4.AR 5/2 A: 005,2006/92 UUULDm No. 109_92] THE CURRENT SITUATION AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN IRAQ HEAKING BEFORE THE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS SECOND SESSION HEARING HELD NOVEMBER 15, 2006 U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 32-993 WASHINGTON : 2007 For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512-1800; DC area (202) 512-1800 Fa<: (202) 512-2250 Mail: Stop SSOP, Washington, DC 20402-0001 HOUSE COMMITTEE ON AKMED SERVICES One Hundred Ninth Congress DUNCAN HUNTER, California, Chairman CURT WELDON, Pennsylvania JOEL HEFLEY, Colorado JIM SAXTON, New Jersey JOHN M. McHUGH, New York TERRY EVERETT, Alabama ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland HOWARD P. "BUCK" McKEON, California 1 MAC THORNBERRY, Texas JOHN N. HOSTETTLER, Indiana WALTER B. JONES, North Carolina JIM RYUN, Kansas JIM GIBBONS, Nevada ROBIN HAYES, North Carolina KEN CALVERT, California ROB SIMMONS, Connecticut JO ANN DAVIS, Virginia W. TODD AKIN, Missouri J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia JEFF MILLER, Florida JOE WILSON, South Carolina FRANK A. LoBIONDO, New Jersey JEB BRADLEY, New Hampshire MICHAEL TURNER, Ohio JOHN KLINE, Minnesota CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan MIKE ROGERS, Alabama TRENT FRANKS, Arizona BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania THELMA DRAKE, Virginia JOE SCHWARZ, Michigan CATHY McMORRIS RODGERS, Washington MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas GEOFF DAVIS, Kentucky BRIAN P. BILBRAY, California2 Robert L. Simmons, Staff Director Stephanie Sanok, Professional Staff Member John Kruse, Professional Staff Member Mark Lewis, Professional Staff Member Regina Burgess, Research Assistant IKE SKELTON, Missouri JOHN SPRATT, South Carolina SOLOMON P. ORTIZ, Texas LANE EVANS, Illinois GENE TAYLOR, Mississippi NEIL ABERCROMBIE, Hawaii MARTY MEEHAN, Massachusetts SILVESTRE REYES, Texas VIC SNYDER, Arkansas ADAM SMITH, Washington LORETTA SANCHEZ, California MIKE McINTYRE, North Carolina ELLEN O. TAUSCHER, California ROBERT A. BRADY, Pennsylvania ROBERT ANDREWS, New Jersey SUSAN A. DAVIS, California JAMES R. LANGEVTN, Rhode Island STEVE ISRAEL, New York RICK LARSEN, Washington JIM COOPER, Tennessee JIM MARSHALL, Georgia KENDRICK B. MEEK, Florida MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, Guam TIM RYAN, Ohio MARK UDALL, Colorado G.K BUTTERFIELD, North Carolina CYNTHIA McKINNEY, Georgia DAN BOREN, Oklahoma 1 Mr. McKeon took a leave of absence from the Committee on June 29, 2006. 2 Mr. Bilbray was elected to the Committee on June 29, 2006. (II) 6 bilize Iraq could increase Iranian aggressiveness and embolden al Qaeda's ideology. It could also deepen broader Sunni-Shia fissures throughout the region. The changing security challenges in Iraq require changes to our own approach to achieve stability. Let me remind the committee, however, that while new options are explored and debated, my tes- timony should not be taken to imply approval of shifts in direction. It is my desire today to provide an update on current security con- ditions in Iraq and elsewhere and current thinking about the way ahead on the security lines of operation. I remain optimistic that we can stabilize Iraq. I just departed Iraq where I visited with General Casey and his senior command- ers. On the Iraqi side, I had meetings with the prime minister, the defense minister, and the interior minister. Over the past four weeks, the levels of sectarian violence are down in Baghdad from their Ramadan peak, but it is clear to all of us that sectarian violence levels remain unacceptably high. The Iraqi armed forces, while under sectarian pressure, continues to perform effectively across Iraq. Our focus against al Qaeda and Iraq continues to take a toll on Iraqi al Qaeda members and for- eign fighters. Operations against selected targets on the Shia death squad side also have had good effect, and our understanding of these complex organizations continues to improve. Sunni insurgent attacks against the Iraqi security forces and the multinational forces remain at high levels and our forces continue to experience attacks from armed Shia groups especially in the Baghdad region. In the north, significant progress is being made in transitioning security responsibilities to capable Iraqi forces. Cur- rently, around 80 percent of the sectarian violence in Iraq happens within a 35-mile radius of Baghdad. Nonetheless, security transi- tions to capable Iraqi forces continue in most of the country. Iraqis and Americans alike believe that Iraq can stabilize and that the key to stabilization is effective, loyal, nonsectarian Iraqi security forces coupled with an effective government of national unity. In discussions with our commanders and Iraqi leaders, it is clear that they believe Iraqi forces can take more control faster pro- vided we invest more manpower and resources into the coalition military transition teams, speed the delivery of logistics and mobil- ity enablers, and embrace an aggressive Iraqi-led effort to disarm illegal militias. This is particularly important with regard to the Jaish al Mahdi elements operating as armed death squads in Baghdad and else- where. As we increase efforts to build Iraqi capability, we envision coalition forces providing needed military support and combat power to Iraqi units that are in the league. Precisely how we do this continues to be worked out with the Iraqis as ultimately capa- ble independent Iraqi forces loyal to an equally capable independ- ent Iraqi government will set the conditions for the withdrawal of our major combat forces. Our commanders and diplomats believe it is possible