CONTENTS
Page
DATES
Briefing: January 11, 2007
Hearing: February 7, 2007
in
BRIEFER/WITNESS
The Honorable Condoleezza Rice, Secretary of State, U.S. Department of
State:
January 11, 2007
Prepared statement ....
February 7, 2007
Prepared statement .....
LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
The Honorable Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, a Representative in Congress from the
State of Florida: Prepared statement .
APPENDIX
The Honorable Robert Wexler, a Representative in Congress from the State
of Florida: Prepared statement, January 11, 2007 .........
The Honorable Sheila Jackson Lee, a Representative in Congress from the
State of Texas: Prepared statement, February 7, 2007 ......
The Honorable Edward R. Royce, a Representative in Congress from the
State of California: Prepared statement, February 7, 2007 ...
Written responses from the Honorable Condoleezza Rice to questions sub-
mitted for the record by the members of the Committee on Foreign Affairs:
February 7, 2007
(III)





IRAQ
THURSDAY, JANUARY 11, 2007
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:05 p.m. in room
2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Tom Lantos (chairman
of the committee) presiding.
Chairman LANTOS. The Committee on Foreign Affairs will please
come to order.
It is my great pleasure to welcome our most distinguished Sec-
retary of State, Dr. Condoleezza Rice. In her 2 years at the helm
of the Department of State, Dr. Rice brought her enormous foreign
policy acumen to this hearing room on several occasions, and today
marks the start of what we all hope will be her many appearances
before the Foreign Affairs Committee under its new management.
We are delighted to have you, Dr. Rice.
Let me also say, to set the stage both for you and for our col-
leagues, we all look forward to your next engagement with us on
February 7th to discuss the budget requests from the Department
of State; and, as is our practice, on that occasion we will have an
opportunity to engage in a kind of comprehensive tour on the hori-
zon that only you can provide.
Today, our focus is basically on Iraq, but I would like to give you
an opportunity, Madam Secretary, to tell us at whatever length you
choose your plans and your goals in terms of your upcoming visits
to the Middle East. We certainly wish you the very best on this
journey. You are confronting many difficult problems and we know
you will discharge your responsibilities always with enormous skill.
Unfortunately, we will be having votes called shortly, so I will
forgo my opening remarks and call on my good friend and distin-
guished colleague, the ranking member, to say whatever she choos-
es; and then we will turn it over to the Secretary.
Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much, Chairman Lantos. It
is a joy to be serving with you as ranking member, and I also will
forgo my opening statement until later so that we can hear from
the Secretary.
Chairman LANTOS. Madam Secretary, on behalf of all members
of the committee, welcome. We are delighted to have you, and we
would be grateful if you could tell us as in as much length as you
choose what your upcoming visit to the Middle East is designed to
achieve.


2
STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE CONDOLEEZZA RICE,
SECRETARY OF STATE, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Secretary RICE. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman; and thank
you very much, Congresswoman Ros-Lehtinen. I look forward to
continuing our long consultations. The fact is that we have worked
very well together, Mr. Chairman, when you were ranking, and I
look forward to your chairmanship of this committee.
Let me just say a few words about Iraq. I have a longer state-
ment, Mr. Chairman, that I would like to have entered into the
record.
Chairman LANTOS. Without objection.
Secretary RICE. In the opportunity of time, I will not read that.
I just want to underscore a couple of things, and I will speak to
the Middle East more broadly because I think it flows from t
comments I will make on Iraq.
I think as I come before you today we all know this is a crucial
moment for the United States. We all understand the enormous
stakes in Iraq, the enormous stakes for our country, for the region,
a region in which we have extremely important interests and have
had long-standing interests and indeed, because of the centrality of
that region, the importance for the world of a favorable outcome in
Iraq. And just as we recognize the stakes are enormous, we also,
as the President said last night, recognize that the current situa-
tion in Iraq is unacceptable. So if we put those two together, it
means that we need a new strategy for dealing with Iraq.
Last night, the President laid out his views of how we might pro-
ceed. We understand that the current situation, the current strat-
egy is not really working
I would just underscore a couple of things about the new strat-
first is that it is extremely important to recognize that the
Iraqis face-after the Samara Golden Mosque bombing, after Feb-
ruary 2006, an event that was carried out by al-Qaeda precisely to
stoke sectarian violence between Shi’a and Sunnis, it was planned
by the al-Qaeda to do that-the Iraqis face a different set of ci
cumstances where the important political process that they are en-
gaged in is threatened to be overrun by the inability to control
Baghdad, the inability to provide population security for the people
of Baghdad. What the President said last night and what we are
talking about today is the urgent need to do something about the
problem in Baghdad.
But I want to be very clear. It is an Iraqi responsibility to do
something about this sectarian violence. No one believes that
America can determine what kind of Iraq there is going to be. Is
it going to be an Iraq for all people or is it going to be sectarian
and divisive? That is something the Iraqis have to decide.
But if you believe, as we do, that they are now demonstrating,
have now told us of their will to deal with that problem, the ques-
tion is: Do they have the capability? It is the assessment of our po-
litical and military people in the field that they don't actually have
the capability to deal with the urgent problem in Baghdad, they
will bring their best forces from all around the country, but that
we need to augment that effort, and that is the surge of American
forces to which the President spoke last night.


But, very clearly, it can only work if the Iraqis are prepared to
make the tough choices, if they are prepared to behave in an even-
handed fashion toward their population.
Secondly, we recognize that no military force can resolve these
difficulties and indeed this needs to be a comprehensive strategy;
and so the President has ordered and we, in State, are responding
to the need for a civilian surge. That is to deal with the political
and economic side as well. We have had very good effect with our
I reconstruction teams which get us down to the local and
provincial level. These are civil affairs, civil military teams that go
into a province, work with the local people, work with the local
leadership, help to get projects and job growth in a specific area.
We all in America are Federalists, and we know that we could
not possibly have developed as a country if everything was depend-
ent upon success in Washington. So this is an effort to support the
Iraqis bottom up and to, frankly, have multiple points of success,
rather than just being dependent on success in Baghdad. So we are
increasing significantly the commitment to these provincial recon-
struction teams to carry out these important tasks.
I might just mention that we are having some effect in a place
like Anbar, which is the epicenter of al-Qaeda. We are seeing local
leaders respond to this al-Qaeda threat. The local sheiks there got
together. They brought 1,100 young men together. They sent them
to Jordan for training, as they call them, Sons of Anbar, to come
in and get in the fight against al-Qaeda; and the reason the Presi-
dent talked about a surge of forces into Anbar last night was to
support those positive developments.
Now all of this has to be put in the context of the region: and
here, Mr. Chairman, I will talk about your request to talk a little
bit about what I plan to do in the Middle East.
Obviously, Iraq is now the epicenter of how the Middle East
turns out. And our diplomacy has to recognize the importance of
Iraq to the region and the region to Iraq, but it also has to recog-
nize that it is a different Middle East, a Middle East in which
there is a new alignment, and our diplomacy has to respond to that
new alignment.
On the one side, you have extremist forces: Hezbollah, Hamas,
Syria, and Iran. In fact, it is Iran the state that is most responsible
for supporting those extremist forces. On the other side of the ledg-
er, you have youn
young reformist governments like Lebanon, the Gov-
ernment of Iraq and, of course, the positive forces in the Pales-
tinian Territories like Mahmoud Abbas. But you also, of course,
have states like Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Jordan, and the Gulf
States.
We have organized our diplomacy around the proposition that
you begin with those who share your views of how the Middle East
ought to develop; and, therefore, our diplomacy and my trip will
focus heavily on rallying the support of those responsible Arab
states to support the Government of Iraq, to support what needs
to be done there, to support, of course, also Lebanon and the mod-
erate Palestinians.
But, as to Iraq, I do believe that the states of the Gulf and the
Egyptians and the Jordanians understand increasingly that if they
are to resist as much they want to, if they are to resist Iranian in-


fluence or increases in Iranian influence in the Middle East, some-
thing that they fear quite rightly, then it is going to require sup-
port for Iraq. Because Iraq can either be a barrier to further Ira-
nian influence or it can become a bridge if it is not dealt with effec-
tively.
So one of the most important elements of my trip will be to talk
to those countries. I will talk with them individually in Egypt, in
Jordan, and in Saudi Arabia. I will then meet with the Gulf States.
The GCC+2 will have its fourth meeting since September, and it
really is rallying the states around support for these moderate gov-
ernments and in opposition to the extremists forces that Iran, in
particular, and Syria, as the kind of sidecar, are trying to unleash
in the region.
I know there has been a lot of talk about talking to Iran and
Syria. I have talked to you, some of you, about that. Let me say
that it is not that we fear or I fear talking to anyone, but you have
to ask: On what basis do you carry out such a conversation? We
have to separate them. With Syria, we have tried. Colin Powell
talked to Syria. Rich Armitage talked to Syria. William Burns
talked to Syria, and that was as recently as February 2005. Then
the Hariri assassination froze everyone internationally with en-
gagement with Syria.
But it is not that we haven't talked to Syria. The problem is
Syria hasn't acted on such approaches. It has supported extremists
in the opposite direction, continues to support extremist forces in
the region, continues to try to bring down the Government of Fuad
Sinoira in Lebanon, continues to harbor and house the most radical
Palestinian factions that are rewarding process toward a Pales-
tinian state.
So I can't imagine, frankly, what this conversation looks like. If
you go to the Syrians and you say you need to stop destabilizing
Iraq because it is in your interest to do so, most certainly they do
know that; and if they believe it is in their interest to stop desta-
bilizing Iraq, they will stop destabilizing Iraq. On the other hand,
if the idea is that we go somehow as supplicant to ask them to help
us in Iraq—and they will have a price, I can assure you, one can
only imagine that price is the reintroduction of Syrian influence
into Lebanon or perhaps to shave the edges off the tribunal that
the Syrians seem to fear will find some connection to the Hariri
murder.
With Iran, we have 27 years of policy that we did not have diplo-
matic engagement with Iran, but this administration said that we
were prepared to do that if the Iranians would suspend their en-
richment activities leading to the technologies that could lead to a
nuclear weapon, because it doesn't make sense to talk while they
keep improving their nuclear capability. I said, if they did so, I
would meet them anyplace, anytime; and that offer still stands.
But if we are talking about, in the absence of that commitment
from Iran, the following kind of engagement: We go to the Iranians
and as supplicants say to the Iranians, “Help us to secure Iraq,”
do we really believe that the Iranians are going to treat Iraq over
here and not demand that we do something to alleviate the pr
sure that we are now bringing on their nuclear program and their
nuclear ambitions? I don't think it is going to happen.


5
So we believe that the appropriate place for diplomacy for the
United States is to concentrate on this new alignment, Mr. Chair-
man and Congresswoman Ros-Lehtinen. It is an alignment that
could be quite favorable to all of our interests, to a stable Lebanon
is free of Syrian influence, to an Iraq that has the support of
the region, to a Palestinian state that could live side by side with
Israel in peace. That is the alignment that is going to support those
goals, and that is where I will be focused in the diplomacy that I
undertake.
I should mention that we have supported the Iraqis when, as any
state might do, they have engaged their neighbors even when they
have engaged Iran or Syria. But it is fine for the Iraqis to carry
that activity.
And, finally, I would note that we have an international compact
which is a pardon between the international community and the
Iraqis. The Iraqis would agree to do certain things-enact an oil
law, fight corruption; certain other activities—and the inter-
national community would promise support. It seems to me this is
something that could have a positive effect on support for Iraq but
also a positive effect on developments for reform in Iraq.
Let me close, Mr. Chairman, by saying I have been listening to
many from this body and to many from the Senate. We have talked
to lots of people. The President listened to advisors, old ones like
me, who have been a part of this since the beginning and bear the
responsibility for both good decisions and bad decisions; and he has
talked to new advisors like Secretary Gates, who comes with a
fresh look.
We understand the skepticism that we are hearing about wheth-
er or not this strategy can and will work. We understand that a
lot rests on whether or not the Iraqi Government finally makes the
difficult decisions that it needs to make. We also understand the
continuing heartache that America experiences with the death of
our men and women, whether in uniform or the brave civilians also
who are serving there, and we certainly understand the continuing
concern about those who are still in harm's way. But after a lot of
thought and after looking at a lot of different options, the President
very much decided that this is the best option for us going forward.
I have heard many people say that we can not fail and therefore
we need to give ourselves, and most importantly, the Iraqis, a
chance to succeed. That, Mr. Chairman, is what the President laid
out last night; and I hope that you will find a way to support it,
each and every one of you.
Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Secretary Rice follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE CONDOLEEZZA RICE, SECRETARY OF
STATE, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee:
As I come before you today, America faces a crucial moment. We all know that
the stakes in Iraq are enormous. And we all share the belief that the situation in
Iraq is unacceptable. On this we are united.
The new way forward that President Bush outlined last night requires us to do
things differently. Most importantly, the Iraqis have devised their own strategy, and
our efforts will support theirs. To do so, we will further decentralize and diversify
our civilian presence in Iraq to better assist the Iraqi people. We will further inte-
grate our civilian and military operations. And we will fashion a regional strategy


6
the mortis Americane for whateringer
but that are now engrand ethnicces throughop This is not least men interp
that supports reformers and responsible leaders in Iraq and across the Broader Mid-
dle East.
Among Americans and Iraqis, there is no confusion over one basic fact: It is Iraqis
who are responsible for what kind of country Iraq will be. It is they who must decide
whether Iraq will be characterized by national unity or sectarian conflict. The Presi-
dent has conveyed to the Iraqi leadership that we will support their good decisions,
but that America's patience is limited.
Iraqis are now engaged in a task without precedent in their history. Iraq rests
on the main religious and ethnic fault lines in the Middle East, and for centuries,
Iraqis have settled their differences through oppression and violence. Now they are
attempting to do so peacefully and politically. This is not easy, and as one could
expect, many Iraqis have deep grievances, which some violent men interpret as a
license to kill innocent people.
Baghdad has become the center of this conflict. We know that Al-Qaeda delib-
erately sought to provoke sectarian violence in Iraq by targeting Shia civilians. With
last February's bombing of the Golden Mosque in Samarra, the success of their plan
accelerated. Sectarian passions, incited to violence, now threaten to overwhelm
Iraq's fragile, yet promising, process of reconciliation-a process that has produced
successful elections and a new constitution, substantial agreement on a law to share
Iraq's oil fairly, and commitment to a more reasonable approach to “de-
baathification.”
To succeed with national reconciliation, the Iraqi government must improve secu-
rity for its people, particularly in Baghdad. Iraqis themselves must take up this es-
sential challenge. They must protect their population from criminals and violent ex-
tremists who kill innocent Iraqis in the name of sectarian grievance. The Iraqi gov-
ernment must reestablish_civil order in Baghdad to regain the trust of its people
and control of its capital. President Bush has decided to augment our forces to help
the Iraqis achieve this mission. Secretary Gates will have more to say on this.
Success in Iraq, however, relies on more than military efforts alone; it also re-
quires robust political and economic progress. Our military operations must be fully
integrated with our civilian and diplomatic efforts, across the entire U.S. govern-
ment, to advance the strategy that I laid out before you last year: “clear, hold, and
build.” All of us in the State Department fully understand our role in this mission,
and we are prepared to play it. We are ready to strengthen, indeed to “surge,” our
civilian efforts.
Our political and economic strategy mirrors our military plan: Iraqis are in the
lead; we are supporting them. Improvement in the security situation, especially in
Baghdad, will open a window of opportunity for the Iraqi government to accelerate
the process of national reconciliation. We can and will measure whether this work
is being done. We recognize that the trend of political progress in Iraq is just as
important as the end result. On the hydrocarbon law, for example, Iraqis are tran-
scending sectarian differences and achieving a national purpose. The is a positive
trend, and the process is moving in the right direction.
Iraqis must also take steps that accelerate economic development and growth. The
government of Iraq has taken many important steps already on key economic issues,
including policies to open Iraq's economy more fully and responsibly to foreign in-
vestment. The Iraqi government must now move urgently, especially in the most
troubled areas, to deliver essential services to its people-programs that improve
lives in meaningful ways, that restore confidence in national and local governance,
and provide a stake in the country's future for all Iraqis who wish to see an expan-
sion of hope rather than a continuation of violence. The Iraqi government is commit-
ting $10 billion of its own resources to help create jobs, to break the logjams to
growth in their economy, and to further national reconciliation.
To better disperse these new resources throughout the country, Iraqis are building
new governmental structures. One innovation they have proposed is the creation of
a new National Reconstruction Development Council, which would enable the Prime
Minister to deliver resources faster and more effectively for major infrastructure
projects. This Council will also help take the place of our own Relief and Reconstruc-
tion Fund. Another Iraqi innovation is the development of Project Management
Units, to help Iraqis use their own resources more effectively to implement pro-
grams.
For these efforts to succeed, our support will be crucial. Since 2004, we have used
money from the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund and other programs to build
infrastructure and help the central government move toward self-reliance. As we
enter 2007, despite many problems, we have substantially and successfully com-
pleted this phase. As Iraqis take charge, we will narrow our focus in how we help
their central government. Using FY 2006 Supplemental funding, we have worked
with the Iraqis to improve their capacity to govern. Now, our advisory efforts will
growt better disptal structuction Develo and more
Minister to deliveconstruction Developovation they h
birojects. This Counciresources faster andent Council, whichoposed is the crea
lopmen!wn Reliajor into the pro


in Fallujat an unprecedented me will also enable us to the street-level autreen Zone,
concentrate on the most vital ministries. We will advise and invest our resources
where we judge that our efforts will be most effective.
To oversee our economic support for the Iraqi people, and to ensure that it is
closely integrated with our security strategy, I have appointed Tim Carney to the
new position of coordinator for Iraq Transitional Assistance. He will be based in
Baghdad and will work with Iraqi counterparts to facilitate a maximum degree of
coordination in our economic and development efforts.
As Iraqis intensify efforts to improve lives, the main focus of our support will con-
tinue to shift toward helping the Iraqi government expand its reach, its relevance,
and its resources beyond the Green Zone. We will help local leaders improve their
capacity to govern and deliver public services. Our economic efforts will be more tar-
geted on specific local needs with proven records of success, like micro-credit pro-
grams. And we will engage with leading private sector enterprises and other local
businesses, including the more promising state-owned firms, to break the obstacles
to growth.
Our decentralization of effort in Iraq will require a more decentralized presence.
We must continue to get civilians and diplomats out of our embassy, out of the cap-
ital, and into the field, all across the country. The mechanism to do this is the Pro-
vincial Reconstruction Team, or PRT. We currently have ten PRTs deployed across
Iraq, seven American and three coalition. Building on this existing presence, we
plan to expand from 10 to at least 18 teams. For example, we will have six PRTs
in Baghdad, not just one. We will go from one team in Anbar province to three
in Fallujah, Ramadi, and al Qaim. These PRTs will closely share responsibilities
and reflect an unprecedented unity of civilian and military effort.
Expanding our PRT presence will also enable us to diversify our assistance across
all of Iraq. Iraq has a federal government. Much of the street-level authority, and
much of the opportunity for positive change in Iraq, lies outside the Green Zone,
in local and provincial governments, with party leaders and tribal chiefs. By actively
supporting these provincial groups and structures, we diversify our chances of suc-
cess in Iraq. Our PRTs have had success working at the local level in towns like
Mosul, Tikrit, and Tal Afar. Now we will invest in other parts of Iraq, like Anbar
province, where local leaders are showing their desire and building their capacity
to confront violent extremists and build new sources of hope for their people.
All total, we seek to deploy hundreds of additional civilians across Iraq to help
Iraqis build their nation. And we will ask Congress to provide funding to support
and secure our expanded civilian presence. We want to give our civilians, deployed
in PRTs, the flexibility to devote extra resources where they can do the most good
at the local level. Our expanded PRT presence will be a powerful tool to empower
Iraq's reformers and responsible leaders in their struggle against violent extremism.
We therefore plan to request, as part of our FY 2007 Supplemental, significant new
operating funds for our PRTs, as well as hundreds of million of dollars to fund their
programs. When we add in relevant USAID projects, we hope to approximately dou-
ble our resource commitment to help local Iraqi communities through PRTs.
These commitments will not be indefinite. As I said earlier, one of our main objec-
tives in this phase is to help the Iraqis use their own money to rebuild their coun-
try. The Iraqis have budgeted billions of dollars for this mission in 2007, and as
their efforts become more effective, we have kept our FY 2008 requests limited. We
want Iraqis to rely more and more on their own resources, their own people, and
their own efforts. Therefore, by 2008 and 2009, the burden of local assistance should
be assumed more effectively by the Iraqi government. In the meantime, though, our
efforts will be vital.
The final piece of our effort is the development of a regional diplomatic strategy,
which was a key recommendation of the Iraq Study Group. Iraq is central to the
future of the Middle East. The security of this region is an enduring vital interest
for the United States. America's presence in this part of the world contributes sig-
nificantly to its stability and success. So as we recommit ourselves in Iraq, we are
also enhancing our efforts to support reformers and responsible leaders in the re-
gion—and to deter and counter aggression to our friends and allies.
Our regional diplomacy is based on the substantially changed realities of the Mid-
dle East. Historic change is now unfolding in the region, and it is unleashing a great
deal of tension, anxiety, and violence. But it is also revealing a new strategic align-
ment in the Middle East. This is the same alignment we see in Iraq. On one side
are the many reformers and responsible leaders, who seek to advance their interests
peacefully, politically, and diplomatically. On the other side are extremists, of every
sect and ethnicity, who use violence to spread chaos, to undermine democratic gov-
ernments, and to impose agendas of hate and intolerance.
This is why the proper partners in our regional diplomacy are those who share
our goals. In this group, I would count, of course, our democratic allies, Turkey and


Israel. I would also count the governments of the Gulf states plus Egypt and Jordan,
or the “GCC + 2.” We have established unprecedented consultation with this group
of countries. In fact, I will be returning to the region, and to this process, later this
week. I would also count among our key partners the democratic reformers and
leaders in places like Lebanon, the Palestinian territories, and of course, Iraq. Our
most important goal now is to use our diplomacy to empower democratic and other
responsible leaders across the region. We must help them show their fellow citizens
that it is they, not violent extremists, who can best protect their lives, promote their
interests, and advance a future of hope.
On Iraq, in particular, our regional diplomacy has several components. One con-
cerns Iraq's neighbor to the north: Turkey. President Bush and I have engaged re-
tired General Joe Ralston to work with Iraq and Turkey on concerns about ter-
rorism from the Kurdish Worker's Party. Those efforts have helped to ease tensions,
but we will do more to protect our ally, Turkey, from terrorist attacks.
Over the last six months, we have also supported significant progress in crafting
an International Compact between the Iraqi government and the international com-
munity. Working with more than forty countries, Iraq has developed a set of written
commitments to action on political, security, and economic targets. The creation of
the Compact has been guided by a diplomatic process that has already met at the
level of foreign ministers. This group involves all of Iraq's neighbors—including
Iran-and other states that have invested significantly in Iraq's future. Iraq has led
the Compact process. The United Nations has served as co-chair. And the World
Bank has assisted. This diplomatic process also provides a structure that can easily
accommodate flexible, informal meetings of smaller groups of countries about other
topics of common concern.
While many of us are working to strengthen peace in the region, two governments
have unfortunately chosen to align themselves with the forces of violent extre-
mism—both in Iraq and across the Middle East. One is Syria. Despite many ap-
peals, including from Syria's fellow Arab states, the leaders in Damascus continue
to destabilize Iraq and their neighbors and support terrorism. The problem here is
not a lack of talk with Syria but a lack of action by Syria.
Iran is the other. If the government in Tehran wants to help stabilize the region,
as it now claims, it should end its support for violent extremists who destroy the
aspirations of innocent Lebanese, Palestinians, and Iraqis. And it should end its
pursuit of a nuclear weapons capability. I repeat my offer today: If Iran suspends
its enrichment of uranium-which is, after all, an international demand, not just
an American one—then the United States is prepared to reverse 27 years of policy,
and I will meet with my Iranian counterpart-anytime, anywhere—to discuss every
facet of our countries' relationship. Until then, we will continue to work with the
Iraqis and use all of our power to limit and counter the activities of Iranian agents
who are attacking our people and innocent civilians in Iraq.
Mr. Chairman, members of the committee: I know there are no guarantees or
magic formulas on the question of Iraq. I know that most Americans are skeptical
and concerned about the prospects of success. I know and share the concern for
those who remain in harm's way that all Americans feel, as well as the heartbreak
they feel for the families who have lost loved ones.
I also know that, over the past several weeks, President Bush and our entire na-
tional security team have carefully considered a full range of new ideas. The Presi-
dent has heard from those of his advisors, like me, who have been around from the
very beginning, and who bear responsibility for our policy thus far—its successes
and its setbacks. He has also heard from new advisors who bring a fresh perspec-
tive. In addition, the President has weighed the thoughtful advice given to him by
members of Congress, by our friends and allies abroad, and by outside experts, like
the gracious public servants who made up the Iraq Study Group.
The conclusion the President reached, with which I fully agree, is that the most
urgent task now is to help the Iraqi government establish confidence that it can-
and will—protect all of its citizens, regardless of their sectarian identity, from vio-
lent extremists who threaten Iraq's young democracy—and that it will reinforce se-
curity with political reconciliation and economic support. Implementing this strategy
will take time to succeed, and I fully expect that mistakes will be made along the
way. I also know that violent extremists will retain their capacity and their appetite
to murder innocent people. But reestablishing civil order—the willingness and the
capacity of the Iraqi government to meet its responsibilities to its people—is essen-
tial.
The situation in Iraq is unacceptable, and the stakes are extraordinary—for the
United States, for the region, and for the entire international community. It was,
after all, the trouble and turmoil of the Middle East that produced the violent ex-
tremist ideology of Al-Qaeda, which led 19 young men to crash airplanes into our
for thain in har prospects Iraq. There I knoni
memberaddition, the Presidso heard from ng for our policy & been around fro


cities five years ago on September 11. It is clear that, now and for many years to
come, the crucible of the Middle East will remain the center of gravity for American
and international interests.
There have been other critical times for America, when we have united as one
nation to meet great challenges. Now must be such a time, for it is a national desire
and a national imperative not to fail in Iraq. This, we believe, is the best strategy
to ensure success. And I ask that you give it a chance to work.
Chairman LANTOS. Thank you very much, Madam Secretary.
Let me begin where you left off, with the President's speech last
night.
Both last November and in every subsequent public expression
of views, what the American people are looking for is a responsible
plan for de-escalation and not escalation. The President last night
provided a plan of escalation, and the reason that there is such
broad disappointment and disapproval of his presentation has
much less to do with the details of the plan than the general direc-
tion of the plan.
The American people overwhelmingly—and you know the figures
as well as I do—by 80 percent, 85 percent, are in favor of a gradual
redeployment de-escalation and not an escalation of our military
presence.
One of the things which is so disappointing, Madam Secretary-
and, as you recall, 2 days ago at the White House I raised this
issue with the President-is that there is really no indication that
the countries in the region like Egypt or Saudi Arabia are showing
any willingness to participate in setting Iraq straight. Egypt has a
huge military force. I raised the issue, and I am raising it now pub-
licly. Have we asked the Egyptians to provide a significant number
of police and military for stabilizing Baghdad? Have the Saudis,
who have obtained hundreds of billions of dollars of unanticipated
surplus oil revenues, have they stepped forward to carry some of
the financial burden?
We have by now spent some $400 billion on this enterprise,
which is not much money for the Saudis, but they have not partici-
pated at all in any of this. Now if these regimes—which claim to
want to see a stable and peaceful and prosperous Iraq, being so
near facing the possibility of disaster for themselves if the civil war
escalates to the point of becoming a regional war—are unwilling to
do really anything except in the most minimal fashion, no wonder
that the American people feel that we have done our share. It is
now up to Iraq to, as you said at the outset, to provide for their
own security.
Civil wars end. All civil wars end. And it is not our responsibility
to end the particular civil war that we see in Iraq. It is not the
function of the American military to play the role of a referee be-
tween the Sunni and the Shi’a; and I would be grateful if, at the
outset, Madam Secretary, you could deal with this fundamental
issue.
The American people are asking for a program of de-escalation.
The President is giving us a program of escalation. The American
people are asking, What do the neighbors who have so much to
Iose, like Egypt and Saudi Arabia, what are they doing to help?
And on what do we base our optimism or the President's optimism?
A government that has been so pathetically non-national in its ori-


