4.F 76/1:IR 1/17
IRAQ
BRIEFINGS AND HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
JANUARY 17, JANUARY 19 AND FEBRUARY 28, 2007
Serial No. 110–17
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IRAQ
WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 17, 2007
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:05 a.m. in room
2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Tom Lantos (chairman
of the committee) presiding.
Chairman LANTOS. Committee on Foreign Affairs will please
come to order. We are particularly honored this morning to have
not only the first lady Secretary of State in American history to
honor us with her presence, but we are delighted to have one of
this Nation's most outstanding academic experts on foreign affairs
appear before us.
Madeleine Albright and I share many things. Although we have.
not yet decided whether the city of Prague or the city of Budapest
is the preeminent city of the continent, we both come from the
same neck of the woods, and it is the ultimate tribute to the open-
ness of this society that a talented extraordinary lady from the city
of Prague could ascend to the position of first ambassador of the
United States to the United Nations and then Secretary of State
of this great Nation.
And I know from countless conversations with Secretary
Albright, there is nothing in her life she is more proud of than hav-
ing represent, having represented the United States at the highest
levels with so much grace, diplomacy and effectiveness.
I want to welcome the new members of the committee, and we
will have a formal introduction of all new members when the com-
mittee will have organized since we still have a couple of vacancies
to be filled by the Speaker.
We anticipate our first organizing meeting to take place next
Tuesday, at which time, all new members of the committee will be
properly acknowledged and introduced.
We are extremely anxious and eager to use the time this morn-
ing first to listen to and then to engage in a dialogue with our most
distinguished former Secretary of State.
So I shall forego my opening comments and urge all of my col-
leagues to do likewise. I will call briefly on my good friend and the
distinguished ranking member, Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, and for what-
ever observations she would like to make. Then we will turn to Sec-
retary of State Albright, and if any member would like to make an
opening statement, we will insert those statements in the record.
Congressman Ros-Lehtinen.
Duuced.
(1)


,
3; }
Ms. Ros-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman, and wel-
come, Madam Secretary. I look forward to engaging with you in
some questions about the Iraq study group recommendations that
you might make for future action in the President's plan. Thank
you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman LANTOS. Madam Secretary, we ask you to deal prin-
cipally with the subject of Iraq. But this is an unruly crowd, as all
Members of Congress are, and you may be getting questions on
Iran or North Korea or our relations with China or Russia or Ven-
ezuela. I can't predict. Knowing you and knowing your encyclopedic
knowledge of the issues, I know you will be able to handle every-
thing with great aplomb. It gives me extraordinary pleasure to in-
troduce our former Secretary of State, Secretary Albright.
STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE MADELEINE ALBRIGHT,
FORMER SECRETARY OF STATE
Ms. ALBRIGHT. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman and let me
also congratulate you.
Chairman LANTOS. Could you hold for a second because we need
to activate your mike.
Good, please.
Ms. ALBRIGHT. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and let me,
in turn, congratulate you on taking the chairmanship. We have
known each other a very long time. I respect your knowledge and
do share with you the admiration of the United States for letting
people like us take leading roles. And so I am delighted to be able
to testify in front of you and Congressman Ros-Lehtinen, it is a
pleasure to see you again. We have done a lot of work together and
delighted to see you in the position of ranking, and members of the
committee, many of whom I have worked with and are very good
friends.
I am pleased to return to these familiar surroundings and to
have the opportunity to testify regarding United States policy to-
ward Iraq.
To maximize time for discussion and I am happy to take ques-
tions on anything, I will speak both plainly and bluntly. There are
no good options.
At this point, we can go or stay, deescalate or surge, change our
tactics or not, and disturbing even horrifying events will continue
to occur.
The goal of our policy must be to minimize the damage. The
question is how.
The first step is to clarify what our interests are. Three night-
mares come to mind.
First, an Iraq that serves as a recruiting ground for al-Qaeda;
second, an Iraq that is subservient to Iran; third, an Iraq so torn
by conflict that it ignites a region wide war.
As a direct result of U.S. policy, all three nightmares are pos-
sible. We have brought a lot of this on ourselves.
In so doing, we have our Armed Forces in an absurd position,
and like many of you, I have talked to some of the Iraqi leaders
who have come through town. The Sunnis want our troops to pro-
tect them from the Shiites, and the Shiites want us to get out of
the way so that they can consolidate their power.
om : :-
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om I
Sy


What sense does this make? Is our mission to play the role of
hired gun for one side against the other? Is it to be a referee trying
to prevent mayhem in a game without rules? Or is it to protect all
sides from violence by all sides.
That is impossible.
I desperately want General Petraeus and our forces in Iraq to
succeed. Those troops are the finest in the world and will accom-
plish any mission that is within their power. But it is the responsi-
bility of civilian authorities to assign them missions that they can
achieve.
I agree with the President. It would be a disaster for us to leave
under the present circumstances. But it may also be a disaster to
stay. And if our troops are no longer in a position to make the dif-
ference, we have an overriding moral obligation to bring them
home.
James Baker and Lee Hamilton recommended a more limited
role for the United States troops.
Their view, which I share, is that Iraqis must take responsibility
for their own security because although we can assist, we cannot
do the job for them.
We don't have enough people. We don't speak the language. We
don't know the culture. And quite frankly, we do not have the rec-
ognized authority to go into Iraqi homes and order people around.
Each time we do, we lose as much ground politically as we might
hope to gain militarily. This is crucial because if there is to be a
solution in Iraq, it will come about through political means.
An arrangement must be worked out that will give each side
more than they can obtain through continued violence.
If Iraq's leaders should decide to move in this direction, we would
likely see progress on the security front.
And I think the American people would be more patient about
the continued presence of our troops.
But from the evidence thus far, this is neither a likely outcome
nor one we can dictate. For better or worse, the Iraqis think they
know their own society and their own interests better than we do.
They have responsibilities to each other that they must meet, but
no reason, based on our recent record, to take our advice. They
have no appetite after Abu Ghraib and Haditha to listen to our lec-
tures about human rights. And they know that President Bush has
ruled out leaving, so where is our leverage? And that is why the
President's speech last Wednesday night should be viewed less as
a statement of policy than as a prayer.
It was not about reality. It was about hope.
But hope is not a strategy.
Iraqis will continue to act in their own best interests as they per-
ceive them, and we must act in ours.
And this begins with the fact that Iraq is not the central front
from the war against those responsible for 9/11. It remains, in-
stead, the main distraction from that war. Iraq's Sunni insurgents
may be terrorists, but their goals are local and national, not global.
There are elements of al-Qaeda in Iraq because, to a great extent,
because we are there. As for Iran, its influence on its neighboring
country is inevitable. But no Arab population will take orders from
Iran if it has an alternative.


The bottom line is that there must be a political settlement in
Iraq that will end the civil war and reduce the level of insecurity
to something that can be managed. Over all, despite the fact that
I am an optimist, I am not optimistic about this.
I do, however, oppose efforts at this point to cut off funds for
military operations in Iraq. There are more constructive ways to
express concern about administration policies.
Mr. Chairman, and members of the committee, America's own
War Between the States lasted about as long as the current war
in Iraq. It went on so long that Abraham Lincoln said in frustra-
tion that the Heavens were hung in black. We might say the same
today.
I see profound problems ahead, but I have confidence in the resil-
ience of our Nation. We can, in time, regain our balance and re-
store our reputation.
All that is really required is that we live up to our own principles
and that America become America again.
I know that this is primarily about Iraq. But I feel very strongly
at the end of my oral testimony that I need to say something about
Iran.
There is no question that Iran is a terrible problem given its nu-
clear ambitions and the ridiculous statements that President
Ahmadinejad has been making and the interference in Iraq and
going around the world making various deals.
But that does not mean that we should not talk to them. I do
think that the ideas that are in the Iraq Study Group are worth
pursuing. I think we have to get out of the concept that talking is
appeasement and immediately putting forward what they would
want from us as a reason not to talk.
That I don't think is a good way to even begin.
The Iranians may not want to talk to us, but if we would, in fact,
say that we are prepared to have discussions on all issues and they
then decided not to talk to us, they would be at fault and it would
not be us that are isolating ourselves but them that would be iso-
lated. So if I might suggest, I think it is important to figure out
how we got into the war in Iraq and I think it is very important
to figure out what to do now.
But I think it is also very important for Congress to ask what
is going on about Iran.
Why didn't the President accept the recommendations of the Iraq
Study Group and on the contrary, why has his message become so
belligerent? Why is a carrier group being sent into the Gulf? We
got into a war in Iraq on the basis of false information. We cannot
let our relationship with Iran deteriorate even further. And as Sen-
ator Biden said in the Senate, the President does not have author-
ity to go into Iran. So may I respectfully suggest that there be over-
sight hearings on what the role of Iran is and what the plans of
the administration are about Iran?
Thank you very much and I now would be very happy to answer
whatever questions.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Albright follows:]


:
PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE MADELEINE ALBRIGHT, FORMER
SECRETARY OF STATE
Good morning, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee.
I am pleased to return to these familiar surroundings and to have the opportunity
to testify regarding U.S. policy toward Iraq.
To maximize time for discussion, I will speak both plainly and bluntly.
There are no good options.
If there were, many of us would not have objected to the timing of the invasion
in the first place.
At this point, we can go or stay, de-escalate or surge, change our tactics or not,
and disturbing—even horrifying-events will continue to occur.
The goal of our policy must be to minimize the damage.
The question is how.
The first step is to clarify what our interests are.
Three nightmares come to mind.
First, an Iraq that serves as a training and recruiting ground for Al Qaeda.
Second, an Iraq that is subservient to Iran.
Third, an Iraq so torn by conflict that it ignites a region-wide war.
As a direct result of U.S. policy, all three nightmares are possible.
We have brought this on ourselves.
In so doing, we have put our armed forces in an absurd position.
In Iraq, the enemy has been variously described as the supporters of Saddam
Hussein, Al Qaeda, the Sunni insurgency and Shiite militias.
Our ally, presumably, is the government which includes people responsible for
those Shiite militias.
The military and police, which we have tried to train, include many good soldiers,
but also kidnappers, killers, torturers and thieves.
If I were a soldier in Iraq, I wouldn't know whom to shoot at until I was shot
at, which is untenable.
Like many of you, I have talked to some of the Iraqi leaders who have come
through town.
The Sunnis want our troops to protect them from the Shiites and the Shiites want
us to get out of the way so they can consolidate their power.
What sense does this make?
Is our mission to play the role of hired gun for one side against the other?
Is it to be to be a referee trying to prevent mayhem in a game without rules?
Or is it to protect all sides from violence by all sides? That is impossible.
I desperately want General Petraeus and our forces in Iraq to succeed.
Those troops are the finest in the world and will accomplish any mission that is
within their power, but it is the responsibility of our civilian authorities to assign
them missions that it is reasonable to hope they can achieve.
I agree with the president it would be a disaster for us to leave under the present
circumstances.
But it may also be a disaster to stay—and if our troops are no longer in a position
to make the difference, we have an overriding moral obligation to bring them home.
James Baker and Lee Hamilton recommended a more limited role for US troops-
with an emphasis on training, working in tandem, and providing a back up rapid
reaction capability.
Their view, which I share, is that Iraqis must take responsibility for their own
security-because although we can assist—we cannot do the job for them.
We do not have enough people; we do not speak the language; we do not know
the culture and, quite frankly, we do not have the recognized legal and moral au-
thority to go into Iraqi homes and order people around.
Each time we do, we lose as much ground politically as we might hope to gain
militarily.
This is crucial because, if there is to be a solution in Iraq, it will come about
through political means.
This has been obvious for years.
An arrangement must be worked out that will give each side more than they can
obtain through continued violence.
Such an arrangement would allow the Shias to look forward to majority control
in a major Arab country for the first time in 800 years.
It would give the Sunnis minority rights, including the security they need from
Shia militias, a role in the police and military, a fair deal in Kirkuk and a healthy
share of oil.
The Kurds would be assured of a high degree of regional autonomy and continued
significant representation in the national government.
us What senssion to plaferee tryinh violenced our forile accompian auth


principle think in could be Americae Nationaal beganna, parliands of bana
atsary to
and Hezbollah are Shia). We must be mindful of the interests of all factions and
willing to talk to every side, but our message should not vary.
We should pledge support to all-Sunni, Shia, Christian, Druze, Jew, Arab, Kurd,
Persian—who observe territorial borders, honor human rights, obey the rule of law,
respect holy places, and seek to live in peace.
: Third, congress should continue to support efforts to build democratic institutions
in Iraq including the next step_provincial elections. Though the odds seem long,
the best news coming out of Iraq these past few years have been the rounds of bal-
loting, the approval of a constitution, the convening of a national parliament, and
the beginning of a multi-party system. Given where Iraq began, these events have
occurred with startling rapidity. As chair of the National Democratic Institute, I am
not neutral about this but neither is America. It was always unrealistic to believe
that a full-fledged democracy could be created in Iraq even in a decade. But it is
equally unrealistic to think that a stable and peaceful Iraq will ever be created if
democratic principles and institutions are not part of the equation. Security is nec-
essary to create democracy; but in the long run, democracy will be essential to cre-
ate real security. Give up on democracy and you give up not only on Iraq, but also
on America.
Fourth, we should make one more effort to encourage others, especially our NATO
allies, to expand training assistance to Iraq's military and police. Every country in
Europe has a stake in Iraq's future; every country should do what it can to help.
- Finally, we should call on religious leaders from all factions and faiths to take
a stand against the violence in Iraq. Given our own lack of credibility, we can't get
too close to this initiative without poisoning it—but there are figures of respect,
Mustafa Ceric (Grand Mufti of Sarajevo), Mohammed Khatami (former president of
Iran), King Abdullah of Jordan, Malaysian Prime Minister Abdullah Ahmad
Badawi, Ayatollah Sistani—who might be able to articulate the religious case for
reconciliation in Iraq. It's worth a try. Everyone is so convinced they have God on
their side; we should at least make the case that God is on the side of peace.
At the same time, we should re-iterate our own pledge—on moral grounds—to
minimize harm to civilians and guarantee humane treatment to prisoners. An ele-
ment of confession in this would not hurt.
The bottom line is that there must be a political settlement in Iraq that will end
the civil war and reduce the level of insecurity to something that can be managed.
With a settlement, we could withdraw gradually, with mission accomplished. With-
out a settlement, our troops can do little good and might as well come home sooner
rather than later. In that case, we should do all we can to help the Iraqis who have
taken risks to support us these past few years.
Overall, I am not optimistic. I do, however, oppose efforts at this point to cut off
funds for military operations in Iraq. There are more constructive ways to express
concern about administration policies.
Mr. Chairman, America's own War Between the States lasted about as long as
the current war in Iraq. It went on so long that Abraham Lincoln said in frustration
that the Heavens were hung in black. We might say the same today.
I see profound problems ahead, but I have confidence in the resilience of our na-
tion. We can, in time, regain our balance and restore our reputation.
All that is required is that America become America again.
We must use the full array of our national security tools.
We must live up to our own democratic principles.
We must, in the words of John Kennedy, pursue peace as the necessary rational
And we must honor the men and women of our armed forces by ensuring that
they have the right equipment, the right leadership AND the right missions.
Thank you very much, and now I would be pleased to respond to any questions
you might have.
Chairman LANTOS. Thank you very much, Madam Secretary, and
as always, you didn't pull any punches. We are deeply in your debt
for a straightforward, very candid, very substantive presentation.
Let me begin by agreeing with you that there are no good solu-
tions. You cannot unscramble an omelet. And while many meas-
ures currently being proposed could have been useful 4 years ago,
their usefulness is now purely a theoretical possibility.
I remember flying over a good part of northern Iraq with General
Petraeus in his helicopter as he pointed out to me large ammuni-
C
.
end of ratst, in the to our own of our naticome Amerie


10
IDI
And one of the reasons that I believed, and I said in my testimony,
it is important to have provincial elections so that people can get
closer to it. But we can't expect instant democracy. But I don't
think we should give up on democracy either.
And what troubles me so much is that our campaign in Iraq has
given democracy a bad name. It is associated with militarism. You
cannot impose democracy. That is an oxymoron. You can support
and promote.
And I hope very much that we understand that America will al-
ways be a beacon of democracy and that we can provide support
for something that is a long-term process and that democracy has
to deliver. People want to have a life in which they feel secure and
can earn a living as well as vote.
Chairman LANTOS. Madam Secretary, one of the very specific
suggestions you made a few moments ago is that you oppose cut-
ting of funds for the military operations in Iraq. Since this is clear-
ly one of the top items on the agenda of the Congress, would you
be willing to expand and elaborate?
Ms. ALBRIGHT. Well, I, as I also stated, I have the highest admi-
ration for our military.
I think they have done an incredible job with an impossible mis-
sion that has been, in many ways, incoherent. We are askin
ng them
to sacrifice on behalf of all of us, and I think we have a moral obli-
gation to support them. I think the question is what one does about
increasing numbers of troops. But the current troops that are there
need to be supported. I do believe that it is worth considering a cap
on the number of whatever the surge is, and I am opposed to the
surge as I clearly stated. But I think that one has to be very care-
ful before cutting off funds for troops that are over there fighting
on our behalf.
Chairman LANTOS. Let me press you a little bit on that. I don't
think anyone is recommending, or I have seen no one recom-
mending cutting of funds for the troops in the field. But the issue
relates to the authority to increase the number of troops of cur-
tailing, or preventing funds from flowing for a surge. How would
you deal with that issue?
Ms. ALBRIGHT. Well, I think, Mr. Chairman, I think one of the
approaches, and I know that there are numbers of different
thoughts here, is to put a cap on the number of forces that should
be in Iraq, and that is one way to limit the number—the amount
that would be spent on additional numbers.
To me, the surge makes absolutely no sense. I think as Senator
Durbin said, it is too small a number to make a difference and too
many to die, and/or to be involved in an incoherent mission.
So, I do know that Congress has the ability and the requirement,
through purse strings, in order to look at this very carefully, and
I think the hard part here for all of you is how to distinguish sup-
port for the current forces from those that might be added, since
some of them have will have been redistributed from somewhere
else and, perhaps, be taken out of Afghanistan to put into Iraq.
So, I think the question is how you distinguish the mission and
which part of it you would pay for and which you would not. But
I think that there are ways that Congress can do this.


12
I have—you commented that my statement was characteristically
blunt. I have talked to many people, leaders abroad, that I have
not liked or not agreed with.
And therefore, it is possible to have pretty direct conversation
and say what you think, but you can't do it if you are not talking
to them at all.
And I think the designation of the axis of evil was one of the big-
gest mistakes that was made, not that all three countries are not
in some form or another propounding policies that we don't like,
but simply saying that they cannot be talked with is counter-
productive.
I have some experience in terms of trying to deal with Iran, be-
cause we were, during the Clinton administration, we did try to de-
velop dialogue with them. They are very difficult. There is no ques-
tion about that.
They have ways of preventing discussion, as you have pointed
out, but I think that we are isolating ourselves at the moment if
we decide that we don't want to talk to them.
They definitely are in a position-frankly, I think they are the
ones that have benefited the most from the war in Iraq and they
are taking advantage of it. They are obviously, the statements that
President Ahmadinejad has made are unacceptable, but there are
those within Iran that are expressing somewhat different views in
a very difficult way.
So I don't think we should just decide because they are difficult
or saying things we don't like that we will not at least try.
And I do think they are responsible for some horrendous state-
ments on issues of the Holocaust or generally about the existence
of Israel. But I think we need to go past that, at least in the ideas
forward and not do frankly what the administration is doing, is ba-
sically setting up arguments about why we never should talk to
them and the kinds of statements that the President has made as
well as Secretary Rice has made, which make it seem as though
it is even hard harder to begin the talks.
So you don't have to like them. You don't have to agree with
what they are doing. But I think it is worth putting talks without
preconditions on all subjects on the table and let's see where it
goes.
Chairman LANTOS. Well, I fully agree with you, Madam Sec-
retary, but let the record show that it takes two to tango. And if
the Iranian authorities refuse to issue visas for Members of Con-
gress who wish to engage in a dialogue, they share in the responsi-
bility of preventing a dialogue. And this is the case as of this morn-
ing. And I hope the Iranians are watching and listening and will
change this singularly counterproductive policy, because I stand
ready to take a delegation from the Foreign Affairs Committee to
Tehran at any time for a serious dialogue without any pre-
conditions.
But in order for members of this committee to engage in a dia-
logue, the Iranian authorities must be willing to invite Members of
Congress to Tehran so the dialogue can take place.
Ms. ALBRIGHT. I fully agree with you.


