4.G 74/7:IR 1/12 THE EVOLVING NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR VICTORY IN IRAQ HEARING BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY, EMERGING THREATS, AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS OF THE COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS SECOND SESSION JULY 11, 2006 Serial No. 109-228 http://www.house.gov/reform U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 34-545 PDF WASHINGTON : 2007 For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512-1800; DC area (202) 512-1800 Fax: (202) 512-2250 Mail: Stop SSOP, Washington, DC 20402-0001 CONTENTS Page hearing held on July 11, 2006 1 Statement of: Jeffrey, Ambassador James, Senior Advisor on Iraq to the Secretary of State and Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for the Middle East, Department of State; Mary Beth Long, Representative, Department of Defense; and Brigadier General Michael Jones, Deputy Director for Political Military Affairs, Joint Chiefs of Staff 74 Jeffrey, James 74 Jones, Michael 82 Long, Mary Beth 81 Pollack, Kenneth, director of Middle Eastern policy, Brookings Institu- tion; Laith Kubba, senior director for Middle East and North Africa, National Endowment for Democracy; Anthony Cordesman, Admiral Arleigh Burke Chair in strategy, Center for Strategic and International Affairs [CSIS]; and Dr. Kenneth Katzman, Specialist in Middle East Affairs, Congressional Research Service 113 Cordesman, Anthony 145 Katzman, Kenneth 157 Kubba, Laith 136 Pollack, Kenneth 113 Walker, David M., Comptroller General of the United States, accom- panied by Joseph Christoff, Director of International Affairs, Govern- ment Accountability Office 21 Letters, statements, etc., submitted for the record by: Cordesman, Anthony, Admiral Arleigh Burke Chair in strategy, Center for Strategic and International Affairs [CSIS], prepared statement of .... 147 Jeffrey, Ambassador James, Senior Advisor on Iraq to the Secretary of State and Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for the Middle East, Department of State, prepared statement of 78 Jones, Brigadier General Michael, Deputy Director for Political Military Affairs, Joint Chiefs of Staff, charts 85 Katzman, Dr. Kenneth, Specialist in Middle East Affairs, Congressional Research Service, prepared statement of 159 Kubba, Laith, senior director for Middle East and North Africa, National Endowment for Democracy, prepared statement of 138 Kucinich, Hon. Dennis J., a Representative in Congress from the State of Ohio, prepared statement of 16 Pollack, Kenneth, director of Middle Eastern policy, Brookings Institu- tion, prepared statement of 116 Shays, Hon. Christopher, a Representative in Congress from the State of Connecticut, prepared statement of 4 Walker, David M., Comptroller General of the united States, prepared statement of 25 Waxman, Hon. Henry A., a Representative in Congress from the State of California, prepared statement of 10 (III) THE EVOLVING NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR VICTORY IN IRAQ tuesday, july 11, 2006 House of Representatives, Subcommittee on National Security, EmerGinG Threats, and International Relations, Committee on Government Reform, Washington, DC. The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:08 p.m., in room 2154, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Christopher Shays (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. Present: Representatives Shays, Marchant, Burton, Platts, Turn- er, Dent, Kucinich, Sanders, Maloney, Van Hollen, Ruppersberger, Lynch, Higgins, and Waxman (ex officio). Staff present: R. Nicholas Palarino, Ph.D., staff director; Robert A. Briggs, analyst; Robert Kelley, chief counsel; Raj Lalla, Jake Parker, and Jeff Hall, interns; David Rapallo, minority chief inves- tigative counsel; Andrew Su, minority professional staff member; Earley Green, minority chief clerk; and Jean Gosa, minority assist- ant clerk. Mr. Shays. A quorum being present, the Subcommittee on Na- tional Security, Emerging Threats, and International Relations hearing entitled, "The Evolving National Strategy for Victory in Iraq" is called to order. Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad called Iraq the defining challenge of our time. He said, "What happens in Iraq will shape the future of the Middle East, and the future of the Middle East will shape the future of the world." I think he is right on target. On April 9, 2003, the bronze statue of Saddam Hussein towering over Baghdad's Firdos Square was torn down. The statue's toppling is viewed as the symbolic point at which Hussein's government ceased to exist, and when hopes were high that hostilities would end. After a successful military campaign lasting less than 6 weeks, President Bush declared, "Major combat operations in Iraq have ended. In the battle of Iraq, the United States and our allies have prevailed. And now our coalition is engaged in securing and recon- structing that country." Saddam Hussein and his government were toppled, but combat operations did not end. The job of securing and reconstructing Iraq has become extremely difficult. The terrorists and insurgents seek to prevent Iraq from having a democratically elected government that respects majority rule and minority rights. (l) 2 Over the past 38 months, I have visited Iraq 12 times, and this subcommittee has had 10 hearings relating to Iraq. I have seen both setbacks and progress in our efforts to help this new nation. Numerous Americans and Iraqi officials and Iraqi citizens have shared with me their concerns about serious mistakes made by the United States and coalition forces. In my judgment, flawed plan- ning for postconflict Iraq by the Department of Defense allowed Americans to be the face for Iraq for more than a year. Failed plan- ning allowed widespread looting immediately after coalition forces took control; indiscriminate de-Baathification of the government work force; and dissolution of Iraqi security forces, military police and border security forces. After digging ourselves into a deep hole during the first year, we have made significant progress. The first major success was the transfer of power to Iraqis in June 2004. This was followed by the Iraqi people electing an interim government in January 2005, which then drafted a Constitution. The Iraqi people ratified that Constitution in October 2005 and elected a 4-year representative government in December of that same year with 76 percent voter participation. Since June 2004, the members of the Iraqi security forces have nearly tripled to 265,000. They have made strides in combat effec- tiveness and leadership. They are better trained and equipped, and they are developing the capability to act independently of coalition forces. Today these security forces are taking the lead in controlling approximately 30 percent of the country. The Iraqi economy is growing. The International Monetary Fund estimates that gross domestic product grew by 2.6 percent last year and is expected to grow by 10.4 percent this year. Initially the administration relied on the Military Campaign Plan, a classified military campaign plan, as its strategy for trans- forming Iraq into a representative democracy. Then, in November 2005, the administration published the National Strategy for Vic- tory in Iraq. This roadmap established a three-pronged strategy: Build stable, pluralistic national institutions; clear areas of enemy control; and restore Iraq's neglected infrastructure. As the situation has evolved, so has U.S. strategy. The adminis- tration is focused on assisting a new Iraqi Government in promot- ing its own agenda of national reconciliation, improving security, increasing oil and electricity production, and engaging other na- tions in Iraq's development. To help implement Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki's agen- da, President Bush on June 14th at a news conference said, "We will continue to conduct joint military operations with Iraqi secu- rity forces to secure the cities of Baghdad and Ramadi, send senior Cabinet-level advisors to Iraq to improve oil and electricity produc- tion, and increase diplomatic outreach to other countries promoting assistance to Iraq." To end the war and begin a withdrawal of U.S. forces, the United States needs to particularly support Iraq's national reconciliation. National reconciliation entails amending Iraq's Constitution, pro- viding conditional amnesty for insurgents, and revising wholesale de-Baathification. This effort is absolutely essential. 3 Today, with the help of the Government Accountability Office, administration witnesses including Ambassador James Jeffrey, Ms. Mary Beth Long, Brigadier General Michael Jones and reknowned experts on Iraq, we examine our National Strategy for Victory in Iraq and recent statements by President Bush after his meeting with the Prime Minister in Iraq by assessing the evolution of the U.S. National Strategy for Victory in Iraq in response to changing security, political and economic events, and, perhaps more impor- tantly, evaluating the evolving strategies themselves to better un- derstand their chances for success. The United States liberated Iraq from a tyrant who tortured and killed his own people. We made mistakes in our efforts to secure and rebuild the country, but we are correcting those mistakes, and progress is being made. Yes, the task is difficult, but that only rein- forces the need to closely examine our roadmap for success. I am not afraid we will lose the war in Iraq in Iraq. I am deeply concerned we will lose the war in Iraq here at home. Our efforts to remove Saddam Hussein from power and help bring democracy to the most troubled part of the world is truly a noble effort that must succeed, because, as Ambassador Khalilzad said, "What hap- pens in Iraq will shape the future of the Middle East, and the fu- ture of the Middle East will shape the future of the world." We thank all the witnesses for taking the time to appear with us today. [The prepared statement of Hon. Christopher Shays follows:] lUM UAVlS, VtHCilNlA. CHAlRMAN HENRY A WAXMAN, CALtFORNlA. RANKlNG MlNORlTY MEMBER CHRtSTOPHER SHAYS. CONNECTtCUT OAN BURTON. tNDlANA lL6ANA ROS-LEHTlNEN. FLORlDA * JOHN M. McHUGH. NEW YORK it JOHN L MCA, FLORtDA jQ GlL GUTKNECHT, MlNNESOTA MARK E SOUDER. tNDtANA STEVEN C LaTOURETTE. OHtO TODD RUSSELL PLATTS. PENNSYLVANtA CHRlS CANNON, UTAH .(^HN J DUNCAN. JR, TENNESSEE ONE HUNDRED NlNTH CONGRESS TOM LANTOS, CALtFORNtA MAJOR R OWENS. NEW YORK EDOLPHUS TOWNS. NEW YORK PAUL E KANJORSK1, PENNSYLVANtA CAROLYN B MALONEY, NEW YORK ELlJAH E. CUMMlNGS, MARYLAND DENNtS J. KUCtNtCH. OHJO DANNY K. DAVtS, tLLtNOtS Wm LACY CLAY MlSSOURl Congress of tfte ©tuteb States i>ous!e of i&epregentattoeg COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM 2157 Rayburn House Office Building Washington, DC 20515-6143 BRtAN HlGGtNS, NEW YORK ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON. DtSTRlCT OF COLUMBtA VtRGtNtA FOXX, NORTH CAROLtNA JEAN SCHMtDT, OHlO VACANCY BERNARD SANDERS, VERMONT, tNDEPENDENT http://reforrn.houso.gov SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY, EMERGING THREATS, AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS Christopher Shays, Connecticut Chairman Room B-372 Rayburn Building Washington, D C, 20515 Tel, 202 225-2548 Fax 202 225-2382 "The Evolving National Strategy for Victory in Iraq" Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad called Iraq the defining challenge of our time. He said, "What happens in Iraq will shape the future of the Middle East, and the future of the Middle East will shape the future of the world." I think he is right on target. On April 9, 2003, the bronze statue of Saddam Hussein towering above Baghdad's Firdos Square was torn down. The statue's toppling is viewed as the symbolic point at which Hussein's government ceased to exist, and when hopes were high that hostilities would end. After a successful military campaign lasting less than six weeks, President Bush declared, "Major combat operations in Iraq have ended. In the battle of Iraq, the United States and our allies have prevailed. And now our coalition is engaged in securing and reconstructing that country." Statement of Rep. Christopher Shays July ll, 2006 Page J of 4 5 Statement of Rep. Christopher Shays July 11, 2006 Page 2 of 4 Saddam and his government were toppled, but combat operations did not end. The job of securing and reconstructing Iraq has become extremely difficult. The terrorists and insurgents seek to prevent Iraq from having a democratically elected government that respects majority rule and minority rights. Over the past 38 months, I have visited Iraq twelve times, and this Subcommittee has held ten hearings related to Iraq. I have seen both setbacks and progress in our efforts to help this new nation. Numerous American and Iraqi officials, and Iraqi citizens, have shared with me their concerns about serious mistakes made by the United States and Coalition Forces. In my judgment flawed planning for post-conflict Iraq by the Department of Defense allowed Americans to be the face of Iraq for more than a year. Failed planning allowed widespread looting immediately after Coalition forces took control; indiscriminate de-Baathification of the government workforce; and dissolution of Iraqi security forces—military, police and border forces. After digging ourselves into a deep hole during the first year, we have made significant progress. The first major success was the transfer of power to Iraqis in June 2004. This was followed by the Iraqi people electing an interim government in January 2005, which then drafted a constitution. The Iraqi people ratified that constitution in October 2005, and elected a four-year representative government in December 2005, with 76 percent voter participation. Since June 2004, the members of the Iraqi Security Forces have nearly tripled to 265,000. They have made strides in combat effectiveness and leadership. They are better trained and equipped and are developing the capability to act independently of Coalition Forces. Today these security forces are taking the lead in controlling almost 30 percent of the country. The Iraqi economy is growing. The International Monetary Fund estimates that Gross Domestic Product grew by 2.6 percent last year and is expected to grow by 10.4 percent this year. 7 Statement of Rep. Christopher Shays July 11, 2006 Page 4 of 4 • Evaluating the evolving strategies themselves, to better understand their chances for success. The United States liberated Iraq from a tyrant who tortured and killed his own people. We made mistakes in our efforts to secure and rebuild the country, but we are correcting those mistakes and progress is being made. Yes, the task is difficult, but that only reinforces the need to closely examine our roadmap for success. I am not afraid we will lose the war in Iraq, in Iraq. I am deeply concerned we will lose the war in Iraq here at home. Our efforts to remove Saddam Hussein from power and help bring democracy to the most troubled part of the world is truly a noble effort that must succeed, because as Ambassador Khalilzad said, "What happens in Iraq will shape the future of the Middle East, and the future of the Middle East will shape the future of the world." We thank all the witnesses for taking the time to appear before us today. 9 what if the violence continues? Will the administration's decision be based on reducing the number of attacks each week, and what are our performance measures? When will the administration de- cide it's time to go, and why can't the American people know ahead of time what the specific benchmarks are? The GAO report is critical of the Bush administration's strategy in one particularly telling way. GAO states as follows, "the strategy neither identifies the current and future costs of implementing the strategy, nor does it identify the sources of funding needed to achieve U.S. political, security, and economic objectives in Iraq." Since there is no future cost data, GAO makes this finding, "as a result, neither DOD nor Congress can reliably determine the cost of the war, nor do they have details on how appropriated funds are being spent or historical data useful in considering future funding needs. In addition, none of the strategy documents take into ac- count the total cost of Iraq's reconstruction." The administration has been in Iraq for 3 years and has spent $311 billion to support its efforts there, yet the administration strategy includes no information about future costs. This tells me they don't have a real plan. They are winging it, hoping that the violence will miraculously settle down, but lacking any real sense of how to achieve this. Mr. Chairman, I have little confidence in this administration's proclamations about the future of Iraq. For the past 3 years, they have been saying the next 6 months are going to be the turning point. I hope we can get more specific, substantive and straight- forward answers from them today. Mr. Shays. I thank the gentleman. [The prepared statement of Hon. Henry A. Waxman follows:] 10 CHRlSTOPHER SHAYS, CONNECTtCUT DAN BURTON. lNDtANA ttEANA ROS-UHTtNEN. FLORtDA JOHN H. McHUOH. NEW YORK JOHN L MCA. FLORlDA GtL OUTKNECHT. MlNNESOTA "»RKE SOUOER. tNDtANA fH C. LATOURETTE. OHtO 3 RUSSELL PLATTS. PENNSYLVANtA .HtS CANNON. UTAH JOHN J. DUNCAN. JR.. TENNESSEE CANCHCE MtLLER, MtCHtQAN MtCHAEL R. TURNER. OHlO DARRELL lSSA. CALtFORNtA JON C. PORTER, NEVADA KENNY MARCHANT, TEXAS LYNN A WESTMORELAND, GEORGtA PATRtCK T. MCHENRY. NORTH CAROLtNA CHARLES W. DENT, PENNSYLVANtA ONE HUNDRED NlNTH CONGRESS Congress of tije ®mteb States i>ouse of fttpregentattoes, COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM 2157 Rayburn House Office Building Washington, DC 20515-6143 TOM LANTOS. CALlFORNlA MAJOR R. OWENS, NEW YORK EOOLPHUS TOWNS. NEW YORK PAUL E. KANJORSn, PENNSYLVANIA CAROLYN 6. MALONEY, NEW YORK ELlJAH E. CUMMMQS. MARYLAND DENNtS J. KUCMCH, OHtO DANNY K. DAVlS, tLLtNOtS Wm. LACY CLAY. MISSOURI WANE E. WATSON. CAUFORNtA STEPHEN F. LYNCH, MASSACHUSETTS CHP4S VAN HOLLEN. MARYLAND LlNOA T. SANCHEZ CAUFORNIA CA DUTCH R MARYLAND Statement of Rep. Henry A. Waxman Ranking Minority Member, Committee on Government Reform Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats, and International Relations Hearing, "The Evolving National Strategy for Victory in Iraq" July 11,2006 All Americans want Iraq to succeed. They want Iraq to be peaceful, and they want ordinary Iraqis to have electricity, clean water, and a safe environment. At the same time, Americans want an end to the war. They want our troops to come home, they want to stop losing lives, and they want to stop hemorrhaging taxpayer dollars. The question for today's hearing is whether the Bush Administration has a plan to do this that will actually work. Unfortunately, the Bush Administration's record on planning for Iraq has been abominable. Before we went to war, President Bush and other senior Administration officials promised that we would be would be welcomed as liberators. They also promised that the reconstruction of Iraq would pay for itself. This turned out to be ignorant, wishful thinking that ignored the advice of experts who had studied the region for years. As a result, both of these promises turned out to be false. We have faced a virulent insurgency that has grown increasingly deadly. And we have squandered approximately $50 billion in U.S. and Iraqi funds on reconstruction with virtually nothing to show for it. GAO is issuing a report today that confirms this. The GAO report states that "the original plan assumed a permissive security environment, which never materialized." GAO also finds that "essential services have not been restored to prewar levels," and "the United States has yet to prove that it has made a difference in the Iraqi people's quality of life." These were not the only mistakes. Ambassador Bremer dismissed the Iraqi Army, providing recruits for the insurgency. The Administration underestimated the number of troops that were necessary, despite the warnings of General Shinseki and others. The Administration failed to plan for troop support until after the fall of Baghdad. And the Administration failed to prevent massive looting after the fall of Baghdad. 11 These were all grave errors that made things worse. And they thrust us into a quagmire. So now we are in the unfortunate position of having to rely on this incompetent Administration to lead Iraq and the United States out of this war. We all want to succeed, but how do we get there? The Bush Administration offers vague proclamations about its strategy. They say victory will take time, that the process cannot be based on a timeline, and that success must be based on conditions on the ground. But what conditions? The goal is a "peaceful, united, stable, and secure Iraq." How will the Administration decide when the American people have done enough? Based on the number of Iraqi security forces we train? And what if the violence continues? Will the Administration's decision be based on reducing the number of attacks each week? What are our performance measures? When will the Administration decide it is time to go? And why can't the American people know ahead of time what these specific benchmarks are? The GAO report is critical of the Bush Administration's strategy in one particularly telling way. GAO states as follows: The strategy neither identifies the current and future costs of implementing the strategy, nor does it identify the sources of funding ... needed to achieve U.S. political, security, and economic objectives in Iraq. Since there is no future cost data, GAO makes this finding: As a result, neither DOD nor Congress can reliably determine the cost of the war, nor do they have details on how appropriated funds are being spent or historical data useful in considering future funding needs.... In addition, none of the strategy documents takes into account the total cost of Iraq's reconstruction. The Administration has been in Iraq for three years, and it has spent $311 billion to support its efforts there. Yet the Administration's strategy includes no information about future costs. This tells me they don't have a real plan. They are winging it, hoping that the violence will miraculously settle down, but lacking any real sense of how to achieve this. Mr. Chairman, I have little confidence in this Administration's proclamations about the future of Iraq. For the past three years, they have been saying the next six months are the turning point. I hope we can get more specific, substantive, and straightforward answers from them today. Thank you. 2 12 Mr. Shays. I understand the vice chairman of the committee does not have a statement. I appreciate his being here and will ask the former vice chairman of the committee Mr. Turner if he has a statement. Mr. Turner. Mr. Chairman, I thank you so much for your con- tinued focus on Iraq and for your holding this hearing today. This is a very important topic, and your commitment continuing to go to Iraq to see on the ground what is occurring there is so impor- tant, and your bringing that information back and making certain that we have hearings so that this story can be told about what is occurring and what the plans are is very important. I regret that this issue of Iraq continues to be made a political issue. Something as simple as the war on terror, where we should have full and unanimous support from everyone, turns into a litany of political complaints and assaults on the administration, which I think is incredibly unfortunate. Our enemies are watching today. Those who are in the war on terror against us are watching today. Repeatedly, misinformation and mistruths, untruths, are told about Iraq and are told about the situation that led up to the war. I just participated on June 29th in a hearing in the Armed Serv- ices Committee. I am a member of the Armed Services Committee, and in that hearing Lieutenant General Maples was testifying on the weapons of mass destruction that had been discovered in Iraq. Those portions are of a report that had been most recently made public, the remainder of which remains classified. With all the par- tisan discussions that we have heard, there are many people even on this dais who have made statements that there are no weapons of mass destruction. I want to read to you a portion of my questions and the answers from Lieutenant General Maples that occurred in that hearing, be- cause the evidence that was presented, what so far was allowed to be made public, is that since 2003, coalition forces have recovered approximately 500 weapons munitions which contained mustard or sarin nerve agent. These are my questions for Lieutenant General Maples, who is before us in that unclassified, declassified portion of the report. It's about Iraq, and I asked, knowing that we have these 500 weapons that are now in our possession. In Iraq, they produced those weapons-grade chemical agents, and they weaponized them. You are actually finding weapons; is that correct? I will say that again, and they produced those weapon- grade chemical agents, and they weaponized them. You are actu- ally finding weapons; is that correct? Lieutenant General Maples said, that is correct. The report says over 500. And there's a portion of the report that is classified, and the general went on to say that the portions of the report that are classified indicate that the numbers are, of course, greater than 500. I asked another question about the capabilities of the regime. From the review of these weapons, is it clear that they are Iraqi in origin? We had already established that they are chemical weap- ons-grade, chemical agents, and they have been weaponized. So I asked, are they Iraqi in origin? These are not weapons of mass de- 13 struction that have been purchased on, say, wmd.com; these are Iraqi-produced. And he said, yes, sir. Do you have any evidence that the individuals that produced them were no longer in Iraq or had lost the capability or the intel- lect or the knowledge or the production that would assume they could then produce others? And he responded that there was no in- formation that the ability of Iraq to produce weapons-grade agents or to weaponize them had been eliminated. Some of the political statements that we have had, Mr. Waxman himself on June 15th stated, Mr. Speaker, before we went to war, President Bush and other administration officials made three promises to the American people: One, we would find weapons of mass destruction; and goes on to say all of these three promises have proved to be false. Mr. Waxman read almost virtually his June 15th quote today. He left out the no weapons of mass destruction. Mr. Dennis Kucinich said there were no weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, but there are WMD in D.C. Lies are weapons of mass destruction. What is important about those statements is that we have in our hands over 500 weapons of mass destruction, weapons-grades nerve agent, where it has been weaponized by Iraq, that showed they had the capability. Yet the political discourse here has been to discredit the existence or the capability of Iraq to have or possess or to cre- ate weapons of mass destruction. I certainly would like the political discourse on the reconstruction and our efforts to win the war on terror to be one of support and not one of undermining the efforts of the United States to protect the American people. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Shays. I thank the gentleman. The Chair would recognize Mr. Kucinich. Mr. Kucinich. With all due respect to my good friend from Ohio, this administration led this country to war based on lies. You know, where are the weapons of mass destruction? We were given this whole phantasm of, well, you know, we are going to be hit with weapons of mass destruction, Iraq is going to attack us. Iraq did not have weapons of mass destruction, did not have the capability of attacking us, did not have the intention of attacking us, was not connected to September 11th, and we are here talking about a na- tional strategy for victory in Iraq. Who are we kidding? Come on, get real, wake up, America. This administration has lied to the people. They are selling this lie all over. They are selling it again to this committee. Balderdash. It's time that we challenge them directly. You know, this idea of a national victory strategy was issued in 2005. It was quite clear to many of us that it was nothing more than a public relations ploy. The so-called strategy came 2 years after the mission was declared accomplished, and we were told that major combat operations had ended. This administration never had and still doesn't have a realistic strategy in place. They continue to issue a wish list and timetables based on a political situation in Washington, not on a situation in Baghdad. They often use this line: Well, when the Iraqis stand up, we will stand down. That is just a slogan; that's not a plan. Mean- 14 while, over 2,500 troops have died, tens of thousands have been in- jured, hundreds of thousands of innocent Iraqis injured or killed. This administration had a plan, all right, a plan for occupation; doesn't have a plan for reconstruction, doesn't have a plan for exit strategy. In the past they stood before the Congress and the Amer- ican people and declared that we would be greeted as liberators, that Iraqi oil would pay for reconstruction, that Iraq's vast stock- pile of WMDs posed a threat to this Nation. The White House knew there were no WMDs in Iraq. There was no link between September 11th and Iraq, no uranium in Niger, no mobile trailers functioning as biological labs. All these claims, like their so-called phony strategy for victory, were misleading. They were false. They were meant not only to scare and confuse and dis- tract the public from this war, they were meant to establish a per- manent presence in Iraq. Nobody in this administration has taken responsibility. Nobody has been held accountable for these lies, but I predict that someday the world community will hold these individuals accountable. The administration has proven its credibility problem time after time, and the national strategy for victory is an example of this problem. When it comes to Iraq, this administration's credibility gaps be- come a credibility abyss. OK, you have Saddam Hussein in jail, al Zarqawi is dead, Iraq is in the midst of a civil war, and violent deaths are reported daily. Our troops are still in harm's way, and we have still not dealt with the serious issue, are we ever going to leave Iraq? Could it be this administration doesn't have an exit strategy be- cause they don't intend to exit? Even if and when large numbers of our troops are sent home from Iraq, all evidence seems to sug- gest that we are planning a permanent military presence there. De- spite the denial by the Pentagon leaders that they are not building permanent base in Iraq, we know of several large airbases at Balad, Al-Asad, Camp Taji and Talil constructed for the long-term. In these bases we have already invested hundreds of millions in taxpayers' dollars. These bases now have fast-food restaurants, they have bus routes, even have their own supermarket. We are not there for the long term? Furthermore, the Overseas Basing Commission last spring wrote that military presence corresponds to influence. We cannot hope for much influence without presence. The degree of influence also cor- relates a level of permanent presence that we maintain forward. So it's inconceivable that long-range U.S. influence in Iraq is not being sought, yet plans for a long-range military presence in Iraq are not being made to this Congress and particularly this sub- committee. The Department of Defense's plans for a military base in Iraq go right to the question of what victory in Iraq is supposed to mean. It's hard to understand our national security strategy in Iraq can be assessed without knowing the plans for a military base in Iraq. I hope the GAO has been successful, where our subcommittee ef- forts had failed, in determining the DOD's sufficient detailed infor- mation about the cost and types of military installation in Iraq. As Congress continues to debate the strategy for handling the war in Iraq, it is imperative to examine the usefulness or lack 15 thereof of the long-term and near-term U.S. military presence there. I hope this hearing will accomplish this. But, you know, it's time we challenge this administration about their phony stories about WMDs, and you can produce some kind of manifest right now. The fact is that the United States sold weap- ons of mass destruction to Iraq years before Saddam Hussein— when Saddam Hussein was in power, and those weapons were ac- counted for by the United Nations commission, and we know that they were destroyed, and this administration went to war based on a false pretext. Period, end of story. Mr. Shays. I thank the gentleman. [The prepared statement of Hon. Dennis J. Kucinich follows:] 16 Statement of Rep. Dennis J. Kucinich Ranking Minority Member House Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats and International Relations Committee on Government Reform U.S. House of Representatives Hearing on "The Evolving National Strategy for Victory in Iraq" July 11,2006 Good afternoon. Thank you, Chairman Shays for convening this hearing. When the 'National Strategy for Victory' was issued in 2005, it was quite clear to many of us that it was nothing more than a public relations ploy. This so-called strategy came two years after the mission was declared accomplished and we were told that major combat operations had ended. This Administration never had and still doesn't have a realistic strategy in place. They continue to issue wish lists and timetables based on the situation in Washington, not the 1 17 situation in Baghdad. The Administration's often-used line, 'When the Iraqis stand-up, we will stand down' is a slogan, not a plan. Meanwhile, over 2,500 US troops have died. Tens of thousands more have been injured, and hundreds of thousands of innocent Iraqis have been killed. It's clear that this Administration didn't have a plan for occupation, it doesn't have a plan for reconstruction, and it sure doesn't have an exit strategy for the withdrawal of our military forces in Iraq. In the past this Administration has stood before Congress and the American people and declared that we would be greeted as liberators, that Iraqi oil would pay for reconstruction, and that Iraq's 'vast stockpile' of WMD posed a threat to this nation. The White House knew there were no WMD in Iraq, no link between 9/11 and 2 18 Iraq, no uranium in Niger, no mobile trailers functioning as biological labs. All these claims, like their so-called strategy for victory, were misleading and false, meant only to scare, confuse, and distract the public from the reality of this war. Nobody in this Administration has taken responsibility nor been held accountable for these lies. The Administration has proven its credibility problem time after time, and the National Strategy for Victory is a shining example of this problem. When it comes to Iraq, this Administration's credibility gap has become a credibility abyss. Though Saddam Hussein is in jail, and Zarqawi is dead, Iraq is in the midst of civil war, and violent acts and deaths are reported daily. Our troops are still in harm's way. And we have still not dealt with a serious issue: Are we ever going to leave Iraq? 3 19 Could it be that the Administration does not have an exit strategy because they do not intend to exit? Even if, or when, large numbers of our troops are sent home from Iraq, all evidence seems to suggest that we are planning a permanent military presence there. Despite the denials of Pentagon leaders that they are not building permanent bases in Iraq, we know of several large air bases at Balad, Al-Asad, Camp Taji, and Talil, which appear to be constructed for the long term. These bases, where we have already invested hundreds of millions of taxpayer dollars, now have fast food restaurants, bus routes, and even their own supermarkets. Furthermore, the Overseas Basing Commission last spring wrote that military presence corresponds to influence: "We cannot hope for much influence without presence - the degree of influence often correlates to the level of permanent presence that we maintain forward." It is inconceivable that long range US influence in Iraq is not being sought, yet plans for a long-range military presence in Iraq 4 20 are not being made known to Congress, and particularly this Subcommittee. The DoD's plans for our military bases in Iraq go right to the question about what victory would mean in Iraq. It is hard for me to understand how the National Security strategy on Iraq can be assessed without knowing the plans for military bases in Iraq. I hope that GAO has been successful where our subcommittee efforts have as yet failed: in determining from DoD sufficient detailed information about the costs and types of military installations in Iraq. As Congress continues to consider and debate the strategy for handling the war in Iraq, it is imperative to examine the usefulness - or lack thereof - of both the near-term and long-term US military presence there. I hope this hearing will accomplish that today. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I look forward to the testimony of our witnesses today. 5 21 Mr. ShaYS. We will continue with the testimony of our witnesses when we get back. We will be delayed for a little bit with a few votes. We are at recess. [Recess.] Mr. Shays. I call this hearing to order. I appreciate the patience of our witnesses. I would like to take care of some business first before recognizing our first panel. I ask unanimous consent that all members of the subcommittee be permitted to place an opening statement in the record and that the record remain open for 3 days for that purpose. Without objec- tion, so ordered. I ask for unanimous consent that all witnesses be permitted to include their written statements in the record, and, without objec- tion, so ordered. At this time, we will recognize our first panel. Our first panel is the Honorable David M. Walker, Comptroller General of the United States, accompanied by Joseph Christoff, Director of International Affairs. Both are obviously from the Government Accountability Of- fice. As is our custom, I would invite both witnesses, and if there is any other witness, Mr. Christoff, behind you, anyone else who might make a comment, I would like them to be sworn in at this time as well. [Witnesses sworn.] Mr. Shays. I would note for the record that all of our witnesses have responded in the affirmative, including our Comptroller Gen- eral. Let me just say before beginning, the purpose of this hearing, and obviously Members are free to discuss other issues that they choose to with the witnesses, but the purpose of this hearing is to examine, one, whether we had and have a strategy, and to what extent that strategy is meeting the needs of our engagement in Iraq. But obviously Members are free to ask any other questions or make any other points they want to make about Iraq. I consider this one of the more important hearings this sub- committee has held. I am very appreciative to all our witnesses. I realize that there will obviously be strong emotions about an issue that is extraordinarily important. So with that, Mr. Walker, can you hear us? Mr. Walker. Yes, I can, Mr. Chairman. Can you hear me? Mr. Shays. We hear you very well. Please give your statement. We thank you for taking the time to do it, even though you are in Dallas. STATEMENT OF DAVID M. WALKER, COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, ACCOMPANIED BY JOSEPH CHRISTOFF, DIRECTOR OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, GOV- ERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE Mr. Walker. [The following statement was delivered via tele- conference.] Thank you, Mr. Chairman, members of the subcommit- tee. I want to thank you for the opportunity to appear before the subcommittee. I want to congratulate you and the subcommittee on your continued commitment to oversight in this area and other areas. I also want to thank you for allowing me to be able to testify 24 enhancing their support capabilities; namely, command and con- trol, logistics and intelligence. Second, expanding efforts to improve the capabilities of national and provincial governments, including greater technical assistance and training. The United States and the international community need to do more to help Iraqis help themselves deliver results that all Iraqi citizens care about. Most Iraqi citizens care about the same things that most American citizens do, safe streets, good jobs, reliable electricity, clean water, pick up the trash, education, health care, etc. Last, No. 3, the need to develop a comprehensive anticorruption strategy that improves the regulatory environment, strengthens ac- countability organizations, reduces subsidies and enhances invest- ment opportunities. Mr. Chairman, that completes my summary statement. I would be more than happy to answer any questions that you or the other subcommittee members may have. Joe Christoff is there to provide additional information as necessary. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Shays. Thank you very much. [The prepared statement of Mr. Walker follows:] 25 United States Government Accountability Office Testimony Before the Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats, and International Relations, Committee on Government Reform, House of Representatives REBUILDING IRAQ More Comprehensive National Strategy Needed to Help Achieve U.S. Goals and Overcome Challenges Statement of David M. Walker Comptroller General of the United States GAO-06-953T 26 L GAO Accountability tntegrity- Ratability Highlights Highlights ot GAO-06-953T, a testimony before the Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats, and international Relations, Committee on Government Reform. House of Representatives Why GAO Did This Study In November 2005, the National Security Council (NSC) issued the National Strategy for Victory in Iraq (NSVI) to clarify the President's strategy for achieving U.S. political, security, and economic goals in Iraq. The U.S. goal is to establish a peaceful, stable, and secure Iraq. In addition, in June 2006, the administration issued a fact sheet at. Camp David discussing current progress and goals in Iraq. This testimony (1) discusses the extent to which the NSVI and its supporting documents address the six characteristics of an effective national strategy, and (2) assesses how security, political, and economic factors will affect achieving the U.S. strategy for Iraq. In this testimony, the NSVI and supporting documents are collectively referred to as the U.S. strategy for Iraq. What GAO Recommends A GAO report issued today recommends that NSC, along with the Departments of Defense and State, complete the strategy by addressing all six characteristics of an effective national strategy in a single document. State commented that the NSVl's purpose is to provide a broad overview of the U.S. strategy in Iraq, not ail details. GAO's analysis was not based exclusively on the NSVT but included all key supporting documents. Consequently, GAO retained the recommendation for a more complete and integrated strategy. www.gao.gov/cgi-birv'getrpt?GAO-06-953T. To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on the link above. For more inlormation, contact Joseph Christotl at (202) 512-8979 or christotfjSgao.gov. REBUILDING IRAQ More Comprehensive National Strategy Needed to Help Achieve U.S. Goals and Overcome Challenges What GAO Found The NSVI is an improvement over previous U.S. planning efforts for stabilizing and rebuilding Iraq. However, the NSVI and supporting documents are incomplete as they do not fully address all the characteristics of an effective national strategy. Among its positive attributes, the strategy's purpose and scope is clear; it identifies U.S. involvement in Iraq as a "vital national interest and the central front in the war on terror." Also, the strategy generally addresses the threats and risks facing the coalition forces and provides a comprehensive description of U.S. political, security, and economic objectives in Iraq. However, the discussion of outcome-related performance measures to assess progress in achieving these goals and objectives is limited. Moreover, the strategy falls short in at least three areas. First, it only partially identifies the agencies responsible for implementing key aspects of the strategy. Second, it does not fully address how the U.S. will integrate its goals with those of the Iraqis and the international community, and it does not detail Iraq's anticipated contribution to its future needs. Third, it only partially identifies the current and future costs of U.S. involvement in Iraq, including maintaining U.S. military operations, building Iraqi government capacity, and rebuilding critical infrastructure. Furthermore, the June 2006 Camp David fact sheet provides additional detail but does not address these key shortfalls. Security, political, and economic factors will hamper U.S. efforts to stabilize Iraq and achieve key U.S. goals. First, the U.S. and Iraq are trying to stabilize Iraq by training and equipping additional Iraqi security forces and securing Baghdad and other strategic cities. However, increases in attacks against the coalition and its Iraqi partners and the growing influence of militias will adversely affect U.S. and Iraqi efforts. Second, the U.S. and Iraq are trying to improve Iraq's capacity to govern by reconciling sectarian groups and building the capacity of national and provincial governments to provide security and services. However, sectarian conflicts, the lack of capacity in the ministries, and corruption serve to hinder these efforts. Third, the U.S. and Iraqi governments are trying to revitalize Iraq's economy and restore the oil, electricity, and other key sectors. However, these efforts have been impeded by security, corruption, fiscal, and other challenges. The formation of a permanent Iraqi government gives the U.S. an opportunity to re-examine its strategy for Iraq and align its efforts with Iraq and the international community. As a first step, NSC should complete the strategy by defining and disseminating performance metrics, articulating clear roles and responsibilities, specifying future contributions, and identifying current costs and future resources. In addition, the United States, Iraq, and the international community should (1) enhance support capabilities of the Iraqi security forces, (2) improve the capabilities of the national and provincial governments, and (3) develop a comprehensive anti- corruption strategy. United States Government Accountability Office 27 Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee: I am pleased to appear today to discuss the U.S. government's strategy for victory in Iraq. In November 2005, the National Security Council (NSC) issued the National Strategy for Victory in Iraq (NSVI) to clarify the President's existing strategy for achieving U.S. political, security, and economic goals in Iraq. The NSVI and supporting documents incorporate the same desired end-state for U.S. operations in Iraq first established by the Coalition Provisional Authority in 2003: a peaceful, united, stable, secure Iraq, well-integrated into the international community and a full partner in the global war on terrorism. In addition, in June 2006, the administration issued a fact sheet at Camp David discussing current progress and goals in Iraq. My testimony is based on the report we are releasing today evaluating the NSVI and seven supporting documents, as well as related reports assessing the challenges to achieving U.S. objectives in Iraq. My testimony assesses (1) the extent to which the NSVI and supporting documents collectively address the six key characteristics of an effective national strategy, and (2) how security, political, and economic factors will affect achieving the U.S. strategy for Iraq. In this testimony, the NSVI and supporting documents are collectively referred to as the U.S. strategy for Iraq. While we assessed unclassified and classified documents, the information in the statement is unclassified. We conducted our reviews for these reports under my statutory authority as Comptroller General in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. The NSVI is an improvement over previous U.S. government planning efforts for stabilizing and rebuilding Iraq. However, the NSVI and its supporting documents are incomplete because they do not fully address all of the desirable characteristics of an effective national strategy. On the one hand, the strategy's purpose and scope is clear because it identifies U.S. involvement in Iraq as a "vital national interest and the central front in the war on terror." The strategy also generally addresses the threats and risks facing the coalition forces, as well as provides a comprehensive description of the desired U.S. political, security, and economic objectives in Iraq. However, the discussion of outcome-related performance measures to assess progress in achieving these goals and objectives is limited and not transparent. On the other hand, the strategy falls short in at least three key areas. First, it only partially identifies which U.S. Page 1 GAO-06-953T 28 agencies are responsible for implementing key aspects of the strategy or resolving conflicts among the many implementing agencies. Second, it does not fully address how U.S. goals and objectives will be integrated with those of the Iraqi government and the international community, and it does not detail the Iraqi government's anticipated contribution to its future security and reconstruction needs. Third, it only partially identifies the current and future costs of U.S. involvement in Iraq, including the costs of maintaining U.S. military operations, building Iraqi government capacity at the provincial and national level, and rebuilding critical infrastructure. The June 2006 Camp David fact sheet provides additional detail but does not address the key shortfalls we identified in these three areas. Security, political, and economic factors are hampering U.S. efforts to stabilize Iraq and achieve key goals in the U.S. strategy. First, the U.S. and Iraqi governments are trying to stabilize Iraq by training and equipping Iraqi security forces and securing Baghdad and other strategic cities. Although the number of the Iraqi security forces is increasing, these forces still lack the logistical, command and control, and intelligence capabilities to operate independently. Moreover, increases in attacks against the coalition and its Iraqi partners and the growing influence of militias have adversely affected U.S. and Iraqi efforts. Second, the U.S. and Iraqi governments are trying to improve Iraq's capacity to govern by reconciling the conflicting sectarian groups and building the capacity of national and provincial governments to provide security and deliver services. However, continuing sectarian conflicts and the lack of core competencies in the ministries, along with widespread corruption, are hindering these efforts. Third, the U.S. and Iraqi governments are trying to revitalize Iraq's economy and restore essential services in the oil, electricity, and other key sectors, but these efforts have been impeded by security, corruption, fiscal, and other challenges. The formation of a permanent Iraqi government gives the United States a new opportunity to re-examine its strategy for Iraq and more closely align its efforts with Iraq and the international community. The report we are releasing today recommends that the NSC, in conjunction with the Departments of Defense (DOD) and State, complete the U.S. strategy for Iraq by addressing all six characteristics of an effective national strategy in a single document. In particular, the revised strategy should clarify agencies' roles and responsibilities, specify future contributions, and identify current costs and future resources needed to implement the strategy. Page 2 GAO-06-953T 29 DOD and State did not comment on the recommendations in a draft of the report released today. However, in its comments State noted that our report misrepresented the NSVT's purpose—to provide the public with a broad overview of the U.S. strategy for Iraq. Importantly, our analysis was not limited to the publicly available, unclassified NSVI but was based on the classified and unclassified documents that define the U.S. strategy for Iraq. Collectively, these documents still lack all of the key characteristics of an effective national strategy. Based on our other ongoing and completed work, the United States, Iraq and the international community could take additional actions to achieve success in Iraq. These actions include (1) sustaining the development of Iraqi security forces by enhancing their support capabilities (command and control, logistics, and intelligence); (2) expanding efforts to improve the capabilities of national and provincial governments, including greater technical assistance and training; and (3) developing a comprehensive anti-corruption strategy that improves the regulatory environment, strengthens accountability organizations, reduces subsidies, and enhances investment opportunities. Prior to the fall of 2005, the U.S. stabilization and reconstruction effort in Iraq lacked a clear, comprehensive, and integrated U.S. strategy. State assessments and other U.S. government reports noted that this hindered the implementation of U.S. stabilization and reconstruction plans. A review of the U.S. mission completed in October 2005 found, among other things, that (1) no unified strategic plan existed that effectively integrated U.S. government political, military, and economic efforts; (2) multiple plans in Iraq and Washington had resulted in competing priorities and funding levels not proportional to the needs of overall mission objectives; (3) focused leadership and clear roles were lacking among State, DOD, and other agencies in the field and in Washington, D.C.; and ( 4) a more realistic assessment of the capacity limitations of Iraq's central and local government was needed. In November 2005, the National Security Council (NSC) issued the National Strategy for Victory in Iraq (NSVI) to clarify the President's existing strategy for achieving U.S. political, security, and economic goals in Iraq. According to this document, prevailing in Iraq is a vital U.S. national interest because it will help win the war on terror and make America safer, stronger, and more certain of its future. To achieve victory, the strategy requires the United States to maintain troops in Iraq until its objectives are achieved, adjusting troop strength as conditions warrant. Background on the National Strategy for Victory in Iraq Page 3 GAO-06-953T 30 The strategy reorganized U.S. government stabilization and reconstruction efforts along three broad tracks—political, security, and economic—and eight strategic objectives (see fig. 1). Overall, officials in DOD and State identified seven documents that describe the U.S. government strategy for Iraq in addition to the NSVI.1 Figure 2 shows the NSVI and key supporting documents. The U.S. government uses these documents to plan, conduct, and track efforts at the strategic, operational, and implementation levels. 'Two separate campaign plans were included in our analysis: the August 2004 plan and the April 2006 Joint Campaign Plan issued by the Chief of Mission and the Commander of the MNF-I. Page 4 GAO-06 953T 32 accountability and more effective results. The six characteristics are (1) a clear purpose, scope, methodology; (2) a detailed discussion of the problems, risks, and threats the strategy intends to address; (3) the desired goals and objectives, and outcome-related performance measures; (4) a description of the U.S. resources needed to implement the strategy; (5) a clear delineation of the U.S. government's roles, responsibilities, and mechanisms for coordination; and (6) a description of how the strategy is integrated internally (that is, among U.S. agencies) and externally (in this case, with the Iraqi government and international organizations). These six characteristics can be subdivided into 27 separate elements. For a more detailed assessment, see appendix L National Strategy for Victory in Iraq and Supporting Documents Do Not Fully Address All Key Characteristics of an Effective National Strategy The NSVI aims to improve U.S. strategic planning for Iraq; however, the NSVI and supporting documents do not fully address all of the six desirable characteristics of effective national strategies that GAO has identified through its prior work.2 We used these six characteristics to evaluate the strategy—-that is, the NSVI and supporting documents that DOD and State officials said encompassed the U.S. strategy for rebuilding and stabilizing Iraq. As figure 3 shows, the strategy generally addresses three of the six characteristics but only partially addresses three others, limiting its usefulness to guide agency implementation efforts and achieve desired results. Moreover, since the strategy is dispersed among several documents instead of one, its effectiveness as a planning tool for implementing agencies and for informing Congress about the pace, costs, and intended results of these efforts is limited. Although the June 2006 Camp David fact sheet provides additional detail on recent U.S. and Iraqi actions, it does not address the key shortfalls we identified in the three 2See GAO, Combating Terrorism: Evaluation of Selected Characteristics in National Strategies Related to Terrorism, GAO-O4-408T (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 3,2004); and Defense Management: Comprekensihv Strategy and Periodic Reporting Are Needed to Gauge Progress and Costs of DOD's Global Posture Restructuring, GAO-06-48GC (Washington, D.C.: May 26, 2006). Page 6 GAO-00-953T 33 1. Clear purpose, scope, and methodology s 2. Detailed discussion of problems, risks, and threats 3. Desired goals, objectives, activities, and performance measures 4. Delineation of U.S. government roles and responsibilities s 5. Description of strategy's integration among and with other entities 6. Description of future costs and resources needed Sources: GAO analysts of NSC, Slate, and OOO 0 Strategy Generally Addresses Purpose and Scope, Risks and Threats, and Goals and Objectives Strategy Identifies Purpose and Scope Strategy Identifies Problems, Risks, and Threats The strategy provides (1) a clear statement of its purpose and scope; (2) a detailed discussion of the problems, risks, and threats; and (3) an explanation of its goals, subordinate objectives, and activities but a limited discussion of outcome-oriented performance measures. This characteristic addresses why the strategy was produced, the scope of its coverage, and the process by which it was developed. A complete description of purpose, scope, and methodology makes the document more useful to organizations responsible for implementing the strategies, as well as to oversight organizations such as Congress. The NSVI and supporting documents generally address this characteristic by identifying U.S. government efforts to rebuild and stabilize Iraq in terms of these three overarching objectives and address the assumptions that guided the strategy's development. For example, to help Iraq achieve the strategic goal of forging a national compact for democratic government, the strategy's subordinate objectives state that the United States would help promote transparency in the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of government, and help build national institutions that transcend regional and sectarian interests, among other activities. This characteristic addresses the particular problems, risks, and threats the strategy is directed at, as well as risk assessment of the threats to and vulnerabilities of critical assets and operations. Specific information on both risks and threats helps responsible parties better implement the strategy by ensuring that priorities are clear and focused on the greatest needs. The NSVI and supporting documents generally address some of the problems, risks, and threats found in Iraq. For example, the NSVI identifies the risks posed by the insurgency and identifies three basic types of Page 7 GAO-06-953T 34 insurgents—rejectionists, supporters of former Iraqi President Saddam Hussein, and terrorists affiliated with or inspired by al Qaeda—and the different actions needed to confront each one. In addition, various supporting documents provide additional information on the threats of the Shi'a militias and the corruption that could affect the Iraqi government's ability to become self-reliant, deliver essential services, reform its economy, strengthen rule of law, maintain nonsectarian political institutions, and increase international support. This characteristic addresses the goals of the national strategy and the steps needed to attain those goals, as well as the priorities, milestones, and outcome-related performance measures to enable more effective oversight, and accountability. The NSVI generally addresses goals and subordinate objectives by identifying 8 strategic objectives (pillars), 46 subordinate objectives, or "lines of action," and numerous project activities, but only partially addresses outcome-related performance measures. The supporting strategy documents also provide information on how progress will be monitored and reported. In addition, the NSVI identifies the process for monitoring and reporting on progress via interagency working groups. It also identifies some metrics to assess progress, such as the number of Iraqis willing to participate in the political process, the quality and quantity of the Iraqi units trained, and barrels of oil produced and exported. However, the metrics the strategy uses to report progress make it difficult to determine the impact of the U.S. reconstruction effort. We reported previously that in the water resources and sanitation sector, little was known about how U.S. efforts were improving the amount and quality of water reaching Iraqi households or their access to the sanitation services because the U.S. government only tracked the number of projects completed or under way.' For instance, as of March 2006, Iraq had the capacity to produce 1.1 million cubic meters of water per day, but this level overestimated the amount of potable water reaching Iraqi households. U.S. officials estimate that 60 percent of water treatment output is lost due to leakage, contamination, and illegal connections. The U.S. mission in Iraq reported in December 2005 that it had developed a set of metrics to better estimate the potential impact that U.S. water and See GAO, Rebuilding Iraq: U.S. Water and Sanitation Efforts Need Improved Measures for Assessing Impact and Sustained Resources for Maintaining Facilities, GAO05-S72 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 7, 2005). Strategy Discusses Goals, Objectives, and Activities but Provides Limited Discussion of Outcome-Related Performance Measures Page 8 GAO-06-953T 35 sanitation reconstruction efforts were having on Iraqi households, but acknowledges it is difficult to measure how much water Iraqis are actually receiving or whether the water is potable. The mission report notes that without such comprehensive data, mission efforts to accurately assess the impact of U.S. reconstruction efforts on water and sanitation services is seriously limited. Strategy Partially Addresses Agency Responsibilities, Integration, and Costs Strategy Partially Addresses U.S. Roles, Responsibilities, and Coordination Mechanisms The NSVI and supporting documents only partially (1) delineate the roles and responsibilities of key U.S. government agencies; (2) describe how the strategy will be integrated among U.S. entities, the Iraqi government, international organizations and the mechanisms for coordination; and (3) identify what the strategy will cost and the sources of financing. This characteristic addresses which U.S. organizations will implement the strategy as well as the roles, responsibilities, and mechanisms for coordinating their efforts. The NSVI and the supporting documents partially address the roles and responsibilities of specific U.S. government agencies and offices and the process for coordination. For example, National Security Presidential Directive 36 makes the Department of State responsible for the non-security aspects of reconstruction and lays out key roles for the U.S. Chief of Mission in Baghdad and CENTCOM. It directs that the Commander of CENTCOM will, under the guidance of the Chief of Mission, oversee all U.S. government efforts to train and equip Iraq security forces. However, it is not clear which agency is responsible for implementing the overlapping activities listed under the NSVI's eight strategic objectives. For instance, one activity is to promote transparency in the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of the Iraqi government; however, the NSVI and supporting documents do not indicate which agency is responsible for implementing this activity, or who is to be held accountable for results. Moreover, little guidance is provided to assist implementing agencies in resolving conflicts among themselves, as well as with other entities. In our prior work, we found that delays in reconstruction efforts sometimes resulted from lack of agreement among U.S. agencies, contractors, and Iraqi authorities about the scope and schedule for the work to be performed.4 *See GAO-05-S72. Page 9 38 Other GAO-Related Work Shows that Security, Political, and Economic Factors Hamper U.S. Efforts to Achieve Strategic Goals Other GAO work shows that security, political, and economic factors have and will continue to hamper U.S. efforts to stabilize Iraq and achieve key U.S. goals. First, increases in attacks against the coalition and its Iraqi partners, growing sectarian violence, and the influence of militias have adversely affected U.S. and Iraqi efforts to secure Baghdad and other strategic cities. Second, sectarian control over ministries and the lack of skilled employees hinder efforts to improve Iraq's governance by building the capacity of ministries and reconciling differences among sectarian interests. Third, security, corruption, and fiscal problems limit U.S. and Iraqi plans to revitalize Iraq's economy and restore essential services in the oil and electricity sectors. A linchpin of the current U.S. strategy is that, as Iraqi forces "stand up," U.S. forces will "stand down." According to the NSVI, putting capable Iraqis forward in the fight against the enemy would increase the overall effectiveness of U.S.-Iraqi operations, as Iraqis are better able to collect intelligence and identify the threats in neighborhoods. The Secretaries of Defense and State have reported progress in developing Iraqi army and police units. According to State Department reports, the number of trained army and police forces has increased from about 174,000 in July 2005 to about 268,000 as of June 2006. This represents about 82 percent of the planned security force strength of 326,000. DOD has also reported that Iraqi army units are becoming increasingly capable of leading counterinsurgency operations with coalition support.6 Although the number of Iraqi security forces is increasing, these forces still lack the logistical, command and control, and intelligence capabilities to operate independently. Even as the number and capabilities of Iraqi security forces have increased, overall security conditions have deteriorated, as evidenced by attack trends, sectarian violence, and the growth and influence of militias. Enemy-initiated attacks against the coalition, its Iraqi partners, and infrastructure have continued to increase over time (see fig. 4). Overall, attacks increased by 23 percent from 2004 to 2005. After declining in the fall of 2005, the number of attacks rose to the highest ever in April 2006. The monthly attacks data for May and June remain classified. However, Security Forces' Capabilities Improving but Have Not Led to Improvements in Security Vor a description of how DOD measures the capabilities of Iraqi security forces, see GAO, Rebuilding Iraq: Enhancing Security, Measuring Program Results, and Maintaining Infrastructure Are Necessary to Make Significant and Sustainable Progress, GAO^MJ-173T (Washington, D C: Oct. 18, 2005). Page 12 GAO-06-953T 39 DOD publicly reported in May 2006 that the average number of weekly attacks was higher for the February to May 2006 time period than for any previous period. Further, in late June 2006 the MNF-I Commanding General publicly stated that attack levels in Iraq had increased. Moreover, a senior U.S. military officer said that the recent security operation in Baghdad had led to an increase in the number of attacks in the area. Figure 4: Enemy-lnitiated Attacks against tha Coalition and Its Partners, by Category, June 2003 through April 2006 NunlM) otsrtacta SJM0 Jum Ams. Oct Ote. Fab. Ay. Jinx Atta. Oct 0t. Hb, Apr. Juo» Abb. Out Doc. fab. Apt. aw tab* ms» "~ iosa* . j _J Attad^i} Oft li^{G«n)mwt aerate ABac^si on lrJ»as«rw3ure Alt»*(sJ on totgi ssiurSy fc**3 A!t»*;si (X! CSjBKlS Attacks) w So, The data lor 2006 does not separate attacks against lraqi government officials from attacks against lraqi civilians. I recently asked the Secretary of Defense to routinely declassify monthly attacks data in a timely manner. The enemy-initiated attacks data help inform Congress and the American public on progress in improving Iraq's Pa(e 13 GAO-06-9S3T 40 security situation, an important consideration in any decision to reduce the U.S. military presence in Iraq. While attacks data alone may not provide a complete picture of Iraq's security situation, we believe they provide a sound depiction of general security trends in the country.' According to a June 2006 United Nations (UN) report, an increasingly complex armed opposition continues to be capable of maintaining a consistently high level of violent activity across Iraq. Baghdad, Ninewa, Salahuddin, Anbar, and Diyala have been experiencing the worst of the violence. Other areas, particularly Basra and Kirkuk, have recently witnessed increased tension and a growing number of violent incidents. Sectarian tensions and violence increased after the bombing of a holy Shi'a shrine in Samarra in February 2006. A June 2006 UN report states that, in recent months, much of the violence was committed by both sides of the Sunni-Shi'a sectarian divide. Groups that are specifically targeted included prominent Sunni and Shi'a Iraqis, government workers and their families, members of the middle class (such as merchants and academics), people working for or associated with MNF-I, and Christians. The presence of militia groups in Iraq has become more prominent in recent months and threatens Iraq's stability. Although the total number of militias is unknown, a DOD report said that more than a dozen militias have been documented in Iraq, varying in size, extent of organizational structure, and area of influence. The largest of the known militias include (1) the Badr Organization, a militia group of the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iran, (2) the Mahdi Army, a militia group of radical Shi'a cleric Muqtada al-Sadr, and (3) the Kurdish Peshmerga, the primary security force for the Kurdish regional government, in the northern region of Iraq. The Coalition Provisional Authority developed a strategy for disbanding or controlling militias in May 2004, and the Iraqi Constitution prohibits the formation of militias outside the framework of the armed forces. Many militias, however, remain present in Iraq and threaten the country's stability. Since the February 2006 Samarra bombing, the number of attacks by militia groups increased. According to the MNF-I Commanding General, Iran has increased its support of a variety of Shi'a extremist groups in southern Iraq since the beginning of this year. GAO, DOD Reports Should Link Economic, Governance, and Security Indicators to Conditions for Stabilizing Iraq, GAO-06-152C (Washington, DC: Oct 18,2005). P*gc 14 GAO-06-953T 41 Need for National Reconciliation and Enhanced Ministerial Capacity Hinders Efforts to Govern Sectarian Divisions Undermine Efforts to Foster Reconciliation Iraq's new government is addressing two critical issues—how to foster national reconciliation and how to strengthen government so it can deliver essential services and provide security to all Iraqis. However, Iraqi efforts to foster reconciliation are primarily confronted by sectarian divisions between Shi'a and Sunni groups. Moreover, U.S. and Iraqi efforts to strengthen government ministries face the daunting task of developing the ability of Iraq's ministries to govern after 30 years of autocratic rule. On June 25, 2006, a few weeks after the formation of Iraq's first permanent government, Iraq's Prime Minister proposed a 24-point reconciliation plan for the nation. The plan's provisions include initiating a national dialogue with all parties, including those opposed to the government; providing amnesty for detainees and others not involved in terrorist acts; and ensuring that Iraqi security forces do not intervene in politics. The Iraqi government has taken several steps to foster national reconciliation and implement the provisions of this plan. For example, Iraq's Foreign Minister met with the UN Security Council in midJune. At that meeting, the UN agreed to support the League of Arab States in planning to convene a conference on Iraqi national accord. The Iraqi government also announced that it would release 2,500 detainees. As of mid-May, the Ministry of Human Rights reported that there are about 28,700 detainees throughout Iraq. As of late June, the Iraqi government had released more than 1,000 detainees. Finally, the Iraqi Prime Minister confirmed that he had contacted groups through a third party which had been responsive to the reconciliation plan. He planned to hold direct talks with seven resistance groups. He also clarified that amnesty would not be granted to insurgents who killed Iraqis or coalition troops. In addition, following the February 22 bombing of the Golden Mosque in Samara, the U.S. Embassy reported that it called upon Iraqi leaders to join together in unity and turn away from sectarian violence. Although the Iraqi government has taken positive steps, national reconciliation faces a long and difficult course because of sectarian divisions within Iraq. According to a June 2006 UN report, much of the violence in recent months stemmed from acts perpetrated by both sides of the Sunni-Shi'a sectarian divide. The report states that Iraqis are threatened by revenge attacks, the use of force by military and security forces, and militia activities, among other threats. In a prior report, the UN stated that militia power in Southern Iraq has resulted in systematic acts of violence against the Sunni community. The UN report concluded that unless there is progress towards national reconciliation soon, increased polarization and even civil war could occur. In addition, on June 7, 2006, Page 15 GAO-06-953T 42 the coalition killed al-Zarqawi, the operational commander of the al-Qaeda movement in Iraq, who tried to incite civil war. According to the President of the United States, his death is an opportunity for the new government to succeed. However, the President also cautioned that sectarian violence will continue. Iraq Faces Challenges in The U.S. government faces significant challenges in improving the Delivering Government capability of national and provincial governments to provide security and Services deliver services to the Iraqi people. According to State, the Iraqi capacity for self-governance was decimated after nearly 30 years of autocratic rule.9 In addition, Iraq lacked competent existing Iraqi governmental organizations. According to an Inter-Agency Strategy for Iraqi Stability (ISIS) Working Group draft paper," the Baathist regime had let governmental infrastructure organizations deteriorate since the first Gulf War, and employment in these organizations had been based on cronyism and political correctness rather than managerial competence. Since 2003, the United States has provided Iraqis with various training and technical assistance to improve their capacity to govern. U.S. agencies provided senior advisers to Iraqi ministries to help in the reconstruction of Iraq. For example, the Multinational Security Transition Command-Iraq continues to develop the ministerial abilities of the Ministries of Interior and Defense. In January 2006, State reported a new initiative—the National Capacity Development Program—to improve the capabilities of key Iraqi ministries. In partnership with coalition allies and others, the program provides technical assistance and training for 3 years to help the government of Iraq improve managerial capacity. The program focuses on improving core ministry functions, such as leadership and communication, financial and human resource management, and information technology, among others. It also includes extensive anti-corruption activities, such as standardized auditing and procurement reform and policies and practices that aim to eliminate patronage. 'Quarterly Update to Congress, Section 2207 Report (January 2006). Methods of Post-Conflict Reconstruction in Iraq: A Preliminary Assessment (draft), Inter-Agency Strategy for Iraqi Stability (ISIS) Working Group, Baghdad, Iraq (December 2005). Page 16 GAO-06-953T 43 Reforming Iraqi ministries will face challenges. According to a recent State Department report, corruption remains a critical impediment to the successful governance of Iraq. The report also stated that Iraq needs training in modern civil service policies. Another State assessment found that non-security ministries face challenges and have limited capabilities to carry out core functions, such as budgeting, procurement, and human resource management. U.S. officials recognize that increased technical assistance and training is important and the United States is working with the UN, the World Bank, and allies such as Italy, Denmark, and the United Kingdom in efforts to partner with staff from Iraqi ministries and provincial governments. Another important complement to these efforts is increased U.S. agency and international partnering with Iraqi officials in areas such as planning, financial management, budgeting and procurement, and human resource management These efforts are aimed at providing the Iraqis with the essential management skills to govern effectively. GAO is also involved in these efforts and is taking steps to partner with Iraq's Commission on Public Integrity and the Board of Supreme Audit. Efforts to Restore Oil and Electricity Sectors Are Hindered by Security, Corruption, Fiscal, and The U.S. and Iraqi governments are trying to revitalize Iraq's economy and restore essential services in the oil and electricity sectors. However, these efforts have been hindered by security, corruption, fiscal, and management challenges. Despite Efforts, Restoring Iraq's Oil and Electricity Sectors Has Been Difficult According to the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Gulf Regional Division, DOD has added or restored more than 1,400 megawatts of potential generating capacity to the Iraq national electricity grid, as of June 2006. According to agency reporting, average daily hours of electricity across most of Iraq remained at 12 hours per day during the last two weeks of June 2006. Available power for Baghdad averaged 8 hours per day for the same period. In the oil sector, DOD has completed or is working on a number of projects to boost Iraq's oil production, refining, and export capacity. However, key reconstruction goals have yet to be achieved (see table 1). As of June 25, 2006, oil and electricity sectors were below the planned U.S. end-state. In June 2006, State reported that oil production was about 2.29 million barrels per day (mbpd), which was below the desired goal of 3 mbpd. In June 2006, electricity generation capacity was about 4,832 P«ge 17 GAO-06-953T 44 megawatts—above its prewar level but below the post-war peak of about 5,400 megawatts and the planned U.S goal of 6,000 megawatts. In addition, it is unclear whether the current capacity can be sustained. Table 1: Reconstruction Goals Not Met for OH and Electricity Sectors Pre-War Planned U.S. (2003) Current (June 2006') end state Sector Metric Oil Crude Oil Production Capacity 2.6 MBPD 2.29 MBPD 3.0 MBPD Electricity Peak Generation Capacity 4,300 MW 4,832 MW (5,387 6,000 MW MW peak in 7/14/05) MBPD . mil lion barrels per day MW ■ megawatts Source: GAO anatyas of Department of Stale data. Security, Corruption, Fiscal, and Management Challenges Hinder Reconstruction and Stabilization efforts A combination of insurgent attacks on crude oil and product pipelines, dilapidated infrastructure, and poor operations and maintenance have hindered domestic refining and have required Iraq to import significant portions of liquefied petroleum gas, gasoline, kerosene, and diesel. Both the oil and electricity sectors face a number of challenges to meeting Iraq's needs. Improving infrastructure security. The insurgency has destroyed key infrastructure, severely undermining progress. U.S. officials reported that major oil pipelines continue to be sabotaged, shutting down oil exports and resulting in lost revenues. Major electrical transmission lines have been repeatedly sabotaged, cutting power to other parts of the country. Current U.S. assistance is focused on strengthening the Strategic Infrastructure Battalions, which are Ministry of Defense forces that protect oil fields and pipelines. Security conditions in Iraq have, in part, led to project delays and increased costs for security services. Although it is difficult to quantify the costs and delays resulting from poor security conditions, both agency and contractor officials acknowledged that security costs have diverted a considerable amount of reconstniction resources and have led to canceling or reducing the scope of some reconstruction projects. Page 18 45 Deterring corruption. U.S. and international officials reported increased concerns about pervasive corruption in Iraq. Transparency International ranked Iraq 137th of 159 countries in 2005 in terms of corruption. To combat corruption, U.S. and international officials reported that the Iraqi government established the Commission on Public Integrity, which is charged with the criminal investigation of corruption cases, and the independent Inspectors General within individual Iraqi ministries, and revived the existing Board of Supreme Audit (BSA). The U.S. government, including GAO, is working directly with these institutions. The oil and electricity sectors remain particularly vulnerable to corruption. Corruption in the oil sector presents a special problem, particularly because of the sector's importance to the economy. According to State officials and reporting, about 10 percent of refined fuels are diverted to the black market, and about 30 percent of imported fuels are smuggled out of Iraq and sold for a profit. According to U.S. Embassy documents, the insurgency has been partly funded by corrupt activities within Iraq and from skimming profits from black marketers. Moreover, according to one analysis, corruption diverted much of Iraq's oil revenue from reconstruction to government officials and their accomplices in organized crime."3 Corruption in the electricity sector is also a problem. According to State's Iraq Reconstruction Management Office (IRMO) officials, the Ministry of Electricity contracts with tribal chiefs, paying them about $60 to $100 per kilometer, to protect transmission lines running through their areas. However, IRMO officials reported that the protection system is flawed and encourages corruption. According to U.S. and UN Development Program officials, some of these tribes are also selling materials from downed lines and extracting tariffs for access to repair the lines. The lack of metering facilitates opportunities for corruption in the oil and electricity sectors. Despite a 2004 audit recommendation made by the International Advisory and Monitoring Board for the Development Fund for Iraq, and initial steps to install meters in accordance with standard oil industry practices, the Iraqi government still lacks an effective system of metering to measure production and export levels. According to U.S. '"Kenneth M. Pollack and the Iraqi Policy Working Group, "A Switch in Time: A New Strategy for America in Iraq," Saban Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institution (February 2006). Page 19 GAO-06-953T 46 officials in the electricity section, about 30 percent of the meters in Iraq are damaged. Most meters are old mechanical meters that need to be replaced with electronic ones so that the system may be better monitored. Addressing fiscal challenges. Iraq's ability to contribute to its own rebuilding is dependent on addressing key fiscal challenges, particularly in the oil and electricity sectors. Current government subsidies constrain opportunities for growth and investment and have kept prices for oil and electricity low. Domestic fuel prices in Iraq are among the lowest in the world. U.S. and international officials report that these low prices have led to a rampant black market and fuel smuggling out of the country; inadequate maintenance and improvements; and over-consumption. According to U.S. and international officials, the Iraqi budget is directly affected, since state- owned refineries cover less than half the domestic demand, and the Iraqi government has to import the rest at world market prices. As part of its Stand-By Arrangement with the International Monetary Fund (IMF), Iraq must reduce government subsidies of petroleum products. By the end of 2006, the Iraqi government plans to complete a series of adjustments to bring fuel prices closer to those of other Gulf countries. According to State reporting, a new round of price increases for diesel, kerosene, and propane began to take effect in Baghdad and other areas the week of June 19, 2006, and is being extended countrywide. The Iraqi government committed itself to bring fuel prices closer to regional prices as part of its IMF reform program. Iraqis currently pay about $.44 per gallon for regular gasoline compared with about $.90 per gallon in neighboring countries. According to U.S. and international officials, the negative effects of the electricity subsidy are similar to those for fuels. The national grid is currently unable to satisfy the demand, and Iraqis must buy electricity from privately-operated small diesel generators which are inefficient sources of electricity. Moreover, according to World Bank reporting, increasing tariffs is complicated by the desire to preserve wide access to the grid and subsidize low-income groups. Iraq faces other fiscal challenges, such as generous wage and pension benefits, increased defense spending, and high external debt Our April GAO-06-953T 47 2006 testimony before this committee provides additional details on these other challenges." Managing and sustaining new a?id rehabilitated infrastructure. The U.S. reconstruction program has encountered difficulties with Iraq's ability to sustain the new and rehabilitated infrastructure and address maintenance needs. A June 2006 Congressional Research Service report noted that as more large-scale construction projects have been completed with U.S. assistance, there has been increasing concern regarding the financial, organizational, and technical capacity of Iraqis to maintain the projects in the long run." More specifically, our prior reports and testimony note that the Iraqis' capacity to operate and maintain the power plant infrastructure and equipment provided by the United States remains a challenge at both the plant and ministry levels. As a result, the infrastructure and equipment remain at risk of damage following their transfer to the Iraqis. U.S. officials have acknowledged that more needs to be done to train plant operators and ensure that advisory services are provided after the turnover date. In January 2006, State reported that it has developed a strategy with the Ministry of Electricity to focus on rehabilitation and sustainment of electricity assets. The November 2005 NSVI and supporting documents represent the results of efforts to improve the strategic planning process for the challenging and costly U.S. mission in Iraq. Although the strategy is an improvement over earlier efforts, it is incomplete even when considered in the context of all supporting documents, both classified and unclassified. Without additional information on roles and responsibilities, future contributions and costs, and outcome-based metrics, the strategy does not provide the Congress with a clear road map for achieving victory in Iraq. The formation of the new Iraqi government provides an opportunity for the United States government to re-examine its strategy and more closely align its efforts and objectives with those of the Iraqi people and other donors. "See GAO, Rebuilding Iraq: Governance, Security, Reconstruction, and Financing Challenge, GAO-06-697T (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 25, 2006). '"See Congressional Research Service RL31833, Iraq: Recent Developments in Reconstruction Assistaiwe (Washington, D.C., June 2006). Page 21 GAO-06-953T 49 Appendix I: Extent the U.S. Strategy for Iraq Addresses GAO's Desirable Characteristics of an Effective Strategy Extent the U.S. Strategy for Iraq Addresses GAO's Desirable Characteristics cf an Effective National Strategy 1. Clear purpose, scope, methodology Purpose 1a. tdentifies the impetus that led to the strategy being written, such as a statutory requirement, mandate, or key event © • tb. Discusses the strategy's purpose. • • Scope ic. Defines or discusses key terms, major (unctions, mission areas, or activities the strategy covers • • Methodology 1d. Discusses tne process that produced the strategy, e.g . what organizations or offices drafted the document, whether it was the result of a working group, or which parties were consulted in its development. o © 1e. Discusses assumptions or the principles and theories that guided the strategy's development. • • 2. Detailed discussion of problems, risks, and threals Problem definition 2a. lncludes a detailed discussion or definition o( the problems the strategy intends to address. • 2b. lncludes a detailed discussion of the causes of the problems. © © 2c. lncludes a detailed discussion of the operating environment. • • Risk assessment 2d. Addresses a detailed discussion of the threats at which the strategy is directed. • • 2e. Discusses the quality ot data available, e.g., constraints, deficiencies, and "unknowns." 