to achieve an end state in Iraq that finds Iraq at peace with its neighbors, an ally in the war against extremists, respectful of the rights and lives of its own citizens; and with security forces sufficient to maintain 10 source is distributed appropriately to all Iraqis and that foreign in- vestment in that sector is maximized. On the economic track, we have seen real progress. The govern- ment of Iraq is moving forward aggressively together with the United Nations on launching a new international compact for Iraq. This will provide a new and very aggressive framework for mutual commitments between Iraq and the international community, par- ticularly those in Iraq's neighborhood, to bolster Iraq's economic re- covery and ability to be self-sustaining. The goal is very simple: it is for Iraq to demonstrate to the international community and to its own people its commitment to implementing needed social, po- litical, economic reform. Iraq must commit, will commit to reform- ing its main economic sectors—oil, electricity and agriculture;—to establishing the laws and building the institutions needed to com- bat corruption, assure good governance and to protect human rights. And in return, the international community will provide the assistance needed to support Iraqi efforts to become self-sustaining over the next five years. With this compact, Iraq is reaching out to the world, and I am pleased to report that the world is reaching back in response. The compact is nearly complete. The text is near- ly closed, and we hope by the end of this year, the compact itself can be welcomed by the international community. Between now and then, Iraq will be asking its friends and neighbors to consider their goals and reforms to come forward with concrete pledges of assistance. We are urging Iraq's neighbors in particular to step for- ward and to support the future of a stable, moderate Iraq. In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, we will continue to support strong- ly the government of Iraq as it moves forward on these three tracks, but I want to make one point very clear, each of these tracks, security, political, economic, is inextricably linked to the other. All must move forward together, and failure on one will mean diminished chances of success on the others. Militias must be effectively confronted and demobilized, but that will not happen in the absence of meaningful progress on political reconciliation. Political reconciliation itself cannot survive if the government does not have the economic tools in its hands with which to provide an alternative to the appeal of violence and crimi- nal behavior. Iraqis will not be able either to modernize their econ- omy or to pursue political reconciliation if there is continued sectar- ian violence in the street or the pursuit of sectarian agendas at the highest levels of government. We believe, Mr. Chairman, that a successful path forward can still be forged in Iraq. As the transition continues for Iraqi govern- mental control and lead, we do need to help in the best and smart- est ways possible Iraqis assume their responsibilities. There is much work to do, and there is limited time in which to do it. The months ahead truly will be critical. But we believe that the fates and the interests of our two countries are now intertwined; that the consequences of failure far beyond Iraq and the fate of Iraqis are too profound for the United States not to apply every effort pos- sible to achieve success. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. [The prepared statement of Ambassador Satterfield can be found in the Appendix on page 55.] 17 portunity. We have a full committee today and we will be hard pressed to hit that 5 deadline. Mr. Skelton. That is understood. Mr. Hefley. I think it is fine for her to sit in and listen and if we get through with everybody, well then that is another thing. All right, do I hear objection? Okay. Mr. McHugh. Mr. McHugh. Thank you, Mr Chairman. Gentlemen, welcome. Thank you for being here. It has been a long day I know for both of you. Mr. Ambassador, in your comments you made the statement that I think I got mostly correct, but correct me fully if you feel it is appropriate, that there was much less to do and limited time in which to do it. Define for me as best you can the phrase "limited time." how much time do we have? Ambassador Satterfield. Congressman, that limited time comes from the fact that the more militias grow, the more sectarian vio- lence proceeds in Iraq, the smaller the political space becomes, the smaller the convergence that still exists between Shia and Sunni national agendas, sectarian agendas becomes. How much time? I am very loathe to give a specific deadline, but I think it is clear that the next few months are absolutely critical for real progress to be demonstrated. Mr. McHugh. Thank you. General, would you agree, a few months, does that work for you? General Abizaid. I think so. Mr. McHugh. Okay. Obviously you at the table, I think many of us in the room agree the sectarian violence is a critical challenge, and it is critical particularly so because, as both of you have com- mented, it is really up to the Iraqis to solve this. I certainly agree with that as well. I have heard, General Abizaid, you repeatedly say in your discussions with the prime minister that he wants and the Iraqi government wants to do more. You said I believe Maliki and his team want to do more. Those are great words, but honestly I think many of us on this side of the ocean become troubled when we see the prime minister order down the barricades around Sadr City with apparently little or no notification to U.S. forces, recent criticism of the