13
Chairman LANTOS. Thank you very much. I am delighted to turn
to my friend and colleague, the ranking member, Mrs. Ileana Ros-
Lehtinen.
Ms. Ros-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman, and wel-
come, Madam Secretary, it is a pleasure to see you again. You tes-
tified that you agree with the President; in your own words, it
would be a disaster for us to leave under the present cir-
cumstances, and as you pointed out, you also testified that you do
not support withholding appropriations.
I am proud to say that my stepson, Doug and his wife Lindsay,
both served in Iraq as Marine pilots and they joined many other
brave Americans in ridding the world of the regime that was re-
sponsible for so many atrocities against the Iraqi people, and for
my family members who could be returning, the prospect of Con-
gress withholding funds is worrisome.
So my first question, Madam Secretary, is, would you please tell
us what is at stake if we were to pull out of Iraq precipitously; and
secondly, you had been in favor of troop increases before, but now
you are critical of President Bush's plan. If you can tell us what
has changed in your views? Thirdly, about the Iraq Study Group,
Madam Secretary, that report places a security and stability on top
of the list of priorities in Iraq without significantly reducing the
level of sectarian violence and effectively fighting the insurgents
and their death squads. There is no doubt that little progress can
be expected in establishing peace and stability in Iraq. And as a
part of the effort to stabilize Iraq, it is essential that the Iraqi Gov-
ernment reach a power sharing agreement with secular and mod-
erate leaders so that major issues such as oil revenue distribution,
is quickly resolved.
And in the Iraq Study Group, and the administration agrees,
that addressing these issues would likely lead to a significant re-
duction in the current level of insurgency and instability in Iraq.
The President's plan also calls for doubling the number of provin-
cial reconstruction teams, to bring together military and civilian
experts to help Iraqis strengthen the moderates, pursue national
reconciliation, and accelerate the pace so that we can have self reli-
ance of the Iraqi people.
Given your particular expertise, Madam Secretary, could you am-
plify your recommendations for specific benchmarks that we should
require of the Iraqi leadership and to what extent should we link
progress on the Iraqi political front to our support on this the secu-
rity front? And also, Madam Secretary, could you—
Chairman LANTOS. If I may interrupt my good friend, and, this
is a caution to all members of the committee, I want to be totally
fair to all members of the committee. Every member is allotted 5
ot 5 minutes to present the questions and then have
another 5 minutes to listen to the answers.
So I will count obviously the time that it takes to raise the issues
against your 5 minutes, because otherwise, we will be here ad infi-
is unfair to the junior members of the committee be-
cause the Secretary, at a certain point, will have to leave.
So while I certainly won't penalize my friends and colleague, I
want to caution all members that the longer your questions, the


14
:
"
less time there will be to answer them, and I will cut off each mem-
ber's time at 5 minutes.
Ms. Ros-LEHTINEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Do you have a
count of how long your opening repartee was?
Chairman LANTOS. We do.
Ms. Ros-LEHTINEN. You do. May I ask what it is?
Chairman LANTOS. It is exactly the same length of time.
Ms. Ros-LEHTINEN. It is sort of unusual to interrupt me in the
middle of mine to make that statement but-
Mr. ACKERMAN. Welcome to the minority.
Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. I don't think that Mr. Chairman Hyde and
Mr. Lantos had that difficulty, Mr. Ackerman. Thank you. But fine,
I will just leave it at that, Mr. Chairman, and just one minor note.
When you talked about the Israeli Palestinian issue and linking it
to Iraq, I believe that so many countries and leaders of institutions
have used that linkage as an excuse to wash their hands of respon-
sibilities that they might have to help the Iraqi people achieve
peace and stability. And I will shut it off.
Ms. ALBRIGHT. Congresswoman, I also said it would be a disaster
to stay under the current circumstances. I think that we have an
incoherent policy toward Iraq. I personally have not been for in-
creases in troops. My position on Iraq has been is—and I said this
from the very beginning—that I understood the why of the war be-
cause Saddam Hussein was a terrible person, and all the things
that President Bush said. But I did not think that Iraq was an im-
minent threat.
I did think that Afghanistan was the problem from whence those
who hit us on 9/11 came and that we should have kept our eye on
the ball, so I didn't understand why now and I certainly did not
understand what next. Because those are the issues that I have
been involved in when we were in office in post conflict resolutions
and there was no plan and that is what we are suffering from now
in terms of a lack of understanding of the sectarian issues that you
have raised or understanding the divisions between the Shi'as,
Sunni, and their religious basis to those, and there has been no
plan.
I have been very worried about the reconstruction units because
as I understand it, part of the problem is that many of our political
people that are there are within areas like the Green zone where
there really is not enough contact with the Iraqi people.
The problem that we have is we are involved in the worst chick-
en and egg problem that I can ever think of, which is you cannot
do anything unless you have security. And the security situation is
constantly deteriorating. And the only issue here and the one that
I think we have to work on is to realize that there is not a military
solution to this problem, that the only solution is a political one.
And rather than being a cheerleader for Prime Minister Maliki,
we need to press and suggest ways for a political settlement, which
is why the question about using religious leaders, using other coun-
tries to help, but we cannot make Maliki do anything.
But we don't have to cheerlead for him, when he makes his state-
ments.
I think, as I made very clear, there are no good options here, and
the question is, how to minimize the damage and how to leave in
")


16
II
IU
and my positions have not been cleared by the bureaucracy of the
State Department.
So I am speaking for myself here.
I think that what needs to happen is that we need to look at the
various problems of the Middle East separately but also as a re-
gion. I personally think that it would be very useful to have a large
view of what the issues are and to think about having Summit
meetings and regional conferences than a major push in diplomacy.
Part of that would be the Middle East peace process, because I
agree with you that on itself, on its own merit, it is essential to
deal with, but it is also being used by a lot of players within the
system as an excuse.
And so for 2 reasons, it would—or many reasons—it would be
good to solve it and to take away the excuse issue, but primarily
for the people of Israel and the Palestinians.
And so that would be a key part.
But I think we need to begin to look at some kind of a new secu-
rity system within the Middle East. Part of the problem with Iran
is that they need to both feel that they are a part of the Middle
East, but also bear responsibility for some of the things that are
going on. You can deal with any issue by separating it into all its
little parts and deal with one part at a time, or you can have a
large agenda and do a series of negotiations to do dea
particular issues. That is what I would recommend.
But it requires a belief in diplomacy. It requires diplomats who
really want to get in there and roll their sleeves up and spend days
and months in the area, looking at Israel's relationship with Syria,
as well as with the Palestinians, looking at what Iran's role in the
21st century is going to be, understanding the role of Turkey in the
region, understanding the Shi’a-Sunni split, and I think there is a
need to look at this as a regional issue with full understanding of
the details of every one of these countries. And I don't think—the
idea would be nice if they were all democracies, but there are not
a lot of countries that are looking at Iraq at the moment and think-
ing I want my country to look just like that.
So it is not a great advertisement for democracy. And I do think
there needs to be a larger approach to all of this.
Chairman LANTOS. Mr. Smith. .
Mr. SMITH OF NEW JERSEY. Thank you, very much. Madam Sec-
retary, welcome, once again, to the committee. In your written tes-
timony, you mentioned that the United States should be more en-
gaged in an effort to resolve the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. You ex-
plain exactly what steps you would take in resolving the conflict.
If you could comment on how the United States should deal with
the Hamas-lead Palestinian authority, and secondly, if you would
elaborate on your statement that the question of the Golan Heights
must be addressed.
What exactly do you mean by that?
And third, Î, too, like many colleagues, have serious, troubling
questions about the surge. You, however, a year ago in an op-ed in
USA Today on January 25, 2005, advocated for achieving success
in Iraq by admitting mistakes, increasing troop levels to secure key
areas and creating an economic reconstruction program to employ
and feed Iraqis, thereby undercutting insurgents recruiting. My


17
question is would you have supported the surge if it was a year
ago, which the op-ed clearly seemed to convey, or is it the timing?
What is the problem with the surge now? And I ask this very sin-
cerely, because, like I said, many of us have some very real trou-
bling questions about it.
Ms. ALBRIGHT. I think on the Middle East peace issue, first of
all, when we left office, we were pretty close to some kind of an
agreement on a variety of issues to deal with the Middle East.
I would have hop
ve hoped that some of those initiatives would have
been picked up and worked on for 6 years.
Congressman Berman mentioned dealing with the Palestinians
prior to Hamas winning. I fully agree, it would have been very
helpful to give greater support to President Mahmoud Abbas and
to give him an ability to show that democracy did deliver.
He was not, I think, supported enough.
I also think that as I mention in my testimony, it is absolutely
essential, Middle East is the bread and butter work of the Sec-
retary of State. And it is absolutely essential that it be done all the
time, either by a peace team that is very much there in a variety
of ways, and it needs constant work. And I think that as I men-
tioned, you know, it is a good sound bite, but it happens to be true,
the road map was never taken out of the glove compartment.
So I think that there was not enough work done. I personally
think that it would be useful to try to figure out ways to create jobs
for the Palestinians, there is a huge unemployment rate of very
young people.
I am part of the Aspen Institute effort to try and get Palestinian
Arab and Israeli businessmen to create jobs both in Gaza and on
the West Bank. I think that is very important.
And I think we have to show that, as I said, democracy has to
deliver.
And I think that has not happened enough. I am very glad that
Secretary Rice is there now. It needs attention-
Mr. SMITH OF NEW JERSEY. If I could interrupt briefly, but on
Hamas, what do you recommend we do?
Ms. ALBRIGHT. I am the one who put Hamas on the terrorist list,
so we cannot deal specifically with Hamas. I do think, however,
that there are others that can, in many ways, try to do something
akin to what happened in Ireland is to try to figure out politically
how to separate some of the more peaceful aspects
violence so that the violence was not used as a tactic by Hamas.
We could spend a long time on this, but I want to answer your
question. My op-ed that I wrote
Mr. SMITH OF NEW JERSEY. If I can interrupt again on the Golan
Heights.
Ms. ALBRIGHT. I am sorry, on the Golan Heights, I was very in-
terested to read in the papers today actually that there have been
some private discussions between the Israelis and Syrians on the
Golan Heights with very close, looks to me from the newspapers,
to the ideas that we had, which was a way that the Golan Heights,
there would be agreement on the line, there might be the possi-
bility of creating a peace park—we were almost there on that also,
there were just several hundred yards that divided us, and it is a
matter of putting some of those ideas back on the table.
m
the


18
.
And I think it is important because Israel, I believe in the exist-
ence and security of Israel, it is essential to the way that we all
see our foreign policy and the security of the Israeli people and try-
ing to work out on the basis of those ideas I think would be a very
good idea.
Which leads to the other point, which is, there is no reason in
the fact that we are pressing Israel and Syria into—I am sorry,
Iran and Syria into some kind of an alliance. We should be dealing
with Syria also.
My op-ed was written in early 2005, really before there was a
civil war.
And that, I think, in many ways, the mission at that time made
a certain amount of sense.
I think that as the insurgency increased, and I don't want to see
our troops trying to figure out who we are supposed to hit. They
are unfortunately in the middle of insurgent and civil war fighting.
And I think that was my perspective.
I think that it would have been helpful a long time ago to have
a better plan for reconstruction.
I think part of the problem was, as I said earlier, I was among
the people, I call us the former people, that were asked to come
and be briefed at the Pentagon before the war started, and I spe-
cifically asked what the timeline was on reconstruction and on
post-conflict part of Iraq. I could not get an answer.
There was no timeline. There was no sense of what the next
steps were going to be. And I don't think we did enough on the re-
construction. But it is so easy to go back and look at all the mis-
takes. I know it can be done about any number of things.
I think the problem is now that we need to figure out a way that
our forces are not there in the middle of a civil war and we need
to press for a political settlement. It is very important. And we
need to look at a regional aspect and we need to ask questions
about what we are doing about Iran and Syria.
Chairman LANTOS. Mr. Ackerman.
Mr. ACKERMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The former Secretary
of Defense told us that you go to war with the army you have, not
the army you want.
The President of the United States told us that he is listening
to the generals in the field.
The difference is that when he doesn't have the generals that he
wants, he just replaces them to get the advice that he has already
decided.
Generals Abizaid and Casey seemed to have gotten the Shinseki
treatment, the President replaced them.
First could you comment on whether or not an increase in our
troop strength will indeed result in an increase in violence? And
my second question is I think a bit heavier, and it goes to the crux
of theory, philosophy and what the heck are we doing now. You are
right, democracy is not the answer.
Somehow sanity is the answer.
The world is confronted by people who are driven by either evil
or God. And I have no problem with people who pray. They can
pray all day and talk to God all day. I have a problem with the


19
people that God then talks to and directs to do things that are not
very, very sane.
Hitler was elected democratically. He was directed by evil.
So many people today are directed by God.
I think North Korea is an easier do for us because it is really
in negotiation. And while they might be bad, I don't know that they
are pure evil, and they are certainly, they certainly have no belief
in any God.
How do we deal with people? And I believe, as do you, and as
has also been championed by Chairman Lantos that the
Churchillian advice that jawing is better than warring. How do you
compromise by people who are driven either by evil, or religious
convictions that tell you that they have to annihilate an entire
other people? How do you negotiate with that?
You know, we didn't talk, as you point out, to certain factions if
they—like Hamas, because they were terrorist organizations. How
do you talk to a compromise with a government that is a terrorist
state? Do you say, okay, we will allow you to kill half the world's
Jews? Or cut up Israel into factions? Drive them halfway off the
planet? How do we sit down? And I know we have to find opportu-
nities to do something. But where do you begin a compromise with
people like that?
Ms. ALBRIGHT. Well, first of all, I think that it is one thing to
talk; it is another to give in. I am not suggesting compromise on
issues that are of vital importance to us, whether it is their ambi-
tion to have nuclear weapons or obviously their destruction of
Israel. I do think that what has to happen is that more enemies
are being created than we are capable of dealing with at this point
in time. I think that is the tragedy of our times, and what I would
have suggested as far as Iran is concerned, there was a period
shortly during the beginning of the Afghanistan war where there
were a number of issues on which we agreed with the Iranians, to
look for areas where there can be some agreement on common in-
terests, but it does not mean giving up on your principles. I would
never advocate that, but we aren't getting anywhere in terms of
our relationships, not only with Iran but with other countries be-
cause we are looking as though we are isolating ourselves.
You know, the role of God—this is what I was examining in this
book, the role of God and religion in policy is actually not new. It
has been something that has motivated the United States for a
long time. I went back, and I looked at our history. And President
McKinley, for instance, thought it was our duty to Christianize the
Philippines even though they were Catholic or perhaps because
they were Catholic. And so they—this is not something new. Wood-
row Wilson was also somebody who felt that God had a role in our
policy. I think the question is how you look for the various aspects
of commonality among people instead of just the differences. I have
not turned into a religious mystic, and I am not a theologian, but
I do think that there are ways that we need to begin to parse the
issue that there are Iranians, for instance, who would like to see
some change. And it is not beyond the intelligence of American dip-
lomats to try to parse some of this.
Chairman LANTOS. Mr. Pence.


21
I have to say that I have worked in Congress; I worked for Sen-
ator Muskie. I understand the role of Congress. I teach about this,
and I was Secretary of State. So I have looked at this issue of what
roles, who has what, quite a lot. And clearly the way that the Con-
stitution is set up and is described in some books, it is an invita-
tion to struggle. There is no question about that. What I think
needs to happen in terms of not getting into a constitutional argu-
ment-I think this is a great debate. It is very important. I wish
we had had this debate 4 years ago where there really were ques-
tions about why we went into this war, were the facts accurate?
And to have a—and I happen to be a great believer in bipartisan-
ship, in having this kind of a debate. I think the President, you
know, he is the Commander-in-Chief, and I remember we were in
the middle of the war in the Balkans when I was summoned up
here in order to discuss whether there should be a cut off of funds.
It is not easy when you are in the executive branch, but what has
happened, frankly, Congressman, is that there has not been a great
interaction between the two branches in the last—or an ability to
have an open discussion representing the will of the American peo-
ple, and so I do think—I don't question the power of the Com-
mander-in-Chief, but I also urge all of you, all of you on both sides
of the aisle to ask a lot of questions. It is not much fun when you
are sitting here representing the administration, I can tell you
that. I have been through that, but it is what the job is about, and
it makes you really rethink what you are saying. It makes the bu-
reaucracy become active in terms of providing answers, and it is
what America is about. It is an open dialogue about how, what our
role in the world should be, and also how we use our forces, and
that is what we should be doing.
Chairman LANTOS. Mr. Faleomavaega.
Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Madam Secretary, I thank you for making this appearance before
the committee. And I do want to thank you for the most eloquent
commentary of the mess that we have created in Iraq. I am re-
minded of one of Clint Eastwood's cowboy classics called, The Good,
the Bad and the Ugly. The good is that we got rid of the brutal
dictator Saddam Hussein, although he was not responsible for the
attacks of 9/11. It was Osama bin Laden and his al-Qaeda group,
and today we are still looking for Osama bin Laden. The bad in
that, as a result of our waging war against Iraq, we have caused
more tension in the Middle East than ever before, we are now occu-
piers and not liberators as some of our neo-conservative leaders
managed to persuade our President to believe that. And we went
into this war based upon false intelligence, false information and
simply going through this whole ordeal on the cheap. And by not
having enough military force structure, as General Eric Shinseki
rightly stated, you cannot fight a war with only 9 divisions when
you need to have 12 divisions to do the job. And ugly now because
it has cost 3,000 lives of some of our finest soldier who have made
the ultimate sacrifice to our Nation, and let alone some 20,000
wounded and maimed for life, not even accounting for some 50,000
Iraqi lives that we have cost in this mess that we have caused.
Can you share with us, Madam Secretary, and I am having a lit-
tle problem, how would it be possible for us to send 20,000 addi-


23
a position or does not have the will or doesn't have the support or
doesn't know how to build coalitions, whatever. At the moment,
things do not seem to be working, and I think that is part of the
issue here. Plus there seems to also be a disagreement between
how he would use forces and the way that the United States used
forces. We celebrate the fact that he was popularly elected, and
then we expect him to do exactly what we want. So it is part of
the-I could do a whole testimony on the paradoxes of Iraq, and
that is certainly one of them.
Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Thank you very much.
Chairman LANTOS. Mr. Rohrabacher.
Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much. Madam Secretary, you
mentioned thator you compared our situation to a scrambled
in a ham and scrambled egg omelet.
Chairman LANTOS. That was my statement.
Mr. ROHRABACHER. That came from the Secretary.
Ms. ALBRIGHT. I make omelets, too.
Mr. ROHRABACHER. Let me note that the Chairman made that
comparison, but that comparison, if we have to look back and find
out when this omelet first began to take shape, that Madam Sec-
retary, you were the chef at the stove. The eggs were cracked when
you were Secretary of State. You mentioned that 9/11 came about
because of what was going on in Afghanistan, not Iraq. And let us
note, Madam Secretary, that you were at the helm; you were mak-
ing the decisions when the Taliban was established. And you were
making the decisions that kept the Taliban basically from being
overthrown earlier on in the regime. You, actually, were the person
who established the Taliban policy that was still in place at 9/11
because this administration didn't act to change that when they
first came in.
Let us also note that I don't find anything incoherent about our
policy. It may not be working, but our policy is coherent, and it is
also transparent as compared to the policies that were in place
when you were Secretary of State, toward the Taliban and toward
bin Laden. Let us note that when Ben Gilman was chairman of
this committee and I was a member of this committee, we asked
you, we quired and requested on several occasions information
concerning your policies on the Taliban. We were met with a stone-
wall, Madam Secretary. We did not get cooperation. You had any-
thing else but a transparent policy, anything but a coherent policy
as the Taliban then began to offer themselves as a basis of oper-
ation for bin Laden who eventually did attack on 9/11.
With that said, let me go on to some specific questions that you
have raised today. I have not forgotten that Mr. Smith has brought
forward the fact that, just a year ago, you were advocating an in-
crease in the troop level, which that was not answered. And let me
note that, in your testimony, you had suggested that you were op-
posing the introduction of a carrier, another aircraft carrier. How
do we expect to have any negotiations in the Middle East without
actually giving our President or this administration or anyone who
is negotiating for us the leverage they need with the extra military
presence, whether it is an aircraft carrier or a surge in Iraq? And
let me just note that while you suggest that you were supporting
our effort there, I don't believe that it does any good to the United


25
that we are should all be in a position to not only discuss where
we are in Iraq now but also look to what are the thoughts on Iran.
Chairman LANTOS. Mr. Payne.
Mr. PAYNE. Thank you very much. It is always good to follow my
colleague from California. He is amazing. It is almost like Rip Van
Winkle. You know, Rip Van Winkle, when he went to sleep, King
George was the head of the United States; his picture was on the
wall. When Rip Van Winkle woke up, George Washington was
President. He had slept through a revolution, and it seemed like
these past 6 years reminds me of Rip Van Winkle. You criticize the
former Secretary of State.
Let me just bring out a couple points. I really wish I had more
time, but one, when the roadmap was that close, when the two Pal-
estinian authorities were that close to coming together, the Bush
administration said, you know what, it is too much pressure. Let
them just go and decide for themselves, and when they want to get
together, they will come together. A year and a half wasted, and
we have the situation that we have today. Absolutely insane.
Number two, we had six-country talks with North Korea, but
also, we had bilateral talks, and you know, there was not the situa-
tion with North Korea is even telling us now. Let me tell you
something, Iran is at least trying to lie. They are saying we want
this for domestic consumption. North Korea says, you know what,
we are doing this, we are making a bomb, no question about it. But
we decided to drop the six-country—the bilateral talks and only
leave it up to the six-country talks. Another mistake.
The whole question of the support for 9/11, the world was on our
side. We had a golden opportunity, but Rumsfeld said there were
no good targets in Afghanistan. He had this flip way about himself.
And so we go into Iraq. Inspectors there, Hans Blix was given full
authority. Of course, Saddam had denied the inspectors in the past,
so he violated some U.N. resolution, saying that the inspectors
should be able to go anywhere. But then Saddam, knowing he had
no weapons of mass destruction or biological or chemical weapons,
said, okay, inspectors, you can go all the way. Well, the bluff was
over. What did we do? President Bush orders the inspectors out in
48 hours so he could have his shock and awe and mission accom-
plished. Absolutely the worst foreign policy that I have seen in my
life, and then you talk about, why would we talk about Abu
Ghraib? Because if we are going to wallow in the gutter with the
worst in the world, then how deep have we gone? I mean, even in
Dante's Inferno, there are only seven levels of purgatory. Could we
farm an eighth? It makes no sense at all. It is ridiculous. I have
never heard anything so strange.
Even taking Somalia, all of a sudden, the United States Govern-
ment decides we are supporting the warlords. Who are these war-
lords? They are the same ones who brought the Black Hawks down,
remnants of the same clans. So all of a sudden just because Islamic
Courts Union is in all of Somalia, 99.9 percent Islamic, so it is not
that you have got some persecution of Christians. We, therefore, go
and support the warlords, pay them money, equip them, and now
we are saying, well, there are three al-Qaeda operatives in
Mogadishu, and that is right. They have been there for 10 years.
They have been there with the support of the warlords that we are


26
paying and supporting to have this current program going. Those
al-Qaeda people should have been gone after 10 years if we knew
they were there. They said that there is a training camp near the
border of Kenya. This has all been controlled by the ones we are
backing now to try to oust the Islamic Courts Union, which has
stopped the piracy, which has taken the warlords off the streets.
So then we encourage Ethiopia to invade Somalia, and we send in
troops. When we try to get the United States to at least have a no-
fly zone in Darfur not to send troops but just to say, like we did
for the Kurds in Iraq, you can't come over this border—we don't
put a troop on the ground. But we send troops into Somalia to look
for three guys where 450,000 people have been killed.
Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Mr. Chairman, is the gentleman's time up?
Chairman LANTOS. The gentleman's time has just expired.
Mr. PAYNE. Let me conclude by saying that I do think that when
we compare your time as Secretary of State to the current 6 years,
I think that there is absolutely no comparison.
Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Time's up.
Chairman LANTOS. Mr. Manzullo.
Mr. Royce.
Mr. ROYCE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you, Madam Secretary. There is much that I agree
with in your testimony, but I have to say that some of your terms,
frankly, are surprising and, Madam Secretary, I think unnecessary
and I think harmful. As mentioned before in your written testi-
mony, you state, we cannot celebrate an elected Government in
Iraq and then demand that it act like performing animals in our
circus. And I guess my point is what would be the point of that
rhetoric? In one part of your testimony later on, you celebrate
democratic progress in Iraq, yet I think that is lost. I certainly
think it would be lost to Iraqis because you have told the world
that America has demanded that the elected Government in Iraq
act like a performing animal in a circus.
You know, let's criticize the shortcomings. The President, the
President has admitted shortcomings, and you and I agree on a
number of those shortcomings, but it seems that we should check
the rhetoric so as not to disrespect the fundamental goal of pro-
moting democracy and stability in the eyes of Iraqis. And I would
like to give you the opportunity to clarify your circus remark on
that.
And then I would like to just say, we can debate what is the cen-
tral front, but it seems to me that you agree that al-Qaeda in Iraq
is a concern. I would like to know how you think we should best
address this threat. Does a U.S. withdrawal help or hurt? And then
you place an emphasis on reaching out to NATO allies. I am for
that, but I think you are right that they have a stake in Iraq's fu-
ture, but this committee has been frustrated by NATO's shortfall
in Afghanistan let alone Iraq. So this recommendation sounds a bit
fanciful. And again, as you said, hope isn't a strategy. So I would
just like your observations on that.
Thank you, Madam Secretary.
Ms. ALBRIGHT. I think that what has troubled me a lot is this
paradox of being pleased at a democratically elected government,
a sovereign Government in Iraq, and at the same time following at
-
I