12
scramble an omelet. You don't need to be reminded of General
Shinseki's proposal that we would need something like 400,000
people to undertake this mission.
Now, I was in Iraq in a military helicopter shortly after the
major military operations ended; and the general who was with me
pointed to huge ammunition dumps, all of them unguarded because
we did not have adequate troops to guard them. And we agreed
that we will pay for this later on, and we are paying for it very
dearly.
What is the logic behind expecting that approximately 20,000 ad-
ditional troops-basically in a city, a metropolis deeply divided, of
5 million people—can really turn the corner? We all so much want
us to prevail and to bring some stability and tranquility to these
people who have suffered so much. But it is very difficult to follow
the logic which expects, after all this period of sectarian violence
and increasing hatred and hostility and bloodshed, to expect that
one more modest push will do it.
Secretary RICE. Well, Mr. Chairman, I would agree with you that
you need to nip things in the bud, and we still believe, and this
Îraqi Government believes, this is something that can be done, that
Baghdad is not yet beyond the point at which it can be brought
back from the brink. It is not yet at the point in which civil order
is so broken down that, with a concerted effort of Iraqi security
forces supported by American forces, they can't deal with these
death squads that are carrying out the violence.
Again, I think it is not simply that every Shi'a and every Sunni
want to fight with one another. This is a deliberate campaign of
armed people, who go into neighborhoods and do terrible things,
and they have to be stopped, and that is a civil order problem.
Chairman LANTOS. Isn't it a little bit more than that, Madam
Secretary? I mean, the Sunnis had been in control, they had been
the commanding force not only in Iraq but in much of the region
for a long, long time. There are countless stories of how the Sunnis
still believe that they are the majority. After this protracted period,
literally centuries of the suppression of the Shi'a, they now are in
the majority. They feel very powerful. This is payback time from
their point of view. From the Sunni point of view, it is desperate
desire to regain their earlier predominance. Isn't it much more
than just some bad groups engaging in some violence under deep
sectarian divisions here which we are attempting to paper over?
Secretary RICE. There are the absolutely sectarian divisions that
go back from the fact, as you know well, Iraq was drawn literally
on the fault lines between Sunni and Shi'a. But I would make a
couple of points.
First of all, these people have managed before to live together.
They are intermarried. Sometimes the tribes are both Sunni and
Shi'a. It is not as if-
Chairman LANTOS. But they lived under a police state.
Secretary RICE. That is right.
Chairman LANTOS. And the police state has a way of dealing
with people who get out of line.
Secretary RICE. But that is exactly my point. Mr. Chairman.
When the democratic process took place and it became one man,
one vote, it is absolutely the case that they could have come to an


13
irreconcilable place where Sunni were determined to reestablish
their power—and certainly there were some, the Baathists, in par-
ticular, who were in that camp—and it could have come to a place
where Shi’a were determined to work the will of the majority even
if it meant completely crushing the interest of the minority. But
that is not where they went. They went inside to a Constitution
that, while not perfect, is certainly a document that could provide
the basis for a unity government.
They went to a unity government in which they brought Sunnis
and Shi'a and Kurds together. The President, after all, is a Kurd.
The Vice President is a Sunni. They went to the development of
what we believe is going to be a very good oil law which didn't do
what people thought it would do, which is the Kurds said, What
is mine is mine and what is yours is negotiable. That is not the
oil law that they created.
So I think this is evidence that these are a people who actually
do want to live in the same body.
Now, what has happened is that because this new political proc-
ess has been slow—and I will underscore slow-in doing all of the
work of national reconciliation because some of the early moves
were, frankly, very sectarian, like the de-Baathification law that
cut much too deep, it did create an environment in which, once the
spark was set at Samara, the sectarian violence didn't get con-
trolled. It is unfortunate, frankly, just as a historical fact, that the
government was very new—the government hadn't even been
formed, and so it took them some time to get on top of it.
But I think that the possibility of a national compromise, a na-
tional reconciliation is still there. They are still working at it every
day. That is why they are still working on an oil law, working at
a new de-Baathification law, promising to hold provincial elections.
But if they don't find a way to provide population security so that
Iraqis across the spectrum believe that they will be protected by
their government, then people are going to do precisely what they
are starting to do but in larger numbers. They are going to depend
on protection of militias, depend on protections of armed men. That
is what they are trying to get a handle on, and that is why the
President wants to act now on Baghdad, rather than waiting until
the Iraqis can completely do it themselves.
Chairman LANTOS. Before I turn it over to my friend from Flor-
ida, could I just ask you to comment on the lack of Saudi and Egyp-
tian help?
Secretary RICE. Sure.
The Saudis have been quite helpful on the Sunni outreach side
and I think in convincing of some of the tribes to be a part of the
political process. I think we have been, or the Iraqis have been re-
luctant to have forces from their neighbors and near neighbors ac-
tually in their country.
Chairman LANTOS. How about financial help?
Secretary RICE. Financial help—I do believe what the Saudis
should do is debt relief. That is the single best thing they could do
for the Iraqis.
Chairman LANTOS. Why haven't they, Madam Secretary?
Secretary RICE. It is part of the international compact which is
being negotiated. But, frankly, we had spent a lot of time remind-


14
ing the Saudis and convincing them, and I think they are getting
there, that an Iraq that is a failed Iraq is really going to be much
worse for their interest; and if they are worried about Iranian in-
fluence, that is the way to make sure Iran has influence in the re-
gion. But I think they will act. They too, would like to see the
Maliki government demonstrate some evenhandedness between
Sunnis and Shi'a.
Chairman LANTOS. Thank you very much.
Congresswoman Ros-Lehtinen.
Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much to my friend and col-
league, Chairman Lantos. Welcome, Secretary Rice.
My stepson and daughter-in-law have served in Iraq, and they
continue to serve our country as proud Marine officers. They may
be serving abroad again soon, so I understand the sacrifices of our
military families.
I support the President's new strategy for victory in Iraq and
hope to push that forward. I have a fuller statement there explain-
ing why. But I would like to use my time, Mr. Chairman, to give
it to other members who sometimes don't have the opportunity to
speak to important people like Secretary Rice; and I would like to
start with Mr. Barrett, if I could yield my time to Mr. Barrett.
Mr. BARRETT. I thank you, Gentlelady. Madam Secretary, thank
you for being here today.
Three questions I'm going to give you all at a time.
Why 21,500? Is this a number that is going to take to be success-
ful for victory, or is this a number because of what we had? Num-
ber two, please clarify rules of engagement. You touched on it ear-
lier. Iraqi and United States. Is this exactly what we need? And
third and last, Moqtada al-Sadr. He has to be dealt about. Who is
going to deal with him, us or the Iraqis?
Secretary RICE. Thank you, Congressman.
First of all, the number was established in the following way:
When the mission was determined to be to support the Iraqis in
their effort to gain confidence of the population and to protect the
population, the commanders determined what numbers they would
need to be able to support Iraqi forces, because this is an Iraqi
lead. The United States isn't going to fix the sectarian problem. It
means getting an American battalion within each of the nine dis-
tricts that are being developed. So that is how the numbers were
developed. Of course, the 4.000 for Anbar to deal with the positive
developments there of the people of Anbar starting to fight back
against al-Qaeda.
General Pace was asked this question this morning in a press
conference that we did, and he made very clear that the Joint
Chiefs considered their role to resource the mission and require-
ments that they get from the field and not to allow what they have
to dictate what they recommend to the President.
On rules of engagement, this has been the crux of the argument
and discussion with the I should say the discussion with the
Iraqis. They haven't really argued about it, but it has been the crux
of the discussions. Those have been the most candid discussion. We
cannot get into a situation again, and we think about this being a
problem for American forces, but there were circumstances where
Iraqi forces were trying to do the right thing and were pulled up


15
short politically. That can't happen again, and that has been the
crux of it.
And finally, on Sadr, this is something that the Iraqis are really
going to have to deal with. The Prime Minister said in his speech
that under no circumstances are any forces of disruption outside
the law, any of them, going to be spared and that they will go after
those who are killing innocent Iraqis whoever they are and wher-
ever they come from and whatever their stripe.
Chairman LANTOS. Congressman Berman.
Mr. BERMAN. Because of the impending votes and the time out,
I will limit all of the comments I wanted to make and just follow
up on Mr. Barrett's last question.
Is it our intention to destroy Sadr's militia, to either get them to
disband or to force them to disband? And what is there in the
record that would make the President think that this Prime Min-
ister, this political base and his previous record of actions is going
to have the Iraqi army lead the effort to destroy that militia, if that
is our intention?
Secretary RICE. Congressman, I think they will begin with the
death squads that are killing innocent Iraqis, and some of those
are indeed associated and may indeed come from the Jaish al-
Mahdi, the al-Sadr militia. They also have a requirement that they
themselves have set to disband militias that were not covered
under the early orders about how militias like the Pershmerga
would be dealt with.
I think the reason that we believe in and think that they, this
time, are going to actually deal with death squads and with those
who are causing this chaos, whoever they are, is it is a necessity.
When they came to us, they said that Baghdad couldn't continue
as it is going, and I think everybody agrees with that. And so ne-
sity and self-preservation means that they have to do the things
that they have to do.
Now the rules of engagement: We are going to know fairly soon
whether or not they are living up to the obligation—the promise-
to follow rules of engagement in a non-sectarian, non-political way.
We are going to know very soon, and the President was very clear
that he is not going to stay involved in a plan in which the Iraqis
are not carrying out their obligations. So I think we will have a
very good sense of whether they are going through with it.
Mr. BERMAN. I hope you are right, but I have to say I think the
President here is making, if you pardon the expression, a Hail
Maliki pass without any foundation for persuading the American
people or the Congress that this has a real chance of success.
RICE. May I just note, you know, the Iraqis are already
engaged in some security sweeps. They have begun some activity.
I think obviously when the forces come in, start coming in on Feb-
ruary 1st, we will get an early indication of how they intend to use
them. But we think this is the best chance that they will have to
stabilize Baghdad.
Chairman LANTOS. Mr. Rohrabacher.
Mr. ROHRABACHER. Sometimes you win the game when you
throw a Hail Mary pass, and maybe this will be a worthwhile en-
deavor.
Secr


16
Just prefacing my question about Iraq, let me note this adminis-
tration's insistence on sending to prison two border guards for what
they were doing when they intercepted a drug dealer on our south-
ern border undermines the President's support among those of us
who would like to offer more support. Because if he thinks this
lowly of securing our southern borders, it makes us question why
we are sending troops overseas. I will just preface it with that.
Is this not-and we wish you success—but is this not the Iraqi
people's last chance because of the public opinion here in the
United States? And we wish you success. We wish the President
success because we want the forces of evil to be thwarted there in
Iraq. But if the Iraqi people don't step up after we have given them
this chance, this is their last chance, is it not?
Secretary RICE. Well, obviously, failure in Iraq would be of great
consequence for us and for the American people as well. And so I
think what we are trying to do is in what is a very important and
pretty bad set of circumstances in Baghdad to give them a chance
to get on top of the sectarian violence. I don't think they have
many more chances to do it.
Mr. ROHRABACHER. I would say it is their last chance. If you do
not succeed, you are talking about the frame of the social network.
Aren't we really talking about the disintegration of Iraq as a na-
tion? And if that comes, would not the Kurdish population declare
their own nationhood and perhaps wouldn't that affect Iran in a
very negative way to have a Kurdish nation there?
Secretary RICE. Well, I don't think there is any doubt that if we
can't help the Iraqis maintain their unity-and, by the way, the
Iraqis always talk about a unified Iraq. They don't talk about Iraq
divided into three parts like goals. They talked always about a uni-
fied Iraq.
When we invaded Iraq to overthrow Saddam Hussein, we did
make a representation to the region that we understood the impor-
tance of the territorial integrity of Iraq and the unity of Iraq. We
did that because obviously the dynamic between the Kurds and
Turkey, the dynamics between the south and Iran, not to mention
the dynamics between the Sunnis and the rest of the region, would
be quite difficult to manage if in fact Iraq does not remain unified.
It is another reason to recognize the stakes that we have in an Iraq
that remains unified.
Let me be very clear. Most of the country has not collapsed into
“sectarian violence.” Most of the country is either peaceful under
Iraqi control or is kind of going about it in its own way. But with
the center of the country, Baghdad, with the capital having a sec-
tarian problem, it does undermine the confidence of the whole
country in the unity of Iraq, and it is why it is very important for
the Iraqi Government to succeed in it.
Mr. ROHRABACHER. For them and for the people of that region.
Chairman LANTOS. Thank you.
As a sign of our respect and affection for you, you will now be
able to have a late lunch; and the committee will stand in recess.
[Recess.]
Chairman LANTOS. The committee is now in session.


18
even-handed fashion because of the color of your skin or because
of your religious sect. We know that very, very well in our own
country.
And what has developed, I think, is that since the Shi'a majority
government has come into being, they have done a lot of things to
reach out to the Sunnis. They have worked with the Kurds. They
have made some progress. But the sectarian violence in Baghdad
and the way that it has been handled has called into question their
willingness to go after Shi’a death squads that are going into mixed
neighborhoods and cleansing them of Sunnis, and that has eroded
the confidence of the population. That is not something, no matter
how good our military is, and they are very, very good, they can't
fix that problem.
What the President outlined last night is that the Iraqis have
undertaken that they want to fix that problem, that they have the
will to do it now, but they don't quite have the capability to do it.
So our 20,000 or 20,000 plus forces, minus the 4,000 that would go
into Anbar, are to give them augmented strength to do what they
need to do.
But they have got to be on the front lines of this. They have to
go into the neighborhoods and make sure that these populations
are protected. That is why I think we believe that, with their re-
sponsibility, with their plan, this has a better chance for success.
The second point is that it has to be properly resourced. When
we have tried to deal with Baghdad before, there haven't been
enough reliable forces. But what is really new in this is the accept-
ance of Iraqi responsibility for dealing with the nature of what
their country is going to become and demonstrating that to the
population.
The third point is that we are decentralizing and diversifying our
efforts to get out of Baghdad and to grow in a sense, to bring from
o strong leadership among local and provincial lead-
ers. Because no country can really succeed just from the top down.
This is having some effects in some places like Mosul. I think it
is beginning to have an effect in Anbar, and that should also
strengthen our efforts.
But as to the question of our patience being limited, I do know
that the President feels that our patience with Iraqi indecision,
Iraqis unwillingness to make tough decisions is not limitless. It
can't be. That doesn't mean that we don't recognize that we will
continue to have interest in Iraq, that we continue to have respon-
sibility for the territorial integrity of Iraq, something we promised
the neighborhood, that we continue to have responsibility for fight-
ing al-Qaeda. But on the Iraqis' dealings with their own national
reconciliation, I think it would be the wrong signal-
Mr. ACKERMAN. Could you address—
Chairman LANTOS. I am sorry. The gentleman's time has ex-
pired.
Mr. ACKERMAN. Can I explore this for 10 seconds?
With the President's patience limited and November being cited,
do we leave—and the Iraqis not stepping up to the plate by our
standard, do we leave or start to leave in November?
Secretary RICE. I don't think that is what the President was say-
ing. But we do know that this plan for Baghdad, and for national


20
guaranteed if it would be done, but I want to offer my thank you
for your help in getting that with our Ambassador of New Zealand,
Ambassador McCormick, who I met just a couple weeks ago. Thank
you so much.
I was taken by the question raised by my colleague, Congress-
man Barrett, concerning Muqtada al-Sadr. I think the media as
well as many of our national officials have pictured him as not only
as a killer, an extremist deeply anti-American, but I wanted just
to kind of share with you a perspective and the fact that we can
talk about nuclear dangers and all of this and that, but sometimes
we seem to dismiss it as unimportant, a 1,000-year rivalry among
the Sunnis and the Shiites all wanting-all factions wanting to
claim the rights of succession to the Prophet Mohammed. This has
a lot of cultural barriers, sometimes we dismiss it and think it is
not important, taking into consideration 40 years of suppression of
rule in Iraq by Saddam Hussein and of course the Shiites were the
real—in terms of repression, this is really what happened. We are
also quite aware of when we supported the Shah of Iran and his
brutal repression of the people of Iran, predominantly Shiites. It is
my understanding that at that time Vice President Saddam Hus-
sein made a deal with the Shah of Iran, Ayatollah Khomeini. That
is why the Ayatollah ended up in Paris for all those years. And at
the time Saddam Hussein eventually became President, he tried to
figure out a way to put the blame on the highest cleric at that time
in Iraq was Ayatollah al-Sadr, who happens to be the father of
Muqtada al-Sadr. What did they do with the Ayatollah? This is
what Saddam Hussein did, got his sister in his presence, raped and
murdered her, and then after that burned the beard of the Aya-
tollah al-Sadr—this is Muqtada's father—while he was alive and
drove nails into his head. If you can put that perspective in terms
of if you were his son—I suppose if it was Bush 41 and Bush 43,
I would have some really, really strong feelings about how my peo-
ple had been treated by Saddam and his regime, and I think we
have to put that in perspective as to why Muqtada al-Sadr is very
much part of this whole thing because of course the Mahdi militia
that he now controls simply because he wants to make sure the
Shiites are never going to be under suppression by the Sunnis.
This is where we find ourselves in the situation now in Iraq, and
I just wanted to ask you the question of whether or not-and I am
sure that you probably may have already explained this, the surge
or the addition of troops as we have tried before, would it really
bring some sense of resolution to the crisis that we now face our-
selves in Iraq? And I just wanted to give that question to you.
Secretary RICE. Well, thank you. First of all, I think you make
a very important point about the deep grievances that are there.
And they are deep grievances that are not just in Iraq, they are
deep grievances that are region-wide, and it underscores the dif-
ficulty of overcoming that through political process rather than
through violence and repression. I think we also have to recognize
that in the modern era the continued oppression of the Shi'a by dic-
tatorships is simply not going to survive. It is going to explode to
the surface, and what is happening in Iraq is that you have now
one man, one vote, and the Shi’a are in the majority, and so they
have been the majority in the government. But the task is for the


21
Shi’a and indeed the Kurds to see themselves as a part of a broad-
er picture to put majoritarian interests below that of the nation as
a whole, but that is a hard lesson to learn. I think we recognize
that our own democracies had a tough time with some of that, and
it takes time, and I recognize and myself feel some impatience
with the Iraqis sometimes for not getting the oil law passed, for not
getting the de-Baathification law quite right, but they are asked to
do something quite remarkable given the history that you just cited
and so the political process now gives them a chance to solve their
problems politically. It would have an enormous impact on this re-
gion if in fact that became the model, and as tough as it is, it
worth continuing to pursue because succeeding in that would mean
a very different kind of Middle East.
As to the question of why the surge would help, I think that
what you are trying to do in this case is to give some breathing
space to national reconciliation. The points of General Abizaid have
been noted a couple of times, but General Abizaid was talking in
a particular context, he went on to say, you know, that given cer-
tain circumstances it might help. And we all had hoped that the
additional forces would be Iraqi forces, but those Iraqi forces are
simply not going to be ready in time to help deal with the Baghdad
problem which threatens to overwhelm the political process that
has a chance to deal in a political rather than a repressive or vio-
lent way with the tensions that you have outlined.
Chairman LANTOS. Thank you very much. Mr. Burton.
Mr. BURTON. It is nice seeing you again.
Secretary RICE. Nice seeing you.
Mr. BURTON. Tough times for you, but you are handling it well.
Secretary RICE. Thank you.
Mr. BURTON. Last night the President's speech was, I thought.
very effective and very good, and I listened not only to the Presi-
dent's speech but I also listened to the response from my Democrat
colleagues on what should be done or shouldn't be done. And they
have continually pointed out from their perspective that we need
to start redeploying, moving our troops out of there, and putting
them someplace else. What I would like to ask you today, and I
don't want to be redundant, you may have been asked and an-
swered this before I arrived, but what I would like to know from
your perspective, and I know nobody has a crystal ball, but if we
were going to signal that we were going to redeploy, if we were
going to say we would pull our troops out of there within a given
time period, what would happen, number one? And number two,
long term, what would that lead to? Would it lead to another con-
flict of maybe more devastating magnitude than what we have seen
so far? And could it lead to a war throughout that entire region?
Secretary RICE. Thank you, Congressman. First of all, let me just
say that redeployment really means withdrawal, and I think we
need to be clear about the language. And withdrawal under the cir-
cumstances would, I think, before the Iraqis are ready and before
they have had a chance to make their political process work and
before their security forces can handle the jobs, before al-Qaeda is
defeated-and make no mistake about it, we have been empha-
sizing Baghdad and saying Anbar is the center of al-Qaeda, but al-
Qaeda's fingerprints are on a lot of what is happening in Baghdad


22
too, and we have to keep that in mind. So I think the notion of
withdrawing and leaving this country to terrorists' safe haven of
the kind that was Afghanistan but this time in a country that is
central to the Middle East, leaving an Iraq that cannot govern
itself, cannot sustain itself, an Iraq in which its neighbors are
tempted to, so to speak, pick at its bones if it cannot govern itself,
and we have to remember that it has a particularly troublesome
neighbor to the east, and I might just mention, of course America's
own credibility with our friends and allies in the region. Our
friends and allies in the region still remember that after Beirut we
left Lebanon. They still remember that. They still remember, from
their point of view, that that said that when times get tough Amer-
ica will leave. And you say, but we have been together through the
Gulf War, through—but they still remember. If the United States
is not willing to keep its commitments, not willing to finish the job,
I think of the negative impact on our influence in the region, on
our standing in the region. If there is not American influence in the
region, there will be other influences in the region, and my can-
didate would be Iran. So the stakes are enormously high in Iraq,
and let me just say, we all fully understand—this administration
fully understands and I understand personally that this has not
gone as we would have hoped it would have gone. We understand
the difficulties. We understand how hard it is, but we know that
it is not done, and we have made mistakes, there is no doubt about
it. But to allow this to fail for lack of trying, for lack of willingness
to augment our forces, to give the Iraqis a chance to stabilize their
capital, I think would be a real tragedy. And I thank you also, Con-
gressman, for the expression of concern, but let me just say, I can't
think of anything that is a greater honor or indeed more stimu
lating, and in many ways I feel myself very, very lucky because if
you are going to do this you might as well try to do it at a time
of consequence. So thank you very much.
Chairman LANTOS. Mr. Payne.
Mr. PAYNE. Thank you very much. Ms. Secretary, I wish you well
on your trip. Just a quick comment and then I will ask about this
surge. I saw where the United States went into Somalia and at-
tempted to get three al-Qaeda-accused persons that had been there
for about a decade anyway, but the swiftness of our action once we
decided to do that certainly shows we can do what we want to do.
I just look at Darfur with 450,000 who have been slaughtered by
al-Bashir and his government and all we have asked for is just a
no-fly zone to prevent the Sudanese from continually bombing and
killing innocent people, 450,000 there, but we cannot even do that.
And so I would hope that in some of these other issues we can take
as gravely and as important the lives of those innocent people as
we are going after these three suspected al-Qaeda operatives.
Let me just ask a question about the surge. The question about
surging appears that when you surge it is like a wave. You come
in, you bring a lot in, you have a lot of activity, but surges seem
then to recline, I guess. You can't keep a surge. Like I guess on
a swing with a child, you surge up but you can't stay up. So is this
a surge? Or is it an escalation? Because if you are going to then
continue, and I recall that word in the 1960s when Vietnam, the
word “escalation,” I see that we are not using escalation here but


24
sions, that has been brought up to our delegation. Those leaders,
at all different levels, really felt like it is just not doing the job. Is
that something-would you agree with that assessment? Is that
something—that to me, we have got all of these things going on
that aren't fixable, but that to me really is one of those real things
that is kind of the basis of a lot of the stuff that is going on that
is fixable. So again, I would appreciate your comments.
Secretary RICE. Well, thank you. First of all, I do agree that we
need to do a better job in terms of what we were able to do to begin
to reproduce what we were able to do at the time of the Cold War
with the Voice of America, Radio Free Europe, Radio Liberty,
which was a lot of our success in Eastern Europe. Of course times
have changed. We now talk about satellite TV. There is a satellite
t apartment buildings in most of the Arab world. We
face a certain skepticism if it is seen to be an American Govern-
ment product and I think we have to understand that. We didn't
face that skepticism with Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty.
We were known to be the voice of the truth. I think in the Arab
world sometimes there is great, great suspicion of American pro-
grams. But that said, we are trying to rebuild some of that capa-
bility. We did let it go at the end of the Cold War, disbanded USIA,
basically believed that the job had been done and didn't foresee
that a lot of this would be needed for hearts and minds in a very
different part of the world. So with stations like Al-Hura, Radio
Farda, which is focused on Iran, we are doing our best to improve
our capability, and we are also trying to get people out and around,
to be good voices on the media that is there. I know we all have
a particular view of Aljazeera, it is a view with which I completely
agree, it is very often-most often propaganda. However, even with
Aljazeera, we try to get our people out on Aljazeera; we try to get
our people out on Al Arabia because satellite TV is extremely im-
portant to spreading the message. So I agree with you about the
importance of that path.
Chairman LANTOS. Mr. Wexler.
Mr. WEXLER. Thank you. Madam Secretary, each time you have
very generously testified before our committee you have done so
with conviction, with passion, vociferously defending this adminis-
tration's policies. I very much respect your intellect and certainly
your consistency.
Last night the President, when he addressed the Nation, made
a stunning admission that the United States effectively had al-
ready implemented the strategy that he was proposing anew, the
strategy of American troops going door to door in Baghdad, Amer-
ican troops going neighborhood to neighborhood, removing the kill-
ers in Baghdad. And then the President said, “But we didn't have
enough troops to hold the gains.” The quote from the President
was—this is the President's language: “This time we will have the
forces level we need to hold the areas that have been cleared.”
You have focused a good bit of your answers on the mistakes that
the Iraqi Government has made. With all due respect, the Iraqi
Government did not determine the troop level that we employed in
Baghdad. That was the American Government that made that
choice. It was the American administration that rejected General
Shinseki's initial estimation of troops. It was the American Govern-


