of the strife in Iraq? Ambassador SATTERFIELD. Mr. Chairman, there is a vital role, an ongoing role, for the region to play in stabilizing Iraq. The Gulf states, our critical Arab partners in Egypt, Jordan, and elsewhere, have contacts with both the Iraqi Government and with elements of the Sunni community that are very important. We have been working closely with them to try to mobilize the greatest concerted effort to press those sides which are engaged in violence to stop and to provide support for the Iraqi Government. But more needs to be done. Political support for the new Iraq, for a democratic post-Saddam Iraq, economic support, particularly in the form of Gulf state debt forgiveness, need to move forward, and the time to move is now. Our friends in the Gulf, in particular, speak and we listen to them when they express concern over the extension of negative Iranian influence in Iraq, the growth of al Qaeda and Islamic extremism in Iraq. These are valid concerns. We share them. We need their support in helping to confront these growing concerns, and the best way to do that is through active engagement, not isolation, not fence-sitting, on the part of these regimes. Mr. Chairman, your question about engaging the negative actors in the region-Syria and Iran-is a very significant one. With re- spect to Syria, we do not believe that the issue involving Syria's negative behaviors towards Iraq, Hezbollah, Lebanon, Iran, or Pal- estinian radical groups is a question of lack of dialogue or lack of engagement. We believe the Syrian Government is well aware of our concerns and the steps required to address those concerns. But 116 Syria has made a series of choices and the last choice, the most sig- nificant and negative choice, was during the Lebanon war, when Syria cast its lot, as it remains today, with Iran, with Hezbollah, with forces of violence and extremism. When that changes, we will of course respond. The problem is not one of dialogue or engage- ment. With respect to Iran, we are prepared in principle to discuss Ira- nian activities in Iraq. The timing of such a direct dialogue is one we still have under review. Chairman WARNER. Thank you very much. So in summary, you would say at the present time negotiations with those two coun- tries are not on the table? Ambassador SATTERFIELD. We are prepared in principle for a di- rect dialogue with Iran. The timing of that dialogue is one that we are considering. Chairman WARNER. Thank you. Senator Levin. Senator LEVIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General, you indicated in your statement that the changing secu- rity challenges in Iraq require changes to our own approach to achieve stability. What changes are you referring to? General ABIZAID. Primarily referring to the need to increase our commitment to our military transition teams, to increase the num- ber of people that are on each of these teams, to ensure that they are as robust as they need to be to give the Iraqis the capability to take the lead. I believe that that is essential for being able to change from us being in the lead to Iraqis being in the lead. Senator LEVIN. You also say that new options are being explored and debated. Is one of the options that is being explored additional U.S. forces going to Iraq? General ABIZAID. We have every option on the table and we will present them to the chain of command. Senator LEVIN. Including that? General ABIZAID. To include that. Senator LEVIN. Including an announcement of a plan for possible reduction of forces some time down the road? Is that also on the way- General ABIZAID. Yes, Senator, it goes all the way from increas- ing our U.S. forces, our U.S. combat forces, all the way down to withdrawing our U.S. combat forces. Senator LEVIN. Are some of them down the road, in some planned way? General ÅBIZAID. Right, and repositioning of forces in different ways, et cetera. Senator LEVIN. Thank you. Ambassador, you testified that it is critical that we work with the Government of Iraq to set out measurable, achievable bench- marks on the three tracks that you mentioned-political, security, and economic. Apparently there were some benchmarks and timelines that were said by Ambassador Khalilzad to have been agreed upon by the Iraqi leaders. He made that announcement, then the next day Prime Minister Maliki rejected what apparently the Ambassador thought had been accepted. 117 Were we surprised Prime Minister Maliki rejected those time- lines? Ambassador SATTERFIELD. Senator Levin, the Iraqi Government has articulated a sense of goals and objectives on the political proc- ess and they have been actively engaged in articulating with the U.N. a very detailed set of goals and objectives on the economic side. On security, the discussions between our two sides continue. With respect to timelines, there is a timeline embedded in the po- litical process outlined by the Iraqi Government, as well as on the economic steps now in the process of finalization. Similarly on security, we think it is valuable, very valuable, for the Iraqis to articulate, certainly with our input, where they intend to move, how they intend to move, and over what timeline on secu- rity goals, as General Abizaid has outlined. But all of these proc- esses are very much in train. Senator LEVIN. Apparently there was a specific document which Ambassador Khalilzad was referring to when he said that certain timelines and benchmarks had been agreed upon. Is that true? Is there a document? Ambassador SATTERFIELD. There is a document on political benchmarks that is a document articulated and published by the Iraqi Government in mid-October. Senator LEVIN. Did we present a different timeline and set of benchmarks to them from the one you just referred to? Ambassador SATTERFIELD. No, Šenator. I think whatever confu- sion may have been reflected in Prime Minister Maliki's remarks has been resolved. I would not overplay the significance certainly at this point of those comments. We are very closely working on benchmarks and goals and objectives on the security process. Senator LEVIN. So there was no document which we said that the Iraqis had agreed to, which in fact Prime Minister Maliki said had not been agreed to? Ambassador SATTERFIELD. No, Senator. Senator LEVIN. There is no such document? Ambassador SATTERFIELD. I do not think that was the substance of the prime minister's remarks. Senator LEVIN. All right. But that is not my question. My ques- tion is: was there a document? Ambassador SATTERFIELD. They have not repudiated any agreed document, no, sir. Senator LEVIN. Was there a document presented, which was not accepted? Ambassador SATTERFIELD. No, sir. There are documents in dis- cussion. Senator LEVIN. Recent reports have been published about the ISFs being infiltrated by Shiite militias implicated in sectarian death squads, and there has been some evidence that has been true now of the Iraqi army. General, a recent, very devastating report in the New York Times last Sunday implicated the division com- mander of the Fifth Iraqi Army Division in Diyala Province of a campaign to drive the Sunnis out of that province. His actions re- portedly led American officers to require that the general clear all operations with them, even though on July 3 there had been a transfer of lead authority to the Iraqis. 118 Are you familiar with that specific report? General ABIZAID. I am familiar with the article that appeared in the New York Times. Senator LEVIN. Is that accurate? General ABIZAID. It is not completely accurate, no. Senator LEVIN. Is it essentially accurate? General ABIZAID. There is certainly concern that in some units there is infiltration by sectarian groups. Senator LEVIN. Did the events that were described there occur? General ABIZAID. Did the events described in the article occur? Senator LEVIN. Did the event that was described there in that ar- ticle occur? General ABIZAID. I cannot really say that the article is exactly ac- curate. I can say in that division there were sectarian problems that were brought to the attention of our chain of command and were brought to the attention of the Iraqi chain of command. Senator LEVIN. Was there a list of people that the Iraqi general wanted us to arrest and detain? General ABIZAID. Wanted us, Americans, to arrest and detain? Senator LEVIN. Right. General ABIZAID. I do not know that that is true. Senator LEVIN. Do you believe, General, that Prime Minister Maliki will move against the Sadr militia? General ABIZAID. I think he must move against the Sadr militia if Iraq is to become a free and sovereign and independent state. Senator LEVIN. You believe he will? General ABIZAID. I believe he will and he will use the Iraqi army to do so, and he will use political activity to ensure the disar- mament of the Jaysh al-Mahdi. I believe he must do that; other- wise the Jaysh al-Mahdi starts to become the curse of Hezbollah, except on an Iraqi scale as opposed to a Lebanon scale. Senator LEVIN. I can ask this of either of you—do we believe that the grand ayatollah can influence Sadr's behavior? Ambassador SATTERFIELD. Senator, Ayatollah Sistani has signifi- cant influence in Iraq, an influence that extends well beyond Najaf and well beyond the Shiite community alone. He has been a sus- tained and consistent voice for moderation, for calm, and a sectarian violence. But he is challenged, as all moderates in Iraq are challenged, by the militias, by their sectarian violence, by the campaign of terror that foments and sustains that violence. Certainly the Ayatollah has a vital role. It is a role we very much hope he will continue to play. Senator LEVIN. Could he just declare a truce to sectarian violence or deliver a religious fatwa against that violence? assador SATTERFIELD. Senator. I believe there will need to be concerted action by the political leadership of Iraq and by ISFs in order to bring about a meaningful drop and sustained end to sec- tarian violence. Senator LEVIN. My time is up. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chairman WARNER. Thank you, Senator Levin. Senator Graham. Senator GRAHAM. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: that Iraq is the central battlefront in the war on terror? General? 119 General ABIZAID. I agree with that. Senator GRAHAM. Ambassador? Ambassador SATTERFIELD. It is a central battlefront. It is not the only battlefront. Senator GRAHAM. Who would be the biggest winners and losers in a failed Iraqi state? General? General ABIZAID. Al Qaeda and Iran. Senator GRAHAM. Ambassador? Ambassador SATTERFIELD. Absolutely. Senator GRAHAM. Was General Shinseki correct when you look backward that we needed more troops to secure the country? Gen- eral Abizaid? General ABIZAID. General Shinseki was right that a greater international force contribution, U.S. force contribution, and Iraqi tribution, should have been available immediately after major combat operations. Senator GRAHAM. So both of you believe that more troops would have been helpful, that we are in the central battle, one of the big- gest battles in the war on terror; is that correct? Both of you be- lieve that, that this is a central battle in the war on terror, Iraq? General ABIZAID. The central battle is happening in Iraq. That is by the definition of our enemies, and the question is, Senator GRAHAM. Well, and you agree with their definition? General ABIZAID.—do we need more troops? My answer is yes, we need more troops that are effective, that are Iraqi. Senator GRAHAM. Do we need more American troops at the mo- ment to quell the balance? General ABIZAID. No, I do not believe that more American troops right now is the solution to the problem. Senator GRAHAM. Do we need less American troops? General ABIZAID. I believe that the troop levels need to stay where they are. We need to put more American capacity into Iraqi units to make them more capable in their ability to confront the sectarian problem- Senator GRAHAM. So it is your testimony that we do not need any change in troop levels to get this right? General ABIZAID. It is possible that we might have to go up in troop levels in order to increase the number of forces that go into the ISFs, but I believe that is only temporary. Senator GRAHAM. If we withdrew troops to Okinawa, would that be a good idea? General ABIZAID. No. Senator GRAHAM. If we withdrew troops to Kuwait, would that be a good idea? General ABIZAID. Not at this stage in the campaign. Senator GRAHAM. People in South Carolina come up to me in in- creasing numbers and suggest that no matter what we do in Iraq the Iraqis are incapable of solving their own problems through the political process and will resort to violence and we need to get the hell out of there. What do you say? General ABIZAID. I say the Iraqis are capable of fighting for their country, solving their political problems, and bringing their country towards stability with our help and support. 120 Senator GRAHAM. Having said that, do you see it possible to get political solutions to these difficult problems the Iraqis are facing with the current level of violence? Ambassador SATTERFIELD. Senator, we see the need for action both on the political front and on the security front. The current levels of violence work against a political resolution and the failure to move forward a political process, a reconciliation process, feed and sustain those levels of violence. Senator GRAHAM. Would you agree with this statement, that if current level of violence is not contained or reduced dramati- cally the chance of a political outcome being successful in Iraq is almost zero? Ambassador SATTERFIELD. There is no question that if levels of sectarian violence, if the growth of militias are not addressed and brought down significantly, that the chances of a political resolu- tion are significantly diminished. Senator GRAHAM. Having said that, our troop posture will basi- cally stay the same? General ABIZAID. Senator, our troop posture needs to stay where it is as we move to enhance the capabilities of the ISFs, and then we need to assess whether or not we can bring major combat units out of there due to the increased effectiveness of the ISFs. My be- lief is that the Iraqi army, which has taken casualties at three times the rate of our own troops, is willing to fight. They need to be led properly by their own officers and they need to be supported by their own government. The government needs not to support the sectarian militias. They need to disband the sectarian militias. Senator GRAHAM. Why is the government not supporting the army—why are they supporting the militias over the army? That would be my last question. General ÅBIZAID. I believe that the government understands that they must support the army over the militias. Senator GRAHAM. Why are they not doing it? General ABIZAID. I believe they are starting to do it. Senator GRAHAM. No further questions. Chairman WARNER. Thank you. Senator Reed. Senator REED. Thank you very much. General Abizaid, the Shiite control the Government of Iraq at the moment and there seems to be, at least in my view, a conscious process of ethnic cleansing going on. Would you ascribe to that view? General ABIZAID. There are certainly areas in Baghdad where Shiite death squads have moved in and tried to move Sunni fami- lies out of there by threatening them, murdering them, or kidnap- ping them. Senator REED. Do you see that as something more than just coin- cidental, but organized and systematic? General ABIZAID. I think it is organized by some of the Shiite mi- litia groups, yes, I do. Senator REED. It seems also to me that the Shiite Government recently passed legislation creating a super-region which would en- compass the Kurdish area in the north, making it autonomous. In 121 effect, what seems to be happening or could be happening is that the Shiite plan, the government plan, is that they will end up with an oil-rich region in the south, much as the Kurds have in the north, that on the edges between Shiite and Sunni communities there is some deliberate action of ethnic cleansing going on and that that rationale might explain why there is not a directed at disbanding militias, cooperating with United States forces, sharing intelligence, doing lots of things. Ambassador SATTERFIELD. Senator, in fact that has not hap- pened. The manner in which the issue of moving forward on the constitutional provisions for the formation of federal regions was handled shows not a dominant Shiite unilateral agenda, but rather cross-sectarian alliances, in which Shiite in the political process ex- pressed very different views on what ought to be the course for- ward, in which Sunnis participated very much in a decision, along with Kurds, that put off for 18 months any step by provinces to take advantage of the constitutional provisions to form a federal re- gion. We see this as a positive, not a negative outcome. Similarly, we en significant progress made on a national hydrocarbon law, which would provide for national distribution of revenues on a fair and equitable basis, which would reflect both local and national needs, and those are both encouraging signs. Senator REED. Is it encouraging that there are significant reve- nues that they are not committing to reconstruction efforts? Tal Afar is one example among many where they are not committing their own resources to do what everyone argues has to be done. Ambassador SATTERFIELD. Senator, there are very significant Iraqi resources which are available and which need to be moved into Iraqi reconstruction, development, and growth. We are work- ing with the Iraqis, as is the international community, on focusing them on the need to move those resources through better budget execution, through other means, to get them to the fight where they are needed. Senator REED. General Abizaid, how much time do you think we have to bring down the level of violence in Baghdad before we reach some type of tipping point where it accelerates beyond the control of even the Iraqi Government? General ABIZAID. I think it needs to be brought down within the next several months. Senator REED. 90 days, 60 days? General ABIZAID. 4 to 6 months. Senator REED. 4 to 6 months. You have said that your view is that the Iraqi Government and Maliki are committed to do that. The $300 billion question is when? General ABIZAID. I think he is ready to do it now. Senator REED. What is holding him up, is he ready to do it now? General ABIZAID. I believe he has moved in a direction with na- tional police reform, which has been a major problem, with dis- missing officers that are showing sectarian values as opposed to national values, with committing the armed forces to independent operations that are necessary to quell the sectarian violence, in a 123 of responsibility are really the ambassador's, the DOS's, are they not? With the military as a supportive role, or are we confused about who is responsible? Ambassador SATTERFIELD. We are not confused at all, Senator. It is a joint mission. All of the key issues that you have raised, and they are all critical, have elements which reflect both our military input, and our civilian input, not just from DOS, but from other Government agencies represented. But we act in tandem. Our strategic plans are jointly developed. Our benchmarks and timelines—and we do have them—are jointly arranged and re- viewed and they are jointly executed. Senator SESSIONS. It is good that you are working well together. I hear that when I am in Iraq, both from the uniformed people and the people. But are you confident that the DOS, the Justice Depart- ment, the Commerce Department, the other Departments of this Federal Government, are contributing to this effort as their capa- bility exists sufficiently when compared to DOS and the military? Ambassador SATTERFIELD. Senator, this is a very important issue for the President and for Secretary Rice, and we are very pleased, particularly over the last 6 months, at the outpouring from other agencies apart from the DOS and the DOD to provide qualified ci- vilians to the fight in Iraq, including in those very dangerous, very exposed PRTs. Senator SESSIONS. With regard to an issue that I spent most of my professional career dealing with crime, both of you, I would like your comments. I have heard from a parent who I have confidence in that his son, a soldier there, that they are apprehending dan- gerous people that are being released far, far too quickly. When we re on my last trip to Iraq, we met with military people. They expressed great frustration that they are taking risks to ar- rest people and they are being released promptly. I believe it was Robert Kagan writing in Atlantic Monthly talked about Mosul and he met with the mayors in that whole r egion, and after the pleasantries ended the first thing they complained about was too many of the people that had been arrested being released from the prison. That was their number one complaint. tell you as someone who knows a little bit about the crime thing, people have to have some stability. You noted it in your comments, Mr. Ambassador. Some Iraqis have turned to armed militias and other extragovernmental groups to provide se- curity, while others have seized upon the security vacuum to pur- sue local power. I guess what I am saying to you is, are you confident that you have enough prison spaces, that we are adequately adjudicating those who are involved in these bad activities, and do you recognize the importance of that to creating a stable Iraq? Ambassador SATTERFIELD. Senator, there are two issues here that you allude to. The first is how we, the U.S. Government, the U.S. military, handle our own detention process in terms of re- leases, and we do have a high level of confidence in that process. But there is another area in which we do not have a similar level of confidence, and that is how Iraqis are proceeding to establish the rule of law, a transparent and effective judicial process. I will take 124 that to a very simple point. The Iraqi Government must establish consequences for bad actions, whether those actions are abuse of human rights or financial corruption, both of which sap the fabric of Iraqi society and the Iraqi state. Much more needs to be done. Now, we are helping. We have an aggressive program to provide physical capacity, physical infrastructure, prisons, corrections offi- cers. But that capacity is only as good as the judicial process that supports it on the Iraqi side. For a combination of reasons, includ- ing intimidation and threats, there are significant challenges ahead which we and the Iraqis need to continue to address. But I would like to follow up on an earlier comment you made and express particular appreciation to the Attorney General for the support that the Department of Justice has offered us in Iraq and in our PRTs. It is a very robust and an absolutely critical presence. Thank you very much. Senator SESSIONS. One of my assistant U.S. attorneys volun- teered from the Department of Justice and is over there today. But that is a critical element, is creating a system of law, and that in- cludes, sir, guilty people not being released. That is really a serious problem in this kind of culture. Chairman WARNER. Thank you, Senator. Before proceeding to Senator Bill Nelson, I will ask the indul- gence of the committee. [Whereupon, at 12:42 p.m., the hearing was recessed and the committee proceeded to other business, then reconvened at 12:45 p.m.] Chairman WARNER. Senator Bill Nelson. Senator BILL NELSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General Abizaid, I trust you. I must say that I come to this hear- ing with a great deal of skepticism because prior to this hearing there has been a great deal of obfuscation by the witnesses in front of this committee as to what the truth is, and I trust you, and you have been to me the most forthcoming witness as you have ap- peared in front of this committee over the course of time. Now, I want to pick up on what Senator Graham was asking you about in the stability and the degree of the number of forces that we need. I draw attention to an article yesterday in USA Today in which, talking about Anbar Province, where we have had 40 Amer- icans killed there in October. Marine General Zilmer says that he ugh troops to train Iraqis, but he does not have enough to defeat the insurgency. Then Marine General Neller says many po- lice in Anbar Province have not been paid for 3 months. Now, how do we reconcile that, if it is true, with your response to Senator Graham? General ABIZAID. First of all, Senator, it is true. I was out talking to General Zilmer and his commanders just 2 days ago, and there is a problem in Al Anbar Province and there is a big problem with pay getting to the police in Al Anbar Province, and it has to do with on the one hand, the immaturity of the Iraqi Government, and on the other hand, suspicions within the national police organiza- tion that people in the Sunni areas are in particular not being paid in order to advance a sectarian agenda. We have discussed this with the Minister of the Interior. He un- derstands what the problem is. They must be paid. But what those 125 officers said is a problem is in fact a problem. On the other hand- Senator BILL NELSON. The question is, our troop strength to get the job done, since this is a critical area for terrorism in the world. General ABIZAID. Al Anbar Province is critical, but more critical than Al Anbar Province is Baghdad. Baghdad is the main military effort. I told the marines when I was out there that the main effort is clearly Baghdad. They understand that. That is where our mili- tary resources will go. On the other hand, I would tell you that the al Qaeda activity, which is highest in Al Anbar Province, is being very robustly challenged by our Special Operations Forces and our Marine Forces and we are having what I would call very good suc- cess out there. Senator BILL NELSON. Both are critical. But the question is, be- cause I am asked this question all the time, do we need more troops or should we withdraw? I say I want to leave it to the com- manders, like General Abizaid. You have stated to Senator Graham do not need a change in the troops right now. But the commentary coming out of Anbar by General Zilmer and General Neller would indicate otherwise. General ABIZAID. I understand that. I have talked it over with those commanders out there. I think our main effort is where it has been designated, which is in the Baghdad area. It is where it needs to stay. I think that we have made progress in Baghdad. We are going to continue to make progress in Baghdad, and that we do need more troops and the more troops we need are Iraqis. The Iraqis understand that. They have increased the size of their armed forces. They have gone out to recruit more police. I believe that the 300,000-plus armed Iraqis, in addition to our current force strength, give us the opportunity to put the Iraqis in the lead, pro- vided the Government of Iraq will get behind their armed forces. I believe that is a good bet. Senator BILL NELSON. Okay. Let me ask you on the opposite side of the question, because I get this all the time: “We ouş draw; we ought to have a phased withdrawal.” Can you tell us in your professional military opinion what does that involve? You have to consider the tactical questions, you have to consider the logistical considerations. Clearly you just cannot pick up and walk out. You are talking about plans over some period of time under- standing that any kind of phased withdrawal depends on political, economic, and military conditions, what are the essential questions that you as a commander would need to have answered in order to set that timetable? General ABIZAID. Clearly, the number one question we need if someone were to say withdraw is when. You have to understand that moving 140,000 troops from combat positions out of the coun- try and then dealing with their withdrawal and all of the logistics apparatus that is entailed is a considerable endeavor. We would have to know what the policy conditions and con- straints are, what the rules of engagement would be during this pe- riod. It is an extremely complex and difficult operation. I would also tell you, Senator Nelson, just to make sure that we are completely communicating here, I did release the Marine Expe- ditionary Unit that is under my control to the marines in Al Anbar 126 Province and it has already started its deployment up in the area to help address some of General Zilmer's concerns, with General Casey's concurrence of course. Senator BILL NELSON. That is useful information. Chairman WARNER. Thank you very much, Senator. Senator BILL NELSON. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chairman WARNER. Senator McCain. Senator McCAIN. General Abizaid, is Al Anbar Province under control? General ABIZAID. Al Anbar Province is not under control, Sen- ator. Senator McCAIN. Yet we have enough troops to take care of the problem, which you say Baghdad is the primary area. Would it not make sense to say it might be well to get both Baghdad and Al Anbar Province under control before we have ano ner battle of Fallujah and lose many more lives because the insurgents have taken control of a good part of Al Anbar Province? General ABIZAID. Senator McCain, I believe that the marines have done an excellent job in securing the key areas of Al Anbar Province, Ramadi, and Fallujah. They are the three most decisive areas. I believe that you cannot have a main effort everywhere and that the preponderance of military activity needs to go into the Baghdad area. Senator MCCAIN. I do not understand that tactic, General. You just told Senator Graham that General Shinseki was right that we did not have enough troops there after the initial military oper- ation. Is that correct? General ABIZAID. I believe that more ISFs that were available would have made a big difference. I believe more international forces would have made a big difference. Senator MCCAIN. Would more American troops have made a dif- ference? General ABIZAID. I think you can look back and say that more American troops would have been advisable in the early stages of May, June, and July. Senator MCCAIN. Did you note that General Zinni, who opposed the invasion, now thinks that we should have more troops? Did you notice that General Battiste, who was opposed to the conduct of this conflict, says that we may need tens of thousands of additional troops? I do not understand, General, when you have a part of Iraq that is not under our control as Al Anbar Province is, I do not know how many American lives have been sacrificed in Al Anbar Province - but we still have enough and we will rely on the ability to train the Iraqi military, when the Iraqi army has not sent the requested number of battalions into Baghdad. General ABIZAID. Senator McCain, I met with every divisional commander, General Casey, the corps commander, and General Dempsey. We all talked together, and I said: “In your professional opinion, if we were to bring in more American troops now, does it add considerably to our ability to achieve success in Iraq?” They all said “no.” 130 I, frankly, while finding that I could not entirely believe their comments, always believed here in this committee that I could be- lieve and trust what you were saying and what other leading gen- erals were telling us. I find here—and again, I do not know whose accounts to believe, but I find here consistent contradictions of those upbeat statements and statements of agreement with in par- ticular the Secretary of Defense about these major decisions. It is being pursued here again today, the question of troop strength. Again and again, these books attest that you, sir, and the other military commanders, at least some of the others, believed that we needed more troops. I do not know what to believe, sir, when I hear these contradictions General ABIZAID. What you can believe is that when we evaluate what needs to be done on the battlefield, we make our rec- ommendations, we have our debate, we make our decisions, and then we move on. Senator DAYTON. But this commitment you made at the time of your confirmation says that you will express your personal views to this committee even if they disagree with the administration. I do not, in my view, believe, sir, that you or others have done that if these accounts are accurate. General ABIZAID. I have given you my best judgment. I stand by the record. I think the record is pretty clear. If you want to infer that the Woodward book is correct, feel free to do so. But I cannot say that it is. Chairman WARNER. Thank you very much, General, Senator DAYTON. Thank you very much, General. Chairman WARNER. I wish to be recorded on the record that I have been at every one of these hearings and have had the privi- lege to chair them. I think you have been very forthcoming, and I opened this hearing with a very pragmatic statement you made on August 3, which was heard not only throughout this country but around the world. Thank you very much. Senator Collins. Senator COLLINS. Thank you. Ambassador, in your testimony you noted that we need to move forward on three tracks—security, policy, and economics. The solu- tion in Iraq depends not just on a military approach, but on an eco- nomic and political success as well. In that regard, the lack of ade- quate Sunni participation in the political process and in the gov- erning bodies presents a major challenge to the long-term stability of Iraq. The power imbalance is particularly acute in Baghdad, where the mayor's office, the governor's office, and the provincial council are all entirely in Shiite hands. Now, one way to remedy that imbal- ance is through additional elections. Yet I am told that provincial elections, which might help to remedy that power imbalance, have once again been delayed. I believe they were supposed to have oc- curred in September of this year. They were then postponed to March of next year, and now I am told that they are being post- poned again until the fall of 2007. That delay effectively perpetuates the lack of power for the Sunni population. What are we doing to try to remedy the imbalance po- 131 litically, because we are never going to have a stable and peaceful democratic Iraq if the Sunnis feel that they are excluded. Ambassador SATTERFIELD. Senator, Iraq has had two extraor- dinary elections, the constitutional drafting process and the ref- erendum for the constitution, in which the overwhelming majority of Iraqis participated, including Sunnis. That was a major step for- ward. The council of representatives reflects, we think, in a fair and accurate fashion the balance of demographics within Iraq, and the reality is that in Iraq, as in many other states, demographics do shape the way voting patterns trend. But that does not diminish from the fact that at a provincial level, at a local level, including in Baghdad, there do need to be new free elections held with full Sunni participation. The Sunnis largely boycotted those initial elections. They have come in at the national level. They now need to come in at the provincial level. We want to see local elections take place as soon as possible and there has been no decision to postpone elections. There are several legislative steps and there are some organizational measures in which international organizations are involved and Iraqi non- governmental organizations are involved that need to be put in place. But we believe the government is committed to moving for- ward with provincial elections as rapidly as possible. Frankly, I would hope that could still take place early in the new year. Senator COLLINS. I certainly hope so. I think it is absolutely es- sential. General, are any of the Iraqi army battalions operating inde- pendently, without U.S. support, at this point? General ABIZAID. There are a large number of Iraqi battalions, 91 to be, in fact that are in the lead. But they have embedded U.S. training teams. Again, this is one of the key and important changes that we are recommending, that we make those teams more robust. Senator COLLINS. I know we are making progress and that obvi- ously has been the cornerstone of our strategy in Iraq, is to trans- fer security. I realize that there are additional army battalions every day that are taking the lead in operations, but are there any that are able to operate without support from the U.S., without em- bedded advisers, at this point? General ABIZAID. That would operate completely independently? Senator COLLINS. Right. General ABIZAID. No, we are not doing that at this time. Senator COLLINS. Do we have a timetable or a goal for having a significant number of Iraqi battalions operating without U.S. sup- port? The reason I am pressing you on this is obviously our ability to start withdrawing our troops in large numbers depends on the ability of Iraqi army troops to operate without significant support. General ABIZAID. We want to speed the transition. The transition ultimately is Iraqi units independently operating in the field under Iraqi command. But it requires more heavy weapons, more deployable types of equipment such as trucks, the ability to move around the battlefield, and more logistics. We need to speed this process. When we can arrive at the point where Iraqi forces under Iraqi command can operate without U.S. military transition teams, it is hard to really say where that will be, but it is some months away. 132 I think you will start to see some divisions very capable of inde- pendent operations, especially down in the south and up in the north, very soon. Chairman WARNER. Thank you very much, Senator. Senator COLLINS. Thank you, and thank you for your service. Chairman WARNER. For the information of colleagues, Senator Levin and I have conferred. The witness team before us has to ap- pear before the House, but we will hopefully have sufficient time for each member present now to ask their questions within a 5- minute timeframe. I thank the indulgence of the committee. Senator Lieberman. Senator LIEBERMAN. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. General and Ambassador, thanks for your service to our country. General, you said earlier that the status quo in Iraq is not accept- able. I think everyone agrees with that, and my hope is that we have a window of opportunity and really responsibility now, after the election to find a bipartisan consensus for being supportive of the efforts of our troops and our diplomats there to achieve success, because it is critical to our security to achieve success there, I be- lieve. You know that there has been a range of suggestions, from a con- gressionally-mandated forced withdrawal by a deadline, to what is now being described as phased redeployment, which I take it to be a general withdrawal but not a date yet by which it will happen, to the increasing of our troops there. I want to ask you a few ques- tions about some of those alternatives. If Congress ordered the beginning of a phased redeployment of American forces out of Iraq to occur within the next 4 to 6 months, what do you believe, General, would be the effect on the sectarian violence in Iraq? General ABIZAID. I believe it would increase. Senator LIEBERMAN. Why do you believe it would increase? ABIZAID. Because we are at this point right now where building capacity and confidence in the ISFs, along with building confidence in the Iraqi Government, needs to come together in order for them to be able to start taking the lead. It is very impor- tant that we keep our troop levels at the right level. Senator LIEBERMAN General ABIZAID. Despite discussions between Senator McCain and I, it is not that we are absolutely not considering force in- creases. We will, but it seems to me that the prudent course ahead is keep the troop levels about where they are, increase the number of forces that are with ISFs to make them better, more confident, and in conjunction with our colleagues on the diplomatic side move towards governance policies that will seek reconciliation. Senator LIEBERMAN. Understood. So most importantly, you have told me that if we began, if Congress ordered a phased redeploy- ment out of our troops in the next 4 to 6 months, sectarian violence would increase. If Congress ordered a phased redeployment of American troops out of Iraq in the next 4 months, what effect do you think that would have on the Maliki Government? Ambas- sador? Ambassador SATTERFIELD. Senator, it would be interpreted as a withdrawal of U.S. support. It would encourage even greater hedg- 133 ing behaviors by all actors in Iraq as they begin to negotiate for tion, and that would be in an unhelpful, not helpful, direction after the fact. Senator LIEBERMAN. I appreciate the answer. Some of those who are recommending a phased redeployment begin in the next 6 months I think have essentially given up on our effort in Iraq. But I think others quite sincerely believe that it may be the only way we can convince the Maliki Government and the ISFs that they have to take over. I take it by your answer that you profoundly disagree with that conclusion? Ambassador SATTERFIELD. Senator, the U.S. presence in Iraq, our activities there, whether civilian or military, are gauged against specific missions. Those missions reflect our best assess- ment of dynamics in Iraq and outside Iraq. Adjustments in either of our presences in Iraq of any kind up or down, or changing in missions, that is part of a concerted strategy that thinks through the knock-on consequences of what we do, is one thing and that is something we are committed to examining and reexamining. But a declaration that affects presence without linkage in a stra- tegic sense to consequences and other issues we believe would be harmful. Senator LIEBERMAN. I agree with both of you that a congres- sional mandate to begin a withdrawal from Iraq in a time certain would be a disaster for the Iraqis and more directly for the United States. Let me ask you the other part of the question, picking up on what Senator McCain and Senator Graham asked you. General, I want to ask you: You have said that the military transition teams, the Americans embedded with the ISFs, are probably having a very significant positive effect on those forces and that our forces em- bedded with the Iraqis should be, I believe you said in your initial testimony, significantly increased. How can we do that without in- creasing the overall number of American troops in Iraq? In other words, I fear that the only other way to do it is to pull our troops out of other danger areas, like Anbar Province, and then they will fall into more chaos. General ABIZAID. I cannot say for sure that we can do it without having to increase our overall troop levels. But I believe that there is a way to make the transition teams more robust from within the existing force structure inside Iraq. Senator LIEBERMAN. I hope that you will take a look and not hesitate to most directly ask the Commander in Chief to give you authority to send more troops in if you really feel that the embed- ding—and I do strongly feel—that the embedding is working best to enable the ISFs to take over. It may be that a short-term in- crease in our forces there embedded with them will be the best way for us to more quickly get to a point where we can actually draw down our forces. A final quick question, Chairman WARNER. Thank you, Senator. We are quite a bit over, and I appreciate that. Senator LIEBERMAN. I will save it. Chairman WARNER. Senator Thune. 135 Now, the other thing I would like to say, you have to understand that as we move towards more and more sovereignty in Iraq that the Iraqis have a view about more U.S. troops coming on their ter- ritory as well. I have asked them several times about how they would view a major increase in American troops in order to help with the security situation for a short period of time, and they are not very much in favor of that. They believe it undermines their gaining greater and greater authority and responsibility. Senator THUNE. Is it possible that in your efforts to establish the tability and to get rid of or stem the rising sectarian violence, that while this permanent professional and trained police force is being developed, have you explored the possibility of bringing in some trained police units that might be contributed on a temporary basis from other Arab Muslim countries in the region, like Jordan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, or some of the Gulf countries where you would be having primarily Shiite-manned units donate? General ABIZAID. Senator, I would defer that to Ambassador Satterfield, but I would tell you, Senator, that there have not been any real contributions in that regard from the neighboring states that have been forthcoming. Ambassador SATTERFIELD. Senator, Jordan hosts a training facil- ity which has proved vital to the efforts to build Iraqi forces. But in terms of direct contributions of Arab security forces, whether po- lice or other, I do not think that is a likely prospect, and it is not for any failure on our part to solicit. I do not think the willingness exists. Senator THUNE. So that has been asked. It seems like some of those countries, particularly neighboring countries, have a real stake in making sure that this transition occurs. Ambassador SATTERFIELD. That stake is unmistakable. They do and it is a very significant one. But as General Abizaid said, we have seen little if any willingness to provide the kind of direct sup- port, Senator, that you have referred to. Senator THUNE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. My time has expired. Chairman WARNER. Thank you very much. Senator Ben Nelson. Senator BEN NELSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General Abizaid, let me add my appreciation for your service. You are certainly in a period of time and an era that will be re- corded, so I appreciate what you are attempting to do. Mr. Ambas- sador, thank you. I have said for a long time that—and I think I am hearing this today—when people are asked are we winning the war, that the answer is: We cannot win the war. The Iraqis have to win their own war. I have been asked, can we help quell the sectarian vio- lence? The answer is: Perhaps provide support in that effort, but we do not even understand the 1,000 years-plus differences be- tween these two groups. So I agree with the embedding of military personnel, ours, in their military personnel. I agree, and I have heard it so many times that we are going to stand up their troops to stand down our troops. I understand the symmetry that goes with that and I think that is what you are saying, General Abizaid, perhaps better than I have. 136 But the continuing question will always be, how quickly are we moving, what is the progress, and what remains to be done. That is why I have been for 2 years asking if we can have conditions for staying, in other words measurable goals and outcomes that you can identify in advance and then measure success toward that. Is that similar to what we are hearing in terms of benchmarks? Because I wrote a letter last September to Secretary Rumsfeld to follow up on that hearing that we had at that time, to follow up on the joint U.S.-Iraqi committee being established to address issues that I and the other members have raised regarding ISFs reaching levels that allow them to address sectarian violence and the insurgency. I asked as well whether there are any metrics or measurements that might exist to demonstrate the number of per- sonnel and time required for Iraqis to secure and govern them- selves. I guess my question first is, what are our measurable goals? Is it standing up their troops? Is it weeding out the militias that are in the police force, forces around the country? Does that include also weeding out the militias and the sectarian differences in the military? If that is the case, then standing up and standing down is one phase of it, but the other phase is how soon can we weed out these elements that are obstructionist to the goals that we have? Ambassador SATTERFIELD. Senator, the critical elements of any set of goals and objectives and any timeline in Iraq today are on security, confronting sectarian violence, starting in Baghdad, con- fronting the growth of militias, starting in Baghdad, moving for- ward a political process that focuses on reconciliation and on con- sequences for gross abuses of human rights and financial crimes, growing Iraqi capacities on budgeting so they can use their re- sources to sustain themselves, and attracting foreign investment. Senator BEN NELSON. That is on the economic side- Ambassador SATTERFIELD. Those are the key goals. No, those are on political and security as well, Senator. As General Abizaid and I have both said, the timeline is a diminishing one. What is critical here is whether there is a national agenda or a sectarian agenda being pursued on sectarian, on governance, on economics, whether the government can move in enough time to preserve and exploit the convergence that we believe still exists between Sunnis and Shiite before that convergence diminishes to the point it cannot be Senator BEN NELSON. The coexistence, the policy of coexistence. Ambassador SATTERFIELD. Absolutely, Senator. Senator BEN NELSON. On a scale of 1 to 10, how certain are you that we are re going to be able to help them do that or are they going to be able to do that on their own? Ambassador SATTERFIELD. I am very certain we can help them do that. Senator BEN NELSON. Ten, nine? Ambassador SATTERFIELD. Very certain we can help, but the question is will they take the difficult decisions. We support Prime Minister Maliki. The President has made that very clear. We be- lieve he is a national leader, but leaders have to do more than sim- ply say the right things. They need to do the right things. 137 Senator BEN NELSON. We are trying to move away from a cycle of dependence and that is why I understand what is being said. Ambassador SATTERFIELD. Absolutely. Senator BEN NELSON. I agree with that. But also, I am concerned about what is required for independence in terms of standing up troops and getting the prime minister in a position where he can lead. On a scale of 1 to 10, what do you think the chances are that he is going to be able to lead? Ambassador SATTERFIELD. Senator, significantly more progress on each of the areas I described needs to be made by the Iraqis. Senator BEN NELSON. Thank you. Chairman WARNER. Thank you very much, Senator. Senator BEN NELSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chairman WARNER. Thank you. Senator Chambliss. Senator CHAMBLISS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. General Abizaid, no officer in the United States Army has faced a greater challenge than what you have before you today and what you have had for the last several months. You have not only done it professionally, in a professional way, you have done it in a very admirable way. We continue to be very impressed with the men and women who serve with you and serve under you. Let me see if I have this straight in my mind, though, General, when we talk about additional troops. I hear you saying that we do need additional troops if we are going to be able to control the sectarian violence, but that the number of troops that we need to add to the current level of force structure that we have there should come from the Iraqis rather than coming from the United States, and I can appreciate that. But if that is correct, if I am hearing you right, we have been at this for 4 years now and we were training raw recruits and we were training men and I assume some women in the Iraqi army who had no military experience. I have been there several different times and have seen those troops being trained and I have heard General Petraeus and General Dempsey talk about the fact that these people had never held a gun, they did not know how to shoot a gun. So certainly there has to be a timeframe which they have to go through to where they reach the ability to be able to fight and defend their country. But we have been at it 4 years now. We take kids straight out of high school, we train them for 6 months, a year, I am not sure what the time period is now, and we send them to Iraq and ask them to fight. So what have we got to do to get the Iraqi army over that hump, General, to get them to the point to where they can take control? Because obviously it has taken us a lot longer than what we thought. What do we have to do to get them over that military hump for them to start being able to defend themselves without us? General ABIZAID. First of all, Senator, I think that sometimes here in the United States we tend to believe that every Iraqi unit is not doing their duty. That is not true. Most Iraqi units are doing their duty. Most Iraqi units are going into the field and fighting for their country. No doubt that there are difficulties in some Iraqi units and in the national police there are more difficulties. 