28
I believe we should talk to Iran, but the fault is in Tehran. Sec-
retary Rice has offered to go anywhere and talk about anything
with the Iranians so long as they suspend their nuclear enrich-
ment, uranium enrichment during that process. If the Iranians
were serious about talking to us, they would agree, talk with us ex-
peditiously. And then if the talks didn't go anywhere in the first
week, they could always go back to enriching uranium. They did
suspend enriching uranium for a while in order to talk to the Euro-
peans. Instead, my fear is that the talk about talks followed by the
talks themselves will provide cover for the uranium nuclear enrich-
ment program. There are those that want us to go well beyond
talks to make unilateral concessions to Iran as kind of a sweetener
before the discussions begin. I want to point out, Madam Secretary,
that the last year of your office, that is exactly what we did. We
opened our markets to everything Iran would want to sell us except
oil. Carpets, et cetera. In other words, we would buy anything that
we didn't need and that they couldn't sell anywhere else. Iran's
public response was a personal rebuke to you, Madam Secretary.
Their private response was to continue their nuclear program and
to aid the 9/11 hijackers, though they may not have known and
probably didn't know their exact mission.
I agree with you, Madam Secretary, that Iraq is not the central
front on the war against radical Islam. The President has asked us
to compare the war against radical Islam to the Cold War.
· Vietnam. We were told that if we didn't prevail in
Vietnam, there would be Communists on the beaches of Santa
Monica. Instead, we prevailed in the Cold War beyond our expecta-
tion's because we had the good sense to leave Vietnam, a battlefield
which was not of our choosing.
Madam Secretary, what strategy should we have for success in
the war on global terrorism and radical Islam, assuming Iraq goes
very poorly in the end? And I hope you will address the idea that
you and I have discussed or at least that I have put forward to you,
that we try to reach a grand bargain with Moscow to get their com-
plete support, especially in the U.N., especially with regard to
Iran's nuclear program in return for us making some concessions
and accommodations on issues important to Russia in Russia's own
neighborhood.
Ms. ALBRIGHT. Well, you have put a lot of points on the table,
Congressman. I do think that fighting terror is absolutely essential
for us, but are we doing it in the best way? And I think that we
need to do a better job of not isolating ourselves and finding allies
to help us. You were talking about something to do with Vietnam
and the end of the Cold War and Iran in addition to that; it re-
minded me to make the following point which is, the Soviets, ac-
cording to everything that we knew, had missiles pointed at us,
and wanted us to be in the dustbin of history. We talked to them
throughout the entire time. There are a number of reasons why the
Cold War ended, and some of it had to do with the fact that they
spent themselves into oblivion but also that their system did not
work and that we had a capability of operating in a variety of ways
with the Soviet Union, helping with dissidents, looking at a variety
of ways that they might be undercut. And Vietnam obviously also
played a role, but the point I want to make is, throughout the Cold
cing.
M


31
tration, but there have been administrations that have put pres-
sure on Israel, and I think very, very unfairly.
We know that what is happening in Iraq, as you pointed out, it
is more and more like a civil war. It is Shi'a versus Sunni, and the
resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, in my opinion, would
have nothing to do with helping resolve that situation. So I am
wondering if you can comment on that.
The other thing I would like to mention, and it was also men-
tioned by the Iraq Study Group and people here have said that we
should talk to all sides. While I do think it is important to talk to
everyone, I don't necessarily think it should be done by formal ne-
gotiations. There are ways to do it in a back channel way. Because
I have no problem, frankly, if we don't talk to terrorist groups like
Hamas, and you mentioned that that was a policy of the Clinton
administration. And it has been a policy of the Bush administra-
tion. Why do we talk to countries that are terrorist states? And I
regard Iran as a terrorist state. It aids and abets terrorism. It is
a country that is fanning the fires of all these movements. I don't
think you can isolate them. And sure I think it would be important
to have some kind of back channel dialogue, but I don't know how
we have a consistent policy. We won't talk to Hamas, and I don't
believe we should, but we will talk to Iran. So I am wondering if
you can comment on those two things.
Ms. ALBRIGHT. First of all, I am definitely one of those who is
not blaming everything on the Israeli-Palestinian issue, and I think
while it is very important, it is not the answer to everything. But
I do think for its own sake, it should be resolved. And I think a
lot can be done without putting pressure on Israel. And I hate to-
well, I don't hate to—I like to refer to what we left in 2000. I mean,
basically, there was pretty much an agreement that was not put-
ting pressure in a way that you described but a way of finding a
solution that suited both sides. So it is possible to work out a solu-
tion. I think it is important for its own sake, but I don't think it
should be viewed as the central and only way to resolve the issues
with Iraq or the Middle East.
My point about talking to Iran is—I also happen to agree with
you that there are a number of different ways to do this on a track
to diplomacy and other groups. But there are other ways to have
these negotiations embedded within others. For instance, when we
were dealing with Iran, and granted in the end it didn't work out,
but there were ways, for instance, where there was a group at the
U.N. called the “Six Plus Two” that basically dealt with Afghani-
stan. And we sat at a table with Iran, looking at issues to do with
Afghanistan. I think there are different diplomatic methods of get-
ting these kinds of dialogue, discussions going. And to go back to
something Chairman Lantos said, I think there needs to be some
kind of exchange, but it is this kind of flat-out way that the admin-
istration turned down what I thought the Iraq Study Group pre-
sented were some very good ideas about having a surge in diplo-
macy, and that is what I am advocating also, is that that be used.
Chairman LANTOS. Mr. Wilson.
Mr. WILSON. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.
I yield 45 seconds to Ms. Ros-Lehtinen.
Ms. Ros-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much, Mr. Wilson.


32
Dado:
Part of my opening questions, Madam Secretary, I was reminded
of it when, in Mr. Paul's question to you and your response, you
had said that in Iraq we had a greater need for diplomacy, that
there was no overwhelming need to go to war, no overriding United
States interest to justify our military involvement in Iraq. And I
am reminded of your leadership, sterling leadership in the Balkan
issue. Despite the lack of an overt and immediate threat to United
States national security posed by the developments in the Balkans,
thanks to your leadership, we led the effort to end ethnic slaugh-
tering in Bosnia and Kosovo. In fact, and I am going to quote your
response to the arguments raised by Colin Powell who was then
the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, he argued against United
States military involvement in the Balkans. And you said, “Madam
Secretary, what is the point in having this superb military you are
always talking about if we can't use it?” And more than a decade
later, we and many other countries are still heavily involved in the
region in an effort to secure stability there. And I would argue that
the Iraqi people are no less deserving of our commitment than the
people of the Balkans.
Thank you, Mr. Wilson.
Mr. WILSON. Thank you, Madam Secretary, for being here today.
And I appreciate very much in your statement, I desperately want
General Petraeus and our forces in Iraq to succeed, and I share
your passion for that. That is so important for the security of
American families.
But I disagree with your statement that Iraq is not the central
front in the war of those responsible for 9/11. We know that 9/11
was an al-Qaeda operation. We are aware that Osama bin Laden
through his deputy Zawahiri wrote a letter to the al-Qaeda leader-
ship at that time, Zarqawi in Mesopotamia, in Iraq and the letter
of January-excuse me, July 9, 2005, said: "I want to be the first
to congratulate you for fighting the battle in the heart of the Is-
lamic world which was formerly the field of major battles in Islam's
history which is now the place for the greatest battle of Islam in
this era, and our enemies have declared Iraq as a central front in
the war on terrorism."
Can you respond? If our enemies acknowledge this, and I think
is really important for all of us, Democrat and Republican, to ac-
knowledge who our enemies are and face them.
Ms. ALBRIGHT. Well, first of all, I fully agree with you: We need
to define who the enemy is, and that is part of our problem, frank-
ly. I do think there was no connection between Iraq and Sa
Hussein on one side, and Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda on 9/11.
I mean, that is something that, as facts have been shown, the peo-
ple that hit us came from and were supported out of Afghanistan,
and I fully supported and continue to support what is going on in
Afghanistan.
I think that what has happened is—and again, I quote Secretary
Rumsfeld on this, that there has been a creation of more terrorists,
et cetera, in Iraq than when this started. I can't remember his
exact quote, but basically I think that there are other areas where
we should be fighting terrorism. I think that whatever it is we are
doing is, in fact, making this insurgency more complicated, and
therefore, I am very concerned that we are not paying attention to


33
fighting terrorism in other places, and that we have determined
that it is the central front on terrorism. And I don't believe that.
I think it is a horrible place, and I think there is a civil war taking
place. And I think there are foreign fighters taking advantage of
it, but the central front of terrorism, Afghanistan is where we still
need to be looking at the problem.
Mr. WILSON. But shouldn't we go after al-Qaeda wherever they
are? Successfully, we have killed the al-Qaeda leadership in Alge-
ria, in Egypt, the al-Qaeda leader in Iraq. Shouldn't we go after the
al-Qaeda wherever they are? And how would you respond to bin
Laden's statement that the third world war has begun in Iraq?
Ms. ALBRIGHT. Well, first of all, I do think we need to go after
al-Qaeda and anybody who wants to kill us. I do think that we
need to get rid of the terrorists who want to kill us. But I think
it requires us to understand in what areas this is taking place and
what the effect of—whether we are really doing what we say we
are doing. I can't, you know, I think that bin Laden takes advan-
tage of situations. He writes—or somebody on his behalf writes
things that then get us all diverted from what we should be doing,
is going after him and looking how to defeat al-Qaeda. I fully be-
lieve that.
Chairman LANTOS. Ms. Woolsey.
Ms. WOOLSEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Madam Secretary, thank you for sharing your knowledge, your
opinions and your voice with us today. You are needed, and you are
missed, believe me. Thank you for being here.
Today, Madam Secretary, I and others will introduce legislation
to bring our troops home and to reinstate sovereignty to the Iraqi
people and the Iraqi Government, and we will be using the funds
that are appropriated—have been appropriated that are in the
pipeline as we speak—to escalate training of the Iraqi security and
to ensure that our troops come home safely. But at the same time,
this bill commits to supporting an international effort to assist the
Iraqis in rebuilding their government and with reconciliation, pro-
viding we are invited to do that. You see, we believe that con-
tinuing this occupation is the ultimate disaster. So that is where
we are, and we believe, the American people are virtually with us
on that.
My question to you today is, What authority does this President
have to expand his occupation to Iran and possibly Syria?
Ms. ALBRIGHT. Well, I think that is the question because, as far
as I can tell, there has been no way that Congress has spoken on
the fact that this needs to be extended into other countries. There
was a question about who has—whether some Iranian agents or
something were seized in Iraq. There clearly is an influence that
Iran has over Iraq, and that Syria has an involvement in it.
But I think that the President, any President, has to be very
careful about his role as Commander-in-Chief in terms of expand-
ing a military action. And so, again, this goes to my point, is that
there need to be hearings on what the intentions are in Iran and
questions of where the authority comes from. I think we are in a
position now where we are involved in a war that went way beyond
what anybody expected, that has clearly been badly managed, and


34
.
THE
(EC)
has not done honor to our country and has not served our troops
well.
I feel so strongly about the fact that our troops are out there in
an incoherent mission. We have to help our troops. And that is
what I hope we all address ourselves to in terms of how this might
spread.
Ms. WOOLSEY. Well, just to continue, our legislation resumes the
Iraqi war powers that we gave the President. Would that force the
President to come back to the Congress before he can take action
in Iraq-in Iran?
Ms. ALBRIGHT. Well, it is very hard for me to speculate about
what is influencing the members of this administration. I mean
frankly, the voters spoke November 7th and you all changed where
you sit. And I really do think that that is the message. But it is
hard for me to interpret how, out of all the information that has
been out there, and also out of all the work that the Iraq Study
Group did, that the President came to the decision that he did.
So I am not competent to tell you how he would see what you
do here.
Chairman LANTOS. Mr. Fortenberry.
Mr. FORTENBERRY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Madam Secretary,
thank you for joining us here today. To whom should we speak in
Iran? Whom should we engage? What platform is available for such
a conversation? I would like to hear your thoughts on some of the
practical aspects of that, and I will tell you my own disposition to-
ward it. In my mind, it is always essential to keep open some lines
of communication without which you can have very limited hope of
any type of relationship, no matter how meager.
But with that said, would you give me your thoughts on the prac-
tical aspects of that position which you hold?
Ms. ALBRIGHT. Well, I do think that there are—I have personally
not been to Iran, but I do think that there are members of the po-
litical configuration that would be willing to have some discussions.
That is why I actually think Congressman Lantos sending a
group of you there would be useful. I think there also are private
citizens, there are various groups of business people and various
aspects of a small civil society that I think would be willing to talk.
There are also without I think part of the issue here is as one
lays this all out, you don't want to—you don't want to in any way
make their life more complicated, but there was an election in Iraq.
President Ahmadinejad actually did not do that well in terms of
some of the local elections. Mr. Rafsanjani was someone who had
run against Ahmadinejad.
I think we need to understand better the configuration of Iranian
society than we do. It is much more complicated, it is more layered.
And I think that with a will to talk to various groupings, one can
find people to talk to.
Mr. FORTENBERRY. Would you be at all concerned about the unin-
tended consequence of empowering further the geopolitical aims of
Iran as expressed by the current regime?
Ms. ALBRIGHT. Well, I am worried about that, but I think what
you have to do is look at a map and look at how big Iran is, and
the role that it has played. It has—and I find this very troubling


35
to say—but it has gained influence and generally more power as
a result of Iraq, there is no question in my mind.
And you watch what Ahmadinejad is doing, going around making
deals with Chavez and doing all kinds of things and not being help-
ful on issues to do with Sudan and other places. They have gained
an influence. And so they are there.
That is a statement of fact now. And therefore, from a diplomatic
perspective, trying to figure out how to engage them and change
the correlation of forces is what we should be looking at.
And I would hope that this administration is looking at it in a
way other than just saying they are going to isolate them. And that
is all I am advocating at this stage is that there be a new look at
how we deal with Iran and that you all be a part of that discussion.
Chairman LANTOS. Ms. Jackson Lee.
Ms. JACKSON LEE. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much and,
Madam Secretary, let me thank you for your leadership. I am new
on this committee and honored to be here, and certainly I have ap-
preciated your enormous leadership for women around the world
and empowering them as well as your strong advocacy for human
rights.
Might I just say as a reflection on your leadership and that of
the past administration, we lived in peace. It was not an easy time
and certainly we confronted large challenges around the world. But
it is interesting that for that period of time, we were able to use
diplomacy in a very effective manner and I think that history
should not go unnoticed.
This morning we had the opportunity to greet the new United
Nations Secretary General, and I appreciated the broadness of his
perspective. And I think all of us encourage the United Nations to
be an effective new tool for peace and reconciliation, whether it is
in the Palestinian-Israeli question or whether it may ultimately be
in Iraq. I think it should be noted that former U.N. Secretary Kofi
Annan had to be one of the most courageous Secretary Generals on
his strong advocacy for peace and confronting ills no matter where
he found them, whether or not it was the United States or other-
wise.
I may not have an opportunity to hear your answer in respect
of the 5-minute time, but let me just share with you how I think
this Congress has failed the American people regardless of what
our position is, our party, and whether or not we voted for or
against the war or voted against it. But it is interesting that when
Franklin Delano Roosevelt wanted to pack the Court, for example,
the Supreme Court, the Congress rose up to whether you agree or
disagree to challenge the Presidency on the basis of our constitu-
tional premise of three equal branches of government. The same
thing happened with respect to Vietnam.
Interestingly enough, after Richard Nixon took office we did in
fact pass an initiative that said none of the funds herein appro-
priated under this act may be expended to support, directly or indi-
rectly, combat activities in or over Cambodia, Laos, North Vietnam
and South Vietnam by United States forces, and after August 15,
1973 no other funds heretofore appropriated under any other act
may be expended for such purpose.


38
-
tion, why was it correct for us to react militarily in that time, in
that circumstance, and incorrect now in this circumstance?
Ms. ALBRIGHT. Well, let me just say I think what happened in
Bosnia was a case study, and also in Kosovo, of a combination of
diplomacy and force. Just look at the diplomatic efforts that went
on at the same time that we were
Ms. Ros-LEHTINEN. Madam Secretary, in all the U.N. resolutions
on Iraq, didn't we also pursue diplomatic means? It is not that we
went to war, boom, and that is it.
Ms. ALBRIGHT. We didn't-Dayton. Take Dayton the amount of
effort that was put in in order to bring the parties together, and
there was a combination of force and diplomacy. It was true also
in Kosovo. I do not think that the diplomatic string was followed
out on Iraq after the President won a great victory of getting the
inspectors back in.
Ms. Ros-LEHTINEN. Thank you.
Chairman LANTOS. Mr. Miller.
Mr. MILLER. Madam Secretary, my question also has to do with
the allocation of powers between Congress and the President in
this area, a topic which you said you had given a great deal of
thought to over the years. I know that the Constitution makes the
President the Commander-in-Chief, but I have also read the enu-
meration of the powers of Congress in article I, section 8, and I
don't think the framers of the Constitution intended that the Presi-
dent could commit our Armed Forces to hostilities, to place our
Armed Forces in harm's way and leave them there with just the
agreement of the President's wife and dog.
You said earlier—well, in your testimony you said that you op-
posed efforts to cut off funds for military operations in Iraq. You
said there are more constructive ways to express concerns about
the administration's policies; you said we could cap the Presi-
dent's—the forces in Iraq. Could we do that as a cond
ing or through authorization? What is the way that we can do that?
Ms. ALBRIGHT. I do think that there are ways through, I think,
a cap. I know it is some idea that has just kind of been surfaced
in one way to try to figure out how to put some limit on the Presi-
dent's authority without undercutting his authority as Com-
mander-in-Chief and making clear that you all are a coequal
branch of government and actually, according to article I, the con-
trollers of how the militaries are raised.
And you know, as I have studied the Constitution, there was a
real attempt to limit an imperial Presidency. That was part of what
was going on.
And it is not easy—having been on other side—on the other side
of this, it is not easy to work with a coequal system branch of the
government. But it is what our system is based on.
And that is what the American taxpayers pay the money to in
order to be able to support forces and do—and they send a pretty
strong signal. That was my message.
Mr. MILLER. I have read the Federalist Papers and those topics,
and I think you are right about your reading of the Constitution.
In the Clinton administration, to your great credit, the last 6
years of the administration when there was a Democratic President
and Republican Congress, the Clinton administration avoided con-
w
-


39
stitutional confrontations with Congress and provided documents
that were quite arguably within the executive privilege: Pro-
viding-allowed testimony to very private conversations between
the President's top advisers, usually preserving the constitutional
claims by asserting them and then waiving them.
With respect to the War Powers Resolution, providing reports re-
quired by the War Powers Resolution, but saying that the report
is not pursuant to, not required by the administration, was con-
ceding that was constitutionally required, but providing them any-
way, saying that they were consistent with the requirements.
I am not so convinced that this administration will avoid con-
stitutional confrontation.
If we take the position that we can cap, for instance, cap the
American forces in Iraq, and the President takes the view that we
cannot constitutionally do that, how do we resolve that conflict?
Ms. ALBRIGHT. Well, I hope that it isn't something that ulti-
mately ends up in the courts, but I do think that this is a discus-
sion that is worth having. I think that there has to be some way
that Congress shows what its desire is, representing the American
people are, on this particular issue.
I am not capable of this at this point to give you exact details
about how you would frame this particular piece of legislation. But
I think it is worth considering the fact that you are, I presume,
planning to support to fund the troops that are there, if that is a
hypothesis, or that there has to be a way to exert a view that add-
ing forces without additional authorization is something that
should not-not involve you in a constitutional battle, but is part
of your job in terms of questioning how moneys are raised to sup-
port the military.
Mr. MILLER. Madam Secretary, since there are just a few mo-
ments left, what are some of the other constructive ways to express
concern? Concern, by the way, is a very mild term, in my view, of
the policies of this administration in Iraq.
Ms. ALBRIGHT. Well, I do think there has been some issue as to
whether a nonbinding resolution is right. I think there is a way,
again, without I was taught not to interfere with the domestic af-
fairs of other countries and also in the domestic affairs of Congress
here. I can't micromanage this. But it strikes me that it would be
useful to do a series of steps that would begin to deliver a pretty
strong signal to the administration that they are going down the
wrong path. In a way, I think we all have to always be careful to
make clear that we are not trying to undercut our troops, because
at least none—nobody that I have spoken to thinks that we should
be doing that nor is that appropriate because they are defending
us.
Chairman LANTOS. Mr. Boozman.
Mr. BOOZMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Madam
Secretary, for being here. And we do appreciate your service to our
country.
You know, I had a lot of friends that I had great respect for that
oppose the war, and then I had many others that supported it. And
I know that, you know, you had a lot of friends who voted for the
war and things. So we can argue as to whether or not we should
be there. But the reality is that we are there.


40
We also can argue as to whether or not it is central front on the
war on terror, or a front. But I am very active in the NATO Par-
liament and I think it is fair to say that our NATO allies, most of
our allies, whether they are European or in the region, the
Bahrainians, the Egyptians, the Saudi Arabians, and the list goes
on and on, the Turks, are very concerned about the problem if we
are a failure in Iraq. And I think you could argue that if we are,
if it is not, if it is not a front, you know, the foremost front now,
that with failure it could very easily become that in the future.
Can you tell us if we do fail in Iraq, if we leave too early, if the
place descends into chaos, can you teſl us what do you think will
happen? Can you tell us the effect on our allies like Saudi Arabia?
Will that increase the possibility of nuclear proliferation in the
area? Will those countries defend themselves against Iran? Which
is a risk, you know, has traditionally been a tremendous adversary.
Ms. ALBRIGHT. I am also concerned about a failed mission in
Iraq, which is something that, unfortunately, I don't know what
you call what is going on now. I say mess. That is a diplomatic
term of art. But they can't say that there is a success there now.
I think as somebody who very proudly represented the United
States, I think it is very bad to see a questioning of American mili-
tary power and a stretching of our military to the extent that has
been taking place, and I am very troubled about the long-term ef-
fect of this.
Therefore, I do—I believe that there needs to be a-and to go
back to something I said earlier, a new look at how the Middle
East should be treated, a regional approach that would show that
we do not have an intention to have permanent bases there, but
we continue to have an interest; that there needs to be some kind
of a new security framework for them, that we do not condone
Iran's behavior, that we cannot allow the whole region to be over-
taken by those who want to kill each other. But failure for the
at the moment, you cannot say that America's power is respected
or that we are fulfilling the role that I have always believed we
should have is as the indispensable Nation. And we have to figure
out how to build that kind of trust. But putting more troops into
a mission that is incoherent doesn't make sense to me.
Mr. BOOZMAN. Yes, ma'am. Again though, like I say, if we
now, certainly everyone would agree that things are not going-
have gone like we would like for it to do, but if Iraq descends into
worst-case scenario, okay, and you have got tremendous Iranian in-
fluence, again, what do you see the allies in the region-how do
you see Pakistan? How do you see Saudi Arabia? How do you see
some of these other countries? The Turks, what will their response
be in your
Ms. ALBRIGHT. Well, since Secretary Rice's trip as she is going
around, I think that she is trying to gather support. I think we do
not want the area to spin out of control so that there is increased
nuclear proliferation.
Brings me to another s ject. I think we need to rethink how the
nuclear proliferation regime is set up. We need to rethink some of
our nuclear doctrine. We have to figure out a way that there are
not loopholes and that we don't let the whole area spin out of con-
trol.
12
D
.