25
ment that made the mistake on the amount of money it would
take. It was the American Government that made the mistake on
the nuclear program in Iraq. It was the American Government that
mischaracterized the connection between al-Qaeda and Saddam
Hussein. But yet today we focus on the mistakes of the Iraqi Gov-
ernment.
Now why is it a fair, I believe, question to ask? Because in No-
vember the American people spoke, and the American people said,
"No new troops, no new troops.” You in fairness, in response to Mr.
Burton, said, “We need to be clear about our language, redeploy-
ment means withdrawal.” I grant you that. That is fair. But you
too need to be fair and clear about your language. Surge means es-
calation. The American people in November said, "No new troops."
So we as the representatives of the American people have the obli-
gation, I would argue, to ask you, we have a whole series of Amer-
ican misjudgments, American mistakes. Who was it that told the
President of the United States, recommended to the President of
the United States we had enough troops in Baghdad when as you
described we knew al-Qaeda was about to blow up a Shiite holy
site and create a civil war? Why didn't we ask for 40,000 more
American troops before that happened to stop it? But last night,
the President went on TV and asked for 20,000 more American
troops. I would respectfully suggest not so much because of the
Prime Minister of Iraq's mistakes but because of the mistakes of
the United States Government and the American people have a
right to ask, is it the same people that made these mistakes that
now want us to buy into this escalation of troops? And if so, why
should we give you the benefit of the doubt this time when it ap-
pears so evident that so many mistakes have been made in the
past?
Secretary RICE. Well, Congressman, thank you very much. First
of all, I don't think we did know that al-Qaeda was going to blow
up the Samara Mosque. With all due respect, we don't have a crys-
tal ball and we didn't see it coming. We did know that al-Qaeda
was going to try to stoke a civil war because we knew that Zarqawi
was planning to do so. I don't frankly know that 40,000 troops
would have stopped him from blowing up the Samara Mosque. So
I fully accept that the American administration has made mis-
takes. I think we have done some very good things. I think we have
done some things that would not have worked out as we would
have had them work out. We fully accept the responsibility for
me of the people who are advising the President, like me,
are the same people who have been advising him since the begin-
ning of the war. Others who are advising him, like Secretary Gates,
came to this with fresh eyes. We all came to the same conclusion,
listening to the military commanders on the ground, listening to
our political people, that the urgency of dealing with the Baghdad
situation and helping the Iraqis to deal with that situation re-
quired a surge, and by surge—and I am not here to speak again
to what Congressman Payne said-a surge to do a specific mission
related to Baghdad security.
Now, in fact, the last Baghdad security plan did not fail because
American troops didn't show up. It failed because Iraqi troops
didn't show up in the numbers that they promised, and it failed be-


26
cause the rules of engagement were rules of engagement that al-
lowed political interference. I think we believe that we fixed that
problem this time. But to be absolutely clear, we understand that
this plan depends very much on execution, it depends on human
beings to execute it. And if human beings don't execute it well,
then it is going to fail.
Mr. WEXLER. Madam Secretary, with all due respect, it is now
your testimony that American troops were sent into harm's way in
Baghdad knowing that the commitment of the Iraqi troops was not
there that you thought would be there and, so be it, that is just
the way the cookie crumbles?
Secretary RICE. Congressman, let me say what my testimony is
if you don't mind.
Mr. WEXLER. Please do.
Secretary RICE. My testimony is that we had a plan for the secu-
rity of Baghdad. It succeeded very often in clearing the neighbor-
hoods because we had enough forces, Iraqi and American, to do
that, but because there were not enough Iraqi forces that indeed
were supposed to be a part of this plan, it turned out to be impos-
sible to hold those areas after they were cleared. So in fact, the
first part of the plan worked. The other part that didn't, of cou
get done is that the build section—and we have spent too little
time or I have spent too little time talking about the economic and
political side of this that has to accompany the military effort be-
cause it wasn't possible to hold the areas. It was
to build.
This plan also is an Iraqi plan that has a different structure to
it with districts in Baghdad that are governed by military com-
manders, with forces at their disposal in a kind of wheel-and-spoke
fashion. So Congressman, I want to be very clear about what the
President was saying last night. We understand that there were
problems with the Baghdad security plan the last time around. We
also understand what those problems were. And we understand
first and foremost that without Iraqi buy-in to this plan it is not
going to work, and that is where the President has spent most of
his time with Prime Minister Maliki, making certain that he has
the Iraqi buy-in and the Iraqi assurances that we need.
Chairman LANTOS. Mr. Royce.
Mr. ROYCE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Secretary Rice, I was in
Haifa, Israel, in August when it was being shelled by Hezbollah.
So I have seen the effects in the trauma hospital of Iran's involve-
ment in Lebanon. Incidentally, the Hezbollah general on that
southern front, Karani, had a brother, Mahmoud Karani, who in
fact came into the United States. He was caught. Here he had
come in in the trunk of a car in my State, in California. Later he
was caught up in Dearborn, Michigan, with a cell, Hezbollah cell,
and found to have been trained by Iranian intelligence. That does
raise certain questions about our border security. It also raises
questions about support for our border patrol. But the question I
would like to get at today is something that our Director of Central
Intelligence, former Director Woolsey—as you know, he was here
this morning prior to you, and he raised this question. He said that
the head of Hezbollah for Iraq is al-Sadr, and likewise the Iraq
Study Group raised a point that Muqtada al-Sadr is, as they said,


following the Hezbollah model that they are following in Lebanon.
In other words, they are building a political party now in their
areas that they influence in Iraq that controls basic services within
the government and controls an armed militia outside of the gov-
ernment. And I was going to ask if you shared that assessment,
and then I would go to one thing that you said previously in your
testimony today. You said that Iraqis will have to deal with Sadr,
and I was going to ask how likely that is, but also, do we have no
role to play in dealing with Sadr?
Secretary RICE. Well, on the latter point, I think it is important
to recognize what you have just said, Sadr is a political force. He
has people in the legislature. He has had people in the government,
although currently standing down from that. And when I say Iraqis
have to deal with Sadr, I mean they have to deal both with the vio-
lence he causes and with the political problem that he causes. But
I do think it is best done as an Iraqi responsibility because of the
nature of the problem. I don't doubt that at some level Sadr's forces
see as a model the way that Hezbollah has emerged in Lebanon.
A poor Shi'a area, as the south of Lebanon is, as Sadr City is in
Iraq, historically discriminated against, historically impoverished,
where social services are not delivered by the central government,
where there is a sense of discrimination, and where people take
their aid from whomever can offer it, and in this case a well-orga-
nized group can offer it. I think that is undoubtedly what they
have in mind. Therefore, the wise thing for the Iraqi Government
to do is to make sure that they don't repeat the conditions that the
Lebanese Government created in order to let that take hold. That
means getting goods and services and education and jobs programs
into these areas where there has been deprivation. It means that
you don't live with a political party that has an armed militia be-
side it. At some point in time it has to be disarmed. It means, too,
that you don't permit outside forces to become embedded in the
training of these. Now, there isn't really, frankly, very much evi-
dence of the Iranian influence with Sadr himself, but I will say
that we do believe that the Iranians of course have a role in help-
ing militias and in helping violent people who are hurting our
forces. But I think that it is a forewarning to the Iraqi Government
that unless they provide the kinds of services from the central gov-
ernment and from localities that they will face an organization that
has a Hezbollah-like model in mind.
Mr. ROYCE. Thank you, Secretary Rice.
Chairman LANTOS. Mr. Engel.
Mr. ENGEL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And Madam Secretary, I
want to just make a couple of quick statements and then I just
want to ask you a question about Iraq. First, thank you for your
testimony, and thank you for calling me the other week. I really
appreciated our exchange of views, and I thought it was very, very
helpful. You know we have always talked about the Syrian Ac-
countability Act, which I authored and cosponsored with Ileana
Ros-Lehtinen, and I just, again, want to urge the administration to
implement all the sanctions of the Syrian Accountability Act. I
know that you are going to the Middle East, and one of the things
that has been talked about is the Israeli-Palestinian dispute, and
I just want to say that I disagree with the Iraq Commission and


28
others who say that the key for solving all the problems in the Mid-
dle East is solving the Israeli-Palestinian dispute because the
translation to that usually means, let's put pressure on Israel to
make concessions without really getting anything in return, let her
make concessions to a Hamas government that denies their right
to exist, and just keep pressure on Israel. So I hope that that won't
be the case, and that we want the goal of a Palestinian state living
side-by-side in peace with Israel, but I think such a state can only
happen if the Palestinians recognize Israel's right to exist.
My question about Iraq is this, no one wants chaos in Iraq, and
no one obviously wants defeat in Iraq, and no one wants terrorism
to get the upper hand. The question is: Does the President's plan
simply perpetuate the problem? Is Iraq winnable? That is the ques-
tion. And if it is, what do we mean by winning? Because we have
said a couple of times, our goals in Iraq are one thing and
seem to kind of shift it.
We had a hearing this morning on Iran, and I think that a case
can be made that as long as we are bogged down in Iraq the Ira-
nians will continue their mischief, and we lack the ability to deal
with them because of our being bogged down in Iraq. So the ques-
tion really is: If we need to deal with combating terrorism, and we
do, are our goals best served by pouring more troops and resources
into Iraq? Or might our goals be better served by realizing our lim-
itations and realizing again that by being bogged down in Iraq we
are exacerbating the terrorist problem by being led by Iran, who
is the leader of terrorism, by not being able to deal with that suffi-
ciently? Iran is thumbing its nose at us because they know we are
too preoccupied in Iraq to deal with them sufficiently.
Secretary RICE. Thank you. Well, first of all on the Syrian Ac-
countability Act, let me thank you again, you and Congresswoman
Ros-Lehtinen, for it. I think you will see us use it. We
trying to use it to leverage contributions, so to speak, multilaterally
but the President is determined to use those powers. So thank you
very much.
On Israel and the Palestinians, we see this as a conflict that has
its own logic and needs to be resolved on its own terms. Obviously
it would be a very good thing for the Middle East if this were re-
solved. It is not that it would solve all the problems of the Middle
East but one can't imagine a truly different kind of Middle East
without this resolved. But we are going to do it on the logic that
makes sense for that conflict. It may well be that as people realign
their interests in the way that I was describing, that there may be
more interest, for instance, on the part of some of the Arab states
in being supportive of the establishment of the right kind of Pales-
tinian state. But let me just assure you, we are not about to sac-
rifice the interests that we have maintained in a stable and demo-
cratic Jewish state of Israel and indeed, a Palestinian state that
can live side by side. We are not about to sacrifice that.
As to Iraq, I do think—not only do I think it is winnable, I think
if it is lost, then we really will empower Iran in a very major way
because then Iran's ability to meddle in the affairs of an Iraq that
is truly unable to govern itself, and in effect to use Iraq as a bridge
for Iranian assertiveness to the region, I think, is only going to
grow. The converse of that though is if we are able to stabilize a


29
Shi’a-led government in the middle of the Middle East, and one
that by the way that is not theocratic, which I do not think the
Iraqis will be, that is really a barrier to further expansion of Ira-
nian influence. I don't think that it is an issue of being bogged
down. I know that it is not an issue of being bogged down that
makes it difficult to deal with Iran. What makes it difficult to deal
with Iran is that it is a state that has tentacles out through ex-
tremist groups like Hezbollah and now is trying to push those ten-
tacles into Hamas, and that it has a sidecar, Syria, that is certainly
helping it in those activities. Iran is in pursuit of a nuclear weap-
on. But I would not—I don't feel at all a lack of optimism or, to
put it differently, pessimism about our ability to deal with Iran. We
have in the last year gone from people questioning whether or not
the Iranians are really trying to get a nuclear weapon to Chapter
7 sanctions against Iran in the Security Council. Now, I would be
the first to say those sanctions are not enough because they are not
strong enough to change Iran's calculations. However, being under
Chapter 7 resolution is not very good company to keep. It is states
like Sudan, it is being with states like North Korea, and a few
states that I think we will soon be out from under, like Liberia an
the DROC. It is not the kind of company that you want to keep.
Given the reputational risks for private financial institutions and
private investors as well as the shadow of further sanctions, I
think you are beginning to see an effect on Iran's ability to invest
in its oil and gas industry and in its ability to move its assets. So
it has a collateral effect that is very important, and I think we
have to press our allies to be very tough on this matter. Frankly,
one of our problems is that we have not had the kind of concerted
international effort on Syria or, to that matter, Iran that we need
to build. I think we are getting there, but that is ultimately going
to help us to deal with Iran, and perhaps change Iran's calcula-
tions. But I think an Iraq that fails is going to be a real boon for
Iran.
Chairman LANTOS. Mr. McCaul.
Mr. MCCAUL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Madam Secretary, I
want to thank you for the job you are doing under tremendous
pressure, and we all recognize that here. I served as a consultant
to the Iraq Study Group and while I don't agree with all the find-
ings, there are many that I do. Number one, this is one you men-
tioned, and that is that failure is not an option. I think failure for
all Americans is something that we cannot afford. It will create a
situation far worse than what we have today. Secondly, this is not
going to be won militarily alone. I think that there is a political so-
lution to this. I am hopeful that the President's plan and the surge
in troops will provide the security and stability necessary so that
we will have a breathing period, if you will, so that a political solu-
tion can be reached, and I know you are working in that effort. I
have three short questions I want to ask you. One, one of my con-
cerns all along with this conflict is— .
Chairman LANTOS. I am sorry to interrupt my colleague. I don't
want you to use up all of your time because then we won't get a
chance to hear the answers. So ask your first question. Then we
will listen to you.


31
agreement between Iraq and Iran is. I think that would be of inter-
est to us.
In addition, I would also note for the record that Foreign Min-
ister Zeybari back in June made a comment that—and I am
quoting here: “Iran doesn't want to claim they want to obtain a nu-
clear weapon or a nuclear bomb so there is no need that we ask
them for any guarantee now.”
I think we all can agree that is somewhat disturbing. So in terms
of where Iraq is in relation to the Islamic Republic of Iran I think
is very much open to debate. There are a number of agreements
that have been executed. But I heard what you said earlier about
the plan being an “Iraqi plan.” And yet today in the New York
Times, there is a headline that says, “Promising Troops Where
They Aren't Really Wanted.” And a close associate of the Prime
Minister, Mr. al-Abadi, has this to say: “The government believes
there is no need for extra troops from the American side. The exist-
ing troops can do the job.” That is his quote, not mine. And I am
also aware that we talk about American public opinion, but the De-
partment of State and independent groups have done extensive
polling, and I find it very disturbing the results that in excess of
70 percent of the Iraqi people, according to DoS poll as well as the
University of Maryland poll, want the Americans out. They want
us out in the course of at least a year-I think that is how the
question was proposed—because their belief is that it is provoking
more violence rather than de-escalating the violence. In addition,
in the University of Maryland poll there was a question about sup-
port for attacks by Iraqis on American military personnel. And I
think it is very disturbing to hear or read that the conclusion is
that in excess of 60 percent of the Iraqi population said it was
okay. I mean, I guess my point is, are we really wanted there by
the Iraqi people, Madam Secretary? And if so, how do you account
for the polling there?
Secretary ŘICE. Well, first of all, I do understand that one has
to be very careful on how one reads polls because you have to know
precisely what was asked and of whom and under what cir-
cumstances. I am a social scientist. I know quite a bit about poll-
ing, and one has to be careful in how one-even Department of
State polls have to be carefully read from the assumptions that
were built in and so forth. But that said, I don't doubt that Iraqis
would like to see their country free of foreign forces. It is a country
that doesn't particularly like having foreign forces on its soil, but
I do know that the Iraqi Government overwhelmingly, v
ception of the Sadr bloc, has made very clear that they do not think
that America can afford to leave and that is why the Iraqi Govern-
ment requested through the United Nations an extension of the
multinational forces for Iraq. Every time those leaders are here
they thank us for the liberation of Iraq, but of course they want
to get to the day when they themselves are able to take care of
their security problem, and I think that also explains why, when
the Maliki government came forward in Jordan with its plan, it
wanted this to be all Iraqi forces. I fully remember that and want
you to understand that. That is a good sign. However, when the ex-
perts took a look at the plan and said, What would need to be done
in order to bring stability and security to the population of Bagh-


32
dad? It was the assessment of our generals and frankly of their de-
fense experts that there was a gap between what they had and
what they would need and that that gap was going to persist well
into the summer.
Mr. DELAHUNT. So this is an American plan, not an Iraqi plan?
Secretary RICE. No, no. I said they brought the plan but we then
sat with their experts and our experts. Prime Minister Maliki
handed the plan to the President. He said, “Now go and get our
experts together to see how we can execute this plan.” It is a per-
fectly logical thing to do. So when they sat together, they recog-
nized there was a gap between Iraqi capabilities now and Iraqi ca-
pabilities in the summer and nobody felt that this could wait until
the summer. And that is how the augmentation came through.
Now I don't doubt-Iraq is now actually a very free wheeling kind
of democracy and people say all kinds of things and I am not at
all surprised that there are a lot of Iraqis that still believe that
Iraqi forces can do this on their own. I think they want to do it
on their own but we do have to ask the question, given the stakes
and given that security in Baghdad is a very high priority, we don't
want them to fail. And so helping to augment their capabilities so
that they can succeed is a logical thing to do.
Chairman LANTOS. Mr. Smith.
Mr. SMITH OF NEW JERSEY. Thank you very much, Mr. Chair-
man. And welcome again, Madam Secretary. Thank you for your
candor and your leadership. Let me just ask a couple of brief ques-
tions. In the past when I met with the leader of the reconciliation
commission in Iraq and several of its members, I got the distinct
feeling they felt isolated and not supported by either their own gov-
ernment or by the international community.
Secondly, on the plight of the Assyrian Christians and other
Christians who are a minority in Iraq, as we know, according to
information we received at a hearing of this committee in late De-
cember, approximately 40 percent of those seeking refugee status
from Iraq over the past 3 years have been Christians, and UNHCR
has said very clearly they were destitute of those who had man-
aged to get out. My question is, despite these reports, the United
States is not making direct access to those refugee programs avail-
able to the Iraqi religious minority. Is there consideration being
given to creating a new or expanded option for those Christians
who are fleeing? I hoped that that would have happened already,
UNHCR has not done it either. So this is a very pressing issue.
Finally, on the issue of labor guidelines. We all know that we
held hearings on this last year. I traveled to Iraq to check it out
myself in September. There is a concern that many of the foreign
workers, the 35,000-plus that have been brought in, many of whom
were brought in under brokers who were used in deceptive prac-
tices and other kinds of very misguided procedures. Unfortunately,
some of them could be construed as trafficked individuals. General
Casey, to his credit, issued a zero tolerance policy and put into
place a number of important steps to try to mitigate and hopefully
end the status of that labor agreement. How was it proceeding? Are
we hiring people who are getting a fair wage for their work, under
the circumstances that we would consider to be fair?


33
Secretary RICE. Thank you, Congressman. As you said, obviously
we do have a zero tolerance. You know how strongly we feel about
trafficking, how much we have been an international leader on
trafficking. Anytime we have a chance to stop it, even in places
where we don't have as much influence as we do in Iraq, we try
to do it. I think it is fair to say that this is a very complicated place
right now. They have got a lot on their plate, and they are not
going to do everything perfectly but of course we are pressing the
case.
Let me go first to the reconciliation commission. I also have
heard that they sometimes feel they are not listened to. The Prime
Minister's people say they do work with them, they do listen to
them, but it is awfully important there be a sense that the work
that they are doing is really being taken seriously. I think it is. I
think some of the proposals that are coming out are really coming
out of that commission, but it should be taken very seriously.
Finally, on refugee policy and the current refugee policy more
generally, I have asked to look again at our refugee policies on
Iraq. As you know, we have had some delay in the way that
UNHCR deals with these cases. We have places where people will
not—where they are residing where they are not classified as refu-
gees by the government, which causes some problems, and of
course we have had a fairly limited program for special refugees,
so to speak. So I do think this is something worth looking at.
Mr. SMITH OF NEW JERSEY. If you could do that as quickly as
possible, those people really are on the edge. Many will die. I
heard, while I was in Baghdad, from several of those individuals,
and they are in dire straits, and they are often looked at as if they
are the Americans by the warring factions, and they are Iraqis, but
they are singled out in a way that leads to putting them in dire
straits and often leads to their death. So, I would hope a special
program or at least an inclusion of them in programs could be done
as quickly as possible.
Secretary RICE. We will take a look.
Chairman LANTOS. Mr. Meeks.
Mr. MEEKS. Madam Secretary, when I remember sitting in this
committee now close to 4 years ago and at that time there was a
big deal that was being made about the “coalition of the willing"
and that we were not doing this by ourselves. And then I look in
the New York Times today, and I see the biggest partner of the “co-
alition of the willing,” the British, they are not surging with us.
They are talking about redeploying or, as you say, withdrawing.
They are not talking about escalating. And I have not heard of any
of the “coalition of the willing" surging with us. It seems as though
we are surging alone, and that coalition that was a big deal a few
years ago that we were not going at it alone is no longer intact.
So my first question is, Where is the “coalition of the willing”?
Is there anyone surging with us or are we surging alone?
Secondly, listening to the President last night, I couldn't help but
think about a number of the things that he had said in the past
and how he has pulled on the Americans' emotion strings, if you
will. I can recall vividly you, in fact, talking about a mushroom
cloud, and the American people were fearful as a result of that. I
recall the President saying, “Bring it on.” And the American people


34
at that time, because it was seen to be patriotic, we are going to
go get them. And then I recall the banner, Mission Accomplished,
and that was supposed to be it. We went in there, we did our thing
and everything that we talked about was done. Then I recall every
press conference. There was a plan for victory that we never
seemed to see happen. Then we had the deck of cards with all of
the different heads of the Saddam Hussein regime and we were
supposed to pick them off one by one, and Americans were sup-
posed to feel that once we captured them, then it would be over,
particularly when we found Saddam Hussein in a hole. Americans
were hopeful. That was going to be the end. There was going to be
some peace. That didn't happen. Then we had elections in Iraq.
That was going to change things. Then that was going to make it
better in Iraq, and Americans had its hope up. Then stay the
course. And now, surge. And then I listen to the President. So my
question is, last night the President then said that the U.S. has re-
sponsibility and engagement is not open ended. And allegedly there
are benchmarks being set up. Now to me the President has a credi-
bility problem. So if you are going to set up benchmarks at this
point, is there a timetable? How do we know? Is it a month? Is it
O months? Is it a year? How do we know? What are those bench-
marks? What is that timetable that we will be utilizing to deter-
mine whether or not the Iraqi Government has shown up, doing
their thing, taken control of their country or they are not? Is it
open ended, or do we have dates to go? Forget about withdrawing
now, I am not even talking about withdrawing, but dates to see if
the Iraqis have met their benchmarks to show that they are keep-
ing up their end of the bargain based upon the plan for which I
heard you say they brought to us and said they can do? There
should not be any excuses because it is their plan.
Secretary RICE. Well, first of all, Congressman, let me be very
clear about what their plan is. Their plan is for Baghdad—there
are other elements of this plan that the President is putting for-
ward for Anbar, and for the decentralization of our political and
economic structures. I want to be very clear that the Baghdad plan
with the nine districts and so forth that we would help to resource,
that is the part that is an Iraqi plan, and obviously it is going to
be very important to monitor how they are doing on meeting their
commitments.
But I will tell you the benchmark, if you want to call it that, that
I am most interested in is, are they going to make the difficult deci-
sions when it comes time to take down death squads that are re-
lated somehow politically to influential people, or who are of one
sectarian stripe or another. I think that is probably, in the short
time, the most important benchmark.
Mr. MEEKS. How will we know-
Secretary RICE. I think we are going to know right away when
the commanders say that they did or did not receive the green light
to do what they needed to do.
Chairman LANTOS. The gentleman's time has expired.
Mr. Tancredo.
Mr. TANCREDO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. First of all, let me
thank you, start off by thanking you for allowing the transitive
President Chen through San Francisco. I think that is a very good
LINK


35
development, and I want to thank you publicly for allowing that to
occur.
Secondly, I want to bring to your attention something that has
come up recently as a result of the fact that once in Colorado, I
think once in Tennessee, an Iraqi national who was here, was ar-
rested for a very serious crime in both cases. At least in one case
it was manslaughter; I think in the other case it was something
similar or just as serious. It turns out we cannot return these peo-
ple, who would otherwise be returned to their country of origin if
they committed an act like this in the United States, after serving
their time they would be deported back to the country of origin.
Turns out that Iraq won't accept their nationals who have com-
mitted crimes in the United States. They will not accept them back
if we try to deport them.
It also turns out, when we looked into it, there is something like
40,000 Chinese that fall into the same category. China will not ac-
cept back their nationals.
In a letter I sent to you and a response I got today, I under-
stand-although I have not read it yet, and I was just given a part
of the response, it said that—as you know, by the way, that the law
requires, U.S. Code 1253 states very clearly that on being notified
by the Attorney General that the government of a foreign country
denies the ability of the United States to actually send back or de-
port someone who has committed one of these crimes, that we are
to stop giving that country visas.
I mean, it is a very clear law. It gives absolutely no wiggle room,
if you will, to the Department of State; and in your letter back you
said something like, Well, we need to consider foreign policy consid-
erations. What other foreign policy considerations that have pre-
vented us from actually sending back criminal aliens to countries
like Iraq, which we are doing a great deal for, it seems to me that
they should at least reciprocate by taking their own people back if
they have committed a crime in the United States. And the same
thing with China, considering our trade relationship with them.
And the second question deals specifically with the issi
President's speech. If you could explain in detail what exactly he
meant by a benchmark being established for November, if, in fact,
the Iraqi Government, or by that time Iraq's Government is to take
over responsibilities for the security in all provinces in Iraq by No-
vember. That is what I heard him say. But I wondered if you could
actually tell me what that means in terms of, especially, what
would be the response if they did not? What are the ramifications
for failing to meet that benchmark in very specific ways?
Secretary RICE. Congressman, I don't think it will be a matter
of the Iraqis failing from a lack of will to do it. If for some reason
we are unable to train their forces to be able to do it, then perhaps
that would be a cause, but we fully expect that by November they
are going to be able to do this.
Mr. TANCREDO. What if they don't?
Secretary RICE. I really don't think it is a good thing to speculate
what options we might have.
Mr. TANCREDO. Then the benchmark means nothing?
Secretary RICE. No. The benchmark is that you meet the bench-
mark and then we will still have to work with the Iraqis—we don't


36
want to cut off our nose to spite our face. If they are moving along
and doing rather well in their country, and the generals come and
say, “Well, it is going to be a little bit longer," I think we will want
to consider that.
What the President is saying is. November is the time that they
are supposed to take over the responsibility. We expect them to do
it. We think they will be ready to do it. A lot depends, frankly, on
how well the training goes for those forces, but we fully expect
them to do it. I just don't want to get into trying to talk about what
consequences there may be if they don't deliver.
I think that we have made very clear to them that it is time for
them to deliver. I am frankly much more concerned initially about,
as I said to Congressman Meeks, what happens as this Baghdad
security plan unfolds. Are they living up to the rules of engagement
that they have agreed to? Are they bringing in the best forces they
need to do? Are they acting in an evenhanded fashion? Let us cross
that bridge, get them trained, and I think they will meet the No-
vember time frame.
As to the point about the various countries and their willingness
to take back criminals, this is something that we have and are dis-
cussing with the Chinese. I think that we understand the law. We
also understand that there are certain downsides to having no visa
traffic between the United States and China. So that is what is
meant by foreign policy considerations. One has to consider those
things.
When it comes to want them to shat is already having ly basis,
When it comes to Iraq, the Iraqis have a lot of problems, a lot
of problems that we want them to solve. And the issue of the re-
turn of our criminals to a country that is already having trouble
dealing with the detainees that we are picking up on a daily basis,
and they are trying to take these people off the streets who are
doing very terrible things, I think we want to be judicious in how
hard we press them on this issue. Although we raise it with them,
we want them to take them back, I just ask for a little bit of judi-
ciousness with a country that is obviously fighting on many, many
different fronts right now.
Chairman LANTOS. Mr. Sherman.
Mr. SHERMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Madam Secretary, I am simply concerned that we are putting far
too little of our diplomatic and economic power behind the effort to
prevent Iran from developing nuclear weapons and putting all of
our power—diplomatic, our good name and, of course, our mili-
tary-behind this effort in Iraq.
The Global War on Terrorism has many fronts and will last for
many years. You and I were with the President about a month ago
when he compared the Global War on Terrorism to the Cold War.
Let us learn from the Cold War. We won that one; there are some
good lessons. Kissinger and Nixon told us that if we did not prevail
in Vietnam, the Stalinists would take over Southeast Asia, South
Asia, and eventually win the Cold War.
Eventually we got smarter. We realized that Vietnam was the
worst possible place to bottle totalitarian communism. We with-
drew from Vietnam, and I would venture that if we had never
withdrawn from Vietnam, we would not have prevailed in the Cold
War. In any case, we withdrew from Vietnam and we prevailed.