0 © 3. Desired goals, objectives, activities, and performance measures Goals and subordinate objectives 3a. Addresses the overall results desired, i.e., an -end-state." • • 30. ldentifies strategic goals and subordinate objectives. • • Activities 3c. ldentifies specific activities to achieve results. • • Performance measures 3d. Addresses priorities, milestones, and outcome-related performance measures © © 3e. tdentifies process to mc-rwtor and report on progress. • • 3f. tdentities lirnitatrons on progress indicators. 0 o £ Addresses © Partially addresses O Does not address Sources: GAO analysis of NSC, State, and DOC data Page 23 GAO-06-953T 50 / / V Mf Extent the U.S. Strategy for lraq Addresses GAO's Desirable Characteristics of an Effective National Strategy 4. Description of future costs and resources needed Resources and investment* 4a. tdentifies what the strategy will cost. o © Ri.kmaruiaenu.nt o 4c. Addresses where resources or investments should be targeted to balance risks and costs. o © 4d. Addresses resource allocation mechanisms. o © 4e. tdentifies risk management princip*s and how they help implementing parties prioritize and allocate resources. o o 5. Delineation of U.S. government roles and responsibilities Organizational rotes and responsibilities Sa. Addresses who will implement the strategy. © • 5b. Addresses lead, support, and partner roles and responsibilities ol specific lederal agencies, departments, or offices, e.g.. who is in charge during all phases of the strategy's implementation o © Coordination 5c. Addresses mechamsms and/or processes for partes to coordinate efforts within agencies and with other agencies. 0 © 5d. ldentifies process to. resolving conflicts. o o 6. Description of ..rateoys lntegration among and with other entitle, o © 6b. Addresses integration wilh relevant documents from other agenc*s and subordinale levels (vertical). o © © Partially addresses O Does not address : GAO analysis ot NSC. Slate, and DOO data. (320434) Page 24 GAO-06-953T 52 Mr. Shays. We will start off with Mr. Kucinich. Mr. Kucinich. May I direct questions to Mr. ShaYS. Yes, you may ask Mr. Christoff or the Comptroller General. Mr. Kucinich. These questions would be to Mr. Walker. First, I have to preface my questions. The DOD's plans for our military bases in Iraq go right to the question about what victory in Iraq would mean. For instance, last spring the Overseas Basing Com- mission wrote that military presence corresponds to influence. They said, "We cannot hope for much influence without presence. The degree of influence often correlates to the level of permanent pres- ence that we maintain forward." So, it's inconceivable the long-range U.S. influence in Iraq is not being sought. What exactly are the plans for a long-range military presence in Iraq? This subcommittee has been trying to ascertain what the long-range plans are for certain very large military instal- lations in Iraq, such as at Balad, Al-Asad, Talil and Camp Taji. The Congressional Research Service wrote in April 2005 some projects suggest a substantial U.S. investment to improve facilities that could be used for the longer term. DOD has requested its mili- tary construction funds for 5 years, the standard length of time, which could be perceived as indicating a more extended U.S. pres- ence, and that is in Iraq. Projects that suggest a longer U.S. presence include $57 million for Balad Airbase designated as a strategic aerial port to expand aircraft ramps, construct roads and storage areas for equipment, and replace airfield lighting. That is a quote from a CRS memoran- dum. Now, our staff met with members of the Overseas Basing Com- mission, Mr. Walker. They learned that the Commissioners re- ceived no information from DOD about Iraq and would not com- ment. When our staff was briefed by DOD, they were told that a strict silence would be observed in all matters relating to Iraq. Now, it's hard to understand how national security strategy in Iraq can be assessed without knowing the plans for a military base in Iraq. So, Mr. Walker, did the GAO succeed where our subcommittee efforts have not? Did GAO receive from DOD sufficient detailed in- formation about the cost and types of military installations in Iraq? Mr. Walker. Well, first, Mr. Kucinich, let me say that we have not performed a specific engagement designed to try to ascertain the cost of military construction activities in Iraq. It is something that we would be willing to consider doing, but that's not some- thing that we have undertaken. However, let me tell you what we do know, if I may. Mr. KuCINIch. No, wait, you have answered my question. I have a followup question. Mr. WalKEr. I will, very quickly. Mr. KuCINIch. Were you able to ascertain whether or not future costs and resources were addressed? Mr. Walker. No. Basically the position right now, the Defense Department, is the United States does not plan to have a long-term presence in Iraq. That is why the Overseas Basing Commission was not asked to look at this. It's clear that we are likely to have 53 a presence for a considerable period of time. It's clear that there will be capabilities that will be there for the Iraqis or someone. But their position is, at the present time, the United States does not plan to maintain a long-term presence in Iraq. Mr. KuciNich. Was the GAO given a detailed briefing of the DOD's intentions for facilities in Iraq? Mr. KuciNiCh. We have had some interaction with the Defense Department on this issue, but their position has and remains, to my knowledge, that while extensive costs are being incurred, they are being incurred primarily to support our involvement for an un- determined period of time, and not to maintain a long-term pres- ence in Iraq. Mr. KuciNich. So, you say an undetermined period of time is a short presence is what you are saying. Now, Mr. Walker, what at- tempts did GAO make to find the answers to these questions about bases? Did you, for example, seek access to these bases at Balad and others to see how permanent or impermanent they may be? Mr. WalKEr. We have done some work in Iraq, but we have not done a specific engagement designed to try to address the issues you are raising, Mr. Kucinich. I am more than happy to talk to you and other members of the subcommittee if you are interested in doing so. Mr. Kucinich. Well, I certainly think that it would be of interest to this committee and the American people to know whether or not the United States is preparing for a long-term presence in Iraq based on the construction of those bases. And since it didn't look at it in terms of the scope of this study, I think it would be impor- tant for you to do it in a followup. Thank you, sir. Mr. Walker. Thank you. Mr. Shays. The Chair would recognize Mr. Waxman. What we are doing is we are doing 6-minute questioning. Mr. Waxman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Before I ask some questions of Mr. Walker, I want to respond to the comments made by our colleague on the other side of the aisle, Mr. Turner from Ohio. He mentioned in his opening statement that he thought I was derelict for not mentioning that weapons of mass destruction were found in Iraq, and he mentioned a report by Gen- eral Maples and the National Ground Intelligence Center. But, unfortunately, Representative Turner gave only a small part of the story. According to General Maples, the munitions recently found buried in Iraq were produced in the 1980's, and, according to the NGIC report, these munitions are not proof of an ongoing weapons of mass destruction program in the 1990's. I would just add that there was a FOX News story from June 22nd quoting a Defense Department official that the munitions were not even in useable condition. And according to this official Bush administration account, "This does not reflect the capacity that was built up after 1991. These munitions are not the WMDs this country and the rest the world believed Iraq had, and not the WMDs for which this country went to war." So before criticizing me, perhaps the Member would do better to consult the actual report he cites. Well, before everybody gets ex- cited, therefore, that he found the weapons of mass destruction, let's just put that issue to rest. 55 the United States could still be an occupying power in a bitterly hostile land. Now, your report, the GAO report, makes clear that the adminis- tration incorrectly believed it would have a permissive environ- ment, but your report doesn't say why they believed this. Who told them that? Who was giving them advice it would be a permissive environment, and why did they ignore all these experts, including the President's father? Mr. Walker, you want to address that? Mr. Walker. I will start, and then I will ask Joe to fill in. It was very clear that there was inadequate intelligence, poor planning, not enough options considered with regard to potential scenarios for conditions on the ground. Now, as to why they did or did not consider the advice and coun- sel of various individuals, I can't comment on that. I don't know whether and to what extent Mr. Christoff can, but I would ask him to try. Mr. Waxman. Well, I think you pretty much answered my ques- tion, except you raised another one. Are you a partisan? You sug- gested there were a lot of mistakes made. Mr. Walker. I am an independent. I said that there was poor planning and inadequate consideration of alternative scenarios for potential conditions. And because of that, I believe that some of the challenges that we have have manifested themselves. Mr. WAXMAN. Mr. Christoff, your report concludes the adminis- tration diverted billions of dollars intended for reconstruction to ad- dress security concerns, and that it failed to anticipate before the war. Is this an accurate statement? Mr. Christoff. What our report said was that there was a re- consideration of what the priorities were that Ambassador Negroponte brought in and felt that there was insufficient re- sources that were going to the security environment, and he trans- ferred moneys from the water and electricity sector to try to pro- vide additional moneys for the security sector, particularly for training and equipping Iraqi security forces. Mr. Waxman. They didn't anticipate that. Mr. Christoff. What they anticipated—could I get back to your first question about the permissive security environment? The as- sumptions that the CPA developed were assumptions that were de- veloped in the summer of 2003 when the insurgency was not as in- tense as what subsequently developed. So they went into the reconstruction plans with three key as- sumptions, one of which was that there would be a permissive se- curity environment that would allow reconstruction to go forward; second, that the Iraqi Government would make important contribu- tions to that reconstruction effort. So those were the critical as- sumptions, as well as trying to get the infrastructure up to prewar levels. Mr. Waxman. Thank you, Mr. Shays. Mr. Shays. I thank the gentleman. We are going next—let me just tell you the order I have on the Democratic side of the aisle. I had Mr. Kucinich first, Mr. Waxman, then I have Mr. Higgins next, then Mr. Van Hollen, Mrs. Maloney, and then Mr. Lynch, and then Mr. Sanders will be after that. We 56 will inject Republicans as they come in. I am just going to keep coming down here at this time. Mr. Higgins. Just so the Members know, we are giving approxi- mately 6 minutes, sometimes a little over. I am not going to fight the red light. Mr. HiGGins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I just—I am on the GAO findings, and a lot of this is, you know, a question of seman- tics and seemingly fact distortion and verbal manipulation, because when I look at the situation, what I have come to learn, what I have read, both official and unofficial, fundamental to the success of the Iraqi operation is security, without which none of the other assumptions really matter all that much, because they are not achievable without fundamentally achieving that goal of security and allowing the new Iraqi system to evolve naturally toward self- sufficiency, self-determination, which would eventually lead to an American withdrawal not based on arbitrary dates, but on real dates, based on a real strategy. It just seems to me that when we are talking about the several assumptions that have significantly changed, the several assump- tions haven't significantly changed, they were fundamentally wrong in the first place. What was also wrong was that the assumptions that went into trying to address these things. I am concerned that this really adds up to a generally failed pol- icy, a policy that has not kept its commitment to the American peo- ple, that has not kept its commitment to the Iraqi people, to create a safe and stable environment. And, anecdotally, the reports that we get every single day seem to further question this whole issue of security and making progress. I look at these charts, and while, you know, somewhat attractive, and seemingly there is some kind of measured progress here, the insurgency threat is only increas- ing. The terrorist threat is only increasing. So my question is, you know, what does—what is the authority of the Comptroller General's capacity to provide the basis, form the basis to change this policy? Because from what I see here, this is a continuation of the same, despite your office having found that things have significantly changed. I don't see a corresponding change in the policy. I think that is what this committee needs to know. I think that is what the American people need to know. I would ask that question fundamentally of you, whoever wants to take it. Mr. Walker. Mr. Higgins, let me address that question. As you know, the Comptroller General of the United States is head of the Government Accountability Office, which is a legislative branch agency. Therefore, we are an Article I institution under the Con- stitution. We can do our work in a professional, objective, fact- based, nonpartisan, and nonideological manner, which is what we do. We can make recommendations. But under the Constitution, we cannot require the executive branch to adopt our recommendations. Fortunately, about 85 percent of the recommendations we make are eventually adopted. In the case of security, I would agree with you that security is fundamental. As Maslow's theory notes, which we all learned in college, self-preservation is the most fundamental need. Therefore, if you do not have an adequate security environ- ment, then that has an adverse ripple effect with regard to a vari- 57 ety of other dimensions, one of which being the reconstruction di- mension, but it's only one. At the same time, while you need to secure the security objec- tives, and while the trends on that have not been positive within the last year or so, the fact is in order to achieve real and sustain- able success, it needs to be not just on the security dimension, but also on the political and economic dimension, because even if you have stability, which is key, you need to start delivering results that all of the Iraqi people care about, whether they are Shi'a, Sunni or Kurd, and there's a real problem there. Mr. HiGGlNS. Obviously. I am done, thank you. Mr. Shays. At this time I will recognize the vice chairman of the committee Mr. Marchant. Mr. Marchant. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Walker, President Bush in his June 14th press conference on his return from Baghdad said that he suggested to the Iraqis that they use the country's oil assets to unify the country. The most common question that I am asked in my district about the rebuild- ing of Iraq is what is happening to the oil income from the Iraqi's sale of oil? What was the original plan as far as the use of the oil income in Iraq? Mr. Walker. I will start and ask Mr. Christoff to supplement. First, the assumption was, rightly or wrongly, that the Iraqis would be able to pay for a lot of the related reconstruction efforts in large part through oil revenues, because, as you know, the Iraqis at the present point in time, are receiving about 90 percent plus of government revenue through oil revenues. The challenge of that is severalfold. No. 1, oil production levels are below prewar levels. There are serious challenges with regard to production and distribution, in part complicated by the insur- gency, in part complicated by the fact that even when you end up repairing something, the Iraqis have a difficult time maintaining it. But furthermore, there's tremendous corruption, and there's a lot of theft going on. There's an estimate, as noted in our report, that about 10 percent of the refined fuels are being diverted, and about 30 percent of the imported fuels are being diverted. In fact, I myself have been to Iraq a couple of times. My son fought in Iraq with the Marine Corps. But the last time I was there, which was earlier this year, I was showed some numbers with regard to oil production and revenues, and it took me about, you know, a second and a half to realize that, obviously, there was massive corruption going on, because the numbers just didn't add up. Mr. Marchant. Mr. Christoff. Mr. Christoff. Let me give you some information, Mr. Marchant, and you can tell me if I'm answering your question. First of all, when the original assumptions were made back in 2003 about Iraq's investment, the assumption was that there would be oil revenues beyond what was needed to run the government, to provide all of the functions of government that could be used for reconstruction efforts. The situation that you have today now is that if you look at the Iraqi budget you see a budget that, No. 1, is funding what some could contend to be a blow to bureaucracy, primarily because often- 58 times you don't know who is working in the different ministries. There are ghost employees. You have subsidies that the IMF esti- mates that 50 percent of GDP in Iraq is going to food, fuel and electricity subsidies, and then you have the continuing support for a burgeoning security force and the costs associated with that. You add all that up and there isn't a lot in terms of capital in- vestment that Iraq can currently contribute. They budgeted $6 bil- lion in their 2006 budget for capital investments. I don't know if they're going to be able to provide any assistance in that area since last year they budgeted $5 billion but were only able to spend a couple hundred million. Mr. Marchant. Do you think that it was a reasonable assump- tion going in that the oil income would be a significant supplement to the rebuilding? Mr. Christoff. I'm not certain if we knew what all of the com- mitments and expenditures were on the Iraqi Government in terms of the massive subsidies, the pensions, the employment, costs asso- ciated with employment. Mr. Marchant. In his press conference on June 14th, President Bush indicated that perhaps a distribution of the oil revenues be- tween the Shi'as, Sunnis and Kurds would be a way of unifying the country. Is that a realistic—at this point, is there enough of the oil income that's not dedicated simply to the day-to-day organization that could be used for that benefit? Mr. Christoff. That is one of the 24 points that's part of the Na- tional Reconciliation Plan the Prime Minister has put together. There are going to be some really tough decisions that have to be made in the next 4 months as we go through the constitutional process—the constitutional amendment process. The Constitution has, some would contend, interesting but conflicting articles within it. One article says that all existing oil reserves are part of a na- tional government, all future reserves are more or less decided to- ward the issue of what is the Federal structure, what will the na- tional government control, what will the provincial government's control. What complicates that debate even more is that the Kurdistan Regional National Resources Minister has said that the debate about who owns what has already been decided and they are not open to any further negotiations about the Constitution. So Iraq certainly is oil rich, but the question of who controls the future oil reserves is going to be a contentious issue as we go through the constitutional amendment process. Mr. Marchant. Mr. Walker, do you think it is a reasonable as- sumption going forward for us to continue to speculate that there will be oil income available for the rebuilding? Mr. Walker. I think that you are going to have to deal with the security situation. We're going to have to end up helping them to enhance capacity to be able to increase production and maintain these facilities. There's also going to have to be efforts taken to deal with the subsidies. One of the reasons that there's so much theft going on is because the price for energy on the market within Iraq is sub- stantially lower than it is in surrounding countries; and, therefore, that provides a tremendous incentive to be able to steal these fuels 60 Mr. VAN Hollen. That's right. Would you agree that in any or- ganization if you ignore and reward failure you get more failure? Mr. Walker. I think there has to be accountability when things don't go the way that you want. Mr. Van Hollen. Thank you. As the head of the Government Ac- countability Office I'm pleased to hear you say that. Let me give you a couple of facts with respect to Iraq. Let's start with weapons of mass destruction. Individuals in the administra- tion who got it wrong with respect to weapons of mass destruction have either been left in place or rewarded. Secretary Rumsfeld, Secretary Rice have never received any sort of penalty or display of criticism from the President for getting it dead wrong. George Tenet, who said it was a slam-dunk case, received the Presidential Medal of Freedom. Individuals at INR Department of Energy who questioned the issues like the aluminum tubes, I have never seen them get an in- crease in pay for their performance in getting it right. General Shinseki said we needed more troops on the ground. He was cavalierly dismissed by then Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz who said those numbers were way to high. We know many Generals now, at least eight, have come out and said their advice was ignored by Secretary Rumsfeld and they've called for his dismissal and resignation. Secretary Wolfowitz said we'd have plenty of money to pay for the war in Iraq based on Iraqi oil revenue. He was rewarded with a position as President of the World Bank. Those individuals who called for greater troops on the ground, their predictions and re- quests were ignored. The cost of the war. The President's former Chief Economic Advi- sor, Lawrence Lindsey, at one point predicted $100, $200 billion cost of the war. People said, hey, you're crazy; that's way too much. Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz said that. So did the head of OMB at the time, Mitch Daniels. They said that's crazy, way too high. We know now that it was in fact too low. My question is very simple. When you have that many people getting it wrong, doesn't it send the wrong signal for the President not to hold anybody accountable for those failures, failures with re- spect to WMD, failures with respect to number of troops needed for stability on the ground, failure with respect to predictions of costs, failure with respect to Abu Ghraib and other things that have un- dermined U.S. credibility and our moral standing around the world. Doesn't it make it more difficult to succeed in Iraq when you ignore failure? Isn't that going to give us more failure? Mr. Walker. Mr. Van Hollen, I believe very strongly in not being partisan and not being personal; and so, therefore, I won't comment with regard to specific individuals. I will, however, say this: There has been inadequate accountability today. Mr. Van Hollen. I appreciate that. I think it's pretty clear from the litany of failures and the fact that nobody has been held ac- countable. Let me ask you this, if you had that kind of series of failures at the Government Accountability Office, would you be giving bonuses to those individuals who were making those decisions? Mr. Walker. Absolutely not. 62 consider quantity but also quality and the ability of these forces to operate independently and to sustain themselves. So we've made real progress in training an additional number of Iraqi security forces. Their capabilities are improving, not as fast as many would like. But the real challenge here is going to be what about their ability to sustain themselves, their ability to provide command and control, logistics, intelligence. We are having to pro- vide most of that, and that's likely to continue to be the case for a period of time. Mr. Dent. As a followup, I want to get to the issue of the costs of our involvement in Iraq. What is the current cost per month of the U.S. involvement in Iraq, including the cost of U.S. military op- erations, rebuilding critical infrastructure, and Iraqi security forces and any other cost elements that you can elaborate on? Mr. WalKEr. First, I think you have to keep in mind the current cost versus the tail. The current costs are estimated at about $1.5 billion a week, but there is a tail, and the tail is the cost associated with refurbishing, reconstituting our equipment, transferring the force, costs associated with disability and health care for those who have been disabled and wounded in battle, and we still don't know how long we are going to be there and in what size. But about $1.5 billion a week is my understanding. Mr. Dent. As a followup to Mr. Marchant's question, you had talked about the price of oil or gasoline in Iraq. When I was there last summer, I thought I heard the number bandied about that the price of gasoline was about 15 cents per gallon, which was consid- erably less than the cost to produce and refine the product. What did you say a few moments ago was the actual current market price for gasoline in Iraq? Mr. Walker. That was Mr. Christoff, and I ask that he repeat those numbers. Mr. Christoff. You're right. Last summer through December it was about 13 cents a gallon. It's now 44 cents a gallon for regular. Mr. Dent. It was my understanding, too, at the time that most of the gasoline that was produced, the crude produced in Iraq was sent out of the country to be refined, is that correct? Mr. Christoff. Iraq has about half of its needs it can produce within the country, and the remaining half it has to import. Mr. Dent. So under that regime, obviously, the government must have been subsidizing gasoline, subsidizing not just gasoline but electricity and other commodities. Mr. Christoff. Food as well. Mr. Dent. Can you give me a quick assessment as how that has changed? Apparently, it's gotten better, at least in gasoline. Are we allowing market forces to establish themselves more effectively in that economy today than had been the case 6 months to a year ago? Mr. Christoff. When Iraq signed an agreement with the IMF, they agreed to increase fuel prices this entire year so that it hope- fully reached levels of about 90 cents a gallon, which is comparable to the region. They missed a March increase, so they tried to make it up for the increase that occurred last week when they went from 13 cents to 44 cents a gallon. The goal is by the end of this year to bring it up to regional prices of about 90 cents a gallon. 63 Mr. Dent. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have no further ques- tions and yield back. Mr. Shays. Thank the gentleman. At this time, the Chair would recognize Mrs. Maloney. Mrs. MalONEy. Thank you very much. Thank you for your testi- mony. In your report you noted that only—the financing of it is only partially identifying the current and future costs of U.S. involve- ment in Iraq. Are you tracking or is our Government tracking by program? Can we total it by program the full cost of the involve- ment in Iraq of the $311 billion? Can you break it down by what's going for rebuilding critical infrastructure, how much for Iraqi se- curity services? Can you break it down in those categories? Mr. Walker. Mrs. Maloney, there is an ability to break it down to a certain extent, but as you and the other members on the sub- committee know, the Defense Department has terrible accounting systems. It is the only major department in the U.S. Government that still cannot withstand an audit. We are receiving cooperation from the Defense Department in trying to understand how supplemental funds are being expended as well as other funds, but they have thousands of legacy non-inte- grated accounting systems which do not provide for timely, accu- rate and useful information to make informed decisionmaking, nor do they provide adequate information for the Congress to be able to discharge its constitutional responsibilities effectively. Mrs. Maloney. For well over 3 years we have been having hear- ings in this committee and others where the administration says it's going to get better, we just need a few more trained Iraqis, and it just never seems to get better, and the number of trained Iraqis seems to never get in place, and it doesn't seem like they have clear measures of what they need to achieve to be able to have suc- cess so that our troops can come home. One area that is particularly disturbing to me is the whole area of contracting and procurement. Of the $311 billion, why can't we give some of it to the Iraqi people to rebuild their own schools and hospitals and oil fields? And I cite the example that General Petraeus told me when I went to Mosul. He was trying to build a cement factory. A U.S. firm had a large contract for tens of millions of dollars. They weren't acting. He just put up a notice, is there any Iraqi who can build a cement factory, and they built it for $60,000. The Iraqis were employed, they were happy, and he got the cement factory to go forward and help the people of Iraq. But what is so disturbing to me is we have one hearing after an- other where we discuss scandals with Halliburton and other con- tractors. The Government continues to give the contracts to Halli- burton and others and for some reason cannot contract with the Iraqi people. We might have less problems with stealing and ac- counting if we worked with the Iraqi people and they would be em- ployed and it would be moving toward stability in the country. My question is, why can't we as a country contract with the Iraqi people to rebuild their own country so our people can come home and why do we continue to give money to a contracting system that 64 by all reports has all types of flaws and scandals and mismanage- ment? So, again, for 3 years we have been calling for reforms in that; and I haven't seen any reforms. Why haven't we been able to con- tract with the Iraqi people like General Petraeus so successfully did? Mr. Walker. Mrs. Maloney, as you know, the contracting activity for the Department of Defense has been on GAO's high-risk list for many years. There are serious problems in contracting not only in Iraq but, frankly, outside of Iraq. There is little question that there are additional opportunities to try to be able to engage the Iraqi people to help them rebuild their country, and that's something that I think needs to be considered to a much greater extent than it has been in the past. It's some- thing that I have testified on in the past, and my understanding is the chairman is also planning to have another hearing in the not-too-distant future talking about contracting activities. Mr. Shays. Will the gentlelady yield? Mr. Comptroller General, we are waiting from the GAO for a spe- cific list of the businesses to look at for investigation and we said we would go wherever it took us. So whether it's Halliburton or some smaller company. And we are still waiting for that list. I just want you to know that. So you are right. We have pledged to do a hearing. We have yet to receive that list. I welcome it, and this committee will pursue it. Mr. Walker. I will followup with you. And I also think it's important, Mr. Chairman, that you not just obtain information from us but you also obtain information from SIGR, which is the Special Inspector General for Iraq, which is supposed to be focused 100 percent on reconstruction, as well as some of the others. But I will followup. Mr. Shays. I just want to remind you. I'm giving the gentlelady her time. In public forum when you were sitting at the front desk you made the very important point that we have a corruption problem and it isn't just the bigger companies; and I said to you, just give us the worst examples and we'll go forward. If you want to seek advice from the Inspector General, we would welcome that. But you have given very aggressive testimony today, and I just want to be very certain that you are aware that you made the statement be- fore. We publicly encourage you to provide that information and we have waited and waited and waited for that information to come forward, and that's an example I think of accountability on the other side of the coin. Mr. Walker. Be happy to get back with you. I think there was a misunderstanding on what we'd agreed to, but I'll followup. Mr. Shays. It's a public record. Mrs. Maloney, you have the floor; and I have given you back your time. Mrs. Maloney. Following up on the chairman's comments on the corruption problem, maybe we'd have less of a corruption problem if we could contract with the Iraqi people. It would also help with the employment and rebuilding the infrastructure. It would be less 67 U.S. military; if your water isn't running, you go see the U.S. mili- tary; transportation, go see the U.S. military. Hospitals, schools, the whole 9 yards, it's the responsibility of the U.S. military. It's a political process. We are falling down especially in the role of transitioning some of the basic services to the Iraqi Government. I had my staff and some folks at CRS, I asked them a question. I said, given our history in the United States, are there any other models out there where the United States had occupied another country and had a transition government from the U.S. military to the civilian incumbent population? And they came back with one report, and it was the example of the Philippines. In 1944, after the United States drove the Japanese out of the Philippines, by default we ended up in control of the 7,000 islands that make up the Philippines. It wasn't an independent nation at the time. I think what FDR and the U.S. Congress in 1944 did then was instructive to this case today. What they did was they established a national commission made up of representatives from the White House, picked by the White House, three from the Senate, three from the House; and their responsibility, their sole responsibility, was to transfer the government from the U.S. military to the Phil- ippine Government. And it worked very well in that instance. It in- troduced accountability sector by sector, and that's something that we lack very much here. Now I'll be back in Iraq in late August, beginning of September, and there is still no system of determining how this whole process is going, and I think we need that process here. If Congress and the GAO are going to do our jobs in terms of tracking progress or lack of progress or at least informing the American people what's going on, we have to have a system in place to do that. It is not there right now. We don't have transparency. I can't tell you exactly how we're progressing over there with any of the areas of government control. I'm not an expert on military issues, but I think every Member of Congress is somewhat of an expert on politics. I know from being in Iraq and listening to the Iraqi people they are not much different from the American people in this sense, they elected their leaders back in December, they elected a parliament, a President, Prime Minister, but still for all these basic services they've got to go to the U.S. military to get some action. I know what my constituents would do if they elected me and I did nothing for them. I know what my constituents would do. They would regard me as a puppet government or someone who is just a shield. And the Iraqi people are going to draw that conclusion at some point in this whole process. So if we want to do the right thing for the Iraqi people, we shift the responsibility to the Iraqis for a lot of this stuff. I think one failure in the President's thinking is there is going to be this moment of peace and quiet in Iraq where he can do this transition. Not going to happen. Not in any stretch of the imagina- tion. So we need you. Now I have actually drafted a bill on this. It's called the Iraqi Transition Act, which creates—it's not original. I took the example that FDR and the Congress in 1944 set up. It's not my idea, it was 68 theirs, and it worked. But we need something like this to put us on a track where we have accountability so we can measure progress or lack of progress. We have to have a plan. Mr. Shays. Thank you very much. Mr. Sanders, you have the floor. Mr. Sanders. Let me concur with much of what Mr. Lynch just said. Mr. Walker, if I could, in your report, you discuss a poll done in March 2006 of Iraqi citizens; and your report states, and I quote, that the poll indicated that a majority thought Iraq was heading in the wrong direction and growing numbers of people believe that the security situation, the provision of electricity and corruption have worsened. And later you indicate that—your report says bluntly, quote, essential services have not been restored to pre-war levels, undermining efforts to improve the lives of the Iraqi people. If you could, could you elaborate on your sense of how the Iraqi people perceive their reality? The President of the United States seems to think that every time there is a negative report that it's the media's fault. The media is not telling us the truth about all of the wonderful things happening in Iraq. But it seems that the people of Iraq do not perceive all of the wonderful things that are happening there as well. What is your perception of how the Iraqi people themselves feel about how things are going with regard to essential services and other aspects which impact their day-to-day lives? Mr. Walker. Mr. Sanders, based upon my trips to Iraq and the work that our teams have done, including their visits to Iraq, my view is that the Iraqi people care about basically the same type of things that most Americans care about. They want safe streets, good jobs. They want reliable electricity, safe water. They want the trash picked up. They want education and health care, the basic things. When you look at the statistics, while we have made progress on a number of fronts, with the sole exception of electric generation, which for the first time within the last month has now reached and exceeded pre-war levels, for the most part in many of these other areas we're below pre-war levels; and that doesn't go unnoticed by the Iraqi people. Candidly, in many ways I think we're asking the military to do too much; and that's why I come back and reinforce what I said in my opening statement. We need better metrics, we need better milestones, we need more transparency, and both the United States and the international community—and I underline "and the international community"—can and should be doing more to help the Iraqis help themselves deliver these types of needs to the Iraqi people. These are nonmilitary. These are the need for civilian experts. And, quite frankly, the U.N. and many other countries have ex- perts that can add a tremendous value here, but they haven't been forthcoming. Mr. Sanders. Mr. Walker, if I could just change the subject just a hair; and that is, earlier, in response to a question, you spoke about massive corruption with regard to oil production and dis- tribution. I would like you to say a word with regard to what is 69 going on in terms of reconstruction of Iraq in terms of the kinds of buildings and improvement in sewers, water, schools and hos- pitals, all these other things that we want to see. I would suggest that, regardless of one's opinion on the war, and I strongly oppose the war, that the American people who are put- ting billions and billions, hundreds of billions of dollars into Iraq at least want to see an Iraqi infrastructure created where the kids can go to school, where people can drink clean water and so forth and have the other amenities of life that you indicated the Iraqi people want just as much as the people in America want. Now what is the level of incompetence, of abuse, of waste? I read somewhere that some $9 billion was unaccounted for in terms of Iraqi reconstruction. Can you say a word on that? Mr. Walker. Well, several things. One, when you have an unsta- ble security environment, it impedes your ability to reconstruct as well as to maintain what has been reconstructed. Second, the Iraqis have limited capability to maintain certain technologically advanced facilities, whether electric generation fa- cilities or water treatment plants. That has been a problem. Third, in some of the planning that has been done, the planning for reconstruction activities has been somewhat flawed. For exam- ple, there is a well-publicized example of where we were going to build 100 to 200 health care facilities, clinics if you will, and that rather than trying to build 10 here and seeing how it goes and then 10 there, there was an effort undertaken to start virtually all of them at once to where very few got completed before the money ran out. So there are a number of planning problems, there are a number of mismanagement problems, but the security situation as well as the relative inability of the Iraqis to maintain certain more ad- vanced facilities is very problematic. Mr. Sanders. No one would disagree with you that the security situation will make construction very, very difficult, and recon- struction. But, on the other hand, there should not be billions of dollars unaccounted for in the process. The American people want to make sure that when we invest in rebuilding Iraq, we know where that money is going. Can you speak a little bit about billions of dollars which presumably have not been accounted for? Mr. Walker. What I would ask, Mr. Sanders, and I would sug- gest to the chairman for his consideration as he deems appropriate, is that not only will I provide the information that we talked about before but I think it would be productive for this subcommittee, to the extent the chairman believes it would be prudent, to consider having a hearing where myself, the Special Inspector General for Iraq for reconstruction and possibly others might come before this subcommittee to talk specifically about construction activities. Mr. Sanders. OK. I would yield back, Mr. Chairman. Thank you. Mr. ShaYS. Thank you. We will be happy to pursue that sugges- tion because I think it makes a lot of sense. I'm going to give myself time now to ask questions and say Mr. Burton. When you get a chance, I would like to make a comment. 