139 improving. In fact, the testimony to follow you, which will be in the next panel, particularly by Lieutenant General Maples from the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), very clearly sets out that the DIA assesses the conditions for further deterioration and in fact lists how the overall attacks have gone up. They are up on our soldiers, up on the ISFs, up on civilians. That the kind of benchmarks which Senator Nelson and Senator Chambliss and others of us have reported in the past just seem to recede further and further on the horizon. Hope is not a strategy. Hortatory talk about what the Iraqi Gov- ernment must do is getting old. I have heard over and over again, the government must do this, the Iraqi army must do that. Nobody disagrees with that. The brutal fact is it is not happening. With respect to the kind of insurgency that we clearly are con- fronting, which in many ways is perhaps the most complicated that I am certainly aware of as you go back and look at other counter- insurgencies, we do not have a military force that is creating a se- cure environment and we do not have a government that is putting forth political programs and reforms that engender confidence in the population to support the government rather than seeking se- curity behind militias and other nongovernmental forces.. So from the perspective of those of us sitting on the other side of the table and on both sides of the aisle, what I have heard today is that from General Abizaid that all options are on the table, but the Maliki Government does not want more troops. What I have also heard is that withdrawal by our troops would create even more disruption and sectarian violence, but that a phased redeployment putting conditions that can be enforced by actions taken by the American Government, which apparently are the only actions we have any control over, would not be a good idea. So we are really left with very few strategic options than the con- tinuation of hope on behalf of the Maliki Government to take con- trol of a situation that is deteriorating. General Abizaid, one of the ideas that has been proposed by a number of different sources is some kind of partition. Now, I under- stand the complexity of that, the difficulty of that. But is there any strategic argument to be made in favor of a partition that would at least give us territory that along with the Kurds, for example, could be controlled? That is the first question. Ambassador Satterfield, the political decisions that have to be made keep getting kicked down the road by the Maliki Govern- ment. We have had testimony now for 4 years about what must be done and it does not get done. I see very little indication that there has been a resolution within the Iraqi Government that they want the sectarian violence to cease because people are still jockeying for positions. In such a conflict it is unlikely to get to any political resolution until one or all sides decide that the killing should stop, that they are not going to get a greater advantage from pursuing violence than by pursuing political progress. So with respect to partition, with respect to the political bench- marks, can you offer us more than the hope that the Iraqi Govern- ment and the Iraqi army will step up to the task that confronts them, and give us perhaps more strategic benchmarks or conditions 140 that we can look to and set forth those conditions so that we can judge whether there is progress being made going forward? Ambassador SATTERFIELD. Senator, with respect to partition, I would like to be very clear on this. Partition in Iraq could only be achieved at an expense of human suffering and bloodshed and force dislocation that would be both profound and wholly unacceptable, I believe, to the American people. It is wholly unacceptable to this administration. The mixed communities of Iraq are found through- out the country. There is no easy map that can be drawn, no easy political decision that can be taken, that would not involve death and suffering to achieve partition. But more important than my views is that very few in Iraq wish to see partition as an outcome. Even the Kurdish leadership, who enjoy a federal status within Iraq, do not want to see partition. They view that as a threat to their interests because of the insta- bility that it would produce on their borders. This is simply not an option. It is not a practical option, it is not a moral option. ect to your comments, which I respect, on the need for some greater degree of certainty, not hope—and I agree with you, hope is not a strategy—on moving the political process forward, we still believe Prime Minister Maliki is capable of effectively being a national leader. We still believe there is a sufficient degree of mini- mal convergence on the critical issues of ending sectarian fighting, confronting militias, dealing with al Qaeda, to make our continued best assistance, best help, warranted. If that changes, then of course our basic assessment changes with it. But it continues to be our fundamental assumption. Senator CLINTON. General? General ABIZAID. Senator Clinton, I believe that partition is not viable for Iraq. I cannot imagine in particular how a Sunni state could survive. I believe it would devolve into an area where al Qaeda would have a safe haven, where they would export their ter- ror to the surrounding countries. I believe that the Shiite state would be decidedly subject to the domination of Iran, and that that would not be good for the region. It would start to move the region into Sunni-Shiite tensions that the region has not seen for a long time. With regard to hope not being a method, Senator, I agree with you, and I would also say that despair is not a method. When I come to Washington I feel despair. When I am in Iraq with my commanders, when I talk to our soldiers, when I talk to the Iraqi leadership, they are not despairing. They believe that they can move the country towards stability with our help, and I believe that. This has been a very hard and difficult process and over the length of time we have learned some hard lessons. We have not misled people. We have learned some hard lessons. I believe that we can take the Iraqi armed forces, increase our level of commit- ment to them, continue to deliver the type of security force that our current troop levels give us, and in the period of the next 6 months clearly have a better understanding about the possibilities for suc- cess. But all of us that are involved in this thing believe we can be successful. It is not a matter of professional pride. It is a matter 141 of seeing that the enemy cannot win. There will be some hard things on the horizon. They will have to do something in Al Anbar Province. We will have to commit forces to deal with the Jaysh al- Mahdi. Each of those things will be battles in and of themselves that we can win if we set the right political and military conditions, and I sincerely believe we can do that. Senator CLINTON. Thank you. Chairman WARNER. Thank you very much, Senator. Senator Kennedy. Senator KENNEDY. Thank you. Thank you very much, Ambassador, General Abizaid. Again, thank you for your service. As our chairman has pointed out, American troops have been battling there longer than they battled in World War II. They have shown extraordinary courage. They have done everything they have been asked to do. I think the real challenge is to try to honor their valor, is to get the policy correct. That is what you are all attempting here, recognizing the history and the current situation. General, I must say I was interested in your response about the progress that is being made immediately, because those who have talked about some phased redeployment immediately get accused of having either the words “cut and run” or a "bloodbath” associated with their names or with their positions on it. We have seen the United Nations reports that more than 6,500 Iraqis were killed in July and August, an increase of 1,000 over the number killed in the previous 2 months. As Senator Clinton point- ed out, General Maples this afternoon is going to talk about the overall attacks increase. The bottom on page 3 of his opening state- ment he talks about sectarian violence, a weak central government, problems in basic services are causing more Iraqis to turn to sec- tarian groups, militias, and insurgents for basic needs, imperiling Iraqi unity. The total number of Americans that are being killed or the cas- ualties: August. 65: September, 71; and October, 106. The CENTCOM report on civil conflict on October 18 shows the colors here, right on the border of chaos in Iraq. These are all your figures or the Pentagon's figures or U.N. figures, the Pentagon's own report. [The information referred to follows:] 142 The New York Times November 1, 2006 w w wwwwwwwwwwww Iraq: 1&W of Civil Conflict w 18 XXNNN E4* - Doa Key Reads: Political / religious leaders increase public hostile rhetoric Political / religious leaders lose moderating influence over constituents Provocative sectarian attacks / assassinations: Unorganized spontaneous mass civil conflict Additional Indicators: Index of Civil Comflict (Assessed) Militias expand security role Governance Police ineffectual Army ineffectual Neighbors enable violence Sectarian tensions / violence displace populace Sectarian conflicts between /within ISF forces U ISF refuse to take orders from central government, mass desertion D Kurdish accelerate moves toward secession / annexing Kirkuk Low level violence motivated by sectarian differences CHANGE SINCE ROUTINE RREGULAR LAST WEEK SIGNIFICANT CRITICAL Urban areas experiencing "ethnic cleansing" campaigns to consolidate control ... violence at all-time high, spreading geographically. Sarnar Last week Current w ww w wwwwwwwwwwwww United States Central Command A slide titled "Iraq: Indications and Warnings of Civil Conflict" lists factors that are destabilizing Iraq. Senator KENNEDY. So when we hear talk about some kind of a phased redeployment that we are going to have a bloodbath, many think there is a bloodbath going on today. Let me ask you specifically: There were the series of benchmarks which the administration had supported and the Maliki Govern- ment had indicated that they support. As a matter of fact, the Maliki Government indicated in their joint press release the Iraqi Government—this is the joint statement of Maliki and the U.S. Ambassador—the Iraqi Government has made clear the issues that must be resolved, with timelines, to take the positive steps for the Iraqi people. That is, sharing the wealth, disbanding the militias, continuing on, which you have outlined here. Why is it all right for the administration to say, we will take a timeline with regards to what you have to do here, we will take a 143 timeline on that, and then be so critical of others who say we also need to have a timeline in terms of the phased redeployment of American troops? Can you tell me that? Then maybe you could make a comment about what happened yesterday in a major city, where a series of automobiles go on down and into the education department, take out hundreds of different students, teachers, and then bring them back through the check- points. Now, how, when we are talking about the progress that is being made, let alone the difficulty of the American Forces of trying to stop violence against Sunnis and men being labeled sympathetic to the Shiites, or if they do not stop it to being labeled sympathetic to the Shiites, the Sunnis on the one hand or the Shiites on the other. What is really the basis of, in terms of all of these reports and the actions that have been taken, evidently timelines for the Maliki Government to take—why is it all right for them to take timelines for progress in this if you are not to say that these timelines are going to be enforced, or are they going to be enforced, and when they meet these timelines we are going to be able to have the kind of phased redeployment of American troops? General ABIZAID. Do you want to take the timeline? Ambassador SATTERFIELD. Senator, our comments here do not re- flect a necessary advocacy for or rejection of increases, decreases, timelines, or transition times. That is part of an overall strategy towards Iraq. It is a strategy that we are reviewing now. What we are saying is to review military force levels, force dispositions in isolation from other aspects that affect that strategic goal of sta- bility, self-sufficiency in Iraq, is mistaken. There needs to be a very careful look at how one addresses the military component, the political component inside and outside Iraq, to get more progress, because progress right now is not satis- factory, not at all, towards success. We do not want military levels or dispositions viewed in isolation, and to take a step in isolation would not I think have a positive impact on any of our goals or any of our interests in Iraq. General ABIZAID. As far as the incident yesterday, we have cer- tainly tried to understand what happened there. People arrived in the education ministry area dressed in ISF uniforms, police uni- forms, I believe. They said that they were there for an official pur- pose. They started to arrest people. I believe they took 70 out. Of course, that is of great concern, that people would impersonate na- tional security personnel and kidnap people. This has been a prob- lem that we have had now for several months. On the other hand, I would tell you that the reaction of the ISFs under the direction of the prime minister, the interior minister, and the defense minister was decisive, that people were released, that other people that participated in the crime were arrested, and that some of the key police commanders were dismissed. So again, what happened is not a good thing. The fact that the government responded in an appropriate manner I think is encouraging. Senator KENNEDY. Just before my time expires, General, is this the area that American troops had been withdrawn from as a re- sult of the request of Sadr? Are these checkpoints that were in the general area of where the school was? General ABIZAID. No, no, Senator. HE 144 Ambassador SATTERFIELD. Not at all. Senator KENNEDY. Were there any American troops in that re- gion, in that immediate area? General ABIZAID. There are American troops in the Karada area, but it is a big city. I cannot say that American troops were in the vicinity when that happened. If they were in the vicinity and peo- ple came in and they appeared to be legitimate ISFs, we may have asked the question, but it is hard to say what we would have been able to do. Chairman WARNER. Thank you very much, Senator. Senator Talent, and to be followed by Senator Akaka and then Senator Bayh and then the hearing will be concluded. Senator TALENT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will be brief. I wanted to go into the question of embeds with General and I know it has come up in the hearings. Are we embedding at platoon and company levels? If not, do you have plans along those lines? It seems to me that this is where they may be the most effec- tive. How soon can we get them into the Iraqi army at those levels? General ABIZAID. The embedding teams that we have in the bat- talion level I think is about 10 to 15 personnel each, and the idea is to increase the size of those forces. Again, I cannot tell you ex- W it would be done because the staffs are working on that. But the idea is to get down as far as we can. I would not want to say what the size of units that might be that would go, or embeds might be, that go into the company and the platoon level. But clearly we need to have more ability to help with much more robust teams, and I think making the teams at the bat- talion level bigger will certainly be able to get down into the com- pany level at least. Senator TALENT. So there are plans definitely as you increase the size or the number of embeds at battalion level to reach down into the company levels? General ABIZAID. In some areas, especially in the Marine Corps areas, they are working at the company level, through the battalion level, as I understand it. Senator TALENT. I just think this is a battle of, in a sense, non- commissioned officers, and the lower we can get them into the Iraqi force structure the more effective they are quite likely to be. Do you agree with that in general? General ABIZAID. I agree with that absolutely, as do our com- manders in the field. Senator TALENT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chairman WARNER. Thank you, Senator Talent. Senator Akaka. Senator AKAKA. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. General and Ambassador, thank you for being here. General, I want to express my pride in our Armed Forces and what they are doing in Iraq and other places in the world as well. We have just completed last weekend ceremonies and memorials for our veterans as well as for those who are in active service in our country, and I am very proud of our leadership and what they are doing. There are some things that have been mentioned here by you, that we put the pressure on the Iraqi people to govern themselves. Let me ask, Mr. Ambassador, General Abizaid testified that we 145 need to get Iraqi troops to do more and instead of putting in more of our U.S. troops, and by doing that we would encourage the Iraqi troops as well as their government to stand up to what they are facing there. We have been talking about the military. Ambassador. I am look- ing at the civilian side of this. Should we be cutting back on our aid and assistance programs there? As was mentioned, there are several tracks there. Besides security and political, there is also economic. My question also includes what are we doing there now in these other than military areas? Rather than U.S. officials, U.S. contractors, and U.S. money doing the work of the Iraqi Govern- ment, should we not stand down and have them stand up to it? How do we get the Iraqi Government to do their job? That is my question. Let me just say, for example, Senator Sessions described a catch-and-release justice system that has become a swinging door for death squads. So my question to you is how do we get the Iraqi Government to do their job? Ambassador SATTERFIELD. Senator, your questions on the eco- nomic side are very well-taken, and the whole thrust of our policy in terms of how our money is spent, what we are doing with our projects over the past 17 months, has been precisely to put Iraqis in the lead and to shift away from U.S. contractors to Iraqi contrac- tors, something we have done at a very dramatic pace.. It is to build capacity, not buildings, in Iraq. It is to give the Iraqis the tools that they will need to lead themselves in terms of economic development and delivery of essential services. This is ex- actly the line on which we will continue. As we look at capacity development, we do assess what you raise and what the General has raised on the military side: Are you fos- tering a culture of dependency or are you building self-sufficiency? We try to tailor our programs and constantly readjust what we are doing to avoid dependency and to build the capacity and self-suffi- ciency on the part of the Iraqis, because they must assume the lead in terms of caring for their own people and addressing their own national lead. On your general question, how do we get the government to lead, it is a combination of putting them in the lead, if you will, taking off the wheels, letting them make decisions. When Prime Minister Maliki asserts a desire to have greater lead, when he takes deci- sions, as he did with respect to the checkpoints around Sadr City, that is positive because he is taking decisions and the responsi- bility for those decisions. Will all of them be decisions we would have taken? No, that is not the case. We will disagree with some of them. But as long as they move broadly in the direction of national unity, of confronting violence, of prosecuting the war on terror, those are decisions which Iraqis should take and we should encour- age them to continue to make. That is a positive development. work with Iraqi leaders to allow them to take the lead in a constructive sense that we are both about here and our own strategy has to be focused on in the time ahead. Sen ator AKAKA. General Abizaid, I have been concerned about the people, about the Shiites and the Sunnis who believe that we are not providing adequate security. My question to you is what 146 steps are we taking to ensure the Iraqi people feel that they are receiving fair and impartial treatment? How are we going to curb sectarian violence if the Sunnis and Shiites do not believe we are working adequately to address this matter? General ABIZAID. Senator, I believe the key to success in Iraq is to make a nonsectarian armed forces that is loyal to the central government, that is effective on the battlefield, and that supplants the militias. That is the key to moving Iraq forward. A government of national unity plus an armed forces that respects the rights of its people and represents all of its people will stabilize Iraq. Chairman WARNER. Thank you very much. General ABIZAID. I believe they can do that with our help. Chairman WARNER. Thank you very much, Senator. Senator Bayh. Senator BAYH. Gentlemen, thank you for your presence today and thank you for your service to our country. There are strong dif- ferences of opinion about what to do with Iraq, but no one ques- tions your sincerity or your service to the country. I just want to say that up front. General, my first question is for you. You mentioned that you agree with something that the President has said from time to time, that Iraq is the central front in the war on terror. You ref- erenced something that he also says from time to time, that our ad- versaries say that it is the central front in the war on terror, there- fore it must be so. Is it not possible that our adversaries define it as the central front in the war on terror because that serves their interests, not ours? Is it not possible that al Qaeda defines it as the central front because they know our expenditure of resources there detracts from our ability to stabilize Afghanistan and that the Iranians know we cannot serve as a robust enough deterrent to them as long as we are in presence the way we are in Iraq? So my question, General, and I must say I am a little troubled by the fact that we let our adversaries define what is in the na- tional security interest of the United States, is that not a dan- gerous place to be? General ABIZAID. Senator, when you look at the broader fight, the fight against al Qaeda, which is not just a fight in the CENTCOM AORs, it is a fight that is global, but where you see where the most military activity takes place, where the most sui- cide bombers are fielded, where the most al Qaeda troops are fight- ing, it is clearly inside Iraq where the most foreign fighters flow to. It is inside Iraq. So in the fight against al Qaeda, our number one battlefield is inside Iraq. Senator BAYH. But my question is why are we letting them de- fine the battlefield for us? Might it not be in their interest to have us there, but not in ours? General ABIZAID. The enemy, al Qaeda will fight us wherever we are. If we are in Iraq they will fight us in Iraq. If we are in Afghan- istan they will fight us in Afghanistan. If we are in the United States they will fight us in the United States. That is what they intend to do, and our intention is to keep them from fighting us in the United States. 147 Senator BAYH. My second question, gentlemen, and it is for both of you, but General, I will start with you again. I think, General, you indicated you are optimistic about our ability to stabilize Iraq, and I think you had, Ambassador, some faith that we could accom- plish that objective. Let me ask you both, and it was following some of your answers: What would it take—what would shake your faith and optimism? What would make you pessimistic about our chances? General ABIZAID. Certainly what would make me very pessi- mistic is if the Government of Iraq fails to disarm the illegal mili- tias. That would be my number one concern. Senator BAYH. Let me follow up on that, General. The last time you were before the committee you indicated, and I think you indi- cated again today, that what is driving the insurgency are unre- solved political disputes among Iraqis in large part. We have some outsiders to be sure, but that really it is for Iraqis to get a hold of this situation.. We just had an election in our country in which the American people expressed less than total confidence in the effectiveness of our own Government. We look at the functioning of the Govern- ment in Iraq and I have to tell you that too often they appear to be operating as members of their tribe or their sect or their ethnic group first, rather than as Iraqis first. They say the right things, but when the going gets tough and they have to make the hard decisions, they retreat into their corner and they are just not able to find that common ground. I find that troubling. Why should we have confidence in their ability to rec- oncile those differences in the face of their behavior? Ambassador SATTERFIELD. Senator, you pose a very good ques- tion, and there are key indicators on the negative. The abandon- ment of any efforts to construct a national dialogue, the pursuit of exclusively sectarian agenda by Shiite and by Sunnis, the rejection of our assistance and our presence as no longer relevant to those sectarian agendas or contradictory to those sectarian agendas, all of which would be marked by a continued rise in militia presence, a continued rise in sectarian violence and force displacement, that would indicate that indeed hope for success had largely vanished. But we do not see ourselves at that point. More importantly, we do not see Iraqi leaders at that point today. But the critical chal- lenge we all face, the Iraqis who are committed to a moderate out- come and us, is that the space that still exists, the political space for convergence, for reconciliation, be acted upon before it vanishes. Senator BAYH. My final question, gentlemen, would be simply this. We all want them to succeed. We all want them to be able to stabilize their country, with the assistance that we have pro- vided them. Too often they seem unable or unwilling to do that my question to both of you, and my time has expired, is: Is there anything else we can do to move them in the direction of making the hard decisions that only they can make? Ambassador SATTERFIELD. Senator, the President has asked for a review by all national security agencies of exactly what the chal- lenges are, how best using our resources and assets, current or po- tential, in Iraq, outside Iraq, how the region factors in, how we can best move forward toward success. It is exactly the question you 148 pose, how best can we get the kind of progress in the areas where progress is needed now in Iraq, and on a timeline that is relevant and meaningful to what is happening in that country. Senator BAYH. My final observation, it is a question that is just hanging in the air. With all of our assistance, all of our blood and treasure and sacrifice there, at some point we have to ask our- selves the question: do they have it in them to forge one country in a common destiny or is that beyond their capabilities? . General ABIZAID. Let me answer that. I have been dealing with the Iraqis for a long time. Yes, they have it in them. They can forge one country. They are fighting and dying for their country. They can overcome these problems. But it is not an easy thing to do, just like it was not an easy thing for us to forge our own destiny after the revolution. We had a lot of fighting and a lot of difficult times ahead of us after that period. Iraq is a young country. It is a country that is different from any other country in the Middle East and it is a country that can make à difference in the Middle East. I believe that we must stick with them until such time that they show us that they cannot do it. As far as those of us that have been fighting—and I do not in- clude myself; I include the commanders and troops in the field- those among us who fight bet on the Iraqis, and as long as they are confident, I am confident. Chairman WARNER. Thank you very much, Senator. Senator BAYH. Thank you for service, gentlemen. Chairman WARNER. Thank you, General Abizaid, for that con- cluding comment. I think that summarizes very well your own pro- fessional and personal feelings, and you have devoted much of your life to hoping that this conflict can be resolved along the lines that you so stated. Thank you again for excellent testimony. Ambassador Satterfield, this was your first appearance before this committee. I believe your outation as a man who will testify straight and to the point and precise will be known by many committees and you will be inun- dated with invitations. You have done a wonderful job. Thank you very much. Ambassador SATTERFIELD. Thank you. Senator BAYH. To his great misfortune, Mr. Chairman. [Laugh- ter.] Chairman WARNER. Yes. General ABIZAID. Mr. Chairman, may I just say one word? Chairman WARNER. Yes. General ABIZAID. Thank you, sir. I know you are stepping down as the chairman. Those of us that have served with you, God bless you for your service to the Nation. Thank you, sir. Chairman WARNER. I thank you very much, General. We are ad- journed. [Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:] QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JOHN MCCAIN TROOP LEVELS IN IRAQ 1. Senator McCAIN. General Abizaid and Ambassador Satterfield, in a November 15, 2006, New York Times article, General Anthony C. Zinni, USMC (Ret.), former head of U.S. Central Command, argued that any substantial reduction of American TO 149 forces in Iraq over the next several months would be more likely to accelerate the slide to civil war than stop it. Speaking of Iraqi Prime Minister Maliki, General Zinni said, "You can't put pressure on a wounded guy. There is a premise that the Iraqis are not doing enough now, that there is a capability that they have not em- ployed or used. I am not so sure they are capable of stopping sectarian violence.” Instead of taking troops out, General Zinni said it would make more sense to con- sider deploying additional American forces over the next 6 months to “regain mo- mentum" as part of a broader effort to stabilize Iraq that would create more jobs, foster political reconciliation, and develop more effective Iraqi security forces (IŠFs). Do you agree that a substantial reduction of American forces over the next several months would be ineffective in pressuring the Iraqi Government to “do more" and may even be counterproductive? Please explain. General ABIZAID. I agree that a substantial reduction of American forces would be ineffective in pressuring the Iraqi Government to do more and would be counter- productive. The current troop levels are needed for controlling the sectarian violence and applying the resources required to accelerate ISF capacity and capability for taking the lead in security operations. ISFs are continuing to make significant im- provement, but more training, equipping, and reforming parts of those forces are still required. Iraqi leaders are actively seeking more control, and as conditions are met, we are transferring more security responsibilities to them. In time, the Iraqis loyal to the national government will demonstrate the ability to conduct inde- pendent operations. However, more security responsibility for ISFs will only work if there is commitment to use of these forces as instruments for national unity. Ambassador SATTERFIELD. The Department of State (DOS) defers to the Depart- ment of Defense (DOD) on troop levels. At the same time, the President laid out a revised military approach when he addressed the Nation on January 10 and an- nounced his new strategy, 'The New War Forward,' in Iraq. U.S. force strength ad- justments continue to be made in support of ISFs with the aim of assisting the Iraqi people in gaining control of the security situation. However, a change in military force strength will not reduce violence by itself. Stabilization of Iraq also requires political and economic solution that includes action by Iraq's political, religious, business, and civic leaders. We will continue to work closely with and support Prime Minister Maliki and the Iraqi Government particularly to foster political reconcili- ation. cauri Kuels the violenese increases with sectarian violencell. Additiot hmined increasmately.comce, and munal troops 2. Senator MCCAIN. General Abizaid and Ambassador Satterfield, do you agree that we should deploy additional forces as one component of a broader effort to sta- bilize Iraq? Please explain. General ABIZAID. I have stated that all options are on the table subject to condi- tions and requirements that may develop. We will do whatever is required to sta- bilize the situation in Iraq, but temporarily surging American forces to decrease sec- tarian violence will not provide a sustainable effect by itself, and may have a longer range negative impact if conducted unilaterally rather than as part of an overall, integrated effort that includes economic and governance enhancements. Based on discussions with my commanders in Iraq, additional American forces, by them- selves, would increase Iraqi dependence, shift the focus away from transitioning se- curity responsibility, and fail to solve the broader issues of extremism which actu- ally fuels the violence. A sustained increase in force levels is required for stabiliza- tion in Iraq; but these increases must ultimately come in the form of ISFs that can defeat the insurgency and deal with sectarian violence, and must also be matched with efforts from nonkinetic means of support as well. Additional troops, if sent, should reinforce success of the Iraqi army by providing operational training and mentorship through the employment of transition teams. A strong, nonsectarian Iraqi army will provide the foundation for success by ultimately defeating the insur- gency and extremists, stabilizing the country, and allowing the Iraqi Government to embrace meaningful national reconciliation. Ambassador SATTERFIELD. Military efforts, while a critical part of the solution, will not by themselves reduce violence. Stabilization of Iraq also requires a political and economic solutions that include Iraqi political, religious, business, and civic leaders. U.S. force strength adjustments and employment decisions continue to be made in support of ISFs to ultimately assist the Iraqi people in gaining control of the security situation. The President laid out a revised military approach when he addressed the Nation on January 10 and announced his new strategy, "The New War Forward,' in Iraq. The DOS defers to the DOD on troop levels. 