37
Now we are being told by the administration that there is no way
to prevail against the worldwide terrorists unless we achieve sta-
bility, perhaps democracy, in Iraq. We are told that this is the case
because if Iraq is not completely pacified, then terrorists will have
a place where they can meet and plot against us. But, of course,
terrorists right now are not only meeting and plotting against us
in Iraq, but in many places in Waziristan, in northwest Pakistan,
many places in Afghanistan, many places in the Congo are avail-
able to them; they just don't need to go to Iraq.
And so it seems fairly obvious that in this war against terrorism
there will be many places where terrorists can plot against us, and
if we devote 100 percent of all of our effort to try to deprive terror-
ists of one place where they can meet, we are kind of losing sight
of the entire effort.
Is Iraq the be-all and end-all of the war on terrorism? And as you
speak, reflect on the words of Kissinger and Nixon; why did they
have it wrong, but you have got it right?
Secretary RICE. Well, with all due respect to my good friend
Henry Kissinger, I think we have a history with al-Qaeda that we
didn't have with Vietnam.
Mr. SHERMAN. That was part of the global war.
Secretary RICE. Let me answer.
We have a history with al-Qaeda. It is the history of September
11th and we know what it would mean to have al-Qaeda able to
roam freely in one of the most important states of the Middle East.
We also know what it would mean to have an Iraq that is so dis-
abled and so crippled that Iranian influence became a major factor
in the Middle East, really endangering American interests that go
back more than 60 years in the Persian Gulf region.
We know, too, what it would mean to our allies in the region to
have that kind of Iranian influence and what that would mean for
American influence. It is going to be one way or another in the
Middle East, and if it is not American influence, I will bet you it
will be Iranian influence.
As I said, Iraq given over to terrorists in its Sunni areas and
Iraq given over to Iranian influence is most certainly then going to
be a bridge for Iran into the region, and an Iraq that is successful
is going to be a blockade.
I just frankly think that our interests are so much clearer in
what would happen if Iraq fails—our interests in the war on ter-
rorism and the implications of that failure. I would just point, Con-
gressman, to the fact that I think whether it was the Baker-Ham-
ilton Study Group or many of the experts that I have been listening
to as they have been testifying, there is a very generalized sense
that Iraq, if it fails, is going to have enormous consequences for the
United States; and I just think we have a different history with
Iraq.
Chairman LANTOS. The gentleman's time has expired.
Secretary RICE. Mr. Chairman, I didn't answer Congressman
Meeks question about the "coalition of the willing,” and I should do
that.
Chairman LANTOS. Please.
Secretary RICE. We don't anticipate that there will be additional
forces because in the areas that those coalitions' partners are, they


40
Ms. WATSON. Thank you, and I want to thank the Secretary for
spending this amount of time with us. And I would hope that the
next time we meet we will not be on this same issue because I have
listened for the last few hours, both about Iran and Iraq, and I
can't identify what victory in Iraq really is.
But I hope diplomacy will win out over bullets and guns; and I
will expect that you can join me in that one.
I have three things, and I am going to run them all together, and
then if time allows, you can respond.
But what I am hearing now is that we have helped draft up a
law in Iraq that would give Western oil companies about 75 per-
cent of the profits and contracts for the next 30 years. And you
mentioned “given the stakes,” are these the stakes? I would like
you to comment on that.
What is really disturbing is that occupying Iraq is not something
that we want to do. But I said here, when it was decided to build
the largest Embassy in the world with 5,000 workers at the cost
of approximately $1 billion, that, to me, says we are going to have
a massive presence for a long, long time in a country that I think
has 28 million people. And I understand that currently the total of
Embassy personnel, well within that total there are less than 10
people who are fluent in Arabic.
So I am just wondering why we are spending that much money,
why we are making it appear that we are going to be there for a
long time.
And I would hope that you would help us understand the work
that you do. And I respect it and admire it, and it might play a
major part, rather than this surge or this escalation of military
personnel and weapons.
Thank you.
Secretary RICE. Thank you very much, Congresswoman Watson.
First of all, we have not helped to draft a law that would advan-
tage Western oil companies. We have encouraged the Iraqis to have
a private sector with a free, open market. I think they will make
the best deals they can with whatever companies they can. That
has really been our goal.
There are a lot easier ways to ensure oil supplies than what we
have done in Iraq, and I think the notion that we somehow are
seeking oil is not right, and we ought to put that to rest right now.
Ms. WATSON. I am going to share an article that I pulled up,
Googled up, and I will share it with you.
Secretary RICE. Now
Ms. WATSON. I know you can read it, but I am going to share.
Secretary RICE. The Embassy is—$569 million to build it. But
you are right, it is a large Embassy. We do expect to have a pres-
ence in Iraq for a long time. It doesn't mean a military presence
necessarily. It means that like we have a presence in China, India,
and Egypt. We need an Embassy, and given the security situation
there, it is an Embassy that has special features. I think it is per-
fectly logical that we will want to have a large diplomatic presence,
a large aid presence, and a large presence to engage the Iraqi peo-
ple. Iraq is one of the most important countries in one of the
world's most important regions, and that is the reason for the large
Embassy there.


41
In terms of the Arabic, I said earlier and I would like to repeat
it because it is very important. We do have an awful lot of people
who have Arabic at different levels working in the Embassy. And,
in fact, we have a program to try to recruit more people with those
skills through our critical languages program and to begin to train
people in lower grades in critical languages. That is an initiative
that Margaret Spellings and Don Rumsfeld and John Negroponte
and I announced, because the truth of the matter is, this country
is underinvested in people who can speak the critical languages
like Arabic and Persian.
I am an example of how the country invested in people who could
speak Russian; and we did not make the same investment in crit-
ical languages of the Middle East, and now we are going to have
to catch up, and I hope there will be support for our efforts. It can't
be just the U.S. Government; I hope that universities will
incentivize people to learn these critical languages.
Finally, you are absolutely right—this can't be military alone. I
think the President was clear that we need the military surge be-
qis need help for the difficult mission that they want
to undertake. But he was also very clear—and I thank you for giv-
ing me the chance, because we haven't talked enough about it—this
has to be a political and economic surge.
We need very much to decentralize our efforts, our political and
economic efforts, out of Baghdad. We will have three new provin-
cial reconstruction teams in Baghdad. We will have several in
Anbar. I think it is five in Baghdad and three in Anbar.
We also are going to continue to build these provincial recon-
struction teams out with localities and provinces because we don't
want the only point for success to be Baghdad. We want this coun-
try to build its governance in economic and political structure from
the bottom up. And if I could introduce you, Congresswoman, to
some of the provincial reconstruction team leaders who are out
there in places like Mosul and places very far from Baghdad, who
are engaging the local population, engaging local leadership, help-
ing to bring reconstruction and job programs right to the local
level, I think you would get a sense of how we are trying to bring
the work that we do to support the building of a stable and demo-
cratic Iraq.
Finally, on the diplomatic front, I am going to leave tomorrow be-
cause I think it is extremely important that we embed this in a re-
gional strategy. Iraq is central not just to our interest; it is central
to the interests of the region. We are pressing the regional states
to be more responsive to Iraqi needs, to be politically more sup-
portive. We do have an international compact, which is a set of
benchmarks for the Iraqis to meet with a set of benefits that would
come from the international community as the Iraqis meet those
benchmarks: Like the oil law and the anticorruption measures that
they might take.
So thank you for giving me a chance to talk about some of the
things we are doing that are nonmilitary.
Chairman LANTOS. I am sorry. The gentlewoman's time has ex-
pired.
Ms. WATSON. I will call you.
Mr. SIRES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.


42
Madam Secretary, I am the new kid on the block here, so just
bear with me.
I am constantly amazed at our effort, the money that we have
spent, the human toll that we have in the region, and you men-
tioned the word before, self-preservation. Everybody is concerned
about Iran, if we lose, if we withdraw, how they are going to step
in. I guess my question is, What would it take for these people to
see the light, the neighbors of Iraq?
I am talking about Saudi Arabia. They have to come to the dance
floor. What would it take? Would it take a plan for us, instead of
a surge, to say that we are going to withdraw 20,000 troops every
6 months until they participate? I mean, what would it take from
us?
And the other part is, you spoke about Aljazeera and how we
need a vehicle for us to get out our message in this area. Maybe
I am wrong, but I thought I read where Saudi Arabia is one of the
biggest contributors to Aljazeera, and I am sure they can use a lit-
tle force. I don't think they have to worry about the FCC in that
part of the world. Can we get them to at least participate in trying
to change some of the opinions that these people have of us?
Secretary RICE. Thank you, Congressman.
First of all, you are right. It is one of our friends. It is in Qatar
that Aljazeera is, but the point is still well taken, and we have in-
deed engaged the Government of Qatar in telling them that
Aljazeera is engaging in propaganda that is endangering our forces.
You can be sure that is something that we press very hard with
them. They keep saying they are making changes in the manage-
ment, but it never quite materializes.
Mr. SIRES. It is the money.
Secretary RICE. You make a very good point of that. What would
it take for them to be more involved?
I think they are becoming much more involved than they were.
They have been pretty involved in getting Sunnis involved in the
political process in a useful way, and we have to recognize that.
Jordan is training lots of policemen for the Iraqis in Jordan.
A lot of them have now begun to really have missions in Iraq,
if not at the Embassy level at least at the chargé level. The Arab
League did send the head of the Arab League there because part
of this is to have Iraq have an Arab identity, not one that is linked
through the Shi'a to Iran. So I think those are useful things.
We want the Gulf States to really—the things they could do most
importantly is debt relief, especially Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, be-
cause in fact the Iraqis—and a point I have not made and I should
have made to Congresswoman Watson—the Iraqis are about to
spend $10 billion of their own money on reconstruction, as well
they should. They have been slow to spend it; we have been press-
ing them to spend it. So they do have resources.
One of the issues is, can debt relief help the Iraqis to have even
more resources? Because one of the limits on the resources has to
do with this overhang of debt that we hope people will forgive.
The international compact gives everybody an opportunity to step
up, and we plan to press that. Frankly, the Iraqis need to dem-
onstrate to the region, just like they need to demonstrate to their
own people, that they are going to be evenhanded in the treatment


43
of Sunnis and Shi’as. With that I think then they will get a better
response and a good response from the region.
But I don't want to leave the impression that the region has done
nothing. They have been much more engaged with the Iraqis over
the last year. They could, frankly, be more engaged than that.
Chairman LANTOS. Thank you.
Ms. Jackson Lee.
Ms. JACKSON LEE. First, Mr. Chairman, let me express my ap-
preciation. It is an honor to be able to serve with you and serve
with Ranking Member Ros-Lehtinen, but also with all of the mem-
bers of this committee.
Last evening I sat in front of the television with a little black
book and intently tried to take notes—even though I knew they
would be reported very aptly in today's newspapers—of the Presi-
dent's speech. And I recognized constitutionally we are three sepa-
rate branches of government with the President being the Com-
mander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces and, in actuality, can call our
troops into battle.
The most frustrating aspect of what I heard last night was seem-
ingly the conspicuous ignoring of the vast input of Members of Con-
gress—I note there were a number of Senators who had recently
come back from Iraq who wanted to engage and I am not sure
whether they were completely engaged—and completely ignoring
the creature of the Congress which was the Baker Commission, a
studious, thoughtful presentation of diplomacy first.
The concern that I have for the President's representation last
night, and as you recalled for me and I will quickly get to the
question—the Cold War, my brief recollections that Lech Walesa of
Poland claimed Martin Luther King as an idol, claimed a social
movement of nonviolence.
We cannot compare large portions of the end of the Cold War to
the violent upheaval in Iraq. There was a great deal of diplomacy
utilized in the coming to a conclusion of the Cold War. Although
there may have been a number of conflicts that we can recount-
I know that, and you are the Soviet expert. But what you have
done based—the President has based his efforts on is an Iraqi de-
pendent policy. You are sending troops into battle based upon a
failed government that has never kept its promises short of our
forced election. When I say "forced,” we provided them the protec-
tion.
So I ask the question—and you may have answered it already,
and I will ask the question. Riddled in my remarks may be some
errors because obviously I am just becoming familiar with the vast-
ness of the details that this committee has been privy to. How are
we, the American people, to rely upon a dependent foreign policy
versus a coalition foreign policy? I don't think we should send our
troops into battle based upon this dependent foreign policy of an
Iraqi Government that has failed to engage the Sunnis and the
Shiites, has failed to engage in diplomacy.
Secretary RICE. Thank you, Congresswoman. Let me just make
clear about the Cold War.
I was actually talking about the first part of the Cold War, not
the last part of the Cold War, and I think it would be fair to say
that the first part of the Cold War was pretty violent. The first


45
really hard; given the tremendous grievances that they have
against one another throughout history, they understand that their
best future is together.
Now in the time that they have been in office, or even before
they came into office, we have to recognize that al-Qaeda did set
out to stoke sectarian violence through the bombing of the Golden
Mosque and that to a certain extent it succeeded. What the Presi-
dent was talking about last night was a limited mission for addi-
tional American forces to bridge the gap for the Iraqis between the
force that they need to deal with in Baghdad and the force that
they have.
I want to repeat again, if you really do think that this is just a
matter of will, that all the Iraqis have to do is step up, then in fact
I think the right policy might be to challenge them on that, step
back and say, “Step up.” But it is the assessment of our people on
the ground, our military people, our political people and, indeed, in
conjunction with their military experts that they don't currently
have those forces. It would be at least the summer, maybe a little
bit later, before they have those forces. And because the sectarian
violence in Baghdad that needs to be dealt with that is so urgent,
they have got to regain the confidence of the population that they
will indeed deal evenhandedly with the violent people who are kill-
ing innocent Iraqis.
If I may, I just want to repeat something that I have been saying
today because there is an image that is pervasive of Sunnis and
Shi’as simply going at each other, random Sunnis and random
Shi’as, just simply going at each other because they hate each
other. The chairman is absolutely right; there are deep enmities be-
tween these groups. But the real problem is, in these mixed neigh-
borhoods and to a certain extent in some Sunni neighborhoods, you
have organized violent people, organized gangs, organized death
squads, that are going into neighborhoods killing the men and
sending the women into exile. That is a breakdown in civil order,
and the Iraqi Government has got to get control of that problem.
In order to do that, they developed a plan that puts a military
governor in Baghdad, that puts two deputies in nine districts
where Iraqi army forces, Iraqi national police and Iraqi police will
operate out of police stations like the spoke out of a wheel, spoke-
to-wheel, and where we are supporting them with an American
battalion in each of those nine districts.
This is a very limited mission, I think, for a very important,
high-priority task. But I absolutely fully agree and admit that if
the Iraqis aren't able to step up to their part of the bargain, this
isn't going to work.
What gives some comfort to me is that I think they now under-
stand that everything is on the line for them in convincing their
population that they can actually govern.
Chairman LANTOS. Madam Secretary, before I thank you, let me
just say, and I know I speak for every member of this committee,
we stand in awe of your intellectual brilliance and your mastery of
a global portfolio of unprecedented proportions and complexity, and
we are immensely proud of you.
Let me also wish you on behalf of every member of this com-
mittee Godspeed and good successes in your mission. Let me tell


46
you, we are looking forward to February 7th when we will have the
pleasure of seeing you again.
Secretary RICE. I look forward to it.
Ms. Ros-LEHTINEN. If I could also extend our best wishes to the
Secretary as well. And it is just so wonderful to be speaking on be-
half of American values of freedom, democracy and respect for
human rights, so be proud.
Secretary RICE. Thank you very much. Thank you.
Chairman LANTOS. Thank you very much.
This briefing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 5:10 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]


48
excuses prevent us from exerting strong multi-lateral pressure on
Iran through increased economic sanctions.
While I do not believe that Iran is likely to be deterred in its pur-
suit of nuclear weapons, the hollowness of its claims of peaceful in-
tent can be easily exposed. If Iran's nuclear program is truly peace-
ful, Tehran should welcome an opportunity to ensure a stable sup-
ply of nuclear fuel from an internationally supported nuclear fuel
bank located in a safe nation. If Iran is instead building a nuclear
weapon, its nefarious intentions will be quickly exposed should it
refuse to participate in this important project.
So, Madam Secretary, today I am introducing legislation to pro-
vide both financial and material support for establishing an inter-
national nuclear fuel bank, under the auspices of the International
Atomic Energy Agency. This bank will ensure that any state that
keeps its nuclear non-proliferation commitments can get the fuel it
needs without establishing its own fuel production facilities.
Madam Secretary, with this legislation we can put an end to the
lame excuses of the Government in Tehran. But the same holds
true for Afghanistan: The time for excuses is over.
As you know, Madam Secretary, I just returned from a fact-find-
ing trip to Iraq and Afghanistan with Speaker Pelosi and other col-
leagues in the National Security Leadership of Congress. Soon
after our plane touched down in Kabul, a delegation met with
President Karzai. Increased economic assistance for the troubled
nation was at the top of his request list, and I know it is on vours.
as well.
Let me be clear. I support an increase in economic and security
assistance to Kabul. Security must be restored; abject poverty must
be tackled; and the explosive growth of poppy production must be
checked. There is every reason to believe Afghanistan can still be
safe.
But if American taxpayers are to be expected to allocate an addi-
tional $10.5 billion to Afghanistan, the oil-rich Arab countries in
the Gulf should surely be expected to match our contributions, at
the very least.
Over the past several years, the Saudis have made more than
$300 billion in excess oil profits, while Americans paid $2.50 or
$3.00 a gallon at the pump. Meanwhile, the Saudi contribution to
Afghan reconstruction and development has been pathetic, a mere
drop in the barrel.
While their fellow Moslems are struggling to survive in the harsh
Afghan winter, the Saudi royal families contend with handing out
a few small coins from its change purse. Madam Secretary, I hope
| continue to make it abundantly clear to the Gulf na-
tions that their miserly ways must end, and it must end now.
The member nations of NATO must also rethink their knee-jerk
aversion to being major players in bringing peace to Afghanistan.
Europeans loved NATO when the alliance protected them from the
menacing Soviet threat, but their ardor has cooled as NATO is
called on to protect Afghanistan from devolving into a narco-ter-
rorist state.
NATO literally has to beg for troops, and the numbers are still
too few: Approximately 35,000, with almost 14,000 coming from the
United States. Those European troops that are present in the coun-


50
It is in the process of implementation that failure or success is often determined.
This seemingly simple task is in fact enormous, requiring close management of
the global efforts of thousands of employees, contractors, and others; coordination
of the work of scores of bureaus, agencies, and programs; and ensuring the smooth,
daily operation of our countless actions in every country on the planet.
Madame Secretary, you are to be congratulated not only for your dedication in
your role of Secretary of State but also for choosing to undertake a massive and
long-overdue reorganization of the operations of the State Department and its asso-
ciated agencies to meet the rapidly changing conditions of the world in which we
live.
Given the complex challenges and foreign policy objectives outlined above, and the
demands these and current programs place upon our ability to implement them, the
question before us today is whether or not this budget submission is the one best
structured to accomplish the goals you have set.
A good place to start would be to revisit the resources and independence of the
Office of the Inspector General.
Although State's overall budget has increased by approximately 50% since FY
2001, the Inspector General's budget has increased by only 1%.
Obviously, strengthening State's own internal oversight mechanism is a pre-
requisite to effective reform elsewhere.
There is also a great need to review whether or not the training and deployment
of personnel are adequate to current needs.
Last fall, the GAO released a report that concluded that State needed to devote
far more attention to addressing staffing shortfalls and improving language pro-
ficiencies of employees at foreign posts, especially those critical to the war on terror.
I believe some of your broader reform proposals address some of these issues.
I welcome any details you may be able to share with us and look forward to hear-
ing from Ambassador Tobias in coming weeks regarding the progress on this front.
We must also be alert to decision-making by inertia and to be wary of the trap
of equating the spending of money with advancing U.S. interests.
For example, in his FY 07 budget, the President requested funding for U.S. mem-
bership in more than forty international organizations.
But it is not at all clear that continued membership in each of these organizations
serves U.S. interests.
Given that the new and supposedly reformed United Nations Human Rights
Council still includes some of the world's worst human rights violators, I believe
that a sober look at the costs and advantages of our participation in these inter-
national organizations be undertaken as soon as possible.
Regrettably, the UN provides many such examples where a fresh eye and
unclouded judgment are sorely needed.
On a larger scale, there is an undeniable need for a thorough reexamination re-
garding the focus of our assistance programs overseas.
In some instances, I would argue we need to move away from government to gov-
ernment programs and focus more on developing and strengthening civil society.
We must also be careful not to place undue emphasis on conferences and sporadic
training efforts but, rather, should structure our programs toward long-term sus-
tainability.
Last year, the National Endowment for Democracy issued a report stating that,
in certain countries around the globe, “government efforts to constrain democracy
assistance have recently intensified and now seriously impede democracy assist-
ance.”
We must remain vigilant and hold foreign aid recipients accountable for their ac-
tions.
The overriding goal of our State Department operations and foreign aid budget
should be to better integrate and streamline our programs, in order to effectively
advance both the Security and Freedom Agendas I have already mentioned.
The need for a new approach extends to all levels, beginning with the mechanisms
and standards we currently employ to monitor and evaluate the performance in the
field of our assistance programs.
We must restructure or eliminate those programs which have failed to secure the
results set out for them.
Madame Secretary, again let me thank you for your appearance here today. I look
forward to working with you as you move forward in implementing this long-over-
due reorganization of how we conduct U.S. foreign policy.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.


51
STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE CONDOLEEZZA RICE,
SECRETARY OF STATE, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Secretary RICE. Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr. Chair-
man. Thank you, members of the committee, for this opportunity
to address the committee about the challenges and the opportuni-
ties that we face today, and the resources that the President will
be requesting to be able to meet those challenges.
And Mr. Chairman, I had a longer statement, but I would pro-
pose to make short opening remarks, and then to have the full
statement placed into the record, if that is acceptable.
Chairman LANTOS. Without objection.
Secretary RICE. Thank you. I will also, Mr. Chairman, address
your question at the end of my remarks concerning civilians in
Iraq.
President Bush's fiscal year 2008 international affairs budget for
the Department of State, USAID, and other foreign affairs agen-
cies, totals $36.2 billion. The President's budget also requests $6
billion in supplemental funding for the year 2007, to support ur-
gent requirements that are not funded in the annual budget cycle.
This supplemental request includes $1.18 billion for additional op-
erating costs of the Department of State and other agencies largely
related to the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.
It also includes $4.81 billion to meet urgent new foreign assist-
ance needs in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Lebanon, as well as peace-
keeping and humanitarian assistance in Sudan Somalia, and other
countries in need.
In addition, the administration is requesting $3.3 billion in war
supplemental funding for fiscal year 2008, or $1.37 billion for for-
eign assistance and $1.93 billion for State Department operations.
This is responsive, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee,
to a request that has been made several times that we try and
project what the war costs will be in the coming year. And these
are costs that we would not expect to want to put into base budget
because they are, in a sense, emergency spending, and related to
specific circumstances.
These resources are absolutely fundamental to our national secu-
rity. I think the members of the committee recognize that over the
last 5 years since September 11, we have been very engaged in the
global war on terrorism. It is a war, and it is definitely a war in
the sense that we are losing human treasure in that war.
But it is a completely different kind of war than we have fought
before. To be successful, force of arms is necessary, but not suffi-
cient; and we are mobilizing our democratic principles, our develop-
ment assistance, our compassion, our multi-lateral diplomacy, and
the power of ideas to win what is going to be a generational strug-
gle.
I am pleased that in this struggle, President Bush has made
clear our commitment to a broad approach to the war on terror.
And that is why this year, for the first time, he has designated the
Department of State as a national security agency, alongside the
Department of Defense and the Department of Homeland Security.
That is why the State Department has the lead in most of the
tasks associated with the national counterterrorism strategy.