70 Mr. SHaYS. I would be happy to have the gentleman from Indi- ana have the floor. Mr. Burton. I have great respect for everybody who's spoken re- cently, my friends from Massachusetts and Vermont. But, you know, when we start talking about history and talking about the Philippines and how things were done so much better then, Ger- many wasn't mentioned after World War II and neither was Japan. There was an awful lot of wasted money then. We had military control over both Japan and Germany for a long period of time, and it's always a work in progress. Obviously, there are shortcomings in Iraq in turning the govern- mental control over to the Iraqis and making sure it's a secure en- vironment. If you go back to Germany after World War II, there was all kinds of terrorist activity in Germany, in several parts of Germany by those who still supported the Nazi philosophy. So it's not an easy task. I'm not making excuses for some of the shortcomings, but I think we ought to realize that this is a very difficult task. We are talking about fighting a war against terror- ism, the headquarters of which or the head of it is in the Middle East; and one of the things that we have to consider, in my opin- ion, is making sure that they don't have an operational head- quarters from which to expand their terrorist network around the world. And if we don't handle things properly in Iraq, if we don't stick to our guns over there, if we don't win the peace, so to speak, then I think that there's going to be a vacuum created and al Qaeda and the Taliban and all the others will see that as an oppor- tunity to expand this sphere of influence and go in there and fill that vacuum and there will be a headquarters, if you will, from which they can operate worldwide. I think this is a very, very integral part of the war against ter- rorism and I think our troops are doing a magnificent job. As the gentleman from Dallas said, there are some management problems, there are areas where I'm sure money is wasted, and that has to be corrected, and there needs to be accountability. As far as transparency is concerned, I think the administration is trying to be as transparent as possible. I don't see them hiding anything. When we start talking about history, I'd urge my colleagues to look at what happened in Germany and Japan after World War II when we were fighting the Nazis. It was extremely important that we take over those countries until they had a viable governmental structure established, which we did establish, and once it was es- tablished then we turned over control to them, and it's worked out pretty well. I think it will work out just as well in Iraq, but we have to stick to our guns, in my opinion. And it's extremely important in this day and age, especially in view of the fact that there is a worldwide war against terror, that terrorists have attacked the United States, attacked Spain, they've attacked England, they've attacked all over the place, and Indonesia, Bali they attacked. We have to be ready and willing to stay the course, and that course may take some time. Iraq is one of the major focal points, and I hope my colleagues on the other side of the aisle will realize that this is something that 71 we can't back away from, even though I agree with you there's a lot of shortcomings. I yield back. Mr. Shays. I would like to have the gentleman yield me time. Mr. Burton. I'll be happy to yield. Mr. Shays. I'll say we didn't hit the clock right away, so I'll take 2 minutes off his time. Let me start out by my question. Then I'll take my own time. Mr. Comptroller General, Mr. Walker, we really appreciate the work you do; and I am, frankly, one of your biggest fans. I am eager, though, to—I feel that you have pointed out areas to which you disagreed with the strategy to which it had not met the expec- tations. I have heard very little positive comments so I am drawn to conclude that basically you're pretty unhappy, that it's not a good plan, not a good strategy. That's the way you have come across. If that's the way you choose to come across, then that's the way it should be. But you have been extraordinarily negative, in my judgment, without pointing out any positives; and I need to know if you just see it as a dark side and there is no positives. Mr. Walker. Absolutely not. Can I clarify, Mr. Chairman? Mr. Shays. I would love you to, because you're on record. Mr. Walker. You have to keep in mind I have to respond to the questions that I'm asked. I do try to respond to them. First, I tried to make it very clear at the outset that this new plan is clearly superior to the last version. I tried to make clear that this new plan addresses three of the key elements that we be- lieve need to be addressed in an effective national strategy reason- ably well. Mr. Shays. Which are? Mr. Walker. Those three are: It states a clear purpose; second, it addresses the key threats and risk; and, three, it helps to define the desired political, security and economic objectives that we're trying to achieve. Mr. Burton. Mr. Chairman, if I might interject, just reclaim a few seconds of my time. I understand that this is a political season and there is political issues at stake, and you just raised the issue of the Comptroller General being very, very negative. I hope this is not because of partisanship, Mr. Comptroller. You were ap- pointed, I understand, by—who were you appointed by? Mr. WalKEr. I was recommended by the Republican Congress and appointed by President Clinton, confirmed by the Senate. Mr. Burton. You were recommended by President Clinton? Mr. Walker. I was recommended by the Republican Congress, nominated by President Clinton, and confirmed by the Senate. Mr. BuRtoN. Nominated by President Clinton. Mr. Walker. I'm also a Reagan and Bush 41 Presidential ap- pointee. Mr. BURtoN. I hope this is not an indication of a political ven- detta. Mr. Walker. Absolutely not, Mr. Burton. I call it as I see it, non- partisan, nonideological. I think there are a lot of things that have gone well, but there are some serious challenges, too. Mr. BuRtoN. Thank you very much. 72 Mr. Walker. We're trying to be balanced. Mr. Shays. The gentleman's time has expired, and I will take my 6 minutes. I want to pursue the line of questioning that I began. The bottom line to your answer is there are three parts to the strategy that you agree with and three that you disagree, is that correct? Mr. Walker. It's not agree or disagree, Mr. Chairman. This is very important. We are basically saying that, based upon our work, that there are six elements of a strategy that need to be in place in order to maximize the chance that it will be successful. Mr. Shays. Hold on a second. Let me understand. Under what basis do you decide the six? Is it from a textbook, general practices? I just want to understand. Mr. Walker. It's based upon past experience, best practices, looking at what has been done in the past. I issued a separate report on that, Mr. Chairman, I might add. Mr. Shays. What are the six best practices that you would say have to be in every strategy? Mr. Walker. Again, I will give you a summary. I'll be happy to provide a copy of the report which was issued previously. First, that there needs to be a clearer purpose. No. 2 Mr. Shays. The strategy meets that. Mr. Walker. Second, it needs to address all major threats and risks. Mr. Shays. Does the strategy meet that? Mr. Walker. No. 3 Mr. Shays. Mr. Walker, I want you to take each one of those principles and then delineate whether the strategy meets it or not. Mr. Walker. All right. With regard to staying a clear purpose, the answer is yes. With regard to addressing key threats and risk, the answer is yes. With regard to discussing desired key objectives, namely political, security and economic, the answer is yes. I would footnote that by saying we think there needs to be addi- tional detailed metrics and milestones and more transparency over those, as some Members have noted. Mr. ShaYS. Let me pursue that. It is your point that you want this committee to know that we don't have a way to evaluate suc- cess or failure of the strategy, is that correct? Mr. Walker. That's correct. There's not enough adequate infor- mation available to the Congress in order to effectively address in a timely manner what is going well Mr. Shays. I understand that. Mr. Walker [continuing]. Where we had a plan and where we are having problems. Mr. Shays. Now take me to the third, fourth and fifth and tell me why those are an integral part of any plan. Mr. Walker. OK. So the first three we're saying they have it in their entirety or substantially. The next three we're saying they have addressed it but not adequately and there are significant gaps that we think need to be addressed. The first one, which is No. 4, that it does not adequately identify which specific departments and agencies of the U.S. Government 73 are responsible for each of the key elements. In some cases, it does; in other cases, it does not. The fifth element is how do the U.S. goals interrelate and how can they be integrated with the goals of the Iraqi Government and with the efforts of the international community. So we are laying out our plan, we're saying here is what the de- sired outcomes are, but the need to try to integrate that with what the Iraqis are doing and hopefully what we can get the inter- national community to do more of, which is to try to help make this a successful situation. And then, last, there is not enough information on what the esti- mated cost of achieving these objectives will be and what the fund- ing sources are likely to be for those costs. And one of the functions of that is not only how much but to calculate how much, how long. Mr. ShaYS. Thank you. I want to be on record as saying that I have no question about your presentation and the authenticity of it and the value of it. I just want to be on record with you. You have a lot of credibility with me. What I now wrestle with is, in my 12 visits to Iraq, four times outside the umbrella of the military, if I asked one Iraqi after an- other Iraqi after another what is their biggest fear, it's this, that you will leave us. And then some say that you will leave us before we can take hold of democracy, like your country has, or that you will leave us like you did in Vietnam. And it's true there is a poll that says 60 percent want us to leave and 60 percent want us to stay, but it does add up. They want us to leave but not until—we abolished their army, we abolished their police, we abolished their border patrol. It would, in my judgment, be an outrage to leave before we replace them, at the very least. To leave them without their own police, without their own border patrol, without their own army to me is inexcusable. It is not your testimony, is it or not, that we need to leave? Mr. WalKER. That is not my testimony. What my testimony is, we're in there. A lot of people agree or disagree as to whether or not we should have gone in, but we're in, and if we want to be suc- cessful, what is it going to take in order to be successful. What I'm testifying is, based upon our work, what do we think the key ele- ments need to be in order to maximize the chance of success? It is in all of our interest as well as the Iraqis in the international com- munity to be successful. That goes without saying. Mr. Shays. Thank you very much for your testimony. We will adjourn this panel, and we will start with the second panel. We will have a 2-minute break. Thank you very much for your time. Thank you very much, Mr. Christoff. [Recess.] Mr. ShaYS. Calling this hearing to order and to welcome our sec- ond panelists at 5 of 5 p.m. We have Mrs. Mary Beth Long, Prin- cipal Deputy Assistant of Defense for International Security, a very knowledgeable person on Iraq and Iran, as are our other two wit- nesses, Ambassador James Jeffrey, Senior Advisor on Iraq to the Secretary of State and Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for the Middle East, Department of State. And also I think you were in Iraq, Mr. Ambassador, for 13 months. 74 Mr. Jeffrey. That is correct, sir. Mr. Shays. We have Brigadier General Michael Jones, Deputy Director for Political Military Affairs, Joint Chiefs of Staff; and I believe you have had experience in Iraq as well is that right, sir? General Jones. Yes, I did, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Shays. We welcome all three of you. As you know, we swear in our witnesses. There's only one person who ever has not been sworn in while I have been the chairman in my 12 years, and that was Senator Byrd. If you'd rise. I chick- ened out. [Witnesses sworn.] Mr. Shays. I would note for the record our witnesses responded affirmatively. We will start with you, I think, Ms. Long. Excuse me, I think we will go with you Ambassador Jeffrey. You will be starting this testimony. I usually move up the line, but we are starting in the middle here. Then we will go to you, Ms. Long and then to you, General. But what I want to say is that I really appreciate your presence. I think that this will be very helpful to the knowledge of Congress, certainly be helpful to me, and I think ultimately to the American people. So it's wonderful to have you here. Mr. Ambassador, you have the floor. STATEMENTS OF AMBASSADOR JAMES JEFFREY, SENIOR AD- VISOR ON IRAQ TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE AND PRIN- CIPAL DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE MIDDLE EAST, DEPARTMENT OF STATE; MARY BETH LONG, REPRESENTATIVE, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE; AND BRIGA- DIER GENERAL MICHAEL JONES, DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR POLITICAL MILITARY AFFAIRS, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF STATEMENT OF JAMES JEFFREY Mr. Jeffrey. Thank you very much. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Kucinich, members of the subcommittee, it is an honor to be here today with you and a great honor to talk about a crucial issue in our entire foreign policy in Iraq. Let me begin by addressing the subcommittee's query about the relationship between the President's national strategy for victory in Iraq and the decisions announced following the June Camp David principals meeting and the President's visit to Baghdad. The November 2005 national strategy laid out in comprehensive detail the President's program for victory at the strategic level. The document begins by describing victory in Iraq as a process that will come in stages, with an end state of an Iraq "peaceful, united, sta- ble and secure, while integrated into the international community, and a full partner in the global war against terrorism." To achieve that, the document lays out policies on three core tracks, the politi- cal, the economic, and the security. On June 13th, on the concluding of a meeting on the NSC prin- cipals in Iraq, which also included the President's trip to Iraq and extensive contact with senior-ranking officials, the White House re- leased a fact sheet on the Camp David meetings and certain steps that would be taken to carry out the discussions. 75 The Camp David meetings took place in response to a number of operational developments on the ground since the November re- lease of the national strategy. These include such positive events as the formation of a broad national government in Iraq based upon record voter turnout in December; rapid stand-up of Iraqi se- curity forces; achievements in infrastructure despite insurgent ef- forts, including an increase in both electrical generation above last year, as we just heard, and oil exports reaching levels close to the IMF 2006 target; as well as the killing of al Qaeda in Iraq leader al-Zarqawi. The meeting also came in the wake of less positive de- velopments including sustained high levels of insurgent attacks and a marked increase in sectarian violence and strife. The decisions taken in June do not represent any deviation, modification or replacement of the November national strategy. Rather, that national strategy outlines in a comprehensive and un- classified form our strategy for victory in Iraq. The Camp David fact sheet discusses our present-day tactics and actions as updated following the stand-up of a new unity govern- ment in order to carry out our strategy and reach our strategic goals. There is no inconsistency between the two documents. They are complementary and part and parcel of a comprehensive plan for achieving success. The meetings in June also focused on building civilian capacity, improving U.S. plans to support a rule of law initiative with the Iraqis, and reaching out to the international community in order to support the reconciliation program announced subsequent to this meeting by Prime Minister Maliki. One such initiative is an Arab League meeting scheduled in early August to be held in Baghdad. On the economic track, Prime Minister Maliki discussed his policy of national revitalization. The President, in turn, as you have mentioned, Mr. Chairman, has announced a series of actions by the Department of Treasury and visits by several of our secretaries to support the economic wing of our strategy. In support of the national strategy's core as- sumption, "Iraq needs and can receive the support of the region and the international community to solidify its successes." The President welcomed Prime Minister al-Maliki's approach to international organizations to take the lead with his government in developing a compact between the international community and the Iraqi Government and people. The President designated Dep- uty Secretary of Treasury Robert Kimmitt and Department of State Counselor Philip Zelikow to lead the U.S. effort in support of this initiative. Since that time Prime Minister Maliki has publicly appealed to the United Nations, and Secretary General Kofi Annan has re- sponded very positively, and we are moving forward with a meeting now scheduled for July 20th in Baghdad with international partici- pation. In sum, sir, we see the work plan emerging from the Camp David meetings as a critical roadmap to organize our assistance to the Iraqi Government and to appeal to the international commu- nity in the coming months. We are heartened by the rapid decisive decisions taken by the al-Maliki government. We are impressed by the courage shown by the Iraqis, beginning with their political 77 Sir, that is all I have at this point, but I would like to turn it over to the Defense Department, Mary Beth Long, to make a few additions. Mr. Shays. Thank you, Ambassador. [The prepared statement of Mr. Jeffrey follows:] 78 TESTIMONY BEFORE HOUSE SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY, EMERGING THREATS, AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM AMBASSADOR JAMES F. JEFFREY SENIOR ADVISOR TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR IRAQ Mr. Chairman, members of the Subcommittee, it is an honor to be here today with you, and a great honor to talk about a crucial issue in our entire foreign policy, the way ahead on Iraq. Let me begin by addressing the Subcommittee's query about the relationship between the President's National Strategy for Victory in Iraq and the Decisions announced following the June Camp David Iraq Principals Meeting and the President's visit to Baghdad. I believe that a review of this will not only respond to your specific query, but help answer other issues you have raised in your letter to Secretary Rice. The November 2005 National Strategy laid out in comprehensive detail the President's program for victory at the strategic level. While the document provided detail on current activities, strategies, and programs, its primary focus is on establishing our core goals, laying out a path to achieve them, and highlighting basic tenets on which we align our daily policy. The document begins by describing Victory in Iraq, as a process that will come in stages, with an end state of an Iraq "peaceful, united, stable, and secure, well integrated into the international community, and a full partner in the global war on terrorism." To achieve that end state, the document lays out our policy along three core tracks: the Political, the Security, and the Economic, describing in detail the assumptions behind each track, the actions that are being pursued and why we feel these will help Iraq reach its goals, the progress being made, and the challenges that remain. In addition, the National Strategy highlights the following basic tenets, every bit as true today as eight months ago: ■ Our strategy is working, but victory will take time ■ Progress in each of the above tracks reinforces the other; thus no one track alone will secure success ■ Success in Iraq is central to winning the war on terror ■ Iraq is increasingly in the lead in our joint efforts to defeat terrorists and providing security; 2006 is a year of transition, as Iraqis take on greater and greater responsibilities in the military and civilian realms; ■ But this process cannot be based on any timeline; rather, it must be conditions- based 79 On June 13, on the conclusion of a meeting of NSC Principals on Iraq, including the President's trip to Baghdad and discussions with PM Maliki and other Iraqi leaders, the White House released a Fact Sheet on these Camp David Meetings. The Camp David Meetings took place in response to a number of operational developments on the ground since the November release of the National Strategy. These include such positive events as the formation of a broad, inclusive government based upon record voter turnout in December, rapid standup of Iraqi forces, achievements in infrastructure despite insurgent efforts, including an increase in both electrical generation above last year, and oil exports reaching levels close to the IMF 2006 target, as well as the killing of Al Qaida in Iraq leader Zaqawi. The Meetings also came in the wake of less positive developments, including sustained high levels of insurgent attacks, and a marked increase in sectarian violence and strife following the attack on the Samarra Golden Mosque in February. Camp David provided the President and his senior advisors an opportunity to take stock of the progress in carrying out the National Strategy. They were also able to contemplate the newly-articulated priorities and programs of the Iraqi government and consider how the United States might best support them. In this context, the group took a number of operational decisions, which are documented in the Camp David Meetings Fact Sheet. The decisions do not represent any deviation, modification or replacement of the National Strategy, but rather tactical and operational steps to carry out that Strategy, refined by the developments on the ground and by the Prime Minister's program. Indeed, the National Strategy outlines in a comprehensive and unclassified form, our strategy for victory in Iraq. The Camp David Fact Sheet discusses our present-dav tactics and actions - as updated following the stand-up of a new unity government - to carry out our strategy and reach our strategic goals. There is no inconsistency between the two documents; they are complementary and part and parcel of a comprehensive plan for achieving success. On the Political and Security Tracks, Camp David reviewed on-going operations in Ramadi and Baghdad, the standup of Iraqi security forces, and efforts to assist the newly- named Ministers of Defense and Interior in building key functions in their headquarters. The Meetings also focused on building civilian capacity, approving US plans to support a rule of law initiative with the Iraqis, with special emphasis on increasing the number of judges, enhancing security, providing technical assistance and building prison capacity. The Meetings also welcomed the Prime Minister's initiative on bringing armed groups under government control, and in this regard the President directed MNF-I Commander GEN Casey and Ambassador Khalilzad to coordinate with their Iraqi counterparts and provincial authorities to ensure that Iraqi forces have a military edge. Finally, in support of the Prime Minister's reconciliation effort, the Camp David Meetings described US work with NGOs and other institutions to bring Iraqi leaders together with those of other countries, and welcomed initiatives by other international bodies to provide forums to bring Iraqis together. Such initiatives for example include an Arab League Meeting scheduled for this summer in Baghdad. 85 87 General Jones. I believe that number today is 75 that are in con- trol of their own sectors. Mr. KuciNich. How many troops would that be, General? General JONES. It's a total of 260,000 or so Iraqi police forces and Iraqi Army soldiers. Mr. KuciNich. Now, in 2005, the Iraqi Army nominally had about 115 battalions; is that correct? General Jones. Yes, sir. Mr. KuciNich. That would be about 80,000 troops, roughly? General Jones. For the army troops, that would be correct, sir. Mr. KuciNiCH. OK. Now, I understand that when the Ministry of Defense decided to supervise the payment of salaries, about a third of the payroll was returned, meaning that people just weren't showing up. I also understand that one ministry official estimated that barely half the nominal army exists, and that just 10 percent show up for combat. Is that correct, or is it a little bit different? General JONES. Sir, first of all, by my experience, that would not be correct. I have not ever seen anything to indicate that ever. What I would say, early on in the early days, before we stood up the forces, I think there was a considerable problem in both police and to some degree in the army forces that we stood up of what we call ghost soldiers or ghost policemen. That is people on the roll, but not present. The embedding of what we call the transition teams actually has helped put a significant amount of quality control on knowing how many soldiers are present in the unit; also instituting things like the daily report of accountability of soldiers, so that you know how many were signed, how many were present for duty and so forth. So I think, in terms of the number of these ghost soldiers and policemen, you have seen those go down markedly. The Iraqi forces also instituted or reviewed—actually go through the roles in order to try to ensure that there weren't these kinds of ghost folks out there. So I think there has been significant change in that. Mr. KuciNich. Thank you, General. Who in the army keeps track of the records of the weapons that are provided by the United States to the Iraqi Army? General Jones. I think Minstiki is probably the one source that knows what's been issued to whom throughout the period, although I think in the early days, when we first started standing up these forces, that the accountability for those probably is not very firm, because we saw in April 2004 kind of a failure of the forces at that point, a lot of desertions and so forth. And I believe there's prob- ably a significant loss of accountability of those early weapons. Mr. KuciNiCh. Well, I have read that Iraqi defense officials have said that the Americans have not provided them with records of who has been receiving weapons, and that without such controls, soldiers have been selling their weapons on the open market. Would that be consistent with your understanding of what it was like, say—let's say, a couple of years ago? General Jones. I would say certainly there have been—undoubt- edly been instances where individual policemen or soldiers sold a weapon that was issued to them, I believe probably more prevalent in the police forces, because those weapons were actually issued to 89 Mr. KUCINICh. When you put up a supermarket or swimming pool or fast-food restaurant, do they go into temporary facilities as well? General JONES. Right. As I recall, the Balad post exchange, which is what I think you may be referring to, is in what we call a clamshell kind of facility, which is actually a temporary facility. But, yes, there's a significant post exchange up there, as well as the other major bases where we have large concentrations of troops. They are not, to my knowledge, intended to be permanent. And my visits to those facilities would indicate they wouldn't be over a period of years. Mr. Kucinich. Thank you. To Ms. Long, the GAO report says, and I quote, cost data are not included in the strategy. As a result, neither DOD nor Congress can reliably determine the costs of the war, nor do they have de- tails in how the appropriated funds are being spent or historical data useful in considering future funding needs. Is that true or false? Ms. Long. It's certainly true that the strategy that the GAO looked at and the accompanying seven documents did not include cost figures, that is correct. Mr. Kucinich. How much—can you tell this committee, what is the war going to cost? Ms. LONG. I don't believe anyone could tell you what the war is going to cost, sir. But what I can tell you is that strategy docu- ments that are outlining the goals and the implementation of the President's policies and strategies for Iraq probably are not the place where one would go for a resource guide. Those are budgetary documents that are available elsewhere in the administration. Mr. Kucinich. Well, this does say that you do not discuss sub- stantial financial and other costs in connection with your strategy. Now, are you saying that the cost is decoupled from your strategy? Ms. Long. No, sir; in fact, I believe that Ambassador Jeffrey pointed out that the resourcing requests that were made are tied to the strategy and the implementation documentation, and, in fact, there's a pamphlet that produces that. I also believe, sir, that the Comptroller testified that he did not request the cost documentation, that it is available, sir. Mr. Kucinich. Actually, what it says here is the strategy neither identifies the current or future costs of implementing the strategy, nor does it identify the source of funding. That is in this report. What do you have to say about that? Ms. Long. I would say that statement is accurate, and that it is not intended to be in the strategy document that the GAO looked at; that information is available elsewhere; and that GAO, I be- lieve, testified that they did not request it, sir. Mr. KuCINICh. You just told me that information is available elsewhere, but a second ago, you just told me that you can't esti- mate the cost of the war. Now, do you have documents, you know, anywhere in the Depart- ment of Defense that estimates the cost of the war over a long pe- riod of time? Ms. LONG. I would take that back, sir. It is my understanding that the Comptroller from DOD is coming to testify before this sub- 90 committee in 2 weeks, and I would suggest that we have that infor- mation for you to be sent as it is available for that hearing, sir. Mr. KuCINIch. So you are saying there is information available, or there is not? Ms. LONG. I am saying, sir, I am unable to provide that informa- tion, and I will take your question back. Mr. KuCINICh. There's been a little bit of circumlocution. Mr. Shays. If the gentleman will suspend, we will be having a hearing next week on the total cost of fighting the war on terror, which will include Iraq, and we have specifically requested—so the gentleman will be able to pursue this information. I am going to give him a little more time to just make his point. But we specifically, in part because of your request, are going to have that hearing, and I think it will be very interesting, about the cost, about the cost. Mr. KuCINICh. Yes, Mr. Chairman. You know, we are looking at this report, which came kind of late to members of the committee. Mr. Shays. That's the GAO report. Mr. KuCINIch. Right. That's the report I am talking about. When it talks about a national strategy for victory, whatever that is, when you can't get into the cost, then you decouple strategy from things like infrastructure, reforming the economy, building Iraq's capacity, maintaining infrastructure, international, economic com- munity and all those things, you know. This may be way above your pay grade, Ms. Long, but I am just going to tell you that your responses, while I am grateful that you are here, have not really met the challenge that the Comptroller raised in his document. Mr. Chairman, I thank you. Mr. Shays. Thank you. Let me just say that I think that the Comptroller was saying that he would like the strategy to include the issue of cost, and that is his opinion, and I would like to get into that issue with you as to whether it should or should not when my chance comes. Mr. KuCINICh. Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you, but I want to point out again, this document—I want to point out that this document came to members of the committee, we got it right here. When I read this, some of the things that I read were, at a very instance—in terms of testimony that I heard would have been help- ful to have had it earlier. Mr. ShaYS. Let me explain, the hearing that we had, the GAO, the GAO came out with their finding today, and that is one reason why we invited the Comptroller to come. So they released it today. That is why you are seeing it today. It is not DOD or State Depart- ment's issue. Mr. Kucinich. Right. I understand that. I thank you. I thank the witness. Mr. Shays. But we will use this document to dialog next week as well. The Chair would recognize the gentleman from Philadelphia—I mean, from Pennsylvania rather, excuse me. Mr. Platts. Central Pennsylvania, the beautiful part, York, Get- tysburg and Carlisle. 91 Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for hosting this hearing on very im- portant issues that we are discussing. I want to thank our panel- ists for your testimony here today, as well as your service to our Nation in all three of your capacities. We certainly are a grateful Nation for the job you and your colleagues are doing. Ambassador Jeffrey, it is good to see you again here stateside, having had the privilege of visiting our troops and other personnel, including yourself in Iraq, on four occasions—I think three of those four I had the pleasure of being able to meet with you. In fact, I think you were part of a lunch meeting with a number of us Mem- bers about 2V2 years ago, where we met with Iraqi women leaders. And that lunch meeting has long stayed with me, the message I came across, and the issue of our presence in Iraq. And especially when I see polls cited that 80 percent of the Iraqis want us out of Iraq, and it's always, well, what do they mean by that? In that lunch meeting, the Iraqi women leaders, some govern- ment and nongovernment, said, we can't wait for you and all of the coalition forces to go home; and then went on to say, but we are very glad you are here. No country wants to have to rely on the assistance of others, but they appreciate the assistance that our military or Department of State and other agency officials are doing in having liberated them from a tyrant and giving them the hope and opportunity of democ- racy that we so wonderfully are blessed with. So I appreciate all of your work. A couple of issues. I apologize with being back and forth with other commitments today. I don't think I am repeating the other questions that were asked. But on the issue of national reconcili- ation and the 24-point plan that the Prime Minister laid out, and then President Bush touched on in his statement in June, one of the aspects of that was dealing with oil revenues and the distribu- tion of those revenues between the Shi'a, the Sunni, the Kurds, and then that went a long way in getting toward national reconciliation or a key aspect. I guess, Ambassador Jeffrey, your insights in how critical is that in the big picture, and where do we stand in trying to move toward that effort? Mr. Jeffrey. It's a very critical element. But, first of all, the President, in his June 14th press conference, addressed this at some length. The first thing he did was to underline that this is an Iraqi decision. It's their oil. It's very important to the Iraqi peo- ple that they come up with their own conclusions. Looking at this from the outside, and we have had a lot of experi- ence around the world in a situation such as Iraq, certainly the principle that the oil belongs to the people, we believe, is fun- damental as a suggestion that we made to the Iraqis. In fact, the Iraqis have incorporated that right into their Constitution, Article 108. The second point is how the oil is managed, from our experience again around the world, can play a huge role in bringing together a diverse country, which Iraq is, and a very pluralistic country, or it can help drive it apart. So, therefore, the Iraqis have to make wise choices. It's not our job to propose to them what the specific choices would be. We would just urge them that in their constitu- 92 tional revisions, which they will look at on these and other arti- cles—and this is tied, you are absolutely correct, to the reconcili- ation effort with the Sunni Arabs and some of the others—that they take this into full consideration. We believe that they will. They will be very, very interested in this. The President has charged the Secretary of Energy to go out and work with his Iraqi counterparts in the electrical and oil ministries to discuss how we can be helpful in more detail, and we will do everything we can. We do believe in these principles, but we have to be careful in trying to push too hard in suggesting to Iraqis how to apply them. Mr. Platts. I think that is an appropriate caution. The way I look at it is we have given the Iraqi people the opportunity for de- mocracy and freedom, but ultimately it's up to them and how they embrace it and how it is defined in Iraqi terms, not American terms. Us being there to assist but, you know, not be controlling is very important. The current status, though, those negotiations, as they look ahead to constitutional revisions, has there been any formal talks on the oil distribution issue, or is it still preliminary? Mr. Jeffrey. The Iraqis are still mulling over how they are going to respond to the requirement that came out as part of the last-minute additions to the constitutional process back last fall of having a constitutional commission look at possible amendments within 4 months. I am not going to speak for the Iraqis. I think that they know that they have to deal with several other key things both for their own political future and also for the reconcili- ation process. One of them is the role of the regions, particularly the idea of a very large Shi'a Arab region in the south. Another is oil. A third one could well be the Kirkuk situation, how they are going to ad- dress that. We don't want to predict in advance, because this is going to be something that democratically elected leaders in their Parliament will decide. We do know that they are very much seized with this; it's tied into the whole reconciliation effort. We have faith that they will work out a good solution. Mr. Platts. I know that oil is a big part of that revision and ad- dressing the Sunni concerns that were part of that brokered agree- ment in moving forward with the referendum in October 2005. Is there a timeframe—it was 4 months—as far as when the commis- sions work? I know on the one hand you want deadlines or timeframes, but given that they are where we were 230 years ago—so asking for deadlines today for us is a little different than asking an emerging democracy for deadlines. Where do we stand on that timeframe? Mr. JEffREy. You are absolutely correct. There are two deadlines which we are also striking for. There is also a deadline within 6 months to come up with an implementing legislation on the oil pro- vision, so, thus, they have to come up with a hydrocarbon, and the two are, in essence, tied. The Iraqis, of course, are faced with an insurgency that they have to deal with. They have a major security operation under way in Baghdad. There's a lot of fighting there. I think that they will probably approach these deadlines with a certain degree of flexibil- 93 ity. Again, I can't predict anything fully, based upon the same prin- ciples that we applied, as you said, 230 years ago, in a parliamen- tary democracy, that sometimes you handle things in a variety of different ways. We don't know how they are going to handle this. We know they are aware of this. They do have these deadlines, and they will come up with an answer. I would point out to the committee that we have seen the Iraqis face a terrible—not a terrible, but a very, very demanding series of deadlines in the U.N. Security Council resolutions and the tran- sitional administrative law for elections and other things. As you know, in a few cases, they missed some of the deadlines, particu- larly for standing up various organs of government, by a few weeks and in some cases more than a few weeks, but in the end they met that. I think there's a lot of credibility that they will live up to the spirit and, we hope, the letter of these commitments. Mr. Platts. I always think it's helpful when we try to judge progress is that we do look back to our own Nation's birth. In 1776, our Constitution—you know, 1789, in between, we had the Articles of Confederations, which were ratified by the Constitution—Con- tinental Congress in my hometown of York when Congress met there for 9 months in 1777. But it was 12 years later 'til we came back and actually got it right with our Constitution that we oper- ate under today. Sometimes I think we forget how long it took us in our emerging democracy to do what we are now looking for the Iraqis to do. I think its good that we are conscious of those deadlines. They certainly are Iraqi deadlines, but our assistance, and the coalition forces and all the nations, you know, being supportive of them, moving forward because of our government and the other govern- ments that are providing a lot of the assistance militarily or finan- cially, we know that there is some end goal in sight that we are moving toward addressing some of the key issues, especially in the area of national reconciliation. The second issue, maybe Ambassador Jeffrey and General Jones, both of you, the rule of militias, I know that may have been touched on a little bit. You know, where we stand, I know, in the Constitution, you know, they are prohibited outside of their formal government entity, yet we obviously see, you know, their presence still being very horrifically felt, I guess, by some of the actions of some of these militias. Where do we stand in trying to get arms around or the Iraqi Government getting its arms around the militia issue? I guess, General Jones, we will start with you. General JONES. Yes, sir. Obviously, it's an item of concern not only for us, but for the Iraqis. The 24-point plan that the Prime Minister laid out included addressing militias. On the security side, we have actually seen some what I think is considerable progress here recently. We have actually seen an in- crease in the number of instances where the Iraqi security forces have confronted members of militias who were out with weapons and doing things that they are not allowed to do, things on the streets. So that is good. We have also actually seen the arrest of one senior militia member just here in the last few days. So we are 94 seeing the Iraqis be more aggressive about enforcing the existing laws that are already there. In addition, I think there's recognition that, you know, the rea- son that these militias exist is for a variety of complex reasons, so they are looking at all the solutions that have to be applied, not the least of which is part of the national reconciliation demobiliza- tion, things—the ability to put militia—former militia members to work, integrate those that want to be as individuals into the Iraqi—legitimate Iraqi security forces and so forth. So it is a considerable problem, but I think the Iraqis are start- ing to face it in a much more serious way. Mr. Platts. Mr. Chairman, if I could squeeze one last question in. Thank you, Chris. Related to that, getting kind of arms—or the Iraqi Government and their security forces getting arms around this issue, is the com- petence of the local police, and in my meetings with General Casey and the visits where we talk about this year being the year of the police where we kind of made great headway on the military and now trying to stand up the police, and not just numbers, but in quality. I think the way in of my meetings in Fallujah in February, that ultimate success in these local communities is really going to be be- cause of the success of the police who are in that local community, as opposed to the military units. Where does Iraqi police stand up—stand as far as where we want to be, where we want; and then how many are fully equipped out there to kind of patrolling on their own, as we ultimately need them to be? General Jones. I guess I would just start off by summarizing. Mr. Platts. I apologize if this repeats some of what was said in the opening. General Jones. Not at all. There is considerable progress being made with police, but we are starting from a position much farther behind with them. In some cases, the one tier of police that have reached a very high level of capability is the national police. These are those high-end forces that have capability. We would probably have the equivalent description of a SWAT team or something like that, but significant forces that can do special kinds of missions. Behind that, and requiring still quite a bit of work, are the local police, the station police that we would think of as a precinct that are out patrolling and so forth. Several reasons for that, not the least of which I think is this is adverse to the tradition of policing in Iraq. Traditionally station police stayed in the station. Nobody was out patrolling. So we are trying to kind of change this police culture to move people out of the police station and start doing this community policing. We have embedded police transition teams, just like we have done with military transition teams. We have started to embed those to work with Iraqi police in police stations. So we are seeing signs of improvement. But I would tell you it's the weakest aspect of Iraqi security forces and is still going to take a continued amount of time to work with them. In terms of individuals trained and equipped, the current projec- tion is by the end of this year, we will have the initial basic train- 98 and, I believe, the State Department I think points to a terrible failure in the U.S. policy. I think it is the biggest single danger to having a political reconciliation in Iraq today. The only question is, in my mind, whether there is, in fact, much that we could have done to prevent it, which raises the question why wasn't more attention given to this very serious issue that was raised by Dick Cheney when he was Secretary of Defense before we made the decision to go to war in Iraq? Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Shays. I thank the gentleman. I would like to yield myself some time now. This is really a ter- rific opportunity to understand the strategy and to understand whether critics are accurate when they said there is no strategy. We are talking about a strategy. We are talking about whether it's good enough, but we are talking about a strategy. What I am interested in—well, I am interested in a lot of issues. But what I would first like to do is put on the record that I happen to believe that we did not find weapons of mass destruction. I am not in this debate on whether what we are finding now are weap- ons of mass destruction. For me, I am just putting myself on the record. They are the remnants of what existed. I find that to get into this issue, well, now, being we finally found them, they were not operative, they were not, in my judgment, a threat; not why I wanted to go in, because of my concern of weap- ons of mass destruction. I also want to say whether or not al Qaeda was there when we went in, though al-Zarqawi was clearly—even listening to my col- league talking about al-Zarqawi from the beginning—I mean, if the beginning was—that is interesting that there would be the accept- ance that al-Zarqawi was there. But they are there now, and it took us a long time to find him, but we did find him. We took care of him. So, one, I am not in debate on whether weapons are there now. I know we are there now. I know al Qaeda is there now. I know it is head-to-head combat right now, right now with al Qaeda. At least that is what I believe. I would like to know whether you, General, you, Ambassador, you, Ms. Long, believe that al Qaeda is there, and that they believe that this is where, for them, the battle is. Do they want to succeed? Is it significant if they succeed to their overall goals? Maybe we could start with you, General. General JONES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Clearly al Qaeda in Iraq exists. Its fighting, we believe, is re- sponsible for a very large number of the most brutal attacks, espe- cially against Iraqi civilians, and so no doubt that they are there. Mr. Shays. Are their attacks directed at one sect or Sunni, Shi'as and Kurds? General JONES. Mr. Chairman, my understanding is that they at- tack each of the sects with the intent of trying to incite sectarian violence. So I am not sure about Kurds. Certainly both Sunni and Shi'a targets are in their target set. Mr. Shays. And Kurds that happen to be in Sunni and Shi'a areas. 99 General Jones. Yes, sir. It's very hard to put all these in cat- egories. Baghdad is a very mixed area of not only those three but Christians, Jews, other kinds of populations. Mr. Shays. The bottom line is you don't have any doubt that they're there and you have no doubt that they're taking it to us, correct? General Jones. Mr. Chairman, no doubt that they're there, no doubt in my mind they think that a successful democratic Iraq is a huge threat to their more global aspirations, and the fighting is very hard there. Mr. Shays. Ambassador. Mr. Jeffrey. Mr. Chairman, first of all, they're there. Second, they see this as the main event in their struggle for con- trol of the Middle East and opposition to the West and opposition to a global structure in security. If we falter and fail in Iraq and if they're able to establish a permanent sanctuary in all parts of Iraq as they have in Afghanistan, my fear is that this will erase all of the tremendous good we have done in response to 9/11 and we'll be back where be we started. Mr. Shays. Ms. Long. Ms. LONG. I couldn't concur more with my colleagues here, but, quite frankly, one need not take this panel's testimony. Al Qaeda itself has said in its proclamation that it is there and that Iraq is the center of gravity for its global jihad and only step one in that strategy and it's a long-term strategy to promulgate terrorism worldwide. Mr. Shays. Thank you. Ambassador, the national strategy for victory in Iraq was a docu- ment that came out more recently, but we have been there since April 2003. What were the guiding mechanisms that we used? What was the document that would detail our strategy? Was it the military combat effort or how would you—walk me through. Mr. Jeffrey. What I'll do is I will start with and then I will walk back from this point. Because, otherwise, it wouldn't be a satisfac- tory answer. I'll start with the summer of 2004. The newly arrived General Casey heading the new MNFI and Ambassador Negroponte collabo- rated on the first campaign plan. This campaign plan picked up many of the ideas that we have further developed in the Victory in Iraq document, specifically, the concept of a wedge to try to, as we say in this document, isolate those who we can't bring into the system such as some of the Bathists and al Qaeda folks but engage many others, even people in the insurgency who are willing to lay down their arms and willing to abide by the rule of the majority. That was our strategy that summer. That led to—and once again in response to the GAO's concerns, this led specifically and deliberately, and I was involved in this process, to major resource shifts. As the Comptroller General and his people testified, we shifted billions of dollars from longer-term infrastructure into shorter-term projects, primarily security but also democracy programs, elections and immediate increases to the oil system which are now coming on stream in increasing produc- tion. This was done in furtherance of exactly that strategy. Now before that time, sir, I would have 100 Mr. Shays. Before. Mr. Jeffrey. Before the summer of 2004, I would have to turn to the military on what documents that they used. I was out under CPA in the latter days, and I wasn't aware of that. Mr. Shays. Let me just clarify, the bottom line was before June 2004 Mr. Bremer was under the command of the Defense Depart- ment—excuse me, answerable to the Defense Department. It's my understanding that the Secretary had sole responsibility of the po- litical as well as the military effort in Iraq, as well as the recon- struction, and that, when we transferred power in June to the Iraqis, that brought in State Department, who now had the respon- sibility for the political part of our effort in Iraq and the recon- struction and left to Defense obviously this major effort of the mili- tary operations and the reconstruction of their security forces. Is that a fair analysis of what's the significance of June 2004? General Jones. Mr. Chairman, I believe so. The transition to CPA, yes, sir, that's where, although it was still under depart- mental control, you had this separate entity called CPA that was not under the control of the uniformed military. Mr. Shays. Answerable to whom? The White House directly? General Jones. No, sir, answerable to the Secretary of Defense. Mr. Shays. CPA was answerable to the Secretary of Defense. General JONES. Yes, sir. Mr. Shays. So you had that transfer at that moment. Before then, the State Department had a limited role, correct? General Jones. That's my understanding, sir. Mr. Shays. Can you speak to the strategy that guided us for that first year? General Jones. I would go back to the very beginning. That is, the establishment of the national military objectives led to the Cen- tral Command campaign plan. From that the Central Command land component commander had a plan, an operations plan for the actual attack into Iraq in the time immediately following. They transitioned that organization to a Combined Joint Task Force 7, CJTF-7. It then developed what they call their CJTF-7 campaign plan. Subsequently, that was upgraded to multinational force in about the timeframe you're talking about, the June 2004, time- frame, simultaneously with the stand-up of the embassy. At that time multinational force developed their campaign plan, which has now been revised several times, the latest of which is actually a joint campaign plan with the embassy. Mr. Shays. To the outsider and even to me the implications are that we only had a strategy guiding the military, and are any of the three of you capable of disavowing me of this fact? I mean, did this plan as you understand it include dealing with the economic reconstruction of Iraq, the political stabilization of Iraq? Mr. Jeffrey. Let me take that on. We definitely had plans covering all three tracks—economic, po- litical and security—in the year before the summer of 2004. To cite two examples on the political and economic tracks, as the General covered the security track under CJTF-7, the Congress and the administration together worked out a reconstruction pro- gram, Earth 1 and Earth 2, totaling $21.9 billion, the largest single reconstruction program in real dollars since the Marshall Plan, bro- 103 right by Americans who allowed them to do it. I understand the logic. We didn't want to engage the Iraqis. So that was one issue. To not have contained, at least where we could, the munitions depots and to let literally our adversaries drive up in trucks and take these munitions to me was a huge mistake. But the mistake that I happen to believe was the most egregious was we decided to not allow the army to restand, the police to restand, and we basically got rid of their border patrol. What we did is we said to 150,000 coalition forces you have to be the police, the border patrol and the army for 26 million people in a country the size of New England and New York. I think that was an impos- sible task. So, General, I'm just going to say to you that I thought we had enough military troops until we did that. But what I'm going to say to you is that I think we then dug ourselves a deep hole. Am I to view—and the reason I mention that—I've been there 12 times— is I try to go every 3 to 4 months because I want to take the tem- perature and I want to gauge where we are. I basically viewed us as being very successful in April 2003, with a chance of not having what took place; and we took a nose dive in my judgment when we disbanded their army, their police and their border patrol. I had Iraqis say, why did you put my brother, my uncle, my cous- in, my father out of work? Why did you put my son out of work? Why couldn't they at least guard a hospital? That's poignant to me, because the first death in the 4th Congressional District was Alfredo Perez guarding a hospital. I'm just saying to you I carry a strong conviction that mistakes were made in the early times and that since June 2004 was the moment to which we made a hugely successful, important decision and that was to transfer to the Iraqis the ability to start to have control over their own destiny. We started to have an Iraqi face. I had a press conference shortly after we transferred power with Negroponte and the foreign minister, and it was really thrilling for me to have a press conference with the Iraqis. I stepped forward and said, I think we've made a number of mistakes. Are there any questions? The first question was for the Foreign Minister, the second was for the Foreign Minister, the third; and finally I leaned over to Am- bassador Negroponte and said, this is the best proof that transfer- ring power, that they have bought into the fact that Iraqis are now beginning the control of their own destiny. They're making their own decisions. Maybe you could just speak to the concept of mistakes, if you don't choose to talk about particular ones. Were mistakes made in this war? General JONES. Mr. Chairman, no doubt in my mind. I think your historical context is exactly correct, and that is it's a human endeavor, no doubt there were mistakes made. Like you, I studied history quite a bit as well. I think the important thing is you're not going to avoid the fact that you're going to make some of these kinds of mistakes, but what's most important is what do you do about that. Do you learn? Do you adjust and compensate for things that you either thought would be true, turns out not to be, or things that you didn't anticipate? I think in that regard we have 104 learned from mistakes and made considerable progress building on what we've learned. Mr. Shays. Maybe I could ask this question to you this way, Am- bassador. Thank you, General. How can the American people have confidence that we are less likely to make mistakes today than in the past? Mr. Jeffrey. As any conflict or campaign goes on, I think we learn from what worked, what didn't work. Without going into the issue of why mistakes were made—and I agree with the General and I agree with my Secretary, who mentioned a thousand mis- takes—I can simply tell you, Mr. Chairman, that I made my fair share of those thousand mistakes when I was out there. I will say that, having been on the ground, it's an environment like any chaotic wartime environment, where mistakes are inevi- table. The issue is do you keep your eye on the underlying goal. And, as I have said, the underlying goal, which is laid out here in the President's strategy, is a democratic Iraq that isn't a haven for terrorists. That is what we guide on. And when we deviate from that, when something goes wrong, we work with Iraqis to try and correct it; and we're going to keep on doing that. At the end of the day, the American people, through their politi- cal processes, one of which was seen before us today, will have to decide we'll just try and do our best. I can't give you a better an- swer than that. Ms. LonG. I can't disagree with any of the other panel members, although I do think there is one thing that we can tell the Amer- ican people about our hope that less mistakes will be made in the future and that is, to the extent many mistakes were made in the past, some of those were probably because we were unfamiliar with or the changing circumstances of the ground had an impact on our planning that were unanticipated or unaccounted for or not pre- pared enough for. But now we are in full partnership with the Iraqi Government and the Iraqi people, and the Prime Minister and his cabinet have been outstanding in their public and other statements in support of all the goals that we have adopted for one another in moving this fight forward. So we now have a partner on the ground who is as much if not more interested in our success. Mr. Shays. Would you agree that it was a major change, a piv- otal point when you transferred power to the Iraqis in June 2004? Mr. Jeffrey. I believe, Mr. Chairman, that it was, but the fact that was simultaneous with my arrival there may color my judg- ment somewhat. I do think it was an important step. I think the President took a very courageous step in accelerating what was originally going to be a several year process. I think the process that we set culminated in the current government is the proof in the pudding, sir. Mr. Shays. I have just one other area before I go to Mr. Van Hollen. Let me just ask this and come to you. The national strategy says build a stable, pluralistic national in- stitution, clear areas of enemy control and restore Iraqi's neglected infrastructure. Now the administration is putting a focus on assist- ing the new Iraqi Government in promoting its own agenda, which is compatible, it strikes me, but it's national reconciliation, improv- 106 Mr. Shays. We're basically looking at al Qaeda's presence there, we're dealing with Sunni insurgents, and we're also dealing with al-Sadr and some of the Shi'a groups. If we're successful—excuse me, if Iraq is successful in reconciliation with the Sunnis, then does that not isolate al Qaeda and isn't it more likely that we will see Iraq have significant success against al Qaeda if we have the Sunnis on board going after them instead of going after the govern- ment? That's directed to you, General. General JONES. Sir, my answer would be absolutely yes. Mr. Shays. Ms. Long, do you have any comment about that? Ms. LONG. No. I think General Jones is correct in that this wedge strategy had been something that has been under discussion for some time. Mr. Shays. And is part of the strategy? Let me just be clear about that. This is an effort on the part of the Iraqi Government, and one of the criticisms of the Government Accountability Office was, and specifically Mr. Walker, was that there is not coordination between the plans of Iraq, which I just mentioned, and our own victory in Iraq plan. So if you'd just speak to that coordination and how the two strategies are compatible, and then Mr. Van Hollen has the floor for as long as he wants. Mr. Jeffrey. The wedge strategy of the original 2004 campaign plan was discussed with the Allawi government. Allawi was very active particularly in that period of time before our Fallujah oper- ation in the fall of 2004. Reaching out to Sunni groups from Fallujah and elsewhere, we participated in those. He was well aware of the undertakings, as all the other Iraqi Governments, that you need to, again, to quote the victory in Iraq strategy, to iso- late those that are not going to be part of this process, the al Qaeda, the Bathists, and to bring in those folks that are willing to or can be persuaded to lay down their arms. That's been our strat- egy for a long time, sir. General JONES. Mr. Chairman, just for clarity, I'll go to page 30 of the NSVI and just to point out one of the elements in there is supporting Iraqi leaders in their request to bring all Iraqis into the political process through dialog and the creation of inclusive insti- tutions. So, clearly, this has been part of our desire to achieve this reconciliation effort throughout the time we've had our strategy. Mr. Shays. But the challenge that the first Prime Minister had was he was the interim, transformational and then permanent. He was the first. He was basically—there had been no election, so he hadn't been elected. He had been chosen by groups, correct, but not elected. So the advantage Malaki has is that he now is the elected chosen, with the fact that 76 percent of the Iraqis chose this gov- ernment, including Sunnis, is that not correct? Mr. Jeffrey. That's correct, sir. Mr. Shays. Thank you. Mr. Van Hollen, you have the floor as long as you want. Mr. Van Hollen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I won't take too long. I just want to go back to, first, the point you have made with re- spect to the mistakes and acknowledging mistakes and learning from mistakes and getting back to the earlier point I made with the Comptroller General with respect to accountability. Because I 108 I saw this is Bosnia when people said we should have sided with the Bosnians in 1992, 1993, but there was a great deal of very in- telligent advice that said, no, that would be a terrible mistake. Then I worked closely with Dick Holbrook in 1996, and people were advising him in different ways and the Secretary of State and the President. It's a very difficult situation where you don't—particularly in the fog of war, at the highest levels, I think at the levels you're talking of, we have to let the American people pass judgment and hold our leaders accountable for succeeding as we think they will or not suc- ceeding, sir. Mr. Van Hollen. I would agree with you that's where respon- sibility ultimately lies. I would just say there seems to be an in- credible pattern here of consistently siding with the side that gave the wrong advice against the side that gave the right advice. And I would just point out again—and we've heard the testimony and statements made by a number of the generals who were involved in various capacities with decisionmaking, whether it was going to war or in the post-war period, and I stop with this and close with a question. We had retired Major General John Baptiste, he stated a little while ago Rumsfeld should step down because he ignored sound military advice about how to secure Iraq after Baghdad fell. We had a number of other generals strongly recommending that Secretary Rumsfeld step down as an accountability measure. I don't know, General, and I don't want to put you in a tough spot. I guess what I want to know is, were you in a position to be aware as to whether or not the advice that was provided by many of the people who have since criticized Rumsfeld and called for his resignation, were you in a position to determine whether or not the advice was in fact heeded or whether it was ignored? General JONES. Congressman, the position I was in at that time, I knew that there was lots of advice being given, not necessarily always consistent, as the Ambassador said: more troops, less troops. You have people arguing both ways even today. How much of that advice was taken, whose advice was taken and who's wasn't, I don't have any personal knowledge of that. Mr. Van Hollen. I understand, sir. I'll just close, Mr. Chairman. I think that, as the Ambassador pointed out, we have a number of mechanisms within the Government for accountability. Ulti- mately, it is the decision of the American people. But I do believe in terms of just managing the Government, and I just—managing the Government in terms of creating the right incentives within the Government, when people who do get it right are ignored and peo- ple who get it wrong are somehow promoted or encouraged, I do be- lieve that sends a very bad signal to the men and women in our Federal Government. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Shays. I thank the gentleman. I just have a few other questions. I'm not looking for long an- swers, but they are not insignificant. You respond as you choose. The GAO said the strategy does not show costs, identify agency roles, integrate U.S. goals with Iraq and U.N. goals. I would like you, Ambassador, to speak to those three criticisms. 109 Mr. JEffREy. Very quickly, to followup on my initial comments, the strategy taken as a whole, as I said, does have a funding com- ponent to it on the state side, and the military has a similar docu- ment as well. We'll put this in the record. It is assigned with a three-track policy: security, political and economic. In terms of the organization, there I would disagree strongly. I think that NSBD 36 and the NNSI program I describe are Mr. Shays. You're speaking to Mr. Jeffrey. Yes, sir. The organizational roles are as clear as I have ever seen it. Considering Government service and considering the size of this endeavor, it's amazing. These are very clear. Of course, there are disputes. The GAO said it doesn't clarify every dispute between agencies. On this man's and woman's Earth we'll never come to that point, but it comes as close as it can to setting up a coherent process. The GAO is correct that we haven't been able to align our goals, our resources and such fully with the Iraqis. That's because we've not had a long-term Iraqi Government, and thus we had the meet- ing with the Iraqis for over 2 days on June 12th and 13th with the President going there to do exactly that. Mr. Shays. Thank you. I know that you answered each of these questions in a little more depth, but I appreciate that succinct an- swer. With regard to the militia, how can we—let me start with this. I would like to know the role that you think Iran is playing in terms of sending agents and money to Iraq. Mr. Jeffrey. Iran is playing a very worrisome role, including the death of coalition soldiers and Iraqis; and in the political sense of it being difficult for us to fathom why the Iranians are doing this. We are very concerned about this. We have spoken out publicly about it, and this is another one of the key items on our agenda. Mr. Shays. Isn't it true that if Iraq were to break into three parts that they not only have a Kurdish problem but they would have a Shi'a-Arab problem? Because they not only have a large Kurdish population in Iran but don't they have a fairly substantive Shi'a-Arab population as well? The reason I ask this question is because this is what I was basi- cally told by folks in the Arab Emirates, that what they were try- ing to argue to me is that it is not in Iran's best interest, ironically, to have Iraq fail. Mr. Jeffrey. We agree with you. That's why one of our concerns with the Iranian activities is that we can't find an obvious expla- nation for it. Some of Syria's non-productive actions we have a cer- tain explanation. Mr. Shays. Are the Syrians cooperating with stopping jihaddists from crossing Syria into Iraq? Are we sometimes getting coopera- tion and sometimes not? I met with the Syrian ambassador, and he tells me you just tell us what we're doing wrong and we'll stop. And I said 3 of the 10 things you're doing wrong; we want you to stop all 10 things. What is the relationship that we have with Syria at this point? Mr. Jeffrey. Our relationship with Syria is colored by their be- havior in Iraq, their behavior, for example, in hosting the leader of Hamas who played such a bad role in recent events in Gaza and 113 I don't think we'll start that way. Yes, we will. We'll start with you Dr. Pollack, and we'll go right down. Just make your points as you choose to, and we're not even going to turn the clock on unless one of them speaks too long and the others have to wait too long. So maybe we better turn the clock on. We'll do it 5 minutes and roll it over. STATEMENTS OF KENNETH POLLACK, DIRECTOR OF MIDDLE EASTERN POLICY, BROOKINGS INSTITUTION; LAITH KUBBA, SENIOR DIRECTOR FOR MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA, NATIONAL ENDOWMENT FOR DEMOCRACY; ANTHONY CORDESMAN, ADMIRAL ARLEIGH BURKE CHAIR IN STRAT- EGY, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL AF- FAIRS [CSIS]; AND DR. KENNETH KATZMAN, SPECIALIST IN MIDDLE EAST AFFAIRS, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERV- ICE STATEMENT OF KENNETH POLLACK Dr. Pollack. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. It's a great privilege to be here before this subcommittee. It's also a great privi- lege to be on this panel with so many distinguished colleagues. I think, as you are aware, a number of months ago we at the Brookings Institution put together our own study group on Iraq, came up with our own alternative strategy for Iraq, and most of my remarks are framed by our thinking in the conversations that we had when we were trying to work through this problem and deter- mine what the United States ought to do to ensure success in Iraq. The first point that I think is important to make in the course of these hearings is to say that our conclusion as part of this group was that we fully have just one more chance in Iraq. At the very least, we ought to assume that they have only one more chance left in Iraq. We may get more. The fact of the matter is we've already had a number of bites at this apple and we have so far failed to put reconstruction on a firm footing. The problem that we face right now is that both the American and—Iraqi and the American people are growing impatient. Ulti- mately this war can be lost in Washington. It can be lost in Bagh- dad. The problem is it can be lost in either capital, and we need both to provide their full support. Inside of Iraq, I think the problems that we face are particularly acute and need to be taken into account. First, as you are well aware, and as we have heard other Members in these hearings sug- gest, the Iraqis are increasingly unhappy. They are increasingly frustrated, something that I know you know firsthand, Mr. Chair- man. They had great expectations with the fall of Saddam Hussein, and they have been waiting to see those expectations fulfilled. And increasingly Iraqis are fearful that the United States and that the new Government of Iraq doesn't know what it is doing or will be unwilling to do what is necessary to actually give them the better life that they ultimately deserve. And we are seeing increasing numbers of Iraqis turning to these vicious sectarian militias, turning to organized crime, turning to in- surgent groups to provide them with the security and basic services 115 Just to give an example, Tall Afar, where we are having some degree of success because we are sitting on that city, we are doing it with the right force ratio, a force ratio of 20 security personnel per 1,000. The right number for Baghdad, applying that same ratio, is about 125,000, not the 75,000 we have now. And I know it may be possible—and Dr. Cordesman will be the first one to point out, he is absolutely right—that numbers in war are very troublesome. But the fact of the matter is that it is going to be very difficult to make this Baghdad security plan work with only 75,000 troops. In addition, the focused reconstruction plan is as much about marrying up civilian, political and economic reconstruction with this new emphasis on protecting Iraqi civilians, and both parts are absolutely critical. But so far what we have seen in the Baghdad security plan is that only the military has been able to implement its part of a plan, and we have seen much less on the civilian side that is an absolutely necessary complement to these changes on the security side. The amnesty, which you have already talked about, needs to be general. The amnesty is very important, but if we do not apply it to all Iraqis, it is going to be meaningless. The administration is making new efforts to reach out to its neighbors. This is also a very important effort. But at the end of the day, unless we are willing to make some new real concessions to those neighbors, bring them into the process and give them some sense that they are going to have a stake in how Iraq develops, they are not going to provide us anything more. Finally, in light of the United Nations, I am heartened to see that the Bush administration is making a new effort to try to en- gage the United Nations and is trying to gain some traction. We had a member of the United Nations as part of that group, and what we heard time and again from that member and from others that we spoke to was the U.N. will only be there if you can provide security and if you are willing to allow the U.N. a much greater say and control over operations. It is wonderful that the Bush administration has rediscovered the U.N. and is trying to bring them into the process, but until we are willing to make those concessions, to give them a greater say in control, and to provide the security that their civilians need, it's not going to make any difference. Thank you, sir. Mr. Shays. Thank you very much. [The prepared statement of Dr. Pollack follows:] 116 PREPARED TESTIMONY OF KENNETH M. POLLACK SENIOR FELLOW AND DIRECTOR OF RESEARCH THE SABAN CENTER FOR MIDDLE EAST POLICY AT THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY, EMERGING THREATS, AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS July 11,2006 Saving Iraq Mr. Chairman, distinguished Members of the Subcommittee, it is a great privilege to appear before you today and to testify regarding our nation's effort to help bring peace and stability to Iraq. These hearings could not come at a more important moment. Public opinion in the United States and in Iraq, both of which are absolutely vital to this mission, are poised on the proverbial knife's edge. Iraqis are increasingly frustrated with the failures of the United States and the previous four governments that sat in Baghdad since the fall of Saddam. They see internecine violence eroding their nation and their lives and if they do not seen signs of real progress soon, the trickle who are turning to the militias and the insurgents for security and basic services could become a torrent. Most polls show that while the American people remain committed to the notion that success in Iraq is vital to our national security, they too have increasingly concluded that their government does not have a feasible plan to address the many problems there. Meanwhile, we finally have a new Iraqi government in Baghdad, with a new prime minister in Nuri al-Maliki who has shown a willingness to embrace the need for far-reaching change, at least rhetorically so far. He has already taken positions that his people want him to take and that anyone who wants to see Iraq stabilized can only cheer, but that both his political allies and rivals oppose. Moreover, in recent months, the Bush Administration and the U.S. military have begun to debate making similarly significant changes in our support to Iraq's reconstruction. Those arguing for dramatic change within the armed forces and the Administration desperately need the support of the American people and their Representatives in Congress to make the kind of changes that represent what could be our last chance to save Iraq from all-out civil war. One Last Chance to Get it Right The Administration is correct to observe that there are still many positives in Iraq. The most important is the determination of the vast majority of Iraqis to see the political and economic reconstruction of their country succeed. They want a better future and are terrified that failure will mean full-scale civil war. Consequently, they have endured the injustices and disappointments of reconstruction thus far, and most remain hopeful and committed to improving the process of reconstruction. As long as the majority of Iraqis continue to take that view, reconstruction can be turned around to produce a stable, pluralistic Iraq. Nonetheless, we must recognize that time is working against us. In addition to their impact on the American public, a range of underlying problems are gradually eroding Iraqi public support for reconstruction. Put differently, Iraqis have waited a long time for the meaningful improvements that they hoped for and were promised after the fall of Saddam. The longer that these hopes are 118 away from reconstruction will mean civil war, there is every reason to believe that if the U.S. and Iraqi governments can demonstrate that they are making major changes, that the changes are the right ones, and that these changes are beginning to produce positive results for the average Iraqi, most will continue to support reconstruction at least for as long as it keeps moving in the right direction. We have had several shots at making Iraqi reconstruction work already and so far have failed to make any of them count. We may get more chances than the one we have now, but it would be the height of folly to assume that we will. We simply cannot predict how much more patient the Iraqis and the American people will be, and the trends of increasing internecine violence, eroding Iraqi public optimism, and the installation of Iraq's permanent government—with no likelihood of a better successor on the horizon—means that we must treat this as our last chance. We must assume that if we fail this time, we won't get another shot at success. What Needs to be Done: The Big Picture The starting point to understand the problems of Iraq is to recognize that at present, Iraq lacks the military, political, and economic institutions to provide basic security or the minimum necessary services for the Iraqi people to live normal lives. Indeed, the only thing holding the country back from all-out civil war a la Bosnia, Lebanon, and Congo is the presence of roughly 140,000 foreign troops. While this does confirm the Bush Administration's contention that it is critical that the United States maintain a strong commitment to Iraq to prevent it from sliding into civil war, this should not be seen as an endorsement of the Administration's conduct there to date. Frankly, Mr. Chairman, it is appalling that after over three years we still have not been able to build any Iraqi institutions capable of effecting meaningful changes beyond the Baghdad Green Zone without massive American assistance. Thus, Washington and Baghdad's must develop a comprehensive new strategy to build capable Iraqi institutions able to preserve Iraqi stability and security, and create eventual progress toward a functional and prosperous society. However, doing so will take quite some time—at least several years—and, as noted above, neither the governments of Iraq nor the United States have a luxury of time anymore. Consequently, medium-term institution-building must be coupled with short-term approaches to create some sense of progress in the country. In addition, it is impossible to build new institutions in conditions of insecurity, lawlessness, and internecine strife. So the United States and Iraq must also immediately adopt measures to deal with the security situation facing the country and begin to deliver basic services for key segments of the population. Of all the many blunders of the United States in Iraq, the greatest was the original sin of allowing a security vacuum after the fall of Saddam's regime in April 2003. Because we did not bring enough troops to secure the country, nor did we give those troops we did bring the mission to protect the population, we allowed a security vacuum to emerge and to persist to this day. This security vacuum led to two intimately related phenomena: a full-blown insurgency, largely based in the Sunni tribal community of Western Iraq, and a failed state, in which the governmental architecture has essentially collapsed and has not yet been effectively replaced by new, capable military and political institutions. Inevitably, vicious sectarian militias emerged to fill this vacuum and these militias are now waging a constant struggle over turf and resources. In other words, Iraq has a daunting combination of insurgency-related problems similar to those of the wars in Vietnam, Northern Ireland, and Algeria, compounded by failed-state challenges similar to those of Lebanon in the 1970s and '80s, the formeT Yugoslavia in the '90s and the Congo today. Finally, persistent problems related to the many mistakes that accompanied America's poorly-planned initial efforts at reconstruction continue to erode Iraq's institutional capacity and popular support for U.S.-led reconstruction. Corruption is rampant in Baghdad and has rotted-out nearly every Iraqi ministry. Two-and-a-half years after the fall of Saddam's regime, the Iraqi central government has little ability to effect real change anywhere outside Baghdad's heavily protected 3 121 insurgents and militias, and it will not go about its normal business, thereby undermining the economy and the political system. The Iraqi insurgents are largely accomplishing these goals because Coalition forces are too thinly stretched and have left the cities of central and southern Iraq vulnerable to insurgent and terrorist attacks, to militia takeover, and to general lawlessness. For this reason, Coalition forces must fundamentally reorient their priorities towards "area security"— protecting towns and neighborhoods. Coalition forces must also shift their emphasis from offensive missions designed to "kill bad guys" to defensive missions designed to "protect good guys." While even counterinsurgency strategies require some offensive components, they should not be their principal focus. Typically in counterinsurgency and stability operations, offensives should only be mounted in immediate counterattack to an insurgent/militia action or when intelligence has clearly identified a high-value target. Even then, the degree to which offensive operations are emphasized is relative to troop numbers. Offensive operations can be employed more liberally only when there are more than enough troops for the defensive missions that are the crux of a counterinsurgency/stability campaign. In Iraq at present, offensive operations need to be de-emphasized because there are not enough troops for vital defensive missions. Offensive operations, particularly large raids, should not be the default mode of security forces as it is for many U.S. and U.S.