3. Senator MCCAIN. General Abizaid and Ambassador Satterfield, there are many who believe that we face a number of tasks in Iraq: to clear insurgent sanctuaries and hold the territory with a combination of coalition and Iraqi forces; to provide 150 lizeir taskectariansire to me sufficient security in Iraq so that economic reconstruction and political activity can take place; to arrest the momentum of sectarian death squads; to disarm militias; to train the Iraqi army and keep an American presence in Iraqi units; and to place U.S. personnel in Iraqi police units. Do you agree that we need to do these things? Please explain. Do you believe that we have, today, sufficient force levels in order to accomplish all these tasks? Please explain. General ABIZAID. These tasks certainly need to be accomplished in Iraq, but not necessarily completed exclusively by the United States or our coalition partners. For example, a key task for the Iraqi leadership and their security forces is taking on the militias and death squads. In the last 3 or 4 months the Prime Minister, and his ministers, in particular the Minister of Defense and the new Minister of Interior, have shown a desire to move against the militias, death squads, and extremists that foment sectarian violence. They know dealing with illegal armed groups is largely their task, and that sectarian violence can be fatal to Iraq if it's not checked. Stabi- lizing Iraq will continue to require Iraqi sacrifice, courage, and responsibility, along with the support of the United States and our allies. As I have stated, this very well may require more troops, but they must ultimately be ISFs to have a lasting impact. We now have trained and equipped over 325,000 Iraqi soldiers and police; and at the Prime Minister's request we are adding an additional 37,000 personnel so as to ultimately exceed 362,000 members in the ISFs. The increasing number of per- sonnel is critical to the Government of Iraq's plan for self security. In addition, the quality of their forces is also constantly improving. Over recent weeks, we have wit- nessed substantial improvement in ISF responsiveness, command and control, and ability to address unlawful activity. Still, the government must get behind its army and give it confidence that it can operate independently of a sectarian agenda. Again, all options remain on the table. Sending more American troops into Iraq to help stabilize the situation and to embed transition teams in Iraqi units to help build organizational capacity is a possibility. In doing so, we would accept the risk of delaying full transition to Iraqi security control at a point in the campaign where Iraqis increasingly in the lead is both desired and necessary. Ambassador SATTERFIELD. The DOS defers to the DOD on troop levels. However, all of the actions mentioned above constitute elements of U.S. strategy and tactics in Iraq. An oft overlooked issue with regards to troops in Iraq is how to calibrate all elements of national power and resources over time to enact the various political, economic, and security related tasks. Each track is inextricably linked to the other. While all move forward together, a failure or setback in any one area could hinder progress in the others. This is why the President announced an increase of not only troops, but also civilian Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) in his “new way forward." TROOP WITHDRAWAL IN IRAQ 4. Senator MCCAIN. General Abizaid and Ambassador Satterfield, some members of the Senate have proposed what they refer to not as a withdrawal of American forces from Iraq, but rather what they call a “redeployment” or an “over-the-horizon force” that would, in their minds, continue to exert military influence on Iraq after withdrawal from much of the country. The idea seems to be that U.S. forces would remain on bases in Iraqi Kurdistan, Kuwait, or elsewhere in the region and support the Iraqis with “rapid reaction forces.” I'd like to ask several questions about the wisdom of such a proposal. How could we supply a huge forward operating base in the Kurdish region if we abandon all of Iraq to the south? Would the Turks be likely to allow us to supply it from their territory or would we be forced to fly in all required supplies? General ABIZAID. [Deleted.] Ambassador SATTERFIELD. DOS defers to the DOD. 5. Senator McCAIN. General Abizaid and Ambassador Satterfield, if a quick reac- tion force is based in Kuwait, how would the forces get to Iraq when needed after all, it is a several days drive by military convoy from Kuwait to Baghdad. Would progress not be arrested by improvised explosive devices (IED) and a lack of any ground-level intelligence from U.S. forces? Please explain. General ABIZAID. [Deleted.] Ambassador SATTERFIELD. DOS defers to the DOD. 6. Senator McCAIN. General Abizaid and Ambassador Satterfield, if a force based in Kuwait or Kurdistan instead flies to engage in combat in Iraq, would it not need 153 measures needed to make a buyout program a realistic or sustainable option to limit opium production. There are no shortcuts to fighting opium production in Afghanistan. Both econom- ics and the practicality of such systems in Afghanistan argue against proposals to license or buyout Afghanistan's opium poppy crop. Based on many years of experi- ence in other nations and an appreciation for Afghanistan's historical and cultural context, the U.S. Government supports a mix of deterrence, prevention, and alter- natives in order to bring this problem under control and allow rule of law to flour- ish. The Government of Afghanistan itself strongly opposes the legalization of opium poppy as does the INCB and U.S. Government. QUESTION SUBMITTED BY SENATOR LINDSEY GRAHAM TROOP LEVELS 9. Senator GRAHAM. General Abizaid, in your testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee you indicated that we could not increase troop levels in a mean- ingful way in Iraq and be able to sustain that force for any length of time given the size of our own forces. Please quantify with specifics the increase we would we need in the Army and Marine Corps in order to increase U.S. military forces in the Iraq theater and be able to sustain that force (assuming rotations continue on the current timetable). General ABIZAID. If the commanders in the field believe that they need more troops, then they will recommend both the size and type of force necessary. If such an increase exceeds the existing force structure, then it is the Services' responsi- bility in their role as force providers to determine what, if any, force structure in- creases are required. zations in evide funding in Iraq, the contribution, and they deos are on QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR EDWARD M. KENNEDY NONGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS 10. Senator KENNEDY. Ambassador Satterfield, American NGOs are on the front lines in Iraq promoting and supporting democracy, and they deserve full support of this country. Despite their significant contribution and the enormous risks their em- ployees take by working in Iraq, the administration has made no long-term commit- ment to provide funding for their work in Iraq. Is there a plan to fund these organi- zations in the long-term? Don't they deserve a commitment from our Government that is matched by adequate resources? Ambassador SATTERFIELD. Building democracy in Iraq, the Middle East, and the world at large has been one of the main goals of this administration. The Depart- ment has funded a wide range of democracy programs, and we recognize the signifi- cant contributions and enormous risks these groups and their employees take by working in Iraq. In particular, however, program costs in Iraq, including program costs for democracy building, have changed overtime, especially as the need for secu- rity has changed. This has caused a number of companies and organizations, both for-profit and not-for-profit, to reallocate funds for security expenses, reducing the amount they have been able to spend on other parts of their programs. The Depart- ment will continue to work with the organizations involved in promoting democracy, and our other contractors and grantees, to ensure that essential U.S. Government policy objectives are met. wanae amenne risks these groups and their employee nt contin Iraq. In puilding, haved ha number des for security programing democracyt 5 and enorlar. however, provertime, especial and organiza ducing the IRAQI REFUGEES 11. Senator KENNEDY. Ambassador Satterfield, the war in Iraq has created hun- dreds of thousands of refugees who, virtually unknown to the rest of the world, are seeking sanctuary in Syria, Iran, Lebanon, Jordan, and other neighboring countries. More than 3 million Iraqis are refugees in neighboring countries or are internally displaced. One thousand are being forcibly displaced each day and an estimated 40,000 are leaving Iraq each month and hundreds of thousands of others are tee- tering on the edge of displacement. It is likely that neighboring governments such as Jordan and Syria will increasingly restrict Iraqi refugees' ability to enter, stay, and gain access to social services. Iraqis are being forced to leave their communities because of threats, assassina- tions, kidnappings, armed conflict, forced displacement, and generalized violence driven by sectarian agendas. Countless other Iraqis fear persecution because of their political views, ethnic affiliation, or affiliation with the United States. 154 The President's report to Congress on proposed refugee admissions for fiscal year 2007 indicates that the U.S. program is once again open to receiving new referrals of vulnerable Iraqi cases from the United Nations Higher Commissioner for Refu- gees. The President's proposed regional ceiling for refugees from the Near East and South Asia (primarily vulnerable Iraqis, Afghans, and Iranian religious and ethnic minorities) is 5,500. In fiscal year 2006, the United States admitted only 202 Iraqi refugees for resettlement. I believe the United States has a duty to assist Iraqi refugees who can't return home, particularly the ones who are facing persecution because of their affiliation with the United States. What efforts has the administration made to convince Jor- dan, Syria, and other countries to keep their borders open to Iraqi refugees? Ambassador SATTERFIELD. The United States is very concerned about the situa- tion facing Iraqi refugees and we are working to ensure that their assistance and protection needs are addressed appropriately. We recognize how very important it is for neighboring countries to keep their borders open to Iraqi refugees, and we be- lieve the best way to ensure this is by providing humanitarian assistance through our international partners to Iraqis both inside and outside Iraq. The United States is assisting Iraqis who, at present, are unable to voluntarily return to Iraq. We fund United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and NGO programs for the most vulnerable Iraqis in Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon and because needs are increasing, we hope to expand these programs in 2007 if we receive additional fund- ing. We have accepted 466 vulnerable Iraqi refugees into the U.S. resettlement pro- gram since fiscal year 2004 and are expanding our capability. These protection and assistance programs are designed to serve all Iraqis facing a well-founded fear of persecution. Refugees who have worked with the United States will have equal ac- cess to protection and assistance in the region. We are working to obtain signifi- cantly greater access for those who face persecution because of their work for us to the U.S. resettlement program and to immigration into the United States. Both Jordan and Syria have been generous hosts of Iraqis. We are working with these governments and UNHCR to relieve some of the humanitarian burden and help these countries keep their borders open to asylum seekers. 12. Senator KENNEDY. Ambassador Satterfield, does the DOS plan to increase as- sistance to neighboring countries burdened with the high number of Iraqi refugees? Ambassador SATTERFIELD. The United States is very concerned about the situa- tion facing Iraq refugees and we are working with our international partners such as UNHCR and several NGOs, as well as host governments, to ensure that their assistance and protection needs are addressed appropriately. The DOS indeed hopes to increase assistance to host countries neighboring Iraq. We recognize the increasing demands vulnerable Iraqis are placing on host coun- tries. We want to ensure that Iraqis do not overburden the public services of neigh- boring countries by increasing humanitarian assistance so that these countries can continue to offer refuge to Iraqi asylum seekers. We hope to generously respond to UNHCR's 2007 appeal to significantly expand their protection and assistance activi- ties for Iraqi refugees in Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, Egypt, and Turkey. We also plan to expand existing NGO programs that identify and assist the most vulnerable refu- gees in Jordan and Syria as well as IDPs in Iraq if we receive additional funding. 13. Senator KENNEDY. Ambassador Satterfield, how can the United States better assist Iraqis displaced internally to obtain adequate food and shelter and other hu- manitarian needs? Ambassador SATTERFIELD. We are assisting many internally displaced persons through U.S. Government funded programs that deliver humanitarian aid to the most vulnerable families and individuals. Many of the newly displaced inside Iraq have joined extended families, and we want to ensure that they can successfully in- tegrate into their host communities until they can return to their homes. For this reason, we also consider it a priority to look beyond immediate relief commodities to ensure that water, sanitation, health, and education services in hosting commu- nities are not overburdened. Our programs are designed in such a way that we can quickly respond to emerging needs as they arise. 14. Senator KENNEDY. Ambassador Satterfield, given the human suffering caused by this massive Iraqi refugee crisis, isn't it just and proper that the United States dramatically increase the number of Iraqis it takes in for resettlement drawing on all priority categories? Ambassador SATTERFIELD. The United States Refugee Admissions Program (USRP) is committed to considering for resettlement all Iraqi refugees referred to us, either as individuals or in groups, by UNHCR. Our embassies may also refer 155 an Iraqi case for consideration. In addition, Iraqis with close family members in the United States may be eligible for the USRP family reunification program. To ad- dress growing assistance and resettlement needs among Iraqi refugees, we fund UNHCR's general budget for the near east region, and provide extra targeted funds specifically to support resettlement activities in the region. These funds will help address humanitarian assistance needs of this growing population and will boost UNHCR's capacity to register and refer to us and other countries vulnerable Iraqi cases in need of third country resettlement. 15. Senator KENNEDY. Ambassador Satterfield, can't you draw on the 20,000 unallocated reserve to increase the 5,100 target for the near east and south Asia? Ambassador SATTERFIELD. Yes. There is no specific limit on how many Iraqis can be included in the program. The current Presidential Determination on Refugee Ad- missions in fiscal year 2007 permits the admission of 70,000 refugees allocated by regions with 5,500 for the near east and south Asia. The 5,500 was developed as a planning figure for the region. If necessary, and if sufficient funding is available, we can draw on the unallocated reserve numbers. QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR DANIEL K. AKAKA TROOP LEVELS IN IRAQ 16. Senator AKAKA. General Abizaid and Ambassador Satterfield, Secretary Rumsfeld has indicated that more U.S. forces will be needed to provide security in Iraq. At this point in time, how can more troops best be utilized to contain the esca- lation of attacks by insurgents? General ABIZAID. [Deleted.] Ambassador SATTERFIELD. The DOS defers to the DOD on troop levels and on the military aspects of the President's new strategy, “The New Way Forward” in Iraq. However, together with the additional troops will be increased civilian efforts to support moderates and improve the performance of government at the national, pro- vincial, and local levels, thereby weakening the extremists. Iraq. Specific questions this plan should be addressed to the DOD. 17. Senator AKAKA. General Abizaid and Ambassador Satterfield, is or will the Iraqi Government assist in this effort or are they preventing U.S. military forces from truly getting the violence under control? For example, the U.S. forces were told to remove check points in Sadr City by Prime Minister Maliki. General ABIZAID. I believe the Iraqi Government and Prime Minister Maliki are committed to bringing down the level of violence. I believe Prime Minister Maliki has moved in a direction with national police reform, which has been a major prob- lem, with dismissing officers that are showing sectarian values as opposed to na- tional values, with committing the armed forces to independent operations that are necessary to quell the sectarian violence, in a way that leads me to believe he is going to continue to doing more. In the past 6 weeks we have had increasing success with joint Iraqi-U.S. forces moving into Sadr City, precisely targeting death cells and death squad leadership and taking them out. I believe this will also continue. Ambassador SATTERFIELD. Solutions to the growing violence in Iraq must be the result of concerted decisions by the Iraqi political leadership and ISFs. Prime Min- ister Maliki has repeatedly stated his desire for increased control over ISFs. As the Iraqi Government assumes more security responsibility, operational decisions will be made by the sovereign leaders that may not be the best course of action from a U.S. perspective. Prime Minister Maliki's decision regarding Sadr City check points clearly indi- cates his desire to take action. The President laid out a revised military approach when he addressed the Nation on January 10 and announced his new strategy, 'The New War Forward,' in Iraq. The President has made it clear that America's commit- ment is not open-ended and will hold the Iraqis to clear security, political, and eco- nomic benchmarks and milestones. be the best rational"desks. Astia EMERGENCY HOTLINE 18. Senator AKAKA. General Abizaid and Ambassador Satterfield, it is my under- standing that there are some Iraqis that believe we are to blame not only for the attacks but also for planting IEDs at night while we impose curfews. What efforts are underway to better our standing within various communities, especially since 157 the ne Iraqi conle tips rece medence leveles. This increase jihistry of Interiobete 2006, this caffs in Sovit ups received. This increase is based on --- 19. Senator AKAKA. General Abizaid and Ambassador Satterfield, this hotline was suppose to help provide our forces with information regarding the insurgents-how- ever, when many Iraqis did call, they were unable to get through. I understand that the program has gotten better with regards to operators answering the phone but what have we done to win back their confidence of this program? General ABIZAID. First, the National 130 Tips Hotline has never been branded as an emergency service number; it has always been a tips hotline. The intent of the hotline is to provide a 24-hour, 7-day a week phone-in reporting service that empow- ers Iraqi citizens to provide information to the Government of Iraq and coalition forces on terrorist and criminal activity. Often hotline tips require surveillance and operational planning before any police or military action can occur. We gain confidence in the program when the Iraqi people see good results from their calls. We have developed two documentaries explaining the process of what happens when a call comes in. In addition, we have added the tag line at the end of commercials telling viewers if they can't get through to keep trying. I can assure you, people are still calling. Any time that you visit the tips facility, the phones are always ringing off the hook. Based on our most recent polling data, the significant majority of Iraqis understand the purpose of the hotline (73 percent), and are moti- vated through the advertising campaign to utilize the hotline number (88 percent). At the same time, a growing confidence in the program is apparent with a majority of the populace (83 percent) confident in the hotline's operation. This tells us that the message is getting out and we are on track. The Iraqi confidence level is also apparent in the recent and significant increase in tips/actionable tips received. This increase is based on several factors. First, man- agement and leadership presence: The Iraqi Ministry of Interior designated a Briga- dier General as on-site manager. Since his arrival in September 2006, this officer has reinforced to his subordinates the importance of correctly responding to calls in a timely manner. The hotline workers/operators now have a better understanding of the importance of the calls they receive, process, and disseminate, as the lives of many Iraqis depend on their actions. : Second, life support improvements. Coalition assets have been addressing some life support requirements such as water provision, communications hardware and infrastructure repairs, and maintenance, to mention the main ones. Third, institutionalizations of best practices, creation of standard operating proce- dures, and a formal training program have resulted in the optimization of Tips Hot- line Program operations. The growing interest in Tips is a welcomed sign. If the fa- cility had new state-of-the-art equipment and a professional dedicated staff of IT technicians, the response and data processing time would be significantly improved. Any assistance you can provide in this area would be welcomed. Fourth, appropriate work ethics and a sense of esprit-de-corps have been instilled within the workforce. Finally, the presence of coalition advisors reassures the Iraqi operators that theirs is an important operation. The combined implementation of these five variables has resulted in an upward trend of actionable reports that are sent to both coalition and ISF elements. Tips program is undergoing a transition process that will result in full Government of Iraq control of Tips operations by June 2007. Ambassador SATTERFIELD. Iraqi citizens are becoming more comfortable making direct contact with the National "Tips” Hotline because of the anonymity it provides. National Hotline calls are at an all time high in part as a result of Iraqi citizens use of the call center for personal emergencies in the absence of a trustworthy 911 type of emergency services alert center. The Multi-National Forces-Iraq command reports over 2,800 calls received in December, 300 more than the previous month. The hotline continues to provide tips that lead to significant captures and weapon seizures. Specific questions regarding this Multi-National Force-Iraq program should be addressed to the DOD. IRAQI DEATH SQUADS 20. Senator AKAKA. Ambassador Satterfield, it is my understanding that, even within the Iraqi Government, there are different approaches regarding how to cur- tail the violent attacks conducted by insurgents and/or death squads. Are we work- ing with the Iraqi Government to try and alleviate these tensions? Ambassador SATTERFIELD. Dealing with sectarian violence by death squads, insur- gents, and illegally armed militias is the greatest challenge Iraq faces. A military solution alone will not reduce violence. A reduction in sectarian violence will require a comprehensive political solution that includes Iraqi political, civil, and religious leaders working together to implement reconciliation initiatives, economic policies, 160 Graham; Arjun Mody, assistant to Senator Dole; Bob Taylor and Stuart C. Mallory, assistants to Senator Thune; Sharon L. Waxman and Mieke Y. Eoyang, assistants to Senator Kennedy; Frederick M. Downey, assisant to Senator Lieberman; Elizabeth King, assistant to Senator Reed; Richard Kessler and Darcie Tokioka, assistants to Senator Akaka; William K. Sutey and Alea Brown, assistants to Senator Bill Nelson; Eric Pierce, assistant to Senator Ben Nelson; Luke Ballman, assistant to Senator Dayton; Todd Rosenblum, as- sistant to Senator Bayh; and Andrew Shapiro, assistant to Senator Clinton. OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN WARNER, CHAIRMAN Chairman WARNER. Good afternoon. The Senate Armed Services Committee resumes its sequence of hearings on the current situa- tion in Iraq and Afghanistan. Part one of the hearing was excellent this morning. The committee received, as it expected, the very frank and candid assessments from General Abizaid and Ambas- sador Satterfield. In part two of the hearing the committee will receive testimony from General Michael Hayden, Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and Lieutenant General Michael Maples, Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA). Both of them have appeared before Congress, but this is General Hayden's first appearance in his capacity as Director of the CIA. The panel's appearance here today is very important. The rela- tionship between intelligence and policymakers has been the sub- ject of discussion over the past few years. In the session this morn- ing I described five events that will converge in the next few weeks and months to help formulate the views of Congress, most particu- larly the Senate, on such changes as we may deem as necessary, the five being: this series of hearings; followed by, presumably in the first week of December, the hearing with Bob Gates, nominated to be the new Secretary of Defense; followed by a hearing with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs and his report; then hopefully we will have the Jim Baker of the Iraq Study Group, with Lee Hamilton, testify; and lastly, I think very valuable work is now underway to extend the U.N. resolution under which our forces are operating in Iraq today that expires on December 31, 2006. Senator Levin. STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN Senator LEVIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the continuation of this very important hearing. It is critical that we have the inde- pendent and objective testimony of our Directors of the CIA and DIA to help us understand the situation in Iraq and in Afghani- stan. We look forward to that testimony and in the interest of time I will not present a full statement. Chairman WARNER. Thank you very much, Senator Levin. General Hayden. 