U.S. forces in their attempts to disarm the Mahdi militia. One of the key reasons the Sunnis, in my opinion, have abso- lutely no confidence in this government is the ability to keep its se- curity. Where do we find the bridge between what the prime min- ister is saying and what the prime minister is doing or not doing? General ABIZAID. The prime minister needs to back his army when his army is in performance of a national mission. The prime minister has shown recently the willingness to target the death squads in the Sadr City area where Iraqi forces with U.S. transi- tion teams have gone in there and taken out key leaders and key cellular structures. He also believes that he needs to have a politi- cal solution to some of the militia problems, as the ambassador talked about, both kinetic and political action coming together. I was very encouraged by not only my discussions with them the day before yesterday but the reaction of the government to the kidnap- ping that took place in the Karradah District yesterday where the government immediately ordered its armed forces into the area, re- 30 the kind of training and experience that you want them to have and the numbers you think we need? General Abizaid. I think that the Army has come a long way in training the transition teams, the Marine Corps does an excellent job in providing transition teams with some cultural background al- though you can imagine it takes a long time to develop. You would also be appreciative of the fact that in some areas senior transition team members are on their second or third tour of duty. They have already developed a pretty good cultural understanding. There are good relationships between our transition teams and the units in the field, the Iraqi units in the field, but it is my opinion and the opinion of our commanders in the field that we must make our transition teams more robust. Ten to 15 people per team, it is pret- ty difficult for that to sustain operations in a combat zone over time at a battalion level. We need to increase their size and as we do that we will probably have to dip into the pool of available offi- cers within the Army and the Marine Corps to come in and fill into additional transition team requirements. There is also a need to make the national police and police tran- sition teams more effective. We are examining how much of that can come out of the force structure that is already in Iraq, and I believe that probably most of it can. But again, we will certainly be coming to the Secretary with a detailed requirement here in the next couple of weeks. Dr. Snyder. Thank you, General. Thank you for your service, General Abizaid. The Chairman. Thank the gentleman and before we go to Dr. Schwarz, I wanted to make a little announcement here. Every now and again we mention a personal thing or two about members, and the distinguished gentleman from Missouri, Ike Skelton, at 5:02 a.m. became a grandparent to Harry Page Skelton. So congratula- tions. So somebody's being productive around here. So the gentleman from Michigan, Dr. Schwarz. Dr. Schwarz. Thank you very much. General Abizaid, Ambas- sador Satterfield, thank you very kindly for your service. Mr. Am- bassador, where were you stationed, where were you posted in late 2002 and early 2003? Ambassador Satterfield. 2002-2003, I was Deputy Assistant Secretary for Near East Affairs in the Department of State. Dr. Schwarz. As the build-up to the campaign in Iraq was being made, you as an Arabist, and we have had few Arabists, true Arabists entered in the tradition of perhaps of St. John Philby be- fore this committee, were you as an Arabist or those working in your office consulted about the appropriateness and perhaps—less the appropriateness but the difficulties we could possibly run into in a campaign in Iraq itself and in the City of Baghdad itself? Ambassador Satterfield. Congressman, my portfolio during those years was the Arab Israeli peace process and the responsibil- ity for Egypt, Israel, and the Levant, Lebanon. Dr. Schwarz. You were dealing with Egypt, Israel, and Lebanon. Ambassador Satterfield. Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, yes. Dr. Schwarz. I won't pursue this line any further because I am not going to ask you to do a hypothetical for me. Ambassador Satterfield. Thank you. 31 Dr. Schwarz. I am going to ask you to do one thing because I know we are on C-SPAN and one of the things that the American people, especially my constituents back in Michigan frequently ask me and I can answer the question but I would rather have someone like you answer the question because it is frequently asked. So I am going to take the rest of my time, Mr. Chairman, and just turn the time over to Ambassador Satterfield. How did Iraq become Iraq? What is Iraq? From 1920 on, how did it get from something started by the British at the end of World War I to where we are now? And it is all yours for whatever amount of time I have. The American people ask this question all the time. They don't know the answer. They don't know what Iraq is. Ambassador Satterfield. Congressman, Iraq is a combination created following the dissolution of the Ottoman empire at the end of the First World War of different peoples, different ethnicities, different religious affiliations, Christian of many different stripes, Kurds, both Sunni and Shia. Shia Arabs, Shia Persians descent and Sunni Arabs. Tribal elements, you had balanced elements, ele- ments that related very much to the outside world, to the broader Middle East, Southwest Asia and beyond, elements that were very much focused in their village life. Agriculture predominated until oil was exploited. Agriculture remained a critical underpinning of