44
400,000 Americans had died in 1 year, and were the conflict on our
own soil, we would certainly refer to it as a civil war.
In fact, historians note that in the course of the entire U.S. Civil
War, more than 600,000 soldiers from the north and south per-
ished, most of them from disease. Figures on civilian casualties are
less reliable.
Chairman Hamilton, I strongly commend you for the Commis-
sion's proposal to draw down our troops and withdraw virtually all
combat forces by early next year, but our reservations about the
proposal to leave some of our forces embedded in the Iraqi army
down to the company level well after the bulk of our forces have
departed. I would like to feel confident that this will not leave the
embedded forces more vulnerable to attacks by anti-American
Iraqis, including from within a sectarian Iraqi military.
As you know, I am a firm believer in dialogue and I strongly sup-
port the proposal in this report to engage Iraq's neighbors in efforts
to create and maintain stability in Iraq. Unfortunately, the report
has been widely interpreted to mean that we should go to the Syr-
ians and the Iranians and ask for help. I very much hope you will
clarify this point. I see no reason why Damascus and Tehran, after
having spent almost 4 years attempting to undermine our efforts,
would suddenly come around and be helpmates.
I am also puzzled by the implication that resolving the Israeli-
Palestinian problem, which certainly is a very desirable goal, is
central to resolving our problems in Iraq. These two issues, both
resolve, should not be artificially conflated. The status
of the Palestinians does not prompt Shiites and Sunnis to engage
in reciprocal mass assassinations in Iraq, as I am sure you agree.
There are countless sound reasons to encourage the continuance of
serious efforts to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian problem, but Iraq
is surely not one of them. I hope you will speak to this issue, and
I will welcome your clarification. I would also like to hear your
evaluation of the response to your report by Iraqi officials, Chair-
man Hamilton, including Kurdish leaders.
As you know, President Talabani was scathing in his comments.
He called it an insult to the Iraqi people and made other stun-
ningly bitter comments, including this, I quote: “We can smell the
attitude of James Baker in 1991 when he liberated Kuwait but left
Saddam in power.”
I want to conclude by pointing out that the best barometer of the
wisdom of the President's new plan is the response not of his critics
but of his supporters. Two of the administration's strongest sup-
porters, Charles Krauthammer and Peggy Noonan, have been unre-
strained in denouncing the plan in recent days. In today's Wash-
ington Post, Mr. Krauthammer, a determined proponent in the War
in Iraq, states that Maliki's government is, I quote, “hopelessly sec-
tarian.” And the President's plan to increase our forces "will fail be-
cause the Maliki government will undermine it.”
Former Reagan speechwriter Peggy Noonan wrote in the Wall
Street Journal earlier, what a dreadful mistake the President made
when he stiff-armed the Iraq Study Group report, which are bipar-
tisan membership and air of mutual party investment, the impri-
matur of what remains of and is understood as the American estab-
lishment and was inherently moderate in its proposal.


45
Ms. Noonan concluded, I thought the administration would see it
as a life raft. Instead, they pushed it away. Like the old woman
in the flood who took to the roof and implored God to send a boat
to save her, a hunk of wood floated by as she prayed with fervor,
a busted wooden door floated by as the waters rose, and she dou-
bled her prayers.
Finally she cried, "God I asked you to save me and you didn't
send a boat.” And the voice of God replied, “I sent you a hunk a
wood and a door.” We don't always recognize deliverance when it
arrives.
Mr. Chairman, I would also like you to comment briefly, if you
would, on the various legislative proposals that have been intro-
duced in recent days, ranging from the bipartisan proposa.
Senate, some proposals here in this body and the general negative
reaction to the search advocated by the administration.
to the esteemed ranking member of the committee.
Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, for whatever remarks she wishes to make.
Ms. Ros-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much, Chairman Lantos,
and I would also like to thank Chairman Hamilton for testifying
before our committee today. I had the great pleasure of serving on
this very same committee under his leadership. So we welcome you
back to your home, Chairman Hamilton.
And I would like to commend the members of the Iraq Study
Group for their work on the difficult situation in Iraq and for pro-
viding many useful recommendations to help us in our debate re-
garding United States policy in that country. Ensuring stability
and security must be our overriding priorities. Without signifi-
cantly reducing the level of sectarian violence and effectively com-
bating the insurgents and their death squads, little progress can be
expected in establishing peace and stability in Iraq.
However, we cannot achieve these goals by ourselves. As the
President has stated, the principle responsibility for ensuring peace
and security in Iraq lies with the Iraqi Government and the Iraqi
people. As for the report itself, I have strong reservations regarding
some of the Commission's assessments and recommendations. The
first concern is regarding the proposal to turn to state sponsors of
terrorism, namely Iran and Syria, to help stabilize Iraq. Rec-
ommendation nine on page 51 to 52. Direct engagement with Iran
and Syria without first requiring that these regimes end their sup-
port of the insurgency groups within Iraq and end their assistance
to Islamic Jihadist groups such as Hamas and Hezbollah would
send a terrible message that the United States is willing to over-
ny outrage by our enemies in return for the vague
prospect of help.
The reality is that the interests of Iran and Syria in Iraq are op-
posed to those of the Iraqi people and the United States. These re-
pressive regimes are not interested in establishing a stable democ-
racy in Iraq because that would directly threaten their own prior-
ities.
Iran continues to provide arms, funding and training to Iraq's
Shiite militias including al-Sadr's army which has been responsible
for much of the bloodshed in Iraq and which has targeted United
States-led coalition forces. Syria also reportedly continues to fund
many of the insurgents in Iraq and has allowed money and weap-


46
ons to be funneled to al-Qaeda and other extremist groups that are
operating there. The truth is that the reason Iran and Syria might
want to cooperate is not to help Iraq, but to help themselves by re-
ducing the international pressure now building on them in other
areas.
The United States and our allies have placed significant pressure
on the Iranian regime to stop its clandestine nuclear program. The
U.N. Security Council is also taking steps to hold Iran a
for its nonproliferation violations, calling on Tehran to suspend its
uranium enrichment program. However, Iran continues to ignore
these and other measures and refuses to cooperate with the Inter-
national Atomic Energy Agency, even though it is bound by the
international treaty to do so. Merely saying that Iran should stem
the flow of equipment, technology and training to any group resort-
ing to violence in Iraq as stated in page 53 of the report is not suf-
ficient. The same is true for Syria. The Syrian regime hopes to use
the appearance of cooperating with the international community to
divert attention from its involvement in the 2005 assassination of
er Prime Minister of Lebanon, Hariri, and its ongoing ef-
forts to reassert its influence over Lebanon.
Given the interest of these two countries, their ongoing terrorist
activities and their poor record of international cooperation, I
strongly believe that it would be a mistake to turn to them for as-
sistance in Iraq. Further, I am concerned that such unconditional
negotiations with rogue regimes like Iran and Syria would hamper,
rather than promote and encourage, United States allies in the re-
gion to engage in the diplomatic offensive of described in the re-
port. Another significant concern I have with the report is its link-
ing the Israeli-Palestinian conflict to the situation in Iraq. Rec-
ommendations 13 and 15 and 17. I have a hard time believing that
if the Israeli and Palestinians were to make peace tomorrow, the
insurgents in Iraq would stop their attacks, that ethnic strife would
immediately stop, that al-Qaeda would pack up their bags and
leave, and that Iran would give up its plan for regional domination
I believe that it is essential that the United States continue to
make every effort to help the Israelis and the Palestinians achieve
peace and security. However, we should not adopt the rhetoric or
give credence to the excuses offered by the likes of Syria to justify
their support for Jihadists and suicide bombers as legitimate resist-
ance. I am concerned that if some of these recommendations were
implemented, these and other recommendations would greatly com-
plicate the situation in Iraq and have damaging consequences for
United States policy throughout the Middle East. I believe that
there is much value in the report. It does pave the way for creative
thinking, and I commend all of the participants for putting it for-
ward. I look forward to the testimony of Chairman Ha
and to hearing the statements made by other members. Thank you,
Mr. Hamilton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman LANTOS. Thank you very much, Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Ac-
cording to the policy of the committee, the chairman and ranking
member of the appropriate committee are now recognized for 3
minutes. Mr. Ackerman.
Mr. ACKERMAN. Thank you very much Mr. Chairman. I want to
concur with the statements, opinions that you have expressed as
The
]
CE
:


47
well as that of the ranking member, Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. I thought
they were very good.
Mr. Hamilton, it has been a pleasure working and serving with
you on this committee for so many years, and I just want to tell
you that your personal modesty has denied us the delight of having
your portrait on the wall with so many other of the past chairmen,
but we want you to know that the work that you have done and
the impression that you have made still have a lasting imprint on
the work that is done in this room.
Mr. Chairman, I have a brilliantly written 3-minute opening
statement that—not to set a precedent for me, but in the interest
of saving time, I would like to put in the record.
Chairman LANTOS. I appreciate that.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Ackerman follows:1
AL
BLE
PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE GARY L. ACKERMAN, A REPRESENTATIVE
IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF NEW YORK
Thank you Mr. Chairman for again bringing our Committee together to discuss
Iraq. There is no more pressing issue for the United States and I think your deci-
sion to focus on to the situation there is entirely appropriate. The Republican Con-
gress was, for too long, a silent partner in a losing venture. The American public,
however, made its view of the situation clear in November of last year. They expect
more of us than fraudulent debates for political gain and meaningless resolutions
stuffed with platitudes and pieties.
Perhaps, greater congressional attention to Iraq might have improved the Admin-
istration's conduct of the war to date. I'd like to think so, but no one knows. I don't
think there's any question that it couldn't have made things worse—if only because
the Bush Administration has fouled up more or less every part of this entire horrific
enterprise. But what is critical, is that we come to recognize that the political pat-
tern we are seeing today is no different than the original pattern set in 2002.
Back then, the Bush Administration decided on a policy of dubious wisdom, and
then set about terrifying the American people in order to justify it. Their facts, or
at least what they called facts, turned out to be fictions. Of their errors,
misstatements and exaggerations, some were known to be false, some should have
been known to be false, and some were just wild guesses dressed up as real think-
ing. Our military was given a job without proper resources or a comprehensive plan
to guide their mission. No inclusive, coherent regional strategy was considered nec-
essary because nothing succeeds like success.
Skeptics and critics were aggressively dismissed as being unrealistic, foolish, cow-
ardly, unpatriotic, or some combination of all of the above. The President addressed
the nation, put his proposals in the ill-fitting garments of World War II, and set
in motion plans no deeper than a Power Point presentation and no more effective
at shaping events than a fairy tale.
And then, of course, reality intervened, in the form of the real Iraq with all its
chaos, ethnic and religious tension, tribalism, decay and ambiguity; the real inter-
ests and motives of Iraqis which were and are, far too complex to be captured in
the happy talk the President likes to make on TV; and the unanticipated, though
stupefyingly obvious efforts of Iran and Syria to advance their own interests in what
is, in fact, their own backyards.
We have seen this pattern again and again. And it's the same thing, again and
again. Before the war. After the war. With the creation of the Coalition Provisional
Authority and the appointment of Jerry Bremer as Grand Poo-bah. With the hand-
over of sovereignty. With the adoption of the Constitution. With the elections. With
the appointment of the new government. And now with the surge of 21,000 troops.
Success is always around the next corner, on the far side of the hill.
We shouldn't have believed this nonsense the first time around; we definitely
should have asked hard, serious questions the second time around and, frankly,
there never should have been a third time around.
How we got here, at the fifth or sixth iteration of this, by now, familiar and tragic
pattern of fear mongering followed by incompetence begetting failure, should be
plain. It is the Bush Administration's standard operating procedure. It is their de-
fault method of operation and they will continue this pattern as long as they are
not checked by the Congress.
is, we have seen thjar. After the waterry Bremer as itution. With th


49
ernor, former Governor Tom Kean, on the bipartisan 9/11 Commis-
sion. The work of that Commission has been of enormous value,
and it has helped America to realize and to implement lessons
learned. It was not just about accountability, it was about where
to go forward, just like the Iraq Study Group.
But finally, I want to thank and pay special trouble to our col-
league Frank Wolf for his extraordinary vision and the actions that
he took to establish the Iraq Study Group. As many of my col-
leagues know, the Iraq Study Group was the brilliant idea of Frank
Wolf. It was his brainchild, conceived after his third trip to Iraq in
September 2005. Mr. Wolf created the consensus, he worked with
the administration, he worked in a bipartisan way, and authored
the appropriation of $1 million to establish the Iraq Study Group.
Chairman LANTOS. The gentleman's time has expired.
Mr. SMITH. And I thank the Chair for yielding, and I thank Mr.
Wolf again.
Chairman LANTOS. Unless there is strong objection, I would like
to go from our distinguished witness, because if we hear from ev-
erybody and with the pending vote that we anticipate, he will not
even get a chance to begin.
Chairman Hamilton, we are delighted to have you. Please pro-
ceed any way you choose.
STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE LEE HAMILTON, CO-CHAIR
OF THE IRAQ STUDY GROUP (BAKER-HAMILTON COMMISSION)
Mr. HAMILTON. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman and the
Ranking Member Ros-Lehtinen. I appreciate greatly your most gra-
cious comments. It is very good to be back in this room where I
have spent many, many hours. I think I felt a little more com-
fortable on that side of the witness stand rather than this one. I
have always thought it was a little easier to ask the questions than
it is to answer them, but I will do the best I can this morning.
I am very sorry that Secretary Baker is not able to join us, be-
cause of a lot of conflict and his schedule, and I am also sorry that
Secretary Eagleburger is not here, both of them would add a lot of
depth to this discussion this morning, and I know you are dis-
appointed in not having them, but believe you me, I am just as dis-
appointed, perhaps more than you that they are not here. I do ask
permission to revise and extend my remarks.
Chairman LANTOS. Without objection.
Mr. HAMILTON. I will address in my statement a number of the
comments that you and the ranking member have made about
criticisms of the report, but of course, we will be happy to return
to that if you have questions about it.
Let me begin by noting some of the common elements of the Iraq
Study Group report and the President's position. We agree with the
President when he said in his speech that the situation in Iraq is
unacceptable to the American people. We agree when he said that
the consequences of failure are clear, we agree when he said that
only the Iraqis, as I think share—the ranking member quoted,
"only the Iraqis can end the sectarian violence and secure th
people.”
We do support increasing the number of American advisors em-
bedded in Iraqi army units with the goal that the Iraqi Govern-


51
underlying political agreement among Iraqis about the future of
the country. The Study Group, the President, Prime Minister
Maliki agree on the key measures that the Iraqi Government must
take. There is extraordinary agreement at this point. You are very
familiar with them. Sharing the oil revenues fairly and provincial
elections later this year, reform of the de-baathification laws, and,
of course, a fair process for considering amendments to the con-
stitution. The Study Group sets dates for performance. It calls on
the United States to consult closely with the Iraqi Government to
develop additional milestones tied to calendar dates.
Prime Minister Maliki's words on behalf of these goals have been
good, but his performance has been weak. I like the President's
statement where he says that I have made clear to the Prime Min-
ister and Iraq's other leaders that America's commitment is not
open ended. If the Iraqi Government does not follow through on its
promises, it will lose the support of the American people, and it
will lose the support of the Iraqi people. Now is the time to act.
It is a very good statement. What is lacking, I believe, in the ad-
ministration's approach, is holding Iraqi leaders to specific bench-
marks and to specific dates of performance. The United States
needs to use its leverage to get Iraqi leaders to perform. We use
conditionality of assistance with many other recipients of U.S. aid.
We should do so with Iraq. We stated in our recommendations that
if the Iraqi Government does not make substantial progress toward
the achievement of milestones on national reconciliations, security
and governance, the United States should reduce its political mili-
tary or economic support for the Iraqi Government. Some of you
who have been around this institution for a while know that that
language really came out of legislation dealing some years ago with
El Salvador.
In the absence of pressure, the Iraqi Government will not per-
form. In the absence of pressure, there will be no national reconcili-
ation. In the absence of national reconciliation, there will be sec-
tarian violence without end. The third point is diplomacy. And I,
of course, was struck by the comments made by the chairman and
the ranking members about some of our recommendations on diplo-
macy. The President did not, of course, endorse a diplomatic effort
including all of Iraq's neighbors. He did say in his speech that we
will use America's full diplomatic resources to rally support for Iraq
from nations throughout the Middle East. The Study Group took
the view that the United States should engage directly with Iran
and Syria in order to try to obtain their commitment to construc-
tive policies toward Iraq and other regional issues. I suspect that
is not the most popular recommendation we made. Iran and Syria
have influence in Iraq. That is simply a fact. There are things they
are doing that we want them to stop doing, a good many of them.
There are things they could be doing that they are not doing, also
a good many of them. But we cannot wish that influence away. Un-
doubtedly, they are part of the problem. It was the view of the
Study Group that we must try to make them a part of the solution.
Sometimes the argument is made that Iran has momentum in the
region, and the United States should not negotiate until it has
more leverage over Iran. I do not accept that the United States of
America is too weak to negotiate.


53
liver the basic services of government today. It falls short in pro-
viding electricity and water, it falls short in providing security, and
the current Government of Iraq can succeed, only if it starts to win
the confidence of those it governs.
Capacity building means technical assistance and advice. It
means better procedures in government agencies, including a great-
er delegation of authority, and much better internal controls.
The Secretary of State has named a reconstruction coordinator in
Baghdad. That may be helpful, but it does not go to the problem
that we described in the report. The problem is coordination at the
interagency level, and it is most acute here in Washington. The
new coordinator is capable, but he is the Secretary of State's ap-
pointee, not the President's appointee. He cannot chair the NFC
meetings in Washington and make other agencies do what he tells
them to do.
Let me conclude, and I will make a few comments about the
surge. The President has decided on a new strategy. Its hallmark
is a surge of United States forces, about five additional combat bri-
gades for Baghdad. We stated in our report that we could support
a short-term redeployment or a surge, and we use the word
“surge,” of American combat forces to stabilize Baghdad, com-
plemented by comprehensive political economic and diplomatic ef-
forts.
All of the attention right now is on the military aspects of policy.
That is true of the President. It is true of his critics. To some de-
gree, that is quite understandable. We are all concerned, deeply
concerned when young men and women are sent into harm's way.
But the violence in Baghdad will not end without national rec-
onciliation. The violence will not end unless Iraq's leaders step up
and make difficult decisions about the future of their country. The
President correctly stated that only the Iraqis can end the sec-
tarian violence. We are placing all of our bets on the performance
of the Iraqi Government.
The Prime Minister's rhetoric is good. His performance so far has
been disappointing. He has not been effective. He has not proved
reliable, nor have many of Iraq's other leaders. Too often they have
acted in their sectarian interest, not the national interest. The
Study Group believes in the comprehensive military, diplomatic,
economic and political approach. The primary U.S. military mission
must shift from combat to training. Iraq's neighbors and the inter-
national community must be engaged to play a constructive role on
behalf of stability in Iraq. We need a robust economic program fo-
cused on job creation and building the capacity of the Iraqi Govern-
ment. And above all, Iraq's Government must be able to meet per-
formance benchmarks on national reconciliation. One of the Amer-
ican generals in Baghdad told us, if the Iraq Government does not
make political progress, all the troops in the world will not provide
security.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and I will be pleased to
respond to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Lee Hamilton follows:]


54
PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE LEE HAMILTON, CO-CHAIR OF THE IRAQ
STUDY GROUP (BAKER-HAMILTON COMMISSION)
Chairman Lantos, Ranking Member Ros-Lehtinen, distinguished members of the
Committee on Foreign Affairs: It is a distinct honor to appear before you this morn-
ing. Thank you for the opportunity to discuss the recommendations of the Iraq
Study Group report.
Introduction
Let me begin by noting some common elements in the Study Group report and
the President's recent speech. We agree with President Bush:
• "The situation in Iraq is unacceptable to the American people ..."
• “The consequences of failure are clear ..." and
• “Only the Iraqis can end the sectarian violence and secure their people.”
We support increasing the number of American advisors embedded in Iraqi Army
units with the goal that the Iraq government will assume control of security in all
provinces in Iraq by November 2007.
We recommended many of the benchmarks President Bush outlined for Iraq, and
agree that now is the time for the Iraqi government to act.
As part of my prepared statement, I have attached a statement that Secretary
Baker and I released after the President's speech. Also attached is a chart from the
January 11th Washington Post comparing key proposals from the Iraq Study Group
Report with the President's proposal.
The report of the Study Group already has been analyzed at length. If it is agree-
able to the Chair, I would like to be fairly brief in my opening remarks and con-
centrate on making a few points on:
• the security mission;
• benchmark performance;
• diplomacy;
• economic assistance;
• the military surge; and
• the Maliki government.
Training the Iraqi Army: Primary versus Essential Mission
There are points of similarity between the Study Group report and the President's
plan. Both keep_rapid reaction and special operations forces in place to strike al
Qaeda in Iraq. Both increase the number of U.S. personnel embedded with Iraqi
Army units. Both emphasize the training mission.
The President stated: “... we will accelerate the training of Iraqi forces, which
remains the essential U.S. security mission in Iraq.”
The Study Group stated (p. 70): “The primary mission of U.S. forces in Iraq
should evolve to one of supporting the Iraqi Army, which would take over primary
responsibility for combat operations."
. While there are similarities between these two proposals, it is my belief that there
is still a very large gap between them.
The Study Group states flatly that training should become the primary mission
for U.S. forces.
The President states that training “remains the essential ... mission.” The
President's plan also makes clear that U.S. forces will be sent to Baghdad to "help
Iraqis clear and secure neighborhoods.” That means door-to-door sweeps. That
no
- mar and secure neighborhoods.” That
Training cannot become the primary mission for U.S. forces in Iraq if the mission
includes a stepped-up security mission in Baghdad.
The Administration will tell you that our soldiers can carry out both missions.
I agree—our soldiers can do both missions. I am also confident that if you do both,
the training mission suffers. All of the attention now is on the surge, not on the
training mission.
We were told on several occasions that more U.S. forces can bring stability on a
temporary basis in a specific area, but only the Iraqis can step up and secure their
country. Sometimes the presence of U.S. forces can inflame tensions and enable the
Iraqis to put off responsibility.
Unless the training mission is the primary mission:
• You delay the date of completion of the training mission;
• You delay the date of a handover of responsibility to the Iraqis;