161 STATEMENT OF GEN. MICHAEL V. HAYDEN, USAF, DIRECTOR, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY General HAYDEN. Thank you, Senator. Mr. Chairman, Senator Levin, members of the committee: The overthrow of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan and of Sad- dam Hussein's regime in Iraq, when combined with our determined pursuit of al Qaeda worldwide, essentially inaugurated a new era of both risk and opportunity for our country in its engagement with much of the Muslim world. We are now face-to-face with whole so- cieties that are in profound and, frankly, volatile transitions and whose fate will directly affect our fate, whose fate will directly af- fect the security of the United States. With American forces in Afghanistan and Iraq, and with the United States leading the global war on terrorism, we are now ac- tors to an unprecedented degree in supporting states, including Iraq and Afghanistan, which are attempting to create and sustain a stable new order. Arrayed against this endeavor are significant new forces. They hey are political and ethnosectarian forces that, frank- ly, were previously hidden or subordinated, and are now competing to shape the identity of these states. Now, some of this competition is taking place within a legitimate political and democratic process. But in other cases we have radical groups like al Qaeda and its affiliates sponsoring terrorists, insur- gents in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere, that seem to be able to preempt governments and eclipse the moderate actors in the re- gion. Then at the regional level you have opponents of the United States like Iran seeking to capitalize on the instability of this tran- sitional period to expand their own influence and, frankly, to con- test the vision we have for this region. With these trends in mind, let me begin by focusing on Afghani- stan, where we have made some important progress in the face of some substantial challenges. Afghanistan's future depends heavily on the international community's willingness to continue to deliver concrete resources to the Afghan Government. It depends equally on international willingness to help protect that government from the Taliban and other extremists who are waging a bloody insur- gency, especially in the south and east of that country. Now, neither of these tasks are simple. Neither of them are going to be completed soon. But the past few years have been a story of success for the Afghan Government and people, as well as the international community. That country has made remarkable polit- ical progress. The international community and the Afghan Gov- ernment under the leadership of President Karzai have built some national level political institutions—a new constitution, an elected president, a democratically elected parliament. These are remark- able achievements when you hold them up against the backdrop of the ruinous decades of war that Afghanistan experienced before 2001. But the successes of the last few years have not lessened the need for international involvement in this country. It has only pro- vided the foundation upon which we can now build. Now we need to bolster the Afghan Government's ability to provide sound gov- ernance at all level caricE au all levels 01 20vernment. 162 Ambassador Neumann recently said that this effort will take a long time, and if you ask my view it will take at least a decade and it will cost billions of dollars. I will add one more time that the Af- ghan Government will not be able to do it alone. The capacity of the government needs to be strengthened to deliver basic services to the population, and of course that begins with security. in security. These problems span Afghanistan, but they are especially preva- lent in rural areas. Quality-of-life for millions of Afghan citizens, spread across a desolate land in isolated villages, has not advanced very much, and in many areas the Afghan Government is simply nowhere to be found. This situation will get worse if it is not addressed. Right now more than half of the Afghan population is under the age of 19. That means millions of young Afghans will enter the labor force over the next decade, adding to an unemployment rate that is al- ready hovering around 40 percent. I think we all know that the il- licit drug trade is a significant hurdle to the expansion of the cen- tral government's authority and it undercuts the international com- munity's and the government's efforts to rebuild the economy. It fuels provincial and local corruption. According to the International Monetary Fund, the Afghan opiate gross domestic product (GDP) in 2005 was $2.5 billion, roughly a third of what the country's licit GDP was. The key to making progress is security. There are simply not enough properly trained, equipped, well-paid security forces and, even though the Afghan National Army continues to become larger, stronger, and more experienced, progress has been slow and there has been a lot less progress made in constructing an effective Af- ghan national police. The Taliban has clearly built momentum over this past year. The level of violence that they have inflicted has increased significantly. The group has clearly become more aggressive. The Taliban almost certainly refocused its attacks in an attempt to stymie the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's (NATO) efforts in southern Afghani- stan. Kabul's ability to provide sound governance to these kinds of areas will be key to preventing the Taliban and other extremists from intimidating the population into acquiescing with its activi- ties. Kabul needs help because it lacks capacity, not because it lacks will, and not because it lacks popular support. I have spoken with President Karzai. He understands this and he recognizes his government's responsibilities. Now Iraq. It provides another example of how the forces of change are reshaping the Muslim world. The deep fissures that I know you have talked about earlier today with General Abizaid and Ambassador Satterfield, they are among the groups fighting in Iraq and were not created by the coalition's overthrow of Saddam's dictatorship. Throughout Iraq's modern history there has been a Sunni minority ruling with the support of the military, and Sad- dam made this worse. His cult of personality tragically reinforced this pattern by using extreme violence to suppress the vast major- ity of Iraq's inhabitants. He killed tens of thousands of Kurds and Shiite in a short period from 1988 to 1991, brutally suppressing Shiite and Kurdish revolts. He ruled during his last years with vio- 164 The Iranian hand is stoking violence and supporting even com- peting Shiite factions. Even if the central government gains broad- er support from Iraq's various communities, implementing the re- forms needed to improve life for all Iraqis will be difficult. Current violence is eating away at the state's ability to govern. The security forces are plagued by sectarianism. They have maintenance and lo- gistics problems. Ministerial capacity, limited ministerial capacity, is limiting progress on key issues. The civilian bureaucracy is buf- feted by inefficiency and partisan control. Only if the Iraqi state asserts its authority across the board can the government in Baghdad begin to turn its goals into concrete re- alities. As I mentioned earlier, complicating these historic forces, difficult enough in their own right, is the pernicious effect of al Qaeda's presence in Iraq. Despite Zarqawi's death, al Qaeda con- tinues to foment sectarian violence, seeks to expel coalition forces. An al Qaeda victory in Iraq would mean a fundamentalist state that shelters jihadists and serves as a launching pad for terror throughout the region and against our own Homeland. Let me talk just for a minute, Mr. Chairman, more broadly about al Qaeda. It sees its war against us as a continuation from their perspective of decades, perhaps century-old, struggle to defend Islam from political and cultural domination by a Judaeo-Christian alliance that they now perceive as being led by the United States and Israel. Since bin Laden declared war on us in 1998, al Qaeda has focused primarily on attacks aimed at weakening and pun- ishing the United States and its immediate allies. They see us as the main obstacle to realizing their vision of an extreme fundamen- talist social and political order throughout the Muslim world. Although the group has suffered significant losses since their at- tacks on our Homeland, it has shown resilience and it remains thoroughly dedicated to mounting new attacks on our Homeland and on our interests abroad. Understanding al Qaeda is essential to defeating it. With regard to the central organization headed by Osama bin Laden, in the face of our substantial success against it the group's cadre of seasoned, committed leaders has allowed it to remain fairly cohesive, it has allowed it to remain focused on its strategic objectives, again despite having lost a number of veterans over the years. Osama bin Laden and Zawahiri continue to play a crucial role. They inspire jihadists and their very presence promotes unity. Their demise would not end the threat, but it probably would con- tribute to the unraveling of the central organization. The loss of a series of al Qaeda leaders since September 11 has been substantial, but it has also been mitigated by what is, frankly, a pretty deep bench of low-ranking personnel capable of stepping up to assume leadership positions. Though a number of these people are new to the senior manage- ment, they are not new to jihad. My point here, Senator, is this threat has taken a long time to build; it will take some time to un- ravel it. These new leaders average over 40 years of age and 2 dec- ades of involvement in global jihadism. The second critical factor is their physical safe haven along the Afghan-Pakistan border. That safe haven gives them the physical and even psychological space they need to meet, train, plan, and 165 prepare new attacks. Many locals in that region have ties to al Qaeda dating back to the 1980s wars against the Soviets and root- ing them out from that region is complicated by rugged terrain and a local culture that is intensely suspicious of and at times hostile to outsiders, including their own government's forces. A third important factor is Osama bin Laden's extremist ideology and strategic vision, which continues to attract recruits, inspire like-minded groups, help our enemies weather setbacks. In addition to planning attacks of its own, al Qaeda supports terrorist activi- ties by other groups and seeks to encourage Muslims worldwide to take up the cause. It spreads its propaganda through taped state- ments, some of them with very high sophisticated production val- ues. As a western nation, we have limited tools to counteract that kind of propaganda. We need to make sure our own message is clear, but we also need to work with our Muslim allies. Finally, I need to emphasize that the asymmetric nature of al Qaeda's style of warfare gives it certain advantages. Our open soci- eties present an almost endless source of targets and the enemy ated its ruthlessness through a willingness to attack the innocent. Mr. Chairman, in all aspects of today's global struggle, and the three pieces I have mentioned-Iraq, Afghanistan, and al Qaeda- are all intricately and intimately interrelated—we are dealing with deep historical forces and it will require patience and wisdom as well as just power to deal with them. This will unfortunately be a long struggle. Thank you. [The prepared statement of General Hayden follows:] PREPARED STATEMENT BY GEN. MICHAEL V. HAYDEN, USAF Mr. Chairman, members of the committee: The overthrow of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan and of Saddam Husayn in Iraq as well as our determined pursuit of al Qaeda worldwide have inaugurated a new era of risk and opportunity for the United States in its engagement with much of the Muslim world. We are now face- to-face with whole societies which are in profound and volatile transitions and whose fate will directly affect the security of the United States. With U.S. forces deployed in Iraq and Afghanistan and with the United States leading the global re- sponse to the threat of terrorism, we are now actors to an unprecedented degree in supporting states—especially Iraq and Afghanistan—which are attempting to create and sustain a stable new order. • Against this endeavor significant new forces are arrayed. Political and ethno-sectarian forces previously subordinated are now competing to shape the identity of states. Although some of this competition is taking place within the legitimate democratic process, in other cases radical Islamic groups—including terrorists and insurgents in Iraq and Afghanistan-are able to preempt governments and eclipse more moderate actors. • At the regional level, opponents of the United States—like Iran-are seeking to capitalize on the instability of this transitional period to expand their own influence and contest the vision sustained by the United States and its allies. of states prev in the AFGHANISTAN With these trends in mind, let me begin by focusing on Afghanistan where we have made important progress in the face of substantial challenges. Afghanistan's future depends heavily on the international community's willing- ness to continue delivering concrete resources to the Afghan Government. It de- pends equally on international willingness to help protect the Afghan Government 166 against the Taliban and other extremists who are waging a bloody insurgency in the south and east of the country. Neither of these tasks will be simple, and neither will be completed soon, but the past few years have been a story of success for the Afghan Government and people, as well as the international community. The country made remarkable political progress through the completion of the 2001 Bonn Accord—the political roadmap for rebuilding the country. The international community and the Afghan Government, under the leadership of President Karzai, have built national-level political institu- tions—including a new constitution, legitimate presidential elections, and a demo- cratically elected parliament. • These are all remarkable achievements given the ruinous decades of war Afghanistan experienced prior to 2001. The success of the past few years hasn't lessened the need for international in- volvement in the country—it has only provided a foundation upon which to build. Now, we need to bolster the Afghan Government's ability to provide sound govern- ance at all levels of government. Ambassador Neuman recently said the effort would take a long time-in my view, at least a decade and cost many billions of dollars. I would add that the Afghan Government won't be able to do it alone. The capacity of the government needs to be strengthened to deliver basic services to the population—especially security. The problems span Afghanistan, but they are especially prevalent in rural areas. The quality-of-life for millions of Afghans- spread across desolate land and isolated villages—has not advanced and in many areas the Afghan Government is nowhere to be found. • The social situation will get worse if it is not addressed. Right now, about 55 percent of the Afghan population is under the age of 19; millions of young Afghans will enter the labor force over the next 5-10 years, adding to an unemployment burden that is already hovering around 40 percent. The illicit drug trade is a significant hurdle to the expansion of central govern- ment authority and it undercuts efforts to rebuild the economy. The drug trade also fuels provincial and local corruption. According to the International Monetary Fund, the Afghan opiate gross domestic product (GĎP) in 2005 was $2.6 billion-roughly a third of the country's $7.3 billion licit GDP. Key to making progress is bolstering security. Even in areas of the country where the insurgency is not active, security is falling short. • There are not enough properly trained, equipped, or well-paid security forces. Even though the Afghan National Army continues to become larger, stronger, and more experienced, progress has been slow and little progress has been made in constructing an effective Afghan National Police force. The Taliban has built momentum this year. The level of violence associated with the insurgency has increased significantly and the group has become more aggres- sive than in years past. The Taliban almost certainly refocused its attacks in an at- tempt to stymie the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's (NATO) efforts in south- ern Afghanistan. • Kabul's ability to provide sound governance and badly needed aid to these areas will be key to preventing the Taliban and other extremists from intimidating the population into acquiescing in its activities. • Kabul needs help because it lacks capacity—not because it lacks political will or lacks support. President Karzai understands this and recognizes his government's responsibility. IRAQ Iraq provides another example of how the forces of change are reshaping the Mus- lim world. The deep fissures among the groups fighting in Iraq were not created by the coalition's overthrow of Saddam's dictatorship. Throughout Iraq's modern his- tory, a Sunni minority ruled with the support of the military; Saddam's cult of per- sonality tragically reinforced this pattern by using extreme violence to suppress the vast majority of Iraq's inhabitants. Saddam killed tens of thousands of Kurds and Shiite in the short period from 1988, when he launched the Anfal campaign against the Kurds, to 1991, when he brutally suppressed Shiite and Kurdish revolts: • Saddam ruled during his last years through violent repression and by fa- voring a small elite within the Sunni community from his home region of Tikrit—to the dismay of other Sunnis. • Saddam deliberately diverted resources to his powerbase, depriving much of the rest of the country of economic and educational opportunities, and in the case of the Shiite majority, basic religious liberty. 167 Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) completely upended the Saddamist state and Iraqi society. In every respect-political, social, and economic-OIF instituted a sea change in the way Iraq is governed. The dissolution of the Iraqi military and the Baath party swept away the tools that a small group in power had used to terrorize Iraq, and the subsequent vacuum of authority gave vent to deep seated hatreds that had simmered for years in a brutalized society: • The Shiite now focus on assuring that Iraq's new government reflects the will of the majority Shiite population and making sure the Baathists never regain power. This fear of a return to Baathism is almost palpable among Shiite elites. Sunnis view the Shiite as Iranian controlled and the current government as predatory. The Kurds, for their part, want to keep and strengthen the substantial autonomy they have exercised since 1991. • It is also noteworthy, however, that the Shiite and the Kurds, with some Sunni participation, crafted a democratic constitution that could provide a structure to allow İraqis to settle their differences peacefully. For this to happen, Iraqi leaders—Shiite, Sunnis, and Kurds alike—will need to flesh out the document through extensive legislation in such a way that all par- ties, and particularly the Sunni public, accept as legitimate. We are all acutely aware that Iraq today is very far from peaceful. No single nar- rative is sufficient to explain all the violence in Iraq today. There remains in Iraq today an active insurgency; a broad al Qaeda offensive targeting use and Iraqis; criminality and lawlessness on a broad scale; rival militias competing for power. Since the bombing of the al-Askari Mosque in Samarra last February, however, vio- lence between Arab Shiite and Sunnis has grown to such an extent that sectarian violence now presents the greatest immediate threat to Iraq's stability and future. • Last year violence was mostly limited to Sunni insurgent attacks on coa- lition and Iraqi targets, but now Shiite militia attacks against Sunnis and coalition forces are an integral part of the pattern of violence. • The Kurds live in a fairly homogeneous region under self-government. Yet in the seamline where Kurds, Arabs, and others meet, we see worrying signs—such as a recent surge in violence in the city of Kirkuk—that the legacy of Iraq's repressive past continues to shape both the Arab/Kurd and nts the greates limited to Sunattacks against di Any Iraqi leader, nault lines in Iraqi socief to shape both theirkuk-that the Any Iraqi leader, no matter how skillful, would be hard pressed to reconcile the divergent perspectives that Shiite, Sunnis, and Kurds bring to the table—and also to the streets. To strengthen the common ground that all Iraqis can share, the gov- ernment of Prime Minister Maliki will have to overcome several formidable obsta- cles: • Internal divisions and power struggles among the Shiite make it difficult for Shiite leaders to take the actions that might ease Sunni fears of domi- nation. Radical Shiite militias and splinter groups stoke the violence, while brutal Sunni attacks make even moderate Shiite question whether it is pos- sible to reconcile the Sunnis to the new Shiite-dominated power structures. The Iranian hand is stoking violence and supporting even competing Shiite factions. • The Sunnis are even more divided. Many see violent opposition as the only way to overcome the democratic rules that, due to demographic reali- ties, place a ceiling on Sunni political influence. Even if the central government gains broader support from Iraq's communities, implementing the reforms needed to improve life for all Iraqis will be extremely dif- ficult. Iraq's endemic violence is eating away at the state's ability to govern. The security forces are plagued by sectarianism and severe maintenance and logistics problems; inadequate ministerial capacity is limiting progress on key issues; and the civilian bureaucracy, buffeted by corruption, inefficiency and partisan control, is not currently up to the challenge of providing better services to the Iraqi people. Only if the Iraqi state asserts its authority across the board can the government in Bagh- dad begin to turn its goals into concrete realities. Complicating these historic forces is the pernicious effect of al Qaeda's presence in Iraq. Despite Zarqawi's death, al Qaeda continues to foment sectarian violence and seeks to expel coalition forces. An al Qaeda victory in Iraq would mean a fun- damentalist state that shelters jihadists and serves as a launching pad for terrorist operations throughout the region-and in the United States. Turning next to al Qaeda ... Al Qaeda sees its war against the West as the continuation of a decades, perhaps centuries-old, struggle to defend Islam from political and cultural domination by a Judeo-Christian alliance now led by the United States and Israel. Since Osama bin Se neng anak ng hroughout t shelters jihadistsal Qaeda victor to foment se 168 Laden declared war on the United States in 1998, al Qaeda has focused primarily on attacks aimed at weakening and punishing the United States and its immediate allies. • The group sees the United States as the main obstacle to realizing its vi- sion of an extreme fundamentalist social and political order throughout the Muslim world. • Although the group has suffered significant losses since September 11, it is resilient and thoroughly dedicated to mounting new attacks on the U.S. Homeland and our interests abroad. Understanding the source of al Qaeda's resilience is key to defeating it. With re- gard to the central organization headed by bin Laden, that resilience stems from several factors: First, the group's cadre of seasoned, committed leaders has allowed it to remain fairly cohesive and stay focused on its strategic objectives—despite having lost a number of important veterans over the years. • Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri continue to play a crucial role in inspiring jihadists and promoting unity. Their demise would not spell the end of the threat, but probably would contribute to the unraveling of the central al Qaeda organization. • The loss of a series of veteran al Qaeda leaders since September 11 has been mitigated by the group's “deep bench” of lower-ranking personnel ca- pable of stepping up to assume leadership responsibilities. Although a num- ber of individuals are new to senior management in al Qaeda, they are not new to jihad: they average over 40 years of age and nearly 2 decades of in- volvement in jihad. A second critical factor is the group's physical safehaven in the Afghanistan-Paki- stan border area. This safehaven gives al Qaeda the physical—and psychological- space needed to meet, train, expand its networks, and prepare new attacks. • Many locals have ties to al Qaeda dating back to the 1980s war against the Soviets in Afghanistan. • Rooting out al Qaeda elements there is complicated by the rugged terrain and a local culture that is intensely suspicious of—and, at times, overtly hostile to—outsiders, including government security forces. • The safehaven not only gives al Qaeda and the Taliban a venue for ter- rorist plotting, but also serves as a jump-off point for its guerrilla forays into Afghanistan. A third important factor is Osama bin Laden's extremist ideology and strategic vision, which continue to attract recruits, inspire like-minded groups, and help our enemies weather setbacks and reconcile themselves to a long struggle. • In addition to planning attacks of its own, al Qaeda supports terrorist ac- tivities by other groups and seeks to encourage Muslims worldwide to take up the cause of violent jihad. • Al Qaeda spreads its propaganda through taped statements—sometimes featuring relatively sophisticated production values—as well as books and websites. • As a western nation, we have limited tools to counteract this propaganda. We need to make sure our own message is clear and we need to work with our Muslim allies. Finally, it's important to note that the asymmetric nature of al Qaeda's style of warfare gives it certain advantages. • Our open society presents an almost endless source of targets, and the enemy has demonstrated its ruthlessness through a willingness to attack civilians—including other Muslims—a preference for spectacular, high-cas- ualty operations, and its own adherents' desire for martyrdom. • As September 11 showed, even a handful of committed attackers, with relatively modest resources, can inflict terrible damage. Mr. Chairman, in all aspects of today's global struggle, we are dealing with deep historical forces and it will require patience and wisdom as well as power for us to deal with them. This will be a long struggle. Thank you. Chairman WARNER. Thank you very much, General. General Maples. Lincluding a fits own adheren handful of image. 