Iraq's national earnings up until the era of Saddam Hussein. But despite these disparate points of origin of the peoples that make up Iraq, as I said in my testimony, coexistence of communities rather than violence between communities was the norm, not the excep- tion in the history of Iraq. The challenge now that confronts the Iraqi people, that confronts us is how best to help the Iraqi government, its political leadership, to sustain that unity, to avoid the forces which would split Iraq apart and the consequences of such splitting. Now, that is not an easy challenge. If it were simple, we, our coalition partners, Iraqis themselves, Iraq's neighbors who are constructively engaged would have been able to achieve greater success. It is a difficult challenge. But it is not a challenge which we believe is insurmountable. It is a challenge though which must be addressed, must be surmounted in the time to come, in the limited time to come before centrifugal forces spin away that convergence at the center which we believe still exists. And Congressman, if I could offer a personal observa- tion. Dr. Schwarz. Please do. Ambassador Satterfield. I watched closely the evolution of Leb- anon from the 1970's through the 1980's and 1990's, the beginning, the progress and the end of its civil war. Iraq today is not where Lebanon was in the spring of 1975. Civil war, the dissolution of any sense of cross-sectarian, cross-community ties and convergence was profound in Lebanon in the 1970's. It is not dominant in Iraq today. But it can't become dominant unless violence is addressed, unless militias who have a sectarian identification are confronted, stopped and a reconciliation process advanced that calls on Iraqis to do what most Iraqis want, to come together and live a normal life. That is the thought of most Iraqis, and we take great assur- ance in the fact that that is the will of most of Iraq's people, not 45 Iraqi security forces? Are they motivated by loyalty to a united Iraq, or are they simply looking for employment? General Abizaid. The percentage of officers that were former offi- cers in Saddam's army and security forces, I don't have that num- ber, but I would say it is certainly well over half, if not more than that. The officer core, of course, is the key point here. Soldiers in the previous army were conscripts. And the professional officer corps, many of the officers had served in the professional officer corps, are now serving in the current army. Mr. LANGEVIN. And the second half of my question, the people who serve, are they motivated by loyalty to Iraq, or are they simply looking for a job? General Abizaid. Sir, it is my opinion that most of them are mo- tivated by service to Iraq, but they are also motivated to serve be- cause jobs are scarce in Iraq. So there are a lot of different reasons that people serve. But the officer corps in particular is motivated to serve Iraq. They have a culture of service. They need to develop a resistance to sectarian impulses now. Mr. Langevin. I see my time has expired. I want to thank you for your testimony today. General, irrespec- tive of how frustrated we all are with the current course right now and the progress we are making and as much as we want to see a change in course and ultimately we want to see the troops brought home as quickly as possible, you are doing an exceptional job and especially our men and women in uniform. I hope you will continue to convey the support that they have of the American peo- ple and how proud we are of their patriotism and their dedication. That is without question. Thank you. General Abizaid. Thank you, sir. They are great young troops. Mr. Langevin. Thank you. The Chairman. I thank the gentleman. The gentleman from Missouri had a few closing comments. And I understand now that Baby Harry, born at 5:02 a.m., was seven and three quarters pounds? Mr. Skelton. He is doing well. The Chairman. Okay. The gentleman is recognized. Mr. Skelton. Thank you so much. General, can Dr. Snyder and I tomorrow morning midmorning go down in Baghdad and have a cup of tea without any armed escort? General Abizaid. Could you? Mr. Skelton. With Dr. Snyder. General Abizaid. No, I wouldn't advise it. And I think that is the litmus test, isn't it, Congressman? Mr. Skelton. It is interesting to note that, in talking with a member of the news media, he said, in 2003, you can do that and yet you couldn't do that today. Is that the case? General Abizaid. I would say what he told you is correct. It is very dangerous for westerners. Mr. SKELTON. General, you testified before the Senate a number of weeks ago—and I can't remember the exact phraseology—but you made reference to civil war in Iraq. Are we close to civil war in Iraq? 50 there is also 60,000 other troops in my theater that are fighting and serving the country in incredibly important and dedicated and dangerous ways. And I would just like to add for the record that these young people that are out there in places like Afghanistan, patrolling the Persian Gulf, ensuring that air strikes are run and headquarters are manned in a difficult part of the world are really doing wonderful work and the country should every now and then think about them. There is also 1,400 of them that are serving in the Horn of Africa in a very, very difficult circumstance fighting the Global War on Terror in a very effective way; and acknowledging their contribu- tions I think is always important as well. Thank you. The Chairman. Well, thank you, general. May God bless them and bless our country. And a safe passage back to your head- quarters. Thank you. This hearing is adjourned. [Whereupon, at 5:40 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]