56
Some have asked us: What does the Arab-Israeli conflict have to do with the war
in Iraq? Why make one problem harder by taking on two?
The answer is simple. You cannot get anything done in the Middle East without
addressing the Arab-Israeli issue. We want these other countries, especially the
Sunni Arab countries, to help us. When we go to talk to them about Iraq, they will
want to talk to us about the Arab-Israeli conflict.
The United States says it wants to empower “moderate Muslims." Yet the only
way to empower the moderates is to take away the most potent grievance of the
extremists: that the United States does not care about the Palestinians.
A comprehensive Arab-Israeli peace will deal the extremists a blow in Baghdad
and Beirut. It will bolster American prestige. And-above all—it will guarantee the
long-term security of America's ally: Israel.
All of us understand that the peace process is difficult, and that results will be
measured in years, not months. But a sustained effort counts. A sustained effort will
help us with Iraq and will win us important diplomatic leverage across the board
in the Middle East.
Economic Assistance
The President asked for over $1.1 billion in additional economic assistance for
Iraq. That is a step in the right direction. The Study Group believes the commit-
ment should be substantially larger—$5 billion per year. Why?-because our cur-
rent approach needs balance. It is too heavily weighted toward the military mission.
.. We are spending $ 2 billion a week on the military alone. We need to do many
things right in Iraq if we are going to succeed. We need to devote resources to job
.
things right icapacity buildiy to give
: SE .
!
Por Can
.
Job creation is necessary to give some hope and purpose to young Iraqis. Too
many of them are frustrated and cannot provide for their families. Too many have
turned to militias and the insurgency. Our commitment to job creation should in-
clude the Commander's Emergency Response Program, but it must be broader. We
need to help Iraqis restart their many idle factories.
Capacity building is necessary because the Iraqi government is weak. It cannot
deliver the basic services of government. It falls short in providing electricity and
water. It falls short in providing security. The current government of Iraq can suc-
ceed only if it starts to win the confidence of those it governs. Capacity building
means technical assistance and advice. It means better procedures in government
agencies, including a greater delegation of authority and better internal controls.
The Secretary of State has named a reconstruction coordinator in Baghdad. That
may be helpful, but that is not the problem we described in our report. The problem
of coordination is interagency, and it is most acute in Washington. The new coordi-
nator is capable, but he is the Secretary of State's appointee, not the President's
appointee. He cannot chair NSC meetings in Washington and make other agencies
do what he tells them to do.
Conclusions
Mr. Chairman, the President has decided on a new strategy. Its hallmark is a
surge of U.S. forces, especially five additional combat brigades for Baghdad.
The Study Group stated that it could “support a short-term redeployment or surge
of American combat forces to stabilize Baghdad,” complemented by comprehensive
political, economic and diplomatic efforts.
All of the attention right now is on military aspects of policy. That is true of the
President, and true of his critics. To some degree it is understandable: We are all
concerned when more of our young men and women get sent in harm's way.
But make no mistake: The violence in Baghdad will not end without national rec-
onciliation. The violence will not end unless Iraq's leaders step up and make dif-
ficult decisions about the future of their country.
The President correctly stated that only the Iraqis can end the sectarian violence.
We are placing all of our bets on the performance of the Iraqi government. The
Prime Minister's rhetoric is good. His performance, so far, has been disappointing.
He has not been effective. He has not proved reliable, nor have many of Iraq's other
leaders. Too often, they have acted in their sectarian interest, not the national inter-
est.
The Study Group believes in a comprehensive military, diplomatic, economic and
political approach.
• The primary U.S. military mission in Iraq must shift from combat to training;
• Iraq's neighbors—and the international community—must be engaged to play
a more constructive role on behalf of stability in Iraq;
ne
:


57
• We need a robust economic program focused on job creation and building the
capacity of the Iraqi government; and
• Above all, Iraq's government must be held to performance benchmarks on na-
tional reconciliation.
As an American General in Baghdad told us, if the Iraqi government does not
make political progress, “all the troops in the world will not provide security.”
Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee, I would be pleased to respond to
your questions.
APPENDIX #1
STATEMENT OF THE CO-CHAIRS OF THE IRAQ STUDY GROUP-JANUARY 11, 2007
JAMES A. BAKER, III AND LEE HAMILTON
We are pleased that the President reviewed the report of the Iraq Study Group
carefully and seriously. Some of our recommendations are reflected in the new ap-
proach that he outlined Wednesday, while others have not been adopted.
We agree with President Bush that, “the situation in Iraq is unacceptable to the
American people," the consequences of failure are severe, and “only the Iraqis can
end the sectarian violence and secure their people.” As the President said, “the es-
sential U.S. security mission” in Iraq is the training of Iraqi forces. We support in-
creasing the number of American advisors embedded in Iraqi Army units with the
goal that the Iraq government will assume control of security in all provinces in
Iraq by November 2007. We recommended many of the benchmarks President Bush
outlined for Iraq, and agree that now is the time for the Iraqi government to act.
We hope the President and his Administration will further consider other rec-
ommendations of the Iraq Study Group. The President did not suggest the possi-
bility of a transition that could enable U.S. combat forces to begin to leave Iraq. The
President did not state that political, military, or economic support for Iraq would
be conditional on the Iraqi government's ability to meet benchmarks. Within the re-
gion, the President did not announce an international support group for Iraq includ-
ing all of Iraq's neighbors, nor mention measures we suggested to reach a com-
prehensive Arab-Israeli settlement.
The Iraq Study Group indicated that it could “support a short-term redeployment
or surge of American combat forces to stabilize Baghdad” complemented by com-
prehensive political, economic, and diplomatic efforts. Questions, of course, remain
about the nature of the surge. We are encouraged by the President's statement that
“America's commitment is not open-ended” and Secretary Gates' statement that the
addition of 21,000 troops would be viewed as a temporary surge. The violence in
Baghdad will not end without national reconciliation.
America's political leaders have a responsibility to seek a bi-partisan consensus
on issues of war and peace. We want to be helpful in forging that unity of effort.
We welcome President Bush's commitment to form a working group with congres-
sional leaders that will work across party lines in pursuit of a common policy. #
Chairman LANTOS. Thank you very much, Chairman Hamilton,
for your typical thoughtful, serious substantive and very somber re-
marks. There is only one issue I would like to open up with you
before turning to my colleagues, and that relates to the Study
Group's recommendation of dialogue with Syria and Iran.
There is no Member of Congress who is more in favor of dialogue
than I am. As you well remember while you were Chairman of this
committee, I opened dialogue with Albania some 15 years ago. I
opened more recently dialogue with Libya and dialogue with North
Korea, and I have been trying, unsuccessfully thus far, to open a
dialogue with Iran. But I do believe that there is an enormous dif-
ference between the dialogue and an attempt to hope that countries
which have been primary players in undermining U.S. foreign pol-
icy objectives will suddenly turn around and be helpful partners
and allies in dealing with problems that they consider to be very
much of importance to them, and they view their goals as totally
different from ours.


58
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:
:
Iran would like to have Iraq as much under its way as is hu-
manly possible. Iran wants to see a Shi'a-dominated Iraq. We want
a coalition and open democratic friendly entity. And I truly believe
that the Study Group's stated hope that this can happen, that Iran
and Syria will turn around on their basic policy goals and long-es-
tablished practices, is utterly unrealistic. With respect to the obser-
vation you just made, Mr. Chairman, which repeats the Study
Group's printed statement, that you cannot get anything done in
the Middle East without resolving the Palestinian-Israeli crisis,
may I just remind you, and I would use two dozen examples, that
we succeeded in having Syrian troops removed from Lebanon with
no change in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.
So the fact that any progress has to be achieved only after the
Palestinian-Israeli dilemma is resolved, which will take a long
time, I simply believe is unrealistic. I would be grateful if you can
expand on your observation.
Mr. HAMILTON. Well, you changed one very important word in
what I said, Mr. Chairman. We did not say that you have to re-
solve the problem between Arabs and the Israelis. We said you
have to address it. And there is a very big difference. Now let me
go into a little more detail here because obviously this has been a
huge criticism of the Iraq Study Group report. The first point I
want to make is that the current approach is not working. We have
ried to isolate, and we have tried to pressure Syria. Where has
that gotten us? Iran has become the most powerful country in the
region. Excuse me. The most powerful country in Iraq with the ex-
ception, probably, of the United States. It is a rising regional
power. It is developing its nuclear program. How can you possibly
argue that American diplomacy toward Iran is working? Syria has
been a negative force in Iraq for sure. It continues to support ter-
rorist organizations in Lebanon and Palestine. We have a long list
of complaints against Iran. I don't know if there is any country in
the world that has caused us more heartburn in the last several
decades than Iran, and the chairman is absolutely right, and so is
the ranking member when they point out all of these grievances we
have got against Iran.
We don't make any prediction about what comes out of this nego-
tiation. We just say you ought to try it. We know the obstacles. The
obstacles are pretty easy to set forth, but how do you know unless
you try? Talking is not appeasement. It is diplomacy. Conversation
with a country is not capitulation. The United States doesn't sac-
rifice its interests or values when we talk to another country.
As you were talking, Mr. Chairman, I thought of events many
decades ago that occurred in this room. The early conversations be-
tween the United States and the Soviet Union occurred right here.
They would get up and read formal statements. We would get up
and read formal statements. Then we end with a toast to vodka
and telling everybody we were for peace on earth, then we would
go home. And we kept that up decade after decade after decade,
and we didn't make much progress, but we kept talking. And even-
tually those talks loosened up a little bit, and we began to talk to
people, we got to know them a little better, and we put aside the
set speeches, and we began to address the real issues, and we kept
talking, and we kept talking, and eventually the Soviet Union fell.


59
I think there is a misunderstanding, quite frankly, of what diplo-
macy is all about. I think a lot of people say diplomacy is reaching
an agreement. That may be part of diplomacy, but diplomacy is
much more than that. You may want to withhold agreement; you
may just want to explain your position. You may want to collect
some intelligence. You learn an awful lot when you talk to people.
Maybe you want to deter some actions, you may want to dispel
some misunderstandings. All kinds of things can happen when dip-
lomats get together and begin talking about the relationships be-
tween the two countries. Now, you can't be starry-eyed about this.
We certainly were not on the Iraq Study Group. So I don't think
talking by itself is good or bad. Do we have so little confidence in
the diplomats of the United States that we are not willing to let
them talk to somebody we disagree with? Now the other point here
is that I mentioned in my remarks are these two countries, Syria
and Iran have a lot of influence in Iraq. We don't like that fact.
And they are certainly part of the problem.
Now, look, we talked to Iran not very long ago with regard to Af-
ghanistan. We had a common interest there. There aren't very
many common interests we can identify with Iran, but this is one
of them. Neither one of us wants the Taliban in Afghanistan, and
we began talking with one another, and for a brief period of time,
it worked effectively. I don't, for a minute, think we will sit down
and reach an agreement with Iran on all of these multitudes of
problems you mentioned. That is going to take a long, long, long
time. Let me remind you when Ronald Reagan was President of the
United States and he said, "tear down that wall,” that very week
he sent a negotiator to Moscow on arms control.
Now finally, Mr. Chairman, on this I think there is a common
interest between the United States and Iran in stability. I under-
stand that Syria and Iran want to see us tied down in Iraq, and
I understand Iran is doing all sorts of things in Iraq that are mak-
ing life more difficult for the Iraqis and for us. But it is not in their
long-term interest to have a chaotic Iraq. Look at the population
makeup of Iran.
Only about 50 percent of that country is Persian. There are a lot
of centrifugal forces operating in that country today. Look at the
morning newspaper. The President of Iran is being scolded by the
supreme leader. Okay. If you are smart, you are going to try to
take advantage of those kinds of divisions within Iran.
Chairman LANTOS. Mr. Chairman, your
Mr. HAMILTON. I am talking too long?
Chairman LANTOS. No. We have a vote.
Mr. HAMILTON. I get a break there, don't I?
Chairman LANTOS. Your clarification-
Mr. HAMILTON. I am just getting wound up.
Chairman LANTOS. We noticed that. That is why I interrupted
you. We are very grateful for your clarification, and I have good
news for you, Chairman Hamilton. We have one vote which is the
last vote of the week. We will return in a few minutes, and then
we will continue uninterrupted. The committee stands in recess.
[Recess.]
Chairman LANTOS. The committee will come to order.
The gentlelady from Florida, Ms. Ros-Lehtinen.


60
les-
Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this
important committee.
And thank you, Mr. Hamilton, for your testimony. I agree with
the chairman about what he had said about trying to link the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict to the difficult situation in Iraq, and I
think many of our allies used that as an excuse to not further en-
gage and help us with our conflict.
But because of the limited time, Mr. Chairman, I would like to
yield my time, with your permission, to Mr. Barrett.
Mr. BARRETT. Mr. Hamilton, in a perfect world, I agree with you
that diplomacy is an important th
but I have got a bl
tion.
If we know that Iranian forces are operating within Iraq and at-
tacking our soldiers, if we know that Syrian soldiers are operating
in Iraq and attacking our soldiers, is that not an act of war?
Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Barrett, if they are attacking our soldiers,
that is a very grievous act. The phrase "act of war” is a legal one,
and I am not an expert on that; but obviously we couldn't tolerate
that.
* But I don't believe that we—by advocating diplomacy, I therefore
don't want to take military action. I think you have to integrate
these.
Do I support strong military action against those who attack us?
You bet I do. But I also support diplomacy, too. How do you achieve
peace without talking to your enemies? I don't know how you do
it other than to talk.
So given the hypothetical, as far as I know, that you put before
us, I would say it is a very grievous act, and in all likelihood is
an act of war. We have often negotiated with people who have com-
mitted acts of war against us.
Mr. BARRETT. And I am I hear you loud and clear, Mr. Ham-
ilton, but I think the first thing, the first act of diplomacy when
we are talking with these guys is to say that if we can verify, if
we know and can verify that, then you need to suffer the con-
sequences. If you are going to attack a sovereign nation that is de-
fending another sovereign nation, then we will be against that.
Would you agree with that?
Mr. HAMILTON. I do not think military action and diplomacy are
mutually exclusive. I think you have to do both. Even after very
severe circumstances, I think you have to do both.
Mr. BARRETT. Thank you.
Mr. HAMILTON. What is the option with Iran? Suppose you reject
altogether the idea of diplomatic contacts with Iran. What is the
option?
Okay, one option is that the regime change. That is a popular
ase. Wh at does it mean? Everybody is for regime change in
Iran. I am for regime change in Iran. We don't want like this guy
that is President.
But that is the question. The question is, What are you going to
do about it? What are you prepared to do about it?
Okay. We are going to ratchet things up. We are going to put an
aircraft carrier in the Gulf. That probably makes sense because
those oil supplies are pretty doggone important.
on


63
committing atrocities; there are people on the right that are
committing atrocities. Keep that conditionality. It helps me do
a better job.”
The other day when Secretary of State Madeleine Albright testi-
fied, she made what I considered to be, and many of us did, an out-
rageous statement when she said, “Secretary Rice says she has told
Iraqi leaders, You have to perform.' I say we cannot have it both
ways.” She goes on, “We cannot celebrate an elected government in
Iraq and then demand that it act like a performing animal in our
circus.”
You properly pointed out, I believe, that it is important that the
United States needs to use its leverage to get Iraqi leaders to per-
form. Conditionality doesn't mean that we don't respect their right
to govern or the institutions that they have forged with great sac-
rifice. But we are friends. Friends don't let friends commit human
rights abuses, and it seems to me that saying that the Iraqi leaders
need to perform is somehow acting like a puppeteer or training an
animal in a circus is outrageous and can foment real damage.
So conditionality, I think, is essential. It seems to me that you
think so as well. We have benchmarks. We have to hold them to
a very, very high account.
I know this is a lot of questions, but please, if you could answer
to what I have asked.
Mr. HAMILTON. First of all, on the national reconciliation on Iraq,
we met with them. It is a start, but they really haven't taken any
action, and that is the problem.
When you meet with all of these Iragi leaders. Mr. Smith, as vou
know and I know—you have met with some of them—the question
that is uppermost in our mind always is, are they Iraqi leaders or
are they sectarian leaders. And too often I think they are sectarian
leaders rather than Iraqi leaders.
So I like the idea of the National Reconciliation Commission. I
think it can be a great tool, as it was in the South African consider-
ation, but they have got to start moving here. Taking actions to—
and there is no mystery about what those actions are. I mean, ev-
erybody agrees what steps need to be taken; they just haven't
taken them.
On the question of the provincial elections, we do think they are
necessary and important because they will give a tool mechanism
for the Šunnis to participate. And the Sunnis, as you know, feel
very much left out of things there, and this would give an oppor-
tunity for them to participate.
Chairman LANTOS. Thank you.
Mr. Meeks.
Mr. MEEKS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And it is indeed an honor and privilege, Mr. Hamilton, to have
you as a witness and, in essence, as a role model for this particular
committee, because the work that you have endeavored on and how
you do it twice sitting with a bipartisan committee working to-
gether for the benefit of the country.
I think that often the American people would like to see Demo-
crats and Republicans doing the same as you have done on the two
missions. You are sitting down in a bipartisan way, without poli-
tics, really playing a major role; and in particular, when we are


64
SIS
talking about foreign policy, because there is too much at stake to
play politics on foreign policy when lives are on the line.
And I think that that is what you have demonstrated with what
you do and what you have done with the Iraqi Study Group and
in the 9/11 Commission. I want to commend you for that.
hat regard, you know, I am frustrated because when we
went down to go to the war in Iraq, I don't think that we asked
the kinds of questions that we should have. We allowed politics to
play a little bit into that, in whether we should go to war.
I was one that was against going to the war altogether. But I sit
here as a Member of Congress, and I tell a lot of individuals how
proud I am to be a Member of Congress. And when I look at what
is happening now and how the President has moved on with ref-
erence to Iraq, and looks like Iran, I ask myself, What can I do as
a Member of Congress?
We know we talk about diplomacy with the diplomats from the
State Department, et cetera, and it seems that this President is not
moving forward or—either President, whether it is Ahmadinejad or
President Bush. But what can I do as a Member of the House of
Representatives?
And so, you know, one of the things that I am thinking of and
started looking at Iran a little bit closer, and I would like to get
your opinion on some of this. Then I started watching and looking
at their elections, and I saw that Ahmadinejad wasn't elected by
a landslide margin. In fact, his initial election was contested, I
thought, similar to the United States in 2000.
Then I looked at what has taken place, whether or not there was
freedom of press there, whether he could be criticize
Iran, and I am finding, as you have indicated, sort of headlined
today, he is.
And then I looked at where are the people of Iran; forget just the
leadership, but the people, the average, everyday people of Iran.
And just like our country, you know, there is a midterm election
that we had here that did not like the direction that our President
was taking us in, and as a result, I now sit on this side of the ma-
jority, and I saw in the last elections in Iran that, in fact,
Ahmadinejad's party lost.
So I am saying that maybe then there are some individuals who
sit, like I do, in their Parliament that might be individuals that we
can talk to in a similar fashion that you talked about, whether it
is in—you know, we talk about visas, whether we can go there or
they can't come here either, but maybe there can be some other
place. We can go and we can start. I have talked to some of my
colleagues, Rangel, I think we are going to start a dialogue in Con-
gress.
Chairman LANTOS. The gentleman's time has expired. We will
have to wait for the answer, briefly.
Mr. HAMILTON. I think he is driving at a very important point,
and that is the whole idea that parliamentarians can play in the
foreign policy that Congress obviously yields to the President.
The President is not only the chief maker of foreign policy, but
he is also the sole implementer of foreign policy. But the Congress
still has a very important role. And the kind of thing that you are
.
har


65
talking about seems to me to be a very worthwhile initiative, and
that is to begin a dialogue with Iranians.
Now, that dialogue can be in the private sector, unofficial chan-
nels, but it can be also at the parliamentary level. That is not easy
to work out today, because there are restrictions in contacts be-
tween our two countries, but I think it is very much worth the ef-
fort. And I commend you for it.
Chairman LANTOS. Mr. Royce.
Mr. ROYCE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I wanted to say that
I respected your work when you chaired this committee, when we
served together, and I have appreciated your continued service to
this country since you left Congress. I thank you for that.
Mr. HAMILTON. Thank you.
Mr. ROYCE. In response to maybe an observation made by some
of my colleagues on the other side of the aisle, I would, just in dis-
cussing Iran, point out that we won't find democrats as parliamen-
tarians in Iran because those who ran as democrats were taken off
the list by the Mullahs, and as a result, you have got to be, you
know, a member of the Iranian revolutionary cadre to be in that
Parliament.
Now, this was not always the case, but we seem to be losing
ground on that front in Iran. We are putting considerable hopes in
neighboring states, and I understand that strategy. And you iden-
centives there, but your report states that no country will
benefit in the long term from a chaotic Iraq, and then you say ob-
jectively that that does prove that does depend upon a certain
level of rational self-interest, wouldn't you say, by today's Iraq?
And I think that is where we begin to question whether some
the current leadership is capable of rational self-interest. It re-
quires that the political leadership can get over what must be as
little satisfaction with our predicament and act in its long-term in-
terest.
Your report discusses briefly the ethnic dynamics that could
harm Iran if Iraq spirals out of control, and I would like to hear
about that and ask what we might be able to do to make these
longer-term risks a little more evident to the Iranian leadership.
But at the same time, I would like to point out that the Finan-
cial Times had an article on the growing schism there in Iraq, and
they said a new political coalition is emerging in Iran in response
to growing United States pressure, especially over their nuclear
program and concern over the radical approach of their President
in both foreign and domestic policy.
So here you have a situation where top Iranian officials complain
that our efforts to cut off finance are harming their oil sector. Infla-
tion is out of control. Employment is out of control. These are
sticks, it seems to me, that the administration and others are effec-
tively wielding. And I would like to know how your report's rec-
ommended engagement with Iran squares with our continued pres-
sure on Iran over its nuclear program.
Those are my concerns.
Mr. HAMILTON. Well, I think when you are dealing with a diplo-
matic relationship as difficult as ours is with Iran, you have to look
at all of the carrots and all of the sticks you can. And I think you
probably have to apply both of them.