169 STATEMENT OF LTG MICHAEL D. MAPLES, USA, DIRECTOR, DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY General MAPLES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator Levin, members of the committee. I thank you for the opportunity to tes- tify before you today. I have submitted a statement for the record and I have shortened that statement for my opening statement, but would be more than pleased to address the contents of my state- ment that I have submitted. Chairman WARNER. Both statements will be submitted into the record. General MAPLES. Thank you, sir. The testimony that I am about to present represents what we know and judge to be the state of the conflicts in Iraq and Afghani- stan and is the product of the dedicated men and women of the DIA. Many of them today are executing their missions in remote and dangerous areas in Iraq and Afghanistan. I thank them for their service and the exceptional work that they are doing for our Nation. I would also like to thank you for your continued support of them and for your continued support of the DIA. In Irag. the conflict is unquestionably complex and difficult. The fight to define post-Saddam Iraq has been primarily an intra-Arab struggle to determine how power and authority will be distributed. Iraqi nationalists, Baathists, former military, angry Sunni, jihadists, foreign fighters, and al Qaeda provide an overlapping, complex, and multipolar Sunni insurgent and terrorist environ- ment. Shiite militias, Shiite militants, and extensive criminal activ- ity further contribute to violence, instability, and insecurity. We have seen some recent developments that give us hope for progress. They include the verdict against Saddam Hussein, efforts to address problems associated with the deBaathification, increased cooperation between Sunni Arab tribes and the government in al Anbar Province, arrest warrants for Ministry of Interior personnel accused of abuses, and the expulsion of rogue elements from al- Sadr's movement. We note the continued development and increased capability of Iraqi security forces (ISFs) and the police. The ISFs will meet man- ning, training, and equipment milestones and improved unit capa- bilities. Nevertheless, the ISFs will remain dependent on coalition support. It will also be essential that ISF leaders reject militia in- fluence and instill discipline in their formations to gain legitimacy with the population. The conflict has changed in character, in scope, and the dynamics and is increasingly a sectarian struggle for power and the right to define Iraq's future identity. The perception of unchecked violence is creating an atmosphere of fear and hardening sectarianism which is empowering militias and vigilante groups and reducing confidence in government and security forces. Despite ongoing Iraqi government and coalition operations against terrorists, Sunni Arab insurgent groups, and Shiite mili- tias, violence in Iraq continues to increase in scope, complexity, and lethality. The Sunni Arab-based insurgency has gained strength and capacity despite political progress and security force develop- ments. 170 Attacks by terrorist groups like al Qaeda in Iraq account for only a fraction of the insurgent violence. Yet the high-profile nature of these operations have a disproportionate impact on the population and on perceptions of stability. Al Qaeda in Iraq has capitalized on the current cycle of sectarian violence. Its strategy has fueled by appealing to perceptions that its operations are defending Sunni in- terests. Al Qaeda in Iraq also poses a threat outside Iraq as it is the only terrorist group in the country with known aspirations for external attacks. Baghdad remains the center of the conflict as Shiite and Sunni Arabs fight for territorial control and political influence. Sectarian attacks constitute most of the violence in the mixed ethnicity areas in and around the capital, while the coalition remains the primary target in the Shiite south and the Sunni west. Recent coalition and ISF operations in Baghdad have achieved limited success. In Au- gust levels of violence temporarily decreased, primarily in Sunni Arab neighborhoods. However, as armed groups adapted to the coa- lition presence and the ISFs were unable to exert authority once coalition forces moved on, attacks returned to and even surpassed pre-operational levels. The Iraqi government is making progress, but is likely to remain fragile owing to different challenges, lack of experience and capac- ity, mistrust, and constitutional constraints. Iraqi government offi- cials continue attempts to achieve national reconciliation, but at- tacks against civilians, a key driver of ethnosectarian conflict, con- tinue to increase. Sectarian differences limit the effectiveness of government as groups maintain a hard-line stance on contentious issues. Shiite militias are a growing impediment to stability. The Ministry of In- terior and the police are heavily infiltrated and militias often oper- ate under the protection or approval of Iraqi police to attack sus- pected Sunni insurgents and Sunni civilians. DIA judges a coalition presence is the primary counter to a breakdown in central authority, which would have grave con- sequences for the people of Iraq, stability in the region, and U.S. strategic interests. No major political figure in Iraq has endorsed the notion of civil war or partition and most political and religious leaders continue to restrain their communities. Moreover, DIA judges that Iraqi Arabs retain a strong sense of national identity and most Iraqis recall a past in which sectarian identity did not have the significance that it has today. Although leaders across the political spectrum who are partici- pating in the government continue to talk and search for a positive way forward, the challenges to bringing stability and security with a cohesive, unified, and effective government remain significant. Turning to Afghanistan, in Afghanistan the Taliban-led insur- gency, aided by al Qaeda, is incapable of directly threatening the central government and expanding its support networks and areas of influence beyond strongholds in the Pashtun south and east. De- spite having absorbed heavy combat losses in 2006, the insurgency has strengthened its capabilities and influence with its core base of Pashtun communities. If a sustained international military and Afghan security presence throughout the volatile Pashtun south and east is not established alongside credible civilian administra- 171 tions, central government control over these areas will be re- stricted. In 2007, insurgents are likely to sustain their use of visible, ag- gressive, and lethal tactics. Al Qaeda remains committed to rees- tablishing a fundamentalist Islamic government in Afghanistan. In 2006 al Qaeda appears to be attempting to reinvigorate its oper- ations from safe havens in the Afghan-Pakistan border region. Since 2001 the Afghan Government has successfully established national level political institutions by drafting a new constitution, holding legitimate presidential election, and creating a democrat- ically elected national assembly. However, local government insti- tutions receive limited resources from Kabul and struggle to pro- vide effective governance. Unrealized expectations at local levels are likely contributing to an erosion of support for the government. Nevertheless, President Karzai remains the most powerful political figure in Afghanistan and retains the widest support. Mr. Chairman, Senator Levin, members of the committee, thank you again for this opportunity to discuss with you our assessment of the current security situations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Our Na- tion is engaged in a long war against terrorism and violent extre- mism. Providing support to our soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines and civilians engaged in fighting insurgencies in Iraq and Afghani- stan and the global war on terrorism is our first priority. Thank you for your continuing support. [The prepared statement of General Maples follows:] PREPARED STATEMENT BY LTG MICHAEL D. MAPLES, USA INTRODUCTION Good afternoon Mr. Chairman, Senator Levin, and members of the committee. Thank you for the opportunity to testify before you today. The testimony I am about to present represents what we know and judge to be the state of the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan and is the product of the dedicated men and women of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA). These outstanding military and civilian intel- ligence professionals provide our warfighters, defense planners, and national secu- rity policymakers with information and knowledge essential to our efforts around the world, but especially to operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Many of them are executing their missions in remote and dangerous areas of Iraq and Afghanistan. I thank them for their service and the exceptional work they are doing for our Na- tion. I would also like to thank you for your continued support of the DŇA. IRAQ We have seen some recent developments that give hope for progress. These in- clude the verdict against Saddam Hussein, efforts to address problems associated with de-Baathification, increased cooperation between Sunni Arab tribes and the government in al Anbar Province, arrest warrants for Ministry of Interior personnel accused of abuses, and the expulsion of radicals from Muqtada al-Sadr's movement. We note the continued development and increased capability of the Iraqi security forces (ISF) and police. The ISF will meet manning, training, and equipment mile- stones, improving unit capabilities. Nevertheless, the ISF will remain dependent on coalition support. It will also be essential that ISF leaders reject militia influence and instill discipline in their formations to gain legitimacy with the population. The economy has seen moderate growth despite the security situation, with con- tinued improvement in basic services, economic reforms, and institution-building. The conflict is unquestionably complex and difficult. The fight to define post-Sad- dam Iraq has been primarily an intra-Arab struggle to determine how power and authority will be distributed. Iraqi nationalists, ex-Baathists, former military, angry Sunni, Jihadists, foreign fighters, and al Qaeda provide an overlapping, complex and multi-polar Sunni insurgent and terrorist environment. Shiite militias and Shiite militants, some Kurdish Peshmerga, and extensive criminal activity further con- tribute to violence, instability, and insecurity. een primarid. Iraqi nationaaeda provide an Shiite militias further con- 172 . soite onorino Traperung Iragi unity. The U.S. presence obscured the true nature of this fight between and among com- peting groups for power as observers focused on insurgent attacks and rhetoric di- rected at the United States. Today, DIA assesses the conditions for the further dete- rioration of security and instability exists within this ongoing, violent struggle for power. Although a significant breakdown of central authority has not occurred, Iraq has moved closer to this possibility primarily because of weak governance, increas- ing security challenges, and no agreement on a national compact. The conflict has changed in character, scope, and dynamics and is increasingly a sectarian struggle for power and the right to define Iraq's future identity. Overall attacks averaged approximately 180 per day in October 2006, up from approxi- mately 170 the previous month, and 70 in January 2006. Daily average of attacks against ISF in October more than doubled the number reported in January, approxi- mately 30 compared to 13. Daily average of attacks on civilians in October was four times higher than reported in January, approximately 40 compared to 10. The per- ception of unchecked violence is creating an atmosphere of fear and hardening sec- tarianism which is empowering militias and vigilante groups, hastening middle- class exodus, and shaking confidence in government and security forces. Sectarian violence, a weak central government, problems in basic services, and high unem- ployment are causing more Iraqis to turn to sectarian groups, militias, and insur- gents for basic needs, imperiling Iraqi unity. Despite ongoing Iraqi government and coalition operations against terrorists, Sunni Arab insurgent groups, and Shiite militias, violence in Iraq continues to in- crease in scope, complexity, and lethality. The Sunni Arab-based insurgency has gained strength and capacity despite political progress and security force develop- ments. Nationwide, insurgents still conduct most attacks against the coalition and ISF and retain the resources, capabilities, and support to sustain high levels of vio- lence. Attacks by terrorist groups account for only a fraction of insurgent violence throughout Iraq, yet the high-profile nature of these operations and the tactics they use have a disproportionate impact on the population and on perceptions of sta- bility. Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), formerly led by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi and currently headed by Abu Ayyub al-Masri, is the largest and most active of the Iraqi-based ter- rorist groups. AQI's targeting strategies have not changed significantly in the wake of al-Zarqawi's death on June 7, and attacks against Iraqi government targets and coalition forces continue apace. In addition, AQI is one of the most visible perpetra- tors of anti-Shiite attacks in Iraq-a hallmark of its strategy since 2003—and has capitalized on the current cycle of sectarian violence by increasing perceptions that its operations are defending Sunni interests. AQI also poses a threat outside Iraq, as it is the only terrorist group in the country with known aspirations for external attacks, including possibly against targets in Europe and the U.S. Homeland. Be- cause of his involvement with al Qaeda-linked terrorists since the early 1980s, Abu Ayyub may have increased ties to al Qaeda senior leaders; these could enhance AQI's external attack capabilities. AQI operates with relative freedom in Iraq's Sunni-dominated territories, and as long as this remains true, the group will pose a threat to Iraq's internal stability and to Western interests abroad. Ansar al- Sunna, the second-most prominent terrorist group in Iraq, also poses a threat to Iraqi stability and has longstanding ties to AQI and external al Qaeda elements. Baghdad remains the center of the conflict as Shiite and Sunni Arabs fight for territorial control and political influence. Sectarian attacks constitute most of the violence in the mixed-ethnicity areas in and around the capital, while the coalition remains the primary target in the Shiite south and Sunni west. Recent coalition and IŠF operations in Baghdad have achieved limited success. In August, levels of violence temporarily decreased, primarily in Sunni Arab neighbor- hoods. However, as armed groups adapted to the coalition presence, and the ISF was unable to exert authority once coalition forces moved on, attacks returned to and even surpassed preoperational levels. Among a range of factors, the govern- ment's reluctance to conduct operations in Shiite militia strongholds also decreased the effectiveness and potential for success of the Baghdad efforts. The Iraqi government of Prime Minister Maliki is making progress but is likely to remain fragile owing to very difficult challenges, lack of experience and capacity, mistrust, and constitutional constraints. Iraqi government officials continue at- tempts to achieve national reconciliation, but attacks against civilians, a key driver of ethno-sectarian conflict, continue to increase. Political leaders' inability to resolve key issues such as federalism, de-Baathfication, amnesty for insurgents, and militia integration also contribute to continued Sunni Arab discontent, fueling support for terrorist and insurgent groups. Sectarian difference limit the effectiveness of govern- ment as groups maintain a hardline stance on contentious issues. husust, levels of violence operations in Baghdand Sunni west. " to Tome Iraqi gors and potetust operati levels. A forces malition preseni Arab neces. In venessce to concoperationce coalicia gilernment of Pati for successin Shiite mili range of atta 174 CONCLUSION Mr. Chairman, Senator Levin, members of the committee, thank you again for the opportunity to discuss with you our assessment of the current security situations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Our Nation is engaged in a long war against terrorism and violent extremism. Providing support to our soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines engaged in insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan and the global war on terrorism is our first priority. Thank you for your continuing support for the men and women of the DIA. Chairman WARNER. Thank you very much, gentlemen, for excel- lent opening statements. I would start with a question and I will direct it to both of you. There are discussions today, and I think it is important that dis- cussions be held and they are being held at all levels of our execu- tive branch here today, on the very subjects that each of you have covered. Part of those discussions relates to looking at the possi- bility of having some form of negotiations with both Syria and Iran. My question to you is what can you advise us with respect to the viability of persons or an entity of government in each of those countries that can, in a responsible way, engage in such discussions should they be undertaken? General Hayden? General HAYDEN. Senator, that is a difficult question and one on which a lot of things will hinge. If I can just perhaps characterize what we view to be the issues in Iraq to the west and to the east- Syria and Iran. As I said in my opening statement, an awful lot of the issues in Iraq are inherent to the structures of Iraqi society and their history. That said, the problems there are made worse by activities done by Iraq's neighbors, particularly Iran. I mentioned specifically in my comment that the Iranian hand appears to be powerful and I would offer the view it appears to be growing. Ira- nian ambitions in Iraq seem to be expanding. With regard to Syria, it is sometimes hard to judge the distinc- tion between incompetence and malevolence with regard to what goes on in Syria that may affect the situation in Iraq. Clearly both governments could do more. That I think is clear. If our dialogue with them could convince them to do more and convince them that their interests are not served by a fracturing of Iraq, then I would say that might be useful. Again, it is a complex question. It is fraught with other policy considerations. Talking to Iran about Iraq cannot be isolated, I be- e. from the broader nuclear question. Talking to Syria about Iraq cannot be isolated from Lebanon, Hezbollah, and the Pales- tinian territories. So there are a lot of things to balance there. Right now, the positions of both governments are not useful, par- ticularly the Iranians. But an awful lot of what is going on in Iraq is endemic to the circumstances in Iraq, Senator. Chairman WARNER. Thank you. General Maples? General MAPLES. Sir, I believe that we do have a regional issue that needs to be addressed, and I believe that there are activities that are currently undertaken by both of those countries, Iran and Syria, that have an adverse impact on what we are trying to achieve in Iraq. The activities range and have been discussed in the past in terms of support for militias within Iraq and also the transiting of foreign fighters and members of al Qaeda. So that ter- liev 175 ritory and activities that are conducted in those two nations are having a significant impact on the conflict. Your question was the viability of discussions with persons in those two countries and I believe that in both cases the govern- ments of those two countries are very centralized and that the con- trol of the central governments in each of those cases wou an ability to impact the activities going on within their countries and to influence the outcomes in Iraq as well. Chairman WARNER. A question to both of you. I detect, and I am just going to speak for myself, there is a strong resolve both in the executive branch and Congress as we work our way through a ma- trix of options here with regard to possible change, substantial change in strategy. There is a resolve to try very hard to continue to seek the goal of enabling the government in Iraq to fully grow in strength and size and influence such that it can exercise the full range of sovereignty, and that includes of course their own per- sonal security, of their nation. But should that fail despite the best attempts by ourselves and other nations, what would you project as being the consequences, General Hayden, as it relates to the region and indeed that part of the world? General HAYDEN. Yes, Senator. I would judge it catastrophic, first of all for the people of Iraq, because I think it would plunge them even deeper into chaos and the road out of it would be longer and more steep. With regard to the region, it would be almost as bad as it would be for the people of Iraq, because I think you would see a fracturing of Iraqi society along some of those seam lines that I suggested earlier. The temptation of neighbors to intervene may become irresistible, and, of course that could prompt other sorts of activity. With regard to us, failure in Iraq, failure to create a viable Iraqi state, I think would embolden the worst of our enemies, certainly al Qaeda. It would provide them with a safe haven rivaling the one they had in Afghanistan prior to October 2001. I think it would also embolden other adversaries in the region, particularly Iran, whom I would suggest to you right now, not totally warranted, seems to be conducting a foreign policy with a feeling of almost dangerous triumphalism. I think that would make it even worse. So I do not see any happy outcomes that would come from our not being successful. Chairman WARNER. You certainly did not suggest there would be any happy outcome. I think you very carefully summarized your own professional opinion. Now, General Maples? General MAPLES. Sir, I would make four points. The first is that we would embolden the jihadist movement throughout the world. They would see this as a victory and would move on to other areas that would threaten our national interest. The second is, it would establish Iran, I believe, as a regional power. That would not be in the best interest of the United States. The third is, I think there would be a great economic con- sequence potentially to this as well, most specifically from the threat to the production of oil and the impact that would have on economies. 176 The fourth point I would make is that I think it would also bring about instability in other countries in the region. Chairman WARNER. My last question, again to both of you. The most difficult challenge in many respects in the Afghan situation- and you indicated a decade, General, if I understood you, to bring about a stabilized country in terms of internal security such that their economy can begin to prosper and care for their people. But therein requires a resolution of this drug situation, which by any reasonable estimate is better than half of their gross national prod- uct, which is permeating throughout not only that region, the ill ef- fects of it, but much of Europe, who apparently receive a lot of the drugs. Who is doing what, and what must be done if it is not being done to begin in a reasonable period of time eliminate that aspect of the restoration of the nation of Afghanistan? General HAYDEN. Sir, I think you characterize the problem quite correctly. It is a massive portion currently of the real GDP of Af- ghanistan, and unfortunately that may not be by explicit choice, but many people in Afghanistan are pushed into that as the only viable economic opportunity they might have. So I would suggest to a first order rebuilding the infrastructure and providing the peo- ple of Afghanistan with alternative means of livelihood, be it farm- ing, extraction industries, and the like. That will require some in- vestment on our part. I have talked to the Afghan leadership in a recent visit. They un- derstand this. But it is almost the devil's own problem, Senator. Right now the issue is stability and a powerful anti-drug program going into, say, Helmand Province, which is probably the worst province there is right now in terms of opium production. Going in there and attacking the drug trade actually feeds the instability that you want to overcome. That is not a reason for not doing it. It just makes it even more challenging. Senator, there are a few other notes I would add, but perhaps in closed session I could add some of the other activities. Chairman WARNER. General Maples? General MAPLES. Sir, I would agree with General Hayden. The real issue is the conflict that you have in terms of the economics at the local level and what alternative crops, what alternative means of subsistence you could provide to the local populace. At- tacking the problem directly in terms of the drug trade at the same time would undermine the attempt to gain popular support in the same regions—a real conflict, I think. In terms of your question, there is a program that is going on in terms of ground eradication and there are several institutions that have been put together by the government of Afghanistan in order to try to begin to address the drug problem. There are related issues, of course, associated with drugs. It goes into corruption, it goes into support to the Taliban. So there are a number of issues that are associated there. Chairman WARNER. Thank you. Senator Levin. Senator LEVIN. Thank you. 179 General HAYDEN. Absolutely, Senator. Senator LEVIN. Do you have any assessment as to the direction, the current direction, as to whether it does not change, as to whether it leads to success or not? General HAYDEN. Clearly, as General Abizaid suggested this morning, the Iraqi government has to step up to some responsi- bility. I believe specifically he mentioned the army is gaining in ca- pability. It needs the political leadership from the central govern- ment in order to carry out its tasks. Senator, if I could just offer one additional thought, I know it is commonplace to say how complex, and so on, it is. We are asking these individuals, these new leaders in Iraq, to overcome their own personal histories. You have Sunnis who have never been in this circumstance, Shiites who have never been in this circumstance, and each of them thinking the other presents an existential threat to them. It is going to require, as General Maples suggested, all the tools we have to motivate them to make decisions that are clearly in their best interests for the long-term. Senator LEVIN. My time is up. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chairman WARNER. Thank you very much. Senator McCain. Senator MCCAIN. Thank you very much. Thank you, Generals, for being here, and thanks for your out- standing service. Let me give you a couple of proposals, General Hayden and General Maples. One is that we announce that in 4 to 6 months we are going to start removing troops from Iraq. What do you think of that idea, General? General HAYDEN. Senator, it is difficult for me to predict what that means with the situation being so volatile. I would attach it to a strategy. As I said this morning, things are changing. There may be places when we should be pushing where we have been pulling, running when we should be walking. But I would not want to just say, if we change this then what else would happen. I would rather work it from the other way around: what is the effect we are trying to create? Senator McCAIN. General Maples? General MAPLES. Sir, I believe that the coalition forces right now are the element that is keeping Iraq together and that their pres- ence is important for that factor alone. Four to 6 months from now, I do not know. There are so many things that need to happen, so many things that will happen, in the next 4 to 6 months. But the impact of removal of the forces I think will lead us to a greater level of violence perhaps in Iraq than what we are seeing now. General MAPLES. How about we partition Iraq into three dif- ferent nation states? What do you think of that idea? eral MAPLES. Sir, I think that is particularly problematic. In particular, I would see a problem in the western part of Iraq. As you partition that, the lead in the western part of Iraq would fall to jihadist groups. That would give them the base to conduct the kinds of external operations that they have said that they want to conduct. General HAYDEN. Senator, I do not even know how you would do it, given that a third of the population is in mixed urban areas. I just do not know how a partition could work. 180 Senator McCAIN. You mentioned, General Hayden, as did Gen- eral Abizaid this morning, it is time for the government to step up. What do we think when an American soldier is kidnapped, our military sets up checkpoints and barricades Sadr City, and then the prime minister orders us to stop that? Is that not a bit dispiriting? General HAYDEN. Senator, I am looking at it from a distance, so I do not know the tactical situation. On the face of it, I understand the question and I understand the response. We are dealing with a sovereign Iraqi government. We want them to step up. We want them to be independent, but independent in a way that expresses an Iraqi government rather than a government that is anchored in one of the factions. Senator MCCAIN. The suspicion is that this is the case, and that is obviously very disturbing. General Maples, is Anbar Province under control? General MAPLES. No, sir, I do not believe it is. Senator McCAIN. What about Ramadi and Fallujah specifically? General MAPLES. I think we have greater control in those two cit- ies. Senator MCCAIN. But in the province in general? General MAPLES. In the province in general, I would say not. Senator McCAIN. How would we fix that problem, since it has been in and out of control four or five times in the last 342 years that I know of? General MAPLES. Sir. I think it is going to take a combination of additional security forces. I think it is going to take leadership out of the tribal sheiks who are in that province. I think we need to interdict those elements that are influencing activities in Anbar Province from external sources to Iraq. General HAYDEN. Senator, I would reinforce one point- Senator McCAIN. I am sorry, go ahead. General HAYDEN.—that General Maples brought up, and that is convincing the local sheiks, the local tribes, that their interests are not coincident with the interests of al Qaeda. Senator McCAIN. We are not doing that now, right, General Maples? We are not doing that now? General MAPLES. Sir, there are some efforts that are underway with the tribal sheiks. In fact, there have been some recent suc- cesses along that line. Senator MCCAIN. So do you expect us to gain control of Anbar Province any time soon? General MAPLES. No, not over just the two successes. It is going to take a combination of things for us to gain the control. HAYDEN. Senator, if you look at that tactic, which I agree with, it shows the complexity of the problem. To the degree you empower the tribal sheiks to do that in al Anbar, what have you done to the authority and the sovereignty of the government in Baghdad? Senator MCCAIN. This of course brings me full circle, a sufficient number of troops. I will not belabor you with that any more. How would you describe, General Hayden and General Maples, today, in light of this really striking event of the kidnapping of 150 people in broad daylight in Baghdad today? When something like 181 that happens it really is an attention-getter, obviously. Go ahead, General. General HAYDEN. Sir, I think one of the words I thought you were going to come up with was "inexplicable.” Our station in Baghdad has a strong view on this. Their view of the battlefield is that it is descending into smaller and smaller groups fighting over smaller and smaller issues, over smaller and smaller pieces of ter- ritory. That event could probably best be explained by cir- cumstances that are well beyond our view at the national level. That is the product of the lack of governance and somewhat of the chaos that we are seeing there now. Senator McCAIN. Of course, the thing that is so disturbing is they were dressed in police uniforms apparently. Did you ever think about maybe just disbanding the police and using the mili- tary instead, instead of police? That is the case in some countries, where the army does all that kind of work. General HAYDEN. Sir, I do know if you just look at the tactical situation, we are using the Iraqi army for functions that are police functions in other areas. Senator McCAIN. Is it most disturbing that I understand the al Qaeda effect and I appreciate both of your comments. But is it not. most disturbing that what seems to be a rising level of violence, of sectarian violence? General HAYDEN. Absolutely frightening. There are historical forces that have been unleashed by what I referred to earlier, Sen- ator, as the satanic level of violence al Qaeda has inflicted on par- ticularly the Shiite population. Senator MCCAIN. Another probably uninformed comment. In Tur- key many years ago we bought up the opium crop, the poppies. Have we thought of that? General HAYDEN. I have not been privy to any of those discus- sions. General MAPLES. I am not aware. Senator MCCAIN. Because it certainly is pervasive today and it could turn it into a narco-state. But a lot of us are in it together, that is the good news, right? Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chairman WARNER. Senator Kennedy. Senator KENNEDY. Thank you very much. Thank you, gentlemen, for coming. Could I ask, of those that are being killed out here in this violence, what percent of those are for- eigners? General Maples or General Hayden? General MAPLES. In terms of foreign fighters? Senator KENNEDY. Yes, the fraction. . General HAYDEN. It is a small fraction, Senator. Senator KENNEDY. I had heard figures of 2 or 3 percent. Is that about the figure? . General HAYDEN. That is probably about-maybe slightly higher, but not much. . Senator KENNEDY. So the foreign fighters represent 2 or 3 per- cent and the rest of those that are involved in the fighting are the sectarian fighters? I am just trying to get some sense about who is involved in these. 182 General HAYDEN. I would agree that the rest of the fighters are from Iraq. Sectarian as opposed to al Qaeda may be a distinction that would be important to make. Senator KENNEDY. What do you say are the 2 to 3 percent? Are they the leaders of the 97 percent of the rest, or are they foot sol- diers? General HAYDEN. Two categories, Senator. A significant portion of the leadership of al Qaeda in Iraq is foreign and an over- whelming percentage of the suicide bombers are foreign, so they have an impact well beyond their numbers. Senator KENNEDY. So the ones, the 2 to 3 percent, that includes the suicide bombers? General HAYDEN. Yes, sir. Senator KENNEDY. So we have the suicide bombers that are part of it. But the rest of it therefore is the sectarian killings or conflict? General HAYDEN. Again, it is fighters- Senator KENNEDY. Indigenous effectively to Iran? General HAYDEN. The fighters are from Iraq. Senator KENNEDY. Iraq, rather, indigenous effectively to Iraq. General HAYDEN. Yes, sir. Senator KENNEDY. Iraqis against Iraqis? General HAYDEN. Yes, sir. Senator KENNEDY. Sunnis against the Shiite and the other groups. Now I am going to direct your attention to the National Intel- ligence Estimates (NIE). The last one was done on Iraq and was completed in July 2004, 2 years ago. August 3, the Senate approved an amendment that I offered with Senator Reed to the Department of Defense (DOD) appropriations mandating an updating of the NIE. This is to include the overall intelligence assessment. This in- cludes the prospects for controlling sectarian violence, the civil war prospects, the ethnic, religious, and tribal divisions, the prospects to disarm and demobilize the militias, likelihood of the government success in response to the Sunnis, a wide range of different kinds of requirements that you are all too familiar with. On August 4, the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) agreed to task the Intelligence Community (IC) to prepare it. They had said there had been numerous developments in Iraq since the last NIE in mid-2004, to include three political transitions. DNI be- lieves it is timely to prepare an updated estimate giving the op- tions and questions concerning Iraq. Two days ago we received a letter from the DNI informing us the National Intelligence Council, working with the IC, has been final- izing the terms of reference for the NIE and is beginning, it uses the word “beginning,” to work on the report, beginning to work on it. Is there any way that you can explain why the IC is dragging its feet on a new assessment of Iraq? We have the President now announcing that he is going to have his own assessment. You have the Hamilton-Baker Commission doing its assessment. We have a new Secretary of Defense coming in that will want the best in terms of intelligence. Why is there such dragging of the feet effec- tively in developing the NIE, which was so important really in 183 terms of the community and the policymakers' decisions about Iraq policy? General HAYDEN. Senator, I am going to go first and then I am sure General Maples will have a comment, because we both sit on the board that approves the NIEs. I would not, in all fairness, characterize it as dragging our feet. In fact, in terms of how NIEs are crafted, this one is more or less on a pretty fast track. I recognize the need for your committee, the rest of Congress, the Baker-Hamilton Commission, and others to have the benefit of the IC's thinking. That is happening in parallel. I can tell you, for example, that much of my remarks have been crafted on our participation in the working groups that are already under way to craft the final NIE. So although the final product, I am not sure when Ambassador Negroponte projected it, but if the final product is in January it does not mean that the thinking that has gone into that product will not be available, portions of it, a lot of it, prior to that date. Senator KENNEDY. General Maples, anything? General MAPLES. Sir, no. Senator KENNEDY. Just to add, these are the critical times, as we have been pointed out-major discussions in the Nation, the elec- tions, new Secretary of Defense, the Baker-Hamilton Commission making recommendations, the President doing his own kind of as- sessment on this. It is against the background, as has been talked about in the hearing, of these seizing of the Department of Edu- cation. I returned after our hearing just at about 2 o'clock and turned on CNN. CNN said 50 more bodies were found, bullet-ridden bod- ies, today. The Minister of Education has just resigned because of this, what is happening. There is a sense of urgency that is out there. This does provide the best in terms of the IC for the policy- makers. To the extent that you can give a greater sense of urgency in the preparation of it, I think the country would be well-served. General MAPLES. Understand. Senator, and we certainly Our analysts are already engaged in helping to prepare that. I have reviewed the terms of reference as well and made suggested changes to that, to the terms of reference. We certainly understand how significant this is to the Nation. Senator KENNEDY. Thank you very much for your service. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Senator INHOFE (presiding). Thank you, Senator. This morning I did not attend. I could not attend because I was chairing a hearing at the same time, and so I have more of my thoughts really that would be more appropriate for the first panel. Let me just try this on you. I think when it is suggested, as we have heard it suggested many times, that we change our s in Iraq and bring a lot of our troops down to Kuwait, have them deployed then to go back up there to put out fires. General Abizaid felt this would not work. You both agree with him on this, his answers? General HAYDEN. Yes, Senator. Senator INHOFE. The other thing that came up this morning- and I was not here, but they told me about it was the idea of in- creasing our embedding. Now, a minute ago we were talking about 184 Fallujah. I had occasion to be there three or four times, during all the elections, I might add. When General Madhi was in charge there, a guy, a general who really did not like Americans to start with, until we started, they started their embedded training with the Marines—and you can remember the story, that he said when they rotated them out they all got together and cried. They became very close. They thought that was a very successful program. Now, that is kind of a model in my mind of embedded training. When you say you might want to increase embedded training, are you talking about increasing the ratio of our troops or coalition troops or in- creasing the whole numbers to get more embedded training? General MAPLES. Sir, I believe the proposal is to increase the size and the capability of our military transition teams that are embed- ded with ISFs. I do believe that that is important to build gre capability for the ISFs in the near-term. Senator INHOFE. I agree with that. I just returned from my 12th trip to that region and I was in, mostly in Afghanistan during this time, with a rather larger group. As you will recall, General Jones had a group of the private sector over there, and we went to the Provincial Reconstruction Teams to see what the successes are. General Jones has a way of showing what has happened in Af- ghanistan. I think that is very good. He uses this chart that hope- fully some of our members up here have seen and of course you are very familiar with. [The information referred to follows:] Afghanistan Redevelopment Aghanista uilding Afghan Compact 2006 Judicial Counter Narcotics Reform Disamamen Demobilization Reintegration (DDR) Train the Afghan National Army Train Police Forces AN United Kingdom Lead Italy Lead Japan Lead Germany Lead United States Lead SECURITY SECTOR REFORM UNAMA-NGOS ISAF OEF INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY Senator INHOFE. His observation is, and I agree, when you look at the tasks—he had counternarcotics—the U.K. was supposed to be doing that judicial reform, that was Italy with the lead; disar- mament, demobilization, reintegration, that was Japan; training 185 police forces was Germany. But our function was to train the Af- ghan National Army (ANA). I would have to only give us a good grade on that. I do not think any of the other four pillars are being done and being done right. I was over there when we first turned over the training of the ANA to the Afghans and I saw a great deal of pride and I thought they were really doing the right thing. Do you agree on those five functions that we have done a pretty good job, that we are the only ones by comparison who have done a good job, compared to what the other nations have or have not done? General HAYDEN. I know our formal assessment is that the ANA is the best national institution in the Afghan Government. Senator INHOFE. I certainly think that General Jones agrees with that. He even made comments that really the military function is more over than some of the other functions. General Hayden, I wrote down that you said you understand that understanding al Qaeda is the key to defeating it. What do we least understand right now about al Qaeda? General HAYDEN. Actually, Senator, I think we know a lot, and obviously this is a work in progress and every day we understand it better. I think we understand the hierarchical structure that at- tacked us in 2001, and because of that we have attacked it and been very successful. We are building our understanding of what the President last October called those groups affiliated with al Qaeda and how they are connected. We now have underway—and this may be the long-term project and the one that is ultimately the war-winner-how do you understand the “inspired by al Qaeda.” Those are the groups that do not have a formal connection. You do not see the movement of people or money or supplies. You see the movement of ideas. How do you identify that and how do you counteract it? Senator INHOFE. Yes. General Maples, you said that Prime Minister Maliki must dis- member the militia. I look at someone like al-Sadr and I would as- sume that is one of the major militias that he would be talking about. You said in your statement that they are confused between them and the police. How are you going to correct that? Maybe what was suggested by Senator McCain might not be a bad idea, just get rid of the police and then at least everybody knows. Is that something you General MAPLES. Sir, I think there are major reforms that are needed in the Ministry of Interior and with the Iraqi police, and I think many of those actions are underway right now. But I think we have a significant problem with the Iraqi police, and as a result of that we have a problem with security, and local residents then turn to local groups, whether they be a watch or a militia, to pro- vide that security and basic services for them. That is what we have to overcome. If the ISFs, and I think they probably are, are our best means to achieve that, by continuing to build their capability and their ca- pacity to establish security, it will enable us to start having less of a reliance on watches and militias. 186 Senator INHOFE. I agree with that, and that reminds me that on several trips over there in talking to our military as well as their military and some of their leaders they have stated that if we get to the point where we have what would be comparable to 10 divi- sions of trained and equipped ISFs, which would be about 325,000, that we would then be in a position to start looking at the possi- bility that they would be able to take care of their own security. I know you cannot—it is a trap to walk into something to say so many, it has to be a specific number and that would equate to 10 divisions. But we are getting close, and every time I go over there and I see the quality of the training is so much better than you hear it is on the media—do you think we are getting closer now to the point where in terms of shear numbers, if we had them trained properly that that might be getting close to the numbers that we need for providing their own security? General HAYDEN. Senator, I will defer to General Abizaid and General Casey for the fine print, but yes. All the metrics in terms of training are all headed in the right direction. Senator INHOFE. If we had even thought that we would be this close-I understand right now the number is some 312,000. General HAYDEN. Beyond the raw military capacity, these armed men have to think of themselves as Iraqi rather than some other identity, and they have to be responsive to a government that iden- tifies itself as being a unity government for Iraq. Senator INHOFE. A couple weeks ago when I was in Afghani- Chairman, this will be my last question—there is this perception, this reality I guess, that al Qaeda is, getting back to Afghanistan, having a much larger presence there and they do that rms of using their three favorite techniques: the improvised explosive device (IED), the rocket-propelled grenades, and suicide bombs. They have escalated just rather abruptly, which leads me to believe that there is a greater presence. me believe that a lot of those are coming actually from Iraq. Any military group is finally going to wear down over a period of time and there are several who are speculating that might be hap- pening and that is why many of them are coming home and you are seeing a larger presence of al Qaeda in Afghanistan than we used to. Do you have any thoughts on that? General MAPLES. Sir, I have not seen any direct linkage to Iraq. We have seen from an al Qaeda standpoint increased al Qaeda ac- tivity, particularly in the eastern provinces, in Afghanistan. Senator INHOFE. Yes, yes, I know that is true. Thank you very much. General HAYDEN. Sir, I would just add that the connective tissue between the fight in Iraq and the fight in Afghanistan is al Qaeda. Although we may not see arms or individuals transitting from west to east, certainly the tactics and the lessons learned in Iraq are being applied in Afghanistan. Chairman WARNER. Thank you. Senator Reed. Senator REED. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, gentlemen, for your testimony. When I was last in Iraq in October, I got the impression from some of our American commanders that the ISFs were not sharing all the intelligence ke in E 187 they had with respect to the situation on the ground, the militias, insurgents. Is that an accurate assessment, General Hayden, Gen- eral Maples? General MAPLES. I think we are receiving intelligence from the ISFs. I do not know that their intelligence systems are mature enough at this point that we are receiving all the intelligence that they could provide to us. I know that at the national level with my counterpart that we need to develop some capacity and procedures with him. In fact, I have invited him to come back and to work those issues with us, to see if we cannot develop increased intel- ligence-sharing. I think that they have a lot of information that would be very valuable to us. We need to establish the means of our forces receiv- ing that intelligence. General HAYDEN. Senator, my relationship with my counterpart could serve as a model for what we want to do inside the Iraqi Ministry of Defense with our DOD forces. The sharing is direct, in- timate, and immediate. Senator REED. Do you have evidence of systematic ethnic cleans- ing in parts of Iraq? General Maples, General Hayden? General MAPLES. I have not seen necessarily systematic ethnic cleansing in that term. But I do think there have been directed at- tacks in multi-ethnic neighborhoods with an intent to probably drive families out of those neighborhoods. So whether I would cat- egorize it as ethnic cleansing, I am not sure. But clearly there are attempts to gain advantage from a territorial standpoint as a result of the sectarian violence that is going on. Senator REED. General Hayden, is that your impression? General HAYDEN. Yes, sir. I would not characterize it in s broad terms as ethnic cleansing. Clearly, at the local level there are attempts to move populations out of neighborhoods. We see that. To say that is a part of a broader plan of orchestrated and synchronized activity, I think that would be too far. Senator REED. Recently in October the assembly passed legisla- tion that Ambassador Satterfield pointed out would take 18 months to go in effect, that would allow essentially super-regionalization of the country. Do you think that is a positive development? General HAYDEN. All the devils are in the details with regard to that, Senator. I know the Shiites, many Shiites, have that as an idea, but even they argue among themselves. Is it three provinces? Is it nine provinces? And so on. We have a wondrous federal exper- iment and we still have a centralized government with a national identity. We cannot rule out that possibility in Iraq. But that is not the same as partition. Senator REED. Does it not complicate things a bit when you see that the most successful part of Iraq is the Kurdish area, which is virtually autonomous, which has its own militia, the Peshmerga, which has been operating to provide security, which is economically thriving? Is it not difficult then to argue that you really have to have a national non-militia force, that you cannot rely upon this re- gionalization? General HAYDEN. I understand the argument quite well. Again, I know you are not arguing for partition, which is something quite different. 189 gested to me in terms of the dynamic at work in Iraq today as being realistic. General HAYDEN. Senator, I will speak for myself personally and let Mike add. I have met with the leadership. Like all of us, they are products of their personal histories. But like most of us, these are pretty noble individuals trying to do the right thing. So that is where we are. Chairman WARNER. Thank you very much, Senator. Senator Sessions. Senator SESSIONS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and thank both of you for your service to your country and the count- less hours you have given to this important issue for United States policy, world policy, and world peace. I will go straight to a concern I have, and I think we have to con- front it. I think we can make real progress in this area, but I do not believe for some reason we are making sufficient progress. That deals with the arrest and release of people who we have evidence are connected to terrorist activities. We heard it in our last trip Senators Warner, Levin, Pryor, and I attended and we got a real passionate concern about it. I guess you would both agree that one of the things our soldiers are doing is identifying and apprehending dangerous people. Noth- ing could be more discouraging than to be successful in capturing someone significance and then have them released prematurely. If someone in the United States were involved, for the bombing of that building here, that individual would be executed. This is a se- rious thing, for somebody to be involved in an activity in a nation that kills innocent men, women, and children. There is no more horrible crime, if the nation has a system of law. So when I ask about this lawfulness and the ability to apprehend and deal with this in this state of extremity that Iraq is in. Fre- quently people tell me we are trying to establish a rule of law. First, I would suggest that it is an unlawful society when people can be captured and bomb and kill and then be released pre- maturely. That is unlawful in itself. First, do you think that is a problem? If so, how can we improve it? What do we need to do now to get this thing moving? Because I have been talking about it for over 3 years. General Taples? General MAPLES. Sir, I will start. I believe it is a problem, and it is a problem that we hear from our soldiers who go to great ef- forts to apprehend individuals who are involved in activities, only to see them back on the streets again. We hear that. Senator SESSIONS. Now, is this a result of American procedures or Iraqi failures? General MAPLES. Largely due to, as you mentioned, the rule of law and having a functioning judiciary within Iraq. Senator SESSIONS. Well now, how critical is this to the overall success? Because I believe it was General Abizaid in his opening statement, or maybe the Ambassador, that indicated that one of the reasons for the rise in the militia is the fact that people do not feel safe, that somebody blows up their family, their neig their sect, and nobody gets apprehended, so now some militia are coming along and just killing a bunch of people in retaliation. 