52
What I would submit to you today is that this requires of the De-
partment of State, of USAID, fundamentally different thinking
about our role; fundamentally different ways to train our people, to
recruit our people, and to deploy them. It gives us a better under-
standing of what we are called to do.
We are calling this mission transformational diplomacy. Indeed,
we are making changes in where we deploy our personnel, how we
deploy them, what we ask of them, and the training that we give
them. In some cases, Mr. Chairman, we are trying to catch up, for
instance, in terms of language skills. I want to just note for this
committee that one of my own personal concerns is to improve the
capability to draw on people who have critical languages. When I
was a young student going to college and then graduate school, it
was the patriotic thing to do to learn to speak Russian. Along the
way I learned to speak Czech, too, because for this country, the in-
vestment, through the National Defense Languages Act, that peo-
ple needed to learn those at-the-time-critical languages was under-
stood.
We are frankly under-invested as a country in the acquisition of
critical languages like Arabic, Farsi, and Chinese. Indeed, Sec-
retary Spellings and former Defense Secretary Rumsfeld, then DNI
John Negroponte and I have proposed to the President's critical
language initiative that we try and address that deficit in language
skills. This is just one of the examples of what we are trying to do
to prepare ourselves better for the long-term war on terror.
But we are doing other things. We are revolutionizing our ap-
proach to development assistance. We are trying better to realign
our foreign assistance with our foreign policy goals, to make sure
that our foreign assistance is contributing to the development of
well-governed democratic states. Because, after all, well-governed
democratic states form the foundation of a more stable world.
We recognize that democratizing states also have to be able to
meet the needs of their people for education and for health. Amer-
ica is a compassionate country that wishes to be involved in the
great health struggles of malaria and HIV/AIDS. We are revolu-
tionizing that through the way that we deliver foreign assistance,
and what we expect of those who receive our foreign assistance.
But we are also revolutionizing the way that we perform by sim-
ply being right on the front lines in the war on terror. We have
people serving in Iraq and Afghanistan, in other places, who, like
their military counterparts, leave family behind; they serve unac-
companied in places like Iraq and Afghanistan. They serve literally
on the front lines. Our people in Iraq are not sitting in the green
zone in Baghdad; they are in places like Anbar Province, one of the
most difficult provinces.
The provincial reconstruction teams' concept is one that was de-
veloped by the Department of State to get our diplomats and our
political personnel and our economic counselors closer to the people
of Iraq and Afghanistan, so that they can help to deliver services.
Frankly, Mr. Chairman, this puts our people at great risk. I
want today to pay tribute to the many civilians who, on a daily
basis, see mortar attacks against their positions and who must
travel in convoys that are dodging attacks. We know that they are
in danger. We have done everything that we can to help secure


54
be recruited, they have to be vetted, and they have to receive ap-
propriate security clearances.
Our agreement with the Department of Defense was that for a
period of time and we think that is 6 or so months, maybe a little
longer; it depends a little bit on when we get the funding, so that
we can let contracts for these civilians—we would actually use re-
servists to fill those positions. Because the military actually does
have a reserve corps that has many of those specialties.
It speaks to me, Mr. Chairman, to the importance of the coopera-
tion that we have had with the Defense Department in making
sure that we have the right specialties, and that they can fill in
until the civilians are recruited. But the Department of State's po-
sitions for this surge have already been addressed, the people have
been identified, and they are ready to go.
What we have to do is to recruit other civilians. It speaks to me,
too, Mr. Chairman, of the very importance of the civilian response
corps that the President proposed in the State of the Union. We
don't have a counterpart to the military National Guard or a re-
serve corps of civilians who can be ready and trained to go out and
perform these functions: Engineers, lawyers, agricultural special-
ists.
So we are charged with developing the concept for civilian re-
sponse corps. We will be coming to the Congress for support for
that concept, and for funding for that concept, so that we can have
a ready reserve of civilians to take exactly this kind of task.
But currently, the Department of State is, in fact, ready to go.
We will recruit other civilians from within the U.S. Government
agencies, and then we will recruit broader numbers of civilians.
But Mr. Chairman, I am glad you asked. Because I know the
President, because I just talked to him about it, and I have talked
to him many times about it, he appreciates what these civilians are
doing out there in harm's way. And I hope that everyone in Amer-
ica understands that we have a lot of civilians who are very coura-
geous, and are taking great personal risk because they believe in
these missions.
Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Secretary Rice follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE CONDOLEEZZA RICE, SECRETARY OF
STATE, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee:
Thank you for this opportunity to address the Committee about the many chal-
lenges and opportunities of our world today. I look forward to continue working with
Congress, closely and across party lines, to ensure that America's diplomacy, and
the courageous individuals who undertake it, have the necessary resources to pro-
tect our national security, advance our democratic ideals, and improve people's lives
throughout the world. With these duties we also reaffirm our responsibility to the
American people: to be the best possible stewards of their hard-earned dollars.
President Bush's FY 2008 International Affairs Budget for the Department of
State, USAID, and other foreign affairs agencies totals $36.2 billion. The President's
budget also requests $6 billion in supplemental funding for FY 2007 to support ur-
gent requirements that are not funded in the annual budget. This supplemental re-
quest includes $1.18 billion for additional operating costs of the Department of State
and other agencies. It also includes $4.81 billion to meet urgent new foreign assist-
ance needs in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Lebanon, as well as peacekeeping and humani-
tarian assistance in Sudan, Somalia, and other countries in need. In addition, the
Administration is requesting $3.3 billion in war supplemental funding in FY 2008–


55
anoulder to shoulder Wan just manage an end their governm
$1.37 for foreign assistance and $1.93 billion for State Department operations—to
support emergency requirements in Iraq and Afghanistan.
This money is a fundamental investment in our national security. More than five
years after the September 11 attacks, America remains engaged in a global war on
terrorism, but it is a war of a totally new and different kind. We face a long con-
frontation, in which military strength is important to our success, but is not suffi-
cient. The defining feature of our world today is its interdependence. The security
of the American people depends on the stability and the success of foreign societies.
If governments cannot, or choose not, to meet their responsibilities as sovereign
states, then every country in the world is threatened. The President believes that,
in today's world, the defense of our country depends on the close integration of our
multilateral diplomacy, our development efforts, and our support for human rights
and democratic institutions. That is why President Bush, in his budget, designates
the State Department as a national security agency.
We must recognize that our Foreign Service, our Civil Service, and our Foreign
Service Nationals are performing a vital national security role- often in difficult
and dangerous posts, far away from their friends and families, and in many cases,
shoulder to shoulder with our men and women in uniform. We are asking our civil-
ians to do far more than just manage an existing international order; we are charg-
ing them with helping foreign citizens and their governments to transform their
countries—to move them toward peace, freedom, prosperity, and social justice.
This is the national security mission of our State Department today, which we
have referred to as transformational diplomacy. To succeed in this critical work for
the American people, we are making important changes to our department's organi-
zation—both in terms of the roles our people are playing and how we are revolution-
izing our approach to foreign assistance. This is the foundation of our budget, and
I would like to briefly review these important changes.
TRANSFORMING THE STATE DEPARTMENT
Faced with new challenges to our country, President Bush has initiated major re-
forms to bring our institutions of national security into the 21st century. Now it is
the State Department's turn. With the support of Congress, we are moving our peo-
ple off the front lines of the last century, in the capitals of Europe and here in
Washington, and into the critical posts of this new century-in Asia, and Africa, and
the Middle East, and here in the Americas. Last year, we reprogrammed 200 posi-
tions for this purpose; we are set to reposition 80 more. At the same time, we are
moving more of our people out of our embassies and into the field, so they can en-
gage and work not only with governments but with the people of the nations in
which they serve. We are making every necessary change-giving our diplomatic
corps better training, better tools and technology, and more language skills—to em-
power them to meet this challenge.
We realize that resources are tight, so in all that we do, we seek to be good stew-
ards of the taxpayers' money. That is why, last year, I created the position of Direc-
tor of United States Foreign Assistance, which Randy Tobias now occupies. He
serves concurrently as the Administrator of the United States Agency for Inter-
national Development, and in these dual roles, helps to bring unified leadership to
our foreign assistance resources. Our goal for this budget was unprecedented: the
strategic alignment of our foreign assistance with our foreign policy goals.
The budget that you have in front of you represents the first joint effort of the
State Department and USAID, working together, to align resources strategically in
order to accomplish key national security and development goals with maximum ef-
ficiency and fiscal responsibility. To that end, we allocated our resources on the
basis of shared goals, established common definitions for our foreign assistance pro-
grams, and common indicators to evaluate their performance. Six strategic prin-
ciples guided our efforts:
• to integrate our planning based on the totality of our government's resources,
so we can make the smartest investments possible, without duplicative efforts
or wasteful spending;
to assess where each country stands in its course of development, so we can
tailor our assistance to the unique demands of each individual country and
support its own efforts to combat poverty;
to invest in states critical to regional stability and prosperity, which are often
those key to the global war on terror;
to focus our assistance on the most critical impediments to and catalysts for
long-term country progress;
corps better terve. We are man overnments bus and into the face same time,


56
at aines ofitions nd Lebo reflectir no
• to empower our Ambassadors and Missions Directors to oversee the complete
range of foreign assistance programs in the countries in which they work;
• and finally, to align our account structure with the country conditions and
goals that they are designed to address.
The main idea that I want to stress is this: Our new approach to foreign assist-
ance ensures an efficient, effective, and strategic use of the American taxpayer's
money. The adjustments you may see in one program are justified by what we have
determined is an even greater need elsewhere, and for the first time, we are start-
ing to measure the trade offs in order to make the best use of our limited resources.
With the performance and accountability measures we are putting in place, we will
better ensure that we are providing both the necessary tools and the right incen-
tives for host governments to secure the conditions necessary for their citizens to
reach their full human potential. This furthers our goal of helping developing na-
tions to “graduate” from our assistance, not to grow dependent on it.
EMPOWERING OUR PEOPLE
We are moving ahead on these actions with our existing authority. They are steps
that need to be taken, and we are taking them. But we must do more, and to do
it, we need more resources. We need the continued, indeed the increased, support
of the Congress. That is why we are requesting $7.2 billion for State Department
administration.
As we transform our existing positions to serve new purposes, we must also create
new positions that advance our strategic objective of getting more Americans onto
the diplomatic frontlines of the 21st century. This year, we are requesting $125 mil-
lion to create 254 new positions in critical spots like India, China, Indonesia, Ven-
ezuela, Nigeria, South Africa, and Lebanon. This funding will also enable us to es-
tablish new American Presence Posts, reflecting our goal of moving more of our dip-
lomats into the regions and provinces of our host countries. In addition, we request
57 positions and $23 million for the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and
Stabilization and our Active Response Corps. This will strengthen our ability to de-
velop a deployable cadre of civilian staff able to respond quickly to crises and sta-
bilization missions overseas.
Our department's new and evolving mission, which is vital to our national secu-
rity, requires an increased investment in our people. They need the latest tech-
nology and the best training, both leadership and language skills. This budget meets
those demands, including $905 million for information technology. We must also
continue to improve our security in a dangerous world. This budget allocates $965
million to strengthen overall security for our posts, our people, and our information
systems worldwide, including through the creation of 52 additional positions for se-
curity professionals.
At the same time, we must continue to modernize and improve our buildings
across the world. We seek $1.6 billion to address the major physical security and
rehabilitation needs of our embassies and consulates worldwide so we can protect
the men and women serving in our posts. In the fourth year of Capital Security Cost
Sharing, other U.S. government agencies with personnel abroad will contribute $362
million for the construction of new, secure diplomatic facilities.
To continue filling the ranks of the Foreign Service with our nation's best talent,
we will continue our efforts to revamp the pay scale for our diplomatic corps. State
Department personnel are increasingly expected to serve in what we call “hardship
posts,” which now comprise nearly 20 percent of all department positions. We must
fairly compensate our men and women serving abroad in difficult locations, often
far away from their families, and we must rectify a growing disparity between basic
salary levels for employees in the United States and overseas. Our budget request
includes $35 million to begin transition to a performance-based pay system and a
global rate of pay.
The State Department mission also extends to defending our borders and pro-
tecting our homeland. We must strive to remain a welcoming nation for tourists,
students, and businesspeople, while at the same time increasing our security
against terrorists and criminals who would exploit our open society to do us harm.
For this purpose, our budget includes $1.3 billion for the Border Security Program,
and we seek to add 122 consular positions to address rising passport and visa de-
mands. As good stewards of taxpayer dollars, we are using revenues from visa, pass-
port surcharge, and visa fraud fees to fund improvements in our border security.
In coordination with the Department of Homeland Security, we seek to fulfill the
President's vision of secure borders and open doors.
Finally, we are requesting $1.35 billion to meet our commitments to international
organizations such as the United Nations. Over the past year, in particular, we have
We must stille at the sameur open soci
tecting our ha businesspeople who would exploit for the


58
Iraq depends on more than military efforts alone; it also requires robust political,
economic, and diplomatic progress. Our military operations must be fully integrated
with our civilian and diplomatic efforts, across the entire U.S. government, to ad-
vance the strategy of “clear, hold, and build.” The State Department is prepared to
play its role in this mission. We are ready to strengthen, indeed to “surge,” our civil-
ian efforts. To do so, we are requesting $2.3 billion in the FY 2007 supplemental
and $1.4 billion in FY 2008 to fund our assistance efforts in Iraq.
The main focus of our support will continue to shift toward helping the Iraqi gov-
ernment expand its reach, its relevance, and its resources beyond the International
Zone. We will help local leaders improve their capacity to govern and deliver public
services. Our economic efforts will be targeted on local needs with proven strategies
of success, like micro-credit programs. And we will engage with leading private sec-
tor enterprises and other local businesses, including the more promising state-
owned firms, to break the obstacles to growth.
We must continue to get civilians and diplomats out of our embassy, out of the
capital, and into the field, all across the country. The mechanism to do this is the
Provincial Reconstruction Team, or PRT. We currently have ten PRTs deployed
across Iraq, seven American and three coalition. Building on this existing presence,
we plan to expand from 10 to 20 teams. For example, we will have seven PRTs in
Baghdad, not just one. We will go from one team in Anbar province to four with
PRTs in Fallujah, Ramadi, and al Qaim. These PRTs will closely share responsibil-
ities and reflect an unprecedented unity of civilian and military effort.
Expanding our PRT presence will also enable us to diversify our assistance across
Iraq. Iraq has a federal government. Much of the street-level authority, and much
of the opportunity for positive change in Iraq, lies outside Baghdad, in local and pro-
vincial governments, with party leaders and tribal chiefs. By actively supporting
these provincial groups and structures, we diversify our chances of success in Iraq.
Our PRTs have had success working at the local level in towns like Mosul, Tikrit,
and Tal Afar. Now we will invest in other parts of Iraq, like Anbar province, where
local leaders are showing their desire and building their capacity to confront violent
extremists and build new sources of hope for their people.
The importance of these joint teams in Afghanistan and Iraq is clear, as is the
need to increase our capacity to deploy civilians. The President has called on us to
work together to develop a “civilian reserve” to provide the government with outside
experts to augment our government teams. I look forward to working with you to
address this challenge.
In Lebanon, we are requesting $770 million in the FY 2007 supplemental for a
new comprehensive package to support the Lebanese people's aspirations for peace,
stability, and economic development. I made this pledge last month at the Lebanon
Donor's Conference, which raised $7.6 billion to support the Lebanese people and
the democratic government of Prime Minister Siniora. Our new package includes
both economic and security assistance. And let me add, most importantly: Our as-
sistance will support the Lebanese government's own ambitious reform program,
which demonstrates its commitment to reducing its debt and achieving economic
and financial stability. In November 2006, we also signed a Trade and Investment
Framework Agreement to help support Lebanon's development through enhanced bi-
lateral economic ties.
As we take steps forward in the reconstruction and development effort, we must
not lose sight of the need to continue to implement fully all UN Security Council
resolutions related to Lebanon, in particular Resolution 1701. We commend the Leb-
anese government for its efforts to deploy the Lebanese armed forces to the south
of its country, and we applaud the international community for its successful de-
ployment of the enhanced UNIFIL forces to help Lebanon secure its sovereignty.
Much more work remains to be done, however, and I look forward to the report of
the UN Secretary General on what further steps must be taken to continue imple-
menting Resolution 1701, so that we can move forward vigorously.
In the Palestinian territories, President Abbas's desire to support a better life for
his people and to make peace with Israel is being blocked by the radical leaders of
Hamas. One year after this group's legitimate election, the international community
continues to stand together in our insistence that Hamas must meet the conditions
set out by the Quartet: recognize Israel, renounce violence, and recognize all pre-
vious agreements between Israel and the Palestinian Authority. The leaders of
Hamas now find themselves increasingly isolated and unable to govern.
Our goal with the Palestinians this year, working with Israel and responsible
Arab governments, is to empower President Abbas—to help him reform Fatah, pro-
vide security in the Palestinian territories, provide essential services to his people,
and strengthen the political and economic institutions of his state. We are request-
ing $77 million for these objectives. At the same time, we seek to facilitate discus-


61
Šuda for via the res
grouped every country to which we provide assistance by means of its internal char-
acteristics. We have identified five main country categories:
• Restricted states are those countries with significant freedom and human
rights issues, for which our assistance is geared to promote democratic reform
and support for civil society.
• Rebuilding states are countries in or emerging from conflict, in which estab-
lishing security and the foundations for effective governance and economic
growth are the highest priorities.
Developing states are low or lower-middle income countries, in which poverty,
governance, and investment in people are the greatest barriers to progress.
Transforming states are low or lower-middle income, relatively stable and
well governed, but for which poverty, disease, and human development re-
main impediments to progress.
Sustaining Partnership states are countries with upper-middle levels of in-
come or greater, for which our support is strategically targeted to sustain
peace, prosperity, and partnership.
If a country's characteristics describe its overall demand for assistance, we now
think of our foreign assistance in terms of supply—the programs and resources we
can supply to help countries advance along the path of their own development. In
order to allocate our resources more strategically, we identified five broad purposes
for our foreign aid programs.
First is humanitarian assistance. The United States is a compassionate nation,
and we will always be moved to action when tragedy strikes, and when innocent
people are in desperate need. The FY 2008 budget provides more than $2 billion
for the protection of refugees and for basic needs like food, water, and medicine for
vulnerable populations. One of the major recipients is Sudan, for which we are re-
questing a total of $359 million for humanitarian assistance, excluding funding for
Sudanese refugees in neighboring countries. This year we are continuing our sup-
port for victims of war and genocide, especially the internally displaced people in
Darfur and the refugees in eastern Chad.
The second purpose of our foreign assistance is to promote peace and security. In
addition to humanitarian assistance, this is the other major form of support that
we are providing in Sudan, because it is a major need right now. The same is true
in other countries that are struggling to emerge from the shadow of conflict: Demo-
cratic Republic of the Congo, Liberia, Somalia, Haiti, Colombia, and Lebanon. In
some of these countries, and in many others, UN peacekeeping missions are playing
a vital role, so for FY 2008, $1.1 billion of our peace and security assistance will
support America's share of the costs of those deployments.
A third purpose is governing justly and democratically. For FY 2008, we are re-
questing a significant increase over last year's funding level. These resources will
go to support programs, in every region of the world, to strengthen the rule of law,
fight corruption, monitor elections, and other such demands. One region in which
we are increasing our support for governing justly and democratically is here in our
own hemisphere. The democracies of Latin America are now more capable of pro-
viding social services to their citizens on their own. As a result, we are reducing
our direct provision of services and using our limited resources to strengthen the
institutional capacity of Latin American democracies to deliver the benefits of devel-
opment to their people.
Fourth is investing in people. Human capacity must be strengthened and poverty
and disease addressed in order to promote and sustain development success. Our
request for resources to combat disease and mitigate its impacts on vulnerable popu-
lations, to improve access to quality education, and to provide social services and
protection to vulnerable populations represents a 40 percent increase over FY2006
enacted levels. The President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief and Malaria Initia-
tive are core components of this increase, as these diseases claim over 5 million lives
annually in the developing world; and dramatically impact a country's workforce
and development trajectory. Poor nations cannot hope to devote necessary resources
to address the magnitude of these diseases, and development progress is therefore
severely handicapped. Basic education is also necessary for progress and estab-
lishing a foundation for prosperity. The FY2008 request for resources to support
basic education programs is $535 million, the largest request this Administration
has ever made.
The final goal of our foreign assistance is alleviating poverty through economic
growth. On this front, our flagship initiative is the Millennium Challenge Corpora-
tion, or MCC. Since 2004, the MCC has signed development compacts with eleven
countries worth a total of $3 billion. MCC works with transforming countries that
and to mpacts oment su


62
het of our insest meainst poverent countries themat
meet objective standards of progress for governing justly, advancing economic lib-
erty, and investing in their people. This money is given in the form of grants, not
loans, and the compacts are designed and managed by recipient countries them-
selves, reinforcing their ownership of their fight against poverty. These resources
complement and amplify the impact of our investments in other foreign assistance
accounts and provide a clear trajectory and incentive for countries to continue insti-
tutional improvement.
Ultimately, there are limits to what development assistance can achieve. For a
country to unlock the potential of its people to increase economic productivity, create
jobs, and combat poverty, it must integrate its economy into regional and global net-
works of free trade. The President remains committed to achieving a successful out-
come to the World Trade Organization's Doha Development Agenda—one that opens
markets, creates new trade, and strengthens the rules-based system. As a part of
the President's robust trade agenda, we have negotiated ten free trade agreements
(FTAs) with 15 countries worldwide, and Congress has already approved agree-
ments with 12 of these countries. Most recently, we signed FTAs with Colombia and
Peru, and we completed negotiations with Panama. We look to Congress to support
these important agreements.
Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee:
The State Department has assumed substantial new responsibilities as a national
security agency in the war on terrorism. We are the lead agency on many of the
tasks in the Administration's National Counterterrorism Strategy. Using our exist-
ing authority, we are taking dramatic steps to make our foreign assistance more ef-
fective and to enhance our ability to serve as responsible stewards of the American
taxpayers' money.
Our role in advancing peace and security is growing. We need increased funding
to push this agenda forward, but in recent years Congress has significantly reduced
the Administration's requests for International Affairs. Without greater support for
our request, we will fall short of our goal of protecting America and advancing our
vision of a better world.
In this challenging time, the men and women of American diplomacy are doing
all that we are asking of them—and much more. They are nobly answering the call
to service and shouldering their national security mission. I ask you to provide the
resources we need to play our part.
Chairman LANTOS. Thank you very much, Madam Secretary. Let
me just say from my own personal experiences around the globe in
meeting with civilian employees of both the Department of State
and other agencies, that their commitment and courage and patri-
otism is extraordinary. And I am very pleased that we are now em-
barking on a nationwide effort to have a civilian corps of men and
women who are prepared to undertake these dangerous missions.
I now would like to welcome my friend and colleague from Flor-
ida, and ask her to proceed with her opening statement.
Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman. And
thank you, Madam Secretary, for your testimony and for your serv-
ice to our nation.
I will forego my opening statement. Thank you for making it a
part of the record. And I would like to ask some questions about
the President's plan on Afghanistan.
As we know, opium production in Afghanistan is soaring, and
with it, the power of warlords, drug kingpins who are linked to the
Taliban fighters, as well as al-Qaeda.
In an effort to address this situation, last night and I am sure
that you have it-I and three of our colleagues sent you a letter
outlining a 16-point unified counternarcotics, counterterrorism
strategy modeled after our successful campaign in Colombia.
Among the proposals were increased extradition of the kingpins;
expanding the awards program to facilitate the capture of bin
Laden and other major terrorists operating in the region; devel-
oping a consensus policy with our allies to address the linkage and
the interdependence between drugs and terror in Afghanistan; and


63
increasing the trade capacity for legitimate Afghan products: For
example, carpets, gemstones, and other legitimate products.
This is not just a policy issue for me, but also for personal rea-
sons. My daughter-in-law, Lindsay, who, along with my stepson,
Doug, served in Iraq, will soon be deployed in Afghanistan in a few
weeks, where these drugs are financing the terrorists. So for Lind-
say and for all the men and women who are serving our nation in
the military, as well as in Foreign Service, in the Civilian Corps
that we hope to establish, and for our U.S. national security inter-
ests, we have got to make sure that we are implementing the best
plan; one that integrates all of our capabilities and assets to win
over the terrorists.
So here is my question, Madam Secretary. Why is it so difficult
to, when everyone acknowledges that these drugs are financing the
resurgence of the Taliban, to get consensus, both in our Govern-
ment and with coalition partners, to take this issue on in a serious,
calculated, coordinated man
And secondly, related to that, drug production is sky-rocketing;
the safe havens in Pakistan remain. And the new policy with a
$10.6 billion price tag does not offer new initiatives to solve the
narco-terrorism problem. More of the same will clearly not work.
What new initiatives can we expect to fight this drug production
problem?
Thank you.
Secretary RICE. Thank you very much, Congresswoman Ros-
Lehtinen.
First of all let me say that we are not satisfied, either, with the
results on counternarcotics in Afghanistan. One could not be satis-
fied. Indeed, we are reviewing again whether there are, as you say,
other new initiatives that might be taken.
We do believe that the base initiatives that we have undertaken
are important ones and ought to be continued. For instance, we
started a program with the Afghans a little more than a year ago
of so-called governor-led eradication, so that the governors them-
selves buy into what needs to be done. And to be fair, not every
province in Afghanistan has a huge problem in this regard.
But unfortunately, it does collocate with the most difficult in
terms of terrorism, like Helmand Province, and it is not a coinci-
dence. Because, as you said, the terrorism feeds on the drug traf-
ficking, and fuels them and funds the terrorists. So this is a link
that we absolutely have to break.
We are also continuing our efforts to improve the opportunities
for farmers to participate in the legal economy, rather than in the
illegal economy, through giving them alternative development
projects.
I will note that one of the problems in Afghanistan is that the
alternative development projects for crops requires that a road net-
work to be able to deliver those crops to market. One of the advan-
tages, if you will, to poppy is it doesn't spoil.
We are working with the Afghan Government. One of the ele-
ments of the request, the reconstruction request, is to accelerate
our road building in Afghanistan, so that the licit economy, the
legal economy, can grow. In fact, as