-trained Iraqi units. Consequently, the U.S. and Iraqi security forces must focus first on defensive operations to make the Iraqis feel safe in their homes, their streets, and their places of business. This does not mean simply deploying soldiers in defensive emplacements around Iraqi population centers. It means establishing a constant presence throughout those areas to be secured to reassure the population and to deter and defeat insurgents and militias. This means constant patrols (principally on foot); checkpoints; security personnel deployed at major gathering points like markets, entertainment, religious and political events, and main intersections and thoroughfares among other measures. Security personnel should routinely search persons entering large facilities, such as businesses or apartment complexes, street markets or shopping arcades, or sports arenas. Fixed defensive positions, checkpoints, or ambushes can be employed against known routes of insurgent infiltration. Above all, offensive operations should become the exception rather than the rule. The militias established themselves in central and southern Iraq because the United States never properly filled the post-Saddam security vacuum. The only way to reverse this trend is to fill the security vacuum by deploying U.S., Iraqi and other Coalition forces there. Very few of the Shi'i militias have ever tried to resist Coalition forces when they moved into an area in strength, because they understood that doing so was essentially suicidal. Once the Coalition has concentrated sufficient forces to move back into a population center in central or southern Iraq, it should be able to do so. Coalition forces must then remain in strength over time, and thereby obviate the need that drove the locals to support the militia. This is critical in Iraq not only to create a basis for defeating the insurgency, but to prevent the failed-state aspects of Iraq from causing the country to spiral into chaos and civil war. Once these initial enclaves are secured, and as additional Iraqi security forces are trained, they should be slowly expanded to include additional communities—hence the metaphor of the spreading "oil stain." In every case, the Coalition would focus the same security, political, and economic resources on each new community brought into the pacified zone. If implemented properly, a true counterinsurgency approach can win back the entire country. However, employing such a strategy means superficially ceding control over parts of the country at first and accepting that it will take time before all of Iraq will become a stable, unified, pluralist state. Objectionable though that might appear at first glance, it is worth remembering that the U.S. military and the Iraqi government do not currently control much of Iraq.. Thus, the "oil stain" strategy simply acknowledges that we can only control part of Iraq with the forces currently available and that our control over other regions is at best nominal. It means focusing our efforts on 6 122 controlling the most important areas where roughly half the Sunni Arabs live, and where the bulk of the Shi'ah and Kurds, the strongest supporters of reconstruction, also reside. We should concentrate our resources on holding those regions properly, rather than squander them playing "whack-a-mole" with insurgents in areas that we cannot control. Over time, such a strategy will allow us to slowly expand our control over the rest of the country as more resources become available. Perhaps the most heartening news I have heard from Iraq in recent months is that Lt. General Peter Chiarelli, the new Corps commander in Baghdad has devised a new campaign plan for Iraq along these very lines. This is not surprising because when Chiarelli commanded the 1st Cavalry Division in Baghdad in 2004-5, he employed a similar approach in his AOR and enjoyed tremendous success. He, along with a handful of other outstanding division and regimental commanders, has put such a scheme to work and seen it pay immediate dividends. As currently conceived, LTG Chiarelli's "Focused Reconstruction" blueprint is a brilliant plan. It is the first military plan for securing Iraq since the invasion that could actually work. It is designed to concentrate U.S., Iraqi, and other Coalition military forces in Baghdad and a number of other major population centers in central and southern Iraq—where the bulk of Iraq's population resides. It is a combined military-political-economic effort that envisions Coalition and Iraqi personnel working hand-in-hand to secure key Iraqi urban areas and immediately revive local governance, basic services, and economic opportunities so that Iraqis see immediate benefit from the operations and will support them. It may be no understatement to say that if any one man can save the reconstruction of Iraq, it is LTG Chiarelli. Unfortunately, Focused Reconstruction is more a vision than a reality right now. The new Baghdad security plan is the opening move of the plan, but it is being conducted with too few troops (about 75,000 according to press reports, as opposed to the 100-120,000 that would probably be required for a city the size of Baghdad), with a divided command structure that does not match Lt. General Chiarelli's vision of a unified military-civilian chain of command, and without the necessary political and economic assistance to make security in the capital sustainable. Moreover, military personnel have suggested that Focused Reconstruction has not been fully accepted within the armed forces' own hierarchy, and thus there is no political commitment to it either. Mr. Chairman, it would be a tragedy for the United States and for Iraq to allow Lt. General Chiarelli's Focused Reconstruction to wither on the vine. For the first time, we have a plan rooted in sound historical analysis and tested in actual operations in Iraq. There is every reason to believe that it can succeed where past efforts failed. But it can only succeed if it has the necessary resources. I can think of no more useful role for these hearings to play than to see that it gets the chance. Building the Iraqi Armed Forces The training of Iraqi security forces is progressing better than ever before, but there is still a long way to go before they will be able to shoulder the burden of providing security in Iraq alone. The Bush Administration appears correct in stating that there are a large number of Iraqi troops in various stages of readiness and various capacities to assist in security operations. However, even the 235,000-plus Iraqi security personnel in the field or in the training pipeline are inadequate to the task: Iraq probably requires more than twice that number to address the security problems of a failed-state and an insurgency—and, at present, only about one-third of the 235,000 considered "trained" are actually capable of playing a meaningful role in securing Iraq. An important and related caveat is that the four-level rating system developed by Multinational Security Transition Command Iraq (MNSTCI) and regularly discussed in the media is unhelpful and unrepresentative. Every echelon of the chain of command in Iraq appears to use a different system to rate the readiness of the forces it is training, none appear to correspond easily to one another, and many personnel do not seem to understand the systems used by the echelons above or below them. One level will use colors to denote readiness, another letters, still others use numbers. 7 123 Moreover, the rating system used by MNSTCI itself sets the threshold for Iraqi security units too high. Counterinsurgent warfare requires only a small number of truly first-rate forces to serve as a strategic reserve and to conduct what should be rather limited and discrete offensive operations. The vast bulk of security forces are expected to conduct basic defensive missions, particularly area security, which requires far less capability—although it does require basic skills, effective leadership, and a high degree of unit cohesion. Thus, units do not need to reach the highest level of readiness (defined as the capacity to operate fully independently) to play a meaningful role in COIN operations. Plenty of units rated as level 2, or even some rated as level 3, are probably capable of handling their own battlespace while others can still be helpful when working closely with Coalition forces. U.S. military personnel and the MNSTCI must place a much greater emphasis on the selection and training of Iraqi military leaders, especially at tactical levels. Although many factors go into making a military effective, none is more important than the quality of its leadership at all levels. Unfortunately, the leadership of Iraqi security forces is very mixed. There are some intelligent, honest, brave, and patriotic officers, but there appear to be an equal number who are just the opposite. There are sadists, cowards, incompetents, thieves, along with too many whose first loyalty seems to be to the insurgents, the militias, or organized crime rings. The fact that so many unqualified Iraqis remain as leaders of companies, battalions, and brigades, is a major source of weakness. Moreover, it is often difficult to remove them—frequently, they received their commission and their command because they are important political figures or are related to more senior officers. It is hard for U.S. military personnel to remove even those who do not fall into these categories because Iraq is now a sovereign state and the Americans must often negotiate serious political hurdles to have an Iraqi officer transferred or relieved of his command. As hard as it may be, improving the quality of Iraq's military leadership is crucial to building Iraqi security forces capable of meeting the nation's problems on their own. Consequently, the U.S. military command—including, but not limited to MNSTCI—must make it a priority for all Americans training Iraqi formations to identify competent personnel and see them promoted, while systematically removing from positions of authority those unqualified for their commands. All echelons of the chain of command must make this a priority so that lower level personnel will have the support of their superiors when pushing to remove unqualified Iraqi personnel. At the same time, the U.S. training program which is now doing reasonably well at training the combat units themselves, must pay greater attention to the identification and training of Iraqi officers. True leaders take much longer to forge than the units they are to command. Additional training courses need to be added for officers, first to give them the basic soldiering skills that Iraqi officers typically lack; second to provide them with a better grounding in basic civics (and the role of military forces in a democratic society), which almost none of them understand; and last to teach them the art of leadership. At present, some training in all of these areas is provided, but not enough. Greater and longer training is also very helpful in allowing U.S. personnel to observe their Iraqi counterparts and identify both the best and worst among them. The U.S. and Iraqi high commands must make a much greater effort to create integrated Iraqi security formations. Of the 30-40 best Iraqi battalions available at this time, virtually all are composed of soldiers from a single sect or ethnic group: these units are all Kurd, all Shi'i Arab, or occasionally all Sunni Arab. This has proven necessary because of the need to get some Iraqi formations out in the field and operating alongside Coalition forces promptly; however, it creates problems in the short term and risks in the long term. Many communities are angered by the presence of battalions entirely composed of members of another sect or ethnic group—in particular, Sunni Arab towns and villages react badly to the presence of all-Shi'i Arab units. Since the goal of 8 124 the deployments is to make the local populace feel safe and supportive of the security presence, this is counterproductive. This is especially true because in many cases these units were simply militia units inducted in toto into the Iraqi security forces, given new uniforms and a new name, but little else. Over the long term, such single-sect units cannot be counted on to remain loyal to the central government in time of great stress. The Iraqi armed forces must be one of the main centripetal forces to overcome the centrifugal forces that could push the country into civil war. These single-sect units might therefore make civil war more likely if, as seems probable, in a future crisis they chose to honor their loyalty to the leaders of their own sect rather than the central government. Creating capable integrated units will take a great deal more time, effort and resources, but it is critical to the long-term success of the Iraqi armed forces and therefore the country: • Initially, the MNSTCI should concentrate on building up a small number of truly integrated units as elite formations, principally for psychological reasons. The goal should be to make more Iraqi security personnel want to join these formations. • The best personnel must be recruited from all of the existing units of the armed forces. They must be provided with higher pay and other benefits to coax them into volunteering for integrated units. • The integrated units should have longer periods of training with the best Coalition trainers. It is critical for these units to feel confident in their abilities and to have the time for a sense of unit cohesion to develop. Both argue for a longer training period. • Integrated units should be provided with the best equipment. Indeed, they probably ought to be provided with the full suite of equipment, weaponry, etc., available to U.S. light infantry battalions. Again, it is imperative for the personnel of these units—more than for any other formations in the Iraqi military—to have confidence in their ability to execute their missions. Moreover, because inadequate gear is a constant complaint of Iraqi formations, the integrated battalions should be lavished with equipment so that they feel a degree of "eliteness" and so that other military personnel will want to join the integrated units. • Integrated units need to be put into operational situations, at least initially, only when their success is virtually guaranteed. Although this should be true for all Iraqi security units as they are formed up, it is particularly true for these units. Their cohesion is likely to be fragile, so they need to be brought along slowly with stress applied only in gradual increments. Moreover, it would be disastrous if these units were involved in a military defeat early on, which could shatter the unit and dampen recruitment. By the same token, reports of their successes would likely strengthen their cohesion and improve recruitment. Although it is not yet a priority, at some point, the United States will have to make building Iraq's military support infrastructure a higher priority if the Iraqi armed forces are to take overfull responsibility for securing the country. At present Iraqi forces are wholly reliant on U.S. military forces for combat service support and most combat support functions. The Iraqis have taken the first steps toward eventually taking over their training and command and control systems; however, these are effectively the only areas where they have made any progress and even in these areas it has been very modest. The Iraqis have virtually no capacity to handle logistics, communications, intelligence, personnel, maintenance, medical, or transportation on their own, and these services are still almost wholly handled by the Coalition, in reality by the Americans. 9 127 groups to serve in the new occupation-sponsored authorities. Consequently, sectarian divisions have become far more prevalent and entrenched than they were in the past, and in the absence of a general program of national reconciliation or a broader power-sharing arrangement, they are tearing apart Iraq's large, peaceful, and integrated center—including allowing foreign Salafi Jihadists to tum the violent resistance of Iraq's minority Sunni community into a fairly deadly insurgency. Moreover, they have so far precluded the adoption of a workable constitution that might allow the Iraqi government to begin to address some of the country's many problems. 2. Iraq's central government is now fully-constituted but essentially powerless. It lacks the resources or the governmental institutions to tackle any of the challenges facing the country without massive external assistance. Iraq's ministries are understaffed and eviscerated by endemic corruption of a kind that Iraqis believe compares unfavorably even with Saddam's despicable regime. Corruption has diverted much of Iraq's oil revenue from reconstruction to the bank accounts of government officials and their friends in organized crime. Iraq's local governments, originally founded by the U.S.-led Coalition in the immediate aftermath of the fall of Baghdad—and a critical element in a proper bottom-up approach to reconstruction— have largely been cut-off and neglected. The failings of Iraq's ministries have hamstrung the development of new military capabilities, reduced the amount of funding available, prevented the development of careful plans for reconstruction, and frightened investment capital out of the country. 3. Iraq's political parties have only tenuous connections to the Iraqi people and mostly limit their interaction with their nominal constituents. This too is a product of American mistakes in the wake of the fall of Baghdad. By bringing to office political exiles and extremist groups neither of which truly represented the will of the Iraqi people (and in many cases were unknown to them), we created a political elite that did not come to power via a popular mandate and were, in fact, threatened by true leaders emerging from the people. As a result, Iraq's current leaders have mostly spent their time haggling over the division of power within the government and snuffing out any legitimate efforts by charismatic figures to organize new political movements that would genuinely represent the will of the Iraqi people. This disconnect has helped hinder the provision of basic necessities to the Iraqi people, warped Iraq's decision-making, and soured many Iraqis towards their own leadership. 4. The United States, the principal occupying power and the driving force behind reconstruction lacks the personnel, the capabilities, the know-how, and even some of the resources to rebuild the Iraqi nation. Nevertheless, the Bush Administration's policy choices have effectively prevented the United Nations from playing a greater role in Iraq. That, as well as the security threats in Iraq, has also kept many Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) from participating in this effort. This is highly problematic because UN agencies and NGOs possess valuable skills and capabilities needed for nation-building. Conceived broadly, a new approach to political reform in Iraq should consist of six interlocking processes. 1. National reconciliation. This is the one aspect of political reform where the U.S. government cannot be faulted for a lack of effort or creativity. That effort must be maintained. What needs to change, however, is the context in which national reconciliation and power-sharing talks are framed. It is hard to see what more the United States could do within this process; 12 129 building political parties and guiding political processes toward becoming more transparent, accountable, and representative. Finally, as is now apparent, the United States is increasingly wearing out its welcome in Iraq, and shifting to a more international approach would likely allow us to prolong the process of externally-assisted reconstruction longer than will a continuing U.S.-dominated approach. None of this would have been easy even if it had been planned for before the invasion and properly implemented afterwards. Unfortunately though, current conditions in Iraq are likely to make it that much harder to implement. Specifically, the December 15,2005 nation-wide elections have produced a new Iraqi government that is supposed to be fully sovereign, permanent, and capable of running the country alone. In truth, it is none of these—the last least of all. However, the reality may be less important than the perception. Many of the changes proposed below are going to be painful for Iraq and even more so for Iraq's current political elite, which of course is both the product, and cause, of so many of the problems that must be solved. Moreover, the repeated failings and mistakes of the United States have considerably eroded Iraqi good will toward their liberators. All of which suggests that U.S. representatives in Baghdad will face a very tough fight in having these changes (or any far-reaching reforms) adopted by the new government. Decentralization Reducing the power and influence of the Iraqi central government in Baghdad is both inevitable and necessary. It is necessary because Baghdad has become a major obstacle to reconstruction in all aspects. Iraq's central government is dominated by political leaders many of whose legitimacy, in the sense of actually representing a significant segment of the population, is dubious and who have largely spent their time squabbling over the division of power and spoils, leaving the rest of the country to fend for itself. To make matters worse, they are so jealous of their power and prerogatives that they regularly attempt to prevent those outside of Baghdad (and especially those outside Baghdad who owe them no allegiance) from exercising authority or getting things done. This is not to suggest that there are not some good Iraqi political leaders trying to do the right thing for their country and their people, only that these are too few in number. Iraq's ministries are crippled by corruption, lack many key personnel, are generally undermanned, and largely remain tied to sclerotic bureaucratic practices inherited from the former regime. Baghdad has always been something of a bottleneck in Iraq, but this was greatly exacerbated during Saddam's regime because he wanted every decision to be referred to Baghdad to preclude the emergence of independent centers of power elsewhere in the country. The result of all of this is that the Iraqi capital is incapable of doing much for the Iraqi people but still prevents the rest of the country from providing for itself. This state of affairs is intolerable: it is one of the main reasons, along with the persistent security vacuum, that Iraqis do not have the basic necessities they so desperately desire (and deserve). Thus the overwhelming requirement to begin materially improving the lives of average Iraqis within the next 6-12 months demands that the United States pursue this goal vigorously, both through its own foreign aid efforts and by pressing the Iraqi government to begin a major effort to decentralize power and resources away from Baghdad and out to local governments that may be able to use them more effectively. An important part of this process will be building the capacity of local governments so that they can employ the authority and resources to be devolved to them. At present, because they have been so badly neglected, few Iraqi provincial or municipal governments can do so. Thus, this process also demands a major emphasis on capacity building at local level. This is critical for the development of pluralism and good government in Iraq (both of which grow best from the bottom up), and in many ways should be easier than dealing with the incapacity of the central government (which cannot be neglected either, see below). Local governments are, by definition, smaller and 14 130 dealing with the needs of fewer people, which makes them easier to reform. Moreover, it will be much easier to build capacity at local levels than at the national level as part of a traditional counterinsurgency strategy: simply put, the Coalition should focus on building capacity only in those areas that begin as part of the initial oil stain, which is far more feasible when considering sub- national governments than when dealing with national-level ministries that are designed and intended to serve the entire country. As the oil stain spreads to new regions, the Coalition should in turn set to work reforming local government in those areas as well. Federalism is another part of this equation. Whether the United States likes it or not, federalism is inevitable in Iraq. It is possible that had we handled the early days of the post-Saddam era differently, we might have moved Iraqis down a path that would have allowed for the re-creation of a more centralized state, but that is impossible today. The Kurds were always uneasy about a centralized system and having seen all of the chaos and violence unleashed by the Shi'ah and Sunni Arabs against each other, they want even less to do with what goes on there. Unfortunately, the same is now true of many (but hardly all) of the Shi'ah, as noted above. A number of Shi'ah leaders have decided that it would be better for the Shi'ah also to preserve a considerable degree of autonomy from Baghdad so that they can live their lives as they see fit without fear of being told otherwise, or the need to get Iraq's other communities to ratify it. The Sunni Arabs are the most uniformly opposed to federalism, largely because they fear that it will leave the Kurds and the Shi'ah with the vast bulk of Iraq's oil resources (which they assume those two groups will attempt to control locally), but also because they are the most ardently devoted to Iraqi nationalism. But even some Sunnis are beginning to approve of federalism in the realization that the new Iraqi government is likely to be dominated by the Shi'ah for many years to come, and they fear that this could mean that they would be oppressed by the Shi'ah just as Saddam's Sunni regime oppressed them. To the extent possible then, the United States and the new Iraqi government should begin moving toward a federal system in which the central government retains control of the armed forces, foreign policy, monetary policy and currency, national standards including the regulation of the media, and the regulation of the oil sector (but not its distribution). Most other powers should be allowed to devolve to local governments and the process of filling in the gaps in the constitution should be used to assist this process. Thus, decentralization is inevitable and necessary, but its course is not set. This creates a very dangerous set of conditions and it is crucial for the United States not to attempt to impede that process, but to foster it and guide it in directions that will assist reconstruction. Some of the most important initiatives that the United States should pursue include: • Enhance the political authority and economic and security power of local government. Wherever possible, the United States and members of the Iraqi government must look for ways to shift various economic, political, social, and even security responsibilities from the central government to local government and provide them directly with the resources necessary to accomplish them. This is the heart of decentralization. It should include the provision of funds directly to local government to be spent at their discretion. Similarly, Iraq's various police forces should be transferred from the Ministry of the Interior (MOI) to the control of local officials (also discussed in greater detail below). Without control over money and even limited security forces, Iraq's local governments will be powerless. • Diminish the role of Iraqi ministries by allowing considerable implementation, contracting and even some elements of regulation to be set by local governments. Iraq's ministries are too heavily involved in implementation of policy. For a variety of reasons, including the fight against corruption, this needs to be changed. Doing so will allow many of the 15 132 also vital to breaking the logjam created by the capital's corrupt and incompetent bureaucracy. • An important element in reforming Iraqi politics is to use Iraq's oil revenues to make the Iraqi people interested in the goings on in Baghdad by tying their own material rewards to the actions of the Council of Representatives. When there is money involved, people pay attention. • One way to help galvanize people against both organized crime and the insurgency is to give them a direct stake in Iraq's oil revenues. If they know that a system has been created which will result in more of the oil money going to their benefit—both directly and indirectly—they will be much more motivated to actively oppose both the criminals who steal the oil and the insurgents who attack the oil production and export systems. • Similarly, since a great deal of the corruption in Baghdad stems from misappropriation (or outright theft) of oil revenues, developing a system that makes it harder to steal oil or oil money is also an important part of dampening corruption. What all of these imperatives make clear is that Iraq must have a relatively fixed system for the distribution of its oil revenues. Without such a fixed plan, it is impossible to imagine real national reconciliation because all of the parties will continue to fight over who gets how much—and anyone who doesn't like the results will be tempted to resort to force to try to have their way. All of the fighting for oil revenues will distract elected officials and technocrats from the job of running the country, let alone rebuilding it. And varying constituencies could feel alienated by a particularly inequitable division of the pot, possibly pushing them to rebel. If it is self-evident that Iraq requires a relatively set distribution scheme for oil revenues, it is harder, but not impossible, to stipulate what that scheme should look like a priori. Dollar figures can really only be set based on the price of oil, the actual costs of governance (which are not yet available and vary from year to year), and the needs of various projects. However, it is possible to describe the basic features of such a plan and its essential workings. Its key features are: • Ensure that there are multiple "baskets" into which Iraq's oil revenues are poured. Fewer, larger pools of money are always easier to rob than more, but smaller, pools. This plan proposes five separate such "baskets." • Basket I: Some funding of the Iraqi federal government is critical. In particular, the salaries of federal employees and all members of the nation's armed forces (including the reconstituted ICDC/Gendarmerie which will be part of the Ministry of the Interior) could all reasonably be funded from oil revenues. • Basket 2: Fund infrastructure development directly. Iraq's infrastructure is in a woeful state and it would be ideal to have a pool of money available to directly fund local, municipal, and provincial-level projects to repair and build new infrastructure. • Baskets 3 and 4: Create a mixed system for wealth distribution to provincial and municipal governments to promote popular interest in local government and national representation and in turn make both local and national-level representatives more accountable to their constituents. This is a critical aspect of the proposed system. Just as it is important that some 17 134 incentive to make the government work more efficiently, and every incentive to pocket as much public wealth as they can. Likewise, few of Iraq's political leaders pay much attention to addressing the needs of the Iraqi people. The only reason that the situation is not worse is that the United States has managed to curb some of the worst excesses of the current leadership, and a small number of those serving in the Iraqi government have turned out to be both morally upright and committed to the notion of a safe, prosperous Iraq. However, we cannot count on a few good apples curing the bunch. Instead, key features of the Iraqi system need to be reformed so that the country has a better chance of solving its many problems. Consequently, the United States must also work toward a real process of political reform in Iraq to engineer a shift toward political structures that would have a greater prospect for insuring good governance well into the future. This should include: • Revising Iraq's electoral system. Iraq's current electoral system employs a modified form of proportional representation which is hindering the emergence of many key features of democracy and could eventually prove disastrous for Iraq. All party leaders want proportional representation because it rewards party loyalty and favors weak national parties over strong individual candidates. It is only natural that Iraq's party leaders favored it, especially so given how little popular support most of them had when they first took power. Proportional representation has made every election a choice among these various parties— because they were the best organized—even though Iraqis might not have voted for any of the individuals on their party slates if the candidates had had to run on their own in local elections. This is also one of the reasons for the growth of sectarianism in Iraq: since the United States empowered a number of chauvinistic and religiously-based Shi'i parties and most Iraqi Shi'ah had few other choices for whom they could vote (and Ayatollah Sistani urged them to vote for these parties), they garnered a huge percentage of the vote, in many cases by default. Once in power, those Shi'i chauvinists proceeded to act, unsurprisingly, like Shi'i chauvinists. This alienated the Kurds and Sunni Arabs, and marginalized the secular exile parties, the most important of which had already been discredited by the inability of Ay ad Allawi's interim government to live up to its promises during the period June 2004- January 2005. Instead, Iraq should be encouraged to shift to direct, geographic representation, as in Great Britain and the United States, because this would encourage parliamentary compromise (and national reconciliation) and force legislators to pay close attention to the needs of their constituents. Geographic representation favors the individual candidate over the party, thus allowing the emergence of strong, popular figures. And because every parliamentarian is elected by a specific district, he or she must care deeply about the well-being of those voters. Moreover, a geographically-based "winner-takes-all" system emphasizes compromise within the legislative process. Candidates from districts representing mixed populations have a tremendous incentive to find solutions that will secure the support of all of their constituents. Thus, while proportional representation pushes parliamentarians toward the extremes (to demonstrate the differences between the parties) geographic representation pushes parliamentarians toward the center. And Iraq desperately needs a political system that will encourage compromise across party and sectarian lines. • Supporting political parties that run on issues—even single issues—rather than identity. It is vital to change Iraq's political discourse from a debate over identity to a debate over issues, both because doing so would further weaken the strength of the sectarian blocs and because 19 136 Mr. Shays. Dr. Kubba. STATEMENT OF LAITH KUBBA Dr. Kubba. Mr. Chairman, it's my pleasure to be here. I have had the pleasure of meeting you in Baghdad when I was a spokes- man for Prime Minister al-Jaafari. And as an Iraqi American, I very much appreciate and admire and salute the good work that you have been doing not only from an American perspective, but also very much appreciated by the Iraqis. Mr. Shays. Well, it's our privilege to have you here. Dr. Kubba. What I want to do is bring some insights into the way ahead. Without question, the document that we have ahead of us struck and highlighted a very clear purpose, and I just want to underline that purpose. Failure in Iraq does mean expansion in al Qaeda. It does mean many September llths worldwide, and it's ab- solutely not an option to let Iraq go down. I think the possibility of Iraq going down is real, and we should brace ourselves for tough weeks or months ahead. And the only way we can confront that reality is by clarity of purpose. Looking at the document and its three main tracks and the plan to integrate these tracks, the politics, the security and the econ- omy, what I found the central piece that needs to be highlighted, which is the key to making the plans work, those wishes being ful- filled, is an approach to state building. We are in a catch-22 situation, where if you trace the causes for nearly all the problems, all the failures in Iraq, it is the absent, weak state. And if you try to trace why aren't we trying to build that state and succeeding in it, then you look back again into secu- rity problems and to gridlock on the political and into deteriorating services in their country. And unless we break that deadlock on how to approach state rebuilding, I don't think that plan can mate- rialize. The key to making progress is to make progress on the political process. We have already made advances in Iraq. There is a func- tioning Parliament elected, inclusive. There is a draft Constitution that has the capacity to lend itself to many changes in the country. However, having said that, what I see, a lack of vision or genuine consensus between the three major blocks in the Iraqi Parliament, the three blocks that constitute nearly 90 percent of the seats rep- resenting the Shi'a, Sunnis and Kurds, broadly speaking, they do not have a shared vision on what state they really want. I think unless this issue is addressed or at least approached on how to address it is agreed to, then I feel our efforts will just go around in circles. The good effort that has been put in trying to boost the economy or even to train the police and army is not going to pay dividends unless there is a genuinely agreed vision what type of state the Iraqis want, and there is an opinion collectively that they believe in it collectively on nation-state building. Up until this moment we do not have that position, and I think this issue needs to be addressed, because the Constitution is due to be reviewed and amended, and there have not been shared views or a process at least to go in that direction. A second threat I see is that the political process is most impor- tant; then most urgent is the spread of sectarian violence that has 137 started to sweep the country. Over the last 3 years, al Qaeda tried and failed to stir up sectarian violence. It is not rooted in Iraq his- tory. It is not rooted in Iraq history. In fact, the only reason why there is a favorable climate today to sectarianism is because of the absent state. We have handed millions of people to criminal net- works, to militias, to local parties out there, and the state has been absent. Today, regretfully, after 3 years we see al Qaeda managed to stir up sectarian violence. My biggest concern is if the government, the Iraqi Government, does not come heavy on it right now, then we would have little other than ashes left in Iraq to deal with. Even our celebrated success, the political process, will go down the drain because the politicians would be consumed by the fire of sectarian- ism that is out there. I believe, despite what rhetoric is out there, the Iraqis by and large appreciate the role of the United States. Maybe in the streets Iraqis vent or are critical of the U.S. presence, but nearly all politi- cians in the Iraqi Parliament know the need for the U.S. role to stabilize a very fragile condition that they have already. In that respect, I suggest—and I believe the United States can play a much bigger role, not necessarily by increasing soldiers on the ground, but maybe by leveraging their influence on the political process. There are a number of ideas that one cannot bring out now, but certainly I feel that this is the way to go forward. Thank you. Mr. Shays. Thank you. We forgot to hit the clock. It was red the whole time. Your statement was very appreciated. Thank you. [The prepared statement of Dr. Kubba follows:] 138 The Evolving National Strategy for Victory in Iraq Testimony ofLaith Kubba, Program Director for the Middle East and North Africa, National Endowment for Democracy, to the Sub-Committee on National Security, Emerging Threats, and International Relations House Committee on Government Reform United States Congress July 11th, 2006 140 security and economic. While security is most urgent and obvious, political progress remains the foundation for both a lasting security and a viable economy and must be looked at carefully. Assessing Iraqi Politics On the positive side, Iraqis made real progress in the political process. Today, there is an inclusive elected parliament with vibrant committees and sub-committees deciding on a future Iraq. Its last national election had over 70% participation in all of its 18 provinces. The US can rightfully claim credit for facilitating Iraq's emerging political process. The December 2005 elections marked the end of the transition interim period and transferred sovereign powers to an elected parliament, which now bears legal responsibility and is fully empowered to govern. All issues, including political and communal concerns, are finding their way to parliamentary committees and subcommittees. The constitution has room for amendments, setting up new institutions, such as a senate, restructuring provinces and regions and legislating. However, this political achievement remains fragile and under constant threat of unraveling. All stakeholders must have a closer and critical look on how to consolidate the strengths and address weaknesses of the political process. Last month, Iraqi prime minister, Nur al-Maliki, launched a reconciliation initiative to consolidate his government of national unity. He visited Gulf states to reach out for more regional support to the political process and the inclusion of Arab Sunnis. He promised that only government forces will bear arms and empowered the ministries of defense and interior, which have no ties to armed political groups and militias, to assume control. Such measures and gestures are helpful but dwarf into insignificance compared to the challenge ahead of bringing unity of vision among the three main communities in Iraq (Sunnis, Shias and Kurds) to agree on constitutional amendments. Iraq passed the constitution in a national referendum despite Sunnis' overwhelming rejection. Only the promise and hope of future constitutional amendments brought the Sunnis back to participate in elections and in government. No committee on constitutional amendments has been formed yet. Pushing the issues without clear ideas on how to reconcile differing views might trigger a political crisis at this critical moment and deny Iraq its last chance to resolve constitutional differences. If the minimum of Sunni hopes in amendments is not realized, then the country will sink into more violence. Mr. Chairman, Differences run deep among the three major