68
a.
A lot of bad things can happen if we come out of Iraq in the
wrong way. So the problem here is, how do you begin in some man-
ner to reduce your commitments and obligations in Iraq?
You may be exactly right. You may be, but I am not sure you
are right.
Mr. TANCREDO. That is why I am asking.
Mr. HAMILTON. And if you are not right, then a lot of bad things
can occur.
What all of this says to me is that we have to be very careful
and very cautious in what we do in trying to change the dynamics
in the region.
Chairman LANTOS. Thank you very much.
Ambassador Watson.
Ms. WATSON. Thank you so much, Mr. Hamilton, for your time
and your insight and your analysis of what we are facing.
I don't feel at all that this administration, the State Department,
really understands the elements, the psychological elements that
we are dealing with in the Middle East. You have got to know how
people think. And the bloodbath is going on right now. It is plain
for the world to see.
Because the way the Middle Easterners think, they see America
coming in and doing nation-building, occupying first Iraq, then they
want to tell Iran what to do, ignoring their sovereignty. We are cer-
tainly guilty of that. We are nation-building.
Why do we have to tell Maliki what to do? We ought to set our
benchmarks and say look, it is going to be on you. And I really
don't think that democracy will ever stick and can be applied to the
theocracy that exists now.
Our troops are not getting killed from bullets shot from guns. It
is the IEDs. We don't know who the enemy is. So, to me, it doesn't
make sense to put manpower over there so we will have more tar-
gets because we don't-we are not able to identify who the enemy
is.
So my question to you—and I hope I am not using up all of your
time-is, what do you think about our nation-building, and that
certainly is—and civil war, it certainly is Sunni, Shiites and other
groups killing, you know, at the marketplace, going into school
yards, killing each other. And we have not really understood how
these people think in that.
Thank you so much for your response.
Mr. HAMILTON. Well, surely our experience in Iraq is in the fu-
ture going to make us very cautious about intervention. And we
have to understand that, how complicated intervention can be.
I think you make a very, very good point about the our lack of
understanding of the complexity of these societies. Particularly in
a country like Iraq, but of course it applies to many other places
as well. We simply did not understand that country, and we didn't
understand what we were getting into. And we have paid the price
for that very, very heavily.
Now that leads me to your question about nation-building. I don't
have much doubt that future Presidents of the United States are
going to have to wrestle often with the question of intervention.
And it will probably be the toughest question they have to deal
with, because we are going to be asked to do it again and again;


70.
TEK
How urgent is it? I don't think it is the end of the world if we
are not able to begin conversations with Iran and Syria imme-
diately. On the other hand, I think our chances of stabilizing Iraq
are higher if you begin to do it. Nobody can tell how that plays out.
We didn't make any predictions in the report as to what might
happen. There is good reason to believe that the talks would get
nowhere for a long period of time, and that was pretty well articu-
lated here a moment ago.
I can't deny that that is a possibility. It could easily be the case.
But how do you know unless you try? And who can be satisfied
with the way things are today? And what have you got to lose? Are
we so fearful that if we sit down with this country that we are
going to agree to make all kinds of concessions to them? That just
shows a total lack of confidence in American diplomacy.
So I think I would answer your question by saying that your
chances of success in dealing with Iraq are better if you employ all
of the tools of American power, including diplomacy and including
direct talks with Iran and Syria.
Will it work? I don't know.
Chairman LANTOS. Thank you very much.
Mr. Costa.
Mr. HAMILTON. On the executive relationship, that is another
seminar, Mr. Paul, but you are right about that. The consultation
has to be much deeper and much improved, and it is going to come
to the fore on Iran.
Chairman LANTOS. Thank you very much.
Mr. Costa of California.
Mr. COSTA. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Again, an-
other, I think, very important hearing that we are having this
morning.
Mr. Hamilton, it is good to have you here. My question is going
to focus on your comments of the current Iraqi Government and
Maliki's capability of performing. You mentioned that his words
2 your opening statement, but his follow-through
has been weak. I share that feeling..
We were among the first congressional delegations to visit the
Maliki government last May, and I told him then that the patience
of the American public was wearing thin, and that by the end of
last year I believed he needed to show some initial victories. He re-
sponded by saying that victory was more important than timing. I
indicated that that may be so, but that American patience again
was running thin and that if he didn't have some victory soon, I
think he might run out of time.
I told the President 2 weeks ago, when he met with a group of
us, to put me in the doubtful column on this surge if it was not
accompanied by a political agreement that the Maliki government
would hold with the Kurds and the Sunnis on power-sharing and
sharing of the oil revenue. And I think absent a political agreement
like we make political agreements here, where they say it in Arabic
to their constituents and they hold hands and then they follow
through, that we are kidding ourselves.
I would like your take on whether you think this current Maliki
government is capable of performing the political agreements nec-
essary to make this effort a success because, frankly, absent that,
-


71
I don't see, even with the best of your recommendations, us getting
out of there successfully.
Mr. HAMILTON. The honest answer is, I don't know. We can all
make our judgments. The one thing we can all agree on is they
have not performed. He has been in office now how long? About 9
months. He certainly knows what needs to be done. But he just
hasn't done it.
Mr. COSTA. Do you think politically he is incapable of doing it be-
cause of
Mr. HAMILTON. Well, is he incapable? I think politically he has
very formidable obstacles to doing the kinds of things we are ask-
ing him to do on national reconciliation. There is no doubt about
that, I think. But he seems to recognize the need to do it.
Does he have the strength, the political will to do it? I just do
not know.
Now, in the President's approach and in our approach in the Iraq
Study Group, we depend very heavily on Maliki performing. But
what other choice do you have? You can't pick people off the streets
of Baghdad and make an agreement with them. You have got to
deal with the government as it is.
Mr. COSTA. But the timelines, you think we will know that very
soon?
Mr. HAMILTON. I would think that we will begin to know very
soon that he is willing to take the steps. There are already some
indications in the press that he is firming up a little bit. I hope
that continues. And certainly with regard to the acid test with
whether or not they get a sufficient number of Iraqi groups to help
support our groups, we should know in a matter of weeks, I would
think.
All of us in this town are engaged in the question of trying to
judge Maliki's ability, capabilities to perform. But one of the things
that strikes me about it is, what are your alternatives here?
Chairman LANTOS. The gentlemen's time has expired.
I would like to pose a question to our distinguished witness.
Mr. Chairman, when do you need to leave?
Mr. HAMILTON. Right now.
Chairman LANTOS. Well, we promised Chairman Hamilton that
we will not keep him beyond 12 o'clock, and under those cir-
cumstances, I request members who have not yet asked questions,
without objection, the record will be kept open and you may submit
your questions in writing. You need to provide committee staff with
your questions within 7 days.
I want to put a number of items, without objection, in the record
including a letter from Mr. Smith, an op-ed from Mr. Wolf, an op-
ed from the San Francisco Chronicle.
[The information referred to follows:]


72
COMMITTEES:
CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH
4TW DISTRICT, NEW JERSEY
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
VICE CHAIRMAN
CONSTITUENT SERVICE CENTERS:
1540 Kusor Road, Suite A9
Hamilton, NJ 08619-3828
091 585-7978
Y (609) 585- 3650
ANDA
AFRICA, GLOBAL HUMAN RIGHTS
AND INTERNATIONAL
OPERATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE
CHAIRMAN
108 Lacey Road, Suite 38A
Whiting, NJ 08759-1331
(732) 350-2300
Congress of the United States
House of Representatives
September 8, 2006
2373 Rayburn House Office Building
Washington, DC 20515-3004
1202) 225-3765
COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND
COOPERATION IN EUROPE
CO-CHAIRMAN
--
His Excellency Hojjatoleslam Seyyed Mohammed Khatami
Former President of the Islamic Republic of Iran
The Willard Intercontinental Hotel
Washington, D.C. 20004
:
-
Dear President Khatami:
Just as we meet today at the Willard in an atmosphere of mutual respect and candid
dialogue, I respectfully request your immediate personal assistance in securing the release of
several incarcerated men and women in Iran.
In recent years, hundreds of prominent Muslim political activists and dissidents have
been sentenced to lengthy prison terms, allegedly on charges of seeking to overthrow the Islamic
system, while other individuals have been arrested and charged with blasphemy and criticizing
the nature of the Islamic regime. Reformists, democracy activists, and joumalists are also
targeted, with Iranian authorities regularly trying them under press laws and the Penal Code on
charges of "insulting Islam,” criticizing the Islamic Republic, and publishing materials that
deviate from Islamic standards. I am deeply dismayed by these governmental actions, the
pervasive use of torture coupled with long imprisonments, and especially the recent death of two
political prisoners while in custody
Religious liberties in Iran are also a concern. Recent statements by government leaders
have led to an increase in harassment and imprisonment of, and physical attacks against, non-
Muslims. In addition, reports of systematic discrimination and harassment toward Christians,
Jews, and Sunni and Sufi Muslims continue to arise, while Baha'is are repeatedly subjected to
particularly severe religious freedom violations.
-
Surely you understand and appreciate the utter disgust I share with many others over the
oft repeated anti-Semitic tirades, Holocaust denial, and calls for the destruction of the Israeli
state by high Iranian officials. All anti-Semitism—just like anti-Muslim sentiment—is
offensive, deplorable, and totally unbecoming of any man or woman who loves God and seeks to
do His will.
As a practicing Catholic, I have fought for 26 years in Congress to protect the religious
liberties of peoples of all faiths, whether they be Uighurs, Christians and adherents of Falun
Gong in China, Evangelicals and Buddhists in Vietnam, Shi’a Muslims in Azerbaijan, Sunni
Muslims in Uzbekistan and Sufi Muslims in Turkey. One doesn't have to accept the tenants of
another's religion in order to respect their right to practice their faith as they see fit.


73
President Khatami
September 8, 2006
Page Two
Mr. President, I ask for the unconditional release of all political and religious prisoners,
including the following individuals:
• Ahmed Batebi
• Manouchehr Mohammadi
• Ali Akbar Moussavi Khoeini
Hamid Pourmand
Bahram Mashhadi
Pooya Movahhed
Ramin Jahanbegloo
Arzhang Davoodi
Ali Khodabakhshi (also known as Elyaz Yekanli)
Ashraf Kolhari
Abed Tavancheh
Mehdi Babaei Ajabshir (also known as Oxtay)
• Elham Afroutan
• Abbas Lisani
• Sa'id ‘Awda al-Saki
I also ask for a full pardon for the approximately 130 Baha'is who have been released
from prison on bail (between August 2004 and June 2006) that are awaiting trial. Every human
life, regardless of religious or political beliefs, is precious and deserving of respect, compassion
and tolerance.
Mr. President. I reşpectfully ask you to intervene on behalf of these suffering people.
Sincerely,
.
CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH
Chairman
Africa, Global Human Rights
and International Operations


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President Bush's address to the nation on
Iraq last week dispensed with many of
the 79 recommendations included in the
142-page report of the Iraq Study Group.
The headline on the speech was the decision to surge 21,000 troops, rather than downsize
the U.S. military presence in Iraq as the ISG had advised: But the Bush administration also
took a pass on'study group's controversial recommendation to engage with Syria and Iran,
in an effort to convince these state sponsors of terrorism to play a more productive role in
Iraq. Instead, the president implied a military solution, saying that U.S. forces would
"interiyot the flow of sypport" to the insurgençvfrom these states.
:
Administration opposition to engagement with Syria, in particular, is sure to ruffle some:
fcathers in the new Democratic-led Congiess. Indeed, after the Iraq Study Group report was
released in early December, members of Congress -- ignoring State Department counsel --
started to press forward with the suggestion to engage with Syria.
A weck after the Iraq Study Group report was published, U.S. Sen. Bill Nelson, D-Fla.,.
travelcd to Damascus to gauge for himself whether Syrian President Bashar Asad might be
willing to: "be part of a solution" on Iraq. Then, a week later, Democratic Sens. John Kerry,
D-Mass., and Christopher Dodd, D-Conn., made the pilgrimage. These legislators' visits. :.
... were the first of their kind since 2004, when Rep. Tom Lantos, D-San Mateo, visited :
Damascus.
.
The White House has been critical of rcncwcd engagement with Syria on Iraq. Its own :. .
extensive effoftsat dialogue fáilcd miserably, leading thc Bush administration to thc : . .
conclusion thåt'engagement was unhelpful at best, and counterproductive at worst." ..
Legislators such as Sen. Kerry maintain that "you can't-begin to resolve those differences if :
you're not willing to try to understand." But cven thosc making the tick to Damascus arcn't
optimistic that engagement will work. Rather, the argument scems to be that cngagement
can't hurt.
Regrettably, the Bush administration's experience has proven otherwise. Meetings, in which
U.S. emissaries delivered blunt messages to Asad, were spun by Damascus as
"breakthroughs" in Syrian-U.S. relations, undermining the morale of the region's democrats
and alleviating pressure on the regime. As White House spokesman Tony Snow said after
Nelson's visit, even iſ delegations deliver a tough message, "the Syrian have already won a
PR victory."
So Bush administration engagement has proved unproductive. But whal of congressional
visits? A quick assessment suggests that these meelings have also undermined Bush


76
administration policy. A 2003 meeting of U.S. Reps. Darrell Issa, R-Vista, and Nick Rahall,
D-W.Va., with Asad is emblematic of the problem. During the trip, Issa and Rahall
discussed with Asad the presence in Syria of former Iraqi regimc elements who were aiding
the insurgency in Iraq. The congressmen later told the press: "We looked the president
[Asad) in the eyes and asked for his assurance that he would cxpel any Iraqi leader in his
country and not grant asylum. He agreed." With this pledge in hand, Issa and Rahall
declared victory. Issa later pronounced that Asad's "word seems to be good."
The problem, of course, is that Asad lied. Two years later, in February 2005, the Bush
administration announced that Syria continued to harbor a dozen former top-ranking
associates of Saddam Hussein, who were helping to orchestrate the insurgency.
Tile inautht uxceptiaritrithe streamsf.highly damaging congressional visits has been
Lantos, incoming chairman of the House International Relations Committee. In 2003, when
he was in the minority, Lantos met with Asad, but unlike his Democratic and Republican
colleagues, Lantos towed a hard line both in the meeting and out. In fact, immediately after
his audience with Asad in 2003, Lantos returned to the Damascus Sheraton hotel and gave
an unprecedented press conference, reviewing the full litany of U.S. grievances with Syrian
policy, from human-rights abuses, to active undermining or stability in Iraq, to Syrian
support for Palestinian terrorists and Hezbollah.
Although the Bush administration was likely not pleased with the Lantos trip at the time, his
courageous public message countered the potentially negative implications of thc visit. Not
surprisingly, when Lantos returned to Syria in 2004, he was not granted a meeting with
Asad, but instead had to settle for then Foreign Minister Farouq Sharaa.
The difference between Lantos and the other congressional visitors to Damascus is that
Lantos reinforced the Bush administration's message with regard to Syria, instead of
undermining it. But Lantos is the exception to the rule. Generally speaking, the post-
meeting statements by these delegations left -- and continue to leave -- Asad with the (mis)
impression that he has little about which to worry. This mixed message on U.S. policy has
in turn diluted the effectiveness of an already tenuous Syria policy.
Now that the new House Majority Leader Steny Hoyer, D-Md., is encouraging contact with
Syria and Iran as a central plank of the new Democratic Congress, congressional travel to
Damascus may be inevitable. Of course, it would be best if members of Congress did not
visit Syria, as it cannot but legitimate the regime. But if these legislators do feel a need to
"fact find," the general principal should be to do no harm.
In this regard, delegations would be well advised to follow Lantos' lead, and not shy away
from publicly articulating in uncompromising tones the tough messages they say they are
conveying in private, and doing so on Syrian soil. Meeting Asad should not be about
blandishment or gaining "understanding," but rather about conveying an unvarnished
message. Given Syria's continuing problematic behavior -- and the pending investigation
into the assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri, in which Syria is a
leading suspect -- engagement absent this public component risks sending the wrong
impression and further emboldening this already dangerous regime.
David Schenker is a senior fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. From
2002 to 2006, he was the Syria, Lebanon, Jordan and Palestinian affairs adviser in the


:
:


IRAQ AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY
WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 28, 2007
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:08 a.m. in room
2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Tom Lantos (chairman
of the committee) presiding.
Chairman LANTOS. The committee will be in order.
I want to begin by commending both Secretary Rice and the Gov-
ernment of Iraq on the initiative for a regional conference which is
scheduled to take place soon in Baghdad. As my colleagues know
because we have discussed this on numerous occasions, I am pas-
sionately committed to dialogue with those with whom we disagree.
That is the only way potentially to clarify and, perhaps, to diminish
disagreements. Clearly, one multilateral meeting will not solve our
problems with Iran or Syria. But it is a first step, and potentially
of great significance.
As my colleagues will recall, I had the privilege after a 50-year
hiatus to be the first Member of Congress to go to Albania at a
time when not a single American citizen was in Albania and we
had no diplomatic relations with that country. And while I cer-
tainly do not claim credit, Albania's Communist dictator at the
time after our meetings gave me a letter to our President request-
ing the resumption of diplomatic relations. And a few months later
I had the pleasure of being at the State Department, witnessing
the signing of the exchange of documents reestablishing diplomatic
relations between Albania and the United States.
I had the privilege of being the first American official to visit
Libya at a time when we had no relations with Libya. And my goal
was to work for the establishment of full diplomatic relations with
that country. I have been there now six times with six extensive
meetings with Colonel Kadafi, and while again there were many
factors at play, we now have full diplomatic and commercial and
cultural relations with Libya.
I was one of the first to visit North Korea for two lengthy meet-
ings. And this afternoon, our committee will have as its principal
witness Assistant Secretary of State for Asia and Pacific Affairs
Chris Hill, who just completed successful negotiations with North
Korea.
It has been very difficult to have a dialogue with Iran for a num-
ber of reasons. Until this change in administration policy, our ad-
ministration opposed dialogue until Iran suspends its nuclear ac-
tivities. I disagreed with that position, and I am pleased to see that
the Secretary of State yesterday made a 180 degree change in
United States administration policy by looking forward to sitting
(79)


82
Some have argued that a national unity government in Iraq that
can defend itself is not possible in Iraq today, and they support
proposals that would partition Iraq and create what they call
stronger regional governments within a single Federal state. By
contrast, others contend that such an effort would merely intensify
the sectarian divide and others raise concerns about the potential
benefits for Iran of such an arrangement given that the Supreme
Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq, one of the most powerful
Shiite groups in the country with strong ties to Iran, have made
similar proposals.
So we have many complex challenges in front of us, Mr. Chair-
man. Thank you again for your leadership in holding these hear-
ings. Thank you.
Chairman LANTOS. Thank you very much.
I am delighted to call on my friend and distinguished colleague,
the Chair of the Middle East Subcommittee, Congressman Acker-
man.
Mr. ACKERMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for sched-
uling today's hearing, and assembling yet another very distin-
guished panel to talk to us about United States policy in Iraq and
elsewhere.
Dr. Kagan, I read the executive summary of your statement that
you provided us with, and found it to be very interesting and cer-
tainly provocative and challenging, at least from my perspective.
Ambassador Holbrooke, I read your statement with very keen in-
terest and I couldn't agree more with the issues that you have
raised in your discussion of the choices that America now faces. It
is clear, at least to me, that in Iraq we should be focused on man-
aging the consequences of a disastrous policy that underestimated
the enormity of the task in Iraq, and did not provide sufficient
troops necessary at a time when sufficient troops would have made
a different in stabilizing the situation.
Now, as pointed out, we are in a position where we cannot re-
solve the differences between Iraqis. Only Iraqis can do that.
I would note on a positive step forward by the Iraqi cabinet in
approving a draft law on the distribution of oil revenue. This step,
while necessary, is not sufficient however to stop the sectarian vio-
lence in Iraq. But instead of implementing a rational policy that
would extricate us from the mess that is now Iraq, we seem instead
to be intent of fomenting region wide Sunni-Shiia conflict with the
aid of our friends, the Saudis.
If Seymour Hersh's recent article is even half right, then the
United States is engaged in supporting Sunni extremists with
Saudi money as a way to counter Iran. It strikes me that such a
policy carries with it the very real risk of region wide conflict. The
law of unintended consequences will apply here as it did in Afghan-
istan during the war with the Soviet Union. With our blessing and
our instigation in the eighties and nineties, the Saudis supported
the Mujahadeen in Afghanistan. That policy produced both good
and bad outcomes. Withdrawal of the Soviet Union was good, de-
scent into civil war of Afghanistan was bad. The birth of al-Qaeda
proved worse than bad.
The administration seems ready to repeat this sequence across
the Middle East in an effort to counter Iran, but we don't have any


83
control over where this money goes. It seems to me that there is
a significant risk of winding up in the hands of groups who are just
as happy to attack us and our interests as they are to attack Ira-
nian interests.
Mr. Ambassador, I would be interested in your view of such a
policy, the likelihood of its success and an assessment of the poten-
tial risks that are involved as well as hearing from Dr. Kagan on
the same matter.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman LANTOS. Thank you very much. And before going to
Ambassador Holbrooke, I am delighted to call on my good friend
from Indiana, the distinguished ranking member of the Middle
East Subcommittee, Mr. Pence.
Mr. PENCE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for calling this
important hearing and bringing these two learned, experienced,
and distinguished witnesses before this panel.
I believe there is simply no more pressing matter before the Na-
tion today than the issue of succeeding in Iraq as the success of our
overall foreign policy I believe is inextricably linked to victory in
Iraq.
The great Prussian military philosopher Karl von Clausewitz,
with whom our distinguished chairman is quite familiar, described
the nature of war nearly 200 years ago.
Chairman LANTOS. I know him personally.
Mr. PENCE. I know. [Laughter.]
I meant academically familiar, Mr. Chairman.
As you know he wrote, “If you want to overcome your enemy, you
must match your effort against his power of resistance which can
be expressed as the product of two inseparable factors: The total
means at his disposal and the strength of his will.”
American migħt is unsurpassed. That is a bipartisan opinion on
this committee. Therefore, our enemy targets our will.
was home in Indiana this past week, had a number of town hall
meetings, and I heard two things. Number one, I heard Hoosiers
who were concerned about our lack of progress in Iraq, but I also
heard profound concern over the possibility that we might abandon
this cause before we achieved a stability and a victory for freedom
in that troubled part of the world.
Yes, the Iraqi Government needs improvement. My concern is
that the repeated reference to a political solution overlooks the ad-
ministration's nonstop effort to accomplish that. I agree with Dr.
Kagan's statement that “The strategy of relying on a political proc-
ess to eliminate the insurgency has failed.” Nonetheless I do want
to credit the administration for recently making extraordinary
progress in negotiating an agreement on oil revenue. The New York
Times credited Ambassador Zol Kollazaid's negotiations as crucial
to achieving unanimous cabinet approval this past Monday.
Mr. Chairman, I say respectfully it is not sufficient for those
charged with national leadership to just be armchair quarterbacks.
I think the critics of this administration's policy in Iraq, including
those distinguished witnesses today, ought to be willing to tell us
what course they would take, and specifically what the Middle East
would look like in the wake of an irresponsible American with-
drawal. Clever words like redeployment I don't believe will fool


84
M
.
America's enemies, they know exactly what it will mean, with-
drawal, defeat and retreat. It will mean that because they will de-
fine it that way.
look forward to the testimony of our witnesses and I also appre-
ciate their agreement on two main issues. They both desire success
in Iraq and they both recognize according to testimony that rapid
withdrawal would be disastrous. I believe that we should declare
victory as our national policy in Iraq, and I look forward to the in-
sights of these two distinguished men.
I thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman LANTOS. Thank you very much, Congressmen Pence. It
is a strong preference of the Chair to our witnesses at this point,
but I will, as always, be happy to entertain 1 minute statements
should anybody be so inclined.
If not, Ambassador Holbrooke, the floor is yours.
STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE RICHARD C. HOLBROOKE,
VICE CHAIRMAN, PERSEUS LLC, FORMER UNITED STATES
AMBASSADOR TO THE UNITED NATIONS
Mr. HOLBROOKE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is a great honor
to appear again before this committee which, as I will never forget,
was the very first committee I testified before in 1977, almost ex-
actly 30 years ago. But the pleasure if far greater today, because
you, Mr. Chairman, are a man who has been a close friend and ad-
visor to me personally for many years, and also to my wife who
shares with you a common country of birth and a commitment to
the values that you have always epitomized.
Chairman Lantos's career is well known to all of you, but his in-
fluence often exercised in low key and subtle ways may be less well
understood to many of you. While I was at the United Nations,
Congressman Lantos, as my wife would say, Lantos, was by far the
most helpful member of the House in dealing with issues of im-
mense complexity, including the absolutely extraordinarily difficult
issue of fixing the arrears problem. Congressman Lantos's role in
deepening understanding on the most vital issues of national secu-
rity whenever possible on a bipartisan basis has been huge to our
Nation.
This has been true on the crises we face in Iraq, Afghanistan,
and Iran. This committee has an opportunity—indeed, I would sug-
gest, an obligation—to address these issues urgently. It is with this
in mind that I appear before you today, just after a trip to northern
Iraq and Turkey, which concluded with the Munich Security Con-
ference at which Congressman Berman, among others, was present
· as well. .
Let me start, Mr. Chairman, with a statement that I never
thought I would make and never wanted to make. The situation in
Iraq is far worse than it ever was in Vietnam. I speak as a veteran
of services as a civilian in Vietnam for over 3 years, and four more
years on working on the problem in the White House of Lyndon
Johnson, the State Department, the Pentagon where I wrote one
volume of the Pentagon Papers, and the 1968–1969 Paris Peace
Talks with the North Vietnamese. Never, in the years since, did I
imagine that anything would or could be worse.