64
the illicit economy is going down. But we do need to provide oppor-
tunities for people.
Third, and perhaps most importantly, you put your finger on the
problem of the ability to actually prosecute and punish people who
are engaged in these kinds of activities. There is a large justice sec-
tor, anti-corruption element to the programs we have been pur-
suing.
One of the problems is that it is not just the local farmer who
is doing this. The local farmer—you might be able to get him out
of the business. But the drug kingpins, the networks, have to be
gone after. So we are working on means by which to do that. And
obviously, it can be a fairly dangerous proposition for people who
try those people. This is another element of what we are doing.
Finally, I would just note, we do have, within the U.S. Govern-
ment, complete agreement about what it is we want to do. We are
working with our coalition partners on questions like spraying, ei-
ther ground spraying or aerial spraying, which has helped us in
other places. It is of concern to the Afghan Government because it
is not very well understood, but we are continuing to work on that
issue.
I might just note that I think our people out in the field have
been doing a very good job. They have been getting out; they have
been working on these issues. In the natural rotation of our ambas-
sador, the new Ambassador to Afghanistan will be Bill Wood, who
has been our Ambassador in Colombia. And we think that he will
bring with him, then, some experience on this issue.
But as a bottom line, I want to say that we, too, do not think
n acceptable outcome. We are going to work very hard.
We think some of the things that we are doing will help, but unfor-
tunately it is a rather long-term problem to try and get rid of.
Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, Madam Secretary, and we look
to the written response to our letter. Thank you very
much.
Mr. Chairman.
Chairman LANTOS. Thank you. Madam Secretary, I know in due
course I will get an official reply from the Department concerning
the legislation I am introducing today concerning an international
nuclear fuel bank.
Let me just ask you to give us your initial reaction. Because it
is clear that Ahmadinejad in Tehran has succeeded in uniting a va-
riety of forces within the country, who may dislike him and oppose
him on other issues, on the importance of Iran's right to develop
civilian nuclear capabilities.
My legislation would provide enriched fuel and reprocessing out-
side of Iran, not only for that country, but for any country. And I
would be grateful if you think you could comment initially on this
proposal.
Secretary RICE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. We would like very
much to work with you on this legislation, because it falls very
much in the context of what the President thinks we need to do.
He, at the National Defense University in 2004, talked about the
need to have ways for countries to pursue civil nuclear power with-
out having the fuel cycle. Because obviously, enrichment and re-
processing can be used for the development of nuclear weapons,


65
and therefore there is a proliferation risk. But we want countries
to have access to civil nuclear power.
So breaking that link between the fuel cycle and having civil nu-
clear power with some kind of fuel bank we think would be a very
good idea. Bob Joseph, the Under Secretary for International Secu-
rity, has been talking with people about it.
I think that, Mr. Chairman, there is a lot that we could do with
this idea. And it would be important, as you said, not just for Iran.
One thing that we need to say loud and clear to the Iranian people
is we do not wish to deny them access to civil nuclear power.
The problem is when the technologies that they use to acquire
that civil nuclear power can lead, and appear to us to be leading,
rsuit of a nuclear weapon. So I think this is a very posi-
tive idea, and we would like very much to work with you.
Chairman LANTOS. I thank you, Madam Secretary. I will now
call on all colleagues for 4 minutes for questions and answers. If
your questions run 4 minutes, I will ask the Secretary to submit
the answer in writing. So please husband your 4 minutes.
I am pleased to call on my friend and colleague from California,
Mr. Berman.
Mr. BERMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you, Madam
Secretary, for being here.
Later in February you are going back to the Middle East to pre-
side or participate in a trilateral meeting with the Prime Minister
of Israel and the President of the Palestinian Authority. I am very
glad to see you and the United States more engaged in trying to
facilitate a meaningful peace process. I wish there had been times
sometimes in the past, particularly after the Israeli withdrawal
from Gaza, where we had been more engaged. Perhaps the January
elections would have turned out differently had more been done on
the ground.
But I am curious about your expectations. Can we move forward
while there is a Hamas-led Palestinian Authority that seems to-
tally disinterested in meeting the three conditions, dealing with the
shelling coming from Gaza, recent suicide bombing, actually re-
sponsibility claimed by the Al Aqsa Martyrs Brigades of Fatah, an
affiliated group.
Give us some notion of where you see this going in the context
of a roadmap, of a horizon, of a final settlement, how, with Hamas
still having the role that it has and its unwillingness to deal with
the three conditions that have been set forth, we can move forward.
And perhaps even more importantly, some of this seems motivated
by a belief that some of our friends in the Arab world, if we can
make some progress here, are going to be willing to do things in
the context of Iraq and other areas of the Middle East that they
are not now apparently prepared to do.
Could you spell out a little more clearly what exactly we think
can happen by their more active participation that can make things
in Iraq better? Because for some of us, we don't quite understand
the connection that both the Baker-Hamilton Commission Report,
and even some of your diplomatic efforts, seem designed to achieve.
Secretary RICE. Thank you, Congressman. First of all, let me just
say, in terms of any linkage, we see the Israeli-Palestinian issue


68
Department to make in order to at least do the research necessary
on microherbicides, which could well be a method of eliminating
opium production in Afghanistan, that has gone unspent for a
number of years.
Now, I know there are fanatics who are saying don't even look
at that option, we don't know who the heck is financing these fa-
natics, or are telling us not even to investigate. But are you going
to spend that $12 million to find out if microherbicides are a pos-
sible tool against the opium production in Afghanistan?
Secretary RICE. Well, Congressman, I will get back to you on the
specifics about microherbicides and what we are doing in terms of
research.
I will say that there are always questions about what one can do
in the use of certain kinds of herbicides worldwide, in terms of
crop, even illicit crop. And there are environmental issues that
have to be examined.
Mr. ROHRABACHER. That is correct. That is why that research is
important, and you have had $12 million. And because of some fa-
natic opposition to it, perhaps being financed by people who are
afraid it might be seen as an effective tool, you haven't moved for-
ward yet. And we would expect you to at least spend that money.
Secretary RICE. Well, I will get back to you about that, Congress-
man.
Mr. ROHRABACHER. All right. And one last thing-oh, my time is
up. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
*Chairman LANTOS. Thank you very much. Mr. Ackerman.
Mr. ACKERMAN. Thank you very much. Welcome, Madam Sec-
retary.
I was rather intrigued that you spent so much time talking about
the foreign language deficit that we have, and how greatly that is
needed.
It seems that the Defense Department has a don't ask, don't tell
policy when it comes to homosexuals. You don't have such a prohi-
bition in your agency, do you?
Secretary RICE. No, we do not.
Mr. ACKERMAN. Good for you. Well, it seems that the military
has gone around and fired a whole bunch of people who speak for-
eign languages-Farsi, Arabic, et cetera—after they trained them
in their foreign language school for 63 weeks, and presumably they
all passed all kinds of security things. And many of them told on
themselves, and were fired. For some reason, the military seems
more afraid of gay people than they are of terrorists, because they
are very brave with the terrorists. I mean, if the terrorists ever got
hold of this information, they could get a platoon of lesbians to
chase us out of Baghdad.
The affirmative suggestion that I would make is: Why can't the
State Department look to pick up all those people that were fired
from the military? Because apparently you don't have a policy. And
put these three dozen or so Farsi and Arabic people to work doing
what you are suggesting would cost a lot of money to do in train-
ing, et cetera, because we have them. Can we marry up those
two-or maybe that is the wrong word. Can we get some kind of
union of those two issues that you might be willing to—


69
Secretary RICE. Congressman Ackerman, I am not aware of the
availability of people, but I certainly will look. What we are doing
right now is we have quadrupled the number of people in the crit-
ical languages areas. One of the problems that we are trying to
deal with, and again it is a budget request this time, is that we
would like to train people to higher levels of competence.
Right now, because of just needing people in the field, we are
getting people to what is called three-three, and then getting them
out the door. We would like to get them to higher language levels,
but that requires having a greater number of people so that we can
have that kind of training-
Mr. ACKERMAN. Right. Well, maybe you might find some of those
competent people among those who were recently unemployed over
the past several years.
Secretary RICE. Yes, we will look at it.
Mr. ACKERMAN. During previous trips to the Middle East, democ-
racy promotion has been very highly promoted by the administra-
tion. And the reforms in the region seem to question the reality of
that happening.
On your trip to Cairo University in 2005 you had spoken very,
very powerfully about democracy reform. And in 2006, it doesn't
seem to have been mentioned as part of the agenda.
My question is: Where does democracy reform really fit into our
foreign policy? And do we have a strategy for democratization that
is going to work? Why are we not really pushing our friends in
Egypt and Saudi Arabia and Pakistan? And if, as in Egypt, they
worry about the Muslim brotherhood, and then beat up everybody
who is running for office, they kind of leave room only for people
who want to be terrorists to resist, because they don't cave in to
getting beat up, and we do away with all of the legitimate sources
of-
Secretary RICE. Well, thank you, Congressman. First of all, de-
mocracy is right at the core of what we are doing in our foreign
policy, because the President and I consider it not just a moral
cause, although of course it is a moral cause, but it is also a matter
of national security.
The fact of the matter is that well-governed democratic states are
allies, and that is the source of true stability. But it is also the case
that when you have a freedom gap or deficit, politics will go on, but
it will go on on the radical side, while the healthy forms of modera-
tion and reform that could take place don't take place. And I think
we have seen that in the Middle East, and it is one reason that
I think authoritarianism has produced circumstances in which ter-
rorism breeds, because people go to the extremes rather than to
more legitimate and more benign ways of carrying out their polit-
ical interests. So it is very much at the core.
The Cairo speech I felt was maybe the most important speech I
have made as Secretary. And I thought the President's—
Mr. ACKERMAN. Great speech.
Secretary RICE [continuing). Second inaugural was one of the
most important speeches an American President has made in
years. We are going to continue to press the case.
know that when I was in Luxor recently, and I was on the
ground for 272 hours, I think, total to talk about the Palestinian


71
was supposed to come later, only that proof never came because the
accusations turned out to be false.
Here is what we do know. The Iranians are very unlikely to sup-
port the Iraqi Sunnis and Baathists. They consider the Sunni
Iraqis the enemy. However, some 99 percent of all the attacks on
United States troops occur in the Sunni Arab areas, carried out by
Baathists or Sunni fundamentalist guerilla groups. How does that
compute with administration claims that Iran is playing the major
role in the insurgency?
Realistically, the Iranians do have a justifiable self-interest in
dealing with Iraq: A neighbor cast into civil war as a result of our
United States invasion. They face incredible instability next door.
We should also remember that Iraq Shiites that Iran is most anx-
ious to help are the Supreme Council, our allies around whom we
are trying to build a government in Iraq.
So this is my question. Can you assure me, this committee and
the American people, that the United States will not initiate a pre-
emptive attack on Iran?
Secretary RICE. Well, Congressman, first of all let me say that
I think the President has made very clear that we are not planning
or intending an attack on Iran. What we are doing is we are re-
sponding to a number of Iranian policies, both in Iraq and around
the world, that are actually quite dangerous for our national secu-
rity. Let me take them one by one.
The Iranian support for terrorism is well known and well under-
stood. And it is not just the United States that believes that Iran
is a key sponsor of terrorists. Whether one talks about Hezbollah
in Lebanon, where they arm and support them, bringing about, for
instance, or helping to bring about the Hezbollah attack on Israel
across the blue line this summer. Whether you talk about Iranian
port for some of the worst elements of militia and death squads
in Iraq. Indeed, networks that both we and the British have cited
as perhaps most likely being the source of the extremely powerful
enhanced IEDs that are killing our soldiers. I don't think any gov-
ernment in the world would stand by and not react to that.
If I could move to the nuclear file. I just don't think it is right,
Congressman, to say that this is a United States ginned-up notion
about an Iranian nuclear weapon. I would just note that the peo-
ple, the diaspora that signaled that in fact there might be some-
thing going on illegally at Natanse in Iran, where it turns out now
that they had been enriching and reprocessing for 18 years without
the knowledge of the IAEA, was a tip given not just to the United
States, but to the IAEA.
Indeed, much of our information is coming from the International
Atomic Energy Agency. I think the reason that we have been able
to get a Chapter VII resolution, 15–0–0, about the Irania
program, is that the United States of America is not the only coun-
try worried about an Iranian nuclear weapon.
As the chairman was noting, enrichment and reprocessing can be
for peaceful purposes. But most likely in this case, it is for the
technology that would allow you to build a bomb. And that is why
the world is uniting against Iran, 15–0, for Chapter VII, against
their nuclear program. So, I just don't think it is right to say that
it is somehow the United States that is fueling this story.


73
I think my time has about expired. Just one last thing: I would
like to commend the President on the PEPFAR program. It is well
received. Everyone knows about it. The Congress, of course, funds
it. And I mentioned to him at the State of the Union that I com-
mend him for that.
However, we are lacking health in other areas now. I mean, we
are getting good funding for HIV and AIDS, but child mortality and
all the rest of general health is not being funded. So I wish you
would look into that.
Thank you.
Secretary RICE. Yes. Thank you, Congressman Payne. And let me
thank you for the personal interest that you have had in these Afri-
can issues, and our opportunities to discuss them on a number of
occasions.
Let me just speak, very briefly, on Somalia. We are working on
a couple of fronts. First of all, we were first on the ground with hu-
manitarian assistance, I think about $16.5 million worth, which is
what we requested for humanitarian assistance. Obviously, we
think that a broad-based government would be the best for Soma-
lia, and we are encouraging the transitional Federal Government
to do that.
I do think that there are concerns about terrorist links to some
elements of the Islamic courts. Of course, it was the Islamic courts
that tried to go to Baidoa, and attacked Baidoa, provoking the
Ethiopian response. I think we do have to recognize that. But we
are counseling for the broadest possible government that can fight
terrorism and provide for the people of Somalia. There will be, I be-
lieve, a reconciliation conference fairly shortly, and we would sup-
port that approach.
On Liberia, I will host a donor's conference for Liberia next week.
The United States has been I think very generous in support for
Liberia. We do believe that this is a real success story in many
ways, but we have to now make sure that we consolidate that suc-
cess.
If you think about where Liberia was 4 or so years ago, with 13-
year-old boys on the front page of the New York Times with AK-
47s, and now you see the President, the first woman President of
Liberia, it is heartening. America is in large part responsible for
having sent in Marines to secure the airports, secure the ports, for
having assisted in bringing Charles Taylor to justice. This is some-
thing that we very much need to do.
On South Sudan, Andrew Natsios is, as you know, our Sudan
envoy. He is going to spend some time in South Sudan now. He has
very good contacts with the SPLM. Of course there has been some
considerable difficulty there since the death of John Garang. But
Ambassador Natsios is prepared to spend, we have talked about it,
he is going to spend some more effort on trying to make sure that
we don't lose the CPA, the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, while
we are rightfully concerned about the humanitarian crisis and
genocide in Darfur.
Finally, just on the health issues, thank you for the support of
PEPFAŘ. I should thank the entire Congress for that. We also
i major malaria initiative, because we believe that if you
want to think about things that really ought to be treatable, ma-


74
laria is preventable. So we have a major new malaria initiative.
Simple things like bed nets can make all the difference in the
treatment of malaria. Malaria disproportionately affects women
and children.
We have concentrated our other health resources in a couple of
ways: To support what we are doing with HIV/AIDS and to support
malaria. But also we have concentrated it in places where child
and infant mortality tend to be a problem. So while you might see
overall some of those numbers go down, I think you will see that
what we are doing is really we are now concentrating in places that
need it most.
But if you would like, I would be happy to give you a fuller re-
port in writing on what we are doing.
Chairman LANTOS. Thank you, Madam Secretary. Let me just
mention, before recognizing the next colleague, that tomorrow
morning, former USAID Administrator Natsios will appear before
this committee on Darfur.
The gentleman from Ohio, Mr. Chabot.
Mr. CHABOT. Thank you. Madam Secretary, I am one of the co-
chairs of the Missing and Exploited Children's Caucus. And you
and I have discussed in the past the tragic case of Tom Sylvester,
a Cincinnati gentleman whose daughter was taken illegally, when
she was 13 months old, to Austria. She is now 12 years old. He
went all the way to the Austrian Supreme Court. It wasn't en-
forced. And I know you are familiar with the case, so I won't elabo-
rate any further.
But in our discussion last year, you indicated that you would be
willing to meet with Mr. Sylvester and myself, if it would be pro-
ductive. At this point I think you may be his last, best hope. So
I hope that we can discuss with your staff a possible meeting so
that we can impress upon the Austrian authorities the gravity of
this situation.
Secretary RICE. I would be happy to do it.
Mr. CHABOT. Thank you very much. I appreciate that.
Also, Madam Secretary, I am deeply concerned about the Special
Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction's recent reports of wide-
spread waste and fraud in Iraq reconstruction efforts. With a re-
ported 80 active investigations of potential criminal activity in
Iraq, what steps is the State Department taking to ensure that tax-
payer dollars are spent wisely, both in terms of quality workman-
ship, and also for intended purposes?
Secretary RICE. Thank you. In fact, I have had a number of con-
versations with Stuart Bowen of SIGÍR (the Special Inspector Gen-
eral for Iraq), and we are very much supportive of the effort that
they are making.
Obviously, Iraq is a very challenging environment. Much of the
report that has been so concerning relates to another time period,
and to the expenditure of the Iraqi Development Fund. And it is
not that we don't take that seriously; we absolutely do. Those were
not U.S. taxpayers' dollars, but we take it seriously. It has helped
to give us some clues, some ideas about how to improve oversight
in what is a very challenging environment.
I think when it comes to the Iraqi Reconstruction Fund, the
$18.6 billion fund that was allocated by the Congress, that you can


76
But if they come over for a permanent transfer, then you won't
give credence to the Pentagon, which makes us wonder whether
that is a rational system, given especially the tremendous burdens
on those people who provide for security clearances. I would hope
that you would trust your friends over at the Pentagon, or decide
n't trust them even as to people who are assigned to the
State Department temporarily. But the idea that you would have
different standards for the two strikes me as odd.
I hope you create a special envoy to deal with the Sri Lankan
problems. I know that you need to hire people who have an under-
standing of la
ages in the Middle East.
e you would focus
on those who have moved from the Middle East to the United
States, and particularly many who are parts of religious minorities
who understand the culture they came from, and are motivated to
be part of America's efforts to bring human rights to that region,
and security to the United States.
When it comes to granting visas, putting aside terrorism and
looking only at whether people will come, enjoy their visit, and
then leave, we don't even have the statistics. We don't know who
has left. The failure of the Federal Government to keep track of
this shows that the Federal Government is in a worse position than
Disneyland. They know when you buy the ticket, then they scan
you when you leave. Whereas very few people illegally stay in
Disneyland permanently. [Laughter.]
Five million people are here in the United States because some-
body gave them a visa, expecting them to leave on time, and they
never left. And at the same time, millions of people are denied
entry into the United States, and we need them in Disneyland, be-
cause we need the tourists.
I would hope that you would look again at the idea, not on the
terrorism issue—we don't want to admit anybody who is a threat
to our security—but on the idea of getting performance bonds. So
that if somebody posts a bond saying that they will leave our coun-
try and go back home within the time limit given by the visa, that
that would be perhaps a better system than relying—or an alter-
native system, not an exclusive system—than the enormous delays
that it takes to get visas, and we have no idea what the success
rate is.
We don't know what the batting average is of any consulate or
any consular officer. Is 1 percent of the people they let into this
country overstaying; 80 percent? We don't know whether they are
letting legitimate tourists in. We don't know whether they are let-
ting illegitimate immigrants in. We don't even know whether they
are successful. So it is very hard to defend the present system
I want to associate myself with the comments of Chairman Lan-
tos on Iran, and ask one question. And that is, how do we talk to
other countries about the rule of law and democracy, when the
State Department ignores the Iran Sanctions Act, formerly the
Libya Sanctions Act, by taking the position that there are no cog-
nizable investments from foreign oil companies in the Iran oil sec-
tor.
Chairman LANTOS. The gentleman's time has expired, and the
Department, I take it, will respond in writing. I just want to men-
tion to the gentleman that several of my grandchildren wanted to


77
have permanent citizenship in Disneyland, and we are still work-
ing on that. (Laughter.]
Mr. SHERMAN. It is close to my district. Maybe something can be
arranged.
Chairman LANTOS. I am delighted to call on my friend from Flor-
ida, Mr. Mack.
Mr. MACK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And welcome, Madam Sec-
retary. It is good to see you again.
Secretary RICE. It is good to see you.
Mr. MACK. It probably won't be any surprise to you, but I have
got some questions about Venezuela. And understanding that we
only have 4 minutes, maybe there would be an opportunity, I would
hope anyway, for us to sit down and talk further about what our
plans are.
I am very concerned about the growing challenge, I guess you
would say, in Venezuela with Hugo Chavez and what he is doing
to intimidate and manipulate his country moving away from de-
mocracy, and toward a dictatorship. Quickly, some questions.
Do you believe that freedom is under attack in Venezuela? Do
you believe that there are human rights issues in Venezuela? What
are our plans to promote democratic reform and support a civil so-
ciety in Venezuela? And which of the five categories in the Office
of the Director of Foreign Assistance that you just recently created
would you put Hugo Chavez's Venezuela?
Knowing that our time is going to run out, if you could facilitate
either a meeting or a written response in more de
en response in more detail what our
plans are in Venezuela, I would appreciate it.
Secretary RICE. Yes. Well, thank you very much. First of all, yes,
I believe there is an assault on democracy in Venezuela, and I be-
lieve that there are significant human rights issues in Venezuela.
The United States has been one of the strongest supporters of
non-governmental organizations that are trying to operate there.
For instance, the Organization Sumate, the President met with the
woman who was under attack-being charged by Venezuela. We
think it may have, even though the case has not been decided, we
think it may have helped. Because we, for instance, got European
Union ambassadors to go and sit there for the trial every day, just
to make an international statement. We raise these issues in the
Organization of American States at all times, and with all the
states in the region.
I do believe that the President of Venezuela is really destroying
his own country, economically, politically. And this is a place with
which we have had traditionally very good relations, and would
like to continue to have good relations.
Our Ambassador has had some trouble there because he has
gone out and worked with kids, and had baseball games and the
like. And it is not very well liked by the government, but it is liked
by the Venezuelan people. We are going to continue to try to do
those things.
I would say that I think that one thing that we want to avoid
is to get into a rhetorical contest with the President of Venezuela.
Because, frankly, it takes the spotlight off of our very positive
agenda in Latin America. In fact, we work very well, whether it is
governments of the left or governments of the right, with any num-


78
ber of governments in Latin America. It is not a left-right issue,
which is, I think, the way he would like to make it. It is not a
United States-Venezuela issue. This is about the United States and
democratic countries, and the democratic charter of the OAS.
So when we work with a country like Brazil or a country like
Chile, or even a country like Uruguay, I think we demonstrate that
we can work with countries on either side of the political spectrum.
We are going to continue to press for the protection of democracy.
We are going to continue to call attention to the concerns about de-
mocracy. It is a good question, where we put the country at this
point, because I think it is in a transition—a negative transition,
if you will. And we need to look at how we are spending our aid
in Venezuela to do what.
I have had discussions with people about support for free trade
unions, for instance, in Venezuela, something that perhaps could be
done by labor organizations. That would be, I think, a very helpful
thing to the people of Venezuela. The Catholic Church is under at-
tack in Venezuela. We had discussions with the Church about that.
So we are going to continue to press the case; we are going to
continue to fund organizations that are trying to resist. But I think
we want to make this about American defense of democracy, not
a rhetorical contest with the President of Venezuela. I think in that
regard, he probably did himself no good with his speech at the
United Nations General Assembly, and made it not very hard, ac-
tually, to argue that Venezuela had no place on the Security Coun-
cil. As you notice, they are not there.
Chairman LANTOS. Thank you very much. Mr. Wexler.
Mr. WEXLER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you, Madam
Secretary, because you have participated very eloquently.
The committee has undergone I think a very thorough analysis,
under the chairman's leadership, of our policy in Iran, particularly
relating to the Iraq Study Group's recommendation for a dialogue.
We heard from former Secretary Madeline Albright, and her testi-
mony essentially was in accord with the study group, suggesting
the dialogue with Iran. You and others in the administration have
taken a different view.
What concerns me regarding the administration's approach is
that it seems to undermine what I think has been a very positive
effort by you and others, since the President first visited Brussels
in February after the election, and he joined with the EU3. And
then subsequently the administration supported further European
offers to Iran, I think wisely so, and wisely supported the Russian
offer to do the enrichment in Russia. All very wise moves which
culminated in the first round of sanctions in a multilateral forum.
It would seem to me that accepting the Iraq Study Group's rec-
ommendation and others would strengthen the administration's
hand with China, with Russia, in engaging those nations to ferret
up, to increase the sanctions on Iran.
The thing that troubles me most in terms of determining, well,
which policy is best, quite frankly, are the reports that in 2003,
that Iran apparently sent to the administration what the adminis-
tration officials have said seems to be an authentic offer—a pro-
posal, as was reported in the Washington Post and other publica-
tions—which essentially put everything on the table, including full


79
cooperation on Iran's nuclear programs, acceptance by Iran of
Israel, and Iranian termination for its support for Palestinian mili-
tant groups.
Now, I don't think anyone naively believes that Iran is going to
change its colors overnight. But it seems that what concerns me
most are the representations of members of the administration as
they have left. For instance, I think it is a Mr. Leverett, Flint
Leverett, who may have been on your staff, if I understand it cor-
rectly, who says, in responding to this Iranian offer, they believe,
meaning the administration, the Bush administration—this is a
quote: “They believed that just with a little prodding from us, push-
ing from us, it would be over. They were wrong.”
So here we have the Senior Director of the National Security
Council staff, if I understand it correctly, saying the administration
was wrong in its analysis of the Iranian offer for negotiations.
Given that somewhat damning conclusion, why should we accept
the administration's analysis today that it is correct to yet again
not engage with Iran, when administration officials at the time
now have concluded—at least this one and one or two others—that
the administration was wrong.
Secretary RICE. Well, first of all, I don't know what Flint
Leverett is talking about, quite frankly. Maybe I should ask him
when he came to me and said we have a proposal from Iran, and
we really ought to take it.
I have read about this so-called proposal from Iran. We had peo-
ple who said the Iranians want to talk to you; lots of people who
said the Iranians want to talk to you.
But I think I would have noticed if the Iranians had said we are
ready to recognize Israel. Congressman, I just don't remember ever
seeing any such thing.
Mr. WEXLER. So you did not see that supposed fax?
Secretary RICE. I just have to tell you that perhaps somebody
saw something of the like, but I can tell you, I would have noticed
if the Iranians had offered to recognize Israel. So let me not repeat
the past. Let me go to the present.
You listed a number of things that we did. I appreciate very
much that you support the efforts that we have made with the Eu-
indeed with the Russians. And I think it has paid off.
I think that is why you have a 15–0 Chapter VII resolution.
But there is one other thing that we did. I went out in May, and,
having worked on a package of incentives that we offered the Ira-
nians with the Russians, with the Chinese, and with the Euro-
peans, we said we are prepared to sit and negotiate from the basis
of this set of incentives, if you will just do one thing: Suspend your
enrichment and reprocessing activities so people know that you are
not trying to perfect a nuclear weapon while we talk. Just suspend.
And that, by the way, had been a demand of the Europeans. It
had actually been, the Iranians had actually agreed to do it, and
then they were the ones who walked out of the talks with the Euro-
peans and began their enrichment and reprocessing activities
again.
So I just have to repeat, Congressman, I don't think the question
is why won't we talk to Tehran, the question is why won't they talk
to us? What is so important in continuing to enrich and