groups on nation state building. Behind their commitment to national unity are different visions on how to build Iraqi governing institutions, in particular on the nature of the state, the mandate of central government and the control of security and natural resources. Reconciliations are difficult because of hardened positions, zero- sum perspectives to politics, historical grievances, mistrust, inflated assumptions about negotiating positions and lack of experience. A closer look at their differences suggests that not all can easily or quickly be resolved. Arab Sunnis, who are most experienced in administrating a central state and least in negotiating with local politicians, seek the return of a centralized Iraq with an autonomous Kurdish administrative region. Kurds, who secured a constitutionally 2 141 recognized and highly empowered federal region with a strong hold in Baghdad, will not accept any rollback from such a position. Moreover, they expect to add Kirkuk to their region. Arab Shias, with least experience in government, have mixed positions about the return of a centralized state without the Kurdish region. Some groups are pushing towards a southern federal region, similar to the Kurdish one. The parliamentarian committee to be tasked with drafting amendments has not been formed yet and politicians have not brought forward new ideas on how to proceed. The future of Kirkuk and the prospect of forming a southern region are perceived by Arab Sunnis as most problematic. At dispute are articles on the control of natural resources and the concept of citizenship and state institutions. If Iraqis fail to agree peacefully through parliamentary daytime debates, they will fight street battles outside parliament at night. Six months do not give politicians enough time to reconcile these differences but at least they can freeze controversial issues now and at least agree to procedures on how to reconcile conflicting visions and agendas. None of these groups can form a majority to dictate and govern alone. They need each other and they all seek US good will and support. The US can bring in additional leverage over Iraqi politics through Iraq's neighbors. To break gridlocks, the US can leverage its influence and change the dynamics of negotiations by insisting on the agreed rules rather than pushing specific outcomes. Threats of Civil War Fixing Iraqi politics is the most important challenge but putting down the rapidly spreading sectarian violence has become most urgent. Iraq did not have communal conflicts in its history and Iraqis pride themselves on the extent of mixed marriages and neighborhoods. For more than 3 decades, Saddam played communities against each other, elevated mistrust between citizens and caused communal tensions. Still, Iraqis blamed the government but not each other for Saddam's repression of Shias and Kurds and refused sectarianism. Some Iraqi exile leaders with external influence fed ethno-religious agendas into Iraqi politics and institutionalized sectarian quotas at all state levels. For obvious political gains, they too pushed sectarianism. That partially explains the passive slow reaction of some Iraqi political elites to growing sectarian conflicts. Others confuse the insurgency with sectarianism. Until recently, the insurgency was the number one threat to Iraq. Although it exploited Sunni political isolation and dysfunctional government security agencies, the insurgency failed to block the political process and the emergence of an Iraqi national unity government. The killing of Zarqawi was a severe blow. As Al Qaeda and Saddam loyalists were running out of time, they unleashed their most devastating weapon: sectarianism. For the past three years, they have been trying without success to stir up Arab Shia-Sunni violence. They brutally beheaded Shias, blew up their mosques and destroyed their most holy shrine. Now, their fire of sectarian violence is spreading and threatening the whole process. Within Baghdad, more than 100 Shia and Sunni citizens are indiscriminately killed daily. Estimates of displaced families range between 150,000 living in tents to over a million displaced from their homes all over Iraq. These camps will inevitably be recruiting grounds for sectarian militias and criminal networks. Sectarian violence is contagious and its rapid spread will suck in politicians and threaten the continuity of the fragile Iraqi 3 142 unity government. The Iraqi government and parliament must come out strong in denouncing sectarianism, showing national unity and banning inflammatory statements. Also, there should be an immediate and harsh crackdown on politicians, civil servants, police and others who are involved in sectarian agitation and violence. Without a bold political stand and deterrents, Iraqi police and army units can easily get sucked into sectarian violence. If the Iraqis do not respond fast enough to put this fire down, then the US should put more pressure on them and provide critical resources to help them do so. Without it, Iraq's modest political progress and the unity of its armed forces may not survive long. State Building The notion of modern state institutions transcending ethno-religious lines is clearly desired and a stated policy but remains weak, if not absent, in reality. Iraqis need a central government with strong national institutions controlling arms, intelligence and borders and strong local administrations providing services and jobs. The US has provided enormous technical assistance to build Iraqi ministries and bureaus. As important as this might be, the real predicament in state building remains in the lack of an agreed concept and an overall architecture of the state and not in technical resources. Under current electoral rules, Iraq will always have a weak executive and a fragile coalition government, where the prime minister cannot hire and fire incompetent or corrupt ministers without causing a political crisis. It took months to form a cabinet whose success is not defined by services but by continuity. The cabinet is formed without a shared vision but with a complex quota system dividing ministries. Inevitably, autonomous ministers are more accountable to their party bosses and less to the prime minister. A similar dilemma has emerged in the provinces. Iraq's decentralization plan has weakened central government to near paralysis. According to the current constitution, real power rests in regions and provinces. The Kurds set up the model—exclusive self governance in the North with an equally strong position in a weak government in Baghdad. Now southern provinces want to emulate the same model. Currently, provinces have no clear authority structure and their relationship to the center is complicated through politics. Basra is a case in point. Last year, the Ministry of Oil was allocated to a party whose power base is in Basra. Its local and national politics were directly linked to its hold over the Ministry of Oil. Its local officials were involved with oil smuggling on a massive scale. Basra had many disputes over militias running its police force. Other ministries, too, have become sectarian-political fiefdoms with a deadly mix of corruption, organized crime and local militias as ministries' police. The result is an entrenched system of illicit benefits packaged in ethno-religious politics. Dismantling organized crime and political mafias is essential in restoring a functioning state. One most important and urgent issue in state building is the ability to control armed groups and exert authority all over Iraq. The government has to negotiate disarming militias whose loyalties, ethnic, religious or political, to their leaders rise above their loyalty to the state. The top three militias are Kurdish Peshmerga who are the best trained and disciplined, the Shia Bader brigade with its extended networks of social organizations, and the Mehdi Army, the least organized and most thuggish. Integrating members of these groups into Iraqi units must come through rigorous selection and training procedures. Alternative long term proposals, 4 145 Mr. SHAYS. The insights you bring in particular, having been a close adviser to a Prime Minister, the Prime Minister, will be very helpful in our dialog, and thank you. Dr. Cordesman. STATEMENT OF ANTHONY CORDESMAN Dr. Cordesman. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for the opportunity. My colleagues made a lot of points that I would make. I have . prepared a detailed picture of the strategy that I think we need, which I would ask to be put in the record, and also a very detailed critique of some of the recent reporting on Iraq, because I think the GAO is absolutely correct. The kind of reporting that has come out of Iraq has not served the purpose of measuring whether we are accomplishing our mission, whether we are implementing the strat- egy, and in some cases I think it has been so bad as to be totally misleading. I have provided a detailed description of the reasons why. Mr. Shays. Maybe you could just give an example or two before we start our questions of what you mean. Dr. Cordesman. Well, I think one is the absolutely absurd esti- mate of the economy. It's just a symbol of how bad the economic reporting is in the recent quarterly report. It basically says that 74 percent of the gross domestic product of Iraq, a country with 27 million people, is the oil industry. Frankly, if you look at any other U.S. Government reporting, which isn't designed to report on the strategy, it directly con- tradicts that. There is a statement made about the oil industry and about oil exports, which gives the impression we are making real progress. In the last 2 weeks, the Energy Information Agency of the De- partment of Energy issued a country analysis brief on Iraq which directly contradicts every aspect of that, talks about a steadily de- teriorating situation, and refers to the fact that so much damage is being done to Iraq's producing oil fields, that they will only get 15 to 25 percent recovery versus an industrywide average of up to 60 percent. You have the electric power generation measured in capacity without any requirement or relevance to distribution based on de- mand as it was at the time of Saddam Hussein. Again, other U.S. Government reporting says that you need at least 3,000 megawatts more right now to meet demand as it currently exists than the State Department report sets as a requirement. When the U.S. Government has its experts directly contradicting the kind of sort of spin-oriented reporting provided, it's a dan- gerous warning that we need to do a much better and more realis- tic job. But if I may, sir, make a few other points. Ken made the point about implementation, and I think this is the right strategy. I wish it had been the strategy from the start. But I think there are deep concerns. One that Laith Kubba touched on is frankly the inability to deal with the Constitution in any clear way. If there's an imple- mentation strategy to deal with those 58 extremely difficult divi- sive issues, it has not yet been described. Those have to either be 146 dealt with in some way Iraqis can live with, or the Constitution can be far more of a problem than a solution. I look at the military side, and I do not see the resources being provided to deal with the year of the police. I do not see the equip- ment going to the Iraqi military that either offers them the ability to operate independently in many of the types of missions they need to survive, or to operate as an independent force in the future, and I see no plan to give them the capability to defend the country against foreign enemies. I do not see a clear plan for dealing with the problems within the Ministry of Interior, special security forces, and the corruption and problems in the ministries, where we have had very little advisory presence, and we simply haven't manned the effort. And these are critical improvements. As a result, I just don't believe at present the year of the police will work. The issue has been raised here several times about permanent bases. What I do not see is a clear signal to the Iraqis of our inten- tions, and I think that is more important than any sort of strange conspiracy theories about what we are going to do with the bases. The worst dimension may be the least critical in time. I think that there is a real need within the Congress to investigate specifi- cally what has happened with the AID, with the Corps of Engi- neers and the contracting process. From the beginning I think this has been a nightmare. I cannot conceive that the Iraqis could be more inept or more corrupt than the U.S. Government and U.S. contractors have been in using Iraqi AID money and the money the Congress has appropriated, and we are running out of that money. Basically it is virtually all obligated. It has not provided the serv- ices that we promised, and we have no way under current funding to sustain the projects we began. That is a critical problem, and there is no strategy to deal with it. Let me say just a few other things about your questions. One was, have we taken the actions to diffuse sectarian and ethnic dif- ferences and achieve national reconciliation? I think we have done what we can. But I am deeply disturbed that the operation in Baghdad right now seems to be creating more problems than it is making things better. It isn't clear we have a phase between the political actions nec- essary to make military actions work. And it certainly isn't clear that we have done anything that interferes with the Sadr militia and the other problems in Baghdad, which is the one area we have operated in. We talk about neutralizing militias. We have a broad plan, and we have rhetoric, and that is it. Finally, on the international side, I agree with what has been said. It's always very nice to call in the international community. It often helps, and it can't do much harm. But your last question asked about bringing countries in generally. Iran, Turkey and Syria are going to remain serious problems, and either we act, or they do. Thank you. Mr. Shays. Thank you very much, Doctor. [The prepared statement of Dr. Cordesman follows:] 149 Cordesman: Winning "Long War" in Iraq 7/10/06 Page 3 been no more honest as a body than the Bush Administration, and only a few members have truly sought bipartisan solutions that will serve the national interest. Partisan spin and opportunism is as much a threat to the US as the spin within the Administration. Like the President, the Congress is more of a threat than the insurgency. The US military and senior US officials also need to stop "cheerleading" and spinning the facts on the ground. The leaders must present the real facts and options, honestly address the risks, present a strategy for long-term involvement, and provide metrics that give an honest picture of what is happening good and bad. Americans need to see that there are practical plans; they need to be able to trust what senior military and civilian officials say; and they need to see a case for patience that builds credibility and trust. There is a reason polls show a growing lack of confidence and support. The US government simply has failed to earn it. US officials reporting on Iraq should recognize the fact that the US Embassy in Iraq, and US intelligence and military officers, see many of the same problems in Iraq as the media. No one is hiding the "good news." Put simply, not much progress has been made, and it was never reasonable to assume progress could be quick and easy. Instead of playing games with numbers and definitions, US officials should prepare the American people and the Congress for years of effort. They should communicate in ways that build enduring trust by honestly stating the problems and by providing meaningful metrics of success and failure. US leadership should reassure Iraqis and the rest of the world that the US is addressing Iraq in real world terms, and it should put indirect pressure on Iraqis to lead, act, and succeed by highlighting their successes and failures. Continue Active Political Engagement and Pressure There are areas where the US can reinforce success, although not without risk. The US needs to continue to actively engage Iraqi political leaders at the highest levels to push them towards national unity, to find working compromises between sectarian and ethnic factions, to create effective ministries and methods of governance, and to make military and economic progress. The US must actively "interfere" in Iraqi politics. If top-level US officials do not visit Iraq to engage Iraqi political leaders, and if the US ambassador is not a key "agent provocateur," the Iraqi political process is likely to get bogged down, and the risk of failure and division will increase. Such US action will inevitably lead to protests by whatever Iraqi faction feels the US is opposing or failing to support it. It will provoke some Iraqi nationalists and outside critics on principle. Iraq, however, needs active outside pressure, criticism, and effort to force it to actually make decisions and move. It also needs constant reminders that Iraqis are now responsible and that there are limits to US and other outside support. Iraqis need to know that the US will provide support where it is productive, but there are no open-ended commitments. At a different level, the US government needs honest plans and assessments that can shape a more structured political effort. Exercising US political influence requires effective long-term plans backed by aid to Iraq's emerging political structure. Moreover, effective US influence demands governance that recognizes the need for at least a five-year strategy funded to have a major impact in aid at the regional and local levels. Iraq's politics are as much urban and local as they are national, and US strategy must recognize this. 150 Cordesman: Winning "Long War" in Iraq 7/10/06 Page 4 Let the Calendar Slide if Iraqis Want This The US should let Iraqis move at their own pace in terms of the redrafting of the constitution and referendums on it. The goal should be a process of steady cumulative progress in political compromise, improving security and governance, and improving the economy. The US should not try to impose deadlines, push Iraqis into resolving every issue at once, or trying to achieve milestones. The US needs to give Iraq time to work. Expand Presence at the Governorate and Local Level The US is still forming Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) to supplement and replace the Provincial Support Teams and Regional Embassy Office (REO). The PRTs should have been in place years ago. According to the latest State Department reporting, however, they have only been established in Ninawa, Babil, Kirkuk, and Anbar Provinces, and they seem to have serious recruiting problems and difficulties in getting experience and qualified personnel. Political power in Iraq, economic development, and security have all increasingly devolved down to the governorate and city level. The problem has been made worse by the near collapse of the British effort in the Basra area, and ethnic divisions over Kirkuk, as well as by the range of sectarian and ethnic divisions in Baghdad and Mosul. The US does not need a grossly overstaffed "white elephant" in Baghdad. It does need to expand its local efforts at every level, and provide a full civilian component to support the US military in the field. This requires a major reorientation in the US presence in Iraq, a "go or be fired" approach to ensuring full staffing by the most qualified people in the foreign service, and direct Presidential pressure on Cabinet officers to provide the rest of the needed staff. It needs the kind of Congressional funding, and flexibility in using US aid funds at the local level, necessary to give such a presence. The US military also need to be ordered to provide security for such missions. They will have the highest possible priority, and US officials simply should never have been made dependent on contract and civilian security in a war zone. Sustain A Firm Commitment to Iraqi Unity US political influence cannot ensure Iraq remains unified, or prevent civil war and division if Iraq's political process fails. The US must not, however, be seen in Iraq, the Arab world, or the region as promoting any form of Iraqi division. As Iraq moves toward clarifying its constitution and reshaping its politics and process of governance, Iraq's sects and ethnic groups need to hear again and again that the US is not on any group's side. The US needs to repeatedly make it clear at the official level that it supports Iraqi unity. It needs to make it clear that it is not pro-Shi'ite because they are the majority and because this might be politically opportunistic—this would reinforce the insurgency, civil violence, and play into Iran's hands. The US needs to make it clear to Sunnis that the US will support fair compromises, but it will not be pressured into giving the Sunnis special treatment. The Kurds need to know officially that the US will not support Kurdish independence, excessive demands for autonomy, or adventures in Kirkuk. The US should leave the issue of "federalism" to the Iraqis, along with the definition of the role of national, governorate, and local government. It should not encourage the division of Iraqi 152 Cordesman: Winning "Long War" in Iraq 7/10/06 Page 6 insurgents and any new hostile militia elements. "Oil spot" concepts cannot work in so divided a country with so much internal movement and mobility. • Reexamine the equipment effort to provide a much larger pool of armor, artillery, transport, etc. Iraqi military, security, and police forces need to "outgun" and "outprotect" the insurgents. The present aid and equipment effort is too cost constrained and too limited in scope. • By all means go on with the "year of the police," but understand that a half-decade of training, support, and aid will be necessary; progress will be slow and sometimes faltering, and police really are just as important as regular military to Iraqi success. • Work with the Iraq government to find new employment for militias, security guards and protection forces, and various local defense forces. Seek to avoid integrating low quality personnel, with strong sectarian and ethnic loyalties, into the Iraqi forces. • Put Presidential pressure on the Cabinet to ensure that civil positions in the police training effort are fully staffed with fully qualified personnel when these must come from outside the Department of Defense. • Give creating an effective local court, prison, and criminal justice the same priority as the police. Solving the police problem is impossible without solving the rule of law problem and providing popular security. • Work with the Iraqi government to steadily expand its local presence. National politics and central government cannot be a substitute for actual governance at the regional and local level, having a visible presence, and providing goods and services that clearly come from the center. At this point, more politics and "democracy" are part of the problem and not the solution. People have to see a working civil government to supplement the Iraqi forces and criminal justice system. This is a three to five year commitment at a minimum. Anything less is either deception or an invitation to defeat. Come to Grips with Economic Reality The US aid process has failed. It has had some important individual successes, but it has wasted at least half of the some $22 billion in US funds (out of $31.9 billion so far appropriated), and much of the $34.6 billion in Iraq funds, it attempted to use to secure and develop Iraq's economy. This is a critical issue in a country which the USG reports has 27-40 percent unemployment, and the total impact of US aid to date is to employ some 114,000-129,000 people - many in low grade temporary jobs, out of a workforce of 7.4-9 million in a country with a total population of 27-28 million. Even by ppp measurements, Iraq has a per capita income of $3,500, and the real world level is far smaller. A flood of wartime expenses and aid money has often left the country, income distribution has gotten steadily worse, the middle class (and merchants, professionals, and technocrats) are being impoverished or forced to flee the country. Moreover, infrastructure and services have deteriorated in many areas, and employment is almost unavailable in high threat areas - leaving only crime, joining the insurgency, and joining the Iraqi forces as options. The full scale of this failure has been overlooked because of the constant flow of political and military problems in Iraq, but the realities are massive unemployment, terrible distribution of income, as many infrastructure problems as successes, costly subsidies that overshadow successes in financial reform, a failing petroleum sector, and a massive "brain drain." It is also brutally clear that USAID, the Corps of Engineers, and other elements of the US government that have been involved have failed to effectively plan, manage, and account for aid activity. There have been many competent US officials in the field, but the leadership of USAID 153 Cordesman: Winning "Long War" in Iraq 7/10/06 Page 7 has been a national disgrace. The fact is that Iraq is as much a failure as New Orleans, and the US agencies involved need massive reorganization and new leadership. US contractors have done no better. They lacked experience in dealing with anything approaching problems on Iraq's scale, and in working with the "command kleptocracy" the previous Ba'ath rule had created. They also were given an impossible mission: unrealistic plans, constantly rotating USG personnel in the field, a lack of clear accounting rules and field supervision, no mandated measures of effectiveness, unrealistic deadlines, and responsibility for improvising their own security in a war zone. Some contractors have been corrupt and irresponsible, but the fundamental failure lies with agencies like USAID and the US government. It is also brutally clear that the efforts the US congress has made to ensure control of funds and accounting have done nothing to reduce corruption and waste. All that has happened is that much of the corruption and waste has been spent outside Iraq. In any case, preventing waste and corruption in a war zone and case like Iraq is at best a third order priority. Winning and making things work are what count. The US needs to "zero base" its efforts. It needs to honestly assess its successes and failures in terms of their sustained capability. It needs to take steps to ensure what has succeeded continues to function, and failures are terminated as soon as possible. Most important, the nightmare of incompetence that has emerged out of USAID, the US Army, and Corps of Engineers needs to be put aside. The US needs to plan on major continuing economic aid expenditures, but not using US agencies, contractors, and outside security. The US does need to try to mutilateralize the flow of aid and economic assistance, so that international agencies and other countries play a major role in advising and overseeing Iraqi efforts. At the same time, the key priority is to put the Iraqis in charge of aid and their economic development, in spite of the failures and corruption that will follow. A failed US government structure and method of contracting needs to be taken totally out of the loop. Iraqis need to make their own mistakes, learn to take responsibility, and spend the money in ways that stay in Iraq and suit both national needs and sectarian and ethnic equity. The good news is that they cannot possibly be more incompetent, more wasteful, and more corrupt than the US-planned and managed effort to date. Moreover, it will be far easier for the US to monitor and account for what Iraqis do than try to run the aid effort. Transfer does not mean a loss of accountability. If anything, the US can focus on highlighting Iraq's needs, how well Iraqis plan and manage, whether corruption happens, and the effectiveness of the result. The mantra should not be control or micromanagement: it should be to reward honesty and success and insist on transparent, public US official reporting of corruption and failure. To accomplish this, the Administration and Congress should expand the role of the Special Inspector General for Iraqi Reconstruction (SIGIR), not reduce or eliminate it. (See http://www.sigir.mil/) There is a serious risk that the Republican leadership of the Congress will try to cover up the failures in the aid progress and putting supervision and review of the US aid effort back under the same agencies that has disgraced themselves and their country. What is really needed its to take advantage of SIGIR and its field staff, expand its role to review planning of the aid effort and all use of aid moneys and Iraqi revenues, and report on the 155 Cordesman: Winning "Long War" in Iraq 7/10/06 Page 9 The US should not push for privatization or Iraq's use of US companies. This would be totally counterproductive and arouse a host of Iraqi and regional protests. It should make it clear that Iraq needs clear plans and rapid action. It should offer to help with field development and recovery. It also should work with the USGS and DOE to create broader plans for oil development that show Iraq's fields can be developed in ways that are much less sensitive to sectarian and ethnic concerns, and create profits that aid all parts of the country. The US also needs to help Iraq recover from the disastrous subsidies of domestic product, and lack of refinery development, that vastly underprice gasoline and fuel and make Iraq dependent on imports for 27% of its diesel fuel, 49% of its gasoline, and 51% of its LPG. This does not mean ignoring infrastructure and water needs, and other aid and planning priorities, Money is political glue, however, and first things first. A Priority for Making Things Work It should be clear by now that success in Iraq is going to be limited and highly relative, and that Iraq is not going to transform other countries. It should be equally clear that it will be years before the US can hope to see Iraq become a stable country, and that progress in many areas will be slow and erratic. The US needs to accept this, and the fact it cannot do everything at once. There will be serious problems with human rights, the rule of law, democracy, etc. There will be continuing problems in key areas like women's rights and respect for secular practices and beliefs. The US advisory effort should not abandon continuing efforts to move Iraq forward, but it cannot afford Congressional mandate for instant success or to move from influence to confrontation. Iraqis need the basics. There was never a time the US should have seen Iraq as a social experiment or Iraqis as 27 million "white rats." It certainly is not the time now. Steady patient influence can accomplish a great deal over time. A drive for "instant success" will do more harm than good. But, Prepare Now for Bad Cases Finally, the US needs to work now with its allies around Iraq and in the Gulf to prepare for being forced to leave Iraq, withdrawing from civil war or division, or being asked to leave. The US should not plan to exist rather than succeed, but it may have to do so. A major increase in the intensity of the civil war, a government that asked the US to leave, a divided Iraqi, or simply a failed political process, could all create conditions that make anything approaching the current US presence and effort pointless or unsustainable. This could also happen with little or no warning. The US needs to make sure its allies understand this and are prepared for such a contingency. It needs to make sure it has bases and facilities ready, and that nations understand that the US will maintain its strategic presence in the region. It needs to assure them that it will not give up on trying to make Iraq work from the outside, on dealing with Iran, on fighting terrorism, and other regional issues. The US does not need an "exit" strategy because it simply cannot afford a true exist. It does need a contingency plan for relocation and repositioning. 158 We have reports that even in Baghdad there are mortar crews on the street corner lobbing mortars at the green zone. Nobody is ratting them out. Nobody is reporting on them. They are just there. Clearly this indicates, I think, that they have popular support. The Sunnis in many ways see the insurgents as basically their army. The United States has created an army which is largely Shi'a and maybe to a lesser extent Kurdish. The Sunnis, they feel they have no army, they have no protectors. So this is why, I be- lieve, they are protecting the insurgents. Then what has happened is the insurgents began attacking Shi'a. For a while Ayatollah Sistani held off the Shi'a. He said, don't re- taliate, show restraint. They did for a while. But like any human nature, that can only hold back so long if you keep hitting some- body, eventually they will not be restrained. They will punch back eventually. This is why I believe the Shi'as and the Shi'a militias, particu- larly Sadr's Moqtiar Army, began striking back, and that is where we are now is this internecine sectarian conflict, which I think is not limited to army or militia versus militia. I believe it is elements of a population against each other, which I find quite troubling. Anyway, to be positive, however, if I were to recommend any- thing, my recommendation is that the strategy, any strategy for victory, needs to really get to the roots of the political structure of Iraq right now. I think the only thing that would really satisfy the Sunnis and end their sense of humiliation would be a very, very major restructuring of the political process right now. There are some ideas out there, Senator Biden and Gelb-Biden on forming three autonomous regions. There are other ideas. One is to basically throw out the results of the 2005 elections and start over, put together some sort of factional bargain, as happened in Afghanistan. Mr. Shays. You have to be positive. Jeez. I mean, this is an elec- tion with 76 percent participation, which puts to shame anything in the United States. Well, anyway Dr. Katzman. Correct. Mr. Shays. I can only interrupt him, by the way. That is one of the privileges of a Congressman. Dr. Katzman. That may be extreme. But Khalilzad actually has tried in certain ways. He tried—one way what he did was he tried to create this National Security Council outside of the Constitution. In other words, he is trying to find ways to amend the political structure because it's part of his strategy. Also, he came in realiz- ing that the Sunnis felt very disenfranchised, and he has tried to find ways to bring the Sunnis in. I think, as I said, he has had some success, but I think not com- plete success. If he had complete success, I think we would see a substantial diminution of the violence. If we do not see a diminu- tion of the violence, then that suggests to me that there is more work to do to amend the political structure. Thank you. Mr. Shays. Thank you very much. [The prepared statement of Dr. Katzman follows:] 160 did not all welcome the fall of Saddam. Instead, the major communities in Iraq see the political system as a "winner-take-all," "life and death" contest. The Kurds and Shiite Arabs saw the fall of Saddam Hussein as a way to redress the abuses they suffered under Saddam Hussein. The Sunni Arabs saw the invasion and the U.S.-backed transition as a humiliation that left the minority Sunnis vulnerable to slaughter and repression at the hands of the victorious Shiites and Kurds. The Administration set up a political transition mechanism based on one-man one-vote system. Because the Shiite Arabs are so numerous (an estimated 60% of the Iraqi population), this system virtually guaranteed that Shiite Arabs would dominate the elected governments. Sunni resentment was assured as well, because the Sunnis can never hope to return to power under this electoral system. The only way they can prevail, in the Sunni view, is by overturning the political process altogether through violence. The Administration answers this criticism by asserting mat Sunnis are moving into the political process, and that the post-Saddam transition roadmap does not inherently cause Sunni opposition. My prepared statement has the list of the winning blocs in the two parliamentary elections held in 2005 and, as you can see, there was a distinct change in between the two major elections. The Sunnis who actively participated in the January 2005 elections were primarily westernized Sunnis who had long accepted the U.S. invasion to topple Saddam. Some, such as Ghazi al-Yawar, served in top jobs in the occupation era (2003-2004) and the 2004-2005 transition government of Iyad al- Aliawi, The December 2005 election, however, saw the participation of what could be called "skeptical Sunnis" - Sunnis who had opposed the U.S. invasion and boycotted previous elections. Those in this category include Adnan al-Dulaymi of the General People's Council and Mahmoud Mashhadani of the National Dialogue Council who is now speaker of the Council of Representatives (parliament). Election Results (January and December) Seats (Dec. 05) UIA (Shiite Islamist); Sadr formally joined list for Dec. vote 140 128 Kurdistan Alliance (PUK and KDP) 75 53 Iraqis List (secular, Allawi); added some mostly Sunni parties for Dec. vote 40 25 Iraq Concord Front (Sunni). Main Sunni bloc; not in Jan. vote — 44 Dialogue National Iraqi Front (Sunni. Saleh al-Mutlak) Not in Jan. vote 11 Iraqi National Congress (Chalabi). Was part of UIA list in Jan. 05 vote - 0 Iraqis Party (Yawar, Sunni); Part of Allawi list in Dec. vote 5 — Iraqi Turkomen Front (Turkomen, Kirkuk-based, pro-Turkey) 3 1 National Independent and Elites (JanVRisalyun (Mission, Dec) pro-Sadr 3 2 People's Union (Communist, non-sectarian); on AHawi list in Dec. vote 2 - Kurdistan Islamic Group (Islamist Kurd) 2 5 Islamic Action (Shiite Islamist, Karbala) 2 o National Democratic Alliance (non-sectarian, secular) I Rafidain National List (Assyrian Christian) 1 1 Liberation and Reconciliation Gathering (Sunni. secular) 1 3 Ummah (Nation) Party. (Secular, Mithal ai-Alusi, former INC activist) 0 1 Yazidi list (small Kurdish, heterodox religious minority in northern Iraq) - 1 Number of polling places: January: 5,200; December: 6,200. 161 Eligible voters: 14 million in January election; 15 million in October referendum and December. Turnout: January: 58% (8.5 million votes)/ October: 66% (10 million)/ December: 75% (12 million). It also is not clear that those who have entered government are representative of or can control those Sunnis who support and form the insurgency. The all-important Muslim Scholars Association (MSA), which is widely believed close to insurgent groups, has remained outside the political process and continues to demand a timetable for U.S. withdrawal. It is also important to note that many of the Sunnis entered the December 2005 elections with the hope that doing so would strengthen their hand in the promised constitution amendment process. This was to begin when the new Council of Representatives was seated, but sources indicate that the process of negotiating amendments is not likely to begin until September. These same observers say that the amendment process has been slowed because the Sunnis have judged that the Kurds and Shiites will not entertain the major amendments sought by the Sunnis, particularly modification of the constitution's provisions for the formation and powers of new "regions." Furthermore, those Sunni leaders that are in the cabinet are perceived as included in the government because the United States pressured the Shiites to included them, and not because of any genuine Sunni empowerment. As such, the presence of these Sunnis in the government does not end the sense of humiliation and vulnerability on the "Sunni street." As evidence of the fragility of Sunni participation in government, the main Sunni blocs began a boycott of parliament in early July after the kidnapping of one of its parliamentarians, Tayseer Mashhadani. Reports said the Sunnis might expand their boycott to a suspension of Sunnis' participation in the cabinet. The Insurgent Challenge It is these structural political dynamics that, in my view, have caused the Sunni Arab-led insurgency against U.S. and Iraqi forces to defy most U.S. expectations of intensity and duration. Although hesitant to assess the size of the insurgency, U.S. commanders say that insurgents probably number approximately 12,000-20,000. Some Iraqi intelligence officials have publicly advanced higher estimates of about 40,000 active insurgents, helped by another 150,000 persons in supporting roles. Insurgent attacks — characterized mostly by roadside bombs, mortar and other indirect fire, and direct fire weapons as well as larger suicide bombings — numbered about 100 per day during most of 2005, and the DOD report cited above now puts that number at about 90 attacks per day, a figure including both insurgent and sectarian-related attacks. As discussed in the Administration's "National Strategy for Victory in Iraq" (November 30, 2005), many of the insurgents are motivated by opposition to perceived U.S. rule in Iraq, to democracy, and to Shiite political dominance. Others want to bring the Baath Party back into power, although, according to many experts, some would settle for a larger Sunni role in governance without the Baath. Still others are pro-Al Qaeda fighters, either foreign or Iraqi, that want to defeat the United States and spread radical Islam throughout the region. The insurgent groups appear to be loosely coordinated within cities and the wider provinces, but probably not nationally. However, in early 2006, suggesting broader coordination, a group of five insurgent factions announced the formation of a national "Mujahedin Shura (Council)" led by an Iraqi, Abdullah Rashid al-Baghdadi. This grouping purportedly consists mostly of Iraqi factions but includes foreign fighters formerly led by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. The key to assessing the insurgency is to determine its degree of popular support. The insurgency appears to be drawing on substantial Sunni resentment for its strength. We can see in its pattern of attacks - and particularly its ability to operate almost with impunity in urban areas - that 162 it clearly has some popular support in the Sunni majority areas of Iraq. Whole neighborhoods of Baghdad, including Amiriya, Jihad, Amal, and Doura, appear to be hosting insurgents, not to mention the Anbar Province city of Ramadi, for example. One recent press account quotes Iraqis as saying that the upscale and previously quiet Baghdad district of Mansour is now penetrated by insurgents. We have anecdotal reports from observers that insurgent mortar crews are often active in some of these districts, lobbing indirect fire into the Green Zone and elsewhere without any interference or any tip-off to the Iraqi security forces. The recent trends in the violence - particularly the kidnappings of groups of 50-80 persons at a time in broad daylight, in bustling areas of Baghdad - demonstrates the freedom of movement that the insurgents have. These are clear indicators that elements of the population are actively harboring and facilitation insurgent operations. The question is, why do the insurgents have popular support? It is because the Sunni population feels defenseless, and believes U.S. forces to be aligned with the Shiites and Kurds. The Sunnis perceive that the Iraqi security forces are essentially the tools of the Shiites and Kurds to obtain revenge for Saddam-era abuses. The Sunnis therefore see the insurgents as their only source of leverage and protection, and it is unlikely that a critical mass of Sunnis would cooperate in dismantling insurgent groups. Foreign Insurgents/Zarqawi Faction.' A numerically small but politically significant component of the insurgency is non-Iraqi. Some studies, such as one by the Center for Strategic and International Studies, released in September 2005, said that about 3,500 foreign fighters are in Iraq. According to the study, the foreign fighters come mostly from Algeria, Syria, Yemen, Sudan, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt, with Saudis constituting only about 350 of the 3,000 estimated foreign fighters. The Department of Defense said on October 20,2005, that 312 foreign fighters had been captured in Iraq since April 2005. A major portion of the foreign fighters was commanded by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, a 40-year-old Jordanian Arab who reputedly fought in Afghanistan during the 1980s alongside other Arab volunteers against the Soviet Union. He was killed in a June 7,2006, U.S. airstrike and has been succeeded by the little known Abu Hamza al-Muhajir (also known as Abu Ayyub al-Masri), an Egyptian national. The foreign fighters have been a U.S. focus because of their alleged perpetration of large scale suicide and other bombings against both combatant and civilian targets, as well as kidnappings and beheadings of foreign nationals and diplomats. However, their more policy-significant contribution to the overall insurgency has been their focus on fomenting Sunni — Shiite civil war in Iraq. Zarqawi's group apparently was responsible for the February 22 attack on the Askariya Shiite mosque in Samarra that has sparked significant sectarian violence. Zarqawi' s successors issued a purported statement on June 13, 2006 that he would continue to emphasize attacks on Shiite civilians. It is also unclear whether Zarqawi's faction, after his death, will attempt to conduct activities outside Iraq. Zarqawi's faction reputedly committed the August 19, 2005, failed rocket attack in the Jordanian port of Aqaba against two U.S. warships docked there, as well as the November 10, 2005, bombing of Western-owned hotels in Amman, Jordan. Sectarian Violence/Militias/Civil War? The combination of Iraqi insurgent activity, and the dedicated strategy of the Zarqawi faction, has caused a marked increase in Sunni - Shiite violence. Top U.S. officials have said recently that sectarian-motivated violence has now displaced the insurgency as the primary security challenge in Iraq. U.S. officials, both military and civilian, have said the sectarian violence risks becoming all- out civil war, but that they do not consider Iraq in a civil war now. Some experts consider the 1 See CRS Report RL32217, Iraq andAl Qaeda: Allies or Not?, by Kenneth Katzman. 