190 Is that not kind of what we mean by sectarian violence, General Hayden? General HAYDEN. Yes, sir, that is it. It begets the circumstances you describe. For that individual, that is an incredibly logical deci- sion to protect his family. Unfortunately, it leads to very horrible things for the society when most of the nation does that. Senator SESSIONS. I do not think it is that difficult to fix this thing. I think they need to have in Iraq some clear laws, if you are caught with possession of IED paraphernalia, that ought to be a minimum of 20 or 30 years without parole or death penalty if you can tie them to the event, and some clear laws like that. We need to treat those cases somewhat differently than we do an Internal Revenue Service case in the Southern District of New York. This is a life and death situation in Iraq. Making a mistake can have deadly consequences. For example, the Marine Times publication said that one indi- vidual known as “The Beheader” had been released, a known beheader. Another one was a bomber who had been captured, been active in bombing, and as a result of some period of time he was released. They had already found his signature back in another city where he was undertaking bombing again. How can we get this—if this is a problem, as you suggest it is, how can we raise this up and do something about it? General HAYDEN. Senator, I will just add to what General Maples said earlier. This is fundamentally an issue of capacity- building inside the Iraqi government-a functioning court system, a functioning national police and orderly processes. Senator SESSIONS. Let me ask you, do you think the people that are trying to help the Iraqis set up a functioning court system are focused on a model of a court system in the United States and are not focused on the kind of model that is necessary to protect inno- cent men, women, and children in Iraq? Because it is quite a dif- ferent thing. General MAPLES. Sir, I am not sure the answer to that one. We would have to take that question and get back to you. [The information referred to follows:] The Defense Intelligence Agency has not assessed the model of a court system being developed in Iraq nor what model might be most appropriate for the Iraqi ju- dicial system and the Iraqi people. The Department of Justice may be better able to address this question. Senator SESSIONS. I hope you will because it is discouraging to me and I think we are at a point where some action needs to be taken, and we need to recognize that the same degree of judicial protections that we provide in a non-violent case in the United States may not be what is necessary. Some sort of military commis- sion or something in which the central government can come in and try these people promptly, give them a fair trial, and if they are guilty take substantial severe action against them. General MAPLES. Senator, I think you are right. You also men- tioned a very strong set of counterterrorism laws to take into con- sideration where we are in Iraq today, and that is very important to the Iraqi government. Senator SESSIONS. We have in the United States, if you are caught with an explosive device or an illegal firearm, you are guilty 194 I Senator GRAHAM. People who are trying to defeat democracy, yes. General HAYDEN. Now you are widening the circle. If you use in- surgents, those who are opposed to the coalition presence what do you think, Mike? General MAPLES. It depends on how we count the militias as a part of all this. Senator GRAHAM. People who are using violence to disrupt progress in Iraq. General HAYDEN. If that is your definition, Senator, it is tens of thousands. Senator GRAHAM. How many? General HAYDEN. Tens of thousands. Senator GRAHAM. Tens of thousands? 100,000? General HAYDEN. Again, Senator, I am sorry. I do not mean to dodge the question. But what portion of Jaysh al-Mahdi, the militia under Sadr, is under his control and therefore on a particular given day not attacking us; what are not and are out of control and are in essence lawless—that is why I think General Maples and I are a little reluctant to give a firm number. If you are talking about the insurgents in Anbar, those who are opposed to the allied presence, largely the Sunni, low five figures is the number I would give you. I am not trying to dodge you. I just do not- Senator GRAHAM. What number did you pick? General HAYDEN. 10,000 or so. Senator GRAHAM. 10,000. General HAYDEN. That is a pretty wide circle, people who are mad at us. That is not full-time fighters. Senator GRAHAM. So less than 20,000 between them and the for- eign fighters. Now, on the Shiite side, how many people are the problem in terms of using violence? We do not know, have no idea? General MAPLES. It is difficult to say. I would say that in terms of active within the militias you have probably a range of 20,000 to 30,000 if you combine all of that. But you have many more who are involved in the support mechanisms and providing support to both militia and to the insurgents as well, on the Sunni side as well. Senator GRAHAM. Okay. What percentage of the Iraqi people buy into our view of Iraq being a democratic functioning government? General HAYDEN. That is hard to estimate, Senator. I am sorry. Senator GRAHAM. Is it a majority? General HAYDEN. I think a majority of the people of Iraq, an overwhelming majority of the people of Iraq, want to live in a plu- ralistic society, want to live in a unified Iraq, want to live in a peaceful Iraq. Senator GRAHAM. So a majority, overwhelming majority of peo- ple, share the goal of a unified Iraq, not a partitioned Iraq. General HAYDEN. Unified, pluralistic, and peaceful. Senator GRAHAM. Why are they not doing better? General HAYDEN. That is a wonderful question, Senator. Tom Friedman asked that question in an article in the New York Times 2 or 3 weeks back. He talked about the absence of the center. The longer this goes on, the less controlled the violence is. The more the violence devolves down to the neighborhood level, the center dis- 195 appears and normal people acting not irrationally end up acting like extremists. Senator GRAHAM. Finally, would you agree that there are three groups in Iraq. There is a small minority who have taken up arms for religious or ethnic purposes to destabilize the government. Some of them are foreign in nature. The second group are very brave people who are volunteering to be the judges and the lawyers and they are getting assassinated. The third group is the over- whelming majority who are keeping their powder dry because they are afraid to come forward. Is that fair? General MAPLES. Sir, I think that is probably a pretty fair state- ment. I think there are a relatively small number who are actively engaged in the conflict. I think you are exactly right, there is a small number that is trying to provide the leadership and bring the country together. Senator GRAHAM. Why do we not as a nation throw everything in the world that we have at this small group so that the majority will come forward? Why are we treating this in such a police action fashion if it is indeed the central battlefront on the war on terror that will dictate the region for years to come and humanity as we know it? Why are we having this stupid debate about number of troops if we do believe that it is the central battlefront in the war on terror and bring aid to the people who are trying to fight and change Iraq? Why are we stuck on a troop level that is not work- ing? General HAYDEN. Sir, obviously—and I think General Maples has said the same thing—that is a policy question, not exactly in either of our job descriptions. Senator GRAHAM. What is your advice? General HAYDEN. I would offer the view that, again as I tried to state in my opening comments, a lot of the issues here are driven by deep historical forces that have been unleashed by the toppling of the Saddam regime. At the end of the day, Senator, this has to be won by the Iraqis. Senator GRAHAM. Is it your advice as CIA Director that this is the central battlefront in the war on terror? General HAYDEN. Our enemy believes it to be so and has said so. Senator GRAHAM. Do you believe it to be so? General HAYDEN. It is an absolutely critical battlefront in the war on terror. Senator GRAHAM. Would it be your advice to this committee to throw everything this Nation has into winning this battle? General HAYDEN. I would advise the committee to do everything within our power to use our power wisely to win this battle. Again, Senator, what I was trying to articulate before: At the end of the day, an American face will not be present on victory here. It must be an Iraqi face. Senator GRAHAM. Thank you. Chairman WARNER. Senator Lieberman, would you indulge me? Senator LIEBERMAN. Of course. Chairman WARNER. I think we should also explore—that is a very important line of questions. Time and time again we are told by well-informed witnesses that the presence of U.S. troops engen- ders a lot of the fighting, and if we are to increase the numbers 196 the perception is we are there to stay, we are there to be perma- nent conquerors or however they want to do it, and this could begin to increase the numbers of the persons antagonistic against us. Is that not part of the equation of thinking that has to be looked at in the context of raising our troop level? General HAYDEN. Senator, earlier I said not one narrative ex- plains the war, and it depends on which narrative you want to lay out as to how much our troop presence generates opposition. For that one narrative about opposition to foreign occupation, which has been a powerful narrative, an American face on security carries with it its own costs and its own countervailing pressures. I would also say that the American presence there gives life to al Qaeda propaganda that they misuse and misrepresent to the larger Arab world. The more they can put an American face on the activity in Iraq, the more they are served by it. General MAPLES. Sir, I think it is a valid point in some factions that the U.S. presence is the issue that they are trying to deal with, and removing the coalition is exactly what they would like to achieve, but not for the same purposes that we want to achieve it. Their purpose in removing the coalition is to enable their own ob- jectives, and here I largely refer to al Qaeda in Iraq. I think in some cases the Shiite, that is the case also, so they can further their own goals. General HAYDEN. What has happened, Senator, in the last 6 to 10 months—and I heard this alluded to this morning—is that you had that violence there that was generated by al Qaeda. You had that violence there that was generated by just opposition to our presence. That has remained. That has not gone away. What has I to it is the Iraqi on Iraqi violence that the sectarian divisions have created, and hence my comment earlier, not one plot line describes this. Chairman WARNER. Thank you, Senator. Senator LIEBERMAN. Thanks. Senator LEVIN. Would my good friend yield for one additional question? You have been very generous. Senator LIEBERMAN. In the spirit of bipartisanship that I espouse, how could I say no? [Laughter.] Senator LEVIN. Just a comment also on Senator Graham. You have both testified, have you not, that a political settlement is the only way to achieve success, a political settlement between the Iraqi factions is the only way to achieve success in Iraq? Have you not testified to that? General HAYDEN. Senator, that is absolutely correct. I will add one caveat. Without sanding off the edges Senator LEVIN. Add all the caveats you want. . General HAYDEN.—you put on there, there is a certain level of security required to create the conditions for a political settlement. Senator LEVIN. I understand that. General HAYDEN. Yes, sir. Senator LEVIN. With that one condition, that a political settle- ment is essential, it is the key to a success in Iraq? General MAPLES. I agree. General HAYDEN. I agree. added to it is the 197 Senator LEVIN. I thank our friend, who always espouses what we all aspire to, which is bipartisanship. Chairman WARNER. The chair will very generously give you an added minute. Senator Lieberman. Senator LIEBERMAN. Thank you, sir. You have a big heart. Thank you. This series of discussions, Senator Graham, Senator Warner, Senator Levin, has been most interesting. I appreciate your answer because obviously this will not be solved without an Iraqi political settlement, but if there is no security there will never be a political settlement, nor will the economy have an op- portunity to rebound. So it has to be all of that together. These are tough questions—I was thinking about it because in one sense we do hear, as you said, that the presence of American forces makes some Iraqis angry. But on the other hand, General Hayden, how are we going to get that center to come together and stand up against the extremists if there is no security? Right now I think we are critical to that security, because the Iraqis cannot handle it on their own. I did want to ask in that regard—incidentally, I thought you were both very compelling in response to Chairman Warner's ini- tial questioning, I believe, about the consequences of a failure in Iraq for us. We have a lot on the line here. So we tried to talk a little bit about how do we succeed. I believe you both indicated that you felt that the military transition teams, that is the Americans embedded with the ISFs, were one of the most successful things happening there now in terms of our involvement. Am I right about that? General HAYDEN. Yes, sir. Senator LIEBERMAN. General Abizaid said that today, too. There- fore would it be fair to assume that—and we talked about this today, too—that the more that we can do, the more likely we are sooner to get the Iraqis to a point where they can take over from us on the security front and we can begin to lessen the number of American troops we have there? From an intelligence point of view—I am not trying to get you into policy here—I do not see how we can increase the number of American troops embedded with the ISFs, which seems to be work- ing now, without increasing the total number of American forces in rag, because if we are taking them from elsewhere is that not going to leave that elsewhere, like Anbar Province, subject to catas- trophe or at least chaos? In other words, based on intelligence, on that question, the nar- row question of increasing the number of American troops embed- ded, would you say we need more American troops there? General MAPLES. Sir, it really depends on the analysis by the command of the troop-to-task ratio that they have to have. They out the tasks they have to accomplish and how many troops will be required to successfully accomplish those tasks. Senator LIEBERMAN. I understand, you are not prepared to an- swer. General MAPLES. Senator, I am reluctant, but I will give you per- haps a factor that will be used, that is very important. As you do 198 that, you actually increase the combat power of the Iraqi unit that you have stiffened, so to speak, with the U.S. presence. Senator LIEBERMAN. Exactly. General MAPLES. So you may actually be able to buy a great deal more of combat power and buy down the political cost of our pres- ence. Senator LIEBERMAN. Exactly, because our troops are in those cases within the Iraqi forces and they become a force multiplier for the Iraqis. We will come back to that. I want to ask you about Iran, because you both talked about Ira- nian activities in Iraq being significant and growing. Can you talk a little bit more about that? What are they doing? How many Ira- nians would you say are in Iraq now and what are they up to? General HAYDEN. Sir, I can give you more details in closed ses- sion. There is a significant Iranian presence in Iraq. I do not want in any way to say that all of that is in any way illegitimate. Much of that would be the presence that any neighboring state with in- terests in Iraq would have. But as time has gone on, the amount of Iranian involvement with the Shiite militias of all stripes, which has been quite a new development, the provision to them-let me just s s in a general way—the provision to them of capabilities that have been used against the coalition has been quite striking. I will admit personally, Senator, that I have come late to this conclusion, but I now have all the zeal of a convert as to the ill ef- fect that the Iranians are having on the situation in Iraq. Senator LIEBERMAN. Yes, absolutely. I appreciate your saying that. I would like to go into it further in closed session. Let me give you a statement and then ask you both to respond to it, which is that in Iraq, Iran has absolutely the opposite goals that we have. Our goal is to help the Iraqis form a free, unified, stable, multi-ethnic government. The Iranians want just the oppo- site. They benefit from the chaos now and in fact if the whole thing fell apart they would probably come in, either directly or through the Shiite militias, and control a big part of Iraq. True or false? General HAYDEN. Tough, tough question for an Iranian policy- maker. The chaos there aids and abets them in their broader “rela- tionship,” that word in quotes, with the United States. Their per- ception is it punishes us, it ties us down, it makes us less capable of doing other things. That is their perception, I believe. On the other hand, I can see this happening in the Iranian equivalent of our National Security Council, Senator. On the other hand, I do not think they want Iraq to fracture. I think they want it to be unified. A democratic Iraq will be an Iraq in which the Shi- ite have a reasonably strong voice. Senator LIEBERMAN. This is a really interesting question, be- cause I guess the question is, because we know that Iraqi Shiites are different from the Iranian Shiites. Obviously the Iranians are Persians, the Iraqis are Arabs, but they have a theological dif- ference, too. So would they really want a unified democratic, pre- sumably pro-American, Iraq? I ask all these questions and I am going to ask you to respond, General Maples, because I am con- cerned as we begin to raise the possibility of talking directly with 199 Iran about Iraq, because I think I worry that we have very dif- ferent ambitions there, very different goals. It is one thing to talk to the other Sunni Arab countries to play a larger role—the Saudis, the Egyptians, the Jordanians, the Gulf countries—because they have similar and in fact anti-Iranian views, General, but I never would hesitate to talk to anybody be- cause, thank God, we are a strong enough country to talk. But I would be real skeptical about anything good coming out of the talks with the Iranians, particularly now after the Europeans have spent 3 years negotiating with them on their nuclear program and they have not done anything. You had a great phrase. It was a “triumphal”—what did you call it? General HAYDEN. "Dangerous triumphalism.” Senator LIEBERMAN. The Iranians are beginning to show a dan- gerous triumphalism about their role in the Middle East. They are beginning to think of themselves as dislodging us, and that is bad news for the region and for the world, and of course for us. General Maples, did you want to respond, and then my time is up. General MAPLES. Sir, our assessment is that Iran would like to have a stable government in Iraq, but they clearly want it to be Shiite-led. Senator LIEBERMAN. Thank you. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. Chairman WARNER. Do you have a question, Senator Levin? I thought I would ask just one. I was particularly struck with your observation that the de- Baathification, or exactly how you phrased it, is still a very formi- dable deep concern among the Iraqi people, which contributes to their insecurity and their fear to step forward as individual citizens and try and take more responsibility in their neighborhood and other foras. Am I correct in that? General HAYDEN. Sir, I think what you are saying is that I would say the course of de-Baathification is a current, vibrant issue for the present government. Chairman WARNER. Do you concur in that? General? ral MAPLES. I do. sir. I think the fear is a return of the Baathists to power. On the other side, the fact that the former Baathists are disenfranchised and have no ability to contribute is an issue on the Sunni side. Chairman WARNER. Let me ask this question. Assuming that, and in no way do I infer by the question that any measure of due process should be denied Saddam Hussein. But we have followed this rather extraordinary exercise of their concept of due process. A sentence of death has been pronounced. Presumably the appel- late process and other things will take place. If after the flow of due process in an orderly way he is hung or otherwise put to death, would that help alleviate this serious prob- lem of fear that the Baathists might return? General HAYDEN. I cannot rule out that it could, Senator. I will say that the capture of Saddam-at that time, if you recall, the issue there was Sunni violence. It was far less of Shiite violence. It was all the provocations from al Qaeda and so on. The capture 200 of Saddam did not in and of itself reduce Sunni violence at that time. So I would say perhaps it is a possibility, but not a sure thing certainly. Chairman WARNER. Do you have any views, General? General MAPLES. Sir, I would expect that, particularly from a Shiite viewpoint, right now that carrying out a sentence would probably not eliminate the fear of a return of Baathists to control of Iraq. Chairman WARNER. Thank you very much. Gentlemen, we have had an excellent hearing. We will now go into closed session in SH-219. We are adjourned. [Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:] QUESTION SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JOHN ENSIGN COUNTERDRUG 1. Senator ENSIGN. Lieutenant General Maples and General Hayden, given the many problems in Afghanistan associated with the cultivation of poppies there, would it be worth instituting a program similar to what the U.S. did in Turkey in the 1980s whereby we purchased the poppies to keep them off the open market? Please elaborate on the pros and cons of undertaking such a program for Afghani- stan. General MAPLES. Widespread poppy cultivation in Afghanistan remains a difficult problem for the Afghan Government and the international community. DIA judges a program of purchasing opium to keep it off the open market ultimately would like- ly increase rather than reduce the amount of illicit opium available for the drug trade. Supporters of a program to buy opium from farmers at farm-gate prices (the price paid to farmers at the time of harvest) argue all of the opium could be purchased for the amount spent to eradicate less than a tenth of the 2006 poppy crop. These supporters also believe Afghanistan would be competitive with other countries in producing licit opium for the pharmaceutical industry. In addition, supporters argue the poppy crop could be more easily reduced if it were regulated; noting those farm- ers with cultivation permits would not defend illicit producers. DIA assesses a farmer compensation program would be very costly for donors and the licit opium market. The program would be difficult to enforce owing to geog- raphy, instability, and corruption and it would encourage farmers to expand cultiva- tion. • Buying all of Afghanistan's illicit opium would require a major financial investment. The United Nations estimates the farm-gate value of Afghani- stan's 2006 opium production to be $760 million. Unless international do- nors are willing to subsidize an expensive annual program to purchase and destroy the entire crop, a compensation program of this magnitude could be financed only through licit sales of pharmaceutical opiates. The influx of ad- ditional opium most likely would flood the medical market, which probably is not flexible enough to accommodate Afghanistan's production while com- peting with prices drug traffickers offer. • Afghanistan's geographically dispersed poppy cultivation and labor-inten- sive harvesting process would complicate efforts to prevent diversion of licit opium to higher paying drug markets. A lack of government security forces and insurgent influence in areas of elevated opium production would im- pede access to farmers. Widespread official corruption would also hinder ef- forts to regulate the industry. • Creation of a compensation program would provide a strong incentive for many new farmers to begin planting poppies and for many existing poppy farmers to increase their cultivation because poppies still would be much more profitable than other licit crops. Afghan farmers could substantially expand poppy cultivation beyond the 3 percent of arable land currently used, thereby increasing the cost of compensation. General HAYDEN. [Deleted.] rices drug traffick dispersed poppys to prevent diversity sine harvesting procent drug markets. avated opium productialso hinde 201 c-mm in Afghanistan. Moreover, there. Maples, I una QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR DANIEL K. AKAKA AFGHANISTAN 2. Senator AKAKA. Lieutenant General Maples, I understand that we are losing ground in Afghanistan. Moreover, the Taliban is gaining more influence and author- ity while Karzai's government is losing the hearts and minds of the people. What efforts are being done to address this matter? General MAPLES. The Afghan Government and the international community have made efforts to address the threat posed by declining popular support for President Karzai's administration. DIA judges root causes of decreasing support for the central government include fear of a resurgent Taliban, doubts that the Afghan Govern- ment can defend against this threat, concerns about endemic government corrup- tion, the slow pace of reconstruction, and the lack of economic opportunities. The international community and the Afghan Government are addressing each of these factors. • Efforts to Improve Security. With the support of other members of the international community, the United States is training and equipping the Afghan National Army as well as other elements of the Afghan national se- curity forces. However, these forces remain challenged by resource short- ages, high attrition rates, corruption, and tense relations among security forces. NATO's International Security Assistance Force also conducted a se- ries of counterinsurgency operations this year aimed at denying insurgents safe-haven and freedom of movement in southern and eastern Afghanistan. Gains made this summer and fall, however, have largely been offset by ro- bust insurgent recruitment and propaganda efforts. • Efforts to Improve Governance. The Attorney General of Afghanistan is in the process of conducting a campaign aimed at addressing corruption within the government. DIA believes this campaign will help restore some confidence in the legitimacy of the administration. In addition, President Karzai has taken steps to replace corrupt or ineffective governors, including reassigning the former Governor of Herat, Ismail Khan, whom many saw as a divisive figure. However, this effort remains limited by the lack of edu- cated, capable, and trustworthy political leaders. • Development and Reconstruction Efforts. The United States, with support from the international community and nongovernmental organizations, has worked to extend reconstruction and development assistance to garner pop- ular support. This includes establishing provincial reconstruction teams that engage with the local people to provide development projects: paving of the Ring Road around Afghanistan and numerous community aid projects. Unfortunately, the unstable security situation, particularly in the south and southeast, has slowed some of these efforts. Finally, the U.S. Agency for International Development's Alternative Livelihoods Program, designed to accelerate economic growth in Afghanistan's principal poppy- producing provinces and at-risk areas, has shown progress in irrigation de- velopment, road construction, cash-for-work, and agricultural assistance. Despite these efforts, the continued dearth of alternative economic opportu- nities may have contributed to record poppy cultivation in 2006. Sageli onemos pero ad forts tribu have contribut continued dear hork, and agress in irrigati IRAQI DEATH SQUADS 3. Senator AKAKA. Lieutenant General Maples, did our efforts to train Iraqi per- sonnel as law enforcement and military create recruits for the death squads that have been tormenting many Iraqi communities? General MAPLES. [Deleted.] [Whereupon, at 4:35 p.m., the committee adjourned.] PENN STATE UNIVERSITY LIBRARIES A 000061490321