81
We obviously are also very concerned about export controls. We
have, as you know, had to sanction a number of Chinese entities
for proliferation activities, and will continue to use that tool when
necessary. But this is just, I think, part of our concerns about a
number of military activities that seem to us outsized for China's
regional, and even global, interests.
Mr. MANZULLO. Well, Í have got to second that. Mr. Mack from
Florida just wanted me to ask you if, on the record, you would be
willing to meet with him on this issue. And I presume the answer
is yes.
Secretary RICE. Of course.
Mr. MANZULLO. Thank you.
Chairman LANTOS. Thank you very much. Mr. Engel of New
York.
Mr. ENGEL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Madam Secretary, it is
always a pleasure to see you. Welcome.
I am going to submit for the record, as the chairman of the West-
ern Hemisphere Subcommittee, a question on Haiti—I just came
back from Haiti—and article 98. And I will submit that to you, and
I will get it.
But as Chairman of the Western Hemisphere Subcommittee, I
have very serious concerns about overall reductions in development
assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean. In the budget that
is submitted, overall aid to the region is down over $70 million
from fiscal year 2006. And at a time when anti-Americanism in the
region is on the rise, I think we need to show our commi
all of our neighbors in Latin America, not just a select few.
Outside of increases to three KAFTA countries, how do you ex-
plain the administration's decision to reduce development assist-
ance funding for the region? That is my first question.
I want to also ask you a question about Syria. As you know, we
have through the years discussed this. I was the author of the
Syria Accountability Act. And Syria continues to play a very nega-
tive role in Iraq, a negative role in Lebanon, and it is rearming
Hezbollah. Most of the rockets and anti-tank missiles fired at
Israeli communities and IDF tanks last summer came directly from
Syria in arsenals.
And I might also say that Mr. Abbas made a statement which
was very disappointing, where he said that the Palestinians should
not turn their guns on each other, but should turn their guns on
the Israeli occupiers. I thought that was a very disappointing state-
ment that he made.
But back to Syria. Some of us are now saying that we should be
engaging Syria. I want to ask you your opinion. Is now the time
to end the diplomatic isolation of Syria, and engage? Do you believe
that Bashar al-Asad, who hints at diplomatic offers toward Israel,
are his offers real? And if not, when are we going to implement the
Syria Accountability Act?
And finally, I want to ask you about Kosovo, the final status of
Kosovo. U.N. Special Envoy Martti Ahtisaari delivered his pro-
posals for a Kosovo status settlement. I support that. I am a big
supporter of independence for Kosovo. And I just would like to
know what the administration is going to do now, since the poten-
tial for the Russians to play a negative role is there, the Serbs are


82
being very negative about it. I would like to know what the admin-
istration is doing on it.
Thank you.
Secretary RICE. Thank you. On Kosovo, we are indeed supporting
very closely the efforts of the Special Envoy Ahtisaari, who has
now put forward a plan. I think we have helped. Frank Wisner,
who is a very well regarded diplomat, has been a kind of ambas-
sador-at-large for the United States, working on this issue.
We believe that the Ahtisaari plan deserves support. And we are
working with our European allies, who I think also support the
Ahtisaari plan. I have talked very often to the Russians, first of all,
that Kosovo is a precedent for nothing, which is a very important
point to make. And secondly, that we need to recognize that the
longer this drags out, the more likely we are to have a breakdown
in order in Kosovo itself.
So over the next several weeks, the next couple of months actu-
ally, Ahtisaari will be talking to the parties, negotiating with the
parties, working with the parties. Then I think the international
community is going to have to support an outcome there. We will
work with all parties, including the Russians, to try and make that
outcome as good an outcome as possible.
The Kosovars have a responsibility, too, to protect minority
rights, to make certain that Serbs feel that they can really live
there. We are having equally difficult and tough, sometimes, dis-
cussions with the Kosovar Albanians about their responsibilities.
I think we helped when we included Serbia in the Partnership
for Peace for NATO, because we want Serbia to have a democratic
and European horizon. We don't want a revanchist and angry Ser-
bia. We are working with our European allies to make sure that
Serbia understands that it belongs in Europe.
As to Latin America and our efforts there, let me just note that
aid to Latin America has risen dramatically since the start of this
administration. It has gone from $862 million in foreign assistance,
$862 million in 2001, to $1.4 billion in 2008.
We are, frankly, concentrating our resources on certain things.
We are supporting, through MCC compacts, a number of countries
that we believe have a chance to take off, if you will, particularly
in Central America. But we also have increased aid significantly to
Uruguay, as another example.
On the other hand, we do have limited resources. We are trying
to fit a lot of needs and a lot of concerns into a growing, admit-
tedly, but still relatively small budget. So we have been consoli-
dating our resources in, for instance, efforts to support democratic
gains—that is up about 5 percent.
We have been shifting some of our focus from service delivery
and health, and basic education, in places where we think that is
well advanced, and perhaps where host countries have resources of
their own to spend. We are focusing on some key anchor states;
places like Colombia, and Peru, and Haiti, in which aid is very
much up.
I understand that if you look at the specific number just as a
total, it looks like the resources have gone down to Latin America.
I think if you look at all resources, it has, in fact, gone up fairly
dramatically.


83
Let me just address, too, that I know that people are concerned
that there not be a substitution effect for MCC and development
assistance. I do think if you look at the dramatic growth in official
development assistance in this administration, that you cannot
make that case. But in some countries, where we are making huge
MCC compacts, we are reallocating our aid to support some of the
efforts that we think would make those MCC compacts more effec-
tive.
Chairman LANTOS. Thank you very much. Mr. Fortenberry.
Mr. FORTENBERRY. Mr. Chairman, might I inquire how much
time I have?
Chairman LANTOS. You and the Secretary combined have 4 min-
utes.
Mr. FORTENBERRY. Thank you, sir. Madam Secretary, nice to see
you again. Thank you so much for joining us. I am sorry I missed
a portion of your testimony; I was called away to the Floor in an
urgent matter. I had to congratulate the University of Nebraska's
Women's Volleyball Team on winning the NCAA championship.
Secretary RICE. Oh, good for you.
Mr. FORTENBERRY. So, a pleasure to see you again. You stated
several times through your testimony that well-governed demo-
cratic states are the foundation for stable societies throughout the
world. And obviously that is a reigning paradigm in your effort at
governance, and I appreciate that.
I would like to go a little bit deeper, though, into that, and sug-
gest that across social norms, across time and across cultures, indi-
cate that strong families—in particular, in the idea of those led by
a loving mother and a nurturing father-give the best possible out-
come for children, and actually undergird civil order that can lead
to broader promotion of a more representative type of societies
that, again, are interested in just and good outcomes.
So I would just suggest that our foreign assistance program
should prioritize strengthening families, particularly those that are
most vulnerable in the world. That is just a comment. You are wel-
come to comment back.
The second question I have is regarding our policy in which we
accept invitations from other countries in the Middle East to train
Iraqi security forces. I am specifically asking about the offer that
has been extended to us, I know numerous times, by the Egyptian
Government, to participate in training the Iraqi security forces.
And why is there a hesitancy to take them up on that offer?
Secretary RICE. Yes. Well, we do want other countries to partici-
pate in the training of security forces, and they are being trained
in some places. The Egyptians, I understand, have talked about
this.
I will say that it is just the nature of the kind of training that
we are doing, that it is best to integrate it in country. We have
tried to focus countries toward a willingness to train in country for
a variety of reasons. But we have had training in Jordan, we have
had training in the UAE, and we have had training as far away
as some of the NATO countries.
We are not opposed to training people in other places. But our
focus has been to try to get people to train, or to be part of training


84
missions like the NATO training mission for leadership, for in-
stance, in Iraq.
Mr. FORTENBERRY. Is that a developing policy potentially with
the Egyptians?
Secretary RICE. Absolutely. I think we want to take advantage
of all offers, obviously, to help. It is just that it is preferable if
countries are willing to be a part of training missions that are
there.
But for instance, Jordan is currently training 1,100 young people
from Anbar who have been sent by the tribal elders to become a
force against the al-Qaeda in Anbar. So those efforts are going on.
Mr. FORTENBERRY. And do you have any comments on my earlier
comments regarding foreign assistance programs targeted at em-
powering and enabling families?
Secretary RICE. Well, obviously it would be, we believe in family.
I agree with your analysis.
We have tried to focus on efforts like maternal and child health.
We have tried to focus on trying to get people the ability, for in-
stance on a little farm, to be able to do better with their efforts
through economic development.
And of course, on something like adoption, we have also tried to
help bring children to solid situations when they can't find them
at home. So yes, it is very important.
But I think that the key here is to try to focus on human need,
on doing it in a way that gives people an ability to keep their roots,
if you will. And family I would associate as a part of that.
Mr. FORTENBERRY. Thank you.
Chairman LANTOS. Thank you. Mr. Delahunt of Massachusetts.
Mr. DELAHUNT. Yes, thank you. Madam Secretary, you used the
term limited resources, and I think we all understand that. Just
recently it was announced in my local paper that the administra-
tion is recommending a cut in Medicare over 5 years of some $66
billion, which clearly is going to impact many of my constituents,
and those of my colleagues here.
Speaking to Iraq and the reconstruction effort there, the Amer-
ican taxpayer has already expended some in excess of $20 billion
in reconstruction efforts. It was done in the form of a grant, not
a loan, despite the fact that some of us sought amendments which
would have made that expenditure in the form of a loan.
But having said that, you are now back, and you are requesting
an additional, in the aggregate, some $2.5 billion worth of funding
for reconstruction efforts. It is broken out as $1.1 billion in the fis-
cal year 2008 supplemental, $400 million in the fiscal year 2008
regular budget, and an additional $1 billion in fiscal year 2008
emergency requests being considered in conjunction with the reg-
ular budget.
Yesterday—and again, this is a grant program, you know. The
American taxpayers would not see any of this money again.
Yesterday, in the Government Reform Committee, the Special In-
spector General for Iraq, Mr. Bowen, indicated that there was $12
billion that were unspent by the Iraqi Government at the end of
the year. Why should the American taxpayer continue to bear the
burden?


86
Secretary RICE. Well, thank you. I will look more closely at the
specific concerns.
I do think it is very important that we begin to manage our re-
sources in a more integrated fashion. That is why Randy Tobias
holds both the Director of Foreign Assistance and the USAID Ad-
ministrator positions. But let me get you the specifics.
Obviously, it is a time of some transition in Cuba. We want to
make sure that we are doing the very best that we can.
Mr. FLAKE. That leads to my next question. But just to give you
an example of some of the things that the GAO audit found. Some
of the funds were spent on a gas chainsaw, computer equipment
and software, like Nintendo Game Boys, Sony PlayStations, a
mountain bike, leather coats, cashmere sweaters, crab meat, and
chocolates. I think it is safe to say that those items never
made it to Cuba, and we can do a lot better in that regard. And
I hope that State manages that program better.
With regard to what we do going forward. As you mentioned,
there is a transition going on in Cuba, maybe not the type that you
would like to see. But we seem to be largely marginalized. It seems
that we are on the outside.
And you have mentioned before I was out, but was told that
you said regarding Venezuela—that we are not going to engage in
a war with rhetoric. But it seems that is what we are doing with
Cuba. Let me just give you an example.
The U.S. Intrasection, our version of an Embassy in Havana, has
a message board across the top. And at this time last year, here
is one of the messages that was put out:
"Miami public schools adopted a new menu to attract more
children to school breakfast. Eggs, sausages, pancakes, cereal,
yogurt, milk, dried fruits, nuts, raisins and cookies are some of
the choices. The Federal Government pays for the breakfast of
all children in Miami public schools.”
There are many more messages that are using the same kind of
words that are just kind of taunting Cuban people for what they
lack.
It seems to me that this kind of diplomacy—and I am extremely
impressed as I travel around the world and meet with our ambas-
sadors, and I have always appreciated the professionalism that you
have exhibited. But this seems like sophomoric diplomacy. Can I
have a response?
Secretary RICE. Well, I think that one of the reasons that we are
trying to point out to the Cuban people that there might be a bet-
ter future is that they lack information. They fully lack informa-
tion. It is a completely closed and dictatorial society. And I think
we have to be very clear about that.
It is. We have many problems with other states in the region.
But the one problem that we don't have is that their leaders are
unelected. If you go to the Organization of American States, the
only chair that is empty is Cuba. And it is empty because it is not
in alignment with the Inter-American Democratic Charter.
ne ability to tell the Cuban people what, to counter the
propaganda of that regime about what life is like in Cuba, I think
is extremely important.


87
Now, I hope that we will also be able to increasingly have posi-
tive messages for the Cuban people. In recent months, I have per-
sonally done a message to the Cuban people that says that in
whatever transition happens, we want to be friends of the Cuban
people. We want to try and help meet their needs. We want very
much to see them have the same access to democracy and liberty
that everybody else in the region enjoys..
And I think if the Cuban people are able to find a course, if their
leaders allow them to find a course to a democratic future, they are
going to have no better friend than the United States. And they
will have humanitarian assistance, and they will have assistance
with education. I would like nothing better.
But in the current circumstances, I think we have tried. We have
tried to work to reach out to people in Cuba who want a different
future. It is obviously very difficult for them, because it is a very
brutal regime when people challenge.
Chairman LANTOS. Thank you very much. The gentlelady from
California, Ms. Watson.
Ms. WATSON. Thank you so very much, Mr. Chairman. And I
want to commend you, Madam Secretary, for your transformation
diplomacy. I think it is long overdue. So thank you.
Secretary RICE. Thank you.
Ms. WATSON. Mr. Chairman, I would like unanimous consent to
submit my whole list of questions for the record.
Chairman LANTOS. Without objection.
Ms. WATSON. And I just have two areas of concern. The rest will
be in writing to you.
First, Mr. Royce and I sent you a letter that you responded to
in September about Liberia. And I am still concerned—I had staff
that went on a codel thereabout Madam President Sirleaf's per-
sonal security. So when I finish, if you will comment on that, and
what we are doing to support the justice system and the rule of law
in Liberia, and long-term strategies to support Liberia's rebuilding.
I am going to skip over other questions, and get to the deepening
conflict in Iraq, between the various sets. And what is concerning
me at this time are the innocent people now that are leaving Iraq
across borders, and going over to the surrounding countries. I
would like to know what we are proposing to do to assist their
neighbors with this increase in, I guess, refugees that are leaving
because of their fears, and because of the conflict.
So if you will address those two, I will take the rest in writing.
Thank you.
Secretary RICE. Thank you. We have indeed been very supportive
of President Sirleaf Johnson in all areas that we possibly could, in-
cluding security, and including the justice system. In fact, there is
a private effort that we have been supporting to help with the
training of Liberian judges and the like.
I will host a donor conference for Liberia next week. I look very
much forward to getting the kind of contributions from around the
world that the United States itself has already made. We will con-
tinue to pledge assistance to Liberia.
I was saying earlier, Congresswoman Watson, that it is a success
story in one way, in that Charles Taylor was brought to justice
largely because the United States helped to insist that that would


91
bean nations. And I really think that is an unfair—and the Latin
countries—and I think it is an unfair posture.
I yield, as there is no time. So I will look forward to hearing from
you.
Chairman LANTOS. The gentlelady's answers will come in writ-
ing. And I want to thank —
Ms. JACKSON LEE. Thank you, Madam Secretary.
Chairman LANTOS. My friend from South Carolina, Mr. Inglis.
Mr. INGLIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you, Madam
Secretary, for being here.
When people yell at you in hearings, it makes us all thankful ac-
tually that capable people like you are willing to do the jobs that
you do. So thank you for your service to the country.
Tom Friedman wrote a piece last week that basically contrasted
Saudi Arabia with Iran, and asked the question, Which one is our
ally, our natural ally? Admittedly, it was somewhat provocative in
favor of Iran in asking the question. But it does raise some inter-
esting points, it seems to me.
What do you think of that analysis? Our natural ally.
Secretary RICE. Well, thank you. First of all, we do have a very
good relationship with Saudi Arabia, and we work hard with them
in a number of ways. We have not been shy about raising our
hopes for reform and political pluralism in Saudi Arabia, including,
as I said, I said to the Saudi Foreign Minister women ought to
vote. I said it publicly in Saudi Arabia. And I think we want to
work with them.
But you know, our natural allies could be the people of Iran. I
don't have any doubt about that. The problem is the regime.
Mr. INGLIS. Right. And that was my next question, actually. We
had some interesting testimony here from Jim Wo
sador Pickering on that point, about how do you get through to the,
they said, as I recall, Mr. Chairman, 90 percent they figure of Ira-
nians might sort of like us. And so you have got a 10 percent to
90 percent; usually it is the 80/20 rule, maybe. But it is a little bet-
ter there, perhaps. Only 10 percent, you know, in this Armageddon
kind of apocalyptic kind of notion. And maybe the 90 percent are
thinking, Hey, why don't we get close to the Americans?
Secretary RICE. I think there is no doubt that there is a reservoir
of good will toward Americans. I will tell you, we are trying with
our outreach programs.
We just had the American Wrestling Team in Iran. They were
received very, very warmly everywhere that they went. We just
had a series of medical professionals from Iran here. They went to
places like the CDC in Atlanta, and some of the research institutés.
So we really are trying to reach out to the people of Iran. Because
it is a great culture, these are great people. I would like to see the
day when the Iranian people are actually able to pursue, for in-
stance, technologies of the kind that their government is talking
about, but without a risk of the proliferation of a nuclear weapon.
So not only do we have no quarrel with the Iranian people,
think we would like to be able to reach out to them, and to dem-
onstrate that America could be a good friend; that America could
in fact be an ally, as they try and reach the full potential of really
a great culture and a great people.


92
Mr. INGLIS. And so the challenge is, how do you get past the
leadership.
Secretary RICE. Yes.
Mr. INGLIS. And we have been supporting a regime change in
various places. The question is—that gets a little bit provocative.
You know, I can say anything about my brother, but you better not
say anything about him, you know, kind of thing. I can criticize my
leaders, but I really don't want you to come and try to change
them, maybe.
I guess I am asking the impossible questions. How do you get
past them, and get to the people, and say you know, we really want
to live in peace with you?
Secretary RICE. Well, I think there are a couple of things we
have to do. We have increased broadcasting to Iran dramatically
over the last year. It was a part of the $75 million that the Presi-
dent requested; I think we ended up with $65 million or so. We are
doing that through the Broadcasting Board of Governors, but also
through efforts of the State Department Bureau of Educational and
Cultural Affairs.
We have small grants for Iranians—for NGOs to work with Ira-
nians, because we don't want to put people at risk by having them
work with Americans, so to speak. As I said, we have these ex-
changes; we will continue them.
I have been supportive of non-governmental organizations, uni-
versities, whoever can get there. The Library of Congress was
there, the head of the Library of Congress a few years ago. I think
these are really great things. Because the Iranian regime would
like the Iranian people to believe that the United States is trying
to keep them from getting the kind of technological and economic
progress that they deserve. And that just isn't the case. We could
be a good partner in that.
Mr. INGLIS. Thank you.
Chairman LANTOS. Thank you very much. The gentleman from
Texas, Mr. Hinojosa.
Mr. HINOJOSẢ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Madam Secretary,
thank you for coming today.
As you know, the International Boundary and Water Commission
is responsible for the construction, the repair and maintenance of
over 2,000 miles of levees along the United States/Mexico border.
Yet, a report submitted by the IBWC last year found that most of
these levees were either too low or too weak to protect the commu-
nities living behind them, because of chronic funding shortfalls.
The IBWC needs $100 million to repair all of the levees: $50 mil-
lion would allow the worst levees in the most populous areas to be
repaired, yet the President's budget provides only nominal funding
to the IBWC for this purpose.
Where I come from, the Rio Grande Valley in Texas is home to
over 1 million people who are living behind inadequate IBWC lev-
ees. A rain event, not even a hurricane, could cause another hor-
rible situation like New Orleans. Hidalgo County, the most popu-
lous in the Valley with 650,000 population, recently passed a bond
issue and is going to give the IBWC $10 million to fix a small part
of the most damaged levees in the county.


93
According to the census, Hidalgo County is one of the poorest
urban counties in the country, with over half of its residents living
national poverty level. Yet my constituents are going to
have to pay higher local property taxes because the Federal Gov-
ernment is not living up to its responsibility.
Madam Secretary, what does the administration plan to do to ad-
dress this critical situation on, A, the international levees on the
Texas side; and B, on the Mexican side of the international levees,
which are equally as important?
Secretary RICE. Congressman, obviously this is an area in which
we do work very closely with the Mexican Government, and the
IBWC is funded by the United States.
I will get a proper answer for you on the steps that are being
taken to address the issue that you have raised. Let me do that so
that the technical experts can give you an answer that is worthy
of your question.
Mr. HINOJOSA. I want to add to my remarks that this is not a
local, it is not a regional problem; it is a national problem, because
we have over 300 maquiladoras on the Mexican side producing
products that are then crossed over the Rio Grande River, and
shipped all the way to the Great Lakes to Just In Time manufac-
turing companies. And it would just completely damage the trade
and commerce if we were to have a crisis like the one I just de-
scribed
We have gone through that experience back in 1967 with Beulah,
and we were out for over 3 or 4 months. So I ask you to please give
it a high priority; that we be proactive, rather than to be reacting
because we failed to do that, as they did in New Orleans.
Secretary RICE. Thank you. I will get an answer for you, Con-
gressman.
Mr. HINOJOSA. Thank you.
Chairman LANTOS. Thank you very much. Mr. Brad Miller of
North Carolina.
Mr. MILLER OF NORTH CAROLINA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and
Madam Secretary.
Madam Secretary, President Bush spoke in the State of the
Union of the tragic escalation of sectarian rage and reprisal in
Iraq, and said this is not the fight we entered in Iraq, but it is the
fight we are in.
Madam Secretary, the Iraq War Resolution passed by Congress
in 2002 gave us its reasons: The violation by the Hussein regime
of the United Nations resolutions, an active weapons of mass de-
struction program in Iraq, and close ties to terrorist groups which
raised the fear that weapons of mass destruction would be provided
to terrorist groups. And he authorized the use of military force to
deal with the threat posed by the Hussein regime, and to enforce
United Nations resolutions.
There is a great debate over whether that was really the fight
we entered in Iraq, but there is no real doubt that that is not the
fight we are in.
Does the resolution adopted by Congress in October 2002 still
apply to what is happening in Iraq, what our military forces are
doing there now? If it does, will the time ever come that it does


94
not apply, and the administration will come back to Congress for
authority for the fight we are in in Iraq?
Secretary RICE. Well, I think, Congressman, that the fight that
we are in is the natural outcome of the fight that we fought to
overthrow Saddam Hussein. The fact is that we also undertook cer-
tain responsibilities when we overthrew Saddam Hussein, to make
sure that Iraq was a unitary state. Those are obligations to the
international community to safeguard its territorial integrity, to
make sure that it was a place that terrorists couldn't operate, and
to help bring to it a government that could defend itself and gov-
ern.
I would make the comparison, in a sense, Congressman, that
when we overthrew Adolph Hitler, I doubt that it said in the reso-
lution "and establish a stable and democratic Germany.” But I
think nobody believed that it was not a part of our responsibilities
to follow the overthrow of Adolph Hitler with trying to leave behind
something that was more stable for the future. And indeed, that
case has worked out very, very well.
In this case, I think that is what we are trying to do. We are try-
ing to deal with the aftermath of the overthrow of Saddam Hus-
sein.
Now, to be certain, I have said, and the President has made
clear, that it is not the United States Government or the people of
the United States that are going to determine what kind of country
Iraq is going to be in terms of its sectarian profile. That has to be
done by Iraqis.
But what the President said last month when he put forward his
plan is that the Iraqis have expressed their desire, an urgent desire
to bring an end to the sectarian violence, particularly in Baghdad,
but that they need assistance in doing that. If it were just a matter
of Iraqi will to do this, then it would make sense just to say to
them, just be on your own and do whatever you can.
But we believe, and I think there is plenty of support for this
w, that if they are simply left to their own, without adequate
forces, without adequate support, then this situation is likely to be-
come more violent, not less violent. And then the possibility for an
Iraq that can govern itself and can sustain itself becomes even
more difficult.
It is a very difficult situation in Iraq. But I don't think that the
intent was ever that once we overthrew Saddam Hussein, we would
simply walk away and leave the Iraqi people to their own devices.
I don't think that was what was intended, either.
So we have overthrown him. I think it was the right thing to do.
The world will be better off without him, and all of the instability
ought to the region. But we do now have an obligation
and a responsibility to the Iraqi people, but also to our own inter-
ests in the region, to try to help the Iraqi people to come to sustain-
ability and govern ability.
Chairman LANTOS. Mr. Costa of California.
Mr. COSTA. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and our rank-
ing member for the time. And thank you, Madam Secretary. It is
good to see you again.