85
But Iraq is worse than Vietnam except in terms of American cas-
ualties, and this is compounded by the fact that we are waging a
second war in Afghanistan that is also not going well, although I
believe strongly that it is still salvageable in Afghanistan and must
be turned around.
What makes these two wars all the more disastrous is that the
major beneficiary is the country in between them, Iran.
First, we eliminated regimes they despised but could not get rid
of themselves, the Taliban in Afghanistan and Saddam Hussein in
Iraq. Then, even as we got tied down in protracted insurgencies in
both countries, Iran fattened its coffers with high-priced oil, backed
two dangerous anti-Israeli movements, Hamas and Hezbollah,
quietly supported extreme anti-American movements within Iraq,
and exported the most virulent brand of anti-Semitism since the
Holocaust. And last but certainly not least, they are defying the
world and developing a nuclear capability.
Now, Mr. Chairman, my opening statement, which I submitted
to you on Monday as requested, has been overtaken by events that
you and your colleagues have already alluded to. As everyone
knows, the Secretary of State announced yesterday that the United
States will participate in international meetings convened by the
Iraqi Government, to which Iran and Syria have been invited.
While this falls short of what many, including myself, think
would best serve our national interest in regard to Iran, it is an
important step forward, and I share your acknowledgement, both
you and the ranking member of the minority, in regard to that.
It is also a clear response to the recommendations and pressures
from the American public, the new Congress, and the Baker-Ham-
ilton Commission. It should therefore be welcomed and encouraged,
and it is to be hoped that these meetings will have the participa-
tion of Iran and Syria. Both nations must have buy-in in Iraq is
ever to be stabilized. This is equally true of the other neighbors,
Turkey, Syria, Jordan and of course Saudi Arabia.
Discussions with Iran should not be restricted to the nuclear
issue but the whole range of things they are doing to destabilize
a vast region, and I might add, the Russians must be part of this
process.
But until yesterday the idea of participating directly in a broad-
ly-based international effort to deal directly with Iran had been re-
jected by this administration. This is doubly remarkable in light of
the recent breakthrough by Assistant Secretary of State Chris-
topher Hill in his talks with North Korea, and I think in light of
the announcement yesterday it is extremely fortuitous that you
have him as your witness this afternoon, Mr. Chairman.
The model Chris Hill used, with the full backing of President
Bush and Secretary Rice, was simple and elegant, and it definitely
bridged the rather public internal disagreement within the admin-
istration. Hill conducted a bilateral negotiation within a multi-
party forum, the Six-Party Talks. This put the other four countries,
especially China, the primary host, in the position of exerting pres-
sure on North Korea while allowing the United States negotiating
flexibility to reach an agreement.
I might note that the 1995 Dayton negotiations, which you men-
tioned earlier, Mr. Chairman, that ended the war in Bosnia were


86
1
conducted by a small American team, and Chris Hill was my senior
political deputy. He is one of the most outstanding career diplomats
this Nation has, and essentially—making allowances for vast dif-
ferences in substance and structure—Hill followed a similar struc-
ture with the Secretary of State and the President's support after
an intense internal debate in the administration.
At Dayton, the European Union and the Russians played an im-
portant role. So they must do in regard to Iran as these negotia-
tions begin.
Let me turn directly to Iraq itself, and let us start with a simple
but critical proposition which Congressman Pence has already re-
ferred to. All Americans want success in Iraq. And here, Mr. Chair-
man, I want to stress something very important about the dif-
ference between Iraq and Vietnam. There are many similarities,
but there is a critical difference, and I say this because of all the
noise that is going on in the public debate, particularly on the cable
channels.
: In Vietnam, as all of you know and many of you remember per-
sonally, the opposition to the war included people who actively took
the side of the enemy, the people who were killing Americans. Peo-
ple demonstrated carrying Vietcong flags. They had posters of Ho
Chi Minh. This was not the right thing to do while Americans were
under combat, and people in their anger against the war went far
further than they should have.
But I want to stress particularly to my friends on the minority
side of the aisle that this is not the case in Iraq. There is nobody
who wants these dreadful people to succeed, al-Qaeda, the Taliban,
the Sunni extremists, the Shiite extremists. This is a critical but
unnoticed difference, and this is in reference to your comment,
Congresswoman, that we are here for—and I agree with you—we
are here to discuss practical solutions.
. I would also add that the announcement of Secretary Rice yester-
day was in fact, and she acknowledges in her hearing yesterday,
a response to the very kind of practical suggestions put forward by
Baker-Hamilton Commission, by many members of this committee,
by many leading American foreign policy experts.
I don't question the patriotism or motives, the motives of those
with differing points of view, and I regret the assertion that oppo-
nents of the war are aiding and abetting the enemy. That is not
true, and as General Pace himself has said, they are exercising the
very things we are fighting for.
But the U.S. and President Bush do indeed face the most dif-
ficult choices imaginable and we must be honest about them if we
are to contribute this morning to their solutions. Perhaps the addi-
tional troops being rushed to Iraq can delay a far worse blood bath
for awhile, but I believe, and I say this with great regret, that no
surge will definitively turn the tide and, as everyone knows, as
President Bush himself has said, sooner or later the United States
will leave Iraq.
The question therefore is not whether but how and when we re-
deploy in Iraq. How do we redeploy in a responsible manner-not
the irresponsible manner, to use Congressman Pence's exact-and
avoid the chaotic end that we saw in Vietnam in 1975? How do we
protect our vital national security interests in the rest of the vast
1
!
.


87
and vital and turbulent region that stretches from Beirut to Bom-
bay, from the Mediterranean to the Himalayan Mountains? How do
we deal with the estimated 6,000 al-Qaeda in western Iraq who are
there as a result of the war? They weren't there before the war but
they are there now, and we can't just say, well, it is our fault they
are there. We have to deal with them as a real threat. And if we
are going after al-Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan, we can't
ignore them in a situation much closer to the European heartland.
The first thing that must be done is to define our vital national
interests. This has not been done adequately to my mind. Time
does not permit a full review today of what these vital national in-
terests would be, but I suggest you consider additional hearings fo-
cused on this precise issue in order to help educate the American
people. What is our vital national interest in the region?
The consequences of the administration's mistakes have created
a new set of consequences, and al-Qaeda entrenching itself in west-
ern Iraq, and Sunnis and Shiites tearing each other apart, with
Americans caught in the middle, what should we do? Two of your
colleagues, Mr. Chairman, have asked this to be specific. I will try
briefly to answer the question posed.
The President's answer was the surge, which I view as a mini-
escalation. To my mind, and I believe my distinguished co-witness
will disagree with me on this point, I think 21,000 troops is either
too many or too few. I don't believe it is the right amount. Now,
none of us are going to know until the history books are written.
I base my assessments on many years of participating in, studying,
and watching guerilla wars.
Twenty-one thousand are not enough to turn the tide, but they
significantly deepen our involvement in a war that everyone says
cannot be won through military means. American casualties will
increase and the escalation increases the risks that the ultim
American exit from Iraq will be precipitous.
At this point, Mr. Chairman, it is clear that all our choices in
Iraq are bad. Given these circumstances, I have come to the conclu-
sion that, however difficult and however painful, we should try to
manage a careful phased redeployment of American troops rather
than face the situation in the future that might force our hand.
This is to some extent what the British decided to do with their
announcement last week. More British withdrawals are certain in
my view once the prime minister changes later this year, and the
South Koreans with far less notice are following the same pattern.
Such a redeployment, and please note I used the word "redeploy-
ment” very deliberately, would take perhaps a year if done prop-
erly, and could start relatively soon if President Bush would con-
sider it and present it, not as a defeat but as an opportunity to sal-
vage something from the wreckage that is now Iraq. The United
States could leave some troops behind for specific tasks related di-
rectly to our own national security interests—first and above all-
pursuit of al-Qaeda and their network in western Iraq. And again
Ī stress, since everyone here is supporting enhanced effort in Af-
ghanistan against the same enemy, we can't go after them in Af-
ghanistan and ignore their growing presence in western Iraq, and
I don't think enough attention has been focused on this conun-


90
within and close to the administration, further illustrates that. Finally, let me stress
my belief that as long as we are tied down in Iraq, it will be virtually impossible
to deal with Tehran, while Iran can continue to raise the price for us in Iraq with
relatively low-cost, deniable actions.
Let me turn therefore to Iraq itself. I must start with a simple, but critical, propo-
sition: all Americans want success in Iraq. I do not question the patriotism or mo-
tives of those with differing points of view, and I regret the outrageous assertion
that opponents of the war are aiding and abetting the enemy. But the United States
and President Bush face the most difficult choices imaginable, and we must be hon-
est about these issues if we are to contribute to their solutions. A long term Amer-
:.ican presence in Iraq is inconceivable, for obvious military and political reasons. Yet
most experts believe that a rapid withdrawal is likely to result in an even worse
bloodbath than the one already going on, as well as further gains for Iran and al-
Qaeda. The United States is perceived in the rest of the Arab world, which is over-
whelmingly Sunni, as backing the Shiites, thus increasing our problems with the
very Arab nations we have traditionally been closest to. Yet there is no gratitude
among Shiites, nor should we expect any. They want everything in Iraq, after hav-
ing been the suppressed majority for over 400 years. What the United States un-
leashed, we can no longer control. Perhaps the additional troops being rushed to
Iraq can delay a far worse bloodbath for a while, but no surge will turn the tide,
and—as everyone knows-sooner or later the United States will leave Iraq.
The question, therefore, is not whether, but how and when we redeploy in Iraq.
How do we redeploy in a “responsible” manner, and avoid the chaotic end in Viet-
nam in 1975? How do we protect our vital national security interests in the rest
of the vast and vital region that stretches from the Mediterranean to the
Himalayas? How do we deal with the estimated 6,000al-Qaeda now operating in
western Iraq, as a result of American politics?
The first thing that must be done is to define our vital national interests—some-
thing that has been sorely lacking. Time does not permit a full review today of what
these would be, but I suggest that you consider hearings focused on this precise
issue in order to help educate the American people. While oil and energy resources
are often put at the top of any list, we cannot allow ourselves to be blackmailed
because of energy. In any case, remaining in Iraq hardly helps us, or anyone else,
on oil. There is plenty of oil there, but it will not flow to the rest of the world in
significant quantities until there is peace and stability, and, in any case, American
has never been dependent on Iraqi oil.
Nor is promotion of democracy a top priority, at this time, in Iraq or its neighbors.
Now, Mr Chairman, you and I have both spent much of our lives supporting democ-
racy and human rights around the world; indeed, it is one of the issues that first
brought us together. But the oath we take when we enter government service calls
on us to preserve and protect the United States against all enemies, foreign and do-
mestic. We can deplore the behavior of regimes in nations from Burma to Zimbabwe,
and we should use whatever influence we have to call them to account for their
treatment of their own people. If the opportunity arises, we should act to promote
a peaceful transition to popular rule, as we did in the Philippines, Taiwan, South
Korea, Chile, and Central and Eastern Europe. But we cannot intervene every-
where, and in any case, military action is unlikely to produce the popularly-based
governments that we prefer. Those who supported the initial action in Iraq did so
because the American people were misled on the issue of Weapons of Mass Destruc-
tion, because Saddam was a monster, because we believed that the administration
was competent, because they asserted a link between Saddam and 9/11, and because
when American troops are in harm's way, our first instinct is to support them. But
not-I repeat, not-to impose democracy in a country that had never known it, that
was torn by ancient sectarian divisions, and that should never have been created
within its present boundaries to begin with.
The consequences of these monumental mistakes have created a new set of con-
sequences. With al-Qaeda now entrenching itself in western Iraq, and Sunnis and
Shiites tearing each other apart, with Americans caught in the middle, what should
we do?
The president's answer was the surge, which is really a mini-escalation. To my
mind, 21,000 more troops are either too few or too many. They are not enough to
turn the tide, but they significantly deepen our involvement in a war that cannot
be won through military means. American casualties will increase, and the esca-
lation increases the risks that the ultimate American exit from Iraq will be a pre-
cipitous one.
At this point, it is clear that all our choices in Iraq are bad. Given these cir-
cumstances, I have come to the conclusion that, however difficult and painful, we
should try to manage a careful, phased re-deployment of American troops, rather
EEN


93
is true that a number of the states neighboring Vietnam also fell
to communism as some had warned that they would, and other
states that did not fall nevertheless came under great pressure. It
was also true that the net result of that was far less significant
than many people thought it would be, and far less significant than
many other things that were going on in the world at that time.
I do not believe, in fact, I am convinced that that is not true in
Iraq. If you look at the measures, and there is a terrific report that
I commend to your attention if you have not already seen it, by
Ken Pollack and Dan Bymam called “Things Fall Apart”, about the
likely consequences of spillover in the region if we allow Iraq to im-
plode completely.
There is every reason to believe that if we withdraw from Iraq
without establishing a basic level of security and a basic level of
effective governance that the war will turn into a maelstrom that
will involve the entire region, and we have already seen Iran di-
rectly involved in supporting insurgents, Shiia insurgents, also ap-
parently Sunni insurgents in Iraq. We have seen Syria involved in
supporting insurgents in Iraq. The Saudis have made it clear that
if this gets out of hand they will intervene. The Turks have threat-
ened to intervene.
I think that a collapse in Iraq is very likely to lead both to re-
gional conflict and also to subsidiary civil wars throughout the
Middle East, especially throughout the Arab world, and I do not
think that anyone can really say honestly that is in the interests
of the American people to have such a thing happen.
So as many people are pessimistic about the possibility of success
in Iraq where I think it is possible, I think people are not pessi-
mistic enough about the likely consequences of allowing Iraq to col-
lapse completely, and I think it is worth discussing that in a lot
of detail, and I would commend again to the attention of the com-
mittee the Pollack and Bymam report, and I would suggest that
you might want to address in more detail various scenarios for pos-
sible consequences of an American withdrawal from Iraq from a re-
gional perspective.
Does Iraq matter to the global war on terror? Well, Ambassador
Holbrooke pointed out that there are thousands of al-Qaeda fight-
ers in Al Anbar province, and he is absolutely right, and there is
no question that that question must be dealt with. There are many
who would say that the way to deal with that problem is to aban-
don our efforts to bring sectarian violence under control, and in-
stead focus our efforts in Iraq on somehow preventing those 6,000
al-Qaeda terrorists in Al Anbar province from establishing bases
and training camps and so forth, and basically take some sort of
approach-I am not even sure exactly what it would look like to
prevent them from gaining a foothold.
The problem is that in my view this is a misreading of the situa-
tion in Iraq. Al-Qaeda is not only in Al Anbar. Al-Qaeda operates
throughout the belt of cities and villages that surround Baghdad.
Its networks run into the heart of Baghdad. It is at the heart of
much of the sectarian fighting in Baghdad. The networks run into
Diyala providence, into the provincial capital of Bacuba,
way out to the Iranian border, and they run up to the north into
Ninua province as well.


96
Madri will begin to fight us when they realize that they really will
be eliminated. I fully expect, as we have already seen, that al-
Qaeda in Iraq will step up its attacks. I fully expect that Sunni in-
surgents will continue to resist and fight, and of course the political
complexities are enormous.
Nevertheless, at this stage I think the trend lines for the first
time in a long time are even if ever so moderately positive, and I
think that it is far from time at this point considering how central
Iraq is to all of our interests to give up on this effort, and I would
exhort Congress and the committee to give General Petreus the
time and the resources that he needs to help us to success in Iraq.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Kagan follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF MR. FREDERICK W. KAGAN, RESIDENT SCHOLAR, AMERICAN
ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE
ately. This approu.s. supporta Iraq will descer
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Victory is still an option in Iraq, and it is vital to America's security. Defeat will
lead to regional conflict, humanitarian catastrophe, and increased global ter-
rorism.
• Iraq has reached a critical point. The strategy of relying on a political process to
eliminate the insurgency has failed. Rising sectarian violence threatens to break
America's will to fight, and it will destroy the Iraqi government, armed forces, and
people if it is not rapidly controlled.
We must adopt a new approach to the war and implement it quickly and deci-
sively.
• Three courses of action have been proposed. All will fail.
Withdraw immediately. This approach will lead to immediate defeat. The
ISF are entirely dependent upon U.S. support to survive and function. If
U.S. forces withdraw now, they will collapse and Iraq will descend into total
civil war that will rapidly spread throughout the region.
Engage Iraq's neighbors. This approach will fail. The basic causes of violence
. and sources of manpower and resources for the warring sides come from
within Iraq. Iraq's neighbors are encouraging the violence, but they cannot
stop it.
Increase embedded trainers dramatically. This approach cannot succeed rap-
idly enough to prevent defeat. Removing U.S. forces from patrolling neigh-
borhoods to embed them as trainers will lead to an immediate rise in vio-
lence. This rise in violence will destroy America's remaining will to fight,
and escalate the cycle of sectarian violence in Iraq beyond anything an Iraqi
army could bring under control.
• We must act to restore security and stability to Baghdad, which has been identi-
fied as the decisive point.
• There is a way to do this.
- We must change our focus from training Iraqi soldiers to securing the Iraqi
population and containing the rising violence. Securing the population has
never been the primary mission of the U.S. military effort in Iraq, and now
it must become the first priority.
We must send more American combat forces into Iraq and especially into
Baghdad to support this operation. A surge of seven Army brigades and Ma-
rine regiments to support clear-and-hold operations starting in the Spring of
2007 is necessary, possible, and will be sufficient.
These forces, partnered with Iraqi units, will clear critical Sunni and mixed
Sunni-Shi’a neighborhoods, primarily on the west side of the city.
- After the neighborhoods have been cleared, U.S. soldiers and marines, again
partnered with Iraqis, will remain behind to maintain security.
- As security is established, reconstruction aid will help to reestablish normal
life and, working through Iraqi officials, will strengthen Iraqi local govern-
ment
.". This approach requires a national commitment to victory in Iraq:


101
wound up as a lawyer, so I guess there was a pattern there.
[Laughter.]
But the point is at one time no matter how nice your good, naive
intentions might be when you decide that the plan is not attainable
you have to come up with a different plan, and the plan isn't you
should go to school for another 4 more years and study harder to
be a dinosaur, some plans don't work out. Not every story has a
happy ending. Not every life is filled with happiness and joy.
I think that we don't learn from those kinds of experiences and
face realities and find a different kind of solution and a different
kind of approach we wind up mucked down in the mire, we are
mired down in the muck, anyway you want to have it.
I don't know how adding 20,000 troops fixes this p
were 400,000 troops, I think a lot of people could say, well, maybe
that can work and figure out things, but 20,000 troops is just going
to cite the math that I have already put before you.
Dr. Kagan in that I havent things, but ple could sa problem. If it
Mr. KAGAN. Congressman, I don't believe that I have ever been
called a dinosaur before. I also wanted to be a dinosaur when I was
young and that didn't work out so well for me.
Mr. HOLBROOKE. That I am not so sure of.
Mr. KAGAN. Thank you very much, Ambassador. I thought you
were a diplomat. [Laughter.]
Congressman, to answer your question, the 130,000, and we have
had as many as 160 some thousand troops in Iraq in the past, were
not doing what the force in Iraq is now being called upon to do.
They did not have it as their mission to provide security for the
Iraqi people. They had it as their mission to train Iraqis and hand
over responsibility.
Mr. ACKERMAN. Well, then let me ask this, Dr. Kagan, because
our time is short, if they are not doing what has to be done, why
don't we take 20,000 of the 130,000 and have them do what should
be done with the new 20,000 and send 110,000 home?
Mr. KAGAN. Because when you look at the force requirements, we
are actually accomplishing the mission of providing security, espe-
cially in Baghdad, and this was not a question of instinct or what
we thought would work. We pulled together a team of experienced
military planners with many years taken together of experience in
Iraq, fighting situation, and we asked them given this mission,
which is to try to establish security in the critical areas in Bagh-
dad, what forces would be necessary. That is how we generated
what our force-
Mr. ACKERMAN. So you are saying it is 150. It is not the 20 doing
something new, it is 150.
Mr. KAGAN. All of the forces in Iraq are doing new things. This
is not just a question of 20,000 establishing security and the others
doing the same thing. This is a fundamental change in strategy.
Mr. ACKERMAN. And how is that working out?
Mr. KAGAN. Well, we haven't really begun yet, but so far, as I
indicated in my opening remarks, the trend lines are positive, in
fact, surprisingly so.
Mr. ACKERMAN. Well, not for a couple of funerals that I have
been to recently.
Ambassador Holbrooke?