165 an option in Iraq by supporting militant Shiite parties that are prepared to step up operations against U.S. and British forces. On June 22, 2006 General George Casey reiterated previous U.S. statements that the Qods Force (Jerusalem force) of Iran's Revolutionary Guard is assisting Shiite armed factions in Iraq with explosives and weapons. The most likely recipient is the Shiite faction of Moqtada al-Sadr and its affiliates, including the Fadilah party and the newly declared Iraq-Abbas Brigades. U.S. Efforts to Restore Security At times, such as after the capture of Saddam Hussein in December 2003 and after all three elections in 2005, U.S. officials have expressed optimism that the insurgency would subside, only to see it continue. As outlined in the "National Strategy for Victory in Iraq," the Administration continues to try to refine its stabilization strategy. "Clear, Hold, and BuikTStrategy/Provincial Reconstruction Teams. The Administration is now pursuing a strategy called "clear, hold, and build," intended to create and expand stable enclaves by positioning Iraqi forces and U.S. civilian reconstruction experts in areas cleared of insurgents. The strategy, based partly on an idea advanced by Andrew Krepinevich in the September/October 2005 issue of Foreign Affairs? says that the United States should devote substantial resources to preventing insurgent re-infiltration and promoting reconstruction in selected areas, cultivating these areas as a model that would attract support and be expanded to other areas and eventually throughout Iraq. In conjunction with the new U.S. strategy, the Administration is forming Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), a concept used in Afghanistan. Each PRT is civilian led, composed of about 100 U.S. State Department officials and contract personnel, to assist local Iraqi governing institutions, such as the provincial councils (elected in January 2005), representatives of the Iraqi provincial governors, and local ministry representatives. As reported in the Washington Post on January 15,2006, the concept ran into U.S. military objections to taking on expanded missions at a time when it is trying to draw down its force. The internal debate has apparently been resolved with an agreement by DOD to provide security to the U.S.-run PRTs. Thus far, five PRTs have been inaugurated: in Mosul, Kirkuk, Hilla, Baghdad, and Anbar Province. Plans are for three more U.S. led PRTs and four coalition partner-run PRTs, as well as perhaps eight Iraqi-run PRTs. To date, Britain has agreed to establish a PRT in Basra, and Italy has agreed to form one in Dhi Qar province. U.S. Counter-Insurgent Combat Operations. The Administration position is that continued combat operations against the insurgency are required. About 132,000 U.S. troops are in Iraq (down from 160,000 there during the December election period and down from 2005 baseline levels of 138,000), with about another 50,000 troops in Kuwait and the Persian Gulf region supporting OIF. The prospects for force reductions are discussed in the section on options below. A major focus of U.S. counter-insurgent combat remains Anbar Province, which includes the cities of Fallujah and Ramadi, the latter of which is the most restive of all Iraqi cities. An additional 1,500 U.S. troops were sent to Ramadi in May 2006 to combat U.S./Iraqi apparent loss of control there. About 40,000 U.S. troops are in Anbar alone. Differing degrees of combat continue consistently in about two dozen other Sunni-inhabited towns, including Baqubah, Balad, Tikrit, Mosul, Samarra, Hit, Haditha, and Tal Altai, as well as several small towns south of Baghdad, such as Yusufiya. In the run-up to the December 15 elections, U.S. and Iraqi forces conducted several major operations (for example Operations Matador, Dagger, Spear, Lightning, Sword, Hunter, Steel Curtain, and Ram) to clear foreign fighters and other insurgents from Sunni cities along the 3 Krepinevich, Andrew. "How to Win in Iraq," Foreign Affairs, Sept./Oct. 2005. 169 Ministry of Interior Forces Force • . Size/Strength - .— U.S. Funds Allocated Iraqi Police Service (IPS) 107,000, including 1,300 person Highway Patrol. Target size is 135,000 by 2007. Gets eight weeks of training, paid $60 per month. Police work out of police stations nationwide; not organized as battalions. S 1.806 billion allocated for training and technical assistance. Center for Dignitary Protection About 500 personnel National Police About 26,500. Comprises "Police Commandos," Public Order Police," and "Mechanized Police." Organized into 28 battalions, 2 of which (about 1,500) are "in the lead" in counter-insurgency operations. Six battalions (about 4,000) control security in their areas. Overwhelmingly Shiite, but U.S. is attempting to recruit more Sunnis. Gets four weeks of counter-insurgency training. Emergency Response Unit About 300, able to lead operations. Hostage rescue. Border Enforcement Department About 38,000. Controls 258 border forts built or under construction. Has Riverine Police component to secure water crossings. S437 million, S3 million of which is allocated to pay stipends to 150 former regime WMD personnel. Totals (ail forces) 152,300. Goal is 195,000 Training Training by 2,000 U.S. personnel as embeds and partners. Pre-operational training mostly at Jordan International Police Training Center, Baghdad Police College and seven academies around Iraq; and in UAE. Countries doing training aside from U.S.; Canada, Britain, Australia, Sweden, Poland, UAE, Denmark, Austria, Finland, Czech Republic, Germany (now suspended), Hungary, Slovenia, Slovakia, Singapore, Belgium, and Egypt. Facilities Protection Service Technically outside MOI. About 145,000 security guards protecting economic infrastructure. S53 million allocated for this service thus far. 170 ISF Funding. The accelerated training and equipping of the Iraqis is a key part of U.S. policy. The Administration has been shifting much U.S. funding into this training and equipping mission. According to the State Department, a total of $5,036 billion in IRRF funds has been allocated to build (train, equip, provide facilities for, and in some cases provide pay for) the ISF. Of those funds, about $4,912 billion has been obligated as of May 30, and $4,519 billion of that has been disbursed. A FY2005 supplemental appropriation (P.L. 109-13) provided an additional $5.7 billion to equip and train the ISF, funds to be controlled by the Department of Defense and provided to MNSTC-I. (When spent, that would bring total ISF funding to $11 billion.) The conference report on the FY2006 supplemental (P.L. 109-234) provides about $3 billion of those funds, but withholds the remaining ISF facilities construction funding. Non-U.S. Coalition Forces According to the Administration, there are 28 countries (aside from the United States) contributing a total of about 19,000 peacekeeping forces to Iraq. The main non-U.S. contingent is that of Britain, which has about 7,500 forces based in Basra. However, several major contingents have left or are in the process of reducing troop levels in Iraq. This could represent progress, in that the departure of foreign forces might indicate that Iraqi forces can compensate for any withdrawals. On the other hand, many interpret this trend as an indicator of waning international support for the mission. Among recent major developments: • Italy has reduced its force from 3,200 in September 2005 to about 1,700 currently, based in the southern city of Nasiriyah (Dhi Qar Province). Prime Minister Romano Prodi says all Italian troops will be out by the end of 2006. • Ukraine, which lost eight of its soldiers in a January 2005 insurgent attack, completed withdrawal of its remaining 1,500 forces after the December 2005 elections. • Bulgaria pulled out its 360-member unit after the December 15 Iraqi elections. However, in March 2006 it said it had sent in a 150-person force to take over guard duties of Camp Ashraf, a base in eastern Iraq where Iranian oppositionists are located. • South Korea withdrew 270 of its almost 3,600 troops in June 2005, and, in line with a November 2005 decision, withdrew another 1,000 in May 2006, bringing its troop level to about 2,200 (based in Irbil in Kurdish-controlled Iraq). The remainder will stay through 2006. • In June 2006, Japan began withdrawing its 600 Ground Self-Defense Forces from the Samawah area. Options and Debate on an "Exit Strategy" Some say that major new initiatives need to be considered to ensure success of the U.S. mission in Iraq. As U.S. public support for the U.S. commitment in Iraq has appeared to decline, debates have emerged over several congressional resolutions proposing an "exit strategy." Some of the ideas widely discussed are assessed below. Re-Working the Political Structure. It flows from the above analysis that many Sunnis will only be satisfied by a major restructuring of Iraqi politics that makes the Sunnis full partners of 172 to deepen the U.S. commitment without a clear exit strategy. Others believe that increasing U.S. force levels would further the impression that the Iraqi government depends on the United States for its survival. Immediate Withdrawal. A more vigorous debate has emerged over whether and when the United States should reduce its security commitment to Iraq. Some Members argue that the United States should begin to withdraw virtually immediately. Supporters of this position tend to argue that the decision to invade Iraq and change its regime was a mistake in light of the failure thus far to locate WMD, that a continued large U.S. presence in Iraq is inflaming the insurgency, and that remaining in Iraq will result in additional U.S. casualties without securing U.S. national interests. Those who take this position include the approximately 50 Members of the "Out of Iraq Congressional Caucus," formed in June 2005. In November 2005, Representative John Murtha, a ranking member and former chairman of the Defense Appropriations Subcommittee, publicly articulated a similar position, calling for an "immediate" pullout (over six months). His resolution (H.J.Res. 73) called for a U.S. withdrawal "at the earliest practicable date" and the maintenance of an "over the horizon" U.S. presence to help the ISF. A related resolution, H.Res. 571 (written by Representative Duncan Hunter, chairman of the House Armed Services Committee), expressed the sense "that the deployment of U.S. forces in Iraq be terminated immediately;" it failed 403-3 on November 18,2005. Other bills, such as H.R. 3142, H.Con.Res. 197„ state that it [should be] U.S. policy not to maintain a permanent or long-term presence in Iraq. The conference report on the FY2006 supplemental appropriation (P.L. 109-234) omitted a provision to this effect that was in the House version. Withdrawal Timetable. Another alternative is the setting of a timetable for a U.S. withdrawal. This has been exemplified by H.J.Res. 55, introduced by Rep. Neil Abercrombie, which calls on the Administration to begin a withdrawal by October 2006. H.Con.Res. 348, introduced by Rep. Mike Thompson, calls for a redeployment of U.S. forces no later than September 30,2006. In November 2005, Senator Levin, who takes the view that the United States needs to force internal compromise in Iraq by threatening to withdraw, introduced an amendment to S. 1042 (FY2006 defense authorization bill) to compel the Administration to work on a timetable for withdrawal during 2006. Reportedly, on November 10, 2005, Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee John Warner reworked the Levin proposal into an amendment that stopped short of setting a timetable for withdrawal, but required an Administration report on a "schedule for meeting conditions" that could permit a U.S. withdrawal. That measure, which also states in its preamble that "2006 should be a period of significant transition to full Iraqi sovereignty," achieved bi-partisan support, passing 79-19. It was incorporated, with only slight modifications by House conferees, in the conference report on the bill (H.Rept. 109-360, P.L. 109-163). Responding to the November 2005 congressional action, President Bush and U.S. commanders remained adamant in their stated opposition to the setting of any timetable for troop pullouts, let alone an immediate pullout. During and after his June 13, 2006 visit to Baghdad, President Bush again appeared to rule out a pullout by stating that the United States would uphold its "commitment" to the Iraqi government, although he did suggest in trip-related comments that Iraqi officials need to plan their own future. Supporters of such positions maintain that the Iraqi government would collapse upon an immediate pullout, representing a victory for terrorists. H.Res. 861, stating that "..it is not in the national security interest of the United States to set an arbitrary date for the withdrawal or redeployment" of U.S. forces from Iraq, passed the House on June 16 by a vote of 256-153, with 5 voting "present." On June 22, the Senate debated two Iraq-related amendments to a FY2007 defense authorization bill (S.2766). One, offered by Senator Kerry, setting a July 1,2007 deadline for U.S. redeployment from Iraq, was defeated 86-13. Another amendment, sponsored by 173 Senator Levin, called on the Administration to begin redeployment out of Iraq by the end of 2006, but with no deadline for full withdrawal. It was defeated 60-39. Troop Reduction. The House and Senate debate occurred a few days before press reports appeared that Gen. Casey, during a visit to Washington in late June, had presented to President Bush options for a substantial drawdown of U.S. forces in Iraq, beginning as early as September 2006. According to reports of the Casey plan, which the Administration says is one option and is dependent on security progress, U.S. force levels would drop to about 120,000 by September 2006, with a more pronounced reduction to about 100,000 by the end of 2007. The new reports are similar to some previous reports of plans for reduction. Previous such reported plans, such as those discussed in late 2005, have tended to fade as the security situation has not calmed significantly. Accelerating Economic Reconstruction. Some believe that the key to calming Iraq is to accelerate economic reconstruction. According to this view, accelerated reconstruction will drain support for insurgents by creating employment, improving public services, and creating confidence in the government. This idea appears to have been incorporated into the President's "National Strategy for Victory in Iraq" document and the formation of the PRTs, as discussed above. Others doubt that economic improvement alone will produce major political results because the differences among Iraq's major communities are fundamental and resistant to economic solutions. In addition, the U.S. plan to transfer most reconstruction management to Iraqis by the end of2007 might indicate that the Administration has not found this idea persuasive. Internationalization Options. Some observers believe that the United States needs to recruit international help in stabilizing Iraq. One idea is to identify a high-level international mediator to negotiate with Iraq's major factions. In a possible move toward this option, in March 2006 President Bush appointed former Secretary of State James Baker to head a congressionally created "Iraq Study Group" to formulate options for U.S. policy in Iraq. (The conference report on the FY2006 supplemental appropriation (P.L. 109-234) provides $1 million for operations of the group.) However, there is no public indication, to date, that Baker himself might be such a mediator, and most experts believe that a mediator, if selected, would likely need to come from a country that is viewed by all Iraqis as neutral on internal political outcomes in Iraq. Another idea is to form a "contact group" of major countries and Iraqi neighbors to prevail on Iraq's factions to compromise. This idea is reflected in S.J.Res. 36, introduced May 8, 2006 by Senator Kerry. 175 at this point there is very little chance that someone can reestab- lish it by force. We talked about having eliminated this, but one other great problem here is we don't have people out in the field to really measure what is happening in smaller towns and cities. I would note that there are province-by-province reports, and they do describe some of these, and there are maps of Baghdad, Mosul, Kirkuk and other cities that show red zones and yellow zones, but these are not things distributed broadly. You can't tie them to numbers to show exactly how violent things are. The one punchline to all of this, though, is I think everyone is worried that we may be drifting toward a large-scale civil war, and that if the Iraqi political process doesn't hold together, that could easily happen in the next few months. Mr. Van HOllEN. Well, I think that seems to be the trend, and the question is whether we can do anything to reverse that trend. As you point out, one of the big concerns is the sectarian violence is spilling beyond Baghdad to other areas. I think Kirkuk is a pos- sible ticking time bomb and an issue that has to be addressed in the Constitution. Whether it can be or not, we will find out. But, Dr. Katzman, you raised the issue of the make-up of the military pointed out that many of the military units are largely Shi'a, other than the Kurdish units. We, I think, all well know reality given the history of the Kurd- ish people. There was never any question as to whether or not they were going to give up their own control over the military, the Peshmerga. I think that was going to be a nonstarter from the be- ginning. So as you observed from the Sunni's perspective, there are only armed forces to defend themselves or, in fact, the insurgency. If you could just give us a little more statistics, because I think the picture the Americans have of the American military are these units that are integrated where you have Kurds and Sunnis and Shi'as operating together under a general command. If you are going to have a central government, if you are going to have a democratically elected government that has any kind of credibility, they will have to be able to order the military to do things, and the military will have to see the central government as the primary authority, rather than the Shi'a leader or the Sunni leader or the Kurdish leader. But I think if you could talk about the make-up of the army, be- cause we hear the numbers, this many new units in the military, this and that. But if you sort of look beneath it and look at the make-up, I think it tells a different story and one that is troubling. If you could elaborate. Dr. Katzman. I may have to get back to you with more precise statistics, but my understanding is that of the army units deployed in the Sunni areas, about 70 percent are Shi'a. When you get a lit- tle further up north into Mosul, north of Tikrit, north of Samarra, there's more of a Kurdish—many of the units have more Kurds; not necessarily more Kurds than Shi'a, but it's more Kurdish. The Kurds are deployed, Mosul and north, Kirkuk, etc.; and mainly the Shi'a units in the Sunni areas. 176 In the Shi'a areas, it's not really that relevant, because the Shi'a areas are peaceful anyway. It's not that big an issue. The issue is Shi'a-dominated units, policing and securing the Sunni areas. That is very sensitive to the Sunnis, and it has made them feel that they are basically being pressed. Mr. Shays. I would like each of you to define success in Iraq and failure in Iraq, and that is what I am going to have you do. But I am first going to make a comment to Dr. Kubba. Doctor, when I have gone to Iraq, I felt like I have been the typi- cal American who goes in and says to—when I am sitting down with Shi'a, Sunnis and Kurds, as I am asked to do in the govern- ment, I say, are you a Shi'a? They will say, I am a Shi'a, but I am married to a Sunni. Then I will ask someone, are you a Sunni or a Shi'a or a Kurd? And they will say, I am a Sunni, but my son or my daughter is married to a Shi'a. I mean, they are constantly kind of like correcting me. Then I will ask a Kurd, and he will say, well, I am a Kurd, but I am a Sunni. So I find myself being lec- tured in a way by Iraqis that they are Iraqis. Yet in this country we divide you into these three parts. I will say to you that when I was in Arbil for the first vote of January 2005, I finally—I was watching the celebration as the Kurdish women were bringing their husbands to vote, and their children in their arms, dressed up, celebrating. After about 2 hours of watching this, I wanted to kind of stick my finger in the ink jar for about a week as proof that I had witnessed one of the greatest experiences in my life, seeing people vote for the first time and, in many cases, under great duress. I asked this Iraqi woman I was there—the Kurdish woman who was there if I could stick my finger in that ink jar. She looked at me. She looked down, she looked up. Then she yelled, no, you are not an Iraqi, and I got a chill. I was embarrassed, but I got a chill. She didn't say because I wasn't a Kurd. Do we tend to overemphasize the difference between Shi'a, Sunnis and Kurds, or are there real distinct differences, and are we foolish not to know that? Dr. Kubba. Well, I am glad you asked this question. Regretfully, Saddam Hussein had played communities against each other and raised temptation among them. But Iraqis are by and large intermixed marriages. At the same time you will see half are Shi'a, half are Sunnis. Religion has not really played a big role, and peo- ple were comfortable to integrate within Iraq through universities, through the army, like the bureaucracies, like any other modern state. Regretfully, the politics, the recent politics, have led a group of politicians or political parties to build their power base by playing ethnic differences. It just gave them new entry. I think recently we have institutionalized these differences by creating a quota system within the government, creating ministries so that we have exactly the right balance of Arabs, Kurds, Shi'as, Turkmens, Assyrians. And by and large with the elections that we have put in Iraq, we have created an environment that people have started to drift to these affiliations, this is at the political level. But most importantly at the street level when the government force is absent, there is no system I can rely on, no system I can rely on, then people natu- 177 rally will take refuge if their sub or secondary identity, not their main identity—because the state represents the main identity, and that is absent. So the state has created the environment, and it has taken a while today to see Iraq the way it is. I think there is a lot of re- serve in Iraq. I think in essence other than the Kurdish region, the Kurds have struggled for a national identity in an autonomous re- gion. But the rest of Iraq, which shares more or less the same lan- guage, culture, space, they really do not have an inherent problem, and I think what we are seeing today primarily is not the cause of the problems, their diversity in Iraq, but it is the consequence or the fact Iraq is being the absent state or the weak state. We have handed just streets, districts and people to different groups, and the state is absent. Mr. Shays. Thank you. Now, you have given your three col- leagues an opportunity to think of what is success in Iraq and what is failure, so I will ask you go fourth. Dr. Pollack, do you want to go first, define success, define fail- ure? Dr. Pollack. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me first by defining failure because it's much easier. Failure is all-out civil war in Iraq. What we have now is low-level civil war, not all-out civil war, and the differences matter. They matter a lot. I agree with my colleagues that the trend lines, unfortunately, are toward all-out civil war. I don't believe we have reached the point of no return, but that is where we have headed. Success, therefore, to a certain extent, is avoiding failure. It's avoiding all-out civil war. I would like to be able to say that we ought to consider the bright shining city on a hill that the adminis- tration conceived of as being the goal of the—the initial invasion of Iraq as being a possibility. It may still be, but it's a long-term one at this point in time. This effort that we undertook at Brookings, we basically defined avoiding failure. We defined success as what we called sustainable stability, which is a stable situation in Iraq, where Iraq has the military, political and economic institutions that are capable of sus- taining that stability in the absence of massive American assist- ance. It is effectively going to the point that Laith just made, which I think is right on the money. The principal problem that we have in Iraq today is that it is a failed state and a security vacuum, and we need to create Iraqi institutions that are capable of dealing with that failed state and that security vacuum. And if we can do that, we will have achieved sustainability, stability, and that will be suc- cess. Mr. ShaYS. Dr. Cordesman. Dr. Cordesman. Let me just define victory. I think it is if by 2010 you have available political compromise in Iraq that preserves most elements of pluralism, but above all creates a rule of law that protects minorities in the individual. It is if Iraqis have assumed responsibilities for their security in virtually all missions. It is if the economy has begun to grow again, you have eliminated the worst pockets of unemployment, and you have found some way to agree on the sharing of oil revenues and resources. Finally, it is if 188 Interior and the Army responsible for the orders did not fully carry out their roles and responsibilities, the contractor was allowed to play a role in the procurement process normally performed by the government. GAO identified interagency contracting as a government-wide high risk issue in January 2005. (Illustrative contractor: CACI International, Inc.) Prioritization of contract vulnerabilities. While all of these systemic problems continue to be of concern, two warrant particular attention because of their widespread nature and opportunities for prospective improvements: (1) the adequacy of government oversight over contracts in Iraq, and (2) the capacity of the acquisition workforce to oversee the heavy contract workload in Iraq. 189 190 Advancing the President's National Strategy for Victory in Iraq: Funding Iraq's Transition to Self-Reliance in 2006and 2007 Two Fundamental Principles Success in Iraq requires progress on alt three tracks — political, security, and economic — of the Presidents National Strategy for Victory in Iraq. The three tracks are fundamental to our counter-insurgency, counterterrorism campaign and our effort to help Iraqis build a democratic, stable and prosperous country that is a partner in the war against terrorism. The Departments of State, Defense, Justice, Homeland Security, Treasury, and USAID coordinate closely to carry out their respective roles in each track. As the strategy states, "progress along one of the political, security and economic tracks reinforces progress along the other tracks." ■ The first fundamental operating principle is that transition to Iraqi responsibility cannot be sustained without integrated progress on all three tracks. For instance, the ability of Iraqi Security Forces to maintain stability and security in an area relates not only to their capabilities, but also to the capabilities of the local and provincial governments, as well as the economic climate and the willingness of local leaders to engage in politics and not violence. Because success in the political, security, and economic realms are intertwined, foreign assistance funding must be seen as an important tool in our overall effort to defeat the terrorists and neutralize the insurgency. Funding just one element of our strategy will produce lopsided effects in what must ultimately be an integrated effort for Iraqis to succeed, and for us to complete our mission in Iraq. ■ A second principle is that 2006 will be a critically important year: it is the year of transition to greater Iraqi self-reliance, which requires helping Iraqis sustain their infrastructure, and build greater Iraqi civilian capacity at the national, provincial and municipal levels for better, more responsive and more transparent governance. Accordingly, the State Department's portion of the Administrations request for Iraq constitutes S3.252B in the FY 2006 Supplemental (S1.610B for foreign assistance and $1.642B for State and AID operating expenses), and $771M in the FY 2007 foreign assistance budget for Iraq for a total of$4.023B. 2 191 Transition from the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund 1 and 2 Congress provided S20.9B in Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund (IRRF) 1 and 2 funds in 2003 and 2004, as documented in the Department of States report: U.S. Achievements Through the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund, February 2006 (http://www.state.gov/documents/ organization/60952.pdf)- While our overarching policy goals in Iraq have remained constant, we strategically re-allocated funds with the approval of Congress, and refined our programs in order to respond to evolving events on the ground, lessons learned, and emerging Iraqi priorities. Furthermore, this flexible approach will enable the Administration and Congress to carefully examine the 2006-2007 foreign assistance requirements supporting Iraq's transition to self-reliance. Almost all of the large infrastructure projects funded under IRRF 2 will be completed within the new Iraqi government's first year and many by the end of summer 2006. IRRF 2 will be fully obligated by the close of FY 2006, and will not be available to fund the critical requirements in the FY 2006 Supplemental and FY 2007 request. Of the S18.4B IRRF, we have obligated S15.810B and disbursed S10.875B as of February 22, 2006. We have an FY 2006 obligation plan for the remaining S2.629B that is managed daily, and updated monthly, which indicates we could have less than $1.5B to obligate by April 2006. Approximately 60% is for water and electricity projects, vital for the government to retain civilian support for the counter-insurgency effort; and approximately 40% is for oil, security, justice and other programs. These remaining IRRF funds serve as the principal tool the United States has to improve the Iraqi civilian authorities' ability to form and run the government, sustain political support for the counterinsurgency effort, and bolster Iraqi self- reliance, thereby showing Americas commitment to the new government and the people of Iraq. IRRF, FY 2006 Supplemental and FY 2007 budget request can be seen as phases in U.S. foreign assistance for Iraq, which is strategically calibrated to the changing needs in Iraq. The IRRF was used to kick-start reconstruction. The FY 2006 Supplemental and the FY 2007 budget request will support the counterinsurgency (COIN) campaign and develop the capacity to sustain Iraqi self-reliance. To start, we re-positioned $288M of the IRRF to programs and activities that in 2006 support the COIN campaign and the transition to Iraqi self-reliance through the Security, Economic, and Political Tracks.1 We need follow- on FY 2006 Supplemental and FY 2007 funding for these programs and activities to be successful. Timeline of Iraq Foreign Assistance Availability CY £003 CY 2004 t3.8B tRRF 1 $18 tB tRRF 2 192 $2.38IB in FY2006 Supplemental and FY2007 Foreign Assistance Requests In addition to conventional foreign assistance and post conflict programs funded under the IRRF, critical activities that support the counter- insurgency efforts and transition to Iraq's self- reliance will need funding through 2006 and 2007. This foreign assistance funding complements the funds DoD is seeking in its FY 2006 Supplemental.1 With the exception of prison construction, no other request is being made for large construction projects. ■ The $1.610B FY 2006 Supplemental funds emergency programs Support the COIN Campaign. Spending these monies is timed to begin in June, as IRRF funding becomes exhausted, and may carry us through the first six months of FY 2007. ■ The FY 2007 budget of $771M funds other high-priority foreign assistance programs to sustain the transition to Iraqi self-reliance for the remainder of FY 2007. Security Track Reconstruction Team (PRT)/Provincial 1 (PRDC)J and Infrastructure Security ($962M! We are continuing to transfer control of more territory to Iraqi Security Forces and are seeking to exploit fissures in the insurgency. We are adjusting our military posture to emphasize focused operations on terrorists, and making a concerted effort to improve the Iraqi police, to fight corruption, to disband militias, and to protect the With an ongoing insurgency, xfed in the aftermath of military operations, and for some other volatile areas. We also will focus on upgrading provincial governments, including through joint State-DoD PRT operations, directly supporting local civilian authorities important to coalition military forces. Our request is keyed to the following critical economic-security programs: ■ S325M (Supplemental) for focused stabilization of strategic cities and PRTs/PRDCs projects. Embassy Baghdad's will coordinate with PRTs, PRDCs and Multi-National Force- Iraq (MNF-I) the programming of $325 million in the provinces. This part of the Focused Stabilization of Strategic Cities (FSSC) program will be coordinated with local officials, religious and business leaders, and affected communities to meet local short-term essential service needs, build the trust of Iraqis in their government, and engage Iraqi citizens in the decision-making process. The FSSC program will help stabilize communities following military operations through restoring critical growth and community stabilization. In some communities, these funds will be used proactively to foster stability. $275M will be programmed as PRDC projects with $50M going to Baghdad, and approximately $15M each for the remaining 14 provinces and the Kurdish region. Some of these monies may also be used for FSSC program. • $50M will be programmed in local community service infrastructure for the FSSC program of approximately ten strategic cities. ■ SI65M (Supplemental) for PRTs to implement a Local Governance Program (LGP), to assist Iraq's provincial government and local leaders in developing a transparent and sustained capability to govern, providing increased security 4 193 and rule of law, promoting political and econimical development to meet rhe needs of the local population. These programs will also aid overall anti-corruption efforts. l SI65M (Supplemental) for Jobs Corps programs to generate employment and develop skills, and create informal educational opportunities for youth in strategic cities. l $20M (Supplemental) for local business development in strategic cities to expand small to medium size enterprises and to create micro- enterprise organizations. t S287M (Supplemental) for infrastructure security for oil, electricity and water and other key facilities and nodes which have been targeted as a part of insurgent and criminal activity. Economic Track Infrastructure Sustaimnent and Agriculture and Private Sector Development ($631.5M-S276.5M FY 2007 Budget t $355M Supplemental) We seek to economically sustain the security forces in their COIN effort through helping Iraq develop and maintain functioning essential services and the agriculture and private sector, thereby transitioning the economy from a centralized Stalinist model to a market-based transparent model. ■ S509M (S154M FY2007Budget and S355M Supplemental) for Infrastructure Sustaimnent • $80M (S20M FY2007 Budget + $60M Supplemental) for capacity development training and technical-level management to increase the Iraqis' abilities to operate and maintain Iraq's essential service infrastructure; and management tools and skills for USG-funded projects in six sectors (oil, electricity, health, water, communications, and transportation). • S429M ($134M FY2007 Budget + $295M Supplemental) for operations and maintenance of USG-funded infrastructure in key sectors. ■ S122.5M (Budget) for Agriculture and Private Sector Development • $84M (FY 2007 Budget) to promote agriculture sector development. This program will use an enterprise-driven approach to create value chains from the farm (both crops and livestock) to the market, particularly for higher value cash crops. The intent is to develop small and medium-scale private agro-food enterprises to produce, process, package, market, and distribute agro-food goods and services. This program will establish rural financial services, improving their ability to survive as enterprises. $18.5M (FY2007 Budget) to provide technical training to banks, complete automation of the stock exchange, assist the securities commission and association of securities dealers; increase the network of micro-finance institutions and public education campaigns on business creation; and increase education of and access to capital for small and medium enterprises. • $20M (FY2007 Budget) technical advisory support for ministries and Iraqi government institutions that regulate commerce, promote privatization and provide lending. Funding will also support Iraq's business civil society organizations, and non-bank financial institutions to ensure a broad diversification of financial services to meet the needs of the private sector. The business community will also be trained on information technology through resources and equipment provided to universities. 194 Political Track National Capacity Building/Reforms <$787.39M-$494.69M FY 2007 Budget • J292.7M Supplemental) To be economically and politically sustainable, the security forces require the support of a more effective, transparent and democratic civilian government. Accordingly, the US will provide specialized training programs to help new ministers and their staffs grow the management and administrative capabilities of their ministries. We will continue supporting the creation of democratic institutions, particularly the formation of effective national and provincial governments. In the December elections, Iraqis voted mostly along ethnic and sectarian lines. For Iraq to succeed politically we are funding programs for inter-communal and cross-sectarian cooperation and reconciliation, and rule of law to help Iraq reach a national compact to unify Iraq's communities. This includes economic policy reforms to stimulate private sector growth that carry significant political costs. To reach these goals, our critical political programs include: ■ S105M for Ministerial Capacity Building (MCB) $75M (Supplemental) for < capacity building to improve the core f of and skill sets in key ministries (eg., fiscal and personnel management, strategic planning and policy development, leadership, information technology, communication and technical skills). MCB also supports fiscal accountability and anti-corruption efforts. I $30M (Supplemental) to re-equip and modernize Iraqi institutes of public administration such as the National Center for Consultations and Administrative Development to provide modern training to Iraqi government officials in a range of core functions cited above, which the US will transition to the Government of Iraq in 2007. ■ $58M ($25M FY2007Budget * S33M Supplemental) of emergency and longer term funding to help the government adjust more quickly to pressures from corruption, the insurgency, and a transition from a cash economy, which are increasing security and other expenditures. Accordingly, we will support the Ministry of Finance and Central Bank to strengthen the economic system by increasing fiscal and budgetary discipline and government transparency, and assisting Iraq to meet the requirements of its IMF program, including increasing capacity for macroeconomic and monetary policy-making, budget formulation and execution, and supervision of commercial banks; and implementation of subsidy reforms, banking sector reforms and a national inter-bank payments system. These programs will substantially aid anti-corruption efforts. ■ S90M (FY2007Budget) for policy, subsidy, legal, regulatory and transparency reforms vital to re-shaping the economy from a centralized authoritarian model to a market- based, transparent system integrated into the global economy. ■ S73.27M (S63.27M FY2007 Budget + SIOM Supplemental) to promote democracy through training and support for the development of political parties and civil society groups that support the development of democracy, free trade unions, free enterprise, anti-corruption, and open media; to establish a National Institutions Fund to assist with priority projects that i and seed money for; groups, and think tanks that promote democracy; and continue programs for worr human rights issues, polling, and peace- building and reconciliation activities. ■ S423.3M Rule of Law S362.3M (S254.6M FY2007 Budget + SJ07.7M Supplemental) for Rule of Law 196 United Stai rs Dkpaktmi-.ni or Stat* Washing row DC Rl ! KASI.i) I1V I Hi BCRtM: Ol Nf.\K tvASURN At FAtRS A\J> Hit BlKIAt OF PtJRt tti AFFAIRS HflKI m« 2006 . Shi. I'mm umv ll.UJ Tff WMHBK? L.BRAWES