96
Mr. COSTA. Worst-case scenario. What if this effort, with our best
of intentions and all of our resources, is unsuccessful? What is Plan
B?
Secretary RICE. Well, Congressman, I think we have to con-
centrate at this point on Plan A. Obviously, we are going to have
many opportunities as this plan unfolds, because it doesn't hit on
one day and stop. This is something-
Mr. COSTA. No, I understand.
Secretary RICE [continuing]. That unfolds. We are going to have
opportunities to assess how we are doing. We are going to have op-
portunities to assess how the Iraqis are doing. We are going to
have opportunities to make adjustments.
And so I don't think we have a Plan A that is so fixed that if
we are seeing that it is not being effective, that we have to stop
and wait until we have to go to Plan B. We are going to make ad-
justments in this plan.
One of the most important elements of this plan—and we have
all been very focused on Baghdad—but one very important element
of this plan is also to increase the multiple points for success by
going down to decentralize and diversify the number of people who
can help to govern at the local and provincial levels, as well.
I think that this plan will be over time. We will make adjust-
ents to it. But you are right; we have told the Iraqis that this
is not open-ended. I think we don't want to try to give a date by
which it is not open-ended, but I think they understand the mes-
sage very clearly.
Chairman LANTOS. Thank you very much.
Mr. COSTA. Mr. Chairman, I am out of time, but I will submit
the balance of my questions.
Chairman LANTOS. Very good. The gentleman from New Jersey,
Mr. Sires.
Mr. SIRES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Madam Secretary, thank
you for being here again. I have two questions, and one has to do
with Cuba.
The one concern that I have is that we don't do enough, maybe
in your department with this country, in pointing out to the world
the brutality of this regime, and the violation of human rights. I
mean, they have roving mobs where they beat up on the dissidents.
And just a couple of weeks ago we had one of the more prominent
dissidents just died from lack of medicine, and his family many
times were brutalized. I would hope that in the future we can get
this information out to the world, that this is a brutal regime. And
I would hope that through your office, we can do that.
The other observation that I have is—and I agree with Congress-
woman Jackson Lee regarding the cuts and investing in people in
the Western Hemisphere. At a time when you have Chavez, at a
time where they are making us look like the ugly American again,
at a time that we need to have more money so we can do education,
we can do health, we can do all the things that Chavez is filling
in that we are not doing, why are we cutting this budget in these
areas? To me, that just doesn't make sense. These are our neigh-
bors, and this is a time when we should step in, and don't let them
fill the void.
So I just wonder if you have a—


99
in job creation, and to make them more capable of spending their
own resources. So this is really a different phase. And it is not
large-scale reconstruction projects that we are now funding.
This is a different program. And I don't think that there are ade-
quate resources. I know that there are not adequate resources to
fund the companion civilian economic political augmentation of our
effort to go alongside the counter-insurgency, or as part of the
counter-insurgency effort to help support our military operation. So
it is a different, different approach.
Ms. WOOLSEY. Well-
Chairman LANTOS. I am sorry, the lady's time has expired.
Ms. WOOLSEY. I just wanted to say one little, tiny thing. On 508
we also talked about bringing the contractors home. Thank you.
Chairman LANTOS. Thank you very much. I am pleased to recog-
nize my colleague from Arizona, Ms. Giffords.
Ms. GIFFORDS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you, Sec-
retary Rice.
Unfortunately, what is happening because of the problems in
Iraq and in the Middle East is that it is sucking a lot of energy
out of an issue which is really important to my district, which is
Southern Arizona: Immigration, illegal immigration.
I am curious what you are doing, and whether you believe you
have a real partner in Mexico to try to curb illegal immigration.
With Mexico's new President and new cabinet, if you would please
discuss with us what we are going to be doing to stop the hundreds
of thousands of people who are now crossing our borders illegally
through the Eighth Congressional District of Arizona and other
parts of southern Arizona, as well.
Secretary RICE. Thank you. Well, we recognize that a part of this
is an issue with Mexico, in partnership with Mexico, to work on
these immigration issues; to tighten border security, to have an un-
derstanding with Mexico that they have to speak and act as if the
laws of the United States must be respected as to the issue of peo-
ple crossing the border. And it is a constant discussion.
I believe that the Government of Mexico does understand that.
A number of months ago they put out a kind of manifesto, which
they put in our newspapers, by the way, which suggested that the
shared responsibility here is one that recognizes the need to en-
force the laws. And that is a point that we are making all the time.
We also, in the State Department and at Homeland Security,
have counterparts there, and we have increased our efforts on the
border, with more people, with more technology, with efforts to ac-
tually improve our ability to monitor our border. I think these ef-
forts have been generated, in part, in response to concerns in your
part of the country about that border.
The President has said that we need a comprehensive plan on
immigration that includes border security, that includes respect for
our laws, that includes the respect of employers for our laws; but
that also recognizes that we have a large number of people here
who are doing jobs that Americans will not do, and that we need
a temporary worker program that would allow us to deal with that
population in a way that is humane, but also gives people an incen-
tive to respect the law, which is why the President does not favor
amnesty for illegal immigrants.


100
The final point that I would make is that in the long run, even
the medium run, the development of the Mexican economy and the
well-being of the Mexican economy so that people stay home is an
extremely important part of this. And in that regard, the North
American Free Trade Agreement has had the effect of making the
orthern part of Mexico more prosperous, so that people have not
felt that they had to leave in order to get jobs.
So I think if we have a multi-faceted approach to this, we will
be able to make a dent in this problem. But I want to be very clear
that we respect both the need for a humane policy, but also the
need for respect for our laws. It is something that we consistently
and constantly bring up with the Mexican Government.
Ms. GIFFORDS. Secretary Rice, with all due respect, you can have
a tremendous amount of respect for the laws, but the reality is peo-
ple are still coming. And one of their largest economic drivers tends
to be money that is returned back from the United States into
Mexico. It is going to continue to happen.
I support a comprehensive immigration plan. I think that Con-
gress needs to pass it immediately. I think it is critical.
But I also know that with our friends to the south, that there
is a big economic driver here that we have to pay attention to, and
we are not. I am just concerned that, again, with all of the focus
on Iraq and other areas, we are not giving proper emphasis to Mex-
ico.
Secretary RICE. Oh, we are giving a lot of emphasis to this, Con-
gresswoman. I will be in Canada on the 23rd to meet with my
Mexican and Canadian counterparts. I can assure you that this will
be an issue, to secure borders, immigration policy, even that discus-
sion. So it is something that we pay a lot of attention to, and I do
personally.
Ms. GIFFORDS. Thank you.
Secretary RICE. Thank you.
Chairman LANTOS. Thank you very much. Before I recognize the
last member of our panel, I want to extend my apology to you be-
cause I may have to leave to cast a vote in the Government Reform
Committee.
But I am pleased now to recognize my friend from Florida, Con-
gressman Klein.
Mr. KLEIN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Thank you,
Secretary Rice, for your patience and your responses today.
I am from South Florida. And as many parts of the country,
South Florida is integrated greatly with what goes on in Latin
America. And I know you have had an opportunity to respond to
some of the concerns. There have been expressions of support for
democratization in Latin America, but at the same time, histori-
cally, and certainly even predating this administration, there has
been somewhat of a hands-off effort in dealing with many aspects
of issues in Latin America, from at least my perspective in review-
ing and understanding the issues.
But more particularly, now there are lots of complications that
have arisen. It is not just a question of dictatorships in certain
parts of Latin America. It is now Mr. Chavez and his goals, and
the fact that he has billions of dollars to spread around and try to


102
I will tell you, Congressman, I think that we got associated for
a while with the belief that all we cared about was economic
growth, and we didn't care about the needs of the people. In fact,
if you look at the compacts that we have, if you look at the work
that USAID is doing, you will see that we have an extremely posi-
tive story to tell about the projects that we are engaged in across
Latin America. They are just becoming more and more con-
centrated. And I think that that is the right thing to do with scarce
resources.
Mr. KLEIN. And I appreciate that. I mean—
Chairman LANTOS. The gentleman's time has expired.
Madam Secretary, I want to express my appreciation on behalf
of all of my colleagues for this extraordinary tour-de-force, and we
look forward to having you back.
Secretary RICE. Thank you very much. And thank you to mem-
bers of the committee, as well.
Chairman LANTOS. Thank you. This hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:45 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]


APPENDIX
MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE ROBERT WEXLER, A REPRESENTATIVE IN
CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF FLORIDA, AND CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPE
nic
civilianusands ovil war.
JANUARY 11, 2007
Secretary Rice you are no stranger to this committee, having testified before in
your capacity as National Security Advisor and as Secretary of State. Each time you
have testified with conviction and passion-vociferously defending this Administra-
tion's policies.
You did so even as Iraq spiraled out of control, Even as an insurgency, which the
Administration originally denied, emerged from the ashes of a disbanded Baath
party, even as a civil war, which the Administration denied, consumed Iraq, and
even as thousands of brave American soldiers lost their lives and tens of thousand
Iraqi civilians were slaughtered in an ongoing cycle of violence, retribution and eth-
nic cleansing
Help me understand why you along with the President defended initial troop lev-
els—against the advice of General Shinseki. Help me understand, how this Adminis-
tration can somehow claim that Iraqi troops are now prepared to shoulder more of
the security burden-even as the cycle of violence continues to worsen.
Just a few months ago your administration assured us that we were “winning the
war.” Now after four years, 3000 America military deaths, thousands of maimed
service members and billions of dollars misspent, you now ask us to support a mili-
tary and economic escalation of American resources in Iraq even though General
Abizaid said increasing the number of American troops—is not the answer for Iraq.
Despite overwhelming evidence, you are asking the American public to put their
faith in unreliable Iraqi security forces and Prime Minister al-Maliki who was se-
verely criticized by National Security Advisor Hadley in a November memo to Presi-
dent Bush. The same Prime Minister al-Maliki, whose position in power is contin-
gent on the support of a 30 vote block controlled by the radical Shiite cleric Sadr.
With all due respect many of your own military advisors did not support this esca-
lation and even some Iraqi officials connected to Prime Minister al-Maliki have said
they do not want additional troops, and we tried a surge of 12,000 American troops
last summer in Baghdad and it failed to curb the violence or more importantly re-
solve vexing political issues.
Madame Secretary, it clear to me that the American people sent an unequivocal
message to you and the President in November—No New troops.
PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE SHEILA JACKSON LEE, A REPRESENTATIVE
IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF TEXAS
FEBRUARY 7, 2007
Thank you Mr. Chairman. I would like to thank Chairman Lantos and Ranking
Member Ros-Lehtinen for convening this critical hearing on the international affairs
budget for FY 2008.
I welcome Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice. Your service to our country as the
66th United States Secretary of State is historic, much appreciated, and respected
by every Member of this Committee and all Americans who understand how impor-
tant it is for the United States to use its status as the world's sole superpower and
its enormous assets—diplomatic, economic, political, military, and moral—in the
cause of global leadership for peace, justice, and security. I look forward to your tes-
(103)


106
WRITTEN RESPONSES FROM THE HONORABLE CONDOLEEZZA RICE, SECRETARY OF
STATE, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED FOR THE FEBRUARY
7, 2007, HEARING RECORD BY THE MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AF-
FAIRS
MEMBERS OF TUSUBMITTED FOR SECRETARY OF
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY THE HONORABLE TOM LANTOS, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CON-
GRESS FROM THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA, AND CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN
AFFAIRS
Question:
Iranian influence: We remain concerned about Iran's influence with the major Shi-
ite players in Iraq, many of whom were supported by and took refuge in Iran while
seeking shelter from the regime of Saddam Hussein. What is the prospect of the Shi-
ite-dominated Iraqi government colluding with Iran to the detriment of our interests
in the region? Is Iraq likely to slip into Iran's sphere of influence? How far along
is this process already? How would you describe the current state of Iranian-Iraqi
government-to-government relations? In your view, how much influence does Iran
have in Iraq and how does it exercise it? What explains the exceptionally harsh criti-
cism by Masoud Barzani's Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) in reaction to the
U.S. military's raid on the Iranian installation in Irbil last month? What was the
U.S. response to the KRG statement?
Response:
We share your concern that Iraq should not fall under Iranian domination. While
Iran has longstanding cultural and religious ties with Iraq, Iraq's leaders are sen-
sitive to this issue. As you noted, some Iraqi leaders who were persecuted under
Saddam Hussein's regime lived in exile in Iran and developed close ties. While Iraq
seeks peaceful relations with its neighbors, including Iran, Prime Minister Maliki
has made it clear that Iraq will not subject itself to Iranian control or sphere of in-
fluence. That said, Iran's actions in Iraq continue to be destabilizing, and we have
raised these concerns both publicly and privately with Iran and with Iraqi officials.
Iran has supplied resources, weaponry and training to sectarian militias that
threaten the security and unity of Iraq.
We will not characterize or speculate on what motivated KRG officials' remarks
following the detention of Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) officials on
January 11 in Irbil, except to say that the United States has close relations with
the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) on all matters, including security issues,
and will continue to do so. Senior U.S. diplomatic and military officials have con-
sulted closely with KRG and Iraqi officials about this issue, as well as other issues
of common interest. The Government of Iraq has said definitively that the IRGC
Irbil facility was not an Iranian consulate.
Question:
Coordination of Iraq Reconstruction Funding: You recently announced the appoint-
ment of Ambassador Timothy Carney as Coordinator for Economic Transition in
Iraq. Given the request for additional U.S. funding for Iraq reconstruction, what au-
thority will Ambassador Carney have in coordinating this money? To whom will Am-
bassador Carney report?
Response:
On January 10, I named Ambassador Carney as the Coordinator for Economic
Transition in Iraq. Ambassador Carney, who is based in Baghdad, reports directly
to the Ambassador and works closely with Iraqi officials to ensure that Iraq's con-
siderable resources are brought to bear on the task of rebuilding Iraq. One of the
issues on which he will focus is helping the Iraqis better execute their budgets, par-
ticularly on capital spending for investments to improve essential services and pro-
mote economic development. Ambassador Carney will also help Iraq meet its com-
mitments under the International Compact with Iraq. In this regard, Ambassador
Carney's primary focus will be on liaison with Iraqi officials on expenditure of Iraqi
funds, while other senior USG officials, such as the Director of IRMO and the
USAID Mission Director, coordinate the design and execution of U.S. assistance.
Question:
Labor: Based on discussions with the AFL-CIO's Solidarity Center, we understand
that Iraqi workers and their unions have been working without the proper legal
framework, social security, or the basic rights to which any worker is entitled.
Saddam's 1987 labor law, which drastically limits the right of workers to organize,
remains the law of the land. Moreover, in August 2005, the Iraqi government froze
the assets of all labor unions, effectively preventing the emergence of an active labor


110
Further, the GAO reported that 38 percent of all Arabic designated positions were
filled by officers that did not meet the language requirement. In Baghdad, only 2 of
6 of designated positions were then filled by officers who met the requirement, just
33 percent. In comparison, in South and Central America , 96 percent of Spanish
language-designated positions in were filled by employees who met designated Span-
ish proficiency requirement.
Has the number of language-designated positions changed in Iraq since the Sep-
tember 2005 report and if so, what is the current number of language designated po-
sitions? How many of these positions are filled by officers who fully meet the lan-
guage requirement? How is the amount of language designated-positions determined,
especially in critical foreign policy posts such as Baghdad?
Response:
There are currently 12 language-designated positions within Embassy Baghdad.
Of these positions, five are filled by officers who fully meet the language require-
ment. An additional six officers within the Embassy, and 14 officers assigned to Re-
gional Embassy offices or Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), speak Arabic at
the 2/2 level or higher, although their positions are not language designated.
The number of language designated positions is determined at each Foreign Serv-
ice post, including Baghdad, by the specific work requirements of a position. In addi-
tion, post management reviews the overall language capabilities required for a par-
ticular section, and the Mission as a whole. In Iraq, Mission language capabilities
are bolstered by four American citizen employees who are native speakers of Arabic,
as well as by the expert assistance of our professional interpreters.
At times, decisions must be made to waive the language requirements in order
to fill a critical position on a timely basis. If other officers in the section have the
required language abilities, even if their positions are not language designated, it
is more likely that a language waiver may be requested by the regional bureau.
Question:
In Afghanistan, the GAO report stated only 16 language designated-positions with
only 33 percent of those positions filled by individuals that met the requirement.
What is the current situation in Afghanistan in regards to meeting our Arabic lan-
guage needs?
Response:
It will take two to three years to develop a full cadre of Dari and/or Pashto speak-
ers, and we have made progress over the past year to meet this goal. We have both
increased the number of language-designated positions and the number of employ-
ees studying to attain proficiency.
For the September 2006—August 2007 assignment cycle, 34 of 133 total positions
in Afghanistan were language designated. 12 of these 34 positions (35%) are filled
by an employee who tested language proficient or higher.
For the September 2007–August 2008 assignment cycle, we have added an addi-
tional 16 language designated positions for a total of 50 positions. 44% of these posi-
tions will be filled with a language proficient employee.
In the 2007–2008 language training cycle, 32 employees will be enrolled to study
Pashto and/or Dari. After attaining language proficiency, these employees will fill
positions beginning in summer 2008 and will raise the percentage of language des-
ignated positions being filled with language proficient employees to 64%.
Question:
What actions has State taken to address these Arabic language shortfalls? What
funding in the FY2008 State Department budget is dedicated to this goal and how
much has that amount increased throughout the War on Terror? When will these
shortfalls be fully addressed?
Response:
The State Department is addressing the shortage of Arabic speakers by expanding
our capacity to train students in Arabic, focusing recruiting efforts on Arabic and
other critical needs language speakers, and giving bonus points in the Foreign Serv-
ice hiring process to candidates with demonstrated Arabic proficiency.
State enrollments in Arabic language training at our Foreign Service Institute
(FSI) have nearly quadrupled since 2001, with roughly 450 in FY 2006. Given world
events and our focus in the region, we anticipate this upward trend will continue,
predominantly in distance learning and similar delivery methods as alternatives to
traditional classroom based training. We expect higher enrollments in FY 2007 and
FY 2008, though it is not possible to definitively predict future training require-
ments.


112
UN hybrid force, continues to block humanitarian access, or interferes with the on-
going political process.
Question:
We understand that much of the Taliban leadership is directing attacks in Afghan-
istan are based in Quetta, Peshawar and other cities. If this is true, I find it hard
to believe that President Musharaff's vaunted “ISI” intelligence service and secret po-
lice cannot locate and arrest these high-ranking Taliban officials in their midst.
What prevents Pakistan from arresting these officials? At what point do we ac-
knowledge that despite the overwhelming support the U.S. is providing to Pakistan
in the form of economic, humanitarian, and military assistance, we are not getting
results from the Pakistan Government?
Response:
We are getting results from the Pakistani Government. Hundreds of suspected Al-
Qaida operatives have been killed or captured by Pakistani authorities since Sep-
tember 2001, and Pakistan has arrested or killed hundreds of terrorist suspects and
taken military action against terrorists and other violent extremists operating with-
in its borders, including the recent reported capture of Taliban Defense Minister
Mullah Obaidullah in Quetta.
The U.S. provides economic and military assistance to Pakistan as a long-term
strategic partner and as a staunch ally in the War on Terror. We believe that Paki-
stan is very cooperative and engaged in this fight. As Ambassador Crocker has said,
“We face a determined, resilient enemy, an enemy who is not ready to give up its
fight. There are no easy answers, no quick solutions.”
Question:
Is the Pakistan so-called "truce” with tribal elders and Taliban in North
Waziristan working to the satisfaction of the United States Government? Do you
want to see this model replicated in other provinces in Pakistan Frontier areas?
Response:
The intent of the North Waziristan Peace Agreement signed in September 2006
was to restore peace in the region through a series of social and political measures,
recognizing that extensive military operations had not sufficed. The Agreement aims
to engage traditional tribal elders in enforcing an end to militancy in the region.
The Agreement contains several excellent points, among them the prohibition of
cross-border attacks into Afghanistan, or tolerating the presence of violent extrem-
ists in their communities. The challenges with the Agreement are not with the con-
cept, but with implementation. The Pakistan Government agrees that this is the
case and is determined to improve the enforcement and implementation of this
Agreement to render it more effective. We would like to see future arrangements
that continue to embrace the concept of engagement with traditional tribal elders
in securing cooperation in enforcing an end to militancy in the tribal areas that are
being exploited by violent extremists.
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY THE HONORABLE STEVE CHABOT, A REPRESENTATIVE IN
CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF OHIO
Question:
Madam Secretary, I am deeply concerned about the Special Inspector General for
Iraq Reconstruction's recent reports of widespread waste and fraud in Iraqi recon-
struction efforts. With a reported 80 active investigations of potential criminal activ-
ity in Iraq, what steps is the State Department taking to ensure that taxpayer dollars
are spent wisely, both in terms of quality workmanship-and for its intended pur-
poses?
Response:
Oversight and accountability are among our highest priorities. We continue to
work closely with the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR) and
have benefited from SIĞIR's observations of how we can do better. In fact, the State
Department's Office of the Inspector General (OIG) has issued several joint audit
reports with SIGIR in recent months. We are working hard to ensure that U.S. tax
dollars appropriated for Iraq are used to the greatest benefit of the Iraqi people.
Although there have been no allegations to date of fraud or abuse with the Iraq
Relief and Reconstruction Fund (IRRF) or other foreign assistance funds, we are
aware of problems in managing some of the projects under IRRF. We have not met
all of our original reconstruction goals for a variety of reasons, mostly because of


115
center Northern ithabeea manpowthern part of Hystem reform
remain key to addressing this issue. The United States has provided over $40 mil-
lion to train and equip the HNP and HCG since 2004, including providing boats,
fuel, and maritime interdiction training for the Haitian Coast Guard, and refur-
bishing the Haitian Coast Guard base in Cap Haitien.
Most recently, we funded advanced counter-narcotics training for 11 members of
the HNP counter-narcotics unit (French acronym BLTS) at the Drug Enforcement
Administration's (DEA) Academy in Virginia in January.
In addition, the DEA will conduct two operations starting in March to augment
the capacity of the HNP to respond to illicit smuggling. Operation “Rum Punch” is
an island-wide effort involving stationing helicopters and fixed wing aircraft in Haiti
to help the GOH respond to and deter incoming smuggling aircraft. In addition, the
DEA will conduct the Northern Plateau Initiative—a surge operation to reinforce
and augment HNP and BLTS with DEA manpower and technical assistance to ex-
tend GOH counter-narcotics operations in the Northern part of Haiti.
We are working to support the Government of Haiti's justice system reform plans.
U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) justice programs include train-
ing judges and court personnel on court management and administration; improving
coordination among justice sector actors; supporting the creation of a judicial coun-
cil; and designing an improved judicial inspection and disciplinary unit. These pro-
grams also support facilities' improvements and public advocate legal assistance.
USAID will launch a new justice reform program in 2007 that will continue training
in investigative techniques, case management and administration.
We will continue to identify opportunities to work with the Government of Haiti
and Haitian law enforcement to improve their ability to interdict and deter drug
smugglers.
Question:
In a letter dated October 25, 2006, Assistant Secretary of State Jeffrey Bergner
wrote to me, “In support of our counter-narcotics programs, the Drug Enforcement
Agency maintains a country attaché and a special agent at the embassy in Port-au-
Prince. Three more special agents will soon join them. In addition the Department
is recruiting an officer to serve in the newly created position of Director of the Em-
bassy Narcotics Affairs Section (NAS).” Please update me on these and other anti-
drug efforts in Haiti.
Response:
A Department of State TDY employee will manage Embassy Port-au-Prince's Nar-
cotics Affairs Section (NAS) through summer 2007. A Foreign Service Officer then
will assume the permanent NAS Director position. Previously a Santo Domingo-
based regional director supervised the Port-au-Prince NAS. However, a medical
emergency necessitated the director's evacuation from Santo Domingo in October
2006.
The Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) will increase its presence in Haiti to five
personnel in Port-au-Prince by March 31. Currently, there are two DEA agents in
Port au Prince. During February 2007, a medical emergency forced the departure
of DEA's Special Agent in Charge.
DEA will launch two operations starting in March to augment the Haitian Na-
tional Police's (HNP) capacity to respond to illicit smuggling. Operation “Rum
Punch” includes an island-wide effort involving stationing helicopters and fixed wing
aircraft in Haiti to help the Haitian authorities to track, interdict and respond to
aircraft bringing drugs into Hispaniola. In addition, DEA will begin the “Northern
Plateau Initiative”-a surge operation to reinforce and augment the HNP and their
counter-narcotics units (French acronym BLTS) with DEA manpower and technical
assistance. This initiative will extend GOH counter-narcotics operations in the
Northern part of Haiti.
In April, U.S. Treasury financial investigation advisers will resume their men-
toring activities with the staff of Haiti's Central Financial Intelligence Unit and its
Financial Crimes Task Force. In addition, the Embassy NAS and the U.S. Coast
Guard will work with the Haitian Coast Guard to expand its patrol and port secu-
rity operations from its bases in Port-au-Prince and Cap Haitien.
Question:
I want to bring your attention to the prohibitions on foreign assistance that have
been imposed on foreign countries that have not signed Article 98 agreements with
the United States. I appreciate your support in eliminating some of these restrictions.
As you may know, I, along with then-Chairman Burton, successfully led a bipartisan
group of Committee members urging Armed Services conferees to strike restrictions
on IMET in the Defense Authorization Act. I was also pleased by the President's
waiver of Article 98 restrictions on Economic Support Funds to 14 countries includ-


116
ing Bolivia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Mexico, Paraguay, and Peru. But we are still un-
necessarily tying our hands as only Colombia and El Salvador receive FMF in the
President's 2008 budget. As you once said, we are "cutting off our nose, to spite our
face." I will be reintroducing legislation to strike all of the sanctions against coun-
tries which have not signed an article 98 agreement. Does the administration plan
to continue to work with Congress in removing FMF restrictions in the coming year?
And, is the Administration ready to support legislation to eliminate the rest of these
self-defeating sanctions?
Response:
Last year, during consultations with Congress concerning the possible waiver of
International Criminal Court-related prohibitions of the provision of training pursu-
ant to the International Military Education and Training program and to the use
of Fiscal Year 2006 Economic Support Funds, Executive branch representatives
stated that, after considering the impact of the relevant prohibitions, a waiver of
only those two forms of assistance would be appropriate. In reaching this conclusion,
the Executive branch considered factors such as the effect of the prohibitions on the
countries subject to them, the potential effect of any change in U.S. policy on those
countries that have entered into Article 98 agreements, and the continuing U.S. con-
cerns with the International Criminal Court. Should a determination be made that
further changes are warranted, we will consult with Congress.
Question:
Remittances sent from the U.S. to Latin America can help in reducing poverty, es-
pecially in low-income households and communities. In fact, at $50 billion per year,
remittances from immigrants in the U.S. to countries in the Western Hemisphere rep-
resent substantial portions of our neighbors' GDPs. A number of Mexican hometown
associations in the United States have sent money back home for specific development
projects. I believe that if these transfers can be regularized and sent through banks
in the U.S. and in the recipient country, transaction costs can be minimized and the
monies can be leveraged by families to finance homes, small businesses, or other
projects. What is the Administration doing to help facilitate the quick, easy, transfer
and receipt of remittances to Latin America and the Caribbean? Is any particular
attention being given to leveraging remittances in order to expand their impact upon
economic development in the region?
Response:
The USG is working to enhance the development impact of remittances to the re-
gion, estimated at $45 billion in 2006. The USG’s global remittance strategy focuses
on four key areas. First, we are improving cost efficiency. At the January 2004 Spe-
cial Summit of the Americas, leaders pledged to facilitate a cut by half in the cost
of sending remittances by 2008 by promoting competition and enhancing market in-
frastructure. So far, the average transactional costs for remittance have been re-
duced from 7.7% in 2003 to 5.6%, according to the Inter-American Development
Bank. Second, we are improving access to the full range of financial services. USAID
has supported the World Council of Credit Unions, which has facilitated over
353,000 transactions in six Latin American countries. Third, we are broadening fi-
nancial literacy. The U.S. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation's Money Smart
has extended financial training to over 35,000 Mexican immigrants in the United
States. Finally, we are promoting financial soundness and integrity. Based on the
2004 G7 Sea Island remittances initiative, the U.S. Federal Reserve was a key par-
ticipant in drafting principles to assist countries that seek to reform their payment
systems.
Question:
I am very pleased to learn that President Bush will travel to Brazil, Uruguay, Co-
lombia, Guatemala, and Mexico from March 8–14. What are the issues that the
President plans to raise with his counterparts in each country? .
Response:
The President's visit to the region will reaffirm his commitment to furthering po-
litical, economic, and social advancement in these countries and will provide him the
opportunity to emphasize progress on hemispheric goals of making democracy serve
every citizen more effectively and justly, generating broad-based growth through
freer trade and sound economic policies, investing in people, and protecting the
democratic state.
In Brazil, the President plans talk to President Lula about energy, particularly
biofuels, and will praise Brazil's regional leadership role in UN peacekeeping efforts.