103
aren't we getting bogged down already, and that was 5 days into
the operation. Anyway, I think that attitude has a lot to do with
it. Let me ask you some specifics.
I agree with you that there is a competency problem here. There
was no plan, post-Saddam plan, and I would agree with my col-
leagues with their criticism of this administration, not on its goal,
but on the competency that it has had in terms of actually admin-
istering this really important goal and project they set in motion.
When we are trying now to come to a way to manage the situa-
tion regionally, would you think that—wouldn't you think that it
would be better for the President to call a summit of regional lead-
ers and go there with them from Saudi Arabia, and from Qatar,
and Kuwait, as well as Syria and Iran, and Turkey? Wouldn't that
be better than just trying to open up a series of private negotia-
tions with the various countries like Syria and Iran?
Mr. HOLBROOKE. Thank you, Congressman.
Before I answer that question, please allow me a word on your
use of the word “defeatism.”
Mr. ROHRABACHER. Okay.
Mr. HOLBROOKE. I have served my country on and off for 45
years this year. I believe in the country. I don't believe we will ever
be defeated in the sense that you mean. We have difficulties from
time to time. Vietnam most notably, and now Iraq. Those are the
bookends. Those will probably be the bookends of my own career.
But I have never been imprisoned by the Vietnam ghosts any-
more than you have. You were there. I was there. Some people
were traumatized forever, but we have to learn from history, not
be imprisoned by it.
In regard to the use of military force, I am quite willing to use
it or threaten to use it when necessary, and as you know, did so
repeatedly during the Clinton years when necessary in the Balkans
over, I might add, the skepticism and opposition of two-thirds of
the House which voted thee to one against what President Clinton
did in Bosnia, and many people of both parties said force wouldn't
work in the Balkans, and, as I said earlier, I supported the resolu-
tion in September 2002.
So I think the use of the word “defeatism” is exactly what I am
trying to avoid. I have stressed in my comments here and in all the
things I have written, as has Chairman Lantos, that what we are
looking for is a solution that protects our vital national security in-
terests. And again, if Petreus succeeds, I will be delighted. But the
question has been asked by Congressman Berman and Congress-
man Ackerman what happens if they don't, and that has to be ad-
dressed.
Now, on your specific question, speaking just as a person who
has practiced diplomatic arts, if President Bush were to ask my ad-
vice, which by the way he won't, I would not recommend he call
for a regional summit conference. First of all, others wouldn't come,
and it would just further weaken America's leadership role in the
region and the world.
Secondly, summits should be carefully prepared. You don't just
get on a boat like Woodrow Wilson did and spend 6 months in
Paris and come up with a “solution,” which 80 years later gives us


105
tends to being able to order Shiia factions in Iraq to stop fighting
as long as there continues to be a danger to the Shiia community.
Mr. SHERMAN. Thank you.
Ambassador Holbrooke?
Mr. HOLBROOKE. I suspect that is correct, but I want to under-
score our dilemma. We don't actually know. Not even the greatest
experts in American and Iran understand fully the relationship be-
tween the Shiites of Iraq and the Shiites of Iran. The Arab Persian
difference is rather critical here as well, and I don't think we
should base our policies therefore on thinking we can understand
and micro manage these things which we will never understand
fully.
The fact is that while we don't know the exact relationships be-
tween these people we do know that Hakim, the very man who
called on the President in the oval office a few weeks ago, spent-
I don't know—something like 20 years in Iran, and el Sadra may
not like the Iranians, but Fred believes he is in Iran now, and
whether he is or not he has certainly been getting supplies, includ-
ing lethal things used against Americans from Iran. So let us not
overanalyze the situation.
Mr. SHERMAN. Ambassador, if I could follow up. Why all this at-
tention toward the need to talk to Syria in Iran when I put forward
the question, what if they delivered everything we could possibly
ask for, and both you and your fellow witness says that would have
perhaps only a modest impact on what goes on in Iraq?
Mr. HOLBROOKE. No, that is not what I believe. I truly don't
know where a dialogue with Iran would take us. I don't even know
if the Iranians would agree to such a dialogue at this point, al-
though there is a lot of evidence they wanted one right after the
Bonn negotiations that led to the Karzi government with Iranian
support, nor did Richard Nixon know what would happen when he
went to China. He didn't know what he was setting out for, but
once the door opened amazing things happened.
I see no down sides if you proceed carefully with the iranians on
the issue of Iraq while making clear to them that we remain in-
tensely concerned about Hamas, Hezbollah, and their nuclear pro-
gram, and their support of terrorism.
Mr. SHERMAN. Thank you.
Chairman LANTOS. Thank you very much.
Mr. Royce of California.
Mr. ROYCE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Ambassador Holbrooke, I too want to express my appreciation for
your service to this country. We had an opportunity to work on
issues affecting the African crisis, but I think that your persever-
ance as special envoy during the Balkan's war will be recorded by
history. Your effectiveness in that position was very, very impres-
sive.
Mr. HOLBROOKE. Thank you.
Mr. ROYCE. I wanted to ask you because you brought up the op-
ed that you penned about a year ago on Afghanistan, and former
Ambassador Peter Thompson, who you and I know.
Mr. HOLBROOKE. Galbraith.
Mr. ROYCE. Pardon?
Mr. HOLBROOKE. I am sorry.


114
S-
know all the details. But I would just be very brutal about it, again
speaking simply as an American from our national security inter-
est.
It doesn't matter to me what that oil agreement is. What matters
to me is that it be acceptable to all three elements in Iraq, and the
key factor here are the Kurds who when I was in Arabell was re-
fusing to make the agreement, and I would draw your attention to
one other very important point which nobody has focused on yet.
It turns out that there is a lot of oil in the Sunni areas, and people
have a pretty good idea where it is, but they can't develop it in con-
ditions of insecurity. That may be a long-term factor which could
ease the problem because up to now we have all believed that all
the oil was in the Kurdish areas and the Shiite areas.
Having said that, I close again where I started. Whatever agree-
ment is acceptable to the three factions, that it shares the revenue
and helps keep the country together is fine with me.
Mr. GREEN. And I think that is something we ought to as a coun-
try encourage because if we can at least get them to talk to each
other and share the resources they will know that one region won't
be impoverished. And I have heard the same thing about the Sunni
area, that there is great potential, but typically when you hear re-
ported the production is in the Kurdish area, or the Shiia area, and
not in the Sunni, but to have stability they could actually be.
Again, even from Texas, you know. Just so that oil gets in the
world market I will be happy with that, and you know, you are
going to have to come to Houston because we have the folks that
can get that oil out of the ground wherever it is at, and be that
as it may.
Dr. Kagan, I didn't want to leave you out because I enjoyed your
testimony too.
Mr. KAGAN. Congressman, if I could just respond-
Mr. GREEN. Please.
Mr. KAGAN [continuing]. Briefly to Ambassador Holbrooke's com-
ments.
The issue of the Sunni oil is not just an issue of security. There
are many places in the world where you have a lot of insecurity
and you nevertheless have international investment, and you nev-
ertheless have people working oil fields. The security is an impor-
lem, and as I said, I think we have seen a lot of progress
on that. But the oil law actually really is critical to that because
I think we have been looking at the oil law as a way of bringing
Iraq together and solving the sectarian differences, and I am not
convinced, you know, what it is going to do for that.
Mr. GREEN. It is not the panacea.
Mr. KAGAN. Right. But what it will do is create the legal basis
that is the absolute essential precondition for having foreign invest-
ment in Iraq, and one of the big problems we have seen so far is
that because there has not been agreement about this, and specifi-
cally agreement about to what extent the regions in Iraq are em-
powered to make agreements and so forth, it has been a hostile cli-
mate for foreign investment.
Now, this isn't going to be a panacea in that regard either be-
cause there is a question of security as well, but I think from the
1.


116
back to the Pollack and Byman report, what you see is that when
you have these spin-off civil wars and they happen in many, many
cases—the exception being the one in which Ambassador Holbrooke
played such a critical role in the Balkans where we actually man-
aged to get violence under control—when you don't do t
you have civil wars and the civil wars tend to spawn even more
terrorist groups, and this is a common phenomenon. So I think
those are vital interests that we have right now.
Mr. INGLIS. Speaking of this question of civil war, what percent
of the trouble in Iraq right now do you think is an insurgency, and
what percent is internal?
Mr. KAGAN. I think most of what we are seeing in Iraq is inter-
nal. I think we are seeing Sunni Arab insurgency that is con-
tinuing, but that is, frankly, losing force. We are having continued
attacks by al-Qaeda on United States targets, also on Shiia targets
in an effort to stoke the civil war, and increasingly on Sunni Arab
targets because the Sunni Arab's leadership in Anbar has turned
against them.
So you have a lot of civil war going on. The Sunni Arab insur-
gency is a part of that. But I believe that the process is very largely
internal to Iraq right now in terms of where it is drawing its sup-
port and what is driving it.
Mr. INGLIS. And if it is internal, why not focus on the political
causes? In other words, why not put them on a schedule like we
had them on for elections, for the adoption of an oil law, for the
fixing of the Ba'ath problem and announce that publicly?
Mr. KAGAN. Well, the problem is we have been trying all along
to find a political solution to this problem, and the diffic
s that
if the population doesn't have a basic level of security, where peo-
ple don't have to worry in the morning if they are going to live to
see the end of the day, then trying to get political processes to solve
that is very unlikely to be successful. It is very important to estab-
lish security first as a precondition, and then to move forward with
this political process.
I am astonished at the degree of successes we are already seeing
in the political process given that we have not yet established secu-
rity. But I believe that as we establish security our leverage to
press them to find political solutions will increase dramatically.
Mr. INGLIS. But can you—
Chairman LANTOS. I am sorry. The gentleman's time has ex-
pired.
Ms. Sheila Jackson Lee of Texas.
Ms. JACKSON LEE. I was here, Mr. Chairman. Yes, I was here.
Chairman LANTOS. Yes.
Ms. JACKSON LEE. I thank the chairman very much, and the wit-
nesses..
Let me indicate my belief that Iraq is worse than Vietnam, but
I think the lesson that comes from Vietnam really is that a leaving
did not generate a collapse of the values and the existence of Amer-
ica or its foreign policy.
I think another example is the 20 years that Russia spent in Af-
ghanistan left, certainly unsuccessfully, but there is no documenta-
tion that would suggest their staying would have accomplished
their goals.
C
..
E


126
0
:
1
Forty years later, the United States finds itself again bogged down in another
misguided, mismanaged, and unpopular war. And once again, it is time to speak
truth to power. Although I am proud to have been one of the 126 Democrats in the
House who voted against the October 2002 Authorization to Use Military Force
(AUMF) in Iraq, I remain saddened that our voices and votes were not powerful or
persuasive enough to steer our country away from the iceberg that is the Iraq War.
Given the loss of the more than 3,000 brave servicemen and women, the 23,000
American casualties, the hundreds of thousands of Iraqis killed and wounded, and
the nearly $400 billion of taxpayer dollars expended on this misadventure, it is
small consolation to know, as the Washington Post finally recognized in an article
by Walter Pincus published December 4, 2006, the 126 House Democrats who spoke
out and voted against the Iraq War resolution have turned out to be correct in their
warnings about the problems a war would create.
We Democrats spoke truth to power. We predicted before the war that “the out-
come after the conflict is actually going to be the hardest part, and it is far less
certain.” We made the point that it was essential for the Administration to develop
"a plan for rebuilding of the Iraqi government and society, if the worst comes to
pass and armed conflict is necessary.” As my colleague, Mr. Skelton, now the Chair-
man of the Armed Services Committee wrote to President Bush, “I have no doubt
that our military would decisively defeat Iraq's forces and remove Saddam. But like
the proverbial dog chasing the car down the road, we must consider what we would
do after we caught it.”
We warned of the “postwar challenges,” particularly the fact that "there is no his-
tory of democratic government in Iraq,” that its “economy and infrastructure is in
ruins after years of war and sanctions” and that rebuilding would take “a great deal
of money.” We warned against sending American soldiers to war in Iraq without
adequate protection against biological weapons.
Mr. Chairman, I am also reminded how General Eric Shinseki told the Senate
Armed Services Committee in February 2003 that the Defense Department's esti-
mate of troops needed for occupying Iraq is too low and that several hundred thou-
sand soldiers would be needed. Then Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz, ap-
pearing before Congress two days later, testified that Gen. Shinseki's estimate was
"wildly off the mark” and that it is "hard to conceive that it would take more forces
to provide stability in post-Saddam Iraq than it would take to conduct the war itself
and to secure the surrender of Saddam's security forces and his Army. Hard to
imagine.”
Defense Secretary Rumsfeld named Gen. Shinseki's successor one year before the
end of his term, making him a lame duck and an example to the rest of the military.
Three months after Gen. Shinseki's comments, former Army secretary Thomas
White admitted he was right. Dr. King would applaud the general's courage.
Mr. Chairman, to date, the war in Iraq has claimed the lives of 3,020 brave serv-
icemen and women (115 in December and 20 in the first 14 days of this month).
More than 22,000 Americans have been wounded, many suffering the most horrific
injuries. American taxpayers have paid nearly $400 billion to sustain this misadven-
ture. The war is also exacting a terrible toll on the Iraqi people as well. Conserv-
ative estimates place the number of dead and wounded in the hundreds of thou-
sands. The latest tragedy, yesterday's bombing of a university in Baghdad took the
lives of more than 70 innocent persons. All told, more than 108 Iraqis were killed
yesterday in Baghdad.
Mr. Chairman, I strongly opposed the proposal announced by President Bush last
week. It is clear that President Bush has not offered a new strategy for success in
Iraq, just an increase in force levels of 20,000 American troops. The president's pro-
posal will not provide lasting security for Iraqis. It is not what the American people
have asked for, nor what the American military needs. It will impose excessive and
unwarranted burdens on military personnel and their families.
Mr. Chairman, the architects of the fiasco in Iraq would have us believe that
"surging" at least 20,000 more soldiers into Baghdad and nearby Anbar province is
a change in military strategy that America must embrace or face future terrorist
attacks on American soil. Nothing could be further from the truth, as we learned
last year when the “surge” idea first surfaced among neoconservatives.
Mr. Chairman, the troop surge the President announced is not new and, judging
from history, will not work. It will only succeed in putting more American troops
in harm's way for no good reason and without any strategic advantage. The armed
forces of the United States are not to be used to respond to 911 calls from govern-
ments like Iraq's that have done all they can to take responsibility for the security
of their country and safety of their own people. The United States cannot do for Iraq
what Iraqis are not willing to do for themselves.
.
is


127
Troop surges have been tried several times in the past. The success of these
surges has, to put it charitably, been underwhelming. Let's briefly review the
record:
1. Operation Together Forward, (June-October 2006):
In June the Bush administration announced a new plan for securing Baghdad by
increasing the presence of Iraqi Security Forces. That plan failed, so in July the
White House announced that additional American troops would be sent into Bagh-
dad. By October, a U.S. military spokesman, Gen. William Caldwell, acknowledged
that the operation and troop increase was a failure and had “not met our overall
expectations of sustaining a reduction in the levels of violence.” [CNN, 12/19/06.
Washington Post, 7/26/06. Brookings Institution, 12/21/06.]
2. Elections and Constitutional Referendum (September-December 2005):
In the fall of 2005 the Bush administration increased troop levels by 22,000, mak-
ing a total of 160,000 American troops in Iraq around the constitutional referendum
and parliamentary elections. While the elections went off without major violence
these escalations had little long-term impact on quelling sectarian violence or at-
tacks on American troops. [Brookings Institution, 12/21/06. www.icasualties.org]
3. Constitutional Elections and Fallujah (November 2004–March 2005):
As part of an effort to improve counterinsurgency operations after the Fallujah
offensive in November 2004 and to increase security before the January 2005 con-
stitutional elections U.S. forces were increased by 12,000 to 150,000. Again there
was no long-term security impact. [Brookings Institution, 12/21/06. New York
Times, 12/2704.]
4. Massive Troop Rotations (December 2003-April 2004):
As part of a massive rotation of 250,000 troops in the winter and spring of 2004,
troop levels in Iraq were raised from 122,000 to 137,000. Yet, the increase did noth-
ing to prevent Muqtada al-Sadr's Najaf uprising and April of 2004 was the second
deadliest month for American forces. [Brookings, 12/21/06; www.icasualties.org.
USA Today, 3/4/04]
Mr. Chairman, stemming the chaos in Iraq, however, requires more than opposi-
tion to military escalation. It requires us to make hard choices. Our domestic na-
tional security, in fact, rests on redeploying our military forces from Iraq in order
to build a more secure Middle East and continue to fight against global terrorist
networks elsewhere in the world. Strategic redeployment of our armed forces in
order to rebuild our nation's fighting capabilities and renew our critical fight in Af-
ghanistan against the Taliban and al-Qaeda is not just an alternative strategy. It's
a strategic imperative.
Mr. Chairman, it is past time for a NEW DIRECTION that can lead to success
in Iraq. We cannot wait any longer. Too many Americans and Iraqis are dying who
could otherwise be saved.
I believe the time has come to debate, adopt, and implement a plan of strategic
redeployment. I am not talking about “immediate withdrawal," "cutting and run-
ning,” or surrendering to terrorists, as the architects of the failed Administration
Iraq policy like to claim. And I certainly am not talking about staying in Iraq for-
ever or the foreseeable future.
I am talking about a strategic redeployment of troops that:
• Reduces U.S. troops in Iraq to less 60,000 within six months, and to zero by
the end of 2007, while redeploying troops to Afghanistan, Kuwait, and the
Persian Gulf.
• Engages in diplomacy to resolve the conflict within Iraq by convening a Gene-
va Peace Conference modeled on the Dayton Accords.
• Establishes a Gulf Security initiative to deal with the aftermath of U.S. rede-
ployment from Iraq and the growing nuclear capabilities of Iran.
• Puts Iraq's reconstruction back on track with targeted international funds.
• Counters extremist Islamic ideology around the globe through long-term ef-
forts to support the creation of democratic institutions and press freedoms.
As the Center for American Progress documents in its last quarterly report (Octo-
ber 24, 2006), the benefits of strategic redeployment are significant:
• Restore the strength of U.S. ground troops.
• Exercise a strategic shift to meet global threats from Islamic extremists.
• Prevent U.S. troops from being caught in the middle of a civil war in Iraq.
Avert mass sectarian and ethnic cleansing in Iraq.
å straftan against theation's fightingStrategic redue to fight ages from Iraq istic na-


132
attacks on American strategy that America mistan and nearby Anbar provi
merces of in way for not woop surgeirst su
7
in their country's that haves are not 20 without a
s that have not done be used to respond a dyantage. The armed
Troop surge not willing to do to own people. The take responsibility fo from govern
have asked for, nor what the American military needs. It will impose excessive and
unwarranted burdens on military personnel and their families.
Mr. Chairman, the architects of the debacle in Iraq would have us believe that
"surging" at least 20,000 more soldiers into Baghdad and nearby Anbar province is
a change in military strategy that America must embrace or face future terrorist
attacks on American soil. Nothing could be further from the truth, as we learned
last year when the “surge” idea first surfaced among neoconservatives.
Mr. Chairman, the troop surge the President announced is not new and, judging
from history, will not work. It will only succeed in putting more American troops
in harm's way for no good reason and without any strategic advantage. The armed
forces of the United States are not to be used to respond to 9/11 calls from govern-
ments like Iraq's that have not done all they can to take responsibility for the security
of their country and safety of their own people. The United States cannot do for Iraq
what Iraqis are not willing to do for themselves.
Troop surges have been tried several times in the past. The success of these
surges has, to put it charitably, been underwhelming. From Operation Together For-
ward in 2006, the Elections and Constitutional Referendum in 2005, the Constitu-
tional Elections and Fallujah in 2004–2005 and lastly massive troop rotations in
2003–2004.
· Mr. Chairman, the ISG Report gets it right: rather than surging militarily for the
third time in a year, the United States needs to surge diplomatically. A further mili-
tary escalation would simply mean repeating a failed strategy. A diplomatic surge
would involve appointing an individual with the stature of a former Secretary of
State, such as Colin Powell or Madeleine Albright, as a special envoy. This person
would be charged with getting all six of Iraq's neighbors—Iran, Turkey, Syria, Jor-
dan, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait-involved more constructively in stabilizing Iraq.
These countries are already involved in a bilateral, self-interested and disorganized
way.
Mr. Chairman, the President's plan has not worked. Doing the same thing over
and over and expecting a different result is, as we all know, the definition of insan-
ity. It is time to try something new. It is time for change. It is time for a NEW
DÍRECTION.
I look forward to hearing from Chairman Hamilton and considering his thoughtful
responses to the Committee's questions.
Thank you. I yield the balance of my time.
WRITTEN RESPONSES FROM THE HONORABLE LEE HAMILTON, CO-CHAIR OF THE IRAQ
STUDY GROUP (BAKER-HAMILTON COMMISSION), TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED FOR
THE JANUARY 19, 2007, BRIEFING RECORD BY THE HONORABLE SHEILA JACKSON
LEE, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF TEXAS
Question:
Many of the recommendations in the ISG report echo the potential value of a con-
certed and collected effort by the U.S. between the Iraqi government and Iraq's neigh-
bors, including Iran and Syria. How do we begin to initiate dialogue to seek this po-
tential support from Iraq's neighbors?
Response:
The Study Group recommended that the United States, working with the Iraqi
government, should launch the comprehensive New Diplomatic Offensive to deal
with the problems of Iraq and the region. The Study Group recommended that this
step take by December 31, 2006.
As an instrument of this diplomatic offensive, the Study Group recommended the
organization of an Iraq International Support Group. The membership of this Sup-
port Group should include Iraq and all states bordering Iraq, including Iran and
Syria; key regional states, including Egypt and the Gulf States; the five permanent
Members of the UN Security Council, and the European Union.
The Study Group further recommended the participation of the office of the
United Nations Secretary-General.
While the United States needs to be a driving force in helping to organize and
start this diplomatic initiative, the UN Secretary-General or the UN Security Coun-
cil could be the formal chair of the Support Group and could initiate the multilateral
diplomatic dialogue.
The United States should also initiate a direct, bilateral dialogue with each of
Iraq's neighbors.
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.
Wouldn't a diplomatic and economic surge be better at improving the standard of
living of the Iraqi people by creating jobs and increasing reconstruction efforts; and
bolstering civil society such as human rights groups, the press, NGOs and advocates
of minority, women and children's rights?
Response:
The Study Group places very strong emphasis on diplomatic and economic meas-
ures. Both diplomatic and economic measures are essential in support of the goal
of a national reconciliation. Only Iraq's leaders can make the difficult and necessary
decisions in support of national reconciliation. In the absence of national reconcili-
ation, the violence in Iraq will not end.
The measures referenced in the question certainly could help improve the stand-
ard of living in Iraq and bolster civil society. Recommendations number 32 and 33
of the Iraq Study Group report address the protection of minority rights in Iraq, and
the protection of civil society. The rights of all minority communities must be pro-
tected. The process of registering non-governmental organizations (NGOs) must not
be used as a tool for politicizing or stopping NGO activity.
Question:
In 2006, while estimates of U.S. reconstruction assistance dwindled to $750 mil-
lion, we have spent a total of more than $400 billion on our military efforts. How
can we better balance this disparity so that we can win the confidence of the Iraqi
people by illustrating more clearly our interest and investment in their standard of
living and by bolstering the capacity of our reconstructive efforts?
Response:
The Study Group agrees with the premise of the question.
Building the capacity of the Iraqi government should be at the heart of U.S. re-
construction efforts, and capacity building demands additional U.S. resources.
Progress in providing essential government services is necessary to sustain any
progress on the political or security front. Job creation is also essential.
For these reasons, the Study Group recommended that U.S. economic assistance
to Iraq should be increased to a level of $5 billion per year rather than be permitted
to decline. We need better balance and integration in the use of U.S. power.
Question:
Prudently, the ISG report mentions many reasons to oppose a precipitous with-
drawal (pp.37–38). Do you believe that conditions will improve significantly in Iraq
over the next year?
Does it not make sense to begin a phased withdrawal and thereby save hundreds
if not thousands of American lives?
Response:
The Study Group found the situation in Iraq grave and deteriorating.
Violence is increasing in scope, complexity, and lethality.
Key players within the government too often act in their sectarian interest.
Iraq's tremendous growth potential is hobbled by insecurity, corruption, lack of in-
vestment, dilapidated infrastructure, and uncertainty.
Iraq's neighbors are doing too little to help it, and some are undercutting its sta-
bility
Absent significant action, particularly on national reconciliation, the Study Group
believes these conditions and trends will continue. If current trends continue, the
potential consequences are severe.
With respect to the U.S. military mission, the Study Group stated: “The primary
mission of U.S. forces in Iraq should evolve to one of supporting the Iraqi Army,
which would take over primary responsibility for combat operations.”
The Study Group stated further: “While these (training and equipping) efforts are
building up, and as additional Iraqi brigades are being deployed, U.S. combat bri-
gades could begin to move out of Iraq. By the first quarter of 2008, subject to unex-
pected developments in the security situation on the ground, all combat brigades not
necessary for force protection could be out of Iraq.”
Question:
The ISG report states: "the United States has both a national and a moral interest
in doing what it can to give Iraqis an opportunity to avert anarchy” (p.2). At what
point, would you say, we have paid our moral debt for having created the cir-
cumstances that led to the current situation? At what point does the withdrawal of
our military become a higher national-interest priority than is the effort to limit in-
stability in Iraq?
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